[Senate Hearing 109-305]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                 S. Hrg. 109-305, Pt. 3

                                                        Senate Hearings

                                 Before the Committee on Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________


                                                          Department of

                                                      Homeland Security

                                                            Fiscal Year
                                                                   2007

                                         109th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

                                                              H.R. 5441

PART 3

  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

  NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
       Department of Homeland Security, 2007 (H.R. 5441)--Part 3




                                                 S. Hrg. 109-305, Pt. 3

  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                                before a

                          SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

            COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                       ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                                   on

                               H.R. 5441

 AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                               __________

                                 PART 3

                    Department of Homeland Security
                       Nondepartmental Witnesses

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations


  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                               index.html



                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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                               __________
                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                  THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        TOM HARKIN, Iowa
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky            BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CONRAD BURNS, Montana                HARRY REID, Nevada
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
                    J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
              Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
                                 ------                                

          Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security

                  JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
TED STEVENS, Alaska                  DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              HARRY REID, Nevada
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

                           Professional Staff
                             Rebecca Davies
                              Carol Cribbs
                            Shannon O'Keefe
                             Nancy Perkins
                           Mark Van de Water
                       Charles Kieffer (Minority)
                        Chip Walgren (Minority)
                         Scott Nance (Minority)
                      Drenan E. Dudley (Minority)

                         Administrative Support

                            Christa Thompson


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                       Tuesday, February 28, 2006

                                                                   Page

Department of Homeland Security..................................     1
Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................   435


  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2006

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gregg, Allard, Byrd, Leahy, Mikulski, 
Kohl, and Murray.

                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY


                opening statement of senator judd gregg


    Senator Gregg. We'll begin the hearing. I'm advised that 
Senator Byrd is on his way but he asked that we proceed and I 
appreciate Secretary Chertoff's participation in this hearing. 
This is obviously the subcommittee which has jurisdiction over 
the Department of Homeland Security, and the appropriations 
responsibility that goes with that. There's a lot to talk 
about; in fact, it's hard to know where to begin. But, 
obviously, the topic of the moment, and it's a very serious 
one, is the issue of ownership and management of American ports 
by the UAE and a company owned by Dubai Ports World (DPW), and 
the question of whether or not there's been adequate vetting of 
the potential that ownership may have for enhancing the threat 
to the ports.
    The initial representation of course from the 
administration was that it was adequately vetted. There is now 
a number of different views of that. As I understand it, in the 
initial vetting, the Department of Homeland Security raised 
issues and then, in addition, the Coast Guard, which is part of 
the Department, raised issues. The Coast Guard, issues went to 
the question of whether or not there were concerns about gaps 
in intelligence for DPW ownership and the fact that the Coast 
Guard didn't feel it could adequately assess those gaps. The 
language being in the report that the breadth of the 
intelligence gaps also infer potential unknown threats against 
large numbers of potential vulnerabilities and the intelligence 
gaps include but are not limited to the following major themes; 
operations it lists that; personnel, it list's that; and 
foreign influence, it lists that.
    So the Coast Guard appeared to have severe reservations, 
now whether they were specific to the issue of the Dubai 
ownership, DP World, or whether they were just generally 
concerns is not clear. However, they were represented as fairly 
significant.
    Today, however, the Coast Guard has put out a statement 
that says, and I'll quote it to give them fair representation, 
``What is being quoted is an excerpt from a broader Coast Guard 
intelligence analysis that was performed earlier on, as part of 
its due diligence process. The excerpts made public earlier 
today, when taken out of context do not reflect the full 
classified analysis performed by the Coast Guard.'' That 
analysis concludes: ``That DP World acquisition of PNO in and 
of itself does not pose a significant threat to U.S. assets in 
continental United States ports.'' Upon subsequent and further 
review, the Coast Guard and the entire CFIUS panel believe that 
this transaction, when taking into account strong security 
assurances from DP World, does not compromise U.S. security.
    Now that appears to be the position of the Coast Guard 
today, which appears to be inconsistent with the excerpt, and 
they're explaining that that is an excerpt, in part, of an 
overall intelligence analysis. And it just, I think, leads to 
further confusion. Because I think there's a genuine concern, 
and its legitimate, that turning these ports over to an Arab/
operated owned-state sponsored entity is an issue which 
deserves significant review, especially when the country in 
question, although definitely friendly and supportive, has had 
individuals from that country who have actually, according to 
the 9/11 attack, been participants in the event and, therefore 
clearly represent--those individuals clearly intended to do us 
harm. And, thus, I think it's very appropriate that we pursue a 
pause here and review further the security issues since there 
is confusion, it appears to me, within even the Coast Guard's 
position; and get an analysis which is unquestioned and factual 
which we can have confidence in. I understand that sort of an 
agreement has been reached with the leadership of the Senate, 
Senator Warner specifically, and I would be interested when the 
Secretary gives his opening statement, if he could address that 
issue specifically, because it is one of major concern.
    On a larger concern, or not a larger concern but a concern 
I have of equal significance, is the entire budget that was 
sent up here by the administration relative to Homeland 
Security. Homeland Security, as we know, has gone through a 
major restructuring and a period of assimilation as it has 
tried to get up and running. And let me begin by congratulating 
the Secretary, I'm not one of these folks who feels the 
Secretary has not done a good job. I think the Secretary has 
worked very hard to do a good job. And I believe that he has 
set out a system and he has done it from a systematic approach, 
and that's exactly the way we need to address the Department of 
Homeland Security. But that doesn't mean the job is done, as 
I'm sure the Secretary would be the first to acknowledge, and 
there are very definite gaps in the Homeland Security 
department, and the way it is delivering service and protecting 
us.
    The biggest gap I believe is the way it is viewed by this 
administration, to be very honest. I believe it is used a 
stepchild of national defense. I can't think of anything more 
significant to national defense than protecting our border and 
making sure that our Homeland is secure. And yet, time and time 
again we see budgets being sent up here which dramatically 
increase the core operation of the Defense Department 
independent of what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan, which 
is getting money outside of the budget process. And yet the 
Department of Homeland Security is being starved for funds in 
crucial areas and this year is no different. What happened is 
that there's a representation that the Department got an 
increase in funding. But that increase in funding is tied 
directly to getting a fee increase which the administration 
knows is a non starter. The chairman of the authorizing 
committee in the Senate, second ranking member of the 
Appropriations Committee, former Chairman of Appropriations 
Committee Ted Stevens has said it's a non starter and he proved 
it last year. So when the administration sends up a budget 
which assumes increase in operations on the border, which I 
totally agree with the commitment in that, the desire to that. 
In fact, last year, this committee unilaterally moved in that 
direction after the initial presentation from the 
administration was flat funding of border activity. This 
committee unilaterally, with Senator Byrd's support and 
leadership, changed the entire structure of the funding stream 
and put in 1,500 new agents when we had finished, approximately 
1,800 new beds for detention, and dramatically increased 
funding for Border Patrol and border enhancement activities; I 
thank the Secretary for his support of that. I suspect he would 
have supported it earlier if he hadn't maybe been stonewalled 
in the halls of the administration but the fact is, we had to 
do it unilaterally up here and then we got the support from the 
White House. But now, rather than continuing that effort 
although it's stated that it's being continued because the 
policies, as proposed, add another 1,500 agents and more beds, 
all of which needs to be done. But the actual substance behind 
those policies isn't there. There's no money behind those 
policies. This is a situation of showing a proposal and then 
hiding the funds. And so we end up with a budget that we've got 
a $1.6 billion hole in. Last year, the chairman of the full 
committee Senator Cochran in a very gracious act with the 
ranking member obviously Senator Byrd, increased the allocation 
of this committee by about $1.2 billion, I think, it was over 
what it would have been, simply to try to fill that hole. Well 
they don't have that flexibility this year. I asked, 
aggressively asked, this administration in the supplemental 
that they were going to send up for defense appropriations, did 
they consider having in that supplemental $1.2 billion of 
capital items to basically get the Coast Guard the planes they 
need, get the border patrol the cars they need, get the 
training facilities up to snuff in Artista, New Mexico so that 
we would be able to do the physical capital expenditures that 
are needed to have the border patrol be efficient and 
effective, and have the Coast Guard be efficient and effective. 
That seemed like a fundamental element of national defense to 
me. Yet the administration has stonewalled us on that. They've 
sent up a supplemental which doesn't have any money in it for 
national defense on the borders, for Homeland Security, but has 
a significant amount of dollars for Katrina, and a significant 
amount of dollars for Iraq, both of which I'm sure are 
necessary. But in the pecking order of national defense, 
protecting our borders is right up there with both those 
exercises.
    And so this committee is being put in an extremely 
difficult place by the White House's proposals on Homeland 
Security. We're being asked to fund an expansion of the Border 
Patrol which we are totally committed to and basically created, 
authored, and drove as a policy, but being told that the funds 
to do that are going to be illusory. It's a hollow budget and I 
can't understand it because I've watched the press conferences 
where the administration has said it's committed to border 
security and domestic defense. And yet this budget isn't going 
to get there. So that's a concern I have. On the operations 
side we've got lots of issues, whether we'll have time to get 
to them today, but let me just highlight a few. First, again 
congratulations to you Mr. Secretary for approaching this in a 
systematic way. That's the way it should be approached. But we 
still have huge operational dysfunctionality in this 
Department. It's not your fault, it's a function of the fact it 
was thrown together quickly. The agencies within this 
Department brought with them some systemic problems which 
haven't been resolved and created some problems by being thrown 
together that haven't been resolved. The most significant ones 
are computer technology capability across the department, and 
interfacing with other agencies, especially the US VISIT issue, 
which I still have deep reservations about whether that we're 
going to pull that off. But we've held hearings on it, so we 
won't pursue that here. I appreciate the fact that the 
Department is trying to stay on it, and stay aggressive on it. 
I especially appreciate the independent views that you're using 
to try to make sure it's done right.
    But other issues are equally effecting performance. The 
Katrina event was a horrific, embarrassing, and a terrible 
event for the people down there and our country as a whole. And 
the problem is not only the unintended consequences of the 
event, but that the Department has had to refocus so much 
energy on trying to straighten out the problems which were 
shown by Katrina. I genuinely believe that for a period here we 
moved away from national defenses as the primary goal of this 
Department to solving the Katrina problems, which we have to 
solve. But that's just showing that this functionality in the 
face of a major catastrophe that's not driven by terrorists 
doesn't maybe work that well.
    Second, we've got this whole issue which has not been 
resolved, of the relationship between Border and Customs and 
ICE. Everywhere I go I hear this and I always ask the question 
in a very vanilla way, how's it working? And the answer is um--
well; it's not bluntly spoken but it's clearly between the 
lines, ``It's not working,'' from the people on the frontline. 
It can't afford not to work. This is too big an issue. Then we 
have the issue of just immigration policy itself, which is you 
know obviously something you don't have full control over but 
you have an impact on.
    So these are things that concern me, I wish it were a more 
pleasant story, because I have tremendous respect for you and 
your team. I think you've brought good people on, but the story 
is difficult right now to be kind. Hopefully you can shed some 
light on it, and give us a little more optimism. I'll yield to 
Senator Byrd for an opening statement, then we'll go to your 
statement, then we'll to do questions.


                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD


    Senator Byrd. I share the chairman's concerns. I greatly 
admire this Chairman he's totally dedicated to the task. He's 
trying to make this function a success. He is chagrinned as he 
makes very clear, and I totally agree with him. This Department 
has been off and running for 3 years I believe. I don't know 
how well it's running, but I don't know what to do about this. 
Sometimes I feel like just throwing the books down and saying 
to hell with it. That certainly would be the wrong attitude. 
But we can't seem to get this thing going Mr. Secretary. You 
seem to know a great deal about the problem and about what is 
needed to fix it. And I have a feeling that you're highly 
dedicated as well. But I simply cannot understand why with all 
this money, all this effort, all this attention, and all this 
dedication that we on this panel have given to this agency, why 
it still is not functioning properly. Why it's not doing the 
job. There's nothing secure about this thing. Talk about 
Homeland Security, what's secure about.
    So I thank our able chairman, Senator Gregg for calling 
this hearing. Hardly a day goes by that Americans do not read 
about the Department of Homeland Security in their own town 
newspapers like the Beckley, West Virginia Register Herald, the 
New Hampshire Union Leader, and every other major paper in the 
land. This is an agency that impacts the lives of every 
American. And the lives of every American are to a considerable 
degree dependant upon this agency. I look forward to working 
with you Mr. Chairman as we review not just the budget for the 
agency, but also the policies and the operations for the 
Department. And I welcome you here today Mr. Secretary.
    Before discussing the President's budget it is important to 
take a moment to thank the 182,000 employees in your 
Department. They serve this Nation in the heat of the desert. 
They serve this Nation in the cold of a northern winter. They 
serve this Nation in the roughest seas and winds, at our ports, 
our border stations, our airports. They are to be commended for 
their efforts to preserve our freedoms, to make this truly a 
Department of Homeland Security, and to secure our homeland.


                        IMPROVED BORDER SECURITY


    I'm pleased to see that the budget includes significant 
resources for improving security at our borders. Last spring, 
Senator Craig and I offered, with Chairman Gregg's support, an 
amendment to begin the process of hiring and training a 
significant number of Border Patrol agents and immigration 
investigators. Despite administration opposition--now did you 
hear that?
    Despite administration opposition, the funds were enacted 
into law. With the chairman's leadership we continued that 
effort in fiscal year 2006. Two months ago Chairman Gregg tried 
to secure an additional $1.1 billion for this fiscal year to 
provide our border security personnel with the tools they need. 
The tools they need to do their jobs effectively, but he ran 
into opposition from the other body.


                 HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET AND ANOMALIES


    Mr. Secretary, I urge you today to join in this cause and 
urge the White House and the House leadership to embrace this 
effort. Scream to the high heavens if they don't. Let the 
people know where the fault lies. Let the people know really 
who is for security. The administration continues to have a 
huge credibility gap when it comes to homeland security. 
There's a continuing drum beat that another terrorist attack is 
likely. The President, in his State of the Union address said 
to America ``The enemy has not lost the desire or the 
capability to attack us.'' And yet a look at the 
administration's budget reveals an odd, odd, odd complacency. 
The administration's speech writers on the one hand and the 
administration's policy writers seem to be living in 
alternative realities. For example, in the White House disaster 
response report released just a few days ago, the White House 
calls for ``integrating and synchronizing the Nation's homeland 
security plans across Federal, State and local governments'' 
yet what happens? The budget proposes to cut funding for 
Emergency Management Performance Grants, which State and local 
emergency managers depend on for their survival. The White 
House report recommends improvements to communication's 
equipment used in response to a catastrophe, but the budget 
proposes to cut first responder grants by 25 percent. What's 
wrong? What is wrong Mr. Secretary? Why the disconnect? Why the 
disconnect? The White House report recommends improvements to 
communication's equipment used in response to a catastrophe, 
but the budget on the other hand--which is the White House's 
product--proposes to cut first responder grants by 25 percent. 
Why the disconnect? Hear me down there at the White House. Why 
Mr. Bush? Why? In response to the administration's decision to 
allow Dubai Ports World to operate terminals in six major U.S. 
ports, the administration has asserted that they have a 
robust--ha--a robust layered security system for our ports. And 
yet the White House proposes for the second straight year, 1 
year is not enough, for the second straight year, to eliminate 
the port security grant program. Now why is that?
    Of the $816 million that Congress has appropriated for port 
security, only $46 million was requested by the President. Why 
is that so Mr. Bush? Why is that so? Hear me. Let me say that 
again. Of the $816 million that Congress has appropriated--that 
Congress has appropriated--for port security, only $46 million 
was requested by the President. There's nothing robust about 
that. If that's robust then I'm an 810 pound giant. Take me on. 
Yeah. There's nothing robust about that. Five months ago, the 
Congress approved $173 million for port security grants, and 
the Department has not even seen fit to announce how ports can 
apply for the funds. Why is this? What's the matter Mr. 
Secretary? Why don't we get off the ground. I do not understand 
why this administration allows port security dollars to collect 
dust at the Treasury in Washington. How really serious--how 
serious is this administration about port security when it 
decides to allow Dubai Ports World to control six major U.S. 
ports and the President, Mr. Bush, and the Vice President, Mr. 
Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security don't even know the decision was 
made. What is happening? What's the matter with the right hand 
that the left hand doesn't know what's going on? How serious is 
the administration about port security when customs and borders 
protection inspects only 5 percent of the 11 million containers 
that come into the country each year. I believe I've been 
reading that for 2 or 3 years, it doesn't seem to change. How 
serious is the administration when the Coast Guard's Deepwater 
budget for replacing its ships, planes and helicopters will not 
even be completed until 2026. Man, I will have long since met 
my maker by then and I hope you folks will carry on in my 
stead. I don't know what good it will do you. The Coast Guard 
will be the FEMA of 2010 if you do not invest in it now. What 
about that? What's wrong? How serious is the administration 
about helping victims of a disaster when it has made decisions 
that have crippled FEMA? When the terrorists hit New York City 
in 2001, FEMA was immediately on the scene and FEMA helped the 
city to recover. Four years later when Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita hit the gulf coast, FEMA was no longer up to the task. 
Within the bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland Security, 
FEMA has lacked professional leadership, lacked attention, and 
lacked resources. Bad management of the agency and its mission 
has diminished the effectiveness of the qualified professionals 
who serve in FEMA and who love their jobs. For example the 
decision to separate the FEMA preparedness function from its 
response and recovery function has proven to be a mistake. I 
was against that, I said, I was against it. I was against it 
then, I've been against it ever since. I'm against it now. 
Separating the preparedness function from response and recovery 
is like asking the marines to go into battle without first 
training at Camp Lejeune. It's absolutely essential that our 
emergency managers and first responders at every level of 
government have the resources to train and exercise together 
before a disaster. Whether it is a terrorist attack, or a 
natural disaster.
    I'm concerned that the Department of Homeland Security has 
become the department of promises unfulfilled. The department 
of promises unfulfilled. This must be rectified. Mr. Secretary 
you have a tough job, I look forward to your testimony. Thank 
you Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator Byrd. I want to echo 
something that Senator Byrd said however. There's obviously a 
lot of concern here. It's deep, it's significant, and it needs 
to be raised. But we all greatly admire the people on the 
frontline.
    Senator Byrd. You bet.
    Senator Gregg. And you've got a lot of them. And they do 
very good work for us, and they put their lives at risk, and 
they're willing to work in difficult situations and we 
appreciate that very much. Hopefully nothing that's said here 
would in anyway reflect on their professionalism and their 
commitment which is superb.
    Senator Byrd. No.
    Senator Gregg. What we want to do is make them more capable 
of doing their jobs well.
    Senator Byrd. Heavens forbid.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we'd like to hear 
from you.


                     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF


    Secretary Chertoff. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 
the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee before you 
Mr. Chairman, and before Senator Byrd as ranking member. Of 
course a lot has been raised in the opening statements, I 
suspect I'll have the opportunity to answer some specific 
questions about a lot of these as we go on, and I'm sure you'll 
appreciate my saying that I do not intend to occupy a lot of 
time in an opening statement addressing everything.
    But I do want to talk about some of the major elements of 
the budget. And I want to begin also by echoing the fact that 
as you have both said what this Department does touches the 
lives of every American. In fact, I venture to say, we probably 
touch the lives of Americans in more individual and disparate 
ways than does any other department in the Government. At the 
same time we also have a tremendous workforce. We have 183,000 
people, they serve everywhere from storm tossed seas, to very 
hot desert landscapes. They do a superb job. We do owe them the 
support that they're entitled to in order to carry out their 
missions. Part of what I am trying to do, and I think part of 
what my team is trying to do is to impose some discipline and 
some systematic thinking to the missions. I don't think we want 
to attack our budget problems by assigning money first and then 
thinking about what to do with it afterwards. That has 
sometimes been a course taken in Government. I think we want to 
make sure we've thoroughly thought through what we need to do 
and what the system and the mission is, and then apply the 
money in a way that makes the mission occur.
    I also understand that we have a challenge with respect to 
the $1.6 billion amount that is allocated to be paid for by an 
increase in passenger fees. I view the proposed increase as 
being extremely modest. In fact it really evens out an anomaly 
between those who leave from hub cities, and those who leave 
from non hub cities. As I've said before, I think we're talking 
about the price of a soda pop, and a newspaper at the airport. 
I recognize from my experience last year this has engendered a 
lot of push back, I'd still like to believe that we can get the 
right thing done here. I also of course as always take back the 
chairman and the ranking member's concerns about the need to 
have capital investment back to the White House, and we will 
continue to discuss how we can make sure we meet these needs. 
Because I think we all agree at the end of the day we need to 
be in the same place.


                 MAJOR INITIATIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS


    Let me talk about some of the major initiatives in the 
budget though, which does reflect a 6 percent increase in 
funding if we get that fee that we should be getting over 
fiscal year 2006, and also a 6 percent increase in growth 
discretionary funds over the prior year. Let me begin by 
talking about port security which is on everybody's mind. You 
know this is an area where although there is a lot to do, a lot 
has been done. And I think in fairness to the American people I 
want to lay out a little bit what we actually have 
accomplished, because we have made significant strides this 
year as compared to previous years which I want to talk about.


                       PORT SECURITY ALLOCATIONS


    One of the criticisms I often hear is that we spend 
billions of dollars on aviation security and only a few hundred 
million on port security. My response to the criticism is that 
that is really comparing--not apples to oranges, but apples to 
raisins. I think when you look at the total amount of money 
we've spent on port security since 9/11 and you include the 
2007 budget I had it calculated for this hearing. If our 2007 
budget request is passed we will have spent nearly $10 billion, 
with a B--$10 billion on port security and that's because when 
I count port security I count not only the port security grants 
which are obviously only a few hundred million. But I count the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, and billions of dollars we've 
invested in the Coast Guard port security program, as well as 
the significant amounts we've invested in elements of customs 
and border protection, science and technology, and our new 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which is investing millions 
of dollars in research on radiation portal monitors.
    So I think in fairness as we look back, and we consider all 
of the money line itemed out for port security at these various 
components it is actually a fair amount of money that has been 
spent.


                      DHS' PORT SECURITY APPROACH


    But I want to measure this not only in terms of money 
spent, because what matters is not input, it's output. Let me 
take a couple of minutes to talk about the way we approach port 
security. Port security does not begin at home, it begins 
overseas. It's kind of the opposite of charity. We begin by 
having our Container Security Initiative which is designed to 
put our resources in overseas ports of departure so we can 
begin to screen cargo at the point of which is starts to enter 
the supply chain, the maritime supply chain and not merely when 
it starts to arrive in our American ports. We have a chart here 
indicating where we have gone with the Container Security 
Initiative. And what you will see--and a copy of this in my 
prepared testimony for the Senators--you'll see that before 9/
11 we had no elements overseas as part of a container screening 
initiative. In March 2002, we were at about 14 percent of the 
cargo was coming through ports of embarkation that were part of 
the initiative. This February we're up to about three-quarters, 
and we are on track to get up to about 85 percent by the end of 
fiscal year 2007. That's because most of the cargo that we are 
concerned about comes through a comparatively small number of 
ports, we have focused on the 42 ports which now are 
responsible for three-quarters of the containers and these are 
all now part of our Container Security Initiative.
    What that means is we begin the process of screening well 
before the cargo even gets to the overseas port. We then 
inspect cargo overseas, before it actually gets on the ship, if 
it is high risk cargo. And that really pushes our security 
envelope way out. I'm not going to tell you the job is done, 
one of the things I said, I think last year, and I've continued 
to say earlier this year, is we need to extend our visibility 
into the supply chain, even further back into the process so 
that we see what is entering our maritime domain, really almost 
at the point it leaves the factory overseas. And we also need 
to have better security and tracking of containers once we've 
got the containers stuffed and loaded onto ships. So we are 
continuing to do work and research into pushing that out. But 
it would be unfair for me not to observe how far we have come. 
In that regard I'm actually planning to go to Hong Kong later 
on in March to actually look at a system they have in place 
there, which at least has established a concept of doing the 
radiation screening and the x-ray screening for every container 
before it gets loaded. I want to see how that works and see 
whether that is a possibility for extending what we're doing. 
But of course the supply chain security doesn't end at the 
overseas port. We get the manifest of the cargo, the Coast 
Guard examines the manifest, examines the crew list, examines 
the history of the ship, even while the ship is underway to 
come into American ports. When necessary the Coast Guard boards 
ships in order to inspect cargo, or in order to examine crew 
members who are listed on the cruise ship.
    I should say that the Coast Guard actually inspects ports 
overseas as part of our international initiatives on port 
security. And if a port overseas does not have an adequate 
security profile, we have the power and we have exercised the 
power to suspend ships from that port coming into the United 
States.
    [The information follows:]

 How Often has DHS (Coast Guard) Exercised the Power to Suspend Ships 
       From Entering Into the Port Coming Into the United States?
    We have broken this data down into two separate categories, one for 
deficiencies related to port state control and maritime security 
compliance examinations; and one for failures to provide required 
notice of arrival.
    For deficiencies related to port state control and maritime 
security compliance:
  --In 2004, we expelled 15 vessels and denied entry to 2 vessels.
  --In 2005, we expelled 5 vessels and denied entry to 2 vessels.
  --Thus far in 2006, we've not expelled or denied entry to any vessel 
        for port state control or maritime security compliance.
  --We only expel or deny entry to a vessel due to extremely 
        substandard conditions.
  --The Coast Guard generally allows these vessels enter or re-enter 
        port when they have corrected the substandard conditions.
    For failures to provide appropriate notice of arrival:
  --In 2005, we denied entry to 147 vessels and expelled 15 vessels.
  --Thus far in 2006, we denied entry to 11 vessels and expelled 7 
        vessels.
  --The Coast Guard generally allows the vessels to enter or re-enter 
        port once the vessel makes proper notice of arrival and once 
        the appropriate 24 hour or 96 hour vetting period ends.

    Senator Byrd. How often is that done?
    Secretary Chertoff. I could give you the number; we have 
done it on occasion. Usually what we do is if the shipping 
company imposes its own security guards around the ship at a 
port that has not met security requirements, we will allow the 
ship in. In other words we will allow the shipping company to 
do its own remediation with respect to guarding its own ship. 
But I can think of one occasion in the last year where we got 
to the point of decertifying a port, and for a short of period 
of time, I think the port was decertified. I can get you the 
details on the numbers. But this process is underway as we 
speak with the Coast Guard going overseas inspecting ports 
overseas.
    Now let's continue to follow the supply chain. So we've 
looked at--in many instances, three-quarters of the containers 
we've done screening and necessary inspection before the cargo 
has left. We've then looked at the crew, we've looked at the 
ship, and Coast Guard has reviewed it while it's on route. When 
it comes into the United States, if we have cargo that we have 
screened, we've screened 100 percent, we're virtually at 100 
percent of the cargo at this point using very complicated 
analytical tools and using information we have about the 
shipper, the cargo, the destination, and the method of payment. 
If at the time it arrives we haven't inspected high risk cargo, 
we then inspect it when it arrives. We put it through radiation 
portal monitors and just to show you where we are with this, 
these are large machines through which one can drive a truck 
carrying a container and it will detect radio active emissions 
from inside the container. We've gone again from February 2003, 
where we had only a small number of radiation portal monitors 
to a situation in which by the end of this year, we expect to 
have about two-thirds of the container cargo going through our 
seaports covered by radiation portal monitors. And we're on 
track to get to 90 plus percent by the time we get to the next 
fiscal year. And that's of course apart from hand held 
radiation monitors and things of that sort. So that's a 
significant amount of the containers coming through American 
ports that are being checked through these radiation portal 
monitors. In addition again if we have high risk containers 
that haven't been inspected, we inspect them on the spot. So 
it's only at the end of this very lengthy supply chain, with 
multiple defenses none of them perfect, but in combination a 
pretty effective series of defenses, only at the end of that 
does the container finally enter the hands of the port terminal 
operator which of course is the topic of conversation that 
we've had over the last week involving Dubai ports.
    So my point here is that the port terminal operator really 
lies after the last line of defense and is not a critical 
player in the line of defense. I should tell you the port 
terminal operator plays no role in our selection of what cargo 
to examine, in our screening process, in the Coast Guard's 
examination of the ships that come in, in our decision of what 
to put through the radiation portal monitors, or in our 
decision about what containers to open up. The port terminal 
operator has zero impact on that.
    Let me briefly touch on the Coast Guard analysis which I 
think you asked about Mr. Chairman, and then I will touch on 
just a few other points before I conclude. As you correctly 
point out, yesterday there was disclosed an unclassified 
portion of a much larger classified study by the Coast Guard 
early on in the process of reviewing this Dubai ports 
acquisition. This process of review by the way began in I 
believe October of last year, and concluded in January. So that 
although the formal filing may have only been less than 30 days 
before the conclusion of the process, the actual examination 
and vetting process began actually months earlier when the 
company first approached the CFIUS Committee.
    The Coast Guard as part of its early review assessment 
concluded that there were intelligence gaps. I should tell you 
that I often see, by the way, intelligence analytic documents 
that have that conclusion. By its nature I think an intelligent 
and cautious analyst is always very careful to identify not 
only what is known but what is unknown. And I think there was a 
response to that. The response to that was, not only continuing 
the process of checking with the other 12 departments involved 
and their intelligence elements. But more important, putting 
into place a significant number of assurances that would make 
sure that as we go forward with this. Implementing this 
transaction, Coast Guard and Customs would have an 
unprecedented ability to look into what was being done at these 
terminals, to insist upon the highest standard of security and 
if necessary to enforce those standards. I would conclude my 
comment on this by observing again, as you said Mr. Chairman, 
even at that early stage the Coast Guard concluded that ``DP 
World's acquisition of PNO in and of itself does not pose a 
significant threat to U.S. assets in continental United States 
ports.

               ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PREPAREDNESS AND FEMA

    Let me briefly touch on a few other things before I 
conclude Mr. Chairman. We have put additional money into 
Preparedness and into FEMA, $50 million into a National 
Preparedness Integration Program which, even as we speak, is in 
the process of reviewing and validating and ultimately working 
with States to improve the individual evacuation and emergency 
plans all over the country. There are increases in targeted 
capability grants. Although we do not support specifically 
targeted port grants, we've actually put a couple of hundred 
million dollars extra into the TIPP, the Targeted 
Infrastructure Protection Program which includes port grants. 
We've got a budget that allocates $10 million for chemical site 
security. Increases in FEMA's core budget of 10 percent, $492 
million including when we build on the amounts in the 2006 
supplemental a total of 240 additional FTEs. As well as some 
very specific steps we're taking for this hurricane season. As 
you noted in border security we are proposing an increase in 
1,500 agents, $100 million on border technology over $400 
million to bring detention bed space up to 27,500 beds. And let 
me say Mr. Chairman we are now for the first time building and 
carefully tracking through metrics, exactly how we are 
progressing and ending catch and release, and turning it into 
catch and return for non-Mexicans we apprehend at the border. 
This is a big accomplishment, we have some additional hurdles 
to overcome and I'd be happy to address them if anybody asks 
me. But we are, for the first time, in a position to see 
exactly where we need to go, where we are, and we can identify 
exactly what we need to do to cover the distance. And that's 
part of this systematic thinking I'm thinking about. I've got a 
lot of other elements to the budget. I'm sure you have a lot of 
questions. I will ask that my statement--written statement be 
accepted for the record, and I will be delighted to answer 
questions.
    [The statement follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Michael Chertoff

    Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Committee: Before 
beginning to outline our fiscal year 2007 budget request, I want to 
thank you for the strong support you showed for the Department in the 
two full budget cycles since it was fully established in March 2003. 
This is my first full budget cycle and I am honored and pleased to 
appear before the Committee to present President Bush's fiscal year 
2007 budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
    I would like to begin by assuring Members of this Committee and the 
public of the Department's efforts to secure the Nation's seaports. The 
Department continues to implement a multi-layered defense strategy to 
keep our ports safe and secure. Utilizing the expertise of our 
bureaus--particularly the United States Coast Guard and U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection--the private sector, and state and local 
authorities, we have made great strides since 9/11 to ensure that there 
are protective measures in place from one end of a sea based journey to 
the other. With the President's fiscal year 2007 Budget request, total 
DHS funding for port security activities since fiscal year 2004 total 
nearly $10 billion.
    As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard 
routinely inspects and assesses the security of 3,200 regulated 
facilities in more than 360 U.S. ports at least annually in accordance 
with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) and the Ports 
and Water ways Safety Act (PWSA). Every regulated U.S. port facility, 
regardless of owner/operator, is required to establish and implement a 
comprehensive Facility Security Plan (FSP) that specifically addresses 
the vulnerabilities identified in the facility security assessment and 
details measures and procedures for controlling access to the facility, 
including screening, designating employees with key security 
responsibilities, verifying credentials of port workers, inspecting 
cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, quarterly 
training, drills and annual exercises, and reporting of all breaches of 
security or suspicious activity, among other security measures.
    Working closely with local port authorities and law enforcement 
agencies, the Coast Guard regularly reviews, approves, assesses and 
inspects these plans and facilities to ensure compliance.
    In accordance with MTSA, the Coast Guard has completed verification 
of security plans for U.S. port and facilities and vessels operating in 
U.S. waters. Specifically:
  --Port Threat Assessments for all 55 militarily or economically 
        critical ports have been completed. The Coast Guard has 
        developed 44 Area Maritime Security Plans covering 361 ports, 
        the Great Lakes, the Inland and Western Rivers and the Outer 
        Continental Shelf region.
  --The Coast Guard completed initial security plan verification exams 
        on all 6,200 U.S. flag inspected vessels on July 1, 2005.
  --The Coast Guard has completed 2,400 verification examinations on 
        uninspected vessels regulated under the MTSA, and is on track 
        to complete all 4,800 by December 31, 2006.
  --Reviewed and approved 3,200 facility security plans.
  --Approved 60 offshore facility security plans.
    In addition to the Coast Guard's broad authorities for ensuring the 
security of U.S. port facilities and operations, the Coast Guard worked 
through the International Maritime Organization to develop the 
International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. Through the 
International Port
    Security Program, the Coast Guard has partnered with other nations 
worldwide to ensure compliance with ISPS. The Coast Guard has assessed 
44 countries, which are responsible for 80 percent of the maritime 
trade to the United States. Of those 44 countries, 37 have been found 
to be in substantial compliance with the ISPS Code. The seven countries 
that are not in substantial compliance have been or will soon be 
notified to take corrective actions or risk being placed on a Port 
Security Advisory and have Conditions of Entry imposed on vessels 
arriving from their ports. The Coast Guard is on track to assess 
approximately 36 countries per year.
    The Coast Guard has also taken multiple steps to enhance our 
awareness in the maritime domain. Publication of the 96-hour Notice of 
Arrival regulation allows sufficient time to vet the crew, passengers, 
cargo and vessel information of all vessels prior to their entering the 
United States from foreign ports. The Coast Guard also has expansive 
authority to exercise positive control over a vessel intending to enter 
a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Since 
July 2004, the Coast Guard has boarded 16,000 foreign flag vessels for 
security compliance with the ISPS Code and the MTSA. Out of those 
16,000 boardings, the Coast Guard imposed 143 detentions, expulsions or 
denials of entry. In addition, the Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) has been fielded at 9 ports with Vessel Traffic Service systems 
and allows the Coast Guard to identify and track vessels in the coastal 
environment. Long range tracking, currently in development, will enable 
the Coast Guard to identify and track vessels thousands of miles at 
sea, well before they reach our coastal zones. Likewise, the Inland 
River Vessel Movement Center provides critical information about the 
movement of hazardous cargoes along our Nation's inland rivers.
    The Coast Guard has increased its operational presence through a 
number of other initiatives. For example, the Coast Guard has 
established processes to identify, target, and have conducted 3,400 
security boardings on High Interest Vessels. These boardings included 
1,500 positive control vessel escorts to ensure these vessels cannot be 
used as weapons of mass destruction. The Coast Guard has also 
established 12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams and enforced hundreds 
of fixed and moving security zones to protect Maritime Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets (MCI/KA) and Naval Vessel Protection 
Zones (NVPZ) to protect U.S. Navy and Maritime Administration vessels. 
Further, the Coast Guard is developing a Risk-Based Decision Making 
System, to be implemented this year, which will help prioritize High 
Capacity Passenger Vessels (HCPV) escorts. Although initially developed 
for high capacity ferries, its application is being expanded to enhance 
current security measures for other HCPVs: ferries, cruise ships, and 
excursion vessels carrying 500 or more passengers.
    The Coast Guard is also working closely with various other agencies 
to implement the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and its eight 
supporting plans. Together, the plans provide the road map for the 
integration of national efforts in supporting the four primary pillars 
of maritime security: Awareness, Prevention, Protection, and Response 
and Recovery. As DHS's executive agent for implementing and updating 
plans related to Maritime Domain Awareness (Awareness), Global Maritime 
Intelligence Integration (Prevention), Maritime Transportation System 
Security (Protection), and Maritime Operational Threat Response 
(Response/Recovery), the Coast Guard, in cooperation with other 
stakeholders, is leading efforts to increase the coordination, 
effectiveness and efficiency of existing government-wide initiatives.
    In close coordination with the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons 
from entering the United States by eliminating potential threats before 
theyContainer Security Initiative arrive at our borders and ports. For 
example, through a program administered by CBP, the Department has 
implemented the 24-Hour Advanced Manifest Rule, requiring all sea 
carriers, with the exception of bulk carriers and approved break bulk 
cargo, to provide proper cargo descriptions and valid consignee 
addresses 24 hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port for 
shipment to the United States. Failure to meet the 24 hour advanced 
manifest rule results in a ``do not load'' message and other penalties. 
This program gives the Department greater awareness of what is being 
loaded onto ships bound for the United States and the advance 
information enables DHS to evaluate the terrorist risk from sea 
containers.
    Similarly, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiatives bolster port 
security. Through CSI, CBP works with host government Customs Services 
to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports, 
before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States. 
In addition to the current 42 foreign ports participating in CSI, many 
more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, we expect 
that 50 ports, covering 82 percent of maritime containerized cargo 
shipped to the United States, will participate in CSI. The table above 
shows the Department's substantial progress in expanding the CSI 
program since September 11, 2001.
    Through C-TPAT, CBP has created a public-private and international 
partnership with nearly 5,800 businesses (over 10,000 have applied), 
including most of the largest U.S. importers. CTPAT, CBP and partner 
companies are working together to improve baseline security standards 
for supply chain and container security. CBP reviews the security 
practices of not only the company shipping the goods, but also the 
companies that provided them with any services.
    At present, the C-TPAT program has completed validations on 27 
percent (1,545 validations completed) of the certified membership, up 
from 8 percent (403 validations completed) a year ago. Additionally, 
validations are in progress on another 39 percent (2,262 in progress) 
of certified members, and these validations will be completed 
throughout 2006, bringing the total percentage of certified members to 
65 percent by years' end. In 2007, the C-TPAT program validations will 
continue. And we will have validated 100 percent by the end of CY 2007.
    CBP also uses cutting-edge technology, including large-scale X-ray 
and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo. 
Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our 
Nation's ports, including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports. 
CBP also utilizes over 170 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices 
to examine cargo and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection 
devices. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $157 million 
to secure Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Deployments at current and 
next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry through the 
DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Over 600 canine detection 
teams, capable of identifying narcotics, bulk currency, human beings, 
explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons, are deployed at 
our ports of entry. As reflected in the Radiation Portal Monitor 
Deployment at Seaports table, 621 RPMs will be deployed to our Nation's 
top seaports, which will allow us to screen approximately 98 percent of 
inbound containers by December 2007.
    CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is also a critical component 
of our layered port security efforts. The NTC provides tactical 
targeting and analytical research support for CBP antiterrorism 
efforts. Experts in passenger and cargo targeting at the NTC operate 
around the clock using tools like the Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
to identify tactical targets and support intra-departmental and inter-
agency anti-terrorist operations. The ATS serves as the premier tool 
for performing transactional risk assessments and evaluating potential 
national security risks posed by cargo and passengers arriving by sea, 
air, truck, and rail. Using pre-arrival information and input from the 
intelligence community, this rules-based system identifies high-risk 
targets before they arrive in the United States. The Department's 
Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) is supporting the introduction 
of advanced intelligent algorithms to further improve these risk 
assessment capabilities.
    A key responsibility of the NTC is the support that it provides to 
the field, including tactical targeting and research support for the 
CSI personnel stationed at critical foreign ports throughout the world. 
The NTC, combined with CSI, C-TPAT, the 24-hour rule, and ATS ensures 
that all containers on-board vessels destined for the United States are 
risk scored using all available information; and that all cargo 
determined to be of high risk are examined. The NTC, working closely 
with the Coast Guard, also vets and risk scores all cargo and cruise-
ship passengers and crew prior to arrival. This ensures that DHS has 
full port security awareness for international maritime activity.
    Further, DNDO's fiscal year 2007 budget request of nearly $536 
million, a 70 percent increase from fiscal year 2006, includes $157 
million which will allow for the acquisition and deployment of nearly 
300 current and next-generation radiation detection systems at our 
ports of entry. These systems will be deployed and operated by CBP. In 
addition, DNDO's fiscal year 2007 budget also includes $30.3 million 
for the development of enhanced cargo radiography screening systems for 
our ports of entry. These enhanced screening efforts will compliment 
the many information based programs, such as C-TPAT, the Department 
already has in place for enhanced port security.
    In addition to increased screening efforts at our own ports of 
entry for radioactive and nuclear materials, the Department fully 
endorses the concept of increased active and passive detection at 
foreign ports of departure. The systems DNDO are acquiring and 
developing can also be used by foreign ports with a CSI presence, as 
well as the Department of Energy's Megaports program. We must continue 
to stress the need for increased screening at foreign ports of 
departure, while at the same time have a robust screening effort at our 
own ports of entry.
    In order for the Department to increase its visibility into the 
security of our international supply chains, S&T is developing 
technology solutions that can be applied across the supply chain. Part 
of this effort is the development of a new class of security devices 
that will monitor the integrity of intermodal shipping containers and 
enable CBP Officers, CSI personnel and the NTC to gather information on 
the status of a container to improve risk assessment and data 
collection. When coupled with the broad supply chain security 
architectural framework currently under development by S&T, the 
Department will have the capability to bridge data and information 
between container security devices, shippers, and the National 
Targeting Center (NTC).
    Finally, in addition to the work of the Coast Guard, CBP, S&T and 
the DNDO, the Port Security Grant program has awarded over $700 million 
to owners and operators of ports, terminals, U.S. inspected passenger 
vessels and ferries, as well as port authorities and State and local 
agencies to improve security for operators and passengers through 
physical security enhancements. The mission of the Port Security Grant 
program is to create a sustainable, risk-based effort for the 
protection of ports from terrorism, especially explosives and non-
conventional threats that would cause major disruption to commerce and 
significant loss of life.
    The Preparedness Directorate will also announce the application 
process for an additional $168 million in port security grants in the 
coming weeks, bringing total funding to over $870 million since 9/11. 
In addition, the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget bolsters funding 
for infrastructure protection, including ports, through the $600 
million Targeted Infrastructure Protection grant program. The fiscal 
year 2007 request consolidates existing infrastructure grant programs 
into a single program with a 55 percent increase in funding.
    With all of the layered efforts already in place, and the ongoing 
efforts that are supported in the 2007 budget request, port security 
has substantially improved since 9/11, and since the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security.

                       OTHER KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

    I would like to now address some of our other major accomplishments 
to date. As DHS approaches its third anniversary on March 1, 2006, 
creating one national integrated strategy to fight the war on terror, 
through awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery 
remains the key focus of its vision and mission. Since its inception, 
the Department has steadily progressed in its efforts to vigorously 
protect America's homeland. Since 2001, the administration:
  --Has increased annual spending on Government-wide non-defense 
        homeland security by 350 percent, more than tripling spending 
        devoted to homeland security;
  --Created the Department of Homeland Security by merging 22 separate 
        agencies and programs into a cohesive department;
  --Restructured the agencies that handle immigration and border 
        security issues. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has Port 
        of Entry officers and Border Patrol agents along the border. 
        Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforces immigration 
        laws and detains those aliens here illegally. U.S. Citizenship 
        and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers a wide variety of 
        immigration benefits and services within the United States;
  --Established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to 
        improve aviation security and other modes of transportation 
        security nationwide. TSA hired a screener workforce and 
        deployed sufficient technology to electronically screen 100 
        percent of passenger and checked baggage;
  --Created a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to detect, 
        identify, and track down the origins of nuclear and 
        radiological materials; and
  --Provided the Department nearly $18 billion for State, local, and 
        tribal governments to enhance their preparedness for a range of 
        hazards, including $14 billion for terrorism and other 
        catastrophic events.
    When I arrived at the Department in 2005, I initiated a Second 
Stage Review (2SR) to assess whether DHS' policies, operations, and 
organizational structure were properly aligned to maximize mission 
performance. The implementation of 2SR instituted a fundamental reform 
of policies and procedures critical to achieving the mission of the 
Department. The Department also conquered many unique challenges, 
making significant strides protecting vital infrastructure and assets; 
preventing security breaches; ensuring safe travel and trade across our 
borders; protecting privacy and civil liberties; and expanding critical 
partnerships at every level.
    In the last year, we have made great strides in the area of 
prevention and preparedness. Our key accomplishments include:
    Revamping the Port Security Grant Program--As part of the fiscal 
year 2005 Office of Grants and Training (G&T) Port Security Grant 
Program (PSGP), significant changes have been introduced to make the 
program more risk based. Changes include limiting eligibility to the 
Nation's most at-risk seaports and distributing funding based on risk, 
needs and national priorities for port security. Additional rigor was 
added to the evaluation process for applications and a communications 
strategy was implemented to ensure consistent guidance was provided 
throughout.
    The program is being further refined in fiscal year 2006, and will 
soon link distribution of funds to participation in a port-wide risk 
management planning process. The intent of this process, which combines 
the USCG's Maritime Security Risk Assessment Methodology (MSRAM) with 
the Office of Grant's and Training's own Special Needs Jurisdiction 
Toolkit, is to allow port areas to develop risk management strategies 
that will assist them in identifying the most cost effective projects--
essentially allowing them to ``buy down'' the risk in their areas. This 
program, known as the Maritime Assessment and Strategy Toolkit (MAST), 
is an essential step in prioritizing risks and facilitating a port-wide 
risk management planning process. Ultimately, MAST will serve to 
further enhance the existing Area Maritime Security Plans and also 
allow for ports to better integrate their security efforts into the 
broader planning construct that forms the core of the Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI).
    TSA Moves to a Risk-Based, Threat-Managed Security Approach.--
Employing TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams, piloting 
behavioral pattern recognition analysis at 10 airports, and through a 
Nation-wide modification of the prohibited items list, TSA has 
increased its ability to identify and prevent terrorist threats to the 
Nation and enhance aviation security.
    Over $3 Billion Awarded to State and Local Governments.--DHS 
awarded more than $3 billion in grants, training, and technical 
assistance to State and local governments to support various 
prevention, protection and response initiatives.
    Standard First Responder Training Developed.--DHS established a 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) standard curriculum to 
ensure first responder training is widely available and consistent 
among all training providers. More than 725,000 first responders 
completed NIMS training nationwide.
    Counterterrorism Training.--DHS provided counterterrorism training 
to more than 1.2 million emergency response personnel from across the 
country on a range of incident response issues, including incident 
management, unified command, and public works protection/response, and 
training on weapons of mass destruction.
    Sharing Intelligence Information.--The Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis provided State and local governments and the private sector 
with more than 1,260 intelligence information products on threat 
information and suggested protective measures.
    Secret Service Operation Taps Network to Arrest 28 Globally.--U.S. 
Secret Service conducted ``Operation Firewall,'' in which the Secret 
Service became the first agency ever to execute a Title III wire tap on 
an entire computer network. This global operation resulted in 28 
arrests in eight States and six foreign countries. These suspects stole 
nearly 1.7 million credit card numbers.
    The hurricanes last fall stretched our Nation's resources and 
forced us to reexamine our processes. We still however, saw our first 
responders and relief personnel do remarkable things to assist our 
fellow citizens.
    Over 40,000 Rescued by U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA.--In the wake of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Coast Guard and FEMA rescued over 
40,000 people in search and rescue operations. Coast Guard men and 
women employed their Continuity of Operations Plans and demonstrated 
deep commitment to the missions of search and rescue, protection of 
natural resources, and restoration of a safe, efficient marine 
transportation system.
    More than 23,000 Victims Airlifted from New Orleans Airport.--More 
than 700 transportation security officers and Federal air marshals 
helped evacuate more than 23,000 victims at Louis Armstrong New Orleans 
International Airport.
    $5.7 Billion in Federal Aid Distributed.--FEMA distributed over 
$5.7 billion in Federal aid to more than 1.4 million households to help 
pay for housing assistance, food, clothing, home repair and other 
essentials.
    $12 Billion in Claims Distributed.--FEMA's National Flood Insurance 
program paid over $12 billion in claims from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, 
and Wilma, with an estimated $10 billion in additional claims to be 
paid over the next few months.
    In the past year, we have also strengthened our borders and 
interior enforcement of our immigration laws, expanded partnerships 
with our neighbors, and increased our use of emerging technologies to 
assist our efforts.
    Secure Border Initiative Success.--In support of a comprehensive 
strategy to control the border and enforce immigration laws, DHS 
adopted a policy to replace the practice of catching and releasing 
aliens with a ``Catch and Return'' policy. Expedited Removal (ER) has 
been expanded along our entire land border as well as the number of 
countries with nationals subject to ER. DHS adopted a goal to cut ER 
detention time in half to speed alien removals, and the frequency of 
deportation flights has increased. Litigation barriers preventing San 
Diego fence completion have been removed. A process is also well 
underway to seek and select a contract integrator to implement a 
comprehensive border protection program plan using technology, staff, 
and other assets.
    Successful Counter Drug Operations.--Efforts by CBP, USCG and ICE 
to secure the Nation's borders have yielded significant positive 
results in stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. 
In the most recently completed fiscal year, CBP reported seizing nearly 
42,800 lbs of cocaine and more than 531,700 pounds of marijuana. In 
addition, United States Coast Guard and CBP Air and Marine Operations' 
counter drug operations exceeded results from previous years by 
removing over 338,000 lbs of cocaine from the Caribbean Sea and Eastern 
Pacific Ocean transit zones.
    Arizona Border Control Initiative Bolstered Resources in Tucson 
Corridor.--The second phase of this successful initiative included an 
additional 534 Border Patrol agents permanently assigned to the Arizona 
border, a 25 percent increase. These agents were supplemented by 200 
agents and 23 aircraft temporarily assigned to the Tucson sector. The 
initiative coupled with Operation ICE Storm, a human smuggling 
initiative, resulted in more than 350 smugglers prosecuted in total, 
millions in illicit profits seized and a significant decrease in 
homicides according to local authorities.
    Security and Prosperity Partnership Creates Common Security 
Approach.--The United States, Canada and Mexico entered into this 
trilateral partnership to establish common approaches to emergency 
response, improving aviation, maritime, and border security, enhancing 
intelligence sharing, and facilitating the legitimate flow of people 
and cargo at our shared borders.
    Immigration Processing Backlog Cut by 2.8 million.--USCIS reduced 
the backlog of applications for immigration services and benefits from 
3.8 million cases in January 2004 to fewer than one million in December 
2005.
    US VISIT Biometric Entry System Expanded.--US VISIT implemented the 
biometric entry portion of the US VISIT system at 115 airports, 14 
seaports and 154 land ports of entry. As of December 31, 2005, US VISIT 
processed more than 44 million foreign visitors and detected 950 
individuals with a criminal history or immigration violations.
    Passport Requirements Strengthened.--As part of a multi-layered 
approach to increasing the security of our citizens and visitors by 
helping to ensure the integrity of their travel documents, DHS imposed 
requirements establishing that all Visa Waiver Program travelers must 
have a machine-readable passport to enter the United States. Visa 
Waiver Program countries are now also required to produce new passports 
with digital photographs.
    Implemented Coast Guard Sectors.--The Coast Guard has reorganized 
its field infrastructure by unifying previous Groups and Marine Safety 
Offices into ``Sector'' commands. Within the new Sector construct, the 
inclusion of Field Intelligence Support Teams to support port-level 
commanders, as well as the establishment of Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Centers, serves to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness at all 
levels of the chain of command. This restructuring unifies effort and 
command, strengthens maritime border security, and improves information 
sharing by providing a single point of Coast Guard service at the port 
level. The largest Coast Guard reorganization in a decade, the 
establishment of Sectors will be complete in 2006, significantly 
improving maritime preparedness and response without requiring any 
additional resources.

                    FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST

    In accordance with the premise of 2SR and to build on the 
Department's accomplishments, the fiscal year 2007 budget proposal for 
the Department is driven by a mission and risk-based approach to 
allocating the Department's resources, requesting $42.7 billion in 
funding, an increase of 6 percent over fiscal year 2006. The 
Department's fiscal year 2007 gross discretionary budget is $35.4 
billion, also an increase of 6 percent over fiscal year 2006. Gross 
discretionary funding includes appropriated budget authority and 
discretionary fee collections such as funding for the Federal 
Protective Service; aviation security passenger and carrier fees; and 
premium collections. It does not include funding such as Coast Guard's 
retirement pay accounts and fees paid for immigration benefits. The 
Department's fiscal year 2007 net discretionary budget is $30.9 
billion, an increase of 1 percent over fiscal year 2006.
    Central to the Department's budget are five themes to ensure that 
all resource allocations correspond with its integral mission and 
vision. Key enhancements in the Budget for these five areas will allow 
the Department to execute the initiatives of the administration and 
effectively secure our Nation.

Increase Overall Preparedness, Particularly for Catastrophic Events 
        Either Natural or Manmade and Strengthen FEMA
    Preparedness addresses the Department's full range of 
responsibilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of 
terror or other disasters.
    The Budget includes an increase of $294.6 million for the Targeted 
Capability Grants, for a total of $1.4 billion. This builds upon the 
$5.5 billion already in the grant pipeline to assist our States and 
localities in increasing their preparedness and furthers the 
Department's National Preparedness Goals. This funding includes an 
$80.65 million increase for Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to 
provide a second layer of protection for urban areas based on risk. It 
also includes a $213.9 million increase over comparable programs, for a 
total of $600 million, for the Targeted Infrastructure Protection 
Program (TIPP). This will provide States with maximum flexibility to 
target resources to protect our Nation's ports, transit facilities, 
chemical facilities, and other critical infrastructure.
    The Budget also includes $50 million National Preparedness 
Integration Program (NPIP) as a new initiative in the Preparedness 
Directorate. NPIP will improve preparedness by executing Medical 
Preparedness Coordination, Catastrophic Planning, Emergency 
Communications Improvements, and Command and Control Alignment.
    This budget enhances our ability to respond to and recover from 
disasters. Indeed, last year's Gulf Coast hurricanes demonstrated the 
need to strengthen FEMA's planning and response capabilities. While 
funding was increased for these core activities in 2005 and 2006, the 
fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a more significant investment to 
further strengthen FEMA. FEMA's budget represents a 10 percent increase 
over the 2006 fiscal year, including $44.7 million to strengthen 
support functions. We will add resources to critical areas such as 
procurement, information technology, and planning and amounts.
    The Budget includes a $29 million increase and 92 FTE to support 
FEMA's Strengthen Operational Capability initiative and reinforce its 
essential support functions within its programs of Readiness, 
Mitigation, Response, Recovery, and National Security, This program 
increase will allow FEMA to fill critical positions, and upgrade 
capital infrastructure and information technology support services.
    A $5 million increase in the FEMA Procurement Staff supports the 
Department's initiative to strengthen procurement capability across the 
board. These additional 41 FTE will enhance FEMA's ability to 
effectively deliver disaster response and recovery services by 
efficiently and properly processing procurement requests during both 
routine and extraordinary operating periods.
    An additional 40 FTE and $10.7 million is requested for FEMA 
financial and acquisition management. The funding requested will build 
on the positions provided in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental 
appropriation to operate the Gulf Region Acquisition Center to support 
the billions of dollars in contracts necessary to meet the 
unprecedented recovery needs of Hurricane Katrina and to bolster the 
FEMA's financial management capabilities to meet the demands of current 
and future catastrophic disasters.
    An additional $5.3 million is requested for National Response Plan 
(NRP) Support to help FEMA coordinate the response to all types and 
magnitudes of threats or hazards. It will allow FEMA to support 
shortened response times and provide more effective assistance during 
incidents of national significance.
    The fiscal year 2007 Budget seeks an increase of $100 million and 
40 FTE for the pre-disaster mitigation grant program. This program is 
designed to reduce the risk to populations, structures, and critical 
infrastructure from natural disasters. These funds will provide for the 
protection of: over 600 additional properties from flood damage through 
acquisition, elevation, relocation, and/or flood proofing; 250 
additional critical facilities from flood damage through drainage, 
infrastructure, and utilities projects; 240 additional properties from 
hurricane wind damage; 92 additional storm shelters to save lives from 
tornadoes; and 154 additional critical public facilities against 
seismic damage.
    Finally, an additional $5 million is proposed for upgrade of the 
Emergency Alert System (EAS). The EAS, which uses commercial radio and 
television broadcast services to send Presidential messages, provides a 
readily available and reliable means of emergency communications with 
the American people when catastrophic events occur and other national 
communications resources have been damaged or compromised. Building on 
the supplemental funding provided in fiscal year 2006, this funding 
will be used to improve system coverage, reliability, survivability, 
and security by providing a two-way, national-level EAS satellite 
backbone/path that will effectively link all Federal, State, and U.S. 
Territory Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
    The budget also proposes:
  --A total of $62.4 million in funding for the Coast Guard's National 
        Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) program. This funding is 
        needed to provide an air intercept response to potential 
        threats in the National Capital Region airspace, helping to 
        protect Washington, DC, from airborne attack.
  --A total of $17.7 million in funding to support the Radiological and 
        Nuclear Attribution and Forensics initiative. The request will 
        enable the Department to combine information on potential 
        capabilities of terrorist organizations to develop and deploy 
        threat agents with laboratory-based forensics techniques that 
        determine the source of any nuclear and radiological materials 
        or devices.
  --An increase of $3 million for the Office of the Chief Medical 
        Officer to further strengthen cutting-edge science, technology, 
        and intelligence within the Department's policy-making process. 
        This request, more than doubling resources for this office, 
        will be used to develop policy driven initiatives to ensure 
        that the Nation and its critical infrastructures are medically 
        prepared for catastrophic events.
    An increase of $10 million to establish an office to oversee 
chemical site security. DHS will classify facilities into risk-based 
tiers, establish security standards for each tier, and ensure strong 
safeguards are in place to protect the public disclosure of any 
sensitive information gathered by the office.

Strengthen Border Security and Interior Enforcement and Reform 
        Immigration Processes
            Securing our Borders
    One of the key elements in fulfilling the Department's mission is 
securing the border, both land and maritime, from terrorist threats and 
the flow of illegal migration and drugs. Under the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI) DHS will focus on controlling the border, building a 
robust interior enforcement program, and establishing a Temporary 
Worker Program. SBI, a performance-driven, department-wide enterprise 
will make dramatic changes in the border security system. It will cover 
every facet of how we sanction, manage, adjudicate, and remove persons 
caught crossing the border; deter illegal migration overall; manage 
immigration violators currently in the country; and interact with 
States and localities at the front lines of immigration and drug 
trafficking problems.
    Funding dedicated to SBI efforts facilitates a complete program 
encompassing many administrative, legal, and regulatory actions. 
Substantial resource enhancements provided in 2005 and 2006 will pave 
the way for an effective SBI program, and 2007 will be a turning point 
towards meeting long-term border security objectives.
    Among the key investments in the President's Budget for SBI is 
$458.9 million to increase the Border Patrol Agent workforce by 1,500 
agents, bringing the total of new agents added since 2005 to 3,000 and 
the overall total number of agents to nearly 14,000. This increases the 
size of our Border Patrol Agent workforce to 42 percent above the level 
prior to the September 11 attacks.
    To enhance our ability to protect the Nation's borders, the Budget 
includes $100 million for border technology to improve electronic 
surveillance and operational response. In 2006, DHS will solicit and 
award a contract to complete the transition from the current, limited-
scope technology plan to one that addresses the Department's 
comprehensive and integrated technological needs to secure our borders. 
Funding requested in the 2007 President's Budget will provide 
significant procurement investments needed to begin an aggressive 
deployment plan.
    To fund the continued construction of the San Diego Border 
Infrastructure System (BIS), we are requesting $30 million. The project 
includes multiple fences and patrol roads enabling quick enforcement 
response and will give the United States full operational control of 
the most urbanized corridor of our border with Mexico.
    The Tactical Infrastructure Western Arizona (TIWAZ) is a critical 
multi-year project that will deploy approximately 84 miles of vehicle 
barriers and improve 150 miles of access and maintenance roads. The 
Budget includes $51 million for the deployment of this tactical 
infrastructure in Arizona which will enable the construction of 39 
miles of permanent vehicle barriers.
    To support the detention and removal of at least another 100,000 
apprehended persons annually, the budget includes over $400 million for 
an additional 6,700 detention beds and associated staffing and other 
expenses. This would bring the total number of beds to 27,500 in 2007. 
A key element of SBI is replacing a ``catch and release'' protocol for 
captured aliens with a ``catch and return'' process, requiring a 
substantial expansion of bed space. In addition, new bed space will be 
used to return criminal aliens upon release from State and local 
prisons, and address the problem of alien absconders defying orders of 
removal.
    The budget also includes $41.7 million for ICE worksite 
enforcement, to add 206 agents and support staff for this effort. A 
strong worksite enforcement program that continues to expand will send 
a strong deterrence message to employers who knowingly hire illegal 
workers; reduce economic incentive for illegal immigration; and help 
restore the integrity of employment laws.
    An additional $60 million is requested for ICE Fugitive Operations 
apprehension teams, adding a total of 18 teams, to a planned level of 
70 teams nationwide. In addition to shoring up our borders and 
improving workplace oversight, the Department will continue to increase 
efforts to catch the estimated 450,000 absconders around the country--a 
level that is growing every year.
    Outside of core SBI programs, the request level includes funding 
for other vital border security programs to include:
  --An increase of $62.9 million over fiscal year 2006 for total 
        funding of $399.5 million is requested for US VISIT, a critical 
        element in the screening and border security system towards 
        ensuring better border security in a post-September 11 
        environment. Included in the US VISIT initiative is $60 million 
        in new resources to improve connection of information between 
        DHS IDENT system and DOJ IAFIS fingerprint system.
  --CSI & C-TPAT. The request continues to support the Container 
        Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs Trade Partnership 
        Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which are critical in the 
        prevention and deterrence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
        and other dangerous or illegal material importation. The Budget 
        requests $139 million for CSI to pre-screen inbound cargo at 
        over forty foreign ports and $55 million for C-TPAT to review 
        and improve the security of partner organizations throughout 
        the cargo supply-chain.

Reform and Modernization of Immigration Management
    As Congress and the Administration collaborate to reform the 
immigration system in addition to improving border security, it is 
critical that the Department is ready to effectively manage any reform 
and implement a sustainable immigration management system.
    Among other things, the Budget includes resource initiatives for 
worksite enforcement, fugitive operations, employment verification, and 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) business 
transformation efforts.
    The request includes $135 million for the operation and expansion 
of the USCIS Systematic Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program 
which provides immigration verification services to State Departments 
of Motor Vehicles and other Federal and State agencies, and to expand 
and enhance the current Basic Pilot program to be ready to support a 
mandatory national electronic employment authorization verification 
system. The current Basic Pilot program is a voluntary electronic 
verification program enabling an employer to confirm the employment 
eligibility of newly hired employees.
    The President's Budget seeks a total of $112 million in fee and 
discretionary resources within USCIS to accelerate comprehensive reform 
and automation of existing business processes, including the 
modernization of critically needed information technology and actions 
to sustain improvements achieved in reducing the immigration processing 
backlog.
    Finally, as USCIS transforms its business processes, redesigns its 
forms, and improves service delivery and value to its customers, the 
agency will reform its fee structure to ensure the recovery of 
operational costs in line with Federal fee guidelines. Currently, 
application fees are not optimally aligned with the cost of each 
application, and improvements must be made for the long term to more 
effectively link regular and premium fees to specific service levels. 
This effort becomes even more important as USCIS operations are 
automated, forms are reduced and simplified, and USCIS prepares to take 
on substantial new activities including a Temporary Worker Program. The 
Department will continue to assess business model options for 
implementation of the TWP as consideration of the proposal moves 
forward in the Congress.

  IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY AND CREATE BETTER TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
     SYSTEMS TO MOVE PEOPLE AND CARGO MORE SECURELY AND EFFICIENTLY

    A core objective in establishing the Department was to strengthen 
the overall security capability of the Nation's transit systems and 
maritime security. Terrorist attacks on international transit and 
national maritime systems have driven the Department to implement 
rigorous security measures for the Nation's systems. The 2007 
President's Budget request includes initiatives that continue to 
support the objectives of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 
which was enacted to strengthen the transportation system and ensure 
the freedom of movement for people and commerce, by securing America's 
transit system from terrorists, criminal threats and attack; and the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, which was enacted 
to secure U.S. ports and waterways from a terrorist attack.
    A total of $4.7 billion is requested to support TSA's Aviation 
Security efforts. Of this amount, $692 million will continue support 
the deployment and maintenance of Explosive Detection and Electronic 
Trace Detection Systems which provide a higher probability to detect a 
wider range of explosives, and are critical to finding threats in 
transportation venues and eliminating their destructiveness.
    The President's 2007 Budget also proposes to replace the two-tiered 
aviation passenger fee with a single, flat security fee of $5.00 for a 
one-way trip with no change in the overall fee that may be charged on a 
one-way ticket. This is consistent with the screening process whereby 
you only pass through security once. The Budget also proposes to 
collect $644 million in air carrier fees ($448 million for fiscal year 
2007 plus $196 million owed from fiscal years 2005 and 2006). This is 
based on a General Accountability Office (GAO) estimate of what is 
reasonable.
    The Budget also seeks resources for the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office (DNDO) to support next generation technology to secure our 
transportation system. For example, a total of $30.3 million is 
requested to fund the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems 
(CAARS) Development initiative. The DNDO will execute the program 
developing advanced active-imaging radiography systems for cargo 
inspection at the Nation's ports of entry. The CAARS program will 
significantly improve throughput rates of imaging systems specifically 
designed to identify concealed nuclear materials threats.
    Funding of $157 million for the Radiation Portal Monitor 
Acquisition initiative will secure next-generation passive detection 
portals for deployment at official ports-of-entry to expose attempts to 
import, assemble, or transport a nuclear explosive device, fissile 
material, or radiological material concealed within cargo or 
conveyances and intended for illicit use. Consistent with the global 
nuclear detection architecture, the deployment strategy will be 
mutually developed by the DNDO and CBP.
    The Budget also seeks an increase of $12 million to support 
staffing needed by CBP to support the deployment of weapons of mass 
destruction systems deployed through DHS procurement programs. This 
increase will fund 106 positions and ensure CBP will have dedicated 
personal to resolve alarms from RPMs to conduct radiological 
examinations at our Nation's busiest seaports.
    For the U.S. Coast Guard, the President's fiscal year 2007 Budget 
requests a total of $934.4 million for the Coast Guard's Integrated 
Deepwater System (IDS), which is $10.7 million above the fiscal year 
2006 funding level. The Deepwater funding will continue the IDS 
acquisition of: the fourth national security Cutter (High Endurance 
Cutter replacement); the first Fast Response Cutter (Patrol Boat 
replacement); and additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). In 
addition, it will establish a second MPA-equipped air station; complete 
the re-engineering of the HH-65 helicopter, and significantly enhance 
legacy fixed and rotary wing aircraft capabilities. IDS Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) upgrades to the USCG cutters, boats and aircraft 
will enhance maritime domain awareness and are critical to the 
achievement of an integrated, interoperable border and port security 
system.
    In addition to the C4ISR upgrades as part of IDS, $6.4 million is 
requested to support a number of initiatives to enhance Maritime Domain 
Awareness, including the necessary field infrastructure to expand 
SIPRNET capability support, which will protect Coast Guard systems from 
exploitation, and also provide prototype Sector Command Centers (SCC) 
and Joint Harbor Operation Center (JHOC) operations support. $11.2 
million is requested to continue implementation of Nationwide AIS to 
significantly enhance the ability to identify, track and exchange 
information with vessels. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $10.6 
million to build off prior years' efforts to improve MDA, including 
operation and maintenance of the Maritime Awareness Global Network, as 
well as the deployment of 80 Nationwide AIS receivers and transmitters. 
Additionally, the $39.6 million requested for Rescue 21 will continue 
deployment throughout the country, providing a State of the art 
distress and response communications system.
    Finally, the Department seeks a total of $4.8 million for the Coast 
Guard's Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRT). Established to deter, 
protect against and rapidly respond to threats of maritime terrorism, 
the MSRT initiative expands upon the prototype Enhanced Maritime Safety 
and Security Team that was established by re-allocating base resources 
in fiscal year 2006. The unit will be capable of maintaining response 
readiness in the event of domestic maritime terrorism incidents.
Enhance Information Sharing with our Partners
    The ability to share information with State and local partners, the 
private sector, law enforcement, and first responders is critical to 
the Department's success, and promotes greater situational awareness. 
DHS is prepared to enhance and maintain interoperability for 
information sharing purposes to ensure a seamless capacity to share 
information during national emergencies and to execute its daily 
mission of detecting and preventing potential terrorist activity.
    In support of this effort the Budget includes an increase of $45.7 
million, 18.1 percent over fiscal year 2006 funding, for activities of 
the Analysis and Operations Account to fund the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis (I&A) and the Directorate of Operations. I&A leads the 
Department's intelligence and information gathering and sharing 
capabilities by ensuring that information is collected from relevant 
field operations and critical participants in the intelligence 
community; analyzed with a mission-oriented focus; and disseminated to 
the appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector partners.
    The Directorate of Operations distributes threat information 
ensuring operational coordination Department wide; coordinates incident 
management activities; uses all resources within the Department to 
translate intelligence and policy into immediate action; and provides 
oversight of the Homeland Security Operations Center, the Nation's 
nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management 
on a 24/7/365 basis.
    To support the Infrastructure Transformation Program (ITP), the 
Budget proposes an increase of $36.3 million. This increase will 
provide a highly reliable, secure, and survivable network 
infrastructure and data center environment to improve information 
sharing, more effectively securing the homeland while reducing 
redundant investments. ITP will integrate the IT infrastructures of the 
22 legacy components of the Department into ``One Infrastructure'' 
which includes the creation of one secure network; the establishment of 
common and reliable email communication; the restructuring of helpdesks 
and related services; the reduction in number and transformation of the 
data centers; the standardization and modernization of the desktop 
workstation and site services environment; and voice, video and 
wireless infrastructure modernization.
    The Budget also includes an increase of $9 million for Data Center 
Development. The Department will continue the integration of its IT 
infrastructure ``Dual Active/Active Data Centers'' that provide a 
foundation for information sharing and agile responses to threats 
against the homeland. The Data Center Development activity plays a 
central role within the ITP, supporting the Department's strategic 
planning priority of ``Stronger Information Sharing and Infrastructure 
Protection.''

Strengthen the DHS Organization to Maximize Mission Performance
    Sound financial management of the Nation's resources is critical to 
maximizing mission performance for the Department. The President's 
Budget aligns the Department's request according to a risk-based 
allocation method, channeling the Nation's resources into the areas 
that will most effectively accomplish the mission of the Department. 
Successful mission performance is driven by developing human capital, 
executing efficient procurement operations, and possessing state-of-
the-art information technology resources.
    A key enhancement to the Budget includes an increase of $12.6 
million to improve financial management department-wide. This includes 
funding to improve DHS' internal controls over financial reporting, as 
required by Public Law 108-330, the Department of Homeland Security 
Financial Accountability Act; analyze opportunities for further 
functional consolidation of segments of Departmental financial 
management; support the Department's plan to achieve an unqualified 
audit opinion with no material weaknesses; produce financial data that 
is timely, reliable, and useful for decision-makers in their mission to 
properly allocate resources to protect the Nation; and help protect 
against waste, fraud, and abuse.
    A total of $18 million is requested for the eMerge2 (electronically 
Managing enterprise resources for government efficiency and 
effectiveness) program. eMerge2 will continue to consolidate accounting 
providers and systems in the Department by matching components 
positioned to become service providers with those in need of new 
systems. eMerge2 will invest in system enhancements, integrate systems, 
and build tools to consolidate financial data, ensure accountability, 
and provide timely, reliable information for decision making.
    In addition, we propose an increase of $41.8 million for the Office 
of the Chief Human Capital Officer to continue implementation of the 
Human Resources System Initiative--MAXHR, a market and performance-
based compensation system that rewards employees for their 
contributions to the mission of the Department, not longevity.
    The Department has identified organizational performance 
deficiencies in the current procurement process and will implement 
comprehensive modifications to prevent fraud and misuse; and ensure 
effective delivery of services and proper procurement and contracting 
procedures. For this effort, we propose an increase of $27 million 
throughout the Department to improve acquisition operations.
    Finally, the Office of Policy requests an increase of $8.1 million 
to provide funding to support DHS participation on the Committee on 
Foreign Owned Investments in the United States under the Policy office; 
expand duties of the International Affairs office; enhance capabilities 
of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC) to work with private 
sector stakeholders; and increase efforts to oversee immigration and 
border security related initiatives.

                               CONCLUSION

    The fiscal year 2007 budget proposal reflects this administration's 
ongoing commitment to protecting the homeland and the American people 
while ensuring the Department has the resources we need to achieve our 
critical mission. The budget builds upon past success and 
accomplishments, reflects risk-based, outcome-driven priorities, and 
supports the key imperatives under our Second Stage Review.
    We will continue to work with Congress to ensure that our short and 
long term priorities are adequately funded--including border security, 
preparedness, strengthening FEMA, and enhancing chemical security. I 
look forward to continuing our partnership with you to ensure funding 
priorities are met so that we can continue to protect the homeland and 
the American people.
    Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look 
forward to answering your questions and to working with you on the 
fiscal year 2007 budget and other issues.

          REPORTED DHS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DUBAI PORT DEAL

    Senator Gregg. Thank you Mr. Secretary and obviously your 
statement will be put in the record, and I appreciate the 
background on the ports because it's a sophisticated system 
you're trying to put in place. However just to clarify the 
record here, there's been reports that when the initial review 
of the Dubai situation came through that the dissenting agency 
immediate approval was the Homeland Security Department. Then 
there have also been reports as we have read, that the Coast 
Guard had specific concerns which may have been applied 
generally to other issues but in this area was particularly in 
response to Dubai? Is that correct? Did the Homeland Security 
Department initially object or raise opposition in any way to 
the immediate approval, or the approval of this--
    Secretary Chertoff. I think the way that gets reported 
reflects a misunderstanding of the process. First of all the 
Department of Homeland Security and all the departments 
generally in this process, there's an ongoing discussion. It 
doesn't--it's not like a formal vote to start the process. It's 
more like a jury ballot; you know it takes a lot of votes. As I 
think Assistant Secretary Baker has indicated previously DHS 
raised certain concerns and the agreement by everybody was 
those concerns ought to be addressed through assurances and 
safeguards which the company agreed to. Those assurances and 
safeguards satisfied us and everybody else on the committee 
that any concerns that were on the table about the impact of 
this on port security would be adequately--more than adequately 
addressed. Because it gave us total visibility into who the 
people were who were going to be over here; a total ability to 
insist upon adherence to the highest security standards we 
impose anywhere; and an ongoing ability for us to monitor 
compliance. So I think with these elements in place and I don't 
think there was any substantial disagreement about going 
forward and getting these elements. But with these elements in 
place, we were certainly satisfied that we had everything that 
we needed, the Coast Guard was satisfied that there was nothing 
more that they wanted to get in terms of assurances. As I say, 
we did get the benefit not only of use of our own intelligence 
component, but the community takes a position, and, of course, 
each department has its own intelligence element. And the final 
thing I would say is, this was not an unknown company to us. 
Customs and Border Protection has worked with this company for 
several years, including overseas and that obviously was a 
significant comfort level in terms of our assessment of the 
transaction.
    Senator Gregg. That being said why is the administration's 
position now that they're willing to delay further. It sounds 
like you have all the information you think you need.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well again, I want to make sure we're 
accurate. It's been announced publicly, although I haven't seen 
that the letter has come in yet, that the company has indicated 
the intent to send a letter asking us to begin a 45 day 
investigation. I don't know that that's ever happened before. 
Whether it has or it hasn't, if we were to receive such a 
letter and I haven't seen it yet, I anticipate we would honor 
the company's wishes. I understand that there's clearly an 
issue of being transparent, of assuring Congress and the public 
that what we've done is a thorough vetting. It's not only that 
we have to do the right thing; we have to be seen to have done 
the right thing. So if the company wants us to pause and 
undertake this review I see no reason why we wouldn't do that. 
But I don't think that's in any sense a concession that somehow 
we think we did something inadequately before.
    Senator Gregg. I don't know how much time I have left, let 
me turn to Senator Byrd, and I'll come back if there's time.

               CLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON THE DUBAI PORT DEAL

    Senator Byrd. For over a week Chairman Gregg's request and 
my request, my staff's request for a classified briefing have 
been rebuffed. The decision to allow Dubai Ports World to 
operate terminals in six of our major ports was done without 
consultation with the Congress. It was done without 
consultation with the State and local governments near the 
ports. It was done without notifying the Congress. Would you 
commit to provide the subcommittee with a classified briefing 
this week?
    Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
    Senator Byrd. Including providing the community 
intelligence analysis that was used to make the decision?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well whatever--I don't know the exact 
elements of the briefing that we do, but as far as I'm 
concerned we will--in the context of a classified briefing give 
you whatever--the reason I hesitate is I don't own that 
document. And I can't commit to provide a document that I don't 
own. Certainly my Department will provide a briefing and 
whatever classified documents, our Department documents can be 
part of that briefing.

  DHS REQUESTED TO GARNER ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL 
               BORDER SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

    Senator Byrd. The budget that you are presenting today 
finally gets the administration and your Department fully 
behind the bipartisan congressional desire to secure our 
borders. This effort started with the amendment that Senator 
Craig and I offered through the Iraq war supplemental with the 
support of our Chairman, Senator Gregg. Congress has taken the 
lead in hiring more border patrol agents and immigration 
enforcement officers and in providing more detention capacity. 
I'm hopeful that this budget request is the first year of a 
multi year effort at gaining true security of our borders.
    To continue that effort, 2 months ago, Chairman Gregg 
attempted to secure an additional $1.1 billion for border 
security infrastructure. I supported his effort at that time, 
to make sure that the agents and investigators that we're 
hiring have the tools to do their jobs. I continue to support 
him. I see no reason to wait another 7 months for the fiscal 
year 2007 budget. Now will you commit to us today to reach out 
to the White House and the House Republican leadership, to get 
their support for Chairman Gregg's efforts?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I am always more than happy to 
commit to taking back to my colleagues in the administration 
and anywhere else advice from this committee about how we ought 
to proceed. I mean we are strongly committed to a comprehensive 
strategy at the border which includes not only additional 
personnel, and we have 1,500 thanks to Congress' action last 
year. We're in the process of getting them trained and 
deployed, we have 1,500 in this budget we are working on a 
comprehensive technology package through our secure border 
initiative which would allow us to actually start acquisition 
later this fiscal year of an integrated approach to using 
technology as a tool at the border.
    Senator Byrd. Does that mean that you will commit to reach 
out to the White House and to the House Republican leadership 
to get their support for Chairman Gregg's efforts?
    Secretary Chertoff. It means I will be always happy to 
reach out and discuss with great seriousness the--this 
committee's effort to make sure we have adequate funding at the 
border. I think it's consistent with this budget. I think it's 
consistent with our strategy, and I look forward to working 
with this committee in doing that.
    Senator Byrd. So the answer is yes?
    Secretary Chertoff. I've been about as clear as is in my 
capability to be. I will certainly carry this committee's 
message back and have a very serious discussion about what this 
committee thinks is appropriate which I think is consistent 
with what our views are.
    Senator Byrd. So it's yes, maybe.

                    STRENGTHENING MARITIME SECURITY

    Your budget embraces the bipartisan congressional effort 
begun in the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental for 
security at our land borders. The administration is promoting 
what it is calling the Secure Borders Initiative. But the 
initiative makes no mention of securing our wide open waterways 
and coastlines from illegal migration. When you strengthen 
security at the land borders those who wish to enter this 
country illegally will pursue other entry points. The 
administration's own national strategy for maritime security 
States, that, and I quote, ``as security in our ports entry at 
land border crossings, at airports continue to tighten, 
criminals and terrorists will likely consider our relatively 
undefended coastlines to be less risky alternatives for 
unlawful entry into the United States.'' Unfortunately your 
budget fails to address the future weakness. The Coast Guard's 
Deepwater budget is flat as far as the eye can see. The Coast 
Guard needs a 21 century fleet of ships and planes. 
Unfortunately they have a fleet fit for the last century. The 
Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is currently the 37th oldest of 
world's 39 like size naval fleets. The Coast Guard Commandant 
has testified that Coast Guard ships and planes are in a 
declining readiness spiral. Under your Deepwater budget, the 
acquisition of new planes, helicopters and ships won't be 
completed until 2026. Twenty years from now, so the rest of you 
will have to look after that. Given these concerns, how can it 
be that you are satisfied with the Deepwater budget?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well Senator, first let me say that we 
fully agree, in fact, part of our operational planning in terms 
of border security reflects an understanding that we're going 
to get more pressure at our coastal borders as we tighten up on 
our land borders.
    Senator Byrd. Are you satisfied with the Deepwater budget?
    Secretary Chertoff. I am. We've got almost $1 billion in 
this year's budget. And a significant amount of money in Coast 
Guard's budget directed at re-engineering assets so that we 
take helicopters that may be old, but we really outfit them 
with brand new engines and brand new avionics. I also want to 
point out that the budget this year includes a 15, 1-5 percent 
increase over last years levels for Coast Guard's supports, 
waterways, and coastal security program. That's an additional 
$274,000 million for this kind of coastal security.
    Senator Byrd. I believe I've overrun my time.
    Secretary Chertoff. So we are actually putting increased 
money precisely into Coastal security area of Coast Guard.

                 PASSCARD TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

    Senator Byrd. I'll wait my turn.
    Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
    Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman? I wonder if Senator Allard 
would be willing to let me go first. And I realize that 
normally you'd go next, but I've just been told that I have to 
Judiciary, and I wouldn't get a chance to question otherwise.
    Senator Allard. I'd be glad to yield to the chairman from 
Vermont, and I would assume that I would be called on next.
    Senator Leahy. I thank my friend showing his usual courtesy 
and Mr. Secretary, I mentioned this briefly when you came in. A 
lot of people asked you about ports, we don't have ports in 
Vermont we do border with a great and good friend of the United 
States, Canada. And we're like many border States we're highly 
skeptical about the development of the border crossing card. 
The so called ``Passcard.'' I understand that you have some 
legislation you've paged. But I would suggest that we--to be 
looking for different legislation and you should be leading 
that charge.
    Aside from whether it's good policy or not, we've got an 
economic and cultural train wreck on the horizon, these cards 
are threatening all kinds of bottlenecks along the most 
efficient, safest, and longest border in the world certainly, 
the longest unguarded border. And I'm concerned about it. DHS 
and the State Department are promoting two different 
technological infrastructures for the card. DHS is promoting an 
open UHF design, that's what we do to track freight pallets. If 
it's open--if this open standard is adopted and is not secure, 
it may actually reduce safety on the border, not only is it 
less secure, it's completely different than what Custom and 
Border Patrol is installing now to read information off of 
chips with the new E-Passport. So it looks like they have to 
have one set of technology for that, a separate technology for 
less secure items, and they could be easily stolen. It's become 
very, very confusing but it also ignores something else. The 
northern border is not our southern border. Our situation with 
Canada, our largest trading partner is much, much different 
than it is with our southern border. It disregards our Canadian 
friends and neighbors. I think it's counterproductive. I think 
along in our State people have families on both sides of the 
border. The difficulty is going to be in crossing, I think it's 
going to create certainly in my State, it will create enormous 
costs but I don't see where it does anything for our security.
    So my question is, why are you supporting this ultra high 
frequency standard, the same thing we do on commercially 
tracking pallets on a truck? Why not support the standard that 
is being used on E-Passports? It seems like everybody's going 
off in different directions, it was probably a dumb idea in the 
first place, but it just gets worse.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well let me answer Senator by saying 
first of all I don't think a decision's been made, in fact what 
I've said, and I've talked to Secretary Rice about this, I 
think we've both agreed and I think we've announced it, is that 
we actually ought to migrate to a common standard. I would be 
very surprised and dismayed----
    Senator Leahy. Well you're sure not going in that direction 
now, you're going in an entirely different one.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, I mean if there are people who 
think they're going in a different direction, maybe the final 
decision hasn't been made. I'm pretty committed to going in a 
single direction. Meaning, I want to have a chip, some kind of 
an RFID chip that is compatible. Whether we do it in a 
passport, or an border crossing card, or in some other kind of 
card.
    Senator Leahy. Well, but Canada is not moving on something 
like this. I mean you're talking about doing this by January 1, 
2008. Is that even realistic? If you don't have a common 
technology now, I mean how realistic. Have you even asked for 
money to get a common technology? I mean I can just see a 
complete screw up on the border come January 1, 2008. Certainly 
our closest friend in this hemisphere is going to be like what 
happened? Are we pariahs?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well first of all, you know we're 
facing a legislative deadline, and I think we have an 
obligation to make the deadline. We have money for----
    Senator Leahy. But you haven't reached a common technology 
yet, how are you going to do that?
    Secretary Chertoff. We've actually been in discussion with 
the State Department. And I think we announced a few weeks ago 
that we actually do have--we are working toward a common 
technology, so I will take back certainly your concern, if 
people are sending you a different signal.
    Senator Leahy. Well take back this concern too Mr. 
Secretary, frankly as a life long Vermonter I live an hour's 
drive from the Canadian border, as one who actually has 
relatives in Canada, who understands the economics of dealing 
with Canada, this is a cockamamie idea. I can show you dozens 
of places where if a terrorist wanted to get through they could 
get through with or without this. But I can show you where law 
abiding people in the United States and Canada will be shut off 
from visiting out of this country. It seems like almost doing 
something for the sake of doing something, not really to 
protect us.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do need to push back on that a 
little bit. Right now, what we use for identification crossing 
the borders is not particularly as useful. I mean, we get all 
kinds of documentation. We do ask for documentation, unless 
were to waive all identification requirements, and just let 
people come and go willy-nilly. It seems we owe the American 
public at least the kind of identification document that is 
biometric and that is secure. It doesn't have to be--
    Senator Leahy. I've crossed that border without being asked 
for identification.
    Secretary Chertoff. But I have to tell you with respect 
Senator, so did Ahmed Ressam, he crossed the border, but for 
the--
    Senator Leahy. And he got caught.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well he did, but you know if it hadn't 
been for an alert Customs and Border Protection person, he 
would have blown up Los Angeles Airport, and then we would have 
had a 9/11 Commission to talk about why we didn't have 
identification cards.
    Senator Leahy. Why not work on something with the 
Canadians. You can't even come together with our own State 
Department, can you get together with the Canadians?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well we are more than happy--first of 
all we are getting together with the State Department, we are 
more than happy to work with the Canadians. Look, let me tell 
you what our end State vision here is. Essentially a driver's 
license type of card. With an RFID chip that works the way 
proximity readers work all over office buildings in this city 
that is inexpensive, that is compatible whether it's issued out 
of Canada, or Mexico, or the United States. I believe we can do 
this. We've got a prototype in the works, I completely endorse 
the idea of a common technology and--or at least a compatible 
technology and not going off in two separate directions. If 
there are people in the Department who think they're going to 
proceed in a different direction, I will certainly address 
that. I think it's doable. I think we're legally obliged to it. 
And I think it actually is a good thing to do.
    Senator Leahy. Well thank you Mr. Chairman. And I thank 
Senator Allard, and I will obviously submit some questions for 
the record, and I hope they don't go into a deep dark hole. I 
hope somebody well actually answer them. It would be nice I 
mean. This is always unprecedented, but nice. Thank you.

                             PORT SECURITY

    Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
    Senator Allard. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 
for holding this important hearing. And likewise I'd like to 
thank the Secretary for taking time to appear before the 
committee. I'd also recognize that the Department of Homeland 
Security, a new department was called to duty in important, 
challenging and unprecedented ways last year. And I think I 
want to recognize in a public way that there were a lot of 
employees of the Department, you have over a 180,000 who did 
their job, and they did it well, and I want to commend them for 
that.
    Now during the course of the year we learned that there are 
some areas where the Department excels and we learned that 
there are some areas where it needs improvement. That's why I 
think this hearing is so very important, so we can pursue some 
of those. I want to follow up a little bit on the port 
question. I have some security concerns. Not so much in the 
short term, but in the long term. You know that part of the 
world, all those countries together, have not proven to be 
sterling examples of how you recognize terrorists and how you 
control them from getting into your operation. Are you 
comfortable with how--there's going to be turnover in that 
company, and are you comfortable with how new personnel may 
come into that company, the kind of background checks and 
everything that they may be required to do, and whether there 
is going to be something that, over time, could assure the 
American people that this may not convert over to where you 
have a terrorist or two infiltrate the organization?
    Secretary Chertoff. I am, Senator. And let me explain why 
for a moment. The change that is being envisioned here, is the 
change in the port terminal operator in the United States of 
America. Obviously foreign ports are always operated by 
foreigners, because they're in foreign countries. In terms of 
the workforce, first of all we will know any change in 
management, or any change in personnel. We'll have the 
opportunity to check them against our watch lists, or even 
require a more in depth background check. With respect to the 
longshoreman force that actually is generally handled by a 
hiring hall. Those are not regular employees of the port 
terminal operator, they are hired everyday based on the way the 
union, or if it's not a union, the non union halls send people. 
So those aren't going to be regular employees of the company, 
many of them are background checked according to the ports. 
We're actually going to take some steps in the near future to 
increase the level of background checking.
    And finally, if there is a desire on the part of the 
company, and this is not just this company, any overseas 
company. If any overseas company wants to send people into the 
United States to manage operations here, they've got to get a 
visa. Which means we're going to check them, we're going to 
determine that we're comfortable with them. We're going to run 
them against our watch lists. We're going to do what we would 
do anytime somebody wants to come and work in the country. So 
contrary to some of the reporting, the company, no foreign 
company has the ability on its own to decide they're going to 
send somebody to the United States to work in a port without 
our knowing about it and approving it as part of the visa 
process.

 FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS TO MINIMIZE SPENDING, WASTE AND FRAUD

    Senator Allard. I'd like to move on, I think we've covered 
that issue, perhaps enough. But we've provided, meaning the 
Congress, has provide $87 billion, and dollars already 
allocated in addition to that. The Department's requesting 
additional $19.8 billion to meet what they described as 
emergency needs. Anytime you have a large outflow of dollars 
there's bound to be some waste. I'm interested in knowing what 
kinds of mechanisms you put in place to try and keep the waste 
down to a minimum, try to keep fraud down to a minimum, so that 
we have some accountability, as we move forward in the 
spending.
    Secretary Chertoff. We have an oversight board in place a 
Katrina Oversight board, in place to look in general at the 
gulf and how we're spending money. From the very beginning of 
this post Katrina effort, really the first week, we got the IG 
involved right up front in terms of helping us try to design 
programs that we thought would minimize the amount of fraud and 
waste. We recognized that particularly in the initial weeks 
when there was a real sense of emergency and crisis, we might 
have to bend some of the normal rules, because people were 
literally thrown out of their houses with barely the clothing 
on their back. But we've got an oversight board in place now. 
The IG, I think, has established a separate Assistant I.G., 
Inspector General, simply for the purpose of dealing with the 
Katrina--
    Senator Allard. And have they been submitting reports to 
you on a regular basis?
    Secretary Chertoff. They submit reports to the Inspector 
General, and I will get from the Inspector General, reports 
about what the status of this is. And of course Congress will 
as well.
    Senator Allard. So you've been getting those?
    Secretary Chertoff. I don't know if I recall personally 
seeing one, I know the Inspector General has been getting them, 
and I've been getting oral reports, and reports about 
particular problems that have been arising.
    Senator Allard. Has he pointed out some flaws and perhaps 
maybe some corrections that needed to be made?
    Secretary Chertoff. The Inspector General has; some of the 
flaws he's pointed out have been publicly revealed. We are 
taking steps trying to correct those, frankly some of the steps 
require us to address in advance of this hurricane season, 
contracting so we get some of the things in place before we 
actually get into the emergency situation. And you know, I 
consider the Inspector General a part of our management team, 
in a sense, that we take very seriously his suggestions. And in 
particular the Deputy Director of FEMA who is responsible for 
the gulf, is really tasked to work very closely with the 
oversight board and the Inspector General for the gulf in terms 
of making sure we are constantly monitoring these things.
    Senator Allard. I know my time has expired, if I could 
just--I want to follow up this. Who do we have on that 
oversight board?
    Secretary Chertoff. You know as I sit here I can't tell you 
the names of the people, let me get you that list.
    Senator Allard. Yeah, a list and backgrounds, if you would 
please. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
    [The information follows:]

                        Katrina Oversight Board

               UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT: JANET HALE

    Janet Hale was confirmed on March 6, 2003, as Under Secretary for 
Management. Prior to her nomination and confirmation as Under 
Secretary, Ms. Hale served as the Assistant Secretary for Budget, 
Technology and Finance for the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and as chief financial officer and chief information 
officer.
    Prior to HHS, she was the Associate Administrator for Finance for 
the House of Representatives and the Associate Director for Economics 
and Government at the Office of Management and Budget, responsible for 
budget and policy development, regulatory reform, and financial 
management for the departments of Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, 
Justice, and 25 smaller agencies. Ms. Hale has also served as the 
Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs at the Department of 
Transportation, Acting Assistant Secretary of Housing at the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Vice President with the U.S. 
Telephone Association, and Executive Vice President for the University 
of Pennsylvania.
    She graduated from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, with a 
Bachelor of Science in Education and received a Master in Public 
Administration from the Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government.

            ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER: EUGENE H. SCHIED

    Eugene H. Schied is the acting Chief Financial Officer of the 
Department of Homeland Security. His permanent position is that of 
Deputy CFO. Mr. Schied became the Department of Homeland Security's 
first deputy chief financial officer in December 2004. In this 
capacity, he supports the CFO in the day-to-day management of DHS' 
budget, financial reporting, working capital fund, resource management 
transformation, performance and planning, and investment review 
operations. He is helping to lead the transformation of independent 
legacy financial management operations and systems in DHS into a 
cohesive corporate entity capable of achieving and sustaining the 
highest financial management standards. Mr. Schied also served as DHS' 
budget director from May 2003 until March 2004.
    In between his positions at DHS, he was the budget director at the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which provides 
budget and financial support to the Federal Judicial System.
    Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Schied was the deputy chief financial 
officer of the Department of Justice, where he served in the position 
of deputy assistant attorney general/controller from March 2001 until 
May 2003. He first joined the Department of Justice in 1992 as a 
Presidential Management Intern, and held various positions of 
increasing responsibility within the Department of Justice, including 
holding the position of chief financial officer of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
    Mr. Schied holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the 
Ohio State University School of Public Policy and Management and a 
Bachelors of Arts in political science from the University of Iowa (Phi 
Beta Kappa). Prior to moving to the Washington, DC area, Mr. Schied 
worked for the City of Peoria, Illinois, City Manager's Office.

               CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER: ELAINE C. DUKE

    Elaine C. Duke is the Chief Procurement Officer for the Department 
of Homeland Security. She provides leadership over the department's 
over $11 billion in contracts and $12 billion in financial assistance 
programs. Ms. Duke was the department's Deputy Chief Procurement 
Officer from October 2005 to December 2005, when she assumed duties as 
the acting Chief Procurement Officer. In January 2006, Ms. Duke took 
over the full responsibilities as the department's second procurement 
chief. Before coming to the headquarters, she served for two years as 
the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Transportation Security 
Administration.
    Ms. Duke spent the majority of her career in acquisition with the 
U.S. Navy. She completed her final tour with the Navy at the Naval Sea 
Systems Command in Washington, DC. She was Director, Office of Contract 
Policy as well as the Deputy Director, Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical 
Division in the Contracts Directorate. Prior to her tour with Naval Sea 
Systems Command, Ms. Duke served on the staff of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Environment), working the base 
closure and realignment program.
    Ms. Duke also held various positions with the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command. She began her career as a contracting officer for 
the U.S. Air Force. In addition to her work in the Department of 
Defense, Ms. Duke served as the Deputy Director of Contracting and 
Property Management for the Smithsonian Institution and Director of 
Acquisition and Grant Services for the Federal Railroad Administration.
    Ms. Duke has a Bachelor of Science degree in business management 
and a Master's degree in business administration.

             ACTING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS: ROBERT F. SHEA

    Mr. Shea was named Acting Director of Operations for FEMA in 
support of Acting Director Robert David Paulison in February 2006. In 
this position, Mr. Shea is responsible for implementing policies and 
procedures on behalf of the FEMA Director and overseeing the day-to-day 
response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness activities of FEMA, 
part of the Department of Homeland Security.
    Mr. Shea's 29-year career in public service has touched on all 
phases of FEMA's emergency management roles including preparedness, 
response, recovery and mitigation along with all areas of functional 
responsibility including operations, planning, logistics and 
administration. Beginning as a FEMA Disaster Assistance Employee, Mr. 
Shea has taken successively more challenging roles from program analyst 
to branch chief in the former State and Local Programs and Support 
Directorate, to division director and then deputy administrator and 
finally acting Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation 
Administration in FEMA.
    In 2004 Mr. Shea was detailed to the Office of the Secretary, 
Department of Homeland Security where he confronted the new challenges 
of the post September 11 environment by supporting the issuance of the 
National Response Plan, the initial formation of the Principal Federal 
Official program, and the implementation Special Events Program. These 
responsibilities brought him into contact with each of the 22 
components of DHS.
    Mr. Shea resides in Alexandria, VA where he and his wife, Mary 
Hope, have raised four daughters, Sofia, Michele, Hope, and Victoria.

                 INSPECTOR GENERAL: RICHARD L. SKINNER

    Mr. Skinner was confirmed as the Department of Homeland Security 
Inspector General on July 28, 2005. Between December 9, 2004--July 27, 
2005, he served as Acting Inspector General. He held the position of 
Deputy Inspector General Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since 
March 1, 2003, the date that the Office of Inspector General was 
established.
    Prior to his arrival at DHS, Mr. Skinner was with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where he served as the Acting 
Inspector General (October 2002--February 2003) and Deputy Inspector 
General (1996--2002). From 1991 to 1996, Mr. Skinner served at FEMA OIG 
as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits. In 1998, he received the 
President's Meritorious Executive Rank Award for sustained superior 
accomplishment in management of programs of the United States 
Government and for noteworthy achievement of quality and efficiency in 
the public service.
    From 1988 to 1991, Mr. Skinner worked at the U.S. Department of 
State (DOS) OIG. During his tenure at DOS OIG, Mr. Skinner served as a 
senior inspector on more than a dozen foreign and domestic inspections 
and in 1991, Mr. Skinner was appointed by the Inspector General to 
serve as the ``de facto'' Inspector General for the Arms Controls and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
    From 1972 to 1988, Mr. Skinner held a variety of audit management 
positions with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (DOC). He began his Federal career in 1969 with the OIG of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
    Mr. Skinner holds a B.S. degree in Business Administration from 
Fairmont State College and an MPA degree from George Washington 
University.

               DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL: JAMES L. TAYLOR

    James L. Taylor was selected as Deputy Inspector General effective 
October 16, 2005. He previously served as the Deputy Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) and Director for Financial Management at the Department 
of Commerce. In this role, he also acted as Chair of the CFO Council 
Policies and Practices Committee. Under his direction, the Department 
of Commerce obtained the first of six clean financial statement audit 
opinions and reduced material weaknesses from 11 to 0. Mr. Taylor led 
the Department's successful effort to obtain a ``green'' rating on the 
Financial Management Initiative of the President's Management Agenda.
    Prior to his work at Commerce, Mr. Taylor held the position of 
Deputy Chief Financial Officer at the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), where he was directly responsible for all financial 
operations, with expenditures of over $4-10 billion annually.
    Immediately prior to joining FEMA, Mr. Taylor served as Assistant 
Administrator for the Federal Insurance Administration, a self-funded 
activity charged with managing the National Flood Insurance Program, 
where he was responsible for all financial, personnel, facilities, 
strategic planning and other administrative operations and policy.
    Mr. Taylor has been the recipient of numerous awards for 
outstanding accomplishments, including the Presidential Rank Award for 
Distinguished Executive in 2004; the Donald T. Scantlebury Memorial 
Award for Excellence in Financial Management in 2005; the Gold Medal 
for Outstanding Achievement in Financial Management in 2003; and the 
Director's Award for Outstanding Achievement in 2000.
    Mr. Taylor holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science/Economics 
from Old Dominion University and an MPA in Finance from the University 
of Delaware.
    special inspector general: matthew (matt) a. jadacki, cpa, cgfm
    Mr. Matthew ``Matt'' Jadacki is the Special Inspector General for 
Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery, under the Office of Inspector General, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS/OIG). He joined DHS/OIG in 
October 2005. The Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery Office focuses on 
preventing problems through a proactive program of internal control 
reviews and contract audits to ensure disaster assistance funds are 
being spent wisely
    He is also responsible for coordinating the audit activities of 
other Federal Inspectors General who have an oversight responsibility 
for the funds transferred to their respective departments and agencies 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assist in the 
disaster relief efforts.
    Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Jadacki was the Chief Financial Officer/
Chief Administrative Officer (CFO/CAO) of the National Weather Service, 
a component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). Before the National 
Weather Service, Mr. Jadacki was the Acting CFO of FEMA, managing 
eleven branches with over 200 employees and a $12 billion budget. Prior 
to FEMA, he worked in the U.S. Department of State from 1987 to 1991 as 
an Audit Manager and in DOC as an Operating Accountant/Auditor from 
1981 to 1987.
    Mr. Jadacki holds a B.S. in Business Management from the University 
of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, and is both a Certified Public 
Accountant and Certified Government Financial Manager. He holds 
memberships in a number of societies, including the Association of 
Government Accountants, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants.

                               PASS CARDS

    Senator Gregg. Senator Murray.
    Senator Murray. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I echo the 
comments of the chairman and ranking member, we welcome you 
here. You've got great people but, Mr. Secretary I'm not very 
happy today. I joined Senator Leahy in his deep concern about 
our borders. The confusion is incredible. He mentioned a 2008 
deadline. It's 2007 for ferries. We have people who cross our 
border on land, don't need a passport, get back on a ferry and 
come back and they can't get back in the country because they 
don't have a passport. We're told about these one day passes. 
This is a whole topic of conversation. It isn't working. And 
I'm going to be submitting some questions on that. I want to 
talk about port security today.

                         PORT SECURITY FUNDING

    You came before our committee last year, we gave you a 
pass, you were new on board, but you've got tremendous 
influence on this budget that we've been given. And I was 
curious that your presentation on sea port and cargo security 
was fairly long today, but in your testimony that you provide 
us last week you didn't mention port and cargo security, and 
that's been my concern about the administration since September 
11. We hear rhetoric, we do not see any action. I've been 
calling for a port and cargo security initiatives for almost 4 
years now, and in a comprehensive plan.
    There's 360 ports in our Nation today. I don't go to bed at 
night thinking that we're secure in our port system despite the 
rhetoric and the nice talk you gave about we look at things 
overseas. I don't feel we're very secure. And I look at your 
budget today where you're cutting back major programs, killing 
major programs. Port security program, formula base grants to 
States, training and exercise, port security grants, I mean I 
look through this and I say where's the money? And I hear you 
say you take the information back. Who are you taking it back 
to? You're the Secretary, and it should be you standing in 
front of all of us saying we have to do this. I just feel like 
maybe the DP World has kind of brought this to Nation's 
attention. But we have not done enough on port security. 
Senator Collins has been fantastic, she and I have worked 
together to produce a Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act, 
that is a comprehensive cargo secure regime. We would like to 
get your input back on that we've been working with everybody. 
But it has been very hard to get this administration to put 
their money behind their talk on Homeland Security. And I for 
one, again, do not feel that this Nation is secure when it 
comes to our ports, our cargo, and the millions of containers 
that come in here everyday.
    So my first question to you is when are we going to see a 
comprehensive port security plan. Are you going to get behind 
Senator Collins and I, are you going to ask for the resources 
that we need? We hear the White House say don't worry about 
this deal about UAE DP World because security is being done by 
our Nation. Yet, I've had Secretary Ridge before you come 
before our committee and others who say Federal Government has 
done their part on port security, it's now up to the private 
companies who run these ports. So I hear a really mixed 
message.
    Secretary Chertoff. And I think the answer is, I'd like to 
try to unpack the different elements of this, because there are 
several different elements. I certainly do not believe that the 
Federal Government is finished with port security and something 
which I said last summer, and I think I said it in January, is 
one of our major initiatives has to be to push out the security 
envelope in the supply chain.
    Senator Murray. Right, and you outlined that in your 
testimony and I know that you say the words. But are you going 
to get behind the Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act that 
Senator Collins and I have written and have worked hard to make 
sure that we have a secure regime in place?
    Secretary Chertoff. I don't know that I'm in a position 
right now to take a definitive position on a particular act. 
But what I can tell you is, we're committed, first of all, to 
continuing what we're doing in the overseas, finishing the 
overseas container security initiative, but beyond that, moving 
further down the supply chain. Just a few weeks ago, I was in 
conversations with the major shippers to talk about how we can 
take advantage of the architecture to get better security as we 
push further down, even to the point where things are initially 
manufactured overseas and start their way up the supply chain.
    Senator Murray. I've been hearing that rhetoric for years.
    Secretary Chertoff. But I have to say, I mean that's why I 
went through the exercise of putting the charts up. I don't 
think it's fair to say we haven't made progress. I mean----
    Senator Murray. Well I agree with you we have made some 
progress, we have the radiation port monitors; we've got some 
things in place. We are looking at some of the containers 
overseas today. But we don't have the authority overseas today 
to stop one of those containers from being loaded onto one of 
our cargo container ships. We have a lot of work ahead, 
wouldn't you agree with that?
    Secretary Chertoff. I agree we have work ahead. And I agree 
in particular we've got some----
    Senator Murray. Well and I guess my--and I only have a few 
seconds left. My concern is this budget doesn't reflect the 
need to really focus on cargo and container security and that's 
why the red flags on this whole issue. That's what really 
concerns many of us. I am out of time. I want to have this 
conversation with you; I would like to sit down with you. I 
know Senator Collins would as well. We need to do more.
    Secretary Chertoff. I would be happy to do that.
    Senator Murray. And I would say this, I know my great 
friend from Maryland is going to talk about the Coast Guard 
budget too, but I'll you what, under this proposal 63 percent 
of the Coast Guard budget is directed to Homeland Security. 
They need the money. They're doing a fantastic job out there. I 
don't think any of that should be disregarded. But I look at 
your budget and I see that the Coast Guard's budget on search 
and rescue is cut $31 million, on natural resource protection 
cut $56 million a total cut from traditional missions of $87 
million. In my home State of Washington, we count on the Coast 
Guard for search and rescue, fisheries protection, making sure 
that they are watching our very, very complex coast line and 
when all they hear is their only mission is Homeland Security 
that doesn't make our country very strong when we see 63 
percent of their budget now go to Homeland Security and they're 
losing out on their critical missions, their life saving 
missions that are important to State's like mine and other 
coastal States.
    Secretary Chertoff. I would welcome the opportunity to talk 
to you about this. Let me just make a couple of observations. 
This year our total amount of port security related funding in 
the 2007 budget request will be over $3 billion, about $500 
million more than was enacted for 2006. As far as the 
percentage of Coast Guard that's considered Homeland Security 
funding, I have to say, in some ways, I mean I always look at 
all of it as Homeland Security funding. But one measure of how 
Coast Guard has performed, and the fact that we haven't 
compromised its other missions, is the magnificent performance 
down in New Orleans last summer where we got more rescues than 
in several of the previous years, 33,000 rescues and I think 
that shows----
    Senator Murray. The Coast Guard does a fantastic job.
    Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. The capabilities are 
there.
    Senator Murray. But they are getting burned out. And that 
is a deep concern to many of us in the coastal States. And just 
so you know, much of the funds you're talking about in terms of 
ports are legacy funds. You're not asking for new funding and 
the Commandant of the Coast Guard said it was going to cost 
$7.3 billion over 10 years for our ports just to comply with 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The administration 
has only asked for $46 million, a tiny part of that. I don't 
see how we can continue to do this, and continue to put the 
costs on the private companies that operate our ports and feel 
secure.
    Secretary Chertoff. If I can respond to that, I know that 
everyone's out of time. I would simply say this: I mean the 
private port owners actually do have to step up to the plate 
and do some of the funding, I will tell you for example----
    Senator Murray. But Mr. Secretary that's exactly what the 
President said last week, was that we don't need to worry we 
are in charge of security. Yet you just said that the private 
companies need to step up and do it.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well in terms of some of the funding 
support for example. I don't see why----
    Senator Murray. But if it is their funds, then they're in 
charge of it.
    Senator Gregg. Senator, we're going to have to move on.
    Secretary Chertoff. Let me just give you a concrete 
example. I think that we are clearly responsible for the 
security. On the other hand, I don't think we should pay for 
the fencing for a private company to build fencing and 
lighting. I think we ought to make them pay for it. Now if they 
don't pay for it, we ought to penalize them. There ought to be 
a mandate, and we do mandate it. We mandate a lot of businesses 
have to take certain kinds of precautions to protect 
themselves. I think that's completely consistent with what the 
President said, which is we have the responsibility for 
security, we have to check it. But that doesn't mean we're 
going to pay private companies to do what they ought to be 
doing to protect their own assets.

                           PREPARED STATEMENT

    Senator Gregg. Senator Mikulski.
    Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and 
you're the right person to be chairing this committee. I recall 
you were the first subcommittee on Appropriations along with 
the help of Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, to hold hearings 
on terrorism. Well before 9/11 and your keen interest is very 
much appreciated. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my 
opening statement be in the record.
    [The statement follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski

    Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wanted to start off by saying that Mr. 
Chairman you are the right person to be chairing this committee. I 
recall that you were the first subcommittee chairman on the 
appropriations committee along with the help of Senator Byrd and 
Senator Stevens to hold hearings on terrorism. You held these hearings 
well before the tragedy of September 11. Your keen interest in securing 
our homeland and protecting this country from terrorism is very much 
appreciated.
    Good morning Secretary Chertoff. I want to thank you, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and all of the staff at DHS, as 
well as all of our security agencies, who work so hard to keep this 
country safe. It's good to be here with you today to discuss the 
President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of 
Homeland Security.
    Last year at this time you had just been sworn in as the new 
Secretary of DHS. This past year has certainly been a busy year for the 
Department. It has been full of major challenges such as Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, and has been ridden with major failures. At the top 
of that list was the failure of the Department and a failure of our 
Nation's emergency response and preparedness to the hurricanes and the 
people who were in desperate need of help.
    The President's budget for next fiscal year claims to provide $35.7 
billion to the Department of Homeland Security, which is a 6 percent 
increase over last year. But if you take away the President's proposal 
to double the airline security tax from $2.50 to $5, the budget is only 
a 1 percent increase over last year's level. This concerns me.
    I am pleased that there are small increases to two important grant 
programs: the State Homeland Security Grant Program which has been 
increased by $88.1 million and the Urban Area Security Initiative 
Grants which has been increased by $82.5 million. These are important 
programs and I am happy to see that both have been increased.
    However, I am very concerned about the cuts to key first responder 
grant programs. The SAFER Act or firefighter staffing grants have been 
completely eliminated, the Emergency Management Performance Grants was 
cut by nearly $12 million and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Grants have been totally eliminated.
    But I want to address three issues specifically with you today 
about the Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2007 budget: The 
P&O/UAE Deal and Port Security, immigration application backlogs for 
military service members and fire grants.
    First of all, the P&O/UAE Deal and Port Security Grants. I have 
worked for many years on the Port of Baltimore, from dredging to port 
security. So you can imagine my concern when I learned of a foreign 
government-owned company taking over the Port's operations. I got 
really angry when no one in the administration seemed to know about the 
deal not the President, not the Secretaries of Treasury or Defense not 
you.
    After further inquiry, I learned that the deal was approved quickly 
and secretly. The decision was made behind closed doors by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an entity that 
most Americans don't even know exists. The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States has 12 members: the Secretaries of 
State, Defense, Commerce and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, 
the Secretary of Treasury, and six officials from the White House. The 
six White House officials are: the Director of Office of Management and 
Budget, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Chairman on the Council of 
Economic Advisors, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 
and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
    The decision to outsource our ports was made in only 30 days and I 
am left with many questions about the decision. At what level did this 
Committee meet? Did Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, Attorney 
General Gonzales and Secretary Snow sit around and decide this? Or was 
it delegated to the coordinator of the coordinator? Was the FBI 
consulted? What about the Director of National Intelligence?
    This decision is about national security. The national security 
threats facing our ports are real. I have said before that our ports 
continue to be vulnerable to the infiltration of terrorists, the use of 
commercial cargo containers to smuggle chemical or biological weapons 
or even a dirty bomb, the intentional sinking of large commercial cargo 
ships that could result in loss of life and block access to major 
shipping channels, and the use of land around the port to stage attacks 
on bridges, or our waterfront chemical and oil refineries.
    Port operators play a vital role in insuring that these threats do 
not become realities. The President tells us not to worry the Coast 
Guard will continue to protect our ports. Yet, the Coast Guard is 
already stretched too thin. They have increased responsibilities with 
only slight increase in their budget. The Coast Guard is charged with 
protecting 300 ports, more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals, 
more than 1,000 harbor channels, all of which are spread along 
thousands of miles of coastlines.
    Our Coast Guard is one of the most efficient and effective of all 
Federal agencies weren't we proud of them following Hurricane Katrina? 
The Coast was there when we called on them. We need to ensure that we 
are there for them and that the Coast Guard has the assets it needs to 
been these challenges. The Coast Guard estimates that more than $5 
million is needed for port security improvements. Yet, the President's 
budget eliminates funding for the Port Security Grant Program a $175 
million cut from last year. Our ports are essential to national 
security and border security. I look forward to working with you to 
ensure the security and viability of the Port of Baltimore for now and 
in the future.
    Now I want to turn to the issue of immigration application backlogs 
for men and women serving in the U.S. military. This is an issue that 
is close to my heart. Currently there are over 40,000 non-U.S. citizens 
serving in the U.S. military today. Many of them want to be come U.S. 
citizens but are caught up in red tape and paperwork and immigration 
backlogs. Today there are about 3,000 applications pending at DHS for 
service members applying for U.S. citizenship Spc. Kendell Frederick, 
an Army reservist from Randallstown, Maryland got caught up in this 
immigration backlog. His mother. Mrs. Michelle Murphy tried to help him 
but she got the run around from immigration about what her son needed 
to do to complete his citizenship application. He ended up being killed 
in Iraq before he could become a U.S. citizen.
    This should not have happened. Mr. Secretary, I want to ensure that 
the men and women who have put themselves on the line, fighting for 
this country are treated with the respect and professionalism they 
deserve, including when they are applying to become U.S. citizens. DHS 
should be working to ensure that resources are used to eliminate the 
backlogs and improve the information these members receive.
    It is crucial that service members and their families receive 
accurate information when they call customer service at immigration and 
that immigration forms reflect the current state of the law.
    That has not always happened and this is why I introduced the 
``Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act.'' This bill is meant to 
improve the process for those men and women fighting for this country 
to become U.S. citizens. I hope that you will join me and support this 
important legislation.
    Finally, I want to address another important issue fire grants. We 
all know that when tragic events occur in our community, firefighters 
are always the first on the scene. The Fire Grant Program offers double 
value for American taxpayers firefighters get the training and 
equipment they need to do their jobs safely whether they are responding 
to a terrorist attack or a tornado.
    FEMA and the National Fire protection Association found that an 
estimated 57,000 firefighters lack personal protective clothing one-
third of firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained 
breathing apparatus. The Fire Grant Program supports our firefighters 
by giving them the equipment and training they desperately need. But 
this is not about new fire trucks and protective gear. It's about 
protecting the protectors and saving lives. So I look forward to 
working with Members of the Committee in addressing this funding 
shortfall.
    Thank you Mr. Secretary and look forward to your testimony today.

    Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman and colleagues, I'm going to 
focus on three issues. The Dubai ports, second the issue of 
immigration where our military who have green cards and how 
they're treated in a terrible backlog and number three, the 
short sighted funding of our first responders.

                              DUBAI PORTS

    On the reports, Baltimore is one of the six ports affected 
in this Dubai deal, so we're pretty much on the edge of our 
chair wondering what it means in terms of port security. Here 
is my question Mr. Secretary, you're a member of the committee 
that's--the CFIUS that's supposed to do this. Do you personally 
attend the meetings or do you delegate that authority?
    Secretary Chertoff. The general procedure, which was also, 
by the way, the procedure that was followed when I was at the 
Department of Justice, and as far as I know is the procedure in 
every department is that the--I know the committee does a lot--
    Senator Mikulski. Do you go or do you delegate?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I have to--you've got to give me 
an opportunity to answer the question.
    Senator Mikulski. Well, I've got 5 minutes.
    Secretary Chertoff. I want to answer the question 
accurately. The practice of all departments is, first of all, 
there aren't a lot of meetings where everybody sits around. 
There's a lot of telephone and email. An Assistant Secretary is 
the level that generally conducts activities. If there is an 
issue that is raised, it comes up to the Deputy and to the 
Secretary. So I have on individual cases been involved 
sometimes very deeply----
    Senator Mikulski. Were you involved in the Dubai port?
    Secretary Chertoff. I was not involved in the Dubai port 
deal prior to its--the no objection, going from our department 
to the committee.
    Senator Mikulski. Were you aware of the Coast Guard yellow 
flashing lights that they raised?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I've read the Coast Guard memo, 
including the classified.
    Senator Mikulski. When did you read it?
    Secretary Chertoff. I read it about a week ago. And I will 
tell you I must respectfully disagree with your 
characterization. I don't see it as a flashing light. I have 
seen countless intelligence reports, you've got to let me 
finish. I've seen countless intelligence reports that quite 
properly conclude by analyzing what is known, and then 
indicating that there are things that are not known. The piece 
of this report which was not widely reported yesterday, but was 
finally declassified is the Coast Guard's conclusion in this 
report. Which was an early report that DP World's acquisition 
of PNO in and of itself does not pose a significant threat to 
U.S. assets in U.S. ports.
    Senator Mikulski. Mr. Secretary, I read intelligence 
reports too, I'm on the intelligence committee. Moving right 
along here, are you now going to be personally involved in this 
45 day----
    Secretary Chertoff. I strongly suspect I will be.
    Senator Mikulski. No, I didn't ask if you suspect, sir.
    Secretary Chertoff. Of course I will be involved in it.
    Senator Mikulski. Directly and hands on. Will there 
actually be a meeting of this committee where you, Rumsfeld, 
Secretary Snow, Attorney General Gonzales, in other words those 
named will actually do this. Because it has enormous impact in 
terms of security, public confidence, and also relationships 
with people abroad.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I agree with you it's very 
important. I will be personally involved. I'm not going to 
speak for other Secretaries; you'll have to ask them what their 
degree of involvement is going to be. I have actually been 
personally involved in this since the last couple of weeks when 
it became clear to me this was going to become a matter of some 
controversy. I can't say that I looked at every scrap of paper, 
but I certainly intend to be involved----
    Senator Mikulski. What criteria will be used to determine 
if there is a national security----
    Secretary Chertoff. The same criteria I would use with any 
company, any foreign company, or any foreign country. I would 
judge the risk, I will look at the assurances that we have 
obtained and the guarantees from the company and I will satisfy 
myself that these put us in a position to eliminate any 
material risk with respect to foreign ownership. And in doing 
that I will certainly consult with the chief intelligence 
officer in my department, the experts in Customs and Border 
Protection and the experts at the Coast Guard.
    Senator Mikulski. And will you be coordinating with Mr. 
Negroponte, our Director of National Intelligence?
    Secretary Chertoff. Yes. I will speak to him too.
    Senator Mikulski. And we'll look forward to the classified 
briefing. Is my time up?
    Senator Gregg. No Senator, as I said we'll extend your 
time. We wanted to make sure you got the questions in, so why 
don't you go on to your next question there, and then Senator 
Kohl's next.

                       MILITARY IMMIGRANT BACKLOG

    Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and 
Colleagues, I don't know if you're aware but there are members 
serving in our United States military who are not American 
citizen's but possess green cards. They fight bravely, they 
fight valiantly and they're doing a good job. I had a 
constituent Kendal Frederick who actually was in the high 
school ROTC before the military. Anyway he was jerked around by 
immigration services, as was his mother, saying that his 
fingerprints didn't count that he had given to the military to 
become a citizen. Well the military took pity on him, and in 
Baghdad arranged for him to go get his fingerprints after 
Immigration told him he had to return to Baltimore. You with 
me? From Baghdad, he would have loved to come back. He died on 
his way to getting his fingerprints. So I've looked into this 
situation, I've got legislation pending and now this goes to my 
question, even though other things have been rebuffed.
    Mr. Secretary there are 3,000 men and women fighting who 
have green cards that have a back log with your Department. 
What are you doing about the backlog?
    Secretary Chertoff. We discussed this, and first of all I 
completely agree with you that we ought to make a special 
effort with respect to making sure our service personnel are 
not held up with green cards. I wasn't aware the backlog was 
3,000. I'm certainly prepared to tell you that we should move 
heaven and earth to put these soldiers to the front of the line 
and figure out a way to cut through the red tape. I've conveyed 
that direction to Citizen and Immigration Services, I will 
certainly be pleased----
    Senator Mikulski. I really need you to insist upon it, and 
look at it.
    Secretary Chertoff. I agree. I'm onboard with that.

               DHS ACTIVE DUTY FINGERPRINT VETTING POLICY

    Senator Mikulski. Number two, the issue of fingerprints. In 
other words when you join our military, you're fingerprinted 
and you're vetted. We understand that there is now a bottleneck 
with your agency accepting the vetting process and fingerprints 
of DOD. What is your plan to correct that?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I have not heard that there was a 
problem with it. If there is an issue with respect to the 
quality of the prints, I mean that's, I guess, an issue we have 
to address with DOD going forward. If the prints are of 
sufficient quality and it's just a question of getting them 
compatible with our databases, we ought to be able to sold 
that, particularly because the numbers aren't that large.
    Senator Mikulski. But nothing's happened.
    Secretary Chertoff. As I say, I was not personally aware 
there was a fingerprint backlog, but I will find out about it.
    Senator Mikulski. It's not a fingerprint backlog; it is a 
policy that is what's good enough for the Department Defense to 
accept someone to serve our country is not good enough for you.
    Secretary Chertoff. I mean that doesn't make any sense to 
me, so I agree with you in principle, now as often is the case, 
when I go back I get----
    Senator Mikulski. You get a buzz and I'm tired of the buzz.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well----
    Senator Mikulski. We've been buzzed.
    Secretary Chertoff. All I can tell you is, I believe you 
are correct. We should be able to use DOD fingerprints. If 
there is somehow a problem with the way the prints are taken, 
we have to figure out how to correct that. And we'll get back 
to you.
    [The information follows:]

          DHS' Active Duty Military Fingerprint Vetting Policy

    CIS agrees with the Ombudsman's concept and intent to improve the 
fingerprint process for military naturalization applicants, but CIS 
does not concur with waiving the fingerprint-based criminal history 
check at this time.
    CIS recently initiated efforts with the U.S. Military and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to reengineer the fingerprint 
process specifically for active duty military customers. Several 
meetings and numerous discussions have occurred exploring the 
possibility of waiving the CIS fingerprint requirement by relying on 
background checks performed by the military at the time of enlistment 
as well as post-enlistment background checks. Unfortunately, each of 
the four branches of the military employ independent enlistment 
processes and, even though a fingerprint check is conducted at the time 
of enlistment, post-enlistment background checks are not routine. 
Further, the military has confirmed that post-enlistment arrests and 
charges are not necessarily known by the military. Therefore, because 
no measures are in place with the military to ensure naturalization 
ineligibility issues of criminality are identified, CIS cannot concur 
with waiving the fingerprint requirement.
    Though CIS does not concur with waiving the fingerprint check, CIS 
does recognize of the importance of military service and the special 
needs of military personnel. CIS, in conjunction with the military, FBI 
and Office of Personnel Management (OPM), is developing a fingerprint 
process that will eliminate the need for a soldier to appear anywhere 
for another fingerprint appointment. Under this process, when an 
application for naturalization is filed, the fingerprints previously 
collected by the military at time of enlistment will be forwarded to 
CIS and resubmitted to the FBI for an updated check. The details of the 
process are as follows:
  --At time of enlistment fingerprints are collected by the military 
        and forwarded to the FBI through the OPM
  --The FBI performs a criminal history check, forwards results back to 
        OPM, and the FBI retains the fingerprints in a history file
  --Upon receipt of a naturalization application submitted by an active 
        duty military member to the Nebraska Service Center (NSC), the 
        NSC will notify CIS staff at the FBI to request the 
        fingerprints from the FBI for resubmission
  --Once retrieved by the FBI, the fingerprints are forwarded to the 
        NSC in hard-copy format
  --NSC converts the fingerprints into an electronic format and 
        resubmits the prints to the FBI through CIS' electronic 
        fingerprint system. The fingerprint images are also 
        electronically stored at CIS
  --Fingerprint transaction data and the FBI's search results are 
        posted in CIS' fingerprint system and viewable globally
    The process improvement described above is only a first step. CIS 
envisions additional enhancements as the Biometrics Storage System 
(BSS) becomes available and the military considers possible changes at 
the enlistment stage to automatically provide fingerprints to CIS. 
Additionally, CIS is discussing with the military the concept of the 
military establishing a background check infrastructure to certify 
their personnel as having ``good moral character,'' along with other 
less significant fingerprint process changes.

    Senator Mikulski. This is the functional equivalent of 
March 1. Could we look at this before April 1?
    Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
    Senator Gregg. I'm going to move on to Senator Kohl.
    Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
    Senator Gregg. And by the way Senator, I'm sure you're 
going to be able to straighten this out, because you're on the 
same wave length. But if you can't, I'm sure we can figure out 
how to do something in the bill.
    Senator Mikulski. I'd like to discuss this with you further 
Mr. Chairman. And thank you, I hope I haven't run into your 
time.

                            DUBAI PORT DEAL

    Senator Gregg. Senator Kohl.
    Senator Kohl. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, to 
return to the issue that's been discussed once or twice here 
today. This deal failed to pass the smell test with the 
American people as you know, which is why we're here discussing 
it today in such great detail. And as you know, top 
administration officials, including the President, Secretary 
Snow and yourself, were unaware of the deal until after it was 
approved and announced. And so now, we're talking about a 45 
day delay while it goes through a review process. But the 
President has already said that the deal is a proper deal, and 
I think you're more or less saying it today. So why would any 
of us have great confidence in any chance that you're going to 
come back in 45 days and say, guess what it's not a good deal. 
It's not the right deal, you think many people really believe 
that's going to happen?
    Secretary Chertoff. First of all let me make it clear. I 
don't care whether its 30 days, or 45 days, if new facts were 
to come to light, obviously we would act on the new facts. And 
you know no one has yet asked us to do a 45 day review. There's 
been press accounts, but I haven't seen a letter yet. So I'm 
not going to anticipate a letter that hasn't come yet. But 
look, the bottom line is the facts speak for themselves. We're 
going to give classified briefings, you had 12 or 14 agencies 
looking at this, nobody--once we had the assurances in place 
and they're very, very substantial assurances nobody raised an 
objection to this deal going forward.
    And let me spend just a moment talking about the 
assurances, because I think maybe this is an item that escapes 
public attention. The whole point of the assurances is, it 
makes it clear that it's not like we're done with the process 
of vetting the company. The assurances give us the authority 
and obligation to continue vetting the company for the next 
months and years. And it gives us an unprecedented ability to 
do that. So it was always contemplated, once these assurances 
were signed that we would have the Coast Guard and Customs and 
Border Protection on a port by port basis, deeply engaged in 
the process of reviewing what is going on in those terminal 
operations, who the personnel are, what the security situation 
is. So I basically reject the premise of the criticism that 
somehow once we completed the review and allowed the 
transaction to go forward, we somehow then are done. The 
assurances were in fact designed to make sure we have a 
continuing involvement in the process of security, just as we 
do by virtue of the Coast Guard's inherent authority of 
Captains of the Ports. This happens to be one of those few 
areas where we have agencies that are so deeply involved on an 
ongoing basis, that we have much greater ability to assure 
security than in most sectors of the economy.
    Senator Kohl. I appreciate that, and again what you're 
saying leads me to conclude that in fact this deal is intended 
to go forward by the administration. And I think you're making 
that very clear right now with all the assurances and so on, 
and the President has said that he would veto any attempt by 
the Congress to override that decision. So I'll leave the 
issue, but I think the impression has been made clear that you 
all are intending to go forward with this, in a way which gets 
by the furor that is immediately surrounding it, to a time when 
it could be done--so you know, that's the impression I have, 
you may disagree with that. But I'd like to leave it. I want to 
ask you a question----
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I'm sorry Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't 
like to leave a hearing, a public hearing, and have my silence 
be taken as acquiescence. If we were to be asked to undertake a 
45 day review, we would do it honestly. At the end of the day 
though, the facts are the facts. We will see what the facts 
are. And that means the facts about what the intelligence is, 
what our current security authorities are, what the security 
posture is and what the company undertakes.
    Senator Kohl. Okay.
    Secretary Chertoff. So we'll deal with the facts as they 
are.
    Senator Kohl. In connection with that, I'd like to talk 
about foreign ownership of ports, not ownership in fact but 
ownership of the operation of the ports. Many people are 
arguing that our ports should never have been turned over to 
foreign governments in terms of operations. Legislation, as you 
know, has already been introduced to ban any such deals. And 
we're living in a post 9/11 world. Having been repeatedly 
warned about the vulnerability in our ports I think that this 
legislation deserves serious consideration. How do you feel 
about the principle of having foreign owned companies, deeply 
involved in the operation of our ports?
    Secretary Chertoff. I think in evaluating this proposed 
legislation Congress ought to consider the fact that obviously 
many of our port terminals are operated by foreign countries 
including for example China, which I think acquired a port in 
the late 1990s. PNO itself is a foreign owned company. Almost 
all of our shipping companies are foreign owned and obviously 
if you're going to start to talk about foreign ownership you 
need to talk about the shipping companies, and of course most 
importantly the foreign ports which is where the cargo gets 
loaded therefore where the greatest vulnerability exists. By 
definition, foreign ports are foreign owned because they're in 
foreign countries. So, I guess what I would say from a risk 
management standpoint is, I always caution against the idea of 
focusing very hard in a particular anecdotal issue that arises, 
without stepping back and looking at the whole framework and 
asking where the highest risk is.
    To be honest I think the highest risk in our maritime 
system is what happens overseas, because there's where cargo 
gets loaded. And a lot of our emphasis has to be, without 
suggesting domestic ports aren't important, a lot of what we've 
got to do in terms of further work is extend our security 
overseas. But I have to acknowledge that foreign ports will 
always be operated by foreign companies because they're in 
foreign countries. So we're going to have to live in a global 
world, and I think we need to make sure as we do so, we're 
fair, we have a level playing field, we don't treat, you know 
countries that are friendly are treated in like fashion. We 
should be able to distinguish between our friends and our foes. 
I think it would be a very bad message if people in the Middle 
East for example were to walk away with the feeling that even 
when they're friendly we treat them dismissively. I think all 
foreign companies raise concerns. I think we ought to treat 
those concerns in a manner that's even handed, focuses on the 
facts, and make sure that we treat our friends well and our 
foes not so well.
    Senator Kohl. Well you're right, and this legislation 
that's been introduced is not directed against any part of the 
world as you know, its legislation that says all of our port 
security in this country should be handled by operations owned 
in this country. So it's not in anyway an aspersion on the 
Middle East.

 NECESSITY OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP LONGEVITY AND POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCIES 
                          DUE TO DHS' ENORMITY

    One final question if I may take just a minute. DHS is an 
enormously complicated operation as I'm sure you would attest. 
In terms of it's budget, in terms of its mission, in terms of 
it's number of personnel. I would ask you whether or not, if 
it's going to be operated effectively, somebody needs to be in 
a position of authority like yourself for a long, long, long 
time. And pursuant to that, do you think that DHS is too big to 
be operated effectively for example, with respect to FEMA and 
what happened in Katrina, whether or not FEMA deserves to be an 
independent agency; some of the things that FEMA controls 
deserves to be broken away from DHS. How can DHS be as diligent 
as it must be, and needs to be, if it's such a gargantuan 
organization?
    Secretary Chertoff. I've given that obviously a 
considerable amount of thought in the year that I've been on 
the job. And let me give you two answers, first of all I think 
emphatically, there is value in having this as a single 
organization. It doesn't mean it's easy to integrate. I mean 
it's not easy to integrate and DOD took 40 years. But you know 
in the end DOD produced a product, a combined joint services 
approach to military operations which by all accounts is much 
better than the way it operated when we had three separate 
departments. If you look at what happened in Katrina, the best 
results occurred when we operated in an integrated fashion, 
using the whole department. When Admiral Allen came onboard he 
really was committed to using all the assets of the department 
as PFO and he did so, and he did so effectively.
    When we stepped in as a department and we were able to 
apply our resources at TSA to help manage evacuations, or Coast 
Guard to do rescues. That was when the Department did best. 
When the Department failed is when people decided to go it 
alone. And I am strongly convinced if we were to set--if we 
were to reverse course, separate FEMA out, we'd now create a 
fissure or a fault line between two of the critical elements of 
response. And it would make coordination that much more 
difficult, it would make the ability to build FEMA into what it 
deserves to be that much more difficult. I think that we were 
on course to do the right thing with integrating. I will tell 
you we didn't get there, we weren't there when I arrived, and I 
think I was pretty honest in saying to people we needed to do a 
lot more work. I said it in July, and I draw no comfort from 
the fact that it was proven to be right in August. I think 
though the original design makes a lot of sense. These are all 
prevention, protection, and response, and all a spectrum of 
things we have to use for all hazards whether they be natural, 
whether they be terrorists. We will often not know when we 
could have a outbreak of disease, we wouldn't know if it was a 
terrorist attack, or a natural attack, you know anthrax, for 
example, occurs in nature, but it also can be weaponized. So I 
think that having an integrated approach that learns to use all 
of the tools anytime we have a hazard or a challenge actually 
makes a lot of sense.
    I do though recognize you know, we're 3 years into this. It 
took DOD 40 years to do Goldwater-Nichols, Senator Bennett says 
it took 5 years to get the Department of Transportation right. 
I'm committed to doing the job in less time, but I would be 
less than honest if I didn't tell you that it's not going to be 
done in a week, and I don't think anybody thought it was going 
to be done in record time. So we've got a lot of work to do. 
We've accomplished a lot. I'd be the first to tell you we've 
got a lot of areas where we got to do a lot more work in. But I 
think the course we have now is the right course.
    Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

         DHS' ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FEMA'S CAPABILITIES

    Senator Gregg. Thank you Senator. And we want to let you 
get to the work of which you have a lot to do, but I just want 
to make a couple of comments and then ask a couple of specific 
questions. On this concept of organization, I'm not so sure I 
subscribe to your view. You know, I was here a little bit 
before you got here in this fight; and in fact before 9/11 we 
tried to address this issue and we ended up with a tug of war 
between FEMA and what was then called National Domestic 
Preparedness Office which was in the Justice Department as to 
who would control first responders, and whether FEMA was the 
right agency to deal with first responders in a terrorist 
event. And FEMA came in and co-opted the NDPO and then you 
split it off now, and moved it up to a Secretary level, and so 
there's real issues here of management. And it seems to me that 
it really gets to the capacity of an agency to handle an event. 
That should be the way we should look at it. I think the White 
House has done the right thing, and this Townsend report, I 
don't know what the official title is, but just reading it I 
haven't talked to her. But it seems to me that you've got to 
grade the catastrophe. The event's level of impact and if you 
have a flood in New Hampshire on a major river like we had, 
FEMA does a great job and it should be the response agency. If 
you have a middle level catastrophe but it's contained, such as 
9/11, FEMA again may be the right agency to come in, in 
coordination with a lot of other agencies. But when you get to 
one of these catastrophic events, where you're essentially 
wiping out--what happened was it wiped out a city and a region, 
FEMA is not capable of handling it period. And nor probably is 
the Department of Homeland Security, you just do not have that 
capacity and you're probably going to have to use the 
Department of Defense capability. And so I think there's got to 
be some structure which grades the event before the integration 
occurs as to who is in charge. And then gets those people on 
the ground that should be in charge fast, which was the problem 
in Katrina. We didn't have the right people there. If the 
Department of Defense had charge of New Orleans, those people 
wouldn't have been left at the Super Dome. They would have been 
out of there because we would have had helicopters, and we 
would have had what was needed.
    And so I think the White House is on the right track, I 
know you're very integrated in that process, but this idea that 
FEMA should have responsibility for every major catastrophe in 
this country is I think a huge mistake. I mean there are some 
things they simply aren't going to be able to handle. Also 
whether or not domestic God-driven strategies should be within 
the organization called the Homeland Security Department. And 
when you're time is 50, or 60, or 70 percent, and I suspect it 
was at least that high during the peak of the Katrina event, 
maybe 100 percent of your time is focused on a domestic 
catastrophe because your agency is not functioning well in that 
catastrophe, that's drawing off resources. It's drawing off 
attention from what is the threat, which is the terrorists are 
coming across the border with something that's going to harm 
us, or they're here and they're going to harm us. And so I'm 
just not sure that we shouldn't have some sort of quasi 
independent effort here on the issue of domestic God driven 
events. And I guess we shouldn't blame God for these events, 
but events that have nothing to do with human input. So I don't 
accept necessarily the thesis of your position yet, and I think 
it needs to be looked at in a much more aggressive way, and I 
respect and congratulate the leadership you and the White House 
have given with this Townsend initiative.

                           TSA HIRING FREEZE

    A couple of specific questions, TSA is under a hiring 
freeze, it's been under a hiring freeze for 2 years, I 
supported that freeze the first year, I've supported it the 
second year, you can't continue it. It's clear they're having 
huge attrition; they're using massive overhead dollars, I 
think, to get through the day; there are morale issues, I 
believe, that are developing that are very serious within that 
agency. We're bringing online technology which should reduce 
the need for personnel, but it's not there, it's not working 
yet. In fact these puff machines I understand they take more 
time wiping them down than they save time putting people 
through them. This budget because of the way it's been 
structured basically continues that freeze.
    First question, can this agency continue to function 
effectively and maintain the respect of the public if it is 
under this type of a personnel freeze. Second, if we lose this 
$1.6 billion that has been put in here as a ``here today, gone 
tomorrow'' budget number, a plug, how does your Department 
function?
    Secretary Chertoff. With respect to the first question, I 
think you know, ultimately over time we need to migrate to a 
more efficient, more technologically driven system. But that's 
not going to happen over night as you say Senator. One thing 
that we are trying to do though is change our protocols to 
begin to move to a more efficient use of screeners. One of the 
things that Assistant Secretary Hawley has done for example, 
he's started to retrain them not to focus on the nail and 
scissors, but to focus on detonators and detonators pieces, 
behavioral pattern recognition, this of that sort. Putting more 
of our screening personnel into--and other security personnel 
out into the area of the airport in general rather than having 
them clustered at the area where we do the magnetometer.
    So I think he is actually working very hard to find a way 
to leverage the resources that we have to make them more 
efficient.

                       TSA PASSENGER FEE INCREASE

    I guess we come back to the fee, and look I have a very 
simple position, I think it's the right thing to do. Let's put 
aside whether I'm being a Don Quixote here, but if I didn't 
think it was the right thing to do that would be a different 
story. I think it's a fair price to ask passengers to pay, and 
rather than----
    Senator Gregg. Let me ask you to pause there. Even assuming 
that's true. Under the budget that you sent up here, the fee 
doesn't go to passengers. It goes to border security. So you're 
asking the airline passengers to pick up this cost, now you can 
argue that it's all the same pot, its fungible. But there's no 
increase in TSA personnel even though the fee goes up.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well there is, I mean I guess my answer 
is, it is all the same pot, and it does fund research into new 
technologies, deployment of replacement machines in order to 
deal with other machines. I mean at the end of the day, if we 
didn't--if we had a gap of $1.6 million, I have no doubt some 
of the impact of that gap would be felt in TSA operations. And 
you know at the end of the day, you have to say to the 
industry, a world in which we had to plug a gap and it wound up 
giving us longer lines at the airports and more inconvenient 
airport situations; it would not be a happy situation for the 
airlines. I mean maybe the answer is if we look--you know if we 
don't--if we did have a gap to plug, maybe the answer is we 
should look to plug the gap at least in part where the 
beneficiaries who should be paying the money are located. So 
that at least the cost is visited upon those who don't want to 
pay the fees. I am hopeful that we can figure out a way to come 
up with an appropriate fee. We retooled it this year; we came 
up with a different approach, if someone has a better, fairer 
way to do it, I'm open to hear about a better, fairer way to do 
it. But at the end of the day this was Congress' original 
vision, that this expense ought to be borne by those who 
benefit from it, and I think we ought to insist on that.
    Senator Gregg. Well under that logic there should be a 
border crossing fee.
    Secretary Chertoff. You know you could--I tell you for 
example with respect to immigration services. We charge----
    Senator Gregg. I'm not talking immigration, I'm talking 
about the person who drives across the border from well there 
aren't too many who drive across the border from New Hampshire, 
but you know from Vermont to Canada or from Brownsville to----
    Secretary Chertoff. I think Congress recognized when it 
passed the original transportation security plan; that the 
extraordinary expense of transportation security; keeping that 
system safe was an extraordinary burden and should be borne at 
least in part, because it's not entirely borne by the fee, but 
it should be borne at least in part by the fee. Coast Guard 
charges fees for certain kinds of activities. It's not unknown 
for the----
    Senator Gregg. Well should there be toll booths at the 
borders so that you're actually tying the fee to border 
security and not to airline security.
    Secretary Chertoff. And I think there though, the benefit 
you can argue about border security is distributed so widely 
across the country that everybody benefits and everybody ought 
to pay. Airline security and I think this was Congress' 
position when the legislation was passed, you know people who 
never got on an airplane don't really benefit. The benefit 
really goes to the passengers. And therefore, while we 
shouldn't require them to pay the entirety of it having them 
bear a share doesn't seem unreasonable. You know some people 
disagree obviously. I actually think though that there's a lot 
of merit to that position, and we're talking about a 
comparatively small increase. I mean if we were talking about a 
huge amount of money, I think that would be different. But at 
the end of the day, a net raise of $2.50 for you know, if you 
have to wait at the airport for an hour you spend that in soft 
drinks and newspapers. And now they charge you for the headsets 
on the planes, that's $4, or $5. I mean it just--I have to say, 
in the nature of things, it doesn't seem an unreasonable thing.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you Senator Byrd do you have any 
additional questions?

                        TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

    Senator Byrd. The President has submitted to Congress the 
outline of his proposal for what he calls a Temporary Worker 
Program. The proposal would legalize the status of millions of 
illegal aliens to work in the United States. How many legal 
aliens, individuals who cross the border illegally, or over 
stayed their visas would be allowed to legalize their status 
under the President's guest worker program?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well this is, as you know Senator there 
are a number of different proposals. The President has outlined 
general principles. I don't think he submitted a specific 
proposal yet. I think the estimates are, somewhere between 8 
and 11 million illegal migrants in the country. Now some of 
those are probably children who you know would be--if there 
were a TWP a Temporary Worker Program they would be in the 
country under the umbrella of their parents. But my, again 
rough, really rough estimates are it could be around 7 million 
workers who would ultimately have to be eligible under a 
temporary worker program.
    Senator Byrd. So that's amnesty isn't it?
    Secretary Chertoff. It's not amnesty. I mean the President 
has been very clear that this would be a program that would not 
put people to the head of the line, or reward them for doing 
something that they hadn't done. What it is, is a recognition 
of an economic reality. There are millions of jobs now in this 
country that are being performed by undocumented workers. I was 
talking to a mayor whose name I will not mention, who estimated 
that much of the home health system in the country is run with 
the help of undocumented workers. The lettuce growers out west 
complain without undocumented workers or workers coming in from 
South America, all the lettuce would wilt. I think if you go 
around and you look at grounds keeping, what people do on 
lawns, you find an awful lot of undocumented workers. These 
workers are here because American employers are paying them to 
come here, or paying them to work here. And if we don't admit 
that fact and the incredible economic demand and pull that that 
is, we are not really addressing the problem honestly. I am 
four square behind you increasing enforcement, more border 
control, more satellites, more this, more that. But if you 
expect that to do the job 100 percent, I think there's an 
unfair demand being placed on our Border Patrol. I think in the 
end, you have to address, and find some way to regularize and 
bring into a legally regulated channel all of this economic 
demand for temporary workers, so that we can really focus on 
the people I think the country wants us to focus on most, which 
are people who are coming in not to simply do work that nobody 
else wants to do, but to commit crimes or to commit anti-social 
acts or even to be terrorists.
    Senator Byrd. Now why would such a program not encourage 
other illegal aliens to break the law, in the hope of being 
similarly rewarded with legalized status?
    Secretary Chertoff. I think the answer is two reasons. 
First of all, of course we could in fact make part of the law 
requirement that this would only apply to people who could 
demonstrate they had been in the country prior to the time that 
the program was announced or the time it was passed. But second 
because I think that much of the focus of this has to be on the 
employers. It seems to me right now we're in a situation where 
we're in a twilight zone.
    Senator Byrd. You're what?
    Secretary Chertoff. We're in a twilight zone. We basically 
say to the employers don't hire illegal migrants, but we also 
say we're not going to really check very hard. And I think 
that's the worst of all worlds. What we ought to do is----
    Senator Byrd. Why do we say that?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well we do it, because we have not been 
vigorous enough in enforcing worksite enforcement.
    Senator Byrd. Why is that?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well that's what we're in the process 
of changing. One of the things the budget has ----
    Senator Byrd. How long is it going to take to change it?
    Secretary Chertoff. Let me try to lay out what our plan is. 
We have the basic pilot which allows employers to verify the 
status of their employees. The budget contains I think $135 
million to expand that program. That would give us the 
ability--for the first time--to say to employers, all 
employers, not just a small group--now you have a tool that 
will allow you to check the status of your employees. At the 
same time we are taking steps now to increase our worksite 
enforcement capability. The budget contemplates adding several 
hundred new enforcement agents to enforce worksites. We've got 
some legislative proposals up on the Hill that would give us 
better tools in terms of worksite enforcement. We have to 
consider increased penalties for worksite enforcement; it seems 
to me you've got to do both of these things. You've either got 
to give people a legal channel to check the status of their 
employees; but then at the same time if you give them that 
channel and you give them a temporary worker program, you have 
to have a real sanction if they chose not to use the course 
that the law has set out in front of them.
    Senator Byrd. So you don't think that illegal aliens are 
encouraged to break the law in the hope of being rewarded with 
legalized status?
    Secretary Chertoff. I think if we properly design a 
temporary worker program it will recognize the reality that we 
have, millions of undocumented workers in the country, but will 
encourage people to come in using a documented and legal form 
of temporary worker as opposed to an illegal form?
    Senator Byrd. When are we going to do that?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, the President's budget has money 
in here for the verification. There are a number of proposals 
now for Temporary Worker Program; Chairman Specter I guess has 
issued the chairman's mark on this. We are looking at the 
various proposals, and I think it's our expectation and our 
hope that we will see action on a Temporary Worker Program bill 
this year.
    Senator Byrd. What's he waiting on?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well right now, we've just gotten the 
chairman's mark, Chairman Specter has issued a mark. We've 
got--we're analyzing that. It's just a matter--we've just had 
it for a few days. We have the proposal by Senator McCain and 
Senator Kennedy, we have a proposal by Senator Kyl and Senator 
Cornyn, there's a lot of discussion about these issues. They 
are complicated issues, but at least I think we are now 
underway to tackling this very serious issue.
    Senator Byrd. Once these illegal aliens have been 
legalized, how do you ensure that they'll leave when their 
temporary work visas expire?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well one of the critical elements of 
the process is temporary worker status. It would have to 
involve a background check, would have to involve a biometric 
identification card, so that we would be able to, for the first 
time, have real ability to identify people in this country who 
are temporary workers, and who are working on a temporary 
basis. And then that would be the tool that we would use to 
track people and make sure they're complying with the law. If 
people's visas ran out, at that point, an employer who hired 
that person to continue to work, after their visa had expired 
would face a pretty serious sanction; and we could hold them to 
a pretty serious obligation to check the status of their worker 
to make sure they don't hire somebody who is here, having over 
stayed their visa.
    Senator Byrd. Is it impractical to detain and remove these 
aliens now?
    Secretary Chertoff. It would cost--I had it estimated, if 
we this year were able to round up every single undocumented 
worker, and if you accept the estimate of 8 to 11 million we 
would have to build three times as many jail cells as currently 
exist in the entire United States at some astronomical cost. We 
would have to pay to have all these people removed. I don't 
know that there are enough airplanes, commercial airplanes that 
we could lease to put all of these millions of people on 
airplanes and send them back.
    Senator Byrd. So it's impractical then?
    Secretary Chertoff. I would say it's virtually impossible.
    Senator Byrd. And why is it any less impractical to assume 
that they'll be detained and removed 6 years from now?
    Secretary Chertoff. Because in 6 years if we devise this 
program correctly, and we create a proper incentive structure 
to have employers no longer employ people who are illegal, 
because employers can find sufficient legal temporary workers 
to do the jobs, economics will do the job for us. What will 
happen is after the visa period, the demand for this kind of 
illegal worker will be dried up, this will be satisfied by 
legal workers and by temporary workers. And I think everybody 
agrees that the principal reason people come to this country 
illegally to work, is because they want to make money. If 
there's no work for them, then the incentive is for them to go 
back home.
    And there are some further things we can do. I mean they 
may accumulate benefits for example over 6 years, and we could 
make the receipt of those benefits contingent upon their 
returning back to their home countries. That would create a 
financial incentive. I mean, I don't want to suggest this is 
easy; we have wrestled with this question for 20 years. I 
remember when I was U.S. Attorney in the early 1990s we were 
talking about this.
    The bottom line is, if we don't harness the economics of 
the market place, if we don't build a set of incentive 
structures, we will never solve this problem. I do not believe 
there is a way, simply by using enforcement and border security 
that we can ever address the issue of all these undocumented 
workers.
    Senator Byrd. Well, how do we ensure that our immigration 
system is not overwhelmed by the millions of aliens who would 
qualify for this program?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, part of what we are beginning to 
do now is to plan the kind of information technology 
architecture we would need to process people if we had a 
temporary worker program. And if a temporary worker program 
were passed, we'd have to deal with two sets of people. People 
overseas who want to get in the program who would have to 
presumably come to our consulates and register, and people in 
this country. And I think one of the issues we are wrestling 
with now, is what is the most efficient architecture to 
register people, capture their fingerprints, run their 
fingerprints against databases, interview them as we do with 
visas, and then get them an inexpensive biometric card. I 
suspect probably we would, you know the employers would have to 
play a very significant role in the process because they are 
the beneficiaries and so there might be fees involved. But I 
don't want to get too far ahead of myself. You've identified 
the complicated and important questions that have to be 
addressed, and that we are currently addressing, and we are 
currently planning in the event that we do get a Temporary 
Worker Program that Congress passes. This is a very challenging 
task. And immigration reform has been tried before. It was 
tried in the mid 1980s, in many ways you know, you really have 
to hesitate to take the challenge on. The problem is there's no 
choice. If we don't address the challenge, we will continue to 
be mired in what is an unacceptable situation in this country.
    Senator Byrd. What have we learned from the implementation 
of the 1986 amnesty?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well I think we've learned amnesty is 
not a good idea. And it's not a good idea to build a program 
that is focused only on one element of the spectrum. In other 
words, you've got to have serious border enforcement, serious 
internal enforcement, and a serious Temporary Worker Program. 
And only if all of these elements come into play can we expect 
success.

                  CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY LEGISLATION

    Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, it has been 4\1/2\ years since 
the terrorists struck the homeland. While the administration 
has been focusing a large portion of its resources on aviation 
security and the border, chemical plants remain vulnerable. In 
my State of West Virginia there are 73 chemical manufacturing 
plants, and 100 chemical distribution plants. If there were an 
attack on one or more of these facilities, the potential loss 
of human life and damage to the local and the national economy 
would be devastating. Despite the multitude of warnings that 
the chemical sector is vulnerable to attack, the administration 
has shown a great reluctance to make security at chemical 
facilities a priority. I have pressed this issue with you, and 
I have pressed it with former Secretary Ridge. Repeatedly I've 
done this and to very little avail. I'm told that the private 
sector is taking care of it.
    Last year the Government Accountability Office concluded 
that for 93 percent of the chemical industry it is uncertain 
whether facilities are improving security at all. Only 1,100 of 
the 15,000 chemical facilities identified by the Department of 
Homeland Security are known to adhere to voluntary industry 
security procedures. I was encouraged last summer when the DHS 
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and 
Information Security testified before Congress that a system to 
enforce and audit security standards must be put in place for 
the chemical sector. Unfortunately no action has been taken 
since his testimony.
    Your fiscal year 2007 budget proposes $10 million for a 
chemical security office, which will evaluate the risk of 
chemical facilities and establish security standards for them, 
but this funding would not be available until fiscal year 2007, 
which would further delay the effort to secure chemical 
facilities. Why are you kicking this can down the road and not 
pursuing enforceable standards for the chemical facilities now?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well Senator, I'm pleased to say we 
actually are. As Assistant Secretary Stephen said last year we 
do believe that it is appropriate to have some mandatory 
standards in the industry. I think we've dealt with a number of 
Members of Congress, there's a proposed legislation that 
Chairperson Collins and Senator Lieberman have proposed. We are 
working with them on the legislation. I think we've sketched 
out what principles we believe we need to have in chemical 
plant security legislation, which is to have tiers of risk, 
focused the most on the highest risk in chemical plants, and 
require certain kinds of performance standards. Require audits, 
and verification. We don't have the authority at this point, in 
general, to do this. Although we do under the MTSC have 
authority for chemical plants on waterways and rivers. We're 
really looking to Congress to work with Congress in coming up 
with an appropriate piece of legislation that would give us the 
authority to do, for the chemical sector at large, the kind of 
regulation that we think is appropriate. Now obviously the 
devil is in the details, but we are supportive and working with 
Congress now on some legislation that is working its way 
through the process that would address this issue.

                   CHEMICAL SECTOR NATIONAL STRATEGY

    Senator Byrd. Congress required you to complete a national 
strategy for the chemical sector by February 10, 2006. That 
strategy has not been submitted. Why? And can you tell the 
committee when that strategy will be submitted to Congress?
    Secretary Chertoff. I believe the strategy is in the final 
stages of being reviewed, I think it went through several 
rounds of comments from stakeholders in the private sector. I 
believe that the comment period is now done, and I'm 
anticipating this spring that we will have the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the specific chemical 
sector plan published.
    Senator Byrd. When?
    Secretary Chertoff. This spring.

                  CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY LEGISLATION

    Senator Byrd. This spring. Yesterday, the Government 
Accountability Office concluded that legislation is necessary 
to give the Department the authority to require the chemical 
industry to address plant security. It's been 3 years since the 
Department of Homeland Security was created, why hasn't the 
administration proposed legislation for Congress to consider?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well we actually have in the last few 
months sat down with a number of Members of Congress. We have 
outlined the essential parameters of what we think legislation 
should be. So we have submitted a proposal, not a--not a 
detailed bill, but actually kind of a set of general principles 
and we're actually----
    Senator Byrd. What Members of Congress?
    Secretary Chertoff. We sat down with--I sat down myself 
with Chairperson Collins, and Senator Lieberman who are--I 
think have got a bill that they've been working on, and the 
Homeland Security Committee. I've dealt with a number of 
Members of the House to get their views on a bill, so there is 
actual legislation. Now I don't want to suggest that we support 
the legislation in all respects. There are elements of this 
Collins-Lieberman bill that we support, elements we don't 
support. But we are engaged in the process with Congress as we 
speak in trying to fashion what we think would be a good piece 
of legislation.
    Senator Byrd. How long is that process going to be?
    Secretary Chertoff. I'm afraid that now you're asking me a 
question that lies more in the area of Congress competence than 
mine. I think it's before the committee, I don't know that 
there's been a markup yet. But I may be wrong about that.
    Senator Byrd. But the administration hasn't proposed 
legislation for Congress to consider, has it?
    Secretary Chertoff. We've laid out general guidelines, and 
we've agreed to work with Chairperson Collins and Senator 
Lieberman and their bill recognizing that there maybe some 
areas of disagreement, as well as some areas of agreement.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Gregg. Well we thank you very much Mr. Secretary 
for the time you've given us this morning. And again I know on 
behalf of myself and Senator Byrd and other members, we want to 
thank your staff, and people who work for your agency for their 
dedication to this country. And we hope that the criticism that 
you've heard today is taken as constructive, because it was 
meant to be constructive. And our job is to give you the 
resources you need and make it possible for you to do your job, 
and the people who work for you do their job better; and we're 
very committed to that. And this committee has not been on the 
cheap side on resources, that we've been able to round up for 
you and we intend to continue to go in that direction, but we 
obviously have reservations about what was sent up relative to 
the budget. Thank you.
    Secretary Chertoff. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the 
hearing:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

                        ENDING CATCH AND RELEASE

    Question. Mr. Secretary, you have made a commitment to end catch 
and release of detained illegal aliens. Drastically reducing catch and 
release, even if not ending it completely, is an important commitment. 
We need to understand the cost implications. Can you make good on this 
commitment with the resources available to ICE for fiscal year 2006? If 
not, what additional funds are required?
    Answer. The Department has made ending ``catch and release'' on the 
Southwest Border a priority and the Department has already made 
significant progress in achieving this goal. The Department has:
  --Increased efficiencies in the detention and removal system to allow 
        for faster turnover and greater utilization of detention 
        capacity;
  --Expanded the use of expedited removal across the Southwest Border; 
        and
  --Worked with foreign governments to ensure that they accept back 
        their citizens who have violated our immigration laws on a 
        timely basis.
    The recently enacted supplemental provides sufficient funding for 
an additional 4,000 detention beds in fiscal year 2006 as well as 
associated removal and transportation costs. This additional funding 
will allow DHS to detain nationals of El Salvador apprehended in the 
Rio Grande Valley (RGV) Border Patrol Sector. Nationals of El Salvador 
comprise one of the few populations still subject to ``catch and 
release'' on the southwest border due to the 17 year old court 
injunction. As a result of the supplemental, DHS plans to expand 
detention capacity by approximately 3,000 beds in the Rio Grande Valley 
with the remaining 1,000 beds distributed along the border in response 
to apprehensions.
    Question. Is this commitment only for the southwest border?
    Answer. After implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the 
department pledged to end the practice of ``catch and release'' along 
the Southwest border, where 92 percent of the ``Other Than Mexican'' 
(OTM) apprehensions have taken place for the fiscal year to date. 
Eventually, however, we hope to end this practice altogether. Key 
elements of SBI that are aimed at ending ``catch and release'' include:
  --Increasing the number of agents to patrol our borders, secure our 
        ports of entry and enforce our immigration laws; and
  --Expanding and creating more efficient detention and removal 
        capabilities.
    The detention and removal process is being re-engineered to create 
an efficient system that will always have available detention capacity 
by streamlining the process for removal and minimizing an alien's time 
in detention. To date, we have achieved significant efficiencies in the 
process through increased cooperation with foreign governments, 
increasing detention capacity, and expanding expedited removal, as well 
as streamlining our internal removal process. We will continue to focus 
on these objectives and increase efficiencies as we work to achieve our 
goal.
    Question. When will this be implemented for the northern border and 
along the coasts as the Department has committed to do?
    Answer. DHS is committed to protecting all borders, including the 
northern and coastal borders. On January 30, 2006 DHS took an important 
step by authorizing the use of expedited removal on the northern and 
coastal borders. This was preceded by Border Patrol personnel from 
these sectors being trained in the use of Expedited Removal. Coastal 
and northern border sectors are currently engaged in performing 
expedited removals of aliens who meet the defined criteria for 
placement in this removal process and where detention assets are 
available.
    Question. What is the plan to address the problems presented by 
family detention and placing El Salvadorans in expedited removal?
    Answer. In support of the Secretary's goal to end ``catch and 
release'' of Other than Mexicans (OTMs) along the Southwest Border, ICE 
DRO will begin detaining family units.
    Holding families together within the same facility will maintain 
family unity, allow family members the opportunity to make informed 
decisions together, and reduce anxiety that may be caused by separating 
family members for detention purposes. Families will remain united 
throughout the immigration process, protecting parental rights and 
allowing parents to maintain responsibility for their children.
    The Department's implementation of expedited removal for 
Salvadorans is substantially hindered by a 17 year old injunction in 
Orantes v. Gonzalez. The United States asked the Court to lift or 
modify its injunction more than 6 months ago. Discovery is still 
continuing with respect to that motion so that no decision is 
anticipated in the immediate future. This matter and other old 
injunctions have led the Department to ask Congress to reform the 
immigration injunction process so that the Department may obtain prompt 
relief from old injunctions and will be protected from overbroad future 
injunctions.

                   BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPLEMENTAL

    Question. I believe that taking control of our borders is equally 
important to fighting terrorism in Iraq. Wouldn't you agree Secretary 
Chertoff that fighting the war on terror should start with protecting 
the homeland?
    Answer. Taking control of our borders is paramount to homeland 
security. Since its inception, DHS has undertaken a host of steps to 
enhance border security.
    We began with a number of steps to increase border security at our 
ports of entry. These included significant new initiatives to screen 
individuals entering our country, including deployment of US VISIT and 
revised terrorist watch list screening procedures. We have put in place 
advance data requirements so that detailed information is transmitted 
before a passenger arrives from overseas. We have also deployed a 
number of new border security initiatives directed at cross-border 
threats posed by the transportation of cargo. Amongst these were 
innovative programs, including the Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
    We have also taken a number of steps to enhance border security 
between the ports of entry. Most recently, DHS has developed the Secure 
Border Initiative which is an integrated systems approach to 
immigration enforcement. SBI focuses broadly on two major enforcement 
themes, controlling the border and immigration enforcement within the 
United States. Through SBInet, DHS is seeking an integrator to provide 
a full range of solutions that will include integrating technologies, 
infrastructure, response capabilities, people, and processes into a 
comprehensive border protection system. DHS anticipates the award of 
the integrator contract by September 2006. Securing our Nation's 
borders remains one of the top priorities of DHS.
    Question. In order for our country to take control of the border we 
need not only to increase the personnel and technology available to 
Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
but we need to invest in the infrastructure that will allow them to do 
their jobs effectively. We need cars, planes, buildings, cameras and 
other things.
    Do you agree we need to invest in our enforcement infrastructure?
    Answer. Yes. It is absolutely essential that we invest in and 
maintain our enforcement infrastructure to ensure that our employees 
not only have a safe and secure work environment, but also the tools to 
allow them to perform their duties in the most effective manner 
possible.
    Our enforcement infrastructure acquisition and maintenance 
processes must also be planned and managed in an integrated and 
systematic fashion that ensures that mission performance is optimized 
to the fullest extent by eliminating redundancy and incorporating 
innovativeness and state-of-the-art technology--while also taking care 
to ensure accountability and fiscal responsibility so that the American 
public gets what they paid for.
    To that end, a critical component of the Secure Border Initiative 
is SBInet, which will serve to integrate multiple state-of-the-art 
systems and security infrastructure into a single comprehensive border 
security suite for the Department.
    Question. We know that CBP needs to replace its air fleet, which 
includes some airframes with an average age of 40 years, why haven't 
you requested those dollars in the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
    Answer. We have requested funding in this area. The Budget requests 
$61 million in base Air and Marine procurement funding to be utilized 
to purchase up to 30 new helicopters.
    The fiscal year 2007 budget request was developed as CBP Air and 
Marine was in transition and the requirements for air fleet 
recapitalization were still evolving. Over the last few months, CBP has 
been integrating the former aviation programs of the Offices of Air and 
Marine Operations and Border Patrol under the newly established Office 
of CBP Air and Marine. As part of this integration, CBP has been 
working to develop a detailed plan to meet the threat to our borders 
while maintaining our traditional missions. The plan reflects the newly 
integrated aviation organization and includes requirements for the 
acquisition of new aircraft, the retirement of obsolete assets, the 
introduction of upgrades to aircraft, ground sensors, and 
communications capabilities, the consolidation of maintenance and 
training capabilities, the extension of the P-3 fleet service life, and 
the realignment of air sites to most effectively support mission and 
operational needs. The Department will keep the Committee apprised of 
the plan's status.

                   US VISIT EXIT TRACKING CAPABILITY

    Question. When does the Department expect to make a decision about 
deploying biometric exit tracking at airports?
    Answer. DHS is examining the results of the current exit pilots at 
14 airports and seaports. DHS will then determine the best approach for 
capturing exit data using biometrics and biographic information. We 
continue to rely on our existing exit process, which is now enhanced by 
implementation of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) rule. 
APIS collects electronic arrival and departure records from the 
electronic manifest information sent to Customs and Border Protection 
by carriers. The relevant portions of the arrival/departure records 
transmitted through APIS are then recorded in Arrival/Departure 
Information System (ADIS). ADIS then serves as a repository for entry, 
exit, and status change information.
    Question. When will a plan be submitted to the Committee to 
implement that decision?
    Answer. The Department is currently evaluating the results of these 
pilots, as well as considering land-border exit screening options, and 
will brief the committee at the conclusion of this review.
    Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests a $60 million 
increase for US VISIT. What specifically will be accomplished in fiscal 
year 2007 with the increased funding requested for the program?
    Answer. The $60 million increase for the US VISIT program will fund 
the transition to 10-print and IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability. These 
resources will be used to deploy 10 print readers to ports of entry, 
improve IDENT technical capabilities, and improve interoperability with 
IAFIS.

                           PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

    Question. What is the Department's role in preparing for and 
responding to pandemic influenza?
    Answer. Consistent with the DHS Strategic Plan, National Response 
Plan, and the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DHS will 
develop a plan to implement its roles and responsibilities under the 
Pandemic Strategy. In addition to its incident management coordination 
roles and responsibilities, DHS is responsible for ensuring integrity 
of the Nation's infrastructure, domestic security, entry and exit 
screening for influenza at the borders, facilitating coordination for 
the overall response to a pandemic, and the provision of a common 
operating picture for all departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government
    During a pandemic, DHS is the lead for overall domestic incident 
management and will coordinate the Federal response. Specifically, the 
Secretary, DHS:
  --Retains responsibility for overall domestic incident management;
  --Possesses the authority to declare an Incident of National 
        Significance and activate the Biological Incident Annex to the 
        National Response Plan (NRP);
  --Coordinates non-medical Federal response actions for an Incident of 
        National Significance;
  --As requested by HHS, directs the activation and deployment of 
        National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) health/medical 
        personnel, equipment, and supplies, in a phased regional 
        approach, and coordinates the provision of hospital care and 
        outpatient services, veterinary services, and mortuary services 
        through NDMS;
  --Coordinates with other Federal agencies to develop a public 
        communications plan through ESF #15--External Affairs and the 
        Public Affairs Annex to the NRP;
  --Provides logistics support, as appropriate;
  --Through ESF #1--Transportation identifies and arranges for use of 
        U.S. Coast Guard aircraft and other assets in providing urgent 
        airlift and other transportation support
  --DHS components work with HHS to identify and isolate people and 
        cargo entering in the United States that may be contaminated; 
        and
  --Develops plans and facilitates coordinated incident response 
        planning with the private sector at the strategic, operational 
        and tactical levels.
    Question. A total of $47 million in emergency supplemental funding 
was provided to DHS to plan and prepare for a pandemic event in the 
fiscal year 2006 supplemental appropriations bill signed into law in 
December of 2005. What is the status of the Department's plans for the 
use of this funding?
    Answer. Currently, staff and senior management have finished a 
spending plan that programs the $47 million into various DHS components 
where most immediate and critical needs have been identified. This 
money will allow DHS to expand the Department's role in addressing the 
avian flu issues. The funds will be allocated before the end of the 
fiscal year 2006.

               IMPROVING NATIONWIDE CATASTROPHIC PLANNING

    Question. Mr. Secretary, in your speech on February 14, 2006, a 
reference was made to some of the findings of the Nationwide Plan 
Review Phase I--the effort to find out the status of catastrophic 
planning across the country. I understand folks are hard at work, 
digging into this information to understand it and make recommendations 
to improve things. However, the report contains some very provocative 
findings in terms of the level of confidence that many States and urban 
areas have in the adequacy of their catastrophic plans. What 
conclusions has the Department reached so far?
    Answer. The February 10, 2006 Report to Congress was a compilation 
of the first phase of the Nationwide Plan Review, which involved a 
self-assessment of plans by States, territories and urban areas/major 
cities using guidance and criteria provided by DHS. The Department has 
not reached any conclusions as we are conducting the second phase 
currently. The second phase involves visits by Peer Review Teams 
comprised of former state and local emergency management and homeland 
security officials to 131 States, territories, and urban areas to 
jointly validate self-assessments, determine requirements for planning 
assistance, collect best practices, and recommend corrective actions. A 
Final Report, including recommendations will be provided to Congress by 
June 2006. The purpose of the two-phase approach is to ensure DHS and 
the participants can jointly review the Phase 1 written submission with 
each participating entity's planning team, as well as provide immediate 
feedback with specific recommendations and observations. The 
combination of self-assessments and peer review will provide us with 
the most accurate assessment of plan status.

            FIRST RESPONDER GRANTS--RISK AND THREAT FACTORS

    Question. Some people advocate all grants should be devoted to 
terrorism prevention and preparedness; others that grants should be 
used for all-hazards. Which do you advocate?
    Answer. Fundamental to the mission of the Department is the 
mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences that stem from 
acts of terrorism and natural disasters. Taken as a whole, Departmental 
assistance to States and localities supports the broad mission by 
building capabilities that are applicable to either acts of terrorism 
or natural disasters. Most states and localities have a hard-won 
appreciation for their risks and vulnerabilities to various natural 
disasters, and have already structured their response capabilities to 
address these known risk. In contrast, catastrophic terrorism is more 
recent threat that is not well understood, hard to predict, and for 
which most states and localities are not adequately prepared. Further, 
the Federal Government has a unique role in helping States and 
localities prepare for a threat that has significant roots overseas.
    That said, a number of DHS grant programs--including the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant Program, Citizen Corps Program, and the 
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program--are all-hazard in nature. 
These programs are targeted to particular constituencies such as 
emergency management, community preparedness, or public health and 
medical communities but support preparedness activities across the full 
range of natural and manmade hazards.
    Several other programs--including the State Homeland Security 
Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention Program--focus on terrorism preparedness in 
accordance with statutory intent. However, in fiscal year 2006, the 
scope of allowable activities for several of these programs has been 
expanded to include catastrophic events, provided that these activities 
also build capabilities that relate to terrorism. This broadened scope 
of program implementation activities recognizes and supports ongoing 
preparedness initiatives addressing such issues as pandemic influenza 
and the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that are of critical 
national importance, and recognizes the regional and national impacts 
that such events can have.
    Almost all of the capabilities included in the Target Capabilities 
List and the overall framework of the National Preparedness Goal are 
dual-use in nature, in that they can apply to both terrorism 
preparedness as well as other hazards. Thus, even if a program is 
technically focused on terrorism preparedness, the capabilities built 
and sustained through those programs support a much broader range of 
hazards than terrorism alone.
    Question. How mature is the methodology being used to determine 
where the risks and threats are today?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2006, DHS has taken a major step forward in 
its risk analysis, developing a robust model which evaluates both risks 
to assets as well as risks to populations and geographic areas. By its 
nature, this type of analysis will continually evolve and mature.
    The DHS formula for determining eligible urban areas for its Urban 
Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program has progressed from a simple 
count of ``high'' and ``low'' criticality and numbers of threat reports 
in fiscal year 2003 to a fully risk-based computation that is attack-
scenario based and uses infrastructure-specific vulnerability and 
consequence estimates. At the same time, DHS has gone from considering 
14 infrastructure types in the analysis in fiscal year 2003 to more 
than 40 in fiscal year 2006; the fiscal year 2006 approach evaluates 
risk to well over 100,000 specific infrastructures, and incorporates 
strategic threat analysis from the Intelligence Community along with 
law enforcement investigations, credible and less-credible threat 
reports, and suspicious incident reporting received from local, State 
and other Federal agencies.
    The levels of complexity of the formula and data calculations have 
increased markedly from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2006. For 
example, in fiscal year 2003, three equations were used to formulate 
the city prioritization; in fiscal year 2006, over 4,000 equations were 
used. For fiscal year 2003, approximately 1,500 calculations were made, 
in contrast to more than 3 billion calculations in fiscal year 2006. 
Fiscal year 2005 UASI formulations were represented within a 
spreadsheet of 42,000 cells. If the fiscal year 2006 UASI calculations 
could be included in a spreadsheet, it would contain more than 20 
million cells.
    Question. How confident are you in a process which determined the 
sixth largest U.S. city, San Diego, faces lessened risk?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 risk formula consists of making two 
complementary risk calculations: asset-based risk and geographically-
based risk.
  --Asset-based risk utilizes threat values derived from the 
        Intelligence Community assessments of the intent and 
        capabilities of adversaries to accomplish a set of baseline 
        attack modes. These threats and attack types are mapped against 
        certain infrastructure types, such as bridges, dams, and power 
        plants.
  --Geographically-based risk takes into account values that are based 
        on the inherent attributes of the geographic State or Urban 
        Area. This analysis considers factors such as terrorism-related 
        reporting and investigations, and population density. To arrive 
        at the total relative risk of terrorism, the geographically-
        based risk score is weighted two times the asset risk score.
    San Diego is on the list of eligible jurisdictions for full 
participation in the fiscal year 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative 
(UASI) grant program. In previous years, the risk score directly 
converted to a dollar amount and allocation to the jurisdiction. This 
is not the case for 2006 funding. Each of the 42 cities, including San 
Diego has equal status in competing for the UASI grant funds. The 
fiscal year 2006 Congressional Appropriations language instructed the 
Secretary to award funds based on both risk and need. While San Diego's 
relative risk values are lower in 2006 than they were in 2005, their 
need has yet to be determined, and hence no decisions can yet be made 
as to how much the city will receive. The Office of Grants and Training 
will be making the funding determinations in May 2006.
    Additionally, DHS anticipates that continued experience with the 
annual risk analysis process will further improve the collective 
understanding of the impacts of attacks on systems, improving the 
ability of the process to recognize that, in some cases, a system 
provides resilience, and in other instances the critical nodes within a 
system provide the potential for significantly greater consequences. 
DHS remains committed to continually improving its risk analysis 
process, and looks forward to further refinement of the current 
methodology.

  STAFFING FOR ADEQUATE FIRE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (SAFER) ACT GRANTS

    Question. The National Fire Protection Association found 
potentially two-thirds of the Nation's fire departments are 
understaffed. What is DHS evaluating to determine that no funding 
should be requested for SAFER Act grants?
    Answer. The Department believes that preparedness is a shared 
responsibility between the Federal Government and State and local 
jurisdictions. Further, the dedication of Federal funds to a hiring 
program such as the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response 
(SAFER) program, is not the most effective use of limited homeland 
security funds to enhance existing local preparedness capabilities. The 
Department has requested significant funds over several years to 
support public safety preparedness at the State and local levels of 
government. Congress has appropriated and the Department has granted 
billions of dollars to support training, exercising, and equipping 
public safety personnel, including firefighters, across the Nation. 
Homeland security funds should enhance existing local preparedness 
capabilities rather than support a hiring program such as SAFER. 
Ultimately, local governments have the responsibility to support 
firefighter staffing levels commensurate with their local fire threat.

             EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS (EMPG)

    Question. If Katrina has shown us anything, it is the importance of 
local preparedness and planning. The Emergency Management Performance 
Grant program is important to State and local preparedness.
    What justification is there in the face of the recent catastrophic 
disasters to propose a reduction in funding available for EMPGs?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2007 EMPG request is consistent with the 
Administration's $170 million budget request in fiscal year 2006. The 
Department continues to support the EMPG program, which helps States 
and Urban Areas achieve target levels of capability to enhance the 
effectiveness of their emergency management programs. The EMPG funding 
request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States to continue to 
develop intra- and interstate emergency management systems that 
encourage partnerships among government, business, volunteer, and 
community organizations based on identified needs and priorities for 
strengthening their emergency management and catastrophic planning 
capabilities. In addition, programs such as the State Homeland Security 
Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative--while focused primarily on 
terrorism preparedness, also include catastrophic events, recognizing 
that the capabilities built support a much broader range of hazards 
than terrorism alone.

               PORT SECURITY--AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEMS

    Question. Today, our systems for capturing trade data used in 
targeting incoming cargo is focused on the data available from the 
manifest, i.e. cargo/shipping information versus the people who handle 
the cargo. I understand that CBP has an initiative which started some 
time ago to look at expanded data elements to more fully assess risks 
of cargo, particularly seagoing cargo.
    Is the feasibility and usefulness of capturing information on the 
owners and operators of foreign and United States-based terminals being 
looked at? Where are you with this effort?
    Answer. CBP has been conducting an extensive evaluation of expanded 
data elements that will enhance cargo targeting. In this analysis, we 
have determined that the people who handle the cargo and particularly 
those involved in the loading process are an important informational 
element. The terminal operator has little to no control over the 
security of the container and is therefore not deemed a useful data 
element for cargo targeting. Data elements that we are looking at are 
entities that initiate the movement and the physical handling of the 
cargo.
    CBP has conducted an extensive analysis and proposes that the 
collection of a limited number of additional trade data elements at 
manifest will effectively enhance cargo security and CBP's targeting 
capabilities. New sources and types of data can be gathered during 
other phases of supply chain operations and used to enhance and 
strengthen the effectiveness of CBP screening and targeting efforts. 
Data can be gathered during the purchase order process, staging and 
shipment, and cargo transportation and includes such documents as 
purchase orders, booking confirmations, bills of lading, terminal 
receipts, status reports and proofs of delivery. By collecting more and 
different information throughout the supply chain, greater visibility 
and transparency can be achieved and true risk better understood within 
the international supply chain.
    CBP is working with its trade partners to find ways to obtain 
better information, new information, and to find ways to get the 
information we already have, but earlier in the supply chain so we can 
interdict a known risk or intervene in connection with an unknown risk 
at the earliest point possible. A supply chain security committee has 
been set up within the Trade Support Network as a forum that works with 
the trade community to identify and leverage advance information early 
in the supply chain. This advance information will build upon existing 
CBP security measures to add value to ongoing targeting initiatives in 
order to secure our nations borders, as well as our efforts to 
facilitate legitimate trade. The committee's goal is to identify, 
discuss, document, and submit the trade communities' supply chain 
security requirement recommendations for ACE--which in partnership with 
CBP should result in an information requirements plan for the best data 
set available to CBP.
    Through partnering with the carriers, portals, importers, shippers 
and terminal operators, CBP is gathering supply chain data, studying 
what it means, discovering where it can be most effectively obtained in 
the supply chain, who has it, how the pieces fit together and 
determining how it can improve our targeting programs. All of this data 
will assist us to zero in on suspect movements and perform any 
necessary security inspections at the earliest point possible in the 
supply chain. CBP has evaluated entry-level data time frames and 
believes that submission of this data 24 hours prior to arrival may be 
valuable as a final validation of carrier manifest data.

                    AVIATION SECURITY PASSENGER FEES

    Question. If Congress does not accept the Administration's $1.3 
billion proposal to increase passenger security fees, what specific 
funding in the fiscal year 2007 budget request for programs or 
activities do you propose for reduction or elimination to make up for 
this difference?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues 
to seek Congressional support for the President's request to 
restructure the air passenger fee as part of the TSA budget. TSA 
believes that the adjustment addresses prior congressional concerns 
with a fee based upon emplanements rather than one-way travel. We also 
believe the restructured fee more equitably assigns the costs of 
aviation security to the direct beneficiaries, the air travelers, as 
envisioned in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).
    Aviation passengers currently pay an aviation security user fee of 
$2.50 per emplanement, with a maximum of $5.00 per one-way trip. This 
fee has not increased since it was originally imposed in early 2002, 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The President's budget proposal 
aligns the collection of the fee with the point at which the screening 
is done--upon entry into the aviation system. The proposed change in 
the aviation security fee structure would establish a flat fee of $5.00 
per one-way trip. This would have the effect of equalizing the amounts 
paid by travelers between major cities and travelers who must take 
connecting flights on a round-trip basis. Restructuring the fee would 
also generate an additional $1.3 billion in revenue and bring the 
percentage of aviation security expenses covered by passenger user fees 
to approximately 72 percent. Currently, user fees cover only 42 percent 
of the costs of aviation security.

            OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

    Question. Where is the Department with regard to establishing the 
Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) office?
    Answer. DHS is developing a plan to set up the SCO.
    Question. Five and half months of this fiscal year have expired and 
it is my understanding that not a single employee has been hired for 
this office. In fact, there currently is no SCO office. Is that true?
    Answer. DHS is committed to the SCO and is developing a plan to set 
up the office and to develop coordinated screening policies.
    Question. What is the Department's schedule to stand up this 
office?
    Answer. The department plans to have the office completely 
operational and functioning by the end of fiscal year 2006.
    Question. Given that the office will be operational for less than 
half a year, I expect a significant proportion of the $4 million in 
appropriated funds will not be spent this year. Is that a reasonable 
expectation?
    Answer. The $4 million is necessary for SCO operations in fiscal 
year 2007.
    Question. Given the lags in establishing SCO and the likelihood of 
unspent funds for this office in fiscal year 2006, is the fiscal year 
2007 budget request ($4 million) realistic or optimistic?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $4 million is 
necessary for fiscal year 2007 operations.

               NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS INTEGRATION PROGRAM

    Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a new preparedness 
program called the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP). 
Why is this new program needed?
    Answer. Purpose of the NPIP:
    The purpose of the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP) 
is to improve the Nation's preparedness posture--a national safety and 
security imperative. The NPIP does that by organizing, monitoring, and 
enabling national preparedness activities--with key focus on high-
impact preparedness priorities.
    The basic premise of the NPIP is that effective national 
preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized approach among 
Federal, State, local, tribal and private-sector partners to share 
information and to plan, train, and exercise consistently. The current 
Federal level approach to information sharing, planning, training and 
exercising is inconsistent across departments and agencies, leading to 
non-integrated preparedness.
    As the preparedness enabling element of the Directorate for 
Preparedness, the NPIP will integrate national preparedness system and 
doctrine, and provide field-based preparedness coordination. 
Additionally, NPIP will develop, foster and instill a national 
preparedness culture--an imperative established by the White House and 
the Congress, and an expectation of the American citizens.
    The Scope of the NPIP:
    The NPIP fuses together the core elements of Preparedness--
including strategic risk assessments, contingency planning, doctrine 
development, and training and exercises--and allows for the 
synchronization of these elements to create a functional organizational 
alignment towards common preparedness activities across DHS 
organizations.
    In doing so, the NPIP will enhance strategic tools, including the 
National Incident Management System, National Response Plan, National 
Infrastructure Plan and the National Preparedness Goal. It will ensure 
development of preparedness processes that foster harmonized day-to-day 
routine interaction of disciplines, organizations, levels of government 
and our citizens.
    Because national preparedness is a top priority and DHS is 
responsible for a proactive leadership role in encouraging national 
preparedness, the NPIP will drive specific efforts to reach a robust 
level of national preparedness. It will foster a ``culture of 
preparedness,'' starting within DHS and extending to preparedness 
partnerships beyond the Department.
    The NPIP will play a major outreach role in leveraging and 
encouraging existing efforts, and filling gaps among the connections 
between programs, activities, and doctrine that are integral to 
achieving robust national preparedness. To that extent, the NPIP will:
  --Report directly to the Under Secretary for Preparedness;
  --Focus on identifying and aggressively remedying national 
        preparedness gaps;
  --Improve the Nation's ability to prepare, respond and mitigate 
        natural or other disasters;
  --Examine national preparedness activities and programs and seek ways 
        to integrate and synchronize efforts;
  --Provide a preparedness analysis capability and promote innovative 
        solutions with broad stakeholder input;
  --Focus on addressing critical gaps in coordination among entities 
        responsible for preparedness;
  --Promote proven preparedness practices, and leverage external 
        resources through strategic partnerships;
  --Measure national preparedness using standardized metrics and 
        institutionalize preparedness improvements;
  --Identify (and eliminate where possible) redundant preparedness 
        efforts/activities involving low return on investment; and
  --Provide important incentives for organizations to coalesce and 
        leverage and supplement their efforts to enhance national 
        preparedness.
    As laid out above, the NPIP will be responsive to emerging needs in 
homeland security preparedness including lessons learned from real-
world incidents and exercises. As such, the NPIP will be an essential 
resource for the Under Secretary for Preparedness to use to respond to 
identified needs and capability gaps. Initial efforts will include 
addressing shortcomings associated with the after action analysis of 
the Hurricane Katrina response and the National Planning Scenarios: the 
need to strengthen nationwide planning for catastrophic events; 
synchronization of Federal and selected State and local plans by 
region; incident command and control alignment; evacuation plans; all-
hazard planning for special need populations; and communication system 
improvements. As the Under Secretary's vision continues to evolve and 
further preparedness enhancements are identified, the NPIP will be 
qualified accordingly.
    Question. How will this new program be more effective in this 
mission?
    Answer. One of the fundamental concepts of the NPIP is that 
homeland security preparedness is not just a Federal activity but is, 
in fact, a national activity. The basic premise of the NPIP is that 
effective national preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized 
approach for Federal, State, local and private-sector partners to share 
information and plan, train, and exercise as they work in unison to 
prepare for disasters. Currently, preparedness efforts are largely 
focused but separated at the Federal level, the State and local level, 
or among the private sector, but not necessarily an integration of all 
these levels.
    This was exemplified in almost every aspect of the preparedness, 
response, and recovery activities associated with Hurricane Katrina. 
While many elements performed well within the parameters of their 
understood mission areas, the system struggled because of disconnects 
in the overall effort. These fractures among major organizations and 
missions had not been adequately recognized and addressed prior to this 
catastrophic event.
    The NPIP will change that by:
    Providing an integrated approach to Federal efforts to support 
National Preparedness. Current preparedness efforts reside in different 
parts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--such as Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and 
the Office of Grants and Training--as well as other parts of the 
Federal Government. Building a truly national preparedness capability 
will require substantial DHS coordination with other Federal 
Departments. For example, the NPIP will ensure appropriate interface 
with NORTHCOM and other Department of Defense (DOD) entities as to 
ensure key participation in building a more secure homeland. 
Accordingly, the NPIP will ensure DHS alignment with Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
    The NPIP is intended to synchronize and integrate the preparedness 
efforts of all parts of DHS and the Federal family. It will do so by:
  --Providing a standardized approach to catastrophic planning.
  --Developing integrated preparedness doctrine to share with partner 
        agencies.
  --Enhancing coordination of national exercises and preparedness 
        training.
  --Coordinating DHS medical planning with HHS, among other activities.
    The NPIP will accomplish this through promoting proven preparedness 
practices and leveraging external resources through strategic 
partnerships, both within and outside of DHS, while avoiding redundant 
efforts or activities involving low return on investment.
    This will be a significant change from current practice where there 
is no overarching entity focused on coordinating Federal preparedness. 
For example, FEMA's preparedness function is heavily focused on 
preparing for natural disasters and is not fully integrated with the 
law enforcement or border control communities. Nor does FEMA's 
preparedness effort run the gamut of necessary preparedness activities 
to respond to a catastrophic incident, which include improving 
communication systems.
    Linking Federal efforts to locally-based preparedness efforts. A 
vital part of the NPIP will be the placement of 11 Federal Preparedness 
Coordinators (FPCs) across the country, with ten of the 11 FPCs being 
collocated at the FEMA regional offices. FPCs will be locally-based 
senior DHS officials responsible for coordinating a wide spectrum of 
Federal, State, and local domestic incident planning and preparedness. 
FPCs will provide DHS with an important and functional field presence 
to collaborate and build partnerships with State and local government, 
and private sector homeland security stakeholders within the FPC's 
assigned geographic areas of responsibility and to ensure that these 
stakeholders are working together and are thoroughly prepared. 
Currently, such field level coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and 
DHS does not have always have visibility into how high-risk areas are 
prepared to deal with homeland security incidents.
    In addition, the NPIP will be a means to provide the Nation's 
leaders with the confidence that its local communities are prepared 
should an incident happen. By integrating with the National 
Preparedness Goal and by implementing a common set of preparedness 
metrics, the NPIP will provide the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
White House, and others with an assessment of local-based preparedness 
levels. Currently, that assessment does not exist. An initial 
nationwide emergency plan review is underway, and the NPIP will be the 
mechanism to strengthen nationwide planning for catastrophic events and 
evacuation. The FPCs will be the implementing agents in the field 
charged with synchronizing Federal, State and local plans by region to 
include special need populations.
    Promoting command-and-control alignment among all levels of 
government involved in incident management and response. As Hurricane 
Katrina indicated, successful incident management depends on effective 
command and control alignment. The NPIP will promote such alignment by 
ensuring that needed revisions to the National Response Plan (NRP) are 
made, based on lessons learned from incidents and exercises--such as 
TOPOFF 3--and stakeholder feedback.
    In addition, the NPIP will integrate National Response Plan (NRP) 
and National Incident Management System (NIMS) training and technical 
assistance to improve the likelihood that the command and control 
structure functions effectively and efficiently during incident 
response. The Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina report 
noted the importance of a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP 
for all personnel with incident management responsibilities. As part of 
FEMA's implementation of NIMS, all FEMA full-time employees and 
reservists were required to complete 4 independent study (IS) courses: 
IS-100, Introduction to Incident Command System; IS-200, Basic Incident 
Command System for Federal Disaster Workers; IS-700, National Incident 
Management System: An Introduction; and IS-800, National Response Plan: 
An Introduction. All new hires post-Katrina are also required to 
complete this mandatory training. In preparation for the upcoming 
hurricane 2006 season, FEMA will train a minimum of 1,500 ``disaster 
generalists'' (Stafford Act Employees) by June 1, 2006. In addition to 
the mandatory training above, these generalists will be required to 
complete an additional 40 hours of classroom training on such topics as 
disaster operations, safety and wellness, customer service, managing 
change, disaster assistance procedures, and monitoring of debris 
removal.
    A final key aspect of command and control alignment is the ability 
to communicate during an incident response. The NPIP will enhance that 
ability through better system assessment and operational guidance 
development.
    The above are but a few of the examples of how the NPIP will be 
more effective. Through its five major activities in fiscal year 2007--
catastrophic planning, command and control alignment, communication 
system improvements, medical preparedness coordination, innovation and 
best practices--and the implementation of the FPC concept, the NPIP 
will significantly increase the integration of our Nation's 
preparedness activities, including at the Federal level and between the 
Federal Government and State, local and private sector officials. The 
result of such integration will be seamless processes, established 
preparedness doctrine, interconnected/interagency relationships, and 
leveraged and synchronized resources during incident response.
    Question. Is there an overlap with FEMA's efforts on response and 
recovery?
    Answer. No, the responsibility for response and recovery is charged 
to FEMA, while the Preparedness Directorate is responsible for 
preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 Budget Request for FEMA and 
Preparedness' NPIP may appear to have some overlap; however, the 
difference is in the scope and delineation of responsibilities.
    NPIP addresses national integration and synchronization of Federal, 
State, local, tribal and private preparedness activities to strengthen 
regional abilities to respond and recover. Catastrophic events--
chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and national disasters--
require preparedness to be scalable and adaptable to an event. 
Preparedness establishes the doctrine and standards that allow national 
preparedness and hence response and recovery to effectively work 
together.
    Taking into account the disaster cycle, Planning--Response--
Recovery--Mitigation, there are necessary relationships between 
preparedness, response and recovery that would be strengthened by 
greater collaboration. Each disaster brings lessons learned and hence 
necessary adjustments that feed into preparedness; likewise, response 
and recovery readiness is a function of preparedness efforts.
    FEMA's mission is to lead the Nation's efforts to respond to, 
recover from and mitigate disasters of all types. This includes 
coordinating and ensuring the readiness of disaster response teams and 
assets; sharing emergency management technical knowledge, training, and 
assistance with State and local governments; deploying response teams, 
commodities and supplies, and recovery assets, abilities, and funding; 
and finally mitigating potential disasters through actions that will 
prevent additional loss. FEMA's mission addresses the logistical and 
technical aspects of response and recovery.
    For, example FEMA's Response Division manages the Mobile Emergency 
Response System (MERS), which among other things provides emergency 
communication capabilities in a disaster event. In a catastrophic 
event, such as Katrina, the region's communications infrastructure was 
destroyed, and while the MERS performed as designed, the catastrophe 
overwhelmed capabilities. The Federal Government, DOD, private 
organizations, local governments, and commercial interests have 
communication assets for emergency events; however, there needs to be 
greater standardization of these assets. NPIP proposes to strengthen 
national preparedness by cataloging emergency communication assets, 
pre-coordinating their use, and developing communications plans for 
catastrophic event scenarios. NPIP leads, coordinates, and synchronizes 
Federal preparedness capabilities and assets, and in concert with other 
partners addresses catastrophic scenarios that require the merging of 
Federal, State, and local preparedness and response capabilities for 
responses equal to the magnitude of a catastrophic event.

                   SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT

    Question. Science & Technology is still working with the components 
in deciding fiscal year 2006 funding levels for its research and 
development portfolios. Please explain the process in which each DHS 
components' mission research and development are being addressed and 
adequately funded by Science & Technology.
    Answer. The S&T Directorate has worked to identify and refine the 
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) requirements of 
the Department's components over the last 3 years. For example, the S&T 
Directorate worked closely with the Transportation Security Agency 
regarding the direction of the research and development program at the 
Transportation Security Laboratory. This has resulted in a more 
customer-focused research and development program in the S&T 
Directorate's Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio. The Science and 
Technology Requirements Council (SRC) validates and prioritizes RDT&E 
requirements with components. To further ensure that the S&T 
Directorate is addressing our customers' highest priority needs, the 
DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC) is discussing the development of a 
process to facilitate further refinement and prioritization of RDT&E 
priorities by senior managers within each component.
    Question. Were cuts made to one component's research and 
development budget to pay for another component's?
    Answer. Research and development funding requirements change year-
to-year. As such, in any given budget, S&T makes downwards or upwards 
adjustments in order to fund the highest priority projects.
    Question. I am concerned with the many changes in leadership at the 
Department. The head of Science & Technology just announced his 
resignation which will occur in March. How long will it be before a 
permanent replacement will be named?
    Answer. In June, the President announced his intention to nominate 
Admiral Jay Cohen to be the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. 
Admiral Cohen is currently a Retired Rear Admiral of the United States 
Navy. He has served the United States Navy for over 35 years. He most 
recently served as Chief of Naval Research at the Department of the 
Navy.
    Question. How will you ensure the new head of Science & Technology 
will continue the priorities outlined for fiscal year 2006 and proposed 
for fiscal year 2007?
    Answer. The Department has established a transition office within 
the S&T Directorate to work with present and incoming leadership. This 
office will help to ensure follow-through on the science and technology 
priorities identified to date.

                DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)

    Question. What expertise does DNDO have for developing, acquiring 
and supporting a global architecture designed to detect the nuclear or 
radiological material?
    Answer. As an office staffed largely with representatives from 
across the United States Government (USG) (including the Departments of 
Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (DOS), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as 
well as DHS components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the 
Office of Grants and Training (G&T), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Science and 
Technology Directorate (S&T)), the DNDO has been able, in a very short 
time, to assemble a staff which draws from the inherent expertise of 
each of these agencies. By combining the scientific expertise of DHS 
S&T and DOE with the operational experience of CBP, USCG, and FBI (to 
name a few) and the disciplined systems engineering, large-scale 
acquisition, and logistics approaches of the DOD, the DNDO is well 
suited for carrying out its mission of developing, acquiring, and 
supporting the global nuclear detection architecture.
    Question. Does DNDO have the necessary authorities to have this 
global architecture implemented by other Federal agencies?
    Answer. The DNDO has been given the mission of ``centralized 
planning with decentralized execution.'' As such, the DNDO has been 
given the responsibility, within the Federal Government, to develop the 
global nuclear detection architecture. This will then be implemented 
across multiple agencies, depending on prior missions and 
jurisdictions. While the DNDO will not have oversight over the actions 
of other agencies responsible for implementing their respective 
portions of the global architecture, it will continue to advocate 
beneficial programs to the Administration, as well as the Congress, and 
to identify duplicative or ineffectual programs when necessary, with 
proposed improvements.

                           RISKS AND THREATS

    Question. I believe that you would agree that a biological or 
nuclear event is among the highest catastrophic threats to our Nation's 
security. What funds, by appropriations account, program, project, and 
activity are devoted to preparing to prevent or respond to these in 
fiscal year 2006 and in the fiscal year 2007 budget request.
    Answer. There are many programs across the Federal Government 
committed to preventing or responding to biological or nuclear attacks. 
Specifically within the S&T Directorate and the DNDO, funds in fiscal 
year 2006 and in the fiscal year 2007 budget request are as follows:
    For the biological threat:

                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                                               2006            2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&T Research, Development, Acq. & Ops:             376.2           377.2
 Biological Countermeasures.............
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the nuclear threat:

                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                                               2006            2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
S&T Management and Administration.......             2.6  ..............
S&T Research, Development, Acq. & Ops...           333.7  ..............
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office...           314.8  ..............
    Radiological and Nuclear                        18.9  ..............
     Countermeasures....................
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.......         ( \1\ )           535.8
    Management and Administration.......         ( \1\ )            30.5
    Research, Development, and                   ( \1\ )           327.3
     Operations.........................
    Systems Acquisition.................         ( \1\ )           178.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ n/a.

                                 ______
                                 

              Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                              AGRODEFENSE

    Question. In fiscal year 2006, the Department of Homeland Security 
provided $23 million for site selection and other pre-construction 
activities for the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility. What is the 
current progress of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to 
utilize this funding for site selection and pre-construction 
activities?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate initiated an Expression of Interest 
(EOI) to explore potential sites for the National Bio and Agrodefense 
Facility (NBAF). The EOI was issued on January 19, 2006 in the Federal 
Register. Site criteria and requirements were developed by an 
interagency technical working group (including DHS, the United States 
Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Human Health and 
Services) to evaluate sites that would best support research in high 
consequence animal and zoonotic diseases in support of Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives, HSPD-9 and HSPD-10. The results of 
the EOI will be evaluated in an environmental impact statement (EIS) in 
the fall of 2006, at which time the public will have the opportunity to 
comment on the scope of the analysis. In addition, ORD plans to issue a 
solicitation in March 2006 to procure architect-engineer services to 
conduct conceptual design studies and initial cost estimates for the 
NBAF. The conceptual design will be completed in 2007. Under the 
present schedule construction could begin in 2009 and be operational by 
the end of 2012.
    Question. How much longer will the current aging Plum Island 
Foreign Animal Disease facilities in New York State be able to sustain 
the Department's agroterrorism and animal-based terrorism research 
needs?
    Answer. The Department is committed to operating the Plum Island 
Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in a safe and secure manner until its 
capability may be recapitalized through the National Bio and 
Agrodefense Facility (NBAF), expected to be operational in 2012. The 
Department will maintain the current facility to foster ongoing 
scientific programs in accordance with the expanding missions of the 
departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security.
    Question. Does the Department anticipate constructing one facility 
to carry out the Department's agroterrorism and animal-based terrorism 
research and development research, or does the Department anticipate 
utilizing multiple sites?
    Answer. It is presently envisioned that the National Bio-
Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) will be a single facility (with necessary 
support facilities) within an approximate 30-acre site.

                       DEEPWATER RECAPITALIZATION

    Question. In fiscal year 2006, Congress provided $933.1 million for 
the Coast Guard's Deepwater recapitalization program. The President's 
fiscal year 2007 Budget Request proposes $934.4 million for the 
Deepwater program. How important is full funding of the President's 
Request to the continuation of this recapitalization program?
    Answer. It is very important that full funding for the Deepwater 
recapitalization program be provided. Any reduction will cause a delay 
in the delivery of one or more assets or systems that the Coast Guard 
needs to execute its post-9/11 mission responsibilities reduced funding 
will result in reduced readiness. The Coast Guard requests funding each 
year based on what is planned to be obligated in the year the funds are 
appropriated. Full funding in accordance with the President's fiscal 
year 2007 Budget Request allows the Coast Guard to continue its 
recapitalization program in alignment with the Post 9/11 Revised 
Deepwater Implementation Plan.
    Question. What affect would a decrease in funding from the 
President's Budget Request of $934.4 million have on the continuation 
of this recapitalization program?
    Answer. The following Deepwater projects are categories in the 
fiscal year 2007 President's Budget request that require full funding 
to ensure success of the Coast Guard recapitalization program. Key to 
success is the synchronization of asset acquisitions to produce ``force 
packages'' connected by a common network that enables a synergy of 
operational performance from the totality of the system as depicted in 
the enclosed graphic. If the planned synchronization is delayed due to 
less than full funding in fiscal year 2007, then the planned 
capabilities will be more costly to acquire in the future and the 
operational performance improvements planned for that period are lost. 
In simple terms, the Coast Guard recapitalization program schedule for 
delivery of assets will be affected and the Coast Guard will not be 
ready to accomplish their DHS assigned missions; please see the table 
below.
    Additionally, the graphic illustrates the synergistic linkages 
between assets in the Deepwater system highlighting how reduced funding 
in any one area reduces overall system performance outcomes.
    In summary, the full success of the major AC&I projects is 
dependent on the assets in these budget categories to be fully funded 
as requested in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Budget category                Inadequate funding impacts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR:
    CASA MPA..............................  Would delay ``mission
                                             ready'' status of
                                             aircraft's 4 & 5, delays
                                             delivery and missionization
                                             of MPA #6; and further
                                             delays two air stations
                                             from receiving post 9/11
                                             capabilities.
    VUAV and MCH (HH-65C).................  Will delay delivery of
                                             assets, limit major cutter
                                             ``force package''
                                             capabilities, limiting
                                             surveillance capability to
                                             that achieved by legacy
                                             surface assets.
    HH-60 projects........................  Any project under funded or
                                             out of sequence delays the
                                             entire upgrade and
                                             conversion sequence of the
                                             HH-60; this medium range
                                             helicopter is larger and
                                             more capable than the CG HH-
                                             65s.
    AUF projects..........................  Delayed funding for Airborne
                                             Use of Force upgrades means
                                             that Homeland security
                                             patrols will continue to be
                                             conducted largely by
                                             unarmed aircraft that lack
                                             the capability to take
                                             appropriate response on
                                             ``actionable
                                             intelligence.''
    C-130H Conversion projects............  The C-130H will continue to
                                             operate with aging and
                                             obsolete avionics and a
                                             troublesome radar that has
                                             provided degraded
                                             reliability for several
                                             years.
    C-130J Fleet Introduction.............  Will delay delivery of
                                             asset(s) or prevent
                                             ``mission ready'' status--
                                             that will continue the
                                             shortage of maritime patrol
                                             aircraft operating hours.
SURFACE:
    NSC...................................  Each day of delay means NSC
                                             has an opportunity cost of
                                             not surveilling 42,500
                                             square nautical miles
                                             compared to legacy 378;\1\
    FRC...................................  Delay/loss of enhanced
                                             operational capabilities of
                                             the patrol boat fleet
                                             required by the post 9/11
                                             requirements.
    Mission Effectiveness Project for       The legacy 210 foot and 270
     Legacy 210 foot and 270 foot.           foot cutters are the
                                             youngest in the Coast Guard
                                             fleet, but must be properly
                                             maintained and upgraded to
                                             provide on-going
                                             operational service until
                                             the replacement OPC is
                                             delivered.
    Cutter Small Boats (Long Range          Small boats are part of the
     Interceptor and Short Range             Cutter ``force package''
     Prosecutor).                            providing intercept and
                                             boarding capability from
                                             the parent cutter. Delayed
                                             funding decreases ``force
                                             package'' operating area.
C4ISR.....................................  Will delay delivery of
                                             assets--some components are
                                             essential to asset
                                             operation.
                                            C4ISR is the key to being
                                             AWARE in the maritime
                                             region. Lacking awareness
                                             increases our Nation's risk
                                             for possible attacks from
                                             terrorists and more
                                             criminal activities.
Logistics.................................  Unable to operate as
                                             designed.
                                            Readiness will be lower.
                                            Suboptimal ``homeports'' due
                                             to lack of shore
                                             facilities--forcing use of
                                             ``Ports of Convenience.''
Systems Engineering & Integration.........  Higher risk for lack of
                                             synchronization of
                                             Deepwater assets--will not
                                             operate together.
                                            These funds are required to
                                             review all interoperability
                                             connections which is a
                                             labor intensive effort. If
                                             these connections are not
                                             properly developed and
                                             tested, there will be a
                                             higher probably of failure
                                             during operational use.
Program Management........................  Unable to accomplish
                                             inherently government work
                                             necessary for success,
                                             which includes the
                                             oversight of the prime
                                             contractor, the ability to
                                             get other expert opinions
                                             from sources outside the
                                             government and/or prime
                                             contractor, as well as
                                             track those unique
                                             responsibilities that
                                             belong to the government
                                             such as tracking program
                                             progress and managing the
                                             acquisition program
                                             baseline.
                                            Increased risk of failure
                                             during operation and delay
                                             in deploying due to
                                             insufficient planning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All flight deck capable cutters will benefit from VUAV/MCH force
  package surveillance capabilities.

  
  

    Question. How will the Department and the Coast Guard address 
Congress' frustration with the Coast Guard's poor responsiveness to 
congressional direction?
    Answer. Although the Coast Guard delivered several reports to the 
Appropriations Committees late in fiscal year 2005, fiscal year 2006 
has seen marked improvement. As a result of implementation of a series 
of strategy meetings immediately following release of House, Senate, 
and Conference Marks, report drafting and clearance times have 
decreased. As of March 1, 2006, the Coast Guard has delivered all but 
three of its fiscal year 2006 appropriations reports to Congress on or 
before the due date, as demonstrated in the table below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Date due to
      Appropriations report         Date delivered         Congress
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Bi Annual) Port Security         2/14/2006.........  Update of Oct 2005
 Terrorism Exercises Results                           report
 February 2006.
Coast Guard Housing Report \1\..  2/13/2006.........  2/10/2006
Fisheries Enforcement (fiscal     2/9/2006..........  2/10/2006
 year 2006 Appropriations).
Patrol Boat Availability Report.  2/6/2006..........  2/10/2006
Deepwater Implementation Plan     2/6/2006..........  2/6/2006
 Review.
MSST Policy Report..............  2/6/2006..........  2/6/2006
Operational Gap Analysis........  2/6/2006..........  2/6/2006
Fiscal year 2006 1st QTR          1/13/2006.........  1/15/2006
 Acquisition Report \1\.
Fiscal year 2006 1st QTR          1/17/2006.........  1/15/2006
 Abstract of Operations Report.
Occupational Safety and Health    1/4/2006..........  12/18/2005
 Risks Report \1\.
(Bi Annual) Port Security         10/28/2005........  2/1/2006
 Terrorism Exercises Results
 October 2005.
Schedule of Port Security         10/24/2005........  11/18/2005
 Exercises.
Fiscal year 2005 4th QTR          10/13/2005........  10/15/2005
 Acquisition Report.
Fiscal year 2005 4th QTR          10/13/2005........  10/15/2005
 Abstract of Operations Report.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Delivered late.

         EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANT (EMPG) PROGRAM

    Question. After Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for strong 
emergency management programs at the Federal, State, and local level, 
emergency managers across the country anticipated an increase in the 
President's Budget Request for the all-hazards Emergency Management 
Performance Grant (EMPG) program. However, the President's Budget 
Request proposed $170 million for the upcoming fiscal year, the same as 
the previous year's request.
    What role do you see for State and local emergency management 
programs in national disaster preparedness?
    Answer. The Department continues to fully support the EMPG program, 
which helps States and Urban Areas achieve target levels of capability 
to enhance the effectiveness of their emergency management programs. 
The EMPG funding request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States 
to continue to develop intra- and interstate emergency management 
systems that encourage partnerships among government, business, 
volunteer, and community organizations based on identified needs and 
priorities for strengthening their emergency management and 
catastrophic planning capabilities. Further, homeland security is a 
shared mission and thus a shared responsibility between the Federal 
Government and our State and local partners. The Federal Government 
should not be expected to bear all emergency planning costs. Instead, 
the Department expects that States and localities will devote 
significant funds to enhance their planing based on local conditions 
and thereby help to improve the Nation's level of preparedness.
    In addition, the Department's fiscal year 2007 budget request 
expands the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) and the State 
Homeland Security Program (SHSP), which will significantly enhance 
State and local preparedness capabilities. In fiscal year 2007 the 
Department has requested to expand the UASI program by $80.65 million. 
The fiscal year 2007 UASI funding request will continue to help 
establish a metropolitan area-wide approach to homeland security. 
Allocating UASI funds based on risk and need will continue to reflect a 
results-based planning process that supports achievement of minimum 
baseline capability levels in our Nation's high threat urban areas. The 
fiscal year 2007 budget request also includes an $83 million increase 
in SHSP funding. These SHSP funds will continue to build capabilities 
at the State and local levels through planning, equipment, training, 
and exercise activities and to implement the goals and objectives 
included in the Homelands Security Strategies.
    Question. What role do you see for the EMPG program in the 
Department of Homeland Security's national disaster planning for both 
terrorism and natural disasters?
    Answer. The National Preparedness Goal provides a common framework 
for a systems-based approach to build, sustain, and improve national 
preparedness for a broad range of threats and hazards, regardless of 
origin. Achieving the National Preparedness Goal requires that the 
emergency management discipline play a vital role in support of the 
Goal, as well as the implementation of National Priorities and 
achievement of the target levels of capability described in the TCL. As 
the coordinator for disaster response operations, the emergency 
management discipline is essential to the prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery efforts necessary when disasters or other 
incidents of national significance occur at the State and local level, 
and when Federal assistance is needed.
    Therefore, to sustain and enhance emergency management capabilities 
in support of the Goal, the EMPG funds may assist States and urban 
areas achieve the target levels of capability to sustain and enhance 
the effectiveness of their emergency management program. As part of 
this effort, the Administration has proposed to expand the scope of 
EMPG activities to address homeland security planning. Further, the 
program's current emphasis on funding staff costs limits our ability to 
assess and measure results.
                                 ______
                                 

              Questions Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter

                          FEMA CONTRACT AWARDS

    Question. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, there was concern about 
the contracting processes used by FEMA to procure goods and services 
and concern about the awarding of ``no-bid'' contracts. Are the 
guidelines that direct contracting, especially during times of 
emergency clear?
    Answer. The guidelines contained in both the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and the Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation 
(HSAR) are clear as it relates to contracting during an emergency. 
However, while the guidance is clear, it is spread among several parts 
of the FAR. Therefore, to improve the responsiveness of the acquisition 
community, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense 
Acquisition Regulations Council are amending the FAR to provide a 
consolidated reference to acquisition flexibilities that may be used 
during emergency situations. Specifically, the information will be 
consolidated into a previously reserved FAR part. This initiative, 
however, makes no change to existing contracting policy.
    Question. Is there anything Congress can do to make them clearer?
    Answer. Additional legislation on this topic is unnecessary at this 
time.
    Question. What does FEMA need to do to improve disclosure of 
contract awards?
    Answer. FEMA is making every effort to operate with openness and 
transparency with regard to contracts awarded to support the relief and 
recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina. In addition to complying with 
the requirements of FAR 5.303, which requires notification to Congress 
of contract awards exceeding $3 million, and FAR 4.6, which requires 
the reporting of contracting data in to the Federal Procurement Data 
System, DHS also posts, at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
CPO-KatrinaContracts.pdf, all contract actions awarded by FEMA in 
support of the relief and recovery effort. This list is updated weekly, 
FEMA also posts, as required by FAR 4.6, the award of its contracting 
actions into the Federal Procurement Data System. Recognizing the 
importance of contract reporting, FEMA will provide implementing 
guidance to all contracting personnel on the importance of timely 
posting of contract awards.
    Question. Does this budget proposal adequately fund those needs?
    Answer. Yes. The President's Budget proposal adequately funds those 
needs.

                        CARGO CONTAINER SECURITY

    Question. In recent weeks, port security and cargo container 
security in general have come to national attention. What statistics do 
you have regarding the percent of all shipments entering the United 
States that are inspected for compliance with United States and 
international shipping regulations?
    Answer. CBP targets incoming containerized cargo by automated 
review of advance manifest and other information through its automated 
targeting systems to assess the risk of incoming cargo shipments. CBP 
examines all of the cargo that is identified as ``high-risk'' from this 
initial targeting through either non-intrusive detection technology, 
or, as needed, physical inspection.
    CBP defines an examination as a physical inspection of a conveyance 
and/or the imaging of a conveyance using large-scale Non-Intrusive 
Inspection (NII) technology, for the presence of contraband. CPB 
defines screening as a passive means of scanning a conveyance, baggage 
or cargo. CBP screens conveyances, baggage, and cargoes with radiation 
portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment for the 
presence of radiological emissions.
    From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of 
total containers inspected has increased at a rate of 4.2 percent per 
year. In fiscal year 2005, a total of 25,324,327 cargo conveyances 
arrived in the United States from foreign sources and a total of 
5,301,872 cargo conveyances were inspected.
    In fiscal year 2005, approximately 21 percent of all cargo 
conveyances (i.e., truck, rail and vessel) were examined for the 
presence of contraband, and approximately 67 percent of arriving 
containerized cargo was screened for radiation. Additionally, in fiscal 
year 2005, CBP examined 569,308 or approximately 5 percent of all 
arriving sea-borne containers.
    Question. What sort of tools do inspection agents have to assist 
them in screening containers in a timely, yet responsible manner?
    Answer. Over the last several years, Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) 
technology has been the cornerstone of our layered enforcement 
strategy. Technologies deployed to our Nation's air, sea, and land 
border ports of entry include large-scale X-ray and Gamma-ray imaging 
systems as well as a variety of portable and hand-held technologies to 
include our recent focus on radiation detection technology. All CSI 
ports are also required to have NII technology available to assist in 
the inspection of identified high-risk containerized cargo bound for 
the United States.
    Large-scale systems include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System 
(VACIS), Mobile VACIS, Rail VACIS, Portal VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile 
Truck X-ray, Mobile Sea Container System, Pallet Gamma-ray System and 
Mobile GaRDs unit. Nuclear and radiological detection equipment 
includes Personal Radiation Detectors, Radiation Portal Monitors and 
Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices.
    NII technologies are viewed as force multipliers that enable CBP to 
examine or screen a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic 
while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade, cargo and passengers.
    Question. Secretary Chertoff mentioned in his statement for the 
record that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is developing 
technology solutions that can be applied across the supply chain. How 
is S&T working with the private sector to procure technology?
    Answer. In support of the Department's layered supply-chain-
security strategy, the S&T Directorate interacts with the private 
sector in two main ways: (1) through an ongoing dialog with industry 
and (2) through technology procurements.
    Maintaining an ongoing dialogue with private industry helps the S&T 
Directorate understand the present state of technology in the 
marketplace, enabling sound investment decisions that reflect current 
and future capabilities and meet operational and industry user 
requirements. This dialogue takes place with technology providers, 
supply chain consultants, the shipping industry (including carriers, 
terminal operators, and port authorities) and international partners.
    The S&T Directorate is currently procuring security solution 
technologies from both large and small companies, including university 
laboratories. Technology procurements result from several contracting 
vehicles, which include solicitations under Broad Agency Announcements 
(BAA) and our Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. The 
S&T Directorate presently has private-sector procurements underway for 
the design and/or development of the following technologies:
  --Advanced Container Security Device.--A system to detect intrusion 
        on any six sides of a container as well as to sense a human 
        presence and report alarms;
  --Advanced Material Container.--A proof-of-concept container 
        constructed of composite materials that will incorporate 
        embedded security sensors and communications systems;
  --Marine Asset Tag Tracking System.--A system to provide remote 
        communications capability for an ACSD or CSD to send an alarm 
        or status information;
  --Secure Carton.--Alternative concepts to today's shipping cartons 
        that will enable monitoring to detect and report breaches at 
        the carton level; and
  --Intelligent Anomaly Detection Tools for the Automated Commercial 
        Environment and Automated Targeting System.--Advanced 
        technologies to enable improved capabilities to predict suspect 
        or threat containers bound for the United States. This is in 
        support of the Customs and Border Protection Automated 
        Commercial Environment and Automated Targeting System (ACE/
        ATS).
    The S&T Directorate is also evaluating developmental Container 
Security Devices (CSD) that can monitor container doors and report 
alarms, which are currently being marketed by vendors. The S&T 
Directorate is purchasing sample devices from qualified vendors to 
conduct bench tests and vulnerability assessments to determine the 
suitability of these devices to meet the Department's requirements.
    With these technologies, the S&T Directorate is developing a Supply 
Chain Security Architecture, a technology framework that ensures the 
integration of non-regulated supply chain information and container 
security device data to securely and efficiently transmit it to 
governmental and private-sector stakeholders. In line with the 
Department's emphasis on private sector involvement in supply chain 
security, the S&T Directorate is currently working with two supply 
chain industry experts to ensure supply chain interactions and 
processes are accurately reflected. As this architecture defines the 
standards and protocols for security and information exchange, the 
Department can leverage private-sector supply chain information 
management systems to enhance risk assessments, while providing for 
business efficiencies to the commercial and shipping industry.
    Additionally, the S&T Directorate is committed to ensuring 
interagency coordination with other Federal stakeholders involved in 
supply chain security and to leverage existing capabilities and lessons 
learned.
    Question. What specific types of technology is the Department 
looking for?
    Answer. The Department is seeking technologies and processes to 
improve visibility and security across international supply chains. The 
S&T Directorate is developing and evaluating many of these 
technologies. They include security devices with the ability to monitor 
the integrity of intermodal shipping containers in transit and 
communicate status and alarm information about those containers to the 
National Targeting Center (NTC). Critical to enabling these 
capabilities are underlying technologies that can: operate in the harsh 
intermodal shipping environment; provide close to 100-percent assurance 
that sensors can detect authorized or unauthorized door openings and 
closings, holes or false doors created on any side of a container; and 
interface with other sensors currently under development to detect 
human cargo, explosives, chemical, biological, or radiological 
material, or breaches to the containers' contents at carton level. In 
that containers transit unattended through the supply chain, these 
container security sensors also require the ability to not be easily 
compromised by either an insider attack or an outside adversary along 
the supply chain.
    The Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), currently under 
development in the S&T Directorate will utilize advanced sensors and 
fusion systems to detect intrusion on any of the six sides of the 
container and detect human cargo. The ACSD will be able to interface 
with next generation advanced sensors currently under development 
within the S&T Directorate that detect chemical or biological agents. 
In addition, these systems require remote communications capabilities 
to allow reach-back to the NTC to communicate alerts from any point 
along the supply chain, as well as local communications systems for CBP 
officers in the field. Other sensor suites which will be integrated 
with the ACSD will include systems currently under development by the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to detect and report 
radiological or nuclear agents.
    As part of an effort to identify near term deployable security 
systems for intermodal shipping containers, the S&T Directorate is 
currently in the process of evaluating a variety of existing 
developmental vendor Container Security Device (CSD) technologies that 
claim to have the ability to monitor and report intrusion of the 
container doors. Key to these evaluations is verification of claimed 
system performance and reliable sensor performance. The end goal of 
this survey is to accelerate a near term capability in advance of ACSD 
development to monitor and report container door breaches to the NTC.
    Other technologies under development and critical to container 
security are communications systems that can transmit information from 
containers intermodally and globally, while penetrating the high metal 
environment of container stacks at ports and on ships or while in 
transit on ship, rail and truck.
    Beyond CSD and ACSD, the S&T Directorate is also evaluating a next 
generation container constructed of advanced, light-weight materials 
(versus steel) that will allow security sensors and communications 
technologies to be built into the container's walls, doors and floors. 
It is believed lighter weight containers will also increase business 
efficiencies.
    Lastly, the S&T Directorate is assisting DHS components in the 
development of an architectural framework to enable integration of 
supply chain data beyond that currently regulated by Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP). This data combined with container integrity 
information, when fused in a secure and efficient manner, will enhance 
risk assessment benefiting security, while providing business 
efficiencies to the commercial and shipping industry. Part of this 
effort also involves the development of advanced intelligent algorithms 
for use by CBP's targeting system to further improve anomaly detection 
capabilities to improve assessment and targeting of high risk cargo.
                                 ______
                                 

             Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                        DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT
                     BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION OFFICE

    Question. Provide a list of accomplishments from the beginning of 
fiscal year 2005 to date for the Business Transformation Office.
    Answer.
Fiscal Year 2005
    The BTO was responsible for several major projects during fiscal 
year 2005, such as creating the functional integration Management 
Directives, creating a comprehensive set of functional integration 
milestones for each of the Management Lines of Business, establishing 
functional integration support contracts, and tracking functional 
integration priorities for the Management Directorate. The BTO reviewed 
and tracked Management Directorate programs/initiatives for schedule 
compliance based on identified milestones: eMerge, the Infrastructure 
Transformation Program (ITP), MaxHR, HSPD-12 and IT Cost Avoidance. The 
BTO also coordinated: On-boarding/Exit process, Senior Executive 
Service process, Administrative Analysis project, and streamlining the 
hiring process. Additional detail on the above projects is provided in 
the paragraphs that follow.
    In accordance with direction established in the Functional 
Integration management Directives, the BTO instituted an annual 
reporting process for establishing, measuring and reporting on 
Component functional performance for business processes that are the 
responsibility of the CXOs. The BTO also established a 
process for evaluating and reporting on the performance of Component 
CXOs and other Key Functional Officials to Component Heads.
    Strategic Plan.--The BTO was responsible for the creation of a 
multi-year Strategic Plan for the Management Directorate. The BTO began 
constructing templates and defining content for Line of Business annual 
reports and for business cases supporting functional integration 
initiatives.
    Management Directives.--The BTO was also responsible for creating 
the Functional Integration Management Directives, which provided 
direction on the leadership, integration, and management of the support 
services through each Line of Business Chief (Chief Administrative 
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief 
Human Capital Officer, Chief Procurement Officer and Chief Security 
Officer).
    Since its creation, DHS has achieved many of its objectives toward 
integrating the management functions. From the many systems and 
programs that DHS inherited, the Department has consolidated the 
following:
  --18 financial management centers down to 8 centers;
  --27 bank card programs down to 3 programs;
  --22 Human Resource Servicing offices down to 7 offices;
  --8 payroll providers down to 1 payroll provider;
  --22 Personal Property Management systems down to 3 systems;
  --Acquisition Support for 22 agencies has been consolidated to 8 
        major procurement programs;
  --1,100 Administrative Services agreements with other Federal 
        Departments to 39 agreements;
  --52 percent of workforce through the Tri-Bureau initiative 
        (Organized shared services and resources needed to more 
        efficiently and jointly support our immigration, customs and 
        border protection activities (Customs and Border Protection/
        U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services/Immigration and 
        Customs Enforcement);
  --Consolidated over 35,000 express package service contracts into 1 
        contract;
  --129 commercial information content subscription services to 8 
        services; and
  --Numerous copier maintenance and service contracts into 1 centrally 
        managed departmental contract.
    In addition, the Department has published uniform DHS acquisition 
regulations that apply across the enterprise and has established the 
first Department-wide real property asset management plan which will 
govern the consistent and efficient use and development of DHS land, 
buildings and structures for mission accomplishment.
    CXO Councils.--Each Line of Business Chief established a 
Department-wide council to serve as a governance board which would 
monitor and measure the performance of centers of excellence, shared 
services providers, managed partner providers, and self-supporting 
component providers for the various activities of their function.
    Tri-Bureau Governance Board.--The Tri-Bureau Governance Board was 
created in 2003 to oversee shared services and to serve as a decision 
maker in regard to service consolidation across the Tri-Bureau 
components.
    MOUs/MOAs.--In fiscal year 2005, the BTO ensured that Memorandum's 
of Agreement (MOA) and Memorandum's Understanding (MOU) between the 
Department, DHS components and other government agencies were 
established that would enable the Department to work more effectively 
and efficiently with other Government entities. The BTO was responsible 
for the execution of critical MOU's during the stand-up of the 
Department of Homeland Security with DOJ, DOT, GSA, DOC, DOE, and 
Treasury.
Fiscal Year 2006
    In fiscal year 2006, the BTO completed the multi-year Strategic 
Plan for the Management Directorate, the first in a series of six 
Business Cases for implementing functional integration (Chief of 
Administrative Services), and detailed annual reports for the 
Management Directorate Lines of Business.
    Functional Integration Milestones and Budget: The BTO continues to 
build on the management integration work from fiscal year 2005 by 
creating a comprehensive set of functional integration milestones for 
each of the Management Directorate Lines of Business. The functional 
integration milestones are critical deliverables and/or capabilities 
with due dates that must be met by the Management Directorate Lines of 
Business.
    The BTO is developing a consolidated financial budget focused on 
synchronizing the functional integration budgets of the Lines of 
Business with their relevant components' budgets. This consolidated 
functional integration budget will allow an accurate insight into where 
money is being spent and how much is being spent in each of the Lines 
of Business. This will enable the Department to set a baseline from 
which we can begin to explore organizational transformation across the 
Department and to develop an overall integration strategy for the 
Management Directorate.
    The BTO also continues to prioritize and track functional 
integration priorities for the Management Directorate. The BTO will 
continue to drive the integration of legacy support systems, maximizing 
common platforms and leveraging the ``economies of scale'' that exist. 
Another priority is to conduct a review of operations in the Management 
Directorate on a macro level and look for additional opportunities to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate.
    Question. What are the pros and cons of combining this office with 
the Immediate Office of the Under Secretary of Management?
    Answer. There are benefits to having the Business Transformation 
Office (BTO) as a separate staff element reporting to the Under 
Secretary for Management. The BTO initiative requires specific skills 
in planning, organizational development, program & management analysis, 
project management and budget/finance which are different from those 
required in the Immediate Office of the Under Secretary.
    The BTO staff members generally have in-depth experience with the 
business processes of one or more of the functional Lines of Business. 
As a direct report to the Under Secretary, the BTO has access and 
exposure to the full spectrum of initiatives across all management 
functions (administrative services, enterprise architecture, financial 
management, information technology, human capital management, 
procurement, and security). Consequently, the BTO staff members are 
appropriately qualified and in the proper position to identify 
initiatives and interdependencies among the Lines of Business as the 
Functional Integration efforts continue.
    Combining the BTO with the immediate office of the Under Secretary 
could be done as well, but there are few benefits to doing so. One 
advantage would be that the staff members of the BTO could provide 
program management skills and analysis for other more narrowly-defined 
initiatives within the Management Directorate and among DHS components.
    A disadvantage of this combination, however, would be that the long 
term planning and functional integration roles of the BTO would most 
likely be overcome by the day to day events that require immediate 
attention within the Management Directorate and among the DHS 
components.

                        EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE

    Question. Provide an analysis of the pros and cons of performing 
the duties of the executive sedan service in house (i.e. leasing/
procuring the needed vehicles and hiring the needed drivers) as opposed 
to contracting out for this service?
    Answer. The following analysis shows pros, cons and not only cost, 
but also organizational flexibility and administrative burdens as well 
to provide executive sedan service for DHS executives and senior 
officials.
Completely In-house

                  DHS EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE--IN-HOUSE
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Owned Vehicles (10 @ $23,000/vehicle--cost averaged over         $46,000
 5 years)...............................................
Maintenance.............................................           9,000
18 Drivers (12 hour shift--average 21 days/mo.).........       1,720,232
3 Dispatchers...........................................         186,390
2 Driver Foremen........................................         136,031
Supervisor..............................................         118,346
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................       2,215,999
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Vehicles would be used over a 5 year period. Maintenance and 
operational costs would be expected to increase over the life of the 
vehicle. Disposal costs would be necessary at the end of the period.
    Vehicles are DHS assets and are available for use in a COOP or 
emergent situation.
    Additional vehicle(s) necessary as ready back up in case of 
accident or other failure, and for rotation during scheduled 
maintenance.
    Staff may be assigned to other transportation related duties as 
need and workload dictate in unusual situations.
    A significant addition to on-board FTE is required to assure 
sufficient drivers and support for a 12 hour per day operation, while 
also providing coverage for holidays, annual leave and sick leave.
    This also adds some administrative burden to other administrative 
functions such as human capital and finance.
Completely Contracted Out

              DHS EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE--FULLY CONTRACTED
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicles (9 vehicles @ $40,000--averaged over 5 years)..         $72,000
Drivers.................................................         952,560
Dispatchers.............................................         219,135
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................       1,243,695
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contractor is responsible for assuring an adequate number of 
cleared staff to provide the required support.
    Contractor is also responsible for assuring an adequate number of 
vehicles are available to meet the requirements of the contract.
    Only pay for vehicles used, but with maintenance, replacement, 
standby and mark up costs included. Costs would be higher if vehicles 
are replaced on preferred 2-year cycle. Maintenance and down time would 
be reduced and reliability increased.
    Vehicles are assets owned by the contractor, and availability in a 
COOP or emergent situations would not be expected.
    Administrative burden is minimized as human capital support in 
recruitment and processing as Federal employees is not required.
    Contractor personnel may not be asked to perform tasks not 
specifically covered by the scope of the contract.
Current Arrangement is a Hybrid
    The Department currently contracts for vehicles (leases a 
competitive procurement) and driving services separately in order to 
take advantage of the lower costs and flexibilities that each has to 
offer, while limiting overhead. The Department is paying $799 per month 
($9,588 annually) per vehicle for a fully serviced lease which includes 
maintenance and full insurance coverage. Cars are replaced every 2 
years, which keeps reliability high and the leasing company can sell 
the vehicle which keeps lease costs lower. If the contractor were to 
acquire the vehicles, the Government would pay a higher price along 
with a markup by the vendor. If a vehicle is out of service due to 
other than routine maintenance, a loaner is often available, 
eliminating the need to maintain another vehicle as a backup.
    By contracting for the drivers and dispatchers, the contractor 
bears responsibility for assuring that a sufficient number of cleared 
personnel are available to provide the required level of service. 
Contracting for the drivers and dispatchers also reduces administrative 
burden on DHS.
  --Although using contractor personnel, the vehicles remain DHS assets 
        and are available for use in a COOP or emergent situation.
  --Administrative burden is less than the other options.
  --No disposal costs
  --Through use of an executive lease program, maintenance and 
        insurance are included and loaners are often available thus 
        minimizing the need for a backup vehicle.

                                 MAXHR

    Question. How many of the 29 new positions requested in the budget 
for the MAXHR program could be negatively affected by a ruling against 
the Department in it MAXHR court case?
    Answer. Of the 29 new positions requested for the MAXHR program, 
only six--those additional positions that would be used to support the 
Homeland Security Labor Relations Board (HSLRB)--could potentially be 
impacted by the court case.
    Question. How much of $38.9 million increase to the ``Advisory and 
Assistance Services'' component of the MaxHR program could be 
negatively affected by a ruling against the Department in the MAXHR 
court case?
    Answer. With respect to the $71,749,000 requested in fiscal year 
2007 for human resource management, the only funding that could be 
foregone if the outcome of the court case is not in the Department's 
favor would be the $7.450 million allocated for the Homeland Security 
Labor Relations Board.
    Question. In the event of a court ruling against the Department, 
what are the Department's contingency plans with respect to the new 
positions and support funding?
    Answer. Regardless of the outcome of the litigation pending before 
the Court of Appeals, the implementation of MAXHR will continue at DHS. 
The process for implementation may be significantly more difficult, 
however, if the outcome is not favorable to the Department. The 
flexibilities in the legislation and the MAXHR regulations were 
intended to allow the Department to construct a uniform, performance 
based personnel system that would span the various components and 
occupational categories across the Department. If those flexibilities 
are not sustained by the court, the Department still intends to 
implement a uniform personnel system but may have to invest 
considerably more time and energy in negotiations and consultations 
with the unions that represent employees in more than fifty bargaining 
units across the organization. In addition, the Department may also 
need to maintain multiple pay and performance management systems for a 
longer time, pending the implementation of a single, unified MAXHR 
system.

                            DHS HEADQUARTERS

    Question. Will the $8.2 million requested in the fiscal year 2007 
budget complete the build-out of the NAC? If so, when will the build-
out be finished?
    Answer. The requested $8.2 million requested in the fiscal year 
2007 budget will complete the build out of the NAC. We expect there may 
be a need for some minimal funds in the out years to manage any minor 
rearrangements and reconfigurations as missions changes require.
    Question. When the build-out is complete, how much additional 
capacity for growth (in terms of office space available) will the 
Department have at the NAC?
    Answer. After the NAC build-out is complete the NAC will be at full 
capacity with approximately 300,000 usable square feet of space for 
about 1,700 people, and there will be no additional office space 
available.

                           PROCUREMENT REPORT

    Question. As directed by the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, provide a report on the number of procurement 
officers for each Departmental component and include an assessment of 
the adequacy of the number and training of these personnel.
    Answer. The CPO continues to work with components and the DHS CFO 
to budget for increased contracting staff. Based on fiscal year 2005 
staffing levels, increases have been realized in both fiscal year 2006 
(11 percent) and are projected fiscal year 2007 (47 percent) based on 
the President's proposed budget. The CPO will work to continue this 
trend until optimum staffing levels are attained. The following chart 
shows the staffing numbers and the percentage of trained and certified 
contracting officers.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Percent of
                                                  Authorized FTE  Authorized FTE    President's      Certified
                   Org Element                      Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year     Budget FTE      Contracting
                                                       2005            2006         Fiscal Year     Officers on
                                                                                       2007            Board
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP.............................................              92             119             179              79
OPO.............................................             127             127             227              79
TSA.............................................              67             105             165              74
ICE.............................................              81              64              96              32
USCG............................................             336             339             339              89
FEMA............................................              55              85             127              79
FLETC...........................................              31              36              36             100
USSS............................................              25              25              25              96
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     COMPETITIVE SOURCING PERSONNEL

    Question. How many of the 50 positions requested in the Office of 
Procurement's fiscal year 2007 budget request are to be used for 
competitive sourcing activities?
    Answer. Currently one position will be added to competitive 
sourcing. Once the Director of Acquisition Programs is on board we will 
leverage the staffing of the OCPO programs to offset peaks and valleys 
in work load requirements.
    Question. How many positions in the Office of Procurement are 
currently used for competitive sourcing activities?
    Answer. Two positions.

                         CONTRACTING OUT REPORT

    Question. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation Omnibus (H.R. 2673) 
Division F--Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and Independent 
Agencies, Title VI Section 647(b), contained the following reporting 
requirement: ``Not later than 120 days following the enactment of this 
Act and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the head of 
each executive agency shall submit to Congress a report on the 
competitive sourcing activities on the list required under the Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-270; 31 U.S.C. 
501 note) that were performed for such executive agency during the 
previous fiscal year by Federal Government sources.''
    The Committee has not yet received this year's report. Please 
provide this information as well as any plans for public-private 
competitions in fiscal year 2007.
    Answer. The DHS fiscal year 2005 Section 647 report is being 
prepared for submission to the Congress and posting on the DHS web 
site.
    Question. For fiscal year 2005 (actual), fiscal year 2006 
(estimate), and fiscal year 2007 (request), how many positions in the 
Department (broken down by agency) were competed and how much did the 
competitions cost.
    Answer. As noted in the Department of Homeland Security's Section 
647 Report to Congress, DHS completed Competitive Sourcing (OMB 
Circular A-76) competitions involving a total of 137 FTE in fiscal year 
2005, at a one time cost of $787,000. All of these competitions were 
retained in house.
    For fiscal year 2006, DHS has completed competitions involving 150 
FTE to date--all retained in-house--and is currently preparing for the 
completion of additional competitions involving 235 FTE.
    DHS is currently planning to announce in fiscal year 2006 several 
competitions for completion in fiscal year 2007 involving 4,153 FTE.
    Question. How many positions were subsequently contracted out as a 
result of the competition?
    Answer. No positions were contracted out in fiscal year 2005 and no 
positions have been converted to contract performance as a result of 
our fiscal year 2006 efforts to date.

                      DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE

    Question. How many DHS employees (including the component agencies) 
are currently detailed to the White House (including all Executive 
Office of the President agencies)? Provide the committee a list 
containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to; 
salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end 
dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if the agency is 
reimbursed.
    Answer. Our most recent quarterly report shows 13 detailees to the 
White House as of 12/31/05. See attached report entitled White House 
Detailees.

                                                                                     FISCAL YEAR 2006 1ST QUARTER--DHS DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Detailed from
         Reporting agency             Detailed to which NON-DHS agency      which NON-DHS   Detailed from which   Originating agency   Grade/step or salary    Detail start date      Detail end date     Purpose of detail   Reimb. Y/N
                                                                               agency          DHS component
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE...........................  ..............  ....................  USCG................  O-5.................  Oct-2005............  Mar-2006............  Comprehensive                N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Review Working
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Group/Katrina
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Lessons Learned
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Team.
USCG/PHS.........................  WHITE HOUSE...........................  ..............  DHS/USCG/PHS........  USCG/PHS............  MILITARY............  6/13/2005...........  7/1/2008............  White House                  N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Physician
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Assistant.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/HSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  6/14/2004...........  7/1/2006............  Director for Cargo           N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          and Port Security,
                                                                                                                                                                                                          HSC.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/HSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  9/20/2004...........  11/1/2005...........  Senior Director,             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Border and
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Transportation
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Security, HSC.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/NSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  5/28/2004...........  7/1/2006............  Duty Officer, White          N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          House Situation
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Room.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/NSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  6/27/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Duty Officer, White          N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          House Situation
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Room.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/NSC.......................  ..............  DHS/US CG...........  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  11/17/2005..........  7/1/2007............  Director for Drugs           N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          and Latin America,
                                                                                                                                                                                                          NSC.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/ONDCP.....................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  7/15/2004...........  7/1/2006............  Office of Supply             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Reduction as the
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Acting Staff
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Director and the
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Coast Guard
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Liaison.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/OVP.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  5/17/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Military Aide to             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          the VP.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/OVP.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  6/22/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Special Assistant            N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          to the VP.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/OVP.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  3/21/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Military Aide to             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          the President.
USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/WHCA......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  5/5/2003............  7/1/2006............  Chief of                     N
                                                                                                                                                                                                          Engineering, WHCA.
USSS.............................  WHITE HOUSE/WHO.......................  ..............  ....................  USSS................  $94,260.............  Jul-2005............  Jul-2006............  COOP Policy........          Y
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total White House Detailees 13.

                      DETAILEES TO THE DEPARTMENT

    Question. How many employees of DHS component agencies are 
currently detailed to the Department? Provide the committee a list 
containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to; 
salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end 
dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if this agency is 
reimbursed.
    Answer. Our most recent report (as of 12/31/05) shows 244 staff 
detailed to DHS Headquarters offices. Slightly over half are detailed 
to Operations. See attached report entitled QFR detailees.

                                                                 FISCAL YEAR 2006 1ST QUARTER--DHS DETAILEES TO THE HEADQUARTERS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Detailed from which                                                Detail start                                                                          Reimb.
       Reporting agency             DHS component      Originating agency   Grade/step or salary        date        Detail end date                   Purpose of detail                    Y/N
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRCL..........................  TSA.................  TSA.................  TSA Band H..........  11/1/2005.......  2/28/2006......  Serve as Control Officer, Complaint Adjudication         N
                                                                                                                                      Program, CRCL.
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $86,103 (1101)......  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys                N
                                                                                                                                      Architect-  ure.
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $97,734 (IPA).......  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Assessments.       N
DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $65,000 (0-4).......  12/05/05........  06/04/06.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                      Acq.
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $200,000 (IPA)......  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Director....       N
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  GS-13/1.............  04/18/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-15/1.............  10/03/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                      Acq.
DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $120,000 (O-6)......  01/09/06........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Policy......       N
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $151,156 (1101).....  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Trans. R&D..       N
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  GS-15/2.............  03/01/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  $122,000 (IPA)......  06/09/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Engineer-      N
                                                                                                                                        ing.
DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-15/3.............  02/14/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Policy S&L..       N
DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14/8.............  07/26/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                      Acq.
DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $95,000 (O-4).......  12/05/05........  06/04/06.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-15/6.............  10/03/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                      Acq.
DNDO..........................  TSA.................  TSA.................  $128,000 (K Band)...  02/05/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Chief of           N
                                                                                                                                      Staff.
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $173,186 (IPA)......  06/04/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Assessments.       N
DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  GS-14/1.............  04/18/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-15/1.............  02/19/06........  02/19/07.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $95,000 (O-4).......  01/09/06........  01/09/08.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Systems            N
                                                                                                                                      Engineering.
DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-12/1.............  08/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14/5.............  07/31/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
I&A IA-H/AS...................  OGC.................  DHS/OGC.............  GS 15...............  7/12/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission as attorney................       N
I&A IA-H/AS...................  OGC.................  OGC.................  GS-15...............  12/15/03........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission as attorney................       N
I&A IA-C/CA...................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  4/13/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission............................       N
I&A IA-C/CA...................  TSA.................  TSA.................  GS-14...............  5/24/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & TSA REP..................       N
I&A IA-D/TA...................  USCG................  USCG................  LT..................  1/24/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & USCG Rep.................       Y
I&A IA-D/TA...................  USCG................  USCG................  ....................  8/10/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & USCG Rep.................       Y
I&A IA-D/TA...................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14...............  11/3/2003.......  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & CBP Rep..................       N
I&A IA-H/IM...................  CIA.................  CIA.................  SIS.................  10/20/05........  Indefinite.....  DIRECTOR INFO MGT.................................       Y
I&A IA-L P&I..................  NSA.................  NSA.................  GS-15...............  ................  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & NSA rep..................       N
I&A IA-P/P&I..................  USCG................  USCG................  Lt. Cdr.............  11/28/05........  Indefinite.....  USCG LIAISON TO ASIA..............................       N
L&IA..........................  CIS.................  CIS.................  84,751..............  1/1/2004........  Indefinite.....  LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO IMMIGRATION................       N
L&IA..........................  TSA.................  TSA.................  57,925..............  7/11/2005.......  9/1/2005.......  LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO TSA........................       N
L&IA..........................  COAST GUARD.........  COAST GUARD.........  MILITARY............  6/23/2005.......  Indefinite.....  LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO COAST GUARD................       N
OGC...........................  USCG................  USCG................  82,937..............  3/1/2005........  3/1/2007.......  Assist with international issues and with Team           Y
                                                                                                                                      Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.
OGC...........................  USCG................  USCG................  82,937..............  3/1/2005........  3/31/2006......  Provide legal advice concerning issues as they           N
                                                                                                                                      involve the USCG.
OGC...........................  USCIS...............  CIS.................  110,878.............  3/1/2005........  12/31/2006.....  Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS         N
                                                                                                                                      OGC, focusing on issues relating to immigration
                                                                                                                                      benefits and related USCIS issues.
OGC...........................  ICE.................  ICE.................  135,136.............  7/1/2005........  12/31/2006.....  Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS         N
                                                                                                                                      OGC, focusing on issues relating to immigration
                                                                                                                                      enforcement and related ICE issues.
OGC...........................  HSLRB...............  DHS.................  107,521.............  12/1/2005.......  12/31/2006.....  Assist with implementation of MaxHR...............       N
OGC...........................  HSLRB...............  DHS.................  107,521.............  12/1/2005.......  12/31/2006.....  Assist with OGC's Katrina Task Force..............       N
OGC...........................  UCSIS...............  USCIS...............  118,272.............  12/1/2005.......  12/1/2006......  Assist with promulgation of regulations that             N
                                                                                                                                      impact on USCIS mission.
OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  Jul 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-14...............  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  GS-14...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  H...................  Apr 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  CDR.................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Dec 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-12...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DOI.................  DOI.................  GS-13...............  Dec 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  DNDO................  Cont................  Nov 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  PAO.................  PAO.................  E-7.................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  Lt..................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-12...............  Aug 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  HSOMB...............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  GS-13...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  O-3.................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  HSOMB...............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DOI.................  FPS /DOI............  GS-14...............  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jun 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  O-3.................  Jun 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-14...............  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  E-6.................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-11...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  Apr 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Mar 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  GS-14...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  Cont................  Apr 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  SWO.................  O-6.................  Jun 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  GS-12...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  GS-13...............  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  Fusion..............  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  FAM.................  GS-12...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Feb 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  GS-14...............  Mar 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Jun 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  NBSG................  Cont................  Feb 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  Mar 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Sep 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  GS-11...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  Lt..................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  Cont................  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Nov 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  NBSG................  Cont................  Sep 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  GS-11...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  May 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  Future Ops..........  GS-15...............  Mar 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Internal Security...  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-11...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  GS-15...............  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Nov 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  Cont................  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FPS.................  FPS.................  CMDR................  Nov 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-12...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-15...............  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  O-2.................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DHS PAO.............  PAO.................  GS-13...............  Apr 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  GS-14...............  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  K...................  Sep 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-15...............  Mar 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  DNDO................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-11...............  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Jun 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  HSOMB...............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  E-7.................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  LCRD................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  NBSG................  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-14...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-13...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  PSA.................  Cont................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  GS-12...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-12...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  Executive Staff.....  CDR.................  Jun 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  NBSG................  Cont................  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  LCDR................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
OPS Directorate...............  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Mar 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  LT Commander........  9/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  NCSD................  GS-14...............  1/12/05.........  1/12/06........  Support law enforcement and Intelligence..........       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  INS.................  INS.................  SES.................  6/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 14/..............  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 7/...............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-12...............  5/10/06.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  UND--Off............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-1811-14..........  11/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  1/1/03..........  1/1/04.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  9/13/05.........  5/6/06.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  12/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
PREPAREDNESS..................  S&T.................  S&T Augmentee.......  Detailed Contractor.  4/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  11/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  EP&R................  EP&R................  GS-14...............  9/10/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  5/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  LT..................  4/1/05..........  6/1/06.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-14...............  7/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14...............  10/1/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-15...............  8/2/05..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-11...............  11/17/03........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  NCSD................  GS-14...............  1/4/05..........  Indefinite.....  Support Law Enforcement and Intelligence..........       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  SES.................  9/1/05..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-0132-13..........  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  4/13/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-1811-14..........  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  LT Commander........  4/1/04..........  6/1/06.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  SES.................  6/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  SES.................  9/13/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-13...............  11/3/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  3/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                      monitoring of the Homeland.
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 6/...............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-0132-14..........  3/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-13...............  9/13/05.........  5/10/06........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  H...................  12/23/03........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-13...............  3/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Assist State and Local officials during DHS stand        N
                                                                                                                                      up.
PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  SES.................  10/1/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  H...................  10/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-15...............  10/01/05........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  4/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  12/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-1801-14..........  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  NGB.................  NGB.................  LTC.................  9/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  12/3/03.............  9/4/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  GS-14...............  9/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  I...................  10/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14...............  11/3/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE......  USSS................  USSS................  GS-0301-15..........  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
S&T...........................  USCG................  DHS.................  GS-14...............  01/09/04........  Indefinite.....  Providing technical expertise to S&T..............       N
S&T...........................  CBP.................  DHS.................  GS-14...............  09/12/05........  9/13/2006......  Providing technical expertise to S&T..............       N
S&T...........................  USCG................  DHS.................  CDR.................  09/30/04........  7/30/2007......  Providing technical expertise to S&T..............       N
USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  149,200.............  4/3/2005........  10/28/2005.....  Support Solutions Engineering COE.................       Y
USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  130,155.............  4/4/2005........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  141,844.............  7/13/2003.......  Indefinite.....  DHS/BTS Integration...............................       N
USM/CIO.......................  ICE.................  ....................  100,152.............  12/1/2003.......  1/23/05 ended..  Program management and acquisition support........       N
USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  102,885.............  4/4/2005........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
USM/CIO.......................  CIS.................  ....................  89,736..............  3/1/2003........  Indefinite.....  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.       N
USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  110,278.............  4/3/2005........  10/28/2005       Information Technology............................       Y
                                                                                                                     ended.
USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  145,482.............  10/27/2004......  Indefinite.....  TSA representative to the Information                    N
                                                                                                                                      Transformation Office.
USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  138,093.............  4/3/2005........  10/28/2005       Information Technology............................       Y
                                                                                                                     ended.
USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  141,454.............  7/13/2003.......  10/19/2005       INFRASTRUCTURE program support....................       Y
                                                                                                                     ended.
USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  156,886.............  5/1/2004........  Indefinite.....  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.       Y
USM/CIO.......................  CBP.................  ....................  149,200.............  12/1/2004.......  Indefinite.....  CIO, Wireless Management Office...................       N
USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  120,139.............  5/16/2005.......  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  130,155.............  4/4/2005........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
USM/CIO.......................  CBP.................  ....................  52,468..............  9/19/2005.......  2/19/2006......  Supporting the DHS Deputy CIO.....................       N
USM/CIO.......................  OSLGCP..............  ....................  97,206..............  2/7/2005........  9/30/2006......  Assistant Metadata Program Manager to help manage        N
                                                                                                                                      DHS Metadata Center of Excellence (MCOE) program.
USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  130,155.............  4/4/05..........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
USM/CIO.......................  ICE.................  ....................  100,152.............  12/1/2003.......  Indefinite.....  ACIO acquisition support..........................       N
USM-CAO.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS 15...............  9/12/2005.......  9/11/2006......  Specialization in Portfolio Management and               N
                                                                                                                                      coordination of cross-agency requirements..
USM-CHCO......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS 14/$100,152......  4/28/2004.......  Indefinite.....  New MAX HR System--Communications Team............       N
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

            OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

    Question. In a brief the Committee received in December 2005, the 
briefing materials stated that the Office of Policy was tasked with, 
``Centralized policy development and coordination'' as well as, 
``Ensuring consistency of policy and regulatory developments across 
components.'' In light of this, what are the pros and cons of the 
Office of Screening Coordination and Operations being a component 
within the Office of Policy?
    Answer. After conducting a Second Stage Review of the Department, I 
announced and implemented organizational changes in order to enhance 
the coordination of policy, operations, and intelligence across the DHS 
spectrum. These changes resulted in the creation of a department-wide 
Office of Policy, Office of Operations Coordination and Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis. This new organizational structure became 
effective in November 2005. These offices have been charged with 
utilizing the tools of all of DHS's components to address the 
Department's critical homeland security mission. Indeed, these new 
offices interface on a daily basis with their counterparts in the DHS 
component agencies. This coordinated effort has vastly improved the 
Department's ability to develop strong regulatory and legislative 
proposals.
    The Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) will work 
with each of these offices to improve security screening by creating 
screening standards and polices for the Department of Homeland 
Security, by providing a single redress office for travelers, and by 
setting common standards for registered traveler programs. The 
functions of the SCO include: (1) development of a unified business 
vision and strategy for the coordinated screening of people; (2) 
development of operational standards and coordination of policies; (3) 
oversight of unified program management processes across the various 
screening programs, and management of screening and credential 
acquisitions; and (4) establishment of a portfolio of common screening 
services that include unified standards concerning enrollments; 
biometrics management; credentialing operations; and central redress 
practices and policies.
    The SCO will implement an effective and efficient screening 
capability that integrates policies, business strategies and processes, 
data and information systems, and technology to enhance security and 
immigration, trade, travel, and credentialing experiences.

                       OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

    Question. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget for the Office of 
Procurement Operations in the Working Capital Fund requests an increase 
of 93 FTE. The Office of Procurement in the Under Secretary for 
Management account requests an increase of 25 FTE. Given these large 
increases in FTE for procurement contracting and policy, is a 
sufficient number of lawyers with expertise in procurement law being 
requested for the Office of General Counsel (an increase of four 
attorneys is requested)?
    Answer. The procurement law function within the OGC was originally 
staffed to provide legal support to a small operational procurement 
function serving the departmental offices (the Office of Procurement 
Operations), a departmental grants activity, and the departmental 
policy and executive function for the immediate offices Chief 
Procurement Officer (ICPO). As of September 2004, the procurement law 
function had three full-time procurement attorneys serving 
approximately 60 staff at OPO and ICPO. With limited exceptions, the 
contracts being written at the time by OPO were interagency agreements 
(i.e., agreements to obtain goods and services from preexisting 
contracts with other agencies or contracts to be let by those agencies) 
and orders under blanket purchase arrangements under GSA schedule 
contracts.
    Currently, OGC has five procurement attorneys. Two of the 
procurement attorneys have substantial collateral duties (one attorney 
provides other general law guidance and counsel coordination activities 
for US VISIT, and the other is providing legal advice on operational 
security matters to the Chief Security Officers and his staff). This 
staff is expected to provide: (i) solicitation and award reviews; (ii) 
day-to-day advice on intermediate actions, such as vendor questions and 
answers, discussion issues, competitive range determinations, and 
source selection issues; (iii) legal advice on procurement policy for 
the matters impacting the entire Department; (iv) oral and written 
advocacy on protests and appeals before contract fora, such as the 
Government Accountability Office, the Department of Transportation 
Board of Contract Appeals, and other specialized fora at the Department 
of Labor and Small Business Administration; and (v) litigation support 
to the Department of Justice for procurement matters before the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims.
    Currently, there are 87 staff assigned to OPO (from the 1102 
series, an actual contract writing series). OPO has the authority and 
intention to hire 40 additional staff members this fiscal year. ICPO 
has approximately another 35 personnel on-board (from the 1102 series 
and several administrative personnel from the 301 and 343 series). CPO 
advises that in fiscal year 2007, under the President's budget 
proposal, ICPO would increase staff by another 27 positions (1102), and 
OPO would add another 108 personnel (1102). At the conclusion of fiscal 
year 2007, OPO will have 228 staff on-board, and ICPO will have 62 
staff on-board--for a total of 290 staff in CPO.

                          LOCAL CIS OMBUDSMAN

    Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act 
provided funding for an internal pilot program for local ombudsman 
staffing, training, and coordination. Provide an update on the status 
of this program.
    Answer. The Local Ombudsman Pilot Program was completed on November 
15, 2005. The program met all its goals, to establish personnel and 
support requirements, determine liaison responsibilities and 
limitations and create quality assurance standards and program 
objectives.
    The pilot program created a model of operations for Local Ombudsman 
Offices or field offices. The pilot program ensures uniform operating 
procedures and processes, and provides a consistent and standardized 
model of operation. Personnel and support requirements were identified; 
liaison responsibilities and limitations were determined; and quality 
assurance standards and program objectives were scoped. The pilot 
program also developed cost models to identify personnel, facilitation 
and operating costs for Local Ombudsman Office's in various locations 
across the country.
    Question. Will additional local ombudsman programs be established 
in fiscal year 2007? If so, when will they be stood up and in what 
locations?
    Answer. There are no current plans for the creation of any Local 
Ombudsman's offices in fiscal year 2007.
    Rather, the CIS Ombudsman is developing a ``Virtual Access 
Ombudsman Office.'' This will make Ombudsman services accessible where 
computer access is available. The President's fiscal year 2007 Budget 
requests $5,927,000 for this office, including the annualization and 
adjustment's to base, and provides funding for travel to enable 
personal contact by representatives based in Washington, DC, visiting 
various locations on a ``circuit-ride'' basis. This will enable the 
Ombudsman to objectively identify areas to visit based on problems 
presented by individuals and employers in dealing with USCIS. It will 
provide an efficient method of providing government services which 
incorporate new advancements in communication.

                              BRAC REPORT

    Question. As directed by the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, provide a report describing the impact of the 
closure or realignment of any Department of Defense base resulting from 
the Base Realignment and Closure law on Department of Homeland Security 
facilities and activities.
    Answer. BRAC properties offer DHS the opportunity to acquire assets 
for current and future mission performance requirements that will 
benefit operation effectiveness and efficiencies. The complex analysis 
of the full extent and timing of operational and financial impacts, 
including cost estimates from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010, are 
being completed. We anticipate submitting a full report by January 
2007.

                  SENIOR LEADERSHIP TRAVEL INITIATIVE

    Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the Secretary 
and the Deputy Secretary do not travel by plane together. The fiscal 
year 2007 budget indicates that only the Secretary's travel has been 
designated as ``required use.'' Given this, why is the Deputy Secretary 
requesting $500,000?
    Answer. The use of a government aircraft is sometimes necessary and 
the request for additional funding is based upon the cost per flight 
hour of a government aircraft, which can cost up to $8,936 per flight 
hour.
    Question. Why couldn't the Deputy Secretary fly commercial aircraft 
at a greatly reduced cost?
    Answer. In most cases, the Deputy Secretary does fly commercial 
aircraft in order to minimize the use of taxpayer dollars for travel. 
Nonetheless, in some circumstances--such as during periods of higher 
alert status, in order to accommodate travel to multiple or remote 
locations in a short period of time, or when the traveling party is 
large--it may be more cost effective or otherwise advisable for the 
Deputy Secretary to fly on a government aircraft.
    Question. Provide information on the travel done by the Secretary, 
Deputy Secretary, and Chief of Staff for fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 
2005, and fiscal year 2006 including the number of trips and the 
charges per hour and per trip.
    Answer. The information requested for specific travel costs is 
listed below in the following charts. The rate per flight hour in the 
chart below is the total rate per hour for the entire aircraft (i.e. 
not prorated per passenger). The cost per flight hour therefore 
includes the costs for all staff accompanying the Secretary. The Chief 
of Staff is not included in the chart because the Chief of Staff does 
not travel on government aircraft except when accompanying the 
Secretary.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         FAA                  USCG                 Mil Air
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Rate per              Rate per              Rate per
                                                Number of    flight   Number of    flight   Number of    flight
                                                  trips     hour \1\    trips       hour      trips       hour
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Fiscal Year 2004

Secretary.....................................          6       $675         26     $6,192          9  $2,829-$7
                                                                                                            ,319
                                                        3        875  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                        4      1,937  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                        4      2,214  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Secretary........................         17  .........         26  .........          9  .........
                                               =================================================================
Deputy Secretary..............................          2        875  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                        2      2,214  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Dep. Sec.........................          4  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                               =================================================================

               Fiscal Year 2005

Secretary.....................................          1       $790         26     $6,192          3     $2,829
                                                       12        875         14      8,936          3      8,495
                                                        1      1,937  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                        2      2,214  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                        1      2,590  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                        3      2,829  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Secretary........................         20  .........         40  .........          6
                                               =================================================================
Deputy Secretary..............................          1        875          1      6,192  .........  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Dep. Sec.........................          1  .........          1  .........  .........  .........
                                               =================================================================

   Fiscal Year 2006 (thru January 31, 2006)

Secretary.....................................          1     $2,590          6     $8,936          1     $4,332
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Secretary........................          1  .........          6  .........          1  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Secretary..............................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total, Dep. Sec.........................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ FAA rates per flight hour do not include the 17 percent administrative fee charged on all flights.

                           OPERATIONS CENTERS

    Question. You recently stated before the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee that part of the problem in the 
Hurricane Katrina response was lack of real time information being 
shared among the Department's operations centers to ensure that all the 
decision makers were informed on issues that needed action. You 
indicated the problem was lack of integration of the operations centers 
and cultural information hoarding which leads to stove piping.
    There at least 19 Operations and Intelligence Centers at the 
Department. Please list all DHS operations centers.
    Answer. Below are the DHS Operations Centers for the DHS 
Headquarters and the Component's Headquarters:
    DHS Headquarters, Operations Directorate: Homeland Security 
Operations Center (HSOC)
    FEMA: National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)
    U.S. Coast Guard: Coast Guard Command Center (CGCC)
    U.S. Secret Service: USSS Headquarters Operations Center
    Customs & Border Patrol (CBP): Situation Room (Sit Room)
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA): Transportation 
Security Operations Center (TSOC)
    Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE Operations Center 
(IOC)
    The previous list of 19 submitted in response to other questions 
included intelligence centers are below:

                                DHS HSOC & COMPONENT-LEVEL OPS AND INTEL CENTERS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Responsible agency               Official name and acronym                      Street address
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Homeland          Homeland Security Operations Center      3801 Nebraska Ave, NW, Washington, DC
 Security (DHS): Headquarters/   (HSOC).
 Operations Directorate.        Note: Office of Intelligence & Analysis
                                 (OI&A) (Watch & Warning Branch)
                                 integrated into HSOC.

Federal Emergency Management    National Response Coordination Center    500 C Street SW, Washington, DC
 Agency (FEMA).                  (NRCC).                                 19844 Blueridge Mountain Rd, State
                                FEMA Operations Center (FOC)...........   Route 601, Bluemont, VA 20132

United States Coast Guard       Coast Guard Command Center (CGCC)......  2100 2nd St SW, Washington, DC 20593
 (USCG).                        National Response Center (NRC): Note:    2100 2nd St SW, Washington, DC 20593
                                 Chair EPA; Co-chair USCG.               1461 North Road Street, Elizabeth City,
                                National Strike Force Coordination        NC 27909
                                 Center (NSFCC).

United States Secret Service    USSS Headquarters Operations Center....  Classified
 (USSS).                        Intelligence Division Duty Desk: IA      950 H Street NW, 9th Floor, Washington,
                                 Duty Desk.                               DC 20223

Customs and Border Protection   Situation Room--``Sit Room''...........  1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W., Washington,
 (CBP).                         National Targeting Center (NTC)........   DC 20229
                                Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC)  12379 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, VA
                                National Communications Center (NCC)...   20191
                                Intel Watch............................  1355 Customs Way, March AFRB, CA 92555
                                                                         1900 Lakemont Ave, Orlando, FL 32803
                                                                         1300 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.,
                                                                          Washington, DC 20229

Transportation Security         Transportation Security Operations       13555 Eds Drive, Herndon, VA
 Administration (TSA).           Center (TSOC).                          601 South 12th Street, Arlington,
                                Transportation Security Intelligence      Virginia 22202
                                 Services (TSIS).

Immigration and Customs         ICE Operations Center (IOC)............  425 I St. N.W., Washington, DC
 Enforcement (ICE).             Federal Air Marshalls (FAM) System       FAMS Cabot Tech, 13555 EDS Drive,
                                 Operation Control Division (SOCD).       Herndon, VA 20171
                                Federal Protective Service (FPS)         Southeast Federal Center, Bldg 74, Rm
                                 National Capital Region.                 1, 3rd & M St., SE, Washington, DC
                                ICE Intelligence Watch.................   20407
                                                                         425 I St. N.W., Washington, DC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. What is your plan to finally integrate the centers?
    Answer. The plan is to integrate the DHS Operations Centers as 
follows:
Short Term
    DHS Operations Directorate acts as the Operations Advocate for DHS 
and produces a cascading effect for a single operations function and 
24/7 operations center within each component. The 2SR identified the 
need for an integrated DHS/Department-level operations function and an 
integrated DHS/Department-wide operations architecture/structure. In 
particular, ``structure'' includes Department-wide organizing (and 
resourcing) to provide operations functions at the Component level. The 
newly formed DHS Operations Directorate provides ``one stop shopping'' 
and unity of effort for overall Department-level (strategic/national) 
operations. The formation and implementation of the DHS Operations 
Directorate will cascade the need/requirement for a consolidated 
operations function within each DHS Component. The cascading effect is 
similar to a ``forcing function'' that will ripple from the strategic 
level through the operational and tactical level so that operations are 
unified across the spectrum of threats and characterized by rapid 
planning and execution.
    As the operations advocate, the DHS Operations Directorate is 
forcing a cultural change throughout DHS that focuses on critical 
elements of ``command and staff actions'' including rapid and accurate 
operational reporting, standardization, verification/quality control, 
and real time situational awareness. The DHS Operations Directorate is 
the senior (strategic/national level) operations entity and has staff 
cognizance over operational matters within the strategic, operational 
and tactical framework. Thus, the advocate ``looks out'' for and 
promotes unified operations throughout DHS and with other partner 
agencies. The advocacy includes helping Components develop an 
operations function to promoting organizational and process changes to 
supporting resource requirements. The DHS operations advocate keeps 
critical operating issues in front of the senior DHS leaders.
    The DHS Operations Directorate is providing integrated connectivity 
and increased situational awareness through a Common Operating Network 
and a Common Operating Picture. The common operating network is the 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). It is used for 
operational reporting that will be fed into a Common Operating Database 
(COD) that feeds the Common Operating Picture (COP). Using the HSIN and 
the COP as two tools to coordinate or blend the DHS operation centers 
(strategic, operational, tactical levels) into a functioning whole 
(unity of effort). The COP will then be provided to the components for 
their use and for updating. The integration of the DHS Operations 
Centers via HSIN and the COP/COD provides information sharing and 
situational awareness, both vertically and horizontally, for increased 
unity of effort.
Long Term
    When considering long term options, DHS is exploring solutions that 
will lead to the consolidation as well as integration of its various 
operations centers. Among the options being considered is the National 
Operations Center. A National Operations Center facility would provide 
the protections of subterranean, positive pressure CBRNE survivability 
features common to modern Department of Defense Operations Centers 
would ensure that mission critical collaboration and coordination 
activities throughout all phases of national incident management 
activities.
    Question. Is there money in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget 
to get that done?
    Answer. The 2007 President's budget request fully funds capability 
milestones planned for HSIN and the Common Operating Picture necessary 
to integrate operations across the department in the short-term.

                                I STAFF

    Question. What is the status of the I staff?
    Answer. The Operational Integration Staff (I-STAFF) no longer 
exists. As part of the DHS reorganization following the Second Stage 
Review, the Secretary incorporated I-STAFF functions into the 
Operations and Preparedness Directorates.
    Question. How many of the detailees to the I staff have returned to 
their agencies and how many are detailed to the Operations Directorate?
    Answer. There are no former I-Staff personnel detailed to the 
Operations Directorate. All of the personnel previously detailed to the 
I-Staff have either returned to their previous organizations or been 
placed in permanent FTE positions elsewhere in the Department, with the 
exception of 2 detailees who are transitioning into permanent positions 
and 4 Coast Guard Officers who have been assigned on detail to the 
Preparedness Directorate.
    Question. Are detailees to the Operations Directorate reimbursed?
    Answer. As a general rule, the Operations Directorate does not 
reimburse parent organizations for the interagency support that is 
provided to the Operations Directorate. However, Operations does have 
reimbursable agreements with a few agencies to cover the cost of 
support provided to the HSOC. Currently, agreements are in place with 
the CIA, the National Geospatial Mapping Agency (NGA) and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

                         MORALE PROBLEMS AT DHS

    Question. From August to December of 2004, the Office of Personnel 
Management sent out surveys to 276,424 Federal employees at 30 cabinet 
departments. The purpose of this survey was to allow managers to 
measure, ``employees' perceptions of whether, and to what extent, 
conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their 
agencies.'' In June of 2005 the results of the survey were made public.
    According to the survey, Department of Homeland Security employees 
rated their Department the lowest in terms of performance and job 
satisfaction. Of the 78 questions on the survey, the Department of 
Homeland Security was in the bottom 10 percent of all departments and 
agencies more than 96 percent of the time. In fact, the Department 
ranked dead last on exactly half of the questions asked. Here are some 
of the survey results:
    Only 12 percent said they felt strongly that they were, 
``encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing thing.''
    Only 4.6 percent strongly agree that, ``Employees are rewarded for 
providing high quality products and services to customers.''
    Only 3.3 percent strongly agreed with the following statement, 
``Personnel decisions are based on merit.''
    Mr. Secretary, that survey was taken before you came on board. This 
past summer, you reorganized the Department. Then Hurricane Katrina 
hit. Do you believe that morale and performance are improving at DHS?
    Answer. The results of the Federal Human Capital (HC) Survey were 
received shortly prior to my arrival at DHS. While the employees' 
responses demonstrated a strong commitment to the DHS mission and how 
their work efforts relate to our important tasks at hand, I was less 
pleased with DHS' overall standing in the survey and responses to 
specific areas such as establishment of a performance culture and trust 
in top organizational leaders. Since receiving the survey results, I 
have taken several actions to ensure that we maintain a focus on 
improving the quality of work life for employees of the Department. 
Upon receiving the survey results, I immediately took action to address 
the findings, including correspondence to Departmental leaders and 
establishment of an employee-led team to address the findings and 
opportunities for improvement. Additionally, a ``culture and 
communications'' team was charted under my Second Stage Review for the 
express purpose of identifying opportunities to improving morale and 
communications within DHS. The 2SR team identified a number of 
findings, including an increased emphasis on leadership development, 
creating a continuous learning environment, and establishing a 
performance-based culture.
    I believe that the action steps that are being undertaken as a 
result of our response to the HC Survey as well as the 2SR team finding 
are having, and will continue to have, a positive impact on the 
organization. Our continued emphasis on implementing the Department's 
new human resources system, MAXHR, will also have a tremendous impact 
on our continued development of organizational leaders and movement 
towards a more performance-based organization.
    Question. What specific steps are you taking to improve morale at 
the Department?
    Answer. Today, the HC Survey response team within DHS, the I-team, 
continues to work employee issues at a grass roots level, including 
sponsoring employee focus groups to identify specific action plans for 
improving DHS morale. A Chief Learning Officer position has been 
established to increase our focus on training and development 
opportunities, and MAXHR performance leadership training has been 
initiated and completed for over 3,000 DHS managers to heighten their 
skills and awareness of employee issues and creating a stronger 
performance culture--with 9,000 more managers scheduled for training 
this year. All SES members of the Department received specific training 
in August of last year that included how to improve communications and 
coaching skills within the workforce and how to create a better 
alignment between organizational priorities and individual performance 
expectations. Additionally, I have recently taken steps to improve 
communications between senior leadership and all DHS employees, through 
a Secretarial webcast, through which answers to frequently asked 
employee questions were provided. I plan to continue this and other 
efforts aimed at bettering communications with our leaders and our 
workforce.

                              CIVIL RIGHTS

    Question. How many civil rights complaints/investigations were 
there in fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005, and fiscal year 2006 to 
date (listed by agency)?
    Answer. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) 
categorizes ``Civil Rights Complaints'' in two ways: (1) external 
complaints are allegations that employees or officials of the 
Department have violated the civil rights or civil liberties of members 
of the public, organizations, or non-DHS employees; and (2) for 
internal complaints, the Secretary has delegated the authority to 
direct processing of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. The 
response to this QFR is divided into these two categories.
    External.--For external complaints, there are multiple entry points 
into the Department. The Office for CRCL receives complaints from the 
public and categorizes them by component. The Office retains these 
complaints for investigation or refers them to the appropriate office 
for investigation. In addition, we have provided separate information 
for complaints filed directly with a component Civil Rights Office of 
professional responsibility. Complaints filed with the DHS Office of 
Inspector General are not included in these QFR responses.
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
    The number of complaints received by fiscal year and component in 
the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management 
system is as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           EPR/    IAIP/
          Fiscal year             Total    CBP   DHS \1\   FEMA    PREP     ICE     TSA    USCG    USCIS   USSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004...........................      88      35  .......       2  ......      25      20  ......       5       1
2005...........................      88      36        3  ......       1      30       5       4       7       2
2006 (to date).................      46      17  .......       1  ......      24       3       1  ......  ......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Indicates a multiple-component complaint.

    Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component 
offices is listed below:
Customs and Border Protection
    Fiscal year 2004--218
    Fiscal year 2005--255
    Fiscal year 2006--111 (to date)
Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights
    Fiscal year 2004--1
    Fiscal year 2005--2
    Fiscal year 2006--13 (to date)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    Fiscal year 2004--42
    Fiscal year 2005--97
    Fiscal year 2006--38 (to date)
Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights
    Fiscal year 2004--167
    Fiscal year 2005--564
    Fiscal year 2006--57 (to date)
Internal (EEO)
    For internal complaints the aggrieved individual contacts a 
component EEO Office, completes the informal process for discrimination 
complaints and if the issue is not resolved to his or her satisfaction 
may file a complaint with that component. Upon acceptance of the 
complaint, the component EEO Office arranges for an impartial 
investigation of the complaint. If the issue remains unresolved after 
the investigation, the complainant has the right to a final agency 
decision with a hearing conducted by an EEOC Administrative Judge or on 
the record. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issues 
final agency decisions for the Department.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Fiscal year                  CIS     CBP    FEMA    FLETC   HSHQ     CE      SA      SCG     SSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004....................................      90     208      34       9  ......     271     594      34      14
2005....................................     126     242      64      15       3     274     393      35      16
2006 (1st Qtr)..........................      24      77      18       4       3      45      63       5       3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. On average, how long does it take to investigate and 
resolve a claim?
    Answer. The amount of time to investigate and resolve a claim 
depends on various factors, which are listed below:
External
    DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties:
  --The average length of time for investigation and resolution of the 
        closed referred and retained complaints in the Office for Civil 
        Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management system is 284 
        days.
    Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component 
offices is listed below:
    Customs and Border Protection & Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement:
  --CBP and ICE use a joint database to track civil rights complaints; 
        the average is 6 months.
    Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights:
  --The average is 160 days.
    Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights:
  --The average is 110 days out of an allotted 180 days.
Internal (EEO)
    The numbers in the following chart refer to the average number of 
days to investigate a complaint per component.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Fiscal year                  IS      CBP    FEMA    FLETC   DHSHQ    ICE     TSA    USCG    USSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004....................................     267     211     270     329  ......     227     314     168     181
2005....................................     161     253     293     164  ......     216     414     211     327
2006 (1st Qtr)..........................     N/A     N/A     N/A     N/A     N/A     N/A     391     143     N/A
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. What is the current backlog?
    Answer. The backlog is listed below:
External
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
    The Office defines ``backlog'' as complaints that have been open in 
the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management 
system for over 180 days. The current backlog is 57 complaints, of 
which 30 are retained within the Office and 27 are referred to 
components for investigation, out of total number of 223 complaints 
received to date.
    Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component 
offices is listed below:
Customs and Border Protection & Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    CBP and ICE use a joint database to track civil rights complaints. 
From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006 YTD 761 Civil Rights 
Complaints were received at the CBP/ICE Joint Intake Center (JIC). Of 
the 761 complaints 621 have been completed and closed out. 140 Civil 
Rights Complaints remain open and under investigation.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights
    The current backlog is 15 pending investigation, 2 from fiscal year 
2005 and 13 from fiscal year 2006. The increased activity as a result 
of Hurricane Katrina created a backlog in processing fiscal year 2005 
cases.
Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights
    The current backlog is 13 complaints from fiscal year 2005.
Internal (EEO)
    For internal complaints ``backlog'' is defined as all open 
complaints.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  As of                     CIS     CBP    FEMA    FLETC    HQ      ICE     TSA    USCG    USSS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 (1st Qtr)..........................     140     535     103      12       6     397     995      57      19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                US VISIT
                              IDENT-IAFIS

    Question. I was very pleased that you announced last summer that 
you planned to migrate the US VISIT program from the current two 
fingerprint enrollment for visitors entering this country to ten 
fingerprint enrollment. As you know, I have been pressing for this 
since the Department was created. And I am also pleased that your 
budget requests $60 million for achieving interoperability between the 
FBI and Homeland Security biometric databases as part of this effort.
    What is your estimated timeline for achieving a 10 fingerprint 
process for US VISIT?
    Answer. In order to realize the full benefits of collecting 10 
fingerprints, US VISIT must undertake two initiatives: deploy 
electronic readers capable of scanning 10 fingerprints accurately and 
quickly; and develop interoperability between the FBI's Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and DHS's Automated 
Biometric Identity System (IDENT). US VISIT has already made progress 
towards IDENT/IAFIS interoperability and is exploring 10-print readers 
for deployment to multiple environments.
    DHS, along with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as 
well as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, hosted an 
industry day to challenge the private sector to make a smaller, faster, 
and more accurate 10-print capture device. We are working with industry 
to help design new capture devices that meet DHS's basic operational 
requirements at primary inspection. Advances in technology will allow 
DHS and State to routinely collect 10 slap prints, without negatively 
impacting the thousands of international visitors that pass though our 
ports and visa issuing posts every day.
    Question. What specific elements could be expedited in fiscal year 
2006 if funding were available?
    Answer. The Department has sufficient resources for IDENT/IAFIS 
interoperability in fiscal year 2006.

                                  EXIT

    Question. Provide an update on funding estimates necessary to 
implement exit and the status of the exit pilots.
    Answer. The Department will submit to Congress plans on 
implementation of exit screening once the review of the exit pilots is 
complete.

                       VISA WAIVER PROGRAM (WVP)

    Question. Please explain the DHS role in reviewing any new 
expansion of VWP applications.
    Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, may designate a country meeting the statutory 
criteria for participation in the program. The DHS has established the 
Office of International Enforcement to oversee the Department's role in 
VWP; conduct the statutorily required reviews of currently 
participating countries; and, working with Department of State, 
evaluate whether any additional countries are eligible to participate 
in the program.
    Question. What are the criteria required for a country to become a 
VWP participant?
    Answer. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established as a pilot 
program in 1988. Under the program, nationals of designated countries 
who are in possession of valid passports may visit the United States 
for business or pleasure for 90 days or less without first obtaining a 
nonimmigrant visa. Such visitors must sign a waiver of certain rights 
and affirm, in writing, their admissibility and understanding of 
program conditions prior to application for admission. A visitor under 
the program may not extend his stay or change or adjust status with 
minor exceptions (adjustment through an immediate relative petition or 
an application for asylum).
    The Visa Waiver Permanent Program (VWPP) Act of 2000 made the Visa 
Waiver Pilot Program permanent. The statutory requirements for the VWP 
are found at Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 
Currently, 27 countries participate: Andorra, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The last expansion took 
place in 1999 with the addition of Singapore and Portugal. In fiscal 
year 2004, according to the Office of Immigration Statistics, 
approximately 15.9 million visitors (over 50 percent of all controlled 
entries) entered the United States under the VWP. Most, but not all, EU 
countries participate in the VWP.
    The VWPP Act of 2000 and The Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act of 2002 modified Section 217 to impose new conditions 
on VWP countries. Current statutory requirements are that the country:
  --has reciprocal visa-free travel extended to citizens of the United 
        States for 90 days or less (tourism and business);
  --has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate;
  --has a low immigration violations rate (overstays, etc.);
  --certifies that it reports to the United States on a timely basis 
        the theft of blank passports issued by that country;
  --has a program to issue Machine Readable Passports (MRP) that are 
        tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document 
        authentication identifiers that comply with standards 
        established by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
        (ICAO) by October 26, 2006; and
  --through its designation does not compromise U.S. law enforcement 
        and security interests, including enforcement of U.S. 
        immigration laws and procedures for extraditions to the United 
        States.
    The statute also requires that:
  --a VWP traveler present an MRP;
  --DHS have equipment to read these passports at ports of entry;
  --Transportation carriers provide manifest data electronically; and
  --Participating countries be evaluated against statutory criteria 
        every 2 years.
    By policy issued in June and July 2005, DHS elaborated on the 
statutory criteria by expanding the Lost and Stolen Passport(s) (LASP) 
reporting requirement to include issued as well as blank passports and 
clarified the biometric passport requirements. In addition, under the 
new guidelines, participating countries must have a program in place to 
issue MRPs which contain a digital photograph of the bearer embedded in 
the biographical data page by 10/26/05 (Level I Certification) and a 
``true'' biometric passport (``e-passport'') which includes an IC chip 
containing the biographical information and photo by 10/26/06 (Level II 
Certification). Level II Certification also requires that each VWP 
country commit to certain LASP reporting standards. Currently, these 
new LASP reporting standards are being finalized at DHS.

                      TEN PRINT CAPACITY OVERSEAS

    Question. Please provide the specific time table for the Department 
of State's plan to pilot a 10 print enrollment capacity at overseas 
consulates?
    Answer. The Department of State is the lead agency responsible for 
deploying 10-print enrollment capabilities to overseas consulates. 
Questions concerning this issue would be best answered by the 
Department of State.
    Question. At which locations are the pilots being considered?
    Answer. The Department of State is the lead agency responsible for 
deploying 10-print enrollment capabilities to overseas consulates. 
Questions concerning this issue should be answered by State.

                  WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

    Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2002 mandates that the government develop and implement a plan to 
require U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to present a passport--or 
other appropriate secure identity and citizenship document--when 
entering the United States. Starting by the end of this year, for 
instance, a driver's license will not be sufficient proof of 
identification for flying between Washington, DC and Montreal. This is 
a major change in how we have treated travel relations with our 
neighbors to the north and the south. Citizens on our border have not 
been required to obtain passports in the past. This is a burden and a 
major concern for many of our citizens, especially for the elderly and 
those in rural areas.
    On January 17, 2006, you and Secretary Rice announced a plan to 
create and issue, by the end of 2006, new travel documents for 
Canadian, Mexican, and United States citizens to ensure the secure, but 
relatively unhindered, entry of these citizens into the other countries 
without the need for costly United States passports. You have named it 
the ``People, Access, Security, Service''--or PASS card. As I 
understand it, this card may contain biometric data, such as a 
fingerprint and a digital photograph of the card holder.
    Given that cardholders will still have to fill out a form and 
provide this personal data, how is the proposed PASS card fundamentally 
different than a passport?
    Answer. The recently proposed ``PASS System'' is an important 
element of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). Specific 
questions concerning this issue should be directed to the Department of 
State.
    Question. What funds are included in the President's fiscal year 
2007 budget request to facilitate this new program and where are they 
located?
    Answer. No funds are needed for this initiative in fiscal year 
2007.
    Question. How much will this new program cost the United States 
government?
    Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics 
related to the production of travel documents, are in planning and are 
predecisional.
    Question. What will be the cost to American citizens of obtaining 
these new documents and how will they go about applying for them?
    Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including the specifics 
related to the production of travel documents, are in planning and are 
predecisional.
    Question. Who will issue this document?
    Answer. The Department of State and DHS have announced that State 
will produce PASS system documents.
    Question. How much will the card cost and who will have to pay for 
this card?
    Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics 
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning 
and are predecisional.
    Question. Will new card readers or scanners be required to read 
these documents? How much will they cost?
    Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics 
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning 
and are predecisional.
    Question. Are funds included in the budget request for machines to 
read these cards at the ports of entry?
    Answer. There are no funds needed at this time.
    Question. What is your estimate of the total cost of this program?
    Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics 
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning 
and are predecisional.
    Question. Where will these documents be produced?
    Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics 
related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning 
and are predecisional.
    Question. How will you ensure that these documents will be secure 
and not subject to tampering and fraud?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security will work with the 
Department of State to develop standards to ensure that any PASS travel 
documents issued will contain anti-tampering and counterfeiting 
features.

                      STRATEGIC BORDER INITIATIVE

    Question. Explain the functions and expectations of the Southwest 
border program to end catch and release.
    Answer. Ending catch and release is a major objective of the Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI)'s unified border control strategy, which 
encompasses the interdiction of cross border violators at and between 
official ports of entry. The Department has already made significant 
progress in achieving this goal. Quick and efficient detention and 
removal of apprehended aliens is crucial to border control.
    Three major strategies in this effort are:
  --Detect and respond to all cross-border crime;
  --End ``catch and release'' of non-Mexican illegal aliens; and
  --Deter cross-border violations.
    A deterrence factor exists only when potential violators understand 
that the chances that they will be apprehended and removed have 
increased. This prevents a significant number of potential violators 
from even attempting initial or repeat cross-border violations.
    We have made great strides in our ability to detain non-Mexican 
national aliens apprehended while illegally entering the United States 
on our Southwest Border by employing three tools: increased capacity, 
faster turnover (including increased use of expedited removal), and 
increased deterrence. Indeed, we are now able to detain virtually all 
non-Mexican aliens apprehended between ports of entry along the 
Southwest border with the notable exceptions of El Salvadoran nationals 
who cannot be placed into expedited removal due to an outstanding court 
injunction, and aliens from countries that are slow to accept 
repatriation of their nationals. With the money from the recent 
supplemental, an additional 4,000 beds are available, which will allow 
for the detention of El Salvadoran nationals.
    In addition, until recently, family groups were routinely released, 
but with the opening of a 500 bed family detention center in May, ICE 
is able to detain all apprehended family units on the Southwest border.
    Question. How many people are detained?
    Answer. The funded bed level in fiscal year 2006 is 20,800. The 
average daily population fluctuates, but the average nationwide from 
October 2005 to February 1, 2006 was 20,501.
    Question. How many people are ineligible for expedited removal? 
What is being done with them?
    Answer. Citizens of Cuba arriving at a United States port of entry 
by aircraft are ineligible, by statute, for expedited removal. DHS 
extended this exemption in 2005 to Cubans arriving at a land-border 
port of entry. Also, as a result of an injunction entered by the U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California 17 years ago in 
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, the Department is prohibited from 
applying expedited removal to Salvadorans.
    The Administration has asked the Court to lift or modify its 
injunction last fall. Discovery is still continuing in the court 
proceedings and no decision is anticipated in the immediate future. The 
Administration has also asked Congress to reform the immigration 
injunction process so that the Administration may have additional 
flexibility in the removal process.
    Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, all nationalities are 
amenable to expedited removal as prescribed by law, excluding the noted 
exceptions. Aliens excepted from expedited removal is given a Notice to 
Appear, which places them into removal proceedings, and a determination 
is then made as to whether the alien should be paroled or subject to 
continued detention, based on the likelihood the individual poses a 
danger to the community and/or will appear for the removal hearing.
    The recent supplemental will allow the Department to detain 
additional aliens and will also allow the Department to detain El 
Salvadoran nationals.
    Question. What percent of detainees are refused return by their 
home county and must be released in the United States?
    Answer. Currently, the Department does not track the percentage of 
detainees who are refused return by their home country.
    The Detention and Removal Office (DRO), however, pursuant the 
Supreme court's decision in Zadvydas v. Dabis, and 8 CFR 241.13, 
generally issues release decisions once a determination is made that 
removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, 
usually based on lack of a travel document. DRO issued 969 release 
decisions pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13 in fiscal year 2005. That figure is 
approximately 80 percent of the total cases referred to DRO and in 
which DRO headquarters issued either a release or detain decision 
pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13. These statistics do not address those non-
criminal aliens ICE does not apprehend or take into custody because the 
country does not issue travel documents.
    Question. Does the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 
have an increase in its budget request proportionally comparable to 
support DHS' efforts under SBI?
    Answer. The Department received the following response from the 
Department of Justice: For 2007, the President has requested a program 
increase of 120 positions (including 20 immigration judges, 10 Board of 
Immigration Appeals staff attorneys, and related legal/clerical support 
staff) and nearly $9 million.
    Question. Please provide the caseload statistics for EOIR for 
fiscal year 2003/04/05.
    Answer. See below statistical tables provided by the EOIR. 
    
    
    

    Question. With the expansion of expedited removal across the SW 
border, what is the average number of days an alien occupies a 
detention bed? And what was the comparable average in August 2005? 
Please provide this by nationality.
    Answer. Because of their length, breakdown by nationality is 
provided below. The lists are further divided by credible fear and non-
credible fear cases. Please note that both of these figures include 
Canada and Mexico; countries whose citizens have an extremely short 
length of stay due to proximity and minimal document requirements.

                AVERAGE LENGTHS OF STAY (LOS) BY COUNTRY
            [Expedited removals--credible fear claimed cases]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Country                 June 26, 2006      August 1, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALBANIA...........................               68.4              117.8
ALGERIA...........................  .................              262.0
BANGLADESH........................               97.0              219.6
BOLIVIA...........................               52.7               39.8
BRAZIL............................               52.3               49.4
BULGARIA..........................               51.5               86.1
BURMA.............................               19.0               25.0
CAMEROON..........................  .................              132.0
CHILE.............................  .................               42.0
CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC...........               50.6              177.5
COLOMBIA..........................               55.7              143.2
COSTA RICA........................               65.5               35.2
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................               60.8               92.2
ECUADOR...........................               58.9               59.4
ERITREA...........................               29.0              222.5
ETHIOPIA..........................               55.3              231.0
GUATEMALA.........................               43.7               54.5
GUYANA............................  .................              196.0
HAITI.............................               54.6              112.1
HONDURAS..........................               48.7               65.2
INDIA.............................               63.2              209.9
IRAN..............................               19.0
LITHUANIA.........................  .................               63.0
MACEDONIA.........................  .................              171.0
MEXICO............................                9.5               43.4
NEPAL.............................  .................               84.5
NICARAGUA.........................               70.2              109.5
NIGERIA...........................               73.0  .................
PAKISTAN..........................               45.3  .................
PERU..............................               50.0               69.2
POLAND............................               30.0               46.1
PORTUGAL..........................  .................              209.9
ROMANIA...........................               55.0  .................
RUSSIA............................               19.0  .................
SERBIA............................  .................              220.4
SLOVAKIA..........................  .................               43.4
SOUTH KOREA.......................  .................               84.5
TURKEY............................               44.3  .................
UKRAINE...........................               22.0  .................
URUGUAY...........................  .................              247.0
VENEZUELA.........................               94.3              183.5
YUGOSLAVIA........................               45.9              221.5
Overall Average for Countries With               48.1              124.8
 Credible Fear Claimed Expedited
 Removals (Including Canada and
 Mexico)..........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                AVERAGE LENGTHS OF STAY (LOS) BY COUNTRY
          [Expedited removals--no credible fear claimed cases]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              COUNTRY                 June 26, 2006      August 1, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALBANIA...........................               43.5               89.2
ARGENTINA.........................               30.1               35.3
BANGLADESH........................                165  .................
BELIZE............................               62.3               33.0
BOLIVIA...........................               34.9               60.6
BRAZIL............................               25.9               27.2
BULGARIA..........................               35.5  .................
CAMEROON..........................              137.0  .................
CANADA............................  .................  .................
CHILE.............................               25.9               23.4
CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC...........               23.7              106.1
COLOMBIA..........................               29.2               55.4
COSTA RICA........................               29.8               43.9
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................               39.6               55.5
ECUADOR...........................               27.7               38.2
ERITREA...........................               48.0  .................
FRANCE............................  .................               22.0
GABON.............................  .................               27.4
GUATEMALA.........................               18.8               22.8
GUYANA............................  .................  .................
HAITI.............................               38.0               26.0
HONDURAS..........................               15.3               27.7
INDIA.............................               78.7  .................
ISRAEL............................               17.3               30.0
ITALY.............................               23.0  .................
JAMAICA...........................               26.6  .................
KOREA.............................               15.4  .................
LITHUANIA.........................               31.0  .................
MACEDONIA.........................               37.5               40.5
MEXICO............................                1.5                8.4
NEPAL.............................  .................               48.0
NETHERLANDS.......................               27.0  .................
NICARAGUA.........................               29.3               59.9
NIGERIA...........................               73.0  .................
PAKISTAN..........................               29.0  .................
PANAMA............................               60.0               42.0
PARAGUAY..........................               51.0               17.0
PERU..............................               30.0               44.2
PHILIPPINES.......................  .................               63.0
POLAND............................               31.0               27.0
ROMANIA...........................               44.0  .................
SENGAL............................              103.0  .................
SLOVENIA..........................  .................              152.0
SLOVAK REPUBLIC...................  .................               48.5
SLOVAKIA..........................  .................  .................
SOUTH KOREA.......................  .................               48.0
SPAIN.............................  .................               54.4
SRI LANKA.........................               37.0  .................
SWEDEN............................  .................               77.0
TURKEY............................               35.5  .................
UNITED KINGDOM....................                2.0               40.0
URUGUAY...........................               36.4               43.4
VENEZUELA.........................               19.1               48.8
YUGOSLAVIA........................               31.0              149.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Is ICE's workforce enforcement effort considered a part 
of SBI?
    Answer. Yes, ICE's worksite enforcement effort is a part of SBI. In 
developing SBI, DHS is taking an integrated approach to the problem 
including border security, interior enforcement, and the Temporary 
Worker Program. For any of these pieces to work, each must be 
coordinated. One principal objective of the interior enforcement piece 
is ending the tolerance of illegal employment. Comprehensive employment 
verification, improved recordkeeping, document and database checks, and 
compliance audits are all important as the Administration develops an 
comprehensive strategy. Passage of comprehensive immigration reform 
will be critical to improve the tools available to the Department 
increase our capacity to target egregious employers.

                     CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
                          CBP AND NCRC MISSION

    Question. Since initiating the National Capitol Region air security 
mission in 2003, CBP has performed this security mission via temporary 
rotations of aircraft and personnel from the Southwest border and 
elsewhere in the country--without receiving any additional funds to 
perform this task.
    What is the origin/inspiration for the proposed transfer of $5 
million from the CBP base budget to the Coast Guard to perform the 
National Capitol Region air defense mission?
    Answer. The $5 million transfer represents the annual cost to 
operate the National Capital Region Air and Marine Branch. This amount 
is being proposed for transfer to the Coast Guard because in fiscal 
year 2007 CBP will no longer be performing this function.
    Question. How is this not an erosion of the CBP base budget?
    Answer. The funding supported a function that CBP will not be 
performing in fiscal year 2007. For this reason, it is not an erosion 
of the base.
    Question. What did CBP spend on this mission in fiscal year 2004 
and fiscal year 2005 and what is the estimate for fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2004, The National Capital Region (NCR) 
costs of operations were $4,239,557. Salary costs were for eight 
permanent FTE. In addition, an undetermined number of temporary duty 
station personnel supported the NCR.
    In fiscal year 2005, NCR costs of operations were $5,305,490. 
Salary costs were for twelve permanent FTE. In addition, fourteen 
temporary duty station personnel supported the NCR.
    Estimated fiscal year 2006 costs of operations are $5,414,655. 
These costs are only through August 1, 2006, when the transfer of the 
mission to U.S. Coast Guard is expected to take place.

                     INSPECTIONS OF ARRIVING SAUDIS

    Question. There have been reports that certain Saudi nationals were 
not processed through US VISIT by CBP officers when they arrived at 
Dulles International Airport. Is this true and, if so, why?
    Answer. CBP is not aware of the specific incidents) this inquiry 
references, and would be pleased to research further with additional 
background information. However, certain classes of travelers are 
exempt from US VISIT enrollment. These exempted classes include, 
travelers applying for admission using an A, G, or NATO nonimmigrant 
visa; Taiwan representatives of TECRO and dependents; children under 
the age of 14 and persons over the age of 79. Additionally, the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the 
authority to exempt individual travelers from US VISIT enrollment. 
These individual exemptions sometimes include foreign government 
officials and delegations who may not be traveling with diplomatic 
visas.
    Question. More generally, do supervisors have the ability to decide 
who to enroll and/or process and who not to? What is a supervisors 
``override'' authority?
    Answer. Individual supervisors do not have the ability to decide 
who is and is not enrolled and processed by US VISIT. The Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the authority to 
exempt individual travelers from US VISIT enrollment. This authority is 
exercised at the headquarters level in advance of the arrival of the 
passenger. These individual exemptions sometimes include foreign 
government officials and delegations who may not be traveling with 
diplomatic visas.

                      ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTOMS LAWS

    Question. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
we have witnessed the steady erosion of the Transportation Security 
Administration's legislated mandate to secure ``all modes of 
transportation'', not just aviation. Now I am hearing more and more 
stories from the field that the enforcement of Customs laws and 
regulations are being routinely ignored by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement in favor of enforcing immigration laws. I take a back seat 
to no one in my strong belief that all of our immigration laws should 
and must be enforced. But this should not occur to the detriment of 
enforcing Customs laws. Trade enforcement is critical to the well being 
of our national economy.
    What assurances can you provide me that a continued focus on 
Customs enforcement is being accorded the proper level of support?
    Answer. DHS is absolutely committed to ICE's concurrent customs and 
immigration enforcement missions. ICE's Financial and Trade 
Investigations Division oversees national enforcement of traditional 
customs investigative arenas, including bulk cash smuggling, trade-
based money laundering, commercial trade fraud and intellectual 
property rights (IPR) violations. Specifically, the Trade Transparency 
Unit (TTU) and the Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit target predatory trade 
practices that threaten U.S. economic stability, restrict U.S. industry 
competitiveness in world markets, and place the public health and 
safety of the American people at risk. The TTU, led by ICE, in 
cooperation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. 
Departments of State and Treasury, specifically analyzes domestic and 
foreign import and export trade data for discrepancies or anomalies 
that may indicate trade-based money laundering or other trade fraud 
violations. The Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit targets traditional 
customs violations, including IPR crimes, illegal textile 
transshipment, illegal importation of counterfeit and restricted 
pharmaceuticals, tobacco smuggling, circumvention of international 
trade agreements, and importer and broker compliance.
    In addition, the ICE Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit has implemented 
special enforcement operations targeting identified areas of 
vulnerability in the U.S. commercial trade system. These operations 
include Fraud Investigation Strike Teams (FIST), which target fraud 
within foreign trade zones and customs bonded warehouses, and Operation 
Security Bond, which targets the illegal use of the in-bond system to 
smuggle merchandise. During these operations, ICE's enforcement of 
customs and immigration statutes has resulted in an increased discovery 
of commercial fraud violations and the identification and removal of 
illegal immigrants with unauthorized access to secure areas.
    ICE's commitment to enforcing its concurrent customs and 
immigration enforcement missions is unwavering.

                        CBP PRESENCE AT AIRPORTS

    Question. On November 1, 2005, NTEU President Colleen M. Kelley 
wrote to USA Today responding to an October 24 story the paper had 
written about the increasingly long wait times for international 
passengers arriving in the United States. She claimed that it is the 
result of too few inspectors at the airports as well as because the 
``One Face at the Border'' training has resulted in degradation in the 
specialized types of training CBP officers need to effectively do their 
jobs.
    Are the wait lines the result of too few inspectors?
    Answer. Wait times are contingent on available staffing, the number 
of available primary booths, the number and type of arriving flights/
passengers (high risk flights/passengers vs. low risk), the number of 
arrivals during peak hours, the degree of scrutiny required for each 
passenger, and any heightened security measures.
    Question. Has training been degraded?
    Answer. Current CBP training is more comprehensive and structured 
then in either former agency.
    New CBP Officers receive 160 hours of Pre-Academy Orientation at 
their assigned port of entry before they depart for the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center. They graduate after 72 classroom days of 
training then return to the port prepared to fulfill a limited scope of 
responsibility-primary inspection for what once was Immigration and 
Customs purposes.
    Upon return to their port they undergo a rigorous and regimented 2-
year training program filled with classroom, systems and on-the-job 
training which begins the process of preparing them for the different 
inspection environments to which they will be assigned, such as air 
passenger processing, air cargo processing, land passenger processing, 
sea cargo processing, etc. Neither the Customs Service nor the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had such a structured 
program.
    The current ``combined'' Academy training is shorter in length than 
if CBP had merely put new CBP Officers into back-to-back courses of the 
legacy training. In restructuring its training programs, CBP discovered 
that it was able to condense the combined training in a rational way 
due to the many overlapping areas and similarly taught courses between 
the legacy immigration and customs training courses. For example, while 
Customs Inspectors previously received introductory immigration 
training in their basic course, and Immigration Inspectors received 
some introduction in Customs law, they both received firearms, 
defensive tactics, professionalism, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), 
and interviewing skills training that applies in both environments. In 
addition, CBP now only requires Spanish language training for the 
Southwest border, Miami and Puerto Rico where those skills are needed.
    Incumbent officers who were employed prior to the March 1, 2003 
merger are required to participate in structured and specific cross 
training courses for disciplines they have not previously received 
training for prior to being assigned to a new task. As of December 31, 
2005, CBP has identified, built and distributed more than 37 cross-
training modules ranging from a 6-hour CD-ROM awareness course on 
Customs/Immigration fundamentals to an 8-day classroom session on 
immigration law and procedures in processing passenger in primary. All 
of these training programs include many of the required pre-requisites.
    In addition to the new CBP Academy curriculum, CBP also worked with 
USDA to develop a new unified entry-level training program for 
Agriculture Specialists.

                      CBP INSPECTORS AT OUR PORTS

    Question. Many valid concerns have been raised about the troubling 
sale of control of a number of U.S. seaports to a foreign government-
owned entity. This sale is troubling on so many levels. The President 
assures us that the ports are secure because the Coast Guard provides 
security at the ports and Customs and Border Protection officers 
examine the containers as they are being unloaded. But many outside 
observers believe there are not enough CBP inspectors at the ports to 
conduct robust screening and security activities. While there are 
significant hiring increases in the budget request for Border Patrol 
agents and immigration enforcement officers--increases I strongly 
support--there are no apparent hiring increases for inspection 
personnel at our ports.
    If there are insufficient inspection personnel at our ports at this 
point, and many of our ports are being controlled by foreign entities, 
how can you assure us that this budget request makes our ports safer in 
the absence of additional inspection staff?
    Answer. In the fiscal year 2007 President's budget proposal, CBP is 
requesting an additional 106 positions to enhance its ability to detect 
illicit radiological materials concealed within shipments, conveyances 
or containerized cargo entering the United States. The additional staff 
will support the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
detection systems deployed through Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's 
WMD procurement program and ensure CBP will have dedicated personnel to 
resolve alarms from Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and to conduct 
radiological examinations at our Nation's busiest seaports.
    WMD detection systems are a critical part of CBP's layered process 
that builds on redundant enforcement layers to detect and prevent 
contraband, including illicit materials, from entering the United 
States. CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is 
100 percent effective and accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple 
initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP employs its layered 
enforcement approach in safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, 
air and sea.
    Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology enable CBP to screen or 
examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic in less 
time while facilitating legitimate trade. These tools provide CBP with 
a significant capability to detect and interdict terrorist weapons at 
our ports of entry.

                  CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)

    Question. Please explain the process by which an overseas port 
becomes a member of CSI, including the security review and the 
procedures to which the host government (and Customs officials) agree 
to adhere.
    Answer. A potential Container Security Initiative (CSI) port is 
identified either by CBP or through a formal request from the foreign 
government to the U.S. Embassy or directly to CBP. The decision on the 
first 20 CSI ports was based on the total volume of direct container 
traffic to the United States. Subsequent to the first 20 ports, 
potential CSI ports are evaluated on several factors including 
container volume to the United States, intelligence threat level, 
strategic potential, port assessment status, government political will 
and capacity building status.
    Once a potential CSI port is identified, a preliminary study is 
conducted of the number of containers arriving in the United States 
from that port, the number of high-risk containers arriving in the 
United States from that port, the potential of that port being used for 
transshipment from a high-risk country, intelligence information 
threats and perceived political will.
    An assessment is then conducted at the potential CSI port. The 
assessment teams consist of personnel from CBP, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard Officers, and more 
recently, Department of Energy Megaports Program Officers. The 
assessment evaluates the overall port practices with the goal of 
determining the vulnerabilities to their cargo processing systems, the 
level of competence of the host government to conduct inspections, the 
technical security at the port, the personnel security of the port, any 
vulnerabilities in both the government agencies as well as private 
companies working at the port, the amount of cooperation that the host 
government is willing to provide CSI, the types and effectiveness of 
radiation monitoring systems, the types and effectiveness of large 
scale non-intrusive X-ray or Gamma-ray machines, and the laws 
applicable to allow inspections of cargo.
    Once a favorable assessment is completed, CBP and the host 
government sign a Declaration of Principles (DOP). The DOP is a non-
binding arrangement between the two governments to implement CSI. The 
DOP contains language that both Customs Administrations agree to:
  --Intensify bilateral customs cooperation;
  --Exchange information and work closely to help ensure the 
        identification, screening and sealing of high-risk containers 
        at the earliest possible opportunity;
  --Station, on a basis of reciprocity and on a pilot basis U.S. CBP 
        officers; and
  --Consult closely on the implementation of CSI at the port.
    After the DOP is signed, CBP and the host Nation work together to 
implement the CSI program by facilitating the physical build-out of 
working areas and developing local CSI Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP). The local SOP describes in detail how the CSI process will work 
as well as the container examination procedures.
    After the CSI port becomes operational, an evaluation of the port 
is conducted at 3-months, 6-months, and every 6 months thereafter. The 
evaluations determine whether or not CBP and the host Nation are 
complying with the SOP and formulate ways to improve the CSI operation.

                        DUBAI PORTS WORLD (DPW)

    Question. The Port of Dubai has recently become the first port in 
the Middle East to become a Container Security Initiative (CSI) port. 
When did the initial port assessment for Dubai's participation in CSI 
occur, who performed the assessment, and when was participation 
finalized?
    Answer. The initial port assessment at the Port of Dubai took place 
September 23-25, 2004. Personnel from CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), DHS Attache Offices in Abu Dhabi and Dubai and the 
U.S. Coast Guard participated in the assessment. The Declaration of 
Principles between CBP and Dubai Ports Customs and Free Zone 
Corporation (Dubai Customs) was signed on December 12, 2004. The CSI 
port of Dubai began operations on March 26, 2005.
    Question. What role, if any, did the Department of Defense play in 
the assessment and/or the determination that Dubai should become a 
member of CSI?
    Answer. The Department of Defense did not participate in the 
assessment and/or the determination that Dubai should become a member 
of CSI.
    Question. Under CSI, the United States stations CBP officials at a 
participating ports and, based on threat and analysis, inspects or 
screens containers (determined to be potentially high risk and which 
are headed directly for a U.S. port) prior to the loading of the 
container on the ship. Our CBP personnel request host country Customs 
officials to screen suspect containers and/or physically inspect them 
for suspicious items, however, at best, U.S. CBP officials only observe 
that process. Once a container arrives at a U.S. port, our inspectors 
are able to screen and open containers. It has been asserted by CBP 
officials that the port operators (including potentially DPW) do not 
have access to or are not involved with the imaging or other inspection 
of these containers overseas or in the United States.
    What confidence do we have that CBP's methods of operation cannot 
be compromised by a government-controlled port operating company with a 
CSI port located in that country--i.e. when a potential bad actor has a 
high degree of visibility into both ends of the supply chain?
    Answer. CBP utilizes a multi-faceted layered defense, which employs 
various enforcement activities at several points along the supply 
chain. The system was designed to mitigate the possibility of 
compromising the entire supply chain by breaching one component of it.
    Since 9/11 CBP has initiated:
  --The 24-hour rule which requires cargo information to be transmitted 
        to CBP 24 hours prior to laden at a foreign seaport;
  --The CBP National Targeting Center, which was established to ensure 
        all shipments destined to the United States are reviewed 
        against the CBP Automated Targeting System;
  --The CBP Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which 
        also was initiated as a force multiplier by employing the 
        import/export community to enhance security measures within 
        their respective business practices; and
  --The CBP Container Security Initiative (CSI), which was developed to 
        augment the other CBP programs by allowing for enforcement 
        action to be taken at a point earlier in the supply chain and 
        creating an additional layer of scrutiny and enforcement within 
        the overall supply chain.
    Cargo moving through the supply chain would also be subjected to 
the security and enforcement programs of other U.S. agencies such as:
  --U.S. Coast Guard 96 hour notice of arrival requirement;
  --Port security enhancements as set forth by the International Ship 
        and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code; and
  --Department of Energy (DOE) Megaports program.
    Many of the programs listed above, which are components of the U.S. 
government's layered defense, are not accessible by port operators.
    CBP performs the targeting and analysis of cargo shipments. The 
Automated Targeting System is not shared or linked to the port 
operators or foreign Customs administrations.
    When members of a CSI team suspect that a container warrants 
examination, a request is made to the host Customs Administration. If 
there is agreement, the cargo is examined utilizing Non-Intrusive 
Inspection (NII) equipment. If there is any anomaly then a subsequent 
more intrusive examination is conducted. If the host Customs 
Administration refuses to conduct the examination, then a decision is 
made by the CSI team either to permit the loading of the container and 
designate such container for an examination at the U.S. port of 
arrival, or for CBP to issue a Do-not-Load (DNL) order to the cargo 
carrier.
    Any cargo that is examined at a CSI location is always subject to 
the CBP enforcement protocols in the United States, as well as the 
possibility of the cargo being re-examined. Port operators do not have 
any control or insight into the cargo selection and examination process 
at a CSI location and they do not have any insight into the selection 
and examination/re-examination process at U.S. ports of entry.
    The CBP programs, in conjunction with the multitude of other U.S. 
government agency enforcement initiatives, put forth a layered/multi-
dimensional strategy to combat the attempts by any members of the 
import/export community to compromise the supply chain.

                          SHIPPING CONTAINERS

    Question. Please provide the most recent data on the total number 
of shipping containers which enter the United States, the percentage of 
those that are screened, those that are examined, and those that are 
inspected. Also please provide your definitions of those terms.
    Answer. CBP employs a layered process that builds on redundant 
enforcement layers to detect and prevent contraband, including illicit 
materials, from entering the United States. CBP recognizes that no 
single strategy or risk assessment is 100 percent effective and 
accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple initiatives together to 
accomplish its mission. CBP employs its layered enforcement approach in 
safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, air and sea.
    Conveyances that are identified as high-risk undergo an 
examination. In fiscal year 2005, 11,342,493 sea-borne containers 
entered the United States from foreign locations. Approximately 5 
percent, or 569,308 sea containers were examined. CBP defines an 
examination as a physical inspection of a conveyance and/or the imaging 
of a conveyance using large-scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) 
technology, for the presence of contraband.
    CBP defines screening as a passive means of scanning a conveyance, 
baggage or cargo. CBP screens conveyances, baggage, and cargoes with 
radiation portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment for 
the presence of radiological emissions. CBP currently screens 40 
percent of all sea-borne containers for the presence of radiation.
    NII technology enables us to screen or examine a larger portion of 
the stream of commercial traffic in less time while facilitating 
legitimate trade. These tools provide CBP with a significant capability 
to detect and interdict terrorist weapons at our ports of entry.

                   INSPECTIONS AT AIR PORTS OF ENTRY

    Question. There do not appear to be staffing increases in the 
budget for the POEs. What impact does this have on primary and 
secondary inspections at airports?
    Answer. CBP's existing staff will manage the current and 
anticipated increases in travel and trade by utilizing advanced 
information components and international programs like the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) agreements to mitigate any delays in traveler 
and cargo processing. Implementation of trusted traveler programs and 
further development of the CBP Immigration Advisor Program at foreign 
ports of debarkation would also minimize the impact of a static 
staffing model. CBP utilizes state of the art information technology, 
traveler information sharing efforts with the Department of State, 
advance traveler screening via the Advance Passenger Information System 
(APIS), and the National Targeting Center (NTC).
    Question. Is there a requirement that port directors have been 
given that they must meet in terms of inspecting inbound plane 
passengers--such as 45 minutes?
    Answer. CBP is not currently bound by a required processing time; a 
previous legislative requirement to process all inbound international 
passengers within 45-minutes of arrival was repealed by the Enhanced 
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173). 
CBP does, however, have a 30-minute processing time as a future goal.
    Question. Does this budget address concerns enumerated in GAO 
report 05-663?
    Answer. CBP has addressed the concerns raised by GAO report 05-663 
entitled ``International Air Passengers: Staffing Model for Airport 
Inspections Personnel Can Be Improved.'' Through cross-training 
initiatives, CBP has been adding officers at the passenger primary 
lanes in our airports, processing all travelers, and making mission 
related referrals to secondary inspection for people considered higher 
risk. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests funds to improve the 
Automated Targeting System, extend the Immigration Advisory Program, 
leverage pre-departure passenger information, and strengthen 
consolidated anti-terrorism secondary inspection. This will create an 
effective force-multiplier, and serve to speed the processing of 
legitimate travelers, thus lowering overall wait times.

                          OUTBOUND INSPECTIONS

    Question. What is the status of meeting the outbound inspections 
recommendations as listed in the June 2005 report--OIG-05-21?
    Answer. CBP's Office of Field Operations is beginning its re-
evaluation of the Outbound program, which is responsible for enforcing 
U.S. export laws and regulations and ensuring that weapons of mass 
destruction do not fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists. The 
goal is to align Outbound enforcement and processing with current 
Inbound processes, to the extent possible, which will improve 
uniformity and enhance border security programs.
    With the pending implementation of mandatory Automated Export 
System (AES) filing, which will require electronic filing for all 
export shipments that currently require a Shippers Export Declaration 
(SED), more information will be available on export shipments. It will 
be critical to leverage this electronic information to enhance the 
secure screening and processing of outbound cargo, whereas current 
capabilities for this purpose are limited. Not all export shipments are 
currently filed through AES, which hampers CBP's Outbound targeting 
efforts. The U.S. Census Bureau also has what is known as the ``Option 
4'' filer program, which allows certain exporters to file export 
information after the shipment has departed the United States. 
Ultimately, CBP resources must be aligned in a manner that allows this 
additional advance information to be used to screen and target high-
risk shipments and to conduct compliance inspections. As part of this 
process, CBP must also implement a risk-based screening model for 
export cargo, similar to what is already in place on the import side.
    Currently, CBP outbound enforcement is accomplished with the 
resources resident in the Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Teams 
(A-TCET) at the ports of entry. These teams work as a single, united 
enforcement team with a primary focus on targeting terrorists and 
terrorist weapons. Their secondary focus is the interdiction of 
narcotics, other contraband, alien smugglers/trafficking, fraudulent 
documents and agricultural terrorism.

                                TUNNELS

    Question. What is the policy regarding filling tunnels discovered 
on the borders? Who is responsible for filling them and using what 
funds?
    Answer. While there is currently no policy regarding tunnel filling 
or remediation, both CBP and ICE are currently drafting Tunnel 
Principles/Policy (roles and responsibilities) when a sophisticated 
tunnel (highly organized or sophisticated tunnel leading to a house or 
warehouse) is discovered. The tunnel principles mainly emphasize joint 
cooperation and coordination between CBP and ICE. The Border Patrol 
Sector Chief and ICE Special-Agent-in-Charge will develop local 
protocols based upon these principles.
    There is no specific authority or funding indicating that any 
particular group in the Federal Government has been designated the 
responsibility to fill border tunnels. The cost of the remediation of 
the tunnel in the San Diego, CA area is estimated to be approximately 
$3 million (these costs include security, concrete, environmental 
safety, labor etc). Generally speaking, most of the tunnels detected 
have been rather small by comparison to the most recently discovered 
tunnel in San Diego, CA. The tunnels have been filled by the Office of 
Border Patrol (OBP) Facilities Department or the National Guard, using 
general Salaries and Expenses appropriated funds.
    Question. What activities are being taken by CBP, Science and 
Technology, or other agencies to improve the technology for discovering 
tunnels?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate is working with the Office of Border 
Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to find technology solutions for tunnel detection along 
the Southern and Northern borders of the United States.
    The S&T Directorate participated in the Tunnel Detection Technical 
Support Working Group (TSWG) meeting held in January 2006 and the Joint 
Task Force-6 Tunneling Conference held in June 2004. The S&T 
Directorate is also engaged with NORTHCOM's Futures Group in relaying, 
discussing, and leveraging potential technologies that satisfy DOD and 
DHS's tunnel detection needs. The S&T Directorate's Border & 
Transportation (B&T) Portfolio met with NORTHCOM officials in August 
2005 to discuss specific opportunities to collaborate and leverage each 
organization's expertise.
    CBP is also coordinating with a number of sources that could 
possibly provide technology that will meet CBP's detection needs. These 
sources include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
Sandia Laboratories, and the Border Research Technology Center. There 
is currently no proven technology that can detect the types of tunnels 
that have recently been encountered. Some promising research and 
development is being done by Sandia Laboratories, but at this time, its 
field utility is unknown.
                           cbp air and marine
    Question. Please breakout the items you plan to procure in fiscal 
year 20006/2007 and the funding source within AMO for each item (i.e. 
Northern Border, WHDEA, etc.).
    Answer.
Planned CBP Air and Marine Acquisitions for Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal 
                     Year 2007--Dollars in Millions



    Question. What is the status of establishment of all of the 
Northern border airwings? Please provide the number of personnel on 
board at each location, the number and types of equipment at each 
location, the hours per day/week of operations at each location, and 
specific milestones which must be met (and when they will be met) to 
achieve full operating capacity at each location.
    Answer. In fiscal year 2003, CBP Air and Marine (formerly Air and 
Marine Operations) received congressional funding to open the first of 
five planned Northern border air wing locations. The five planned 
locations were strategically placed along the Northern border in areas 
that provided for a 1-hour minimum response time to a border 
penetration. The five planned locations are Plattsburgh, New York; 
Detroit, Michigan; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Great Falls, Montana; and 
Bellingham, Washington. Bellingham was the first to be opened on August 
20, 2004, followed by Plattsburgh 18 days later on October 8, 2004. 
Great Falls will open third in the summer of 2006. CBP will begin the 
activation process for the new air sites in both Detroit and the Grand 
Forks area of North Dakota in fiscal year 2007. The site survey for 
Detroit has been completed and preliminary work to assess hangar, 
maintenance, and support facility requirements is ongoing. Air assets 
are being identified for transfer to the site and staffing plans are 
being compiled. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation provided $2 million 
for the North Dakota air site assessment, which is in progress and 
should be completed in late May 2006. In addition, DHS is developing 
funding options to ensure we meet the goal of establishing a presence 
at both sites by the end of fiscal year 2007.
    Current number of personnel on board, the number and types of 
equipment, and the hours per day/week of operations at each location 
are as follows in the table below.
    In order to achieve full operating capacity, CBP's aviation 
strategic modernization plan needs to be completed, reviewed and 
approved by the Department and Congress. This plan includes fleet 
modernization, recapitalization and fleet standardization by reducing 
the number of aircraft types currently being operated and associated 
technology, staffing and facility requirements. CBP is taking an 
incremental approach to attain full operating staffing capacity at the 
Northern Border Air branches.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Location                Current FTE    Current aircraft             Current coverage hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plattsburgh, NY.................              18  1--PC-12.........  0800-2400
                                                  2--AS350.........  5 days
                                                  1--C-206.........  After hours callout as necessary
                                                  1--C-210.........
Detroit, MI.....................               1  1--OH6...........  0800-1600
                                                                     5 days
                                                                     After hours callout as necessary
Grand Forks, ND.................               3  1--AS350.........  0700-1500
                                                  1--C-206.........  7 days
                                                  1--C-182.........  After hours callout as necessary
Great Falls, MT.................          \1\ 34  2--C550..........  TBD
                                                  1--PC-12.........
                                                  2--UH60..........
Bellingham, WA..................              19  1--C-550.........  0700-1700
                                                  1--PC-12.........  5 days
                                                  1--AS350.........  After hours callout as necessary
                                                  1--MD600.........
                                                  1--C-206.........
                                                  1--C-182.........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The staffing and aircraft numbers indicated for Great Falls, which will be opening this summer, are
  projected.

                        ADVANCED TRAINING CENTER

    Question. In the December 28, 2005, response to my October 19, 
2005, letter regarding the status of items identified in Conference 
Report 109-241, I was told that the ``final spending plan, project 
schedules, and projected training requirements'' would be provided to 
the Committee ``by February 18, 2006''. It is now March 6, 2006 and we 
have yet to receive the report. When can we expect to receive the 
report?
    Answer. The report receiving final revisions and will be 
transmitted shortly.
    Question. Also, please provide the level of funding provided in the 
fiscal year 2007 request for operations and activities at the Advanced 
Training Center.
    Answer. CBP's base budget for fiscal year 2007 includes $9.5 
million for ongoing operations and management at the Advanced Training 
Center.

                       TUCSON SECTOR CHECKPOINTS

    Question. The DHS Inspector General issued a report in January of 
2006 that made a strong case for permanent Border Patrol checkpoints. 
It said that, ``Permanent checkpoints permit safer, more efficient law 
enforcement. It is not necessary to prohibit permanent checkpoints in 
order to encourage the use of alternative tactics and mobile interior 
operations.''
    What are you doing to remove the House-backed bill language that 
mandates the periodic movement of these checkpoints in the Tucson 
sector?
    Answer. CBP Congressional Affairs has conducted numerous briefings 
to House Appropriations Committee Staff members on the use of efficient 
checkpoints. Permanent checkpoints elsewhere on the Southwest Border, 
located in strategic chokepoints in areas of egress from border areas, 
have proven to be effective enforcement tools and thus make up an 
important part of CBP's ``defense in depth'' strategy of controlling 
the border. Permanent checkpoints are used effectively in every Sector 
of the Southwest Border except Tucson Sector.
    Question. How much does it cost to rotate these checkpoints?
    Answer. The checkpoint located on Interstate 19 is the only 
tactical checkpoint rotated every 7 days from one location to another. 
The two locations currently have checkpoint equipment located at both 
sites and only require personnel to rotate from one location to 
another. In order to rotate checkpoints, it takes a minimum of 10 
agents 2 hours in order to complete the checkpoint rotation, which 
includes the breakdown of one site, and the setup of the other. It also 
costs the duplication of checkpoint equipment to include port-a-johns, 
trailers, signage, cones and lighting. These costs are not per 
rotation, but are as a result of having to rotate. The duplicate 
equipment costs about $65,000 plus an additional port-a-john contract 
for $140 per month.
    Question. What, if any, health-related problems have been 
experienced by the men and women who are working in this difficult 
(extreme heat, vehicle exhaust, lack of rest facilities) environment?
    Answer. There have not been any health-related problems to 
personnel working at the rotating Tucson sector checkpoints. All 
medical and safety precautions are taken for the agents working at the 
checkpoint. Shade, water, medical and communication are available to 
the working agents or the checkpoint would not be allowed to open.
    Question. What is the full construction cost of permanent 
checkpoints in the Tucson sector?
    Answer. The total cost for establishing three proposed checkpoints 
in Tucson Sector was $45.78 million in December 2004. An updated 
estimate would include increases associated with construction and 
inflation factors.
  --Highway 85--$12.79 million
  --Highway 90--$15.31 million
  --Interstate 19--$17.68 million
    This is an estimated total that includes land acquisition, design, 
construction costs, auxiliary cost, management services, and support 
costs. National comprehensive traffic control guidelines are being 
developed in response to the National Transportation Safety Board, and 
may also impact the cost estimate. The guidelines are a collaborative 
effort between CBP, Federal Highway Administration, and representatives 
from the American Association of State Highway Transportation 
Officials.
    Question. To what extent do law breakers take advantage of the 
temporary checkpoints by moving illegal aliens when CBP is closing the 
temporary checkpoints?
    Answer. Since Arizona is required to rotate checkpoints every 7 
days, and Nogales only has two authorized sites, they rotate every 
Saturday. Border Patrol's movements are predictable as dictated by the 
appropriations language, and give the smugglers a clear advantage.
    Law breakers do take advantage when CBP is closing the temporary 
checkpoints by smuggling their illegal cargo (illegal aliens, 
narcotics, etc.) further into the interior of the United States. When 
the checkpoint is at the northern location, smugglers simply stage 
their loads just south of it and once it is moved to the southern 
location, they move their loads north. The moment a checkpoint is 
closed, scouts notify smugglers immediately to transport their illegal 
cargo further north into the United States. The smugglers are very in 
tune to these rotations. Border Patrol deploys additional resources to 
the interstate when possible, but the manpower required to move the 
checkpoints limits this.
    Smugglers also take advantage of Border Patrol movements by 
exploiting the lack of flanking infrastructure, which would otherwise 
be present at a permanent site. With no cameras and only limited 
sensors to the flanks of the temporary sites, smugglers routinely walk 
around the temporary checkpoints.

                    NORTHERN BORDER CARRYOVER FUNDS

    Question. On what activities will you obligate the remaining $11 
million in unobligated Northern Border prior year balances? When will 
these funds be obligated?
    Answer. We anticipate obligating $6 million on Radiation Portal 
Monitors (RPM's) and Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD's) throughout 
fiscal year 2006, $3.8 million for facilities repairs and alterations 
by the end of fiscal year 2006, and $1.2 million to be obligated by 
July 2006 for various mission support projects to support Anti-
Terrorism.

                   SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY SPECIALISTS

    Question. What is the per person cost to hire, train, and make 
proficient the specialists who verify participants' compliance as a 
member of C-TPAT?
    Answer. It is estimated that the per-person cost to hire, train, 
and make proficient the specialists who verify participant's compliance 
as a member of C-TPAT is $201,560. This includes $15,000 in training 
costs, $83,000 in SCS Salary and compensation, $26,560 in benefits and 
$77,000 for 1 full year of validation visits.
    A newly hired Supply Chain Specialist (SCS) must undergo a 2-week 
Basic SCS Training course. This course focuses on the core program 
requirements of the C-TPAT program and is administered by CBP C-TPAT 
program officers and managers, and experienced SCSs. Private sector 
instructors who have first hand knowledge of supply chain principles, 
logistics management, and related business practices provide additional 
instruction.
    In addition to the basic course, two 3-day training sessions are 
held annually. One coincides with the Annual C-TPAT Training Seminar 
and the other is a session held at one of the C-TPAT Field Offices.
     These sessions allow the HQs C-TPAT Director and the Program 
Management staff to communicate important program developments and 
newly implemented procedures and technology.
    While the Basic SCS course provides the students with formal and 
effective classroom instruction to learn the scope of the duties of the 
SCS position, accompanying experienced SCSs on a year's worth of 
validation visits is critical to attaining the desired level of 
proficiency of the SCS.

          ARBITRATION DECISION ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2005 AWARDS

    Question. What is the potential cost of the recent arbitrator 
decision on the fiscal year 2005 awards process?
    Answer. For fiscal year 2005, CBP implemented a unified awards 
process in order to ensure that employees working side-by-side and 
performing the same duties would have the same opportunities for awards 
recognition. CBP inherited four different negotiated awards processes 
when it was formed, two of them very similar to this unified process. 
One union with a significantly different awards program agreed to the 
unified process, but the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) 
sought to maintain its status quo using local joint awards committees 
(JAC). It is the agency's position that we cannot treat our front line 
officers differently while holding them to common standards of 
performance.
    This arbitrator decision affects only bargaining unit employees 
represented by NTEU. The figures below are estimates based on how the 
funding for awards under the old JAC process would have been 
constructed.
  --As of September 3, 2005, there were approximately 13,650 employees 
        in the NTEU bargaining unit, with combined salaries of $754.6 
        million.
  --A unit's awards ``pool'' is typically calculated on the basis of 1 
        percent of the combined salaries of employees on-board in that 
        unit as of a particular date. For fiscal year 2005, the awards 
        pools were calculated in Pay Period 17, which ended on 
        September 3. The awards pool that would have been available to 
        award just NTEU employees for fiscal year 2005 would have been 
        $7.546 million.
  --Organizational components typically reserve 15 to 25 percent of the 
        awards pool to fund special act awards throughout the year. The 
        balance of the pool is available to distribute as awards for 
        superior performance. It is estimated that $6.04 million would 
        have been available to pay awards to NTEU employees under the 
        JAC process.
  --The arbitrator's decision requires the agency to recreate the local 
        JACs, collect nominations for shares, and reach consensus on 
        the number of shares to award, if any, to each nominee. If an 
        award calculated under this process is determined to be higher 
        than what an employee was actually awarded, additional payment 
        is to be made. The decision is silent on the action to be taken 
        if the JAC recommends a lower award or no award to an employee 
        who received one. Theoretically, then, the decision could 
        result in merely a redistribution of awards without additional 
        cost. In reality, however, the agency is unlikely to take 
        actions that will result in loss of an award already paid out.
  --The award process used was designed to be fair and equitable to 
        employees of all bargaining units, and similar to the NTEU 
        process, provided employees the opportunity to nominate 
        themselves and/or co-workers for awards. Therefore, it is not 
        expected that re-running the 2005 awards under the NTEU process 
        would result in substantial increase in costs.
    It is noted that CBP believes the arbitrator's decision is flawed, 
and the agency is filing exceptions with the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority.
    Question. If CBP is required to correct the process and pay out the 
rewards, from which account would these funds be drawn?
    Answer. Any required payments would be made from CBP's Salaries and 
Expenses account.

                  RESPONDING TO LETTERS FROM CONGRESS

    Question. Is CBP looking for a contractor to help its employees 
write letters to Congress? If so, why and isn't this more properly a 
Department rather than a contractor function?
    Answer. CBP does not employ contractors to write letters to 
Congress. We have employed contractors to instruct writing skills to 
our employees so that they are better able to author and edit memos, 
letters, reports, and other documents.

                          BORDER PATROL DUTIES

    Question. On February 15, 2006, the Washington Post ran an article 
regarding the Vice President's accidental shooting of a friend while 
hunting quail on a private ranch in Texas that stated, in part, ``and a 
Federal Border Patrol agent, guarding the gate because Cheney was 
there, knew nothing about the accident.'' The Vice President already is 
protected by a significant Secret Service detail.
    Given the relative paucity of Border Patrol agents posted along our 
Southwest border, and the public's strong interest that our borders be 
protected, why was an agent pulled off the border to perform a duty 
that is routinely and more appropriately performed by the Secret 
Service?
    Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector did 
provide perimeter security during the Vice President's visit to the 
ranch. The U.S. Secret Service requested assistance from the Rio Grande 
Valley Sector due to the vastness of the ranch, the Border Patrol's 4-
wheel drive vehicle capabilities and the agent's knowledge and 
familiarity with the area. The ranch is located within the sector's 
Kingsville Station area of responsibility and is routinely patrolled by 
Border Patrol agents. According to the sector, this request for 
assistance was received well in advance of the visit and was supported 
without sacrificing agent presence along the immediate border area or 
at the sector's checkpoints.

                        VIRGIN ISLAND SUBSTATION

    Question. What is the status of opening a Border Patrol substation 
in the Virgin Islands?
    Answer. The current threat assessments in the sector do not support 
placing it as a priority enforcement area with the creation of a new 
Border Patrol sector. Current assessments of the illegal immigrant flow 
in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) place it at 0.1 percent of that of 
other focus areas, such as the Southwest land border, with an annual 
illegal immigrant flow that exceeds 1 million. Therefore, DHS does not 
support establishing a Border Patrol facility in the USVI at this time.

               ICE CONTRACT WITH KELLOGG, BROWN AND ROOT

    Question. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recently 
awarded Kellogg, Brown and Root, the engineering and construction 
subsidiary of Halliburton, a contingency contract to support ICE 
facilities in the event of an emergency. With a maximum total value of 
$385 million over a 5-year term (consisting of a 1-year base period and 
four 1-year options), the competitively awarded contract will be 
executed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. KBR held the previous ICE 
contract from 2000 through 2005. The contract calls for establishing 
temporary detention and processing capabilities to augment existing ICE 
Detention and Removal Operations facilities in the event of an 
emergency influx of immigrants into the United States, or to support 
the rapid development of new programs. The contingency support contract 
provides for planning and, if required, initiation of specific 
engineering, construction, and logistics associated with expanding 
facilities as required.
    Is it your intention to use this contract to construct the 
additional detention bedspace and the 6,700 new beds called for in the 
budget request?
    Answer. The contingency contract provides ICE with an emergency 
response mechanism to deploy support services and temporary shelters 
within short response times for both emergency responders as well as 
migrant populations. ICE has not utilized the KBR contingency support 
contract to construct detention facilities in the past. ICE does not 
anticipate the need to utilize the KBR contract for developing new 
detention facilities associated with the increase of the 6,700 fiscal 
year 2007 detention beds.
    Question. Has KBR constructed existing detention bedspace under the 
terms of this contract or of any previous contracts? Please provide us 
with the details.
    Answer. ICE has not exercised the current contingency support 
contract to construct any existing detention facilities. Further, ICE 
has not utilized any previous contingency support contracts awarded to 
KBR for the purpose of constructing permanent detention facilities.

                          WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

    Question. For worksite enforcement, please provide fiscal year 2005 
case and workload statistics, both criminal and administrative.
    Answer. There were a total of 412 worksite enforcement criminal 
cases closed in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year 2005, there were 176 
arrests for criminal violations and 1,116 administrative apprehensions.

                             LENGTH OF STAY

    Question. What is the average length of stay for a detained alien 
in ICE's custody, including those in expedited removal?
    Answer. The current average length of stay for all detained aliens, 
including all case types and nationalities, is 33.7 days. Release from 
custody includes all possible release types, to include bonds, order of 
recognizance, order of supervision, removal, etc.
    Source: DRO official statistics (as of May 31, 2006).

              OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL LEGAL ADVISOR (OPLA)

    Question. Please provide a break out of the attorneys in OPLA for 
fiscal year 2003/2004/2005/2006, including position type and location, 
the percentage of growth, how many are on board currently?
    Answer. There are 3 SES positions within OPLA: Principal Legal 
Advisor, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor and the Director of Field Legal 
Operations. The remaining ICE attorneys are in the GS-905 series.
    The following is a breakdown of the number of attorneys onboard:
  --September 30, 2003: 614
  --September 30, 2004: 608
  --September 30, 2005: 571
  --February 10, 2006: 599 (on board)
    The decrease in the number of attorneys from September 2003 (614) 
to February 2006 (599) was the result of several factors. OPLA lost 
attorneys to CIS and CBP in the transition to DHS. Additionally, 
because of an uncertain budget situation, ICE instituted a hiring 
freeze and waiver process that precluded OPLA from effectively 
replacing staff lost through attrition.
    The attached charts show the number of attorneys by location.
    Question. What is the expected average caseload reduction for 
attorneys based on the requested resources for fiscal year 2007?
    Answer. Each additional attorney assigned to perform immigration 
court work handles at least 500 cases annually. With additional 
attorney resources, there will be more time in which to respond to 
motions, prepare cases, write briefs and respond to inquiries from 
clients. If the ICE legal program receives the requested positions, 
attorneys will be able to spend more time preparing the average case 
for hearing before the Immigration Courts. This will have numerous 
beneficial consequences:
    ICE attorneys will have additional time to obtain and review the A-
files, prepare the cross-examination of the respondents, locate and 
interview other witnesses, research complex legal issues, write pre-
trial briefs, and confer with opposing counsel.
    The current attorney level results in the delay and/or termination 
of court proceedings, provides more time for undocumented aliens to 
amass equities in the United States, and results in additional 
detention costs for the agency. Each 1-week continuance costs ICE $665 
(i.e., $95 per day) in additional detention costs. In fiscal year 2004, 
detainees remained in agency custody for an average of 39 days. The 
Immigration Courts completed 84,975 detained cases that year, which 
accounted for 34 percent of its total caseload. Furthermore, with an 
increased attorney workforce, attorneys will have more time to enter 
into stipulated deportation agreements with detainees, resulting in a 
more effective use of detention beds. With an increased number of 
attorneys, the program could make more effective use of detention and 
removal resources.

                             BREACHED BOND

    Question. Please explain the Breached Bond program, how many 
detention beds it supported in fiscal years 2002-2005, how many beds 
are estimated to be supported by it in fiscal year 2006 and budgeted 
for in fiscal year 2007.
    Answer. The Breached Bond/Detention Fund was authorized in Section 
112 of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1993 (Public Law 
102-395). The Act amended Section 286 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, by establishing, in the General Fund of 
the Treasury, a separate account to be called the Breached Bond/
Detention Fund. The first $8,000,000 in breached cash and surety bonds 
collected goes to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. All 
collections in excess of $8,000,000 posted under the INA, which are 
recovered by the Department of Justice, are deposited as offsetting 
collections into this fund. Amounts deposited into the fund, which 
remain available until expended, can be used for expenses incurred in 
the collection of breached bonds, bond management, litigation 
activities to obtain compliance from surety companies found to be 
delinquent in meeting their obligations to ICE, and for expenses 
associated with the detention of criminal and illegal aliens.
    In 1998, the Immigration Detention account receipts were merged 
into this account. These receipts are derived from the penalty portion 
of the receipts collected under Section 245(i) of the INA. Section 
245(i) allows a person who qualifies for permanent residency, but is 
ineligible to adjust status in the United States because of an 
immigration status violation, to pay a $1,000 penalty to continue 
processing in the United States. A portion of each application fee (not 
to exceed $200.00) that the Attorney General determines is required to 
process the application under the section and is remitted to the 
Attorney General. Any remaining portions of such fees are deposited by 
the Attorney General into the Breached Bond Detention Fund established 
under  286(r).
    Detention beds supported from fiscal years 2002-2005 are as 
follows:
  --Fiscal year 2002: 3,857
  --Fiscal year 2003: 5,166
  --Fiscal year 2004: 3,498
  --Fiscal year 2005: 3,378
    Estimated detention beds supported and budgeted for fiscal years 
2006-2007 are as follows:
  --Fiscal year 2006: 2,598
  --Fiscal year 2007: 2,598
    Question. Also, please explain the estimated impact on the program 
of the anticipated increase in detentions resulting from the SBI.
    Answer. While the number of aliens apprehended and detained will 
rise, the Department has put into place practices that will allow the 
program to turn over detention beds quicker, improve the processing of 
aliens, and facilitate their removal from the United States.

                               DETENTIONS

    Question. For fiscal years 2002-2005, how many illegal aliens did 
you detain for one day or longer?
    Answer. Illegal aliens detained for 1 day or longer during fiscal 
years 2002-2005 are as follows:
  --Fiscal year 2002: 181,236
  --Fiscal year 2003: 209,629
  --Fiscal year 2004: 215,417
  --Fiscal year 2005: 217,270
    Question. Of that total, how many were detained for less than 2 
weeks, less than 1 month, and more than 1 month?
    Answer. Illegal aliens detained for less than 2 weeks, less than 1 
month, and more than 1 month are detailed below.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      2 Weeks      2 Wks--1 Mo.       > 1 mo.          Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2002................................          93,728          33,869          53,639         181,236
Fiscal year 2003................................         114,210          36,006          59,413         209,629
Fiscal year 2004................................         115,613          34,637          65,167         215,417
Fiscal year 2005................................         112,705          45,149          59,416         217,270
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

    Question. Please provide the number of State inquiries into the 
LESC for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, and any specific 
workload statistics for LESC in support of fugitive operations.
    Answer. In fiscal year 2003, the LESC responded to a total of 
594,352 queries from Federal, State and local law enforcement officers, 
of which 385,651 were queries from State and local law enforcement 
officers. For fiscal year 2004, the LESC responded to a total of 
667,453 queries, of which 458,711 were queries from State and local law 
enforcement officers.
    The LESC identified a combined total of 4,617 ICE fugitives through 
NCIC in fiscal years 2003 (488), 2004 (1,854) and 2005 (2,275). ICE 
immigration detainers were lodged in each instance by ICE Special 
Agents assigned to the LESC, who then coordinated local action with ICE 
field officers.
    LESC agents are also able to identify alien fugitives based upon 
information contained in incoming queries from the law enforcement 
community. Wanted aliens identified by the LESC are not tracked by 
individual category. However, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, LESC 
agents lodged a combined total of 27,886 detainers against criminal or 
other wanted aliens, including fugitive aliens.
    The LESC routinely provides fugitive leads to ICE field offices 
based on information received from callers to the ICE tip-line. Tip-
line statistics are not available for individual categories of calls; 
however, a substantial number of callers do provide information 
concerning ICE fugitives.
    Question. Describe the work load for LESC.
    Answer. In fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the LESC responded to 
a combined total of 1,938,307 electronic queries from Federal, State, 
local and tribal law enforcement agencies in all 50 States, the 
District of Columbia, two U.S. Territories and Canada. Electronic 
queries to the LESC average in excess of 50,000 queries per month.
    In fiscal years 2004 and 2005 the LESC received a combined total of 
126,528 calls on the ICE tip line (98,857 of those calls were received 
in fiscal year 2005 alone).
    ICE Special Agents assigned to the LESC lodged a combined total of 
27,886 ICE immigration detainers in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, or in 
excess of 1,000 ICE immigration detainers each month.
    The LESC received more than 107,036 telephone calls on its 
dedicated law enforcement line in fiscal year 2005. Calls to the LESC's 
law enforcement line average almost 9,000 per month. In fiscal year 
2005, the LESC had more than 880,000 contacts with the law enforcement 
community or the public concerning law enforcement matters associated 
with ICE authorities and responsibilities.
    In fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the LESC entered a combined 
total of more than 90,000 new ICE records in the NCIC database--an 
average of about 2,500 per month. However, new procedures recently 
implemented at the LESC are expected to increase record entries to an 
average of 5,700 per month.
    In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the LESC was required to validate a 
combined total of 212,420 NCIC records. In the first 3 months of fiscal 
year 2006, the LESC validated an average of 12,000 records per month.
    In fiscal year 2005, the LESC records staff completed more than 1.1 
million file transactions. In the first 3 months of fiscal year 2006, 
they averaged 92,000 record transactions per month, resulting in a 
similar annual projection for fiscal year 2006.

                INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM EXPANSION

    Question. On page 24 of the ICE congressional justification, it 
states that the intensive supervision program is to be expanded to a 
ninth and tenth city. To which cities are you expanding?
    Answer. We are currently reviewing opportunities to expand ISAP 
within the scope of current contracts. No determinations have been made 
at this time.

                          GUANTANAMO FACILITY

    Question. What is the status of the $5 million in fiscal year 2005 
construction funds that were to be used at the Guantanamo facility?
    Answer. $6 million was appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for the 
facility, which provides housing for refugee applicants that are 
awaiting determination of their claims.
    Construction activities undertaken between fiscal years 2004 and 
2006 are:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
20-Bed Segregation Unit.................................      $1,787,000
East Compound 2.1 Acres Security Fencing and                   1,566,658
 Mobilization of Temporary Facilities...................
West Compound 2.9 Acres Security Systems and Perimeter           821,792
 Fences.................................................
Building 624 Demolition and Asbestos Abatement..........         529,200
Building 1567 64-Bed Renovation Project.................         147,153
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................       4,851,803
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
                        EXPLOSIVES TRACE PORTALS

    Question. Please provide a purchase and deployment schedule for 
Explosives Detection Trace Portals (ETPs). The schedule should include, 
by airport, all ETPs purchased and deployed for fiscal year's 2005 and 
2006, ETPs scheduled to be purchased and deployed based on the fiscal 
year 2007 request, and ETPs scheduled for deployment in the future.
    Answer. Below, in figure A, is the list of airports where 
Explosives Trace Portals (ETP) were deployed with fiscal year 2005 
funding.
    ETP deployment using fiscal year 2006 funding will be installed in 
two phases. Below, in figure B, is Phase I of the fiscal year 2006 
deployment. The airport locations and number of units for all fiscal 
year 2006 deployments are subject to change due to space constraints, 
local airport construction, etc.
    Phase II of the fiscal year 2006 deployment is in figure C. And, 
the list of airports scheduled to receive the 92 ETPs requested in the 
President's fiscal year 2007 budget is below in figure D. This list 
accounts for 82 units; the remaining 10 units will be used to backfill 
at airports in which ETPs have not been deployed due to local airport 
construction. Airport locations and number of units are subject to 
change due to space constraints, local airport construction, etc.

                                FIGURE A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOS...............................  Boston-Logan                       1
                                     International
                                     Airport--MA.
BWI...............................  Baltimore-Washington               1
                                     International
                                     Airport--MD.
CLT...............................  Charlotte/Douglas                  3
                                     International
                                     Airport--NC.
DCA...............................  Ronald Reagan                      2
                                     Washington National
                                     Airport--DC.
DFW...............................  Dallas/Ft. Worth                   4
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
DTW...............................  Detroit Metro Wayne                3
                                     County Airport--MI.
EWR...............................  Newark International               2
                                     Airport--NJ.
FLL...............................  Ft. Lauderdale/                    2
                                     Hollywood
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
GPT...............................  Gulfport-Biloxi                    1
                                     International
                                     Airport--MS.
IAD...............................  Washington-Dulles                  1
                                     International
                                     Airport--VA.
IND...............................  Indianapolis                       3
                                     International
                                     Airport--IN.
JAX...............................  Jacksonville                       2
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
JFK...............................  JFK International                  1
                                     Airport--NY.
LAS...............................  McCarran Las Vegas                 4
                                     International
                                     Airport--NV.
LAX...............................  Los Angeles                        1
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
MIA...............................  Miami International                7
                                     Airport--FL.
PBI...............................  West Palm Beach                    1
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
PHX...............................  Phoenix-Sky Harbor                 1
                                     International
                                     Airport--AZ.
PIT...............................  Pittsburgh                         2
                                     International
                                     Airport--PA.
PVD...............................  T. F. Green Airport--              1
                                     Providence, RI.
ROC...............................  Greater Rochester                  1
                                     International
                                     Airport--NY.
SAN...............................  San Diego                          1
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
SFO...............................  San Francisco                      7
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
SJU...............................  Luis Munoz Marin                   3
                                     International
                                     Airport--San Juan,
                                     PR.
SMF...............................  Sacramento                         3
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
TPA...............................  Tampa International                1
                                     Airport--FL.
                                                         ---------------
      Total.......................  ....................              59
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                FIGURE B
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABQ...............................  Albuquerque                        2
                                     International
                                     Sunport Airport--NM.
ALB...............................  Albany International               1
                                     Airport--NY.
ATL...............................  Hartsfield Atlanta                 3
                                     International
                                     Airport--GA.
BDL...............................  Bradley                            2
                                     International
                                     Airport--CT.
BOS...............................  Boston Logan                       8
                                     International
                                     Airport--MA.
BUF...............................  Buffalo Niagara                    2
                                     International
                                     Airport--NY.
BWI...............................  Baltimore-Washington               8
                                     International
                                     Airport--MD.
CLE...............................  Cleveland Hopkins                  4
                                     International
                                     Airport--OH.
CMH...............................  Port Columbus                      3
                                     International
                                     Airport--OH.
CVG...............................  Cincinnati/Northern                4
                                     Kentucky
                                     International
                                     Airport--KY.
DEN...............................  Denver International               6
                                     Airport--CO.
DFW...............................  Dallas/Fort Worth                  8
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
EWR...............................  Newark International               5
                                     Airport--NY.
HNL...............................  Honolulu                           3
                                     International
                                     Airport--HI.
IAH...............................  George Bush                        2
                                     Intercontinental
                                     Airport Houston--TX.
JFK...............................  John F. Kennedy                    3
                                     International
                                     Airport--NY.
LAX...............................  Los Angeles                        8
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
LGA...............................  LaGuardia Airport--                2
                                     NY.
MCI...............................  Kansas City                        4
                                     International
                                     Airport--MO.
MCO...............................  Orlando                            4
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
MDW...............................  Chicago Midway                     2
                                     Airport--IL.
MSP...............................  Minneapolis-St. Paul               7
                                     International
                                     Airport--MN.
OAK...............................  Oakland                            5
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
ORD...............................  Chicago O'Hare                     8
                                     International
                                     Airport--IL.
PBI...............................  Palm Beach                         1
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
PDX...............................  Portland                           4
                                     International
                                     Airport--OR.
PHL...............................  Philadelphia                       7
                                     International
                                     Airport--.
PHX...............................  Phoenix Sky Harbor                 4
                                     International
                                     Airport--AZ.
PVD...............................  T. F. Green Airport--              1
                                     Providence, RI.
RDU...............................  Raleigh-Durham                     3
                                     International
                                     Airport--NC.
SEA...............................  Seattle-Tacoma                     6
                                     International
                                     Airport--WA.
SFO...............................  San Francisco                      1
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
SLC...............................  Salt Lake City                     5
                                     International
                                     Airport--UT.
STL...............................  Lambert St Louis                   5
                                     International
                                     Airport--MO.
TPA...............................  Tampa International                6
                                     Airport--FL.
                                                         ---------------
      Total.......................  ....................             147
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                FIGURE C
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANC...............................  Ted Stevens                        3
                                     Anchorage
                                     International
                                     Airport--AK.
ATL...............................  Hartsfield Atlanta                 6
                                     International
                                     Airport--GA.
AUS...............................  Austin-Bergstrom                   3
                                     International--TX.
BHM...............................  Birmingham                         1
                                     International
                                     Airport--AL.
BNA...............................  Nashville                          2
                                     International
                                     Airport--TN.
BOI...............................  Boise Air Terminal/                2
                                     Gowen Field--ID.
BUR...............................  Bob Hope Airport--                 2
                                     Burbank, CA.
COS...............................  Colorado Springs                   1
                                     Municipal--CO.
DAL...............................  Dallas Love Field--                3
                                     TX.
DAY...............................  James M. Cox Dayton                1
                                     International
                                     Airport--OH.
DCA...............................  Ronald Reagan                      4
                                     Washington National
                                     Airport--DC.
DEN...............................  Denver International               5
                                     Airport--CO.
DTW...............................  Detroit Metro Wayne                6
                                     County Airport--MI.
ELP...............................  El Paso                            1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TS.
EWR...............................  Newark International               4
                                     Airport--NJ.
GEG...............................  Spokane                            2
                                     International
                                     Airport--WA.
GSO...............................  Piedmont Triad                     2
                                     International
                                     Airport--NC.
HOU...............................  William P. Hobby                   4
                                     Airport--TX.
IAD...............................  Washington-Dulles                  4
                                     International
                                     Airport--VA.
JFK...............................  John F. Kennedy                    4
                                     International
                                     Airport--NY.
KOA...............................  Kona International                 2
                                     Airport--AK.
LAS...............................  McCarran                           5
                                     International
                                     Airport--NV.
LAX...............................  Los Angeles                        4
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
LGA...............................  LaGuardia Airport--                4
                                     NY.
LIT...............................  Little Rock National               1
                                     Airport--AR.
MCO...............................  Orlando                            4
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
MDW...............................  Chicago Midway                     2
                                     Airport--IL.
MEM...............................  Memphis                            4
                                     International
                                     Airport--TN.
MHT...............................  Manchester Airport--               3
                                     NH.
MIA...............................  Miami International                3
                                     Airport--FL.
MKE...............................  General Mitchell                   4
                                     International
                                     Airport--WI.
MSP...............................  Minneapolis-St. Paul               3
                                     International
                                     Airport--MN.
MSY...............................  New Orleans                        4
                                     International
                                     Airport--LA.
OGG...............................  Kahului Airport--HI.               2
OKC...............................  Will Rogers World                  2
                                     Airport--OK.
OMA...............................  Eppley Airfield--NE.               2
ONT...............................  Ontario                            2
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
ORD...............................  Chicago O'Hare                     4
                                     International
                                     Airport--IL.
ORF...............................  Norfolk                            3
                                     International
                                     Airport--VA.
RNO...............................  Reno/Tahoe                         2
                                     International
                                     Airport--NV.
RSW...............................  Southwest Florida                  3
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
SAN...............................  San Diego                          5
                                     International
                                     Airport, Lindbergh--
                                     CA.
SAT...............................  San Antonio                        2
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
SDF...............................  Louisville                         2
                                     International
                                     Airport--KY.
SEA...............................  Seattle-Tacoma                     6
                                     International
                                     Airport--WA.
SJC...............................  San Jose                           6
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
SNA...............................  John Wayne Airport--               4
                                     CA.
TUL...............................  Tulsa International                1
                                     Airport--OK.
TUS...............................  Tucson International               2
                                     Airport--AZ.
                                                         ---------------
      Total.......................  ....................             151
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                FIGURE D
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABE...............................  Lehigh Valley                      1
                                     International
                                     Airport--PA.
ACY...............................  Atlantic City                      1
                                     International
                                     Airport--NJ.
AMA...............................  Amarillo                           1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
AVL...............................  Asheville Regional                 1
                                     Airport--NC.
BGR...............................  Bangor International               2
                                     Airport--ME.
BIL...............................  Billings Logan                     1
                                     International
                                     Airport--MT.
BTV...............................  Burlington                         2
                                     International
                                     Airport--VT.
BZN...............................  Gallatin Field                     1
                                     Airport--MT.
CAE...............................  Columbia                           1
                                     Metropolitan
                                     Airport--SC.
CAK...............................  Akron-Canton                       1
                                     Regional Airport--
                                     OH.
CHA...............................  Chattanooga                        1
                                     Metropolitan
                                     Airport.
CHS...............................  Charleston                         2
                                     International
                                     Airport/AFB--SC.
CID...............................  The Eastern Iowa                   1
                                     Airport--IA.
CRP...............................  Corpus Christi                     1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
DAB...............................  Daytona Beach                      1
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
DSM...............................  Des Moines                         1
                                     International
                                     Airport--IA.
EUG...............................  Eugene Airport/                    1
                                     Mahlon Sweet Field.
EYW...............................  Key West                           1
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
FAI...............................  Fairbanks                          1
                                     International
                                     Airport--AK.
FAT...............................  Fresno Yosemite                    1
                                     International
                                     Airport--CA.
FNT...............................  Bishop International               1
                                     Airport--MI.
FSD...............................  Joe Foss Field--SD..               1
FWA...............................  Ft. Wayne                          1
                                     International
                                     Airport--Baer
                                     Field--IN.
GRB...............................  Austin Straubel                    1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
GRR...............................  Gerald R. Ford                     2
                                     International
                                     Airport--MI.
GSP...............................  Greenville-                        2
                                     Spartanburg
                                     Airport--SC.
HRL...............................  Rio Grande Valley                  1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
HSV...............................  Huntsville-Madison                 1
                                     County Airport--AL.
ICT...............................  Wichita Mid-                       1
                                     Continent Airport--
                                     KS.
ISP...............................  Long Island                        2
                                     MacArthur Airport--
                                     NY.
ITO...............................  Hilo International                 1
                                     Airport--HI.
JAN...............................  Jackson                            2
                                     International
                                     Airport--MS.
JNU...............................  Juneau International               1
                                     Airport--AK.
LAN...............................  Capital City                       1
                                     Airport--MI.
LBB...............................  Lubbock                            1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
LEX...............................  Blue Grass Airport--               1
                                     KY.
LGB...............................  Long Beach Daugherty               2
                                     Field Airport--CA.
LIH...............................  Lihue Airport--HI...               1
MAF...............................  Midland                            1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
MDT...............................  Harrisburg                         1
                                     International
                                     Airport--PA.
MFE...............................  McAllen-Miller                     1
                                     International
                                     Airport--TX.
MLB...............................  Melbourne                          1
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
MLI...............................  Quad Cities                        1
                                     International
                                     Airport--IL.
MOB...............................  Mobile Regional                    1
                                     Airport--AL.
MSN...............................  Dane County Regional               1
                                     Airport--WI.
MSO...............................  Missoula                           1
                                     International
                                     Airport--MT.
MYR...............................  Myrtle Beach                       1
                                     International
                                     Airport--SC.
PHF...............................  Newport News/                      1
                                     Williamsburg
                                     International
                                     Airport--VA.
PIE...............................  St Petersburg-                     2
                                     Clearwater Int'l
                                     Airport--FL.
PNS...............................  Pensacola Regional                 1
                                     Airport--FL.
PSP...............................  Palm Springs                       1
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
PWM...............................  Portland                           1
                                     International
                                     Jetport--ME.
RIC...............................  Richmond                           3
                                     International
                                     Airport--VA.
ROA...............................  Roanoke Regional                   1
                                     Airport--VA.
ROC...............................  Greater Rochester                  2
                                     International
                                     Airport--NY.
SAV...............................  Savannah                           1
                                     International
                                     Airport--GA.
SBA...............................  Santa Barbara                      2
                                     Municipal Airport--
                                     CA.
SBN...............................  South Bend Regional                2
                                     Airport--IN.
SFB...............................  Orlando Sanford                    2
                                     Airport--FL.
SGF...............................  Springfield/Branson                2
                                     Regional Airport--
                                     MO.
SHV...............................  Shreveport Regional                2
                                     Airport--LA.
SRQ...............................  Sarasota Bradenton                 3
                                     International
                                     Airport--FL.
SYR...............................  Syracuse-Hancock                   1
                                     International
                                     Airport--NY.
                                                         ---------------
      Total.......................  ....................              82
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Provide a similar schedule for other emerging technology 
that will be used to screen passengers for explosives.
    Answer. Below is the deployment plan for emerging technology in 
fiscal year 2007. These deployments will enable the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) to screen all passengers designated for 
additional screening and a random number of passengers selected to keep 
the equipment in continuous use. TSA is currently developing a 
strategic plan for our passenger screening program which will establish 
our goals for screening passengers for explosives and provide a 
deployment schedule by airport.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         # of
             Technology                 units            Location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives Trace Portals............     \1\ 92  1 per 3 checkpoint
                                                  lanes at Category X &
                                                  I airport
Automated Explosives Spot Sampler...         93  1 at each Category II
                                                  checkpoint
Automated Carry-On Bag Explosives            27  1 at each Category X
 Detection Sy-  stem.                             airport
Whole Body Imaging..................         91  1 per 8 checkpoint
                                                  lanes at Category X &
                                                  I airports
Cast and Prosthetics Scanner........        210  1 at each Category X
                                                  checkpoint
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This is the final phase of deployment to complete the 1 per 3 lanes
  ratio.

    Question. Provide a list of all certified ETP technology.
    Answer. The following Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs) have been 
reviewed by TSA, and are qualified for screening aviation passengers 
for explosives:
  --Smiths Detection Sentinel II; and
  --GE IonTrack Entry Scan3.
    Question. Provide a list of all ETP technology that is being 
evaluated by DHS for certification.
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues 
to work with the two current manufacturers of Explosives Trace Portals 
(ETP) to further refine system performance and operational suitability. 
At the present time, no other vendors have submitted an ETP for TSA 
evaluation.
    Question. How many airports have explosives detection ``puffer'' 
technology?
    Answer. There are currently 94 Explosives Trace Portals installed 
at 37 airports.
    Question. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, what percent of airline 
passengers were screened with this technology?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2005 and early fiscal year 2006, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was in the early stages of 
deployment of Explosives Trace Portals (ETP). Currently, there are 94 
ETPs deployed at 37 airports. The ETPs are used to screen passengers 
requiring additional screening and a random number of passengers to 
keep the units in continuous use. The actual percentages of people 
screened using this technology is considered Sensitive Security 
Information and cannot be disclosed to the public. TSA would be happy 
to provide the Committee with this information in the appropriate 
forum.

                           CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

    Question. How many contract officers are employed at TSA? How does 
that level compare to industry and Federal Government standards?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration currently has 72 
contract specialists and 32 of the specialists are contracting 
officers.
    The generally accepted benchmark for staffing for the procurement 
function is ``cost to spend.'' This metric divides the total dollars 
obligated by the direct manpower costs associated with the contracting 
function. In fiscal year 2005, TSA's Office of Acquisition operated at 
a 0.348 percent cost to spend. The Center for Advanced Purchasing 
Studies (http://www.capsresearch.org) is recognized as the industry 
expert organization regarding benchmarking for the acquisition 
function. Their applicable standard for the acquisition function is 2.1 
percent.
    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a 
standard for the contracting function of 1.2 percent to 1.9 percent. 
The DHS Chief Procurement Officer established a staffing goal of 1.2 
percent in fiscal year 2006. TSA requested $7.5 million for an 
additional 30 FTE and 61 positions in fiscal year 2007.
    Question. How many additional contract employees will be hired 
based on the fiscal year 2007 request?
    Answer. Based on the fiscal year 2007 request, the Transportation 
Security Administration expects to hire an additional 61 staff.
    Question. What percentage of the TSA budget in fiscal year 2006 is 
spent on contract oversight?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2006, the Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA) total budget authority is $6.3 billion and TSA 
is executing approximately $2 billion in contracts. The total budget 
for acquisition, the office that performs contract oversight functions, 
is $20.9 million (payroll, compensation and benefits, and operating 
expenses), and this is approximately 0.3 percent of TSA's total budget 
authority.
    Question. Would the fiscal year 2007 request increase that 
percentage? If so, by how much?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request increases 
the acquisition budget by $7.5 million. The percentage of the 
Transportation Security Administration's budget authority spent on 
contract oversight increases to 0.45 percent.
    Question. Of TSA's full budget authority in fiscal year's 2005 and 
2006, what amount is spent on contracts?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awarded 
$2.1 billion on contracts in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2006, TSA 
expects to award approximately $2 billion on contracts.
    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 request is planned for 
contracts?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates 
executing approximately $2 billion of contracts from the total budget 
authority in fiscal year 2007.
    Question. Please explain TSA's Investment Review Board process.
    Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) acquisition 
programs are categorized into four investment levels (1-4) based on 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) criteria, with Level I being the 
most significant. Program levels determine the review forum for each 
Key Decision Point approval. Level 1 and 2 investments have an 
acquisition value over $50 million and are reviewed at both TSA and 
DHS. The TSA Investment Review Process (IRP) is the initial review 
point for Level 1 and 2 programs and the final review point for Level 3 
and 4 programs. Level 1 and 2 programs, once approved at TSA, continue 
to the DHS IRP.
    The TSA IRP contains two components, the Business Management 
Council (BMC) and Investment Review Board (IRB). Both components ensure 
alignment of capital investments with DHS mission and goals, identify 
program risks, and assess the program's current cost, schedule, and 
performance status. The BMC is the initial review point for all TSA 
programs before proceeding to the TSA IRB. The TSA IRB is the final 
approval authority for Level 3 and 4 programs and assesses the 
readiness of Level 1 and 2 programs before proceeding to DHS.

                            CUSTOMER SERVICE

    Question. What are TSA's performance measures for customer service?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
measured its customer satisfaction using airport customer satisfaction 
surveys. Below are the areas of customer satisfaction measured and the 
results from the customer satisfaction surveys for fiscal year 2003-
fiscal year 2005.




    Question. Are TSA's goals being met in those areas?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is currently 
evaluating the metrics that are being captured to ensure that we are 
measuring elements that are meaningful and that will truly provide 
information that will lead to process improvements. Simultaneously, we 
will continue using the metrics in place and have set an overall 
satisfaction goal of at least 81 percent for fiscal year 2006 and 82 
percent for fiscal year 2007.

                                STAFFING

    Question. Last year, TSA warned against a reduction in funding for 
screeners on the basis that passenger wait times would be longer and 
training costs would be higher. Based on the funding reduction for TSA 
screeners in fiscal year 2006, have those concerns become reality?
    Answer. Prior to November 2005, system wide average wait times were 
stable, averaging just 3 minutes. Since then, average wait times have 
increased, as evidenced by the table below.
    While it is not surprising that wait times might rise over the 
holiday months, the continued rise in wait times in February indicates 
that even with the efficiency improvements from the December 22, 2005 
Standard Operating Procedures changes, the wait times experienced by 
passengers has increased.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Month                       Oct 2005   Nov 2005   Dec 2005   Jan 2006   Feb 2006   Mar 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Wait Time.............................       2.91       3.18       3.62       3.39       3.62       3.85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Please provide a comparison of passenger wait times at 
high peak periods in fiscal year 2006 to the same periods in previous 
fiscal years.
    Answer. A useful period comparison of peak period travel is the 
winter holiday. Actual passenger traffic was down 3.5 percent this past 
winter holiday period, while Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) staffing was down 10 percent due to the staffing reductions 
required for fiscal year 2006. TSA staff were more productive, handling 
7.3 percent more passengers per Transportation Security Officer than in 
the previous year. However, passenger wait times during this past 
winter holiday period increased 8.4 percent over the same period of 
2004/2005.
    Question. With a shrinking screener workforce, how will TSA pull 
screeners off normal security lines and place them at dedicated 
Registered Traveler lines without increasing wait times for normal 
passengers?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not 
expect the implementation of the Registered Traveler program to 
increase the required number of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) 
Full Time Equivalents. TSA does not anticipate a need to move any TSOs 
from normal security lines nor do we foresee increases in wait times 
for passengers.
    Question. Please provide a chart that displays airport management 
staff by airport versus all other staff.
    Answer. The requested information is provided in the table below.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                       Law                                                                                 TSO:
            Apt ID                          Airport name                    Cat          State/U.S.  enforce   FSD &    Air   Screener       TSO:        TSO: bag   TSO:       TSO:       pasgnr     TSO:       TSO:      TSO:   Airport
                                                                                         territory    & reg.   Staff   cargo    mangr   administrative  screening   other  maintenance  screening  training  undefined   total    total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABE...........................  Lehigh Valley Int'l Airport........  II...............  PA.........        2       7       1        4   ..............         8   ......  ...........        35         7   .........       50       64
ABI...........................  Abilene Regional Airport...........  III..............  TX.........        2       1  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........         9         1   .........       15       20
ABQ...........................  Albuquerque Int'l Sunport Airport..  I................  NM.........        6      12       1        4            8            52   ......  ...........        98         9   .........      168      199
ABR...........................  Aberdeen Airport...................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        7
ABY...........................  Southwest Georgia Regional Airport.  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        9        9
ACK...........................  Nantucket Memorial Airport.........  III..............  MA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        6        7
ACT...........................  Waco Regional Airport..............  III..............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         9         2   .........       15       17
ACV...........................  Arcata-Eureka Airport..............  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         9   ........  .........       11       12
ACY...........................  Atlantic City Int'l Airport........  II...............  NJ.........        1       7  ......        3            2            12   ......  ...........        28         2   .........       44       57
ADQ...........................  Kodiak State Airport...............  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        9        9
AEX...........................  Alexandria Int'l Airport...........  IV...............  LA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........        11         2   .........       17       18
AGS...........................  Bush Field Airport.................  III..............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............        10   ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       24       24
AHN...........................  Athens/Ben Epps Airport............  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        7        7
AIA...........................  Alliance Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        5
AKN...........................  King Salmon Airport................  III..............  AK.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........  .........        1   .........        4        5
ALB...........................  Albany Int'l Airport...............  I................  NY.........        2       9       1        4            5            42   ......  ...........        63         2   .........      112      134
ALO...........................  Waterloo Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  IA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        4        5
ALS...........................  Alamosa-San Luis Valley Arpt/        IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        4        4
                                 Bergman Fld.
ALW...........................  Walla Walla Regional Airport.......  IV...............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        8        8
AMA...........................  Amarillo Int'l Airport.............  II...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        2            1            20   ......  ...........        21         4   .........       46       50
ANC...........................  Ted Stevens Anchorage Int'l Airport  I................  AK.........        9      13       3        6            8            65   ......  ...........        90         2   .........      165      204
AOO...........................  Altoona-Blair County Airport.......  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        6        6
APF...........................  Naples Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  FL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
APN...........................  Alpena County Regional Airport.....  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        4        4
ART...........................  Watertown Int'l Airport............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
ASE...........................  Aspen Pitkin County Sardy Field....  III..............  CO.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        6
ATL...........................  Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport...  X................  GA.........       12      23       4       25           33           482   ......          5         565        39          1     1,124    1,221
ATW...........................  Outagamie County Airport...........  II...............  WI.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        20         2   .........       30       32
ATY...........................  Watertown Airport..................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
AUG...........................  Augusta State Airport..............  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
AUS...........................  Austin-Bergstrom Int'l Airport.....  I................  TX.........        6      13       1        4            3            76   ......  ...........       119         6   .........      204      230
AVL...........................  Asheville Regional Airport.........  II...............  NC.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        15   ......  ...........        15         9   .........       39       43
AVP...........................  Wilkes Barre/Scranton Int'l Airport  III..............  PA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............        10   ......  ...........        13         5   .........       27       28
AZO...........................  Kalamazoo/Battle Creek Int'l         III..............  MI.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             6   ......  ...........        16         3   .........       25       27
                                 Airport.
BDL...........................  Bradley Int'l Airport..............  I................  CT.........        6      14       2        9           40            78   ......          1         124        15   .........      257      328
BED...........................  Hanscom Field......................  III..............  MA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         4        (0)  .........        7        7
BET...........................  Bethel Airport.....................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
BFD...........................  Bradford Regional Airport..........  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        7        7
BFF...........................  W. Nebraska Reg'l A/P, W.B. Heilig   IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         1         2   .........        6        7
                                 Field.
BFL...........................  Meadows Field, Bakersfield Airport.  III..............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........        15   ........  .........       17       19
BGM...........................  Binghamton Regional Airport........  III..............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        17   ........  .........       18       18
BGR...........................  Bangor Int'l Airport...............  II...............  ME.........        1       7  ......        3            2            11   ......  ...........        31         3   .........       48       61
BHB...........................  Hancock County Bar Harbor Airport..  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
BHM...........................  Birmingham Int'l Airport...........  I................  AL.........        3      11       1        5            5            45   ......  ...........        49        14   .........      111      136
BIL...........................  Billings Logan Int'l Airport.......  II...............  MT.........        4       7  ......        1            1            16   ......  ...........        29         3   .........       50       63
BIS...........................  Bismarck Municipal Airport.........  III..............  ND.........        2       6  ......        2   ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       18       28
BJI...........................  Bemidji-City Airport...............  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        7
BKW...........................  Raleigh County Memorial Airport....  III..............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       12       12
BKX...........................  Brookings..........................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
BLF...........................  Mercer County Airport..............  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        6        6
BLI...........................  Bellingham Int'l Airport...........  III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         8   ......  ...........        10         2          1        21       21
BMI...........................  Bloomington-Normal Airport.........  III..............  IL.........        1       4  ......  ........  ..............         9   ......  ...........        13         3   .........       25       30
BNA...........................  Nashville Int'l Airport............  I................  TN.........        8      14  ......        6            5            96   ......  ...........       107         2   .........      209      242
BOI...........................  Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field.....  I................  ID.........        5      17  ......        5            6            25   ......  ...........        59         4   .........       95      128
BOS...........................  Logan Int'l Airport................  X................  MA.........       13      18       4       18           69           177   ......  ...........       503        10   .........      759      880
BPT...........................  Southeast Texas Regional Airport...  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         8         2   .........       13       14
BQK...........................  Glynco Jetport.....................  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         9   ........  .........        9        9
BQN...........................  Rafael Hernandez Airport...........  III..............  PR.........        1  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        18   ........  .........       24       25
BRD...........................  Brainerd-Crow Wing Airport.........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
BRL...........................  SE Iowa Regional Airport Authority.  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        3        3
BRO...........................  Brownsville/South Padre Int'l        III..............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         7   ......  ...........         8   ........  .........       16       18
                                 Airport.
BTM...........................  Bert Mooney Airport................  III..............  MT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        9       10
BTR...........................  Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport...  II...............  LA.........  .......       7  ......        4            1            14   ......  ...........        27         2   .........       45       57
BTV...........................  Burlington Int'l Airport...........  II...............  VT.........        1       6  ......        4   ..............        14   ......  ...........        56         1   .........       71       82
BUF...........................  Buffalo Niagara Int'l Airport......  II...............  NY.........        4      10       2        4   ..............        57   ......  ...........        97         8   .........      162      182
BUR...........................  Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport..  I................  CA.........        3      11       1        4            2            25   ......          1         103         6   .........      138      160
BWI...........................  Baltimore-Washington Int'l Airport.  X................  MD.........       13      14       3       13           24           171   ......  ...........       434        10   .........      639      706
BZN...........................  Gallatin Field Airport.............  II...............  MT.........  .......       1  ......        1            1            19   ......  ...........        26         1   .........       48       51
CAE...........................  Columbia Metropolitan Airport......  II...............  SC.........        2       6  ......        2   ..............        24   ......  ...........        32   ........  .........       56       66
CAK...........................  Akron-Canton Regional Airport......  II...............  OH.........  .......       1  ......        3            1            19   ......  ...........        30         4   .........       54       58
CDC...........................  Cedar City Municipal...............  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        6        6
CDR...........................  Chadron Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        5
CDV...........................  Merle K (MUDHOLE) Smith............  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        8        8
CEC...........................  Crescent City Airport..............  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        7        7
CEZ...........................  Cortez Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
CGI...........................  Cape Girardeau Regional Airport....  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
CHA...........................  Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport...  II...............  TN.........  .......  ......  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........        22         3   .........       34       36
CHO...........................  Charlottesville/Albemarle Airport..  III..............  VA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       17       18
CHS...........................  Charleston Int'l Airport/AFB.......  II...............  SC.........        3       8       2        2            2            29   ......  ...........        46   ........  .........       77       94
CIC...........................  Chico Municipal Airport............  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         7   ........  .........        7        7
CID...........................  The Eastern Iowa Airport...........  II...............  IA.........        1       2  ......        3   ..............        18   ......  ...........        34   ........  .........       52       59
CIU...........................  Chippewa County Int'l Airport......  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
CKB...........................  Benedum Airport....................  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5         3   .........       12       13
CLE...........................  Cleveland Hopkins Int'l Airport....  I................  OH.........        9      19       2        7           18            92   ......  ...........       185        15   .........      311      365
CLL...........................  Easterwood Airport.................  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         7         2   .........       13       15
CLT...........................  Charlotte/Douglas Int'l Airport....  X................  NC.........        5      12       3        9            7            81   ......  ...........       170        19   .........      277      313
CMH...........................  Port Columbus Int'l Airport........  I................  OH.........        6      14       1        5            4            69   ......  ...........       107         9   .........      190      221
CMI...........................  University Of Illinois-Willard       III..............  IL.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       14       15
                                 Airport.
CMX...........................  Houghton County Memorial Airport...  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        5
CNY...........................  Canyonlands Field Airport..........  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        4        4
COD...........................  Yellowstone Regional Airport.......  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        8        8
COS...........................  Colorado Springs Municipal.........  I................  CO.........        3      12  ......        3   ..............        44   ......  ...........        49         2   .........       95      113
COU...........................  Columbia Regional Airport..........  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
CPR...........................  Natrona Int'l Airport..............  IV...............  WY.........        1       5       1        2            1             3   ......  ...........         6         2   .........       11       21
CRP...........................  Corpus Christi Int'l Airport.......  II...............  TX.........        2       7       1        2   ..............        16   ......  ...........        18         3   .........       37       49
CRQ...........................  McClellan-Palomar Airport..........  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       14       14
CRW...........................  Yeager Airport.....................  II...............  WV.........        3       5       1        1            5             9   ......  ...........        22         7   .........       42       57
CSG...........................  Columbus Metropolitan Airport......  III..............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........       13       13
CVG...........................  Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Int'l   X................  KY.........        9      16       2        7           10            97   ......  ...........       168         4   .........      279      323
                                 Airport.
CWA...........................  Central Wisconsin Regional Airport.  III..............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........        12         2   .........       20       21
CYS...........................  Cheyenne Airport...................  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        6        6
DAB...........................  Daytona Beach Int'l Airport........  II...............  FL.........        4       8  ......        3   ..............         8   ......  ...........        32         4   .........       44       59
DAL...........................  Dallas Love Field..................  I................  TX.........        7      13       1        6           23            54   ......  ...........       111        15   .........      203      253
DAY...........................  James M. Cox Dayton Int'l Airport..  I................  OH.........        3      10       2        3   ..............        41   ......  ...........        61         1   .........      103      121
DBQ...........................  Dubuque Regional Airport...........  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        8        8
DCA...........................  Reagan Washington National Airport.  X................  VA.........       10      15       1        6           25            87   ......  ...........       244         3   .........      359      416
DDC...........................  Dodge City Regional Airport........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        4        4
DEC...........................  Decatur Airport....................  IV...............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        7        7
DEN...........................  Denver Int'l Airport...............  X................  CO.........       13      22       3       15           11           206   ......  ...........       464        33   .........      714      778
DFW...........................  Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport....  X................  TX.........       18      32       3       29           37           606   ......  ...........       650         9   .........    1,302    1,421
DHN...........................  Dothan-Houston County Airport......  III..............  AL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       13       14
DIK...........................  Dickinson Municipal Airport........  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
DLG...........................  Dillingham Airport.................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           2             2   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        4        6
DLH...........................  Duluth Int'l Airport...............  III..............  MN.........        1       6  ......        4   ..............         9   ......  ...........        11         3   .........       23       34
DRO...........................  Durango-La Plata County Airport....  III..............  CO.........        2       1  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........         6         1   .........       14       18
DRT...........................  Del Rio International Airport......  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
DSM...........................  Des Moines Int'l Airport...........  II...............  IA.........        4       7       1        3            1            24   ......  ...........        36         5   .........       66       83
DTW...........................  Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport.  X................  MI.........       13      21       3       14           19           259   ......  ...........       454        11   .........      743      812
DUJ...........................  Dubois-Jefferson County Airport....  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
DVL...........................  Devils Lake........................  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
EAR...........................  Kearney Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        6        6
EAT...........................  Pangborn Memorial Airport..........  IV...............  WA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        7        9
EAU...........................  Eau Claire.........................  III..............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         2         2   .........       10       10
EGE...........................  Eagle County Regional Airport......  III..............  CO.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        9       10
EKO...........................  Elko Regional Airport..............  III..............  NV.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........        11   ........  .........       13       14
ELD...........................  El Dorado..........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......          1           2         1   .........        6        6
ELM...........................  Elmira-Corning Regional Airport....  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........        14         1   .........       19       20
ELP...........................  El Paso Int'l Airport..............  I................  TX.........        6      13       1        3            2            60   ......  ...........        62        10   .........      134      159
ENA...........................  Kenai Municipal Airport............  IV...............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        5        5
ENV...........................  Wendover Municipal Airport.........  III..............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        1        1
ERI...........................  Erie Int'l Airport.................  III..............  PA.........        1       3  ......        3   ..............        15   ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       29       36
ESC...........................  Delta County Airport...............  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
EUG...........................  Eugene Airport/Mahlon Sweet Field..  II...............  OR.........        1       5  ......        3   ..............        19   ......  ...........        20         1   .........       40       49
EVV...........................  Evansville Regional Airport........  III..............  IN.........        1       2  ......        1   ..............         9   ......  ...........        18         2   .........       29       33
EWN...........................  Craven County Regional Airport.....  IV...............  NC.........        1  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         9   ........  .........       10       11
EWR...........................  Newark Int'l Airport...............  X................  NJ.........       17      13       2       22           55           414   ......  ...........       584        22          1     1,075    1,184
EYW...........................  Key West Int'l Airport.............  II...............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........         8   ........  .........       13       15
FAI...........................  Fairbanks Int'l Airport............  II...............  AK.........        4      11  ......        2            9            17   ......  ...........        23         6   .........       55       82
FAR...........................  Hector Int'l Airport...............  III..............  ND.........  .......       4  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........        17         2   .........       28       34
FAT...........................  Fresno Yosemite Int'l Airport......  II...............  CA.........        2       4  ......        1            2             7   ......  ...........        42         3   .........       54       63
FAY...........................  Fayetteville Regional Airport......  III..............  NC.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        18   ........  .........       25       27
FHU...........................  Sierra Vista Municipal Airport.....  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
FKL...........................  Venango Regional Airport...........  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        8        8
FLG...........................  Flagstaff Pulliam Airport..........  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        10   ........  .........       10       10
FLL...........................  Ft Lauderdale-Hollywood Int'l Arpt.  I................  FL.........        6      14       1       19           21           244   ......          1         434        10   .........      709      770
FLO...........................  Florence Regional Airport..........  IV...............  SC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        8        8
FMN...........................  Four Corners Regional Airport......  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       14       14
FNL...........................  Fort Collins-Loveland Municipal....  III..............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
FNT...........................  Bishop Int'l Airport...............  II...............  MI.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............        21   ......  ...........        31         3   .........       56       59
FOD...........................  Fort Dodge.........................  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
FSD...........................  Joe Foss Field.....................  II...............  SD.........        4       4  ......        2   ..............        16   ......  ...........        13         2   .........       32       42
FSM...........................  Fort Smith Municipal Airport.......  III..............  AR.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             5   ......  ...........         9         2   .........       16       18
FWA...........................  Ft. Wayne Int'l Airport--Baer Field  II...............  IN.........  .......       2  ......  ........           1            16   ......  ...........        22         4   .........       43       46
GBD...........................  Great Bend.........................  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        4
GCC...........................  Gillette-Campbell County...........  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
GCK...........................  Garden City Municipal Airport......  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
GEG...........................  Spokane Int'l Airport..............  I................  WA.........        5      12       1        4            4            25   ......  ...........        71         5   .........      106      132
GFK...........................  Grand Forks Mark Andrews Int'l Air-  III..............  ND.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       16       17
                                  port.
GGG...........................  Gregg County Airport...............  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        7        7
GJT...........................  Walker Field Airport...............  III..............  CO.........        1      10  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        14         2   .........       28       42
GLH...........................  Mid Delta Regional Airport.........  IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
GNV...........................  Gainesville Regional Airport.......  III..............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       15       18
GPI...........................  Glacier Park Int'l Airport.........  III..............  MT.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............        14   ......  ...........        15   ........  .........       29       30
GPT...........................  Gulfport-Biloxi Int'l Airport......  III..............  MS.........        2       5  ......        2            1            15   ......  ...........        25         5   .........       46       56
GRB...........................  Austin Straubel Int'l Airport......  II...............  WI.........        3       6  ......        3   ..............        19   ......  ...........        22         3   .........       43       55
GRI...........................  Central Nebraska Regional Airport..  III..............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        4        5
GRK...........................  Killeen-Fort Hood Regional Airport.  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........        22         2   .........       29       30
GRO...........................  Rota Int'l Airport.................  I................  Mariana      .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
                                                                                         Islands.
GRR...........................  Gerald R. Ford Int'l Airport.......  II...............  MI.........        5       7       2        2   ..............        39   ......          1          51         8   .........       99      116
GSN...........................  Saipan Int'l Airport...............  II...............  Mariana            1       7  ......        1            1            27   ......  ...........        28         1   .........       57       67
                                                                                         Islands.
GSO...........................  Piedmont Triad Int'l Airport.......  I................  NC.........        5      11       1        4            2            35   ......  ...........        75        12   .........      124      146
GSP...........................  Greenville-Spartanburg Airport.....  II...............  SC.........        2       7  ......        2   ..............        31   ......  ...........        43   ........  .........       74       85
GTF...........................  Great Falls Int'l Airport..........  III..............  MT.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             6   ......  ...........        21         3   .........       32       34
GTR...........................  Golden Triangle Regional Airport...  IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        8        8
GUC...........................  Gunnison County Airport............  III..............  CO.........        1  ......  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        6
GUM...........................  Antonio B. Won Pat Guam Int'l......  I................  GU.........        6      13       1        3            4            60   ......  ...........        56        10   .........      131      158
HDN...........................  Yampa Valley Regional Airport......  III..............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        9       10
HGR...........................  Hagerstown Regional Airport........  IV...............  MD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        7        7
HIB...........................  Chisolm-Hibbing Municipal..........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        2        2
HII...........................  Lake Havasu City Municipal Airport.  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
HLN...........................  Helena Regional Airport............  III..............  MT.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........        13         1   .........       20       21
HNL...........................  Honolulu Int'l Airport.............  X................  HI.........       10      17       4       10           30           224   ......          2         304         8   .........      567      637
HOM...........................  Homer Airport......................  IV...............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        5        5
HON...........................  Huron..............................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        2        2
HOT...........................  Hot Springs........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         2         2   .........        5        6
HOU...........................  William P. Hobby Airport...........  I................  TX.........        5      12       1        7            9            67   ......          1         132   ........  .........      208      242
HPN...........................  Westchester County Airport.........  II...............  NY.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        30   ........  .........       41       45
HRL...........................  Rio Grande Valley Int'l Airport....  II...............  TX.........        2       7  ......        2            1            13   ......  ...........        33   ........  .........       47       59
HRO...........................  Harrison...........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        5        5
HSV...........................  Huntsville-Madison Cnty Airport....  II...............  AL.........        2  ......       1        3            1            17   ......  ...........        29         4   .........       52       59
HTS...........................  Tri-State Airport..................  III..............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......        1            2             4   ......  ...........        11         2   .........       19       21
HVN...........................  Tweed-New Haven Airport............  IV...............  CT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        8        9
HXD...........................  Hilton Head Airport................  IV...............  SC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        9        9
HYA...........................  Barnstable Municipal Airport.......  III..............  MA.........  .......       2  ......        1   ..............         3   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        9       12
HYS...........................  Hays Regional Airport..............  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
IAD...........................  Washington-Dulles Int'l Airport....  X................  VA.........        9      19       5       13           41           273   ......          2         265         1   .........      582      669
IAH...........................  George Bush Intercontinental         X................  TX.........       14      22       5       17           25           400        1  ...........       491         3   .........      919    1,002
                                 Airport.
ICT...........................  Wichita Mid-Continent Airport......  II...............  KS.........        4      10       1        4   ..............        30   ......  ...........        40         6   .........       76       95
IDA...........................  Idaho Falls Regional Airport.......  III..............  ID.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        11         1   .........       19       19
IFP...........................  Laughlin/Bullhead City Airport.....  III..............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1      .........  ......  ...........         8   ........  .........        9       10
IGM...........................  Kingman Airport Authority, Inc.....  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        4        4
ILE...........................  Killeen Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        1        1
ILM...........................  Wilmington Int'l Airport...........  III..............  NC.........        1       3  ......        2   ..............        11   ......  ...........        17         2   .........       30       36
IMT...........................  Ford Airport.......................  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        6        6
IND...........................  Indianapolis Int'l Airport.........  I................  IN.........        9      13       3        7           14            68   ......  ...........       182         3   .........      267      313
INL...........................  Falls International Airport........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
IPL...........................  Imperial County Airport............  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        7        7
IPT...........................  Williamsport Regional Airport......  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        8        8
IRK...........................  Kirksville Regional Airport........  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
ISN...........................  Sloulin Field Int'l Airport........  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
ISO...........................  Kinston Regional Jetport...........  III..............  NC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        6        6
ISP...........................  Long Island MacArthur Airport......  II...............  NY.........        2       9  ......        2            2            25   ......  ...........        58         2   .........       88      103
ITH...........................  Tompkins County Airport............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............  .........  ......  ...........        15   ........  .........       15       16
ITO...........................  Hilo Int'l Airport.................  II...............  HI.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............        15   ......  ...........        30         1   .........       47       50
IWD...........................  Gogebic County Airport.............  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
IYK...........................  Indian Wells Valley Airport          IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        6        6
                                 District.
JAC...........................  Jackson Hole Airport...............  III..............  WY.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......        2
JAN...........................  Jackson Int'l Airport..............  II...............  MS.........        5       8  ......        4            2            32   ......  ...........        50   ........  .........       84      103
JAX...........................  Jacksonville Int'l Airport.........  I................  FL.........        5      11       2        7            7            20   ......  ...........       102        10   .........      138      170
JBR...........................  Jonesboro..........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        5
JFK...........................  John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport......  X................  NY.........       27      15  ......       25           56           570   ......  ...........       952        45   .........    1,622    1,746
JHW...........................  Chautauqua County Airport..........  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        7        7
JLN...........................  Joplin Regional Airport............  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        5        5
JMS...........................  Jamestown..........................  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        4
JNU...........................  Juneau Int'l Airport...............  II...............  AK.........        5       6  ......        3   ..............         6   ......  ...........        32   ........  .........       38       52
JST...........................  Johnstown-Cambria County Airport...  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         8   ......  ...........         8   ........  .........       16       16
KOA...........................  Kona Int'l Airport.................  I................  HI.........        2       8  ......        2           (0)           32   ......  ...........        52   ........  .........       84       96
KTN...........................  Ketchikan Int'l Airport............  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        19   ........  .........       27       28
LAN...........................  Capital City Airport...............  II...............  MI.........        1       9  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        24         3   .........       41       53
LAR...........................  Laramie Regional Airport...........  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
LAS...........................  McCarran Int'l Airport.............  X................  NV.........       12      16       3       13           42           274   ......          4         610        20   .........      949    1,036
LAW...........................  Lawton/Ft. Sill Regional Airport...  IV...............  OK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             7   ......  ...........         4         1   .........       12       13
LAX...........................  Los Angeles Int'l Airport..........  X................  CA.........       16      27       8       35           91           836   ......  ...........       985        20   .........    1,931    2,108
LBB...........................  Lubbock Int'l Airport..............  II...............  TX.........        3      12       1        3            5            19   ......  ...........        26         4   .........       54       78
LBE...........................  Arnold Palmer Regional Airport.....  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       10       10
LBF...........................  North Platte Regional Airport......  III..............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        6        6
LBL...........................  Liberal Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
LCH...........................  Lake Charles Regional Airport......  IV...............  LA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........       11       11
LEB...........................  Lebanon Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  NH.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
LEX...........................  Blue Grass Airport.................  II...............  KY.........        2       3  ......        2   ..............         6   ......  ...........        34         2   .........       43       50
LFT...........................  Lafayette Regional Airport.........  III..............  LA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........        15         2   .........       24       25
LGA...........................  LaGuardia Airport..................  X................  NY.........        7      13       2       10           35           227   ......  ...........       446         3   .........      711      779
LGB...........................  Long Beach Daugherty Field Airport.  II...............  CA.........  .......       2  ......        4            2            34   ......  ...........        69   ........  .........      105      113
LIH...........................  Lihue Airport......................  I................  HI.........        1       9  ......        2            1            28   ......  ...........        38         4   .........       71       84
LIT...........................  Little Rock National Airport.......  I................  AR.........        6      10       1        5   ..............        36   ......          1          46        14   .........       97      119
LMT...........................  Klamath Falls Airport..............  IV...............  OR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        7        7
LNK...........................  Lincoln Municipal Airport..........  III..............  NE.........        2       3  ......        2          (46)           31   ......  ...........        51         3   .........       40        1
LNS...........................  Lancaster Airport..................  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
LNY...........................  Lanai Airport......................  III..............  HI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........        10   ........  .........       14       14
LRD...........................  Laredo Int'l Airport...............  III..............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       16       16
LSE...........................  La Crosse Municipal Airport........  III..............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         9         2   .........       18       18
LWB...........................  Greenbrier Valley Airport..........  III..............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
LWS...........................  Lewiston Nez-Perce County Reg'l Air- III..............  ID.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        8        8
                                   port.
LYH...........................  Lynchburg Regional Arpt............  IV...............  VA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       14       15
MAF...........................  Midland Int'l Airport..............  II...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        2            2            12   ......  ...........        24         2   .........       40       45
MBL...........................  Manistee County Blacker Airport....  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        2        2
MBS...........................  Saginaw-MBS Int'l Airport..........  III..............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        18         2   .........       31       34
MCI...........................  Kansas City Int'l Airport..........  I................  MO.........        7      15       2       12   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......       36
MCK...........................  McCook Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        4
MCN...........................  Middle Georgia Regional Airport....  III..............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        6        6
MCO...........................  Orlando Int'l Airport..............  X................  FL.........        8      15       2       20          (30)          353   ......  ...........       403        70   .........      797      812
MCW...........................  Mason City.........................  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
MDT...........................  Harrisburg Int'l Airport...........  II...............  PA.........        2       8       1        4   ..............        19   ......  ...........        34         6   .........       58       73
MDW...........................  Chicago Midway Airport.............  I................  IL.........        6      16       1        8           15           127   ......  ...........       232        34   .........      408      453
MEI...........................  Meridian Regional Airport--Key       IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
                                 Field.
MEM...........................  Memphis Int'l Airport..............  I................  TN.........        5      10       3        7            6            96   ......          4         135        19   .........      260      291
MFE...........................  McAllen-Miller Int'l Airport.......  II...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        14   ......  ...........        24         3   .........       41       45
MFR...........................  Rogue Valley Int'l-Medford.........  III..............  OR.........  .......       2  ......        1   ..............         7   ......  ...........        12         2   .........       21       24
MGM...........................  Montgomery Reg'l Airport (Dannelly   III..............  AL.........        2       8  ......        2   ..............         5   ......  ...........        12         3   .........       20       32
                                 Field).
MGW...........................  Morgantown Municipal Airport.......  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........       11       13
MHK...........................  Manhattan Regional Airport.........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
MHT...........................  Manchester Airport.................  I................  NH.........        1      18       1        6           11            36   ......  ...........        95         1   .........      143      179
MIA...........................  Miami Int'l Airport................  X................  FL.........       24      15  ......       24          105           684   ......  ...........       722   ........  .........    1,510    1,678
MKE...........................  General Mitchell Int'l Airport.....  I................  WI.........        5      12       2        4            3            66   ......  ...........       137         7   .........      213      239
MKG...........................  Muskegon County Int'l Airport......  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             3   ......  ...........         5         3   .........       11       12
MKK...........................  Molokai Airport....................  III..............  HI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       13       13
MKL...........................  Mckellar-Sipes Regional Airport....  IV...............  TN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        5
MLB...........................  Melbourne Int'l Airport............  II...............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        23   ........  .........       34       38
MLI...........................  Metro Airport Authority of Rock      II...............  IL.........        4       9       1        2   ..............        19   ......  ...........        34   ........  .........       53       69
                                 Island.
MLU...........................  Monroe Regional Airport............  III..............  LA.........        1       5  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         4   .........       20       28
MOB...........................  Mobile Regional Airport............  II...............  AL.........        3       9  ......        3            1            16   ......  ...........        32         4   .........       53       69
MOD...........................  Modesto City County Airport H Sham   IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        9        9
                                 Field.
MOT...........................  Minot Int'l Airport................  III..............  ND.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       12       13
MRY...........................  Monterey Peninsula Airport.........  III..............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........        16         2   .........       23       24
MSL...........................  NW Alabama Reg'l Airport...........  IV...............  AL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
MSN...........................  Dane County Regional Airport.......  II...............  WI.........        2       8  ......        3   ..............        26   ......  ...........        34         6   .........       66       79
MSO...........................  Missoula Int'l Airport.............  II...............  MT.........        3       5  ......        1            1            15   ......  ...........        19         2   .........       36       46
MSP...........................  Minneapolis-St. Paul Int'l Arpt....  X................  MN.........       13      26       3       15            8           221   ......          1         278        81          2       592      657
MSS...........................  Massena Int'l Airport..............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
MSY...........................  New Orleans Int'l Airport..........  I................  LA.........        8      13       2        7           22            60   ......  ...........        97        19   .........      197      249
MTJ...........................  Montrose County Airport............  III..............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         8   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       15       15
MVY...........................  Martha's Vineyard Airport..........  III..............  MA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        6        7
MWA...........................  Williamson County Airport..........  IV...............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
MWH...........................  Grant County Airport...............  III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        7
MYR...........................  Myrtle Beach Int'l Airport.........  II...............  SC.........        2       6  ......        3            2            36   ......  ...........        36         1   .........       76       89
NSF...........................  National Screener Force............  NSF..............  ...........  .......  ......  ......  ........          17           201   ......  ...........       292        44   .........      554      571
OAJ...........................  Albert J Ellis Airport.............  IV...............  NC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         7   ........  .........       11       11
OAK...........................  Metropolitan Oakland Int'l Airport.  I................  CA.........        7      14  ......        7           17           119   ......  ...........       166        12   .........      313      359
OGG...........................  Kahului Airport....................  I................  HI.........        4      12  ......        2   ..............        44   ......  ...........        72         9   .........      125      143
OGS...........................  Ogdensburg Int'l Airport...........  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
OKC...........................  Will Rogers World Airport..........  I................  OK.........        4      13  ......        5            1            44   ......  ...........       102        10   .........      157      180
OMA...........................  Eppley Airfield....................  I................  NE.........        5      12       1        5   ..............        48   ......  ...........        77        15   .........      140      163
OME...........................  Nome Airport.......................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        1        1
ONT...........................  Ontario Int'l Airport..............  I................  CA.........        6      13       2        6   ..............        95   ......  ...........       112         5   .........      212      239
ORD...........................  O'Hare Int'l Airport...............  X................  IL.........       17      42      11       23            1           643   ......          3         769         8   .........    1,424    1,517
ORF...........................  Norfolk Int'l Airport..............  I................  VA.........        4      11  ......        5            1            59   ......          3          91         6   .........      159      180
OTH...........................  North Bend Municipal Airport.......  IV...............  OR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        7
OTZ...........................  Kotzebue ``Ralph Widen Memorial''    III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        1        1
                                 Airport.
OWB...........................  Owensboro Davies County Airport....  IV...............  KY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
OXR...........................  Oxnard Airport.....................  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        7
PAH...........................  Barkley Regional Airport...........  IV...............  KY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3         2   .........        8        8
PBI...........................  West Palm Beach Int'l Airport......  I................  FL.........        3      12       2        8   ..............        80   ......          1         133         1   .........      216      241
PDT...........................  E. Oregon Regional Airport.........  IV...............  OR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       11       11
PDX...........................  Portland Int'l.....................  I................  OR.........        9      15       2        6           19           168   ......  ...........       232         1   .........      420      471
PFN...........................  Panama City-Bay County Int'l         III..............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       17       19
                                 Airport.
PGA...........................  Page Municipal Airport.............  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
PGV...........................  Pitt-Greenville Airport............  IV...............  NC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       11       11
PHF...........................  Newport News/Williamsburg Int'l Air- II...............  VA.........  .......       1  ......        1            1            17   ......          1          18         1   .........       37       39
                                   port.
PHL...........................  Philadelphia Int'l Airport.........  X................  PA.........       11      14       4       18           28           241   ......          3         435         5   .........      713      789
PHX...........................  Phoenix Sky Harbor Int'l Airport...  X................  AZ.........       17      30       2       19           35           301   ......          3         462        13   .........      814      918
PIA...........................  Greater Peoria Airport.............  III..............  IL.........  .......       2  ......        2   ..............        13   ......  ...........        17         1   .........       31       35
PIB...........................  Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional Airport  IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
PIE...........................  St Petersburg-Clearwater Int'l       II...............  FL.........  .......  ......  ......        3            2             7   ......  ...........        27         3   .........       40       44
                                 Airport.
PIH...........................  Pocatello Regional Airport.........  III..............  ID.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         6         1   .........       13       14
PIR...........................  Pierre Regional Airport............  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
PIT...........................  Pittsburgh Int'l Airport...........  I................  PA.........       14      16       2        6           21            82   ......          1         184         7   .........      296      355
PKB...........................  Wood County Airport................  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       11       11
PLB...........................  Clinton County Airport.............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        8        9
PLN...........................  Pellston Regional Airport..........  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       13       13
PNC...........................  Ponca City.........................  IV...............  OK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
PNS...........................  Pensacola Regional Airport.........  II...............  FL.........        4       8  ......        2            2            29   ......          1          36         5   .........       72       88
PPG...........................  Pago Pago-American Samoa...........  III..............  AQ.........  .......       3  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         3   .........        7       11
PQI...........................  Northern Maine Regional Airport....  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
PRC...........................  Prescott Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         8   ........  .........        8        8
PSC...........................  Tri-Cities Airport.................  III..............  WA.........  .......       8  ......        5   ..............         6   ......  ...........        27         3   .........       36       49
PSG...........................  Petersburg Airport.................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        6        6
PSM...........................  Pease Int'l Airport................  III..............  NH.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
PSP...........................  Palm Springs Int'l Airport.........  II...............  CA.........  .......       7  ......        2            3            21   ......  ...........        36         7   .........       68       80
PUB...........................  Pueblo Memorial Airport............  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        3        4
PUW...........................  Pullman/Moscow Regional Airport....  III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           2             4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........       10       12
PVC...........................  Provincetown Airport...............  IV...............  MA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
PVD...........................  T F Green State Airport............  I................  RI.........        4      14       1        6           11            79   ......  ...........       116        18   .........      224      260
PWM...........................  Portland Int'l Jetport.............  II...............  ME.........        4       8       1        3   ..............        30   ......  ...........        69   ........  .........       99      115
RAP...........................  Rapid City Regional Airport........  III..............  SD.........        2       5  ......        2   ..............        11   ......  ...........        17         2   .........       30       39
RDD...........................  Redding Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        12   ........  .........       12       13
RDM...........................  Roberts Field......................  III..............  OR.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........        13   ........  .........       20       21
RDU...........................  Raleigh-Durham Int'l Airport.......  I................  NC.........        6      13       2        9           10            91   ......          1         154         2          3       260      300
RFD...........................  Greater Rockford Airport...........  III..............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       17       18
RHI...........................  Rhinelander/Oneida County Airport..  IV...............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        8        8
RIC...........................  Richmond Int'l Airport.............  II...............  VA.........        2      10       1        4   ..............        39   ......  ...........        46         5   .........       90      107
RIW...........................  Riverton Regional Airport..........  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           2             2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        7
RKD...........................  Knox County Regional Airport.......  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
RKS...........................  Rock Springs-Sweetwater County.....  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        4        5
RNO...........................  Reno/Tahoe Int'l Airport...........  I................  NV.........        4      14  ......        5            1            54   ......  ...........        98         4   .........      157      181
ROA...........................  Roanoke Regional Airport...........  II...............  VA.........  .......       3  ......        1   ..............        16   ......  ...........        16   ........  .........       32       36
ROC...........................  Greater Rochester Int'l Airport....  II...............  NY.........        3       8  ......        4   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......       15
RST...........................  Rochester Int'l Airport............  III..............  MN.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             6   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       17       19
RSW...........................  Southwest Florida Int'l Airport....  I................  FL.........        3      13  ......        7            3            41   ......  ...........       156        14   .........      215      241
RUT...........................  Rutland State Airport..............  IV...............  VT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
SAF...........................  Santa Fe Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  NM.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        5        6
SAN...........................  San Diego Int'l Airport, Lindbergh.  I................  CA.........        6      18       1       15           20           168   ......          5         280        40   .........      512      572
SAT...........................  San Antonio Int'l Airport..........  I................  TX.........        6      14       2        8           10            81   ......  ...........       115         8   .........      214      254
SAV...........................  Savannah Int'l Airport.............  II...............  GA.........        4       7  ......        3            2            30   ......  ...........        40   ........  .........       72       88
SAW...........................  Sawyer Int'l Airport...............  IV...............  MI.........        1       1  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         6         1   .........       13       15
SBA...........................  Santa Barbara Municipal Airport....  II...............  CA.........        2       6  ......        3            1            14   ......  ...........        22         4   .........       40       51
SBN...........................  South Bend Regional Airport........  II...............  IN.........        2       5  ......        2            2            13   ......  ...........        28         5   .........       47       58
SBP...........................  San Luis Obispo County Airport.....  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       18       19
SBY...........................  Salisbury/Wicomico County Reg'l Air- IV...............  MD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        11   ........  .........       11       11
                                   port.
SCC...........................  Deadhorse Airport..................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
SDF...........................  Louisville Int'l Airport...........  I................  KY.........        2      10       3        2            5            47   ......  ...........        67         8   .........      128      150
SEA...........................  Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport.......  X................  WA.........       15      13       3       16           34           298   ......          5         469        22   .........      827      907
SFB...........................  Orlando Sanford Airport............  III..............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        4   ..............        20   ......  ...........        51   ........  .........       72       77
SFO...........................  San Francisco Int'l Airport........  X................  CA.........        9      11       5       13   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......       38
SGF...........................  Springfield/Branson Regional         III..............  MO.........        2       6  ......        4   ..............        20   ......  ...........        26         4   .........       49       61
                                 Airport.
SGU...........................  St. George Municipal Airport.......  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         3   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........       10       11
SHD...........................  Shenandoah Valley Airport..........  IV...............  VA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
SHR...........................  Sheridan County Airport............  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        5        6
SHV...........................  Shreveport Regional Airport........  II...............  LA.........        2       8  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        28         5   .........       48       60
SIT...........................  Sitka ``Rocky Gutierrez'' Airport..  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       19       21
SJC...........................  San Jose Int'l Airport.............  I................  CA.........        7      13  ......        8           19            98   ......          4         189   ........  .........      311      358
SJT...........................  San Angelo Regional Airport........  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       15       16
SJU...........................  Luis Munoz Marin Int'l Airport.....  X................  PR.........        6      14       3       15            9           166   ......  ...........       237        11   .........      423      471
SLC...........................  Salt Lake City Int'l...............  I................  UT.........        9      16       2       12           15           205   ......          7         240         5   .........      473      527
SLK...........................  Adirondack Regional Airport........  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
SLN...........................  Salina Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
SMF...........................  Sacramento Int'l Airport...........  I................  CA.........        8      15       1        8           25           103   ......  ...........       153         6   .........      287      344
SMX...........................  Santa Maria Public Airport.........  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             3   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        9       11
SNA...........................  John Wayne Airport.................  I................  CA.........        6      14       1        7           19            68   ......  ...........       152   ........  .........      239      285
SOW...........................  Show Low Regional Airport..........  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        1        1
SPI...........................  Capital Airport....................  III..............  IL.........        1       1  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........         9         1   .........       15       18
SPS...........................  Sheppard AFB/Wichita Falls           III..............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        1            1             9   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       16       18
                                 Municipal Airport.
SRQ...........................  Sarasota Bradenton Int'l Airport...  II...............  FL.........        2       7  ......        3            1            28   ......  ...........        39         1   .........       70       83
STC...........................  St. Cloud Regional Airport.........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         4         2   .........        9        9
STL...........................  Lambert St Louis Int'l Airport.....  X................  MO.........       10      16       2       13            8           120   ......  ...........       242         4   .........      374      422
STT...........................  Cyril E. King Int'l Airport........  II...............  VI.........        2       9  ......        3            1            35   ......  ...........        39         1   .........       76       90
STX...........................  Henry E. Rohlsen Airport...........  III..............  VI.........  .......       3  ......        1            1            12   ......  ...........        20   ........  .........       33       38
SUN...........................  Friedman Memorial Airport..........  III..............  ID.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        8       10
SUX...........................  Sioux Gateway Airport..............  III..............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         3   ......  ...........         6         3   .........       12       14
SWF...........................  Stewart Airport....................  III..............  NY.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........        18         2   .........       30       33
SYR...........................  Syracuse-Hancock Int'l Airport.....  II...............  NY.........        4      13       1        6            2            53   ......  ...........        64   ........  .........      118      144
TBN...........................  Forney Army Airfield...............  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
TEX...........................  Telluride Regional Airport.........  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        5
TLH...........................  Tallahassee Regional Airport.......  II...............  FL.........        4       8  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        28         6   .........       49       63
TOL...........................  Toledo Express Airport.............  II...............  OH.........  .......       4  ......        2   ..............        16   ......  ...........        25         4   .........       46       52
TPA...........................  Tampa Int'l Airport................  I................  FL.........        6      21       2       17           14           174   ......          4         316        17   .........      525      585
TRI...........................  Tri-Cities Regional Airport........  III..............  TN.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       22       23
TTN...........................  Trenton-Mercer Airport.............  IV...............  NJ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
TUL...........................  Tulsa Int'l Airport................  I................  OK.........        3      10       1        5            1            44   ......  ...........        70         1   .........      116      135
TUS...........................  Tucson Int'l Airport...............  I................  AZ.........        6      13       1        5   ..............        79   ......  ...........        72         2   .........      154      179
TVC...........................  Cherry Capital Airport.............  III..............  MI.........        1       6  ......        1   ..............         7   ......  ...........        16         3   .........       26       34
TVF...........................  Thief River Falls Regional Airport.  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
TWF...........................  Joslin Field, Magic Valley Regional  IV...............  ID.........  .......  ......  ......        2   ..............         3   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        9
                                 Airport.
TXK...........................  Texarkana Regional Airport.........  III..............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        7        8
TYR...........................  Tyler Pounds Field Airport.........  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       10       11
TYS...........................  McGhee Tyson Airport...............  II...............  TN.........        1       6  ......        4   ..............        22   ......  ...........        32         4   .........       58       69
UIN...........................  Quincy Regional Airport-Baldwin      IV...............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
                                 Field.
UNV...........................  University Park Airport............  III..............  PA.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........        12         2   .........       19       21
VCT...........................  Victoria Regional Airport..........  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2         2   .........        5        5
VDZ...........................  Valdez Airport.....................  IV...............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        3        3
VEL...........................  Vernal/Uintah County Airport.......  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        4        4
VLD...........................  Valdosta Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         5   ........  .........       11       11
VPS...........................  Okaloosa County Air Terminal.......  II...............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        2            1             9   ......          1          27         3   .........       40       44
WDG...........................  Enid Woodring Municipal Airport....  IV...............  OK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
WRG...........................  Wrangell Airport...................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
WRL...........................  Worland Muni Airport...............  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        3        4
XNA...........................  Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport  II...............  AR.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        27         3   .........       44       47
YAK...........................  Yakutat Airport....................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        3        3
YKM...........................  Yakima Air Terminal-McAllister       III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........        16         2   .........       22       22
                                 Field.
YNG...........................  Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport.  III..............  OH.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         7   ........  .........        7        7
YUM...........................  Yuma Int'l Airport.................  IV...............  AZ.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........        11   ........  .........       12       13
                                                                    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      TOTALS..................  ...................................  .................  ...........      807   1,757     174    1,062        1,357        14,890        1         74      23,279     1,393          9    41,004   46,162
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report shows the annualized FTE burn for PP02 ending February 4, 2006, rounded to the highest whole FTE.
Categories of TSO FTE burn are reported via timesheets and manual pay transactions. Manual pay transactions do not normally include labor distribution and are categorized as Other or Undefined.
TSO and other totals include prior pay period adjustments reported in PP02.
Reporting systems show HQ personnel located at airports by duty location, not airport code/name, so they are reported separately.

                              NO-FLY LIST

    Question. At a recent Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity 
Advisory Committee meeting, it was revealed that nearly 30,000 airline 
passengers were mistakenly placed on the Federal ``terrorist'' watch 
list. Why is the number so high?
    Answer. At a meeting of the Department of Homeland Security Data 
Privacy Advisory Committee on December 6, 2005, TSA testified that 
``over 30,000 members of the traveling public have submitted the 
Passenger Identity Verification Form and have received relief since the 
TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress was created in November 
2004.'' TSA did not say, nor did we imply, that these individuals were 
``mistakenly placed'' on the Terrorist Watch List.
    Through TSA's redress process, the overwhelming majority of these 
persons were determined to have names that were the same as, or similar 
to, individuals appropriately on the Terrorist Watch List. In these 
circumstances, TSA provides the passenger with appropriate information 
and notifies the airlines of the name match or similarity through 
submission of a Cleared List. While this redress process does not 
ensure that a passenger's travel will always be free of delays, it 
helps to streamline the check-in process at airport ticket counters.
    In accordance with the requirements of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive #6, the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) consolidated its watch list operations within the Terrorist 
Screening Center (TSC) and integrated the No-Fly List into the TSC 
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), also called the Consolidated 
Terrorist Watch List. TSA personnel assigned to the TSC conduct a 
comprehensive review of nominations to the No-Fly List to ensure their 
accuracy and completeness. Once these actions are complete, TSA 
disseminates the List to air carriers.
    By using a consolidated No-Fly List within the TSDB, TSA greatly 
improved the coordination of intelligence and law enforcement 
information supporting the program. Additionally, during the past year 
the agencies that nominate subjects to the No-Fly List revalidated 
their submissions and deleted or modified their records. These actions 
have enhanced the quality of data.
    TSA also has developed a comprehensive and user-friendly redress 
process for persons who believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly 
delayed, denied boarding, or flagged for additional screening at our 
Nation's airports. Many individuals experience these problems due to 
the similarity of their names to those of individuals who are 
appropriately on the Terrorist Watch List. A passenger may initiate the 
TSA redress process by submitting a completed Passenger Identity 
Verification Form to the Office of Transportation Security Redress at 
TSA headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a 
determination of whether the redress process may aid in expediting a 
passenger's airline check-in process, and inform the passenger 
accordingly. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as other 
information about TSA's redress process has been posted on TSA's public 
website. To access this information, go to http://www.tsa.gov, click on 
``Travelers and Consumers'' at the top left of the page, choose ``TSA 
Customer Service'' from the column on the left, and then click ``TSA 
Watch Lists Clearance Procedures'' which is located about three-
quarters of the way down the page.
    TSA understands that the process is not perfect, and we will 
continue to analyze the system and improve upon the work done thus far.
    Question. What measures are being put in place to remedy this 
problem?
    Answer. In order to minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches, 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) consolidated its watch 
list operations within the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and 
integrated the No-Fly and Selectee Lists into the TSC Terrorist 
Screening Database (TSDB). TSA personnel assigned to the TSC conduct a 
comprehensive review of nominations to the No-Fly and Selectee Lists to 
ensure their accuracy and completeness. Once these actions are 
complete, TSA disseminates the Lists to air carriers.
    By using consolidated No-Fly and Selectee Lists within the TSDB, 
TSA greatly improved the coordination of intelligence and law 
enforcement information supporting the program. Additionally, during 
the past year the agencies that nominate subjects to the No-Fly List 
revalidated their submissions and deleted or modified their records. 
These actions have enhanced the quality of data and removed persons 
from the No-Fly List that should not have been on this list. The Secure 
Flight program will continue to build on these enhancements and will 
use a more sophisticated and consistent watch list matching system to 
minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches.
    Question. What is the process for redress?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office 
of Transportation Security Redress is currently developing redress 
procedures for addressing any situation where individuals believe they 
have been incorrectly delayed or prevented from flying on an airplane 
under the future Secure Flight program. TSA will maintain a record of 
individuals who have been misidentified as individuals on a watch list, 
which will contain identifying information necessary to authenticate 
the identity of each individual, in order to avoid repeated delays and 
minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches by the Secure Flight 
program.
    Currently, the air carriers conduct the watch list matching 
function, and carriers handle the process differently from one another. 
A primary advantage of the Secure Flight program is that the Federal 
Government will conduct the watch list matching function, thus creating 
a more consistent process that will tie into the redress mechanisms.
    At the present time, passengers who experience delays in obtaining 
a boarding pass because they have a name that is similar to a person on 
the No-Fly or Selectee Lists may choose to participate in the TSA 
Redress Program by submitting a TSA Passenger Identity Verification 
(PIV) form, along with requested information, to TSA. The information 
provided through the PIV form assists TSA in distinguishing passengers 
from persons who are, in fact, on the watch lists. If TSA determines 
that the passenger who submitted the PIV form is not the person on the 
No-Fly or Selectee Lists, TSA will notify the passenger of that finding 
and contact the appropriate parties, such as the airlines, to help 
streamline the check-in process at the airports.

                               RECOVERIES

    Question. Section 531 of the fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Act 
provides specific authority for recoveries. Has TSA realized additional 
recoveries and if so, has a spend plan been developed?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not 
realized any recoveries in fiscal year 2006 to date, although it does 
expect to realize modest recoveries in the fourth quarter.
    Fiscal year 2006 recoveries are expected to be significantly 
smaller than the over $100 million in recoveries reported in fiscal 
year 2005. The large fiscal year 2005 recoveries resulted primarily 
from the close-out of contracts awarded during the TSA start-up in 
fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003.

                           PERIMETER SECURITY

    Question. Has a competitive process for perimeter security pilots 
been put in place? If so, how many pilots will TSA enter into with the 
$5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006? Please describe each 
pilot.
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
currently evaluating options to competitively award the $5 million for 
perimeter security. Responsive projects may include perimeter sensors, 
intelligent camera systems, biometric devices, technologies to detect 
and track potential intruders, and communication capabilities to 
provide appropriate alarm and response notification. TSA anticipates 
award of the grants by the end of calendar year 2006.

                                  EDS

    Question. For EDS procurement, if funding were maintained at the 
fiscal year 2006 level, how much would be needed for installation?
    Answer. If funding for Explosives Detection System (EDS) 
procurement were maintained at the fiscal year 2006 funding level, the 
total funds required for installation would be $432,836,269. This 
includes the mandatory aviation security capital fund of $250M, which 
will primarily be used for LOIs.
    Question. Provide a list of all certified EDS technology.
    Answer. The following is a list of all Explosives Detection Systems 
(EDS) certified for checked baggage screening:
  --GE InVision CTX-1000
  --GE InVision CTX-2500
  --GE InVision CTX-5500
  --GE InVision CTX-9000
  --L-3 eXaminer 3000
  --L-3 eXaminer 6000
  --Reveal CT-80
  --Analogic 6400
    Question. Provide a list of all EDS technology that is being 
evaluated by DHS for certification.
    Answer. Several Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) are scheduled to 
be tested for Transportation Security Administration certification. 
This includes EDS models that have already been certified but are 
undergoing adjustments to their hardware or software, requiring them to 
be re-certified, similarly to new systems.
    Re-certifications:
  --Analogic AN 6400--Certification of Software: Standard threat mass 
        detection algorithm to improve detection performance.
  --GE InVision CTX 5500--Certification of Hardware: standard x-ray 
        computer obsolescence.
  --Reveal CT-80--Certification of CT-80: Modified Gantry speed (60 to 
        90 rpm) to increase system throughput and modified detection 
        algorithm to improve detection performance.
    New Certifications:
  --L3 eXaminer 3DX 6500
  --Analogic XLB
  --Analogic King Cobra
  --GE InVision CTX 9800
  --SureScan
    Future:
  --Long term research and development efforts for checked baggage 
        screening under the Manhattan II project may result in 
        prototype technologies for evaluation. These technologies 
        employ nanotechnology, tomosynthesis, terahertz based systems, 
        neutron based systems, and trace detection systems.
    Question. Provide a LOI funding chart by airport (showing cost by 
fiscal year, amount required for each year, amount funded by TSA, total 
at 75/25 reimbursement cost share, total at 90/10 reimbursement cost 
share, and total project cost).
    Answer.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  Govt Share--75    Fiscal year 2003   Fiscal year 2004   Fiscal year 2005   Fiscal year 2006   Fiscal year 2007
                           75/25                               LOI Total Cost        percent         reimbursement      reimbursement      reimbursement      reimbursement      reimbursement
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATL........................................................    $125,000,000.00        $93,750,000  .................     $15,000,000.00     $26,250,000.00     $26,250,000.00     $26,250,000.00
DEN........................................................      95,000,000.00         71,250,000        $17,812,500      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00  .................
DFW........................................................     139,249,812.00        104,437,359  .................      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00  .................
LAS........................................................     125,000,000.00         93,750,000  .................      15,000,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00
LAX........................................................     341,956,000.00        256,467,000  .................      55,000,000.00      67,155,666.67      67,155,666.67      67,155,666.67
SEA........................................................     212,000,000.00        159,000,000  .................      33,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      42,000,000.00
PHX........................................................     122,000,000.00         91,500,000  .................      13,000,000.00      26,166,666.67      26,166,666.67      26,166,666.67
BOS........................................................     116,000,000.00         87,000,000         29,000,000      29,000,000.00      29,000,000.00  .................  .................
                                                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total................................................   1,276,205,812.00     957,154,359.00      46,812,500.00     212,624,953.00     269,447,286.00     240,447,286.00     187,822,333.00
                                                            ====================================================================================================================================
ATL........................................................     125,000,000.00     112,500,000.00  .................      15,000,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00      45,000,000.00
DEN........................................................      95,000,000.00      85,500,000.00         17,812,500      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00      14,250,000.00
DFW........................................................     139,249,812.00     125,324,830.80  .................      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00      20,887,471.80
LAS........................................................     125,000,000.00     112,500,000.00  .................      15,000,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00      45,000,000.00
LAX........................................................     341,956,000.00     307,760,400.00  .................      55,000,000.00      67,155,666.67      67,155,666.67     118,449,066.67
SEA........................................................     212,000,000.00     190,800,000.00  .................      33,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      73,800,000.00
PHX........................................................     122,000,000.00     109,800,000.00  .................      13,000,000.00      26,166,666.67      26,166,666.67      44,466,666.67
BOS........................................................     116,000,000.00     104,400,000.00         29,000,000      29,000,000.00      29,000,000.00  .................      17,400,000.00
                                                            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total................................................   1,276,205,812.00   1,148,585,230.80      46,812,500.00     212,624,953.00     269,447,286.00     240,447,286.00     379,253,205.00
                                                            ====================================================================================================================================
75/25 vs. 90/10 difference.................................  .................     191,430,871.80  .................  .................  .................  .................    -191,430,872.00
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             PILOT PROGRAMS

    Question. Provide a list and status of all TSA pilot programs 
planned, ongoing, or completed including the cost of each pilot.
    Answer. BEST Pilot.--During September and October of 2005, the Bus 
Explosives Screening Technology (BEST) pilot was conducted by the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in partnership with 
Greyhound and Peter Pan bus services. The goal of this first ever pilot 
was to evaluate the use of screening technologies in a motorcoach 
environment to screen passengers, checked baggage, and carry-on items 
for explosives.
    Status.--The pilot was completed.
    Cost.--The total cost for the first BEST pilot was approximately 
$407,000 in fiscal year 2005 funding.
    HAZMAT Truck Security Pilot.--TSA awarded contracts to Science 
Applications International Corporation and General Dynamics to design 
and build a centralized prototype truck tracking center capability. The 
pilot will also develop a set of protocols capable of interfacing with 
existing truck tracking systems and with, as applicable, Federal, State 
and local government intelligence operations centers, and Federal law 
enforcement and first responder agencies.
    Status.--The pilot is on-going. After the pilot phase is complete 
(target date: May 2007), TSA will base decisions about the program's 
future on the results.
    Cost.--From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, Congress 
appropriated $11.5 million for this pilot. Approximately $6 million has 
been obligated to date.
    Missouri Pilot.--Beginning April 2006, TSA will implement a pilot 
project with the State of Missouri to conduct security plan evaluations 
with the trucking industry. The purpose of this pilot is to monitor and 
evaluate industry performance by leveraging Federal, State, and local 
resources. The pilot will be based on the use of the Corporate Security 
Review (CSR) program that TSA currently conducts with all 50 State 
department of transportation agencies, motorcoach, and school bus 
companies.
    The CSR Missouri Pilot will allow TSA to train 44 Missouri State 
troopers on security plan evaluation techniques; evaluate data 
submitted to TSA for monitoring company and industry security planning 
and implementation performance; conduct more than 300 evaluations by 
September 2006; and evaluate and expand the pilot to States with large 
concentrations of trucking companies. By utilizing existing safety data 
from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), TSA will 
apply a risk-based selection process to determine what carriers or 
motor coach or school bus companies need greater scrutiny.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
    Cost.--It is estimated that this pilot will cost approximately 
$400,000.
    Secure Automated Inspection Lanes (SAIL) Program, Phase III: SAIL I 
& II assessed vehicle and passenger screening technology separately in 
ferry pre-boarding environments. SAIL III will leverage lessons learned 
to apply to a pilot operation in a large ferry operation that includes 
both vehicle and passenger screening.
    Status.--The pilot is in the planning stage.
    Cost.--$225,000.
    Maritime Passenger, Vehicle, and Baggage Screening Research and 
Development Grant.--This pilot program will deploy screening equipment 
into the maritime passenger domain that will be ultimately operated and 
tested by the maritime transportation operators. In the pilot, TSA will 
select screening equipment for various maritime passenger and vehicle 
operations throughout the United States and work with operators to 
develop screening procedures tailored to their existing operations.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
    Cost.--$3.6 million.
    Passenger Rail and Rail Transit Information Pilot.--The purpose of 
this pilot program is to ensure that transit security information 
gathering, synthesis, and sharing at the Federal Government level is 
coordinated, effective, and timely. The pilot brings together Federal 
partners to develop processes for information sharing and 
communications protocols and to eliminate duplication and close 
potential gaps. Objectives include enhancing domain awareness, ensuring 
decision makers at all levels have a comprehensive and accurate picture 
of the State of passenger rail and rail transit security, and 
streamlining procedures in order to improve communication with 
stakeholders during both normal operating periods and emergencies. The 
initial phase of this information pilot is being tested in the National 
Capital Region with the aim of extending the initiative nationwide and 
across modes once the process is fully developed.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
    Cost.--$330,000.
    Integrated Intermodal Information System--Domestic.--The purpose of 
this pilot is to continually spotlight suspicious activity in high 
threat domestic supply chains and provide actionable, near-real time 
advisories.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
    Cost.--$600,000.
    Southern Regional Radiological Pilot Program.--This pilot 
operationally tests and evaluates new, innovative nuclear/radiological 
detection security technologies (portable), and accompanying response 
protocols and procedures.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected by December 
2007.
    Cost.--$4 million.
    Transportable Radiation Monitoring Systems.--This pilot's objective 
is to develop and field test a concept of operations for deployment of 
transportable radiation monitoring systems.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected by December 
2006.
    Cost.--$2 million.
    Southeast Transportation Corridor Radiological Detection Pilot.--
This pilot focuses on the deployment of transportable radiation 
monitoring systems at selected weigh stations along a southeast 
intermodal freight corridor.
    Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected in fiscal 
year 2007.
    Cost.--$1.2 million.
    Hazardous Materials Carrier Training.-- This pilot will develop and 
deploy training for HAZMAT shippers and carriers in how to conduct 
vulnerability self-assessments.
    Status.--The pilot is in the training development/planning stage 
with completion expected by July 2007.
    Cost.--$1.7 million.
    Seals Pilot.--This pilot will evaluate the applicability and 
effectiveness of tamper-evident seals in the air cargo environment.
    Status.--The pilot is planned to start in July 2006.
    Cost.--$500,000
    Hazardous Materials Initiative.--TSA commissioned this initiative 
to study the feasibility of equipping individual railroad tank cars 
with real time tracking devices and constructing a national tracking 
system. Phase I (market survey) and Phase II (equipment testing) are 
complete. Phase III will develop a concept of operations for a national 
tracking system.
    Status.--Phase III is ongoing.
    Cost.--Phases I and II were $175,000. Phase III is expected to cost 
$109,341.
    Multi-Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSET)--TSA seeks to 
enhance the current network of security systems outside the aviation 
mode by deploying teams that include Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) and 
Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI) to other 
transportation sectors. These deployments will enhance the agency's 
ability to leverage a variety of resources to quickly and effectively 
raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the 
country.
    Status.--Six initial pilot deployments were completed in December 
2005, and eight additional pilot deployments were completed as of June 
2006. Planning for future deployments to other transportation venues is 
ongoing.
    Cost.--Incidental Travel and Pay, Compensation, and Benefits for 
team member participants.
    Field Skills Inventory Pilot.--The goal of the TSA Employee Skills 
Inventory (SI) is to allow TSA to quickly identify workforce 
capabilities that would benefit the agency's mission in many 
situations, including:
  --Task forces
  --Details
  --Emergency response situations
  --Gap analysis
  --Employee career development
  --Succession Planning
    Status.--The planned launch date is April 2006.
    Cost.--None.
    Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Project Gandalf.--This pilot 
addresses business processes at the FAMS Mission Operations Center 
(MOC) for ``day of'' mission schedule changes. The Gandalf optimization 
algorithm uses a rigorous set of business rules in selecting targeted 
critical flights in a rapid and logical manner. This new mission 
scheduling optimization tool-set will bring the FAMS core business 
capabilities into the latest technology realm and will design from the 
ground up a system that is tailored to specific FAMS requirements.
    Status.--Initiated in January 2006, this is an ongoing program 
which should be completed at the start of fiscal year 2007. After the 
pilot phase is complete, TSA will base decisions about the program's 
future on the results.
    Cost.--$260,000 of Science and Technology funding has been expended 
to date.
    Reveal CT-80.--This pilot evaluated the operational effectiveness 
and suitability of newly certified Explosives Detection System (EDS) at 
various airports.
    Status.--Pilot was completed.
    Cost.--$4.7 million.
    Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs).--This pilot evaluated the 
effectiveness and suitability of ETPs for passenger screening for 
explosives at various airport checkpoints.
    Status.--Pilot was completed.
    Cost.--$3.5 million.
    Break Bulk Air Cargo Explosives Detection System (EDS).--This pilot 
evaluates the effectiveness and suitability of EDS at various air cargo 
facilities.
    Status.--Pilot is ongoing.
    Cost.--$19 million.20. Airport Access Control Pilot Program 
(AACPP): This pilot evaluates the effectiveness of off-the-shelf access 
control technology.
    Status.--Pilot is ongoing with scheduled completion at the end of 
CY 2006.
    Cost.--$19.6 million.
    Hardened Unit Load Device (HULD).--This pilot evaluates the 
effectiveness and suitability of HULD for the transport of air cargo 
and baggage on passenger aircraft.
    Status.--Pilot is ongoing.
    Cost.--$5 million.
    Automated Carry-On Bag EDS.--TSA competitively selected two vendors 
(Analogic and Reveal) to provide prototype checkpoint EDS systems. 
Units will be deployed to the field to assess effectiveness and 
suitability after they are certified and successfully complete 
laboratory testing.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Cost.--$2.5 million.
    Cast and Prosthesis Scanner.--This pilot will test and evaluate the 
effectiveness and operational suitability of cast and prosthesis 
scanner technology at a hospital and then in the field after safety 
testing is completed.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Cost.--$440,000.
    Passenger Hands and Personal Effects Scanning.--This pilot will 
assess effectiveness and suitability of using ETD technology to screen 
individuals for explosives.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Cost.--$200,000.
    Bottle Liquid Scanner.--This pilot will test and evaluate the 
effectiveness and suitability of technologies to screen bottles for 
flammable liquids.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Cost.--$200,000.
    Emerging Next Generation EDS.--This pilot will test and evaluate 
emerging EDS, including King Cobra and SureScan.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Cost.--$4 million.
    Information Sharing Environment--This pilot will develop an agency-
wide approach, framework, and roadmap for information sharing among all 
TSA stakeholders.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Cost.--To be determined.
    Unpredictable Screening Program (USP) Pilot.--This pilot is 
designed to implement additional screening measures (e.g. sending 
additional individuals through secondary screening) on a schedule which 
would appear random to someone trying to predict TSA's screening 
procedures. The ``unpredictability'' of these measures is intended to 
complicate the ability to develop plans to circumvent screening 
procedures.
    Status.--Pilot is complete.
    Cost.--No additional cost is associated with this pilot.
    Baggage Handler Pilot.--The goal of this pilot is to help determine 
the feasibility, benefits, costs, risks and other potential 
consequences of using baggage handling personnel to support TSA 
screening operations. This program is one of several initiatives being 
undertaken to mitigate the higher than average Transportation Security 
Officer (TSO) on-the-job injury rate.
    The pilot program will be implemented as an Other Transaction 
Authority (OTA) with an airport operator and/or carrier to determine 
whether or not it is more economical to accomplish through the Federal 
sector or to privatize the effort.
    Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage. TSA expects to implement 
the necessary agreements by summer 2006. Once launched, the pilot will 
run 4 months.
    Cost.--$2.64 million.
    Glove Pilot.--This pilot is being designed to test gloves with 
different thicknesses to determine if data validate the assumption that 
using thicker (and more expensive) gloves is a cost effective way to 
reduce the number of TSO hand and finger injuries and the workman's 
compensation claims associated with those injuries. The pilot will be 
conducted at several large airports with a history of such claims.
    Status.--The pilot is currently in the planning and market research 
phase.
    Cost.--To be determined.
    Question. For pilots that have been completed, have any been 
transitioned into full scale programs? If so, please indicate those 
programs.
    Answer. Cockpit Access Security System (CASS) for Domestic Air 
Carriers:
    Prior to 9/11, domestic air crewmembers were routinely authorized 
to ride in the flight deck jumpseat as an effective means of 
transportation. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, all jumpseat 
access by non-operational flight crewmembers was suspended. The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) later issued directives 
that allowed non-operational crewmembers to access the flight deck 
jumpseat provided the air carriers develop a system to verify the 
identity of crewmembers and their employment status.
    CASS, an initiative proposed by member carriers of the Air 
Transport Association (ATA), is a network of databases containing 
employment and security information for individuals authorized to enter 
the flight deck, as regulated by Federal Aviation Regulations. TSA 
commenced a 6-month pilot program to test CASS on May 1, 2004. 
Participation in the pilot program was limited to domestic flights of 
ATA member air carriers, of which 17 currently participate. Because of 
the initial success of the 6-month pilot, CASS was extended several 
times at the request of the participating air carriers.
    CASS operates by interlinking participating air carriers' employee 
databases through a central router. When an employee of a participating 
air carrier makes a request to occupy the flight deck jumpseat, an 
inquiry is made through CASS, allowing the gate agent to immediately 
access the requester's identification information and employment 
status. As another layer of security, the captain of the flight 
verifies the requester's FAA pilot and medical certificates before 
giving final approval to board.
    CASS is an important security initiative as it adds another layer 
of security to protect the flight deck of air carrier aircraft and 
provides a customer service benefit air carriers afford to their 
pilots. First, the system adds a real-time vetting for individuals 
seeking to access the flight deck. Second, it adds another qualified 
individual to the flight deck who can assist the crew in an emergency.
    Air Carriers provided very positive feedback of the pilot and 
supported the permanent establishment of CASS. CASS was approved as a 
permanent program effective September 23, 2005 and is now available to 
all eligible domestic air carriers limited to domestic flights. The 
Reveal CT-80 and Explosives Trace Portal (ETP) pilot programs were 
deemed successful and the TSA has begun deployment of both types of 
equipment at additional airports. Specifically, the TSA will deploy 
over 70 Reveal CT-80 units and over 100 ETPs in fiscal year 2006.
    Question. Does TSA plan to transition any of these pilots to full 
scale programs? If so, please indicate those programs.
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
requested fiscal year 2007 funding for emerging technology; however, 
purchase of this equipment is dependant on the success of the 
technology during the pilot programs. For other on-going pilots, 
decisions will be made after the results of the pilots have been 
evaluated.
    Question. The fiscal year 2006 conference report requires TSA to 
enter into a small number of pilots with airports to improve their 
baggage screening process through creative financing options. Please 
describe ongoing or planned pilots, the schedule associated with each 
pilot, results to date, and next steps.
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
currently exploring with industry partners the means to encourage 
innovative financing to accelerate the deployment of optimal baggage 
screening systems through a cost sharing study. This cost share study, 
mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (Public Law 108-458), should be completed later this year and will 
outline the options available. Once those options are determined, pilot 
projects will be planned using these financing mechanisms.

                          REGISTERED TRAVELER

    Question. For the Registered Traveler program, how will the fee the 
individual traveler pays be determined? For instance, how are costs 
such as capital improvements for space and TSA personnel to operate the 
lanes factored in?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects 
that the user fee will be market-driven with the price established by 
private sector providers. The fee will reflect the providers' capital 
investment, operating expenses, and financial incentives, as well as an 
amount to be remitted to TSA to cover the Agency's direct costs in 
facilitating the program. The TSA-portion of the fee will be 
established through a notice published in the Federal Register in 
accordance with Section 540 of the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2006 (Public Law 109-90).
    The private sector providers will have the option of making capital 
investment in approved screening equipment, additional screeners, and/
or space for separate Registered Traveler screening in accordance with 
their business plan and in coordination with the airport operator and 
TSA.
    Question. What exactly will the Registered Traveler fee pay for?
    Answer. The total RT participant fee will consist of two parts: the 
TSA-set portion and the private sector portion. The private sector 
portion of the fee will be set and collected by the enrollment 
providers. TSA's activities under RT will be completely funded through 
the fees set by TSA in the Federal Register notice, which is currently 
under development. This fee will include components related to the 
management of the program, the security threat assessment, technical 
infrastructure required to operate the program, and vendor compliance 
with the specified program standards.
    Question. Aside from direct appropriations for the Registered 
Traveler program in prior fiscal years, will TSA use other direct or 
fee funded resources to operate this program?
    Answer. For fiscal year 2007 budget forecasts, the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) estimated $20 million in total fee 
collections. TSA will revise its fee collection forecasts as soon as 
more information about program design and private sector costs become 
available.
    Question. How many airlines will have to pay for construction of 
new lanes dedicated for Registered Travelers?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
proposing a public/private partnership in which the government and 
private vendors will team to provide both services and structure to the 
RT program. The sponsoring entity (airport or airline) will be 
responsible for all costs associated with adding new passenger 
screening lanes. Requests for additional lanes will be subject to 
airport and TSA approval based on the unique operational set-ups of the 
individual airports and their checkpoints. TSA-approved checkpoint 
equipment for new RT lanes will be authorized for purchase by the 
service provider or sponsoring entity, depending on the physical 
constraints of the respective location.
    Question. While joining the Registered Traveler program is 
voluntary, what assurances do participants have that data used to 
verify their identity won't be compromised?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
currently considering which databases, both commercial and non-
commercial, will be included in the Registered Traveler (RT) Program's 
watch list vetting process. Once a determination has been made, TSA 
will be working with private sector entities to develop standards for 
securing the data in order to protect the personally identifiable 
information collected about applicants. The Privacy Impact Assessment 
that will be published prior to the program launch will describe 
privacy protections and data integrity safeguards for an ongoing RT 
Program. In addition a Privacy Act System of Records Notice will 
describe what data will be collected, how it will be used in the watch 
list vetting process, how it will be stored and shared, and how it will 
be transmitted to ensure its integrity and security.

                             SECURE FLIGHT

    Question. On February 9, 2006, TSA shut down the Secure Flight 
program and initiated a full scale audit of the program. How long will 
this process take? Please provide a revised schedule for the Issuance 
of a Regulation for Secure Flight.
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
conducting a comprehensive audit in order to ensure that security, 
privacy, and a unified Federal strategy are at the foundation of the 
Secure Flight system and processes. While it should not take an undue 
amount of time to finish, until that audit is completed and a path 
forward for the program is decided upon, it would be premature to 
speculate on the timeframe for Secure Flight milestones, including the 
Secure Flight Regulation. TSA will be vigilant in keeping the Committee 
apprised of all developments in relation to Secure Flight and looks 
forward to working with Congress on this important program.
    Question. When will TSA address all of the concerns raised by GAO?
    Answer. Work on the Secure Flight Program is continuing. The 
announced comprehensive audit will ensure that security, privacy, and a 
unified Federal strategy are at the foundation of the Secure Flight 
system and processes. Currently, the program is focusing on the areas 
of concern raised by the Government Accountability Office regarding 
program management, availability of technical documentation at the 
appropriate level of detail, and the overall end-to-end business 
process.
    Certification of Secure Flight's compliance with the 10 mandates 
will occur through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 
program is in the process of defining specific certification 
requirements for review by the appropriate DHS entities. Secure Flight 
certification will begin after initial results from operational testing 
are available.
    Question. Has TSA complied with all of the provisions related to 
the Secure Flight program in the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations 
Act, including the prohibition on the use of commercial data?
    Answer. Certification of Secure Flight's compliance with the 10 
mandates will occur through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
The program office is in the process of defining specific certification 
requirements for review by the appropriate DHS entities. Secure Flight 
certification will begin after initial results from operational testing 
are available.
    Question. What is the unobligated balance for Secure Flight?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation, less the 1 percent 
rescission, provided $56.1 million for the Secure Flight program, with 
an additional $3.7 million in carryover funds. As of June 21, 2006, the 
Transportation Security Administration has obligated approximately $18 
million. Therefore, the unobligated balance is $41.8 million.
    Question. Is the $40 million requested for fiscal year 2007 still 
necessary in light of the ongoing audit of the program?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
currently rebaselining both the cost and the schedule to ensure that 
TSA has addressed gaps found as part of the audit. TSA will share the 
results of this rebaselinging with Congress once completed.

                               AIR CARGO

    Question. What is the status of the 100 air cargo inspectors funded 
in the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations Act?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
developed an allocation plan for those additional resources, and the 
hiring process is almost complete. The remaining two sections will be 
made by mid-July 2006.
    Question. What criteria must be met to become a ``known shipper''?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has established 
specific criteria that must be met before an air carrier or a freight 
forwarder (also known as an indirect air carrier) can qualify a shipper 
as ``known.'' Those criteria are contained in the carriers' standard 
security programs, but they are Sensitive Security Information and may 
not be publicly disclosed. In general, however, the air carrier or 
freight forwarder must verify that certain business relationship 
standards are met between the carrier and the shipper, and must also 
verify the shipper's legitimacy.
    Question. How often must a shipping company be recertified to be 
maintained in the Known Shipper Database?
    Answer. The requirements to qualify (and recertify) a shipper as 
``known,'' as well as the specifics surrounding use of the 
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Known Shipper Database, 
are contained in the indirect air carrier (IAC) and air carriers' 
security programs, which are Sensitive Security Information and 
therefore, may not be publicly disclosed. TSA Aviation Security 
Inspectors routinely audit IAC and air carrier records to ensure 
compliance with the known shipper requirements.
    Question. How many ``Known Shippers'' are there?
    Answer. Approximately 400,000 known shippers are currently 
contained in the TSA Known Shipper Database. Currently, indirect air 
carriers (IACs) and air carriers have the option of voluntarily 
submitting their list of known shippers to the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) for inclusion in the TSA Known Shipper Database, 
or they can maintain their own internal known shipper listing. TSA does 
not maintain documentation on the number of shippers contained on the 
internal known shipper lists of IACs, and air carriers that do not 
currently participate in the TSA Known Shipper Database. However, TSA 
estimates that this population of known shippers is approximately 1.5 
million.
    The Air Cargo Final Rule, issued May 17, 2006, made participation 
in the TSA Known Shipper Database mandatory for all air carriers and 
IACs. TSA will now have the ability to more accurately ascertain all 
known shippers.
    Question. Currently, how does TSA determine if air cargo is an 
elevated-risk?
    Answer. Currently, all cargo originating from a source other than 
known shippers is considered elevated-risk cargo and is not permitted 
to be transported on passenger aircraft.
    Question. If cargo is identified as an elevated-risk, what security 
procedures are taken?
    Answer. Currently, cargo that originates from a source other than 
known shippers is considered to be of elevated-risk and must not be 
transported on passenger aircraft. Furthermore, cargo that originates 
from known shippers is subject to random screening by the air carriers, 
who must screen the percentage of cargo specified in their security 
programs using Transportation Security Administration-approved 
screening methods.
    Question. TSA has been developing the Freight Assessment System for 
sometime but no such system has been deployed. When will this system be 
deployed?
    Answer. The Freight Assessment System (FAS) is currently in its 
Proof-of-Concept (POC) stage, which includes a data analysis and risk 
assessment evaluation. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
is reviewing the results of the first iteration of the POC, which was 
completed on January 27, 2006. The final iteration of the POC is 
scheduled to be completed by June 30. Upon a successful completion of 
the POC, TSA plans to move forward with an operational pilot that will 
precede the development and implementation of the FAS. It is expected 
that implementation of the FAS will begin in fiscal year 2007.
    Question. What resources are included in the fiscal year 2007 
request for this system?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $55 
million for Air Cargo includes $5 million for the continued development 
of the Freight Assessment System.
    Question. How much will be needed to fully implement the Freight 
Assessment System?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently 
estimates the lifecycle cost for developing and deploying the Freight 
Assessment System would be approximately $140 million. However, TSA 
intends to conduct an alternatives analysis and to re-baseline the 
program upon completion of the Proof-of-Concept to determine whether 
the system can be brought to market faster and more economically.
    Question. What synergies will there be, if any, with the CBP 
National Targeting Center?
    Answer. One of the guiding principles of the Freight Assessment 
System (FAS) development is that industry should not have to provide 
the same information to different Government agencies. Another guiding 
principle is that the FAS should leverage, to the maximum extent 
possible, other risk assessment systems and capabilities within the 
Department of Homeland Security. Consequently, TSA partnered with U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the design of the FAS to ensure 
that it is fully harmonized with CBP's targeting methodology. Once the 
FAS Proof-of-Concept is complete, we will re-engage with CBP to 
determine how best to leverage CBP's targeting hardware and 
infrastructure.
    Question. What are the costs associated with the Freight Assessment 
System in fiscal year 2007?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $55 
million for Air Cargo includes $5 million for continued development of 
the Freight Assessment System (FAS). A total of $5.8 million for FAS is 
included in the fiscal year 2006 spend plan, which is scheduled to be 
under contract before the end of fiscal year 2006 and will fund 
continued development of this key program.
    Question. Where will the work associated with the Freight 
Assessment System be performed?
    Answer. The Freight Assessment System is a complex system that will 
require the participation of multiple vendors to develop, working from 
multiple locations. Several alternative architectures are under 
consideration, and TSA expects to select a deployment approach before 
the end of the fiscal year.
    Question. TSA indicated that initial feasibility studies for blast 
resistant cabin and cargo liners were promising. Has TSA completed the 
prototype for both passenger cabin and cargo hold liners?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
initiated a project to develop proof-of-concept cargo hold and 
passenger cabin blast resistant liner designs and prototypes. This 
project is now being administered by the Department of Homeland 
Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T). The project is 
currently in the preliminary stages of identifying candidate liner 
design materials that are appropriate for use in liner construction 
from both a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness 
perspective, as well as a blast resistance perspective. Explosives 
testing, as well as determination of FAA airworthiness compliance 
(material flammability requirements) testing, is underway on candidate 
composite material configurations that may be suitable for use in 
protection of the aircraft.
    Upon completion of the current material screening process and 
finalization of material selection, expected in the fourth quarter of 
fiscal year 2006, engineering design concepts for cargo hold and 
passenger cabin liners will be developed in the second quarter of 
fiscal year 2007. Upon finalization of the liner design concepts, 
prototypes will be fabricated and blast tested by DHS S&T within actual 
aircraft structures. These tests, expected in the third quarter of 
fiscal year 2007, will determine conformance to explosive mitigation 
requirements and ability of the concepts to adequately protect the 
aircraft.
    Question. When would such a system be ready and what plans does TSA 
have to retrofit existing aircraft with this new technology?
    Answer. Explosive resistant liner design concepts could be ready as 
early as the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007, assuming that the 
liner design concepts developed and tested are deemed successful in 
mitigating internal explosive effects without catastrophic structural 
damage to the aircraft.
    It is too early in the life cycle of these products to determine a 
strategy for implementation. A cost/benefit analysis will be conducted 
to determine if these products provide a good value and security 
benefit. The Transportation Security Administration will base 
subsequent retrofit decisions on the technical merit of the solution 
and also consider issues such as cost variables to include 
installation, maintenance, and additional weight impact. Any 
implementation strategy will involve close coordination with the 
Federal Aviation Administration, airframe manufacturers, and airlines 
from both a technical and regulatory perspective.
    Question. Why has the TSL not established certification standards 
for air cargo screening equipment?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
established protocols for equipment used for screening cargo and 
drafted a preliminary standard for cargo screening equipment similar to 
the standard established for checked baggage screening technologies. 
The draft standard distinguishes between break bulk and containerized 
air cargo, and between perishable and non-perishable commodities. It 
also stresses the importance of attaining a low false alarm rate. TSA 
is working with the Science and Technology Directorate to further 
develop the standards for air cargo screening technology solutions.
    Question. What would be the cost of establishing and executing such 
standards?
    Answer. The development of the standards may require lab testing to 
establish threat thresholds. These costs would become part of the 
research and development funding in the Department of Homeland 
Security's Science and Technology Directorate budget. The cost of 
executing a standard for air cargo screening technologies would be 
dependent upon the maturity of the systems presented for evaluation 
once the standards are published.
    Question. Why has the Department failed to finalize security 
standards for air cargo as required in the Intelligence Reform Act?
    Answer. TSA issued the Air Cargo Security Final Rule on May 17, 
2006. The Rule introduces significant changes to current regulatory 
requirements for four major sectors of the air cargo industry: 
airports; passenger air carriers that transport cargo; all-cargo air 
carriers; and indirect air carriers (also known as ``freight 
forwarders'').

                              CANINE TEAMS

    Question. As of November 2005, TSA had six certified TSA mass 
transit canine teams. TSA anticipated that 30 teams would complete 
training by May 2006. When will TSA fully deploy those teams to the 10 
transit systems identified in November?
    Answer. Twenty-nine teams are currently deployed with the remaining 
team in training. Each of the 10 major mass transit systems identified 
in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) rail initiative 
will initially receive three TSA certified canine teams along with 
associated training and equipment, for a combined total of 30 new 
canine teams. Each mass transit system will commit three handlers for 
training at the TSA Explosives Detection Canine Handler Course in San 
Antonio, TX. This training is provided at no cost to the mass transit/
rail system or law enforcement agency participating in the National 
Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.
    Question. Have any of the participating transit systems dropped out 
of the program? If so, why?
    Answer. All of the original systems that committed to entering the 
program are still participating. After attending the course of 
instruction at the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program 
(NEDCTP) Training Academy, and working with the NEDCTP staff members in 
the field, many of the participating systems have requested that 
additional assets be deployed.
    Question. Does TSA plan to expand this program to other transit 
systems in fiscal year 2007?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
established an ambitious schedule to staff the currently planned 30 
mass transit canine teams. Within the base of funds requested, TSA may 
staff canine teams at additional mass transit locations based on 
potential second year cost efficiencies. As TSA receives interest from 
other mass transit systems, the agency will evaluate each request and 
determine any new locations using risk-based criteria.
    Question. How many canine teams are dedicated to air cargo?
    Answer. Although explosives detection canine teams are not 
dedicated exclusively to screening cargo, nearly 365 TSA-certified 
explosives detection canine teams across the Nation's aviation domain 
currently support cargo screening activities on a routine basis. The $7 
million in additional funds will also assist the program with expanding 
the number of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams 
throughout the Nation by the end of 2006, elevating the number of these 
valuable multi-role canine teams from 365 to 420 in the aviation arena. 
This approach will provide greater flexibility for these limited, yet 
highly versatile, resources.
    The mobility of these highly trained teams remains a critical 
element in our unpredictable security response option. The fact that 
TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams are not solely 
dedicated to cargo screening activities allows these teams to meet on-
site threats at a moment's notice for multiple purposes anywhere in the 
airport environment. As part of its efforts to increase canine cargo 
screening activities, the NEDCTP has established a ``Cargo Training 
Warehouse Lab'' at its training facility at Lackland AFB, in San 
Antonio, TX. As a result of this initiative, every canine team that 
leaves the NEDCTP training center is trained to screen cargo in an 
effective manner.

                             SURGE CAPACITY

    Question. If intelligence indicates that transit systems are being 
targeted by terrorists, does TSA have the resources to deploy personnel 
and technologies to assist transit authorities in a short period of 
time?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
building, training, and testing teams to enhance its ability in this 
regard. In a March 2006 exercise, TSA provided Amtrak with law 
enforcement teams with surveillance detection capability, to 
Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, DC. These teams, called Multi-
Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSETs) included Federal Air Marshals 
(FAMS) and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI). These 
resources possess a broad range of capabilities that allow TSA to help 
protect against multiple threats and introduce elements of 
unpredictability into security processes. TSA teams do not supersede 
local security forces or their jurisdiction when deployed into public 
transportation systems. Rather, the MMSETs supplement local 
capabilities with the unique strengths and expertise TSA brings to the 
transportation security mission.
    TSA initiated several pilot deployments in public transportation 
systems during the week of December 13-18, 2005. Additional pilot 
deployments will occur throughout the current year. The objective is to 
gain the necessary knowledge and experience in public transportation 
modes and with specific public transportation systems to develop and 
maintain an effective security enhancement capability. The MMSET 
deployments expand the agency's capacity to leverage a variety of 
resources in a flexible manner based on threat, so that we can quickly 
and effectively raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation 
anywhere in the country.
    Prior to these pilots, TSA deployed resources on an ad hoc basis 
during periods of heightened alert and National Special Security 
Events. On July 7 and July 21, 2005, STSIs deployed jointly with 
Federal Rail Administration Safety Inspectors to major Rail and Rail 
Transit Operations Centers to monitor security postures and provide the 
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) with security 
situational awareness in response to the London bombings. Inspectors 
also deployed to support recovery efforts in the aftermath of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and to provide enhanced security for the 
Presidential Inauguration and the Super Bowl. STSIs also deploy to 
support investigations of transportation security incidents.
    If passenger or cargo screening becomes necessary, TSA can deploy 
members of the National Screening Force and Transportation Security 
Officers (TSO) from select airports. The Office of Security Technology 
would coordinate with the venue to make any facility modifications 
necessary to deploy equipment. Additionally, TSA could deploy canine 
resources quickly. In response to the terrorist bombings against rail 
systems in Spain in March 2004, Secretary Tom Ridge announced that the 
Department of Homeland Security would create a two-phased approach to 
assist mass transit/commuter rail systems within the United States. The 
first phase was the development of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) mass 
transit canine program to assists State and local law enforcement 
agencies and transit authorities. The purpose of the RDF is to provide 
expanded capability to mass-transit systems within the United States by 
assisting State, local, and transit authorities in the event of an 
increased threat situation. The RDF is designed to reduce 
vulnerabilities to mass transit/commuter rail systems by providing a 
coordinated explosives detection canine capability, as well as a 
deterrent effect against potential attacks.
    Because of groundwork laid in that effort--preplanning and 
acclimation within the mass transit/commuter rail environment--TSA was 
able to rapidly deploy canine teams following the summer 2005 incidents 
in London. TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams were 
deployed across the country to support mass transit/commuter rail 
systems that were in close proximity to their assigned airports within 
hours of notification of the bombing events in London. TSA coordinated 
activities with program agencies to deploy teams to conduct random 
sweeps of platforms, conduct searches of unattended items, and provide 
a physical deterrence, where possible. TSA has also expeditiously 
provided explosives detection canine teams to Amtrak at its request on 
several occasions, including during the Republican National Convention, 
the Presidential Inauguration, and in New York during the fall 2005 
security alert.
    Along with the canine teams, at the request of Amtrak, TSA deployed 
some of the technology field-tested in the Transit and Rail Inspection 
Pilot (TRIP) for screening passengers and baggage in a rail environment 
to the Republican National Convention in August 2004 and Presidential 
Inauguration in January 2005.
    Question. Does TSA have the authority to shift funding from other 
TSA accounts to the Surface Transportation appropriation for short 
periods of surge capacity without requesting a formal reprogramming?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Bill (Public Law 109-
90), section 503(c), provides flexibility to TSA in terms of transfers 
and reprogramming (i.e., ``not to exceed 5 percent of any appropriation 
made available for the current year,'' without increasing an account 
``by more than 10 percent by such transfers''), but such actions 
constitute a permanent change in funding.
    The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) may exercise other 
options to develop and apply surge capability without the need to 
transfer or reprogram funds. For example, under the Multi-Modal 
Security Enhancement Team (MMSET) program, TSA may deploy resources to 
provide surge capacity for enhancing security in public transportation 
systems. The teams may consist of varying combinations of Federal Air 
Marshals (FAMs), Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs), 
Aviation Security Inspectors (ASIs), and explosives detection canine 
teams. The teams provide both a visible deterrent and covert detection 
capability. Use of TSA resources assigned in the geographical area of 
the public transportation system ensures that costs remain minimal and 
within available funding.

                     FEDERAL AGENCY HEAD SCREENING

    Question. Do Federal agency heads receive special treatment at 
airports? If so, why?
    Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) passenger and 
property screening procedures do not provide for an automatic screening 
exemption for heads of Federal agencies or commissions, nor are any 
such exemptions being contemplated. However, like any individual under 
armed protective escort by a Federal law enforcement officer (LEO) some 
senior officials may not be required to proceed through a passenger 
checkpoint upon presentation of proper identifying documents by the 
armed Federal LEO escort (credential, badge, and Government-issued 
photo ID). Under these circumstances, the identities of both the LEO 
and the individual under protective escort must be verified by a TSA 
representative. Screening checkpoint logbook entries must be made for 
both the LEO and the individual being escorted.

                        OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE

    Question. What is the status of the Operation Safe Commerce Pilots?
    Answer. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is currently in its third 
phase. In Phase II of OSC, 18 pilot projects focused on the 
vulnerabilities of containers moving through the supply chains. They 
concentrated on mitigating the identified vulnerabilities through the 
deployment of technologies and business practices. OSC Phase III is 
comprised of 4 pilot projects and a series of four testing phases that 
address specific points of vulnerability in the supply chains.
    Question. How are these results being incorporated into CSI, CTPAT, 
Science and Technology Research, and other container security 
operations?
    Answer. Federal coordination and oversight of Operation Safe 
Commerce (OSC) is an interagency effort. Members of the OSC Executive 
Steering Committee (ESC) include representatives from the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), The Department of Transportation (DOT), 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), the Department of State, and the Department of 
Commerce. The Federal Partners provide valuable insight and guidance in 
the management of OSC, and as such, G&T strives to provide full access 
to the end results of the demonstrations as they become known. In 
addition, Program Management staff from the DHS Office of Grants and 
Training (G&T) has coordinated closely with S&T in the third phase of 
OSC to ensure an alignment with S&T Directorate initiatives that are of 
a similar nature.
    CBP is an important partner because the lessons learned from OSC 
help improve their Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). CSI establishes 
coordination with host government customs services to examine high-risk 
maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports before they are loaded 
on board vessels destined for the United States. C-TPAT is a public-
private and international partnership focused on improving baseline 
security standards for supply chain and container security.

                              COAST GUARD
                               DEEPWATER

    Question. The Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is currently the 37th 
oldest of the world's 39 like-sized naval fleets. The Coast Guard 
Commandant has testified that Coast Guard ships and planes are in a 
``declining readiness spiral''. The Deepwater program won't be 
completed until 2026. However, according to a recent DHS report on gaps 
in Coast Guard operational capabilities, none of the Coast Guard's 
cutters have met their readiness goal in the past 5 years. Coast Guard 
patrol boats are operating at levels lower than they were in 1998, and 
that gap will not be closed until 2012. Coast Guard maritime air 
patrols are below1998 levels, and that gap will not be closed until 
2014.
    Has the Coast Guard considered accelerating Deepwater since the 
program was re-baselined?
    Answer. Although the Coast Guard fleet readiness continues to be 
below acceptable levels, the Coast Guard has been able to meet or 
exceed the majority of its mission performance targets, in part due to 
the enhancements provided to legacy assets by the Deepwater program. 
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request makes a strong 
statement regarding the criticality of funding the Deepwater program. 
The program is now funded at approximately 40 percent more than the 
$572 million funding level for fiscal year 2007, as compared to the 
fiscal year 2002 planning factors. Full funding in fiscal year 2007 
helps to restore readiness to a higher level, and allows the Coast 
Guard to continue development of additional capabilities to be realized 
as a result of enhancements such as:
  --Accelerated HH-65 conversion to a Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter,
  --New National Security Cutter production to replace the legacy 378 
        foot High Endurance Cutters,
  --Additional CASA Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
  --Accelerated post 9/11 capabilities for HH-60 aircraft for airborne 
        use of force,
  --A new Fast Response Cutter with enhanced post 9/11 capabilities 
        will be accelerated to replace the aging 110 foot patrol boat 
        fleet; and
  --Legacy asset maintenance and sustainment, including the Medium 
        Endurance Cutter Mission Effectiveness Project.
    The Deepwater post 9/11 Revised Implementation Plan, as approved by 
the Administration, will recapitalize and modernize the Coast Guard 
surface and aviation assets with robust maritime security and safety 
capabilities that are critical to operational success across all Coast 
Guard missions, now and in the future. Further acceleration of the 
program is not being considered at this time.
    Question. What would the cost be if the Coast Guard accelerated the 
program to be completed in 10 years?
    Answer. A preliminary estimate of $21 billion in funding would be 
required to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 10 
years.
    Question. What would the cost be if the Coast Guard accelerated the 
program to be completed in 15 years?
    Answer. A preliminary estimate of $23 billion in funding would be 
required to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 15 
years.
    Question. Would there be cost savings compared to the current 25 
year plan?
    Answer. Expediting the Deepwater program for completion over the 
next 10 or 15 years would generate a cost avoidance of approximately $1 
to $3 billion. However, annual appropriations of more than $2 billion 
per year for several years would be required to complete the program in 
a 10-year period, and more than $1.5 billion per year for several years 
would be required to complete the program in a 15-year period.

                           DRUG INTERDICTION

    Question. In November 2005, GAO reported that ``according to JIATF-
South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime cocaine movements 
reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean 
because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected movement in 
time.'' The same report noted that Coast Guard and CBP officials were 
concerned that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in 
light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities. The 
same officials noted that the long-term implications of likely declines 
in transit zone assets have not been addressed.
    Has the Coast Guard begun to address this problem? What solutions 
are being pursued?
    Answer. The Coast Guard's long-term plan to mitigate the decline in 
the number of assets in the transit zone is the Deepwater Acquisition 
Project. Deepwater is the Coast Guard's long-term asset 
recapitalization and modernization project. As Deepwater assets come 
into service, the Coast Guard will be able to address declines in 
transit zone assets. In the short-term, the Coast Guard is managing 
existing assets to best meet operational requirements across all of its 
mission areas.

                  COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS RELOCATION

    Question. The request indicates that the Coast Guard Headquarters 
relocation will include other Federal tenants with similar security 
requirements. Please provide a list of other Federal tenants that will 
be relocating to the St. Elizabeths campus.
    Answer. DHS is planning to relocate other functions to St. 
Elizabeths West Campus in addition to the U.S. Coast Guard in order to 
improve operational effectiveness and organizational efficiency. The 
Department of Homeland Security is currently developing a Program of 
Requirements (POR) to identify total real estate needs throughout the 
National Capital Region (NCR).
    Currently, DHS organizations are housed in 61 buildings throughout 
the NCR. These dispersed locations constrain the coordination, 
cooperation and synergy among components and headquarters. Once the POR 
is completed, the Department of Homeland Security will be able to 
identify the specific activities that will relocate to St. Elizabeths, 
as well as the plan to house all remaining DHS functions throughout the 
NCR.
    Question. A prospectus for the design of the Coast Guard 
Headquarters has been approved. What is the status of the prospectus 
for construction of the Headquarters building?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2007 construction prospectus was approved 
by OMB and signed by GSA on February 14, 2006. It has been sent to 
GSA's authorizing committees on the Hill--the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works. The prospectus has not yet been approved 
by the House and Senate authorizing Committees. Attached is a copy of 
the construction prospectus and fact sheet approved by OMB and signed 
by GSA.



                  NATIONAL CAPITAL AIR DEFENSE MISSION

    Question. When will the Coast Guard assume control of the National 
Capital Region Air Defense Mission?
    Answer. The Coast Guard plans to assume the NCRAD mission in late 
fiscal year 2006. Our target start date is 01 September 2006. The exact 
date is contingent upon the timing of Congressional approval of a DHS 
request to transfer $4 million of fiscal year 2006 funds to USCG. 
Approximately 5 months after the approval, the Coast Guard will be able 
to assume the mission. The required 5 month lead time is due to the 
long lead time required to order critical ground support equipment, 
conduct personnel transfers and conduct aircrew training.
    Question. The request includes $13 million (including transfer of 
$5 million from CBP) for operational costs to operate the mission and 
$49 million for the acquisition of 5 helicopters. If the $5 million 
transfer from CBP is not approved, how will the Coast Guard absorb 
costs?
    Answer. If the $5 million in recurring funding is not transferred 
from CBP, the Coast Guard would have to review its program budgets to 
identify internal cost re-allocations that could be proposed to 
Congress for reprogramming. A likely source of funds would be the base 
counter-drug helicopter operations budgets.
    Question. If the request is provided, when will the new HH-65Cs be 
available for operation?
    Answer. If funding is received, the Coast Guard plans to purchase 5 
helicopter airframes in fiscal year 2007. These helicopters will 
subsequently be outfitted at the Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and 
Supply Center (AR&SC) and be ready for operations by early fiscal year 
2008.
    Question. What assets will the Coast Guard use in the interim?
    Answer. The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the National 
Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) mission will be supported by 
existing fleet aircraft (HH-65C) typically used to support cutter 
deployments/special missions until additional helicopters can be 
purchased and outfitted.
    The use of these cutter deployment/special mission helos will be 
offset by exercising the last year option of our MH-68 armed helo 
service contract, which will provide 8 armed helos & 1,000 additional 
cutter days deployed at sea (DDAS) until the contract expires in Jan 
2008. Originally the Coast Guard planed to replace the leased MH-68 
helos with newly armed MH-65C helicopters in Jan 2007. Utilizing the 
last year option of the MH-68 service contract will allow the Coast 
Guard time to purchase and outfit additional HH-65 helicopters by the 
time the MH-68 service contract expires in January 2008.
    Question. Will additional acquisition costs be necessary in the 
out-years? If so, how much?
    Answer. The National Capital Region Air Defense mission will 
require additional AC&I funds in the out-years.
    In fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard's AC&I budget requests $48.5 
million for the acquisition of five helicopters, air intercept 
equipment, ground support equipment, and facility upgrades at Coast 
Guard Air Station Atlantic City.
    In fiscal year 2008, as listed in the Capital Investment Plan, the 
Coast Guard intends to request $18 million AC&I for the last two of the 
seven helicopters needed to support the NCRAD mission.
    Question. Is the Coast Guard considering fixed wing aircraft for 
the NCRAD mission?
    Answer. No.

                           POLAR ICEBREAKERS

    Question. The National Academy of Sciences recently released 
recommendations addressing the condition of the Coast Guard's polar 
icebreaking fleet. What resources would be necessary to comply with the 
report's recommendations?
    Answer. The National Academy of Sciences report made the following 
recommendations for the Nation's polar icebreaking fleet:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
            NAS recommendation                     Potential cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States should reliably control   N/A--the United States
 at least 1 heavy icebreaker to break into   currently controls 2
 McMurdo station.                            vessels.
The United states should maintain           N/A--the United States
 dedicated, year-round icebreaker            currently operates the
 capability for the Arctic.                  Healy as an Arctic
                                             icebreaking and research
                                             vessel.
 In the short term, the required            Between $30 and $50 million
 maintenance should be performed to make     annually in fiscal year
 at least one Polar class ship mission       2007 budget authority.
 capable over the next 4 to 8 years.
Management of the U.S. icebreakers should   N/A--Under the current USCG-
 reside with the U.S. Coast Guard and it     NSF Memorandum of
 should have appropriate operational and     Understanding, the costs to
 maintenance budgets to fulfill U.S. Coast   conduct the polar
 Guard missions that require icebreaking.    icebreaking programs are
                                             fully paid for by the
                                             National Science
                                             Foundation.
In the short-term, NSF should revert to     N/A--Under the current USCG-
 being a user and should continue to         NSF Memorandum of
 negotiate financial agreements to pay for   Understanding, NSF is the
 icebreaker services when U.S. Coast Guard   user of the icebreaking
 ships are employed.                         vessels, while Coast Guard
                                             operates them.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the report recommends that funds for operation and 
maintenance of the Polar Icebreaking fleet be appropriated directly to 
the Coast Guard. The fiscal year 2006 budget proposed, and Congress 
subsequently appropriated, Polar Icebreaking funds to National Science 
Foundation. The fiscal year 2007 budget does not propose any changes to 
this funding approach.

                              PATROL BOATS

    Question. To close the operational gap for 110 foot patrol boats 
today, how many additional 110's would be necessary?
    Answer. Assuming the following: All WPB 110s & 123s are able to 
achieve readiness[?] targets, four 110s are out of service per year for 
mid-life extensions, continued support of six 110s for Operation 
Enduring Freedom and five U.S. Navy WPC-179s remain in service for the 
Coast Guard, the Coast Guard would need three additional Deepwater-
capable patrol boats to fill the current operational gap.
    Question. Has the Coast Guard considered buying new patrol boats to 
bridge the operational gap until the Fast Response Cutter is built and 
deployed? What would the cost be?
    Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard has considered buying new patrol boats 
to bridge the operational gap until the Fast Response Cutter is built 
and deployed. There are several commercially available boats that would 
be suitable, Deepwater-capable patrol boats. The Coast Guard has not 
submitted to industry a Request for Information (RFI) that would allow 
us to accurately determine the cost of a new patrol boat.
    Question. Is there a manufacturing line available to build new 110 
foot patrol boats for the Coast Guard fleet?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is not aware of any production facility in 
the United States that is currently building new 110 foot patrol boats.
    Question. When will the Coast Guard relinquish the 179 foot patrol 
boats currently being leased from the Navy?
    Answer. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Navy States that 
the Coast Guard will retain custody and operational control of five 
WPC-179s through fiscal year 2008. Additionally, this MOA States that 
the Coast Guard may take ownership of the WPC-179s after 1 October 2008 
if requested by the Vice Commandant and approved by the Vice CNO. Other 
options available to the Coast Guard include requesting an extension to 
the current MOA with the Navy or renegotiating a new agreement all 
together.
    Question. How will the Coast Guard make up for the operational 
capability the 179 foot patrol boats currently provide?
    Answer. The loss of the 179-foot patrol boats (WPCs) at the end of 
fiscal year 2008 is accounted for in the Patrol Boat (WPB) Availability 
Report provided to Congress. Our patrol boat report assumes the 6 110-
foot patrol boats deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom will return 
home as we return the 179-foot patrol boats to the Navy, however, there 
is no guarantee that this will occur.
    The Coast Guard is currently exploring various alternatives should 
attempts to extend or renegotiate the 179-foot patrol boat Memorandum 
of Agreement with the Navy not be successful.
    Question. Did the Operational Gap Analysis report take into account 
the loss of the 179 foot patrol boats?
    Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard did take into account the loss of the 
179 foot patrol boats at the end of fiscal year 2008 (September 30). 
The report assumes that the loss of the 179-foot patrol boats to the 
Navy will correspond with an offsetting gain by the return of the 6 
110-foot patrol boats currently deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom.
    Question. For the 110 foot Service Life Extension program, how long 
will each cutter being rehabbed be out of service?
    Answer. Each Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) will remove a 110-
ft patrol boat (WPB) from service for approximately 12 months.
    Question. What is the maximum number of patrol boats that can be 
rehabbed at one time without impacting Coast Guard operational 
capabilities?
    Answer. Each 110 foot patrol boat (WPB) that enters the Mission 
Effectiveness Project (MEP) will be unavailable for operational use for 
approximately 12 months. The optimal balance of acceptable operational 
impact and timely MEP completion is four MEPs per year.
    Question. Could the 110 foot Service Life Extension program be 
accelerated if funding were available?
    Answer. As indicated in the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat Availability 
Report to Congress (dated 2/3/2006), the Coast Guard's current 110 foot 
WPB Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) plan strikes the best balance 
between the needs of the Service's operational commanders and the 
Deepwater spend plan.
    The need to minimize the patrol boat operational hour gap is the 
most significant determining factor. Each 110 foot WPB MEP requires 1 
year of drydock availability. As noted in the report, each MEP will 
have an impact on the patrol boat operational hour gap and the Coast 
Guard's ability to perform its missions.
    If Coast Guard efforts to mitigate the patrol boat hour gap 
produced results beyond current expectations, the Coast Guard would 
consider the costs/benefits of accelerating the 110 foot WPB MEP 
production cycle.
    Question. If funding were available, how long would it take to 
procure and missionize new 110 foot patrol boats with operational 
capabilities?
    Answer. There are several commercially available boats that could 
be suitable Deepwater-capable patrol boats. The Coast Guard is 
investigating options and studying requirements, but has not submitted 
to industry Requests for Information (RFI) that would allow us to 
accurately determine the amount of time it would take to procure and 
missionize new patrol boats with operational capabilities.
    Question. Of the eight 110 foot patrol boats that have been 
stretched to 123 feet, what was the original cost estimate compared to 
the final cost?
    Answer. The Original Contract Price (including Economic Price 
Adjustment) for hulls 1 through 8 was $67.1 million (average $8.4 
million per hull). The projected Final Price, less Request of Equitable 
Adjustment (REA), is $80.3 million (average $10.04 million per hull). 
Resolution of the REA submitted by ICGS and project close-out costs may 
result in a figure slightly higher than the average $10.04 million per 
hull cost.
    Question. Last year, the Coast Guard asserted that new and improved 
``condition measures'' would be established by the end of fiscal year 
2005 that link cutter condition to mission capability. Please provide 
these measures to the Committee.
    Answer. The Coast Guard has developed condition measures that more 
directly link cutter condition to mission capability. A clearer 
relationship between engineering subsystems and mission performance 
will enable a better return on maintenance investments and the best use 
of limited maintenance resources.
    Coast Guard naval engineers have developed two cutter condition 
measures:
  --``Percent of time fully mission capable'' (PTFMC) and
  --``Average number of casualties per operational day'' (ANOCOP).
    The PTFMC and ANOCOP measures will provide a direct link between 
specific cutter engineering subsystems and mission degradation. These 
metrics are expected to be completed by mid-calendar year 2006.
    In fiscal years 2004-2005, a team was assembled to construct asset 
condition matrices that incorporate engineering casualty reporting 
(CASREP) data and performance data maintained in the Coast Guard's 
Readiness Management System (RMS). The team identified and linked 
thousands of shipboard engineering subsystems across every cutter class 
and their direct impact/contribution to each Coast Guard mission. The 
condition measures are currently being tested/validated for use in the 
Coast Guard's Readiness Management System.

                          RESPONSE BOAT MEDIUM

    Question. Please provide a deployment schedule (including 
locations) for the Response Boat Medium program.
    Answer. The Response Boat-Medium Project is currently in the middle 
of source selection for the second procurement phase (production 
contract). Contract award is planned for the forth quarter of fiscal 
year 2006. The delivery location and schedule will be based on contract 
award date, issuance of delivery orders, the contractor's integrated 
master schedule, and operational testing and evaluation (OT&E). The 
delivery locations identified by the Response Boat Siting Study are 
included in the table below.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Unit                            City                    State                     Zip
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIRST DISTRICT:
    STA EASTPORT.....................  Eastport...............  ME.....................  04631
    STA JONESPORT....................  West Jonesport.........  ME.....................  04649-9998
    STA SOUTHWEST HBR................  Southwest Harbor.......  ME.....................  04679-5000
    STA ROCKLAND.....................  Rockland...............  ME.....................  04841-3498
    STA BOOTHBAY HARBOR..............  Boothbay Harbor........  ME.....................  04538-0327
    STA SOUTH PORTLAND...............  South Portland.........  ME.....................  04106-0007
    STA PORTSMOUTH HBR...............  New Castle.............  NH.....................  03854-0600
    STA MERRIMACK RIV................  Newburyport............  MA.....................  01950-2897
    STA GLOUCESTER...................  Gloucester.............  MA.....................  01930-5004
    STA BOSTON.......................  Boston.................  MA.....................  02109-1027
    STA POINT ALLERTON...............  Hull...................  MA.....................  02045-1198
    STA PROVINCETOWN.................  Provincetown...........  MA.....................  02657-9999
    STA CAPE COD CANAL...............  Sandwich...............  MA.....................  2563
    STA CHATHAM......................  Chatham................  MA.....................  02633-3499
    STA WOODS HOLE...................  Woods Hole.............  MA.....................  02543
    STA MENEMSHA.....................  Chilmark...............  MA.....................  02535-9707
    STA BRANT POINT..................  Nantucket..............  MA.....................  02554-2293
    STA CASTLE HILL..................  Newport................  RI.....................  02840-3798
    STA POINT JUDITH.................  Narragansett...........  RI.....................  02882-6229
    STA NEW LONDON...................  New London.............  CT.....................  06320-5593
    STA NEW HAVEN....................  New Haven..............  CT.....................  06512-3698
    STA EATONS NECK..................  Northport..............  NY.....................  11768-1094
    STA MONTAUK......................  Montauk................  NY.....................  11954-9801
    STA SHINNECOCK...................  Hampton Bays...........  NY.....................  11946-3233
    STA FIRE ISLAND..................  Babylon................  NY.....................  11702-4600
    STA JONES BEACH..................  Freeport...............  NY.....................  11520-5001
    STA NEW YORK.....................  Staten Island..........  NY.....................  10305
    STA SANDY HOOK...................  Sandy Hook.............  NJ.....................  07732-4999
    STA BURLINGTON...................  Burlington.............  VT.....................  05401-5226

FIFTH DISTRICT:
    STA WASHINGTON (DC)..............  Washington.............  DC.....................  20032-0702
    STA MANASQUAN INLET..............  Point Pleasant Beach...  NJ.....................  08742-2642
    STA BARNEGAT LIGHT...............  Barnegat Light.........  NJ.....................  08006-9999
    STA ATLANTIC CITY................  Altantic City..........  NJ.....................  08401-1986
    STA CAPE MAY.....................  Cape May...............  NJ.....................  08204-5078
    STA PHILADELPHIA.................  Philadelphia...........  PA.....................  19147-4395
    STA OCEAN CITY...................  Ocean City.............  MD.....................  21842-4240
    STA CHINCOTEAGUE.................  Chincoteague...........  VA.....................  23336-1809
    STA WACHAPREAGUE.................  Wachapreague...........  VA.....................  23480-0370
    STA CAPE CHARLES.................  Cape Charles...........  VA.....................  23310-0621
    STA MILFORD HAVEN................  Hudgins................  VA.....................  23076-9700
    STA PORTSMOUTH...................  Portsmouth.............  VA.....................  23703-2199
    STA LITTLE CREEK.................  Norfolk................  VA.....................  23520-5200
    STA CRISFIELD....................  Chrisfield.............  MD.....................  21817-1656
    STA CURTIS BAY...................  Baltimore..............  MD.....................  21226-1797
    STA OXFORD.......................  Oxford.................  MD.....................  21654-1323
    STA ANNAPOLIS....................  Annapolis..............  MD.....................  21403-5099
    STA ST. INIGOES..................  Saint Inigoes..........  MD.....................  20684-0008
    STA ELIZABETH CITY...............  Elizabeth City.........  NC.....................  27909
    STA OREGON INLET.................  Nags Head..............  NC.....................  27959-9731
    STA HATTERAS INLET...............  Hatteras...............  NC.....................  28537-9999
    STA HOBUCKEN.....................  Hobucken...............  NC.....................  28537-9999
    STA FORT MACON...................  Atlantic Beach.........  NC.....................  28512
    STA WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH...........  Wrightsville Beach.....  NC.....................  28480-2099
    STA OAK ISLAND...................  Oak Island.............  NC.....................  28465

SEVENTH DISTRICT:
    STA GEORGETOWN...................  Georgetown.............  SC.....................  29440-2412
    STA CHARLESTON...................  Charleston.............  SC.....................  29401-1817
    STA TYBEE........................  Tybee Island...........  GA.....................  31328-1400
    STA BRUNSWICK....................  Brunswick..............  GA.....................  31523-0577
    STA MAYPORT......................  Atlantic Beach.........  FL.....................  33139-5101
    STA PONCE DE LEON INLET..........  New Smyrna Beach.......  FL.....................  32169-2041
    STA PORT CANAVERAL...............  Cape Canaveral.........  FL.....................  32920-4402
    STA YANKEETOWN...................  Yankeetown.............  FL.....................  34498-0360
    STA SAND KEY.....................  Clearwater.............  FL.....................  33767-2899
    STA ST. PETERSBURG...............  St. Petersburg.........  FL.....................  33701-5099
    STA CORTEZ.......................  Cortez.................  FL.....................  34215-9999
    STA FT. MYERS BEACH..............  Fort Myers Beach.......  FL.....................  33931-2221
    STA FORT PIERCE..................  Fort Pierce............  FL.....................  34949-3039
    STA LAKE WORTH INLET.............  Riviera Beach..........  FL.....................  33404-2406
    STA FORT LAUDERDALE..............  Dania..................  FL.....................  33004-3079
    STA MIAMI BEACH..................  Miami Beach............  FL.....................  33139-5101
    STA ISLAMORADA...................  Islamorada.............  FL.....................  33036-3317
    STA MARATHON.....................  Marathon...............  FL.....................  33050-2199
    STA KEY WEST.....................  Key West...............  FL.....................  33040-6695

EIGHTH DISTRICT:
    STA PANAMA CITY..................  Panama City............  FL.....................  32407-5898
    STA DESTIN.......................  Destin.................  FL.....................  32540-1289
    STA PENSACOLA....................  Pensacola..............  FL.....................  32508-5231
    STA DAUPHIN ISLAND...............  Dauphin Island.........  AL.....................  36528-4603
    STA PASCAGOULA...................  Pascaboula.............  MS.....................  39568-1228
    STA GULFPORT.....................  Gulfport...............  MS.....................  39502-1198
    STA NEW ORLEANS..................  New Orleans............  LA.....................  70124
    STA VENICE.......................  Venice.................  LA.....................  70091-9998
    STA GRAND ISLE...................  Grand Isle.............  LA.....................  70358-0158
    STA SABINE.......................  Sabine.................  TX.....................  77655-1108
    STA GALVESTON....................  Galveston..............  TX.....................  77553-1912
    STA FREEPORT.....................  Freeport...............  TX.....................  77541-8934
    STA PORT O'CONNOR................  Port O'Connor..........  TX.....................  77982-0057
    STA PORT ARANSAS.................  Port Aransas...........  TX.....................  78373
    STA SOUTH PADRE ISLAND...........  South Padre Island.....  TX.....................  78597-6497

NINTH DISTRICT:
    STA BUFFALO......................  Buffalo................  NY.....................  14203-3189
    STA NIAGARA......................  Youngstown.............  NY.....................  14174-9999
    STA ROCHESTER....................  Rochester..............  NY.....................  14617-1098
    STA OSWEGO.......................  Oswego.................  NY.....................  13126-1396
    STA ALEXANDRIA BAY...............  Wellesley Island.......  NY.....................  13640-2112
    STA ERIE.........................  Erie...................  PA.....................  16505-0130
    STA FAIRPORT.....................  Grand River............  OH.....................  44045-0038
    STA CLEVELAND HBR................  Cleveland..............  OH.....................  44114-1092
    STA LORAIN.......................  Lorain.................  OH.....................  44052
    STA MARBLEHEAD...................  Marblehead.............  OH.....................  43440-5000
    STA TOLEDO.......................  Toledo.................  OH.....................  43611-9999
    STA BELLE ISLE...................  Detroit................  MI.....................  48207-4376
    STA ST. CLAIR SHORES.............  St Clair Shores........  MI.....................  48080-1391
    STA PORT HURON...................  Port Huron.............  MI.....................  48060-2998
    STA TAWAS........................  East Tawas.............  MI.....................  48730-9506
    STA SAGINAW RIVER................  Essexville.............  MI.....................  48732-9602
    STA MARQUETTE....................  Marquette..............  MI.....................  49855-3864
    STA SAULT STE. MARIE.............  Sault Saint Marie......  MI.....................  49783-9501
    STA ST. IGNACE...................  Saint Ignace...........  MI.....................  49781-1899
    STA CHARLEVOIX...................  Charlevoix.............  MI.....................  49720-0258
    STA STURGEON BAY.................  Sturgeon Bay...........  WI.....................  54235-1099
    STA MANISTEE.....................  Manistee...............  MI.....................  49660-1315
    STA MUSKEGON.....................  Muskegon...............  MI.....................  49441-1068
    STA GRAND HAVEN..................  Grand Haven............  MI.....................  49417-1741
    STA ST. JOSEPH...................  Saint Joseph...........  MI.....................  49085-1042
    STA MICHIGAN CITY................  Sheboygan..............  WI.....................  53081-4649
    STA CALUMET HARBOR...............  Chicago................  IL.....................  60617-5197
    STA KENOSHA......................  Kenosha................  WI.....................  53140-2998
    STA MILWAUKEE....................  Milwaukee..............  WI.....................  53207-1997
    STA TWO RIVERS...................  Two Rivers.............  WI.....................  54241-3095
    STA PORTAGE......................  Dollar City............  MI.....................  49922-0350
    STA BAYFIELD.....................  Bayfield...............  WI.....................  54814-0467
    STA DULUTH.......................  Duluth.................  MN.....................  55802-2492

ELEVENTH DISTRICT:
    STA SAN DIEGO....................  San Diego..............  CA.....................  92101-1079
    STA LA/LONG BEACH................  San Pedro..............  CA.....................  90731-0208
    STA CHANNEL ISLANDS HARBOR.......  Oxnard.................  CA.....................  93035-4397
    STA MORRO BAY....................  Morro Bay..............  CA.....................  93442-1319
    STA MONTEREY.....................  Monterey...............  CA.....................  93940-1497
    STA SAN FRANCISCO................  San Francisco..........  CA.....................  94130-5013
    STA VALLEJO......................  Vallejo................  CA.....................  94590-0644
    STA GOLDEN GATE..................  Sausalito..............  CA.....................  94965-2289
    STA BODEGA BAY...................  Bodega Bay.............  CA.....................  94923-0037
    STA RIO VISTA....................  Rio Vista..............  CA.....................  94571-2099
    STA LAKE TAHOE...................  Tahoe City.............  CA.....................  96145-0882
    STA NOYO RIVER...................  Fort Bragg.............  CA.....................  95437
    STA HUMBOLDT BAY.................  Samoa..................  CA.....................  95564-9999

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT:
    STA CHETCO RIVER.................  Harbor.................  OR.....................  97415-0328
    STA COOS BAY.....................  Charleston.............  OR.....................  97420-0629
    STA UMPQUA RIVER.................  Winchester Bay.........  OR.....................  97467
    STA YAQUINA BAY..................  Newport................  OR.....................  97365-0076
    STA TILLAMOOK BAY................  Garibaldi..............  OR.....................  97118-0167
    STA CAPE DISAPPOINTMENT..........  Ilwaco.................  WA.....................  98624-0460
    STA GRAYS HARBOR.................  Westport...............  WA.....................  98595-0568
    STA QUILLAYUTE RIVER.............  La Push................  WA.....................  98350-0009
    STA NEAH BAY.....................  Neah Bay...............  WA.....................  98357-0120
    STA PORT ANGELES.................  Port Angeles...........  WA.....................  98362
    STA BELLINGHAM...................  Bellingham.............  WA.....................  98225-2940
    STA SEATTLE......................  Seattle................  WA.....................  98134-1192
    STA PORTLAND.....................  Portland...............  OR.....................  97217
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               OIL SPILLS

    Question. There were over 3,800 oil spills caused by Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, with more than 8 million gallons spilled from 
Hurricane Katrina alone. What implications do these spills have on the 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund?
    Answer. The level of funds in the OSLTF as of January 2006 was $710 
million.
    To date, there have been no Hurricane Katrina or Rita expenses 
charged to the Fund. All Katrina and Rita oil pollution response 
activities thus far have been funded by either Stafford Act funding or 
by a responsible party. The Coast Guard has received $178 million in 
Stafford Act funds for coastal zone hazardous materials response, and 
the EPA has received a similar amount for inland zone response. These 
funds are expected to be sufficient through April 30, 2006. If response 
requirements continue to be identified without additional Stafford Act 
funding, it is possible that additional response costs will be incurred 
by the OSLTF.
    A bigger threat to the OSLTF is from claims. While none have been 
received to date, third parties who have been economically damaged may 
file claims for reimbursement, as well may Natural Resource Trustees 
seek reimbursement from the Fund. Responsible Parties (RPs) who have 
spent their own money in response to the spills may also try to claim 
reimbursement for costs exceeding their limits of liability or for all 
costs using an ``Act of God'' defense. These claims would have to be 
evaluated on a case by case basis. If such claims meet the requirements 
of OPA 90 they would represent legitimate claims against the fund. It 
is unclear how much has been spent by the major refineries and other 
facility owners in their response to these hurricane related spills.
    The size and number of potential damages and Natural Resource 
Damage (NRD) claims that could impact the fund is currently difficult 
to estimate with any degree of certainty.
    If impacts to the OSLTF from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita begin to 
manifest themselves, the Coast Guard will notify DHS, OMB and Congress. 
Since claims are only paid if there are funds available, we could delay 
payment, or seek supplemental appropriations until the OSLTF is solvent 
enough to make claims payments, all other forecast assumptions 
remaining the same.
    Question. Does the Coast Guard expect to have sufficient resources 
in the Fund to address spills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as well 
as other claims?
    Answer. The size and number of potential damages and natural 
resource damages claims that could impact the OSLTF is currently 
difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty.
    If impacts to the OSLTF from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita begin to 
manifest themselves, the Coast Guard will notify DHS, OMB and Congress. 
Since claims are only paid if there are funds available, the Coast 
Guard could delay payment or seek supplemental appropriations until the 
OSLTF is solvent enough to make claims payments, all other forecast 
assumptions remaining the same.
    Question. Please provide a funding forecast chart through 2014.
    Answer. The current OSLTF forecast, anticipating the resumption of 
revenue (approximately $200 million per year), from the per barrel oil 
tax in April, 2006 as approved in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is 
projected to remain healthy if pasat trends continue and there are no 
significant Hurricane related impacts to the OSLTF (figure (a)).
    It is impossible to estimate the claims that may materialze from 
Hurricane Katrina damages, and whether the OSLTF will be statutorily-
required to pay such claims. 



                    NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

    Question. Please provide a chart of costs the Coast Guard has 
incurred in support of National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The 
chart should display the cost associated with each NSSE in which Coast 
Guard support was provided.
    Answer. The Coast Guard has not participated in any NSSEs in fiscal 
year 2006, and there are none scheduled with a maritime nexus for the 
remainder of fiscal year 2006.

                      MTSA COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS

    Question. In response to an fiscal year 2006 QFR, the Coast Guard 
asserted that it planned to begin an evaluation of its facility 
inspection efforts in June 2005, complete the field portion of the 
evaluation in September of 2005, and produce a final evaluation in 
December 2005. What conclusions were made in the final evaluation?
    Answer. Coast Guard Headquarters and Area staffs developed and made 
available an online survey to be completed by inspectors and direct 
supervisory staff involved with Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA) facility compliance examinations. The responses to questions 
directly related to compliance inspections included:
    A majority of responses (78.3 percent) indicated that unannounced 
security spot checks on facilities are more effective in determining 
compliance than full, scheduled annual examinations. As a result, 
Captains of the Port (COTPs) are more actively performing unannounced 
spot checks in addition to the scheduled annual examinations. A 
security spot check form to aid COTPs in these type inspections was 
created and made available to facility inspectors.
    83.2 percent of the respondents indicated that existing enforcement 
tools (tickets, civil penalties, etc.) are adequate to compel 
compliance with MTSA regulations.
    79.3 percent of the respondents indicated that the Coast Guard's 
compliance guide (inspection checklist for annual examinations) is a 
good resource for conducting and documenting MTSA examinations.
    83.9 percent of the respondents indicated that standardized reports 
accessible to unit personnel for tracking annual examinations, spot 
checks, and deficiencies for all MTSA facilities would be useful. As a 
result, Coast Guard Headquarters staff developed these standard 
reports, which are now available to COTPs within the Readiness 
Management System (RMS).
    79.2 percent of the respondents indicated that the overall MTSA 
facility compliance program (annual compliance examinations and random 
spot checks) is effective.
    Question. How many regulated facilities and vessels must maintain 
compliance with MTSA regulations?
    Answer. Vessels: Approximately 10,900 U.S. flag vessels comply with 
MTSA and/or International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. 
The number of foreign vessels that must comply with the regulations 
issued under the authority of MTSA includes vessels that actually visit 
the United States and meet one of the applicability criteria in the 
MTSA Regulations.
  --In 2004, 6,119 foreign vessels met that criterion.
  --In 2005, approximately 8,100 foreign vessels met that criterion
    Facilities: Approximately 3,200 facilities comply with the security 
plan requirements of MTSA. The Coast Guard conducts annual compliance 
examinations for all of these facilities to ensure continued compliance 
with their approved security plans.
    Question. How many random inspections does the Coast Guard make on 
an annual basis?
    Answer. The Coast Guard conducted 2,201 random compliance 
examinations of vessels in 2005.
    The Coast Guard conducted approximately 5,100 random security spot 
checks of U.S. facilities in calendar year 2005.
    Question. How much is included in the fiscal year 2007 budget for 
compliance inspections?
    Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 Budget request does not 
specifically identify funding for compliance inspections, however, the 
Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 Operating Expense base funding for 
Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) implementation includes $69.4 
million for vessel and facility security plan review, foreign port 
assessments and Port State Control for foreign vessel security plans. 
These activities largely (but not exclusively) support compliance 
inspections support of MTSA.

                           WORKPLACE INJURIES

    Question. The conference report accompanying fiscal year 2006 DHS 
Appropriations Act included a requirement to report on technologies for 
reducing occupational safety and health risks. That report included 
useful information on ways to reduce risk through the use of modern 
information tools. The report also lists deficiencies in these 
programs. For example, the data systems lack documentation, which means 
they can be lost and are hard to update; they are not integrated and 
they are not connected to other systems, which means that there is 
little to no opportunity for creating synergistic benefits.
    Does the fiscal year 2007 budget include the resources to correct 
these identified deficiencies? If not, what is the cost to address 
these deficiencies?
    Answer. The Department is engaged in numerous functional 
integration initiatives to provide synergies among component agencies. 
The Department's Information Technology (IT) Infrastructure 
Transformation Program (ITP), led by the Office of the Chief 
Information Officer, will integrate the IT infrastructures of the 22 
legacy components into ``One Infrastructure.'' The ITP is intended to 
eliminate duplicative and stove-piped infrastructures and provide 
common capabilities and services for all components to leverage. 
Investment in the ITP will benefit DHS component agencies by providing 
economies of scale while promoting DHS integration and improving 
information sharing and interoperability. The amount of IT investment 
funding from components to support the ITP is still under deliberation 
and any such proposal will be fully vetted with the Congress prior to 
any actions being taken.
    While the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 budget does not include 
specific resources to address the deficiencies listed in the report for 
all DHS components, it is important for DHS to work closely with the 
Coast Guard to identify solutions for reducing risk by using 
information tools that are being developed through DHS's ITP. 
Integration and appropriate documentation of data systems, human 
factors analysis systems and aviation safety systems (as discussed in 
the referenced occupational health and safety report) will be critical 
to any potential Department-wide initiatives to manage safety and 
occupational health IT systems.

                      UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
                          CAMPAIGN PROTECTION

    Question. Please provide a historical chart showing the actual 
costs for the campaign protection program. For each election since 
1968, provide the number of candidates that received Secret Service 
protection.
    Answer.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Number of      Protection
                              Year                                protectees \1\       days         Cost ($000)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004............................................................               4             553         $65,347
2000............................................................               7             673          49,233
1996............................................................               6             508          26,816
1992............................................................               7             663          35,809
1988............................................................              12           1,399          37,629
1984............................................................              11           1,152          28,547
1980............................................................              12           1,669          25,001
1976............................................................              19           2,448          16,274
1972............................................................              16           1,273           6,374
1968............................................................              16           1,222           2,981
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes spouses.

    Question. The Secret Service already has a dedicated amount of 
funding for National Security Special Events. Why does the Secret 
Service need a dedicated appropriation for Presidential Campaigns? 
Please describe the difficulties in executing the Candidate Protection 
Program under current law and how a dedicated appropriation will 
resolve those issues.
    Answer. The Secret Service receives $2.5 million annually for 
National Special Security Events (NSSE). The proposal is for a new no-
year appropriation that places NSSE funding and presidential campaign 
funding in a no-year account that is separate from the Service's annual 
funding. This proposal will allow for easier tracking of the funds, and 
will take these funds out of the annual appropriation process used to 
appropriate funding required to operate the Secret Service.
    Currently, the Secret Service budgets for Presidential Campaigns 
three out of every four fiscal years. Funding is required the year 
before the start of the Campaign to purchase equipment and to train 
personnel to work the campaign; funding is required during the campaign 
year for candidate/nominee protection, the conventions, residence 
security and other political events; the year following the main 
campaign year funding is required for the last month of candidate/
nominee protection, post election security and the Inauguration. 
Although the current method of budgeting does not pose a significant 
problem, the Presidential Campaign is a predictable mandatory workload 
increase that happens every 4 years, and because of the mandatory 
nature of this major event the Department believes that a base should 
be established to ensure that funding is available every 4 years for 
this event. By providing a base amount of funding each year in a 
separate account, only to be used for campaign activities, enough money 
will be available at the start of each campaign and throughout the 
campaign cycle. If the funding is not required, it will be non-recurred 
from the base.

                                STAFFING

    Question. What is the status of the 71 positions funded in fiscal 
year 2006?
    Answer. The Secret Service is actively recruiting to fill the 71 
positions funded in our fiscal year 2006 budget. Of the 71 positions 
funded, 51 positions are for special agents, 11 positions are for 
physical security specialists, and 9 positions are for intelligence 
research specialists. To date, (18 physical security specialist and 17 
special agents) of the 71 positions have been filled. Announcements 
advertising special agent, physical security specialist, and 
intelligence research specialist positions have been posted, and are 
being acted upon, with a number of applicants in the final stages of 
the clearance process. Further, a Nation-wide recruiting initiative 
begins in April which targets these and other positions. The Secret 
Service will have identified and made job offers for the remaining 
vacant positions by the end of the fiscal year.
    Question. When will the 71 positions be on board?
    Answer. The 71 positions should be filled by the end of fiscal year 
2006. We project that all basic training should be completed, and the 
new recruits fully operational, by the beginning of calendar year 2007.
    Question. A February 2006 report entitled, Investigative and 
Protective Workload Re-Balancing, States ``to effectively address and 
achieve the balance recommended by the Committee between the 
investigative and protective workloads, the Service would require the 
additional staffing of 675 special agents, 114 uniformed officers, and 
395 other mission critical support (MCS) personnel.'' The report states 
that this could be achieved over a 5-year period.
    What are the costs to carry out this plan?
    Answer. As part of a continual strategic planning process, and in 
an effort to address the efficiency, alignment and adequacy of its 
human capital, the Secret Service has identified workforce strategies 
and staffing requirements to keep pace with increasing work volumes, 
both protective and investigative, and minimize the impact of excessive 
overtime on our workforce.
    Although the special agent and uniformed officer positions are 
needed immediately to rebalance the field's workload and allow 
sufficient resources to continue to support existing and new protective 
operations, recruiting, background investigation, training, and 
supervisory capacity, constraints limit the number of new applicants 
the Secret Service can reasonably accommodate in a single year. The 
Secret Service proposes a measured approach, addressing staffing 
requirements over a 5-year period.
    It would take an estimated $150,000,000 to cover first year costs 
of hiring the 1,184 positions (675 special agents, 114 Uniformed 
Division officers, and 395 professionals). This is based on current 
salary and support costs levels. However, we would need to carry out 
this hiring over a number of fiscal years, and this would add to the 
total cost (outyear Federal pay raises, increased cost of health 
benefits, non-pay inflation).
    To cover the full outyear costs (annualizing the salary after the 
first year, and covering the full-performance level salaries) would 
require approximately another $95,000,000.
    Question. What are the current monthly overtime levels for special 
agents and uniformed division personnel?
    Answer. For the last full fiscal year (fiscal year 2005), overtime 
levels for average monthly overtime for special agents on protective 
details was 75 hours and 67 hours for special agents assigned to field 
offices. During this same time, uniformed officers averaged 33 hours of 
overtime per month. (Source: Tonya Gray, ADM/MNO)
    Question. How do those levels compare to other law enforcement 
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security?
    Answer. CBP response: During fiscal year 2005, CBP Border Patrol 
Agents averaged 44 hours of overtime worked per month and the 
Agriculture Officers averaged 21 hours of overtime per month.
    We continue to work with other DHS components to obtain this 
information.
    Question. How do those levels compare with other law enforcement 
agencies in the Department of Justice?
    Answer. DOJ provided the following data for uniformed law 
enforcement officers during fiscal year 2005: FBI law enforcement 
officers averaged 36 overtime hours per month; the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) officers averaged less than 1 
hour per month; and the U.S. Marshal Service officers averaged 24 hours 
per month. The fiscal year 2005 monthly overtime for non-uniformed 
agents was considerably less, with the FBI and ATF averaging less than 
2 hours per month, while the U.S. Marshal Service agents averaged 6 
hours per month.
    Question. What ratio of staffing between investigations and 
protection has the Secret Service concluded to be appropriate?
    Answer. In order to ensure field office staffing for a balanced 
workload between investigative work and protective work, the Secret 
Service has identified an optimal mix between investigations and 
protection workload at approximately 65 percent investigations to 35 
percent protection. The Secret Service has established as an optimal 
campaign year target, a 50-50 percent split of field special agent time 
devoted to investigations and protection.
    Question. What level of overtime for special agents and Uniformed 
personnel has the Secret Service concluded to be appropriate?
    Answer. In 1999, the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on Special 
Agent Retention and Workload Balancing was formed to address the 
special agent staffing needs of the Secret Service, especially the 
field (at that time, the field was devoting half of its time to 
protection and half of its time to investigations). Also at issue was 
the need to improve the quality of life of special agents. This group 
determined that an effort should be made to reduce overtime levels to 
those similar to fiscal year 1994, recommending that special agents 
work no more than 20 hours of scheduled overtime per month (above the 
standard 10-hour day that includes 2 hours of law enforcement 
availability pay). Although this level of overtime was not necessarily 
viewed as optimal, it was seen as an improvement over the average 73 
hours of overtime worked per agent per month at that time.
    In 2000, the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Secret Service 
Uniformed Division Staffing Review was formed to make recommendations 
designed to assist the Secret Service in improving retention and 
enhancing worklife for its uniformed officers. This group made several 
recommendations to address staffing levels and overtime issues. 
Included was a recommendation that the Secret Service should attempt to 
achieve a target level of 16 to 18 hours of overtime per officer per 
month.

                    NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

    Question. What is the current unobligated balance in the National 
Special Security Events Fund?
    Answer. $4,934,000 is the balance currently in this fund, and 
includes current year and carry-over funding.
    Question. For each designated NSSE over the past 3 years, what were 
the costs incurred by the Secret Service and the costs incurred by the 
other Federal agencies that provided support for the event? For 
instance, if CBP or the Coast Guard provided air support or manpower 
for a particular NSSE, what were their associated costs?
    Answer. 

    
    
    Question. Has the Secret Service reimbursed any other Federal 
agency for costs incurred to support a NSSE?
    Answer. The Secret Service budgets for known traditional protective 
events such as a political convention and the Inauguration. If one of 
these traditional events is designated an NSSE, the Secret Service 
would have funding available to pay travel and overtime costs for 
agents from other agencies and the military who are supporting the 
Service's protective mission.
    However, when events that are not traditional Secret Service events 
are designated an NSSE, the Secret Service does not reimburse other 
agencies.
    Question. Why should the Secret Service have a dedicated fund to 
pay for NSSE's when other Federal agencies that provide support for 
these events do not?
    Answer. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive #62 named the 
United States Secret Service as the lead agency for planning, 
designing, and implementing security for events designated as National 
Special Security Events (NSSEs). This Directive called for a funding 
mechanism to be created to cover the costs of this new responsibility 
within 120 days. No funding mechanism was created.
    In the past the Service has proffered several options for 
establishing funding mechanisms for providing the resources needed to 
provide security for events designated as NSSEs. These options were 
presented to various entities within the Department of the Treasury, 
particularly the Under Secretary for Enforcement, as well as the Office 
of Management and Budget. These options included permanent, indefinite 
appropriations, to be controlled by various entities, with funding 
available to all involved with providing security for these events. To 
date, none of these options has been accepted, nor has an alternative 
solution to the issue of funding these events been established.
    Question. Would a DHS Fund to cover all component NSSE costs be a 
better solution?
    Answer. By statutory authority, the Secret Service coordinates, 
plans and implements the security at National Special Security Events. 
At these events the majority of the costs are incurred by the Secret 
Service. Because many times the Secret Service does not know that an 
NSSE is going to occur in time to budget for the event, funding needs 
to be available to pay for the NSSE that occurs outside of the budget 
cycle. The Department would support any method that assures that 
funding is available to cover the expenses for providing security for 
designated NSSEs.

                                 TRAVEL

    Question. Since 2-year funding authority was provided to the Secret 
Service for protective travel, how much has the Secret Service carried 
over on a year to year basis? Provide a chart showing the carryover 
amount for each year since Congress granted the 2-year authority.
    Answer. Protective travel funds carried forward:
  --fiscal year 2001: $7,856,456
  --fiscal year 2002: $10,017,610
  --fiscal year 2003: $16,231,510
  --fiscal year 2004: $5,853,395
  --fiscal year 2005: $8,113,174
    Question. Is $18 million still an appropriate ceiling for 2-year 
travel funding?
    Answer. Yes. The Secret Service spends approximately $100 million 
per year on travel, with many employees traveling at any one time. This 
leads to numerous outstanding travel vouchers at the end of a fiscal 
year. Trying to estimate the amount of travel expenses not yet 
vouchered at the end of the fiscal year is very difficult. Without this 
2-year authority, use of limited travel dollars would be a lot less 
efficient than it is. The $18,000,000 2-year authority works very well 
for the Service.

                            ARMORED VEHICLES

    Question. How many vehicles are there in the armored vehicle 
program? Please describe a description of the fleet and the purpose 
each vehicle serves.
    Answer. This response is classified and will be provided to the 
Committee under separate cover.

                           PROTECTION FUNDING

    Question. According to the DHS End of Year Execution Report for 
fiscal year 2005, the Secret Service exceeded obligational authority 
for the Protection of Persons and Facilities program activity by 
approximately $20 million. Why hasn't a reprogramming notification been 
sent to Congress?
    Answer. The official reprogramming notification was submitted and 
has been subsequently approved by the Congress.
    Question. What measures are being put in place to better account 
for costs in this activity as they occur?
    Answer. The Service will continue to review and report to the 
Committee on Appropriations obligations by program, project, and 
activity on a monthly basis. Using this information and any additional 
information regarding what the future activity level will be, the 
Service will make assessments regarding the need for a reprogramming 
notification.
    At the point where the Service becomes aware that a notification of 
a proposed reprogramming of funding between programs, projects, and 
activities is necessary, the Service will immediately notify the 
Department. This will be followed, within two workdays, by submission 
to the Department of a letter requesting a reprogramming of funds.
    The Service will make every effort to ensure that all relevant 
information regarding the costs being incurred, and likely to be 
incurred, by program, project, and activity is gathered and analyzed. 
By doing this, we will recognize the need for a formal reprogramming 
notification at the earliest possible moment.
    Question. Please provide a list of Federal agency heads other than 
the Secretary of Homeland Security receiving Secret Service protection. 
Pursuant to Section 522 of Public Law 109-90, has the Secret Service 
entered into any agreement to perform protection for the head of a 
Federal agency other than the Secretary of Homeland Security? Please 
describe each agreement and the associated costs for each.
    Answer. The Secret Service currently provides protection to the 
Secretary of the Treasury on a reimbursable basis. A Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) has been provided to the Treasury Department from 
the Department of Homeland Security defining all costs associated with 
the Treasury Secretary's protection. The MOU estimates the 
reimbursement to the Secret Service in the amount of $4.1 million.
    Question. Please provide a list of all individuals receiving Secret 
Service protection.
    Answer. This response is classified and will be provided to the 
Committee under separate cover.

                        PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE
                       NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL

    Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act 
was signed into law on October 18, 2006 and required that, in 
accordance with the Department's implementation plan, the final 
National Preparedness Goal shall be issued by December 31, 2005. As of 
March 6, 2006 the final Goal has not been issued. Why has final 
issuance been delayed?
    Answer. The National Preparedness Goal is critical to addressing 
many of the recommendations identified by the Administration and 
Congress in the analysis of the responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, 
and Wilma. In addition, other significant recent initiatives, such as 
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza require us to ensure the 
Goal is consistent and synchronized with these initiatives. The 
Department is reviewing the Goal on an accelerated timeline in concert 
with other specific recommendations regarding, for example, the 
National Response Plan and National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The 
Interim National Preparedness Goal was released on March 31, 2005. The 
Department intends to release the final Goal within the next few 
months.
    Question. When will the final Goal be issued?
    Answer. The Department intends to release the Goal within the next 
few months.
    Question. What is the impact to State and local governments?
    Answer. State and local governments are already implementing the 
Interim National Preparedness Goal. In fiscal year 2005, grant 
recipients were required to align their homeland security strategies 
with the National Priorities contained in the Interim Goal. States and 
Urban Areas were also encouraged to adopt the capabilities-based 
approach for planning, training and exercises. The release of the Final 
Goal in the next several months will ensure these efforts reflect the 
important lessons of Hurricane Katrina, Rita and Wilma.

                         HURRICANE PAM EXERCISE

    Question. What lessons were learned from the 2004 Hurricane Pam 
Exercise and how were those lessons incorporated into the fiscal year 
2007 budget?
    Answer. As an initial matter, the President has included $20 
million in its fiscal year 2007 budget request to continue catastrophic 
disaster planning activities. This will allow FEMA to continue to 
review and enhance our operational capabilities as well as to provide 
direct technical support to certain high risk areas for localized 
catastrophic disaster planning.
    In developing the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, 
``Hurricane Pam'', a series of planning workshops were conducted in 
2004 and 2005. Planning topics considered to be the most urgent and 
complex were discussed by State and Federal representatives in the 
workshops such as hurricane pre-landfall issues, search and rescue, 
temporary medical care, sheltering, temporary housing, school 
restoration, and debris removal. Additional important topics included 
access control and reentry, billeting of Federal response workers, 
distribution of ice, water and power, donations management, external 
affairs, hazardous materials, temporary housing, temporary medical 
care, and dewatering of levee enclosed areas.
    Catastrophic planning is an iterative process and will incorporate 
products and results from the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 
Hurricane Planning effort, lessons learned from the 2005 and 2006 
hurricane seasons, and results available from the New Madrid 
catastrophic earthquake planning activities. More specifically, 
activities planned include the following:
  --Continuing the planning initiatives for the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
        and Southeast Florida and initiating catastrophic disaster 
        readiness for response and recovery for additional high-risk 
        communities;
  --Continuing the development and implementation of initiatives that 
        support the critical areas of high-risk locality planning, mass 
        care, temporary housing, decontamination, and logistical 
        support. Specific proposals within each critical area will 
        support topics such as the following;
  --Improving logistical support to include increased efficiency in 
        delivery of Federal resources;
  --Ongoing evacuation and mass care services planning with high risk 
        localities as well as cities and States that are identified as 
        potential hosts for large numbers of evacuees;
  --Training and exercises to evaluate/implement operational 
        requirements for conducting response and recovery activities in 
        contaminated areas;
  --Developing and assessing innovative housing solutions;
  --Implementing technology enhancements that support the expedited 
        application and delivery of needed assistance under the 
        Individual and Public Assistance programs; and
  --Developing strategies to enhance the engagement and coordination of 
        private sector resources in response and recovery operations.

                          GRANT DRAWDOWN RATE

    Question. By grant program, what is the award date, the obligation 
rate and the drawdown rate for funds for each quarter in fiscal year 
2005 and so far in fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. The Department's principal source of homeland security 
assistance to State, local and tribal governments is through the 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). In fiscal year 2005, the HSGP 
was comprised of the six programs--the State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the 
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), the Emergency Management 
Performance Grant (EMPG), the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS), and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP). In fiscal year 2006, the 
HSGP was comprised of the same programs with the exception of the EMPG 
program. In fiscal year 2006, the EMPG program exists as a separate 
program.
    During fiscal year 2005, the award dates for grants to the States 
and territories under the HSGP varied depending on the time required to 
review and finalize each individual grant award application. The first 
of the fiscal year 2005 HSGP grant awards were made on February 14, 
2005, with the last the fiscal year 2005 HSGP grant awards being made 
on June 1, 2005. During fiscal year 2006, only the EMPG grant awards 
have been awarded to date. Forty-seven fiscal year 2006 EMPG grant 
awards were made on February 3, 2006 and the remaining 11 fiscal year 
2006 EMPG grant awards were made on February 15, 2006. The fiscal year 
2006 HSG program awards are still pending review and final award 
decisions expected at the end of May, 2006, as stipulated by Congress.
    The charts below contain information on total award amounts, 
obligation amounts, obligation rates, drawdown amounts and drawdown 
rates by quarter for both the HSGP and the EMPG for fiscal year 2005 
and fiscal year 2006 (to date).



                           NATURAL DISASTERS

    Question. When natural disasters strike the United States each 
year, first responders go to the scene with the same equipment, 
training and exercise that they receive for terrorism.
    Has DHS considered including natural disasters as part of the risk 
criteria for grant funding distribution?
    Answer. The statutory intent of the State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) is focused on 
enhancing capabilities to address Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE), agriculture, and cyber terrorism 
incidents, therefore, natural disaster risk is not included. As many 
States and localities remain ill-prepared for the unique detection, 
prevention, and response aspects of terrorism, homeland security grant 
programs should continue their focus on terrorism-related threats--
though many of these capabilities are of great value for natural 
disaster response.
    A number of other DHS grant programs--including the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant Program, Citizen Corps Program, and the 
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program--are more all-hazard in 
nature. These programs are targeted to particular constituencies such 
as emergency management, community preparedness, or public health and 
medical communities but support preparedness activities across the full 
range of natural and manmade hazards.
    Question. What was the result, including any obstacles encountered?
    Answer. Congress has rejected language that would encourage State 
and local emergency managers to also address planning for homeland 
security threats. This may serve to perpetuate a lack of coordination 
between planning for natural disasters and terrorism-related events. In 
addition, the program has encountered difficulty in defining clear 
goals and objectives.

                    TRANSIENT POPULATIONS ACCOUNTING

    Question. How, specifically, are transient populations accounted 
for in grant programs where funds are distributed based on risk? If 
this answer is classified, please provide it in that format.
    Answer. The graphic below illustrates the risk methodology used in 
the process to determine eligibility for the fiscal year 2006 Urban 
Areas Security Initiative. In May 2005, DHS hosted a one-day 
stakeholders meeting in Washington, DC to solicit input and feedback on 
the fiscal year 2005 risk formula used to determine eligible urban 
areas and associated funding allocations for the UASI Program. Several 
of the recommendations from those stakeholders were incorporated into 
the fiscal year 2006 formula, including data on transient populations 
(e.g., tourists and commuters).



                EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS

    Question. Emergency Management Performance Grants are proposed to 
be cut by $13 million, 7 percent, in the fiscal year 2007 budget. 
Secretary Chertoff recently commented to the Emergency Managers that 
paying for State and local personnel expenses is not in the Federal 
interest. EMPG has traditionally supported personnel expenses so that 
local communities would have the manpower to plan and coordinate. 
Additionally, a report to Congress by the Secretary, entitled The 
Nationwide Plan Review, provides a status on catastrophic planning in 
all States and in the Nation's largest urban areas. Overall, States and 
large cities report they lack confidence in their own ability to manage 
catastrophic events.. Federal seed money that is matched with State and 
local dollars makes it possible to bring all the partners together 
across all disciplines of responders and all layers of government. The 
National Preparedness Integration Program proposed in the fiscal year 
2007 budget claims to make more robust the Federal side of catastrophic 
planning by using Federal Preparedness Coordinators to build and 
maintain positive relationships with identified partners.
    If local governments do not have the capacity to build an emergency 
management program, isn't it a Federal responsibility to help them?
    Answer. Fundamental to the mission of the Department of Homeland 
Security is the mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences that stem from acts of terrorism and natural disasters. 
This mission however, is a shared responsibility and a shared 
commitment of Federal, State, local and tribal governments. As a 
partner in this effort, the Federal government is assisting State and 
local jurisdictions to identify and build essential capabilities.
    As part of its effort, the Department issued the Interim National 
Preparedness Goal in March, 2005. The final Goal will be issued within 
the next several months. The Goal provides a common framework to build, 
sustain, and improve national preparedness for a broad range of threats 
and hazards, regardless of origin. Achieving the National Preparedness 
Goal requires that the emergency management discipline play a vital 
role in support of the goal, as well as the implementation of the 
levels of capability described in the Department's Target Capabilities 
List. As the coordinator for disaster response operations, the 
emergency management discipline is essential to the prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery efforts necessary when disasters or 
other incidents of national significance occur at the State and local 
level, and when Federal assistance is needed.
    The fiscal year 2007 Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) 
request is consistent with the Administration's $170 million budget 
request in fiscal year 2006. The Department continues to support the 
EMPG program's efforts to helps States achieve target levels of 
capability to sustain and enhance the effectiveness of their emergency 
management programs. The EMPG funding request for fiscal year 2007 is 
sufficient for States to continue to develop intra- and interstate 
emergency management systems that encourage partnerships among 
government, business, volunteer, and community organizations based on 
identified needs and priorities for strengthening their emergency 
management and catastrophic planning capabilities.
    Therefore, to sustain and enhance emergency management 
capabilities, including those in support of the goal, the EMPG program, 
in conjunction with the Department's other sources of homeland security 
funding for State and local jurisdictions, is designed to assist these 
jurisdictions achieve the target levels of capability to sustain and 
enhance the effectiveness of their emergency management programs.
    Question. It was stated in the fiscal year 2006 Senate Questions 
for the Record, ``Further, the integration of EMPG into the Homeland 
Security Grant Program umbrella results in synergies with other related 
homeland security assistance programs. In addition, this integration 
also has facilitated efforts by States/local jurisdictions to leverage 
homeland security assistance to accomplish goals and objectives in 
their homeland strategies.'' How specifically has this happened?
    Answer. The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) program 
was separated from the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and 
managed as a stand alone grant in fiscal year 2006 to expedite the 
Nation's emergency management community. G&T continuously evaluates its 
programs, including soliciting stakeholder feedback, to ensure that 
programs support better support Federal, State, and local goals.
    G&T is committed to ensuring that EMPG, HSGP, and other 
preparedness programs are aligned with the National Preparedness Goal 
and the National Priorities, which guide the goals and objectives in 
State and urban area homeland security strategies. EMPG funding will 
help align emergency management efforts with the Emergency Management 
Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard structure, the National Emergency 
Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program (NEMB-CAP), the 
National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).

                               CYBERSTORM

    Question. What lessons were learned from CyberStorm?
    Answer. The DHS cyber exercise team is currently compiling the 
lessons learned for our Cyber Storm Exercise After Action Report (AAR), 
but preliminary results indicate there was tremendous value gained by 
all of the participants. Cyber Storm provided a non-attribution 
controlled environment for our private sector, State, and international 
government and interagency partners to examine cyber incident response; 
information sharing mechanisms; procedures for establishing situational 
awareness; public-private sector decision making; and communicating 
appropriate information to the public during a cyber incident of 
national significance. The exercise brought together the response 
communities within the energy, information technology, 
telecommunications, and transportation sectors, as well as the National 
Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) and Interagency Incident 
Management Group (IIMG)--the interagency bodies responsible to respond 
under the Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP).
    While DHS, State governments, and many of the critical 
infrastructure owner-operators have significant experience in physical 
disaster and counter-terrorism incident response, never before have the 
cyber implications for critical infrastructure, as well as the 
collective cyber incident response community, been exercised 
simultaneously at the strategic and operational levels. The first-ever 
nature of the exercise scenario and player interaction provided a 
significant opportunity to operationalize the Cyber Annex to the NRP, 
raise awareness of the criticality of cyber preparedness at the senior 
leadership level, foster significant cross-sector collaboration, and 
identify areas that require future effort to ensure the Nation's 
preparedness. Highlights from Cyber Storm include:
  --The NCRCG and IIMG exercised their NRP responsibilities together 
        for the first time;
  --State players worked multiple and challenging scenario events not 
        normally encountered and fostered new collaboration levels with 
        the Multi State-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), 
        US-CERT, and their own emergency management structures;
  --Faced with the challenge of simultaneous events, private sector 
        players correlated incidents across sectors, with non-
        traditional partners, while concurrently responding to a robust 
        incident pace;
  --Sector ISACs stressed their operational capabilities beyond their 
        comfort zone, tested and validated prototype communication/
        situational awareness tools, and worked cross-sector 
        coordination outside of the norm; and
  --International coordination between government CERTs tested formal 
        and informal tools, thresholds, and protocols for crisis 
        communication/collaboration for the first time that will 
        provide the baseline and lessons learned for future 
        cooperation.
    The interdependencies, gaps in response structure, and positive 
cross-sector collaboration (between infrastructure sectors, Federal and 
State, international and domestic) are all critical parts of Cyber 
Storm lessons learned and will have enduring impact throughout each of 
the player communities and in the collective.
    Question. How have those lessons been incorporated into the fiscal 
year 2007 budget?
    Answer. Most of the lessons learned were process or procedurally 
focused and DHS is moving rapidly to implement suggested improvements 
and changes. For those specific instances where additional funding or 
resources are required, we will prioritize these needs within the 
budget allocation process for this year as well as out years--again 
moving with all due expediency to meet critical needs for enhanced 
cyber security.
    Based on the lessons learned during Cyber Storm, National Cyber 
Security Division (NCSD)/US-CERT is dividing the corrective actions 
into two areas: funding required and no additional funding required.
    NCSD is currently focusing on the items that can be rectified 
quickly and without additional financial investment. These immediate 
actions include, but are not limited to, procedures, policy and 
practice development, and organizational changes. Since Cyber Storm, 
US-CERT has already implemented organizational changes based on 
exercise findings regarding resource limitations found in having 
multiple facilities perform similar functions, i.e. incident handling.
    Prior to Cyber Storm, NCSD had an existing project plan to test and 
evaluate incident databases and event correlation tools for 
implementation into US-CERT operations. These technology solutions are 
expected to resolve certain exercise lessons learned and were already 
designated as projects to be funded with fiscal year 2007 funds. The 
tools being evaluated will greatly enhance US-CERT's ability to track 
incidents, provide timely and calculated responses, and assist in 
providing overall situational awareness.
    Further, NCSD/US-CERT has additional government positions that will 
be filled in the near term. These government additions will help to 
guide the existing contractor staff and program tasks to completion.

                              FIRE GRANTS

    Question. For FIRE grants, how many applications were received for 
fiscal year 2005?
    Answer. A total of 20,972 applications were received for the fiscal 
year 2005 Assistance to Firefighter Grant funds.
    Question. What was the total value of the fiscal year 2005 
requests?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2005 applications received under the fire 
grant program reflected a request for $2,642,756,563 in Federal 
dollars, though this does not reflect considerations of basic 
eligibility or how such applications would have been scored in the peer 
review process.
    Question. How many applications were funded and at what dollar 
value?
    Answer. To date, under the fiscal year 2005 fire grant program, 
5,731 of the applications received, totaling $586,377,025.00 in Federal 
dollars have been funded. As of this date, $21 million in fiscal year 
2005 funding remained available for award.
    Question. Describe what first responder missions have been 
accomplished (using measurable benchmarks) in fiscal year 2004 through 
fiscal year 2005, that justifies the proposed $252 million (46 percent) 
cut in fiscal year 2007.
    Answer. Since the programs beginning in fiscal year 2001, the fire 
grant program has provided nearly $2.5 billion to local fire 
departments. The program has not developed any benchmarks that directly 
measure the impact of the program at the local or national level.

                                 SAFER

    Question. For SAFER grants, how many applications were received for 
fiscal year 2005?
    Answer. The Department has received 2,985 applications under the 
fiscal year 2005 SAFER grant program.
    Question. What was the total value of the fiscal year 2005 
requests?
    Answer. Applications received under the fiscal year 2005 SAFER 
program requested a total of $1,145,822,782 in Federal dollars, though 
this does not reflect considerations of basic eligibility or how such 
applications would have been scored. The non-Federal cost (local 
contribution) share of the grant requests brings the total to 
$2,889,274,945.
    Question. How many applications were funded and at what dollar 
value?
    Answer. To date, the Department has funded 137 of the fiscal year 
2005 SAFER applications received totaling $61,356,528.00 in Federal 
dollars. Several decisions are still pending and it is anticipated that 
the total amount of grants will be near the program's $65 million 
appropriation.

                        INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS

    Question. How will DHS coordinate with the Department of Commerce 
on the interoperability grant program authorized in the fiscal year 
2006 Budget reconciliation package?
    Answer. In order to implement the interoperability grant program, 
the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) within DHS and National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), located 
within the Department of Commerce are discussing options to determine 
the most efficient way to administer this grant program. One option 
under consideration is to delegate administration of the program 
through an Inter-Agency Agreement to G&T. This would leverage existing 
capabilities of G&T for administering grant awards to State and local 
units of government since 1998, and build on DHS initiatives to 
strengthen interoperable communications.
    Question. Will DHS recommend beginning the program in fiscal year 
2007?
    Answer. The specific timing of the program has not been determined 
as the ``borrowing authority'' is based on projected auction receipts, 
but initial implementation could begin in fiscal year 2007.

                            INTEROPERABILITY

    Question. What progress has been made on Interoperability standards 
since April 2005?
    Answer. Since April 2005, the Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) SAFECOM program, in partnership with the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Justice's 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), have been working with industry 
and the public safety community to accelerate the development of 
Project 25 (P25) standards. Since that time, both the pace and scope of 
standards development activities have increased dramatically. Basic 
protocol standards that specify the functionality and capability of 
these interfaces have now been completed and are being adopted.
    The following list defines three of the standards and summarizes 
progress as of March 2006:
  --Inter-RF Subsystem Interface (ISSI).--The ISSI enables different 
        manufacturers' radio subsystems to interoperate and allows for 
        radios to roam from one system to another. Completion of the 
        ISSI is progressing rapidly with Telecommunications Industry 
        Association (TIA) balloting of a key ISSI protocol standard 
        achieved in January 2006 and completion of the standard 
        expected in March 2006. The public safety community can expect 
        ISSI products to be available in 2007.
  --Fixed/Base Station Subsystem Interface (FSSI).--The FSSI enables 
        voice and control information to be transferred between a base 
        station and radio subsystem or dispatcher's console. A 
        completed FSSI standard was approved publication as a TIA 
        standard in January 2006. The public safety community can 
        expect FSSI products to be available in late 2006.
  --Console Subsystem Interface (CSSI).--The CSSI connects a 
        dispatcher's console to the radio subsystem and allows voice 
        and control information to be transferred between the two. 
        Further development of the CSSI is dependent on completion of 
        the ISSI and FSSI protocol specification standards. The public 
        safety community can expect CSSI products to be available in 
        2007.
    Question. What are the impediments to establishing such standards?
    Answer. Time is the most significant impediment to the development 
and establishment of interoperability standards. The National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-113) 
requires that Federal agencies and departments use technical standards 
that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. 
The process for developing such voluntary consensus standards is quite 
rigorous and lengthy.
    OMB Circular No. A-119 defines the process by which the voluntary 
consensus standards body reaches consensus. The process is designed to 
allow for openness, balance of interest, due process, an appeals 
process, and consensus, which is defined as ``general agreement, but 
not necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to 
resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all comments have 
been fairly considered, each objector is advised of the disposition of 
his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body 
members are given an opportunity to change their votes after reviewing 
the comments.'' While designed to ensure quality, this process takes 
considerable time.
    Question. Is there a measure to determine if local, State and 
Federal entities are more interoperable than previously? If so, how is 
this measured?
    Answer. G&T and the SAFECOM program worked together to ensure that 
a tactical-level emergency interoperable communications capacity is 
developed and tested in 77 urban areas in the Nation. This initiative 
builds on an effort led by SAFECOM and G&T in fiscal year 2004 called 
RapidCom that focused on achieving tactical-level emergency 
interoperable communications in ten major urban areas. The fiscal year 
2005 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) requires each Urban Area 
(77 Total) to develop a Tactical Communications Plan (TICP). For those 
States and territories that do not have a designated urban area they 
must designate a multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area or region as a 
substitute. There are a total of 77 Urban Areas and multi-jurisdictions 
metropolitan areas that are required to submit a TICP. The TICP must be 
submitted by May 1, 2006 and these plans will undergo a review process 
led by subject matter experts, Federal officials, and peers. Once the 
review process has been completed each Urban Areas and multi-
jurisdiction metropolitan areas will then have to test their plan via 
an exercise. At the conclusion of the exercise, an after action reports 
(AAR) will be created to present clearly the issues the public safety 
community must address to achieve meaningful communication 
interoperability. This AAR is a review of the major issues identified 
during the exercise and it will contain a list of recommendations to 
improve regional communication and interoperability. Included in the 
AAR, as an appendix, will be an improvement plan which will document 
specific steps the region can take to improve their interoperability. 
Through the TICP, exercise, and subsequent AAR process, the Department 
can examine potential shortfalls, fill communication gaps, and improve 
communication interoperability.

                   FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS COORDINATORS

    Question. How many Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPC) are 
currently on board? How long have they been on board?
    Answer. The Federal Preparedness Coordinator is a new position and, 
currently, there are no FPCs ``on board.''
    Question. Where are they located and what are their 
responsibilities?
    Answer. The current plan calls for there to be 11 Federal 
Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs). Ten of them will be based in FEMA 
Regional office cities, and co-located with the FEMA regional offices. 
The 11 FPC will be the Director of the Office of National Capital 
Region Coordination, who will be dual-hatted as an FPC and continue to 
be based in the Office of National Capital Region Coordination.
    FPCs are responsible for coordinating a wide spectrum of Federal, 
State, and local domestic incident planning, preparedness, and 
relationship-building activities in advance of any specific threat or 
incident. On a day-to-day basis, the FPC will undertake a range of 
activities to ensure that all homeland security partners within the 
FPC's assigned geographic areas of responsibility are prepared for an 
Incident of National Significance. The area of responsibility for each 
FPC will be the urban area where he or she is based, as well as other 
high-risk and high-population urban areas in the vicinity. This means 
that all Urban Area Security Initiative metropolitan areas in the 
country will have an FPC responsible for coordinating preparedness 
activities.
    The FPC's specific responsibilities related to preparedness will be 
to:
  --Contingency Plan Review.--Coordinate with a preparedness assessment 
        work group for the review of urban area contingency and 
        continuity of operations plans--and lead any subsequent follow-
        up action needed--per direction contained in HR 2360, to 
        ``report on the status of catastrophic planning, including mass 
        evacuation planning in all 50 States and the 75 largest urban 
        areas.''
  --Preparedness Review and Monitoring.--Assess the status of 
        preparedness in their areas of responsibility in accordance 
        with the National Preparedness Goal and guidance provided by 
        the Secretary and U/S for Preparedness.
  --Exercise Coordination and Review.--Coordinate planning for, and 
        participate in, local, regional, and national-level homeland 
        security exercises and drills.
  --Establish Local Relationships.--Build relationships with key 
        stakeholders (DHS operational elements, other Federal agencies, 
        State and local government officials, and the private sector).
  --Situational Awareness.--Maintain situational awareness of available 
        resources and capabilities, existing operations, and possible 
        threats in the FPC's areas of responsibility.
  --Public Communications.--Serve as a preparedness public 
        communications focal point for DHS in the assigned areas of 
        responsibility.
  --Special Event Planning.--Coordinate local area Federal support for 
        designated Level I and Level II Homeland Security Special 
        Events occurring within the FPC areas of responsibility.
  --Incident Response Planning.--Coordinate resource and operational 
        planning in preparation for incident response, in concert with 
        the FEMA Regional Director, and other Federal, State, local, 
        tribal and private sector partners.
    Question. Are they co-located with other DHS or government 
employees?
    Answer. Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) will be co-located 
with FEMA regional offices. (Except for within the Office of National 
Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC), where the Director of the NCRC 
will be dual-hatted as an FPC.) In addition, each FPC will have a small 
staff, including detailees from across DHS, who will also be based in 
the FEMA Regional Offices. It is expected that FPCs will be integrated 
with DOD liaisons who will also work out of FEMA regional offices.
    Question. Do they coordinate or work with other DHS or government 
employees? If so, how and what specific results have come from the 
coordination?
    Answer. DHS Directorate for Preparedness field staff will work 
closely with the 11 Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) and their 
staffs, particularly the Office of Infrastructure Protection Protective 
Security Advisors (PSAs) and the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) 
Preparedness Liaison Officers. PSAs will have a ``dotted-line'' 
reporting relationship to the FPCs, while the G&T Preparedness Liaison 
Officers will maintain their existing reporting relationships but 
collaborate closely with the FPCs and their staff. This will allow FPCs 
to be the lead Directorate for Preparedness staff in the field and be 
the primary interface for preparedness issues with State, local, and 
tribal governments as well as the private sector.
    In addition, FPCs will work closely with FEMA Regional Directors to 
ensure that, in the event of an incident, DHS would have a unified 
response team in place based on pre-established relationships. The 
importance of the relationship between the FPCs and FEMA Regional 
Directors is demonstrated by the fact that FPCs will be co-located in 
FEMA regional offices. The FPCs will work to leverage the efforts of 
FEMA Regional staffs, trusted relationships, and individual points of 
contact. FEMA Regional Directors are responsible for maintenance of 
Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) and Regional Interagency 
Steering Committees (RISCs) under the NRP. These resources can provide 
an abundance of information both during the planning and preparedness 
stages which will be the primary focus of the FPCs, as well as during 
incident response.
    Absent a specific threat or incident, the FPC will help to 
coordinate preparedness activities across DHS components and missions 
within his or her areas of responsibility. It is important that the FPC 
coordinate with and leverage key DHS field component entities: FEMA, 
Preparedness Liaison Officers, Protective Security Advisors, ICE, CBP, 
TSA, USCG, and USSS. The FPC plan recognizes the need to preserve 
existing DHS component entity field relationships and agency statutory 
roles. Therefore, existing component organizational structures, 
reporting relationships, and chains of command will not be changed by 
the introduction of FPCs.
    Outside of DHS, efforts will be made to build relationships with 
local Federal representatives with a focus on key NRP signatory 
agencies. Many of these agencies will have a large role in the Joint 
Field Office during an incident, and pre-existing relationships will 
prove highly beneficial. More specifically, FPCs will initiate 
relationships with two distinct entities within their areas of 
responsibility--the members of the RISC and the Federal Executive Board 
(FEB). Each of these bodies offers the FPC the perspective of key 
officials who support Federal incident management efforts.
    The FPC will also make a focused effort to build a strong 
relationship with the local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Health and Human Services (HHS) 
officials, the U.S. Attorney's Office, ATAC, Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF), and the Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Coordinating 
Officer (DCO). The DCO will be a conduit to U.S. Northern Command's 
(NORTHCOM) Joint Task Force (JTF) or JTF commander in the absence of an 
established JTF.
    The FPC will participate, as appropriate, in deliberations and 
crisis planning with NORTHCOM staff elements leveraging the DCO 
relationship where feasible. The FPC will, where appropriate, 
coordinate with DOD, other Federal, State, tribal, local and private 
sector stakeholders to ensure contingency plans are appropriately 
aligned.
    This interaction between the FPC and other locally-based DHS 
components, as well as other Federal partner agencies, will enable the 
FPC to leverage the capabilities of many important locally-based 
Federal assets in support of developing integrated and synchronized 
preparedness activities across the country.
    Question. How will the proposed new initiative, the National 
Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP), relate to the current FPCs?
    Answer. Specifically the NPIP includes about $7.5 million for FPC 
related activities at the local level. The mission of the NPIP is to 
create, organize, enable and monitor initiatives to integrate and 
synchronize national preparedness. The FPCs will play a key role in 
achieving that mission given that National preparedness is only 
possible when Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private 
sector and the American people are working collectively toward a shared 
goal of enhanced preparedness.
    Through the NPIP, FPCs will provide DHS with an important and 
functional field presence to collaborate and build partnerships with 
State and local government, and private sector homeland security 
stakeholders within the FPC's assigned geographic areas of 
responsibility and to ensure that these stakeholders are working 
together and are thoroughly prepared. Currently, such field level 
coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and DHS does not have always 
have visibility into how high-risk areas are prepared to deal with 
homeland security incidents.
    FPCs will change that by providing vehicles for regular 
coordination, strengthening the linkages between officials responsible 
for responding to possible homeland security incidents. Our Nation 
cannot afford for Federal, State and local government officials to have 
to build working relationships and common approaches to incident 
management amidst the fog of a major incident--such as Hurricane 
Katrina or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Instead, these relationships 
need to be built through frequent collaboration during steady State 
activities, as well as through common, well-understood, and practiced 
approaches to incident response prior to such an approach being needed.

                          TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

    Question. How many times has technical assistance been requested 
and for what purpose?
    Answer. Beginning in fiscal year 2005 to present (October 1, 2004-
February 28, 2006), the Technical Assistance Division (TAD) of the 
Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has 
received 872 Technical Assistance (TA) Delivery Requests. Of these 
requests, 857 TA services were delivered as follows:
  --1 Arch Angel TA;
  --104 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) TA;
  --8 Chemical Protective Clothing TA;
  --15 Continuity of Operations Planning and Continuity of Government 
        (COOP/COG) TA;
  --6 Critical Infrastructure Mitigation (CIM);
  --6 Data Review Project Technical Assistance;
  --249 Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program 
        (DPETAP);
  --2 Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) TA;
  --2 Emergency Response Synchronization Matrix TA;
  --9 Enhancing Grants Management Capacities for State Administrative 
        Agencies (SAAs) TA;
  --3 Fusion Process Pilot Orientation TA;
  --7 Initial Strategy Implementation Plan (ISIP) TA;
  --209 Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program 
        (ICTAP);
  --1 Mayoral Workshop;
  --1 Prevention and Deterrence Surveillance Concepts TA;
  --6 Prevention and Deterrence TA;
  --54 Program and Capability Review (PCR) TA;
  --14 Public Information Plan Development TA;
  --4 Regional Response Planning TA;
  --3 Regionalization Support TA;
  --42 Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Orientation and TA;
  --4 Terrorism Incident Annex (TIA) TA;
  --51 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP);
  --53 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Port and Mass Transit TA 
        Program; and
  --4 UASI Regional Planning TA.
    Question. Have any applications for technical assistance been 
refused? If so, why?
    Answer. Of the requests received during this time (October 1, 2004-
February 28, 2006), the Technical Assistance Division (TAD) of the 
Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has 
referred a small number of requests to other entities better suited to 
respond to the nature of the request, and has been unable to fulfill 
fifteen requests for technical assistance.
    Ten requests for DPETAP services have not been fulfilled in fiscal 
year 2006 as G&T has directed a higher proportion of its funding to 
grants. In addition, 5 requests for ICTAP service deliveries were not 
fulfilled due to the fact that the requests were submitted from the 
State level and the tactical program is funded to support only Urban 
and metropolitan areas.

                               EXERCISES

    Question. How many exercises has the Preparedness Directorate been 
involved in? When, where and what was exercised? Who else participated 
(i.e. local, State, Federal partners)?
    Answer. The Preparedness Directorate has participated in 67 major 
exercises since February 25, 2003. Table A: ``Preparedness Directorate 
Exercises'' (below), is a listing of the 67 exercises by name, date of 
exercise, location, topic of exercise, and scope of participation. In 
addition to these major events, the Preparedness Directorate has 
provided direct support to more than 200 State and local exercises over 
the same period, including workshops, seminars, drills, tabletop 
exercises, command post exercises, and full-scale exercises.

                                                                          TABLE A.--PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE EXERCISES
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               No                               Exercise name                            Date                 Location             What was exercised?                 Who participated?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Fiscal year 2006

67.............................  Red, White, and Bloom......................  July 3, 2006.............  Columbus, OH.....  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                             the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                             Communications Plan of Columbus,   evaluators
                                                                                                                             OH.
66.............................  Regions I & II Hurricane Preparedness Exer-  June 20-22, 2006.........  New York, NY.....  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                   cise.                                                                                     functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                             2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                partners
65.............................  Operation Wildcat..........................  June 20, 2006............  Wilmington, DE...  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                             the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                             Communications Plan of             evaluators
                                                                                                                             Wilmington, DE.
64.............................  Dallas/Ft. Worth Exercise..................  June 20, 2006............  Arlington, TX....  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                             the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                             Communications Plan of Dallas,     evaluators
                                                                                                                             TX and Ft. Worth TX.
63.............................  College World Series Exercise..............  June 20, 2006............  Omaha, NE........  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                             the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                             Communications Plan of Omaha, NE.  evaluators
62.............................  Top Officials (TOPOFF) 4 Command Post        June 19-23...............  National Capital   WMD search and render safe;        Federal Interagency; State,
                                  Exercise.                                                               Region.            Continuity of Operations/          local, non-governmental
                                                                                                                             Continuity of Government;          organization, and private sector
                                                                                                                             Catastrophic incident response.    partners
61.............................  Annual Airport Disaster Exercise...........  June 8, 2006.............  Nashville, TN....  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                             the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                             Communications Plan of             evaluators
                                                                                                                             Nashville, TN.
60.............................  South Carolina Hurricane Isabella Full-      June 7, 2006.............  Charleston/        DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                  Scale Exercise.                                                         Dorchester/        the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                          Berkeley           Communications Plan of             evaluators
                                                                                                          Counties, SC.      Charleston, SC.
59.............................  Region II Hurricane Preparedness Exercise    June 4-5, 2006...........  San Juan, PR.....  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                  (PR, VI).                                                                                  functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                             2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                partners
58.............................  Regional IV Hurricane Preparedness Exercise  May 31-June 1, 2006......  Atlanta, GA......  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                             functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                             2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                partners
57.............................  Operation Helping Hand.....................  May 24, 2006.............  Los Angeles        DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                          County, CA.        the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                             Communications Plan of Los         evaluators
                                                                                                                             Angeles and Long Beach, CA.
56.............................  New Orleans/Baton Rouge Full-Scale Exercise  May 23-25, 2006..........  Baton Rouge, LA..  Full-Scale Exercise to prepare     Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                             for hurricane season; DHS-         agencies; Preparedness
                                                                                                                             mandated exercise to validate      Directorate evaluators
                                                                                                                             the Tactical Interoperable
                                                                                                                             Communications Plans of New
                                                                                                                             Orleans, LA and Baton Rouge, LA.
55.............................  Region VI Hurricane Preparedness Exercise..  May 17-18, 2006..........  New Orleans, LA..  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                             functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                             2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                partners
54.............................
53.............................  Region III Hurricane Preparedness Exercise.  May 3, 2006..............  Philadelphia, PA.  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                             functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                             2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                partners
52.............................  Gallant Fox IV Tabletop....................  March 6, 2006............  National Capital   Pentagon Force Protection          Federal, State and local agencies
                                                                                                          Region.            Exercise designed to practice
                                                                                                                             and test Federal, State, and
                                                                                                                             local response to an incident
                                                                                                                             involving the Pentagon and
                                                                                                                             surrounding region.
51.............................  Blue Cascades..............................  March 1-2, 2006..........  U.S. Pacific       Infrastructure interdependencies   United States and Canadian
                                                                                                          Northwest.         in the Pacific Northwest region.   Federal, State/Provincial, local
                                                                                                                                                                and private sector agencies
50.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral IV................  Feb. 21-24, 2006.........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                             interagency information needs
                                                                                                                             through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                             capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                             spectrum of threat environments.
49.............................  Mass Casualty Exercise.....................  Feb. 9, 2006.............  National Capital   Designed to assess and identify    Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            gaps in the U.S. Government's
                                                                                                                             (USG) ability to mount a
                                                                                                                             coordinated medical response to
                                                                                                                             a mass casualty event.
48.............................  Cyberstorm 2006............................  Feb. 6-10, 2006..........  National Capital   Homeland Security response and     International, Federal, State,
                                                                                                          Region             recovery mechanisms related to a   local, and Private Sector
                                                                                                          (geographically    cyber incident of national
                                                                                                          dispersed          significance.
                                                                                                          effects).
47.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral III...............  Jan. 23-27, 2006.........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                             interagency information needs
                                                                                                                             through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                             capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                             spectrum of threat environment.
46.............................  Catastrophic Assessment Task Force #1......  Dec. 10, 2005............  National Capital   Assess USG policy and resources    Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            as they relate to an influenza
                                                                                                                             pandemic.
45.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral II................  Dec. 5-9, 2005...........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                             interagency information needs
                                                                                                                             through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                             capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                             spectrum of threat environments.
44.............................  Avian Flu Public Affairs Exercise..........  Dec. 1, 2005.............  National Capital   Designed to assess public affairs- Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            specific departmental
                                                                                                                             preparedness, roles and
                                                                                                                             responsibilities, and inter-
                                                                                                                             departmental coordination
                                                                                                                             relative to Pandemic Avian
                                                                                                                             Influenza.
43.............................  IIMG Pandemic Influenza....................  Nov. 29, 2005............  National Capital   Interagency coordination issues    Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            related to preparing for,
                                                                                                                             responding to, and recovering
                                                                                                                             from a pandemic influenza
                                                                                                                             outbreak.
42.............................  DHS Avian Flu Exercise.....................  Nov. 18, 2005............  National Capital   Designed to assess departmental    Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            preparedness, roles and
                                                                                                                             responsibilities, and inter-
                                                                                                                             departmental coordination
                                                                                                                             relative to Pandemic Avian
                                                                                                                             Influenza.
41.............................  Determined Challenge.......................  Nov. 7-30, 2005..........  National Capital   Department and Agency (D/A)        Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            Continuity of Operations (COOP)
                                                                                                                             preparedness.
40.............................  Mercury 05.................................  Oct. 17-21, 2005.........  Australia........  Australian multi-jurisdictional    Australian National and State/
                                                                                                                             prevention and response            Territory agencies
                                                                                                                             capabilities; terrorism threats/
                                                                                                                             attacks.
        Fiscal year 2005

39.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral II................  Sept. 12-16, 2005........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                             interagency information needs
                                                                                                                             through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                             capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                             spectrum of threat environments.
38.............................
37.............................  Coalition Warrior Interoperability           May 31-June 24, 2005.....  National Capital   U.S. combatant command and         Federal
                                  Deliverable 2005.                                                       Region.            international community
                                                                                                                             investigation of command,
                                                                                                                             control, communications, and
                                                                                                                             computers (C4) solutions that
                                                                                                                             focus on relevant and timely
                                                                                                                             objectives for enhancing
                                                                                                                             coalition interoperability.
36.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-4.............  May 26, 2005.............  National Capital   Focused on continuity programs     Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            against the backdrop of a
                                                                                                                             credible nuclear threat/incident.
35.............................  Top Officials 3 (T3) Large Scale Game......  May 3-5, 2005............  National Capital   Designed to explore strategies to  International, Federal, State,
                                                                                                          Region.            positively address the medium-     Tribal, and local governments
                                                                                                                             and long-term impacts and          and private sector
                                                                                                                             recovery issues from an Incident
                                                                                                                             of National Significance.
34.............................  T3 Full Scale Exercise.....................  April 4-8, 2005..........  National Capital   Prevention and response in the     International, Federal, State,
                                                                                                          Region.            context of a chemical and          Tribal, and local governments
                                                                                                                             biological attack on U.S. soil;    and private sector
                                                                                                                             included cyber activity.
33.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-3.............  Mar. 10, 2005............  National Capital   Critical homeland security policy  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            and operational issues in the
                                                                                                                             context of a chemical event.
32.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-2.............  Feb. 15, 2005............  National Capital   Critical homeland security policy  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            and operational issues in the
                                                                                                                             context of a biological even.
31.............................  Port of NY/NJ Economic Strategy Wargame....  Feb. 9-11, 2005..........  New York.........  Designed to better define the      Federal, State, local and private
                                                                                                                             primary issues of concern for      sector
                                                                                                                             private industry when national
                                                                                                                             security issues arise within a
                                                                                                                             vital economic arena.
30.............................  Chemical Security Exercise.................  Feb. 1-2, 2005...........  National Capital   Vulnerabilities and threats to     Private sector
                                                                                                          Region.            chemical infrastructures.
29.............................  Silver Links Tabletop......................  Dec. 1, 2004.............  Toronto, Canada..  Regional, cross-border             United States and Canadian
                                                                                                                             infrastructure interdependencies   Federal, State/Provincial,
                                                                                                                             and associated vulnerabilities     local, and private Sector
                                                                                                                             in the Great Lakes/Northeast       agencies
                                                                                                                             Region.
28.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-01............  Nov. 10, 2004............  National Capital   Critical homeland security policy  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            and operational issues generated
                                                                                                                             by a hypothetical terrorist
                                                                                                                             suicide bombing campaign in the
                                                                                                                             United States.
27.............................  Corporate Emergency Exercise...............  Nov. 4, 2004.............  Baytown, TX......  Private Sector coordination with   Private sector
                                                                                                                             DHS during a terrorism incident
                                                                                                                             at a chemical facility.
26.............................  Silver Links Workshop......................  Nov. 4, 2004.............  Quebec City,       Regional, cross-border             United States and Canadian
                                                                                                          Quebec.            infrastructure interdependencies   Federal, State/Provincial,
                                                                                                                             and associated vulnerabilities     local, and private Sector
                                                                                                                             in the Great Lakes/Northeast       agencies
                                                                                                                             Region.
25.............................  Purple Crescent II.........................  Oct. 26-27, 2004.........  New Orleans, LA..  Regional interdependency           Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                                             shortfalls aimed at making the     sector
                                                                                                                             New Orleans region disaster
                                                                                                                             resistant.
24.............................  Multilateral Cybersecurity Conference......  Oct. 20-22, 2004.........  Berlin, Germany..  Designed to discuss and highlight  International (15 countries)
                                                                                                                             issues related to the formation
                                                                                                                             of a Global Watch and Warning
                                                                                                                             Network among national level
                                                                                                                             cyber security organizations.
        Fiscal year 2004

23.............................  National Capital Region Council of           Sept. 27, 2004...........  National Capital   National Capital Region's          Federal, State and local
                                  Governments.                                                            Region.            capability to respond to
                                                                                                                             multiple simulated weapons of
                                                                                                                             mass destruction (WMD) terrorist
                                                                                                                             attacks.
22.............................  Senior Officials Exercise #4...............  Aug. 19, 2004............  National Capital   Impacts of a ``Redo'' threat       Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            condition, anticipating and
                                                                                                                             minimizing unintended
                                                                                                                             consequences associated with
                                                                                                                             going tom ``Red,'' and
                                                                                                                             developing an Interagency
                                                                                                                             Incident Management Group (IIMG)
                                                                                                                             ``playbook'' for elevating the
                                                                                                                             Homeland Security Advisory
                                                                                                                             System (HSAS) to ``Red.''.
21.............................  Determined Promise 04......................  Aug. 4-5, 2004...........  Richmond, VA.....  Prevention and response in the     Federal, State and local
                                                                                                                             context of air threats to
                                                                                                                             Alaska, Canada, and the
                                                                                                                             continental U.S., chemical
                                                                                                                             attacks in VA and CA, and a
                                                                                                                             radiological release in CA.
20.............................  Cybersecurity Workshop.....................  Aug. 4-5, 2004...........  National Capital   Courses of actions among           Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            organizations involved in
                                                                                                                             responding to cyber attacks.
19.............................
18.............................  Joint Warrior Interoperability Deliverable.  June 14-25, 2004.........  National Capitol   Designed to give Federal D/As the  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            opportunity to view and assess
                                                                                                                             technologies that allow for
                                                                                                                             interagency information sharing.
17.............................  Cascade Fury II............................  May 25-27, 2004..........  Alta, Wyoming....  Coordinated crisis management      Federal and State
                                                                                                                             support to quickly restore the
                                                                                                                             transportation infrastructure in
                                                                                                                             the event of a major disaster or
                                                                                                                             emergency.
16.............................  Forward Challenge 04.......................  May 11-13, 2004..........  National Capital   Federal COOP Plans in the context  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            of a failed terrorist attack in
                                                                                                                             the National Capital Region.
15.............................  T3 CPX.....................................  May 10-13, 2004..........  National Capital   Designed to give key leadership    Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            the opportunity to analyze
                                                                                                                             threats and direct prevention
                                                                                                                             counter measures, protect
                                                                                                                             economic security and critical
                                                                                                                             infrastructures, and develop
                                                                                                                             appropriate Courses of Action.
14.............................  Eligible Receiver..........................  May 3-7, 2004............  National Capital   Designed to exercise the           Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            Interagency in homeland defense
                                                                                                                             and homeland security processes
                                                                                                                             in the context of a nuclear
                                                                                                                             threat.
13.............................  California Spills of National Significance.  Apr. 20-22, 2004.........  California.......  Initial National Response Plan     Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                                             (NRP) and the National Incident    sector
                                                                                                                             Management System. Other key
                                                                                                                             areas that were addressed:
                                                                                                                             economic, national security,
                                                                                                                             cross border, and political
                                                                                                                             issues.
12.............................  Dark Portal................................  Feb. 24, 2004............  National Capital   Designed to address the potential  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            impact of a combination of cyber
                                                                                                                             and physical attacks against
                                                                                                                             various critical infrastructures
                                                                                                                             with the intent to undermine
                                                                                                                             domestic and international
                                                                                                                             confidence in the U.S. banking
                                                                                                                             and finance sector.
11.............................  Thor's Hammer Wargame......................  Feb. 23-27, 2004.........  National Capital   National Security Space--concept   Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            of operations (CONOPS) and
                                                                                                                             investment strategy.
10.............................  Unified Defense 04.........................  Feb. 14-15, 2004.........  National Capital   DHS incident management roles and  Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            responsibilities as defined in
                                                                                                                             Homeland Security Presidential
                                                                                                                             Directive-5 and validation of
                                                                                                                             the Initial NRP and National
                                                                                                                             Information Management System
                                                                                                                             (NIMS).
9..............................  Senior Officials Exercise #2...............  Jan. 30, 2004............  National Capital   Designed to review plans that      Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            will guide a Federal response to
                                                                                                                             a catastrophic WMD event in a
                                                                                                                             U.S. City.
8..............................  Operation Heartland........................  Jan. 27-26, 2004.........  National Capital   Policy-level issues inherent to a  Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                          Region.            terrorist attack on critical       sector
                                                                                                                             transportation infrastructure
                                                                                                                             focusing on the entire spectrum
                                                                                                                             of security.
7..............................  Scarlet Cloud II...........................  Dec. 19, 2003............  National Capital   Management and response in the     Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            context of a biological
                                                                                                                             terrorist incident including:
                                                                                                                             the application of Federal
                                                                                                                             authorities, movement
                                                                                                                             restrictions, issues in
                                                                                                                             implementing a mass prophylaxis
                                                                                                                             effort, and public risk
                                                                                                                             communication and fostering
                                                                                                                             critical continuing public
                                                                                                                             support.
6..............................  Scarlet Cloud..............................  Nov. 19, 2003............  National Capital   Management and response in the     Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            context of a biological
                                                                                                                             terrorist incident including:
                                                                                                                             the application of Federal
                                                                                                                             authorities, movement
                                                                                                                             restrictions, issues in
                                                                                                                             implementing a mass prophylaxis
                                                                                                                             effort, and public risk
                                                                                                                             communication and fostering
                                                                                                                             critical continuing public
                                                                                                                             support.
5..............................  Livewire...................................  Oct. 27-31, 2004.........  National Capital   Existing communications and        Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                          Region.            decision-making processes needed   sector
                                                                                                                             to counter a well-planned, large-
                                                                                                                             scale cyber attack.
        Fiscal year 2003

4..............................  Determined Promise 03......................  Aug. 18-28, 2003.........  NV, CO, National   Designed to train USNORTHCOM in    Federal
                                                                                                          Capital Re-        homeland defense and Military
                                                                                                          gion.              Assistance to Civil Authorities
                                                                                                                             (MACA) missions.
3..............................  Top Officials 2............................  May 12-16, 2003..........  Seattle, WA,       Response to a simulated release    International, Federal, State and
                                                                                                          Chicago, IL.       of WMDs in two U.S. cities.        local
2..............................  IAIP Tabletop Exercise.....................  Mar. 11, 2003............  National Capital   Coordination, integration, and     Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            information sharing processes
                                                                                                                             and responsibilities.
1..............................  IAIP Watch Exercise........................  Feb. 25, 2003............  National Capital   Coordination processes between     Federal
                                                                                                          Region.            the organizations making up and
                                                                                                                             supporting the IAIP and to
                                                                                                                             validate the IW/IC Standard
                                                                                                                             Operating Procedure (SOP)
                                                                                                                             document.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     FIRE SERVICE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

    Question. What is the current status of updating the national needs 
assessment for the Fire Service?
    Answer. The original needs assessment was published in December 
2002. A second study was requested in the 2005 appropriations. This 
study consists of 2 parts: the new national needs assessment and a 
matching analysis of Assistance to Firefighter Grants to needs 
identified in the 2002 study. The U.S. Fire Administration is 
completing final revisions to the needs assessment.

                      DETECTION OF ANIMAL DISEASES

    Question. What capacity do we have as a Nation to do animal disease 
surveillance (especially in response to avian flu)? Is the capacity 
robust?
    Answer. The leads for these efforts are U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) and we defer 
to those departments for details of their efforts. The Department of 
Homeland Security assists these efforts in the development of 
diagnostic tests for use in the USDA National Animal Health Laboratory 
Network and strengthening the capacity (number of tests they can 
perform and time required to perform them) in these laboratories. The 
Department of Homeland Security also assists in the training of Foreign 
Animal Disease Diagnosticians and Practitioners to recognize foreign 
animal diseases introduced into the United States. With respect to 
avian flu specifically, supplemental funds were requested for the 
purpose of advanced development of rapid detection tests of animals for 
advanced surveillance at borders and ports of entry. The Department of 
Homeland Security also is the lead for the National Biosurveillance 
Integration System (NBIS) intended to provide near-real-time 
situational awareness of biological incidents, including animal 
diseases. NBIS is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase development 
plan. Planned NBIS surveillance data inputs will include data sources 
from both USDA, HHS, and DOI.
    Question. What system do we use and who is in charge of it? What is 
DHS's role in monitoring the system?
    Answer. We defer to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. 
Department of Interior (DOI) for information regarding their systems. 
The Department of Homeland Security-led National Biosurveillance 
Integration System (NBIS) is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase 
development plan and is monitored by DHS personnel 24/7. NBIS provides 
near-real-time situational awareness to DHS through the National 
Biosurveillance Group (NBSG) of Federal agency partners.
    Question. Is the system connected to the public health system in 
real time?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security National 
Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) receives data inputs from 
both animal health surveillance and public health systems and provides 
near-real-time situational awareness to DHS and NBIS partners. NBIS 
surveillance data inputs will include data sources from and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Interior, and Health and 
Human Services/Centers for Disease Control.
    Question. What animals are we testing (zoo, wildlife, livestock, 
domesticated animals)? When? And where do the test results go?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security does not perform 
testing of animals but refers testing to U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service and the U.S. 
Department of Interior.
    Question. If there is a threat, how is the information communicated 
to the local level?
    Answer. If there is detection of animal diseases, whether it is in 
the domestic animal population or in nature, the local surveillance and 
health networks will be the first to know. Every State has a State 
Health Director and a State Veterinarian. They work very closely 
together. They practice and exercise their programs together, which 
brings together a network of public and animal health professionals 
from the local level. Regardless whether there is an incident such as 
Mad Cow Disease, West Nile Fever, rabies, or bird flu, the public 
health and animal health specialists at the ground level respond and 
report to the State Health Department and State Veterinarian. The State 
agencies then report any potential threat to the Centers for Disease 
Control and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Protocols in place 
ensure that DHS receives the information.
    Question. What funds has DHS directed specifically toward the 
detection of zoonotic threats in non-agricultural species?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has not directed funds 
toward the detection of zoonotic threats in non-agricultural species. 
Statutory responsibility for wildlife species resides with the U.S 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior.
    Question. What type of coordination exists between Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services and 
the Department of Agriculture to link veterinary diagnostic 
laboratories to do surveillance of interest to agriculture as well as 
public health?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead for the 
National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) intended to provide 
near-real-time situational awareness of biological incidents, including 
animal diseases. NBIS is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase 
development plan. NBIS surveillance data inputs will include data 
sources from and U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of 
Interior, and Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease Control.

           INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND INFORMATION SECURITY
                        OWNERSHIP OF KEY ASSETS

    Question. In a November 2005 report entitled Vulnerability 
Assessments for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, DHS 
identified 1,849 priority assets as part of the National Asset Data 
Base? The report notes that 80 percent of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure assets are owned by the private sector. How many of the 
1,849 priority assets are owned, operated, or administered by a foreign 
company, and how many of those foreign companies are controlled by a 
foreign government?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently 
working closely with the Department of Commerce to determine the 
availability of data on critical infrastructure and key resources and 
to determine ownership of these assets. The Department of Commerce has 
the responsibility for compiling and maintaining the data that supports 
the analysis of ownership issues. As yet, DHS is not in a position to 
determine which priority assets are owned, operated, or administered by 
a foreign company; or which of those foreign companies are controlled 
by a foreign government. As the availability of data to DHS improves, 
so will our understanding of this often complex and multi-faceted 
issue.

                                STAFFING

    Question. Under 2SR, how many of the 803 total FTE funded for IAIP 
in fiscal year 2005 were transferred to IPIS?
    Answer. The total number of IPIS FTE transferred under 2SR was 430.
    Question. How many are currently on-board?
    Answer. The number of IPIS FTE currently on board is 286.
    Question. How many hiring selections remain?
    Answer. Of the 159 remaining hiring selections, 21 FTE are waiting 
for security clearances and 15 FTE were allocated to IPIS in fiscal 
year 2006.
    Question. What is the planned FTE level for IPIS in fiscal year 
2007?
    Answer. The planned FTE level for IPIS in fiscal year 2007 is 445. 
This is the same level as fiscal year 2006 FTE.

                NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN

    Question. When will the revised National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) be completed?
    Answer. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) consists 
of the NIPP Base Plan and the 17 Sector-Specific Plans. The NIPP Base 
Plan is complete and was formally released on June 30, 2006. Subsequent 
updates and revisions to the Base Plan will be published, as necessary, 
to reflect changing infrastructure protection needs and increasingly 
refined best practices. As annexes of the NIPP Base Plan, the Sector-
Specific Plans will be completed 180 days after the issuance of the 
NIPP Base Plan.
    Question. The budget proposes an increase of $39 million for the 
NIPP. The budget justification provides no information on this increase 
or how it will be used. Provide a full justification on the genesis of 
this funding, what it will be used for, and how it will strengthen the 
security of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) request for 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) activities will support 
the implementation of the NIPP Base Plan as well as the development, 
management, and implementation of the Sector-Specific Plans (SSP). This 
funding also will support NIPP programmatic operations and assist the 
Sector-Specific Agencies in the NIPP-related outreach and engagement 
activities across each of the Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Resources (CI/KR) sectors.
    The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) intends to leverage 
the NIPP framework to realize progress in several important areas. 
First, the development of a stronger and steadfast partnership between 
IP and the several Federal agencies assigned sector-specific 
responsibilities. Cooordinated development of Sector Specific Plans and 
other essential elements (such as vulnerability assessment tools and 
methodologies) will provide the underpinnings of a successful, 
efficient risk management program. Second, in partnership with other 
Federal agencies, IP will develop and put into place an essential 
element of risk management, i.e., consistent metrics. IP expects to 
further define structural elements of the NIPP, in order to enable and 
ideally expand participation in our overall risk management strategy, 
especially to private sector owner-operators, State, local and tribal 
governments, as well as to our Federal partners who are not designated 
sector specific agencies. This approach will accelerate and improve 
sector agency progress by facilitating the collection, normalization, 
and prioritization of assets and protection programs based on 
comparative risk across all 17 CI/KR sectors.
    The NIPP provides the framework and sets the direction for 
implementing a coordinated, national infrastructure protection effort 
and is based upon a risk management framework that takes into account 
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences when prioritizing CI/KR 
protection activities. The comprehensive NIPP will be supported by SSPs 
that will detail the application of the risk management framework and 
performance metrics for each of the 17 specific sectors. IP will 
support the implementation of protective programs using cross-sector 
and sector-specific efforts to assure a balanced and effective approach 
across all sectors and sub-sectors.
    Sector-specific partnerships are vital elements of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and are integral to its success. 
IP intends to use the fiscal year 2007 funding to support the 
development and implementation of sector partnerships and related 
actions across the 17 CI/KR sectors with specific activities targeted 
at the most critical sectors. The list of actions below is the initial 
estimate of requirements. However, the proposed spend plan is designed 
to be flexible so DHS can address higher priority needs as the Sector 
Specific Plans required by the NIPP evolve over the coming months and 
identify critical sector shortfalls.
  --$1.0 Million.--Establishment and support for the State, Local, and 
        Tribal Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to serve as a 
        forum for State, local and tribal homeland security advisors to 
        participate in CI/KR protection efforts.
  --$0.5 Million.--Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council 
        (CIPAC) operations. Contractual support to manage and 
        coordinate council activities and to ensure compliance with 
        established policies.
  --$2.5 Million.--Education and Outreach Support. Assist Sector 
        Specific Agencies (SSA) by developing and producing a Sector 
        Specific Plan training curriculum and by developing and 
        reviewing outreach and engagement plans and national CI/KR 
        protection awareness programs to assure a balanced approach 
        across all sectors.
  --$1.0 Million.--Program Management Support. Assist SSA with required 
        reporting, development of response processes, identification of 
        resource requirements and assistance with the preparation of 
        budget support materials.
  --$3.0 Million.--Sector Specific Agency (SSA) Responsibilities. 
        Perform sector-specific work supporting DHS SSA 
        responsibilities for the nuclear, emergency services, and 
        chemical sectors and identify protective program needs and the 
        protective programs that satisfy those needs.
  --$15.0 Million.--Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset 
        Protection Program (RAMCAP). Develop specific RAMCAP modules 
        for the Water Treatment, Wastewater Treatment, Pharmaceutical 
        Manufacturing, Mass Transit Rail, Mass Transit Surface, Freight 
        Rail Yards, Bridges, Dams, Locks and Levees, and Pipelines 
        sectors and sub-sectors.
  --$7.0 Million.--Targeted Comprehensive Reviews. Perform targeted 
        Comprehensive Reviews of the Transportation (Commuter and Mass 
        Transit Rail), Urban Commercial Zones (Metroplexes, e.g., Time 
        Square, Vegas Strip, etc.), and Dams sectors and sub-sectors.
  --$9.0 Million.--IP NIPP Management Responsibilities. NIPP 
        management, administrative, coordination, and support 
        responsibilities including oversight activities associated with 
        coordination of the Sector Specific Agencies.
    Question. Will the process to distribute this funding be 
competitive?
    Answer. This funding is devoted to the development and 
implementation of sector-specific plans and the necessary tools and 
techniques, including the application of a common risk management 
strategy and performance metrics for each of the 17 sectors. All of the 
planned procurements will be awarded using the normal contracting 
process. If Sector Specific Agencies have shortfalls that are of 
critical national interest and request assistance from DHS, we will use 
a yet-to-be developed process to evaluate the need and assign the 
relative priority for funding. When higher priority needs are 
identified as sector specific plans evolve and critical sector specific 
shortfalls surface, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) 
intends to validate the needs and review potential funding 
alternatives. IP recognizes the probability that as this process 
unfolds, certain risks will be identified where the potential 
consequence of attack and/or vulnerability of an asset is not 
tolerable, even in the short term. Where such risks exist, IP will 
partner with Federal agencies, owner-operators, and State and local 
governments in order to identify and implement immediate risk-reduction 
measures.
    Question. What is a Sector Specific Partnership?
    Answer. Sector partnerships between government and the private 
sector are formed in all critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/
KR) sectors via the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 
This sector partnership model is used to promote and facilitate sector 
and cross-sector planning, coordination, collaboration, and information 
sharing for CI/KR protection involving all levels of government and 
private sector owners and operators.
    Question. What is a Sector Specific Agency?
    Answer. Sector-Specific Agencies are specific Federal departments 
and agencies identified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
(HSPD)-7 with lead responsibility for the protection activities in 
specified CI/KR sectors.
    Question. The NIPP budget refers to education and training of 
Federal, State, and local officials and private sector stakeholders. 
Who are the stakeholders? Please be specific.
    Answer. The NIPP security partners stakeholders include those 
Federal, State, regional, territorial, local, or tribal government 
entities; private sector owners and operators and representative 
organizations; academic and professional entities; and certain not-for-
profit and private volunteer organizations that share in the 
responsibility for protecting the Nation's critical infrastructure and 
key resources (CI/KR). For example, in the Dams Sector, some of the 
stakeholders include the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
Department of Interior/Bureau of Reclamation (DOI/BOR), United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Energy (DOE), United 
States Army Corps of Engineering (USACE), Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), United States Coast 
Guard (USCG), four State dam safety officials (CA, NJ, WA, OH), Xcel 
Energy--MN, New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection--NY, New 
York Power Authority, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)--CA (Chair of SCC), 
National Hydro Association (NHA), and the United States Society on Dams 
(USSD) among many others. A similar diverse cross-section of 
stakeholders exists for each of the 17 CI/KR sectors.
    Question. How is this training different than what is provided 
through the DHS Grants & Training Office?
    Answer. The training referred to in the NIPP budget specifically 
deals with understanding the risk management concepts that are central 
to the implementation of the CI/KR protection activities outlined in 
the NIPP.
    Question. Why was the NIPP moved from Protective Actions to the 
Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership activity?
    Answer. This transfer of funding from Protective Actions (PA) to 
Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership (CIOP) in fiscal year 
2007 is congruent with the request for increased funding within CIOP in 
order to consolidate NIPP and sector specific plan budget activities 
within the Directorate for Preparedness, Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (OIP). The OIP is responsible for 5 of the 17 Critical 
Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors: chemical, nuclear 
reactors, materials, and waste, commercial facilities, dams, and 
emergency services. In fiscal year 2006, PA is responsible for 
development and initial implementation of the Sector Specific Plans 
(SSPs) for chemical, nuclear, and commercial facilities. CIOP is 
responsible for the development and initial implementation of the dams 
and emergency services SSPs. CIOP also has responsibility for the 
development of the NIPP and implementation management and measurement 
for all 17 CI/KR sectors. The initial implementation of these plans 
will be completed in fiscal year 2006, causing a shift in execution in 
fiscal year 2007 from PA to CIOP to full implementation, sector 
engagement, outreach, measurement, and education programs, more 
consistent with the CIOP mission.

                    NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

    Question. The budget includes $5.413 million to support National 
Security Special Events (NSSEs) and other events. As the Federal 
coordinator of security at NSSEs, what involvement does the Secret 
Service have in determining the use of this funding?
    Answer. The ``Support to National Special Security Events (NSSEs) 
and Other Events'' line, funds DHS planning and support to Special 
Events as directed by the Secretary as well as Office of Infrastructure 
Protection Continuity of Operations planning, exercise participation 
and facilities support. Included in the roughly 1,800 ``special 
events'' that DHS assesses, prioritizes and supports each year--based 
on assessed risk--there are typically less than a dozen NSSEs . The 
Directorate for Preparedness' Contingency Planning and Support Division 
(CPSD) provides planning and resource support on an as-needed basis for 
NSSEs as requested by and in coordination with the U.S. Secret Service 
(which is the Department lead for NSSEs). This request ensures that IP 
can provide appropriate support to the Secret Service. In addition, 
CPSD identifies for the Secretary's approval and appointment USSS 
nominees with appropriate skills and training to serve as the Principal 
Federal Officials for NSSEs.
    Question. What types of protective measures are deployed with this 
funding?
    Answer. DHS tailors the nature and level of support to each event 
based in part on local capabilities. DHS support ranges from naming a 
PFO or Federal Coordinator and providing appropriate planning and 
threat support to deploying staff and their support equipment (e.g., 
communications).
    Question. What happens to equipment deployed once the event is 
over?
    Answer. Deployed equipment is generally used by DHS personnel and 
returns with them. DHS requires that DHS-loaned equipment deployed in 
support of an event be returned to DHS following the event.
    Question. For fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 (to date) 
provide a breakdown of how this funding was expended, by NSSE.
    Answer. In fiscal year 2006, the activity entitled Protect National 
Security Special Events (NSSEs) and Other Events within the subprogram 
Field Operations and Support, funds the research, analysis, and 
planning to prioritize, rank and assess over 1,800 special events every 
year. The funds are not used to support NSSEs directly, but provide 
analytical and coordination functions in order to identify, coordinate, 
protect, and monitor events of national significance. The significance 
of these events requires special planning and coordination between 
Federal and private stakeholders ensuring that the required protective 
measures are implemented as necessary. The Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (OIP) develops a comprehensive list of special events, and 
the list includes a risk-based assessment and relative prioritization 
of each event that Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Justice and other national, State and local authorities use to 
determine security requirements, as well as, plan incident response and 
management activities. After analyzing and prioritizing the special 
events, OIP recommends and coordinates the assignment of a senior 
Federal official for selected special events or NSSEs. When 
appropriate, OIP then develops and publishes, in coordination with 
national, State and local officials, an Integrated Federal Support 
Plan, summarizing the responsibilities and plans of the various 
stakeholders and authorities.
    During fiscal year 2005, there were only two National Security 
Special Events (NSSEs): the Presidential Inauguration (18 Jan 2005); 
and the State of Union Address (2 Feb 2005). Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (OIP) participation in both of these events was minimal. At 
this time, our financial system does not provide expense information at 
this level. If requested by the Secret Service, who has primary 
responsibility for NSSEs, OIP would provide support in the following 
ways:
  --Provide personnel to participate in pre-event planning;
  --Conduct Site Assistance Visit and Prepare Buffer Zone Protection 
        Plan;
  --Provide radiation detectors to local law enforcement officials for 
        use during the event;
  --Man a 24/7 operations center during events to collect and 
        disseminate intelligence information;
  --Conduct training for local security personnel;
  --Conduct exercises to prepare for events; and
  --Provide Subject Matter Experts to event planners if requested.

                       VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

    Question. The budget proposed to reduce funding for vulnerability 
assessments by 42 percent, from $12.7 million to $7.382 million. Why is 
such an important component of the IPIS portfolio reduced by 42 
percent?
    Answer. The Administration fully understands the Committee's 
concern and fully agrees that vulnerability assessments are an 
important component of the Infrastructure Protection and Information 
Security portfolio. The funds requested for fiscal year 2007 are based 
on the level of assessment activity that actually occurred in fiscal 
year 2006 and takes into account the progress and efficiencies made to 
date in performing site assessments. The requested funding level will 
enable an ongoing program of thorough site assessments, yet, that level 
does not necessarily result in a concurrent reduction in the number of 
vulnerability assessments conducted during fiscal year 2007. The focus 
of vulnerability assessments has shifted to the Buffer Zone Protection 
Program (BZPP) in order to leverage the capability of State and local 
authorities to perform their own vulnerability assessment. IP will 
continue to provide guidance, technical assistance, and validation to 
ensure consistency and accuracy.
    The fiscal year 2007 budget expectation is based on a higher level 
of expertise and training of State and local authorities, the Nation-
wide presence of Protective Security Advisors to reach out to critical 
infrastructure stakeholders and perform some vulnerability assessment 
data collection, and the benefits derived from increased efficiencies 
due to better-defined processes in data collection and staff knowledge.
    In addition, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) is 
placing a greater emphasis on the accelerated development and 
deployment of assessment methodologies that are executable by owner-
operators and tailored to specific types of infrastructure. This 
program, called RAMCAP, has now put into the field a number of 
``modules'' that have proven highly effective at capturing critical 
data regarding consequentiality and vulnerabilities in a manner that 
supports normalization of results by IP.
    As these several more innovative approaches to the assessment 
mission begin to take effect, the need for IP to dispatched teams from 
Washington into the field. to conduct individual assessments has 
declined.

                           CHEMICAL SECURITY

    Question. Your fiscal year 2007 budget proposes $10 million for a 
Chemical Security Office, which will evaluate the risk of chemical 
facilities and establish security standards for them, but this funding 
would not be available until fiscal year 2007, further delaying the 
effort to secure chemical facilities. Why are you kicking this can down 
the road and not pursuing enforceable standards for the chemical 
facilities now?
    Answer. The Department is pursuing chemical security legislation in 
Congress. Assistant Secretary Robert Stephan testified before both the 
House and Senate about the need for comprehensive chemical security 
legislation. Additionally, the Department's Office of Legislative 
Affairs and technical experts from the Department have met with Members 
from both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate on this 
important legislative initiative. The Department remains eager to 
support Congress as they work to grant DHS the authority needed to 
secure the chemical sector from terrorist attack.
    Question. Why hasn't the Department played a lead role by 
submitting legislation to the Congress?
    Answer. The Department continues to work with the Congress on 
chemical security legislation. The Department has outlined a number of 
core principles to guide the development of a regulatory framework:
  --Recognize that not all facilities present the same level of risk 
        and that the most scrutiny should focus on those that, if 
        attacked, could most endanger public health and cause economic 
        harm
  --Develop enforceable, reasonable, clear, and equitable performance 
        standards
  --Set performance standards based on the types and severity of 
        potential risks posed by terrorists and facilities should have 
        the flexibility to select among appropriate site-specific 
        security measures that will effectively address those threats
  --Design any new authority to recognize the progress many responsible 
        companies have made since 9/11 and build on that progress
    We hope the Congress will consider these principles as they work to 
pass this important piece of legislation. Additionally, the Department 
has not waited for legislation to assist in securing the Nation's 
chemical sector.
  --Prior to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
        responsibility for the Nation's critical infrastructure was 
        scattered over various Federal agencies. Now one agency is 
        responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government's efforts to 
        protect critical infrastructure across all sectors, including 
        chemical facilities
  --The Department works in close coordination with Federal, State, and 
        local governments as well as private sector partners to develop 
        and coordinate plans to protect our complex critical 
        infrastructure systems
    This coordination has resulted in physical security enhancements in 
and around chemical facilities, including strengthening law enforcement 
coordination, improving access control, adding multiple buffer zones, 
implementing surveillance and detection technologies, and improving 
response and preparedness capabilities in the chemical, petrochemical, 
and related sites of immediate concern to help protect our Nation, our 
citizens and our way of life.

                                  FEMA
                            MASS EVACUATION

    Question. In February, Secretary Chertoff submitted a report to 
Congress, as directed in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, entitled The Nationwide Plan Review, providing a 
status on catastrophic planning in all States and in the Nation's 
largest urban areas. Overall, States and large cities reported they 
lack confidence in their own ability to manage catastrophic events with 
their current plans. Not surprisingly, plans that have been updated 
and/or exercised recently (within the last 2 years) are considered, by 
the entity, more likely to be adequate.
    The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act also 
included a provision that directs the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security to develop guidelines for State and local governments to 
coordinate mass evacuation plans. Plans are to include, where 
appropriate, the pre-positioning of items such as food, water, 
medicine, and interoperable communications equipment that would be 
required in a mass evacuation. Additionally, the legislation encourages 
the Department to consider the need for such pre-positioned equipment 
in allocating first responder funds. DHS is commended for taking the 
provision to heart and including in the fiscal year 2006 grant guidance 
that States should include their needs for mass evacuation planning in 
their grant applications.
    The nationwide report is a clear indication that we have a lot of 
work still to do. In the State of West Virginia, the vulnerability in 
this case is exposed when you consider those fleeing from an incident 
in the National Capitol Region. West Virginia has a strong and capable 
Governor who constantly works to be prepared to unexpectedly host 
thousands and provide those passing through with food, water, and gas 
for the capable, and medications and other assistance for those with 
special needs.
    What is DHS doing to be ready for mass evacuations?
    Answer. While protecting its citizens is a responsibility of the 
State and local elected/appointed officials and is codified in State/
local laws and statutes, DHS Preparedness grant programs can provide 
support for the development of State and local emergency response 
plans, which should provide for the evacuation of their citizens. 
State/local emergency response plans should clearly lay out timing 
parameters and roles and responsibilities associated with carrying out 
evacuations, as well as account for special needs populations and 
people who do not have their own means of transportation.
    FEMA can assist in a mass evacuation, in part, by providing 
reimbursement to local and State jurisdictions under the Public 
Assistance Program, in cases of declared Federal emergencies.
    Currently, under DHS leadership, a preliminary self-assessment has 
been completed by State and local officials of catastrophic planning in 
all 50 States, 6 territories, and our 75 largest urban areas under the 
Nationwide Plan Review conducted by the Preparedness Directorate and 
released on June 16, 2006. Currently underway is a second phase of this 
review, which includes site visits by teams of former senior State and 
local homeland security and emergency management officials to validate 
emergency plans, identify deficiencies, and make specific 
recommendations to improve catastrophic emergency planning, including 
evacuation issues.
    Prior to Katrina, FEMA, through its National Hurricane Program 
(NHP), had undertaken hurricane evacuation studies in 22 States, 
regional areas, and territories. Through these studies, NHP develops 
the products and tools for State and locals to conduct evacuation 
planning and operationally to conduct the actual evacuations. NHP 
develops the technical information that is used by State and local 
governments to develop an evacuation plan. This includes information 
such as the evacuation clearance time, transportation analysis, hazard 
analysis, and behavioral study. The evacuations and the planning 
involved are a State and local responsibility using the tools and 
products developed by the FEMA. The budget for the NHP is $2.91 million 
per year, and approximately $2.9 million goes directly to the States 
through grants.
    DHS/FEMA is also partnering with the Department of Transportation 
(DOT), whose primary role is to provide and coordinate transportation 
assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. The National Response Plan 
designates DOT as the lead support agency to DHS/FEMA for Emergency 
Support Function 1/Transportation, and calls for DOT to: (1) process 
and coordinate requests for Federal and civil transportation support; 
(2) report damage to transportation infrastructure as a result of the 
incident; (3) coordinate alternate transportation services; (4) 
coordinate the restoration and recovery of transportation 
infrastructure; (5) perform activities conducted under the direct 
authority of DOT elements such as those related to air, maritime, 
surface, rail, and pipelines; and (6) coordinate and support 
prevention, preparedness, and mitigation among transportation 
infrastructure stakeholders at the State and local levels.
    Question. Has there been discussion of using the Stafford Act 
Disaster Relief Fund to preposition water, fuel, food, and 
communications equipment for mass evacuations? If not, why not?
    Answer. FEMA appropriately uses the authorities of the Stafford Act 
and the Disaster Relief Fund to pre-position water, food, 
communications equipment, and other supplies and commodities to support 
the needs of communities and individuals in disaster situations; 
however, this material is not distributed for use until the President 
declares an emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act.

                        PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION

    Question. Please provide a list of grant awards made through the 
Pre-disaster Mitigation program?
    Answer. The following chart list all Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) 
grants awarded (obligated) since the inception of the program in fiscal 
year 2003.

    PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Plans & projects   Management costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2003 Pre-Disaster          $89,662,430.94      $4,682,582.21
 Mitigation Competitive Program
 \1\..............................
Fiscal year 2003 Disaster                3,419,889.00         115,680.00
 Resistant Universities Program
 \2\..............................
Fiscal year 2003 Planning Set-          13,313,576.00  .................
 aside \3\........................
Fiscal year 2005 Pre-Disaster          148,741,988.18       2,998,433.35
 Mitigation Program \4\...........
                                   -------------------------------------
      Total.......................     255,137,884.12       7,796,695.56
                                   =====================================
      Grand Total Pre-Disaster
       Mitigation Grant
       Obligations................             262,934,579.68
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2004 and
  fiscal year 2005.
\2\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2004 and
  fiscal year 2005.
\3\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2003 and
  fiscal year 2004.
\4\ Fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 funds that were awarded in
  fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006.


       FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            AWARDED FED
                                       SUBGRANT TITLE          SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
    CT............................  Elevation of Homes       $641,025.00
                                     in the Cosey Beach
                                     Area of East Haven.
    CT............................  Home Elevation             64,575.00
                                     Project in Milford,
                                     Connecticut.
    CT............................  Stratford Home             56,700.00
                                     Elevation Project.
    CT............................  Town of East Haven         75,206.25
                                     Elevation Non-RLP
                                     Home Elevation.
    MA............................  Metro Boston Pre-         224,962.50
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    MA............................  Town of Winthrop          145,503.00
                                     Flood Mitigation
                                     Project.
    MA............................  Quincy, MA Housing        449,935.00
                                     Elevation and
                                     Retrofitting.
    NH............................  Regional Planning         360,000.00
                                     Hazard Mitigation.
    VT............................  State of Vermont PDM-     450,000.00
                                     C Mitigation
                                     Planning.
    VT............................  River Road                140,440.50
                                     Mitigation Project.
    NJ............................  Carneys Point Pre-      1,162,923.00
                                     Disaster Flood
                                     Mitigation Program.
    NY............................  Nassau County Hazard      224,812.50
                                     Mitigation Planning
                                     Initiative.
    PR............................  Municipality of Las        45,000.00
                                     Piedras Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            30,000.00
                                     Humacao Pre-
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Assistant Program.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard Local         60,000.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Cano-  vanas.
    PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                     Salinas.
    PR............................  Pre-Disaster               30,000.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Catano.
    PR............................  Municipality of            39,000.00
                                     Yabucoa PDM
                                     Planning.
    PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                     Ceiba.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Aibonito PDM
                                     Planning.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard               56,250.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Barranquitas.
    PR............................  Municipality of            48,750.00
                                     Florida Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                     Patillas Planning
                                     Application.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Aquas Buenas
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                     Corozal.
    PR............................  Municipality of            52,800.00
                                     Coamo Local
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Maunabo Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of Toa        52,500.00
                                     Baja Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            73,500.00
                                     Guynabo Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of San        75,000.00
                                     Juan Multi Hazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            60,000.00
                                     Trujillo Alto
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Fajardo Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                     Loiza.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard               52,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     City of Guayanilla.
    PR............................  Municipality of            46,875.00
                                     Comerio Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Preparation of             52,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Yauco.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard               22,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Juana Diaz
                                     Municipality.
    PR............................  Municipio de Vega          30,000.00
                                     Alta.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Orocovis Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard               45,000.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Arroyo.
    PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                     Hatillo.
    PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                     Morovis Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of            41,250.00
                                     Naranjito.
    PR............................  Municipality of            36,750.00
                                     Penuelas Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipality of San        53,499.00
                                     German Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Multi-hazard               56,250.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Ciales.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Lajas Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard               45,000.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Anasco.
    PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                     Lares Mitigation
                                     Plan Application.
    PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                     Maricao Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    PR............................  Municipio de Las           48,750.00
                                     Marias.
    PR............................  Multi-Hazard               30,000.00
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Municipality of
                                     Rincon.
    PR............................  Municipality of San        52,500.00
                                     Sebastian.
    PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                     Villalba.
    PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                     Luquillo Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    MD............................  Prince George's            75,000.00
                                     County Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    PA............................  Township of Abington    3,000,000.00
                                     Flood Mitigation
                                     Project.
    WV............................  West Virginia Multi-    2,743,153.50
                                     Jurisdiction
                                     Mitigation Project.
    AL............................  Valley Creek            2,946,569.85
                                     Floodplain Property
                                     Acquisition and
                                     Demolition-
                                     Birmingham, Alabama.
    AL............................  Jefferson County,         226,641.75
                                     Alabama Pre-
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Acquisition Project.
    AL............................  Village Creek           2,490,315.26
                                     Property
                                     Acquisition and
                                     Demolition-City of
                                     Birmingham.
    FL............................  City of Plantation         14,775.00
                                     Fire Station Number
                                     1 Wind Retrofit.
    FL............................  City of Plantation         87,784.50
                                     Central Water
                                     Treatment Plant
                                     Shutter Retrofit.
    FL............................  Sarasota County            53,639.00
                                     Bishop Nevins
                                     Academy, Dome F--
                                     Hurri-  cane.
    FL............................  City of Plantation E       28,287.00
                                     Water treatment
                                     Plant.
    FL............................  Broward County            728,512.00
                                     Courthouse 201 SE
                                     6th Street.
    FL............................  City of Plantation         26,894.23
                                     Fire Station #2.
    FL............................  City of Plantation         25,358.00
                                     Fire State # 3 Wind
                                     Retrofit.
    FL............................  City of Plantation         18,639.63
                                     Fire Station #5
                                     Retrofit.
    FL............................  Sarasota County            84,585.00
                                     Bishop Nevins
                                     Academy, Dome A--
                                     Hurricane Shelter
                                     Retrofit.
    FL............................  Sarasota County            61,587.00
                                     Bishop Nevins
                                     Academy, Dome E--
                                     Hurri-  cane.
    FL............................  North Lauderdale--        112,500.00
                                     Wind Retrofit Bay
                                     Doors at Fire
                                     station #44.
    FL............................  North Lauderdale--        112,500.00
                                     Wind Retrofit,
                                     Municipal Complex.
    FL............................  City of Miami--Fleet      564,968.00
                                     Maintenance Garage
                                     Retrofit Storm
                                     Shutters and Door.
    FL............................  Bishop Nevins              41,240.25
                                     Academy Dome B Wind
                                     Retrofit.
    FL............................  Wellington Community       41,250.00
                                     Center--Wind
                                     Retrofit Project.
    FL............................  Miami-Dade Co.            654,598.50
                                     School Board
                                     Jefferson Annex
                                     Wind Retrofit.
    FL............................  City of Plantation         22,224.00
                                     Fire Department.
    FL............................  University of Miami     1,912,929.75
                                     Rosenstiel Medical
                                     Research Building.
    FL............................  University of Miami       429,975.00
                                     Wind Retrofit of
                                     Mailman Center for
                                     Child Development.
    FL............................  University of Miami       370,884.75
                                     Professional Arts
                                     Center Wind
                                     Retrofit.
    FL............................  Myers Telecomm.           171,093.75
                                     Center Wind
                                     Retrofit.
    FL............................  City of Opa-locka--     1,418,295.75
                                     Localized Flood
                                     Control.
    FL............................  City of New Smyrna        137,625.00
                                     Beach Drainage
                                     Improvement Project.
    FL............................  Elevate Dixie County       18,750.00
                                     Equipment Shed.
    FL............................  Volusia Elevation 4        52,612.50
                                     Cunningham Drive.
    FL............................  Broward County          2,433,750.00
                                     Oakland Park NE 6th
                                     Ave Drainage
                                     Project.
    FL............................  Broward County          2,625,075.00
                                     Oakland Park
                                     Kimberly Lake
                                     Drainage Pro-  ject.
    GA............................  Augusta-Richmond          146,307.75
                                     County, Hollywood
                                     Subdivision
                                     Acquisition
                                     Demolition Project.
    GA............................  State of Georgia          615,000.00
                                     Multi-Hazard
                                     Planning
                                     Application #1.
    GA............................  State of Georgia          746,250.00
                                     Multi-Hazard
                                     Planning
                                     Application #2.
    GA............................  State of Georgia          656,250.00
                                     Multi-Hazard
                                     Planning
                                     Application #3.
    GA............................  City of Thomasville       174,855.75
                                     Passmore Street
                                     Acquisition.
    GA............................  Chatham County            674,475.00
                                     Lamarville Woods
                                     Subdivision
                                     Acquisition
                                     Demolition Project.
    GA............................  City of Rome,             804,864.37
                                     Brookwood Avenue
                                     Housing Acquisition.
    GA............................  City of Savannah          370,023.94
                                     Acquisition and
                                     Demolition Project.
    GA............................  Columbia County--         271,333.50
                                     Ridge Crossing
                                     Drainage
                                     Improvements.
    GA............................  City of Jesup and       1,099,698.00
                                     Wayne County Law
                                     Enforcement, EOC &
                                     911 Complex Wind
                                     Retrofit.
    GA............................  Peachtree City--          167,437.50
                                     Tinsley Mill
                                     Condominium
                                     Drainage
                                     Improvement.
    GA............................  Bartow County Ember       313,537.50
                                     Way-Penny Lane
                                     Flood Mitigation
                                     Pro-  ject.
    GA............................  Bacon County CR 343       140,779.86
                                     Drainage
                                     Improvement.
    KY............................  Big Sandy Area             76,450.00
                                     Development
                                     District Pre-
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Project.
    KY............................  BRADD Regional             96,819.09
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    NC............................  Mecklenburg County         75,000.00
                                     Multi-
                                     Jurisdictional
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    NC............................  Kure Beach              2,713,218.00
                                     Acquisition and
                                     Demolition of a
                                     condominium complex.
    SC............................  North Charleston           24,446.58
                                     District--Mitigatio
                                     n Project-Hurricane
                                      Doors.
    SC............................  PDM Plan Monitoring        14,163.75
                                     and Follow-Up
                                     Activities.
    SC............................  Litchfield Beach           18,750.00
                                     Weir Replacement
                                     Project.
    TN............................  Rutherford Co.            165,022.50
                                     Midland Fosterville
                                     Rd. Mitigation
                                     Project.
    TN............................  Tennessee State           397,383.60
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    TN............................  Wilson County             154,656.75
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa   Grand Traverse Band        64,800.00
     and Chippewa Indians.           Pre-Disaster
                                     Mitigation Project.
    IL............................  Kane County RepLoss        75,000.00
                                     Area Mitigation
                                     Plans.
    IL............................  Kane County Critical      150,000.00
                                     Facility Audits.
    IL............................  Lake County               307,125.00
                                     Elevations.
    IL............................  Lake County             1,489,737.00
                                     Acquisitions.
    IN............................  City of Fort Wayne &       50,000.00
                                     Adams County
                                     Acquisition Project.
    IN............................  State of Indiana          500,000.00
                                     HAZUS-MH Planning
                                     Grant.
    Lac Vieux Desert Tribe........  LVD Tribal Pre-            18,813.00
                                     disaster mitigation
                                     plan.
    OH............................  City of Fairfield,      2,578,844.99
                                     Ohio Acquisition
                                     Project.
    St. Croix Chippewa of           St. Croix Chippewa         71,295.00
     Wisconsin.                      of WI Risk
                                     Assessment & Pre-
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Planning.
    WI............................  Kewaunee County All        27,000.00
                                     Hazards Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    WI............................  Lac du Flambeau Band       36,000.00
                                     of Lake Superior
                                     Chippewa Indians
                                     PDM planning grant.
    WI............................  Ho-Chunk Nation            55,130.00
                                     Planning Grant.
    WI............................  Calumet County All         22,500.00
                                     Hazards Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    WI............................  Florence County PDM        33,750.00
                                     Planning Grant
                                     Application.
    WI............................  Deer Park (Village)        99,090.00
                                     Acquisition Project.
    WI............................  Portage County            590,739.00
                                     Electric Utility
                                     Protection.
    WI............................  Pittmans Point and        103,950.00
                                     Barber Lane
                                     Mitigation Project.
    WI............................  Kenosha County Fox        297,300.00
                                     River Flood
                                     Mitigation Program--
                                     FINAL.
    WI............................  City of Middleton          12,909.00
                                     Clovernook
                                     Subdivision
                                     Waterway
                                     Stabilization
                                     Project.
    AR............................  Fairview Safe Room        663,495.75
                                     Project.
    AR............................  Euper Lane                441,970.50
                                     Elementary Safe
                                     Room.
    AR............................  Ballman Elementary        441,970.50
                                     Safe Room.
    AR............................  Trusty Elementary         441,970.50
                                     Safe Room.
    AR............................  Bonneville Safe Room      441,970.50
    AR............................  Sutton Elementary         441,970.50
                                     Safe Room.
    AR............................  Beard Elementary          441,970.50
                                     Safe Room.
    AR............................  Albert Pike               441,970.50
                                     Elementary Safe
                                     Room.
    AR............................  Spradling Elementary      441,970.50
                                     Safe Room.
    AR............................  AR. Planning........      455,109.75
    NM............................  County of Torrance         29,250.00
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    TX............................  Texas Multihazard         225,000.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    TX............................  City of Jersey          1,507,005.00
                                     Village Home
                                     Elevation Project 2.
    TX............................  PDM-03-Z-02.........    2,595,429.48
    TX............................  PDM-03-Z-01.........    2,969,373.75
    TX............................  PDM-03-G-01.........    1,477,686.23
    TX............................  Revised 200 Magnolia       94,725.00
                                     Rd.
    IA............................  Farley Pre-Disaster         1,131.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Mechanicsville Pre-         1,508.25
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Clinton Pre-Disaster        6,031.50
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Clinton County Pre-         6,031.50
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Preston Pre-Disaster        1,130.96
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Cedar County Pre-           6,031.50
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Tipton Pre-Disaster         1,507.50
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  West Branch Pre-            1,507.50
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Epworth Pre-Disaster        1,130.96
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  DeWitt Pre-Disaster         1,507.50
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Cascade Pre-Disaster        1,507.50
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  City of Anthon Pre          4,500.00
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Planning.
    IA............................  Hornick Pre-Disaster        4,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Lawton Pre-Disaster         4,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Moville Pre-Disaster        4,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Sergeant Bluff Pre-         4,500.00
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Sloan Pre-Disaster          4,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    IA............................  Woodbury County Pre-        4,500.00
                                     Disaster Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Hazard Mitigation           5,250.00
                                     Plan Update for the
                                     City of Hudson.
    IA............................  City of Glidden             2,625.00
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  City of Rippey              1,875.00
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  City of Lamont              5,250.00
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan Update.
    IA............................  City of Perry PDM           3,750.00
                                     Planning.
    IA............................  City of Paton, Iowa--       2,499.75
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    IA............................  Cedar Falls               450,000.00
                                     Utilities Flood
                                     Protection Project.
    KS............................  City of Olathe            765,000.00
                                     Effluent Pump
                                     Station.
    MO............................  Stockton Community        175,500.00
                                     Center/Library Safe
                                     Room.
    MO............................  Pierce City Fire          119,700.00
                                     Station Safe Room.
    MO............................  Pierce City Pre-           31,500.00
                                     Disaster Hazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CO............................  City of Fort Collins    2,697,188.00
                                     Spring Creek Basin
                                     Mitigation projects.
    MT............................  Petroleum County Un-       17,550.00
                                     Interruptible Power
                                     Supply.
    UT............................  J. Willard Marriott     2,994,037.76
                                     Library, University
                                     of Utah, Seismic
                                     Upgrade.
    WY............................  Flood Control           1,593,514.87
                                     Improvements of I-
                                     180 & Morrie Ave.
                                     Crow Creek
                                     Crossings.
    American Samoa................  Fagaalu Village,          665,673.00
                                     American Samoa
                                     Flood Hazard
                                     Mitigation Project.
    American Samoa................  Pago Pago village,      2,150,979.00
                                     American Samoa
                                     Flood Hazard
                                     Mitigation Project.
    AZ............................  Pima County Hazard         93,750.00
                                     Mitigation Project.
    AZ............................  Local Hazard              413,565.00
                                     Mitigation Planning.
    AZ............................  Pima County/Canada      3,000,000.00
                                     del Oro Flood
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Pro-  ject.
    CA............................  State of California     1,734,798.75
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Planning Program.
    CA............................  Sonoma County Pre-        224,085.35
                                     Disaster
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan-
                                     ning.
    CA............................  San Diego County          603,761.25
                                     Multi-
                                     jurisdictional
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  Ventura County             81,000.00
                                     Regional
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  ABAG San Francisco        450,000.00
                                     Bay Area Pre-
                                     Disaster Hazards
                                     Mitigation Planning
                                     Project.
    CA............................  Cities of Huntington      101,251.71
                                     Beach & Fountain
                                     Valley Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  Los Angeles County         97,500.00
                                     Standard Multi-
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan (DMA 2000 HMP).
    CA............................  Sacramento County          77,344.73
                                     All Hazards
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  City of Redlands          115,828.21
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  UC Berkeley, Loss         287,055.00
                                     Estimation Model
                                     and Multi-Hazard
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Development.
    CA............................  California Fire           643,500.00
                                     Alliance Community
                                     Planning Project
                                     for hundreds of
                                     LHMP's.
    CA............................  City of Rancho             22,837.50
                                     Cucamonga Hazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  Yuba County Hazard      1,132,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  City of Los Angeles       400,000.00
                                     Local Hazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    CA............................  City of Napa Borreo       654,700.35
                                     Building Seismic
                                     Retrofit Project.
    CA............................  County of Sacramento    1,400,267.25
                                     Flood Mitigation
                                     Grant Program.
    CA............................  Urban Wildland            244,087.50
                                     Interface Network--
                                     UWIN Redlands.
    CA............................  Lake City-Humbug          114,369.01
                                     Roadside Fuel break.
    CA............................  Empire Mine Fuel          157,265.17
                                     break Project.
    Cortina Indian Rancheria......  Cortina Indian             83,475.00
                                     Rancheria PDM
                                     Planning--October
                                     2003.
    Hopland Band of Pomo Indians..  Hopland Tribe              32,600.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    Mooretown Rancheria...........  Mooretown Rancheria       193,142.25
                                     Pre-Disaster
                                     Mitigation Project.
    Northern Mariana Islands......  CNMI Fire Station         120,292.00
                                     Roll-Up Doors
                                     Retrofit.
    Confederated Tribes of the      Umatilla Indian           111,173.00
     Umatilla Indian Reservation.    Reservation Multi-
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    ID............................  Canyon, Ada, Elmore       103,162.00
                                     Co. All Natural
                                     Hazard Assessment
                                     and Mitigation Plan.
    OR............................  Oregon University       2,841,978.75
                                     System: Earthquake
                                     Building
                                     Rehabilitation 2003.
    OR............................  Oregon Mid/Southern       374,719.50
                                     Willamette Valley
                                     Multi-jurisdiction
                                     Natural Hazards
                                     Plan.
    OR............................  Clackamas County          204,000.00
                                     CCOM/EOC Seismic
                                     Upgrade Project.
    OR............................  Clackamas County Tri-     249,967.50
                                     City Wastewater
                                     Treatment Facility
                                     Seismic Upgrade
                                     Project.
    OR............................  City of Oregon City       682,500.00
                                     Mountain view
                                     Reservoir Seismic
                                     Retrofit.
    OR............................  City of Canby/Canby       229,275.00
                                     Telephone Central
                                     Offices Seismic
                                     Upgrade.
    Shoshone-Bannock Tribe........  Fort Hall All              30,000.00
                                     Hazards Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    Skokomish Indian Tribe........  Skokomish Multi-          128,233.00
                                     Hazard Pre-Disaster
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     2004.
    WA............................  Snohomish County          150,000.00
                                     Natural Hazard
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    WA............................  Grays Harbor County        50,000.00
                                     Comprehensive
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    WA............................  Pre-Disaster               37,500.00
                                     Mitigation Plan.
    WA............................  Thurston County           371,962.00
                                     Salmon Creek Basin
                                     Elevation Project.
                                                         ---------------
      Total Plans and Projects for  ....................   89,662,430.94
       Fiscal Year 2003 PDM
       Competitive.
                                                         ===============
MANAGEMENT COSTS:
    CT............................  CT PDMC Management         83,750.63
                                     Costs 10 percent.
    MA............................  Commonwealth of            56,568.97
                                     Massachusetts 2003
                                     PDM-C Management
                                     Costs Application.
    NH............................  NH Management Cost..       36,000.00
    VT............................  State Management           56,703.24
                                     Costs.
    NJ............................  Grants Management          29,349.00
                                     Costs.
    AL............................  AEMA Management           867,450.00
                                     Costs.
    FL............................  State of Florida          500,631.75
                                     Department of
                                     Community Affairs,
                                     Division of
                                     Emergency
                                     Management.
    GA............................  Management of State       566,493.80
                                     of Georgia PDM-C.
    NC............................  NCDEM PDM Grant           216,843.00
                                     fiscal year 2003
                                     Management Cost.
    TN............................  Tennessee Technical        70,640.00
                                     Assistance and
                                     Management Costs.
    IL............................  IEMA management            63,000.00
                                     costs.
    OH............................  Ohio EMA TA/              257,884.00
                                     Management Cost.
    WI............................  State PDM-C               132,609.00
                                     Management Costs.
    AR............................  Technical Assistance/     283,916.15
                                     Management Costs 2.
    IA............................  State of Iowa              53,177.54
                                     Management Costs
                                     Application.
    CO............................  State of Colorado TA/      56,250.00
                                     Management Costs.
    UT............................  State of Utah PDM-C        50,000.04
                                     Management Costs.
    WY............................  State of Wyoming           23,902.73
                                     PDMC-2003 Technical
                                     Assistance.
    American Samoa................  Territorial               281,665.00
                                     Emergency
                                     Management
                                     Coordinating Office/
                                     American Samoa.
    AZ............................  AZ Division of             62,274.00
                                     Emergency PDM
                                     Management Grant.
    CA............................  State of California       854,215.14
                                     Technical
                                     Assistance/
                                     Management Cost
                                     Application.
    Cortina Indian Rancheria......  Cortina Indian              8,347.50
                                     Rancheria
                                     Multihazard
                                     Mitigation Plan
                                     Management Costs--
                                     Final.
    Northern Mariana Islands......  CNMI Management            12,029.20
                                     Costs PDM-C 2003.
    Confederated Tribes of the      Unatilla Indian             5,558.22
     Umatilla Indian Reservation.    Reservation Multi-
                                     Hazard Mitigation
                                     Plan.
    ID............................  Idaho State                 3,000.00
                                     Management.
    Skokomish Indian Tribe........  Sub grant Technical        12,823.30
                                     Assistance
                                     Application.
    WA............................  Washington State           37,500.00
                                     Technical
                                     Assistance/
                                     Management Costs.
                                                         ---------------
      Total Management Costs for    ....................    4,682,582.21
       Fiscal Year 2003 PDM
       Competitive.
                                                         ---------------
      Total Obligated for Fiscal    ....................   94,345,013.15
       Year 2003 PDM Competitive.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


       FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        AWARDED FEDERAL
                                     SUB-APPLICANT           SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
    CA..........................  San Jose State                 $99,957
                                   University.
    CA..........................  University of                   67,100
                                   California-
                                   Berkeley.
    CA..........................  University of                  100,000
                                   Southern
                                   California.
    CO..........................  University of                  100,000
                                   Colorado-Boulder.
    FL..........................  University of Miami            226,500
    FL..........................  Florida                        100,000
                                   Agricultural &
                                   Mechanical
                                   University (FAMU).
    FL..........................  Florida                         99,759
                                   International
                                   University (FIU).
    GA..........................  University System              100,000
                                   of Georgia.
    KY..........................  University of                   94,958
                                   Louisville.
    LA..........................  Tulane Power Plant.             18,113
    LA..........................  Southern University            100,000
                                   (LA).
    LA..........................  University of New               99,750
                                   Orleans.
    MA..........................  Colleges of the                100,000
                                   Fenway.
    MA..........................  Mass. Institute of              99,750
                                   Tech.
    MO..........................  Metropolitan                   100,000
                                   Community College.
    MS..........................  University of                   75,000
                                   Mississippi.
    NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....             80,000
    NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....             24,000
    NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....             57,000
    NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....            110,000
    ND..........................  North Dakota State             100,000
                                   University.
    ND..........................  IT Sitting Bull                100,000
                                   College.
    NV..........................  University of                   50,000
                                   Nevada-Reno.
    OH..........................  University of Akron            100,000
    OK..........................  University of                   75,000
                                   Central Oklahoma.
    OR..........................  University of                  100,000
                                   Oregon.
    SC..........................  Horry-Georgetown                89,002
                                   Tech.
    TN..........................  University of                  100,000
                                   Memphis.
    TX..........................  Texas State                     75,000
                                   Technical College.
    TX..........................  Texas University-               97,500
                                   Medical Center.
    VA..........................  Radford University.             31,500
    VA..........................  Virginia State                  75,000
                                   University.
    VA..........................  Virginia Tech......             75,000
    WA..........................  University of                  200,000
                                   Washington-Seattle.
    WA..........................  University of                  300,000
                                   Washington-Seattle.
                                                      ------------------
      Total Plans and Projects    ...................          3,419,889
       for Fiscal Year 2003
       Disaster Resistant
       Universities.

                                                      ==================
MANAGEMENT COSTS:
    MA..........................  Massachusetts                   20,625
                                   Emergency
                                   Management Agency.
    GA..........................  Georgia Emergency               10,000
                                   Management Agency.
    KY..........................  Kentucky State                   3,749
                                   Emergency
                                   Management.
    NC..........................  North Carolina                  27,100
                                   State Emergency
                                   Management.
    TN..........................  Tennessee State                 10,000
                                   Emergency
                                   Management.
    OK..........................  OK Emergency                     7,500
                                   Management.
    CO..........................  CO Emergency                    10,000
                                   Management.
    CA..........................  CA Emergency                    26,706
                                   Management.
                                                      ------------------
      Total Management Costs for  ...................            115,680
       Fiscal Year 2003 DRU.
                                                      ------------------
      Total Obligated for Fiscal  ...................          3,535,569
       Year 2003 Disaster
       Resistant Universities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


       FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            REGION                 RECIPIENT      AWARDED FEDERAL SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................  CT..............                 $248,375
1............................  ME..............                  248,375
1............................  MA..............                  248,375
1............................  NH..............                  248,375
1............................  RI..............                  248,375
1............................  VT..............                  248,375
2............................  NY..............                  248,375
2............................  NJ..............                  248,375
2............................  PR..............                  248,375
2............................  VI..............                  248,375
3............................  DE..............                  248,375
3............................  MD..............                  248,375
3............................  PA..............                  248,375
3............................  VA..............                  248,375
3............................  DC..............                  248,375
4............................  AL..............                  248,375
4............................  FL..............                  248,375
4............................  GA..............                  248,375
4............................  KY..............                  248,375
4............................  MS..............                  248,375
4............................  NC..............                  248,375
4............................  SC..............                  248,375
4............................  TN..............                  248,375
5............................  IL \1\..........                  225,820
5............................  IN..............                  248,375
5............................  MI..............                  248,375
5............................  MN..............                  248,375
5............................  OH..............                  248,375
5............................  WI..............                  248,375
6............................  LA..............                  248,375
6............................  NM..............                  248,375
6............................  OK..............                  248,375
6............................  AR..............                  248,375
6............................  TX..............                  248,375
7............................  IA..............                  248,375
7............................  MO..............                  248,375
7............................  NE \1\..........                  172,256
7............................  KS..............                  248,375
8............................  CO..............                  248,375
8............................  MT..............                  248,375
8............................  ND..............                  248,375
8............................  SD..............                  248,375
8............................  UT..............                  248,375
8............................  WY..............                  248,375
9............................  AZ..............                  248,375
9............................  CA..............                  248,375
9............................  NV..............                  248,375
9............................  HI..............                  248,375
9............................  American Samoa..                  248,375
9............................  Guam............                  248,375
10...........................  WA..............                  248,375
10...........................  OR..............                  248,375
10...........................  ID..............                  248,375
10...........................  AK..............                  248,375
                                                ------------------------
      Total Obligated for      ................               13,313,576
       Fiscal Year 2003
       Planning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Recipients did not request full award amount ($248,375).


       FISCAL YEAR 2005 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     SUBGRANT TITLE    AWARDED FED SHARE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
    CT..........................  Central Naugatuck          $101,050.00
                                   Valley Council of
                                   Governments Pre-
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CT..........................  Capitol Region Pre-         322,500.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CT..........................  NWCCOG-PDM2005.....          40,856.63
    CT..........................  City of New Haven            22,500.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    MA..........................  Ell Pond Flood            1,745,700.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Project.
    MA..........................  Merrimack Valley             73,650.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MA..........................  Pioneer Valley Pre-         224,962.50
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MA..........................  Metro Boston North/         206,868.75
                                   West Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MA..........................  Dukes County Pre-            30,000.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MA..........................  City of Newburyport          23,700.00
                                   All Hazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    MA..........................  Central                     112,500.00
                                   Massachusetts
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MA..........................  Pre-Disaster                 11,249.99
                                   Natural Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plans
                                   for Hawley and
                                   Heath.
    MA..........................  Nantucket All-               44,253.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    MA..........................  Massachusetts MH            111,100.00
                                   Planning Grant on
                                   behalf of
                                   Northeastern
                                   University.
    ME..........................  Town of Canton Pre-       3,000,000.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Acquisition and
                                   Demolition of
                                   Floodplain
                                   Properties.
    NH..........................  City of Claremont,          112,500.00
                                   NH Culvert
                                   Project--Sugar
                                   River Drive.
    NH..........................  Regional Planning           400,200.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation.
    NH..........................  Fire Hazard                 120,000.00
                                   Mitigation
                                   Enhancement Plan,
                                   Statewide NH.
    NH..........................  Water Resource              134,810.00
                                   Planning for
                                   Improved Emergency
                                   Response for
                                   Firefighting in NH.
    VT..........................  VT Fluvial Erosion          337,497.62
                                   Hazard Risk
                                   Assessment.
    VT..........................  Norwich University           41,346.11
                                   Disaster Resistant
                                   Planning.
    NJ..........................  Hudson County Local         880,000.00
                                   Mitigation
                                   Strategy.
    NJ..........................  Essex County Multi-       1,176,187.50
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Mitigation
                                   Strategy.
    NY..........................  Town of Rockland NY       1,115,250.00
                                   Property
                                   Acquisition
                                   Project.
    NY..........................  Town of Rockland            122,663.62
                                   Storm water
                                   Management Culvert
                                   Mitigation Project.
    NY..........................  Village of Fairport         133,705.87
                                   Blackwatch
                                   Subdivision--Under
                                   ground Electrical
                                   Conversion.
    NY..........................  Village of Port              22,500.00
                                   Chester Multi-
                                   Hazard Local
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NY..........................  Town of                     140,000.00
                                   Southampton;
                                   Prepare Town-wide
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    NY..........................  County of Albany,            75,000.00
                                   New York
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NY..........................  Town of Woodbury             50,625.00
                                   N.Y. Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Project.
    NY..........................  Town of                      24,000.00
                                   Eastchester, N.Y.
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NY..........................  Genesee County All           60,002.77
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    NY..........................  Orleans County               45,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Multiple
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Mitigation Project.
    NY..........................  Pelham Village               25,012.50
                                   Comprehensive
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    NY..........................  Rensselaer County            41,056.00
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NY..........................  Suffolk County All-       1,117,904.25
                                   Hazard Multi-
                                   jurisdictional Pre-
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NY..........................  Briarcliff Manor's           45,562.50
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    NY..........................  Broome County Multi-         75,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    NY..........................  Town of Islip                93,750.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    NYIT........................  Seneca Nation               108,750.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning.
    MD..........................  Prince George's             967,305.00
                                   County Tor Bryan
                                   Estates.
    MD..........................  University of               178,425.00
                                   Maryland College
                                   Park Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    PA..........................  Lebanon County               43,930.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    PA..........................  County of Montour            48,000.00
                                   Multi-
                                   jurisdictional
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    PA..........................  Building Disaster         1,694,257.25
                                   Resistant
                                   Universities for
                                   the PA State
                                   System of Higher
                                   Ed.
    PA..........................  Snyder County                27,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan Project.
    PA..........................  County of                    45,416.64
                                   Huntingdon
                                   Multihazard Multi-
                                   jurisdictional
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    PA..........................  Berks County Multi-          90,000.00
                                   jurisdictional
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    PA..........................  Blair County Hazard          27,855.68
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    PA..........................  Armstrong County            105,000.00
                                   Multi-
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    PA..........................  Clarion County               38,465.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    VA..........................  George Mason                112,500.00
                                   University All-
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Planning.
    VA..........................  Expanding and               205,185.00
                                   Revising
                                   Chesapeake's
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    FL..........................  University of Miami         350,174.99
                                   RSMAS Marine
                                   Campus Hurricane
                                   Retrofit.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              125,642.96
                                   System--Ambulatory
                                   Care Center--East.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              411,945.48
                                   System--Ambulatory
                                   Care Center--West.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              394,664.40
                                   System--West Wing.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              168,168.55
                                   System--Central
                                   Wing.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              310,641.58
                                   System--South Wing.
    FL..........................  University of Miami       2,214,674.99
                                   School of Medicine
                                   Hurricane Retrofit
                                   (Multiple).
    FL..........................  Jackson Health               82,150.68
                                   System--North Wing.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health            1,404,397.15
                                   System--East Tower.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              670,029.33
                                   System--Mental
                                   Health (Highland
                                   Pa-  vilion).
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              413,526.79
                                   System--Rehabilita
                                   tion Building.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              296,373.67
                                   System--Rehabilita
                                   tion Annex.
    FL..........................  Jackson Health              295,326.82
                                   System--Institute
                                   Building.
    FL..........................  Roof Reinforcement/         119,250.00
                                   Cutler Ridge
                                   District Station.
    FL..........................  City of North Miami          37,500.00
                                   Police Facility
                                   Window Replacement
                                   Project.
    FL..........................  Miami Children's            395,687.21
                                   Hospital Pre-
                                   Disaster Wind
                                   Mitigation Project.
    FL..........................  Miami Children's             55,933.00
                                   Hospital
                                   Satellite, Pre-
                                   Disaster Wind
                                   Mitigation Project.
    FL..........................  Eckerd College              117,750.00
                                   Mitigation Plan/
                                   Risk Assessment.
    GA..........................  DeKalb County--JAX        2,827,165.50
                                   SQUARE ACQ1.
    GA..........................  DeKalb County--           2,625,750.00
                                   15ACQ.
    GA..........................  DeKalb County--JAX          942,388.50
                                   SQUARE ACQ2.
    GA..........................  City of Warner               96,622.00
                                   Robins Acquisition
                                   Project.
    GA..........................  City of Savannah            741,384.47
                                   Acquisition
                                   Demolition 2005
                                   Project.
    GA..........................  City of Atlanta           1,076,772.75
                                   Acquisition--Fisca
                                   l Year 2005--PDM.
    GA..........................  City of Atlanta           1,634,372.66
                                   Elevation--Fiscal
                                   Year 2005--PDM.
    GA..........................  State of Georgia            301,875.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Planning
                                   Application.
    NC..........................  Acquisition &               337,881.00
                                   Demolition in
                                   Myers Park Manor--
                                   Charlotte, NC.
    NC..........................  Acquisition &             2,113,660.50
                                   Demolition along
                                   Cullman Ave.--
                                   Charlotte, NC.
    NC..........................  UNCW Mitigation              13,500.00
                                   Plan.
    NC..........................  North Carolina DEM          319,794.00
                                   Grant to Update
                                   State 322 Plan.
    NC..........................  UNC-CH 2005 PDM             339,087.80
                                   planning app 2.
    SC..........................  Low country COG               8,781.00
                                   Inclusion of all
                                   Communities into
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    TN..........................  Rutherford County         1,116,112.50
                                   Greenwood
                                   Acquisition
                                   Project 2005.
    TN..........................  Rutherford County           583,912.50
                                   Twin Oaks
                                   Acquisition
                                   Project 2005.
    TN..........................  Metro Nashville           1,971,765.00
                                   2005 Home Buyout.
    TN..........................  Giles County Hazard          30,000.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    TN..........................  University of                56,250.00
                                   Tennessee
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    IL..........................  DuPage County,               75,000.00
                                   Illinois Natural
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    IN..........................  Town of Dyer Multi-          30,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    IN..........................  City of Hammond              37,500.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IN..........................  Hancock County               30,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IN..........................  DeKalb County Multi-         30,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    IN..........................  Noble County Multi-          30,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    IN..........................  Steuben County               30,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IN..........................  Indiana's Boundary        1,821,750.00
                                   River Mitigation
                                   Planning
                                   Initiative.
    MI..........................  Robinson Township         2,428,156.50
                                   PDM Property
                                   Acquisition
                                   Project 1.
    MI..........................  Robinson Township         2,654,815.50
                                   PDM Acquisition 2.
    MI..........................  Michigan                     56,250.00
                                   Technological
                                   University
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MN..........................  McLeod County All            24,750.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    MN..........................  Douglas County All           24,750.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    MN..........................  Grant County All             24,750.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    MN..........................  Wabasha County All           23,273.22
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  City of Darlington          187,500.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Project.
    WI..........................  Marinette County             37,500.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  Waupaca County               33,918.00
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning.
    WI..........................  Brown County All-            74,994.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  Manitowoc County             71,349.00
                                   All-Hazards
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Waushara County All-         35,250.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  Lafayette County             15,874.50
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Sheboygan County             39,750.00
                                   All-Hazards
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Jackson County               45,000.00
                                   Wisconsin
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Dunn County Natural          30,000.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  Forest County All            22,500.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  Langlade County All          22,500.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    WI..........................  La Crosse County             60,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Buffalo County               45,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Wisconsin Emergency         141,818.00
                                   Management
                                   Planning
                                   Application.
    WI..........................  Iron County                  40,152.00
                                   Wisconsin Pre-
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   Development.
    WI..........................  Jefferson County             45,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazards
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WI..........................  Ozaukee County               37,500.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    AR..........................  Fort Smith School           531,329.97
                                   District Safe Room
                                   at Carnall Elem-
                                   entary.
    AR..........................  Fort Smith School           531,329.97
                                   District Morrison
                                   Elementary Safe
                                   Room.
    AR..........................  Van Buren School          1,129,368.75
                                   District High
                                   School Safe Room.
    AR..........................  Mansfield School            412,077.00
                                   District High
                                   School Safe Room.
    AR..........................  Alma School               1,056,555.58
                                   District Safe Room
                                   Application.
    AR..........................  Mansfield School            412,077.00
                                   District Middle
                                   School Safe Room.
    AR..........................  Fort Smith School           531,329.97
                                   District Cavanaugh
                                   Elementary Safe
                                   Room.
    AR..........................  Johnson County               30,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    AR..........................  Pope County Hazard           30,000.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  Caddo Kiowa                 440,999.90
                                   Technology Center,
                                   Fort Cobb,
                                   Oklahoma, Safe
                                   Room Construction.
    OK..........................  City of Dewey Multi-         13,500.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Stillwater           60,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  Tulsa County Multi-          60,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Guymon               15,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Sand                 39,999.50
                                   Springs Multi-
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Ada Multi-           30,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Okmulgee             30,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Holdenville          15,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  McLoud School                19,999.99
                                   Natural Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Muskogee             75,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    OK..........................  City of Tahlequah            21,000.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    TX..........................  City of Nacogdoches         226,831.56
                                   Property
                                   Acquisition
                                   Project.
    TX..........................  Travis County               386,486.04
                                   Acquisition/
                                   Demolition--12
                                   Homes in Timber
                                   Creek.
    TX..........................  Pilot List                2,666,167.06
                                   Application #1.
    TX..........................  Pilot List                2,455,071.76
                                   Application #2.
    TX..........................  Pilot List                2,645,354.48
                                   Application #3.
    TX..........................  Pilot List                2,120,046.52
                                   Application #4
                                   Pasadena.
    TX..........................  Acquisition and           1,855,157.53
                                   Demolition 1.
    TX..........................  Acquisition and           2,215,919.64
                                   Demolition 2.
    TX..........................  Acquisition and           2,542,723.31
                                   Demolition 3.
    TX..........................  Acquisition and           2,657,445.36
                                   Demolition 4.
    TX..........................  City of Laredo               73,230.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Project.
    TX..........................  City of Southlake            30,000.00
                                   HAZMAP.
    TX..........................  City of Arlington           166,545.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Action
                                   Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Forest City          43,200.00
                                   Flood Mitigation
                                   Project.
    IA..........................  City of Hampton              45,936.21
                                   Project to Protect
                                   Critical
                                   Facilities From
                                   Flooding.
    IA..........................  Council Bluffs-             362,396.25
                                   Valley View Drive
                                   Acquisition.
    IA..........................  City of Davenport            10,710.00
                                   PDM Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Kossuth County Pre-           6,375.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Pre-Disaster                 11,999.96
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning--Mills
                                   County, Malvern,
                                   and Hastings, Iowa.
    IA..........................  Iowa 322 Update....         163,200.00
    IA..........................  Pre-Disaster                 30,148.00
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning--Seven
                                   Pottawattamie
                                   County Cities.
    IA..........................  City of Tripoli               5,250.00
                                   Local Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   Application.
    IA..........................  City of Clear Lake            6,375.00
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Britt Pre-            6,375.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Northwood             6,375.00
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Lenox                 2,250.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Wapello County               31,997.35
                                   Multi-Jurisdiction
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Springbrook Pre-              2,835.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Union County                  8,999.40
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Charlotte Pre-                3,645.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Ringgold County              10,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Shellsburg,           3,000.00
                                   Iowa, Pre Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Lost Nation Pre-              3,645.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Low Moor Pre-                 3,645.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Peosta Pre-Disaster           3,645.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Sageville Pre-                3,645.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Delhi Pre-Disaster            3,645.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  LaMotte Pre-                  3,645.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Stuart Pre-           3,375.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Ames All-Hazards             58,406.65
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Norway,               3,000.00
                                   Iowa, Pre Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Davis County Multi-          19,989.90
                                   Jurisdiction Multi-
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Mason City            7,500.00
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Clayton County,               6,375.00
                                   Iowa, Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   Update.
    IA..........................  City of Oxford                1,500.00
                                   Junction
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Luzerne,              3,000.00
                                   Iowa, Pre Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Story County, Iowa,          33,777.97
                                   Multi-
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plans.
    IA..........................  Welton Pre-Disaster           2,835.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Delmar Pre-Disaster           3,645.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Ayrshire              3,750.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Kimballton            2,625.00
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Vail Pre-             2,000.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Sherrill Pre-                 2,835.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Akron Pre-Disaster            3,150.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Plymouth County Pre-          4,500.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Merrill Pre-          4,500.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Graf Pre-Disaster             2,835.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Lee County Pre-              34,687.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    IA..........................  Louisa County Pre-           34,686.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    IA..........................  City of Ruthven               3,750.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  Polk County Multi-          150,579.53
                                   jurisdictional
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation  Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Truesdale             3,750.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Lakeside              3,750.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Grant.
    IA..........................  City of Sheldon               6,000.00
                                   Multi-hazard Pre-
                                   Disaster Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Westfield             3,150.00
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    IA..........................  City of Madrid,               6,000.00
                                   Flood Mitigation
                                   Project.
    KS..........................  Sedgwick County             237,000.00
                                   Public Safety
                                   Center.
    KS..........................  Ottawa County, Ks.            4,248.75
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    MO..........................  Pierce City School-         973,017.36
                                   Shelter.
    MO..........................  City of Brentwood           592,500.00
                                   Property Buyout
                                   Mitigation.
    MO..........................  City of                   1,713,319.00
                                   Independence Power
                                   & Light PDM 2005-
                                   2008.
    MO..........................  Willow Springs R-4          656,580.00
                                   High School and
                                   Middle School
                                   Tornado Shelter.
    MO..........................  City of Butler               31,500.00
                                   Mobile Home Park
                                   Shelter.
    MO..........................  West Plains R-VII         2,050,324.54
                                   School District
                                   Tornado Shelter.
    MO..........................  City of Houston,            145,612.50
                                   Missouri Flood
                                   Loss Prevention
                                   Buyout Project.
    MO..........................  Smith Hatchery Road          48,750.00
                                   Bank Stabilization
                                   Project.
    MO..........................  Blue River                1,273,630.50
                                   Community Safe
                                   Room.
    MO..........................  Sullivan County             336,942.00
                                   Missouri Bridge
                                   Mitigation Project.
    MO..........................  Clay County/                120,727.00
                                   Paradise Pointe
                                   Marina Tornado
                                   Shelter.
    MO..........................  Seymour Special             140,335.12
                                   Road District
                                   Skyline Bridge.
    MO..........................  Clay County/Camp            120,727.00
                                   Branch Marina
                                   Shelter.
    MO..........................  Longview CC               2,553,285.50
                                   Community Safe
                                   Room.
    MO..........................  Maple Woods               2,398,602.75
                                   Community Safe
                                   Room.
    MO..........................  Penn Valley               3,000,000.00
                                   Community Safe
                                   Room.
    MO..........................  BTC Community Safe          993,852.75
                                   Room.
    MO..........................  University of                79,317.41
                                   Missouri--Rolla
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    MO..........................  Kansas City Metro            88,702.50
                                   Area Storm Shelter
                                   Plan.
    NE..........................  Village of Elmwood            1,687.50
                                   All-Hazards
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NE..........................  Village of South              2,250.00
                                   Bend All-Hazards
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    NE..........................  Hall County All-             68,389.96
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    CO..........................  North Cheyenne               71,754.26
                                   Canyon Fuels
                                   Mitigation Project.
    CO..........................  Regional Detention        3,000,000.00
                                   Pond at Police
                                   Station 2 (38th &
                                   Holly).
    CO..........................  City of Colorado            217,632.00
                                   Springs Landslide
                                   Damaged Homes
                                   Acquisition and
                                   Removal-2 Homes.
    CO..........................  Grand County Pre             22,721.25
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    CO..........................  Montrose County              70,875.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CO..........................  Jefferson County,           225,000.00
                                   Colorado.
    CO..........................  Colorado PDM-C               80,000.00
                                   Planning Grant
                                   Fiscal Year 2005.
    MT..........................  Remaining and               208,500.00
                                   Unfunded Montana
                                   Communities
                                   Planning Grant
                                   Application.
    MT..........................  Montana University          255,016.60
                                   System Multi-
                                   Hazard Planning.
    ND..........................  North Dakota 345 kV       1,511,250.00
                                   Transmission
                                   Structure
                                   Replacement.
    ND..........................  City of Fargo Drain         987,000.00
                                   10 Flood
                                   Mitigation.
    SD..........................  Marshall County Pre-          7,012.50
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Kingsbury County              7,012.50
                                   Pre Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Clark County                  7,012.50
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Grant County                  9,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Miner County                  7,012.50
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Charles Mix County            4,968.75
                                   Pre-Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Spink County Multi-           5,250.00
                                   hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    SD..........................  McPherson County              7,012.50
                                   Pre Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Faulk County Pre              7,012.50
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Day County Pre                9,000.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Roberts County Pre            9,000.00
                                   Disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    SD..........................  Perkins County                4,500.00
                                   Multi-hazard,
                                   Multi-
                                   jurisdictional Pre-
                                   disaster
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    UT..........................  City of Orem Fire            75,000.00
                                   Station 1 Seismic
                                   Retrofit--300 East
                                   1000 South, Orem,
                                   UT.
    UT..........................  City of Orem Fire            75,000.00
                                   Station 2 Seismic
                                   Retrofit--911
                                   North Main St.
                                   Orem, UT.
    UT..........................  Layton City Fire            268,608.75
                                   Station
                                   Reconstruction &
                                   Retrofit.
    UT..........................  JVWTP Structural          1,791,750.00
                                   Seismic Retrofit.
    UT..........................  Utah Enhanced PDM           131,187.50
                                   Plan Grant
                                   Application.
    UT..........................  University of Utah          537,340.77
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WY..........................  City of Cheyenne          2,764,684.31
                                   Dry Creek Sheridan
                                   Reach Flood
                                   Control Project.
    WY..........................  Campbell County,             18,750.00
                                   City of Gillette,
                                   Town of Wright
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WY..........................  Pre-disaster                 15,000.00
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   for Lincoln Co.,
                                   WY.
    WY..........................  Sublette County               6,000.00
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Project.
    WY..........................  Northwest College            19,875.00
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WY..........................  Update and                   21,420.00
                                   Expansion of
                                   Wyoming Multi-
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    AZ..........................  State of Arizona             56,250.00
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   Input into AzHMPS.
    AZ..........................  Hazard Mitigation           231,000.00
                                   Planning for
                                   Tribal Governments.
    CA..........................  Pasadena City Hall        3,000,000.00
                                   Seismic Upgrade &
                                   Rehabilitation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  City of Huntington        3,000,000.00
                                   Beach Ca. Civic
                                   Center Seismic Ret-
                                     rofit.
    CA..........................  SF Bay Area Rapid         2,999,999.98
                                   Transit District
                                   Mitigation Project.
    CA..........................  University of             3,000,000.00
                                   California San
                                   Francisco Medical
                                   Center Seismic Saw-
                                   Cut Project.
    CA..........................  Joseph P. Bort            2,976,000.00
                                   Metro Center
                                   Seismic Retrofit
                                   Mitigation Project
                                   (Oakland, CA).
    CA..........................  City of Santa Clara       1,268,801.99
                                   at Grade Water
                                   Tanks Seismic
                                   Retrofit
                                   Mitigation Project.
    CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             48,436.64
                                   Water District,
                                   Reservoir Site 1B,
                                   Seismic Mitigation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                   Water District
                                   Seismic
                                   Mitigation--New
                                   Lurin Reservoir.
    CA..........................  Western Municipal           119,092.50
                                   Water District
                                   Seismic
                                   Mitigation--La
                                   Sierra Reservoir.
    CA..........................  Victor Valley Water         201,000.00
                                   District Seismic
                                   Mitigation--Zone
                                   #2.
    CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                   Water District
                                   Seismic
                                   Mitigation--Markha
                                   m Reservoir.
    CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                   Water District
                                   Seismic
                                   Mitigation--Jim
                                   Jack Reservoir.
    CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                   Water District
                                   Seismic
                                   Mitigation--Roosev
                                   elt Reservoir.
    CA..........................  Cal State                   862,425.00
                                   University San
                                   Bernardino
                                   Physical Sciences
                                   Seismic Mitigation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  Hall of Justice           2,067,577.50
                                   West Courthouse
                                   Seismic Hazard
                                   Miti-  gation.
    CA..........................  Los Gatos                 1,008,350.25
                                   Courthouse Seismic
                                   Hazard Mitigation.
    CA..........................  Palo Alto                   236,514.00
                                   Courthouse Seismic
                                   Hazard Mitigation.
    CA..........................  Cal State San               850,570.75
                                   Bernardino
                                   Biological
                                   Sciences Seismic
                                   Mitigation Project.
    CA..........................  Cal Poly Pomona           2,166,354.00
                                   Science 3 Seismic
                                   Mitigation Project.
    CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley            109,496.98
                                   Water District,
                                   Reservoir Site 1C,
                                   Seismic Mitigation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             35,973.82
                                   Water District,
                                   Reservoir Site 4B,
                                   Seismic Mitigation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             26,841.52
                                   Water District,
                                   Reservoir Site 5B,
                                   Seismic Mitigation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             31,407.67
                                   Water District,
                                   Reservoir Site 6C,
                                   Seismic Mitigation
                                   Project.
    CA..........................  Victor Valley Water         137,250.00
                                   District Seismic
                                   Mitigation--Zone
                                   #3.
    CA..........................  County of Butte             122,155.98
                                   Multi-
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  Arroyo Grande,               51,281.25
                                   Grover Beach, and
                                   Lucia Mar Unified
                                   School District
                                   PDM.
    CA..........................  City of Palmdale             98,325.00
                                   Local Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  Fresno County Local         230,951.34
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  Amador County Multi-         43,875.00
                                   jurisdictional
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    CA..........................  City of San Marcos          124,500.00
                                   Wildland Urban
                                   Interface Hazard
                                   and Risk
                                   Assessment.
    CA..........................  City of La Canada            45,000.00
                                   Flintridge
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  City of Pismo Beach          48,750.00
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    CA..........................  Humboldt County             117,000.00
                                   Multi-Agency Multi-
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    CA..........................  Mendocino Emergency         142,124.42
                                   Services
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Project.
    CA..........................  CA MHMP Enhancement         624,325.00
                                   for Alluvial Fan
                                   Flood Hazards.
    CA..........................  City of Tustin--             56,250.00
                                   Local Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  City of Yuba City            30,000.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    CA..........................  La Habra Local               56,250.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  City of Mill Valley          26,600.29
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Planning Grant.
    CA..........................  City of Novato               39,758.25
                                   Multi Hazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    CA..........................  City of Larkspur             37,499.76
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Planning Grant.
    CA..........................  Clovis Unified               58,974.00
                                   School District
                                   Multi-hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   Development.
    CA..........................  Santa Barbara                61,425.00
                                   School Districts
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation  Plan.
    CA..........................  Imperial County             101,368.50
                                   Multi-
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CA..........................  Eastern Municipal            56,250.00
                                   Water District
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CAIT........................  Picayune Rancheria           51,480.00
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning.
    CAIT........................  PDM-C..............         112,800.03
    CAIT........................  Blue Lake Rancheria          55,338.75
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CAIT........................  Pauma-Yuima Band of          46,170.00
                                   Mission Indians
                                   HMP.
    CAIT........................  Santa Ynez Tribal            60,657.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    CAIT........................  Pala Band of                 76,500.00
                                   Mission Indians
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    HI..........................  County of Kauai--           135,000.00
                                   Dev of New Wind
                                   Design Code
                                   Provisions and
                                   Risk Assess Plan.
    HI..........................  University of               261,821.00
                                   Hawaii System
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Pro-
                                   ject.
    NV..........................  State of Nevada              60,063.50
                                   HAZUS-MH Planning
                                   Grant.
    NVIT........................  Pyramid Lake Paiute          19,500.00
                                   Tribe Pre-disaster
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    AK..........................  Hooper Bay and               14,040.00
                                   Paimiut All
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    AK..........................  Dillingham Hazard             7,515.30
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    AK..........................  Kodiak Island                41,723.25
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    AK..........................  Lake & Peninsula             19,416.75
                                   Borough Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    ID..........................  Caribou County               22,500.00
                                   Public Safety All
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan-  ning.
    ID..........................  Twin Falls County            41,250.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    ID..........................  Gooding County               41,250.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    ID..........................  Cassia County All            41,250.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    ID..........................  North East Idaho            337,530.00
                                   Regional
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    ID..........................  Idaho State Hazard          201,503.84
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   2008.
    ID..........................  Lincoln County               41,250.00
                                   Multi-Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    ID..........................  Camas County Multi-          41,250.00
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Plan.
    IDIT........................  Duck Valley Indian           35,025.00
                                   Reservation All
                                   Hazard Plan.
    OR..........................  Clackamas River           1,570,836.00
                                   Water System
                                   Seismic and Ice
                                   Storm Retrofit
                                   Project.
    OR..........................  Douglas County/             731,512.50
                                   Roseburg Public
                                   Schools Seismic
                                   Mitigation Project.
    OR..........................  City of Beaverton         1,015,087.50
                                   City Hall Seismic
                                   Upgrade.
    OR..........................  Scappoose Fire              162,750.00
                                   Station Seismic
                                   Upgrade.
    OR..........................  City of Lake Oswego         187,500.00
                                   Seismic Upgrade
                                   Grant Application.
    OR..........................  Columbia River Fire         281,400.00
                                   & Rescue Fire
                                   Stations Seismic
                                   Ret-  rofit.
    OR..........................  University                1,977,996.00
                                   Demonstration
                                   Projects: OSU and
                                   WOU.
    OR..........................  Mid-Columbia &              932,237.25
                                   Southeast Oregon
                                   Multi-Jurisdiction
                                   Mitigation Plan
                                   Development.
    ORIT........................  Burns Paiute Tribe--         42,267.50
                                   Multihazard
                                   Mitigation Project.
    WA..........................  S. Lake Union               534,921.75
                                   Armory Seismic
                                   Upgrade.
    WA..........................  Frances Anderson            782,190.00
                                   Center.
    WA..........................  School Seismic            3,000,000.00
                                   Retrofits.
    WA..........................  Cedar River/Rainbow       1,212,127.50
                                   Bend Acquisition.
    WA..........................  City of Westport,            30,000.00
                                   Washington Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WA..........................  Whitman County              111,728.46
                                   Multi-
                                   Jurisdictional
                                   Natural Hazards
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WA..........................  Washington State            377,619.00
                                   University
                                   Statewide Hazard
                                   Mitigation
                                   Planning Project.
    WA..........................  Washington State            493,125.12
                                   Region 5 (Pierce
                                   County) Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WA..........................  Grant County Multi-          40,458.91
                                   jurisdictional
                                   Hazard Mitigation
                                   Planning Sub grant.
    WAIT001.....................  Pre-Disaster                111,685.80
                                   Mitigation Update
                                   Project.
    WAIT004.....................  Tulalip Reservation          17,200.00
                                   State-level Hazard
                                   Mitigation Plan.
    WAIT005.....................  Sauk-Suiattle                16,959.96
                                   Indian Tribe All
                                   Hazards Mitigation
                                   Plan.
                                                      ------------------
      Total Plans & Projects for  ...................     148,741,988.18
       Fiscal Year 2005 PDM.

                                                      ==================
MANAGEMENT COSTS RECIPIENT:
    CT..........................  CT 2005 PDM                  48,691.16
                                   Management Costs.
    MA..........................  Commonwealth of             448,408.00
                                   Massachusetts 2005
                                   PDM-C Management
                                   Costs Application.
    ME..........................  Maine Management            196,816.50
                                   Costs PDM-C 2005.
    NH..........................  New Hampshire State          86,962.50
                                   2005 Management.
    GA..........................  GA State Management         777,179.00
                                   Costs.
    NC..........................  NC State Management         312,392.39
                                   Costs.
    SC..........................  SC State Management         211,800.00
                                   Costs.
    TN..........................  Tennessee 2005 PDM           75,000.00
                                   Technical
                                   Assistance.
    MI..........................  State of Michigan           185,309.50
                                   2005 PDM
                                   Management Costs.
    WI..........................  State PDM-C                 112,740.00
                                   Management Costs.
    IA..........................  State of Iowa 2005          118,888.92
                                   Management Costs.
    ND..........................  State of North              249,825.00
                                   Dakota Technical
                                   Assistance Grant.
    SD..........................  State of South                8,379.75
                                   Dakota-Office of
                                   Emergency
                                   Management.
    UT..........................  State Management            137,064.68
                                   Cost for fiscal
                                   year 2005.
    WY..........................  Wyoming Office of            23,715.00
                                   Homeland Security
                                   fiscal year 2005
                                   PDM--C Management.
    ORIT........................  Burns Paiute Tribe--          3,566.25
                                   Management
                                   Oversight.
    WAIT005.....................  Hazard Management             1,694.70
                                   Plan.
                                                      ------------------
      Total Management Costs for  ...................       2,998,433.35
       Fiscal Year 2005 PDM.
                                                      ------------------
      Total Obligated for Fiscal  ...................     151,740,421.53
       Year 2005 PDM.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. How have these projects proven themselves when disaster 
strikes?
    Answer. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program provides funds to 
States, territories, Federally-recognized Indian tribal governments, 
and communities for hazard mitigation planning and the implementation 
of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. The PDM program is 
designed to reduce the risk to populations, structures, and critical 
infrastructure from natural disasters.
    These funds provide for the protection of lives and properties from 
flood damage through acquisition, elevation, relocation, and/or flood 
proofing; protection to critical facilities from flood damage through 
drainage, infrastructure, and utilities projects; protection of 
properties from hurricane wind damage; saving lives through the 
construction of tornado storm shelters; protection to public facilities 
against seismic damage; and providing the framework for communities to 
analyze risk and better plan to protect their communities from 
disasters.
    The findings of the Multihazard Mitigation Council demonstrate that 
on average, a dollar spent by FEMA on hazard mitigation (actions to 
reduce disaster losses) grants provide the Nation about $4 in future 
benefits. To date, PDM has provided $272.5 million to fund 709 hazard 
mitigation plans and projects. Once PDM grants are implemented at the 
local level, it generally takes several years to complete the hazard 
mitigation activity. Since grant awards began in 2004, not enough time 
has passed to evaluate actual PDM project performance. Below are 
examples of activities that are ongoing with PDM funds across the 
county.
Darlington, Wisconsin--All-Hazard Mitigation Plan and Acquisition 
        Project
    Darlington began its success in PDM with a planning sub-grant in 
2002 which resulted in the City's All-Hazard Mitigation Plan. With a 
long history of damaging floods, the City is taking action to reduce 
the number of repetitively flooded properties.
    One of the latest projects funded through the PDM program is the 
purchase and removal of a light industrial building located in the 
floodway. Having flooded four times in the past 60 years, the building 
has sustained structural and content damage as well as business 
interruption losses. The building will be demolished and the site will 
become part of the Pecatonica Riverside Park, which is heavily used by 
the general public.
    As of January 2006, 19 commercial buildings were flood proofed and 
another 14 were purchased and removed from the floodplain, through PDM 
and FEMA's other grant programs--the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program.
Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida--Wind Mitigation
    A total of 32 hurricanes have struck Southern Florida in the past 
100 years. Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami is one of the Nation's 
busiest hospitals, serving a population of 2.3 million. It is also the 
major teaching facility for the University of Miami School of Medicine. 
Jackson Memorial plans to harden its buildings against windstorms using 
a ``see thru'' shutter system for doors and windows that are engineered 
and installed to comply with local building codes.
    Other structures in Miami Dade County that have been similarly 
retrofitted have suffered only superficial damage, such as chipped 
paint, during high-wind events, including Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma.
City of Birmingham, Alabama--Acquisition Project
    The City of Birmingham has an aggressive goal to remove properties 
that are subject to repeated flooding. Both the City of Birmingham and 
the State of Alabama, with support from FEMA's Region IV Office, have 
successfully used the PDM grant program to further this goal. In 2003, 
Birmingham received a PDM grant of $2,490,315 to purchase 65 flood 
vulnerable properties. The grant monies helped to relocate 55 families 
and turn a hazardous area into recreational parkland in perpetuity.
Bay Area Rapid Transit District, California--Earthquake Mitigation 
        Project
    In the highly seismic area of San Francisco, the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit (BART) system, which carries over 310,000 commuters by fixed 
rail and bus each workday, found its critical Train Operations Center 
to be at significant risk of collapse and liable to fall in on the 
underground portion of the building in the event of an earthquake.
    BART is using its PDM grant to raze the above-ground portion of the 
building and move the entire operation underground. This will reduce 
the potential for damage, increase the safety of BART employees, and 
help to maintain normal transportation routes for the Bay area 
following an earthquake.

                           FEMA FUNDING LAPSE

    Question. Are there plans to use the section 504 authority to 
expedite hiring in fiscal year 2006? If not, why not?
    Answer. FEMA plans to submit Congressional notification to use 50 
percent of the unobligated balances remaining at the end of fiscal year 
2005, as permitted by Section 504 of the Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriation Act of 2005. These funds will be used to meet 
priority resource needs including personnel expenses deferred due to 
the response and recovery requirements for Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
    Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes a new 
initiative that creates a new bureaucracy in the Preparedness 
Directorate to do the same thing that FEMA used to do. The National 
Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP) is proposed to fund improved 
catastrophic planning; enhanced emergency communications systems; the 
aligning of preparedness planning for Federal, State, and local command 
and control processes; harmonized medical coordination; and development 
of innovative ideas and methods for preparedness. This action appears 
to widen the chasm between preparedness and recovery by stove-piping 
FEMA and the Preparedness Directorate.
    What is the overall strategy to ensure that meaningful and 
effective planning efforts are coordinated among levels of government 
and within the Department, that those in command and control know each 
other prior to an incident, and that first responders have trained and 
exercised together, before they respond to the next disaster--no matter 
what the hazard?
    Answer. Results of the Department's Second Stage Review (2SR) 
separated the former Office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) into the new Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A) and the Directorate for Preparedness. As acknowledged by the 
Conferees to the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriation in the Conference 
Report, the new Directorate for Preparedness will assess and prioritize 
policies and operations to enhance preparedness for a natural disaster 
or terrorist attack. The conferees directed the Directorate to work 
with the Director of FEMA to continue an all-hazard approach for 
preparation, response, and recovery to any type of disaster, and this 
concerted approach is under way.
    The overall strategy to ensure that meaningful and effective 
planning efforts are coordinated among levels of government and within 
the Department is summarized in the report, The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. The report recommends that DHS 
should establish an interagency team of senior planners with 
appropriate emergency management experience to conduct a comprehensive, 
90-day review of the NRP and NIMS. As part of this review, all agencies 
will be required to develop integrated operational plans, procedures 
and capabilities for their support to the base NRP and all ESFs and 
Support Annexes.
    In addition, the Lessons Learned Report recommends that DHS 
integrate and synchronize its preparedness functions by fully 
implementing 2SR.
    To ensure that those in command and control know each other prior 
to an incident, and that first responders have trained and exercised 
together before they respond to the next disaster, the NPIP will 
install Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs). FPCs will execute 
NPIP related activities at the local level. The mission of the NPIP is 
to create, organize, enable and monitor initiatives to integrate and 
synchronize national preparedness. The FPCs will play a key role in 
achieving that mission given that National preparedness is only 
possible when Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private 
sector and the American people are working collectively toward a shared 
goal of enhanced preparedness.
    Through the NPIP, FPCs will provide DHS with an important and 
functional field presence to collaborate and build partnerships with 
State and local government, and private sector homeland security 
stakeholders within the FPC's assigned geographic areas of 
responsibility and to ensure that these stakeholders are working 
together and are thoroughly prepared. Currently, such field level 
coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and DHS does not have always 
have visibility into how high-risk areas are prepared to deal with 
homeland security incidents.
    FPCs will change that by providing vehicles for regular 
coordination, strengthening the linkages between officials responsible 
for responding to possible homeland security incidents. Our Nation 
cannot afford for Federal, State and local government officials to have 
to build working relationships and common approaches to incident 
management amidst the fog of a major incident--such as Hurricane 
Katrina or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Instead, these relationships 
need to be built through frequent collaboration during steady State 
activities, as well as through common, well-understood, and practiced 
approaches to incident response prior to such an approach being needed.
    Question. How does this budget reflect that strategy in a way that 
funds will not lapse, the right people are working together, and 
Americans are made safer?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 Budget Request funds the 
strategy outlined above by directing spending through the NPIP to our 
most urgent preparedness integration priorities. The NPIP will serve as 
the Department's lead in coordinating, implementing, and monitoring 
initiatives to integrate and synchronize national preparedness efforts 
at the Federal level, the State and local levels, and throughout the 
private sector.

                           RETOOLING OF FEMA

    Question. On February 13, 2006, Secretary Chertoff announced a 
retooling of FEMA. What resources are needed to accomplish each 
outlined goal and where will the funds come from?
    Answer. The first steps in FEMA retooling are being applied to the 
current focus in FEMA's preparations for the upcoming hurricane season 
through improvements to our response and recovery functions, such as 
victim assistance, logistics, and communications.
    Retooling initiatives in place or underway for the 2006 hurricane 
season include:
  --Implementation of Phase I of the Total Asset Visibility commodities 
        tracking program in Regions IV (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN) 
        and VI (AR, LA, OK, NM, TX).
  --Pre-positioning of emergency supplies through inter-agency 
        agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and private 
        partners.
  --Increased customer service capability through increased victim 
        registration capacity.
  --Public Assistance and Individual Assistance Techncial Assistance 
        Contract improvements.
  --Implementation of improved internal controls and anti-fraud 
        protections (ChoicePoint).
  --Expanded housing inspection capacity.
  --IT and facility improvements at both the Regions and Headquarters 
        for improved situational awareness.
  --Implementation of a program to allow contractors to register on-
        line to provide an immediately accessible, nationwide list of 
        resources for debris removal.
  --Pre-designated mission assignments with other Federal entities to 
        facilitate immediate response requirements.
  --Improved emergency communications capabilities including upgraded 
        and expanded Land Mobile Radios and High Frequency (HF) 
        equipment integration; and
  --Implemented aggressive hiring initiatives to fill critical 
        vacancies.
    The majority of funding for FEMA retooling and 2006 hurricane 
season preparations is sourced from the Disaster Relief Fund. FEMA is 
still in the process of refining these initiatives and identifying the 
specific short and long-term costs.

                            LESSONS LEARNED

    Question. In February 2006, the White House released a report, The 
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, with 125 
recommendations. What resources are need to accomplish each outlined 
goal and where will the funds come from?
    Answer. The Department is currently engaged in comprehensive 
efforts to identify lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina 
response, both on its own and through an interagency working group. 
Many of these lessons have already led to recommendations upon which 
the Department is moving forward and implementing changes using 
currently available resources and authority. Because of the timing of 
the report, recommendations considered for implementation are not 
specifically addressed in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget. The 
Department is identifying available resources within the fiscal year 
2006 budget and considering options for fiscal year 2007 as review and 
implementation work moves forward. We look forward to working with this 
committee on any budgetary resource changes that may be needed in the 
future.
    Question. What legislative changes are needed to implement the 
recommendations?
    Answer. The Department is currently engaged in comprehensive 
efforts to identify lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina 
response, both on its own and through an interagency working group. 
Many of these lessons have already led to recommendations upon which 
the Department is moving forward and implementing changes. As this work 
continues, the need for legislative changes to existing authorities may 
emerge. We look forward to working with this committee on any 
legislative changes which may be needed.

                             FEMA STAFFING

    Question. How many FTEs, by Budget Activity (breaking out 
Preparedness (Readiness), Mitigation Response and Recovery also), is 
FEMA authorized to hire in fiscal year 2004, 2005 and 2006?
    Answer.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Fiscal      Fiscal     Fiscal      Fiscal     Fiscal
                        Activity                          year 2004  year 2004   year 2005  year 2005  year 2006
                                                         authorized    actual   authorized    actual    enacted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness, Mitigation, Response, & Recovery:
    Readiness..........................................         377        295         377        271        176
    Mitigation.........................................         105         92         105         90         95
    Response...........................................         368        366         388        355        379
    Recovery...........................................         194        163         194        165        172
                                                        --------------------------------------------------------
      Total, RMRR......................................       1,044        916       1,064        881        822
                                                        ========================================================
Administrative & Regional Operations \1\...............         971        820         884        825      1,032
Public Health Programs.................................          91         83          40         88         40
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program \2\........          90         77          90         78  .........
National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund..................          55  .........          55  .........         15
Disaster Relief........................................       2,290      3,330       2,290      5,458      3,493
Cerro Grande Fire Claims...............................          12         10           5          2  .........
Flood Map Modernization Fund...........................          33  .........          33         13         33
National Flood Insurance Fund..........................         271        238         271        241        270
Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program Account........           2          3           3          3          3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes the Office of the Under Secretary.
\2\ REP was transferred to the Preparedness Directorate in fiscal year2006.

    Question. How many were or are on board?
    Answer. The chart below reflects the positions on board.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Fiscal year
                                                                    Fiscal year     Fiscal year    2006 on board
                            Activity                              2006 positions   2006 est. FTE  as of February
                                                                                                     18, 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Readiness, Mitigation, Response, & Recovery:
    Readiness...................................................             200             176             161
    Mitigation..................................................             104              95              87
    Response....................................................             427             379             330
    Recovery....................................................             181             172             156
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total, RMRR...............................................             912             822             734
                                                                 ===============================================
Administrative & Regional Operations............................           1,072           1,032             749
National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund...........................              55              15  ..............
Flood Map Modernization Fund....................................              33              33              25
National Flood Insurance Fund...................................             270             270             237
Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program Account.................               3               3               3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Excludes Disaster Relief Fund and Public Health Programs.

    Question. How many vacancies will be filled by funds provided 
through supplemental appropriations bills enacted after August 2005?
    Answer. The supplemental appropriation (Public Law 109-148) 
included 80 full time permanent positions and funding for the staffing 
of the Gulf Region Acquisition Center and Office of the Chief Financial 
Officer. The fiscal year 2007 request includes funding to support these 
positions on a permanent basis. FEMA plans to fill all of the 
positions.

                           FEMA FUNDING LAPSE

    Question. In fiscal year 2005, FEMA lapsed $11 million, 6 percent, 
of the funds in the Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery 
account. What specifically were these funds to be used for and what did 
not happen at FEMA because the funds were returned to the Treasury?
    Answer. Because of FEMA's focus on responding to hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, funding planned for Federal Incident Response 
Support Teams (FIRSTs), medical surge efforts, and filling vacant 
positions lapsed.

                      HURRICANE KATRINA CONTRACTS

    Question. In response to Hurricane Katrina, how many FEMA contracts 
were made?
    Answer. FEMA awarded 3,479 contract actions.
    Question. How many were sole sourced?
    Answer. There were 227 new contracts that were sole source awards.
    Question. Identify the cruise ships contracts. How many contracts 
were made?
    Answer. The Military Sealift Command awarded a total of four 
contracts for cruise ships to support Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. 
One contract was awarded to Scotia Prince Lines for the vessel SCOTIA 
PRINCE. Carnival Cruise Lines was awarded three contracts for the 
HOLIDAY, ECSTASY and SENSATION. The respective contract numbers as 
follows:
    N00033-05-C-5610--Scotia Prince
    N00033-05-C-5611--Carnival Sensation
    N00033-05-C-5612--Carnival Ecstasy
    N00033-05-C-5613--Carnival Holiday
    Question. How many were sole sourced?
    Answer. None. The contracts were competitively procured.
    Question. How were the contracts solicited?
    Answer. The Military Sealift Command released a Request for 
Proposals through its standard, web-based competitive solicitation 
process.
    Question. What was the cost per bed occupied?
    Answer. The average daily per-person-cost (or bed occupied) was 
$307.18, calculated by dividing the contract total obligated amount by 
the total passenger counts for the three Carnival ships.
    Daily costs were calculated by dividing the contract total 
obligated amount by the number of days, then dividing that figure by 
the number of passengers, as described below.
    Contract Amounts (Total obligated, including reimbursable cost 
limits):
  --Ecstasy--$82,713,000
  --Holiday--$62,153,000
  --Sensation--$91,133,000
    (A) Contracts' total obligated amount $235,999,000.
    Passenger Days (Total passenger count for the period of occupancy):
  --Ecstasy--329,204
  --Holiday--135,464
  --Sensation--303,603
    (B) Total passenger days 768,271
    A divided by B=$307.18 per passenger daily cost.

                           MAP MODERNIZATION

    Question. Through the Map Modernization Program how many maps have 
been updated?
    Answer. As of the end of fiscal year 2005 for the Flood Map 
Modernization Program, FEMA estimates that:
  --Digital flood map products were available for 39 percent of the 
        Nation's population.
  --11 percent of the stream miles mapped was based on new, updated, or 
        validated engineering analysis, covering 4 percent of the 
        population.
  --Digital flood map products covered 15 percent of the land area of 
        the continental United States.
    Question. How many are left to update?
    Answer. Between the end of fiscal year 2005 and the end of fiscal 
year 2010, the following actions are planned:
  --Digital flood map products will be available for an additional 53 
        percent of the Nation's population. Map Modernization will 
        provide updated maps for 92 percent of the population by 2010.
  --30 percent of the stream miles mapped will be based on new, 
        updated, or validated engineering analysis, affecting 40 
        percent of the Nation's population.
  --Digital flood map products will cover an additional 50 percent of 
        the land area of the continental United States. Map 
        Modernization will cover 65 percent of the land area of the 
        continental United States by 2010.
    Question. Of the updated maps, how many used new scientific data 
and what type of data (i.e. topographic, etc.), not just technology, 
was used in the update process?
    Answer. Thirty percent of the stream miles mapped will be based on 
new, updated, or validated engineering/scientific analysis, affecting 
40 percent of the Nation's population. For these updates, FEMA is using 
new or updated scientific data such as topographic data, base maps, 
stream gage data, rainfall data, engineering analyses, and land 
surveys. In addition, FEMA has used Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) to compile the updated maps and is making these maps available 
through a web-based mapping information platform.
    Question. In fiscal year 2006, questions for the record, it was 
stated that FEMA is ``on track to complete the project by 2010, should 
the funding requested through 2008 be provided.'' Does this remain 
true?
    Answer. FEMA is still on track to complete the project by 2010, 
should the funding requested through 2008 be provided.
    Question. What is the projected cost through 2008?
    Answer. FEMA estimates that it will need approximately $200 million 
in appropriated funds in both fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 for 
the Flood Map Modernization Program.

                               EXERCISES

    Question. How many exercises has FEMA been involved in? When, where 
and what was exercised? Who else participated (i.e. local, State, 
Federal partners)?
    Answer. Since May 2003, FEMA has been involved in the following 
exercises:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Capabilities
           Exercise Name                       Dates                   Location              exercised          FEMA participants    Other participants
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOPOFF 2..........................  May 12-16, 2003...........  Multiple locations...  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                        and command,           Coordination Center   Homeland Security
                                                                                        control, and           (NRCC) at FEMA        (DHS)/Office for
                                                                                        coordination at top    Headquarters; FEMA    Domestic
                                                                                        officials level.       Regions V and X.      Preparedness (ODP)
                                                                                                                                     (Sponsors)
Determined Promise 2003...........  September 2003............  Las Vegas, NV........  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                        and coordination       Coordination Center   Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                        with DOD.              (NRCC) at FEMA.       Northern Command
                                                                                       Headquarters; FEMA
                                                                                        Region IX; FEMA
                                                                                        Response Division,
                                                                                        Operations Branch,
                                                                                        Planning Section.
Crisis Management Exercise........  2003......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  North Atlantic
                                                                                        and coordination                             Treaty Organization
                                                                                        with DOD.                                    (NATO)/Department
                                                                                                                                     of Defense (DOD)
Unified Defense...................  February 2004.............  .....................  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                        and coordination       Coordination Center   Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                        with DOD.              (NRCC) at FEMA        Northern Command
                                                                                                               Headquarters; FEMA    (Sponsors)
                                                                                                               Region VI; Response
                                                                                                               Division,
                                                                                                               Operations Branch,
                                                                                                               Planning Section.
CWID..............................  2004......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  Department of
                                                                                        and coordination                             Defense (DOD)
                                                                                        with DOD.
Crisis Management Exercise........  2004......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  North Atlantic
                                                                                        and coordination                             Treaty Organization
                                                                                        with DOD.                                    (NATO)/Department
                                                                                                                                     of Defense (DOD)
Determined Promised 2004..........  2004......................  Richmond, VA.........  Response capabilities  FEMA Region III.....  Department of
                                                                                        and coordination                             Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                        with DOD.                                    Northern Command
                                                                                                                                     (Sponsors)
Forward Challenge.................  2004......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters;    Department of
                                                                                        and coordination       FEMA Office of        Defense (DOD)
                                                                                        with DOD.              National Security
                                                                                                               Coordination.
Livewire..........................  2004......................  .....................  .....................  FEMA HQ and FEMA      ....................
                                                                                                               Region I.
TOPOFF 3 CPX......................  2004......................  .....................  .....................  FEMA Headquarters...  Department of
                                                                                                                                     Homeland Security
                                                                                                                                     (DHS)/Office for
                                                                                                                                     Domestic
                                                                                                                                     Preparedness (ODP)
                                                                                                                                     (Sponsors)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant  March 9-10, 2005..........  Brattleboro, VT......  Six person team to     Mobile Emergency      ....................
 Drill.                                                                                 support NPP drill.     Response Support
                                                                                                               (MERS) Detachments.
Defense Interoperability            March 11-28, 2005.........  .....................  Response capabilities  Mobile Emergency      Defense Information
 Communications Exercise (DICE)                                                         and coordination       Response Support      Systems Agency
 2005.                                                                                  with DOD.              (MERS) Detachments.   (DISA)/Joint
                                                                                                                                     Interoperability
                                                                                                                                     Test Command (JITC)
TOPOFF 3..........................  April 4-10, 2005..........  Multiple locations...  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                        and command,           Coordination Center   Homeland Security
                                                                                        control, and           (NRCC) at FEMA        (DHS)/Office for
                                                                                        coordination at top    Headquarters; FEMA    Domestic
                                                                                        officials level.       Regions I and II.     Preparedness (ODP)
                                                                                                                                     (Sponsors)
Chemical Stockpile Emergency        May 8-12, 2005............  .....................  Response capabilities  Mobile Emergency      ....................
 Preparedness Program (CSEPP).                                                                                 Response Support
                                                                                                               (MERS) Detachments.
Radiological Emergency              May 23-27, 2005...........  Brattleboro, VT......  Response capabilities  Mobile Emergency
 Preparedness Exercise.                                                                                        Response Support
                                                                                                               (MERS) Detachments.
Grecian Firebolt 2005.............  June 1-24, 2005...........  .....................  Joint Secure           Mobile Emergency      Department of
                                                                                        Communications         Response Support      Defense (DOD)/ASC
                                                                                        Exercise.              (MERS) Detachments.
Pinnacle Exercise.................  June 20-25, 2005..........  .....................  National level         Mobile Emergency      Department of
                                                                                        response               Response Support      Homeland Security
                                                                                        capabilities           (MERS) Detachments;   (DHS)
                                                                                        demonstration.         FEMA's Office of
                                                                                                               National Security
                                                                                                               Coordination.
Northern Edge/Alaska Shield.......  August 15-19, 2005........  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Region X;        Northern Command
                                                                                                               Mobile Emergency      (Sponsor), Alaska
                                                                                                               Response Support      Command
                                                                                                               (MERS) Detachments.
Dingo King 2005...................  August 20-24, 2006........  Kings Bay, GA........  National Nuclear       FEMA Region IV;       Department of
                                                                                        Weapon Accident        Mobile Emergency      Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                        Exercise- Response     Response Support      Defense Threat
                                                                                        capabilities and       (MERS) Detachments.   Reduction Agency
                                                                                        coordination with                            (DTRA) (Sponsors)
                                                                                        DOD.
Joint User Interoperability         August 1-30, 2005.........  .....................  Interoperable          Mobile Emergency      United States Joint
 Communications Exercise (JUICE)                                                        communications.        Response Support      Forces Command
 2005.                                                                                                         (MERS) Detachments.   (USJFCOM)
Ardent Sentry 2005................  September 2005............  .....................  Response capabilities  National Response     ....................
                                                                                        and coordination       Coordination Center
                                                                                        with DOD.              (NRCC) at FEMA
                                                                                                               Headquarters;
                                                                                                               Response Division,
                                                                                                               Operations Branch,
                                                                                                               Planning Section.
Crisis Management Exercise........  2005......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  North Atlantic
                                                                                        and coordination                             Treaty Organization
                                                                                        with DOD.                                    (NATO)/Department
                                                                                                                                     of Defense (DOD)
Defense Interoperability            February 20-March 3, 2006.  .....................  Defense                MERS--Denton          Defense Information
 Communications Exercise (DICE)                                                         interoperability       Detachment.           Systems Agency
 2006.                                                                                  exercise/testing.                            (DISA)/Joint
                                                                                                                                     Interoperability
                                                                                                                                     Test Command (JITC)
                                                                                                                                     (Sponsors)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               PERSONNEL

    Question. How many permanent and temporary personnel left FEMA 
during fiscal year 2005 and how many were replaced?
    Answer. During fiscal year 2005, there were 5,715 employee 
separations from FEMA and 6,051 employee accessions, for a turnover 
rate of 20.32 percent.
    Question. How many have left in fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. During fiscal year 2006, as of February 4, 2006, there have 
been 644 employee separations from FEMA and 4,822 employee accessions--
for a turnover rate of 2.29 percent.
    Question. How many trained temporary personnel were/are available 
to FEMA in fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2006?
    Answer:
    Fiscal year 2001--2,521
    Fiscal year 2002--2,865
    Fiscal year 2003--3,289
    Fiscal year 2004--3,330
    Fiscal year 2005--5,458
    Fiscal year 2006--11,790
    All of FEMA's temporary Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs) 
receive training. Because DAEs are permitted to list themselves as not 
available for deployment, the number of DAEs available at any given 
time will vary. The numbers provided for prior years reflect total DAEs 
deployed for various disasters during the fiscal year. Fiscal year 2006 
numbers reflect those currently on board as of 5/13/06.

                  CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
                    BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM

    Question. What is the estimated total cost of the business 
transformation program?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2007, USCIS plans to spend $112 million ($47 
million as requested in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget and $65 
million from mandatory). As part of planning efforts in fiscal year 
2006, USCIS is completing the business transformation strategy which 
will inform activities beyond 2007.

                            CIS INITIATIVES

    Question. Please provide a basic description of the SAVE and EEV 
programs including: (a) which one employers currently check to 
determine status of their employees; (b) when the SAVE program started; 
(c) what prohibitions have been placed on the program; (d) and what 
portion of the costs are covered by fees paid by whom.
    Answer. The SAVE Program.--The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (IRCA), required the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (now U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)), to 
establish a system for verifying the immigration status of non-citizen 
applicants for, and recipients of, certain types of Federally funded 
benefits, and to make the system available to Federal, State, and local 
benefit issuing agencies and institutions that administer such 
benefits. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) 
Program was established in September 1987, and is the USCIS office 
responsible for administering DHS programs involving customer access to 
immigration status information contained in the SAVE Verification 
Information System (VIS). The VIS database consists of information 
drawn from the Central Index System (CIS) and the TECS/IBIS system, and 
contains over 120 million records. There are currently 197 agencies 
with over 190,000 Federal, State, and local government users 
participating in SAVE. In fiscal year 2005 SAVE responded to more than 
10.5 million immigration status verification queries from these users. 
SAVE customers access status information via the web, a personal 
computer with modem, 3,270 terminals, or batch method. The SAVE 
Federal, State, and local government users pay a per query cost for 
using the SAVE system. These query costs are paid directly to Computer 
Sciences Corporation, the contractor which operates and maintains the 
VIS database for the SAVE Program.
    The Basic Pilot (Employment Eligibility Verification).--In 1996, 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA), provided for the implementation of the Basic Pilot program 
for a 4-year period. Congress twice extended authorization for the 
Basic Pilot to its current authorization deadline of November 2008. The 
USCIS SAVE Program and the Social Security Administration (SSA) jointly 
conduct the Basic Pilot Program. The program involves verification 
checks of the SSA and DHS databases, using an automated system to 
verify the employment authorization of newly hired employees.
    The Basic Pilot was implemented in November 1997. By statute, the 
Basic Pilot is a voluntary program, and free to employers who 
volunteer. The Basic Pilot was originally available to employers in the 
States of California, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, New York and Texas; 
however, in December 2004, the pilot was expanded to employers in all 
50 States and the District of Columbia. There are currently more than 
5,500 employers enrolled in the Basic Pilot representing more than 
23,500 employer sites. Basic Pilot performed more than 980,000 queries 
in fiscal year 2005.
    By statute, the Basic Pilot cannot be used to pre-screen job 
applicants; to re-verify employment authorization; or to verify 
employment authorization for those employees who were hired prior to 
the company joining the Basic Pilot Program. Presently, the Basic Pilot 
is available through a Web-Based access method. The USCIS is currently 
paying for the Basic Pilot query costs from general immigration benefit 
application fees.
    Question. Also describe the role that the Social Security 
Administration plays in these processes.
    Answer. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is a SAVE agency 
user. SSA uses the SAVE system to verify the immigration status of non-
citizens and naturalized citizens applying for Supplemental Security 
Income benefits and non-citizens applying for Social Security Numbers.
    Additionally, the SSA is jointly conducting the Basic Pilot program 
with USCIS. All Basic Pilot queries, whether the employee claims to be 
a citizen, national, or non-citizen, first go to the SSA database for 
verification. When the information cannot be verified through the 
automated system, the employee must contact an SSA field office to 
correct any discrepancies in the SSA record in order to confirm their 
employment authorization. All non-citizen queries also go to USCIS for 
verification of work authorization status.
    Question. What is the timeline for implementing SAVE and EEV?
    Answer. The SAVE Program has been in existence since September 
1987. The Basic Pilot Program was implemented in November 1997. 
Language mandating an Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) Program 
is included in several pending pieces of legislation. Should 
legislation be passed mandating an EEV program, USCIS has estimated 
that it will take 12 to 18 months, from the time that USCIS receives 
funding through appropriations, to fully implement the program. The 
President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $111 million to improve 
and expand Basic Pilot in anticipation of a mandatory, national 
program. This funding will cover start up infrastructure improvements 
including increases in personnel, increased operating efficiency 
through automation of features and a reengineered process, and the 
increasing accuracy of DHS databases and data on individuals used in 
the verification process. These operating efficiencies are intended to 
reduce the reliance on manual verification and the need for personnel 
for this function.
    Question. What part of the EEV request is not tied to pending 
legislation?
    Answer. A total of $111 million in the President's fiscal year 2007 
budget request is in anticipation of legislation requiring a national 
mandatory employment eligibility verification program. In addition to 
the $111 million, the President's budget also requests $20.5 million to 
support the existing base operations of the Basic Pilot and SAVE 
programs, and $4 million to support expansion of SAVE to meet the 
requirements of the REAL ID Act. Therefore, a total of $24.5 million 
out of a combined total of $135.5 million relating to immigration 
verification activities is not tied to pending legislation.

                             CIS PERSONNEL

    Question. How many status verifiers are there and where are they 
located?
    Answer. There are currently 159 Immigration Status Verifier 
positions. The charts below show where these positions are located.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            AUTHORIZED
                         OFFICE                              POSITIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS:
    National Records Center (Contact Reps)..............              24
FCO POSITIONS:
    Immigration Status Verifiers........................             135
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................             159
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   BREAKDOWN OF POSITIONS BY LOCATION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Office                             Authorized
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADQUARTERS:
    Headquarters........................................              15
    National Records Center.............................               9
EASTERN REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
    Atlanta.............................................               2
    Baltimore...........................................               3
    Boston..............................................               2
    Buffalo.............................................               3
    Cleveland...........................................               1
    Detroit.............................................               1
    Miami...............................................               8
    Newark..............................................               4
    New Orleans.........................................               2
    New York............................................               8
    Philadelphia........................................               2
    Portland, Maine.....................................               1
    San Juan............................................               3
    Washington..........................................               3
SUBOFFICE:
    Albany..............................................               1
    Charlotte, NC.......................................               1
    Charlotte Amalie, VI................................               1
    Hartford............................................               2
    Norfolk.............................................               1
    Pittsburgh..........................................               2
    Providence..........................................               1
    St. Albans..........................................               1
    Vermont Service Center..............................               1
CENTRAL REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
    Chicago.............................................               2
    Dallas..............................................               4
    Denver..............................................               2
    El Paso.............................................               2
    Harlingen...........................................               2
    Houston.............................................               2
    Kansas City.........................................               1
    Omaha...............................................               1
    San Antonio.........................................               2
    St. Paul............................................               1
SUBOFFICE:
    Salt Lake City......................................               1
    St. Louis...........................................               1
WESTERN REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
    Anchorage...........................................               1
    Honolulu............................................               2
    Los Angeles (Perm)..................................              24
    Los Angeles (Term)..................................              17
    Phoenix.............................................               1
    Portland, Oregon....................................               1
    San Diego...........................................               3
    San Francisco.......................................               6
    Seattle.............................................               2
SUBOFFICE:
    Guam................................................               1
    Las Vegas...........................................               1
    Reno................................................               1
                                                         ---------------
      TOTAL.............................................             159
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        USER FEE REFORM PROPOSAL

    Question. Please provide details on the comprehensive immigration 
enforcement user fee reform rulemaking.
    Answer. Details of the Department's plans for this reform 
rulemaking are still under review.

                       TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS

    Question. What is the status of the proposed legislation?
    Answer. To date, the legislation has not been enacted by Congress.
    Question. If legislation is not enacted, what is the impact on the 
fiscal year 2007 budget?
    Answer. Fee revenues would be $20 million less than projected in 
the budget. Other immigration benefit applications would continue to 
subsidize the processing of temporary protected status applications due 
to the statutory fee cap.

                         SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
                              RAIL PILOTS

    Question. In fiscal year 2005, $10 million was funded to develop 
and conduct simulated real-world exercises to validate a training 
program for the use of commercially-available equipment against suicide 
bombers in commuter and passenger rail environments. How has the public 
responded to this program?
    Answer. As part of the rail security pilot program at the Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Rail Station at Exchange Place, screening of 
passengers occurred in two phases at the turnstile check-point: (1) 
Screening of the passenger and (2) Screening of baggage. Passengers 
proceeded through metal detectors, X-ray systems, physical search, and 
trace detection techniques--all of which were adapted to address a 
potential attack by a suicide bomber or via an improvised explosive 
device (IED) that has been left behind.
    Upon completion of this rail security screening, passengers were 
asked to voluntarily respond to the Rail Security Pilot Passenger 
Survey, a seven-item, self-report questionnaire concerning the 
passenger's screening experience and opinions regarding the screening.
    Results of the survey indicated that many passengers felt that they 
were not adequately informed that the screening process was voluntary 
or that they had the right to refuse the screen and board their train 
at another station. However, the results also indicated that:
  --The majority of passengers did not feel uneasy about going through 
        the screening process;
  --Passengers felt the screeners were extremely professional, 
        courteous, and respectful;
  --The screening process, on average, did not require too much time;
  --Passengers were moderately in favor of future additional security 
        testing of explosive detection technologies in rail stations; 
        and that
  --Passengers strongly agreed that improving rail security is worth 
        the additional time needed to go through the screening process.
    Overall survey results suggest that rail passengers had a favorable 
security screening experience and support efforts to improve rail 
screening.
    Question. Is there any funding included in the fiscal year 2007 
budget to expand this program to other transit systems?
    Answer. No funding is included in the fiscal year 2007 budget to 
expand this program to other transit systems.
    Question. Does S&T plan to expand this program to the bus 
environment?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate plans to expand this screening concept 
to a bus terminal. Passengers will be screened in two phases at a 
check-point: (1) screening of the passenger and (2) screening of 
baggage. Passengers will proceed through an array of technologies such 
as walk-through metal detectors, X-ray systems, physical search and 
trace detection techniques--all of which will be adapted to address the 
suicide or leave-behind Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threats.

                                MANPADS

    Question. $340 million has been appropriated to date for the 
development of countermeasures to protect commercial aircraft from the 
threat of Man Portable Air Defense Systems. The fiscal year 2007 budget 
indicates that findings will be presented to the Administration and 
Congress to aid them in making an informed decision to address 
protection of commercial airlines from the threat of MANPADS. When will 
that report be submitted to Congress?
    Answer. Congress has appropriated $231.9 million through fiscal 
year 2006 to the S&T Directorate's Counter-MANPADS program to develop 
and demonstrate the migration of existing Counter-MANPADS technologies 
to the commercial airline industry. The Counter-MANPADS Phase II report 
has been prepared and is in the inter-agency review process. It will be 
provided to Congress as soon as the process is complete.
    Question. What process will the Administration follow in 
determining whether such technological countermeasures should be 
purchased and deployed on commercial aircraft?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate will provide to Congress this spring a 
Counter-MANPADS Phase II report containing cost and performance 
information that can be used as part of the decision-making process. 
The report will also provide information to assist with deciding the 
next steps in applying this technology to protect commercial airlines. 
Specific information that will be provided in the report includes the 
technical results of the Counter-MANPADS system demonstration, data and 
analysis on the installation of the systems on commercial aircraft, and 
current estimates for the cost of installing as well as maintain and 
support the systems in a commercial aviation environment.

                           CHEMICAL DETECTION

    Question. In testimony last year before the Subcommittee, former 
Assistant Secretary Parney Albright stated that S&T was working very 
closely with the Office of Domestic Preparedness on guidance that will 
allow grants to be used by transit authorities to deploy a chemical 
detection system, better known as PROTECT. While some transit 
authorities have purchased individual detectors, only three have 
deployed the PROTECT system. Assistant Secretary Albright stated ``that 
there are something like 30 metro systems around the country--that 
would then basically take the system and install it. It is really 
inexpensive.''
    Why have only 3 systems installed such a system?
    Answer. The decision to install the Program for Response Options 
and Technology Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is 
at the discretion of each transit system. Following the system's 
successful demonstration in Washington, DC, New York City and Boston, 
the PROTECT system became available for installation in other transit 
systems. Procurement and installation of PROTECT systems can be funded 
by the Transit Security Grants Program administered by the DHS Office 
of Grants and Training (G&T). The Transit Security Grant Program 
includes funds for rail transit security, targeted to specific urban 
areas for the prevention and detection of explosive devices and 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents. Acquisition of 
the PROTECT system is permissible under this program. The S&T 
Directorate is assisting G&T with technical data package development 
and is prepared to offer technical assistance in the deployment of the 
system through this program.
    Question. What is the cost to purchase and operate PROTECT?
    Answer. The average cost to equip a single transit station with the 
Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement for Chemical 
Terrorism (PROTECT) system varies between $250,000 to $1 million to 
install, dependent upon the complexity of the station. Annual 
maintenance costs average approximately $50,000 per station.
    Question. If S&T operates the Bio-Watch system for bio-threats, why 
shouldn't S&T operate the PROTECT system for chemical threats?
    Answer. The Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement 
for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is designed for chemical 
attacks within facilities or in localized areas, whereas BioWatch is a 
monitoring system for wide-area biological attacks. PROTECT is also 
designed for specific stakeholders such as transit facilities, and the 
response to an emergency has to be immediate to effectively mitigate 
the event and save lives. PROTECT is integrated with the local 
emergency operations centers (EOC) in the region and designed so that 
it would fit into and utilize existing infrastructure such as camera, 
information technology, and communication systems. Because PROTECT is 
integrated with existing infrastructure, the operating costs remain 
relativity low and are mainly associated with sensor maintenance. The 
sensors, once installed, require an adjustment period which can be 
lengthy to address local chemical interferences from various sources 
(exhausts, cleaning solutions, nearby businesses, etc.). These are best 
addressed locally. Therefore, PROTECT can be effectively owned and 
operated directly by the individual stakeholder.
    Since PROTECT is currently allowed through the Transit Security 
Grant Program, individual transit systems voluntarily make the decision 
to install the system such as Baltimore. Baltimore is in the process of 
installing their own system using a combination of grants and operating 
funds. Many other transit systems have shown an interest in PROTECT.
    The S&T Directorate has successfully installed systems in three 
transit systems and does have experience through the BioWatch program 
in deploying a monitoring and response system nationally. PROTECT, 
however, differs from BioWatch in the response actions which need to be 
locally controlled to ensure an effective and timely response. Thus, 
any Federally funded program to ensure broad installation of PROTECT 
would be best served by requiring that stakeholders commit to incurring 
and maintaining operating and maintenance costs once the installation 
and transition period is complete.

                            TUNNEL DETECTION

    Question. What is S&T currently doing to develop technology and 
other deterrents to border tunnels?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate is developing border protection pattern 
discovery and prediction technologies that will provide a new 
capability to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This 
capability will enable the rapid fusion of disparate information 
sources to discover geo-spatial, behavioral, and temporal patterns and 
indicators that will provide ICE field agents with local scene 
awareness and actionable intelligence. This technology will be 
developed within ICE's Office of Intelligence to facilitate the 
derivation of patterns and indicators that address operational missions 
such as: (1) crossing routes and staging areas for cross border 
smuggling, (2) crossing patterns by group that will help identify the 
number of organized groups involved and their respective signatures, 
(3) crossing patterns by tactic that will help identify distinctive 
signatures for specific tactics, such as drug and human smuggling, (4) 
the identification of links and patterns between illegal border 
crossing and criminal activity within the United States, and (5) tunnel 
activity indicators to help discover the likely next tunneling start 
and end points.
    In addition, the S&T Directorate is working with the Office of 
Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department 
of Defense (DOD) to find technology solutions for tunnel detection 
along the Southern and Northern borders of the United States.
    The S&T Directorate participated in the Tunnel Detection Technical 
Support Working Group (TSWG) meeting held in January 2006 and the Joint 
Task Force-6 Tunneling Conference held in June 2004. The S&T 
Directorate is also engaged with NORTHCOM's Futures Group in relaying, 
discussing, and leveraging potential technologies that satisfy DOD and 
DHS's tunnel detection needs. The S&T Directorate's Border & 
Transportation (B&T) Portfolio met with NORTHCOM officials in August 
2005 to discuss specific opportunities to collaborate and leverage each 
organization's expertise.
    CBP is also coordinating with a number of sources that could 
possibly provide technology that will meet CBP's detection needs. These 
sources include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 
Sandia Laboratories, and the Border Research Technology Center. There 
is currently no proven technology that can detect the types of tunnels 
that have recently been encountered. Some promising research and 
development is being done by Sandia Laboratories, but at this time, its 
field utility is unknown.
    Question. What level of funding has been contributed to this effort 
to date and what, if any, funding is included in the fiscal year 2007 
request?
    Answer. Funding for border protection pattern discovery and 
prediction was $700,000 in fiscal year 2005 and $1.2 million in fiscal 
year 2006. No funds are directly associated with detection of border 
tunnels in the fiscal year 2007 budget request.

                           AIR CARGO SECURITY

    Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory awarded nine 
contracts to develop new technologies that would provide enhanced 
security for containerized air cargo inspection and U.S. mail 
inspection transported on passenger aircraft.
    Please provide a notional schedule from testing of these systems to 
deployment, including costs for each step of the process.
    Answer. In September 2004, the Transportation Security Agency 
commenced a long-term research and development Air Cargo Inspection 
Project for development of new technologies in screening containerized 
and mail cargo. In fiscal year 2006, laboratory test and evaluations 
for eight technologies are planned. Pending availability of funding and 
satisfactory program progress, this will be followed by a 3-year effort 
(fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010) for the system development phase 
and testing of technologies that have passed the laboratory test and 
evaluation. Based on the number of technologies that show potential for 
screening containerized and mail cargo during the system development 
phase, the operational test and evaluation phase will commence in 
fiscal year 2011.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Estimated
                        Development phase                            duration     Projected cost   Funding year
                                                                     (months)       (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phase 1--Preliminary Design/Detailed Design.....................              24           $24.0            2005
    Proof of Concept Testing....................................              12             2.4            2006
Phase 2--System Development:
    Sub Phase I.................................................               8            12.0            2007
    Sub Phase II................................................               8            12.0            2008
    Sub Phase III...............................................               8            12.0            2009
Phase 4--System Test............................................               8             4.0            2010
Phase 5--Pilot Site.............................................               4             8.0            2011
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Total.....................................................              72            74.4  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          NEXT GENERATION EDS

    Question. How much is budgeted for Manhattan II in fiscal year 
2007?
    Answer. Funding for Phase II (systems development) of the Manhattan 
II project for fiscal year 2007 has been tentatively identified in the 
amount of $14.2 million. This is based on three contracts to be awarded 
for screening system development and the development of a system 
architecture to support the screening solutions.
    Question. Based on information provided by the Transportation 
Security Lab (TSL), deployable systems will be available starting in 
fiscal year 2010. However, the Subcommittee has learned that a 
comprehensive audit of the program is underway. What budget and 
deployment schedule implications does this have on the program?
    Answer. There is a cost-sharing study being conducted by the 
Transportation Security Agency (TSA) in response to direction received 
from Congress in fiscal year 2005. A preliminary draft of the results 
from this study is being prepared. Based on the final results of this 
study, the strategic plan developed by TSA in fiscal year 2005 may 
change, which will have an impact on future budget and deployment 
requirements.
    Question. Has there been discussion of charging industry for 
certification of EDS by the TSL?
    Answer. In the mid-90's, when the Transportation Security 
Laboratory (TSL) was part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
a reimbursable agreement was established charging industry a maximum of 
$50,000 for explosives detection system (EDS) certification testing. 
Unfortunately, this process was never re-established as the TSL was 
transferred from the FAA to the Department of Transportation and 
finally to the Department of Homeland Security (first within the 
Transportation Security Administration and then to the S&T 
Directorate). TSL is pursuing reincorporation of this process.
    Question. What is spent on the certification process?
    Answer. In order to accurately determine a fair and reasonable 
charge for the industry, the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), 
in cooperation with the S&T Directorate, is currently assessing the 
costs associated with the use of laboratory time, laboratory materials, 
government and contractor labor used in the execution of explosive 
detection systems (EDS) certification testing. The certification 
process for EDS consists of five primary components: certification-
readiness testing (CRT); pre-certification testing; certification 
testing; post-certification testing; and post-test data analysis and 
reporting. For any given system submitted to the TSL for EDS 
certification, the duration and cost of each of these elements varies, 
depending on the maturity, capability and throughput of the system 
under evaluation. The time that a given system is under evaluation also 
varies, but typically can range anywhere from as short as 6 weeks to as 
long as 6 months. Given these and other factors, at present we estimate 
an industry maximum for EDS certification would be established at 
approximately $250,000.

                               BORDERSAFE

    Question. What technologies have been certified and deployed 
through the BorderSafe program?
    Answer. Three main areas of technology have been deployed through 
the BorderSafe program. They include tools and technologies that 
support data merging and visualization; handheld, wireless access to 
regional and national law enforcement databases; and regional law 
enforcement information sharing. Specific examples are highlighted 
below.
  --A spatial temporal visualization (STV) and criminal activity 
        network (CAN) toolset designed by the University of Arizona's 
        Artificial Intelligence Laboratory was deployed to the Tucson 
        Police Department (TPD). The STV tool enables TPD crime 
        analysts to plot suspicious or criminal incidents near critical 
        infrastructure and explore distribution of those incidents by 
        time period. The CAN tool integrates Customs and Border 
        Protection (CBP) License Plate Reader data with a local TPD 
        criminal record data set to reveal links among subjects who 
        routinely crossed the border and are known offenders in the 
        Tucson region.
  --Impact for customers:
    --BorderSafe merged Federal and local law enforcement data sets for 
            analysis and visualization. As a result, 35 vehicles with a 
            history of crossing the border and known links to criminal 
            activity in Tucson were referred to CBP for alert status.
    --BorderSafe's visualization tools identified a number of high-
            frequency border crossing vehicles with Mexican license 
            plates and known associations to local Tucson crime 
            networks.
  --A wireless data access application (known as Global Query) was 
        developed and deployed to the San Diego Automated Regional 
        Justice Information System (ARJIS)--a California Joint Powers 
        Agency that includes over 70 law enforcement organizations in 
        the counties of San Diego and Imperial. The wireless Global 
        Query application enables field officers to use a handheld 
        device to concurrently query a number of commonly used regional 
        and national law enforcement databases, including: San Diego 
        local records management and officer notification systems 
        (local booking photos, county warrants); the National Crime 
        Information Center (NCIC) (wanted persons, temporary 
        restraining orders, and deported felon alerts); and the 
        California Department of Motor Vehicles (registration, drivers 
        license, and stolen vehicle information). The wireless Global 
        Query application is currently used by more than 150 Federal, 
        State and local law enforcement officers from 15 different 
        agencies and taskforces in Southern California.
  --Impact for customers:
    --Hits on the deported felon watch list by BorderSafe program 
            participants using the wireless Global Query application 
            have led to over 200 identifications and arrests in the San 
            Diego region.
    --An FBI agent registered a ``suspected terrorist'' hit using the 
            wireless Global Query application.
    --The 20,000th fugitive for the San Diego U.S. Marshal's Violent 
            Crimes Task Force was arrested after a record check was run 
            through BorderSafe's wireless Global Query application.
    --DHS Border Patrol agents using the wireless Global Query 
            application arrested 10 Brazilian subjects for being 
            illegally smuggled into the United States. The driver of 
            the vehicle was charged with felony alien smuggling.
    --Hundreds of suspect and fugitive identifications have been made 
            in the field by local law enforcement and Federal task 
            force members running records checks and retrieving digital 
            photographs via BorderSafe's wireless Global Query 
            application.
  --A commercial law enforcement information and knowledge management 
        system was deployed to San Diego ARJIS to consolidate records 
        management data from 18 Southern California jurisdictions. Data 
        query access to the system was made available to the entire 
        ARJIS user community (over 70 law enforcement organizations), 
        and a data sharing protocol and virtual private network (VPN) 
        was implemented to allow information sharing between ARJIS and 
        the Tucson Police Department. VPNs were also implemented in 
        Southern Arizona to support information sharing between the 
        Tucson Police Department regional node and law enforcement 
        agencies in Mohave County, Kingman, Bullhead City, and Lake 
        Havasu City.
  --Impact for customers:
    --One day after implementation of the BorderSafe network connection 
            between San Diego and Tucson, a TPD analyst with only the 
            name of a suspected Tucson crime ring leader obtained the 
            suspect's driver's license and mug shot photos from ARJIS. 
            His photos were shown to an informant who positively 
            identified the suspect, leading to his apprehension and 
            arrest.
    --Through BorderSafe's systems integration and network deployment 
            initiatives, a TPD Sergeant found information and photos in 
            ARJIS relevant to gang related criminals and their 
            associates in the Tucson region. This information was used 
            to enhance ongoing TPD investigations by positively 
            identifying gang suspects and broadening the scope of 
            surveillance of their known associates.
    Question. The budget indicates that the Southwest regional test bed 
will include two additional local jurisdictions along the border in 
fiscal year 2007. Where?
    Answer. During fiscal year 2007, the BorderSafe program's southwest 
regional test bed will expand to include two additional jurisdictions 
located in New Mexico and Texas.

                        TRANSIT SECURITY PROJECT

    Question. Through the Transit Security Project (TSP), S&T assists 
transit agencies in developing tactical countermeasures to reduce risk 
to transit systems from various terrorist threats. What actionable 
measures have been taken by transit systems as a result of the TSP?
    Answer. Since the Program for Response Options and Technology 
Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is currently 
allowed through the Transit Security Grants Program, administered by 
the DHS Office of Grants and Training (G&T), individual transit systems 
voluntarily make the decision to install the system. Baltimore is in 
the process of installing their own system using a combination of grant 
and operating funds. Many other transit systems have shown an interest 
in PROTECT. Following the system's successful demonstration in 
Washington, DC, New York City and Boston, the PROTECT system became 
available for installation in other transit systems via the grant 
program.
    Question. Is S&T working with the Grants & Training Office to make 
clear that these countermeasures are allowable under the current 
transit security grant guidance?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate is working directly with the Transit 
Security Grants Program administered by the DHS Office of Grants and 
Training (G&T). The S&T Directorate also assists G&T with technical 
data by serving as the point-of-contact for questions and is prepared 
to offer technical assistance in the deployment of transit security 
systems through this program.

                            COAST GUARD R&D

    Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget reduces the amount of funding 
in the Coast Guard's budget for R&D. How much in the fiscal year 2007 
budget for S&T is dedicated to R&D for Coast Guard activities? Please 
specify each program and in which portfolio the work is being 
performed.
    Answer. The S&T Directorate is dedicating $2.8 million in fiscal 
year 2007 for research and development for Coast Guard activities. 
Approximately half of the budget in the Coast Guard Portfolio will be 
directed towards efforts in the Boarding Program, which focuses on 
providing and improving capabilities for boarding officers. The balance 
of the effort will be devoted to advancing and adapting technologies in 
the Compel Compliance Program, which concentrates on stopping or 
controlling threatening vessels and people in the maritime domain.

                              R&D FUNDING

    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
dedicated to port security R&D? Please specify each program and in 
which portfolio the work is being performed.
    Answer. The Border and Transportation Portfolios' cargo security 
program supports port security. The fiscal year 2007 budget request for 
this program is $16 million.
    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
dedicated to air cargo R&D? Please specify each program and in which 
portfolio the work is being performed.
    Answer. For fiscal year 2007, $12 million was requested to continue 
the system development and test phase of the Aviation Cargo Security 
Pilot, which is evaluating promising commercial off-the-shelf aviation 
screening technologies. This work is being conducted through the 
Explosives Portfolio and is coordinated with the Transportation 
Security Administration.
    In addition, the fiscal year 2007 budget request for the 
continuation of the Air Cargo Pilots initiated in fiscal year 2006 
included $5 million and an additional $5 million for mid- and long-term 
R&D to support the development and identification of technologies for 
screening air cargo. The screening of air cargo will be based on a 
multi-layered approach due to the various types of cargo commodities, 
packaging types and transportation devices (break bulk, container, 
palletized, skids) that are part of the air cargo supply chain. One 
technology cannot meet all air cargo screening requirements and 
therefore and multi-effort R&D program must be maintained to develop 
and test technologies that meet government screening requirements as 
well as minimizing the economic impact on the air cargo supply chain.
    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
dedicated to container security R&D? Please specify each program and in 
which portfolio the work is being performed.
    Answer. The R&D Cargo Security fiscal year 2007 budget is $16 
million. This program is conducted through the Border and 
Transportation Portfolio. The $16 million funds S&T Cargo Security 
Programs which include the Advanced Container Security Device and 
Container Security Device (CSD), the Marine Asset Tag and Tracking 
System, Security Carton, Advanced Material Container, Advanced 
Screening and Targeting and Supply Chain Security Architecture 
Programs.

                              R&D FUNDING

    Question. What lessons have been learned, if any, from the 
Operation Safe Commerce program?
    Answer. The last phase of Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), Phase II, 
provided insight into container security. During that phase, 
vulnerability assessments were conducted by the 18 pilot projects 
across the supply chains. These assessments included detailed 
examinations of customary operating procedures and infrastructure. They 
revealed that container security is composed of degrees of security and 
relied equally on technology and best practices. The pilot projects 
showed that security could be improved through a combination of 
improved business practices and enhanced technology. Best practices 
which were people driven often varied and were largely dependent upon 
outside factors such as local conditions, infrastructure, and 
traditions.
    Lessons Learned:
  --There are 13 standard security control points that provide the 
        foundation to assess and model container threat scenarios, 
        vulnerabilities and security counter measures.
  --Supplier
  --Factory
  --Empty Container Storage/Dray
  --Drayage of Cargo to Consolidator (if stuffing is not at factory)
  --Container Stuffing/Sealing (Consolidation)
  --Container Storage (Foreign)
  --Drayage to terminal (from factory to consolidator)
  --Foreign Terminal
  --Ocean Commerce
  --U.S. Terminal
  --Inland Drayage or Rail Transport (U.S.)
  --Deconsolidation (U.S.)
  --Business processes/information transmission
  --Technologies tested in Phase II did not adequately protect against 
        a motivated adversary. Commercial technology was successfully 
        used and integrated with business processes. However, even 
        though many of the technologies demonstrated in the OSC pilots 
        provided enhanced security, there were significant deficiencies 
        noted in total detection. Most door seals were readily 
        defeated; cargo in other containers interfered with sensor 
        detectors; and biological and chemical detectors proved 
        unreliable. Fixed reader technology faced many challenges. The 
        dynamics of the supply chain forced many projects to change 
        their routes; there were labor resistance, and the proprietary 
        operation of the technology. Technology alone is not sufficient 
        to protect the Nation's cargo against the introduction of 
        contraband or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
  --There are no incentives to motivate commercial stakeholders to 
        invest in container security measures. Container commerce is 
        extremely cost sensitive and investment in discretionary 
        security measures could place a stakeholder in a disadvantage 
        commercially.
  --Basic security information is not available to the supply chain 
        stakeholders. There is no facilitation of information sharing 
        concerning supply chain security regarding relevant threats, 
        vulnerabilities and security requirements between private 
        industry and government. When anomalies were discovered there 
        were no protocols in place to respond and investigate. 
        Reporting protocols and guidance were developed within the OSC 
        project by US CBP and the OSC Federal partners.
    The formation of supply chain partnerships can enhance container 
security. Container commerce is global and involves many stakeholders 
including the United States Government, foreign governments and 
commercial stakeholders.
    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
dedicated to transit security R&D? Please specify each program and in 
which portfolio the work is being performed.
    Answer. Within the fiscal year 2007 budget request, $183.73 million 
is included for research and development that can support transit 
security technologies. This work is being conducted across all S&T 
Directorate Portfolios, and much of this effort supports other Homeland 
Security mission requirements as well as transportation security.

                TRANSIT SECURITY R&D PROJECTS AND FUNDING
                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Fiscal year
             Portfolio                  Project name           2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border and Transportation.........  Automated Pattern               0
                                     Discovery.
Critical Infrastructure Protection  Automated Scene                 2.1
                                     Understanding/
                                     Insider Threat
                                     Countermeasures.
Standards.........................  Blast Resistant                 0.32
                                     Trash Receptacles.
Threat Awareness..................  Biometrics and                  2.6
                                     Deception Detection.
Biological Countermeasures........  BioWatch............           94.0
Critical Infrastructure Protection  CIP Decision Support            5.8
                                     System.
Critical Infrastructure Protection  Control Systems                 0.5
                                     Security.
Counter-MANPADS...................  Counter-MANPADS                 4.9
                                     Program.
Rapid Prototyping.................  Emerging Civil                  7.4
                                     Aviation Defense
                                     Technologies and
                                     Commercial Aircraft
                                     Protection Program.
Critical Infrastructure Protection  Focused Sector                  3.0
                                     Studies.
Critical Infrastructure Protection  National CIP R&D                0.9
                                     Plan.
Border and Transportation.........  Rail Security:        ..............
                                     Chlorine Mitigation.
Emergent and Prototypical           Transit Security                1.0
 Technology.                         Project.
Explosives........................  Aviation Security...           52.98
Explosives........................  Suicide Bombers/                8.23
                                     Leave-Behind IEDs.
                                                         ---------------
      TOTAL.......................  ....................          183.73
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Automated Pattern Discovery (Border and Transportation).--Fusion of 
disparate data sources that maps threats across basic geographic, 
infrastructure, demographic, behavior, and time data. Impact: Provides 
decision makers the ability to rapidly assess a situation, 
automatically derive locations of high risk and vulnerability, 
prioritize asset allocation, and to assess their effectiveness over 
time.
    Automated Scene Understanding/Insider Threat Countermeasures 
(Critical Infrastructure Protection).--Visual interpretation tools that 
will be able to detect packages left-behind in rail cars. Impact: 
Enhanced monitoring and forensic video technologies for protection of 
mass transportation.
    Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles (Standards).--Will provide 
performance standards and test methods for blast resistant trash 
receptacles, allowing users to make informed purchase decisions. 
Impact: Initiated for transit systems, this project coordinated with 
the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) 
Program will build industry and law enforcement consensus about 
performance standards and test methods for these receptacles. We are 
coordinating with the DHS Office of Grants and Training for these 
standards.
    Biometrics and Deception Detection (Threat Awareness).--Robust 
multi-mode Biometric recognition systems for signature acquisition at a 
distance to increase recognition accuracy and efficiency for 
identification and deception detection. Impact: These systems provide 
an interviewing aid for intelligence & law enforcement and real-time 
screening at air, land, and sea portals with little or no negative 
impact on screening throughput.
    BioWatch (Biological Countermeasures).--Early warning system 
designed to detect the intentional release of select aerosolized 
biological agents; network informs Federal, State, and local emergency 
management authorities about the extent of the release and assists in 
the rapid response to a biological terrorist act. Impact: Provides 
protection to several highly trafficked rail systems to provide early 
detection of a biological terrorism attack. Through the expansion of 
the BioWatch system to high-threat U.S. cities, air, rail, and other 
transportation systems will be equipped with detection capability at 
the discretion of the local decision makers.
    CIP Decision Support System (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
A suite of computer models that analyze and quantify the consequences 
to and interdependencies of the 17 infrastructure sectors (including 
transportation). Impact: Awareness of interdependencies, and cascading 
effects on the transportation sector.
    Control Systems Security (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
Developing security measures and protocols for Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
    Impact.--Security for these systems which are vital in rail and 
waterway transportation.
    Counter-MANPADS Program (Counter-MANPADS).--Protect commercial 
aircraft from shoulder-launched missiles (Man Portable Air Defense 
Systems). Impact: Migration of existing Counter-MANPADS technologies to 
the commercial airline industry seeks to protect commercial aircraft 
while ensuring that resulting countermeasures systems have minimal 
impact on air carrier and airport operations, maintenance, and support 
activities.
    Emerging Civil Aviation Defense Technologies (Rapid Prototyping) 
and Commercial Aircraft Protection Program (Border and 
Transportation).--Studies aircraft susceptibility/vulnerability 
reduction, and countermeasures related to sabotage.
    Impact.--Will study pilot vision protection, aircraft structural 
hardening, reduction in vulnerabilities, thrust-only control/propulsion 
controlled aircraft, CBRE threats, and effects of hazardous items that 
elude screening.
    Focused Sector Studies (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
Identify measures to mitigate the effects of an attack or other hazard 
to critical infrastructure. Waterway transport, locks and dams, is 
under consideration for a study. Impact: Awareness of vulnerabilities, 
consequences of attacks on modes of transportation.
    National CIP R&D Plan (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
Coordination vehicle for all Federal research and development in 
protection of critical infrastructure sectors, including 
transportation. Impact: Improved coordination and awareness of Federal 
R&D in transportation security.
    Rail Security: Chlorine Mitigation (Border and Transportation).--A 
Chlorine Rail Hazard effort to study methods and technologies to 
mitigate the likelihood of an incident and the effects if an incident 
occurs. Impact: Will reduce the risk and effects of an accidental or 
intentional incident involving an extremely hazardous substance such as 
chlorine.
    Transit Security Project (Emergent and Prototypical Technology).--
Characterize the threat of conventional explosives on critical 
structural elements of transit systems (subways); and assist transit 
agencies to analyze feasible countermeasures to reduce risk to 
structures from conventional explosives threat. Impact: HS support of 
the Transit Security project primarily includes (1) specific R&D 
activities for the prevention of and response to a WMD event, and (2) 
approaches to review and evaluate, as well as customize and extend, S&T 
Directorate technologies for the transit industry based on the unique 
characteristics of the transit environment.
    Aviation Security.--Complete the air cargo pilot to evaluate 
available technologies to screen break-bulk air cargo. Evaluate and 
ready for qualification, the prototype automated carry-on baggage 
explosives detection system. Improve and evaluate current passenger 
explosives detection systems. Continue the development of advanced 
systems to screen people for both explosives and weapons. And as 
improved systems become available, evaluate for certification or 
qualification checked baggage EDS, checkpoint screening, and cargo 
screening systems.
    Suicide Bombers/Leave-Behind IEDs.--Pilot available and prototype 
explosives detection and mitigation countermeasures in operational 
environments to protect critical infrastructure. Develop prototypes of 
advanced systems to screen people for suicide bombs.
    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
dedicated to border security R&D? Please specify each program and in 
which portfolio the work is being performed.
    Answer. Within the Conventional Missions (Border and Transportation 
Portfolio), the R&D Border Security fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
$36 million. The breakout is: $20 million for Border Watch (includes 
support to Secure Border Initiative, CBP UAV sensors evaluation) ; and 
$16 million for Cargo Security.
    Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is 
dedicated to interoperability R&D outside of the SAFECOM program? 
Please specify each program and in which portfolio the work is being 
performed.
    Answer. Interoperability research and development (R&D) within the 
S&T Directorate is conducted through the Office for Interoperability 
and Compatibility (OIC). The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $29.74 
million for interoperability related R&D includes $25.39 million for 
SAFECOM and $4.34 million for program areas outside of SAFECOM. The 
chart below specifies the breakout of interoperability related R&D 
programs. It should be noted that these estimates are subject to change 
depending upon the final appropriation amount.

              OFFICE FOR INTEROPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY
                          [Millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Fiscal year
                      Program areas                            2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Communications (SAFECOM) \1\............................            25.4
Equipment...............................................             3.1
Training................................................              .4
Other...................................................              .8
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................            29.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All of the Communications budget supports SAFECOM.

                DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)

    Question. What percentage of the DNDO budget is directed to each of 
the three layers identified--exterior, border, and interior?
    Answer. A majority of the programs included in the DNDO budget 
request have applications across several, if not all, of the three 
architecture layers. For instance, technologies developed with funds 
requested for both systems development and transformational research 
and development (a total of $209 million) could have applications in 
operations within the United States, at the U.S. border, and overseas. 
Equally, these technology programs will feed potential acquisition 
programs beyond those executed by the DNDO and are not represented in 
the DNDO budget request. The systems engineering and test and 
evaluation efforts that support these technology development programs 
also have application across several, if not all, of the three 
architecture layers.
    With that being said, the request for Systems Acquisition, which 
results in detection systems being deployed to specific geographic 
locations, can be clearly allocated to each of the layers. Of the $178 
million requested for Systems Acquisition, $157 million will support 
the deployment of technologies to the Nation's borders (primarily at 
ports of entry), while an additional $21 million will provide a 
detection ``surge'' capacity for the Nation's interior. No funds 
requested through the Systems Acquisition PPA will fund deployment of 
technologies exterior to the United States.
    Question. Since most of the ``exterior'' layer encompasses 
primarily detection and interdiction efforts by other agencies like the 
Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, what authority will DNDO 
have over those agencies in the development and deployment of the 
global architecture?
    Answer. The DNDO has been given the mission of ``centralized 
planning with decentralized execution.'' While the DNDO will not have 
oversight over other agencies responsible for implementing portions of 
the global architecture, it will continue to advocate beneficial 
programs to the Administration, as well as the Congress, and identify 
duplicative or ineffectual programs when necessary, with proposed 
improvements.
    Question. Why does the budget propose to combine both the 
acquisition budget and the longer-term R&D budget together in the same 
appropriation account?
    Answer. At a macroscopic level, all activities of the DNDO are 
aligned to a single, fairly specific goal--the prevention of nuclear 
and radiological terrorism. As such, the Department chose to combine 
all clearly identifiable requests for this purpose into a single 
appropriation for the DNDO. At the same time, the Department did decide 
to segregate acquisition funds into a separate PPA to provide clarity 
regarding investments in long-term research and development and 
procurement activity.
    The decision to combine these activities into a single 
appropriation is supported by the reality that technology development 
and acquisition programs move across a gradual transition from the 
systems development phase to the acquisition phase, with the joint 
goal, from a performance-based standpoint, of fielding capable systems 
to counter the given threat. It is this intrinsic integration that led 
the Department to combine these activities into a single appropriation.
    Question. Would DNDO be better served if long-term research and 
development was separated from the acquisition of technology and 
systems that are available today?
    Answer. The Department believes that the appropriations structure 
included in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget adequately allows 
the DNDO to complete its mandated mission, while at the same time 
providing the necessary visibility into the use of appropriated funds.
    Question. The Government Accountability Office has expressed 
concerns about the reliability of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals 
(ASP) technology. The budget proposes $20 million to expand crystal 
manufacturing capacity to meet ASP requirements for gamma detectors in 
fiscal year 2007-10. In fiscal year 2006 $12 million is proposed to be 
spent on this capacity development. According to the DNDO budget, a 
limited number of ASP portals will not be piloted in the field until 
fiscal year 2007.
    Given GAO's concerns about the ASP technology, why is so much 
funding going towards expanding the capacity of an unproven technology?
    Answer. First, it should be noted that the total investment planned 
for the Sodium Iodide Manufacturing Program is $32 million, concluding 
in fiscal year 2007. The decision to begin to invest in this expansion 
of domestic production capacity is supported by initial results from 
DNDO testing of ASP systems, which validated spectroscopic capabilities 
when compared with polyvinyl toluene, or PVT-based systems and 
demonstrated, in some cases, a four times improvement in performance 
against threat-like objects and a 60 percent reduction in alarms 
generated by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). 
Additionally, in light of DNDO projection to expand the rate of 
acquisition of ASP systems in the coming year, DNDO requirements will 
exceed current crystal production capacity by as early as fiscal year 
2007.
    Given the proven performance of ASP systems during DNDO 
qualification testing in late fiscal year 2005 and the long timescales 
involved in this type of capitalization program, the DNDO believes it 
prudent begin this investment immediately. By doing this, the 
industrial base will be prepared to meet expanding DNDO needs in fiscal 
year 2007 and beyond.
    Question. What is the total investment DNDO plans to make to expand 
the capacity?
    Answer. The total investment planned for the Sodium Iodide 
Manufacturing Program is $32 million, of which $12 million will be 
provided in fiscal year 2006 and $20 million will be provided in fiscal 
year 2007.
    Question. The cost of the ASP Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) is 
roughly three times the cost of PVT-RPMs. Based on the initial testing 
of the ASP technology, has DNDO performed a cost-benefit analysis 
comparing the two technologies?
    Answer. Though initial procurement costs of ASP RPMs are likely to 
be higher than those of PVT-based RPMS, the total life-cycle and 
operations costs for ASP systems are likely to be approximately equal 
to those of PVT-based systems. The primary reason for this is the 
greatly reduced secondary inspection rate associated with ASP systems, 
which will result in the need for less CBP officers (and RPMs) to be 
dedicated to labor-intensive secondary inspections, and an accompanying 
improvement in the overall flow of goods and people.
    The DNDO and CBP are currently conducting a joint analysis to 
determine the most cost-effective means of deploying ASP systems to the 
Nation's POEs. This analysis will take into account performance 
information gathered through DNDO testing and current cost estimates, 
as well as operational metrics such as throughput rates, NORM rates, 
and personally-owned vehicle (POV) rates at individual ports. The 
analysis will lead to a strategy that deploys ASP systems only to 
locations where the benefits of these systems (when compared to 
current-generation technologies) is required to maintain screening 
operations at acceptable detection thresholds without impeding the flow 
of people and goods. Overall, this deployment strategy will provide the 
optimum mix of current and next-generation systems while maintaining a 
fiscally responsible approach to the program.
    Question. In light of the threefold increase to acquire ASP-RPMs, 
what benefits will they provide over RPMs currently deployed?
    Answer. Beyond the reductions in secondary costs outlined in the 
previous response, ASP systems address a substantial capabilities gap 
in the currently deployed architecture by increasing the probability of 
detecting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials, while decreasing 
the probability of falsely alarming on NORM or innocent radioactive 
materials (such as granite tiles, ceramics, and kitty litter) or 
incorrectly dismissing nuclear material. ASP systems use their ability 
to identify the source of detected radiation through spectroscopic 
isotopic identification to accomplish this.
    With current-generation systems, which only indicate the presence 
of radiation but provide no information as to its identity, operational 
requirements often require a `sensitivity threshold' to be set to 
alleviate the need for labor-intensive and time-consuming secondary 
inspections. ASP systems do not implement this type of threshold. 
Rather, ASP portals systems automatically detect all sources of 
radiation--and use the identification capability to sort the threat 
material from the innocent sources of radiation. The use of 
spectroscopic identification will dramatically reduce false positives--
and allow for considerably improved throughput at high-volume ports, 
while simultaneously improving our security.
    Question. According to the DNDO budget, qualification tests for a 
rail portal monitor system will occur in May of 2007. When does DNDO 
anticipate a full rate production decision?
    Answer. Contingent upon ASP contract award in the summer of fiscal 
year 2006, the DNDO is currently anticipating systems qualification 
testing for rail variants of the ASP system by May 2007. Given this 
timeline, the DNDO anticipates a full rate production decision for the 
rail variant by the summer of fiscal year 2007.
    Question. Does DNDO plan to pursue similar systems to screen air 
cargo? If so, is this work being coordinated with the Transportation 
Security Laboratory?
    Answer. If operational requirements to screen air cargo emerge 
(beyond what is currently being done at international mail facilities 
and planned at international airports), and these requirements 
necessitate additional capabilities provided by ASP systems when 
compared to current-generation technologies, the DNDO would pursue ASP 
variants for this mission. If this occurs, the DNDO would fully 
coordinate with TSL (as well as TSA, S&T, and CBP) to incorporate ASP 
systems, as appropriate, into other technology solutions currently 
under development.
    Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a $7 million 
increase for red teaming. Within that budget request, what specific 
exercises to identify vulnerabilities in Federal, State, and local 
operations are planned?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes funding for 
both the Preparedness Directorate's National Exercise Program and for 
DNDO activities. The DNDO intends to conduct red teaming exercises 
across the entire global nuclear detection architecture, to include 
both operational assets such as RPMs at the Nation's borders and 
support assets such as technical reachback and the Nuclear Assessment 
Program. The exact exercises to be conducted in fiscal year 2007 have 
yet to be identified. The DNDO anticipates standing up a red teaming 
``cell'' by April 2006. This cell will develop adversary playbooks 
(without prior knowledge of DNDO capabilities) that can be used to 
evaluate all portions of the deployed and operated architecture. As 
part of this effort, the DNDO red team will participate in the Top 
Officials 4 Exercise (TOPOFF 4) in November 2007. Beyond these red 
teaming activities, the budget request will also fund a series of net 
assessment activities, including an analysis of open source 
information.
    Question. Will any of the funding be used for red teams to 
penetrate border entry points?
    Answer. While the exact nature of the exercises to be conducted in 
fiscal year 2007 is still under development, the DNDO intends to 
conduct red teaming exercises against multiple components of the global 
detection architecture, including border entry points. In addition, 
aspects of the TOPOFF 4 exercises, in which the DNDO will participate, 
will likely involve the evaluation of border entry point operations and 
their overall effectiveness.
    Question. The budget request includes $21 million for the ``SURGE'' 
program. What equipment and systems will be purchased with the funding?
    Answer. The DNDO is currently conducting a requirements analysis 
for the ``Surge'' program, with a targeted completion date of April 
2006. Following this analysis, the DNDO will identify standardized 
equipment that would be acquired, with a goal of initiating procurement 
in early October 2006. The DNDO anticipates that equipment will 
primarily consist of a mix of vehicle-based and human portable 
detection systems.
    Question. What type of capacity to rapidly respond will this 
funding provide?
    Answer. The ``Surge'' program is still in the planning and 
requirements analysis phase, and final determinations for overall 
capacity have yet to be made. Initial planning estimates focus on 
providing the appropriate amount of detection systems to equip 
approximately 250 operators with vehicle-based mobile systems and 
human-portable (backpack and handheld) systems. The requested funding 
will also allow the DNDO to pre-train a number of operators that can 
then be leveraged to train additional operators rapidly in the event of 
a heightened alert. The DNDO is still in the process of exploring 
several operational concepts for the fielding of equipment, including 
Federal/State/local hybrids and concepts for full State and local 
operations using Federally-loaned equipment.
    Question. Where will these systems be stored?
    Answer. The ``Surge'' program is still in the planning and 
requirements analysis phase, but initial DNDO plans focus on pre-
positioning assets with DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) 
teams, so as to leverage existing USG infrastructure. If this option 
ultimately proves to not be viable, additional options that might be 
available for consideration include DOE National Laboratories, DOD 
storage and logistics facilities, and FEMA storage locations.
    Question. What measures are being taken to coordinate with Federal, 
State, and local governments to prepare for scenarios where rapid 
deployment of these systems would be necessary?
    Answer. The DNDO will begin engaging with select State and local 
agencies to develop a range of scaleable deployment strategies based on 
various potential threat scenarios in late fiscal year 2006. Based on 
these interactions, the DNDO plans to conduct the first full-scale 
``Surge'' training program by December 2006, with the first systems 
validation test occurring in January 2007. The DNDO will then expand 
this training to additional State and local operators in preparation 
for TOPOFF 4 in November 2007.
    Question. The budget request includes $13.5 million for Systems 
Architecture development. Based on the fact that other Federal 
Departments such as Energy, State, and Defense are all part of the 
global nuclear detection and interdiction structure, are those agencies 
contributing funding towards the development of the global 
architecture?
    Answer. While multiple agencies across the Federal Government are 
part of the global nuclear detection architecture, the responsibility 
for developing and documenting the architecture resides with the DNDO. 
Other agencies, however, play an important role in the development of 
the nuclear detection architecture. The Departments of Energy and 
Defense, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, CBP, and the 
U.S. Coast Guard have each detailed staff members to the DNDO Office of 
Systems Engineering and Architecture to ensure that input and concerns 
of each agency are represented in architecture development and 
recommendations. However, because the DNDO is the lead agency 
responsible for the design of the global nuclear detection 
architecture, all funds for its development are included in the DNDO 
budget request.
                                 ______
                                 

            Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

 BORDER CROSSING CARD--THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE (WHTI) 
                             IMPLEMENTATION

    Question. Open Ultra High Frequency (UHF) was designed to track 
pallets--it is not a secure technology. Why then is the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) supporting an open UHF standard for the border 
crossing card?
    Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the 
type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border 
traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting 
privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially 
documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven 
CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as 
well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in 
primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one 
would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for 
these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard 
for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that 
the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The 
ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed 
through a two-step process initiated by first running the document 
across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks 
it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could 
thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding 
implications for land border thru-put.
    We are also considering whether documents containing personal data, 
such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice 
documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer 
to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS 
and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such 
as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
    Question. Why will DHS not support the ISO 14443 standard that is 
being used on ePassports?
    Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the 
type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border 
traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting 
privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially 
documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven 
CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as 
well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in 
primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one 
would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for 
these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard 
for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that 
the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The 
ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed 
through a two-step process initiated by first running the document 
across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks 
it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could 
thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding 
implications for land border thru-put.
    We are also considering whether documents containing personal data, 
such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice 
documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer 
to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS 
and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such 
as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
    Question. DHS will have to install readers for the ePassport that 
is based on the secure ISO 14443 technology, which is not compatible 
with open UHF technology. How much more will an entirely second set of 
readers and interface cost if DHS selects an open UHF standard for the 
PASS card?
    Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the 
type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border 
traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting 
privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially 
documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven 
CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as 
well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in 
primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one 
would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for 
these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard 
for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that 
the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The 
ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed 
through a two-step process initiated by first running the document 
across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks 
it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could 
thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding 
implications for land border thru-put.
    We are also considering whether documents containing personal data, 
such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice 
documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer 
to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS 
and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such 
as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
    Question. When will a final decision be made on the PASS card 
technology?
    Answer. This is still being discussed between DHS and DOS, but the 
goal is to begin issuing the new passport cards by the spring of 2007.
    Question. I have several questions about how DHS plans to fund the 
implementation of the border crossing card, which are as follows:
    How much money in fiscal year 2007 has DHS requested for border 
crossing card implementation?
    Answer. The budget doesn't request specific funding for issuing the 
new passport cards.
    Question. I have noted several areas that will require significant 
resources, including information technology; hardware, including the 
PASS Card readers at borders; road work and other infrastructural 
improvements; and training for DHS, CBP and other staff who will try to 
make this program work efficiently on the border.
    Please tell me your plans and budget requests in the specific areas 
of information technology; hardware, such as the card readers; 
infrastructure; and training, as related to WHTI.
    Answer. Up-front funding needs associated with PASS Card 
infrastructure are currently being assessed and were not included in 
the fiscal year 2007 budget.
    Question. How does DHS propose to implement WHTI and have it 
operational by January 1, 2008?
    Answer. We are working with the Department of State to get a Notice 
of Proposed Rule Making published and to develop the best strategies to 
implement the technology piece of WHTI, taking into account privacy 
issues as well as comments from the public from the Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making.
    Question. Is that deadline realistic?
    Answer. DHS believes that it will be able to implement required 
elements by January 1, 2008. DHS is working with Department of State to 
get the Notice of Proposed Rule Making published and to develop the 
best strategies to implement the technology piece of WHTI, taking into 
account privacy issues as well as comments from the public from the 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making.
    Question. If that deadline is unrealistic, then should Congress 
consider modifying it?
    Answer. DHS believes that WHTI is an important border security 
initiative that will standardize and secure travel document 
requirements and believes that it will be able to implement required 
elements by January 1, 2008.
    Question. I would like to work with you to ensure that WHTI is 
implemented in a manner that considers security, commerce and community 
ties.
    In your opinion, does agency discretion allow for implementation in 
phases, such that the government can assess what works and what does 
not?
    Answer. DHS and the State Department have proposed to implement 
WHTI in two phases, first for the air and sea environment, and second 
for the land border environment. Both agencies believe that this will 
allow for an orderly implementation, since more travelers in the air 
and sea environments currently possess travel documents and due to the 
complexities of the land border environment, where additional 
technology must be part of the solution. The regulatory rule making 
process requires the government to evaluate and consider comments from 
the public, giving us the opportunity to review potential solutions to 
help implement WHTI. DHS is also evaluating existing programs and 
pilots for potential solutions.
    Question. In your opinion, does agency discretion allow you to test 
pilot programs before implementing the WHTI?
    Answer. Yes. We expect to build upon existing pilots and programs 
such as FAST (Free and Secure Trade) and NEXUS, which are currently 
operational at many CBP facilities.

                NORTHERN BORDER AND BORDER PATROL AGENTS

    Question. I have fought hard since September 11, 2001, to increase 
the number of border patrol agents on the Northern Border and was glad 
to see a request for approximately 1,500 new agents in the President's 
budget. It was unclear to me, however, whether the request includes any 
new agents for the Northern Border.
    Of the roughly 1,500 new positions, how many are designated for the 
Northern Border?
    Answer. The 1,500 new Border Patrol Agents requested in fiscal year 
2007 will be deployed initially to the Southwest Border where there is 
the largest concentration of apprehensions and gaps in terms of our 
ability to secure the border. While the focus of the new hires is the 
Southwest Border, consideration is given to relocate experienced agents 
to the Northern Border based on current deployment levels and threat 
assessments. It is anticipated that up to 10 percent of the new hire 
amount could be considered for relocation to the Northern Border, 
again, depending on deployment levels, technology, organizational 
capacity and threat assessment at the time the deployments are being 
considered.

                     LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

    Question. I was pleased to see that the President's budget request 
included an additional $4 million for operations at the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). The 
LESC responds to over 600,000 annual inquiries on criminal illegal 
aliens from local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies 
throughout the country 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The workload at 
the LESC is growing significantly as DHS and ICE are tasking the center 
with additional duties to assist even more local, State and Federal law 
enforcement authorities.
    Please provide to me the details for what these additional funds 
will be used at the LESC.
    Answer. The funding will support the hiring of 66 additional 
employees at the LESC.
    Question. Due to the ICE hiring freezes over the past several 
years, I would imagine that the staffing levels at the LESC have fallen 
below authorized levels of FTEs. Will some of the additional funds be 
used to hire additional full time employees at the Center?
    Answer. Yes. The funding will support the hiring of 66 additional 
employees at the LESC.

                               DERBY LINE

    Question. While reviewing the General Services Administration (GSA) 
budget submission for the coming year, I noticed that no money is 
included in the President's proposal for the Derby Line port expansion 
project. In fact, there are seven Southern Border stations on the list 
and not one from the Northern Border. While GSA submits the formal 
request for projects, I understand that DHS compiles and prioritizes 
the list.
    Senator Jeffords and I worked very hard last year to secure the 
money needed by the State of Vermont to upgrade its road network 
leading up to the Derby Line port. We fought hard to ensure Federal 
funds were available to address what was otherwise an unfunded mandate, 
so I therefore have several questions about this situation.
    Is DHS committed to completing the Derby Line project? If so, is 
there enough money available currently to continue the port expansion?
    Answer. DHS is committed to the Land Ports of Entry Modernization 
Program. Derby Line was a priority project, which we forwarded in our 
fiscal year 2005 request to the General Services Administration (GSA). 
GSA has completed the Feasibility Study and Design. Unfortunately, GSA 
must weigh their entire project for all Federal agencies and Derby Line 
was not submitted in their fiscal year 2007 budget. DHS has notified 
GSA that Derby Line will be its highest priority project in its fiscal 
year 2008 submission to GSA.
    Question. What is your timetable for upgrading the facilities at 
border stations across Vermont--especially those for which funding was 
reprogrammed last year?
    Answer. The DHS and CBP Capital Investment Program (CIP) is 
undergoing continuous modifications as Strategic Resource Assessments 
(SRAs) are completed. We have just recently completed site surveys for 
all land ports of entry located in the New England States. The SRAs 
will assess the current facility conditions and use updated land ports 
of entry (LPOE) standards to determine the facility's operational 
requirements. We will then extend our models out 30 years and see what 
our total requirements should be in the future. The SRA will help guide 
us in establishing our priorities based on data collected and 
conditions of the land ports of entry (LPOEs) and rank them 
accordingly.
    Currently, our Capital Improvement Plan has proposed the following: 
Derby Line, VT, as top priority for fiscal year 2008; Richford, VT, in 
fiscal year 2009; Beebe Plains, and Richford (Pinnacle Road), VT, in 
fiscal year 2010; Norton, VT, in 2011 and Highgate Sprints, VT, in 
2012. The CIP is updated annually based on the results of the SRA. We 
will be updating the CIP in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2006 for the 
fiscal year 2008 program and initiate the formulation of the fiscal 
year 2009 program with the General Services Administration.
    Question. What commitment can we expect from DHS make to upgrade 
the Northern Border when it has not requested any funding for 
construction projects?
    Answer. DHS has recently completed design standards for small ports 
of entry. The completion of the design standards will allow DHS and the 
General Services Administration to compress the project delivery 
schedule, and will allow DHS to seek funding for the replacement of 
more than 102 small ports along our northern border over the next 15 
years.
    Question. Will you keep me informed on the progress of border 
upgrades in Vermont?
    Answer. DHS, in concert with General Services Administration (GSA), 
will provide program updates at critical points along the program 
planning and construction delivery process.

                            I-91 CHECKPOINT

    Question. As you may recall, DHS established a temporary checkpoint 
on Interstate 91 in Hartford, Vermont, from December 2003 to May 2005. 
While we occasionally heard about CBP making a drug-bust or identifying 
an expired visa there, it seemed to me that the checkpoint did far more 
to harass law-abiding Vermonters than to protect their security. I was 
not the only person who felt this way. In fact, former Republican 
Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, criticized the Hartford checkpoint 
as an unnecessary government intrusion.
    Last May, DHS announced that the temporary checkpoint would be 
dismantled and the Border Patrol agents there redeployed to the 
Southern Border. You can imagine my surprise, then, when I recently 
learned that DHS has quietly begun conducting a feasibility study to 
see whether it should build a permanent checkpoint on I-91. I 
understand that the study was initiated about a month ago and should be 
complete in 6 months.
    What about the situation on the Southern Border has changed so much 
that shifting 25-30 Border Patrol agents to a checkpoint 92 miles from 
the border with Canada makes any sense?
    Answer. Border Patrol tactical traffic checkpoints, such as the one 
located on Interstate 91, are a critical component of CBP's multi-
layered border security strategy. This strategy was developed to 
maximize resources and increase the certainty of arrest of anyone 
attempting to illegally enter the United States. The Border Patrol 
traffic checkpoint on Interstate 91 is operated intermittently as a 
strategic component, meaning that there may be extended periods of time 
that the checkpoint is not operational. Available resources and 
intelligence dictate when the tactical traffic checkpoint on Interstate 
91 will be operational. When the Interstate 91 Traffic Checkpoint was 
``dismantled,'' it was in fact temporarily not operational. Since the 
tactical Border Patrol checkpoint was instituted on Interstate 91 in 
December of 2003, apprehensions have included 688 illegal alien 
apprehensions, 27 illegal aliens from special interest countries, and 
154 pounds of marijuana valued at $693,000. These apprehensions include 
numerous criminal aliens with convictions and outstanding warrants for 
rape of a child, arson, fraud, assault & battery, domestic assault, 
burglary, fraudulent documents, re-entry after deportation and 
multitude of others with serious immigration or criminal records. 
Furthermore, when the national threat level was raised post September 
11, 2001 the Interstate 91 checkpoint was operational 24 hours a day 7 
days a week. Staffing to facilitate this operation required that 
detailed agents be brought into Swanton Sector to augment the normal 
cadre of agents. Once the threat level was lowered the detailed staff 
were returned to their normally assigned Sectors and the responsibility 
of manning the Interstate 91 traffic checkpoint was returned to Swanton 
Sector. There have never been plans to cease Border Patrol tactical 
checkpoints on Interstate 91 nor were there any plans to permanently 
reassign Northern Border agents to the Southern Border during 2005. 
Since the national threat level was lowered the agents that operate the 
Interstate 91 traffic checkpoint are permanently assigned to the 
Newport Border Patrol Station in Swanton Sector. These agents are 
assigned routine Border Patrol duties when they are not assigned to the 
checkpoint.
    Question. How do you intend to pay for the construction and 
redeployment?
    Answer. If permission to build permanent checkpoints were granted, 
the construction would be identified and submitted as an unfunded 
requirement. The local Sector Chief would address the redeployment of 
personnel as needed.
    Question. Will you keep me informed on the progress of your study 
and decision-making?
    Answer. The Interstate 91 Border Patrol traffic checkpoint 
feasibility and environmental impact study was funded and initiated on 
January 13, 2006. It is estimated that the study will be completed in 
Spring 2006. The results of the study and any decisions on project 
advancement will be shared with your office through CBP's Office of 
Congressional Affairs.

                           HURRICANE KATRINA

    Question. It is difficult to locate hard numbers about the numbers 
of dead or missing resulting from Hurricane Katrina. The press has 
reported that 1,300 persons are dead and that approximately 3,200 
individuals are still listed as ``missing'' or ``whereabouts unknown.''
    Almost 6 months after the hurricane hit, these numbers are 
staggering. It may be that more people were killed in the hurricane 
than were killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11.
    Why are so many names still listed as missing? What is the 
government doing to locate them?
    Answer. As and initial matter, it must be noted that the States 
have the sovereign responsibility for declaring deaths and 
investigating reports of missing individuals. The State medical 
examiner, in particular, is usually responsible for declaring deaths 
and all numbers come from the States.
    DHS supportes the effort to collect data on missing people through 
the Find Family National Call Center (FFNCC), the national collection 
point for information on missing family members or those who may have 
perished in Hurricanes Katrina or Rita from the State of Louisiana. The 
center seeks to reunite families and to help locate and recover the 
remains of loved ones. The FFNCC is a joint effort between the State of 
Louisiana, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services.
    Callers to the FFNCC are asked to provide any available information 
about their missing loved ones, including:
  --A physical description;
  --Doctors' and dentists' names;
  --A medical history, including any dental work or joint replacements; 
        and
  --Unique characteristics like tattoos, scars and birthmarks.
    In, addition, Family members may be asked to release dental 
records, as they are particularly useful in identifying the deceased. 
The health professionals, staff and volunteers at the FFNCC are trained 
to provide sensitive, confidential assistance. All information gathered 
by the FFNCC is held in the strictest confidence and used only for the 
purpose of identifying and reuniting family members.
    The Center also coordinates with other organizations including, the 
Salvation Army, Louisiana Nursing Home Association and the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
    In addition, FEMA has opened a Victim Identification Center (VIC) 
in Carville, LA. The VIS is on a 32-acre site that is designed to 
process, identify and store human remains found following the 
hurricanes. The center replaces a temporary facility that had been 
operating in St. Gabriel for almost 3 months.
    The VIC began the processing of human remains on November 29. The 
facility works with the FFNCC to help identify the remains of 
individuals who perished as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
    Forensic data obtained at the VIC is cross referenced against data 
collected from calls to the FFNCC. This includes fingerprints, X-rays 
and dental records to identify victims.
    DNA analysis may also be used to identify victims when all other 
means have been exhausted. Once a body's identification is confirmed, 
the parish coroner must sign the death certificate. The State medical 
examiner will then authorize the release of the body to the funeral 
home of the next of kin's choice.
    FEMA has also supported the American Red Cross's Family Links 
Registry program which provides evacuees with family reunification 
support. FEMA promoted this effort and other similar family linkage 
efforts by including web linkages on the FEMA Katrina webpage and in 
press releases appropriate.
    In addition, FEMA has worked with the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children (NCMEC) since last October. FEMA facilitated the 
sharing of information in its disaster assistance database with NCMEC 
to enable contact between separated family members.
    As of June 1, 2006 the FFNCC lists 210 persons still missing or 
unidentified.

                             AVIAN BIRD FLU

    Question. Two years ago, we had a shortage of winter flu vaccine. 
We never received satisfactory answers from the Bush Administration 
about why it had not planned and prepared better.
    If it cannot prepare for the seasonal flu, which is an annual 
occurrence, what does that tell us about the government's ability to 
prepare for large scale pandemics or biological terrorist attacks?
    Answer. The shortage of influenza vaccine experienced 2 years ago 
occurred when a manufacturer encountered production problems and could 
not fulfill its orders for vaccine. The Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and Prevention, within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), provided leadership in working with the provider 
community and State and local Health Departments to target early stocks 
of vaccine to high-risk groups most vulnerable to influenza. HHS/CDC 
also acquired more vaccine on international markets to bring our 
vaccine supply levels near to the previous year's totals.
    This incident highlighted a need to create a robust vaccine 
manufacturing capacity within this country, which was one of the 
keystones of the President's $7.1 billion pandemic flu Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations request to Congress. In fiscal year 2006 
Congress provided $3.8 billion for the President's plan and a portion 
of these funds will be used to stimulate U.S. vaccine manufacturing 
capacity.
    The future benefits of the investment include having contractual 
arrangements with these companies to manufacture enough pandemic 
influenza vaccine whenever a pandemic emerges; having a healthy 
influenza vaccine manufacturing industry in the United States, capable 
of making enough annual influenza vaccine for every person in the 
United States which is the current recommendation of public health 
experts; U.S. vaccine manufacturers would be able to sell influenza 
vaccines abroad (a good business proposition and international public 
health situation); and some cell-based vaccine manufacturers may also 
be able to use their new technologies for production of needed 
childhood vaccines.
    Question. Now, we see the bird flu migrating westward. What 
assurance can you give to the American people that the United States 
will be prepared should this deadly virus reach our shores?
    Answer. The U.S. Government is prepared to provide a scalable, 
tailored Federal response that capitalizes on the lessons learned from 
the recent SARS events in Asia and Canada. Individual Departments are 
preparing Pandemic Influenza-specific plans to implement their roles 
and responsibilities under the Pandemic Strategy. The Department of 
Homeland Security is the lead for overall domestic incident management 
and will coordinate the Federal response; HHS is responsible for the 
U.S. medical response; USDA is the lead for a domestic veterinary 
response; and DOS coordinates with international partners.
    The Federal Government intends to utilize a regional command, 
control, and coordination structure to coordinate Federal response 
activities. Joint Field Offices will be pre-identified and will be 
activated based on the outbreak trends and requests for assistance. The 
Secretary of Homeland Security is prepared to pre-designate and deploy 
a Principal Federal Official as required. Timely, factual, and 
consistent public messaging will be coordinated across the USG through 
the use of a National Joint Information Center (JIC) located at DHS and 
a local JIC in the vicinity of the outbreak. Communications will be 
maintained 24/7 with State, local, tribal, private sector, and 
international entities through established coordinating mechanisms.
    Question. By when will the government be fully prepared?
    Answer. Preparedness for a pandemic requires the establishment of 
infrastructure and capacity, a process that can take years. The 
Strategy affirms that the Federal Government will use all instruments 
of national power to address the pandemic threat. The HSC 
Implementation Plan outlines three hundred and twenty-five specific 
tasks that must be completed. Each task has a lead agency and 
coordination agencies identified, with the majority of items having a 
timeline for implementation which range from 3 to 36 months. For a 
small number of the items, no timeline has been identified.
    Question. The H5N1 avian flu virus strain was initially identified 
in Southeast Asia, but has rapidly spread across the rest of Asia, into 
Africa, and outbreaks in birds have now been found in seven European 
nations. The United Kingdom has also positively identified the virus in 
quarantined birds coming from Southeast Asia. It may only be a matter 
of time until it reaches our shores, which leaves many of us concerned 
that the United States is not doing nearly enough to assist with 
surveillance and prevention of and preparation for this deadly virus 
abroad and at home.
    The fiscal year 2006 Defense Appropriations Act reserved for 
international avian flu efforts $3.8 billion, of which $47.3 million 
was designated for the Homeland Security Department for necessary 
expenses to train, plan and prepare for a potential outbreak of highly 
pathogenic influenza. However, the fiscal year 2006 Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations request that the Administration recently 
submitted to Congress included no request to continue our national 
efforts to combat the avian flu and prepare for a possible avian flu 
epidemic.
    I was surprised to see no request for such funding, given that we 
had heard rumors that the Administration planned to ask Congress to 
devote an additional $2.3 billion this year for prepare for a bird flu 
epidemic.
    Secretary Chertoff, does the Administration plan to submit to 
Congress a request later this year to continue our national efforts to 
help in global efforts to combat the avian flu, as well as prepare for 
a possible avian flu epidemic here at home?
    Answer. The Department has five active working groups that are 
defining additional actions and requirements based on emerging data and 
information. Our first priority is to ensure that the $47 million 
already provided achieve the objectives laid out by the Administration, 
and we will also leverage other DHS programs in support of these 
efforts.
    Question. If so, please describe the request that you anticipate 
submitting as a supplemental related to detection and prevention of 
avian flu.
    Answer. At this point, the Department does not envision requesting 
a supplemental in 2007. However, any budgetary needs for fiscal year 
2007 and beyond will be determined and, if necessary, requested by the 
Administration through its normal processes to address all relevant 
agencies' needs.
    Question. What resources and strategies will be deployed by the 
Department to help States and local officials cope with the possibility 
of an outbreak?
    Answer. Recognizing that the Federal Government will be equally 
degraded during an actual pandemic event and will be limited in its 
ability to provide on-the-ground medical resources, DHS and other 
agencies are assisting State and local officials with preparedness 
activities. DHS has developed a planning guide geared to businesses 
which will very shortly be available on the United States Government 
Pandemic Flu website (www.pandemicflu.gov). The Department, in close 
coordination with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and 
Human Services, and Treasury, continues to develop initial plans and 
pilot projects to address State, local, and private sector preparedness 
for this possible event. Full-scale deployment of comprehensive 
training and exercise programs will increase public and private sector 
readiness and overall preparedness across the entire Nation. These 
programs will also assist with development and validation of State, 
local, and private Sector mitigation strategies to ensure efficient and 
effective use of all available public and private sector resources to 
minimize national economic impacts and associated national security 
implications.
    The Federal response structure is designed to be scalable and 
tailored to the outbreak; therefore, its command, control, and 
coordination structure can expand as required. This structure is based 
on concepts outlined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
and further defined in the National Response Plan (NRP). The Department 
is working to ensure that appropriate DHS leaders are in place to 
assist in the coordination of a Federal response during a pandemic. We 
have pre-identified five locations across the Nation where Joint Field 
Offices could be established should the situation warrant, and will 
pre-designate a national pandemic coordinator. As in any disaster, 
these Joint Field Offices will be the primary conduits through which 
States and local governments request support from the Federal 
Government.
    Question. By all accounts, the current capacity to develop an avian 
flu vaccine is inadequate. Even if a vaccine is developed, it will take 
time to produce the millions of doses needed to protect our citizens. 
Some health officials have urged the need for other countermeasures 
such as medications that would fight an infection or increased usage of 
personal protective equipment.
    What steps is the Administration taking to not only increase 
vaccine manufacturing capacity, but to research and stockpile other 
countermeasures?
    Answer. A portion of the funds Congress provided in the Emergency 
Supplemental pandemic appropriation will be used to stimulate a robust 
U.S. vaccine manufacturing capacity.
    The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has plans to 
purchase or subsidize the purchase of 81 million treatment courses of 
antivirals over a 2 year period, much of which will be stored in the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The fiscal year 2006 HHS budget 
allows HHS to purchase 20 million treatment courses of antivirals for 
subsequent distribution States and localities and to subsidize the 
purchase of 31 million treatment courses by them (HHS will provide a 25 
percent subsidy; $170 million has been designated for this).
    To further encourage the development of new medical countermeasures 
against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents 
and to speed their delivery and use should there be an attack, 
President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union address proposed and 
Congress subsequently enacted Project BioShield. Project BioShield 
provides the Department of Health and Human Services with several new 
authorities to speed the research, development, acquisition, and 
availability of medical countermeasures to defend against CBRN threats. 
In exercising the procurement authorities under Project BioShield, HHS 
has launched acquisition programs to address each of the four threat 
agents deemed to be Material Threats to the U.S. population by the 
Department of Homeland Security [Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), smallpox 
virus, Botulinum toxins, and radiological/nuclear agents]. For example, 
HHS has used Project BioShield to award two contracts for vaccines 
against anthrax and one contract for a liquid formulation of a drug to 
protect children from radioactive iodine exposure following nuclear 
events. These countermeasures are being added to the SNS that currently 
includes vaccines, antibiotics to counter infections caused by anthrax, 
plague, and tularemia, antitoxins, chemical antidotes and radiation 
emergency medical countermeasures. However, we recognize that more can 
and must be done to aggressively and efficiently implement Project 
BioShield.
    Finally, with regard to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), that 
could be used to handle a pandemic, the current SNS inventory contains 
1,006,830 N95 respirators and 1 million pairs of gloves.
    As part of the Emergency Supplemental allocation for pandemic 
influenza, funds have been targeted to acquire supplies and equipment 
to enhance preparedness for a response to a Pandemic Influenza event, 
including personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare providers 
such as N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves, and face shields, as 
well as syringes and needles. Decisions on what items to procure are 
being made by subject matter experts in HHS.
    Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The initial target of 
providing for 25 million people has been staged over a 2 year cycle. 
Based on the assumption of 4 masks and 4 pairs of gloves per 
individual, acquisitions in fiscal year 2006 will provide PPE for in 
excess of 20 million people. The balance of the targeted coverage (5 
million people) will be acquired in the following year.
    Low Waste Syringes and Needles. Initial procurement includes low 
waste syringes and needles to support the administration of the 
proposed 20 million H5N1 vaccines doses.
    Question. When Hurricane Katrina hit, and in the days and weeks 
after, many Federal officials took a ``blame the locals'' approach for 
what went wrong with disaster response. Last week, Department of Health 
and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt told both the National 
Governors' Association and the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit not 
to count on Federal agencies to save them should a flu pandemic strike. 
Specifically, Secretary Leavitt said, ``Any community that fails to 
prepare with the expectation that the Federal Government will come to 
the rescue will be tragically wrong.''
    I am concerned that, rather than preparing adequately for the bird 
flu, Federal officials are lowering expectations and hinting that a 
lack of preparedness will be the fault of State and local authorities. 
However, like with Katrina, we have been warned well in advance of the 
potential for disaster.
    Secretary Chertoff, is the Administration advocating an ``every 
State for itself'' approach? Where is the Administration's leadership 
on this issue?
    Answer. If a pandemic should strike this country, every sector of 
society could fall victim. It would affect infrastructure from our 
ability to keep grocery store shelves stocked, to keeping the lights on 
and communications systems working. It would affect local and State 
government workers as well as Federal Government workers. Many of the 
same people we would depend on for help and services in time of an 
emergency will be affected by whatever disease strikes us.
    When Secretary Leavitt told both the National Governors' 
Association and the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit not to count on 
Federal agencies to save them should a flu pandemic strike, he was 
giving State leadership a simple and honest message. The message needs 
to be heard by all local and State officials who have any 
responsibility for local or State emergency response. Additional 
questions regarding the context of Secretary Leavitt's message should 
be directed to HHS.

                           ALL-STATE MINIMUM

    Question. I am disappointed that once again President Bush's 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2007 reduces from 0.75 percent to 0.25 
percent the all-state minimum formula, which I authored. This is a base 
amount used for the distribution of funding under the State Homeland 
Security Grant Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Program. This formula assures that each State receives a minimum of 
0.75 percent of those grants to help support their first responders' 
basic preparedness needs.
    Not only would this change result in the loss of millions in 
homeland security funding for the fire, police and rescue departments 
in small- and many medium-sized States, but also deal a crippling blow 
to their efforts to build and sustain their terrorism preparedness.
    Mr. Secretary, does this Administration want to shortchange rural 
States and roll back the hard-won progress we have begun to make in 
homeland security by slashing the protections provided to us by the 
all-State minimum?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 request for the State 
Homeland Security Program proposes a 0.25 percent minimum allocation 
for all States, territories, and the District of Columbia to ensure 
funding to address basic preparedness needs with the balance of the 
funding to be allocated based on risk and need. Since the threats 
confronting the Nation respect neither jurisdictional nor geographic 
boundaries, limited resources must be allocated and applied in an 
effective and efficient manner to achieve the greatest return on our 
national investment in homeland security by addressing the greatest 
risks and needs.
    The 9/11 Commission has recommended that ``Federal homeland 
security assistance should not remain a program for general revenue 
sharing. It should supplement State and local resources based on the 
risks and vulnerabilities that merit additional support.''
    All States, whether small, medium, or large, have been provided 
over $14 billion in DHS preparedness funding since the attacks of 9/11 
to build and sustain preparedness capabilities. A 0.25 percent minimum 
allocation would be coupled with any additional funding based on risk 
and need. That allocation process would address the risks and needs of 
both large and small States, and would not be calculated soley based on 
population.
    Question. Would you agree that homeland security is a national 
responsibility shared by all States, regardless of size?
    Answer. Yes, homeland security is a national responsibility shared 
by all levels of government. The National Preparedness Goal is truly 
national in scope, communicating a vision that engages Federal, State, 
local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental 
partners, and the general public to achieve and sustain risk-based 
target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, 
and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, 
property, and the economy. The Expanded Regional Collaboration National 
Priority included in the Goal highlights the need for embracing 
partnership across multiple jurisdictions, regions, and States in 
building capabilities cooperatively. Successful regional collaboration 
allows for a multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary approach to 
building capabilities for all four homeland security mission areas, 
spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas.
    Question. Do you agree that each State has basic terrorism 
preparedness needs and, therefore, a minimum amount of domestic 
terrorism preparedness funds is appropriate for each State?
    Answer. While there is no consistent defintion of ``basic terrorism 
preparedness needs'' a minimum allocation of domestic terrorism 
preparedness funds for each State is appropriate.
    The 0.25 percent minimum allocation proposed in the President's 
fiscal year 2007 request will provide States, territories, and the 
District of Columbia with funding continuity. However, since the 
threats confronting the Nation respect neither jurisdictional nor 
geographic boundaries, limited resources must be allocated and applied 
in an effective and efficient manner to achieve the greatest return on 
our national investment in homeland security by addressing the greatest 
risks and needs.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, would you agree that the mission of the 
Department of Homeland Security extends beyond terrorism threats, and 
that States must prepare for and have the ability to respond to all 
types of homeland security threats, such as natural disasters and other 
emergencies?
    Answer. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security includes 
safeguarding the Nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or 
other emergencies and leading national response and recovery efforts to 
acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies. The 
National Preparedness Goal, which outlines preparedness priorities for 
Federal, State, local governments, private sector, and the general 
public, is all-hazard in nature and is predicated on the importance of 
capabilities-based planning as a means to enhance our preparedness. 
Capabilities-based planning is not focused on a particular scenario or 
threat, but rather pushes us as a Nation to plan under uncertainty to 
provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards 
while working within an economic framework that necessitates 
prioritization and choice.
    Question. If you do not support applying the 0.75 percent minimum 
to the State Formula Grants Program, what compromise between 0.75 
percent and 0.25 percent for the distribution of funds would you 
support?
    Answer. As indicated in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget 
request, the Administration supports the .25 percent minimum, which 
will allow over 85 percent of the State Homeland Security Grant Program 
to be awarded based on risk, need, and potential effectivness.

                    STATE AND LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS

    Question. President Bush often says that he wants to ensure that 
our State and local first responders receive the resources necessary to 
do the job the American public expects them to do. I find that hard to 
believe, though, when I read that he proposes nearly $400 million in 
overall cuts to funds for State Homeland Security Grant Program, 
Emergency Management Performance Grants and other programs administered 
by the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness that directly benefit police, fire and medical rescue 
units. Furthermore, the President's budget eliminates funding for the 
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention program. The Administration 
justifies these cuts by stating it does not believe those funds are 
``targeted'' to homeland security capabilities.
    I believe, however, that the current Administration has failed to 
make first responders a high enough priority by consistently 
underfunding homeland security efforts of every State.
    The Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force Report argued that our Nation 
will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting critical 
emergency responder needs through this decade's end if current funding 
levels are maintained. Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds 
available are still not enough to protect from, prepare for and respond 
to future domestic terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
    Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that to be truly protected from, 
prepared for and able to respond to terrorist attacks we must look to 
increase the funds to our Nation's State and local first responders, 
rather than decrease them, as proposed by the President?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request is a strong commitment 
to the Nation's first responders. As always, the Department believes 
that homeland security is a shared mission and thus a shared 
responsibility between the Federal Government and our State and local 
partners. The Federal Government should not be expected to bear all 
homeland security costs. Instead, the Department expects and 
anticipates that States and localities will devote significant funds to 
enhance their security and thereby help to improve the Nation's level 
of preparedness.

     ADMINISTRATION PLANS FOR DUBAI PORTS WORLD TO TAKE CONTROL OF 
                SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS AT SIX U.S. PORTS

    Question. I have several questions about the Administration's 
controversial decision to approve the takeover by Dubai Ports World 
(DPW) of significant operations at six U.S. ports.
    I was pleased by the Administration's recent decision to accept 
DPW's request that the U.S. government conduct a proper full 45-day 
security review, a review that the President previously said was 
unnecessary. This review may reassure a concerned public that DPW's 
management of port operations in the United States will not affect our 
Nation's safety. However, this development does not excuse the 
Administration from its earlier decision to ignore a mandate in the law 
for a thorough review process. Yet again, on an issue of national 
security, the Administration chose to go it alone, operated in secret 
on a national security issue, and then said to the American people, 
``just trust us.'' Like with the domestic spying program and prior 
assertions on interrogation policy, this Administration operates as if 
it is above the law.
    Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which expedited what review 
was conducted. That leads me to ask for the following information from 
you:
    What role did you play in the CFIUS review of the proposed 
transaction?
    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security was represented in the 
CFIUS review of the DPW case by Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker, who 
coordinated across the Department with the relevant intelligence, 
operational, and legal components.
    Question. Please describe the role the Department of Homeland 
Security in the negotiation and review of the deal.
    Answer. In these cases, DHS considers whether the acquisition may 
affect national security broadly construed, focusing in particular on 
the acquisition's potential impact on critical infrastructure and other 
homeland security factors, as well as traditional measures of national 
security. In the CFIUS process DHS determines: (1) whether DHS already 
has sufficient legal or regulatory authority to address any threat to 
homeland security that might be raised by the transaction; (2) whether 
DHS has homeland security concerns about the parties to the 
transaction; and (3) whether the homeland security concerns can be 
resolved with binding assurances from the parties to the transaction.
    In this particular case, DHS and other CFIUS member agencies 
requested and received intelligence assessments about DPW and received 
briefings from the company. Further, as a matter of prudence, DHS 
sought and received binding assurances that, among other things, (i) 
P&O, the subject of the acquisition, would continue to participate at 
not less than the current level in certain port security programs and 
best practices, and (ii) P&O would provide any records upon DHS's 
request.
    With these assurances, DHS believed that there was no basis for 
contesting the transaction.
    As you know, DPW has agreed to sell the U.S. component of P&O to an 
unrelated U.S. buyer and to ensure that it is managed independently of 
DPW until that time.
    Question. Did you or anyone else on behalf of the Department of 
Homeland Security raise any national security concerns about this 
transaction?
    Answer. DHS did not have specific concerns about this transaction. 
In reviewing DPW's proposed acquisition of P&O, DHS concurred with the 
intelligence community and the other CFIUS agencies reviewing the 
transaction that DPW's acquisition presented no current threat to U.S. 
national security. Nevertheless, given DHS's responsibility for 
critical infrastructure protection and port and maritime security, DHS 
wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that DPW would not present a 
future risk to national security by taking adverse action sometime in 
the future and therefore obtained certain written assurances from DPW, 
including: (i) that DPW would participate in certain port security 
programs that are voluntary for other companies but would become 
mandatory for DPW because of its written assurances; and (ii) that DPW 
would provide, upon request, any records maintained regarding DPW's 
operations in the United States.
    Question. What security precautions, if any, were requested?
    Answer. As indicated above, DHS decided that it would be prudent to 
obtain certain security assurances from DPW. DPW committed to 
participate in various U.S. cargo inspection and security programs that 
are only voluntary today. These programs include DHS's Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (``C-TPAT'') and Container Security 
Initiative (``CSI''), and the related Department of Energy Megaports 
program. These programs protect U.S. ports by screening cargo before it 
approaches U.S. shores.
    DPW also agreed to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies (Federal, 
State, and Local) and to disclose any information concerning the 
operation of the company's U.S. facilities, equipment, or services and 
to provide any relevant records that may exist of foreign efforts to 
control operations in any of its U.S. facilities.
    DPW further agreed to maintain P&O's existing security policies and 
procedures at the U.S. facilities--including security personnel--and 
provide written notice to DHS if those policies or procedures change so 
that DHS can address any concerns.
    Finally, DPW also agreed to operate any facilities they would own 
or control in the United States as a result of the acquisition with the 
current U.S. management structure, to the extent possible.
    Question. In an undated document released yesterday, the Coast 
Guard expressed concerns about intelligence gaps concerning foreign 
ownership of port assets. Were you aware of these concerns? Did you act 
upon them?
    Answer. The referenced concerns must be placed in context. The U.S. 
Coast Guard resolved its intelligence concerns in the context of the 
original CFIUS review. Further, DHS considered the intelligence 
community reporting on this case and no unresolved concerns were 
raised.
    Question. Why did the Administration decide to not adhere to the 
45-day review process established by the Byrd Amendment?
    Answer. The Department of the Treasury, as Chair of the CFIUS, is 
better positioned to respond to questions regarding CFIUS's 
interpretation of the Byrd Amendment.
    Question. What led to the January 6, 2006, letter of assurances to 
the Department of Homeland Security in connection with this 
transaction?
    Answer. In reviewing DPW's proposed acquisition of P&O, DHS 
concurred with the intelligence community and the other CFIUS agencies 
reviewing the transaction that DPW's acquisition presented no current 
threat to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, given DHS's 
responsibility for critical infrastructure protection and port and 
maritime security, DHS wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that 
DPW would not present a future risk to national security by taking 
adverse action sometime in the future.
    Question. Is the January 6, 2006, letter intended to be a binding 
contractual obligation? If so, how would it be enforced and by whom?
    Answer. The January 6, 2006 assurances letter from DPW to DHS 
constituted a legally binding agreement. If DPW were to have breached 
the agreement, DHS had full authority to conduct detailed inspections 
of all containers or other cargo handled by the operator and authority 
over the terminal itself so that DHS could protect national security.
    Both the terms of the assurances letter and the CFIUS regulations 
provide CFIUS with authority to reopen its review of a transaction 
where the parties have made a material misrepresentation or omitted 
material facts.
    DHS would have had recourse to all available remedies under 
contract law. For example, the Government could have asked a court to 
order DPW to perform any provision that the Government believed DPW had 
breached, or to pay damages for costs that resulted from such breach.
    Question. What subject matter and personal jurisdiction would our 
courts have over the Dubai principals?
    Answer. As noted in our response to QFR 3683, above, U.S. courts 
would have had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over any of the 
terms of the assurances letter entered into between DP World and DHS. 
In addition, DHS would have had other available remedies that would not 
have required resort to a court, including the full authority to 
conduct detailed inspections of all containers or other cargo handled 
by the operator and authority over the terminal itself so that DHS 
could protect national security.
    Question. What would remedies be available to the United States if 
the contractual obligations were not fulfilled?
    Answer. As stated above, DHS would have had recourse to all 
available remedies under contract law. In addition, DHS could have 
reinstituted CFIUS proceedings and potentially ordered the transaction 
to be unwound.
    Question. Was legal analysis conducted to ascertain whether the 
special assurances offered in the January 6 letter could be enforced? 
Please provide any such analysis and related documents.
    Answer. While not obtained in every case, it is not unusual for one 
or more CFIUS agencies to obtain an assurances letter from a party in 
CFIUS. These letters are contractual arrangements between the parties, 
and terms are enforceable like other contracts.
    DHS's Office of General Counsel reviewed the terms of the January 
6, 2006 assurances letter but did not issue a specific, written opinion 
relating to the ability of DHS to enforce any or all of the contract 
terms.
    Question. Who is the ``responsible corporate officer'' who will 
serve as a point of contact for DHS in each U.S. facility owned or 
controlled by Dubai Ports World, Ports, Customs and Free Zone 
Corporation, and Thunder FZE?
    Answer. Dubai Ports World announced in February 2006 that it would 
sell the P&O facilities in the United States to an American company. 
Until that point, the P&O security officer continues to serve as the 
point of contact at the formerly P&O U.S. facilities.

                         CONCLUSION OF HEARING

    Senator Gregg. The subcommittee will stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Tuesday, February 28, the 
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]


  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                              ----------                              

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                       NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

    [The following testimonies were received by the 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record. 
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2007 budget 
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]

      Prepared Statement of the American Psychological Association

    Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, the American 
Psychological Association (APA) represents 150,000 members and 
affiliates, and works to advance psychology as a science, a profession, 
and a means of promoting health and human welfare. Psychologists are 
involved in a broad spectrum of programs within the jurisdiction of 
this Subcommittee. For example, psychologists manage the Social and 
Behavioral Research Program within the Threat Awareness Portfolio of 
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. Psychologists also provide 
expertise as members of the Homeland Security Science and Technology 
Advisory Committee and the Academe and Policy Research Senior Advisory 
Committee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Psychologists 
serve as Principle Investigators directing the activities of two of the 
five University-Based Centers of Excellence and student psychologists 
are becoming the next generation of Homeland Security experts training 
under the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
    Overall, APA has been pleased to see the increasing emphasis DHS is 
placing on behavioral and psychological science within the department. 
However APA is also concerned about how pending DHS reorganization and 
proposed budget cuts might undermine long range planning for 
psychological and behavioral research programs within the department. 
Finally, DHS must remain ever-mindful that behavioral research 
necessarily involves systematically collected and analyzed empirical 
data that cannot be replaced by the well-intentioned but perhaps ill-
informed speculation of experts or contractors who lack training in the 
behavioral sciences.
    The Threat Awareness Portfolio was cut 35 percent from fiscal year 
2005 to fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an 
additional 6.4 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that 
Congress restore the proposed 6.4 percent cut and fund the Threat 
Awareness Portfolio at or above the $43 million fiscal year 2006 
appropriation.
    The Threat Awareness Portfolio (TAP) in the Science and Technology 
(S&T) Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsors 
research to inform, develop, and test tools and methodologies to assess 
terrorist threats, understand terrorism, and improve national security. 
There are three broad program areas within TAP, one of which is the 
Social and Behavioral Research (SBR) Program. The SBR Program sponsors 
social science and behavioral research to support the missions of DHS 
and the broader law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well 
as promote the safety and security of the American public.
SBR Program Description, Strategic Goals, and Areas of Research
    The SBR Program was developed with four strategic aims. The program 
leverages the theories, data, and methods of the social and behavioral 
sciences to improve the detection, analysis, and understanding of the 
threats posed by individuals, groups, and radical movements; it 
supports the assessment of the psychosocial impacts of catastrophic 
events and the validation of public communications and education 
programs to increase the American public's all hazards preparedness and 
response capabilities; it facilitates information exchange across the 
Federal Government to enhance the knowledge and coordination of 
Federally sponsored social and behavioral science research related to 
national security and preparedness; and it develops mechanisms to 
provide senior policymakers with social and behavioral science theories 
and data that can inform their decisions. To achieve these aims, the 
SBR Program supports numerous coordinated activities that incorporate 
social and behavioral science into coherent, integrated techniques and 
methodologies. These activities fall within four broad research and 
development areas that support each of the strategic goals of the SBR 
Program.
    First, the program's activities inform the ability of operational 
end users (including personnel involved with border and transportation 
security, customs enforcement, and intelligence analysis), to detect 
threats and conduct accurate risk assessments. With continued support, 
these efforts will produce two main products--models of behavioral and 
linguistic cues that indicate whether an individual is likely engaged 
in deception or is intent on doing harm; and an integrative model of 
the ideological, organizational, and contextual factors associated with 
a group or radical movement's likelihood of engaging in violence.
    Second, the program supports coordinating research in public 
education and communication aimed at increasing the American 
population's ability to prepare for and respond to natural and man-made 
catastrophic events and developing quantitative assessments of 
psychosocial vulnerabilities. With continued support, these efforts 
will test and evaluate the effects of various theoretically sound 
messaging and education programs on public all-hazards preparedness and 
response, as well as develop an index to measure the psychosocial 
impact of catastrophic events.
    Third, the program sponsors activities to improve the coordination 
of social and behavioral science research related to national security 
and preparedness by supporting various methods of information sharing 
across the Federal Government. With continued support, these efforts 
will produce integrated symposia and workshops attended by relevant 
Federal partners and a participatory web-based system for sharing 
information on Federally funded social and behavioral science research 
related to national security and preparedness.
    Fourth, the program assembles leading thinkers on the social and 
behavioral aspects of terrorism and national security to participate in 
study sessions and web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to 
the SBR Program and DHS as a whole. With continued support, this group 
will produce white papers and briefings on a range of topics (see 
appended description of DHS Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership 
Program).

    IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENT BY INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF THREATS

    To protect the nation effectively, it is essential to improve our 
ability to assess the potential threats posed by individuals as well as 
the larger terrorist groups and movements to which they may belong. In 
fiscal year 2007, the SBR Program's activities will continue to build 
upon work completed in fiscal year 2006 to improve our ability to model 
whether an individual is intent on doing harm or engaged in deception, 
as well as improve our ability to model the likelihood that a group 
will engage in violent activity. Additional work will be sponsored to 
compare how models based on open source material differ from models 
developed on classified data.
Improving Awareness of Individual Threats--Project Hostile Intent
    An ongoing program, Project Hostile Intent aims to detect and model 
the behavioral cues that indicate an individual's intent to do harm 
and/or deceive The cues examined in Project Hostile Intent are those 
that can be assessed remotely and in real time, and the procedures and 
technologies required to collect these cues are non-invasive and 
amenable to integration into busy operational contexts. In addition to 
detecting these cues, this project examines whether this process can be 
automated through the use of sensors and detection algorithms and, 
subsequently, integrated with other technologies aimed at identifying 
individuals who pose threats to the homeland, e.g., biometric tools and 
databases. The targeted customers of this research are Customs and 
Border Patrol and Transportation Security Administration personnel.
Improving Awareness of Group Threats
    Another SBR Program research priority is improving our ability to 
determine the intentions of various domestic and foreign groups who may 
pose a threat to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad. The 
central activity in this area is the Motivation and Intent (M&I) 
Project, aimed at developing models to inform analysts' assessments 
regarding whether a group intends to engage in violent activity to 
further its goals. In future years, work in this area will be further 
expanded to incorporate the modeling of radical movements and the 
violent activity associated with such movements. In addition, several 
projects will be sponsored to augment the M&I effort by providing 
additional data or addressing gaps in the current social and behavioral 
science research. The tools, methodologies, and knowledge developed 
through this research program will improve the efficiency and accuracy 
of intelligence analysis by identifying key social and behavioral 
science variables to consider when assessing the likelihood that a 
group may intend to act violently.
            The Motivation and Intent (M&I) Project
    In fiscal year 2005, the SBR Program initiated funding of the M&I 
Project. This activity draws on social science data and theories to 
develop analytic models aimed at determining the ideological, 
organizational, and contextual factors associated with a group's 
likelihood of engaging in violence. The goal of this on-going effort is 
to develop an integrated framework that enables analysts to examine the 
impact of various social and behavioral science variables on a group's 
intent to engage in violence. The project will model the factors 
associated with violent activity carried out by both domestic and 
foreign groups. APA believes that this work could be augmented by 
research to understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect 
to target selection (i.e., does target selection depend on 
circumstances such as differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed 
to other considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand 
how specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into 
tactic selection.
            Update and Maintenance of the Global Terrorism Database
    The SBR Program has supported the updating of a coded and 
computerized database comprised of more than 69,000 terrorist incidents 
recorded worldwide from 1970-1997 as well as the initial coding and 
inclusion of incidents that have occurred from 1998 to the present. 
While this worthwhile activity will continue to be supported in fiscal 
year 2006 and beyond, APA believes a complementary database of 
government responses to terrorism would also be helpful as terrorists 
appear to adapt and counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
            Quantitative Analysis of Terrorist Perspectives and 
                    Behaviors
    The SBR Program also will sponsor activity to incorporate 
perspective analysis into the M&I Project. This project will involve an 
analysis of the perspectives of multi-level (individual, group, and 
subculture) actors in a country or region in which various terrorist 
groups of interest operate. An underlying conceptual framework will be 
created informed by social and behavioral scientists and other subject 
matter experts who are familiar with the region, politics, and actors 
of interest. The framework will extract patterns in actors' foci and 
attitudes from various sources of data (e.g., media statements and 
materials from actors' websites). This activity will add a unique 
capability as it will allow an analyst to make more informed decisions 
regarding agents' intentions based on the perspectives of multiple 
actors in a region of interest.
    In addition, a team of social and behavioral scientists will 
quantify the perspectives of these actors and conduct statistical 
analyses relating these perspectives to various types of activities 
(for example, engaging in violence, condoning violence, participation 
in the political process, etc.). This effort will allow for the testing 
of social and behavioral science theories drawing on the unique source 
of data provided by the perspective analyses of various actors. It will 
also allow for a scientifically rigorous analysis of trends in actors' 
attitudes and behaviors based on an analysis of actors' perspectives 
and detailed chronologies of their behaviors. The findings from this 
project will inform the M&I Program's modeling efforts and allow for 
the refinement of the conceptual framework that forms the basis for the 
perspective analysis.
            Systematic Comparison of Open and Classified Data Sources
    The SBR Program will sponsor work that conducts a detailed 
comparative analysis of open source data and classified data, 
specifically focused on the information used to identify the motives 
and intents of actors of interest. This activity will identify the 
relative strengths of these two types of data and explore what types of 
information they provide to help an analyst determine the intentions of 
individuals and groups. The research in this area will provide detailed 
comparative information on open source and classified data that will 
better inform decisions regarding whether and/or when to rely on open 
source data, and the applicability of academic research to intelligence 
analyses.
Improving Risk Assessment and Risk Communication
    Research in the social and behavioral sciences can examine how best 
to help the American population prepare for and respond to natural and 
man-made catastrophic events, thereby reducing one component of 
national vulnerability. Public communication and education strategies 
for natural and man-made catastrophic events are key components of 
DHS's overall preparedness and response missions, and sponsoring 
research on the efficacy of these communications is a stated priority 
of the SBR Program.
    However, current risk communications strategies should be informed 
by decades of existing research which have produced consistent findings 
regardless of the category of risk under study. Such research shows 
that people want the truth, even if it is worrisome and as such, candor 
in risk communication is critical. People can absorb only a limited 
amount of new information at a time and as a result risk communications 
must prioritize and organize critical facts according to the way the 
target audience naturally thinks. Further, people have an inherent 
difficulty in understanding certain kinds of information (e.g. that 
repeated exposure to small risks increases their overall risk) so risk 
communications must accommodate the known strengths and weaknesses of 
the target audiences thought processes. Additionally, emotions can 
cloud people's judgment in predictable ways that interferes with 
decision making so those charged with communicating risks must do so 
respectfully in order to facilitate reasoned decision making. Even the 
most experienced communicators cannot accurately predict how messages 
will be interpreted on novel topics or with unfamiliar audiences. Thus 
messages must be systematically evaluated for both intended and 
unintended reactions before they are disseminated. In emergency 
planning exercises, people exaggerate their ability to predict others 
behavior, as a result social and behavioral scientists need to be 
included in such planning teams to ensure that plans are based upon 
science rather than intuition. Finally, people generally make sensible 
and effective decisions if communicators deliver relevant, timely and 
accurate information.
Improving Federal Information Sharing and Collaborative Research 
        Efforts
    A priority of the SBR Program is the development of effective 
methods for information sharing among Federal agencies tasked with 
addressing various aspects of national security and preparedness. Not 
only will such information sharing increase the effectiveness and the 
ability of the government to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad, 
it will also increase collaborative research efforts and reduce 
unnecessary duplication. The initial effort will consist of workshops 
focused on issues related to national security and will later expand to 
the provision of web-based dialogue and interaction to facilitate 
information exchange.
Providing Policymakers Social and Behavioral Science Information--The 
        Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
    The Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership (Partnership) 
Program assembles leading thinkers on the social and behavioral aspects 
of terrorism and national security to participate in study sessions and 
web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to the SBR Program, 
DHS, and the nation as a whole. It was created to describe the 
significant roles that social, cultural, economic, and psychological 
factors play in the threats we face and our counter-threat activities 
and provide a mechanism for communicating social and behavioral 
research findings to policymakers. In fiscal year 2006, at the request 
of the DHS Policy Directorate, the Partnership will examine the impact 
of U.S. policies on radicalization in the United States. It will also 
hold study sessions on topics related to (1) assessing the intent of 
terrorist groups and (2) determining the long-term impacts of a 
terrorist attack with improvised nuclear device.
    APA recognizes that recent events such as hurricane Katrina, as 
well as forecast events such as a pandemic flu outbreak, have forced a 
realignment of the Department's strategic goals to prioritize the 
strengthening of public resilience in responding to the diverse threats 
facing us. That will mean evaluating Departmental investments in terms 
of their contribution to, among other things, strengthening 
communities, securing trust in government, providing multi-threat 
response capabilities and enhancing economic and institutional 
recovery.
    Accomplishing these tasks will require attention to social and 
behavioral variables in three contexts:
  Predicting the public's response to various threats (e.g., to what 
        extent will people understand warnings, trust authorities, 
        support one another in the face of threats, rebound from 
        trauma).
  Understanding the limits to analyses and plans, so that citizens and 
        officials have realistic expectations of the confidence to 
        place in them.
  Communicating about threats, so that people receive the specific 
        information that they need for effective action, in a credible, 
        comprehensible form.
    These issues are relevant to preparation, response, and recovery 
for all threats. While the Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership 
has begun to address these issues, APA believes the Department would 
benefit from an in-house Center for Translational Social and Behavioral 
Science Research tasked with ensuring that our homeland security plans 
are grounded in the best available science.
    Although the center should be located in the Science and Technology 
Directorate, it should provide services to the entire Department. For 
example, it would be a resource for creating scientifically sound, 
behaviorally realistic communications, usability standards, risk 
analyses, and emergency plans. It would also identify fundamental 
issues, to be studied by the University Centers of Excellence and 
others.
    The Center proposed is similar to the Office of Behavioral and 
Social Sciences Research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
which celebrates a 10 year anniversary this year and leverages a modest 
budget to coordinate interdisciplinary and translational behavioral and 
social science research across the twenty-seven Institutes and Centers 
of NIH. This initiative would address a significant gap in the 
Department's science and technology resources, while providing an 
essential input to implementing the Department's commitment to risk-
based decision making.

         UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS--DHS SCHOLARS AND FELLOWS PROGRAM.

    APA has been very pleased to see how well behavioral and social 
scientists are represented in the DHS Scholars and Fellows awards. 
However, we are concerned that cuts to the fiscal year 2006 budget and 
proposed cuts to the fiscal year 2007 budget will serve to disrupt a 
critical career pipeline for the next generation of Homeland Security 
scientists. If the proposed fiscal year 2007 budget is enacted, DHS 
will cut Scholars and Fellows support by one third. Especially this 
year, as the Administration and Congress focus on the American 
Competitiveness Initiative, we strongly recommend that the subcommittee 
restore full funding of the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
    University Programs were cut 11 percent from fiscal year 2005 to 
fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an additional 
16 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that Congress 
restore the proposed 16 percent cut and fund the University Programs at 
or above the $62 million fiscal year 2006 appropriation.
  department of homeland security report language for fiscal year 2007
Proposed by the American Psychological Association
            Science and Technology Directorate
    The Committee understands that terrorists are people and terrorism 
is behavior, therefore understanding the importance of the behavioral, 
psychological and social sciences to countering terrorism and homeland 
security is paramount. The Committee applauds DHS strong support of a 
full range of behavioral and social science research.
    The Committee recommends DHS implement a Center for Translational 
Social and Behavioral Science Research tasked with ensuring that our 
homeland security plans are grounded in the best available science. The 
Committee believes such a center should be a resource for creating 
scientifically sound, behaviorally realistic communications, usability 
standards, risk analyses, and emergency plans and should also identify 
fundamental issues to be studied by the University Centers of 
Excellence and others.
    The Committee appreciates that the psychological consequences of a 
manmade and natural disasters are likely to be widespread and long 
lasting and that events like hurricanes Katrina and Rita are known to 
have caused stress and anxiety in Americans of all ages, ethnicities, 
and disparate geographical locations. Mental health practitioners must 
be trained to deal with the particular aftermath that such events 
impose. The Committee encourages DHS to ensure that mental health 
research, particularly longitudinal research, is focused on how to 
respond, mitigate and inoculate the populace as effectively as 
possible.
    The Committee also recognizes, however, that the social and 
behavioral sciences have a much larger role to play than the single 
domain of mental health. The technological devices and infrastructure 
that are created in support of counter-terrorism and homeland security 
efforts will be only as effective as the humans who interact with them. 
Because many instances of protection against devastating loss since 9/
11 involved human alertness to unusual behavior, the Committee 
recognizes that a significant portion of the most effective defense 
against domestic attack will be human agents. In addition, the 
Committee acknowledges that as we devise innovative technological 
systems to thwart terrorists, the most dangerous terrorist will be one 
who knows how to modify his or her behavior so as to circumvent these 
systems. Therefore, the Committee believes that effective counter-
terrorism technologies must be developed in concert with the social and 
behavioral sciences.
    The Committee encourages DHS to pursue research on the assessment 
of the human dimensions (social, cultural, and behavioral) in which 
networks exist, such as first-response teams, emergency management 
teams, communication systems, intelligence networks, terrorist groups, 
and U.S. government (Federal, State, and local) departments and 
agencies. Systems analysis and systems engineering are powerful tools 
for understanding how these networks function. However, the Committee 
recognizes that these tools will be useful only to the extent those 
human behavioral variables are appropriately described and incorporated 
into the analyses.
    The Committee is concerned about the utility of the Homeland 
Security Advisory System and encourages DHS to include an on-going 
evaluation of its effectiveness. The Committee encourages DHS to 
support research on risk assessment and the communication of risk in 
order to understand the framework in which the communicator operates as 
well as the knowledge base and competence of the audience. The 
Committee recognizes that an effective and meaningful alert system 
involves knowing how to articulate the goals of the communication 
including whether to inform only, or to inform and change behavior.
    The Committee encourages further development of animal models for 
the assessment of chemical, radiological and biological agents that 
might be used as weapons of attack and the pharmacological 
countermeasures required to neutralize or reverse their effects. The 
Committee recognizes that animal models are useful not only as 
indicators of the apparent physiological responses to such agents, but 
careful measurement of their behavior (motivation, learning, 
aggression) can serve as more sensitive indices of both long- and 
short-term effects of such weapons. Further, the Committee recognizes 
animals also are potential targets of attack in the agricultural 
sector, so that longitudinal data on animal behavior can serve as 
valuable baseline data against which to detect attacks by biological 
agents that may be either slow- or fast-acting.
    The Committee recognizes that understanding how humans process 
information is critical to developing new technologies for information 
gathering and intelligence analysis. The Committee encourages 
additional research to ensure that such technologies optimally 
accommodate the human user. Further, the Committee encourages DHS to 
support research that applies basic learning algorithms to data-mining 
systems. Such systems can then become language-independent and analyze 
text for meaning rather than simply the identification of keywords.
    The Committee recognizes the value of robotics in performing 
dangerous work and in substituting for human surveillance. The 
Committee encourages DHS to support research on human-machine 
interaction to optimize the functions of both the human and machine in 
this partnership. The Committee recognizes that it is imperative to 
understand how best to design robotic systems to interact effectively 
with their human controllers and partners. The Committee believes that 
human behavior cannot be perceived as a weak link in this interaction 
because human cognitive, perceptual and motivational capacities are a 
given and the machine system must be built to complement the human 
user.
    The Committee recognizes the profound effect that terrorism can 
have on social systems and encourages DHS to support research on how 
attitudes and beliefs about terrorism affect consumer confidence, 
population mobility, decisions about child-care, job behaviors, and 
attitudes towards immigrants, religion, political institutions and 
leaders. The Committee encourages further research on understanding the 
short- and long-term effects of stereotyping and marginalization of 
groups as well as research on hate-crimes and the emergence and 
maintenance of fundamentalist, extremist, and anti-government groups 
within the United States and outside the United States.
    The Committee recognizes the potential for massive disruption by 
those who would distribute erroneous or system-destructive information 
into the Internet, the telecommunications infrastructure, embedded/
real-time computing systems, and dedicated computing devices. The 
Committee recommends DHS support research to analyze the behavior, 
motivations and social contexts of known instances of successful 
``hacking''. The Committee encourages DHS to research effective 
safeguards that our consistent with the behaviors of the humans that 
use these systems.
    The Committee recognizes that emergency management, evacuation, and 
the design of egress systems are operable only to the extent that we 
know how humans behave in emergency situations. The Committee 
encourages research on human behavior under duress and encourages 
research on designing emergency systems and infrastructure (operation 
and communication systems, buildings, roads and tunnels, stadiums) that 
facilitate the most effective behavior in emergency situations.
    The Committee recognizes there is a need to put as much attention 
into government responses to terrorism as into terrorist acts 
themselves. There are a number of data bases recording particulars of 
terrorist attacks, but none so far that record government responses 
(legal, military, political, policing; strategy and tactics) on the 
same time line as the terrorist attacks. The committee believes this 
information is critical to track because terrorists appear to adapt and 
counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
    The Committee recommends that DHS also encourage research to 
understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect to target 
selection (i.e., does target selection depend on circumstances such as 
differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed to other 
considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand how 
specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into 
tactic selection.
    The Committee realizes there is a need to understand how groups 
move from radical protest or social movement to terrorism and to 
examine the trajectories by which individuals move to terrorism. 
Whether an individual joins a protest group or social movement which 
escalates to the level of terrorism or joins an existing terrorist 
group, the background and experience and psychology of individuals 
recruited to terrorism in these two ways may be quite different. Moving 
to terrorism as a member of a continuing group is more like a slippery 
slope, whereas moving to terrorism by joining an existing terrorist 
group is more like making a decision.
    The Committee urges DHS to developing data bases of terrorist 
rhetoric for important terrorist groups over time. If terrorists there 
are rhetorical differences between protest groups that do and do not go 
on to commit terrorist acts such differences might be useful for 
directing countermeasure resources. When the rhetoric is not in 
English, English speaking researchers need the rhetoric translated so 
that they can apply text analysis tools in seeking rhetorical 
predictors.
    The Committee appreciates the DHS focus on jihadist terrorism but 
recognizes that it also needs to prepare for a resurgence of domestic 
terrorism. Neo-Nazi, constitutionalist, and white militia violence 
emerged after the Soviet threat disintegrated; similarly it can be 
expected that these groups and their violence will reemerge as the 
threat from Al Qaeda fades. There is a danger in focusing only on 
jihadist terrorism. The Committee suggest that National surveys with 
unobtrusive questions (what percent of world's population is white?) 
could begin to track the popularity of ideas associated with the idea 
that the U.S. Federal Government is the enemy.
    The Committee notes that thus far, Islamic communities in Europe 
have been more involved in jihadist violence than Islamic communities 
in the United States. The Committee urges DHS to continue to research 
the determinants of support for violence among diasporas and develop 
theories of diaspora experience in relation to home country politics 
and especially support for violence in relation to home country 
politics.
    The Committee understands that Al Qaeda is less an organization 
than a brand name or sympathy group with many local franchises now. The 
anarchist movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s had a similar 
quality, and due to the international nature of the anarchist threat 
governments leaders reached unprecedented cooperative agreements in 
trying to suppress the anarchists. The Committee recommends that DHS 
conduct a review of research on anarchist terrorism at the beginning of 
the 20th century in an effort to apply lessons learned for suppressing 
Al Qaeda.
    The Committee urges DHS to continue research on the psychology of 
negative intergroup emotions. Most analyses of terrorism and terrorist 
motives makes reference to fear, hate, anger or humiliation but the 
Committee understands there is very little empirical research on hate 
and humiliation. Further while there is research on anger and hate it 
appears to focus on the interpersonal level which may be very different 
than anger and hate at the intergroup level. The Committee recognizes 
that episodes like Abu Ghraib highlight the problem in understanding 
intergroup emotions which are twofold: understanding the relation 
between interpersonal and intergroup emotions, and understanding in 
particular intergroup emotions of hate, humiliation, and shame.
    The Committee recommends that DHS continue to review criminology 
literature and research related to gangs, especially youth and prison 
gangs, to better understand how different types of terrorist groups on 
the basis of recruiting, decision making, and desistence. The Committee 
believes that through research comparing terrorist groups that do and 
do not split, DHS might learn how to encourage internal conflict and 
splitting within terrorist organizations. Further, the Committee notes 
that there are cases, such as the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation 
of Armenia, and Egyptian Group after Luxor, in which terrorist activity 
drops quickly from high to low levels. As the dynamics of endings are 
not necessarily the reverse of the dynamics of beginnings, the 
Committee believes it should be useful to study such cases to learn how 
to encourage desistence.
    The Committee notes that terrorists are sometimes but not always 
seen as representing the group or cause they claim to be fighting for. 
Psychological research has emphasized attributions to individual actors 
with little attention to attributions to groups, and the attributions 
of interest are moral responsibility more than the usual psychological 
focus on perceived ``causes'' of behavior as trait-based or situation-
based. The Committee encourages DHS to conduct additional research on 
attribution theory to better understand how actions of a few are 
sometimes but not always attributed to the group the individuals come 
from.
    The Committee urges DHS to continue to study why some groups move 
from local to international terrorism. Most terrorism begins in 
response to local issues, and relatively few groups escalate to 
international attacks. The Committee believes we need to understand 
when and how this kind of escalation occurs. The Committee notes that 
most data bases focus on international terrorist attacks and may 
discount data about earlier local attacks by the same groups. The 
Committee believes that by studying local terrorist groups whose 
actions remained local DHS would have a basis for comparison with local 
groups that transitioned to international attacks.
                                 ______
                                 

  Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association

    APTA is a nonprofit international association of over 1,600 public 
and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter 
rail operators; planning, design, construction and finance firms; 
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit 
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members 
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical 
transit services and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public 
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA 
members.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written 
testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems. 
We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look 
forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2007 
appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security.

                               ABOUT APTA

    The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a 
nonprofit international association of more than 1,600 public and 
private member organizations including transit systems and commuter 
rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; 
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit 
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members 
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical 
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using 
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by 
APTA member systems.

                                OVERVIEW

    Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical 
infrastructures. We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of our 
industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6 
billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit 
service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million 
times each weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily 
travelers on the Nation's airlines.
    Safety and security are the top priority of the public 
transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve 
security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since 
then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United 
States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency 
preparedness programs and technology from their own budgets with only 
minimal Federal funding. Last year's events in London and the previous 
year's events in Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen 
security on public transit systems and to do so without delay. We do 
not need another wakeup call like the terrorists attacks on rail 
systems in London and Madrid.
    We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the 
documented needs, we respectfully urge Congress to provide at least 
$560 million in the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations 
bill for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue 
to address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment 
needs. Funding at this level annually would allow for dramatic 
improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year 
period. Federal funding for additional security needs should provide 
for both hard and soft costs as described below and will be in addition 
to investments as transit systems continue to provide from their own 
resources. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can in turn 
provide that amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards 
program which includes participation with our Federal partners to 
assist with the development of transit security standards. In addition, 
we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the 
Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).

                               BACKGROUND

    In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine 
what actions they needed to take to improve security for their 
customers, employees and facilities. In response to the survey, transit 
agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in 
transit security investment needs. State and local governments and 
transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is 
important that the Federal Government be a full partner in the effort 
to ensure the security of the Nation's transit users.
    In fiscal year 2003, transit security was allocated $65 million in 
Federal funds from DHS for 20 transit systems. In fiscal year 2004, $50 
million was allocated from DHS for 30 transit systems. For the first 
time in fiscal year 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150 
million for transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the 
$150 million, transit is to receive approximately $130 million--almost 
$108 million for rail transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also, 
passenger ferries are slated to receive an additional $5 million for 
security from a separate account. In fiscal year 2006, Congress 
appropriated $150 million for transit, passenger and freight rail 
security. DHS is currently deciding how to allocate this funding among 
the modes of transportation. We are very appreciative of this effort. 
However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done.
    Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security 
needs. Based on APTA's 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000 
rail stations do not have security cameras. According to our 2005 
Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars, 
and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras. Fewer 
than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems 
(AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus when an 
emergency occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack 
these AVLs. Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological 
detection system. In addition, only two transit authorities have a 
permanent chemical detection system. A partnership with the Federal 
Government could help to better address many of these specific needs.
    We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $600 
million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the fiscal 
year 2007 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security 
grants for transit, seaports, railways and other facilities. We are 
also disappointed that the Administration did not include a specific 
line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to 
working with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate 
transit security funding that begins to address unmet transit security 
needs throughout the country.
    We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS 
Federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed 
directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating 
Agencies (SAA) on a regional basis. We believe direct funding to the 
transit authorities would be more efficient and productive. The 
Administration's process and conditions that have been put into effect 
have created significant barriers and time delays in getting the actual 
funds into the hands of transit agencies.
    As I noted in previous testimony, APTA is a Standards Development 
Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry. We are now 
applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit 
industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards 
as well. We have already begun to initiate our efforts for security 
standards development and we have engaged our Federal partners from 
both the DHS and Department of Transportation in this process. Through 
these initial meetings, I am pleased to advise that our Federal 
partners have agreed to support these efforts. We look forward to 
working with the Administration and Congress in support of this 
initiative. We respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the 
DHS so that it can in turn provide that amount in grant funding to the 
APTA security standards program which includes participation of our 
Federal partners to assist with the development of such standards and 
practices consistent with what we have already seen through the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA). Our efforts in standards development for 
commuter rail, rail transit and bus transit operations have been 
significant and our status as a SDO is acknowledged by both the FTA and 
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The FTA and the 
Transportation Research Board have supported our standards initiatives 
through the provision of grants.
    We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of 
Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a 
leadership role in advancing research and technology development to 
enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.

                          INFORMATION SHARING

    Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit 
systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their 
security plans and procedures and have been very active in training 
personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to respond to 
emergencies. As well, to the extent possible within their respective 
budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their 
services through the introduction of additional technologies such as 
surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems. 
While the transit systems have been diligent, they have been unable to 
fully implement programs without more assistance from the Federal 
Government.
    A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare 
and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security 
intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to 
informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public 
Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision 
Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems 
throughout the United States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2 
million was provided to APTA by the Federal Transit Administration to 
establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours 
a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources, 
including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems 
following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that 
the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access 
security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC 
operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate method of providing 
security intelligence through DHS's newly created Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to 
create a useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear, 
however, that while the HSIN may become an effective resource, it does 
not match the 24/7 two-way communication functions provided through the 
Public Transit ISAC. However, we believe that consistent, on-going and 
reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit 
ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security 
intelligence. Therefore, we respectfully urge Congress to provide 
$600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
    In addition, APTA's membership includes many major international 
public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid 
Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with 
the European-based transportation association, the International Union 
of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated 
in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia to give United States 
transit agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address 
transit security both here and abroad.

                      COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY

    Following the attacks on London, APTA was asked to assist the TSA 
in conducting a teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to 
discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing 
the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat 
levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems 
and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These 
costs totaled $900,000 per day for U.S. public transit systems or an 
estimated $33.3 million from July 7 to August 12, 2005 during the 
heightened state of ``orange'' for public transportation. This amount 
does not include costs associated with additional efforts by New York, 
New Jersey and other systems to conduct random searches.
    Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to 
upgrade security. For example, New York's Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (NY-MTA) is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure 
the safety and security of its transportation systems in what are among 
the most extensive security measures taken by a public transportation 
system to date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000 
motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter rail facilities 
as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late last year 
with the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY-MTA plans to spend 
over $1.1 billion between now and 2009 on transit security.

                       SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS

    Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry 
has invested some $2 billion of its own funds for enhanced security 
measures, building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At 
the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to 
determine how we could build upon our existing industry security 
practices. This included a range of activities, which include research, 
best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and 
surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of 
how to create a more secure environment for our riders and the most 
critical security investment needs.
    Our latest survey of public transportation security identified 
enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to 
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to 
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs 
for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and 
development have been identified, bringing total additional transit 
security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
    Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for 
which they required additional Federal investment for security 
improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
  --Funding current and additional transit agency and local law 
        enforcement personnel
  --Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during 
        heightened alert levels
  --Training for security personnel
  --Joint transit/law enforcement training
  --Security planning activities
  --Security training for other transit personnel
    Priority examples of security capital investment improvements 
include:
  --Radio communications systems
  --Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
  --Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
  --Automated vehicle locator systems
  --Security fencing around facilities
    Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a 
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection 
devices.
    Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives 
for the transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit 
authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which 
would set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal 
funding assistance. Transit systems have already carried out many of 
the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and 
setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of 
these measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened 
alert is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with 
you in addressing these issues.
    As you know, in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security 
Appropriations bill (Public law 109-90), TSA can hire rail inspectors 
using an $8 million appropriation. We have concerns about this 
provision. We believe that funding for the inspectors would be better 
spent on things that would support the industry such as surveillance 
cameras, emergency communication and other systems rather than 
highlighting security issues without providing the necessary resources 
to address them. We look forward to working with you in addressing our 
concerns.

                   ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS

    Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened 
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively 
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to 
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs. In 
light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive Committee 
has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee 
addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our 
initiatives. This committee will also serve as the mass transit sector 
coordination council that will interface with DHS and other Federal 
agencies forming the government coordinating council.
    In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA 
supported two TCRP Panels that identified and initiated specific 
projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to 
Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation.
    In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental 
in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness 
tools and resources. Many of these resources were developed in close 
partnership with the FTA and we are presently focused on continuing 
that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also, 
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international 
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information 
on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise 
the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
    APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail, 
bus, and rail transit operations. Within the scope of these programs 
are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and 
Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's 
increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Management Audit 
Programs have been modified to place added attention to these critical 
elements.

                               CONCLUSION

    Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs 
post 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public 
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public 
transportation industry has made great strides in transit security 
improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. Therefore, we 
respectfully urge Congress to provide at least $560 million in the 
fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill 
for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue to 
address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs. 
Funding at this level annually would also allow for dramatic 
improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year 
period. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the 
Department of Homeland Security so that DHS can in turn provide that 
amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards program which 
includes participation of our Federal partners to assist with the 
development of transit security standards and practices consistent with 
what we have already seen through the FTA. In addition, we respectfully 
urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
    We have also found that investment in public transit security 
programs, resources and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in 
preparation and response to natural disasters as well. We look forward 
to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department 
of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We 
again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony 
on these critical issues and look forward to working with you on safety 
and security issues.
                                 ______
                                 

   Prepared Statement of the International Association for Emergency 
                                Managers

    Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of 
the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me this opportunity to provide 
testimony on the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    I am Michael D. Selves. I am currently the Emergency Management and 
Homeland Security Director for Johnson County, Kansas. Johnson County 
constitutes the Southwest suburbs of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area 
and, with a population of approximately a half million, is the most 
populous county in Kansas. I currently serve as the First Vice 
President of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) 
and am providing this testimony on their behalf. I am also a Certified 
Emergency Manager (CEM), and have served IAEM over the past 5 years as 
chair of the Government Affairs Committee. For the past 11 years I have 
been an active participant in the National Association of Counties, 
chairing their Subcommittee on Emergency Management, as a charter 
member of their Homeland Security Task Force as well as serving 2 years 
on their Board of Directors. I was appointed by Department of Homeland 
Security Secretary Ridge to his task force on State and local Homeland 
Security funding.
    The International Association of Emergency Managers has over 2,700 
members including emergency management professionals at the State and 
local government levels, the military, private business and the 
nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of 
our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the 
crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the 
local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and 
recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our 
members include emergency managers from large urban areas as well as 
rural counties.
    Hurricane Katrina has unequivocally demonstrated the need for 
strong emergency management programs at the Federal State and local 
levels. As emergency management professionals, we know the only way 
plans, preparations and equipment can be brought to bear in a disaster 
is through the planning efforts--of people . . . people whose job it is 
to bring all elements of a community together to make the plans work 
and who will be there when the time comes to implement those plans. For 
this reason, we are limiting our statement to one single critical 
issue: We respectfully request your assistance in increasing the 
funding for the Emergency Management Program Grant (EMPG).
Emergency Management Performance Grant
  --Request the $13,100,000 funding cut be rejected and the amount 
        increased to $256 million to begin addressing the shortfall.
  --Request that EMPG funding be maintained in a separate account as in 
        the fiscal year 2006 Congressional action and not combined with 
        other grant programs.
    Increase funding for EMPG.--Appropriations Committee report 
language referred to the program as ``the backbone of the Nation's 
emergency management system.'' In order to maintain this system and 
build the capacity required to meet the greatly increasing demands, 
additional investment is needed.
    However, the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2007 
proposes to reduce the funding from the $183,100,000 appropriated in 
fiscal year 2006 to $170,000,000. According to a biennial study 
conducted by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in 
2004 there is a shortfall of $260 million. We respectfully request that 
EMPG be increased $86 million over the fiscal year 2007 request for a 
total of $256,000,000 to begin addressing this shortfall.
    Maintain EMPG as a separate account.--We also urge you to continue 
to maintain EMPG as a separate account. The President's budget includes 
this program in the ``State and Local'' account with a number of other 
grant programs. EMPG is different from the other programs in this 
account. EMPG has existed for over 50 years and supports all hazards 
emergency management, including terrorism. In addition, it is a 
performance based continuing program with deliverables and requirements 
that must be met in order to receive funding the next year.
    EMPG is critically important.--We believe it is the single most 
effective use of Federal funds in providing emergency management 
capacity to State and local governments. No other source of homeland 
security funding is based on a consensus building process determining 
outcomes and specific deliverables backstopped by a quarterly 
accountability process. In fact, we feel this program would more 
accurately be described by the name Emergency Management Assistance 
(EMA) because of the unique requirements for deliverables and 
accountability it imposes--unique among all other homeland security 
sources of financial assistance.
    In addition, this unique program has never experienced ``backlogs'' 
of unspent funds because it is built on the experience and refinement 
of over 5 decades of proven effectiveness and efficiency. EMPG 
assistance requires a 50 percent State or local match, thus creating 
the much-needed ``buy-in'' not present in many other grant programs. 
Actually, the ``buy-in'' in this program is significantly greater due 
to the fact that currently many local jurisdictions are receiving 20 
percent or less. In addition many local jurisdictions receive no 
funding at all because of shortage of funds.
    Examples of the critical benefits of EMPG are the following:
  --This program provides funding for the emergency managers who 
        perform the role of the ``honest broker'' at the State and 
        local level and who establish the emergency management 
        framework for preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation.
  --EMPG funding provides the people who are legally responsible for 
        creating a ``culture of preparedness'' at the State and local 
        level.
  --EMPG funding also provides many of the personnel who can be 
        deployed across State lines to assist other States in case of 
        disaster through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
        (EMAC). During the 2005 response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
        65, 919 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets 
        were deployed from 48 States, the District of Columbia, the 
        Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Over 2100 missions were 
        performed.
  --EMPG funding has assumed a greater importance in light of recent 
        catastrophic events and the responses to those events. For 
        example, the President and the Department of Homeland Security 
        (DHS) have tasked State and local government emergency managers 
        with the responsibility to review their Emergency Operations 
        Plans regarding the issue of evacuation.
  --EMPG supports the people who have had the added responsibility of 
        administering homeland security funding programs and additional 
        planning efforts since 2001. While we agree the National Plan 
        Review is a vitally important project, floods, tornadoes and 
        other disasters simply haven't stopped happening.
    Without more funding and people we can't reach the level of 
preparedness our Nation deserves and our citizens demand.
    The recent White House report on the response to the Hurricane 
Katrina contains 125 recommendations. A significant number of these 
recommendations are ``top-down'' initiatives which require the 
collaboration and coordination efforts of State and local emergency 
managers in order to be fully implemented. We also know that genuine 
solutions to broad based issues like emergency management can only 
succeed if they recognize the primary importance of State and local 
governments.
    One way to sum things up is to acknowledge that beautiful plans 
written without the input and agreement of key stakeholders on roles 
and responsibilities will gather dust on shelves. A plan that works and 
has broad based buy in may be ugly and patched, but it lives, breathes 
and works, just like the people who implement it in a disaster.
    EMPG provides people who build partnerships.--The single most 
critically important thing EMPG funding provides is emergency 
management personnel at the State and local level. People are the most 
important investment this program makes because without them nothing 
else works. Emergency Management is a people process. I would like to 
point to my own jurisdiction--Johnson County, Kansas--as an example.
    Even before Katrina, we were engaged in the process of evaluating 
and revising our local emergency operations plan. I can tell you that 
this plan truly has broad buy in and acceptance within our 
jurisdiction. This happened because 16 subcommittees involving more 
than 120 people for 8 months of effort developed the 16 annexes of our 
plan. Because of the extensively and intensively people-based approach 
of this process, all of our officials--from our elected local 
leadership and senior management to front-line first responders--know 
and accept their roles and responsibilities. This would not have 
happened without EMPG funding providing the personnel in my office to 
facilitate this process. And the end result is very important. If we 
shake hands before the disaster, we won't have to point fingers 
afterwards.
    Emergency Management personnel at the State and local level have 
long involved private enterprise and faith-based groups in their 
inclusive, all-hazards planning process. For example, many of the State 
and local governments that hosted Katrina survivors fully integrated 
private and faith based organizations in their reception planning. 
These organizations' contributions ranged from providing critically 
needed supplies to serving as counselors and community emissaries for 
potential new residents of our communities.
    In conclusion, we believe this program must be maintained and 
sustained at a level which ensures that we continue to have a strong, 
truly national, system of emergency management in America. I sincerely 
thank you for this opportunity to express our deep concerns.
                                 ______
                                 

        Prepared Statement of the National Border Patrol Council

    The National Border Patrol Council thanks the Subcommittee for the 
opportunity to present the views and concerns of the 10,500 front-line 
Border Patrol employees that it represents regarding the resources 
necessary to provide effective homeland security now and in the future. 
Initially, it is important to recognize that there are numerous aspects 
of homeland security, and each of them must receive adequate funding 
and support in order for the overall program to function properly. 
Deficiencies in any part(s) of the system will weaken the entire 
structure, enabling terrorists and other criminals to exploit these 
vulnerabilities. Thus, it is imperative that all of these matters are 
addressed concurrently. Beyond the obvious need to substantially 
increase the number of personnel in all of the Department of Homeland 
Security's programs, there is an equally pressing need to enhance the 
infrastructure that supports these programs.
    It is beyond dispute that our borders are out of control. Millions 
of people cross them illegally every year, and only a small percentage 
are apprehended. While most of these people are merely seeking to 
improve their economic lot in life, a small but significant percentage 
of them are criminals who take advantage of our open borders, and a few 
terrorists undoubtedly do the same. In order to restore a semblance of 
order to this chaotic situation, the root cause of illegal immigration 
needs to be addressed by turning off the employment magnet that lures 
impoverished people to our country. This will require a significant 
revision in the existing statutes so that employers are able to easily 
determine who has a right to work in this country and are discouraged 
from ignoring or disobeying the law through the certain imposition of 
tough penalties. A single, counterfeit-proof document must serve as the 
foundation of this approach. In order enforce this new law, substantial 
additional resources will need to be allocated. At a minimum, 10,000 
criminal investigators should be added for this purpose.
    Even though the adoption of the foregoing measures would eliminate 
most illegal border crossings by people seeking employment, it would do 
nothing to diminish the flow of criminals and contraband. Stopping this 
illicit activity will require a sophisticated network of detection 
devices coupled with substantial increases in Border Patrol agents to 
respond to such intrusions and apprehend the violators. The additional 
1,500 agents requested by the Administration for the upcoming fiscal 
year is entirely inadequate for this purpose, and should be increased 
to 2,500. Thereafter, the size of the Border Patrol should be increased 
by at least the same amount every year until a total of at least 25,000 
agents are deployed.
    The number of inspections personnel at the Ports of Entry also 
needs to be increased significantly to allow for a more thorough 
inspection process without disrupting the flow of legitimate traffic. 
This will require an expansion of the existing facilities in some 
locations, and the building of additional facilities in areas where 
that is impractical. Moreover, the failed ``One Face at the Border'' 
initiative needs to be discarded in favor of a system that fosters 
specialization in each of the complex areas of immigration, customs, 
and agriculture laws.
    The number of detention beds and personnel to guard detainees also 
need to be augmented significantly. The promise of ``catch and return'' 
is meaningless unless it can be backed up by sufficient resources.
    In order to adequately patrol the thousands of miles of coastal 
areas and other waterways along the boundaries of the United States, 
the Coast Guard also needs substantial increases in personnel.
    The number of Federal Air Marshals has been allowed to dwindle to 
dangerously low levels. A significant increase in the ranks of these 
employees is also critical to efforts to bolster homeland security.
    It is important that the occupations supporting the foregoing 
programs also be increased commensurately. Far too often, these 
important resources are neglected when the primary occupations are 
augmented, resulting in needless inefficiencies.
    The addition of significant numbers of new employees will present 
many challenges. First and foremost, it will be necessary to make these 
occupations more attractive in order to recruit and retain sufficient 
numbers of highly-qualified personnel. Law enforcement agencies 
throughout the country are currently experiencing difficulties meeting 
their recruitment goals, and many of them are finding it necessary to 
increase salaries and benefits to remain competitive.\1\ The Border 
Patrol just raised its entry level age from 37 to 40, reflecting the 
difficulties it is facing in attracting a sufficient number of 
qualified recruits. In many areas of the country, the pay and benefits 
of Federal law enforcement agents already lag behind that of their 
State and local law counterparts. In order to become more competitive 
in this job market, the Federal Government needs to upgrade its pay and 
benefits, and take other steps to ensure that these jobs are deemed 
desirable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Police Finding It Hard to Fill Jobs; Forces Use Perks And 
Alter Standards,'' The Washington Post, March 27, 2006, page A-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The pay of many of the Department of Homeland Security's 
occupations needs to be raised substantially. This includes, but is not 
limited to, Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection 
Officers, Immigration Enforcement Agents, and Law Enforcement 
Communications Assistants. Moreover, the demoralizing practice of 
requiring many of the Department's law enforcement employees to work 
long hours of overtime without any compensation needs to be remedied by 
placing all employees under the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act. Also, all of the Department's law enforcement officers need to be 
afforded law enforcement retirement coverage.
    The pay-for-performance plan that is being implemented throughout 
DHS must be discarded in favor of a fair and predictable pay system. 
The pay of dedicated employees should not be left to the whim and mercy 
of arbitrary and capricious supervisors, many of whom are ordered to 
withhold pay increases in order to offset budgetary shortfalls in other 
areas.
    Additionally, the labor-management relations provisions of the 
Homeland Security Act must be repealed. These draconian measures serve 
no legitimate purpose, and will in fact deter employees from exposing 
fraud, waste or corruption. Because they institutionalize the unfair 
treatment of employees, they will also discourage the best and the 
brightest from serving in the Department.
    Although all Federal agencies have the authority to pay generous 
recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances, the 
Department of Homeland Security rarely exercises it because little or 
no money is budgeted for that purpose. This unwise practice needs to be 
remedied. Similarly, the Department needs additional money for the 
purpose of funding personnel relocations. Themovement of personnel from 
one location to another is essential to the success of the 
organization.
    Counter-productive enforcement schemes such as the Border Patrol's 
``strategy of deterrence'' need to be abandoned in favor of effective 
strategies. The notion that criminals and terrorists will be dissuaded 
from crossing the borders illegally because Border Patrol agents are 
positioned at quarter-mile fixed intervals along the border is absurd.
    Surveillance technology can be a useful enforcement tool, 
especially in detecting violators who are attempting to illegally cross 
our borders. The temptation to rely upon such devices to replace 
trained law enforcement officers needs to be resisted, however. Even 
the most sophisticated of these devices is incapable of apprehending a 
single violator. At best, most of these devices are only capable of 
providing snapshot views of intrusions, and their utility is thus quite 
limited. The high cost of complex devices such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles renders them less cost-effective than manned aircraft such as 
helicopters.
    The Department needs to provide all of its officers with instant 
access to databases that allow them to quickly determine if a person is 
wanted for the commission of a crime or suspicion of terrorist 
activities. Disturbingly, almost none of the Department's vehicles have 
portable computers.
    Many of the Border Patrol's vehicles are long overdue for 
replacement. It is senseless to spend large amounts of money repairing 
vehicles that continually break down because of their age and the wear 
and tear of law enforcement use.
    Numerous DHS employees are wearing body armor that is not suited 
for the types of dangers that they face and the environment in which 
they operate. Moreover, the weapons issued to these employees are no 
match for those utilized by the criminals that they face.
    The communications system utilized by many of the Department's 
employees is antiquated and inadequate. There are numerous areas where 
employees routinely operate without the ability to communicate with 
each other because the radio network does not provide coverage. This 
hazardous situation needs to be remedied.
    Many employees do not have hand-held global positioning system 
devices to assist them in navigating around the vast areas that they 
are responsible for patrolling. Moreover, the supply of night vision 
equipment is inadequate, and much of it is outdated.
    Hiring large numbers of employees will require an expansion of the 
existing training facilities. The small size and deplorable condition 
of the Border Patrol's facilities in Artesia, New Mexico are cause for 
particular concern. The infrastructure of that community cannot support 
an operation of the magnitude needed to properly train several thousand 
agents every year, and serious consideration needs to be given to 
finding a new location that is more suited to this purpose.
    As significant numbers of additional personnel are added to all 
parts of the country, it is important to plan ahead and ensure that the 
facilities in those locations are large enough to ensure that the 
operations run efficiently.
    Although most of the infrastructure needs identified herein can 
easily be met through proper planning, the chronic deficiencies in 
these areas demand an approach that incorporates them into the hiring 
process. A funding formula that factors all of these needs into the 
cost of a full career must be developed, adjusted from time to time, 
and followed.
    While the expense of providing effective homeland security may seem 
steep at first glance, it pales in comparison to the cost of failing to 
do so. The investment in the infrastructure of America's homeland 
security must begin now. Further delays will leave our Nation 
needlessly vulnerable to further attacks by those who want to destroy 
us.
                                 ______
                                 

  Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association

Introduction
    Thank you Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished 
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you 
with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) fiscal year 2007 budget. I am Bruce Baughman, the President of 
the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the 
Alabama Emergency Management Agency. In my statement, I am representing 
the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are 
the State emergency management directors in the States, the U.S. 
territories, and the District of Columbia. NEMA's members are 
responsible to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland 
security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural, 
man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.
    As you consider the budget for fiscal year 2007, emergency 
management in our country has received greater attention as a result of 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Though, funding has not followed 
from the Federal Government to assist in meeting the needs for all-
hazards emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation 
activities. Over the past year, our Nation's emergency management 
system has been tested by the extensive natural disasters that we have 
faced. In all, there were 48 major disaster declarations, 68 emergency 
declarations, and 39 fire management assistance declarations. Every 
single State was impacted by one of these declarations, including the 
District of Columbia, and all but two of the U.S. territories. 48 
States were impacted enough by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to warrant 
declarations for Federal assistance, whether the States were disaster 
areas or the States took in significant numbers of evacuees. States 
have been mandated to complete comprehensive reviews of evacuation 
plans and other emergency plans with no Federal support. At the same 
time, emergency management continues to prepare for the threat of 
terrorism with new requirements coming from the Federal Government such 
as updating State plans to reflect the National Response Plan (NRP), 
training emergency responders on the new National Incident Management 
System (NIMS), and implementing the National Preparedness Goal mandated 
by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on National 
Preparedness with no additional Federal financial assistance to meet 
Federal mandates. The multi-hazards emergency management system 
continues to be the means to practice and exercise for devastating acts 
of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the Nation for 
hurricanes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, and floods. We 
respectfully ask for your Committee to consider the role of emergency 
management as you address the fiscal year 2007 appropriations and ask 
for your serious consideration for Federal support for the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) to build State and local 
emergency management capacity.
    The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical 
support to State and local emergency management programs through actual 
dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to 
address three critical issues regarding the proposed Federal budget for 
Department of Homeland Security:
  --Extreme concern for proposed cuts to the Emergency Management 
        Performance Grant (EMPG) program while requirements increase 
        for State and local governments;
  --The need for Federal support for the Emergency Management 
        Assistance Compact (EMAC); and
  --Concerns related to the status of reorganizations at the Department 
        of Homeland Security.

              EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING

EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness/Readiness
    Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every State 
must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the 
capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist 
State and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness 
activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when our 
country is recovering from one of the largest natural disasters and 
making strides to improve the Nation's emergency preparedness/
readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be cut by $13.1 
million. EMPG is the backbone of the Nation's all-hazards emergency 
management system as the only source of direct Federal funding to State 
and local governments for emergency management capacity building. EMPG 
is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at both the 
State and local levels. EMPG is primarily used to assist States in 
maintaining personnel for State and local emergency management 
programs, and consequently the Nation's emergency response system. EMPG 
is being used to help States create and update plans for receiving and 
distribution plans for commodities and ice after a disaster, debris 
removal plans, and plans for receiving or evacuating people.
    The State and local government partnership with the Federal 
Government to ensure preparedness dates back to the civil defense era, 
yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on 
State and local governments. With the recent expanded focus on 
terrorism and the increased demands of the Federal Government to assist 
in implementation of Federal initiatives like the NRP, the NIMS, and 
HSPD8, EMPG becomes more important as a means to ensure State and local 
involvement and compliance with new systems.
    NEMA completed a Quick Response Survey in March 2006 to assess the 
impacts of the proposed cut to the EMPG program. Of the 42 States 
responding, 90 percent of the States will have to cut staff ranging 
from one person to more than 50 positions. If the cut is included in 
the budget: 20 States will have to cut between 1-10 positions; 10 
States will have to cut between 11-30 positions; 4 will have to cut 
between 31-50 positions; and 4 will have to cut more than 50 positions. 
In the same Quick Response Survey, 83 percent of responding States 
report that the majority of EMPG funds go to local grants, so the 
impact of the cut would be greatest on local governments.
State and Local Match
    EMPG is the only program in the Preparedness Account within the 
Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and 
local level. The match is evidence of the critical partnership of State 
and local governments to address the urgent national security need for 
emergency planning for all disasters regardless of the cause. EMPG 
requires a match of 50 percent from the State or local governments. 
According to the NEMA 2004 Biennial Report, budgets for State emergency 
management agencies nationally were reduced by an average of 23 percent 
in fiscal year 2004, yet at the same time States were continuing to 
over match the Federal Government's commitment to national security 
protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal year 2004, which is a 
80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution.
EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
    During last year's hurricane season, the interdependencies of the 
Nation's emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the 
success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). 
EMAC enabled 48 States, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, 
and Puerto Rico to provide assistance in the form of more than 2,100 
missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000 
civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the 
impacted States. The estimated costs of these missions may exceed $829 
million and the missions and requests for aid are continuing. Of the 
personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,448 were National Guard 
personnel and 19,431 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to 
provide assistance were supported by the EMPG program. The nature of 
the Nation's mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all States to 
have appropriate capabilities for all disasters and EMPG allows States 
and local governments to build this capability both for their own use 
and to share in through EMAC. Additional resources are needed to build 
emergency response capabilities on a national basis and to ensure the 
system can handle the demands of natural disasters including 
catastrophic events and other emergencies no matter where they occur.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
    While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after 10 
years of straight-lined funding, the program still needs significant 
investment to accomplish its goals. The final fiscal year 2006 DHS 
conference report provided an additional $5 million for the program, 
but after the across the board cut, the program was left with $183.1 
million. We appreciate all of the efforts of members of Congress and 
the Administration to allow for these increases. The current cut comes 
at a time when emergency management needs to address shortfalls and new 
threats. EMPG needs adequate and predictable resources in order to 
sustain the increased demand for preparedness/readiness. Continued 
funding increases are necessary to make up for a decade of degradation 
of funding and increased State and local commitments because funding 
has not kept pace with inflation or with increasing demand. The 
increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls estimated 
in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2004 to be over $264 million for all 50 
States. The current shortfall is $260, because of a $3.1 million 
increase in fiscal year 2006.
    The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on 
the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that 
responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The 
proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $10 million. These 
cuts mean that emergency management would be saddled with increased 
mandates, while coping with decreases to an already modest budget. In 
budget consideration for fiscal year 2003, 2004, and 2006, Congress 
affirmed the importance of EMPG in appropriations bills in language 
addressing the significance of the program and increased the levels of 
funding for the program twice. Prior to these modest increases, the 
program had been straight lined for over a decade and even with these 
increases the program's growth rate has not kept pace with inflation 
over the last 15 years. Additionally, Congress affirmed the intent of 
the program as all-hazards and dedicated to supporting personnel during 
consideration of the fiscal year 2006 budget. NEMA is appreciative of 
Congress' recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we 
respectfully ask that Congress aggressively address the programs 
shortfalls with an additional $87 million in funding for EMPG for 
fiscal year 2007, for a total of $270 million.
    Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with 
these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006 
Quick Response Survey found that if States were to each receive an 
additional $1 million in EMPG funding for fiscal year 2007, States 
would use the following percentages for the following activities: 88 
percent of States responding would update plans including evacuation, 
sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters and others; 83 
percent would provide more training opportunities for State and local 
emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide more 
preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct 
more State and local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for 
State and local NIMS compliance.
    EMPG's modest Federal increases in helped the program grow, but 
shortfalls continue to force an unequal burden on State and local 
governments. States are continuing to increase their out of pocket 
costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for local programs. 
The shortfall means that many communities that would like to implement 
a full-time, professional emergency management capability cannot do so 
because of shortfalls in Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily 
used as a pass-through program for local governments, so the shortfall 
affects our smallest localities that are often those most in need of 
emergency preparedness planning. Currently, States and local 
governments are over matching the Federal Government's commitment to 
national security protection through EMPG by $96 million according to 
the 2004 NEMA Biennial Report.
Accountability Measures
    Many States have various accountability measures in place to track 
the use of EMPG funding and NEMA supports the development of a national 
system that quantifies the uses of the funding. In fact, NEMA through 
the National Homeland Security Consortium is working closely with the 
new Preparedness Directorate at DHS to work collaboratively on 
performance metrics for HSPD-8 and performance metrics for the Response 
Capabilities in the TCL. The DHS effort will help to develop a national 
picture of EMPG metrics as well. At the same time, States already have 
measures in place at the State level to track the use of EMPG funding 
in their States. Some of the measures in place reported in the 2006 
Quick Response Survey include: 95 percent of responding States have 
reporting requirements; 76 percent of States responding require the 
development of State-wide goals that must be met with the funds; 61 
percent of the States responding call for local governments to 
demonstrate performance against goals that are written by local 
jurisdictions; 42 percent of responding States implement corrective 
action plans if goals are not met with funding; and 45 percent of 
States tie program funding to meeting the standards in place with the 
voluntary Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) for State 
and local emergency management agencies.
EMPG as a Separate Account
    The President's Budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 suggests 
combining the EMPG account with the Citizen Corp account to form a 
formula-based grant account. NEMA strongly disagrees with this 
approach, as EMPG must be maintained as a separate line item account as 
Congress has affirmed since fiscal year 2003. Congress agreed at that 
time that the program account needed to be visible and easy to find in 
the budget because of the importance of the program. The separate 
account is critical because the program is the only all-hazards grant 
program being administered through the Grants and Training Office to 
emergency management agencies. Further, the separate account allows for 
EMPG to be tracked and has raised visibility on the importance of the 
program among members of Congress. Additionally, we suggest that 
Congress maintain the method of distribution for EMPG, similar to the 
language in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations, however continuing to 
allocate the funding through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs) 
continues to cause delays in some States. NEMA supports language that 
would expressedly restore the grants allocation to State emergency 
management agencies, to facilitate the process of getting funding to 
emergency management agencies at the State and local level faster.
All-Hazards Approach
    The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring 
national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate 
numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards 
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse. 
Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for 
adequate emergency management needs from the ground up. Instead of 
making significant investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must 
maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our 
response system for all disasters regardless of cause--EMPG. We 
strongly ask for Congress to ensure predictable and adequate funding 
levels for the EMPG in fiscal year 2007.

          BUIDING OUR NATION'S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC

    The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest 
deployment of interstate mutual aid in the Nation's history through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned 
previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines 
from all member States to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Florida, and Texas. EMAC Operations in Louisiana are still underway. 
The process enabled National Guard, search and rescue teams, incident 
management teams, emergency operations center support, building 
inspectors, and law enforcement personnel to immediately assist the 
requesting States in need of support. The National Guard even chose to 
continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the 
organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking 
abilities EMAC provides.
    EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor 
Lawton Chiles. The system was developed through the members States of 
the Southern Governors' Association to establish mechanisms to enable 
mutual aid among member sates in emergency situations. The Southern 
Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by 
participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs 
nationwide applicability by the National Governors' Association and 
FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (Public Law 104-321). Currently 49 
States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of 
Columbia are members of EMAC. Hawaii is currently considering 
legislation to become a party to the compact during their current 
legislative session. EMAC requires member States to have an 
implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC 
Operations Manual. EMAC takes care of issues such as reimbursement, 
liability protections, and workers' compensation issues.
    Prior to the historic 2005 deployments, EMAC's largest previous 
deployment was during the 2004 Hurricane season in Florida, Alabama, 
and West Virginia, which enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the 
form of more than $15 million in human, military, and equipment assets 
and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days 
of continuous response operations. NEMA utilized the grant funds to 
work with an independent consulting company to complete a 2004 After 
Action Report, that identified areas for continuous improvement for the 
EMAC systems and EMAC has worked to draft a strategic plan to implement 
the lessons learned into practice. NEMA is currently working to 
complete an After-Action Report on the 2005 season, with a meeting of 
stakeholders, assisting States, requesting States, and others later 
this month. The report is expected to be complete by September 2006 and 
the strategic plan will be amended to reflect new lessons learned. The 
support of EMAC is critical to helping offset the costs of disasters 
and maintaining the need for a massive Federal workforce for response 
to catastrophic disasters. The beauty of EMAC is that it provides 
assistance to those in need, but allows others to assist and learn from 
disasters in other States.
    In order to meet the ever-growing need for and reliance on 
interstate mutual aid, EMAC is seeking $4 Million over 3 years to 
continue to build EMAC capabilities. This funding will allow EMAC to 
focus on the implementation of lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita such as Training and Education, Resource Typing and 
Credentialing, and Information and Resource Management. Since EMAC's 
inception in 1993, EMAC was funded by member States until 2003. In 
2003, FEMA funded EMAC with a 3 year grant of $2 Million. This funding 
expires in November 2006. This funding has been used for administrative 
support of EMAC, development of the EMAC Operations system whereby all 
resources deployed under the Compact are tracked from when it is 
requested until reimbursement is paid, and the 2004 and 2005 after 
action reports.

                      SECOND STAGE REVIEW AND FEMA

    As the Congress looks at the lessons learned and recommendations 
for reform included in reports following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
we ask that NEMA's members be consulted regarding further changes to 
the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Most importantly, 
consideration needs to also be given to the connectivity between FEMA 
and the Preparedness Directorate within DHS, since all FEMA's 
preparedness functions were moved out into this new Directorate. When 
the Second Stage Review proposal was announced, NEMA articulated grave 
concern in a July 27, 2005 letter to the Department of Homeland 
Security regarding the Second Stage Review (2SR) creating a 
Preparedness Directorate that would be primarily focused on terrorism. 
The letter to Congress highlighted the lack of the Department's focus 
on natural-hazards preparedness and the inability to connect response 
and recovery operations to preparedness functions, as any unnecessary 
separation of these functions could result in a disjointed response and 
adversely impact the effectiveness of Departmental operations. 
Nevertheless, we understand that the 2SR is moving ahead and look 
forward to finding ways to connect the new Preparedness Directorate 
with FEMA. We fear that if those interrelationships are not made the 
result could mean that many State and local governments will be meeting 
FEMA for the first time when as disaster occurs in their State because 
of the separation of functions. We hope to work with Congress to ensure 
linkages of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation functions 
in the all-hazards approach to emergency management.
    NEMA also calls on Congress to consider the needs of the FEMA in 
this year's budget process, to restore the agencies ability to respond 
to all disasters. Our Nation is same point as the Nation was after 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, questioning organizational structures, 
leadership, the roles of Federal, State, and local government, funding 
for FEMA and emergency management and even citizen preparedness. No 
Federal agency is more qualified structurally and statutorily than FEMA 
to help our Nation respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA has the 
direct relationships with State and local governments because of the 
grant programs and the disaster relief programs authorized through the 
Stafford Act. FEMA is the only Federal agency authorized under the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (42 U.S.C. 
5121 et seq.) to carry out duties on behalf of the President. The 1978 
Reorganization Plan 3, which created FEMA, also gives FEMA the 
responsibility for all of the functions of emergency preparedness and 
response. The plan States:
    ``This reorganization rests on several fundamental principles. 
First, Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to 
major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official 
responsible to the President and given attention by other officials at 
the highest levels. The new agency would be in this position.''
    FEMA is and should be the agency of choice to coordinate the 
functions of the Federal Government in response to disasters, 
regardless of their cause.
    FEMA has the ability to tap into the emergency responder community 
to build relationships through training and exercises. FEMA also has 
the skills to work cooperatively with State and local elected and 
appointed officials to work towards comprehensive recovery. FEMA has 
the coordinating function in the Federal Government and should have the 
ability to tap all the resources at the Federal level to respond to a 
disaster. However, all these areas need to be strengthened with an all-
hazards focus to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments are 
building relationships before a disaster and understand how to work 
together cohesively. FEMA also needs financial support to maintain and 
build their capacity.
    The time to stop the cycle of degradation of emergency management 
functions by reorganization after reorganization is now and we must 
systematically improve our Nation's emergency response system through 
verified lessons learned and not reactionary decisions. We hope that 
Congress will partner with NEMA as they move forward to consider 
changes to DHS organizational functions and the role of FEMA.

                               CONCLUSION

    The last year has proved our Nation's continuous vulnerability 
against all-hazards of many sizes. We will be faced with recovery on 
the Gulf Coast for many years to come and we cannot ignore the 
predictions for the coming Hurricane season. We must continue to build 
national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. In this 
year's appropriations process Congress will make critical decisions 
that shape the future of emergency management in this country. As you 
begin your consideration, we ask you to recognize the importance of 
adequately funding the EMPG program in building capacity through people 
at the State and local level for all disasters. I thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your 
partnership.


       LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
American:
    Psychological Association, Prepared Statement of.............   259
    Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of.....   266

Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
    Questions Submitted by.......................................    73
    Statement of.................................................     5

Chertoff, Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security....     1
    Prepared Statement of........................................    12
    Statement of.................................................     8
Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi, Questions 
  Submitted by...................................................    66

Gregg, Senator Judd, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire:
    Opening Statement of.........................................     1
    Questions Submitted by.......................................    55

International Association for Emergency Managers, Prepared 
  Statement of...................................................   270

Mikulski, Senator Barbara A., U.S. Senator From Maryland, 
  Prepared Statement of..........................................    37

National:
    Border Patrol Council, Prepared Statement of.................   272
    Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of......   274

Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania, Questions 
  Submitted by...................................................    71


                             SUBJECT INDEX

                              ----------                              

                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                                                   Page
Additional:
    Committee Questions..........................................    55
    Funds for Preparedness and FEMA..............................    12
Administration Plans for Dubai Ports World to Take Control of 
  Significant Operations at Six U.S. Ports.......................   255
Advanced Training Center.........................................   117
Agrodefense......................................................    66
Air Cargo........................................................   152
    Security.....................................................   235
All-State Minimum................................................   253
Arbitration Decision on the Fiscal Year 2005 Awards..............   119
Armored Vehicles.................................................   179
Avian Bird Flu...................................................   250
Aviation Security Passenger Fees.................................    61
BRAC Report......................................................    93
Border:
    Crossing Card--the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
      (WHTI) Implementation......................................   245
    Infrastructure Supplemental..................................    56
    Patrol Duties................................................   120
Bordersafe.......................................................   236
Breached Bond....................................................   121
Business Transformation:
    Office.......................................................    73
    Program......................................................   230
Campaign Protection..............................................   176
Canine Teams.....................................................   154
Cargo Container Security.........................................    71
Chemical:
    Detection....................................................   234
    Plant Security Legislation...................................53, 54
    Sector National Strategy.....................................    54
    Security.....................................................   205
Citizenship and Immigration Services.............................   230
    Initiatives..................................................   230
    Personnel....................................................   231
Civil Rights.....................................................    99
Classified Briefing on the Dubai Port Deal.......................    25
Coast Guard......................................................   157
    Headquarters Relocation......................................   158
    R&D..........................................................   238
Competitive Sourcing Personnel...................................    78
Container Security Initiative (CSI)..............................   111
Contract Oversight...............................................   128
Contracting out Report...........................................    78
Customer Service.................................................   128
Customs and Border Protection....................................   108
    Air and Marine...............................................   115
    And NCRC Mission.............................................   108
    Inspectors at our Ports......................................   111
    Presence at Airports.........................................   110
Cyberstorm.......................................................   184
Deepwater........................................................   157
    Recapitalization.............................................    67
Departmental Management..........................................    73
Derby Line.......................................................   247
Detailees to the:
    Department...................................................    80
    White House..................................................    78
Detentions.......................................................   122
    Of Animal Diseases...........................................   200
DHS:
    Active Duty:
        Fingerprint Vetting Policy...............................    41
        Military Fingerprint Vetting Policy......................    42
    Headquarters.................................................    77
    Organizational Structure and FEMA's Capabilities.............    46
    Port Security Approach.......................................     9
    Requested to Garner Administrative Support of the 
      Congressional Border Security Infrastructure Initiative....    25
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)........................65, 242
Drug Interdiction................................................   158
Dubai Ports......................................................    39
    Deal.........................................................    43
    World (DPW)..................................................   112
EDS..............................................................   144
Emergency Management Performance Grants.........................60, 183
    Program......................................................    70
Ending Catch and Release.........................................    55
Enforcement of Customs Laws......................................   109
Executive Sedan Service..........................................    75
Exercises......................................................190, 227
Exit.............................................................   101
Explosives Trace Portals.........................................   123
Federal:
    Agency Head Screening........................................   156
    Preparedness Coordinators....................................   187
FEMA.............................................................   206
    Contract Awards..............................................    71
    Funding Lapse..............................................223, 226
    Staffing.....................................................   225
Fire:
    Grants.......................................................   185
    Service Needs Assessment.....................................   200
First Responder Grants--Risk and Threat Factors..................    58
Fiscal:
    Accountability Mechanisms to Minimize Spending, Waste and 
      Fraud......................................................    30
    Year 2007 Budget Request.....................................    18
Grant Drawdown Rate..............................................   181
Guantanamo Facility..............................................   123
Homeland Security Budget and Anomalies...........................     6
How Often has DHS (Coast Guard) Exercised the Power to Suspend 
  Ships From Entering Into the Port Coming Into the United 
  States?........................................................    10
Hurricane:
    Contracts....................................................   226
    Katrina......................................................   249
    Pam Exercise.................................................   180
I Staff..........................................................    97
IDENT-IAFIS......................................................   101
Ice Contract With Kellogg, Brown and Root........................   120
Improve Maritime Security and Create Better Transportation 
  Security Systems to Move People and Cargo More Securely and 
  Efficiently....................................................    21
Improved Border Security.........................................     5
Improving Nationwide Catastrophic Planning.......................    58
Infrastructure Protection and Information Security...............   201
Inspections:
    At Air Ports of Entry........................................   113
    Of Arriving Saudis...........................................   109
Intensive Supervision Program Expansion..........................   123
Interoperability.................................................   186
    Grants.......................................................   186
I-91 Checkpoint..................................................   248
Katrina Oversight Board..........................................    31
Law Enforcement Support Center.................................122, 247
Length of Stay...................................................   121
Lessons Learned..................................................   224
Local CIS Ombudsman..............................................    93
MAXHR............................................................    77
Major Initiatives and Accomplishments............................     8
MANPADS..........................................................   233
Map Modernization................................................   226
Mass Evacuation..................................................   206
Military Immigrant Backlog.......................................    40
Morale Problems at DHS...........................................    98
MTSA Compliance Inspections......................................   175
National:
    Capital Air Defense Mission..................................   167
    Disasters....................................................   182
    Infrastructure Protection Plan...............................   201
    Preparedness:
        Goal.....................................................   180
        Integration Program......................................    62
    Special Security Events...............................175, 178, 203
Necessity of Senior Leadership Longevity and Potential 
  Inefficiencies Due to DHS Enormity.............................    45
Next Generation EDS..............................................   236
No-Fly List......................................................   143
Northern Border:
    And Border Patrol Agents.....................................   247
    Carryover Funds..............................................   118
Office of:
    General Counsel..............................................    92
    Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA)...............................   121
    Screening Coordination and Operations........................61, 92
Oil Spills.......................................................   172
Operation:
    Centers......................................................    94
    Safe Commerce................................................   157
Other Key Accomplishments........................................    16
Outbound Inspections.............................................   114
Ownership of Key Assets..........................................   201
Pandemic Influenza...............................................    57
Pass Cards.......................................................    34
    Technological Infrastructure.................................    27
Patrol Boats.....................................................   168
Perimeter Security...............................................   144
Personnel........................................................   230
Pilot Programs...................................................   147
Polar Icebreakers................................................   168
Port Security....................................................    29
    Allocations..................................................     9
    Automated Targeting Systems..................................    60
    Funding......................................................    34
Pre-Disaster Mitigation..........................................   207
Preparedness Directorate.........................................   180
Procurement Report...............................................    77
Protection Funding...............................................   179
R&D Funding....................................................238, 239
Rail Pilots......................................................   233
Recoveries.......................................................   144
Registered Traveler..............................................   151
Reported DHS Reservations About the Dubai Port Deal..............    24
Responding to Letters From Congress..............................   120
Response Boat Medium.............................................   170
Retooling of FEMA................................................   224
Risks and Threats................................................    66
Safer............................................................   185
Science and Technology...........................................   233
    Management...................................................    65
Secure Flight....................................................   151
Senior Leadership Travel Initiative..............................    93
Shipping Containers..............................................   113
Staffing..................................................129, 177, 201
    For Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) Act Grants..    60
State and Local First Responders.................................   254
Strategic Border Initiative......................................   103
Strengthening Maritime Security..................................    26
Supply Chain Security Specialists................................   118
Surge Capacity...................................................   155
Technical Assistance.............................................   189
Temporary:
    Protected Status.............................................   233
    Worker Program...............................................    49
Ten Print Capacity Overseas......................................   102
Transient Populations Accounting.................................   182
Transit Security Project.........................................   238
Transportation Security Administration...........................   123
    Hiring Freeze................................................    47
    Passenger Fee Increase.......................................    48
Travel...........................................................   179
Tucson Sector Checkpoints........................................   117
Tunnel Detection.................................................   235
Tunnels..........................................................   114
United States Secret Service.....................................   176
User Fee Reform Proposal.........................................   232
US VISIT.........................................................   101
    Exit Tracking Capability.....................................    57
Virgin Island Substation.........................................   120
Visa Waiver Program (WVP)........................................   101
Vulnerability Assessments........................................   204
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.............................   102
Workplace Injuries...............................................   176
Worksite Enforcement.............................................   121

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