    [Senate Hearing 109-305]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 109-305, Pt. 3

                                                            Senate Hearings

                                     Before the Committee on Appropriations

    _______________________________________________________________________

                                                              Department of

                                                          Homeland Security

                                                                Fiscal Year
                                                                       2007

                                             109th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

                                                                  H.R. 5441

    PART 3

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

      NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
           Department of Homeland Security, 2007 (H.R. 5441)--Part 3

                                                     S. Hrg. 109-305, Pt. 3

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                    before a

                              SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       on

                                   H.R. 5441

     AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
     FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 3

                        Department of Homeland Security
                           Nondepartmental Witnesses

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                                   index.html

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    26-479                      WASHINGTON : 2007
    _____________________________________________________________________________
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                                   __________
                          COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                      THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        TOM HARKIN, Iowa
    MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky            BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    CONRAD BURNS, Montana                HARRY REID, Nevada
    RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
    JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
    LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
    MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
                        J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
                  Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

              Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security

                      JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
    THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
    LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              HARRY REID, Nevada
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

                               Professional Staff
                                 Rebecca Davies
                                  Carol Cribbs
                                Shannon O'Keefe
                                 Nancy Perkins
                               Mark Van de Water
                           Charles Kieffer (Minority)
                            Chip Walgren (Minority)
                             Scott Nance (Minority)
                          Drenan E. Dudley (Minority)

                             Administrative Support

                                Christa Thompson

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                           Tuesday, February 28, 2006

                                                                       Page

    Department of Homeland Security..................................     1
    Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................   435

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2006

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Gregg, Allard, Byrd, Leahy, Mikulski,
    Kohl, and Murray.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY

                    opening statement of senator judd gregg

        Senator Gregg. We'll begin the hearing. I'm advised that
    Senator Byrd is on his way but he asked that we proceed and I
    appreciate Secretary Chertoff's participation in this hearing.
    This is obviously the subcommittee which has jurisdiction over
    the Department of Homeland Security, and the appropriations
    responsibility that goes with that. There's a lot to talk
    about; in fact, it's hard to know where to begin. But,
    obviously, the topic of the moment, and it's a very serious
    one, is the issue of ownership and management of American ports
    by the UAE and a company owned by Dubai Ports World (DPW), and
    the question of whether or not there's been adequate vetting of
    the potential that ownership may have for enhancing the threat
    to the ports.
        The initial representation of course from the
    administration was that it was adequately vetted. There is now
    a number of different views of that. As I understand it, in the
    initial vetting, the Department of Homeland Security raised
    issues and then, in addition, the Coast Guard, which is part of
    the Department, raised issues. The Coast Guard, issues went to
    the question of whether or not there were concerns about gaps
    in intelligence for DPW ownership and the fact that the Coast
    Guard didn't feel it could adequately assess those gaps. The
    language being in the report that the breadth of the
    intelligence gaps also infer potential unknown threats against
    large numbers of potential vulnerabilities and the intelligence
    gaps include but are not limited to the following major themes;
    operations it lists that; personnel, it list's that; and
    foreign influence, it lists that.
        So the Coast Guard appeared to have severe reservations,
    now whether they were specific to the issue of the Dubai
    ownership, DP World, or whether they were just generally
    concerns is not clear. However, they were represented as fairly
    significant.
        Today, however, the Coast Guard has put out a statement
    that says, and I'll quote it to give them fair representation,
    ``What is being quoted is an excerpt from a broader Coast Guard
    intelligence analysis that was performed earlier on, as part of
    its due diligence process. The excerpts made public earlier
    today, when taken out of context do not reflect the full
    classified analysis performed by the Coast Guard.'' That
    analysis concludes: ``That DP World acquisition of PNO in and
    of itself does not pose a significant threat to U.S. assets in
    continental United States ports.'' Upon subsequent and further
    review, the Coast Guard and the entire CFIUS panel believe that
    this transaction, when taking into account strong security
    assurances from DP World, does not compromise U.S. security.
        Now that appears to be the position of the Coast Guard
    today, which appears to be inconsistent with the excerpt, and
    they're explaining that that is an excerpt, in part, of an
    overall intelligence analysis. And it just, I think, leads to
    further confusion. Because I think there's a genuine concern,
    and its legitimate, that turning these ports over to an Arab/
    operated owned-state sponsored entity is an issue which
    deserves significant review, especially when the country in
    question, although definitely friendly and supportive, has had
    individuals from that country who have actually, according to
    the 9/11 attack, been participants in the event and, therefore
    clearly represent--those individuals clearly intended to do us
    harm. And, thus, I think it's very appropriate that we pursue a
    pause here and review further the security issues since there
    is confusion, it appears to me, within even the Coast Guard's
    position; and get an analysis which is unquestioned and factual
    which we can have confidence in. I understand that sort of an
    agreement has been reached with the leadership of the Senate,
    Senator Warner specifically, and I would be interested when the
    Secretary gives his opening statement, if he could address that
    issue specifically, because it is one of major concern.
        On a larger concern, or not a larger concern but a concern
    I have of equal significance, is the entire budget that was
    sent up here by the administration relative to Homeland
    Security. Homeland Security, as we know, has gone through a
    major restructuring and a period of assimilation as it has
    tried to get up and running. And let me begin by congratulating
    the Secretary, I'm not one of these folks who feels the
    Secretary has not done a good job. I think the Secretary has
    worked very hard to do a good job. And I believe that he has
    set out a system and he has done it from a systematic approach,
    and that's exactly the way we need to address the Department of
    Homeland Security. But that doesn't mean the job is done, as
    I'm sure the Secretary would be the first to acknowledge, and
    there are very definite gaps in the Homeland Security
    department, and the way it is delivering service and protecting
    us.
        The biggest gap I believe is the way it is viewed by this
    administration, to be very honest. I believe it is used a
    stepchild of national defense. I can't think of anything more
    significant to national defense than protecting our border and
    making sure that our Homeland is secure. And yet, time and time
    again we see budgets being sent up here which dramatically
    increase the core operation of the Defense Department
    independent of what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan, which
    is getting money outside of the budget process. And yet the
    Department of Homeland Security is being starved for funds in
    crucial areas and this year is no different. What happened is
    that there's a representation that the Department got an
    increase in funding. But that increase in funding is tied
    directly to getting a fee increase which the administration
    knows is a non starter. The chairman of the authorizing
    committee in the Senate, second ranking member of the
    Appropriations Committee, former Chairman of Appropriations
    Committee Ted Stevens has said it's a non starter and he proved
    it last year. So when the administration sends up a budget
    which assumes increase in operations on the border, which I
    totally agree with the commitment in that, the desire to that.
    In fact, last year, this committee unilaterally moved in that
    direction after the initial presentation from the
    administration was flat funding of border activity. This
    committee unilaterally, with Senator Byrd's support and
    leadership, changed the entire structure of the funding stream
    and put in 1,500 new agents when we had finished, approximately
    1,800 new beds for detention, and dramatically increased
    funding for Border Patrol and border enhancement activities; I
    thank the Secretary for his support of that. I suspect he would
    have supported it earlier if he hadn't maybe been stonewalled
    in the halls of the administration but the fact is, we had to
    do it unilaterally up here and then we got the support from the
    White House. But now, rather than continuing that effort
    although it's stated that it's being continued because the
    policies, as proposed, add another 1,500 agents and more beds,
    all of which needs to be done. But the actual substance behind
    those policies isn't there. There's no money behind those
    policies. This is a situation of showing a proposal and then
    hiding the funds. And so we end up with a budget that we've got
    a $1.6 billion hole in. Last year, the chairman of the full
    committee Senator Cochran in a very gracious act with the
    ranking member obviously Senator Byrd, increased the allocation
    of this committee by about $1.2 billion, I think, it was over
    what it would have been, simply to try to fill that hole. Well
    they don't have that flexibility this year. I asked,
    aggressively asked, this administration in the supplemental
    that they were going to send up for defense appropriations, did
    they consider having in that supplemental $1.2 billion of
    capital items to basically get the Coast Guard the planes they
    need, get the border patrol the cars they need, get the
    training facilities up to snuff in Artista, New Mexico so that
    we would be able to do the physical capital expenditures that
    are needed to have the border patrol be efficient and
    effective, and have the Coast Guard be efficient and effective.
    That seemed like a fundamental element of national defense to
    me. Yet the administration has stonewalled us on that. They've
    sent up a supplemental which doesn't have any money in it for
    national defense on the borders, for Homeland Security, but has
    a significant amount of dollars for Katrina, and a significant
    amount of dollars for Iraq, both of which I'm sure are
    necessary. But in the pecking order of national defense,
    protecting our borders is right up there with both those
    exercises.
        And so this committee is being put in an extremely
    difficult place by the White House's proposals on Homeland
    Security. We're being asked to fund an expansion of the Border
    Patrol which we are totally committed to and basically created,
    authored, and drove as a policy, but being told that the funds
    to do that are going to be illusory. It's a hollow budget and I
    can't understand it because I've watched the press conferences
    where the administration has said it's committed to border
    security and domestic defense. And yet this budget isn't going
    to get there. So that's a concern I have. On the operations
    side we've got lots of issues, whether we'll have time to get
    to them today, but let me just highlight a few. First, again
    congratulations to you Mr. Secretary for approaching this in a
    systematic way. That's the way it should be approached. But we
    still have huge operational dysfunctionality in this
    Department. It's not your fault, it's a function of the fact it
    was thrown together quickly. The agencies within this
    Department brought with them some systemic problems which
    haven't been resolved and created some problems by being thrown
    together that haven't been resolved. The most significant ones
    are computer technology capability across the department, and
    interfacing with other agencies, especially the US VISIT issue,
    which I still have deep reservations about whether that we're
    going to pull that off. But we've held hearings on it, so we
    won't pursue that here. I appreciate the fact that the
    Department is trying to stay on it, and stay aggressive on it.
    I especially appreciate the independent views that you're using
    to try to make sure it's done right.
        But other issues are equally effecting performance. The
    Katrina event was a horrific, embarrassing, and a terrible
    event for the people down there and our country as a whole. And
    the problem is not only the unintended consequences of the
    event, but that the Department has had to refocus so much
    energy on trying to straighten out the problems which were
    shown by Katrina. I genuinely believe that for a period here we
    moved away from national defenses as the primary goal of this
    Department to solving the Katrina problems, which we have to
    solve. But that's just showing that this functionality in the
    face of a major catastrophe that's not driven by terrorists
    doesn't maybe work that well.
        Second, we've got this whole issue which has not been
    resolved, of the relationship between Border and Customs and
    ICE. Everywhere I go I hear this and I always ask the question
    in a very vanilla way, how's it working? And the answer is um--
    well; it's not bluntly spoken but it's clearly between the
    lines, ``It's not working,'' from the people on the frontline.
    It can't afford not to work. This is too big an issue. Then we
    have the issue of just immigration policy itself, which is you
    know obviously something you don't have full control over but
    you have an impact on.
        So these are things that concern me, I wish it were a more
    pleasant story, because I have tremendous respect for you and
    your team. I think you've brought good people on, but the story
    is difficult right now to be kind. Hopefully you can shed some
    light on it, and give us a little more optimism. I'll yield to
    Senator Byrd for an opening statement, then we'll go to your
    statement, then we'll to do questions.

                      STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

        Senator Byrd. I share the chairman's concerns. I greatly
    admire this Chairman he's totally dedicated to the task. He's
    trying to make this function a success. He is chagrinned as he
    makes very clear, and I totally agree with him. This Department
    has been off and running for 3 years I believe. I don't know
    how well it's running, but I don't know what to do about this.
    Sometimes I feel like just throwing the books down and saying
    to hell with it. That certainly would be the wrong attitude.
    But we can't seem to get this thing going Mr. Secretary. You
    seem to know a great deal about the problem and about what is
    needed to fix it. And I have a feeling that you're highly
    dedicated as well. But I simply cannot understand why with all
    this money, all this effort, all this attention, and all this
    dedication that we on this panel have given to this agency, why
    it still is not functioning properly. Why it's not doing the
    job. There's nothing secure about this thing. Talk about
    Homeland Security, what's secure about.
        So I thank our able chairman, Senator Gregg for calling
    this hearing. Hardly a day goes by that Americans do not read
    about the Department of Homeland Security in their own town
    newspapers like the Beckley, West Virginia Register Herald, the
    New Hampshire Union Leader, and every other major paper in the
    land. This is an agency that impacts the lives of every
    American. And the lives of every American are to a considerable
    degree dependant upon this agency. I look forward to working
    with you Mr. Chairman as we review not just the budget for the
    agency, but also the policies and the operations for the
    Department. And I welcome you here today Mr. Secretary.
        Before discussing the President's budget it is important to
    take a moment to thank the 182,000 employees in your
    Department. They serve this Nation in the heat of the desert.
    They serve this Nation in the cold of a northern winter. They
    serve this Nation in the roughest seas and winds, at our ports,
    our border stations, our airports. They are to be commended for
    their efforts to preserve our freedoms, to make this truly a
    Department of Homeland Security, and to secure our homeland.

                            IMPROVED BORDER SECURITY

        I'm pleased to see that the budget includes significant
    resources for improving security at our borders. Last spring,
    Senator Craig and I offered, with Chairman Gregg's support, an
    amendment to begin the process of hiring and training a
    significant number of Border Patrol agents and immigration
    investigators. Despite administration opposition--now did you
    hear that?
        Despite administration opposition, the funds were enacted
    into law. With the chairman's leadership we continued that
    effort in fiscal year 2006. Two months ago Chairman Gregg tried
    to secure an additional $1.1 billion for this fiscal year to
    provide our border security personnel with the tools they need.
    The tools they need to do their jobs effectively, but he ran
    into opposition from the other body.

                     HOMELAND SECURITY BUDGET AND ANOMALIES

        Mr. Secretary, I urge you today to join in this cause and
    urge the White House and the House leadership to embrace this
    effort. Scream to the high heavens if they don't. Let the
    people know where the fault lies. Let the people know really
    who is for security. The administration continues to have a
    huge credibility gap when it comes to homeland security.
    There's a continuing drum beat that another terrorist attack is
    likely. The President, in his State of the Union address said
    to America ``The enemy has not lost the desire or the
    capability to attack us.'' And yet a look at the
    administration's budget reveals an odd, odd, odd complacency.
    The administration's speech writers on the one hand and the
    administration's policy writers seem to be living in
    alternative realities. For example, in the White House disaster
    response report released just a few days ago, the White House
    calls for ``integrating and synchronizing the Nation's homeland
    security plans across Federal, State and local governments''
    yet what happens? The budget proposes to cut funding for
    Emergency Management Performance Grants, which State and local
    emergency managers depend on for their survival. The White
    House report recommends improvements to communication's
    equipment used in response to a catastrophe, but the budget
    proposes to cut first responder grants by 25 percent. What's
    wrong? What is wrong Mr. Secretary? Why the disconnect? Why the
    disconnect? The White House report recommends improvements to
    communication's equipment used in response to a catastrophe,
    but the budget on the other hand--which is the White House's
    product--proposes to cut first responder grants by 25 percent.
    Why the disconnect? Hear me down there at the White House. Why
    Mr. Bush? Why? In response to the administration's decision to
    allow Dubai Ports World to operate terminals in six major U.S.
    ports, the administration has asserted that they have a
    robust--ha--a robust layered security system for our ports. And
    yet the White House proposes for the second straight year, 1
    year is not enough, for the second straight year, to eliminate
    the port security grant program. Now why is that?
        Of the $816 million that Congress has appropriated for port
    security, only $46 million was requested by the President. Why
    is that so Mr. Bush? Why is that so? Hear me. Let me say that
    again. Of the $816 million that Congress has appropriated--that
    Congress has appropriated--for port security, only $46 million
    was requested by the President. There's nothing robust about
    that. If that's robust then I'm an 810 pound giant. Take me on.
    Yeah. There's nothing robust about that. Five months ago, the
    Congress approved $173 million for port security grants, and
    the Department has not even seen fit to announce how ports can
    apply for the funds. Why is this? What's the matter Mr.
    Secretary? Why don't we get off the ground. I do not understand
    why this administration allows port security dollars to collect
    dust at the Treasury in Washington. How really serious--how
    serious is this administration about port security when it
    decides to allow Dubai Ports World to control six major U.S.
    ports and the President, Mr. Bush, and the Vice President, Mr.
    Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, and the
    Secretary of Homeland Security don't even know the decision was
    made. What is happening? What's the matter with the right hand
    that the left hand doesn't know what's going on? How serious is
    the administration about port security when customs and borders
    protection inspects only 5 percent of the 11 million containers
    that come into the country each year. I believe I've been
    reading that for 2 or 3 years, it doesn't seem to change. How
    serious is the administration when the Coast Guard's Deepwater
    budget for replacing its ships, planes and helicopters will not
    even be completed until 2026. Man, I will have long since met
    my maker by then and I hope you folks will carry on in my
    stead. I don't know what good it will do you. The Coast Guard
    will be the FEMA of 2010 if you do not invest in it now. What
    about that? What's wrong? How serious is the administration
    about helping victims of a disaster when it has made decisions
    that have crippled FEMA? When the terrorists hit New York City
    in 2001, FEMA was immediately on the scene and FEMA helped the
    city to recover. Four years later when Hurricanes Katrina and
    Rita hit the gulf coast, FEMA was no longer up to the task.
    Within the bureaucracy of the Department of Homeland Security,
    FEMA has lacked professional leadership, lacked attention, and
    lacked resources. Bad management of the agency and its mission
    has diminished the effectiveness of the qualified professionals
    who serve in FEMA and who love their jobs. For example the
    decision to separate the FEMA preparedness function from its
    response and recovery function has proven to be a mistake. I
    was against that, I said, I was against it. I was against it
    then, I've been against it ever since. I'm against it now.
    Separating the preparedness function from response and recovery
    is like asking the marines to go into battle without first
    training at Camp Lejeune. It's absolutely essential that our
    emergency managers and first responders at every level of
    government have the resources to train and exercise together
    before a disaster. Whether it is a terrorist attack, or a
    natural disaster.
        I'm concerned that the Department of Homeland Security has
    become the department of promises unfulfilled. The department
    of promises unfulfilled. This must be rectified. Mr. Secretary
    you have a tough job, I look forward to your testimony. Thank
    you Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator Byrd. I want to echo
    something that Senator Byrd said however. There's obviously a
    lot of concern here. It's deep, it's significant, and it needs
    to be raised. But we all greatly admire the people on the
    frontline.
        Senator Byrd. You bet.
        Senator Gregg. And you've got a lot of them. And they do
    very good work for us, and they put their lives at risk, and
    they're willing to work in difficult situations and we
    appreciate that very much. Hopefully nothing that's said here
    would in anyway reflect on their professionalism and their
    commitment which is superb.
        Senator Byrd. No.
        Senator Gregg. What we want to do is make them more capable
    of doing their jobs well.
        Senator Byrd. Heavens forbid.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we'd like to hear
    from you.

                         STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF

        Secretary Chertoff. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I appreciate
    the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee before you
    Mr. Chairman, and before Senator Byrd as ranking member. Of
    course a lot has been raised in the opening statements, I
    suspect I'll have the opportunity to answer some specific
    questions about a lot of these as we go on, and I'm sure you'll
    appreciate my saying that I do not intend to occupy a lot of
    time in an opening statement addressing everything.
        But I do want to talk about some of the major elements of
    the budget. And I want to begin also by echoing the fact that
    as you have both said what this Department does touches the
    lives of every American. In fact, I venture to say, we probably
    touch the lives of Americans in more individual and disparate
    ways than does any other department in the Government. At the
    same time we also have a tremendous workforce. We have 183,000
    people, they serve everywhere from storm tossed seas, to very
    hot desert landscapes. They do a superb job. We do owe them the
    support that they're entitled to in order to carry out their
    missions. Part of what I am trying to do, and I think part of
    what my team is trying to do is to impose some discipline and
    some systematic thinking to the missions. I don't think we want
    to attack our budget problems by assigning money first and then
    thinking about what to do with it afterwards. That has
    sometimes been a course taken in Government. I think we want to
    make sure we've thoroughly thought through what we need to do
    and what the system and the mission is, and then apply the
    money in a way that makes the mission occur.
        I also understand that we have a challenge with respect to
    the $1.6 billion amount that is allocated to be paid for by an
    increase in passenger fees. I view the proposed increase as
    being extremely modest. In fact it really evens out an anomaly
    between those who leave from hub cities, and those who leave
    from non hub cities. As I've said before, I think we're talking
    about the price of a soda pop, and a newspaper at the airport.
    I recognize from my experience last year this has engendered a
    lot of push back, I'd still like to believe that we can get the
    right thing done here. I also of course as always take back the
    chairman and the ranking member's concerns about the need to
    have capital investment back to the White House, and we will
    continue to discuss how we can make sure we meet these needs.
    Because I think we all agree at the end of the day we need to
    be in the same place.

                     MAJOR INITIATIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        Let me talk about some of the major initiatives in the
    budget though, which does reflect a 6 percent increase in
    funding if we get that fee that we should be getting over
    fiscal year 2006, and also a 6 percent increase in growth
    discretionary funds over the prior year. Let me begin by
    talking about port security which is on everybody's mind. You
    know this is an area where although there is a lot to do, a lot
    has been done. And I think in fairness to the American people I
    want to lay out a little bit what we actually have
    accomplished, because we have made significant strides this
    year as compared to previous years which I want to talk about.

                           PORT SECURITY ALLOCATIONS

        One of the criticisms I often hear is that we spend
    billions of dollars on aviation security and only a few hundred
    million on port security. My response to the criticism is that
    that is really comparing--not apples to oranges, but apples to
    raisins. I think when you look at the total amount of money
    we've spent on port security since 9/11 and you include the
    2007 budget I had it calculated for this hearing. If our 2007
    budget request is passed we will have spent nearly $10 billion,
    with a B--$10 billion on port security and that's because when
    I count port security I count not only the port security grants
    which are obviously only a few hundred million. But I count the
    hundreds of millions of dollars, and billions of dollars we've
    invested in the Coast Guard port security program, as well as
    the significant amounts we've invested in elements of customs
    and border protection, science and technology, and our new
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which is investing millions
    of dollars in research on radiation portal monitors.
        So I think in fairness as we look back, and we consider all
    of the money line itemed out for port security at these various
    components it is actually a fair amount of money that has been
    spent.

                          DHS' PORT SECURITY APPROACH

        But I want to measure this not only in terms of money
    spent, because what matters is not input, it's output. Let me
    take a couple of minutes to talk about the way we approach port
    security. Port security does not begin at home, it begins
    overseas. It's kind of the opposite of charity. We begin by
    having our Container Security Initiative which is designed to
    put our resources in overseas ports of departure so we can
    begin to screen cargo at the point of which is starts to enter
    the supply chain, the maritime supply chain and not merely when
    it starts to arrive in our American ports. We have a chart here
    indicating where we have gone with the Container Security
    Initiative. And what you will see--and a copy of this in my
    prepared testimony for the Senators--you'll see that before 9/
    11 we had no elements overseas as part of a container screening
    initiative. In March 2002, we were at about 14 percent of the
    cargo was coming through ports of embarkation that were part of
    the initiative. This February we're up to about three-quarters,
    and we are on track to get up to about 85 percent by the end of
    fiscal year 2007. That's because most of the cargo that we are
    concerned about comes through a comparatively small number of
    ports, we have focused on the 42 ports which now are
    responsible for three-quarters of the containers and these are
    all now part of our Container Security Initiative.
        What that means is we begin the process of screening well
    before the cargo even gets to the overseas port. We then
    inspect cargo overseas, before it actually gets on the ship, if
    it is high risk cargo. And that really pushes our security
    envelope way out. I'm not going to tell you the job is done,
    one of the things I said, I think last year, and I've continued
    to say earlier this year, is we need to extend our visibility
    into the supply chain, even further back into the process so
    that we see what is entering our maritime domain, really almost
    at the point it leaves the factory overseas. And we also need
    to have better security and tracking of containers once we've
    got the containers stuffed and loaded onto ships. So we are
    continuing to do work and research into pushing that out. But
    it would be unfair for me not to observe how far we have come.
    In that regard I'm actually planning to go to Hong Kong later
    on in March to actually look at a system they have in place
    there, which at least has established a concept of doing the
    radiation screening and the x-ray screening for every container
    before it gets loaded. I want to see how that works and see
    whether that is a possibility for extending what we're doing.
    But of course the supply chain security doesn't end at the
    overseas port. We get the manifest of the cargo, the Coast
    Guard examines the manifest, examines the crew list, examines
    the history of the ship, even while the ship is underway to
    come into American ports. When necessary the Coast Guard boards
    ships in order to inspect cargo, or in order to examine crew
    members who are listed on the cruise ship.
        I should say that the Coast Guard actually inspects ports
    overseas as part of our international initiatives on port
    security. And if a port overseas does not have an adequate
    security profile, we have the power and we have exercised the
    power to suspend ships from that port coming into the United
    States.
        [The information follows:]

     How Often has DHS (Coast Guard) Exercised the Power to Suspend Ships
           From Entering Into the Port Coming Into the United States?
        We have broken this data down into two separate categories, one for
    deficiencies related to port state control and maritime security
    compliance examinations; and one for failures to provide required
    notice of arrival.
        For deficiencies related to port state control and maritime
    security compliance:
      --In 2004, we expelled 15 vessels and denied entry to 2 vessels.
      --In 2005, we expelled 5 vessels and denied entry to 2 vessels.
      --Thus far in 2006, we've not expelled or denied entry to any vessel
            for port state control or maritime security compliance.
      --We only expel or deny entry to a vessel due to extremely
            substandard conditions.
      --The Coast Guard generally allows these vessels enter or re-enter
            port when they have corrected the substandard conditions.
        For failures to provide appropriate notice of arrival:
      --In 2005, we denied entry to 147 vessels and expelled 15 vessels.
      --Thus far in 2006, we denied entry to 11 vessels and expelled 7
            vessels.
      --The Coast Guard generally allows the vessels to enter or re-enter
            port once the vessel makes proper notice of arrival and once
            the appropriate 24 hour or 96 hour vetting period ends.

        Senator Byrd. How often is that done?
        Secretary Chertoff. I could give you the number; we have
    done it on occasion. Usually what we do is if the shipping
    company imposes its own security guards around the ship at a
    port that has not met security requirements, we will allow the
    ship in. In other words we will allow the shipping company to
    do its own remediation with respect to guarding its own ship.
    But I can think of one occasion in the last year where we got
    to the point of decertifying a port, and for a short of period
    of time, I think the port was decertified. I can get you the
    details on the numbers. But this process is underway as we
    speak with the Coast Guard going overseas inspecting ports
    overseas.
        Now let's continue to follow the supply chain. So we've
    looked at--in many instances, three-quarters of the containers
    we've done screening and necessary inspection before the cargo
    has left. We've then looked at the crew, we've looked at the
    ship, and Coast Guard has reviewed it while it's on route. When
    it comes into the United States, if we have cargo that we have
    screened, we've screened 100 percent, we're virtually at 100
    percent of the cargo at this point using very complicated
    analytical tools and using information we have about the
    shipper, the cargo, the destination, and the method of payment.
    If at the time it arrives we haven't inspected high risk cargo,
    we then inspect it when it arrives. We put it through radiation
    portal monitors and just to show you where we are with this,
    these are large machines through which one can drive a truck
    carrying a container and it will detect radio active emissions
    from inside the container. We've gone again from February 2003,
    where we had only a small number of radiation portal monitors
    to a situation in which by the end of this year, we expect to
    have about two-thirds of the container cargo going through our
    seaports covered by radiation portal monitors. And we're on
    track to get to 90 plus percent by the time we get to the next
    fiscal year. And that's of course apart from hand held
    radiation monitors and things of that sort. So that's a
    significant amount of the containers coming through American
    ports that are being checked through these radiation portal
    monitors. In addition again if we have high risk containers
    that haven't been inspected, we inspect them on the spot. So
    it's only at the end of this very lengthy supply chain, with
    multiple defenses none of them perfect, but in combination a
    pretty effective series of defenses, only at the end of that
    does the container finally enter the hands of the port terminal
    operator which of course is the topic of conversation that
    we've had over the last week involving Dubai ports.
        So my point here is that the port terminal operator really
    lies after the last line of defense and is not a critical
    player in the line of defense. I should tell you the port
    terminal operator plays no role in our selection of what cargo
    to examine, in our screening process, in the Coast Guard's
    examination of the ships that come in, in our decision of what
    to put through the radiation portal monitors, or in our
    decision about what containers to open up. The port terminal
    operator has zero impact on that.
        Let me briefly touch on the Coast Guard analysis which I
    think you asked about Mr. Chairman, and then I will touch on
    just a few other points before I conclude. As you correctly
    point out, yesterday there was disclosed an unclassified
    portion of a much larger classified study by the Coast Guard
    early on in the process of reviewing this Dubai ports
    acquisition. This process of review by the way began in I
    believe October of last year, and concluded in January. So that
    although the formal filing may have only been less than 30 days
    before the conclusion of the process, the actual examination
    and vetting process began actually months earlier when the
    company first approached the CFIUS Committee.
        The Coast Guard as part of its early review assessment
    concluded that there were intelligence gaps. I should tell you
    that I often see, by the way, intelligence analytic documents
    that have that conclusion. By its nature I think an intelligent
    and cautious analyst is always very careful to identify not
    only what is known but what is unknown. And I think there was a
    response to that. The response to that was, not only continuing
    the process of checking with the other 12 departments involved
    and their intelligence elements. But more important, putting
    into place a significant number of assurances that would make
    sure that as we go forward with this. Implementing this
    transaction, Coast Guard and Customs would have an
    unprecedented ability to look into what was being done at these
    terminals, to insist upon the highest standard of security and
    if necessary to enforce those standards. I would conclude my
    comment on this by observing again, as you said Mr. Chairman,
    even at that early stage the Coast Guard concluded that ``DP
    World's acquisition of PNO in and of itself does not pose a
    significant threat to U.S. assets in continental United States
    ports.

                   ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR PREPAREDNESS AND FEMA

        Let me briefly touch on a few other things before I
    conclude Mr. Chairman. We have put additional money into
    Preparedness and into FEMA, $50 million into a National
    Preparedness Integration Program which, even as we speak, is in
    the process of reviewing and validating and ultimately working
    with States to improve the individual evacuation and emergency
    plans all over the country. There are increases in targeted
    capability grants. Although we do not support specifically
    targeted port grants, we've actually put a couple of hundred
    million dollars extra into the TIPP, the Targeted
    Infrastructure Protection Program which includes port grants.
    We've got a budget that allocates $10 million for chemical site
    security. Increases in FEMA's core budget of 10 percent, $492
    million including when we build on the amounts in the 2006
    supplemental a total of 240 additional FTEs. As well as some
    very specific steps we're taking for this hurricane season. As
    you noted in border security we are proposing an increase in
    1,500 agents, $100 million on border technology over $400
    million to bring detention bed space up to 27,500 beds. And let
    me say Mr. Chairman we are now for the first time building and
    carefully tracking through metrics, exactly how we are
    progressing and ending catch and release, and turning it into
    catch and return for non-Mexicans we apprehend at the border.
    This is a big accomplishment, we have some additional hurdles
    to overcome and I'd be happy to address them if anybody asks
    me. But we are, for the first time, in a position to see
    exactly where we need to go, where we are, and we can identify
    exactly what we need to do to cover the distance. And that's
    part of this systematic thinking I'm thinking about. I've got a
    lot of other elements to the budget. I'm sure you have a lot of
    questions. I will ask that my statement--written statement be
    accepted for the record, and I will be delighted to answer
    questions.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Michael Chertoff

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Committee: Before
    beginning to outline our fiscal year 2007 budget request, I want to
    thank you for the strong support you showed for the Department in the
    two full budget cycles since it was fully established in March 2003.
    This is my first full budget cycle and I am honored and pleased to
    appear before the Committee to present President Bush's fiscal year
    2007 budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
        I would like to begin by assuring Members of this Committee and the
    public of the Department's efforts to secure the Nation's seaports. The
    Department continues to implement a multi-layered defense strategy to
    keep our ports safe and secure. Utilizing the expertise of our
    bureaus--particularly the United States Coast Guard and U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection--the private sector, and state and local
    authorities, we have made great strides since 9/11 to ensure that there
    are protective measures in place from one end of a sea based journey to
    the other. With the President's fiscal year 2007 Budget request, total
    DHS funding for port security activities since fiscal year 2004 total
    nearly $10 billion.
        As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard
    routinely inspects and assesses the security of 3,200 regulated
    facilities in more than 360 U.S. ports at least annually in accordance
    with the Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA) and the Ports
    and Water ways Safety Act (PWSA). Every regulated U.S. port facility,
    regardless of owner/operator, is required to establish and implement a
    comprehensive Facility Security Plan (FSP) that specifically addresses
    the vulnerabilities identified in the facility security assessment and
    details measures and procedures for controlling access to the facility,
    including screening, designating employees with key security
    responsibilities, verifying credentials of port workers, inspecting
    cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, quarterly
    training, drills and annual exercises, and reporting of all breaches of
    security or suspicious activity, among other security measures.
        Working closely with local port authorities and law enforcement
    agencies, the Coast Guard regularly reviews, approves, assesses and
    inspects these plans and facilities to ensure compliance.
        In accordance with MTSA, the Coast Guard has completed verification
    of security plans for U.S. port and facilities and vessels operating in
    U.S. waters. Specifically:
      --Port Threat Assessments for all 55 militarily or economically
            critical ports have been completed. The Coast Guard has
            developed 44 Area Maritime Security Plans covering 361 ports,
            the Great Lakes, the Inland and Western Rivers and the Outer
            Continental Shelf region.
      --The Coast Guard completed initial security plan verification exams
            on all 6,200 U.S. flag inspected vessels on July 1, 2005.
      --The Coast Guard has completed 2,400 verification examinations on
            uninspected vessels regulated under the MTSA, and is on track
            to complete all 4,800 by December 31, 2006.
      --Reviewed and approved 3,200 facility security plans.
      --Approved 60 offshore facility security plans.
        In addition to the Coast Guard's broad authorities for ensuring the
    security of U.S. port facilities and operations, the Coast Guard worked
    through the International Maritime Organization to develop the
    International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code. Through the
    International Port
        Security Program, the Coast Guard has partnered with other nations
    worldwide to ensure compliance with ISPS. The Coast Guard has assessed
    44 countries, which are responsible for 80 percent of the maritime
    trade to the United States. Of those 44 countries, 37 have been found
    to be in substantial compliance with the ISPS Code. The seven countries
    that are not in substantial compliance have been or will soon be
    notified to take corrective actions or risk being placed on a Port
    Security Advisory and have Conditions of Entry imposed on vessels
    arriving from their ports. The Coast Guard is on track to assess
    approximately 36 countries per year.
        The Coast Guard has also taken multiple steps to enhance our
    awareness in the maritime domain. Publication of the 96-hour Notice of
    Arrival regulation allows sufficient time to vet the crew, passengers,
    cargo and vessel information of all vessels prior to their entering the
    United States from foreign ports. The Coast Guard also has expansive
    authority to exercise positive control over a vessel intending to enter
    a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Since
    July 2004, the Coast Guard has boarded 16,000 foreign flag vessels for
    security compliance with the ISPS Code and the MTSA. Out of those
    16,000 boardings, the Coast Guard imposed 143 detentions, expulsions or
    denials of entry. In addition, the Automatic Identification System
    (AIS) has been fielded at 9 ports with Vessel Traffic Service systems
    and allows the Coast Guard to identify and track vessels in the coastal
    environment. Long range tracking, currently in development, will enable
    the Coast Guard to identify and track vessels thousands of miles at
    sea, well before they reach our coastal zones. Likewise, the Inland
    River Vessel Movement Center provides critical information about the
    movement of hazardous cargoes along our Nation's inland rivers.
        The Coast Guard has increased its operational presence through a
    number of other initiatives. For example, the Coast Guard has
    established processes to identify, target, and have conducted 3,400
    security boardings on High Interest Vessels. These boardings included
    1,500 positive control vessel escorts to ensure these vessels cannot be
    used as weapons of mass destruction. The Coast Guard has also
    established 12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams and enforced hundreds
    of fixed and moving security zones to protect Maritime Critical
    Infrastructure and Key Assets (MCI/KA) and Naval Vessel Protection
    Zones (NVPZ) to protect U.S. Navy and Maritime Administration vessels.
    Further, the Coast Guard is developing a Risk-Based Decision Making
    System, to be implemented this year, which will help prioritize High
    Capacity Passenger Vessels (HCPV) escorts. Although initially developed
    for high capacity ferries, its application is being expanded to enhance
    current security measures for other HCPVs: ferries, cruise ships, and
    excursion vessels carrying 500 or more passengers.
        The Coast Guard is also working closely with various other agencies
    to implement the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and its eight
    supporting plans. Together, the plans provide the road map for the
    integration of national efforts in supporting the four primary pillars
    of maritime security: Awareness, Prevention, Protection, and Response
    and Recovery. As DHS's executive agent for implementing and updating
    plans related to Maritime Domain Awareness (Awareness), Global Maritime
    Intelligence Integration (Prevention), Maritime Transportation System
    Security (Protection), and Maritime Operational Threat Response
    (Response/Recovery), the Coast Guard, in cooperation with other
    stakeholders, is leading efforts to increase the coordination,
    effectiveness and efficiency of existing government-wide initiatives.
        In close coordination with the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons
    from entering the United States by eliminating potential threats before
    theyContainer Security Initiative arrive at our borders and ports. For
    example, through a program administered by CBP, the Department has
    implemented the 24-Hour Advanced Manifest Rule, requiring all sea
    carriers, with the exception of bulk carriers and approved break bulk
    cargo, to provide proper cargo descriptions and valid consignee
    addresses 24 hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port for
    shipment to the United States. Failure to meet the 24 hour advanced
    manifest rule results in a ``do not load'' message and other penalties.
    This program gives the Department greater awareness of what is being
    loaded onto ships bound for the United States and the advance
    information enables DHS to evaluate the terrorist risk from sea
    containers.
        Similarly, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-
    Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiatives bolster port
    security. Through CSI, CBP works with host government Customs Services
    to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports,
    before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States.
    In addition to the current 42 foreign ports participating in CSI, many
    more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, we expect
    that 50 ports, covering 82 percent of maritime containerized cargo
    shipped to the United States, will participate in CSI. The table above
    shows the Department's substantial progress in expanding the CSI
    program since September 11, 2001.
        Through C-TPAT, CBP has created a public-private and international
    partnership with nearly 5,800 businesses (over 10,000 have applied),
    including most of the largest U.S. importers. CTPAT, CBP and partner
    companies are working together to improve baseline security standards
    for supply chain and container security. CBP reviews the security
    practices of not only the company shipping the goods, but also the
    companies that provided them with any services.
        At present, the C-TPAT program has completed validations on 27
    percent (1,545 validations completed) of the certified membership, up
    from 8 percent (403 validations completed) a year ago. Additionally,
    validations are in progress on another 39 percent (2,262 in progress)
    of certified members, and these validations will be completed
    throughout 2006, bringing the total percentage of certified members to
    65 percent by years' end. In 2007, the C-TPAT program validations will
    continue. And we will have validated 100 percent by the end of CY 2007.
        CBP also uses cutting-edge technology, including large-scale X-ray
    and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices to screen cargo.
    Presently, CBP operates over 680 radiation portal monitors at our
    Nation's ports, including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports.
    CBP also utilizes over 170 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices
    to examine cargo and has issued 12,400 hand-held radiation detection
    devices. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $157 million
    to secure Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Deployments at current and
    next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry through the
    DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Over 600 canine detection
    teams, capable of identifying narcotics, bulk currency, human beings,
    explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons, are deployed at
    our ports of entry. As reflected in the Radiation Portal Monitor
    Deployment at Seaports table, 621 RPMs will be deployed to our Nation's
    top seaports, which will allow us to screen approximately 98 percent of
    inbound containers by December 2007.
        CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) is also a critical component
    of our layered port security efforts. The NTC provides tactical
    targeting and analytical research support for CBP antiterrorism
    efforts. Experts in passenger and cargo targeting at the NTC operate
    around the clock using tools like the Automated Targeting System (ATS)
    to identify tactical targets and support intra-departmental and inter-
    agency anti-terrorist operations. The ATS serves as the premier tool
    for performing transactional risk assessments and evaluating potential
    national security risks posed by cargo and passengers arriving by sea,
    air, truck, and rail. Using pre-arrival information and input from the
    intelligence community, this rules-based system identifies high-risk
    targets before they arrive in the United States. The Department's
    Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) is supporting the introduction
    of advanced intelligent algorithms to further improve these risk
    assessment capabilities.
        A key responsibility of the NTC is the support that it provides to
    the field, including tactical targeting and research support for the
    CSI personnel stationed at critical foreign ports throughout the world.
    The NTC, combined with CSI, C-TPAT, the 24-hour rule, and ATS ensures
    that all containers on-board vessels destined for the United States are
    risk scored using all available information; and that all cargo
    determined to be of high risk are examined. The NTC, working closely
    with the Coast Guard, also vets and risk scores all cargo and cruise-
    ship passengers and crew prior to arrival. This ensures that DHS has
    full port security awareness for international maritime activity.
        Further, DNDO's fiscal year 2007 budget request of nearly $536
    million, a 70 percent increase from fiscal year 2006, includes $157
    million which will allow for the acquisition and deployment of nearly
    300 current and next-generation radiation detection systems at our
    ports of entry. These systems will be deployed and operated by CBP. In
    addition, DNDO's fiscal year 2007 budget also includes $30.3 million
    for the development of enhanced cargo radiography screening systems for
    our ports of entry. These enhanced screening efforts will compliment
    the many information based programs, such as C-TPAT, the Department
    already has in place for enhanced port security.
        In addition to increased screening efforts at our own ports of
    entry for radioactive and nuclear materials, the Department fully
    endorses the concept of increased active and passive detection at
    foreign ports of departure. The systems DNDO are acquiring and
    developing can also be used by foreign ports with a CSI presence, as
    well as the Department of Energy's Megaports program. We must continue
    to stress the need for increased screening at foreign ports of
    departure, while at the same time have a robust screening effort at our
    own ports of entry.
        In order for the Department to increase its visibility into the
    security of our international supply chains, S&T is developing
    technology solutions that can be applied across the supply chain. Part
    of this effort is the development of a new class of security devices
    that will monitor the integrity of intermodal shipping containers and
    enable CBP Officers, CSI personnel and the NTC to gather information on
    the status of a container to improve risk assessment and data
    collection. When coupled with the broad supply chain security
    architectural framework currently under development by S&T, the
    Department will have the capability to bridge data and information
    between container security devices, shippers, and the National
    Targeting Center (NTC).
        Finally, in addition to the work of the Coast Guard, CBP, S&T and
    the DNDO, the Port Security Grant program has awarded over $700 million
    to owners and operators of ports, terminals, U.S. inspected passenger
    vessels and ferries, as well as port authorities and State and local
    agencies to improve security for operators and passengers through
    physical security enhancements. The mission of the Port Security Grant
    program is to create a sustainable, risk-based effort for the
    protection of ports from terrorism, especially explosives and non-
    conventional threats that would cause major disruption to commerce and
    significant loss of life.
        The Preparedness Directorate will also announce the application
    process for an additional $168 million in port security grants in the
    coming weeks, bringing total funding to over $870 million since 9/11.
    In addition, the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget bolsters funding
    for infrastructure protection, including ports, through the $600
    million Targeted Infrastructure Protection grant program. The fiscal
    year 2007 request consolidates existing infrastructure grant programs
    into a single program with a 55 percent increase in funding.
        With all of the layered efforts already in place, and the ongoing
    efforts that are supported in the 2007 budget request, port security
    has substantially improved since 9/11, and since the creation of the
    Department of Homeland Security.

                           OTHER KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        I would like to now address some of our other major accomplishments
    to date. As DHS approaches its third anniversary on March 1, 2006,
    creating one national integrated strategy to fight the war on terror,
    through awareness, prevention, protection, response, and recovery
    remains the key focus of its vision and mission. Since its inception,
    the Department has steadily progressed in its efforts to vigorously
    protect America's homeland. Since 2001, the administration:
      --Has increased annual spending on Government-wide non-defense
            homeland security by 350 percent, more than tripling spending
            devoted to homeland security;
      --Created the Department of Homeland Security by merging 22 separate
            agencies and programs into a cohesive department;
      --Restructured the agencies that handle immigration and border
            security issues. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has Port
            of Entry officers and Border Patrol agents along the border.
            Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforces immigration
            laws and detains those aliens here illegally. U.S. Citizenship
            and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers a wide variety of
            immigration benefits and services within the United States;
      --Established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
            improve aviation security and other modes of transportation
            security nationwide. TSA hired a screener workforce and
            deployed sufficient technology to electronically screen 100
            percent of passenger and checked baggage;
      --Created a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to detect,
            identify, and track down the origins of nuclear and
            radiological materials; and
      --Provided the Department nearly $18 billion for State, local, and
            tribal governments to enhance their preparedness for a range of
            hazards, including $14 billion for terrorism and other
            catastrophic events.
        When I arrived at the Department in 2005, I initiated a Second
    Stage Review (2SR) to assess whether DHS' policies, operations, and
    organizational structure were properly aligned to maximize mission
    performance. The implementation of 2SR instituted a fundamental reform
    of policies and procedures critical to achieving the mission of the
    Department. The Department also conquered many unique challenges,
    making significant strides protecting vital infrastructure and assets;
    preventing security breaches; ensuring safe travel and trade across our
    borders; protecting privacy and civil liberties; and expanding critical
    partnerships at every level.
        In the last year, we have made great strides in the area of
    prevention and preparedness. Our key accomplishments include:
        Revamping the Port Security Grant Program--As part of the fiscal
    year 2005 Office of Grants and Training (G&T) Port Security Grant
    Program (PSGP), significant changes have been introduced to make the
    program more risk based. Changes include limiting eligibility to the
    Nation's most at-risk seaports and distributing funding based on risk,
    needs and national priorities for port security. Additional rigor was
    added to the evaluation process for applications and a communications
    strategy was implemented to ensure consistent guidance was provided
    throughout.
        The program is being further refined in fiscal year 2006, and will
    soon link distribution of funds to participation in a port-wide risk
    management planning process. The intent of this process, which combines
    the USCG's Maritime Security Risk Assessment Methodology (MSRAM) with
    the Office of Grant's and Training's own Special Needs Jurisdiction
    Toolkit, is to allow port areas to develop risk management strategies
    that will assist them in identifying the most cost effective projects--
    essentially allowing them to ``buy down'' the risk in their areas. This
    program, known as the Maritime Assessment and Strategy Toolkit (MAST),
    is an essential step in prioritizing risks and facilitating a port-wide
    risk management planning process. Ultimately, MAST will serve to
    further enhance the existing Area Maritime Security Plans and also
    allow for ports to better integrate their security efforts into the
    broader planning construct that forms the core of the Urban Areas
    Security Initiative (UASI).
        TSA Moves to a Risk-Based, Threat-Managed Security Approach.--
    Employing TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams, piloting
    behavioral pattern recognition analysis at 10 airports, and through a
    Nation-wide modification of the prohibited items list, TSA has
    increased its ability to identify and prevent terrorist threats to the
    Nation and enhance aviation security.
        Over $3 Billion Awarded to State and Local Governments.--DHS
    awarded more than $3 billion in grants, training, and technical
    assistance to State and local governments to support various
    prevention, protection and response initiatives.
        Standard First Responder Training Developed.--DHS established a
    National Incident Management System (NIMS) standard curriculum to
    ensure first responder training is widely available and consistent
    among all training providers. More than 725,000 first responders
    completed NIMS training nationwide.
        Counterterrorism Training.--DHS provided counterterrorism training
    to more than 1.2 million emergency response personnel from across the
    country on a range of incident response issues, including incident
    management, unified command, and public works protection/response, and
    training on weapons of mass destruction.
        Sharing Intelligence Information.--The Office of Intelligence and
    Analysis provided State and local governments and the private sector
    with more than 1,260 intelligence information products on threat
    information and suggested protective measures.
        Secret Service Operation Taps Network to Arrest 28 Globally.--U.S.
    Secret Service conducted ``Operation Firewall,'' in which the Secret
    Service became the first agency ever to execute a Title III wire tap on
    an entire computer network. This global operation resulted in 28
    arrests in eight States and six foreign countries. These suspects stole
    nearly 1.7 million credit card numbers.
        The hurricanes last fall stretched our Nation's resources and
    forced us to reexamine our processes. We still however, saw our first
    responders and relief personnel do remarkable things to assist our
    fellow citizens.
        Over 40,000 Rescued by U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA.--In the wake of
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Coast Guard and FEMA rescued over
    40,000 people in search and rescue operations. Coast Guard men and
    women employed their Continuity of Operations Plans and demonstrated
    deep commitment to the missions of search and rescue, protection of
    natural resources, and restoration of a safe, efficient marine
    transportation system.
        More than 23,000 Victims Airlifted from New Orleans Airport.--More
    than 700 transportation security officers and Federal air marshals
    helped evacuate more than 23,000 victims at Louis Armstrong New Orleans
    International Airport.
        $5.7 Billion in Federal Aid Distributed.--FEMA distributed over
    $5.7 billion in Federal aid to more than 1.4 million households to help
    pay for housing assistance, food, clothing, home repair and other
    essentials.
        $12 Billion in Claims Distributed.--FEMA's National Flood Insurance
    program paid over $12 billion in claims from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
    and Wilma, with an estimated $10 billion in additional claims to be
    paid over the next few months.
        In the past year, we have also strengthened our borders and
    interior enforcement of our immigration laws, expanded partnerships
    with our neighbors, and increased our use of emerging technologies to
    assist our efforts.
        Secure Border Initiative Success.--In support of a comprehensive
    strategy to control the border and enforce immigration laws, DHS
    adopted a policy to replace the practice of catching and releasing
    aliens with a ``Catch and Return'' policy. Expedited Removal (ER) has
    been expanded along our entire land border as well as the number of
    countries with nationals subject to ER. DHS adopted a goal to cut ER
    detention time in half to speed alien removals, and the frequency of
    deportation flights has increased. Litigation barriers preventing San
    Diego fence completion have been removed. A process is also well
    underway to seek and select a contract integrator to implement a
    comprehensive border protection program plan using technology, staff,
    and other assets.
        Successful Counter Drug Operations.--Efforts by CBP, USCG and ICE
    to secure the Nation's borders have yielded significant positive
    results in stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States.
    In the most recently completed fiscal year, CBP reported seizing nearly
    42,800 lbs of cocaine and more than 531,700 pounds of marijuana. In
    addition, United States Coast Guard and CBP Air and Marine Operations'
    counter drug operations exceeded results from previous years by
    removing over 338,000 lbs of cocaine from the Caribbean Sea and Eastern
    Pacific Ocean transit zones.
        Arizona Border Control Initiative Bolstered Resources in Tucson
    Corridor.--The second phase of this successful initiative included an
    additional 534 Border Patrol agents permanently assigned to the Arizona
    border, a 25 percent increase. These agents were supplemented by 200
    agents and 23 aircraft temporarily assigned to the Tucson sector. The
    initiative coupled with Operation ICE Storm, a human smuggling
    initiative, resulted in more than 350 smugglers prosecuted in total,
    millions in illicit profits seized and a significant decrease in
    homicides according to local authorities.
        Security and Prosperity Partnership Creates Common Security
    Approach.--The United States, Canada and Mexico entered into this
    trilateral partnership to establish common approaches to emergency
    response, improving aviation, maritime, and border security, enhancing
    intelligence sharing, and facilitating the legitimate flow of people
    and cargo at our shared borders.
        Immigration Processing Backlog Cut by 2.8 million.--USCIS reduced
    the backlog of applications for immigration services and benefits from
    3.8 million cases in January 2004 to fewer than one million in December
    2005.
        US VISIT Biometric Entry System Expanded.--US VISIT implemented the
    biometric entry portion of the US VISIT system at 115 airports, 14
    seaports and 154 land ports of entry. As of December 31, 2005, US VISIT
    processed more than 44 million foreign visitors and detected 950
    individuals with a criminal history or immigration violations.
        Passport Requirements Strengthened.--As part of a multi-layered
    approach to increasing the security of our citizens and visitors by
    helping to ensure the integrity of their travel documents, DHS imposed
    requirements establishing that all Visa Waiver Program travelers must
    have a machine-readable passport to enter the United States. Visa
    Waiver Program countries are now also required to produce new passports
    with digital photographs.
        Implemented Coast Guard Sectors.--The Coast Guard has reorganized
    its field infrastructure by unifying previous Groups and Marine Safety
    Offices into ``Sector'' commands. Within the new Sector construct, the
    inclusion of Field Intelligence Support Teams to support port-level
    commanders, as well as the establishment of Maritime Intelligence
    Fusion Centers, serves to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness at all
    levels of the chain of command. This restructuring unifies effort and
    command, strengthens maritime border security, and improves information
    sharing by providing a single point of Coast Guard service at the port
    level. The largest Coast Guard reorganization in a decade, the
    establishment of Sectors will be complete in 2006, significantly
    improving maritime preparedness and response without requiring any
    additional resources.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET REQUEST

        In accordance with the premise of 2SR and to build on the
    Department's accomplishments, the fiscal year 2007 budget proposal for
    the Department is driven by a mission and risk-based approach to
    allocating the Department's resources, requesting $42.7 billion in
    funding, an increase of 6 percent over fiscal year 2006. The
    Department's fiscal year 2007 gross discretionary budget is $35.4
    billion, also an increase of 6 percent over fiscal year 2006. Gross
    discretionary funding includes appropriated budget authority and
    discretionary fee collections such as funding for the Federal
    Protective Service; aviation security passenger and carrier fees; and
    premium collections. It does not include funding such as Coast Guard's
    retirement pay accounts and fees paid for immigration benefits. The
    Department's fiscal year 2007 net discretionary budget is $30.9
    billion, an increase of 1 percent over fiscal year 2006.
        Central to the Department's budget are five themes to ensure that
    all resource allocations correspond with its integral mission and
    vision. Key enhancements in the Budget for these five areas will allow
    the Department to execute the initiatives of the administration and
    effectively secure our Nation.

    Increase Overall Preparedness, Particularly for Catastrophic Events
            Either Natural or Manmade and Strengthen FEMA
        Preparedness addresses the Department's full range of
    responsibilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of
    terror or other disasters.
        The Budget includes an increase of $294.6 million for the Targeted
    Capability Grants, for a total of $1.4 billion. This builds upon the
    $5.5 billion already in the grant pipeline to assist our States and
    localities in increasing their preparedness and furthers the
    Department's National Preparedness Goals. This funding includes an
    $80.65 million increase for Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to
    provide a second layer of protection for urban areas based on risk. It
    also includes a $213.9 million increase over comparable programs, for a
    total of $600 million, for the Targeted Infrastructure Protection
    Program (TIPP). This will provide States with maximum flexibility to
    target resources to protect our Nation's ports, transit facilities,
    chemical facilities, and other critical infrastructure.
        The Budget also includes $50 million National Preparedness
    Integration Program (NPIP) as a new initiative in the Preparedness
    Directorate. NPIP will improve preparedness by executing Medical
    Preparedness Coordination, Catastrophic Planning, Emergency
    Communications Improvements, and Command and Control Alignment.
        This budget enhances our ability to respond to and recover from
    disasters. Indeed, last year's Gulf Coast hurricanes demonstrated the
    need to strengthen FEMA's planning and response capabilities. While
    funding was increased for these core activities in 2005 and 2006, the
    fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a more significant investment to
    further strengthen FEMA. FEMA's budget represents a 10 percent increase
    over the 2006 fiscal year, including $44.7 million to strengthen
    support functions. We will add resources to critical areas such as
    procurement, information technology, and planning and amounts.
        The Budget includes a $29 million increase and 92 FTE to support
    FEMA's Strengthen Operational Capability initiative and reinforce its
    essential support functions within its programs of Readiness,
    Mitigation, Response, Recovery, and National Security, This program
    increase will allow FEMA to fill critical positions, and upgrade
    capital infrastructure and information technology support services.
        A $5 million increase in the FEMA Procurement Staff supports the
    Department's initiative to strengthen procurement capability across the
    board. These additional 41 FTE will enhance FEMA's ability to
    effectively deliver disaster response and recovery services by
    efficiently and properly processing procurement requests during both
    routine and extraordinary operating periods.
        An additional 40 FTE and $10.7 million is requested for FEMA
    financial and acquisition management. The funding requested will build
    on the positions provided in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental
    appropriation to operate the Gulf Region Acquisition Center to support
    the billions of dollars in contracts necessary to meet the
    unprecedented recovery needs of Hurricane Katrina and to bolster the
    FEMA's financial management capabilities to meet the demands of current
    and future catastrophic disasters.
        An additional $5.3 million is requested for National Response Plan
    (NRP) Support to help FEMA coordinate the response to all types and
    magnitudes of threats or hazards. It will allow FEMA to support
    shortened response times and provide more effective assistance during
    incidents of national significance.
        The fiscal year 2007 Budget seeks an increase of $100 million and
    40 FTE for the pre-disaster mitigation grant program. This program is
    designed to reduce the risk to populations, structures, and critical
    infrastructure from natural disasters. These funds will provide for the
    protection of: over 600 additional properties from flood damage through
    acquisition, elevation, relocation, and/or flood proofing; 250
    additional critical facilities from flood damage through drainage,
    infrastructure, and utilities projects; 240 additional properties from
    hurricane wind damage; 92 additional storm shelters to save lives from
    tornadoes; and 154 additional critical public facilities against
    seismic damage.
        Finally, an additional $5 million is proposed for upgrade of the
    Emergency Alert System (EAS). The EAS, which uses commercial radio and
    television broadcast services to send Presidential messages, provides a
    readily available and reliable means of emergency communications with
    the American people when catastrophic events occur and other national
    communications resources have been damaged or compromised. Building on
    the supplemental funding provided in fiscal year 2006, this funding
    will be used to improve system coverage, reliability, survivability,
    and security by providing a two-way, national-level EAS satellite
    backbone/path that will effectively link all Federal, State, and U.S.
    Territory Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
        The budget also proposes:
      --A total of $62.4 million in funding for the Coast Guard's National
            Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) program. This funding is
            needed to provide an air intercept response to potential
            threats in the National Capital Region airspace, helping to
            protect Washington, DC, from airborne attack.
      --A total of $17.7 million in funding to support the Radiological and
            Nuclear Attribution and Forensics initiative. The request will
            enable the Department to combine information on potential
            capabilities of terrorist organizations to develop and deploy
            threat agents with laboratory-based forensics techniques that
            determine the source of any nuclear and radiological materials
            or devices.
      --An increase of $3 million for the Office of the Chief Medical
            Officer to further strengthen cutting-edge science, technology,
            and intelligence within the Department's policy-making process.
            This request, more than doubling resources for this office,
            will be used to develop policy driven initiatives to ensure
            that the Nation and its critical infrastructures are medically
            prepared for catastrophic events.
        An increase of $10 million to establish an office to oversee
    chemical site security. DHS will classify facilities into risk-based
    tiers, establish security standards for each tier, and ensure strong
    safeguards are in place to protect the public disclosure of any
    sensitive information gathered by the office.

    Strengthen Border Security and Interior Enforcement and Reform
            Immigration Processes
                Securing our Borders
        One of the key elements in fulfilling the Department's mission is
    securing the border, both land and maritime, from terrorist threats and
    the flow of illegal migration and drugs. Under the Secure Border
    Initiative (SBI) DHS will focus on controlling the border, building a
    robust interior enforcement program, and establishing a Temporary
    Worker Program. SBI, a performance-driven, department-wide enterprise
    will make dramatic changes in the border security system. It will cover
    every facet of how we sanction, manage, adjudicate, and remove persons
    caught crossing the border; deter illegal migration overall; manage
    immigration violators currently in the country; and interact with
    States and localities at the front lines of immigration and drug
    trafficking problems.
        Funding dedicated to SBI efforts facilitates a complete program
    encompassing many administrative, legal, and regulatory actions.
    Substantial resource enhancements provided in 2005 and 2006 will pave
    the way for an effective SBI program, and 2007 will be a turning point
    towards meeting long-term border security objectives.
        Among the key investments in the President's Budget for SBI is
    $458.9 million to increase the Border Patrol Agent workforce by 1,500
    agents, bringing the total of new agents added since 2005 to 3,000 and
    the overall total number of agents to nearly 14,000. This increases the
    size of our Border Patrol Agent workforce to 42 percent above the level
    prior to the September 11 attacks.
        To enhance our ability to protect the Nation's borders, the Budget
    includes $100 million for border technology to improve electronic
    surveillance and operational response. In 2006, DHS will solicit and
    award a contract to complete the transition from the current, limited-
    scope technology plan to one that addresses the Department's
    comprehensive and integrated technological needs to secure our borders.
    Funding requested in the 2007 President's Budget will provide
    significant procurement investments needed to begin an aggressive
    deployment plan.
        To fund the continued construction of the San Diego Border
    Infrastructure System (BIS), we are requesting $30 million. The project
    includes multiple fences and patrol roads enabling quick enforcement
    response and will give the United States full operational control of
    the most urbanized corridor of our border with Mexico.
        The Tactical Infrastructure Western Arizona (TIWAZ) is a critical
    multi-year project that will deploy approximately 84 miles of vehicle
    barriers and improve 150 miles of access and maintenance roads. The
    Budget includes $51 million for the deployment of this tactical
    infrastructure in Arizona which will enable the construction of 39
    miles of permanent vehicle barriers.
        To support the detention and removal of at least another 100,000
    apprehended persons annually, the budget includes over $400 million for
    an additional 6,700 detention beds and associated staffing and other
    expenses. This would bring the total number of beds to 27,500 in 2007.
    A key element of SBI is replacing a ``catch and release'' protocol for
    captured aliens with a ``catch and return'' process, requiring a
    substantial expansion of bed space. In addition, new bed space will be
    used to return criminal aliens upon release from State and local
    prisons, and address the problem of alien absconders defying orders of
    removal.
        The budget also includes $41.7 million for ICE worksite
    enforcement, to add 206 agents and support staff for this effort. A
    strong worksite enforcement program that continues to expand will send
    a strong deterrence message to employers who knowingly hire illegal
    workers; reduce economic incentive for illegal immigration; and help
    restore the integrity of employment laws.
        An additional $60 million is requested for ICE Fugitive Operations
    apprehension teams, adding a total of 18 teams, to a planned level of
    70 teams nationwide. In addition to shoring up our borders and
    improving workplace oversight, the Department will continue to increase
    efforts to catch the estimated 450,000 absconders around the country--a
    level that is growing every year.
        Outside of core SBI programs, the request level includes funding
    for other vital border security programs to include:
      --An increase of $62.9 million over fiscal year 2006 for total
            funding of $399.5 million is requested for US VISIT, a critical
            element in the screening and border security system towards
            ensuring better border security in a post-September 11
            environment. Included in the US VISIT initiative is $60 million
            in new resources to improve connection of information between
            DHS IDENT system and DOJ IAFIS fingerprint system.
      --CSI & C-TPAT. The request continues to support the Container
            Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs Trade Partnership
            Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which are critical in the
            prevention and deterrence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
            and other dangerous or illegal material importation. The Budget
            requests $139 million for CSI to pre-screen inbound cargo at
            over forty foreign ports and $55 million for C-TPAT to review
            and improve the security of partner organizations throughout
            the cargo supply-chain.

    Reform and Modernization of Immigration Management
        As Congress and the Administration collaborate to reform the
    immigration system in addition to improving border security, it is
    critical that the Department is ready to effectively manage any reform
    and implement a sustainable immigration management system.
        Among other things, the Budget includes resource initiatives for
    worksite enforcement, fugitive operations, employment verification, and
    U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) business
    transformation efforts.
        The request includes $135 million for the operation and expansion
    of the USCIS Systematic Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program
    which provides immigration verification services to State Departments
    of Motor Vehicles and other Federal and State agencies, and to expand
    and enhance the current Basic Pilot program to be ready to support a
    mandatory national electronic employment authorization verification
    system. The current Basic Pilot program is a voluntary electronic
    verification program enabling an employer to confirm the employment
    eligibility of newly hired employees.
        The President's Budget seeks a total of $112 million in fee and
    discretionary resources within USCIS to accelerate comprehensive reform
    and automation of existing business processes, including the
    modernization of critically needed information technology and actions
    to sustain improvements achieved in reducing the immigration processing
    backlog.
        Finally, as USCIS transforms its business processes, redesigns its
    forms, and improves service delivery and value to its customers, the
    agency will reform its fee structure to ensure the recovery of
    operational costs in line with Federal fee guidelines. Currently,
    application fees are not optimally aligned with the cost of each
    application, and improvements must be made for the long term to more
    effectively link regular and premium fees to specific service levels.
    This effort becomes even more important as USCIS operations are
    automated, forms are reduced and simplified, and USCIS prepares to take
    on substantial new activities including a Temporary Worker Program. The
    Department will continue to assess business model options for
    implementation of the TWP as consideration of the proposal moves
    forward in the Congress.

      IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY AND CREATE BETTER TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
         SYSTEMS TO MOVE PEOPLE AND CARGO MORE SECURELY AND EFFICIENTLY

        A core objective in establishing the Department was to strengthen
    the overall security capability of the Nation's transit systems and
    maritime security. Terrorist attacks on international transit and
    national maritime systems have driven the Department to implement
    rigorous security measures for the Nation's systems. The 2007
    President's Budget request includes initiatives that continue to
    support the objectives of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
    which was enacted to strengthen the transportation system and ensure
    the freedom of movement for people and commerce, by securing America's
    transit system from terrorists, criminal threats and attack; and the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, which was enacted
    to secure U.S. ports and waterways from a terrorist attack.
        A total of $4.7 billion is requested to support TSA's Aviation
    Security efforts. Of this amount, $692 million will continue support
    the deployment and maintenance of Explosive Detection and Electronic
    Trace Detection Systems which provide a higher probability to detect a
    wider range of explosives, and are critical to finding threats in
    transportation venues and eliminating their destructiveness.
        The President's 2007 Budget also proposes to replace the two-tiered
    aviation passenger fee with a single, flat security fee of $5.00 for a
    one-way trip with no change in the overall fee that may be charged on a
    one-way ticket. This is consistent with the screening process whereby
    you only pass through security once. The Budget also proposes to
    collect $644 million in air carrier fees ($448 million for fiscal year
    2007 plus $196 million owed from fiscal years 2005 and 2006). This is
    based on a General Accountability Office (GAO) estimate of what is
    reasonable.
        The Budget also seeks resources for the Domestic Nuclear Detection
    Office (DNDO) to support next generation technology to secure our
    transportation system. For example, a total of $30.3 million is
    requested to fund the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems
    (CAARS) Development initiative. The DNDO will execute the program
    developing advanced active-imaging radiography systems for cargo
    inspection at the Nation's ports of entry. The CAARS program will
    significantly improve throughput rates of imaging systems specifically
    designed to identify concealed nuclear materials threats.
        Funding of $157 million for the Radiation Portal Monitor
    Acquisition initiative will secure next-generation passive detection
    portals for deployment at official ports-of-entry to expose attempts to
    import, assemble, or transport a nuclear explosive device, fissile
    material, or radiological material concealed within cargo or
    conveyances and intended for illicit use. Consistent with the global
    nuclear detection architecture, the deployment strategy will be
    mutually developed by the DNDO and CBP.
        The Budget also seeks an increase of $12 million to support
    staffing needed by CBP to support the deployment of weapons of mass
    destruction systems deployed through DHS procurement programs. This
    increase will fund 106 positions and ensure CBP will have dedicated
    personal to resolve alarms from RPMs to conduct radiological
    examinations at our Nation's busiest seaports.
        For the U.S. Coast Guard, the President's fiscal year 2007 Budget
    requests a total of $934.4 million for the Coast Guard's Integrated
    Deepwater System (IDS), which is $10.7 million above the fiscal year
    2006 funding level. The Deepwater funding will continue the IDS
    acquisition of: the fourth national security Cutter (High Endurance
    Cutter replacement); the first Fast Response Cutter (Patrol Boat
    replacement); and additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). In
    addition, it will establish a second MPA-equipped air station; complete
    the re-engineering of the HH-65 helicopter, and significantly enhance
    legacy fixed and rotary wing aircraft capabilities. IDS Command,
    Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (C4ISR) upgrades to the USCG cutters, boats and aircraft
    will enhance maritime domain awareness and are critical to the
    achievement of an integrated, interoperable border and port security
    system.
        In addition to the C4ISR upgrades as part of IDS, $6.4 million is
    requested to support a number of initiatives to enhance Maritime Domain
    Awareness, including the necessary field infrastructure to expand
    SIPRNET capability support, which will protect Coast Guard systems from
    exploitation, and also provide prototype Sector Command Centers (SCC)
    and Joint Harbor Operation Center (JHOC) operations support. $11.2
    million is requested to continue implementation of Nationwide AIS to
    significantly enhance the ability to identify, track and exchange
    information with vessels. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests $10.6
    million to build off prior years' efforts to improve MDA, including
    operation and maintenance of the Maritime Awareness Global Network, as
    well as the deployment of 80 Nationwide AIS receivers and transmitters.
    Additionally, the $39.6 million requested for Rescue 21 will continue
    deployment throughout the country, providing a State of the art
    distress and response communications system.
        Finally, the Department seeks a total of $4.8 million for the Coast
    Guard's Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRT). Established to deter,
    protect against and rapidly respond to threats of maritime terrorism,
    the MSRT initiative expands upon the prototype Enhanced Maritime Safety
    and Security Team that was established by re-allocating base resources
    in fiscal year 2006. The unit will be capable of maintaining response
    readiness in the event of domestic maritime terrorism incidents.
    Enhance Information Sharing with our Partners
        The ability to share information with State and local partners, the
    private sector, law enforcement, and first responders is critical to
    the Department's success, and promotes greater situational awareness.
    DHS is prepared to enhance and maintain interoperability for
    information sharing purposes to ensure a seamless capacity to share
    information during national emergencies and to execute its daily
    mission of detecting and preventing potential terrorist activity.
        In support of this effort the Budget includes an increase of $45.7
    million, 18.1 percent over fiscal year 2006 funding, for activities of
    the Analysis and Operations Account to fund the Office of Intelligence
    and Analysis (I&A) and the Directorate of Operations. I&A leads the
    Department's intelligence and information gathering and sharing
    capabilities by ensuring that information is collected from relevant
    field operations and critical participants in the intelligence
    community; analyzed with a mission-oriented focus; and disseminated to
    the appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector partners.
        The Directorate of Operations distributes threat information
    ensuring operational coordination Department wide; coordinates incident
    management activities; uses all resources within the Department to
    translate intelligence and policy into immediate action; and provides
    oversight of the Homeland Security Operations Center, the Nation's
    nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management
    on a 24/7/365 basis.
        To support the Infrastructure Transformation Program (ITP), the
    Budget proposes an increase of $36.3 million. This increase will
    provide a highly reliable, secure, and survivable network
    infrastructure and data center environment to improve information
    sharing, more effectively securing the homeland while reducing
    redundant investments. ITP will integrate the IT infrastructures of the
    22 legacy components of the Department into ``One Infrastructure''
    which includes the creation of one secure network; the establishment of
    common and reliable email communication; the restructuring of helpdesks
    and related services; the reduction in number and transformation of the
    data centers; the standardization and modernization of the desktop
    workstation and site services environment; and voice, video and
    wireless infrastructure modernization.
        The Budget also includes an increase of $9 million for Data Center
    Development. The Department will continue the integration of its IT
    infrastructure ``Dual Active/Active Data Centers'' that provide a
    foundation for information sharing and agile responses to threats
    against the homeland. The Data Center Development activity plays a
    central role within the ITP, supporting the Department's strategic
    planning priority of ``Stronger Information Sharing and Infrastructure
    Protection.''

    Strengthen the DHS Organization to Maximize Mission Performance
        Sound financial management of the Nation's resources is critical to
    maximizing mission performance for the Department. The President's
    Budget aligns the Department's request according to a risk-based
    allocation method, channeling the Nation's resources into the areas
    that will most effectively accomplish the mission of the Department.
    Successful mission performance is driven by developing human capital,
    executing efficient procurement operations, and possessing state-of-
    the-art information technology resources.
        A key enhancement to the Budget includes an increase of $12.6
    million to improve financial management department-wide. This includes
    funding to improve DHS' internal controls over financial reporting, as
    required by Public Law 108-330, the Department of Homeland Security
    Financial Accountability Act; analyze opportunities for further
    functional consolidation of segments of Departmental financial
    management; support the Department's plan to achieve an unqualified
    audit opinion with no material weaknesses; produce financial data that
    is timely, reliable, and useful for decision-makers in their mission to
    properly allocate resources to protect the Nation; and help protect
    against waste, fraud, and abuse.
        A total of $18 million is requested for the eMerge2 (electronically
    Managing enterprise resources for government efficiency and
    effectiveness) program. eMerge2 will continue to consolidate accounting
    providers and systems in the Department by matching components
    positioned to become service providers with those in need of new
    systems. eMerge2 will invest in system enhancements, integrate systems,
    and build tools to consolidate financial data, ensure accountability,
    and provide timely, reliable information for decision making.
        In addition, we propose an increase of $41.8 million for the Office
    of the Chief Human Capital Officer to continue implementation of the
    Human Resources System Initiative--MAXHR, a market and performance-
    based compensation system that rewards employees for their
    contributions to the mission of the Department, not longevity.
        The Department has identified organizational performance
    deficiencies in the current procurement process and will implement
    comprehensive modifications to prevent fraud and misuse; and ensure
    effective delivery of services and proper procurement and contracting
    procedures. For this effort, we propose an increase of $27 million
    throughout the Department to improve acquisition operations.
        Finally, the Office of Policy requests an increase of $8.1 million
    to provide funding to support DHS participation on the Committee on
    Foreign Owned Investments in the United States under the Policy office;
    expand duties of the International Affairs office; enhance capabilities
    of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC) to work with private
    sector stakeholders; and increase efforts to oversee immigration and
    border security related initiatives.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The fiscal year 2007 budget proposal reflects this administration's
    ongoing commitment to protecting the homeland and the American people
    while ensuring the Department has the resources we need to achieve our
    critical mission. The budget builds upon past success and
    accomplishments, reflects risk-based, outcome-driven priorities, and
    supports the key imperatives under our Second Stage Review.
        We will continue to work with Congress to ensure that our short and
    long term priorities are adequately funded--including border security,
    preparedness, strengthening FEMA, and enhancing chemical security. I
    look forward to continuing our partnership with you to ensure funding
    priorities are met so that we can continue to protect the homeland and
    the American people.
        Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look
    forward to answering your questions and to working with you on the
    fiscal year 2007 budget and other issues.

              REPORTED DHS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DUBAI PORT DEAL

        Senator Gregg. Thank you Mr. Secretary and obviously your
    statement will be put in the record, and I appreciate the
    background on the ports because it's a sophisticated system
    you're trying to put in place. However just to clarify the
    record here, there's been reports that when the initial review
    of the Dubai situation came through that the dissenting agency
    immediate approval was the Homeland Security Department. Then
    there have also been reports as we have read, that the Coast
    Guard had specific concerns which may have been applied
    generally to other issues but in this area was particularly in
    response to Dubai? Is that correct? Did the Homeland Security
    Department initially object or raise opposition in any way to
    the immediate approval, or the approval of this--
        Secretary Chertoff. I think the way that gets reported
    reflects a misunderstanding of the process. First of all the
    Department of Homeland Security and all the departments
    generally in this process, there's an ongoing discussion. It
    doesn't--it's not like a formal vote to start the process. It's
    more like a jury ballot; you know it takes a lot of votes. As I
    think Assistant Secretary Baker has indicated previously DHS
    raised certain concerns and the agreement by everybody was
    those concerns ought to be addressed through assurances and
    safeguards which the company agreed to. Those assurances and
    safeguards satisfied us and everybody else on the committee
    that any concerns that were on the table about the impact of
    this on port security would be adequately--more than adequately
    addressed. Because it gave us total visibility into who the
    people were who were going to be over here; a total ability to
    insist upon adherence to the highest security standards we
    impose anywhere; and an ongoing ability for us to monitor
    compliance. So I think with these elements in place and I don't
    think there was any substantial disagreement about going
    forward and getting these elements. But with these elements in
    place, we were certainly satisfied that we had everything that
    we needed, the Coast Guard was satisfied that there was nothing
    more that they wanted to get in terms of assurances. As I say,
    we did get the benefit not only of use of our own intelligence
    component, but the community takes a position, and, of course,
    each department has its own intelligence element. And the final
    thing I would say is, this was not an unknown company to us.
    Customs and Border Protection has worked with this company for
    several years, including overseas and that obviously was a
    significant comfort level in terms of our assessment of the
    transaction.
        Senator Gregg. That being said why is the administration's
    position now that they're willing to delay further. It sounds
    like you have all the information you think you need.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well again, I want to make sure we're
    accurate. It's been announced publicly, although I haven't seen
    that the letter has come in yet, that the company has indicated
    the intent to send a letter asking us to begin a 45 day
    investigation. I don't know that that's ever happened before.
    Whether it has or it hasn't, if we were to receive such a
    letter and I haven't seen it yet, I anticipate we would honor
    the company's wishes. I understand that there's clearly an
    issue of being transparent, of assuring Congress and the public
    that what we've done is a thorough vetting. It's not only that
    we have to do the right thing; we have to be seen to have done
    the right thing. So if the company wants us to pause and
    undertake this review I see no reason why we wouldn't do that.
    But I don't think that's in any sense a concession that somehow
    we think we did something inadequately before.
        Senator Gregg. I don't know how much time I have left, let
    me turn to Senator Byrd, and I'll come back if there's time.

                   CLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON THE DUBAI PORT DEAL

        Senator Byrd. For over a week Chairman Gregg's request and
    my request, my staff's request for a classified briefing have
    been rebuffed. The decision to allow Dubai Ports World to
    operate terminals in six of our major ports was done without
    consultation with the Congress. It was done without
    consultation with the State and local governments near the
    ports. It was done without notifying the Congress. Would you
    commit to provide the subcommittee with a classified briefing
    this week?
        Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
        Senator Byrd. Including providing the community
    intelligence analysis that was used to make the decision?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well whatever--I don't know the exact
    elements of the briefing that we do, but as far as I'm
    concerned we will--in the context of a classified briefing give
    you whatever--the reason I hesitate is I don't own that
    document. And I can't commit to provide a document that I don't
    own. Certainly my Department will provide a briefing and
    whatever classified documents, our Department documents can be
    part of that briefing.

      DHS REQUESTED TO GARNER ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
                   BORDER SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

        Senator Byrd. The budget that you are presenting today
    finally gets the administration and your Department fully
    behind the bipartisan congressional desire to secure our
    borders. This effort started with the amendment that Senator
    Craig and I offered through the Iraq war supplemental with the
    support of our Chairman, Senator Gregg. Congress has taken the
    lead in hiring more border patrol agents and immigration
    enforcement officers and in providing more detention capacity.
    I'm hopeful that this budget request is the first year of a
    multi year effort at gaining true security of our borders.
        To continue that effort, 2 months ago, Chairman Gregg
    attempted to secure an additional $1.1 billion for border
    security infrastructure. I supported his effort at that time,
    to make sure that the agents and investigators that we're
    hiring have the tools to do their jobs. I continue to support
    him. I see no reason to wait another 7 months for the fiscal
    year 2007 budget. Now will you commit to us today to reach out
    to the White House and the House Republican leadership, to get
    their support for Chairman Gregg's efforts?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I am always more than happy to
    commit to taking back to my colleagues in the administration
    and anywhere else advice from this committee about how we ought
    to proceed. I mean we are strongly committed to a comprehensive
    strategy at the border which includes not only additional
    personnel, and we have 1,500 thanks to Congress' action last
    year. We're in the process of getting them trained and
    deployed, we have 1,500 in this budget we are working on a
    comprehensive technology package through our secure border
    initiative which would allow us to actually start acquisition
    later this fiscal year of an integrated approach to using
    technology as a tool at the border.
        Senator Byrd. Does that mean that you will commit to reach
    out to the White House and to the House Republican leadership
    to get their support for Chairman Gregg's efforts?
        Secretary Chertoff. It means I will be always happy to
    reach out and discuss with great seriousness the--this
    committee's effort to make sure we have adequate funding at the
    border. I think it's consistent with this budget. I think it's
    consistent with our strategy, and I look forward to working
    with this committee in doing that.
        Senator Byrd. So the answer is yes?
        Secretary Chertoff. I've been about as clear as is in my
    capability to be. I will certainly carry this committee's
    message back and have a very serious discussion about what this
    committee thinks is appropriate which I think is consistent
    with what our views are.
        Senator Byrd. So it's yes, maybe.

                        STRENGTHENING MARITIME SECURITY

        Your budget embraces the bipartisan congressional effort
    begun in the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental for
    security at our land borders. The administration is promoting
    what it is calling the Secure Borders Initiative. But the
    initiative makes no mention of securing our wide open waterways
    and coastlines from illegal migration. When you strengthen
    security at the land borders those who wish to enter this
    country illegally will pursue other entry points. The
    administration's own national strategy for maritime security
    States, that, and I quote, ``as security in our ports entry at
    land border crossings, at airports continue to tighten,
    criminals and terrorists will likely consider our relatively
    undefended coastlines to be less risky alternatives for
    unlawful entry into the United States.'' Unfortunately your
    budget fails to address the future weakness. The Coast Guard's
    Deepwater budget is flat as far as the eye can see. The Coast
    Guard needs a 21 century fleet of ships and planes.
    Unfortunately they have a fleet fit for the last century. The
    Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is currently the 37th oldest of
    world's 39 like size naval fleets. The Coast Guard Commandant
    has testified that Coast Guard ships and planes are in a
    declining readiness spiral. Under your Deepwater budget, the
    acquisition of new planes, helicopters and ships won't be
    completed until 2026. Twenty years from now, so the rest of you
    will have to look after that. Given these concerns, how can it
    be that you are satisfied with the Deepwater budget?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well Senator, first let me say that we
    fully agree, in fact, part of our operational planning in terms
    of border security reflects an understanding that we're going
    to get more pressure at our coastal borders as we tighten up on
    our land borders.
        Senator Byrd. Are you satisfied with the Deepwater budget?
        Secretary Chertoff. I am. We've got almost $1 billion in
    this year's budget. And a significant amount of money in Coast
    Guard's budget directed at re-engineering assets so that we
    take helicopters that may be old, but we really outfit them
    with brand new engines and brand new avionics. I also want to
    point out that the budget this year includes a 15, 1-5 percent
    increase over last years levels for Coast Guard's supports,
    waterways, and coastal security program. That's an additional
    $274,000 million for this kind of coastal security.
        Senator Byrd. I believe I've overrun my time.
        Secretary Chertoff. So we are actually putting increased
    money precisely into Coastal security area of Coast Guard.

                     PASSCARD TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

        Senator Byrd. I'll wait my turn.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
        Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman? I wonder if Senator Allard
    would be willing to let me go first. And I realize that
    normally you'd go next, but I've just been told that I have to
    Judiciary, and I wouldn't get a chance to question otherwise.
        Senator Allard. I'd be glad to yield to the chairman from
    Vermont, and I would assume that I would be called on next.
        Senator Leahy. I thank my friend showing his usual courtesy
    and Mr. Secretary, I mentioned this briefly when you came in. A
    lot of people asked you about ports, we don't have ports in
    Vermont we do border with a great and good friend of the United
    States, Canada. And we're like many border States we're highly
    skeptical about the development of the border crossing card.
    The so called ``Passcard.'' I understand that you have some
    legislation you've paged. But I would suggest that we--to be
    looking for different legislation and you should be leading
    that charge.
        Aside from whether it's good policy or not, we've got an
    economic and cultural train wreck on the horizon, these cards
    are threatening all kinds of bottlenecks along the most
    efficient, safest, and longest border in the world certainly,
    the longest unguarded border. And I'm concerned about it. DHS
    and the State Department are promoting two different
    technological infrastructures for the card. DHS is promoting an
    open UHF design, that's what we do to track freight pallets. If
    it's open--if this open standard is adopted and is not secure,
    it may actually reduce safety on the border, not only is it
    less secure, it's completely different than what Custom and
    Border Patrol is installing now to read information off of
    chips with the new E-Passport. So it looks like they have to
    have one set of technology for that, a separate technology for
    less secure items, and they could be easily stolen. It's become
    very, very confusing but it also ignores something else. The
    northern border is not our southern border. Our situation with
    Canada, our largest trading partner is much, much different
    than it is with our southern border. It disregards our Canadian
    friends and neighbors. I think it's counterproductive. I think
    along in our State people have families on both sides of the
    border. The difficulty is going to be in crossing, I think it's
    going to create certainly in my State, it will create enormous
    costs but I don't see where it does anything for our security.
        So my question is, why are you supporting this ultra high
    frequency standard, the same thing we do on commercially
    tracking pallets on a truck? Why not support the standard that
    is being used on E-Passports? It seems like everybody's going
    off in different directions, it was probably a dumb idea in the
    first place, but it just gets worse.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well let me answer Senator by saying
    first of all I don't think a decision's been made, in fact what
    I've said, and I've talked to Secretary Rice about this, I
    think we've both agreed and I think we've announced it, is that
    we actually ought to migrate to a common standard. I would be
    very surprised and dismayed----
        Senator Leahy. Well you're sure not going in that direction
    now, you're going in an entirely different one.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, I mean if there are people who
    think they're going in a different direction, maybe the final
    decision hasn't been made. I'm pretty committed to going in a
    single direction. Meaning, I want to have a chip, some kind of
    an RFID chip that is compatible. Whether we do it in a
    passport, or an border crossing card, or in some other kind of
    card.
        Senator Leahy. Well, but Canada is not moving on something
    like this. I mean you're talking about doing this by January 1,
    2008. Is that even realistic? If you don't have a common
    technology now, I mean how realistic. Have you even asked for
    money to get a common technology? I mean I can just see a
    complete screw up on the border come January 1, 2008. Certainly
    our closest friend in this hemisphere is going to be like what
    happened? Are we pariahs?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well first of all, you know we're
    facing a legislative deadline, and I think we have an
    obligation to make the deadline. We have money for----
        Senator Leahy. But you haven't reached a common technology
    yet, how are you going to do that?
        Secretary Chertoff. We've actually been in discussion with
    the State Department. And I think we announced a few weeks ago
    that we actually do have--we are working toward a common
    technology, so I will take back certainly your concern, if
    people are sending you a different signal.
        Senator Leahy. Well take back this concern too Mr.
    Secretary, frankly as a life long Vermonter I live an hour's
    drive from the Canadian border, as one who actually has
    relatives in Canada, who understands the economics of dealing
    with Canada, this is a cockamamie idea. I can show you dozens
    of places where if a terrorist wanted to get through they could
    get through with or without this. But I can show you where law
    abiding people in the United States and Canada will be shut off
    from visiting out of this country. It seems like almost doing
    something for the sake of doing something, not really to
    protect us.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do need to push back on that a
    little bit. Right now, what we use for identification crossing
    the borders is not particularly as useful. I mean, we get all
    kinds of documentation. We do ask for documentation, unless
    were to waive all identification requirements, and just let
    people come and go willy-nilly. It seems we owe the American
    public at least the kind of identification document that is
    biometric and that is secure. It doesn't have to be--
        Senator Leahy. I've crossed that border without being asked
    for identification.
        Secretary Chertoff. But I have to tell you with respect
    Senator, so did Ahmed Ressam, he crossed the border, but for
    the--
        Senator Leahy. And he got caught.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well he did, but you know if it hadn't
    been for an alert Customs and Border Protection person, he
    would have blown up Los Angeles Airport, and then we would have
    had a 9/11 Commission to talk about why we didn't have
    identification cards.
        Senator Leahy. Why not work on something with the
    Canadians. You can't even come together with our own State
    Department, can you get together with the Canadians?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well we are more than happy--first of
    all we are getting together with the State Department, we are
    more than happy to work with the Canadians. Look, let me tell
    you what our end State vision here is. Essentially a driver's
    license type of card. With an RFID chip that works the way
    proximity readers work all over office buildings in this city
    that is inexpensive, that is compatible whether it's issued out
    of Canada, or Mexico, or the United States. I believe we can do
    this. We've got a prototype in the works, I completely endorse
    the idea of a common technology and--or at least a compatible
    technology and not going off in two separate directions. If
    there are people in the Department who think they're going to
    proceed in a different direction, I will certainly address
    that. I think it's doable. I think we're legally obliged to it.
    And I think it actually is a good thing to do.
        Senator Leahy. Well thank you Mr. Chairman. And I thank
    Senator Allard, and I will obviously submit some questions for
    the record, and I hope they don't go into a deep dark hole. I
    hope somebody well actually answer them. It would be nice I
    mean. This is always unprecedented, but nice. Thank you.

                                 PORT SECURITY

        Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
    for holding this important hearing. And likewise I'd like to
    thank the Secretary for taking time to appear before the
    committee. I'd also recognize that the Department of Homeland
    Security, a new department was called to duty in important,
    challenging and unprecedented ways last year. And I think I
    want to recognize in a public way that there were a lot of
    employees of the Department, you have over a 180,000 who did
    their job, and they did it well, and I want to commend them for
    that.
        Now during the course of the year we learned that there are
    some areas where the Department excels and we learned that
    there are some areas where it needs improvement. That's why I
    think this hearing is so very important, so we can pursue some
    of those. I want to follow up a little bit on the port
    question. I have some security concerns. Not so much in the
    short term, but in the long term. You know that part of the
    world, all those countries together, have not proven to be
    sterling examples of how you recognize terrorists and how you
    control them from getting into your operation. Are you
    comfortable with how--there's going to be turnover in that
    company, and are you comfortable with how new personnel may
    come into that company, the kind of background checks and
    everything that they may be required to do, and whether there
    is going to be something that, over time, could assure the
    American people that this may not convert over to where you
    have a terrorist or two infiltrate the organization?
        Secretary Chertoff. I am, Senator. And let me explain why
    for a moment. The change that is being envisioned here, is the
    change in the port terminal operator in the United States of
    America. Obviously foreign ports are always operated by
    foreigners, because they're in foreign countries. In terms of
    the workforce, first of all we will know any change in
    management, or any change in personnel. We'll have the
    opportunity to check them against our watch lists, or even
    require a more in depth background check. With respect to the
    longshoreman force that actually is generally handled by a
    hiring hall. Those are not regular employees of the port
    terminal operator, they are hired everyday based on the way the
    union, or if it's not a union, the non union halls send people.
    So those aren't going to be regular employees of the company,
    many of them are background checked according to the ports.
    We're actually going to take some steps in the near future to
    increase the level of background checking.
        And finally, if there is a desire on the part of the
    company, and this is not just this company, any overseas
    company. If any overseas company wants to send people into the
    United States to manage operations here, they've got to get a
    visa. Which means we're going to check them, we're going to
    determine that we're comfortable with them. We're going to run
    them against our watch lists. We're going to do what we would
    do anytime somebody wants to come and work in the country. So
    contrary to some of the reporting, the company, no foreign
    company has the ability on its own to decide they're going to
    send somebody to the United States to work in a port without
    our knowing about it and approving it as part of the visa
    process.

     FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS TO MINIMIZE SPENDING, WASTE AND FRAUD

        Senator Allard. I'd like to move on, I think we've covered
    that issue, perhaps enough. But we've provided, meaning the
    Congress, has provide $87 billion, and dollars already
    allocated in addition to that. The Department's requesting
    additional $19.8 billion to meet what they described as
    emergency needs. Anytime you have a large outflow of dollars
    there's bound to be some waste. I'm interested in knowing what
    kinds of mechanisms you put in place to try and keep the waste
    down to a minimum, try to keep fraud down to a minimum, so that
    we have some accountability, as we move forward in the
    spending.
        Secretary Chertoff. We have an oversight board in place a
    Katrina Oversight board, in place to look in general at the
    gulf and how we're spending money. From the very beginning of
    this post Katrina effort, really the first week, we got the IG
    involved right up front in terms of helping us try to design
    programs that we thought would minimize the amount of fraud and
    waste. We recognized that particularly in the initial weeks
    when there was a real sense of emergency and crisis, we might
    have to bend some of the normal rules, because people were
    literally thrown out of their houses with barely the clothing
    on their back. But we've got an oversight board in place now.
    The IG, I think, has established a separate Assistant I.G.,
    Inspector General, simply for the purpose of dealing with the
    Katrina--
        Senator Allard. And have they been submitting reports to
    you on a regular basis?
        Secretary Chertoff. They submit reports to the Inspector
    General, and I will get from the Inspector General, reports
    about what the status of this is. And of course Congress will
    as well.
        Senator Allard. So you've been getting those?
        Secretary Chertoff. I don't know if I recall personally
    seeing one, I know the Inspector General has been getting them,
    and I've been getting oral reports, and reports about
    particular problems that have been arising.
        Senator Allard. Has he pointed out some flaws and perhaps
    maybe some corrections that needed to be made?
        Secretary Chertoff. The Inspector General has; some of the
    flaws he's pointed out have been publicly revealed. We are
    taking steps trying to correct those, frankly some of the steps
    require us to address in advance of this hurricane season,
    contracting so we get some of the things in place before we
    actually get into the emergency situation. And you know, I
    consider the Inspector General a part of our management team,
    in a sense, that we take very seriously his suggestions. And in
    particular the Deputy Director of FEMA who is responsible for
    the gulf, is really tasked to work very closely with the
    oversight board and the Inspector General for the gulf in terms
    of making sure we are constantly monitoring these things.
        Senator Allard. I know my time has expired, if I could
    just--I want to follow up this. Who do we have on that
    oversight board?
        Secretary Chertoff. You know as I sit here I can't tell you
    the names of the people, let me get you that list.
        Senator Allard. Yeah, a list and backgrounds, if you would
    please. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        [The information follows:]

                            Katrina Oversight Board

                   UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT: JANET HALE

        Janet Hale was confirmed on March 6, 2003, as Under Secretary for
    Management. Prior to her nomination and confirmation as Under
    Secretary, Ms. Hale served as the Assistant Secretary for Budget,
    Technology and Finance for the U.S. Department of Health and Human
    Services (HHS), and as chief financial officer and chief information
    officer.
        Prior to HHS, she was the Associate Administrator for Finance for
    the House of Representatives and the Associate Director for Economics
    and Government at the Office of Management and Budget, responsible for
    budget and policy development, regulatory reform, and financial
    management for the departments of Treasury, Transportation, Commerce,
    Justice, and 25 smaller agencies. Ms. Hale has also served as the
    Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs at the Department of
    Transportation, Acting Assistant Secretary of Housing at the Department
    of Housing and Urban Development, Vice President with the U.S.
    Telephone Association, and Executive Vice President for the University
    of Pennsylvania.
        She graduated from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, with a
    Bachelor of Science in Education and received a Master in Public
    Administration from the Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of
    Government.

                ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER: EUGENE H. SCHIED

        Eugene H. Schied is the acting Chief Financial Officer of the
    Department of Homeland Security. His permanent position is that of
    Deputy CFO. Mr. Schied became the Department of Homeland Security's
    first deputy chief financial officer in December 2004. In this
    capacity, he supports the CFO in the day-to-day management of DHS'
    budget, financial reporting, working capital fund, resource management
    transformation, performance and planning, and investment review
    operations. He is helping to lead the transformation of independent
    legacy financial management operations and systems in DHS into a
    cohesive corporate entity capable of achieving and sustaining the
    highest financial management standards. Mr. Schied also served as DHS'
    budget director from May 2003 until March 2004.
        In between his positions at DHS, he was the budget director at the
    Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which provides
    budget and financial support to the Federal Judicial System.
        Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Schied was the deputy chief financial
    officer of the Department of Justice, where he served in the position
    of deputy assistant attorney general/controller from March 2001 until
    May 2003. He first joined the Department of Justice in 1992 as a
    Presidential Management Intern, and held various positions of
    increasing responsibility within the Department of Justice, including
    holding the position of chief financial officer of the Drug Enforcement
    Administration.
        Mr. Schied holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the
    Ohio State University School of Public Policy and Management and a
    Bachelors of Arts in political science from the University of Iowa (Phi
    Beta Kappa). Prior to moving to the Washington, DC area, Mr. Schied
    worked for the City of Peoria, Illinois, City Manager's Office.

                   CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER: ELAINE C. DUKE

        Elaine C. Duke is the Chief Procurement Officer for the Department
    of Homeland Security. She provides leadership over the department's
    over $11 billion in contracts and $12 billion in financial assistance
    programs. Ms. Duke was the department's Deputy Chief Procurement
    Officer from October 2005 to December 2005, when she assumed duties as
    the acting Chief Procurement Officer. In January 2006, Ms. Duke took
    over the full responsibilities as the department's second procurement
    chief. Before coming to the headquarters, she served for two years as
    the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Transportation Security
    Administration.
        Ms. Duke spent the majority of her career in acquisition with the
    U.S. Navy. She completed her final tour with the Navy at the Naval Sea
    Systems Command in Washington, DC. She was Director, Office of Contract
    Policy as well as the Deputy Director, Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical
    Division in the Contracts Directorate. Prior to her tour with Naval Sea
    Systems Command, Ms. Duke served on the staff of the Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy (Installations & Environment), working the base
    closure and realignment program.
        Ms. Duke also held various positions with the Naval Facilities
    Engineering Command. She began her career as a contracting officer for
    the U.S. Air Force. In addition to her work in the Department of
    Defense, Ms. Duke served as the Deputy Director of Contracting and
    Property Management for the Smithsonian Institution and Director of
    Acquisition and Grant Services for the Federal Railroad Administration.
        Ms. Duke has a Bachelor of Science degree in business management
    and a Master's degree in business administration.

                 ACTING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS: ROBERT F. SHEA

        Mr. Shea was named Acting Director of Operations for FEMA in
    support of Acting Director Robert David Paulison in February 2006. In
    this position, Mr. Shea is responsible for implementing policies and
    procedures on behalf of the FEMA Director and overseeing the day-to-day
    response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness activities of FEMA,
    part of the Department of Homeland Security.
        Mr. Shea's 29-year career in public service has touched on all
    phases of FEMA's emergency management roles including preparedness,
    response, recovery and mitigation along with all areas of functional
    responsibility including operations, planning, logistics and
    administration. Beginning as a FEMA Disaster Assistance Employee, Mr.
    Shea has taken successively more challenging roles from program analyst
    to branch chief in the former State and Local Programs and Support
    Directorate, to division director and then deputy administrator and
    finally acting Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation
    Administration in FEMA.
        In 2004 Mr. Shea was detailed to the Office of the Secretary,
    Department of Homeland Security where he confronted the new challenges
    of the post September 11 environment by supporting the issuance of the
    National Response Plan, the initial formation of the Principal Federal
    Official program, and the implementation Special Events Program. These
    responsibilities brought him into contact with each of the 22
    components of DHS.
        Mr. Shea resides in Alexandria, VA where he and his wife, Mary
    Hope, have raised four daughters, Sofia, Michele, Hope, and Victoria.

                     INSPECTOR GENERAL: RICHARD L. SKINNER

        Mr. Skinner was confirmed as the Department of Homeland Security
    Inspector General on July 28, 2005. Between December 9, 2004--July 27,
    2005, he served as Acting Inspector General. He held the position of
    Deputy Inspector General Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since
    March 1, 2003, the date that the Office of Inspector General was
    established.
        Prior to his arrival at DHS, Mr. Skinner was with the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), where he served as the Acting
    Inspector General (October 2002--February 2003) and Deputy Inspector
    General (1996--2002). From 1991 to 1996, Mr. Skinner served at FEMA OIG
    as the Assistant Inspector General for Audits. In 1998, he received the
    President's Meritorious Executive Rank Award for sustained superior
    accomplishment in management of programs of the United States
    Government and for noteworthy achievement of quality and efficiency in
    the public service.
        From 1988 to 1991, Mr. Skinner worked at the U.S. Department of
    State (DOS) OIG. During his tenure at DOS OIG, Mr. Skinner served as a
    senior inspector on more than a dozen foreign and domestic inspections
    and in 1991, Mr. Skinner was appointed by the Inspector General to
    serve as the ``de facto'' Inspector General for the Arms Controls and
    Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
        From 1972 to 1988, Mr. Skinner held a variety of audit management
    positions with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department
    of Commerce (DOC). He began his Federal career in 1969 with the OIG of
    the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
        Mr. Skinner holds a B.S. degree in Business Administration from
    Fairmont State College and an MPA degree from George Washington
    University.

                   DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL: JAMES L. TAYLOR

        James L. Taylor was selected as Deputy Inspector General effective
    October 16, 2005. He previously served as the Deputy Chief Financial
    Officer (CFO) and Director for Financial Management at the Department
    of Commerce. In this role, he also acted as Chair of the CFO Council
    Policies and Practices Committee. Under his direction, the Department
    of Commerce obtained the first of six clean financial statement audit
    opinions and reduced material weaknesses from 11 to 0. Mr. Taylor led
    the Department's successful effort to obtain a ``green'' rating on the
    Financial Management Initiative of the President's Management Agenda.
        Prior to his work at Commerce, Mr. Taylor held the position of
    Deputy Chief Financial Officer at the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA), where he was directly responsible for all financial
    operations, with expenditures of over $4-10 billion annually.
        Immediately prior to joining FEMA, Mr. Taylor served as Assistant
    Administrator for the Federal Insurance Administration, a self-funded
    activity charged with managing the National Flood Insurance Program,
    where he was responsible for all financial, personnel, facilities,
    strategic planning and other administrative operations and policy.
        Mr. Taylor has been the recipient of numerous awards for
    outstanding accomplishments, including the Presidential Rank Award for
    Distinguished Executive in 2004; the Donald T. Scantlebury Memorial
    Award for Excellence in Financial Management in 2005; the Gold Medal
    for Outstanding Achievement in Financial Management in 2003; and the
    Director's Award for Outstanding Achievement in 2000.
        Mr. Taylor holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science/Economics
    from Old Dominion University and an MPA in Finance from the University
    of Delaware.
        special inspector general: matthew (matt) a. jadacki, cpa, cgfm
        Mr. Matthew ``Matt'' Jadacki is the Special Inspector General for
    Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery, under the Office of Inspector General,
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS/OIG). He joined DHS/OIG in
    October 2005. The Gulf Coast Hurricane Recovery Office focuses on
    preventing problems through a proactive program of internal control
    reviews and contract audits to ensure disaster assistance funds are
    being spent wisely
        He is also responsible for coordinating the audit activities of
    other Federal Inspectors General who have an oversight responsibility
    for the funds transferred to their respective departments and agencies
    by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assist in the
    disaster relief efforts.
        Prior to joining DHS, Mr. Jadacki was the Chief Financial Officer/
    Chief Administrative Officer (CFO/CAO) of the National Weather Service,
    a component of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    (NOAA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). Before the National
    Weather Service, Mr. Jadacki was the Acting CFO of FEMA, managing
    eleven branches with over 200 employees and a $12 billion budget. Prior
    to FEMA, he worked in the U.S. Department of State from 1987 to 1991 as
    an Audit Manager and in DOC as an Operating Accountant/Auditor from
    1981 to 1987.
        Mr. Jadacki holds a B.S. in Business Management from the University
    of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, and is both a Certified Public
    Accountant and Certified Government Financial Manager. He holds
    memberships in a number of societies, including the Association of
    Government Accountants, the American Institute of Certified Public
    Accountants, and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants.

                                   PASS CARDS

        Senator Gregg. Senator Murray.
        Senator Murray. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I echo the
    comments of the chairman and ranking member, we welcome you
    here. You've got great people but, Mr. Secretary I'm not very
    happy today. I joined Senator Leahy in his deep concern about
    our borders. The confusion is incredible. He mentioned a 2008
    deadline. It's 2007 for ferries. We have people who cross our
    border on land, don't need a passport, get back on a ferry and
    come back and they can't get back in the country because they
    don't have a passport. We're told about these one day passes.
    This is a whole topic of conversation. It isn't working. And
    I'm going to be submitting some questions on that. I want to
    talk about port security today.

                             PORT SECURITY FUNDING

        You came before our committee last year, we gave you a
    pass, you were new on board, but you've got tremendous
    influence on this budget that we've been given. And I was
    curious that your presentation on sea port and cargo security
    was fairly long today, but in your testimony that you provide
    us last week you didn't mention port and cargo security, and
    that's been my concern about the administration since September
    11. We hear rhetoric, we do not see any action. I've been
    calling for a port and cargo security initiatives for almost 4
    years now, and in a comprehensive plan.
        There's 360 ports in our Nation today. I don't go to bed at
    night thinking that we're secure in our port system despite the
    rhetoric and the nice talk you gave about we look at things
    overseas. I don't feel we're very secure. And I look at your
    budget today where you're cutting back major programs, killing
    major programs. Port security program, formula base grants to
    States, training and exercise, port security grants, I mean I
    look through this and I say where's the money? And I hear you
    say you take the information back. Who are you taking it back
    to? You're the Secretary, and it should be you standing in
    front of all of us saying we have to do this. I just feel like
    maybe the DP World has kind of brought this to Nation's
    attention. But we have not done enough on port security.
    Senator Collins has been fantastic, she and I have worked
    together to produce a Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act,
    that is a comprehensive cargo secure regime. We would like to
    get your input back on that we've been working with everybody.
    But it has been very hard to get this administration to put
    their money behind their talk on Homeland Security. And I for
    one, again, do not feel that this Nation is secure when it
    comes to our ports, our cargo, and the millions of containers
    that come in here everyday.
        So my first question to you is when are we going to see a
    comprehensive port security plan. Are you going to get behind
    Senator Collins and I, are you going to ask for the resources
    that we need? We hear the White House say don't worry about
    this deal about UAE DP World because security is being done by
    our Nation. Yet, I've had Secretary Ridge before you come
    before our committee and others who say Federal Government has
    done their part on port security, it's now up to the private
    companies who run these ports. So I hear a really mixed
    message.
        Secretary Chertoff. And I think the answer is, I'd like to
    try to unpack the different elements of this, because there are
    several different elements. I certainly do not believe that the
    Federal Government is finished with port security and something
    which I said last summer, and I think I said it in January, is
    one of our major initiatives has to be to push out the security
    envelope in the supply chain.
        Senator Murray. Right, and you outlined that in your
    testimony and I know that you say the words. But are you going
    to get behind the Green Lane Maritime Cargo Security Act that
    Senator Collins and I have written and have worked hard to make
    sure that we have a secure regime in place?
        Secretary Chertoff. I don't know that I'm in a position
    right now to take a definitive position on a particular act.
    But what I can tell you is, we're committed, first of all, to
    continuing what we're doing in the overseas, finishing the
    overseas container security initiative, but beyond that, moving
    further down the supply chain. Just a few weeks ago, I was in
    conversations with the major shippers to talk about how we can
    take advantage of the architecture to get better security as we
    push further down, even to the point where things are initially
    manufactured overseas and start their way up the supply chain.
        Senator Murray. I've been hearing that rhetoric for years.
        Secretary Chertoff. But I have to say, I mean that's why I
    went through the exercise of putting the charts up. I don't
    think it's fair to say we haven't made progress. I mean----
        Senator Murray. Well I agree with you we have made some
    progress, we have the radiation port monitors; we've got some
    things in place. We are looking at some of the containers
    overseas today. But we don't have the authority overseas today
    to stop one of those containers from being loaded onto one of
    our cargo container ships. We have a lot of work ahead,
    wouldn't you agree with that?
        Secretary Chertoff. I agree we have work ahead. And I agree
    in particular we've got some----
        Senator Murray. Well and I guess my--and I only have a few
    seconds left. My concern is this budget doesn't reflect the
    need to really focus on cargo and container security and that's
    why the red flags on this whole issue. That's what really
    concerns many of us. I am out of time. I want to have this
    conversation with you; I would like to sit down with you. I
    know Senator Collins would as well. We need to do more.
        Secretary Chertoff. I would be happy to do that.
        Senator Murray. And I would say this, I know my great
    friend from Maryland is going to talk about the Coast Guard
    budget too, but I'll you what, under this proposal 63 percent
    of the Coast Guard budget is directed to Homeland Security.
    They need the money. They're doing a fantastic job out there. I
    don't think any of that should be disregarded. But I look at
    your budget and I see that the Coast Guard's budget on search
    and rescue is cut $31 million, on natural resource protection
    cut $56 million a total cut from traditional missions of $87
    million. In my home State of Washington, we count on the Coast
    Guard for search and rescue, fisheries protection, making sure
    that they are watching our very, very complex coast line and
    when all they hear is their only mission is Homeland Security
    that doesn't make our country very strong when we see 63
    percent of their budget now go to Homeland Security and they're
    losing out on their critical missions, their life saving
    missions that are important to State's like mine and other
    coastal States.
        Secretary Chertoff. I would welcome the opportunity to talk
    to you about this. Let me just make a couple of observations.
    This year our total amount of port security related funding in
    the 2007 budget request will be over $3 billion, about $500
    million more than was enacted for 2006. As far as the
    percentage of Coast Guard that's considered Homeland Security
    funding, I have to say, in some ways, I mean I always look at
    all of it as Homeland Security funding. But one measure of how
    Coast Guard has performed, and the fact that we haven't
    compromised its other missions, is the magnificent performance
    down in New Orleans last summer where we got more rescues than
    in several of the previous years, 33,000 rescues and I think
    that shows----
        Senator Murray. The Coast Guard does a fantastic job.
        Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. The capabilities are
    there.
        Senator Murray. But they are getting burned out. And that
    is a deep concern to many of us in the coastal States. And just
    so you know, much of the funds you're talking about in terms of
    ports are legacy funds. You're not asking for new funding and
    the Commandant of the Coast Guard said it was going to cost
    $7.3 billion over 10 years for our ports just to comply with
    the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The administration
    has only asked for $46 million, a tiny part of that. I don't
    see how we can continue to do this, and continue to put the
    costs on the private companies that operate our ports and feel
    secure.
        Secretary Chertoff. If I can respond to that, I know that
    everyone's out of time. I would simply say this: I mean the
    private port owners actually do have to step up to the plate
    and do some of the funding, I will tell you for example----
        Senator Murray. But Mr. Secretary that's exactly what the
    President said last week, was that we don't need to worry we
    are in charge of security. Yet you just said that the private
    companies need to step up and do it.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well in terms of some of the funding
    support for example. I don't see why----
        Senator Murray. But if it is their funds, then they're in
    charge of it.
        Senator Gregg. Senator, we're going to have to move on.
        Secretary Chertoff. Let me just give you a concrete
    example. I think that we are clearly responsible for the
    security. On the other hand, I don't think we should pay for
    the fencing for a private company to build fencing and
    lighting. I think we ought to make them pay for it. Now if they
    don't pay for it, we ought to penalize them. There ought to be
    a mandate, and we do mandate it. We mandate a lot of businesses
    have to take certain kinds of precautions to protect
    themselves. I think that's completely consistent with what the
    President said, which is we have the responsibility for
    security, we have to check it. But that doesn't mean we're
    going to pay private companies to do what they ought to be
    doing to protect their own assets.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        Senator Gregg. Senator Mikulski.
        Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, and
    you're the right person to be chairing this committee. I recall
    you were the first subcommittee on Appropriations along with
    the help of Senator Byrd and Senator Stevens, to hold hearings
    on terrorism. Well before 9/11 and your keen interest is very
    much appreciated. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my
    opening statement be in the record.
        [The statement follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski

        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I wanted to start off by saying that Mr.
    Chairman you are the right person to be chairing this committee. I
    recall that you were the first subcommittee chairman on the
    appropriations committee along with the help of Senator Byrd and
    Senator Stevens to hold hearings on terrorism. You held these hearings
    well before the tragedy of September 11. Your keen interest in securing
    our homeland and protecting this country from terrorism is very much
    appreciated.
        Good morning Secretary Chertoff. I want to thank you, the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and all of the staff at DHS, as
    well as all of our security agencies, who work so hard to keep this
    country safe. It's good to be here with you today to discuss the
    President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Last year at this time you had just been sworn in as the new
    Secretary of DHS. This past year has certainly been a busy year for the
    Department. It has been full of major challenges such as Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita, and has been ridden with major failures. At the top
    of that list was the failure of the Department and a failure of our
    Nation's emergency response and preparedness to the hurricanes and the
    people who were in desperate need of help.
        The President's budget for next fiscal year claims to provide $35.7
    billion to the Department of Homeland Security, which is a 6 percent
    increase over last year. But if you take away the President's proposal
    to double the airline security tax from $2.50 to $5, the budget is only
    a 1 percent increase over last year's level. This concerns me.
        I am pleased that there are small increases to two important grant
    programs: the State Homeland Security Grant Program which has been
    increased by $88.1 million and the Urban Area Security Initiative
    Grants which has been increased by $82.5 million. These are important
    programs and I am happy to see that both have been increased.
        However, I am very concerned about the cuts to key first responder
    grant programs. The SAFER Act or firefighter staffing grants have been
    completely eliminated, the Emergency Management Performance Grants was
    cut by nearly $12 million and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
    Grants have been totally eliminated.
        But I want to address three issues specifically with you today
    about the Department of Homeland Security fiscal year 2007 budget: The
    P&O/UAE Deal and Port Security, immigration application backlogs for
    military service members and fire grants.
        First of all, the P&O/UAE Deal and Port Security Grants. I have
    worked for many years on the Port of Baltimore, from dredging to port
    security. So you can imagine my concern when I learned of a foreign
    government-owned company taking over the Port's operations. I got
    really angry when no one in the administration seemed to know about the
    deal not the President, not the Secretaries of Treasury or Defense not
    you.
        After further inquiry, I learned that the deal was approved quickly
    and secretly. The decision was made behind closed doors by the
    Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, an entity that
    most Americans don't even know exists. The Committee on Foreign
    Investment in the United States has 12 members: the Secretaries of
    State, Defense, Commerce and Homeland Security, the Attorney General,
    the Secretary of Treasury, and six officials from the White House. The
    six White House officials are: the Director of Office of Management and
    Budget, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Chairman on the Council of
    Economic Advisors, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
    Policy, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
    and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
        The decision to outsource our ports was made in only 30 days and I
    am left with many questions about the decision. At what level did this
    Committee meet? Did Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, Attorney
    General Gonzales and Secretary Snow sit around and decide this? Or was
    it delegated to the coordinator of the coordinator? Was the FBI
    consulted? What about the Director of National Intelligence?
        This decision is about national security. The national security
    threats facing our ports are real. I have said before that our ports
    continue to be vulnerable to the infiltration of terrorists, the use of
    commercial cargo containers to smuggle chemical or biological weapons
    or even a dirty bomb, the intentional sinking of large commercial cargo
    ships that could result in loss of life and block access to major
    shipping channels, and the use of land around the port to stage attacks
    on bridges, or our waterfront chemical and oil refineries.
        Port operators play a vital role in insuring that these threats do
    not become realities. The President tells us not to worry the Coast
    Guard will continue to protect our ports. Yet, the Coast Guard is
    already stretched too thin. They have increased responsibilities with
    only slight increase in their budget. The Coast Guard is charged with
    protecting 300 ports, more than 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals,
    more than 1,000 harbor channels, all of which are spread along
    thousands of miles of coastlines.
        Our Coast Guard is one of the most efficient and effective of all
    Federal agencies weren't we proud of them following Hurricane Katrina?
    The Coast was there when we called on them. We need to ensure that we
    are there for them and that the Coast Guard has the assets it needs to
    been these challenges. The Coast Guard estimates that more than $5
    million is needed for port security improvements. Yet, the President's
    budget eliminates funding for the Port Security Grant Program a $175
    million cut from last year. Our ports are essential to national
    security and border security. I look forward to working with you to
    ensure the security and viability of the Port of Baltimore for now and
    in the future.
        Now I want to turn to the issue of immigration application backlogs
    for men and women serving in the U.S. military. This is an issue that
    is close to my heart. Currently there are over 40,000 non-U.S. citizens
    serving in the U.S. military today. Many of them want to be come U.S.
    citizens but are caught up in red tape and paperwork and immigration
    backlogs. Today there are about 3,000 applications pending at DHS for
    service members applying for U.S. citizenship Spc. Kendell Frederick,
    an Army reservist from Randallstown, Maryland got caught up in this
    immigration backlog. His mother. Mrs. Michelle Murphy tried to help him
    but she got the run around from immigration about what her son needed
    to do to complete his citizenship application. He ended up being killed
    in Iraq before he could become a U.S. citizen.
        This should not have happened. Mr. Secretary, I want to ensure that
    the men and women who have put themselves on the line, fighting for
    this country are treated with the respect and professionalism they
    deserve, including when they are applying to become U.S. citizens. DHS
    should be working to ensure that resources are used to eliminate the
    backlogs and improve the information these members receive.
        It is crucial that service members and their families receive
    accurate information when they call customer service at immigration and
    that immigration forms reflect the current state of the law.
        That has not always happened and this is why I introduced the
    ``Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act.'' This bill is meant to
    improve the process for those men and women fighting for this country
    to become U.S. citizens. I hope that you will join me and support this
    important legislation.
        Finally, I want to address another important issue fire grants. We
    all know that when tragic events occur in our community, firefighters
    are always the first on the scene. The Fire Grant Program offers double
    value for American taxpayers firefighters get the training and
    equipment they need to do their jobs safely whether they are responding
    to a terrorist attack or a tornado.
        FEMA and the National Fire protection Association found that an
    estimated 57,000 firefighters lack personal protective clothing one-
    third of firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained
    breathing apparatus. The Fire Grant Program supports our firefighters
    by giving them the equipment and training they desperately need. But
    this is not about new fire trucks and protective gear. It's about
    protecting the protectors and saving lives. So I look forward to
    working with Members of the Committee in addressing this funding
    shortfall.
        Thank you Mr. Secretary and look forward to your testimony today.

        Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman and colleagues, I'm going to
    focus on three issues. The Dubai ports, second the issue of
    immigration where our military who have green cards and how
    they're treated in a terrible backlog and number three, the
    short sighted funding of our first responders.

                                  DUBAI PORTS

        On the reports, Baltimore is one of the six ports affected
    in this Dubai deal, so we're pretty much on the edge of our
    chair wondering what it means in terms of port security. Here
    is my question Mr. Secretary, you're a member of the committee
    that's--the CFIUS that's supposed to do this. Do you personally
    attend the meetings or do you delegate that authority?
        Secretary Chertoff. The general procedure, which was also,
    by the way, the procedure that was followed when I was at the
    Department of Justice, and as far as I know is the procedure in
    every department is that the--I know the committee does a lot--
        Senator Mikulski. Do you go or do you delegate?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I have to--you've got to give me
    an opportunity to answer the question.
        Senator Mikulski. Well, I've got 5 minutes.
        Secretary Chertoff. I want to answer the question
    accurately. The practice of all departments is, first of all,
    there aren't a lot of meetings where everybody sits around.
    There's a lot of telephone and email. An Assistant Secretary is
    the level that generally conducts activities. If there is an
    issue that is raised, it comes up to the Deputy and to the
    Secretary. So I have on individual cases been involved
    sometimes very deeply----
        Senator Mikulski. Were you involved in the Dubai port?
        Secretary Chertoff. I was not involved in the Dubai port
    deal prior to its--the no objection, going from our department
    to the committee.
        Senator Mikulski. Were you aware of the Coast Guard yellow
    flashing lights that they raised?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I've read the Coast Guard memo,
    including the classified.
        Senator Mikulski. When did you read it?
        Secretary Chertoff. I read it about a week ago. And I will
    tell you I must respectfully disagree with your
    characterization. I don't see it as a flashing light. I have
    seen countless intelligence reports, you've got to let me
    finish. I've seen countless intelligence reports that quite
    properly conclude by analyzing what is known, and then
    indicating that there are things that are not known. The piece
    of this report which was not widely reported yesterday, but was
    finally declassified is the Coast Guard's conclusion in this
    report. Which was an early report that DP World's acquisition
    of PNO in and of itself does not pose a significant threat to
    U.S. assets in U.S. ports.
        Senator Mikulski. Mr. Secretary, I read intelligence
    reports too, I'm on the intelligence committee. Moving right
    along here, are you now going to be personally involved in this
    45 day----
        Secretary Chertoff. I strongly suspect I will be.
        Senator Mikulski. No, I didn't ask if you suspect, sir.
        Secretary Chertoff. Of course I will be involved in it.
        Senator Mikulski. Directly and hands on. Will there
    actually be a meeting of this committee where you, Rumsfeld,
    Secretary Snow, Attorney General Gonzales, in other words those
    named will actually do this. Because it has enormous impact in
    terms of security, public confidence, and also relationships
    with people abroad.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I agree with you it's very
    important. I will be personally involved. I'm not going to
    speak for other Secretaries; you'll have to ask them what their
    degree of involvement is going to be. I have actually been
    personally involved in this since the last couple of weeks when
    it became clear to me this was going to become a matter of some
    controversy. I can't say that I looked at every scrap of paper,
    but I certainly intend to be involved----
        Senator Mikulski. What criteria will be used to determine
    if there is a national security----
        Secretary Chertoff. The same criteria I would use with any
    company, any foreign company, or any foreign country. I would
    judge the risk, I will look at the assurances that we have
    obtained and the guarantees from the company and I will satisfy
    myself that these put us in a position to eliminate any
    material risk with respect to foreign ownership. And in doing
    that I will certainly consult with the chief intelligence
    officer in my department, the experts in Customs and Border
    Protection and the experts at the Coast Guard.
        Senator Mikulski. And will you be coordinating with Mr.
    Negroponte, our Director of National Intelligence?
        Secretary Chertoff. Yes. I will speak to him too.
        Senator Mikulski. And we'll look forward to the classified
    briefing. Is my time up?
        Senator Gregg. No Senator, as I said we'll extend your
    time. We wanted to make sure you got the questions in, so why
    don't you go on to your next question there, and then Senator
    Kohl's next.

                           MILITARY IMMIGRANT BACKLOG

        Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and
    Colleagues, I don't know if you're aware but there are members
    serving in our United States military who are not American
    citizen's but possess green cards. They fight bravely, they
    fight valiantly and they're doing a good job. I had a
    constituent Kendal Frederick who actually was in the high
    school ROTC before the military. Anyway he was jerked around by
    immigration services, as was his mother, saying that his
    fingerprints didn't count that he had given to the military to
    become a citizen. Well the military took pity on him, and in
    Baghdad arranged for him to go get his fingerprints after
    Immigration told him he had to return to Baltimore. You with
    me? From Baghdad, he would have loved to come back. He died on
    his way to getting his fingerprints. So I've looked into this
    situation, I've got legislation pending and now this goes to my
    question, even though other things have been rebuffed.
        Mr. Secretary there are 3,000 men and women fighting who
    have green cards that have a back log with your Department.
    What are you doing about the backlog?
        Secretary Chertoff. We discussed this, and first of all I
    completely agree with you that we ought to make a special
    effort with respect to making sure our service personnel are
    not held up with green cards. I wasn't aware the backlog was
    3,000. I'm certainly prepared to tell you that we should move
    heaven and earth to put these soldiers to the front of the line
    and figure out a way to cut through the red tape. I've conveyed
    that direction to Citizen and Immigration Services, I will
    certainly be pleased----
        Senator Mikulski. I really need you to insist upon it, and
    look at it.
        Secretary Chertoff. I agree. I'm onboard with that.

                   DHS ACTIVE DUTY FINGERPRINT VETTING POLICY

        Senator Mikulski. Number two, the issue of fingerprints. In
    other words when you join our military, you're fingerprinted
    and you're vetted. We understand that there is now a bottleneck
    with your agency accepting the vetting process and fingerprints
    of DOD. What is your plan to correct that?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I have not heard that there was a
    problem with it. If there is an issue with respect to the
    quality of the prints, I mean that's, I guess, an issue we have
    to address with DOD going forward. If the prints are of
    sufficient quality and it's just a question of getting them
    compatible with our databases, we ought to be able to sold
    that, particularly because the numbers aren't that large.
        Senator Mikulski. But nothing's happened.
        Secretary Chertoff. As I say, I was not personally aware
    there was a fingerprint backlog, but I will find out about it.
        Senator Mikulski. It's not a fingerprint backlog; it is a
    policy that is what's good enough for the Department Defense to
    accept someone to serve our country is not good enough for you.
        Secretary Chertoff. I mean that doesn't make any sense to
    me, so I agree with you in principle, now as often is the case,
    when I go back I get----
        Senator Mikulski. You get a buzz and I'm tired of the buzz.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well----
        Senator Mikulski. We've been buzzed.
        Secretary Chertoff. All I can tell you is, I believe you
    are correct. We should be able to use DOD fingerprints. If
    there is somehow a problem with the way the prints are taken,
    we have to figure out how to correct that. And we'll get back
    to you.
        [The information follows:]

              DHS' Active Duty Military Fingerprint Vetting Policy

        CIS agrees with the Ombudsman's concept and intent to improve the
    fingerprint process for military naturalization applicants, but CIS
    does not concur with waiving the fingerprint-based criminal history
    check at this time.
        CIS recently initiated efforts with the U.S. Military and the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to reengineer the fingerprint
    process specifically for active duty military customers. Several
    meetings and numerous discussions have occurred exploring the
    possibility of waiving the CIS fingerprint requirement by relying on
    background checks performed by the military at the time of enlistment
    as well as post-enlistment background checks. Unfortunately, each of
    the four branches of the military employ independent enlistment
    processes and, even though a fingerprint check is conducted at the time
    of enlistment, post-enlistment background checks are not routine.
    Further, the military has confirmed that post-enlistment arrests and
    charges are not necessarily known by the military. Therefore, because
    no measures are in place with the military to ensure naturalization
    ineligibility issues of criminality are identified, CIS cannot concur
    with waiving the fingerprint requirement.
        Though CIS does not concur with waiving the fingerprint check, CIS
    does recognize of the importance of military service and the special
    needs of military personnel. CIS, in conjunction with the military, FBI
    and Office of Personnel Management (OPM), is developing a fingerprint
    process that will eliminate the need for a soldier to appear anywhere
    for another fingerprint appointment. Under this process, when an
    application for naturalization is filed, the fingerprints previously
    collected by the military at time of enlistment will be forwarded to
    CIS and resubmitted to the FBI for an updated check. The details of the
    process are as follows:
      --At time of enlistment fingerprints are collected by the military
            and forwarded to the FBI through the OPM
      --The FBI performs a criminal history check, forwards results back to
            OPM, and the FBI retains the fingerprints in a history file
      --Upon receipt of a naturalization application submitted by an active
            duty military member to the Nebraska Service Center (NSC), the
            NSC will notify CIS staff at the FBI to request the
            fingerprints from the FBI for resubmission
      --Once retrieved by the FBI, the fingerprints are forwarded to the
            NSC in hard-copy format
      --NSC converts the fingerprints into an electronic format and
            resubmits the prints to the FBI through CIS' electronic
            fingerprint system. The fingerprint images are also
            electronically stored at CIS
      --Fingerprint transaction data and the FBI's search results are
            posted in CIS' fingerprint system and viewable globally
        The process improvement described above is only a first step. CIS
    envisions additional enhancements as the Biometrics Storage System
    (BSS) becomes available and the military considers possible changes at
    the enlistment stage to automatically provide fingerprints to CIS.
    Additionally, CIS is discussing with the military the concept of the
    military establishing a background check infrastructure to certify
    their personnel as having ``good moral character,'' along with other
    less significant fingerprint process changes.

        Senator Mikulski. This is the functional equivalent of
    March 1. Could we look at this before April 1?
        Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
        Senator Gregg. I'm going to move on to Senator Kohl.
        Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
        Senator Gregg. And by the way Senator, I'm sure you're
    going to be able to straighten this out, because you're on the
    same wave length. But if you can't, I'm sure we can figure out
    how to do something in the bill.
        Senator Mikulski. I'd like to discuss this with you further
    Mr. Chairman. And thank you, I hope I haven't run into your
    time.

                                DUBAI PORT DEAL

        Senator Gregg. Senator Kohl.
        Senator Kohl. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, to
    return to the issue that's been discussed once or twice here
    today. This deal failed to pass the smell test with the
    American people as you know, which is why we're here discussing
    it today in such great detail. And as you know, top
    administration officials, including the President, Secretary
    Snow and yourself, were unaware of the deal until after it was
    approved and announced. And so now, we're talking about a 45
    day delay while it goes through a review process. But the
    President has already said that the deal is a proper deal, and
    I think you're more or less saying it today. So why would any
    of us have great confidence in any chance that you're going to
    come back in 45 days and say, guess what it's not a good deal.
    It's not the right deal, you think many people really believe
    that's going to happen?
        Secretary Chertoff. First of all let me make it clear. I
    don't care whether its 30 days, or 45 days, if new facts were
    to come to light, obviously we would act on the new facts. And
    you know no one has yet asked us to do a 45 day review. There's
    been press accounts, but I haven't seen a letter yet. So I'm
    not going to anticipate a letter that hasn't come yet. But
    look, the bottom line is the facts speak for themselves. We're
    going to give classified briefings, you had 12 or 14 agencies
    looking at this, nobody--once we had the assurances in place
    and they're very, very substantial assurances nobody raised an
    objection to this deal going forward.
        And let me spend just a moment talking about the
    assurances, because I think maybe this is an item that escapes
    public attention. The whole point of the assurances is, it
    makes it clear that it's not like we're done with the process
    of vetting the company. The assurances give us the authority
    and obligation to continue vetting the company for the next
    months and years. And it gives us an unprecedented ability to
    do that. So it was always contemplated, once these assurances
    were signed that we would have the Coast Guard and Customs and
    Border Protection on a port by port basis, deeply engaged in
    the process of reviewing what is going on in those terminal
    operations, who the personnel are, what the security situation
    is. So I basically reject the premise of the criticism that
    somehow once we completed the review and allowed the
    transaction to go forward, we somehow then are done. The
    assurances were in fact designed to make sure we have a
    continuing involvement in the process of security, just as we
    do by virtue of the Coast Guard's inherent authority of
    Captains of the Ports. This happens to be one of those few
    areas where we have agencies that are so deeply involved on an
    ongoing basis, that we have much greater ability to assure
    security than in most sectors of the economy.
        Senator Kohl. I appreciate that, and again what you're
    saying leads me to conclude that in fact this deal is intended
    to go forward by the administration. And I think you're making
    that very clear right now with all the assurances and so on,
    and the President has said that he would veto any attempt by
    the Congress to override that decision. So I'll leave the
    issue, but I think the impression has been made clear that you
    all are intending to go forward with this, in a way which gets
    by the furor that is immediately surrounding it, to a time when
    it could be done--so you know, that's the impression I have,
    you may disagree with that. But I'd like to leave it. I want to
    ask you a question----
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I'm sorry Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't
    like to leave a hearing, a public hearing, and have my silence
    be taken as acquiescence. If we were to be asked to undertake a
    45 day review, we would do it honestly. At the end of the day
    though, the facts are the facts. We will see what the facts
    are. And that means the facts about what the intelligence is,
    what our current security authorities are, what the security
    posture is and what the company undertakes.
        Senator Kohl. Okay.
        Secretary Chertoff. So we'll deal with the facts as they
    are.
        Senator Kohl. In connection with that, I'd like to talk
    about foreign ownership of ports, not ownership in fact but
    ownership of the operation of the ports. Many people are
    arguing that our ports should never have been turned over to
    foreign governments in terms of operations. Legislation, as you
    know, has already been introduced to ban any such deals. And
    we're living in a post 9/11 world. Having been repeatedly
    warned about the vulnerability in our ports I think that this
    legislation deserves serious consideration. How do you feel
    about the principle of having foreign owned companies, deeply
    involved in the operation of our ports?
        Secretary Chertoff. I think in evaluating this proposed
    legislation Congress ought to consider the fact that obviously
    many of our port terminals are operated by foreign countries
    including for example China, which I think acquired a port in
    the late 1990s. PNO itself is a foreign owned company. Almost
    all of our shipping companies are foreign owned and obviously
    if you're going to start to talk about foreign ownership you
    need to talk about the shipping companies, and of course most
    importantly the foreign ports which is where the cargo gets
    loaded therefore where the greatest vulnerability exists. By
    definition, foreign ports are foreign owned because they're in
    foreign countries. So, I guess what I would say from a risk
    management standpoint is, I always caution against the idea of
    focusing very hard in a particular anecdotal issue that arises,
    without stepping back and looking at the whole framework and
    asking where the highest risk is.
        To be honest I think the highest risk in our maritime
    system is what happens overseas, because there's where cargo
    gets loaded. And a lot of our emphasis has to be, without
    suggesting domestic ports aren't important, a lot of what we've
    got to do in terms of further work is extend our security
    overseas. But I have to acknowledge that foreign ports will
    always be operated by foreign companies because they're in
    foreign countries. So we're going to have to live in a global
    world, and I think we need to make sure as we do so, we're
    fair, we have a level playing field, we don't treat, you know
    countries that are friendly are treated in like fashion. We
    should be able to distinguish between our friends and our foes.
    I think it would be a very bad message if people in the Middle
    East for example were to walk away with the feeling that even
    when they're friendly we treat them dismissively. I think all
    foreign companies raise concerns. I think we ought to treat
    those concerns in a manner that's even handed, focuses on the
    facts, and make sure that we treat our friends well and our
    foes not so well.
        Senator Kohl. Well you're right, and this legislation
    that's been introduced is not directed against any part of the
    world as you know, its legislation that says all of our port
    security in this country should be handled by operations owned
    in this country. So it's not in anyway an aspersion on the
    Middle East.

     NECESSITY OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP LONGEVITY AND POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCIES
                              DUE TO DHS' ENORMITY

        One final question if I may take just a minute. DHS is an
    enormously complicated operation as I'm sure you would attest.
    In terms of it's budget, in terms of its mission, in terms of
    it's number of personnel. I would ask you whether or not, if
    it's going to be operated effectively, somebody needs to be in
    a position of authority like yourself for a long, long, long
    time. And pursuant to that, do you think that DHS is too big to
    be operated effectively for example, with respect to FEMA and
    what happened in Katrina, whether or not FEMA deserves to be an
    independent agency; some of the things that FEMA controls
    deserves to be broken away from DHS. How can DHS be as diligent
    as it must be, and needs to be, if it's such a gargantuan
    organization?
        Secretary Chertoff. I've given that obviously a
    considerable amount of thought in the year that I've been on
    the job. And let me give you two answers, first of all I think
    emphatically, there is value in having this as a single
    organization. It doesn't mean it's easy to integrate. I mean
    it's not easy to integrate and DOD took 40 years. But you know
    in the end DOD produced a product, a combined joint services
    approach to military operations which by all accounts is much
    better than the way it operated when we had three separate
    departments. If you look at what happened in Katrina, the best
    results occurred when we operated in an integrated fashion,
    using the whole department. When Admiral Allen came onboard he
    really was committed to using all the assets of the department
    as PFO and he did so, and he did so effectively.
        When we stepped in as a department and we were able to
    apply our resources at TSA to help manage evacuations, or Coast
    Guard to do rescues. That was when the Department did best.
    When the Department failed is when people decided to go it
    alone. And I am strongly convinced if we were to set--if we
    were to reverse course, separate FEMA out, we'd now create a
    fissure or a fault line between two of the critical elements of
    response. And it would make coordination that much more
    difficult, it would make the ability to build FEMA into what it
    deserves to be that much more difficult. I think that we were
    on course to do the right thing with integrating. I will tell
    you we didn't get there, we weren't there when I arrived, and I
    think I was pretty honest in saying to people we needed to do a
    lot more work. I said it in July, and I draw no comfort from
    the fact that it was proven to be right in August. I think
    though the original design makes a lot of sense. These are all
    prevention, protection, and response, and all a spectrum of
    things we have to use for all hazards whether they be natural,
    whether they be terrorists. We will often not know when we
    could have a outbreak of disease, we wouldn't know if it was a
    terrorist attack, or a natural attack, you know anthrax, for
    example, occurs in nature, but it also can be weaponized. So I
    think that having an integrated approach that learns to use all
    of the tools anytime we have a hazard or a challenge actually
    makes a lot of sense.
        I do though recognize you know, we're 3 years into this. It
    took DOD 40 years to do Goldwater-Nichols, Senator Bennett says
    it took 5 years to get the Department of Transportation right.
    I'm committed to doing the job in less time, but I would be
    less than honest if I didn't tell you that it's not going to be
    done in a week, and I don't think anybody thought it was going
    to be done in record time. So we've got a lot of work to do.
    We've accomplished a lot. I'd be the first to tell you we've
    got a lot of areas where we got to do a lot more work in. But I
    think the course we have now is the right course.
        Senator Kohl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

             DHS' ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FEMA'S CAPABILITIES

        Senator Gregg. Thank you Senator. And we want to let you
    get to the work of which you have a lot to do, but I just want
    to make a couple of comments and then ask a couple of specific
    questions. On this concept of organization, I'm not so sure I
    subscribe to your view. You know, I was here a little bit
    before you got here in this fight; and in fact before 9/11 we
    tried to address this issue and we ended up with a tug of war
    between FEMA and what was then called National Domestic
    Preparedness Office which was in the Justice Department as to
    who would control first responders, and whether FEMA was the
    right agency to deal with first responders in a terrorist
    event. And FEMA came in and co-opted the NDPO and then you
    split it off now, and moved it up to a Secretary level, and so
    there's real issues here of management. And it seems to me that
    it really gets to the capacity of an agency to handle an event.
    That should be the way we should look at it. I think the White
    House has done the right thing, and this Townsend report, I
    don't know what the official title is, but just reading it I
    haven't talked to her. But it seems to me that you've got to
    grade the catastrophe. The event's level of impact and if you
    have a flood in New Hampshire on a major river like we had,
    FEMA does a great job and it should be the response agency. If
    you have a middle level catastrophe but it's contained, such as
    9/11, FEMA again may be the right agency to come in, in
    coordination with a lot of other agencies. But when you get to
    one of these catastrophic events, where you're essentially
    wiping out--what happened was it wiped out a city and a region,
    FEMA is not capable of handling it period. And nor probably is
    the Department of Homeland Security, you just do not have that
    capacity and you're probably going to have to use the
    Department of Defense capability. And so I think there's got to
    be some structure which grades the event before the integration
    occurs as to who is in charge. And then gets those people on
    the ground that should be in charge fast, which was the problem
    in Katrina. We didn't have the right people there. If the
    Department of Defense had charge of New Orleans, those people
    wouldn't have been left at the Super Dome. They would have been
    out of there because we would have had helicopters, and we
    would have had what was needed.
        And so I think the White House is on the right track, I
    know you're very integrated in that process, but this idea that
    FEMA should have responsibility for every major catastrophe in
    this country is I think a huge mistake. I mean there are some
    things they simply aren't going to be able to handle. Also
    whether or not domestic God-driven strategies should be within
    the organization called the Homeland Security Department. And
    when you're time is 50, or 60, or 70 percent, and I suspect it
    was at least that high during the peak of the Katrina event,
    maybe 100 percent of your time is focused on a domestic
    catastrophe because your agency is not functioning well in that
    catastrophe, that's drawing off resources. It's drawing off
    attention from what is the threat, which is the terrorists are
    coming across the border with something that's going to harm
    us, or they're here and they're going to harm us. And so I'm
    just not sure that we shouldn't have some sort of quasi
    independent effort here on the issue of domestic God driven
    events. And I guess we shouldn't blame God for these events,
    but events that have nothing to do with human input. So I don't
    accept necessarily the thesis of your position yet, and I think
    it needs to be looked at in a much more aggressive way, and I
    respect and congratulate the leadership you and the White House
    have given with this Townsend initiative.

                               TSA HIRING FREEZE

        A couple of specific questions, TSA is under a hiring
    freeze, it's been under a hiring freeze for 2 years, I
    supported that freeze the first year, I've supported it the
    second year, you can't continue it. It's clear they're having
    huge attrition; they're using massive overhead dollars, I
    think, to get through the day; there are morale issues, I
    believe, that are developing that are very serious within that
    agency. We're bringing online technology which should reduce
    the need for personnel, but it's not there, it's not working
    yet. In fact these puff machines I understand they take more
    time wiping them down than they save time putting people
    through them. This budget because of the way it's been
    structured basically continues that freeze.
        First question, can this agency continue to function
    effectively and maintain the respect of the public if it is
    under this type of a personnel freeze. Second, if we lose this
    $1.6 billion that has been put in here as a ``here today, gone
    tomorrow'' budget number, a plug, how does your Department
    function?
        Secretary Chertoff. With respect to the first question, I
    think you know, ultimately over time we need to migrate to a
    more efficient, more technologically driven system. But that's
    not going to happen over night as you say Senator. One thing
    that we are trying to do though is change our protocols to
    begin to move to a more efficient use of screeners. One of the
    things that Assistant Secretary Hawley has done for example,
    he's started to retrain them not to focus on the nail and
    scissors, but to focus on detonators and detonators pieces,
    behavioral pattern recognition, this of that sort. Putting more
    of our screening personnel into--and other security personnel
    out into the area of the airport in general rather than having
    them clustered at the area where we do the magnetometer.
        So I think he is actually working very hard to find a way
    to leverage the resources that we have to make them more
    efficient.

                           TSA PASSENGER FEE INCREASE

        I guess we come back to the fee, and look I have a very
    simple position, I think it's the right thing to do. Let's put
    aside whether I'm being a Don Quixote here, but if I didn't
    think it was the right thing to do that would be a different
    story. I think it's a fair price to ask passengers to pay, and
    rather than----
        Senator Gregg. Let me ask you to pause there. Even assuming
    that's true. Under the budget that you sent up here, the fee
    doesn't go to passengers. It goes to border security. So you're
    asking the airline passengers to pick up this cost, now you can
    argue that it's all the same pot, its fungible. But there's no
    increase in TSA personnel even though the fee goes up.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well there is, I mean I guess my answer
    is, it is all the same pot, and it does fund research into new
    technologies, deployment of replacement machines in order to
    deal with other machines. I mean at the end of the day, if we
    didn't--if we had a gap of $1.6 million, I have no doubt some
    of the impact of that gap would be felt in TSA operations. And
    you know at the end of the day, you have to say to the
    industry, a world in which we had to plug a gap and it wound up
    giving us longer lines at the airports and more inconvenient
    airport situations; it would not be a happy situation for the
    airlines. I mean maybe the answer is if we look--you know if we
    don't--if we did have a gap to plug, maybe the answer is we
    should look to plug the gap at least in part where the
    beneficiaries who should be paying the money are located. So
    that at least the cost is visited upon those who don't want to
    pay the fees. I am hopeful that we can figure out a way to come
    up with an appropriate fee. We retooled it this year; we came
    up with a different approach, if someone has a better, fairer
    way to do it, I'm open to hear about a better, fairer way to do
    it. But at the end of the day this was Congress' original
    vision, that this expense ought to be borne by those who
    benefit from it, and I think we ought to insist on that.
        Senator Gregg. Well under that logic there should be a
    border crossing fee.
        Secretary Chertoff. You know you could--I tell you for
    example with respect to immigration services. We charge----
        Senator Gregg. I'm not talking immigration, I'm talking
    about the person who drives across the border from well there
    aren't too many who drive across the border from New Hampshire,
    but you know from Vermont to Canada or from Brownsville to----
        Secretary Chertoff. I think Congress recognized when it
    passed the original transportation security plan; that the
    extraordinary expense of transportation security; keeping that
    system safe was an extraordinary burden and should be borne at
    least in part, because it's not entirely borne by the fee, but
    it should be borne at least in part by the fee. Coast Guard
    charges fees for certain kinds of activities. It's not unknown
    for the----
        Senator Gregg. Well should there be toll booths at the
    borders so that you're actually tying the fee to border
    security and not to airline security.
        Secretary Chertoff. And I think there though, the benefit
    you can argue about border security is distributed so widely
    across the country that everybody benefits and everybody ought
    to pay. Airline security and I think this was Congress'
    position when the legislation was passed, you know people who
    never got on an airplane don't really benefit. The benefit
    really goes to the passengers. And therefore, while we
    shouldn't require them to pay the entirety of it having them
    bear a share doesn't seem unreasonable. You know some people
    disagree obviously. I actually think though that there's a lot
    of merit to that position, and we're talking about a
    comparatively small increase. I mean if we were talking about a
    huge amount of money, I think that would be different. But at
    the end of the day, a net raise of $2.50 for you know, if you
    have to wait at the airport for an hour you spend that in soft
    drinks and newspapers. And now they charge you for the headsets
    on the planes, that's $4, or $5. I mean it just--I have to say,
    in the nature of things, it doesn't seem an unreasonable thing.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you Senator Byrd do you have any
    additional questions?

                            TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

        Senator Byrd. The President has submitted to Congress the
    outline of his proposal for what he calls a Temporary Worker
    Program. The proposal would legalize the status of millions of
    illegal aliens to work in the United States. How many legal
    aliens, individuals who cross the border illegally, or over
    stayed their visas would be allowed to legalize their status
    under the President's guest worker program?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well this is, as you know Senator there
    are a number of different proposals. The President has outlined
    general principles. I don't think he submitted a specific
    proposal yet. I think the estimates are, somewhere between 8
    and 11 million illegal migrants in the country. Now some of
    those are probably children who you know would be--if there
    were a TWP a Temporary Worker Program they would be in the
    country under the umbrella of their parents. But my, again
    rough, really rough estimates are it could be around 7 million
    workers who would ultimately have to be eligible under a
    temporary worker program.
        Senator Byrd. So that's amnesty isn't it?
        Secretary Chertoff. It's not amnesty. I mean the President
    has been very clear that this would be a program that would not
    put people to the head of the line, or reward them for doing
    something that they hadn't done. What it is, is a recognition
    of an economic reality. There are millions of jobs now in this
    country that are being performed by undocumented workers. I was
    talking to a mayor whose name I will not mention, who estimated
    that much of the home health system in the country is run with
    the help of undocumented workers. The lettuce growers out west
    complain without undocumented workers or workers coming in from
    South America, all the lettuce would wilt. I think if you go
    around and you look at grounds keeping, what people do on
    lawns, you find an awful lot of undocumented workers. These
    workers are here because American employers are paying them to
    come here, or paying them to work here. And if we don't admit
    that fact and the incredible economic demand and pull that that
    is, we are not really addressing the problem honestly. I am
    four square behind you increasing enforcement, more border
    control, more satellites, more this, more that. But if you
    expect that to do the job 100 percent, I think there's an
    unfair demand being placed on our Border Patrol. I think in the
    end, you have to address, and find some way to regularize and
    bring into a legally regulated channel all of this economic
    demand for temporary workers, so that we can really focus on
    the people I think the country wants us to focus on most, which
    are people who are coming in not to simply do work that nobody
    else wants to do, but to commit crimes or to commit anti-social
    acts or even to be terrorists.
        Senator Byrd. Now why would such a program not encourage
    other illegal aliens to break the law, in the hope of being
    similarly rewarded with legalized status?
        Secretary Chertoff. I think the answer is two reasons.
    First of all, of course we could in fact make part of the law
    requirement that this would only apply to people who could
    demonstrate they had been in the country prior to the time that
    the program was announced or the time it was passed. But second
    because I think that much of the focus of this has to be on the
    employers. It seems to me right now we're in a situation where
    we're in a twilight zone.
        Senator Byrd. You're what?
        Secretary Chertoff. We're in a twilight zone. We basically
    say to the employers don't hire illegal migrants, but we also
    say we're not going to really check very hard. And I think
    that's the worst of all worlds. What we ought to do is----
        Senator Byrd. Why do we say that?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well we do it, because we have not been
    vigorous enough in enforcing worksite enforcement.
        Senator Byrd. Why is that?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well that's what we're in the process
    of changing. One of the things the budget has ----
        Senator Byrd. How long is it going to take to change it?
        Secretary Chertoff. Let me try to lay out what our plan is.
    We have the basic pilot which allows employers to verify the
    status of their employees. The budget contains I think $135
    million to expand that program. That would give us the
    ability--for the first time--to say to employers, all
    employers, not just a small group--now you have a tool that
    will allow you to check the status of your employees. At the
    same time we are taking steps now to increase our worksite
    enforcement capability. The budget contemplates adding several
    hundred new enforcement agents to enforce worksites. We've got
    some legislative proposals up on the Hill that would give us
    better tools in terms of worksite enforcement. We have to
    consider increased penalties for worksite enforcement; it seems
    to me you've got to do both of these things. You've either got
    to give people a legal channel to check the status of their
    employees; but then at the same time if you give them that
    channel and you give them a temporary worker program, you have
    to have a real sanction if they chose not to use the course
    that the law has set out in front of them.
        Senator Byrd. So you don't think that illegal aliens are
    encouraged to break the law in the hope of being rewarded with
    legalized status?
        Secretary Chertoff. I think if we properly design a
    temporary worker program it will recognize the reality that we
    have, millions of undocumented workers in the country, but will
    encourage people to come in using a documented and legal form
    of temporary worker as opposed to an illegal form?
        Senator Byrd. When are we going to do that?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, the President's budget has money
    in here for the verification. There are a number of proposals
    now for Temporary Worker Program; Chairman Specter I guess has
    issued the chairman's mark on this. We are looking at the
    various proposals, and I think it's our expectation and our
    hope that we will see action on a Temporary Worker Program bill
    this year.
        Senator Byrd. What's he waiting on?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well right now, we've just gotten the
    chairman's mark, Chairman Specter has issued a mark. We've
    got--we're analyzing that. It's just a matter--we've just had
    it for a few days. We have the proposal by Senator McCain and
    Senator Kennedy, we have a proposal by Senator Kyl and Senator
    Cornyn, there's a lot of discussion about these issues. They
    are complicated issues, but at least I think we are now
    underway to tackling this very serious issue.
        Senator Byrd. Once these illegal aliens have been
    legalized, how do you ensure that they'll leave when their
    temporary work visas expire?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well one of the critical elements of
    the process is temporary worker status. It would have to
    involve a background check, would have to involve a biometric
    identification card, so that we would be able to, for the first
    time, have real ability to identify people in this country who
    are temporary workers, and who are working on a temporary
    basis. And then that would be the tool that we would use to
    track people and make sure they're complying with the law. If
    people's visas ran out, at that point, an employer who hired
    that person to continue to work, after their visa had expired
    would face a pretty serious sanction; and we could hold them to
    a pretty serious obligation to check the status of their worker
    to make sure they don't hire somebody who is here, having over
    stayed their visa.
        Senator Byrd. Is it impractical to detain and remove these
    aliens now?
        Secretary Chertoff. It would cost--I had it estimated, if
    we this year were able to round up every single undocumented
    worker, and if you accept the estimate of 8 to 11 million we
    would have to build three times as many jail cells as currently
    exist in the entire United States at some astronomical cost. We
    would have to pay to have all these people removed. I don't
    know that there are enough airplanes, commercial airplanes that
    we could lease to put all of these millions of people on
    airplanes and send them back.
        Senator Byrd. So it's impractical then?
        Secretary Chertoff. I would say it's virtually impossible.
        Senator Byrd. And why is it any less impractical to assume
    that they'll be detained and removed 6 years from now?
        Secretary Chertoff. Because in 6 years if we devise this
    program correctly, and we create a proper incentive structure
    to have employers no longer employ people who are illegal,
    because employers can find sufficient legal temporary workers
    to do the jobs, economics will do the job for us. What will
    happen is after the visa period, the demand for this kind of
    illegal worker will be dried up, this will be satisfied by
    legal workers and by temporary workers. And I think everybody
    agrees that the principal reason people come to this country
    illegally to work, is because they want to make money. If
    there's no work for them, then the incentive is for them to go
    back home.
        And there are some further things we can do. I mean they
    may accumulate benefits for example over 6 years, and we could
    make the receipt of those benefits contingent upon their
    returning back to their home countries. That would create a
    financial incentive. I mean, I don't want to suggest this is
    easy; we have wrestled with this question for 20 years. I
    remember when I was U.S. Attorney in the early 1990s we were
    talking about this.
        The bottom line is, if we don't harness the economics of
    the market place, if we don't build a set of incentive
    structures, we will never solve this problem. I do not believe
    there is a way, simply by using enforcement and border security
    that we can ever address the issue of all these undocumented
    workers.
        Senator Byrd. Well, how do we ensure that our immigration
    system is not overwhelmed by the millions of aliens who would
    qualify for this program?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, part of what we are beginning to
    do now is to plan the kind of information technology
    architecture we would need to process people if we had a
    temporary worker program. And if a temporary worker program
    were passed, we'd have to deal with two sets of people. People
    overseas who want to get in the program who would have to
    presumably come to our consulates and register, and people in
    this country. And I think one of the issues we are wrestling
    with now, is what is the most efficient architecture to
    register people, capture their fingerprints, run their
    fingerprints against databases, interview them as we do with
    visas, and then get them an inexpensive biometric card. I
    suspect probably we would, you know the employers would have to
    play a very significant role in the process because they are
    the beneficiaries and so there might be fees involved. But I
    don't want to get too far ahead of myself. You've identified
    the complicated and important questions that have to be
    addressed, and that we are currently addressing, and we are
    currently planning in the event that we do get a Temporary
    Worker Program that Congress passes. This is a very challenging
    task. And immigration reform has been tried before. It was
    tried in the mid 1980s, in many ways you know, you really have
    to hesitate to take the challenge on. The problem is there's no
    choice. If we don't address the challenge, we will continue to
    be mired in what is an unacceptable situation in this country.
        Senator Byrd. What have we learned from the implementation
    of the 1986 amnesty?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well I think we've learned amnesty is
    not a good idea. And it's not a good idea to build a program
    that is focused only on one element of the spectrum. In other
    words, you've got to have serious border enforcement, serious
    internal enforcement, and a serious Temporary Worker Program.
    And only if all of these elements come into play can we expect
    success.

                      CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY LEGISLATION

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, it has been 4\1/2\ years since
    the terrorists struck the homeland. While the administration
    has been focusing a large portion of its resources on aviation
    security and the border, chemical plants remain vulnerable. In
    my State of West Virginia there are 73 chemical manufacturing
    plants, and 100 chemical distribution plants. If there were an
    attack on one or more of these facilities, the potential loss
    of human life and damage to the local and the national economy
    would be devastating. Despite the multitude of warnings that
    the chemical sector is vulnerable to attack, the administration
    has shown a great reluctance to make security at chemical
    facilities a priority. I have pressed this issue with you, and
    I have pressed it with former Secretary Ridge. Repeatedly I've
    done this and to very little avail. I'm told that the private
    sector is taking care of it.
        Last year the Government Accountability Office concluded
    that for 93 percent of the chemical industry it is uncertain
    whether facilities are improving security at all. Only 1,100 of
    the 15,000 chemical facilities identified by the Department of
    Homeland Security are known to adhere to voluntary industry
    security procedures. I was encouraged last summer when the DHS
    Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and
    Information Security testified before Congress that a system to
    enforce and audit security standards must be put in place for
    the chemical sector. Unfortunately no action has been taken
    since his testimony.
        Your fiscal year 2007 budget proposes $10 million for a
    chemical security office, which will evaluate the risk of
    chemical facilities and establish security standards for them,
    but this funding would not be available until fiscal year 2007,
    which would further delay the effort to secure chemical
    facilities. Why are you kicking this can down the road and not
    pursuing enforceable standards for the chemical facilities now?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well Senator, I'm pleased to say we
    actually are. As Assistant Secretary Stephen said last year we
    do believe that it is appropriate to have some mandatory
    standards in the industry. I think we've dealt with a number of
    Members of Congress, there's a proposed legislation that
    Chairperson Collins and Senator Lieberman have proposed. We are
    working with them on the legislation. I think we've sketched
    out what principles we believe we need to have in chemical
    plant security legislation, which is to have tiers of risk,
    focused the most on the highest risk in chemical plants, and
    require certain kinds of performance standards. Require audits,
    and verification. We don't have the authority at this point, in
    general, to do this. Although we do under the MTSC have
    authority for chemical plants on waterways and rivers. We're
    really looking to Congress to work with Congress in coming up
    with an appropriate piece of legislation that would give us the
    authority to do, for the chemical sector at large, the kind of
    regulation that we think is appropriate. Now obviously the
    devil is in the details, but we are supportive and working with
    Congress now on some legislation that is working its way
    through the process that would address this issue.

                       CHEMICAL SECTOR NATIONAL STRATEGY

        Senator Byrd. Congress required you to complete a national
    strategy for the chemical sector by February 10, 2006. That
    strategy has not been submitted. Why? And can you tell the
    committee when that strategy will be submitted to Congress?
        Secretary Chertoff. I believe the strategy is in the final
    stages of being reviewed, I think it went through several
    rounds of comments from stakeholders in the private sector. I
    believe that the comment period is now done, and I'm
    anticipating this spring that we will have the National
    Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the specific chemical
    sector plan published.
        Senator Byrd. When?
        Secretary Chertoff. This spring.

                      CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY LEGISLATION

        Senator Byrd. This spring. Yesterday, the Government
    Accountability Office concluded that legislation is necessary
    to give the Department the authority to require the chemical
    industry to address plant security. It's been 3 years since the
    Department of Homeland Security was created, why hasn't the
    administration proposed legislation for Congress to consider?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well we actually have in the last few
    months sat down with a number of Members of Congress. We have
    outlined the essential parameters of what we think legislation
    should be. So we have submitted a proposal, not a--not a
    detailed bill, but actually kind of a set of general principles
    and we're actually----
        Senator Byrd. What Members of Congress?
        Secretary Chertoff. We sat down with--I sat down myself
    with Chairperson Collins, and Senator Lieberman who are--I
    think have got a bill that they've been working on, and the
    Homeland Security Committee. I've dealt with a number of
    Members of the House to get their views on a bill, so there is
    actual legislation. Now I don't want to suggest that we support
    the legislation in all respects. There are elements of this
    Collins-Lieberman bill that we support, elements we don't
    support. But we are engaged in the process with Congress as we
    speak in trying to fashion what we think would be a good piece
    of legislation.
        Senator Byrd. How long is that process going to be?
        Secretary Chertoff. I'm afraid that now you're asking me a
    question that lies more in the area of Congress competence than
    mine. I think it's before the committee, I don't know that
    there's been a markup yet. But I may be wrong about that.
        Senator Byrd. But the administration hasn't proposed
    legislation for Congress to consider, has it?
        Secretary Chertoff. We've laid out general guidelines, and
    we've agreed to work with Chairperson Collins and Senator
    Lieberman and their bill recognizing that there maybe some
    areas of disagreement, as well as some areas of agreement.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Gregg. Well we thank you very much Mr. Secretary
    for the time you've given us this morning. And again I know on
    behalf of myself and Senator Byrd and other members, we want to
    thank your staff, and people who work for your agency for their
    dedication to this country. And we hope that the criticism that
    you've heard today is taken as constructive, because it was
    meant to be constructive. And our job is to give you the
    resources you need and make it possible for you to do your job,
    and the people who work for you do their job better; and we're
    very committed to that. And this committee has not been on the
    cheap side on resources, that we've been able to round up for
    you and we intend to continue to go in that direction, but we
    obviously have reservations about what was sent up relative to
    the budget. Thank you.
        Secretary Chertoff. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

                            ENDING CATCH AND RELEASE

        Question. Mr. Secretary, you have made a commitment to end catch
    and release of detained illegal aliens. Drastically reducing catch and
    release, even if not ending it completely, is an important commitment.
    We need to understand the cost implications. Can you make good on this
    commitment with the resources available to ICE for fiscal year 2006? If
    not, what additional funds are required?
        Answer. The Department has made ending ``catch and release'' on the
    Southwest Border a priority and the Department has already made
    significant progress in achieving this goal. The Department has:
      --Increased efficiencies in the detention and removal system to allow
            for faster turnover and greater utilization of detention
            capacity;
      --Expanded the use of expedited removal across the Southwest Border;
            and
      --Worked with foreign governments to ensure that they accept back
            their citizens who have violated our immigration laws on a
            timely basis.
        The recently enacted supplemental provides sufficient funding for
    an additional 4,000 detention beds in fiscal year 2006 as well as
    associated removal and transportation costs. This additional funding
    will allow DHS to detain nationals of El Salvador apprehended in the
    Rio Grande Valley (RGV) Border Patrol Sector. Nationals of El Salvador
    comprise one of the few populations still subject to ``catch and
    release'' on the southwest border due to the 17 year old court
    injunction. As a result of the supplemental, DHS plans to expand
    detention capacity by approximately 3,000 beds in the Rio Grande Valley
    with the remaining 1,000 beds distributed along the border in response
    to apprehensions.
        Question. Is this commitment only for the southwest border?
        Answer. After implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the
    department pledged to end the practice of ``catch and release'' along
    the Southwest border, where 92 percent of the ``Other Than Mexican''
    (OTM) apprehensions have taken place for the fiscal year to date.
    Eventually, however, we hope to end this practice altogether. Key
    elements of SBI that are aimed at ending ``catch and release'' include:
      --Increasing the number of agents to patrol our borders, secure our
            ports of entry and enforce our immigration laws; and
      --Expanding and creating more efficient detention and removal
            capabilities.
        The detention and removal process is being re-engineered to create
    an efficient system that will always have available detention capacity
    by streamlining the process for removal and minimizing an alien's time
    in detention. To date, we have achieved significant efficiencies in the
    process through increased cooperation with foreign governments,
    increasing detention capacity, and expanding expedited removal, as well
    as streamlining our internal removal process. We will continue to focus
    on these objectives and increase efficiencies as we work to achieve our
    goal.
        Question. When will this be implemented for the northern border and
    along the coasts as the Department has committed to do?
        Answer. DHS is committed to protecting all borders, including the
    northern and coastal borders. On January 30, 2006 DHS took an important
    step by authorizing the use of expedited removal on the northern and
    coastal borders. This was preceded by Border Patrol personnel from
    these sectors being trained in the use of Expedited Removal. Coastal
    and northern border sectors are currently engaged in performing
    expedited removals of aliens who meet the defined criteria for
    placement in this removal process and where detention assets are
    available.
        Question. What is the plan to address the problems presented by
    family detention and placing El Salvadorans in expedited removal?
        Answer. In support of the Secretary's goal to end ``catch and
    release'' of Other than Mexicans (OTMs) along the Southwest Border, ICE
    DRO will begin detaining family units.
        Holding families together within the same facility will maintain
    family unity, allow family members the opportunity to make informed
    decisions together, and reduce anxiety that may be caused by separating
    family members for detention purposes. Families will remain united
    throughout the immigration process, protecting parental rights and
    allowing parents to maintain responsibility for their children.
        The Department's implementation of expedited removal for
    Salvadorans is substantially hindered by a 17 year old injunction in
    Orantes v. Gonzalez. The United States asked the Court to lift or
    modify its injunction more than 6 months ago. Discovery is still
    continuing with respect to that motion so that no decision is
    anticipated in the immediate future. This matter and other old
    injunctions have led the Department to ask Congress to reform the
    immigration injunction process so that the Department may obtain prompt
    relief from old injunctions and will be protected from overbroad future
    injunctions.

                       BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPLEMENTAL

        Question. I believe that taking control of our borders is equally
    important to fighting terrorism in Iraq. Wouldn't you agree Secretary
    Chertoff that fighting the war on terror should start with protecting
    the homeland?
        Answer. Taking control of our borders is paramount to homeland
    security. Since its inception, DHS has undertaken a host of steps to
    enhance border security.
        We began with a number of steps to increase border security at our
    ports of entry. These included significant new initiatives to screen
    individuals entering our country, including deployment of US VISIT and
    revised terrorist watch list screening procedures. We have put in place
    advance data requirements so that detailed information is transmitted
    before a passenger arrives from overseas. We have also deployed a
    number of new border security initiatives directed at cross-border
    threats posed by the transportation of cargo. Amongst these were
    innovative programs, including the Container Security Initiative (CSI)
    and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
        We have also taken a number of steps to enhance border security
    between the ports of entry. Most recently, DHS has developed the Secure
    Border Initiative which is an integrated systems approach to
    immigration enforcement. SBI focuses broadly on two major enforcement
    themes, controlling the border and immigration enforcement within the
    United States. Through SBInet, DHS is seeking an integrator to provide
    a full range of solutions that will include integrating technologies,
    infrastructure, response capabilities, people, and processes into a
    comprehensive border protection system. DHS anticipates the award of
    the integrator contract by September 2006. Securing our Nation's
    borders remains one of the top priorities of DHS.
        Question. In order for our country to take control of the border we
    need not only to increase the personnel and technology available to
    Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
    but we need to invest in the infrastructure that will allow them to do
    their jobs effectively. We need cars, planes, buildings, cameras and
    other things.
        Do you agree we need to invest in our enforcement infrastructure?
        Answer. Yes. It is absolutely essential that we invest in and
    maintain our enforcement infrastructure to ensure that our employees
    not only have a safe and secure work environment, but also the tools to
    allow them to perform their duties in the most effective manner
    possible.
        Our enforcement infrastructure acquisition and maintenance
    processes must also be planned and managed in an integrated and
    systematic fashion that ensures that mission performance is optimized
    to the fullest extent by eliminating redundancy and incorporating
    innovativeness and state-of-the-art technology--while also taking care
    to ensure accountability and fiscal responsibility so that the American
    public gets what they paid for.
        To that end, a critical component of the Secure Border Initiative
    is SBInet, which will serve to integrate multiple state-of-the-art
    systems and security infrastructure into a single comprehensive border
    security suite for the Department.
        Question. We know that CBP needs to replace its air fleet, which
    includes some airframes with an average age of 40 years, why haven't
    you requested those dollars in the fiscal year 2007 budget request?
        Answer. We have requested funding in this area. The Budget requests
    $61 million in base Air and Marine procurement funding to be utilized
    to purchase up to 30 new helicopters.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget request was developed as CBP Air and
    Marine was in transition and the requirements for air fleet
    recapitalization were still evolving. Over the last few months, CBP has
    been integrating the former aviation programs of the Offices of Air and
    Marine Operations and Border Patrol under the newly established Office
    of CBP Air and Marine. As part of this integration, CBP has been
    working to develop a detailed plan to meet the threat to our borders
    while maintaining our traditional missions. The plan reflects the newly
    integrated aviation organization and includes requirements for the
    acquisition of new aircraft, the retirement of obsolete assets, the
    introduction of upgrades to aircraft, ground sensors, and
    communications capabilities, the consolidation of maintenance and
    training capabilities, the extension of the P-3 fleet service life, and
    the realignment of air sites to most effectively support mission and
    operational needs. The Department will keep the Committee apprised of
    the plan's status.

                       US VISIT EXIT TRACKING CAPABILITY

        Question. When does the Department expect to make a decision about
    deploying biometric exit tracking at airports?
        Answer. DHS is examining the results of the current exit pilots at
    14 airports and seaports. DHS will then determine the best approach for
    capturing exit data using biometrics and biographic information. We
    continue to rely on our existing exit process, which is now enhanced by
    implementation of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) rule.
    APIS collects electronic arrival and departure records from the
    electronic manifest information sent to Customs and Border Protection
    by carriers. The relevant portions of the arrival/departure records
    transmitted through APIS are then recorded in Arrival/Departure
    Information System (ADIS). ADIS then serves as a repository for entry,
    exit, and status change information.
        Question. When will a plan be submitted to the Committee to
    implement that decision?
        Answer. The Department is currently evaluating the results of these
    pilots, as well as considering land-border exit screening options, and
    will brief the committee at the conclusion of this review.
        Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests a $60 million
    increase for US VISIT. What specifically will be accomplished in fiscal
    year 2007 with the increased funding requested for the program?
        Answer. The $60 million increase for the US VISIT program will fund
    the transition to 10-print and IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability. These
    resources will be used to deploy 10 print readers to ports of entry,
    improve IDENT technical capabilities, and improve interoperability with
    IAFIS.

                               PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

        Question. What is the Department's role in preparing for and
    responding to pandemic influenza?
        Answer. Consistent with the DHS Strategic Plan, National Response
    Plan, and the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DHS will
    develop a plan to implement its roles and responsibilities under the
    Pandemic Strategy. In addition to its incident management coordination
    roles and responsibilities, DHS is responsible for ensuring integrity
    of the Nation's infrastructure, domestic security, entry and exit
    screening for influenza at the borders, facilitating coordination for
    the overall response to a pandemic, and the provision of a common
    operating picture for all departments and agencies of the Federal
    Government
        During a pandemic, DHS is the lead for overall domestic incident
    management and will coordinate the Federal response. Specifically, the
    Secretary, DHS:
      --Retains responsibility for overall domestic incident management;
      --Possesses the authority to declare an Incident of National
            Significance and activate the Biological Incident Annex to the
            National Response Plan (NRP);
      --Coordinates non-medical Federal response actions for an Incident of
            National Significance;
      --As requested by HHS, directs the activation and deployment of
            National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) health/medical
            personnel, equipment, and supplies, in a phased regional
            approach, and coordinates the provision of hospital care and
            outpatient services, veterinary services, and mortuary services
            through NDMS;
      --Coordinates with other Federal agencies to develop a public
            communications plan through ESF #15--External Affairs and the
            Public Affairs Annex to the NRP;
      --Provides logistics support, as appropriate;
      --Through ESF #1--Transportation identifies and arranges for use of
            U.S. Coast Guard aircraft and other assets in providing urgent
            airlift and other transportation support
      --DHS components work with HHS to identify and isolate people and
            cargo entering in the United States that may be contaminated;
            and
      --Develops plans and facilitates coordinated incident response
            planning with the private sector at the strategic, operational
            and tactical levels.
        Question. A total of $47 million in emergency supplemental funding
    was provided to DHS to plan and prepare for a pandemic event in the
    fiscal year 2006 supplemental appropriations bill signed into law in
    December of 2005. What is the status of the Department's plans for the
    use of this funding?
        Answer. Currently, staff and senior management have finished a
    spending plan that programs the $47 million into various DHS components
    where most immediate and critical needs have been identified. This
    money will allow DHS to expand the Department's role in addressing the
    avian flu issues. The funds will be allocated before the end of the
    fiscal year 2006.

                   IMPROVING NATIONWIDE CATASTROPHIC PLANNING

        Question. Mr. Secretary, in your speech on February 14, 2006, a
    reference was made to some of the findings of the Nationwide Plan
    Review Phase I--the effort to find out the status of catastrophic
    planning across the country. I understand folks are hard at work,
    digging into this information to understand it and make recommendations
    to improve things. However, the report contains some very provocative
    findings in terms of the level of confidence that many States and urban
    areas have in the adequacy of their catastrophic plans. What
    conclusions has the Department reached so far?
        Answer. The February 10, 2006 Report to Congress was a compilation
    of the first phase of the Nationwide Plan Review, which involved a
    self-assessment of plans by States, territories and urban areas/major
    cities using guidance and criteria provided by DHS. The Department has
    not reached any conclusions as we are conducting the second phase
    currently. The second phase involves visits by Peer Review Teams
    comprised of former state and local emergency management and homeland
    security officials to 131 States, territories, and urban areas to
    jointly validate self-assessments, determine requirements for planning
    assistance, collect best practices, and recommend corrective actions. A
    Final Report, including recommendations will be provided to Congress by
    June 2006. The purpose of the two-phase approach is to ensure DHS and
    the participants can jointly review the Phase 1 written submission with
    each participating entity's planning team, as well as provide immediate
    feedback with specific recommendations and observations. The
    combination of self-assessments and peer review will provide us with
    the most accurate assessment of plan status.

                FIRST RESPONDER GRANTS--RISK AND THREAT FACTORS

        Question. Some people advocate all grants should be devoted to
    terrorism prevention and preparedness; others that grants should be
    used for all-hazards. Which do you advocate?
        Answer. Fundamental to the mission of the Department is the
    mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences that stem from
    acts of terrorism and natural disasters. Taken as a whole, Departmental
    assistance to States and localities supports the broad mission by
    building capabilities that are applicable to either acts of terrorism
    or natural disasters. Most states and localities have a hard-won
    appreciation for their risks and vulnerabilities to various natural
    disasters, and have already structured their response capabilities to
    address these known risk. In contrast, catastrophic terrorism is more
    recent threat that is not well understood, hard to predict, and for
    which most states and localities are not adequately prepared. Further,
    the Federal Government has a unique role in helping States and
    localities prepare for a threat that has significant roots overseas.
        That said, a number of DHS grant programs--including the Emergency
    Management Performance Grant Program, Citizen Corps Program, and the
    Metropolitan Medical Response System Program--are all-hazard in nature.
    These programs are targeted to particular constituencies such as
    emergency management, community preparedness, or public health and
    medical communities but support preparedness activities across the full
    range of natural and manmade hazards.
        Several other programs--including the State Homeland Security
    Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the Law Enforcement
    Terrorism Prevention Program--focus on terrorism preparedness in
    accordance with statutory intent. However, in fiscal year 2006, the
    scope of allowable activities for several of these programs has been
    expanded to include catastrophic events, provided that these activities
    also build capabilities that relate to terrorism. This broadened scope
    of program implementation activities recognizes and supports ongoing
    preparedness initiatives addressing such issues as pandemic influenza
    and the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that are of critical
    national importance, and recognizes the regional and national impacts
    that such events can have.
        Almost all of the capabilities included in the Target Capabilities
    List and the overall framework of the National Preparedness Goal are
    dual-use in nature, in that they can apply to both terrorism
    preparedness as well as other hazards. Thus, even if a program is
    technically focused on terrorism preparedness, the capabilities built
    and sustained through those programs support a much broader range of
    hazards than terrorism alone.
        Question. How mature is the methodology being used to determine
    where the risks and threats are today?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2006, DHS has taken a major step forward in
    its risk analysis, developing a robust model which evaluates both risks
    to assets as well as risks to populations and geographic areas. By its
    nature, this type of analysis will continually evolve and mature.
        The DHS formula for determining eligible urban areas for its Urban
    Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program has progressed from a simple
    count of ``high'' and ``low'' criticality and numbers of threat reports
    in fiscal year 2003 to a fully risk-based computation that is attack-
    scenario based and uses infrastructure-specific vulnerability and
    consequence estimates. At the same time, DHS has gone from considering
    14 infrastructure types in the analysis in fiscal year 2003 to more
    than 40 in fiscal year 2006; the fiscal year 2006 approach evaluates
    risk to well over 100,000 specific infrastructures, and incorporates
    strategic threat analysis from the Intelligence Community along with
    law enforcement investigations, credible and less-credible threat
    reports, and suspicious incident reporting received from local, State
    and other Federal agencies.
        The levels of complexity of the formula and data calculations have
    increased markedly from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2006. For
    example, in fiscal year 2003, three equations were used to formulate
    the city prioritization; in fiscal year 2006, over 4,000 equations were
    used. For fiscal year 2003, approximately 1,500 calculations were made,
    in contrast to more than 3 billion calculations in fiscal year 2006.
    Fiscal year 2005 UASI formulations were represented within a
    spreadsheet of 42,000 cells. If the fiscal year 2006 UASI calculations
    could be included in a spreadsheet, it would contain more than 20
    million cells.
        Question. How confident are you in a process which determined the
    sixth largest U.S. city, San Diego, faces lessened risk?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 risk formula consists of making two
    complementary risk calculations: asset-based risk and geographically-
    based risk.
      --Asset-based risk utilizes threat values derived from the
            Intelligence Community assessments of the intent and
            capabilities of adversaries to accomplish a set of baseline
            attack modes. These threats and attack types are mapped against
            certain infrastructure types, such as bridges, dams, and power
            plants.
      --Geographically-based risk takes into account values that are based
            on the inherent attributes of the geographic State or Urban
            Area. This analysis considers factors such as terrorism-related
            reporting and investigations, and population density. To arrive
            at the total relative risk of terrorism, the geographically-
            based risk score is weighted two times the asset risk score.
        San Diego is on the list of eligible jurisdictions for full
    participation in the fiscal year 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative
    (UASI) grant program. In previous years, the risk score directly
    converted to a dollar amount and allocation to the jurisdiction. This
    is not the case for 2006 funding. Each of the 42 cities, including San
    Diego has equal status in competing for the UASI grant funds. The
    fiscal year 2006 Congressional Appropriations language instructed the
    Secretary to award funds based on both risk and need. While San Diego's
    relative risk values are lower in 2006 than they were in 2005, their
    need has yet to be determined, and hence no decisions can yet be made
    as to how much the city will receive. The Office of Grants and Training
    will be making the funding determinations in May 2006.
        Additionally, DHS anticipates that continued experience with the
    annual risk analysis process will further improve the collective
    understanding of the impacts of attacks on systems, improving the
    ability of the process to recognize that, in some cases, a system
    provides resilience, and in other instances the critical nodes within a
    system provide the potential for significantly greater consequences.
    DHS remains committed to continually improving its risk analysis
    process, and looks forward to further refinement of the current
    methodology.

      STAFFING FOR ADEQUATE FIRE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (SAFER) ACT GRANTS

        Question. The National Fire Protection Association found
    potentially two-thirds of the Nation's fire departments are
    understaffed. What is DHS evaluating to determine that no funding
    should be requested for SAFER Act grants?
        Answer. The Department believes that preparedness is a shared
    responsibility between the Federal Government and State and local
    jurisdictions. Further, the dedication of Federal funds to a hiring
    program such as the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
    (SAFER) program, is not the most effective use of limited homeland
    security funds to enhance existing local preparedness capabilities. The
    Department has requested significant funds over several years to
    support public safety preparedness at the State and local levels of
    government. Congress has appropriated and the Department has granted
    billions of dollars to support training, exercising, and equipping
    public safety personnel, including firefighters, across the Nation.
    Homeland security funds should enhance existing local preparedness
    capabilities rather than support a hiring program such as SAFER.
    Ultimately, local governments have the responsibility to support
    firefighter staffing levels commensurate with their local fire threat.

                 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS (EMPG)

        Question. If Katrina has shown us anything, it is the importance of
    local preparedness and planning. The Emergency Management Performance
    Grant program is important to State and local preparedness.
        What justification is there in the face of the recent catastrophic
    disasters to propose a reduction in funding available for EMPGs?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2007 EMPG request is consistent with the
    Administration's $170 million budget request in fiscal year 2006. The
    Department continues to support the EMPG program, which helps States
    and Urban Areas achieve target levels of capability to enhance the
    effectiveness of their emergency management programs. The EMPG funding
    request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States to continue to
    develop intra- and interstate emergency management systems that
    encourage partnerships among government, business, volunteer, and
    community organizations based on identified needs and priorities for
    strengthening their emergency management and catastrophic planning
    capabilities. In addition, programs such as the State Homeland Security
    Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative--while focused primarily on
    terrorism preparedness, also include catastrophic events, recognizing
    that the capabilities built support a much broader range of hazards
    than terrorism alone.

                   PORT SECURITY--AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEMS

        Question. Today, our systems for capturing trade data used in
    targeting incoming cargo is focused on the data available from the
    manifest, i.e. cargo/shipping information versus the people who handle
    the cargo. I understand that CBP has an initiative which started some
    time ago to look at expanded data elements to more fully assess risks
    of cargo, particularly seagoing cargo.
        Is the feasibility and usefulness of capturing information on the
    owners and operators of foreign and United States-based terminals being
    looked at? Where are you with this effort?
        Answer. CBP has been conducting an extensive evaluation of expanded
    data elements that will enhance cargo targeting. In this analysis, we
    have determined that the people who handle the cargo and particularly
    those involved in the loading process are an important informational
    element. The terminal operator has little to no control over the
    security of the container and is therefore not deemed a useful data
    element for cargo targeting. Data elements that we are looking at are
    entities that initiate the movement and the physical handling of the
    cargo.
        CBP has conducted an extensive analysis and proposes that the
    collection of a limited number of additional trade data elements at
    manifest will effectively enhance cargo security and CBP's targeting
    capabilities. New sources and types of data can be gathered during
    other phases of supply chain operations and used to enhance and
    strengthen the effectiveness of CBP screening and targeting efforts.
    Data can be gathered during the purchase order process, staging and
    shipment, and cargo transportation and includes such documents as
    purchase orders, booking confirmations, bills of lading, terminal
    receipts, status reports and proofs of delivery. By collecting more and
    different information throughout the supply chain, greater visibility
    and transparency can be achieved and true risk better understood within
    the international supply chain.
        CBP is working with its trade partners to find ways to obtain
    better information, new information, and to find ways to get the
    information we already have, but earlier in the supply chain so we can
    interdict a known risk or intervene in connection with an unknown risk
    at the earliest point possible. A supply chain security committee has
    been set up within the Trade Support Network as a forum that works with
    the trade community to identify and leverage advance information early
    in the supply chain. This advance information will build upon existing
    CBP security measures to add value to ongoing targeting initiatives in
    order to secure our nations borders, as well as our efforts to
    facilitate legitimate trade. The committee's goal is to identify,
    discuss, document, and submit the trade communities' supply chain
    security requirement recommendations for ACE--which in partnership with
    CBP should result in an information requirements plan for the best data
    set available to CBP.
        Through partnering with the carriers, portals, importers, shippers
    and terminal operators, CBP is gathering supply chain data, studying
    what it means, discovering where it can be most effectively obtained in
    the supply chain, who has it, how the pieces fit together and
    determining how it can improve our targeting programs. All of this data
    will assist us to zero in on suspect movements and perform any
    necessary security inspections at the earliest point possible in the
    supply chain. CBP has evaluated entry-level data time frames and
    believes that submission of this data 24 hours prior to arrival may be
    valuable as a final validation of carrier manifest data.

                        AVIATION SECURITY PASSENGER FEES

        Question. If Congress does not accept the Administration's $1.3
    billion proposal to increase passenger security fees, what specific
    funding in the fiscal year 2007 budget request for programs or
    activities do you propose for reduction or elimination to make up for
    this difference?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
    to seek Congressional support for the President's request to
    restructure the air passenger fee as part of the TSA budget. TSA
    believes that the adjustment addresses prior congressional concerns
    with a fee based upon emplanements rather than one-way travel. We also
    believe the restructured fee more equitably assigns the costs of
    aviation security to the direct beneficiaries, the air travelers, as
    envisioned in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).
        Aviation passengers currently pay an aviation security user fee of
    $2.50 per emplanement, with a maximum of $5.00 per one-way trip. This
    fee has not increased since it was originally imposed in early 2002,
    following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The President's budget proposal
    aligns the collection of the fee with the point at which the screening
    is done--upon entry into the aviation system. The proposed change in
    the aviation security fee structure would establish a flat fee of $5.00
    per one-way trip. This would have the effect of equalizing the amounts
    paid by travelers between major cities and travelers who must take
    connecting flights on a round-trip basis. Restructuring the fee would
    also generate an additional $1.3 billion in revenue and bring the
    percentage of aviation security expenses covered by passenger user fees
    to approximately 72 percent. Currently, user fees cover only 42 percent
    of the costs of aviation security.

                OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

        Question. Where is the Department with regard to establishing the
    Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) office?
        Answer. DHS is developing a plan to set up the SCO.
        Question. Five and half months of this fiscal year have expired and
    it is my understanding that not a single employee has been hired for
    this office. In fact, there currently is no SCO office. Is that true?
        Answer. DHS is committed to the SCO and is developing a plan to set
    up the office and to develop coordinated screening policies.
        Question. What is the Department's schedule to stand up this
    office?
        Answer. The department plans to have the office completely
    operational and functioning by the end of fiscal year 2006.
        Question. Given that the office will be operational for less than
    half a year, I expect a significant proportion of the $4 million in
    appropriated funds will not be spent this year. Is that a reasonable
    expectation?
        Answer. The $4 million is necessary for SCO operations in fiscal
    year 2007.
        Question. Given the lags in establishing SCO and the likelihood of
    unspent funds for this office in fiscal year 2006, is the fiscal year
    2007 budget request ($4 million) realistic or optimistic?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $4 million is
    necessary for fiscal year 2007 operations.

                   NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS INTEGRATION PROGRAM

        Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a new preparedness
    program called the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP).
    Why is this new program needed?
        Answer. Purpose of the NPIP:
        The purpose of the National Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP)
    is to improve the Nation's preparedness posture--a national safety and
    security imperative. The NPIP does that by organizing, monitoring, and
    enabling national preparedness activities--with key focus on high-
    impact preparedness priorities.
        The basic premise of the NPIP is that effective national
    preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized approach among
    Federal, State, local, tribal and private-sector partners to share
    information and to plan, train, and exercise consistently. The current
    Federal level approach to information sharing, planning, training and
    exercising is inconsistent across departments and agencies, leading to
    non-integrated preparedness.
        As the preparedness enabling element of the Directorate for
    Preparedness, the NPIP will integrate national preparedness system and
    doctrine, and provide field-based preparedness coordination.
    Additionally, NPIP will develop, foster and instill a national
    preparedness culture--an imperative established by the White House and
    the Congress, and an expectation of the American citizens.
        The Scope of the NPIP:
        The NPIP fuses together the core elements of Preparedness--
    including strategic risk assessments, contingency planning, doctrine
    development, and training and exercises--and allows for the
    synchronization of these elements to create a functional organizational
    alignment towards common preparedness activities across DHS
    organizations.
        In doing so, the NPIP will enhance strategic tools, including the
    National Incident Management System, National Response Plan, National
    Infrastructure Plan and the National Preparedness Goal. It will ensure
    development of preparedness processes that foster harmonized day-to-day
    routine interaction of disciplines, organizations, levels of government
    and our citizens.
        Because national preparedness is a top priority and DHS is
    responsible for a proactive leadership role in encouraging national
    preparedness, the NPIP will drive specific efforts to reach a robust
    level of national preparedness. It will foster a ``culture of
    preparedness,'' starting within DHS and extending to preparedness
    partnerships beyond the Department.
        The NPIP will play a major outreach role in leveraging and
    encouraging existing efforts, and filling gaps among the connections
    between programs, activities, and doctrine that are integral to
    achieving robust national preparedness. To that extent, the NPIP will:
      --Report directly to the Under Secretary for Preparedness;
      --Focus on identifying and aggressively remedying national
            preparedness gaps;
      --Improve the Nation's ability to prepare, respond and mitigate
            natural or other disasters;
      --Examine national preparedness activities and programs and seek ways
            to integrate and synchronize efforts;
      --Provide a preparedness analysis capability and promote innovative
            solutions with broad stakeholder input;
      --Focus on addressing critical gaps in coordination among entities
            responsible for preparedness;
      --Promote proven preparedness practices, and leverage external
            resources through strategic partnerships;
      --Measure national preparedness using standardized metrics and
            institutionalize preparedness improvements;
      --Identify (and eliminate where possible) redundant preparedness
            efforts/activities involving low return on investment; and
      --Provide important incentives for organizations to coalesce and
            leverage and supplement their efforts to enhance national
            preparedness.
        As laid out above, the NPIP will be responsive to emerging needs in
    homeland security preparedness including lessons learned from real-
    world incidents and exercises. As such, the NPIP will be an essential
    resource for the Under Secretary for Preparedness to use to respond to
    identified needs and capability gaps. Initial efforts will include
    addressing shortcomings associated with the after action analysis of
    the Hurricane Katrina response and the National Planning Scenarios: the
    need to strengthen nationwide planning for catastrophic events;
    synchronization of Federal and selected State and local plans by
    region; incident command and control alignment; evacuation plans; all-
    hazard planning for special need populations; and communication system
    improvements. As the Under Secretary's vision continues to evolve and
    further preparedness enhancements are identified, the NPIP will be
    qualified accordingly.
        Question. How will this new program be more effective in this
    mission?
        Answer. One of the fundamental concepts of the NPIP is that
    homeland security preparedness is not just a Federal activity but is,
    in fact, a national activity. The basic premise of the NPIP is that
    effective national preparedness requires an integrated and synchronized
    approach for Federal, State, local and private-sector partners to share
    information and plan, train, and exercise as they work in unison to
    prepare for disasters. Currently, preparedness efforts are largely
    focused but separated at the Federal level, the State and local level,
    or among the private sector, but not necessarily an integration of all
    these levels.
        This was exemplified in almost every aspect of the preparedness,
    response, and recovery activities associated with Hurricane Katrina.
    While many elements performed well within the parameters of their
    understood mission areas, the system struggled because of disconnects
    in the overall effort. These fractures among major organizations and
    missions had not been adequately recognized and addressed prior to this
    catastrophic event.
        The NPIP will change that by:
        Providing an integrated approach to Federal efforts to support
    National Preparedness. Current preparedness efforts reside in different
    parts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--such as Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and
    the Office of Grants and Training--as well as other parts of the
    Federal Government. Building a truly national preparedness capability
    will require substantial DHS coordination with other Federal
    Departments. For example, the NPIP will ensure appropriate interface
    with NORTHCOM and other Department of Defense (DOD) entities as to
    ensure key participation in building a more secure homeland.
    Accordingly, the NPIP will ensure DHS alignment with Health and Human
    Services (HHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection
    Agency (EPA), Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Department of
    Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
        The NPIP is intended to synchronize and integrate the preparedness
    efforts of all parts of DHS and the Federal family. It will do so by:
      --Providing a standardized approach to catastrophic planning.
      --Developing integrated preparedness doctrine to share with partner
            agencies.
      --Enhancing coordination of national exercises and preparedness
            training.
      --Coordinating DHS medical planning with HHS, among other activities.
        The NPIP will accomplish this through promoting proven preparedness
    practices and leveraging external resources through strategic
    partnerships, both within and outside of DHS, while avoiding redundant
    efforts or activities involving low return on investment.
        This will be a significant change from current practice where there
    is no overarching entity focused on coordinating Federal preparedness.
    For example, FEMA's preparedness function is heavily focused on
    preparing for natural disasters and is not fully integrated with the
    law enforcement or border control communities. Nor does FEMA's
    preparedness effort run the gamut of necessary preparedness activities
    to respond to a catastrophic incident, which include improving
    communication systems.
        Linking Federal efforts to locally-based preparedness efforts. A
    vital part of the NPIP will be the placement of 11 Federal Preparedness
    Coordinators (FPCs) across the country, with ten of the 11 FPCs being
    collocated at the FEMA regional offices. FPCs will be locally-based
    senior DHS officials responsible for coordinating a wide spectrum of
    Federal, State, and local domestic incident planning and preparedness.
    FPCs will provide DHS with an important and functional field presence
    to collaborate and build partnerships with State and local government,
    and private sector homeland security stakeholders within the FPC's
    assigned geographic areas of responsibility and to ensure that these
    stakeholders are working together and are thoroughly prepared.
    Currently, such field level coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and
    DHS does not have always have visibility into how high-risk areas are
    prepared to deal with homeland security incidents.
        In addition, the NPIP will be a means to provide the Nation's
    leaders with the confidence that its local communities are prepared
    should an incident happen. By integrating with the National
    Preparedness Goal and by implementing a common set of preparedness
    metrics, the NPIP will provide the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
    White House, and others with an assessment of local-based preparedness
    levels. Currently, that assessment does not exist. An initial
    nationwide emergency plan review is underway, and the NPIP will be the
    mechanism to strengthen nationwide planning for catastrophic events and
    evacuation. The FPCs will be the implementing agents in the field
    charged with synchronizing Federal, State and local plans by region to
    include special need populations.
        Promoting command-and-control alignment among all levels of
    government involved in incident management and response. As Hurricane
    Katrina indicated, successful incident management depends on effective
    command and control alignment. The NPIP will promote such alignment by
    ensuring that needed revisions to the National Response Plan (NRP) are
    made, based on lessons learned from incidents and exercises--such as
    TOPOFF 3--and stakeholder feedback.
        In addition, the NPIP will integrate National Response Plan (NRP)
    and National Incident Management System (NIMS) training and technical
    assistance to improve the likelihood that the command and control
    structure functions effectively and efficiently during incident
    response. The Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina report
    noted the importance of a formal training program on the NIMS and NRP
    for all personnel with incident management responsibilities. As part of
    FEMA's implementation of NIMS, all FEMA full-time employees and
    reservists were required to complete 4 independent study (IS) courses:
    IS-100, Introduction to Incident Command System; IS-200, Basic Incident
    Command System for Federal Disaster Workers; IS-700, National Incident
    Management System: An Introduction; and IS-800, National Response Plan:
    An Introduction. All new hires post-Katrina are also required to
    complete this mandatory training. In preparation for the upcoming
    hurricane 2006 season, FEMA will train a minimum of 1,500 ``disaster
    generalists'' (Stafford Act Employees) by June 1, 2006. In addition to
    the mandatory training above, these generalists will be required to
    complete an additional 40 hours of classroom training on such topics as
    disaster operations, safety and wellness, customer service, managing
    change, disaster assistance procedures, and monitoring of debris
    removal.
        A final key aspect of command and control alignment is the ability
    to communicate during an incident response. The NPIP will enhance that
    ability through better system assessment and operational guidance
    development.
        The above are but a few of the examples of how the NPIP will be
    more effective. Through its five major activities in fiscal year 2007--
    catastrophic planning, command and control alignment, communication
    system improvements, medical preparedness coordination, innovation and
    best practices--and the implementation of the FPC concept, the NPIP
    will significantly increase the integration of our Nation's
    preparedness activities, including at the Federal level and between the
    Federal Government and State, local and private sector officials. The
    result of such integration will be seamless processes, established
    preparedness doctrine, interconnected/interagency relationships, and
    leveraged and synchronized resources during incident response.
        Question. Is there an overlap with FEMA's efforts on response and
    recovery?
        Answer. No, the responsibility for response and recovery is charged
    to FEMA, while the Preparedness Directorate is responsible for
    preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 Budget Request for FEMA and
    Preparedness' NPIP may appear to have some overlap; however, the
    difference is in the scope and delineation of responsibilities.
        NPIP addresses national integration and synchronization of Federal,
    State, local, tribal and private preparedness activities to strengthen
    regional abilities to respond and recover. Catastrophic events--
    chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and national disasters--
    require preparedness to be scalable and adaptable to an event.
    Preparedness establishes the doctrine and standards that allow national
    preparedness and hence response and recovery to effectively work
    together.
        Taking into account the disaster cycle, Planning--Response--
    Recovery--Mitigation, there are necessary relationships between
    preparedness, response and recovery that would be strengthened by
    greater collaboration. Each disaster brings lessons learned and hence
    necessary adjustments that feed into preparedness; likewise, response
    and recovery readiness is a function of preparedness efforts.
        FEMA's mission is to lead the Nation's efforts to respond to,
    recover from and mitigate disasters of all types. This includes
    coordinating and ensuring the readiness of disaster response teams and
    assets; sharing emergency management technical knowledge, training, and
    assistance with State and local governments; deploying response teams,
    commodities and supplies, and recovery assets, abilities, and funding;
    and finally mitigating potential disasters through actions that will
    prevent additional loss. FEMA's mission addresses the logistical and
    technical aspects of response and recovery.
        For, example FEMA's Response Division manages the Mobile Emergency
    Response System (MERS), which among other things provides emergency
    communication capabilities in a disaster event. In a catastrophic
    event, such as Katrina, the region's communications infrastructure was
    destroyed, and while the MERS performed as designed, the catastrophe
    overwhelmed capabilities. The Federal Government, DOD, private
    organizations, local governments, and commercial interests have
    communication assets for emergency events; however, there needs to be
    greater standardization of these assets. NPIP proposes to strengthen
    national preparedness by cataloging emergency communication assets,
    pre-coordinating their use, and developing communications plans for
    catastrophic event scenarios. NPIP leads, coordinates, and synchronizes
    Federal preparedness capabilities and assets, and in concert with other
    partners addresses catastrophic scenarios that require the merging of
    Federal, State, and local preparedness and response capabilities for
    responses equal to the magnitude of a catastrophic event.

                       SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT

        Question. Science & Technology is still working with the components
    in deciding fiscal year 2006 funding levels for its research and
    development portfolios. Please explain the process in which each DHS
    components' mission research and development are being addressed and
    adequately funded by Science & Technology.
        Answer. The S&T Directorate has worked to identify and refine the
    research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) requirements of
    the Department's components over the last 3 years. For example, the S&T
    Directorate worked closely with the Transportation Security Agency
    regarding the direction of the research and development program at the
    Transportation Security Laboratory. This has resulted in a more
    customer-focused research and development program in the S&T
    Directorate's Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio. The Science and
    Technology Requirements Council (SRC) validates and prioritizes RDT&E
    requirements with components. To further ensure that the S&T
    Directorate is addressing our customers' highest priority needs, the
    DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC) is discussing the development of a
    process to facilitate further refinement and prioritization of RDT&E
    priorities by senior managers within each component.
        Question. Were cuts made to one component's research and
    development budget to pay for another component's?
        Answer. Research and development funding requirements change year-
    to-year. As such, in any given budget, S&T makes downwards or upwards
    adjustments in order to fund the highest priority projects.
        Question. I am concerned with the many changes in leadership at the
    Department. The head of Science & Technology just announced his
    resignation which will occur in March. How long will it be before a
    permanent replacement will be named?
        Answer. In June, the President announced his intention to nominate
    Admiral Jay Cohen to be the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.
    Admiral Cohen is currently a Retired Rear Admiral of the United States
    Navy. He has served the United States Navy for over 35 years. He most
    recently served as Chief of Naval Research at the Department of the
    Navy.
        Question. How will you ensure the new head of Science & Technology
    will continue the priorities outlined for fiscal year 2006 and proposed
    for fiscal year 2007?
        Answer. The Department has established a transition office within
    the S&T Directorate to work with present and incoming leadership. This
    office will help to ensure follow-through on the science and technology
    priorities identified to date.

                    DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)

        Question. What expertise does DNDO have for developing, acquiring
    and supporting a global architecture designed to detect the nuclear or
    radiological material?
        Answer. As an office staffed largely with representatives from
    across the United States Government (USG) (including the Departments of
    Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (DOS), the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as
    well as DHS components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
    Office of Grants and Training (G&T), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Science and
    Technology Directorate (S&T)), the DNDO has been able, in a very short
    time, to assemble a staff which draws from the inherent expertise of
    each of these agencies. By combining the scientific expertise of DHS
    S&T and DOE with the operational experience of CBP, USCG, and FBI (to
    name a few) and the disciplined systems engineering, large-scale
    acquisition, and logistics approaches of the DOD, the DNDO is well
    suited for carrying out its mission of developing, acquiring, and
    supporting the global nuclear detection architecture.
        Question. Does DNDO have the necessary authorities to have this
    global architecture implemented by other Federal agencies?
        Answer. The DNDO has been given the mission of ``centralized
    planning with decentralized execution.'' As such, the DNDO has been
    given the responsibility, within the Federal Government, to develop the
    global nuclear detection architecture. This will then be implemented
    across multiple agencies, depending on prior missions and
    jurisdictions. While the DNDO will not have oversight over the actions
    of other agencies responsible for implementing their respective
    portions of the global architecture, it will continue to advocate
    beneficial programs to the Administration, as well as the Congress, and
    to identify duplicative or ineffectual programs when necessary, with
    proposed improvements.

                               RISKS AND THREATS

        Question. I believe that you would agree that a biological or
    nuclear event is among the highest catastrophic threats to our Nation's
    security. What funds, by appropriations account, program, project, and
    activity are devoted to preparing to prevent or respond to these in
    fiscal year 2006 and in the fiscal year 2007 budget request.
        Answer. There are many programs across the Federal Government
    committed to preventing or responding to biological or nuclear attacks.
    Specifically within the S&T Directorate and the DNDO, funds in fiscal
    year 2006 and in the fiscal year 2007 budget request are as follows:
        For the biological threat:

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                                                   2006            2007
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    S&T Research, Development, Acq. & Ops:             376.2           377.2
     Biological Countermeasures.............
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        For the nuclear threat:

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                                                   2006            2007
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    S&T Management and Administration.......             2.6  ..............
    S&T Research, Development, Acq. & Ops...           333.7  ..............
        Domestic Nuclear Detection Office...           314.8  ..............
        Radiological and Nuclear                        18.9  ..............
         Countermeasures....................
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.......         ( \1\ )           535.8
        Management and Administration.......         ( \1\ )            30.5
        Research, Development, and                   ( \1\ )           327.3
         Operations.........................
        Systems Acquisition.................         ( \1\ )           178.0
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ n/a.

                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                                  AGRODEFENSE

        Question. In fiscal year 2006, the Department of Homeland Security
    provided $23 million for site selection and other pre-construction
    activities for the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility. What is the
    current progress of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to
    utilize this funding for site selection and pre-construction
    activities?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate initiated an Expression of Interest
    (EOI) to explore potential sites for the National Bio and Agrodefense
    Facility (NBAF). The EOI was issued on January 19, 2006 in the Federal
    Register. Site criteria and requirements were developed by an
    interagency technical working group (including DHS, the United States
    Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Human Health and
    Services) to evaluate sites that would best support research in high
    consequence animal and zoonotic diseases in support of Homeland
    Security Presidential Directives, HSPD-9 and HSPD-10. The results of
    the EOI will be evaluated in an environmental impact statement (EIS) in
    the fall of 2006, at which time the public will have the opportunity to
    comment on the scope of the analysis. In addition, ORD plans to issue a
    solicitation in March 2006 to procure architect-engineer services to
    conduct conceptual design studies and initial cost estimates for the
    NBAF. The conceptual design will be completed in 2007. Under the
    present schedule construction could begin in 2009 and be operational by
    the end of 2012.
        Question. How much longer will the current aging Plum Island
    Foreign Animal Disease facilities in New York State be able to sustain
    the Department's agroterrorism and animal-based terrorism research
    needs?
        Answer. The Department is committed to operating the Plum Island
    Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in a safe and secure manner until its
    capability may be recapitalized through the National Bio and
    Agrodefense Facility (NBAF), expected to be operational in 2012. The
    Department will maintain the current facility to foster ongoing
    scientific programs in accordance with the expanding missions of the
    departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security.
        Question. Does the Department anticipate constructing one facility
    to carry out the Department's agroterrorism and animal-based terrorism
    research and development research, or does the Department anticipate
    utilizing multiple sites?
        Answer. It is presently envisioned that the National Bio-
    Agrodefense Facility (NBAF) will be a single facility (with necessary
    support facilities) within an approximate 30-acre site.

                           DEEPWATER RECAPITALIZATION

        Question. In fiscal year 2006, Congress provided $933.1 million for
    the Coast Guard's Deepwater recapitalization program. The President's
    fiscal year 2007 Budget Request proposes $934.4 million for the
    Deepwater program. How important is full funding of the President's
    Request to the continuation of this recapitalization program?
        Answer. It is very important that full funding for the Deepwater
    recapitalization program be provided. Any reduction will cause a delay
    in the delivery of one or more assets or systems that the Coast Guard
    needs to execute its post-9/11 mission responsibilities reduced funding
    will result in reduced readiness. The Coast Guard requests funding each
    year based on what is planned to be obligated in the year the funds are
    appropriated. Full funding in accordance with the President's fiscal
    year 2007 Budget Request allows the Coast Guard to continue its
    recapitalization program in alignment with the Post 9/11 Revised
    Deepwater Implementation Plan.
        Question. What affect would a decrease in funding from the
    President's Budget Request of $934.4 million have on the continuation
    of this recapitalization program?
        Answer. The following Deepwater projects are categories in the
    fiscal year 2007 President's Budget request that require full funding
    to ensure success of the Coast Guard recapitalization program. Key to
    success is the synchronization of asset acquisitions to produce ``force
    packages'' connected by a common network that enables a synergy of
    operational performance from the totality of the system as depicted in
    the enclosed graphic. If the planned synchronization is delayed due to
    less than full funding in fiscal year 2007, then the planned
    capabilities will be more costly to acquire in the future and the
    operational performance improvements planned for that period are lost.
    In simple terms, the Coast Guard recapitalization program schedule for
    delivery of assets will be affected and the Coast Guard will not be
    ready to accomplish their DHS assigned missions; please see the table
    below.
        Additionally, the graphic illustrates the synergistic linkages
    between assets in the Deepwater system highlighting how reduced funding
    in any one area reduces overall system performance outcomes.
        In summary, the full success of the major AC&I projects is
    dependent on the assets in these budget categories to be fully funded
    as requested in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Budget category                Inadequate funding impacts
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AIR:
        CASA MPA..............................  Would delay ``mission
                                                 ready'' status of
                                                 aircraft's 4 & 5, delays
                                                 delivery and missionization
                                                 of MPA #6; and further
                                                 delays two air stations
                                                 from receiving post 9/11
                                                 capabilities.
        VUAV and MCH (HH-65C).................  Will delay delivery of
                                                 assets, limit major cutter
                                                 ``force package''
                                                 capabilities, limiting
                                                 surveillance capability to
                                                 that achieved by legacy
                                                 surface assets.
        HH-60 projects........................  Any project under funded or
                                                 out of sequence delays the
                                                 entire upgrade and
                                                 conversion sequence of the
                                                 HH-60; this medium range
                                                 helicopter is larger and
                                                 more capable than the CG HH-
                                                 65s.
        AUF projects..........................  Delayed funding for Airborne
                                                 Use of Force upgrades means
                                                 that Homeland security
                                                 patrols will continue to be
                                                 conducted largely by
                                                 unarmed aircraft that lack
                                                 the capability to take
                                                 appropriate response on
                                                 ``actionable
                                                 intelligence.''
        C-130H Conversion projects............  The C-130H will continue to
                                                 operate with aging and
                                                 obsolete avionics and a
                                                 troublesome radar that has
                                                 provided degraded
                                                 reliability for several
                                                 years.
        C-130J Fleet Introduction.............  Will delay delivery of
                                                 asset(s) or prevent
                                                 ``mission ready'' status--
                                                 that will continue the
                                                 shortage of maritime patrol
                                                 aircraft operating hours.
    SURFACE:
        NSC...................................  Each day of delay means NSC
                                                 has an opportunity cost of
                                                 not surveilling 42,500
                                                 square nautical miles
                                                 compared to legacy 378;\1\
        FRC...................................  Delay/loss of enhanced
                                                 operational capabilities of
                                                 the patrol boat fleet
                                                 required by the post 9/11
                                                 requirements.
        Mission Effectiveness Project for       The legacy 210 foot and 270
         Legacy 210 foot and 270 foot.           foot cutters are the
                                                 youngest in the Coast Guard
                                                 fleet, but must be properly
                                                 maintained and upgraded to
                                                 provide on-going
                                                 operational service until
                                                 the replacement OPC is
                                                 delivered.
        Cutter Small Boats (Long Range          Small boats are part of the
         Interceptor and Short Range             Cutter ``force package''
         Prosecutor).                            providing intercept and
                                                 boarding capability from
                                                 the parent cutter. Delayed
                                                 funding decreases ``force
                                                 package'' operating area.
    C4ISR.....................................  Will delay delivery of
                                                 assets--some components are
                                                 essential to asset
                                                 operation.
                                                C4ISR is the key to being
                                                 AWARE in the maritime
                                                 region. Lacking awareness
                                                 increases our Nation's risk
                                                 for possible attacks from
                                                 terrorists and more
                                                 criminal activities.
    Logistics.................................  Unable to operate as
                                                 designed.
                                                Readiness will be lower.
                                                Suboptimal ``homeports'' due
                                                 to lack of shore
                                                 facilities--forcing use of
                                                 ``Ports of Convenience.''
    Systems Engineering & Integration.........  Higher risk for lack of
                                                 synchronization of
                                                 Deepwater assets--will not
                                                 operate together.
                                                These funds are required to
                                                 review all interoperability
                                                 connections which is a
                                                 labor intensive effort. If
                                                 these connections are not
                                                 properly developed and
                                                 tested, there will be a
                                                 higher probably of failure
                                                 during operational use.
    Program Management........................  Unable to accomplish
                                                 inherently government work
                                                 necessary for success,
                                                 which includes the
                                                 oversight of the prime
                                                 contractor, the ability to
                                                 get other expert opinions
                                                 from sources outside the
                                                 government and/or prime
                                                 contractor, as well as
                                                 track those unique
                                                 responsibilities that
                                                 belong to the government
                                                 such as tracking program
                                                 progress and managing the
                                                 acquisition program
                                                 baseline.
                                                Increased risk of failure
                                                 during operation and delay
                                                 in deploying due to
                                                 insufficient planning.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ All flight deck capable cutters will benefit from VUAV/MCH force
      package surveillance capabilities.

        Question. How will the Department and the Coast Guard address
    Congress' frustration with the Coast Guard's poor responsiveness to
    congressional direction?
        Answer. Although the Coast Guard delivered several reports to the
    Appropriations Committees late in fiscal year 2005, fiscal year 2006
    has seen marked improvement. As a result of implementation of a series
    of strategy meetings immediately following release of House, Senate,
    and Conference Marks, report drafting and clearance times have
    decreased. As of March 1, 2006, the Coast Guard has delivered all but
    three of its fiscal year 2006 appropriations reports to Congress on or
    before the due date, as demonstrated in the table below.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Date due to
          Appropriations report         Date delivered         Congress
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (Bi Annual) Port Security         2/14/2006.........  Update of Oct 2005
     Terrorism Exercises Results                           report
     February 2006.
    Coast Guard Housing Report \1\..  2/13/2006.........  2/10/2006
    Fisheries Enforcement (fiscal     2/9/2006..........  2/10/2006
     year 2006 Appropriations).
    Patrol Boat Availability Report.  2/6/2006..........  2/10/2006
    Deepwater Implementation Plan     2/6/2006..........  2/6/2006
     Review.
    MSST Policy Report..............  2/6/2006..........  2/6/2006
    Operational Gap Analysis........  2/6/2006..........  2/6/2006
    Fiscal year 2006 1st QTR          1/13/2006.........  1/15/2006
     Acquisition Report \1\.
    Fiscal year 2006 1st QTR          1/17/2006.........  1/15/2006
     Abstract of Operations Report.
    Occupational Safety and Health    1/4/2006..........  12/18/2005
     Risks Report \1\.
    (Bi Annual) Port Security         10/28/2005........  2/1/2006
     Terrorism Exercises Results
     October 2005.
    Schedule of Port Security         10/24/2005........  11/18/2005
     Exercises.
    Fiscal year 2005 4th QTR          10/13/2005........  10/15/2005
     Acquisition Report.
    Fiscal year 2005 4th QTR          10/13/2005........  10/15/2005
     Abstract of Operations Report.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Delivered late.

             EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANT (EMPG) PROGRAM

        Question. After Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for strong
    emergency management programs at the Federal, State, and local level,
    emergency managers across the country anticipated an increase in the
    President's Budget Request for the all-hazards Emergency Management
    Performance Grant (EMPG) program. However, the President's Budget
    Request proposed $170 million for the upcoming fiscal year, the same as
    the previous year's request.
        What role do you see for State and local emergency management
    programs in national disaster preparedness?
        Answer. The Department continues to fully support the EMPG program,
    which helps States and Urban Areas achieve target levels of capability
    to enhance the effectiveness of their emergency management programs.
    The EMPG funding request for fiscal year 2007 is sufficient for States
    to continue to develop intra- and interstate emergency management
    systems that encourage partnerships among government, business,
    volunteer, and community organizations based on identified needs and
    priorities for strengthening their emergency management and
    catastrophic planning capabilities. Further, homeland security is a
    shared mission and thus a shared responsibility between the Federal
    Government and our State and local partners. The Federal Government
    should not be expected to bear all emergency planning costs. Instead,
    the Department expects that States and localities will devote
    significant funds to enhance their planing based on local conditions
    and thereby help to improve the Nation's level of preparedness.
        In addition, the Department's fiscal year 2007 budget request
    expands the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) and the State
    Homeland Security Program (SHSP), which will significantly enhance
    State and local preparedness capabilities. In fiscal year 2007 the
    Department has requested to expand the UASI program by $80.65 million.
    The fiscal year 2007 UASI funding request will continue to help
    establish a metropolitan area-wide approach to homeland security.
    Allocating UASI funds based on risk and need will continue to reflect a
    results-based planning process that supports achievement of minimum
    baseline capability levels in our Nation's high threat urban areas. The
    fiscal year 2007 budget request also includes an $83 million increase
    in SHSP funding. These SHSP funds will continue to build capabilities
    at the State and local levels through planning, equipment, training,
    and exercise activities and to implement the goals and objectives
    included in the Homelands Security Strategies.
        Question. What role do you see for the EMPG program in the
    Department of Homeland Security's national disaster planning for both
    terrorism and natural disasters?
        Answer. The National Preparedness Goal provides a common framework
    for a systems-based approach to build, sustain, and improve national
    preparedness for a broad range of threats and hazards, regardless of
    origin. Achieving the National Preparedness Goal requires that the
    emergency management discipline play a vital role in support of the
    Goal, as well as the implementation of National Priorities and
    achievement of the target levels of capability described in the TCL. As
    the coordinator for disaster response operations, the emergency
    management discipline is essential to the prevention, protection,
    response, and recovery efforts necessary when disasters or other
    incidents of national significance occur at the State and local level,
    and when Federal assistance is needed.
        Therefore, to sustain and enhance emergency management capabilities
    in support of the Goal, the EMPG funds may assist States and urban
    areas achieve the target levels of capability to sustain and enhance
    the effectiveness of their emergency management program. As part of
    this effort, the Administration has proposed to expand the scope of
    EMPG activities to address homeland security planning. Further, the
    program's current emphasis on funding staff costs limits our ability to
    assess and measure results.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter

                              FEMA CONTRACT AWARDS

        Question. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, there was concern about
    the contracting processes used by FEMA to procure goods and services
    and concern about the awarding of ``no-bid'' contracts. Are the
    guidelines that direct contracting, especially during times of
    emergency clear?
        Answer. The guidelines contained in both the Federal Acquisition
    Regulation (FAR) and the Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation
    (HSAR) are clear as it relates to contracting during an emergency.
    However, while the guidance is clear, it is spread among several parts
    of the FAR. Therefore, to improve the responsiveness of the acquisition
    community, the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense
    Acquisition Regulations Council are amending the FAR to provide a
    consolidated reference to acquisition flexibilities that may be used
    during emergency situations. Specifically, the information will be
    consolidated into a previously reserved FAR part. This initiative,
    however, makes no change to existing contracting policy.
        Question. Is there anything Congress can do to make them clearer?
        Answer. Additional legislation on this topic is unnecessary at this
    time.
        Question. What does FEMA need to do to improve disclosure of
    contract awards?
        Answer. FEMA is making every effort to operate with openness and
    transparency with regard to contracts awarded to support the relief and
    recovery efforts of Hurricane Katrina. In addition to complying with
    the requirements of FAR 5.303, which requires notification to Congress
    of contract awards exceeding $3 million, and FAR 4.6, which requires
    the reporting of contracting data in to the Federal Procurement Data
    System, DHS also posts, at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
    CPO-KatrinaContracts.pdf, all contract actions awarded by FEMA in
    support of the relief and recovery effort. This list is updated weekly,
    FEMA also posts, as required by FAR 4.6, the award of its contracting
    actions into the Federal Procurement Data System. Recognizing the
    importance of contract reporting, FEMA will provide implementing
    guidance to all contracting personnel on the importance of timely
    posting of contract awards.
        Question. Does this budget proposal adequately fund those needs?
        Answer. Yes. The President's Budget proposal adequately funds those
    needs.

                            CARGO CONTAINER SECURITY

        Question. In recent weeks, port security and cargo container
    security in general have come to national attention. What statistics do
    you have regarding the percent of all shipments entering the United
    States that are inspected for compliance with United States and
    international shipping regulations?
        Answer. CBP targets incoming containerized cargo by automated
    review of advance manifest and other information through its automated
    targeting systems to assess the risk of incoming cargo shipments. CBP
    examines all of the cargo that is identified as ``high-risk'' from this
    initial targeting through either non-intrusive detection technology,
    or, as needed, physical inspection.
        CBP defines an examination as a physical inspection of a conveyance
    and/or the imaging of a conveyance using large-scale Non-Intrusive
    Inspection (NII) technology, for the presence of contraband. CPB
    defines screening as a passive means of scanning a conveyance, baggage
    or cargo. CBP screens conveyances, baggage, and cargoes with radiation
    portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment for the
    presence of radiological emissions.
        From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of
    total containers inspected has increased at a rate of 4.2 percent per
    year. In fiscal year 2005, a total of 25,324,327 cargo conveyances
    arrived in the United States from foreign sources and a total of
    5,301,872 cargo conveyances were inspected.
        In fiscal year 2005, approximately 21 percent of all cargo
    conveyances (i.e., truck, rail and vessel) were examined for the
    presence of contraband, and approximately 67 percent of arriving
    containerized cargo was screened for radiation. Additionally, in fiscal
    year 2005, CBP examined 569,308 or approximately 5 percent of all
    arriving sea-borne containers.
        Question. What sort of tools do inspection agents have to assist
    them in screening containers in a timely, yet responsible manner?
        Answer. Over the last several years, Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
    technology has been the cornerstone of our layered enforcement
    strategy. Technologies deployed to our Nation's air, sea, and land
    border ports of entry include large-scale X-ray and Gamma-ray imaging
    systems as well as a variety of portable and hand-held technologies to
    include our recent focus on radiation detection technology. All CSI
    ports are also required to have NII technology available to assist in
    the inspection of identified high-risk containerized cargo bound for
    the United States.
        Large-scale systems include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System
    (VACIS), Mobile VACIS, Rail VACIS, Portal VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile
    Truck X-ray, Mobile Sea Container System, Pallet Gamma-ray System and
    Mobile GaRDs unit. Nuclear and radiological detection equipment
    includes Personal Radiation Detectors, Radiation Portal Monitors and
    Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices.
        NII technologies are viewed as force multipliers that enable CBP to
    examine or screen a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic
    while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade, cargo and passengers.
        Question. Secretary Chertoff mentioned in his statement for the
    record that the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is developing
    technology solutions that can be applied across the supply chain. How
    is S&T working with the private sector to procure technology?
        Answer. In support of the Department's layered supply-chain-
    security strategy, the S&T Directorate interacts with the private
    sector in two main ways: (1) through an ongoing dialog with industry
    and (2) through technology procurements.
        Maintaining an ongoing dialogue with private industry helps the S&T
    Directorate understand the present state of technology in the
    marketplace, enabling sound investment decisions that reflect current
    and future capabilities and meet operational and industry user
    requirements. This dialogue takes place with technology providers,
    supply chain consultants, the shipping industry (including carriers,
    terminal operators, and port authorities) and international partners.
        The S&T Directorate is currently procuring security solution
    technologies from both large and small companies, including university
    laboratories. Technology procurements result from several contracting
    vehicles, which include solicitations under Broad Agency Announcements
    (BAA) and our Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program. The
    S&T Directorate presently has private-sector procurements underway for
    the design and/or development of the following technologies:
      --Advanced Container Security Device.--A system to detect intrusion
            on any six sides of a container as well as to sense a human
            presence and report alarms;
      --Advanced Material Container.--A proof-of-concept container
            constructed of composite materials that will incorporate
            embedded security sensors and communications systems;
      --Marine Asset Tag Tracking System.--A system to provide remote
            communications capability for an ACSD or CSD to send an alarm
            or status information;
      --Secure Carton.--Alternative concepts to today's shipping cartons
            that will enable monitoring to detect and report breaches at
            the carton level; and
      --Intelligent Anomaly Detection Tools for the Automated Commercial
            Environment and Automated Targeting System.--Advanced
            technologies to enable improved capabilities to predict suspect
            or threat containers bound for the United States. This is in
            support of the Customs and Border Protection Automated
            Commercial Environment and Automated Targeting System (ACE/
            ATS).
        The S&T Directorate is also evaluating developmental Container
    Security Devices (CSD) that can monitor container doors and report
    alarms, which are currently being marketed by vendors. The S&T
    Directorate is purchasing sample devices from qualified vendors to
    conduct bench tests and vulnerability assessments to determine the
    suitability of these devices to meet the Department's requirements.
        With these technologies, the S&T Directorate is developing a Supply
    Chain Security Architecture, a technology framework that ensures the
    integration of non-regulated supply chain information and container
    security device data to securely and efficiently transmit it to
    governmental and private-sector stakeholders. In line with the
    Department's emphasis on private sector involvement in supply chain
    security, the S&T Directorate is currently working with two supply
    chain industry experts to ensure supply chain interactions and
    processes are accurately reflected. As this architecture defines the
    standards and protocols for security and information exchange, the
    Department can leverage private-sector supply chain information
    management systems to enhance risk assessments, while providing for
    business efficiencies to the commercial and shipping industry.
        Additionally, the S&T Directorate is committed to ensuring
    interagency coordination with other Federal stakeholders involved in
    supply chain security and to leverage existing capabilities and lessons
    learned.
        Question. What specific types of technology is the Department
    looking for?
        Answer. The Department is seeking technologies and processes to
    improve visibility and security across international supply chains. The
    S&T Directorate is developing and evaluating many of these
    technologies. They include security devices with the ability to monitor
    the integrity of intermodal shipping containers in transit and
    communicate status and alarm information about those containers to the
    National Targeting Center (NTC). Critical to enabling these
    capabilities are underlying technologies that can: operate in the harsh
    intermodal shipping environment; provide close to 100-percent assurance
    that sensors can detect authorized or unauthorized door openings and
    closings, holes or false doors created on any side of a container; and
    interface with other sensors currently under development to detect
    human cargo, explosives, chemical, biological, or radiological
    material, or breaches to the containers' contents at carton level. In
    that containers transit unattended through the supply chain, these
    container security sensors also require the ability to not be easily
    compromised by either an insider attack or an outside adversary along
    the supply chain.
        The Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), currently under
    development in the S&T Directorate will utilize advanced sensors and
    fusion systems to detect intrusion on any of the six sides of the
    container and detect human cargo. The ACSD will be able to interface
    with next generation advanced sensors currently under development
    within the S&T Directorate that detect chemical or biological agents.
    In addition, these systems require remote communications capabilities
    to allow reach-back to the NTC to communicate alerts from any point
    along the supply chain, as well as local communications systems for CBP
    officers in the field. Other sensor suites which will be integrated
    with the ACSD will include systems currently under development by the
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to detect and report
    radiological or nuclear agents.
        As part of an effort to identify near term deployable security
    systems for intermodal shipping containers, the S&T Directorate is
    currently in the process of evaluating a variety of existing
    developmental vendor Container Security Device (CSD) technologies that
    claim to have the ability to monitor and report intrusion of the
    container doors. Key to these evaluations is verification of claimed
    system performance and reliable sensor performance. The end goal of
    this survey is to accelerate a near term capability in advance of ACSD
    development to monitor and report container door breaches to the NTC.
        Other technologies under development and critical to container
    security are communications systems that can transmit information from
    containers intermodally and globally, while penetrating the high metal
    environment of container stacks at ports and on ships or while in
    transit on ship, rail and truck.
        Beyond CSD and ACSD, the S&T Directorate is also evaluating a next
    generation container constructed of advanced, light-weight materials
    (versus steel) that will allow security sensors and communications
    technologies to be built into the container's walls, doors and floors.
    It is believed lighter weight containers will also increase business
    efficiencies.
        Lastly, the S&T Directorate is assisting DHS components in the
    development of an architectural framework to enable integration of
    supply chain data beyond that currently regulated by Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP). This data combined with container integrity
    information, when fused in a secure and efficient manner, will enhance
    risk assessment benefiting security, while providing business
    efficiencies to the commercial and shipping industry. Part of this
    effort also involves the development of advanced intelligent algorithms
    for use by CBP's targeting system to further improve anomaly detection
    capabilities to improve assessment and targeting of high risk cargo.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                            DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT
                         BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION OFFICE

        Question. Provide a list of accomplishments from the beginning of
    fiscal year 2005 to date for the Business Transformation Office.
        Answer.
    Fiscal Year 2005
        The BTO was responsible for several major projects during fiscal
    year 2005, such as creating the functional integration Management
    Directives, creating a comprehensive set of functional integration
    milestones for each of the Management Lines of Business, establishing
    functional integration support contracts, and tracking functional
    integration priorities for the Management Directorate. The BTO reviewed
    and tracked Management Directorate programs/initiatives for schedule
    compliance based on identified milestones: eMerge, the Infrastructure
    Transformation Program (ITP), MaxHR, HSPD-12 and IT Cost Avoidance. The
    BTO also coordinated: On-boarding/Exit process, Senior Executive
    Service process, Administrative Analysis project, and streamlining the
    hiring process. Additional detail on the above projects is provided in
    the paragraphs that follow.
        In accordance with direction established in the Functional
    Integration management Directives, the BTO instituted an annual
    reporting process for establishing, measuring and reporting on
    Component functional performance for business processes that are the
    responsibility of the CXOs. The BTO also established a
    process for evaluating and reporting on the performance of Component
    CXOs and other Key Functional Officials to Component Heads.
        Strategic Plan.--The BTO was responsible for the creation of a
    multi-year Strategic Plan for the Management Directorate. The BTO began
    constructing templates and defining content for Line of Business annual
    reports and for business cases supporting functional integration
    initiatives.
        Management Directives.--The BTO was also responsible for creating
    the Functional Integration Management Directives, which provided
    direction on the leadership, integration, and management of the support
    services through each Line of Business Chief (Chief Administrative
    Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief
    Human Capital Officer, Chief Procurement Officer and Chief Security
    Officer).
        Since its creation, DHS has achieved many of its objectives toward
    integrating the management functions. From the many systems and
    programs that DHS inherited, the Department has consolidated the
    following:
      --18 financial management centers down to 8 centers;
      --27 bank card programs down to 3 programs;
      --22 Human Resource Servicing offices down to 7 offices;
      --8 payroll providers down to 1 payroll provider;
      --22 Personal Property Management systems down to 3 systems;
      --Acquisition Support for 22 agencies has been consolidated to 8
            major procurement programs;
      --1,100 Administrative Services agreements with other Federal
            Departments to 39 agreements;
      --52 percent of workforce through the Tri-Bureau initiative
            (Organized shared services and resources needed to more
            efficiently and jointly support our immigration, customs and
            border protection activities (Customs and Border Protection/
            U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services/Immigration and
            Customs Enforcement);
      --Consolidated over 35,000 express package service contracts into 1
            contract;
      --129 commercial information content subscription services to 8
            services; and
      --Numerous copier maintenance and service contracts into 1 centrally
            managed departmental contract.
        In addition, the Department has published uniform DHS acquisition
    regulations that apply across the enterprise and has established the
    first Department-wide real property asset management plan which will
    govern the consistent and efficient use and development of DHS land,
    buildings and structures for mission accomplishment.
        CXO Councils.--Each Line of Business Chief established a
    Department-wide council to serve as a governance board which would
    monitor and measure the performance of centers of excellence, shared
    services providers, managed partner providers, and self-supporting
    component providers for the various activities of their function.
        Tri-Bureau Governance Board.--The Tri-Bureau Governance Board was
    created in 2003 to oversee shared services and to serve as a decision
    maker in regard to service consolidation across the Tri-Bureau
    components.
        MOUs/MOAs.--In fiscal year 2005, the BTO ensured that Memorandum's
    of Agreement (MOA) and Memorandum's Understanding (MOU) between the
    Department, DHS components and other government agencies were
    established that would enable the Department to work more effectively
    and efficiently with other Government entities. The BTO was responsible
    for the execution of critical MOU's during the stand-up of the
    Department of Homeland Security with DOJ, DOT, GSA, DOC, DOE, and
    Treasury.
    Fiscal Year 2006
        In fiscal year 2006, the BTO completed the multi-year Strategic
    Plan for the Management Directorate, the first in a series of six
    Business Cases for implementing functional integration (Chief of
    Administrative Services), and detailed annual reports for the
    Management Directorate Lines of Business.
        Functional Integration Milestones and Budget: The BTO continues to
    build on the management integration work from fiscal year 2005 by
    creating a comprehensive set of functional integration milestones for
    each of the Management Directorate Lines of Business. The functional
    integration milestones are critical deliverables and/or capabilities
    with due dates that must be met by the Management Directorate Lines of
    Business.
        The BTO is developing a consolidated financial budget focused on
    synchronizing the functional integration budgets of the Lines of
    Business with their relevant components' budgets. This consolidated
    functional integration budget will allow an accurate insight into where
    money is being spent and how much is being spent in each of the Lines
    of Business. This will enable the Department to set a baseline from
    which we can begin to explore organizational transformation across the
    Department and to develop an overall integration strategy for the
    Management Directorate.
        The BTO also continues to prioritize and track functional
    integration priorities for the Management Directorate. The BTO will
    continue to drive the integration of legacy support systems, maximizing
    common platforms and leveraging the ``economies of scale'' that exist.
    Another priority is to conduct a review of operations in the Management
    Directorate on a macro level and look for additional opportunities to
    improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Directorate.
        Question. What are the pros and cons of combining this office with
    the Immediate Office of the Under Secretary of Management?
        Answer. There are benefits to having the Business Transformation
    Office (BTO) as a separate staff element reporting to the Under
    Secretary for Management. The BTO initiative requires specific skills
    in planning, organizational development, program & management analysis,
    project management and budget/finance which are different from those
    required in the Immediate Office of the Under Secretary.
        The BTO staff members generally have in-depth experience with the
    business processes of one or more of the functional Lines of Business.
    As a direct report to the Under Secretary, the BTO has access and
    exposure to the full spectrum of initiatives across all management
    functions (administrative services, enterprise architecture, financial
    management, information technology, human capital management,
    procurement, and security). Consequently, the BTO staff members are
    appropriately qualified and in the proper position to identify
    initiatives and interdependencies among the Lines of Business as the
    Functional Integration efforts continue.
        Combining the BTO with the immediate office of the Under Secretary
    could be done as well, but there are few benefits to doing so. One
    advantage would be that the staff members of the BTO could provide
    program management skills and analysis for other more narrowly-defined
    initiatives within the Management Directorate and among DHS components.
        A disadvantage of this combination, however, would be that the long
    term planning and functional integration roles of the BTO would most
    likely be overcome by the day to day events that require immediate
    attention within the Management Directorate and among the DHS
    components.

                            EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE

        Question. Provide an analysis of the pros and cons of performing
    the duties of the executive sedan service in house (i.e. leasing/
    procuring the needed vehicles and hiring the needed drivers) as opposed
    to contracting out for this service?
        Answer. The following analysis shows pros, cons and not only cost,
    but also organizational flexibility and administrative burdens as well
    to provide executive sedan service for DHS executives and senior
    officials.
    Completely In-house

                      DHS EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE--IN-HOUSE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Owned Vehicles (10 @ $23,000/vehicle--cost averaged over         $46,000
     5 years)...............................................
    Maintenance.............................................           9,000
    18 Drivers (12 hour shift--average 21 days/mo.).........       1,720,232
    3 Dispatchers...........................................         186,390
    2 Driver Foremen........................................         136,031
    Supervisor..............................................         118,346
                                                             ---------------
          Total.............................................       2,215,999
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Vehicles would be used over a 5 year period. Maintenance and
    operational costs would be expected to increase over the life of the
    vehicle. Disposal costs would be necessary at the end of the period.
        Vehicles are DHS assets and are available for use in a COOP or
    emergent situation.
        Additional vehicle(s) necessary as ready back up in case of
    accident or other failure, and for rotation during scheduled
    maintenance.
        Staff may be assigned to other transportation related duties as
    need and workload dictate in unusual situations.
        A significant addition to on-board FTE is required to assure
    sufficient drivers and support for a 12 hour per day operation, while
    also providing coverage for holidays, annual leave and sick leave.
        This also adds some administrative burden to other administrative
    functions such as human capital and finance.
    Completely Contracted Out

                  DHS EXECUTIVE SEDAN SERVICE--FULLY CONTRACTED
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vehicles (9 vehicles @ $40,000--averaged over 5 years)..         $72,000
    Drivers.................................................         952,560
    Dispatchers.............................................         219,135
                                                             ---------------
          Total.............................................       1,243,695
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Contractor is responsible for assuring an adequate number of
    cleared staff to provide the required support.
        Contractor is also responsible for assuring an adequate number of
    vehicles are available to meet the requirements of the contract.
        Only pay for vehicles used, but with maintenance, replacement,
    standby and mark up costs included. Costs would be higher if vehicles
    are replaced on preferred 2-year cycle. Maintenance and down time would
    be reduced and reliability increased.
        Vehicles are assets owned by the contractor, and availability in a
    COOP or emergent situations would not be expected.
        Administrative burden is minimized as human capital support in
    recruitment and processing as Federal employees is not required.
        Contractor personnel may not be asked to perform tasks not
    specifically covered by the scope of the contract.
    Current Arrangement is a Hybrid
        The Department currently contracts for vehicles (leases a
    competitive procurement) and driving services separately in order to
    take advantage of the lower costs and flexibilities that each has to
    offer, while limiting overhead. The Department is paying $799 per month
    ($9,588 annually) per vehicle for a fully serviced lease which includes
    maintenance and full insurance coverage. Cars are replaced every 2
    years, which keeps reliability high and the leasing company can sell
    the vehicle which keeps lease costs lower. If the contractor were to
    acquire the vehicles, the Government would pay a higher price along
    with a markup by the vendor. If a vehicle is out of service due to
    other than routine maintenance, a loaner is often available,
    eliminating the need to maintain another vehicle as a backup.
        By contracting for the drivers and dispatchers, the contractor
    bears responsibility for assuring that a sufficient number of cleared
    personnel are available to provide the required level of service.
    Contracting for the drivers and dispatchers also reduces administrative
    burden on DHS.
      --Although using contractor personnel, the vehicles remain DHS assets
            and are available for use in a COOP or emergent situation.
      --Administrative burden is less than the other options.
      --No disposal costs
      --Through use of an executive lease program, maintenance and
            insurance are included and loaners are often available thus
            minimizing the need for a backup vehicle.

                                     MAXHR

        Question. How many of the 29 new positions requested in the budget
    for the MAXHR program could be negatively affected by a ruling against
    the Department in it MAXHR court case?
        Answer. Of the 29 new positions requested for the MAXHR program,
    only six--those additional positions that would be used to support the
    Homeland Security Labor Relations Board (HSLRB)--could potentially be
    impacted by the court case.
        Question. How much of $38.9 million increase to the ``Advisory and
    Assistance Services'' component of the MaxHR program could be
    negatively affected by a ruling against the Department in the MAXHR
    court case?
        Answer. With respect to the $71,749,000 requested in fiscal year
    2007 for human resource management, the only funding that could be
    foregone if the outcome of the court case is not in the Department's
    favor would be the $7.450 million allocated for the Homeland Security
    Labor Relations Board.
        Question. In the event of a court ruling against the Department,
    what are the Department's contingency plans with respect to the new
    positions and support funding?
        Answer. Regardless of the outcome of the litigation pending before
    the Court of Appeals, the implementation of MAXHR will continue at DHS.
    The process for implementation may be significantly more difficult,
    however, if the outcome is not favorable to the Department. The
    flexibilities in the legislation and the MAXHR regulations were
    intended to allow the Department to construct a uniform, performance
    based personnel system that would span the various components and
    occupational categories across the Department. If those flexibilities
    are not sustained by the court, the Department still intends to
    implement a uniform personnel system but may have to invest
    considerably more time and energy in negotiations and consultations
    with the unions that represent employees in more than fifty bargaining
    units across the organization. In addition, the Department may also
    need to maintain multiple pay and performance management systems for a
    longer time, pending the implementation of a single, unified MAXHR
    system.

                                DHS HEADQUARTERS

        Question. Will the $8.2 million requested in the fiscal year 2007
    budget complete the build-out of the NAC? If so, when will the build-
    out be finished?
        Answer. The requested $8.2 million requested in the fiscal year
    2007 budget will complete the build out of the NAC. We expect there may
    be a need for some minimal funds in the out years to manage any minor
    rearrangements and reconfigurations as missions changes require.
        Question. When the build-out is complete, how much additional
    capacity for growth (in terms of office space available) will the
    Department have at the NAC?
        Answer. After the NAC build-out is complete the NAC will be at full
    capacity with approximately 300,000 usable square feet of space for
    about 1,700 people, and there will be no additional office space
    available.

                               PROCUREMENT REPORT

        Question. As directed by the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
    Appropriations Act, provide a report on the number of procurement
    officers for each Departmental component and include an assessment of
    the adequacy of the number and training of these personnel.
        Answer. The CPO continues to work with components and the DHS CFO
    to budget for increased contracting staff. Based on fiscal year 2005
    staffing levels, increases have been realized in both fiscal year 2006
    (11 percent) and are projected fiscal year 2007 (47 percent) based on
    the President's proposed budget. The CPO will work to continue this
    trend until optimum staffing levels are attained. The following chart
    shows the staffing numbers and the percentage of trained and certified
    contracting officers.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Percent of
                                                      Authorized FTE  Authorized FTE    President's      Certified
                       Org Element                      Fiscal Year     Fiscal Year     Budget FTE      Contracting
                                                           2005            2006         Fiscal Year     Officers on
                                                                                           2007            Board
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBP.............................................              92             119             179              79
    OPO.............................................             127             127             227              79
    TSA.............................................              67             105             165              74
    ICE.............................................              81              64              96              32
    USCG............................................             336             339             339              89
    FEMA............................................              55              85             127              79
    FLETC...........................................              31              36              36             100
    USSS............................................              25              25              25              96
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         COMPETITIVE SOURCING PERSONNEL

        Question. How many of the 50 positions requested in the Office of
    Procurement's fiscal year 2007 budget request are to be used for
    competitive sourcing activities?
        Answer. Currently one position will be added to competitive
    sourcing. Once the Director of Acquisition Programs is on board we will
    leverage the staffing of the OCPO programs to offset peaks and valleys
    in work load requirements.
        Question. How many positions in the Office of Procurement are
    currently used for competitive sourcing activities?
        Answer. Two positions.

                             CONTRACTING OUT REPORT

        Question. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation Omnibus (H.R. 2673)
    Division F--Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and Independent
    Agencies, Title VI Section 647(b), contained the following reporting
    requirement: ``Not later than 120 days following the enactment of this
    Act and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the head of
    each executive agency shall submit to Congress a report on the
    competitive sourcing activities on the list required under the Federal
    Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-270; 31 U.S.C.
    501 note) that were performed for such executive agency during the
    previous fiscal year by Federal Government sources.''
        The Committee has not yet received this year's report. Please
    provide this information as well as any plans for public-private
    competitions in fiscal year 2007.
        Answer. The DHS fiscal year 2005 Section 647 report is being
    prepared for submission to the Congress and posting on the DHS web
    site.
        Question. For fiscal year 2005 (actual), fiscal year 2006
    (estimate), and fiscal year 2007 (request), how many positions in the
    Department (broken down by agency) were competed and how much did the
    competitions cost.
        Answer. As noted in the Department of Homeland Security's Section
    647 Report to Congress, DHS completed Competitive Sourcing (OMB
    Circular A-76) competitions involving a total of 137 FTE in fiscal year
    2005, at a one time cost of $787,000. All of these competitions were
    retained in house.
        For fiscal year 2006, DHS has completed competitions involving 150
    FTE to date--all retained in-house--and is currently preparing for the
    completion of additional competitions involving 235 FTE.
        DHS is currently planning to announce in fiscal year 2006 several
    competitions for completion in fiscal year 2007 involving 4,153 FTE.
        Question. How many positions were subsequently contracted out as a
    result of the competition?
        Answer. No positions were contracted out in fiscal year 2005 and no
    positions have been converted to contract performance as a result of
    our fiscal year 2006 efforts to date.

                          DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE

        Question. How many DHS employees (including the component agencies)
    are currently detailed to the White House (including all Executive
    Office of the President agencies)? Provide the committee a list
    containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to;
    salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end
    dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if the agency is
    reimbursed.
        Answer. Our most recent quarterly report shows 13 detailees to the
    White House as of 12/31/05. See attached report entitled White House
    Detailees.

                                                                                         FISCAL YEAR 2006 1ST QUARTER--DHS DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                Detailed from
             Reporting agency             Detailed to which NON-DHS agency      which NON-DHS   Detailed from which   Originating agency   Grade/step or salary    Detail start date      Detail end date     Purpose of detail   Reimb. Y/N
                                                                                   agency          DHS component
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE...........................  ..............  ....................  USCG................  O-5.................  Oct-2005............  Mar-2006............  Comprehensive                N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Review Working
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Group/Katrina
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Lessons Learned
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Team.
    USCG/PHS.........................  WHITE HOUSE...........................  ..............  DHS/USCG/PHS........  USCG/PHS............  MILITARY............  6/13/2005...........  7/1/2008............  White House                  N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Physician
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Assistant.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/HSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  6/14/2004...........  7/1/2006............  Director for Cargo           N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              and Port Security,
                                                                                                                                                                                                              HSC.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/HSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  9/20/2004...........  11/1/2005...........  Senior Director,             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Border and
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Transportation
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Security, HSC.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/NSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  5/28/2004...........  7/1/2006............  Duty Officer, White          N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              House Situation
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Room.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/NSC.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  6/27/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Duty Officer, White          N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              House Situation
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Room.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/NSC.......................  ..............  DHS/US CG...........  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  11/17/2005..........  7/1/2007............  Director for Drugs           N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              and Latin America,
                                                                                                                                                                                                              NSC.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/ONDCP.....................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  7/15/2004...........  7/1/2006............  Office of Supply             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Reduction as the
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Acting Staff
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Director and the
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Coast Guard
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Liaison.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/OVP.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  5/17/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Military Aide to             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              the VP.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/OVP.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  6/22/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Special Assistant            N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              to the VP.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/OVP.......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  3/21/2005...........  7/1/2007............  Military Aide to             N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              the President.
    USCG.............................  WHITE HOUSE/WHCA......................  ..............  DHS/USCG............  DHS/USCG............  MILITARY............  5/5/2003............  7/1/2006............  Chief of                     N
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Engineering, WHCA.
    USSS.............................  WHITE HOUSE/WHO.......................  ..............  ....................  USSS................  $94,260.............  Jul-2005............  Jul-2006............  COOP Policy........          Y
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total White House Detailees 13.

                          DETAILEES TO THE DEPARTMENT

        Question. How many employees of DHS component agencies are
    currently detailed to the Department? Provide the committee a list
    containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to;
    salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end
    dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if this agency is
    reimbursed.
        Answer. Our most recent report (as of 12/31/05) shows 244 staff
    detailed to DHS Headquarters offices. Slightly over half are detailed
    to Operations. See attached report entitled QFR detailees.

                                                                     FISCAL YEAR 2006 1ST QUARTER--DHS DETAILEES TO THE HEADQUARTERS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Detailed from which                                                Detail start                                                                          Reimb.
           Reporting agency             DHS component      Originating agency   Grade/step or salary        date        Detail end date                   Purpose of detail                    Y/N
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CRCL..........................  TSA.................  TSA.................  TSA Band H..........  11/1/2005.......  2/28/2006......  Serve as Control Officer, Complaint Adjudication         N
                                                                                                                                          Program, CRCL.
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $86,103 (1101)......  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys                N
                                                                                                                                          Architect-  ure.
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $97,734 (IPA).......  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Assessments.       N
    DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $65,000 (0-4).......  12/05/05........  06/04/06.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                          Acq.
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $200,000 (IPA)......  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Director....       N
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  GS-13/1.............  04/18/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-15/1.............  10/03/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                          Acq.
    DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $120,000 (O-6)......  01/09/06........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Policy......       N
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $151,156 (1101).....  04/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Trans. R&D..       N
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  GS-15/2.............  03/01/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  $122,000 (IPA)......  06/09/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Engineer-      N
                                                                                                                                            ing.
    DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-15/3.............  02/14/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Policy S&L..       N
    DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14/8.............  07/26/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                          Acq.
    DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $95,000 (O-4).......  12/05/05........  06/04/06.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-15/6.............  10/03/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Sys Dev &          N
                                                                                                                                          Acq.
    DNDO..........................  TSA.................  TSA.................  $128,000 (K Band)...  02/05/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Chief of           N
                                                                                                                                          Staff.
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  $173,186 (IPA)......  06/04/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Assessments.       N
    DNDO..........................  S&T.................  S&T.................  GS-14/1.............  04/18/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-15/1.............  02/19/06........  02/19/07.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    DNDO..........................  USCG................  USCG................  $95,000 (O-4).......  01/09/06........  01/09/08.......  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Systems            N
                                                                                                                                          Engineering.
    DNDO..........................  SLGCP...............  SLGCP...............  GS-12/1.............  08/15/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    DNDO..........................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14/5.............  07/31/05........  Indefinite.....  Providing Technical Expertise to DNDO Ops Support.       N
    I&A IA-H/AS...................  OGC.................  DHS/OGC.............  GS 15...............  7/12/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission as attorney................       N
    I&A IA-H/AS...................  OGC.................  OGC.................  GS-15...............  12/15/03........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission as attorney................       N
    I&A IA-C/CA...................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  4/13/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission............................       N
    I&A IA-C/CA...................  TSA.................  TSA.................  GS-14...............  5/24/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & TSA REP..................       N
    I&A IA-D/TA...................  USCG................  USCG................  LT..................  1/24/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & USCG Rep.................       Y
    I&A IA-D/TA...................  USCG................  USCG................  ....................  8/10/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & USCG Rep.................       Y
    I&A IA-D/TA...................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14...............  11/3/2003.......  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & CBP Rep..................       N
    I&A IA-H/IM...................  CIA.................  CIA.................  SIS.................  10/20/05........  Indefinite.....  DIRECTOR INFO MGT.................................       Y
    I&A IA-L P&I..................  NSA.................  NSA.................  GS-15...............  ................  Indefinite.....  Support to I&A mission & NSA rep..................       N
    I&A IA-P/P&I..................  USCG................  USCG................  Lt. Cdr.............  11/28/05........  Indefinite.....  USCG LIAISON TO ASIA..............................       N
    L&IA..........................  CIS.................  CIS.................  84,751..............  1/1/2004........  Indefinite.....  LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO IMMIGRATION................       N
    L&IA..........................  TSA.................  TSA.................  57,925..............  7/11/2005.......  9/1/2005.......  LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO TSA........................       N
    L&IA..........................  COAST GUARD.........  COAST GUARD.........  MILITARY............  6/23/2005.......  Indefinite.....  LEG AFFAIRS LIAISON TO COAST GUARD................       N
    OGC...........................  USCG................  USCG................  82,937..............  3/1/2005........  3/1/2007.......  Assist with international issues and with Team           Y
                                                                                                                                          Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.
    OGC...........................  USCG................  USCG................  82,937..............  3/1/2005........  3/31/2006......  Provide legal advice concerning issues as they           N
                                                                                                                                          involve the USCG.
    OGC...........................  USCIS...............  CIS.................  110,878.............  3/1/2005........  12/31/2006.....  Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS         N
                                                                                                                                          OGC, focusing on issues relating to immigration
                                                                                                                                          benefits and related USCIS issues.
    OGC...........................  ICE.................  ICE.................  135,136.............  7/1/2005........  12/31/2006.....  Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS         N
                                                                                                                                          OGC, focusing on issues relating to immigration
                                                                                                                                          enforcement and related ICE issues.
    OGC...........................  HSLRB...............  DHS.................  107,521.............  12/1/2005.......  12/31/2006.....  Assist with implementation of MaxHR...............       N
    OGC...........................  HSLRB...............  DHS.................  107,521.............  12/1/2005.......  12/31/2006.....  Assist with OGC's Katrina Task Force..............       N
    OGC...........................  UCSIS...............  USCIS...............  118,272.............  12/1/2005.......  12/1/2006......  Assist with promulgation of regulations that             N
                                                                                                                                          impact on USCIS mission.
    OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  Jul 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-14...............  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  GS-14...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  H...................  Apr 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  CDR.................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Dec 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-12...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DOI.................  DOI.................  GS-13...............  Dec 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  DNDO................  Cont................  Nov 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  PAO.................  PAO.................  E-7.................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  Lt..................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-12...............  Aug 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  HSOMB...............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  GS-13...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  O-3.................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  HSOMB...............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DOI.................  FPS /DOI............  GS-14...............  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jun 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  O-3.................  Jun 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-14...............  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  E-6.................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-11...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  Apr 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Mar 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  GS-14...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  Cont................  Apr 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  SWO.................  O-6.................  Jun 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  GS-12...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  GS-13...............  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  Fusion..............  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  FAM.................  GS-12...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Feb 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  GS-14...............  Mar 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Jun 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  NBSG................  Cont................  Feb 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  Mar 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Sep 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  GS-11...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  Lt..................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  Cont................  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Nov 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  NBSG................  Cont................  Sep 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  GS-11...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  May 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  Future Ops..........  GS-15...............  Mar 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Internal Security...  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  Cont................  Jan 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-11...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  IP-NICC.............  GS-15...............  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-13...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Nov 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  Cont................  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FPS.................  FPS.................  CMDR................  Nov 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-12...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-15...............  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  O-2.................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&L.................  S&L.................  Cont................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DHS PAO.............  PAO.................  GS-13...............  Apr 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  DHS Security........  Security............  GS-14...............  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  Cont................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  TSA.................  TSA.................  K...................  Sep 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-15...............  Mar 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  DNDO................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-11...............  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-12...............  Jun 2003........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  HSOMB...............  Cont................  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  USCG................  E-7.................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  LCRD................  Jan 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  NBSG................  Cont................  Oct 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-R................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA-T................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  SIA.................  GS-13...............  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Jan 2006........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-14...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-13...............  Oct 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  PSA.................  Cont................  Jul 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  IA..................  IA..................  GS-12...............  Aug 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  CIS.................  CIS.................  GS-12...............  Sep 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  USCG................  Executive Staff.....  CDR.................  Jun 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  NBSG................  Cont................  Dec 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  S&T.................  S&T.................  LCDR................  May 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Dir.......................  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Aug 2004........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    OPS Directorate...............  Prep Dir............  RMD.................  Cont................  Mar 2005........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  LT Commander........  9/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  NCSD................  GS-14...............  1/12/05.........  1/12/06........  Support law enforcement and Intelligence..........       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  INS.................  INS.................  SES.................  6/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 14/..............  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 7/...............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-12...............  5/10/06.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  UND--Off............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-1811-14..........  11/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  1/1/03..........  1/1/04.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-14...............  9/13/05.........  5/6/06.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  12/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    PREPAREDNESS..................  S&T.................  S&T Augmentee.......  Detailed Contractor.  4/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  11/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  EP&R................  EP&R................  GS-14...............  9/10/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  5/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  LT..................  4/1/05..........  6/1/06.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-14...............  7/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14...............  10/1/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-15...............  8/2/05..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-11...............  11/17/03........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  NCSD................  GS-14...............  1/4/05..........  Indefinite.....  Support Law Enforcement and Intelligence..........       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  SES.................  9/1/05..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-0132-13..........  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  4/13/04.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-1811-14..........  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  LT Commander........  4/1/04..........  6/1/06.........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  SES.................  6/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  SES.................  9/13/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-13...............  11/3/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  J...................  3/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Provide real-time situational awareness and              N
                                                                                                                                          monitoring of the Homeland.
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 6/...............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-0132-14..........  3/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-13...............  9/13/05.........  5/10/06........  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  H...................  12/23/03........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  GS-13...............  3/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Assist State and Local officials during DHS stand        N
                                                                                                                                          up.
    PREPAREDNESS..................  FEMA................  FEMA................  SES.................  10/1/05.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  H...................  10/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS-15...............  10/01/05........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-14...............  4/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  12/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  ICE.................  ICE.................  GS-1801-14..........  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  NGB.................  NGB.................  LTC.................  9/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 13/..............  1/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USCG................  USCG................  12/3/03.............  9/4/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  USSS................  USSS................  GS 15/..............  1/1/03..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  GS-14...............  9/1/04..........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       Y
    PREPAREDNESS..................  TSA.................  TSA.................  I...................  10/1/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS..................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS-14...............  11/3/03.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE......  USSS................  USSS................  GS-0301-15..........  12/1/02.........  Indefinite.....  Support to Preparedness mission...................       N
    S&T...........................  USCG................  DHS.................  GS-14...............  01/09/04........  Indefinite.....  Providing technical expertise to S&T..............       N
    S&T...........................  CBP.................  DHS.................  GS-14...............  09/12/05........  9/13/2006......  Providing technical expertise to S&T..............       N
    S&T...........................  USCG................  DHS.................  CDR.................  09/30/04........  7/30/2007......  Providing technical expertise to S&T..............       N
    USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  149,200.............  4/3/2005........  10/28/2005.....  Support Solutions Engineering COE.................       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  130,155.............  4/4/2005........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  141,844.............  7/13/2003.......  Indefinite.....  DHS/BTS Integration...............................       N
    USM/CIO.......................  ICE.................  ....................  100,152.............  12/1/2003.......  1/23/05 ended..  Program management and acquisition support........       N
    USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  102,885.............  4/4/2005........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  CIS.................  ....................  89,736..............  3/1/2003........  Indefinite.....  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.       N
    USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  110,278.............  4/3/2005........  10/28/2005       Information Technology............................       Y
                                                                                                                         ended.
    USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  145,482.............  10/27/2004......  Indefinite.....  TSA representative to the Information                    N
                                                                                                                                          Transformation Office.
    USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  138,093.............  4/3/2005........  10/28/2005       Information Technology............................       Y
                                                                                                                         ended.
    USM/CIO.......................  TSA.................  ....................  141,454.............  7/13/2003.......  10/19/2005       INFRASTRUCTURE program support....................       Y
                                                                                                                         ended.
    USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  156,886.............  5/1/2004........  Indefinite.....  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  CBP.................  ....................  149,200.............  12/1/2004.......  Indefinite.....  CIO, Wireless Management Office...................       N
    USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  120,139.............  5/16/2005.......  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  130,155.............  4/4/2005........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  CBP.................  ....................  52,468..............  9/19/2005.......  2/19/2006......  Supporting the DHS Deputy CIO.....................       N
    USM/CIO.......................  OSLGCP..............  ....................  97,206..............  2/7/2005........  9/30/2006......  Assistant Metadata Program Manager to help manage        N
                                                                                                                                          DHS Metadata Center of Excellence (MCOE) program.
    USM/CIO.......................  USCG................  ....................  130,155.............  4/4/05..........  4/4/2006.......  Providing support to the HSDN program office......       Y
    USM/CIO.......................  ICE.................  ....................  100,152.............  12/1/2003.......  Indefinite.....  ACIO acquisition support..........................       N
    USM-CAO.......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS 15...............  9/12/2005.......  9/11/2006......  Specialization in Portfolio Management and               N
                                                                                                                                          coordination of cross-agency requirements..
    USM-CHCO......................  CBP.................  CBP.................  GS 14/$100,152......  4/28/2004.......  Indefinite.....  New MAX HR System--Communications Team............       N
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

        Question. In a brief the Committee received in December 2005, the
    briefing materials stated that the Office of Policy was tasked with,
    ``Centralized policy development and coordination'' as well as,
    ``Ensuring consistency of policy and regulatory developments across
    components.'' In light of this, what are the pros and cons of the
    Office of Screening Coordination and Operations being a component
    within the Office of Policy?
        Answer. After conducting a Second Stage Review of the Department, I
    announced and implemented organizational changes in order to enhance
    the coordination of policy, operations, and intelligence across the DHS
    spectrum. These changes resulted in the creation of a department-wide
    Office of Policy, Office of Operations Coordination and Office of
    Intelligence and Analysis. This new organizational structure became
    effective in November 2005. These offices have been charged with
    utilizing the tools of all of DHS's components to address the
    Department's critical homeland security mission. Indeed, these new
    offices interface on a daily basis with their counterparts in the DHS
    component agencies. This coordinated effort has vastly improved the
    Department's ability to develop strong regulatory and legislative
    proposals.
        The Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) will work
    with each of these offices to improve security screening by creating
    screening standards and polices for the Department of Homeland
    Security, by providing a single redress office for travelers, and by
    setting common standards for registered traveler programs. The
    functions of the SCO include: (1) development of a unified business
    vision and strategy for the coordinated screening of people; (2)
    development of operational standards and coordination of policies; (3)
    oversight of unified program management processes across the various
    screening programs, and management of screening and credential
    acquisitions; and (4) establishment of a portfolio of common screening
    services that include unified standards concerning enrollments;
    biometrics management; credentialing operations; and central redress
    practices and policies.
        The SCO will implement an effective and efficient screening
    capability that integrates policies, business strategies and processes,
    data and information systems, and technology to enhance security and
    immigration, trade, travel, and credentialing experiences.

                           OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

        Question. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget for the Office of
    Procurement Operations in the Working Capital Fund requests an increase
    of 93 FTE. The Office of Procurement in the Under Secretary for
    Management account requests an increase of 25 FTE. Given these large
    increases in FTE for procurement contracting and policy, is a
    sufficient number of lawyers with expertise in procurement law being
    requested for the Office of General Counsel (an increase of four
    attorneys is requested)?
        Answer. The procurement law function within the OGC was originally
    staffed to provide legal support to a small operational procurement
    function serving the departmental offices (the Office of Procurement
    Operations), a departmental grants activity, and the departmental
    policy and executive function for the immediate offices Chief
    Procurement Officer (ICPO). As of September 2004, the procurement law
    function had three full-time procurement attorneys serving
    approximately 60 staff at OPO and ICPO. With limited exceptions, the
    contracts being written at the time by OPO were interagency agreements
    (i.e., agreements to obtain goods and services from preexisting
    contracts with other agencies or contracts to be let by those agencies)
    and orders under blanket purchase arrangements under GSA schedule
    contracts.
        Currently, OGC has five procurement attorneys. Two of the
    procurement attorneys have substantial collateral duties (one attorney
    provides other general law guidance and counsel coordination activities
    for US VISIT, and the other is providing legal advice on operational
    security matters to the Chief Security Officers and his staff). This
    staff is expected to provide: (i) solicitation and award reviews; (ii)
    day-to-day advice on intermediate actions, such as vendor questions and
    answers, discussion issues, competitive range determinations, and
    source selection issues; (iii) legal advice on procurement policy for
    the matters impacting the entire Department; (iv) oral and written
    advocacy on protests and appeals before contract fora, such as the
    Government Accountability Office, the Department of Transportation
    Board of Contract Appeals, and other specialized fora at the Department
    of Labor and Small Business Administration; and (v) litigation support
    to the Department of Justice for procurement matters before the U.S.
    Court of Federal Claims.
        Currently, there are 87 staff assigned to OPO (from the 1102
    series, an actual contract writing series). OPO has the authority and
    intention to hire 40 additional staff members this fiscal year. ICPO
    has approximately another 35 personnel on-board (from the 1102 series
    and several administrative personnel from the 301 and 343 series). CPO
    advises that in fiscal year 2007, under the President's budget
    proposal, ICPO would increase staff by another 27 positions (1102), and
    OPO would add another 108 personnel (1102). At the conclusion of fiscal
    year 2007, OPO will have 228 staff on-board, and ICPO will have 62
    staff on-board--for a total of 290 staff in CPO.

                              LOCAL CIS OMBUDSMAN

        Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
    provided funding for an internal pilot program for local ombudsman
    staffing, training, and coordination. Provide an update on the status
    of this program.
        Answer. The Local Ombudsman Pilot Program was completed on November
    15, 2005. The program met all its goals, to establish personnel and
    support requirements, determine liaison responsibilities and
    limitations and create quality assurance standards and program
    objectives.
        The pilot program created a model of operations for Local Ombudsman
    Offices or field offices. The pilot program ensures uniform operating
    procedures and processes, and provides a consistent and standardized
    model of operation. Personnel and support requirements were identified;
    liaison responsibilities and limitations were determined; and quality
    assurance standards and program objectives were scoped. The pilot
    program also developed cost models to identify personnel, facilitation
    and operating costs for Local Ombudsman Office's in various locations
    across the country.
        Question. Will additional local ombudsman programs be established
    in fiscal year 2007? If so, when will they be stood up and in what
    locations?
        Answer. There are no current plans for the creation of any Local
    Ombudsman's offices in fiscal year 2007.
        Rather, the CIS Ombudsman is developing a ``Virtual Access
    Ombudsman Office.'' This will make Ombudsman services accessible where
    computer access is available. The President's fiscal year 2007 Budget
    requests $5,927,000 for this office, including the annualization and
    adjustment's to base, and provides funding for travel to enable
    personal contact by representatives based in Washington, DC, visiting
    various locations on a ``circuit-ride'' basis. This will enable the
    Ombudsman to objectively identify areas to visit based on problems
    presented by individuals and employers in dealing with USCIS. It will
    provide an efficient method of providing government services which
    incorporate new advancements in communication.

                                  BRAC REPORT

        Question. As directed by the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
    Appropriations Act, provide a report describing the impact of the
    closure or realignment of any Department of Defense base resulting from
    the Base Realignment and Closure law on Department of Homeland Security
    facilities and activities.
        Answer. BRAC properties offer DHS the opportunity to acquire assets
    for current and future mission performance requirements that will
    benefit operation effectiveness and efficiencies. The complex analysis
    of the full extent and timing of operational and financial impacts,
    including cost estimates from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010, are
    being completed. We anticipate submitting a full report by January
    2007.

                      SENIOR LEADERSHIP TRAVEL INITIATIVE

        Question. It is the Committee's understanding that the Secretary
    and the Deputy Secretary do not travel by plane together. The fiscal
    year 2007 budget indicates that only the Secretary's travel has been
    designated as ``required use.'' Given this, why is the Deputy Secretary
    requesting $500,000?
        Answer. The use of a government aircraft is sometimes necessary and
    the request for additional funding is based upon the cost per flight
    hour of a government aircraft, which can cost up to $8,936 per flight
    hour.
        Question. Why couldn't the Deputy Secretary fly commercial aircraft
    at a greatly reduced cost?
        Answer. In most cases, the Deputy Secretary does fly commercial
    aircraft in order to minimize the use of taxpayer dollars for travel.
    Nonetheless, in some circumstances--such as during periods of higher
    alert status, in order to accommodate travel to multiple or remote
    locations in a short period of time, or when the traveling party is
    large--it may be more cost effective or otherwise advisable for the
    Deputy Secretary to fly on a government aircraft.
        Question. Provide information on the travel done by the Secretary,
    Deputy Secretary, and Chief of Staff for fiscal year 2004, fiscal year
    2005, and fiscal year 2006 including the number of trips and the
    charges per hour and per trip.
        Answer. The information requested for specific travel costs is
    listed below in the following charts. The rate per flight hour in the
    chart below is the total rate per hour for the entire aircraft (i.e.
    not prorated per passenger). The cost per flight hour therefore
    includes the costs for all staff accompanying the Secretary. The Chief
    of Staff is not included in the chart because the Chief of Staff does
    not travel on government aircraft except when accompanying the
    Secretary.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             FAA                  USCG                 Mil Air
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Rate per              Rate per              Rate per
                                                    Number of    flight   Number of    flight   Number of    flight
                                                      trips     hour \1\    trips       hour      trips       hour
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Fiscal Year 2004

    Secretary.....................................          6       $675         26     $6,192          9  $2,829-$7
                                                                                                                ,319
                                                            3        875  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                            4      1,937  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                            4      2,214  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Secretary........................         17  .........         26  .........          9  .........
                                                   =================================================================
    Deputy Secretary..............................          2        875  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                            2      2,214  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Dep. Sec.........................          4  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                   =================================================================

                   Fiscal Year 2005

    Secretary.....................................          1       $790         26     $6,192          3     $2,829
                                                           12        875         14      8,936          3      8,495
                                                            1      1,937  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                            2      2,214  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                            1      2,590  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                            3      2,829  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Secretary........................         20  .........         40  .........          6
                                                   =================================================================
    Deputy Secretary..............................          1        875          1      6,192  .........  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Dep. Sec.........................          1  .........          1  .........  .........  .........
                                                   =================================================================

       Fiscal Year 2006 (thru January 31, 2006)

    Secretary.....................................          1     $2,590          6     $8,936          1     $4,332
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Secretary........................          1  .........          6  .........          1  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Deputy Secretary..............................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
          Total, Dep. Sec.........................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ FAA rates per flight hour do not include the 17 percent administrative fee charged on all flights.

                               OPERATIONS CENTERS

        Question. You recently stated before the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee that part of the problem in the
    Hurricane Katrina response was lack of real time information being
    shared among the Department's operations centers to ensure that all the
    decision makers were informed on issues that needed action. You
    indicated the problem was lack of integration of the operations centers
    and cultural information hoarding which leads to stove piping.
        There at least 19 Operations and Intelligence Centers at the
    Department. Please list all DHS operations centers.
        Answer. Below are the DHS Operations Centers for the DHS
    Headquarters and the Component's Headquarters:
        DHS Headquarters, Operations Directorate: Homeland Security
    Operations Center (HSOC)
        FEMA: National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)
        U.S. Coast Guard: Coast Guard Command Center (CGCC)
        U.S. Secret Service: USSS Headquarters Operations Center
        Customs & Border Patrol (CBP): Situation Room (Sit Room)
        Transportation Security Administration (TSA): Transportation
    Security Operations Center (TSOC)
        Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE Operations Center
    (IOC)
        The previous list of 19 submitted in response to other questions
    included intelligence centers are below:

                                    DHS HSOC & COMPONENT-LEVEL OPS AND INTEL CENTERS
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Responsible agency               Official name and acronym                      Street address
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Department of Homeland          Homeland Security Operations Center      3801 Nebraska Ave, NW, Washington, DC
     Security (DHS): Headquarters/   (HSOC).
     Operations Directorate.        Note: Office of Intelligence & Analysis
                                     (OI&A) (Watch & Warning Branch)
                                     integrated into HSOC.

    Federal Emergency Management    National Response Coordination Center    500 C Street SW, Washington, DC
     Agency (FEMA).                  (NRCC).                                 19844 Blueridge Mountain Rd, State
                                    FEMA Operations Center (FOC)...........   Route 601, Bluemont, VA 20132

    United States Coast Guard       Coast Guard Command Center (CGCC)......  2100 2nd St SW, Washington, DC 20593
     (USCG).                        National Response Center (NRC): Note:    2100 2nd St SW, Washington, DC 20593
                                     Chair EPA; Co-chair USCG.               1461 North Road Street, Elizabeth City,
                                    National Strike Force Coordination        NC 27909
                                     Center (NSFCC).

    United States Secret Service    USSS Headquarters Operations Center....  Classified
     (USSS).                        Intelligence Division Duty Desk: IA      950 H Street NW, 9th Floor, Washington,
                                     Duty Desk.                               DC 20223

    Customs and Border Protection   Situation Room--``Sit Room''...........  1300 Pennsylvania Ave N.W., Washington,
     (CBP).                         National Targeting Center (NTC)........   DC 20229
                                    Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC)  12379 Sunrise Valley Drive, Reston, VA
                                    National Communications Center (NCC)...   20191
                                    Intel Watch............................  1355 Customs Way, March AFRB, CA 92555
                                                                             1900 Lakemont Ave, Orlando, FL 32803
                                                                             1300 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.,
                                                                              Washington, DC 20229

    Transportation Security         Transportation Security Operations       13555 Eds Drive, Herndon, VA
     Administration (TSA).           Center (TSOC).                          601 South 12th Street, Arlington,
                                    Transportation Security Intelligence      Virginia 22202
                                     Services (TSIS).

    Immigration and Customs         ICE Operations Center (IOC)............  425 I St. N.W., Washington, DC
     Enforcement (ICE).             Federal Air Marshalls (FAM) System       FAMS Cabot Tech, 13555 EDS Drive,
                                     Operation Control Division (SOCD).       Herndon, VA 20171
                                    Federal Protective Service (FPS)         Southeast Federal Center, Bldg 74, Rm
                                     National Capital Region.                 1, 3rd & M St., SE, Washington, DC
                                    ICE Intelligence Watch.................   20407
                                                                             425 I St. N.W., Washington, DC
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. What is your plan to finally integrate the centers?
        Answer. The plan is to integrate the DHS Operations Centers as
    follows:
    Short Term
        DHS Operations Directorate acts as the Operations Advocate for DHS
    and produces a cascading effect for a single operations function and
    24/7 operations center within each component. The 2SR identified the
    need for an integrated DHS/Department-level operations function and an
    integrated DHS/Department-wide operations architecture/structure. In
    particular, ``structure'' includes Department-wide organizing (and
    resourcing) to provide operations functions at the Component level. The
    newly formed DHS Operations Directorate provides ``one stop shopping''
    and unity of effort for overall Department-level (strategic/national)
    operations. The formation and implementation of the DHS Operations
    Directorate will cascade the need/requirement for a consolidated
    operations function within each DHS Component. The cascading effect is
    similar to a ``forcing function'' that will ripple from the strategic
    level through the operational and tactical level so that operations are
    unified across the spectrum of threats and characterized by rapid
    planning and execution.
        As the operations advocate, the DHS Operations Directorate is
    forcing a cultural change throughout DHS that focuses on critical
    elements of ``command and staff actions'' including rapid and accurate
    operational reporting, standardization, verification/quality control,
    and real time situational awareness. The DHS Operations Directorate is
    the senior (strategic/national level) operations entity and has staff
    cognizance over operational matters within the strategic, operational
    and tactical framework. Thus, the advocate ``looks out'' for and
    promotes unified operations throughout DHS and with other partner
    agencies. The advocacy includes helping Components develop an
    operations function to promoting organizational and process changes to
    supporting resource requirements. The DHS operations advocate keeps
    critical operating issues in front of the senior DHS leaders.
        The DHS Operations Directorate is providing integrated connectivity
    and increased situational awareness through a Common Operating Network
    and a Common Operating Picture. The common operating network is the
    Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). It is used for
    operational reporting that will be fed into a Common Operating Database
    (COD) that feeds the Common Operating Picture (COP). Using the HSIN and
    the COP as two tools to coordinate or blend the DHS operation centers
    (strategic, operational, tactical levels) into a functioning whole
    (unity of effort). The COP will then be provided to the components for
    their use and for updating. The integration of the DHS Operations
    Centers via HSIN and the COP/COD provides information sharing and
    situational awareness, both vertically and horizontally, for increased
    unity of effort.
    Long Term
        When considering long term options, DHS is exploring solutions that
    will lead to the consolidation as well as integration of its various
    operations centers. Among the options being considered is the National
    Operations Center. A National Operations Center facility would provide
    the protections of subterranean, positive pressure CBRNE survivability
    features common to modern Department of Defense Operations Centers
    would ensure that mission critical collaboration and coordination
    activities throughout all phases of national incident management
    activities.
        Question. Is there money in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget
    to get that done?
        Answer. The 2007 President's budget request fully funds capability
    milestones planned for HSIN and the Common Operating Picture necessary
    to integrate operations across the department in the short-term.

                                    I STAFF

        Question. What is the status of the I staff?
        Answer. The Operational Integration Staff (I-STAFF) no longer
    exists. As part of the DHS reorganization following the Second Stage
    Review, the Secretary incorporated I-STAFF functions into the
    Operations and Preparedness Directorates.
        Question. How many of the detailees to the I staff have returned to
    their agencies and how many are detailed to the Operations Directorate?
        Answer. There are no former I-Staff personnel detailed to the
    Operations Directorate. All of the personnel previously detailed to the
    I-Staff have either returned to their previous organizations or been
    placed in permanent FTE positions elsewhere in the Department, with the
    exception of 2 detailees who are transitioning into permanent positions
    and 4 Coast Guard Officers who have been assigned on detail to the
    Preparedness Directorate.
        Question. Are detailees to the Operations Directorate reimbursed?
        Answer. As a general rule, the Operations Directorate does not
    reimburse parent organizations for the interagency support that is
    provided to the Operations Directorate. However, Operations does have
    reimbursable agreements with a few agencies to cover the cost of
    support provided to the HSOC. Currently, agreements are in place with
    the CIA, the National Geospatial Mapping Agency (NGA) and Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

                             MORALE PROBLEMS AT DHS

        Question. From August to December of 2004, the Office of Personnel
    Management sent out surveys to 276,424 Federal employees at 30 cabinet
    departments. The purpose of this survey was to allow managers to
    measure, ``employees' perceptions of whether, and to what extent,
    conditions characterizing successful organizations are present in their
    agencies.'' In June of 2005 the results of the survey were made public.
        According to the survey, Department of Homeland Security employees
    rated their Department the lowest in terms of performance and job
    satisfaction. Of the 78 questions on the survey, the Department of
    Homeland Security was in the bottom 10 percent of all departments and
    agencies more than 96 percent of the time. In fact, the Department
    ranked dead last on exactly half of the questions asked. Here are some
    of the survey results:
        Only 12 percent said they felt strongly that they were,
    ``encouraged to come up with new and better ways of doing thing.''
        Only 4.6 percent strongly agree that, ``Employees are rewarded for
    providing high quality products and services to customers.''
        Only 3.3 percent strongly agreed with the following statement,
    ``Personnel decisions are based on merit.''
        Mr. Secretary, that survey was taken before you came on board. This
    past summer, you reorganized the Department. Then Hurricane Katrina
    hit. Do you believe that morale and performance are improving at DHS?
        Answer. The results of the Federal Human Capital (HC) Survey were
    received shortly prior to my arrival at DHS. While the employees'
    responses demonstrated a strong commitment to the DHS mission and how
    their work efforts relate to our important tasks at hand, I was less
    pleased with DHS' overall standing in the survey and responses to
    specific areas such as establishment of a performance culture and trust
    in top organizational leaders. Since receiving the survey results, I
    have taken several actions to ensure that we maintain a focus on
    improving the quality of work life for employees of the Department.
    Upon receiving the survey results, I immediately took action to address
    the findings, including correspondence to Departmental leaders and
    establishment of an employee-led team to address the findings and
    opportunities for improvement. Additionally, a ``culture and
    communications'' team was charted under my Second Stage Review for the
    express purpose of identifying opportunities to improving morale and
    communications within DHS. The 2SR team identified a number of
    findings, including an increased emphasis on leadership development,
    creating a continuous learning environment, and establishing a
    performance-based culture.
        I believe that the action steps that are being undertaken as a
    result of our response to the HC Survey as well as the 2SR team finding
    are having, and will continue to have, a positive impact on the
    organization. Our continued emphasis on implementing the Department's
    new human resources system, MAXHR, will also have a tremendous impact
    on our continued development of organizational leaders and movement
    towards a more performance-based organization.
        Question. What specific steps are you taking to improve morale at
    the Department?
        Answer. Today, the HC Survey response team within DHS, the I-team,
    continues to work employee issues at a grass roots level, including
    sponsoring employee focus groups to identify specific action plans for
    improving DHS morale. A Chief Learning Officer position has been
    established to increase our focus on training and development
    opportunities, and MAXHR performance leadership training has been
    initiated and completed for over 3,000 DHS managers to heighten their
    skills and awareness of employee issues and creating a stronger
    performance culture--with 9,000 more managers scheduled for training
    this year. All SES members of the Department received specific training
    in August of last year that included how to improve communications and
    coaching skills within the workforce and how to create a better
    alignment between organizational priorities and individual performance
    expectations. Additionally, I have recently taken steps to improve
    communications between senior leadership and all DHS employees, through
    a Secretarial webcast, through which answers to frequently asked
    employee questions were provided. I plan to continue this and other
    efforts aimed at bettering communications with our leaders and our
    workforce.

                                  CIVIL RIGHTS

        Question. How many civil rights complaints/investigations were
    there in fiscal year 2004, fiscal year 2005, and fiscal year 2006 to
    date (listed by agency)?
        Answer. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
    categorizes ``Civil Rights Complaints'' in two ways: (1) external
    complaints are allegations that employees or officials of the
    Department have violated the civil rights or civil liberties of members
    of the public, organizations, or non-DHS employees; and (2) for
    internal complaints, the Secretary has delegated the authority to
    direct processing of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. The
    response to this QFR is divided into these two categories.
        External.--For external complaints, there are multiple entry points
    into the Department. The Office for CRCL receives complaints from the
    public and categorizes them by component. The Office retains these
    complaints for investigation or refers them to the appropriate office
    for investigation. In addition, we have provided separate information
    for complaints filed directly with a component Civil Rights Office of
    professional responsibility. Complaints filed with the DHS Office of
    Inspector General are not included in these QFR responses.
    DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
        The number of complaints received by fiscal year and component in
    the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management
    system is as follows:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               EPR/    IAIP/
              Fiscal year             Total    CBP   DHS \1\   FEMA    PREP     ICE     TSA    USCG    USCIS   USSS
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2004...........................      88      35  .......       2  ......      25      20  ......       5       1
    2005...........................      88      36        3  ......       1      30       5       4       7       2
    2006 (to date).................      46      17  .......       1  ......      24       3       1  ......  ......
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Indicates a multiple-component complaint.

        Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component
    offices is listed below:
    Customs and Border Protection
        Fiscal year 2004--218
        Fiscal year 2005--255
        Fiscal year 2006--111 (to date)
    Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights
        Fiscal year 2004--1
        Fiscal year 2005--2
        Fiscal year 2006--13 (to date)
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement
        Fiscal year 2004--42
        Fiscal year 2005--97
        Fiscal year 2006--38 (to date)
    Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights
        Fiscal year 2004--167
        Fiscal year 2005--564
        Fiscal year 2006--57 (to date)
    Internal (EEO)
        For internal complaints the aggrieved individual contacts a
    component EEO Office, completes the informal process for discrimination
    complaints and if the issue is not resolved to his or her satisfaction
    may file a complaint with that component. Upon acceptance of the
    complaint, the component EEO Office arranges for an impartial
    investigation of the complaint. If the issue remains unresolved after
    the investigation, the complainant has the right to a final agency
    decision with a hearing conducted by an EEOC Administrative Judge or on
    the record. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties issues
    final agency decisions for the Department.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Fiscal year                  CIS     CBP    FEMA    FLETC   HSHQ     CE      SA      SCG     SSS
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2004....................................      90     208      34       9  ......     271     594      34      14
    2005....................................     126     242      64      15       3     274     393      35      16
    2006 (1st Qtr)..........................      24      77      18       4       3      45      63       5       3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. On average, how long does it take to investigate and
    resolve a claim?
        Answer. The amount of time to investigate and resolve a claim
    depends on various factors, which are listed below:
    External
        DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties:
      --The average length of time for investigation and resolution of the
            closed referred and retained complaints in the Office for Civil
            Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management system is 284
            days.
        Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component
    offices is listed below:
        Customs and Border Protection & Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement:
      --CBP and ICE use a joint database to track civil rights complaints;
            the average is 6 months.
        Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights:
      --The average is 160 days.
        Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights:
      --The average is 110 days out of an allotted 180 days.
    Internal (EEO)
        The numbers in the following chart refer to the average number of
    days to investigate a complaint per component.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Fiscal year                  IS      CBP    FEMA    FLETC   DHSHQ    ICE     TSA    USCG    USSS
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2004....................................     267     211     270     329  ......     227     314     168     181
    2005....................................     161     253     293     164  ......     216     414     211     327
    2006 (1st Qtr)..........................     N/A     N/A     N/A     N/A     N/A     N/A     391     143     N/A
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. What is the current backlog?
        Answer. The backlog is listed below:
    External
    DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
        The Office defines ``backlog'' as complaints that have been open in
    the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties complaint management
    system for over 180 days. The current backlog is 57 complaints, of
    which 30 are retained within the Office and 27 are referred to
    components for investigation, out of total number of 223 complaints
    received to date.
        Information for complaints filed directly with DHS component
    offices is listed below:
    Customs and Border Protection & Immigration and Customs Enforcement
        CBP and ICE use a joint database to track civil rights complaints.
    From fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006 YTD 761 Civil Rights
    Complaints were received at the CBP/ICE Joint Intake Center (JIC). Of
    the 761 complaints 621 have been completed and closed out. 140 Civil
    Rights Complaints remain open and under investigation.
    Federal Emergency Management Agency Office of Equal Rights
        The current backlog is 15 pending investigation, 2 from fiscal year
    2005 and 13 from fiscal year 2006. The increased activity as a result
    of Hurricane Katrina created a backlog in processing fiscal year 2005
    cases.
    Transportation Security Administration Office of Civil Rights
        The current backlog is 13 complaints from fiscal year 2005.
    Internal (EEO)
        For internal complaints ``backlog'' is defined as all open
    complaints.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      As of                     CIS     CBP    FEMA    FLETC    HQ      ICE     TSA    USCG    USSS
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2006 (1st Qtr)..........................     140     535     103      12       6     397     995      57      19
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    US VISIT
                                  IDENT-IAFIS

        Question. I was very pleased that you announced last summer that
    you planned to migrate the US VISIT program from the current two
    fingerprint enrollment for visitors entering this country to ten
    fingerprint enrollment. As you know, I have been pressing for this
    since the Department was created. And I am also pleased that your
    budget requests $60 million for achieving interoperability between the
    FBI and Homeland Security biometric databases as part of this effort.
        What is your estimated timeline for achieving a 10 fingerprint
    process for US VISIT?
        Answer. In order to realize the full benefits of collecting 10
    fingerprints, US VISIT must undertake two initiatives: deploy
    electronic readers capable of scanning 10 fingerprints accurately and
    quickly; and develop interoperability between the FBI's Integrated
    Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and DHS's Automated
    Biometric Identity System (IDENT). US VISIT has already made progress
    towards IDENT/IAFIS interoperability and is exploring 10-print readers
    for deployment to multiple environments.
        DHS, along with the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, as
    well as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, hosted an
    industry day to challenge the private sector to make a smaller, faster,
    and more accurate 10-print capture device. We are working with industry
    to help design new capture devices that meet DHS's basic operational
    requirements at primary inspection. Advances in technology will allow
    DHS and State to routinely collect 10 slap prints, without negatively
    impacting the thousands of international visitors that pass though our
    ports and visa issuing posts every day.
        Question. What specific elements could be expedited in fiscal year
    2006 if funding were available?
        Answer. The Department has sufficient resources for IDENT/IAFIS
    interoperability in fiscal year 2006.

                                      EXIT

        Question. Provide an update on funding estimates necessary to
    implement exit and the status of the exit pilots.
        Answer. The Department will submit to Congress plans on
    implementation of exit screening once the review of the exit pilots is
    complete.

                           VISA WAIVER PROGRAM (WVP)

        Question. Please explain the DHS role in reviewing any new
    expansion of VWP applications.
        Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
    the Secretary of State, may designate a country meeting the statutory
    criteria for participation in the program. The DHS has established the
    Office of International Enforcement to oversee the Department's role in
    VWP; conduct the statutorily required reviews of currently
    participating countries; and, working with Department of State,
    evaluate whether any additional countries are eligible to participate
    in the program.
        Question. What are the criteria required for a country to become a
    VWP participant?
        Answer. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was established as a pilot
    program in 1988. Under the program, nationals of designated countries
    who are in possession of valid passports may visit the United States
    for business or pleasure for 90 days or less without first obtaining a
    nonimmigrant visa. Such visitors must sign a waiver of certain rights
    and affirm, in writing, their admissibility and understanding of
    program conditions prior to application for admission. A visitor under
    the program may not extend his stay or change or adjust status with
    minor exceptions (adjustment through an immediate relative petition or
    an application for asylum).
        The Visa Waiver Permanent Program (VWPP) Act of 2000 made the Visa
    Waiver Pilot Program permanent. The statutory requirements for the VWP
    are found at Section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
    Currently, 27 countries participate: Andorra, Australia, Austria,
    Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
    Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
    Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
    Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The last expansion took
    place in 1999 with the addition of Singapore and Portugal. In fiscal
    year 2004, according to the Office of Immigration Statistics,
    approximately 15.9 million visitors (over 50 percent of all controlled
    entries) entered the United States under the VWP. Most, but not all, EU
    countries participate in the VWP.
        The VWPP Act of 2000 and The Enhanced Border Security and Visa
    Entry Reform Act of 2002 modified Section 217 to impose new conditions
    on VWP countries. Current statutory requirements are that the country:
      --has reciprocal visa-free travel extended to citizens of the United
            States for 90 days or less (tourism and business);
      --has a low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate;
      --has a low immigration violations rate (overstays, etc.);
      --certifies that it reports to the United States on a timely basis
            the theft of blank passports issued by that country;
      --has a program to issue Machine Readable Passports (MRP) that are
            tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document
            authentication identifiers that comply with standards
            established by the International Civil Aviation Organization
            (ICAO) by October 26, 2006; and
      --through its designation does not compromise U.S. law enforcement
            and security interests, including enforcement of U.S.
            immigration laws and procedures for extraditions to the United
            States.
        The statute also requires that:
      --a VWP traveler present an MRP;
      --DHS have equipment to read these passports at ports of entry;
      --Transportation carriers provide manifest data electronically; and
      --Participating countries be evaluated against statutory criteria
            every 2 years.
        By policy issued in June and July 2005, DHS elaborated on the
    statutory criteria by expanding the Lost and Stolen Passport(s) (LASP)
    reporting requirement to include issued as well as blank passports and
    clarified the biometric passport requirements. In addition, under the
    new guidelines, participating countries must have a program in place to
    issue MRPs which contain a digital photograph of the bearer embedded in
    the biographical data page by 10/26/05 (Level I Certification) and a
    ``true'' biometric passport (``e-passport'') which includes an IC chip
    containing the biographical information and photo by 10/26/06 (Level II
    Certification). Level II Certification also requires that each VWP
    country commit to certain LASP reporting standards. Currently, these
    new LASP reporting standards are being finalized at DHS.

                          TEN PRINT CAPACITY OVERSEAS

        Question. Please provide the specific time table for the Department
    of State's plan to pilot a 10 print enrollment capacity at overseas
    consulates?
        Answer. The Department of State is the lead agency responsible for
    deploying 10-print enrollment capabilities to overseas consulates.
    Questions concerning this issue would be best answered by the
    Department of State.
        Question. At which locations are the pilots being considered?
        Answer. The Department of State is the lead agency responsible for
    deploying 10-print enrollment capabilities to overseas consulates.
    Questions concerning this issue should be answered by State.

                      WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE

        Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
    2002 mandates that the government develop and implement a plan to
    require U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to present a passport--or
    other appropriate secure identity and citizenship document--when
    entering the United States. Starting by the end of this year, for
    instance, a driver's license will not be sufficient proof of
    identification for flying between Washington, DC and Montreal. This is
    a major change in how we have treated travel relations with our
    neighbors to the north and the south. Citizens on our border have not
    been required to obtain passports in the past. This is a burden and a
    major concern for many of our citizens, especially for the elderly and
    those in rural areas.
        On January 17, 2006, you and Secretary Rice announced a plan to
    create and issue, by the end of 2006, new travel documents for
    Canadian, Mexican, and United States citizens to ensure the secure, but
    relatively unhindered, entry of these citizens into the other countries
    without the need for costly United States passports. You have named it
    the ``People, Access, Security, Service''--or PASS card. As I
    understand it, this card may contain biometric data, such as a
    fingerprint and a digital photograph of the card holder.
        Given that cardholders will still have to fill out a form and
    provide this personal data, how is the proposed PASS card fundamentally
    different than a passport?
        Answer. The recently proposed ``PASS System'' is an important
    element of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). Specific
    questions concerning this issue should be directed to the Department of
    State.
        Question. What funds are included in the President's fiscal year
    2007 budget request to facilitate this new program and where are they
    located?
        Answer. No funds are needed for this initiative in fiscal year
    2007.
        Question. How much will this new program cost the United States
    government?
        Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
    related to the production of travel documents, are in planning and are
    predecisional.
        Question. What will be the cost to American citizens of obtaining
    these new documents and how will they go about applying for them?
        Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including the specifics
    related to the production of travel documents, are in planning and are
    predecisional.
        Question. Who will issue this document?
        Answer. The Department of State and DHS have announced that State
    will produce PASS system documents.
        Question. How much will the card cost and who will have to pay for
    this card?
        Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
    related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
    and are predecisional.
        Question. Will new card readers or scanners be required to read
    these documents? How much will they cost?
        Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
    related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
    and are predecisional.
        Question. Are funds included in the budget request for machines to
    read these cards at the ports of entry?
        Answer. There are no funds needed at this time.
        Question. What is your estimate of the total cost of this program?
        Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
    related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
    and are predecisional.
        Question. Where will these documents be produced?
        Answer. Many elements of the PASS system, including specifics
    related to the production of travel documents, are still in planning
    and are predecisional.
        Question. How will you ensure that these documents will be secure
    and not subject to tampering and fraud?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security will work with the
    Department of State to develop standards to ensure that any PASS travel
    documents issued will contain anti-tampering and counterfeiting
    features.

                          STRATEGIC BORDER INITIATIVE

        Question. Explain the functions and expectations of the Southwest
    border program to end catch and release.
        Answer. Ending catch and release is a major objective of the Secure
    Border Initiative (SBI)'s unified border control strategy, which
    encompasses the interdiction of cross border violators at and between
    official ports of entry. The Department has already made significant
    progress in achieving this goal. Quick and efficient detention and
    removal of apprehended aliens is crucial to border control.
        Three major strategies in this effort are:
      --Detect and respond to all cross-border crime;
      --End ``catch and release'' of non-Mexican illegal aliens; and
      --Deter cross-border violations.
        A deterrence factor exists only when potential violators understand
    that the chances that they will be apprehended and removed have
    increased. This prevents a significant number of potential violators
    from even attempting initial or repeat cross-border violations.
        We have made great strides in our ability to detain non-Mexican
    national aliens apprehended while illegally entering the United States
    on our Southwest Border by employing three tools: increased capacity,
    faster turnover (including increased use of expedited removal), and
    increased deterrence. Indeed, we are now able to detain virtually all
    non-Mexican aliens apprehended between ports of entry along the
    Southwest border with the notable exceptions of El Salvadoran nationals
    who cannot be placed into expedited removal due to an outstanding court
    injunction, and aliens from countries that are slow to accept
    repatriation of their nationals. With the money from the recent
    supplemental, an additional 4,000 beds are available, which will allow
    for the detention of El Salvadoran nationals.
        In addition, until recently, family groups were routinely released,
    but with the opening of a 500 bed family detention center in May, ICE
    is able to detain all apprehended family units on the Southwest border.
        Question. How many people are detained?
        Answer. The funded bed level in fiscal year 2006 is 20,800. The
    average daily population fluctuates, but the average nationwide from
    October 2005 to February 1, 2006 was 20,501.
        Question. How many people are ineligible for expedited removal?
    What is being done with them?
        Answer. Citizens of Cuba arriving at a United States port of entry
    by aircraft are ineligible, by statute, for expedited removal. DHS
    extended this exemption in 2005 to Cubans arriving at a land-border
    port of entry. Also, as a result of an injunction entered by the U.S.
    District Court for the Central District of California 17 years ago in
    Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, the Department is prohibited from
    applying expedited removal to Salvadorans.
        The Administration has asked the Court to lift or modify its
    injunction last fall. Discovery is still continuing in the court
    proceedings and no decision is anticipated in the immediate future. The
    Administration has also asked Congress to reform the immigration
    injunction process so that the Administration may have additional
    flexibility in the removal process.
        Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, all nationalities are
    amenable to expedited removal as prescribed by law, excluding the noted
    exceptions. Aliens excepted from expedited removal is given a Notice to
    Appear, which places them into removal proceedings, and a determination
    is then made as to whether the alien should be paroled or subject to
    continued detention, based on the likelihood the individual poses a
    danger to the community and/or will appear for the removal hearing.
        The recent supplemental will allow the Department to detain
    additional aliens and will also allow the Department to detain El
    Salvadoran nationals.
        Question. What percent of detainees are refused return by their
    home county and must be released in the United States?
        Answer. Currently, the Department does not track the percentage of
    detainees who are refused return by their home country.
        The Detention and Removal Office (DRO), however, pursuant the
    Supreme court's decision in Zadvydas v. Dabis, and 8 CFR 241.13,
    generally issues release decisions once a determination is made that
    removal is not likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future,
    usually based on lack of a travel document. DRO issued 969 release
    decisions pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13 in fiscal year 2005. That figure is
    approximately 80 percent of the total cases referred to DRO and in
    which DRO headquarters issued either a release or detain decision
    pursuant to 8 CFR 241.13. These statistics do not address those non-
    criminal aliens ICE does not apprehend or take into custody because the
    country does not issue travel documents.
        Question. Does the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
    have an increase in its budget request proportionally comparable to
    support DHS' efforts under SBI?
        Answer. The Department received the following response from the
    Department of Justice: For 2007, the President has requested a program
    increase of 120 positions (including 20 immigration judges, 10 Board of
    Immigration Appeals staff attorneys, and related legal/clerical support
    staff) and nearly $9 million.
        Question. Please provide the caseload statistics for EOIR for
    fiscal year 2003/04/05.
        Answer. See below statistical tables provided by the EOIR.

        Question. With the expansion of expedited removal across the SW
    border, what is the average number of days an alien occupies a
    detention bed? And what was the comparable average in August 2005?
    Please provide this by nationality.
        Answer. Because of their length, breakdown by nationality is
    provided below. The lists are further divided by credible fear and non-
    credible fear cases. Please note that both of these figures include
    Canada and Mexico; countries whose citizens have an extremely short
    length of stay due to proximity and minimal document requirements.

                    AVERAGE LENGTHS OF STAY (LOS) BY COUNTRY
                [Expedited removals--credible fear claimed cases]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Country                 June 26, 2006      August 1, 2005
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ALBANIA...........................               68.4              117.8
    ALGERIA...........................  .................              262.0
    BANGLADESH........................               97.0              219.6
    BOLIVIA...........................               52.7               39.8
    BRAZIL............................               52.3               49.4
    BULGARIA..........................               51.5               86.1
    BURMA.............................               19.0               25.0
    CAMEROON..........................  .................              132.0
    CHILE.............................  .................               42.0
    CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC...........               50.6              177.5
    COLOMBIA..........................               55.7              143.2
    COSTA RICA........................               65.5               35.2
    DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................               60.8               92.2
    ECUADOR...........................               58.9               59.4
    ERITREA...........................               29.0              222.5
    ETHIOPIA..........................               55.3              231.0
    GUATEMALA.........................               43.7               54.5
    GUYANA............................  .................              196.0
    HAITI.............................               54.6              112.1
    HONDURAS..........................               48.7               65.2
    INDIA.............................               63.2              209.9
    IRAN..............................               19.0
    LITHUANIA.........................  .................               63.0
    MACEDONIA.........................  .................              171.0
    MEXICO............................                9.5               43.4
    NEPAL.............................  .................               84.5
    NICARAGUA.........................               70.2              109.5
    NIGERIA...........................               73.0  .................
    PAKISTAN..........................               45.3  .................
    PERU..............................               50.0               69.2
    POLAND............................               30.0               46.1
    PORTUGAL..........................  .................              209.9
    ROMANIA...........................               55.0  .................
    RUSSIA............................               19.0  .................
    SERBIA............................  .................              220.4
    SLOVAKIA..........................  .................               43.4
    SOUTH KOREA.......................  .................               84.5
    TURKEY............................               44.3  .................
    UKRAINE...........................               22.0  .................
    URUGUAY...........................  .................              247.0
    VENEZUELA.........................               94.3              183.5
    YUGOSLAVIA........................               45.9              221.5
    Overall Average for Countries With               48.1              124.8
     Credible Fear Claimed Expedited
     Removals (Including Canada and
     Mexico)..........................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    AVERAGE LENGTHS OF STAY (LOS) BY COUNTRY
              [Expedited removals--no credible fear claimed cases]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  COUNTRY                 June 26, 2006      August 1, 2005
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ALBANIA...........................               43.5               89.2
    ARGENTINA.........................               30.1               35.3
    BANGLADESH........................                165  .................
    BELIZE............................               62.3               33.0
    BOLIVIA...........................               34.9               60.6
    BRAZIL............................               25.9               27.2
    BULGARIA..........................               35.5  .................
    CAMEROON..........................              137.0  .................
    CANADA............................  .................  .................
    CHILE.............................               25.9               23.4
    CHINA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC...........               23.7              106.1
    COLOMBIA..........................               29.2               55.4
    COSTA RICA........................               29.8               43.9
    DOMINICAN REPUBLIC................               39.6               55.5
    ECUADOR...........................               27.7               38.2
    ERITREA...........................               48.0  .................
    FRANCE............................  .................               22.0
    GABON.............................  .................               27.4
    GUATEMALA.........................               18.8               22.8
    GUYANA............................  .................  .................
    HAITI.............................               38.0               26.0
    HONDURAS..........................               15.3               27.7
    INDIA.............................               78.7  .................
    ISRAEL............................               17.3               30.0
    ITALY.............................               23.0  .................
    JAMAICA...........................               26.6  .................
    KOREA.............................               15.4  .................
    LITHUANIA.........................               31.0  .................
    MACEDONIA.........................               37.5               40.5
    MEXICO............................                1.5                8.4
    NEPAL.............................  .................               48.0
    NETHERLANDS.......................               27.0  .................
    NICARAGUA.........................               29.3               59.9
    NIGERIA...........................               73.0  .................
    PAKISTAN..........................               29.0  .................
    PANAMA............................               60.0               42.0
    PARAGUAY..........................               51.0               17.0
    PERU..............................               30.0               44.2
    PHILIPPINES.......................  .................               63.0
    POLAND............................               31.0               27.0
    ROMANIA...........................               44.0  .................
    SENGAL............................              103.0  .................
    SLOVENIA..........................  .................              152.0
    SLOVAK REPUBLIC...................  .................               48.5
    SLOVAKIA..........................  .................  .................
    SOUTH KOREA.......................  .................               48.0
    SPAIN.............................  .................               54.4
    SRI LANKA.........................               37.0  .................
    SWEDEN............................  .................               77.0
    TURKEY............................               35.5  .................
    UNITED KINGDOM....................                2.0               40.0
    URUGUAY...........................               36.4               43.4
    VENEZUELA.........................               19.1               48.8
    YUGOSLAVIA........................               31.0              149.5
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Is ICE's workforce enforcement effort considered a part
    of SBI?
        Answer. Yes, ICE's worksite enforcement effort is a part of SBI. In
    developing SBI, DHS is taking an integrated approach to the problem
    including border security, interior enforcement, and the Temporary
    Worker Program. For any of these pieces to work, each must be
    coordinated. One principal objective of the interior enforcement piece
    is ending the tolerance of illegal employment. Comprehensive employment
    verification, improved recordkeeping, document and database checks, and
    compliance audits are all important as the Administration develops an
    comprehensive strategy. Passage of comprehensive immigration reform
    will be critical to improve the tools available to the Department
    increase our capacity to target egregious employers.

                         CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
                              CBP AND NCRC MISSION

        Question. Since initiating the National Capitol Region air security
    mission in 2003, CBP has performed this security mission via temporary
    rotations of aircraft and personnel from the Southwest border and
    elsewhere in the country--without receiving any additional funds to
    perform this task.
        What is the origin/inspiration for the proposed transfer of $5
    million from the CBP base budget to the Coast Guard to perform the
    National Capitol Region air defense mission?
        Answer. The $5 million transfer represents the annual cost to
    operate the National Capital Region Air and Marine Branch. This amount
    is being proposed for transfer to the Coast Guard because in fiscal
    year 2007 CBP will no longer be performing this function.
        Question. How is this not an erosion of the CBP base budget?
        Answer. The funding supported a function that CBP will not be
    performing in fiscal year 2007. For this reason, it is not an erosion
    of the base.
        Question. What did CBP spend on this mission in fiscal year 2004
    and fiscal year 2005 and what is the estimate for fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2004, The National Capital Region (NCR)
    costs of operations were $4,239,557. Salary costs were for eight
    permanent FTE. In addition, an undetermined number of temporary duty
    station personnel supported the NCR.
        In fiscal year 2005, NCR costs of operations were $5,305,490.
    Salary costs were for twelve permanent FTE. In addition, fourteen
    temporary duty station personnel supported the NCR.
        Estimated fiscal year 2006 costs of operations are $5,414,655.
    These costs are only through August 1, 2006, when the transfer of the
    mission to U.S. Coast Guard is expected to take place.

                         INSPECTIONS OF ARRIVING SAUDIS

        Question. There have been reports that certain Saudi nationals were
    not processed through US VISIT by CBP officers when they arrived at
    Dulles International Airport. Is this true and, if so, why?
        Answer. CBP is not aware of the specific incidents) this inquiry
    references, and would be pleased to research further with additional
    background information. However, certain classes of travelers are
    exempt from US VISIT enrollment. These exempted classes include,
    travelers applying for admission using an A, G, or NATO nonimmigrant
    visa; Taiwan representatives of TECRO and dependents; children under
    the age of 14 and persons over the age of 79. Additionally, the
    Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the
    authority to exempt individual travelers from US VISIT enrollment.
    These individual exemptions sometimes include foreign government
    officials and delegations who may not be traveling with diplomatic
    visas.
        Question. More generally, do supervisors have the ability to decide
    who to enroll and/or process and who not to? What is a supervisors
    ``override'' authority?
        Answer. Individual supervisors do not have the ability to decide
    who is and is not enrolled and processed by US VISIT. The Secretary of
    State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have the authority to
    exempt individual travelers from US VISIT enrollment. This authority is
    exercised at the headquarters level in advance of the arrival of the
    passenger. These individual exemptions sometimes include foreign
    government officials and delegations who may not be traveling with
    diplomatic visas.

                          ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTOMS LAWS

        Question. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
    we have witnessed the steady erosion of the Transportation Security
    Administration's legislated mandate to secure ``all modes of
    transportation'', not just aviation. Now I am hearing more and more
    stories from the field that the enforcement of Customs laws and
    regulations are being routinely ignored by Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement in favor of enforcing immigration laws. I take a back seat
    to no one in my strong belief that all of our immigration laws should
    and must be enforced. But this should not occur to the detriment of
    enforcing Customs laws. Trade enforcement is critical to the well being
    of our national economy.
        What assurances can you provide me that a continued focus on
    Customs enforcement is being accorded the proper level of support?
        Answer. DHS is absolutely committed to ICE's concurrent customs and
    immigration enforcement missions. ICE's Financial and Trade
    Investigations Division oversees national enforcement of traditional
    customs investigative arenas, including bulk cash smuggling, trade-
    based money laundering, commercial trade fraud and intellectual
    property rights (IPR) violations. Specifically, the Trade Transparency
    Unit (TTU) and the Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit target predatory trade
    practices that threaten U.S. economic stability, restrict U.S. industry
    competitiveness in world markets, and place the public health and
    safety of the American people at risk. The TTU, led by ICE, in
    cooperation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S.
    Departments of State and Treasury, specifically analyzes domestic and
    foreign import and export trade data for discrepancies or anomalies
    that may indicate trade-based money laundering or other trade fraud
    violations. The Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit targets traditional
    customs violations, including IPR crimes, illegal textile
    transshipment, illegal importation of counterfeit and restricted
    pharmaceuticals, tobacco smuggling, circumvention of international
    trade agreements, and importer and broker compliance.
        In addition, the ICE Commercial Fraud and IPR Unit has implemented
    special enforcement operations targeting identified areas of
    vulnerability in the U.S. commercial trade system. These operations
    include Fraud Investigation Strike Teams (FIST), which target fraud
    within foreign trade zones and customs bonded warehouses, and Operation
    Security Bond, which targets the illegal use of the in-bond system to
    smuggle merchandise. During these operations, ICE's enforcement of
    customs and immigration statutes has resulted in an increased discovery
    of commercial fraud violations and the identification and removal of
    illegal immigrants with unauthorized access to secure areas.
        ICE's commitment to enforcing its concurrent customs and
    immigration enforcement missions is unwavering.

                            CBP PRESENCE AT AIRPORTS

        Question. On November 1, 2005, NTEU President Colleen M. Kelley
    wrote to USA Today responding to an October 24 story the paper had
    written about the increasingly long wait times for international
    passengers arriving in the United States. She claimed that it is the
    result of too few inspectors at the airports as well as because the
    ``One Face at the Border'' training has resulted in degradation in the
    specialized types of training CBP officers need to effectively do their
    jobs.
        Are the wait lines the result of too few inspectors?
        Answer. Wait times are contingent on available staffing, the number
    of available primary booths, the number and type of arriving flights/
    passengers (high risk flights/passengers vs. low risk), the number of
    arrivals during peak hours, the degree of scrutiny required for each
    passenger, and any heightened security measures.
        Question. Has training been degraded?
        Answer. Current CBP training is more comprehensive and structured
    then in either former agency.
        New CBP Officers receive 160 hours of Pre-Academy Orientation at
    their assigned port of entry before they depart for the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center. They graduate after 72 classroom days of
    training then return to the port prepared to fulfill a limited scope of
    responsibility-primary inspection for what once was Immigration and
    Customs purposes.
        Upon return to their port they undergo a rigorous and regimented 2-
    year training program filled with classroom, systems and on-the-job
    training which begins the process of preparing them for the different
    inspection environments to which they will be assigned, such as air
    passenger processing, air cargo processing, land passenger processing,
    sea cargo processing, etc. Neither the Customs Service nor the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had such a structured
    program.
        The current ``combined'' Academy training is shorter in length than
    if CBP had merely put new CBP Officers into back-to-back courses of the
    legacy training. In restructuring its training programs, CBP discovered
    that it was able to condense the combined training in a rational way
    due to the many overlapping areas and similarly taught courses between
    the legacy immigration and customs training courses. For example, while
    Customs Inspectors previously received introductory immigration
    training in their basic course, and Immigration Inspectors received
    some introduction in Customs law, they both received firearms,
    defensive tactics, professionalism, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO),
    and interviewing skills training that applies in both environments. In
    addition, CBP now only requires Spanish language training for the
    Southwest border, Miami and Puerto Rico where those skills are needed.
        Incumbent officers who were employed prior to the March 1, 2003
    merger are required to participate in structured and specific cross
    training courses for disciplines they have not previously received
    training for prior to being assigned to a new task. As of December 31,
    2005, CBP has identified, built and distributed more than 37 cross-
    training modules ranging from a 6-hour CD-ROM awareness course on
    Customs/Immigration fundamentals to an 8-day classroom session on
    immigration law and procedures in processing passenger in primary. All
    of these training programs include many of the required pre-requisites.
        In addition to the new CBP Academy curriculum, CBP also worked with
    USDA to develop a new unified entry-level training program for
    Agriculture Specialists.

                          CBP INSPECTORS AT OUR PORTS

        Question. Many valid concerns have been raised about the troubling
    sale of control of a number of U.S. seaports to a foreign government-
    owned entity. This sale is troubling on so many levels. The President
    assures us that the ports are secure because the Coast Guard provides
    security at the ports and Customs and Border Protection officers
    examine the containers as they are being unloaded. But many outside
    observers believe there are not enough CBP inspectors at the ports to
    conduct robust screening and security activities. While there are
    significant hiring increases in the budget request for Border Patrol
    agents and immigration enforcement officers--increases I strongly
    support--there are no apparent hiring increases for inspection
    personnel at our ports.
        If there are insufficient inspection personnel at our ports at this
    point, and many of our ports are being controlled by foreign entities,
    how can you assure us that this budget request makes our ports safer in
    the absence of additional inspection staff?
        Answer. In the fiscal year 2007 President's budget proposal, CBP is
    requesting an additional 106 positions to enhance its ability to detect
    illicit radiological materials concealed within shipments, conveyances
    or containerized cargo entering the United States. The additional staff
    will support the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    detection systems deployed through Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
    WMD procurement program and ensure CBP will have dedicated personnel to
    resolve alarms from Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and to conduct
    radiological examinations at our Nation's busiest seaports.
        WMD detection systems are a critical part of CBP's layered process
    that builds on redundant enforcement layers to detect and prevent
    contraband, including illicit materials, from entering the United
    States. CBP recognizes that no single strategy or risk assessment is
    100 percent effective and accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple
    initiatives together to accomplish its mission. CBP employs its layered
    enforcement approach in safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land,
    air and sea.
        Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology enable CBP to screen or
    examine a larger portion of the stream of commercial traffic in less
    time while facilitating legitimate trade. These tools provide CBP with
    a significant capability to detect and interdict terrorist weapons at
    our ports of entry.

                      CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)

        Question. Please explain the process by which an overseas port
    becomes a member of CSI, including the security review and the
    procedures to which the host government (and Customs officials) agree
    to adhere.
        Answer. A potential Container Security Initiative (CSI) port is
    identified either by CBP or through a formal request from the foreign
    government to the U.S. Embassy or directly to CBP. The decision on the
    first 20 CSI ports was based on the total volume of direct container
    traffic to the United States. Subsequent to the first 20 ports,
    potential CSI ports are evaluated on several factors including
    container volume to the United States, intelligence threat level,
    strategic potential, port assessment status, government political will
    and capacity building status.
        Once a potential CSI port is identified, a preliminary study is
    conducted of the number of containers arriving in the United States
    from that port, the number of high-risk containers arriving in the
    United States from that port, the potential of that port being used for
    transshipment from a high-risk country, intelligence information
    threats and perceived political will.
        An assessment is then conducted at the potential CSI port. The
    assessment teams consist of personnel from CBP, U.S. Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard Officers, and more
    recently, Department of Energy Megaports Program Officers. The
    assessment evaluates the overall port practices with the goal of
    determining the vulnerabilities to their cargo processing systems, the
    level of competence of the host government to conduct inspections, the
    technical security at the port, the personnel security of the port, any
    vulnerabilities in both the government agencies as well as private
    companies working at the port, the amount of cooperation that the host
    government is willing to provide CSI, the types and effectiveness of
    radiation monitoring systems, the types and effectiveness of large
    scale non-intrusive X-ray or Gamma-ray machines, and the laws
    applicable to allow inspections of cargo.
        Once a favorable assessment is completed, CBP and the host
    government sign a Declaration of Principles (DOP). The DOP is a non-
    binding arrangement between the two governments to implement CSI. The
    DOP contains language that both Customs Administrations agree to:
      --Intensify bilateral customs cooperation;
      --Exchange information and work closely to help ensure the
            identification, screening and sealing of high-risk containers
            at the earliest possible opportunity;
      --Station, on a basis of reciprocity and on a pilot basis U.S. CBP
            officers; and
      --Consult closely on the implementation of CSI at the port.
        After the DOP is signed, CBP and the host Nation work together to
    implement the CSI program by facilitating the physical build-out of
    working areas and developing local CSI Standard Operating Procedures
    (SOP). The local SOP describes in detail how the CSI process will work
    as well as the container examination procedures.
        After the CSI port becomes operational, an evaluation of the port
    is conducted at 3-months, 6-months, and every 6 months thereafter. The
    evaluations determine whether or not CBP and the host Nation are
    complying with the SOP and formulate ways to improve the CSI operation.

                            DUBAI PORTS WORLD (DPW)

        Question. The Port of Dubai has recently become the first port in
    the Middle East to become a Container Security Initiative (CSI) port.
    When did the initial port assessment for Dubai's participation in CSI
    occur, who performed the assessment, and when was participation
    finalized?
        Answer. The initial port assessment at the Port of Dubai took place
    September 23-25, 2004. Personnel from CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE), DHS Attache Offices in Abu Dhabi and Dubai and the
    U.S. Coast Guard participated in the assessment. The Declaration of
    Principles between CBP and Dubai Ports Customs and Free Zone
    Corporation (Dubai Customs) was signed on December 12, 2004. The CSI
    port of Dubai began operations on March 26, 2005.
        Question. What role, if any, did the Department of Defense play in
    the assessment and/or the determination that Dubai should become a
    member of CSI?
        Answer. The Department of Defense did not participate in the
    assessment and/or the determination that Dubai should become a member
    of CSI.
        Question. Under CSI, the United States stations CBP officials at a
    participating ports and, based on threat and analysis, inspects or
    screens containers (determined to be potentially high risk and which
    are headed directly for a U.S. port) prior to the loading of the
    container on the ship. Our CBP personnel request host country Customs
    officials to screen suspect containers and/or physically inspect them
    for suspicious items, however, at best, U.S. CBP officials only observe
    that process. Once a container arrives at a U.S. port, our inspectors
    are able to screen and open containers. It has been asserted by CBP
    officials that the port operators (including potentially DPW) do not
    have access to or are not involved with the imaging or other inspection
    of these containers overseas or in the United States.
        What confidence do we have that CBP's methods of operation cannot
    be compromised by a government-controlled port operating company with a
    CSI port located in that country--i.e. when a potential bad actor has a
    high degree of visibility into both ends of the supply chain?
        Answer. CBP utilizes a multi-faceted layered defense, which employs
    various enforcement activities at several points along the supply
    chain. The system was designed to mitigate the possibility of
    compromising the entire supply chain by breaching one component of it.
        Since 9/11 CBP has initiated:
      --The 24-hour rule which requires cargo information to be transmitted
            to CBP 24 hours prior to laden at a foreign seaport;
      --The CBP National Targeting Center, which was established to ensure
            all shipments destined to the United States are reviewed
            against the CBP Automated Targeting System;
      --The CBP Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which
            also was initiated as a force multiplier by employing the
            import/export community to enhance security measures within
            their respective business practices; and
      --The CBP Container Security Initiative (CSI), which was developed to
            augment the other CBP programs by allowing for enforcement
            action to be taken at a point earlier in the supply chain and
            creating an additional layer of scrutiny and enforcement within
            the overall supply chain.
        Cargo moving through the supply chain would also be subjected to
    the security and enforcement programs of other U.S. agencies such as:
      --U.S. Coast Guard 96 hour notice of arrival requirement;
      --Port security enhancements as set forth by the International Ship
            and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code; and
      --Department of Energy (DOE) Megaports program.
        Many of the programs listed above, which are components of the U.S.
    government's layered defense, are not accessible by port operators.
        CBP performs the targeting and analysis of cargo shipments. The
    Automated Targeting System is not shared or linked to the port
    operators or foreign Customs administrations.
        When members of a CSI team suspect that a container warrants
    examination, a request is made to the host Customs Administration. If
    there is agreement, the cargo is examined utilizing Non-Intrusive
    Inspection (NII) equipment. If there is any anomaly then a subsequent
    more intrusive examination is conducted. If the host Customs
    Administration refuses to conduct the examination, then a decision is
    made by the CSI team either to permit the loading of the container and
    designate such container for an examination at the U.S. port of
    arrival, or for CBP to issue a Do-not-Load (DNL) order to the cargo
    carrier.
        Any cargo that is examined at a CSI location is always subject to
    the CBP enforcement protocols in the United States, as well as the
    possibility of the cargo being re-examined. Port operators do not have
    any control or insight into the cargo selection and examination process
    at a CSI location and they do not have any insight into the selection
    and examination/re-examination process at U.S. ports of entry.
        The CBP programs, in conjunction with the multitude of other U.S.
    government agency enforcement initiatives, put forth a layered/multi-
    dimensional strategy to combat the attempts by any members of the
    import/export community to compromise the supply chain.

                              SHIPPING CONTAINERS

        Question. Please provide the most recent data on the total number
    of shipping containers which enter the United States, the percentage of
    those that are screened, those that are examined, and those that are
    inspected. Also please provide your definitions of those terms.
        Answer. CBP employs a layered process that builds on redundant
    enforcement layers to detect and prevent contraband, including illicit
    materials, from entering the United States. CBP recognizes that no
    single strategy or risk assessment is 100 percent effective and
    accurate, so CBP focuses on layering multiple initiatives together to
    accomplish its mission. CBP employs its layered enforcement approach in
    safeguarding U.S. borders from threat by land, air and sea.
        Conveyances that are identified as high-risk undergo an
    examination. In fiscal year 2005, 11,342,493 sea-borne containers
    entered the United States from foreign locations. Approximately 5
    percent, or 569,308 sea containers were examined. CBP defines an
    examination as a physical inspection of a conveyance and/or the imaging
    of a conveyance using large-scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
    technology, for the presence of contraband.
        CBP defines screening as a passive means of scanning a conveyance,
    baggage or cargo. CBP screens conveyances, baggage, and cargoes with
    radiation portal monitors and other radiation detection equipment for
    the presence of radiological emissions. CBP currently screens 40
    percent of all sea-borne containers for the presence of radiation.
        NII technology enables us to screen or examine a larger portion of
    the stream of commercial traffic in less time while facilitating
    legitimate trade. These tools provide CBP with a significant capability
    to detect and interdict terrorist weapons at our ports of entry.

                       INSPECTIONS AT AIR PORTS OF ENTRY

        Question. There do not appear to be staffing increases in the
    budget for the POEs. What impact does this have on primary and
    secondary inspections at airports?
        Answer. CBP's existing staff will manage the current and
    anticipated increases in travel and trade by utilizing advanced
    information components and international programs like the Container
    Security Initiative (CSI) agreements to mitigate any delays in traveler
    and cargo processing. Implementation of trusted traveler programs and
    further development of the CBP Immigration Advisor Program at foreign
    ports of debarkation would also minimize the impact of a static
    staffing model. CBP utilizes state of the art information technology,
    traveler information sharing efforts with the Department of State,
    advance traveler screening via the Advance Passenger Information System
    (APIS), and the National Targeting Center (NTC).
        Question. Is there a requirement that port directors have been
    given that they must meet in terms of inspecting inbound plane
    passengers--such as 45 minutes?
        Answer. CBP is not currently bound by a required processing time; a
    previous legislative requirement to process all inbound international
    passengers within 45-minutes of arrival was repealed by the Enhanced
    Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173).
    CBP does, however, have a 30-minute processing time as a future goal.
        Question. Does this budget address concerns enumerated in GAO
    report 05-663?
        Answer. CBP has addressed the concerns raised by GAO report 05-663
    entitled ``International Air Passengers: Staffing Model for Airport
    Inspections Personnel Can Be Improved.'' Through cross-training
    initiatives, CBP has been adding officers at the passenger primary
    lanes in our airports, processing all travelers, and making mission
    related referrals to secondary inspection for people considered higher
    risk. The fiscal year 2007 budget requests funds to improve the
    Automated Targeting System, extend the Immigration Advisory Program,
    leverage pre-departure passenger information, and strengthen
    consolidated anti-terrorism secondary inspection. This will create an
    effective force-multiplier, and serve to speed the processing of
    legitimate travelers, thus lowering overall wait times.

                              OUTBOUND INSPECTIONS

        Question. What is the status of meeting the outbound inspections
    recommendations as listed in the June 2005 report--OIG-05-21?
        Answer. CBP's Office of Field Operations is beginning its re-
    evaluation of the Outbound program, which is responsible for enforcing
    U.S. export laws and regulations and ensuring that weapons of mass
    destruction do not fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists. The
    goal is to align Outbound enforcement and processing with current
    Inbound processes, to the extent possible, which will improve
    uniformity and enhance border security programs.
        With the pending implementation of mandatory Automated Export
    System (AES) filing, which will require electronic filing for all
    export shipments that currently require a Shippers Export Declaration
    (SED), more information will be available on export shipments. It will
    be critical to leverage this electronic information to enhance the
    secure screening and processing of outbound cargo, whereas current
    capabilities for this purpose are limited. Not all export shipments are
    currently filed through AES, which hampers CBP's Outbound targeting
    efforts. The U.S. Census Bureau also has what is known as the ``Option
    4'' filer program, which allows certain exporters to file export
    information after the shipment has departed the United States.
    Ultimately, CBP resources must be aligned in a manner that allows this
    additional advance information to be used to screen and target high-
    risk shipments and to conduct compliance inspections. As part of this
    process, CBP must also implement a risk-based screening model for
    export cargo, similar to what is already in place on the import side.
        Currently, CBP outbound enforcement is accomplished with the
    resources resident in the Anti-Terrorism Contraband Enforcement Teams
    (A-TCET) at the ports of entry. These teams work as a single, united
    enforcement team with a primary focus on targeting terrorists and
    terrorist weapons. Their secondary focus is the interdiction of
    narcotics, other contraband, alien smugglers/trafficking, fraudulent
    documents and agricultural terrorism.

                                    TUNNELS

        Question. What is the policy regarding filling tunnels discovered
    on the borders? Who is responsible for filling them and using what
    funds?
        Answer. While there is currently no policy regarding tunnel filling
    or remediation, both CBP and ICE are currently drafting Tunnel
    Principles/Policy (roles and responsibilities) when a sophisticated
    tunnel (highly organized or sophisticated tunnel leading to a house or
    warehouse) is discovered. The tunnel principles mainly emphasize joint
    cooperation and coordination between CBP and ICE. The Border Patrol
    Sector Chief and ICE Special-Agent-in-Charge will develop local
    protocols based upon these principles.
        There is no specific authority or funding indicating that any
    particular group in the Federal Government has been designated the
    responsibility to fill border tunnels. The cost of the remediation of
    the tunnel in the San Diego, CA area is estimated to be approximately
    $3 million (these costs include security, concrete, environmental
    safety, labor etc). Generally speaking, most of the tunnels detected
    have been rather small by comparison to the most recently discovered
    tunnel in San Diego, CA. The tunnels have been filled by the Office of
    Border Patrol (OBP) Facilities Department or the National Guard, using
    general Salaries and Expenses appropriated funds.
        Question. What activities are being taken by CBP, Science and
    Technology, or other agencies to improve the technology for discovering
    tunnels?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is working with the Office of Border
    Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of
    Defense (DOD) to find technology solutions for tunnel detection along
    the Southern and Northern borders of the United States.
        The S&T Directorate participated in the Tunnel Detection Technical
    Support Working Group (TSWG) meeting held in January 2006 and the Joint
    Task Force-6 Tunneling Conference held in June 2004. The S&T
    Directorate is also engaged with NORTHCOM's Futures Group in relaying,
    discussing, and leveraging potential technologies that satisfy DOD and
    DHS's tunnel detection needs. The S&T Directorate's Border &
    Transportation (B&T) Portfolio met with NORTHCOM officials in August
    2005 to discuss specific opportunities to collaborate and leverage each
    organization's expertise.
        CBP is also coordinating with a number of sources that could
    possibly provide technology that will meet CBP's detection needs. These
    sources include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
    Sandia Laboratories, and the Border Research Technology Center. There
    is currently no proven technology that can detect the types of tunnels
    that have recently been encountered. Some promising research and
    development is being done by Sandia Laboratories, but at this time, its
    field utility is unknown.
                               cbp air and marine
        Question. Please breakout the items you plan to procure in fiscal
    year 20006/2007 and the funding source within AMO for each item (i.e.
    Northern Border, WHDEA, etc.).
        Answer.
    Planned CBP Air and Marine Acquisitions for Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal
                         Year 2007--Dollars in Millions

        Question. What is the status of establishment of all of the
    Northern border airwings? Please provide the number of personnel on
    board at each location, the number and types of equipment at each
    location, the hours per day/week of operations at each location, and
    specific milestones which must be met (and when they will be met) to
    achieve full operating capacity at each location.
        Answer. In fiscal year 2003, CBP Air and Marine (formerly Air and
    Marine Operations) received congressional funding to open the first of
    five planned Northern border air wing locations. The five planned
    locations were strategically placed along the Northern border in areas
    that provided for a 1-hour minimum response time to a border
    penetration. The five planned locations are Plattsburgh, New York;
    Detroit, Michigan; Grand Forks, North Dakota; Great Falls, Montana; and
    Bellingham, Washington. Bellingham was the first to be opened on August
    20, 2004, followed by Plattsburgh 18 days later on October 8, 2004.
    Great Falls will open third in the summer of 2006. CBP will begin the
    activation process for the new air sites in both Detroit and the Grand
    Forks area of North Dakota in fiscal year 2007. The site survey for
    Detroit has been completed and preliminary work to assess hangar,
    maintenance, and support facility requirements is ongoing. Air assets
    are being identified for transfer to the site and staffing plans are
    being compiled. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation provided $2 million
    for the North Dakota air site assessment, which is in progress and
    should be completed in late May 2006. In addition, DHS is developing
    funding options to ensure we meet the goal of establishing a presence
    at both sites by the end of fiscal year 2007.
        Current number of personnel on board, the number and types of
    equipment, and the hours per day/week of operations at each location
    are as follows in the table below.
        In order to achieve full operating capacity, CBP's aviation
    strategic modernization plan needs to be completed, reviewed and
    approved by the Department and Congress. This plan includes fleet
    modernization, recapitalization and fleet standardization by reducing
    the number of aircraft types currently being operated and associated
    technology, staffing and facility requirements. CBP is taking an
    incremental approach to attain full operating staffing capacity at the
    Northern Border Air branches.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Location                Current FTE    Current aircraft             Current coverage hours
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Plattsburgh, NY.................              18  1--PC-12.........  0800-2400
                                                      2--AS350.........  5 days
                                                      1--C-206.........  After hours callout as necessary
                                                      1--C-210.........
    Detroit, MI.....................               1  1--OH6...........  0800-1600
                                                                         5 days
                                                                         After hours callout as necessary
    Grand Forks, ND.................               3  1--AS350.........  0700-1500
                                                      1--C-206.........  7 days
                                                      1--C-182.........  After hours callout as necessary
    Great Falls, MT.................          \1\ 34  2--C550..........  TBD
                                                      1--PC-12.........
                                                      2--UH60..........
    Bellingham, WA..................              19  1--C-550.........  0700-1700
                                                      1--PC-12.........  5 days
                                                      1--AS350.........  After hours callout as necessary
                                                      1--MD600.........
                                                      1--C-206.........
                                                      1--C-182.........
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The staffing and aircraft numbers indicated for Great Falls, which will be opening this summer, are
      projected.

                            ADVANCED TRAINING CENTER

        Question. In the December 28, 2005, response to my October 19,
    2005, letter regarding the status of items identified in Conference
    Report 109-241, I was told that the ``final spending plan, project
    schedules, and projected training requirements'' would be provided to
    the Committee ``by February 18, 2006''. It is now March 6, 2006 and we
    have yet to receive the report. When can we expect to receive the
    report?
        Answer. The report receiving final revisions and will be
    transmitted shortly.
        Question. Also, please provide the level of funding provided in the
    fiscal year 2007 request for operations and activities at the Advanced
    Training Center.
        Answer. CBP's base budget for fiscal year 2007 includes $9.5
    million for ongoing operations and management at the Advanced Training
    Center.

                           TUCSON SECTOR CHECKPOINTS

        Question. The DHS Inspector General issued a report in January of
    2006 that made a strong case for permanent Border Patrol checkpoints.
    It said that, ``Permanent checkpoints permit safer, more efficient law
    enforcement. It is not necessary to prohibit permanent checkpoints in
    order to encourage the use of alternative tactics and mobile interior
    operations.''
        What are you doing to remove the House-backed bill language that
    mandates the periodic movement of these checkpoints in the Tucson
    sector?
        Answer. CBP Congressional Affairs has conducted numerous briefings
    to House Appropriations Committee Staff members on the use of efficient
    checkpoints. Permanent checkpoints elsewhere on the Southwest Border,
    located in strategic chokepoints in areas of egress from border areas,
    have proven to be effective enforcement tools and thus make up an
    important part of CBP's ``defense in depth'' strategy of controlling
    the border. Permanent checkpoints are used effectively in every Sector
    of the Southwest Border except Tucson Sector.
        Question. How much does it cost to rotate these checkpoints?
        Answer. The checkpoint located on Interstate 19 is the only
    tactical checkpoint rotated every 7 days from one location to another.
    The two locations currently have checkpoint equipment located at both
    sites and only require personnel to rotate from one location to
    another. In order to rotate checkpoints, it takes a minimum of 10
    agents 2 hours in order to complete the checkpoint rotation, which
    includes the breakdown of one site, and the setup of the other. It also
    costs the duplication of checkpoint equipment to include port-a-johns,
    trailers, signage, cones and lighting. These costs are not per
    rotation, but are as a result of having to rotate. The duplicate
    equipment costs about $65,000 plus an additional port-a-john contract
    for $140 per month.
        Question. What, if any, health-related problems have been
    experienced by the men and women who are working in this difficult
    (extreme heat, vehicle exhaust, lack of rest facilities) environment?
        Answer. There have not been any health-related problems to
    personnel working at the rotating Tucson sector checkpoints. All
    medical and safety precautions are taken for the agents working at the
    checkpoint. Shade, water, medical and communication are available to
    the working agents or the checkpoint would not be allowed to open.
        Question. What is the full construction cost of permanent
    checkpoints in the Tucson sector?
        Answer. The total cost for establishing three proposed checkpoints
    in Tucson Sector was $45.78 million in December 2004. An updated
    estimate would include increases associated with construction and
    inflation factors.
      --Highway 85--$12.79 million
      --Highway 90--$15.31 million
      --Interstate 19--$17.68 million
        This is an estimated total that includes land acquisition, design,
    construction costs, auxiliary cost, management services, and support
    costs. National comprehensive traffic control guidelines are being
    developed in response to the National Transportation Safety Board, and
    may also impact the cost estimate. The guidelines are a collaborative
    effort between CBP, Federal Highway Administration, and representatives
    from the American Association of State Highway Transportation
    Officials.
        Question. To what extent do law breakers take advantage of the
    temporary checkpoints by moving illegal aliens when CBP is closing the
    temporary checkpoints?
        Answer. Since Arizona is required to rotate checkpoints every 7
    days, and Nogales only has two authorized sites, they rotate every
    Saturday. Border Patrol's movements are predictable as dictated by the
    appropriations language, and give the smugglers a clear advantage.
        Law breakers do take advantage when CBP is closing the temporary
    checkpoints by smuggling their illegal cargo (illegal aliens,
    narcotics, etc.) further into the interior of the United States. When
    the checkpoint is at the northern location, smugglers simply stage
    their loads just south of it and once it is moved to the southern
    location, they move their loads north. The moment a checkpoint is
    closed, scouts notify smugglers immediately to transport their illegal
    cargo further north into the United States. The smugglers are very in
    tune to these rotations. Border Patrol deploys additional resources to
    the interstate when possible, but the manpower required to move the
    checkpoints limits this.
        Smugglers also take advantage of Border Patrol movements by
    exploiting the lack of flanking infrastructure, which would otherwise
    be present at a permanent site. With no cameras and only limited
    sensors to the flanks of the temporary sites, smugglers routinely walk
    around the temporary checkpoints.

                        NORTHERN BORDER CARRYOVER FUNDS

        Question. On what activities will you obligate the remaining $11
    million in unobligated Northern Border prior year balances? When will
    these funds be obligated?
        Answer. We anticipate obligating $6 million on Radiation Portal
    Monitors (RPM's) and Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD's) throughout
    fiscal year 2006, $3.8 million for facilities repairs and alterations
    by the end of fiscal year 2006, and $1.2 million to be obligated by
    July 2006 for various mission support projects to support Anti-
    Terrorism.

                       SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY SPECIALISTS

        Question. What is the per person cost to hire, train, and make
    proficient the specialists who verify participants' compliance as a
    member of C-TPAT?
        Answer. It is estimated that the per-person cost to hire, train,
    and make proficient the specialists who verify participant's compliance
    as a member of C-TPAT is $201,560. This includes $15,000 in training
    costs, $83,000 in SCS Salary and compensation, $26,560 in benefits and
    $77,000 for 1 full year of validation visits.
        A newly hired Supply Chain Specialist (SCS) must undergo a 2-week
    Basic SCS Training course. This course focuses on the core program
    requirements of the C-TPAT program and is administered by CBP C-TPAT
    program officers and managers, and experienced SCSs. Private sector
    instructors who have first hand knowledge of supply chain principles,
    logistics management, and related business practices provide additional
    instruction.
        In addition to the basic course, two 3-day training sessions are
    held annually. One coincides with the Annual C-TPAT Training Seminar
    and the other is a session held at one of the C-TPAT Field Offices.
         These sessions allow the HQs C-TPAT Director and the Program
    Management staff to communicate important program developments and
    newly implemented procedures and technology.
        While the Basic SCS course provides the students with formal and
    effective classroom instruction to learn the scope of the duties of the
    SCS position, accompanying experienced SCSs on a year's worth of
    validation visits is critical to attaining the desired level of
    proficiency of the SCS.

              ARBITRATION DECISION ON THE FISCAL YEAR 2005 AWARDS

        Question. What is the potential cost of the recent arbitrator
    decision on the fiscal year 2005 awards process?
        Answer. For fiscal year 2005, CBP implemented a unified awards
    process in order to ensure that employees working side-by-side and
    performing the same duties would have the same opportunities for awards
    recognition. CBP inherited four different negotiated awards processes
    when it was formed, two of them very similar to this unified process.
    One union with a significantly different awards program agreed to the
    unified process, but the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU)
    sought to maintain its status quo using local joint awards committees
    (JAC). It is the agency's position that we cannot treat our front line
    officers differently while holding them to common standards of
    performance.
        This arbitrator decision affects only bargaining unit employees
    represented by NTEU. The figures below are estimates based on how the
    funding for awards under the old JAC process would have been
    constructed.
      --As of September 3, 2005, there were approximately 13,650 employees
            in the NTEU bargaining unit, with combined salaries of $754.6
            million.
      --A unit's awards ``pool'' is typically calculated on the basis of 1
            percent of the combined salaries of employees on-board in that
            unit as of a particular date. For fiscal year 2005, the awards
            pools were calculated in Pay Period 17, which ended on
            September 3. The awards pool that would have been available to
            award just NTEU employees for fiscal year 2005 would have been
            $7.546 million.
      --Organizational components typically reserve 15 to 25 percent of the
            awards pool to fund special act awards throughout the year. The
            balance of the pool is available to distribute as awards for
            superior performance. It is estimated that $6.04 million would
            have been available to pay awards to NTEU employees under the
            JAC process.
      --The arbitrator's decision requires the agency to recreate the local
            JACs, collect nominations for shares, and reach consensus on
            the number of shares to award, if any, to each nominee. If an
            award calculated under this process is determined to be higher
            than what an employee was actually awarded, additional payment
            is to be made. The decision is silent on the action to be taken
            if the JAC recommends a lower award or no award to an employee
            who received one. Theoretically, then, the decision could
            result in merely a redistribution of awards without additional
            cost. In reality, however, the agency is unlikely to take
            actions that will result in loss of an award already paid out.
      --The award process used was designed to be fair and equitable to
            employees of all bargaining units, and similar to the NTEU
            process, provided employees the opportunity to nominate
            themselves and/or co-workers for awards. Therefore, it is not
            expected that re-running the 2005 awards under the NTEU process
            would result in substantial increase in costs.
        It is noted that CBP believes the arbitrator's decision is flawed,
    and the agency is filing exceptions with the Federal Labor Relations
    Authority.
        Question. If CBP is required to correct the process and pay out the
    rewards, from which account would these funds be drawn?
        Answer. Any required payments would be made from CBP's Salaries and
    Expenses account.

                      RESPONDING TO LETTERS FROM CONGRESS

        Question. Is CBP looking for a contractor to help its employees
    write letters to Congress? If so, why and isn't this more properly a
    Department rather than a contractor function?
        Answer. CBP does not employ contractors to write letters to
    Congress. We have employed contractors to instruct writing skills to
    our employees so that they are better able to author and edit memos,
    letters, reports, and other documents.

                              BORDER PATROL DUTIES

        Question. On February 15, 2006, the Washington Post ran an article
    regarding the Vice President's accidental shooting of a friend while
    hunting quail on a private ranch in Texas that stated, in part, ``and a
    Federal Border Patrol agent, guarding the gate because Cheney was
    there, knew nothing about the accident.'' The Vice President already is
    protected by a significant Secret Service detail.
        Given the relative paucity of Border Patrol agents posted along our
    Southwest border, and the public's strong interest that our borders be
    protected, why was an agent pulled off the border to perform a duty
    that is routinely and more appropriately performed by the Secret
    Service?
        Answer. The U.S. Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector did
    provide perimeter security during the Vice President's visit to the
    ranch. The U.S. Secret Service requested assistance from the Rio Grande
    Valley Sector due to the vastness of the ranch, the Border Patrol's 4-
    wheel drive vehicle capabilities and the agent's knowledge and
    familiarity with the area. The ranch is located within the sector's
    Kingsville Station area of responsibility and is routinely patrolled by
    Border Patrol agents. According to the sector, this request for
    assistance was received well in advance of the visit and was supported
    without sacrificing agent presence along the immediate border area or
    at the sector's checkpoints.

                            VIRGIN ISLAND SUBSTATION

        Question. What is the status of opening a Border Patrol substation
    in the Virgin Islands?
        Answer. The current threat assessments in the sector do not support
    placing it as a priority enforcement area with the creation of a new
    Border Patrol sector. Current assessments of the illegal immigrant flow
    in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) place it at 0.1 percent of that of
    other focus areas, such as the Southwest land border, with an annual
    illegal immigrant flow that exceeds 1 million. Therefore, DHS does not
    support establishing a Border Patrol facility in the USVI at this time.

                   ICE CONTRACT WITH KELLOGG, BROWN AND ROOT

        Question. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recently
    awarded Kellogg, Brown and Root, the engineering and construction
    subsidiary of Halliburton, a contingency contract to support ICE
    facilities in the event of an emergency. With a maximum total value of
    $385 million over a 5-year term (consisting of a 1-year base period and
    four 1-year options), the competitively awarded contract will be
    executed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. KBR held the previous ICE
    contract from 2000 through 2005. The contract calls for establishing
    temporary detention and processing capabilities to augment existing ICE
    Detention and Removal Operations facilities in the event of an
    emergency influx of immigrants into the United States, or to support
    the rapid development of new programs. The contingency support contract
    provides for planning and, if required, initiation of specific
    engineering, construction, and logistics associated with expanding
    facilities as required.
        Is it your intention to use this contract to construct the
    additional detention bedspace and the 6,700 new beds called for in the
    budget request?
        Answer. The contingency contract provides ICE with an emergency
    response mechanism to deploy support services and temporary shelters
    within short response times for both emergency responders as well as
    migrant populations. ICE has not utilized the KBR contingency support
    contract to construct detention facilities in the past. ICE does not
    anticipate the need to utilize the KBR contract for developing new
    detention facilities associated with the increase of the 6,700 fiscal
    year 2007 detention beds.
        Question. Has KBR constructed existing detention bedspace under the
    terms of this contract or of any previous contracts? Please provide us
    with the details.
        Answer. ICE has not exercised the current contingency support
    contract to construct any existing detention facilities. Further, ICE
    has not utilized any previous contingency support contracts awarded to
    KBR for the purpose of constructing permanent detention facilities.

                              WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

        Question. For worksite enforcement, please provide fiscal year 2005
    case and workload statistics, both criminal and administrative.
        Answer. There were a total of 412 worksite enforcement criminal
    cases closed in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year 2005, there were 176
    arrests for criminal violations and 1,116 administrative apprehensions.

                                 LENGTH OF STAY

        Question. What is the average length of stay for a detained alien
    in ICE's custody, including those in expedited removal?
        Answer. The current average length of stay for all detained aliens,
    including all case types and nationalities, is 33.7 days. Release from
    custody includes all possible release types, to include bonds, order of
    recognizance, order of supervision, removal, etc.
        Source: DRO official statistics (as of May 31, 2006).

                  OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL LEGAL ADVISOR (OPLA)

        Question. Please provide a break out of the attorneys in OPLA for
    fiscal year 2003/2004/2005/2006, including position type and location,
    the percentage of growth, how many are on board currently?
        Answer. There are 3 SES positions within OPLA: Principal Legal
    Advisor, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor and the Director of Field Legal
    Operations. The remaining ICE attorneys are in the GS-905 series.
        The following is a breakdown of the number of attorneys onboard:
      --September 30, 2003: 614
      --September 30, 2004: 608
      --September 30, 2005: 571
      --February 10, 2006: 599 (on board)
        The decrease in the number of attorneys from September 2003 (614)
    to February 2006 (599) was the result of several factors. OPLA lost
    attorneys to CIS and CBP in the transition to DHS. Additionally,
    because of an uncertain budget situation, ICE instituted a hiring
    freeze and waiver process that precluded OPLA from effectively
    replacing staff lost through attrition.
        The attached charts show the number of attorneys by location.
        Question. What is the expected average caseload reduction for
    attorneys based on the requested resources for fiscal year 2007?
        Answer. Each additional attorney assigned to perform immigration
    court work handles at least 500 cases annually. With additional
    attorney resources, there will be more time in which to respond to
    motions, prepare cases, write briefs and respond to inquiries from
    clients. If the ICE legal program receives the requested positions,
    attorneys will be able to spend more time preparing the average case
    for hearing before the Immigration Courts. This will have numerous
    beneficial consequences:
        ICE attorneys will have additional time to obtain and review the A-
    files, prepare the cross-examination of the respondents, locate and
    interview other witnesses, research complex legal issues, write pre-
    trial briefs, and confer with opposing counsel.
        The current attorney level results in the delay and/or termination
    of court proceedings, provides more time for undocumented aliens to
    amass equities in the United States, and results in additional
    detention costs for the agency. Each 1-week continuance costs ICE $665
    (i.e., $95 per day) in additional detention costs. In fiscal year 2004,
    detainees remained in agency custody for an average of 39 days. The
    Immigration Courts completed 84,975 detained cases that year, which
    accounted for 34 percent of its total caseload. Furthermore, with an
    increased attorney workforce, attorneys will have more time to enter
    into stipulated deportation agreements with detainees, resulting in a
    more effective use of detention beds. With an increased number of
    attorneys, the program could make more effective use of detention and
    removal resources.

                                 BREACHED BOND

        Question. Please explain the Breached Bond program, how many
    detention beds it supported in fiscal years 2002-2005, how many beds
    are estimated to be supported by it in fiscal year 2006 and budgeted
    for in fiscal year 2007.
        Answer. The Breached Bond/Detention Fund was authorized in Section
    112 of the Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1993 (Public Law
    102-395). The Act amended Section 286 of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, by establishing, in the General Fund of
    the Treasury, a separate account to be called the Breached Bond/
    Detention Fund. The first $8,000,000 in breached cash and surety bonds
    collected goes to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. All
    collections in excess of $8,000,000 posted under the INA, which are
    recovered by the Department of Justice, are deposited as offsetting
    collections into this fund. Amounts deposited into the fund, which
    remain available until expended, can be used for expenses incurred in
    the collection of breached bonds, bond management, litigation
    activities to obtain compliance from surety companies found to be
    delinquent in meeting their obligations to ICE, and for expenses
    associated with the detention of criminal and illegal aliens.
        In 1998, the Immigration Detention account receipts were merged
    into this account. These receipts are derived from the penalty portion
    of the receipts collected under Section 245(i) of the INA. Section
    245(i) allows a person who qualifies for permanent residency, but is
    ineligible to adjust status in the United States because of an
    immigration status violation, to pay a $1,000 penalty to continue
    processing in the United States. A portion of each application fee (not
    to exceed $200.00) that the Attorney General determines is required to
    process the application under the section and is remitted to the
    Attorney General. Any remaining portions of such fees are deposited by
    the Attorney General into the Breached Bond Detention Fund established
    under  286(r).
        Detention beds supported from fiscal years 2002-2005 are as
    follows:
      --Fiscal year 2002: 3,857
      --Fiscal year 2003: 5,166
      --Fiscal year 2004: 3,498
      --Fiscal year 2005: 3,378
        Estimated detention beds supported and budgeted for fiscal years
    2006-2007 are as follows:
      --Fiscal year 2006: 2,598
      --Fiscal year 2007: 2,598
        Question. Also, please explain the estimated impact on the program
    of the anticipated increase in detentions resulting from the SBI.
        Answer. While the number of aliens apprehended and detained will
    rise, the Department has put into place practices that will allow the
    program to turn over detention beds quicker, improve the processing of
    aliens, and facilitate their removal from the United States.

                                   DETENTIONS

        Question. For fiscal years 2002-2005, how many illegal aliens did
    you detain for one day or longer?
        Answer. Illegal aliens detained for 1 day or longer during fiscal
    years 2002-2005 are as follows:
      --Fiscal year 2002: 181,236
      --Fiscal year 2003: 209,629
      --Fiscal year 2004: 215,417
      --Fiscal year 2005: 217,270
        Question. Of that total, how many were detained for less than 2
    weeks, less than 1 month, and more than 1 month?
        Answer. Illegal aliens detained for less than 2 weeks, less than 1
    month, and more than 1 month are detailed below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          2 Weeks      2 Wks--1 Mo.       > 1 mo.          Total
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year 2002................................          93,728          33,869          53,639         181,236
    Fiscal year 2003................................         114,210          36,006          59,413         209,629
    Fiscal year 2004................................         115,613          34,637          65,167         215,417
    Fiscal year 2005................................         112,705          45,149          59,416         217,270
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

        Question. Please provide the number of State inquiries into the
    LESC for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, and any specific
    workload statistics for LESC in support of fugitive operations.
        Answer. In fiscal year 2003, the LESC responded to a total of
    594,352 queries from Federal, State and local law enforcement officers,
    of which 385,651 were queries from State and local law enforcement
    officers. For fiscal year 2004, the LESC responded to a total of
    667,453 queries, of which 458,711 were queries from State and local law
    enforcement officers.
        The LESC identified a combined total of 4,617 ICE fugitives through
    NCIC in fiscal years 2003 (488), 2004 (1,854) and 2005 (2,275). ICE
    immigration detainers were lodged in each instance by ICE Special
    Agents assigned to the LESC, who then coordinated local action with ICE
    field officers.
        LESC agents are also able to identify alien fugitives based upon
    information contained in incoming queries from the law enforcement
    community. Wanted aliens identified by the LESC are not tracked by
    individual category. However, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, LESC
    agents lodged a combined total of 27,886 detainers against criminal or
    other wanted aliens, including fugitive aliens.
        The LESC routinely provides fugitive leads to ICE field offices
    based on information received from callers to the ICE tip-line. Tip-
    line statistics are not available for individual categories of calls;
    however, a substantial number of callers do provide information
    concerning ICE fugitives.
        Question. Describe the work load for LESC.
        Answer. In fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the LESC responded to
    a combined total of 1,938,307 electronic queries from Federal, State,
    local and tribal law enforcement agencies in all 50 States, the
    District of Columbia, two U.S. Territories and Canada. Electronic
    queries to the LESC average in excess of 50,000 queries per month.
        In fiscal years 2004 and 2005 the LESC received a combined total of
    126,528 calls on the ICE tip line (98,857 of those calls were received
    in fiscal year 2005 alone).
        ICE Special Agents assigned to the LESC lodged a combined total of
    27,886 ICE immigration detainers in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, or in
    excess of 1,000 ICE immigration detainers each month.
        The LESC received more than 107,036 telephone calls on its
    dedicated law enforcement line in fiscal year 2005. Calls to the LESC's
    law enforcement line average almost 9,000 per month. In fiscal year
    2005, the LESC had more than 880,000 contacts with the law enforcement
    community or the public concerning law enforcement matters associated
    with ICE authorities and responsibilities.
        In fiscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, the LESC entered a combined
    total of more than 90,000 new ICE records in the NCIC database--an
    average of about 2,500 per month. However, new procedures recently
    implemented at the LESC are expected to increase record entries to an
    average of 5,700 per month.
        In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the LESC was required to validate a
    combined total of 212,420 NCIC records. In the first 3 months of fiscal
    year 2006, the LESC validated an average of 12,000 records per month.
        In fiscal year 2005, the LESC records staff completed more than 1.1
    million file transactions. In the first 3 months of fiscal year 2006,
    they averaged 92,000 record transactions per month, resulting in a
    similar annual projection for fiscal year 2006.

                    INTENSIVE SUPERVISION PROGRAM EXPANSION

        Question. On page 24 of the ICE congressional justification, it
    states that the intensive supervision program is to be expanded to a
    ninth and tenth city. To which cities are you expanding?
        Answer. We are currently reviewing opportunities to expand ISAP
    within the scope of current contracts. No determinations have been made
    at this time.

                              GUANTANAMO FACILITY

        Question. What is the status of the $5 million in fiscal year 2005
    construction funds that were to be used at the Guantanamo facility?
        Answer. $6 million was appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for the
    facility, which provides housing for refugee applicants that are
    awaiting determination of their claims.
        Construction activities undertaken between fiscal years 2004 and
    2006 are:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    20-Bed Segregation Unit.................................      $1,787,000
    East Compound 2.1 Acres Security Fencing and                   1,566,658
     Mobilization of Temporary Facilities...................
    West Compound 2.9 Acres Security Systems and Perimeter           821,792
     Fences.................................................
    Building 624 Demolition and Asbestos Abatement..........         529,200
    Building 1567 64-Bed Renovation Project.................         147,153
                                                             ---------------
          Total.............................................       4,851,803
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
                            EXPLOSIVES TRACE PORTALS

        Question. Please provide a purchase and deployment schedule for
    Explosives Detection Trace Portals (ETPs). The schedule should include,
    by airport, all ETPs purchased and deployed for fiscal year's 2005 and
    2006, ETPs scheduled to be purchased and deployed based on the fiscal
    year 2007 request, and ETPs scheduled for deployment in the future.
        Answer. Below, in figure A, is the list of airports where
    Explosives Trace Portals (ETP) were deployed with fiscal year 2005
    funding.
        ETP deployment using fiscal year 2006 funding will be installed in
    two phases. Below, in figure B, is Phase I of the fiscal year 2006
    deployment. The airport locations and number of units for all fiscal
    year 2006 deployments are subject to change due to space constraints,
    local airport construction, etc.
        Phase II of the fiscal year 2006 deployment is in figure C. And,
    the list of airports scheduled to receive the 92 ETPs requested in the
    President's fiscal year 2007 budget is below in figure D. This list
    accounts for 82 units; the remaining 10 units will be used to backfill
    at airports in which ETPs have not been deployed due to local airport
    construction. Airport locations and number of units are subject to
    change due to space constraints, local airport construction, etc.

                                    FIGURE A
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BOS...............................  Boston-Logan                       1
                                         International
                                         Airport--MA.
    BWI...............................  Baltimore-Washington               1
                                         International
                                         Airport--MD.
    CLT...............................  Charlotte/Douglas                  3
                                         International
                                         Airport--NC.
    DCA...............................  Ronald Reagan                      2
                                         Washington National
                                         Airport--DC.
    DFW...............................  Dallas/Ft. Worth                   4
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    DTW...............................  Detroit Metro Wayne                3
                                         County Airport--MI.
    EWR...............................  Newark International               2
                                         Airport--NJ.
    FLL...............................  Ft. Lauderdale/                    2
                                         Hollywood
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    GPT...............................  Gulfport-Biloxi                    1
                                         International
                                         Airport--MS.
    IAD...............................  Washington-Dulles                  1
                                         International
                                         Airport--VA.
    IND...............................  Indianapolis                       3
                                         International
                                         Airport--IN.
    JAX...............................  Jacksonville                       2
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    JFK...............................  JFK International                  1
                                         Airport--NY.
    LAS...............................  McCarran Las Vegas                 4
                                         International
                                         Airport--NV.
    LAX...............................  Los Angeles                        1
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    MIA...............................  Miami International                7
                                         Airport--FL.
    PBI...............................  West Palm Beach                    1
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    PHX...............................  Phoenix-Sky Harbor                 1
                                         International
                                         Airport--AZ.
    PIT...............................  Pittsburgh                         2
                                         International
                                         Airport--PA.
    PVD...............................  T. F. Green Airport--              1
                                         Providence, RI.
    ROC...............................  Greater Rochester                  1
                                         International
                                         Airport--NY.
    SAN...............................  San Diego                          1
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    SFO...............................  San Francisco                      7
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    SJU...............................  Luis Munoz Marin                   3
                                         International
                                         Airport--San Juan,
                                         PR.
    SMF...............................  Sacramento                         3
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    TPA...............................  Tampa International                1
                                         Airport--FL.
                                                             ---------------
          Total.......................  ....................              59
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    FIGURE B
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ABQ...............................  Albuquerque                        2
                                         International
                                         Sunport Airport--NM.
    ALB...............................  Albany International               1
                                         Airport--NY.
    ATL...............................  Hartsfield Atlanta                 3
                                         International
                                         Airport--GA.
    BDL...............................  Bradley                            2
                                         International
                                         Airport--CT.
    BOS...............................  Boston Logan                       8
                                         International
                                         Airport--MA.
    BUF...............................  Buffalo Niagara                    2
                                         International
                                         Airport--NY.
    BWI...............................  Baltimore-Washington               8
                                         International
                                         Airport--MD.
    CLE...............................  Cleveland Hopkins                  4
                                         International
                                         Airport--OH.
    CMH...............................  Port Columbus                      3
                                         International
                                         Airport--OH.
    CVG...............................  Cincinnati/Northern                4
                                         Kentucky
                                         International
                                         Airport--KY.
    DEN...............................  Denver International               6
                                         Airport--CO.
    DFW...............................  Dallas/Fort Worth                  8
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    EWR...............................  Newark International               5
                                         Airport--NY.
    HNL...............................  Honolulu                           3
                                         International
                                         Airport--HI.
    IAH...............................  George Bush                        2
                                         Intercontinental
                                         Airport Houston--TX.
    JFK...............................  John F. Kennedy                    3
                                         International
                                         Airport--NY.
    LAX...............................  Los Angeles                        8
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    LGA...............................  LaGuardia Airport--                2
                                         NY.
    MCI...............................  Kansas City                        4
                                         International
                                         Airport--MO.
    MCO...............................  Orlando                            4
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    MDW...............................  Chicago Midway                     2
                                         Airport--IL.
    MSP...............................  Minneapolis-St. Paul               7
                                         International
                                         Airport--MN.
    OAK...............................  Oakland                            5
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    ORD...............................  Chicago O'Hare                     8
                                         International
                                         Airport--IL.
    PBI...............................  Palm Beach                         1
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    PDX...............................  Portland                           4
                                         International
                                         Airport--OR.
    PHL...............................  Philadelphia                       7
                                         International
                                         Airport--.
    PHX...............................  Phoenix Sky Harbor                 4
                                         International
                                         Airport--AZ.
    PVD...............................  T. F. Green Airport--              1
                                         Providence, RI.
    RDU...............................  Raleigh-Durham                     3
                                         International
                                         Airport--NC.
    SEA...............................  Seattle-Tacoma                     6
                                         International
                                         Airport--WA.
    SFO...............................  San Francisco                      1
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    SLC...............................  Salt Lake City                     5
                                         International
                                         Airport--UT.
    STL...............................  Lambert St Louis                   5
                                         International
                                         Airport--MO.
    TPA...............................  Tampa International                6
                                         Airport--FL.
                                                             ---------------
          Total.......................  ....................             147
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    FIGURE C
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ANC...............................  Ted Stevens                        3
                                         Anchorage
                                         International
                                         Airport--AK.
    ATL...............................  Hartsfield Atlanta                 6
                                         International
                                         Airport--GA.
    AUS...............................  Austin-Bergstrom                   3
                                         International--TX.
    BHM...............................  Birmingham                         1
                                         International
                                         Airport--AL.
    BNA...............................  Nashville                          2
                                         International
                                         Airport--TN.
    BOI...............................  Boise Air Terminal/                2
                                         Gowen Field--ID.
    BUR...............................  Bob Hope Airport--                 2
                                         Burbank, CA.
    COS...............................  Colorado Springs                   1
                                         Municipal--CO.
    DAL...............................  Dallas Love Field--                3
                                         TX.
    DAY...............................  James M. Cox Dayton                1
                                         International
                                         Airport--OH.
    DCA...............................  Ronald Reagan                      4
                                         Washington National
                                         Airport--DC.
    DEN...............................  Denver International               5
                                         Airport--CO.
    DTW...............................  Detroit Metro Wayne                6
                                         County Airport--MI.
    ELP...............................  El Paso                            1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TS.
    EWR...............................  Newark International               4
                                         Airport--NJ.
    GEG...............................  Spokane                            2
                                         International
                                         Airport--WA.
    GSO...............................  Piedmont Triad                     2
                                         International
                                         Airport--NC.
    HOU...............................  William P. Hobby                   4
                                         Airport--TX.
    IAD...............................  Washington-Dulles                  4
                                         International
                                         Airport--VA.
    JFK...............................  John F. Kennedy                    4
                                         International
                                         Airport--NY.
    KOA...............................  Kona International                 2
                                         Airport--AK.
    LAS...............................  McCarran                           5
                                         International
                                         Airport--NV.
    LAX...............................  Los Angeles                        4
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    LGA...............................  LaGuardia Airport--                4
                                         NY.
    LIT...............................  Little Rock National               1
                                         Airport--AR.
    MCO...............................  Orlando                            4
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    MDW...............................  Chicago Midway                     2
                                         Airport--IL.
    MEM...............................  Memphis                            4
                                         International
                                         Airport--TN.
    MHT...............................  Manchester Airport--               3
                                         NH.
    MIA...............................  Miami International                3
                                         Airport--FL.
    MKE...............................  General Mitchell                   4
                                         International
                                         Airport--WI.
    MSP...............................  Minneapolis-St. Paul               3
                                         International
                                         Airport--MN.
    MSY...............................  New Orleans                        4
                                         International
                                         Airport--LA.
    OGG...............................  Kahului Airport--HI.               2
    OKC...............................  Will Rogers World                  2
                                         Airport--OK.
    OMA...............................  Eppley Airfield--NE.               2
    ONT...............................  Ontario                            2
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    ORD...............................  Chicago O'Hare                     4
                                         International
                                         Airport--IL.
    ORF...............................  Norfolk                            3
                                         International
                                         Airport--VA.
    RNO...............................  Reno/Tahoe                         2
                                         International
                                         Airport--NV.
    RSW...............................  Southwest Florida                  3
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    SAN...............................  San Diego                          5
                                         International
                                         Airport, Lindbergh--
                                         CA.
    SAT...............................  San Antonio                        2
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    SDF...............................  Louisville                         2
                                         International
                                         Airport--KY.
    SEA...............................  Seattle-Tacoma                     6
                                         International
                                         Airport--WA.
    SJC...............................  San Jose                           6
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    SNA...............................  John Wayne Airport--               4
                                         CA.
    TUL...............................  Tulsa International                1
                                         Airport--OK.
    TUS...............................  Tucson International               2
                                         Airport--AZ.
                                                             ---------------
          Total.......................  ....................             151
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    FIGURE D
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Airport                   Airport name       No. of units
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ABE...............................  Lehigh Valley                      1
                                         International
                                         Airport--PA.
    ACY...............................  Atlantic City                      1
                                         International
                                         Airport--NJ.
    AMA...............................  Amarillo                           1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    AVL...............................  Asheville Regional                 1
                                         Airport--NC.
    BGR...............................  Bangor International               2
                                         Airport--ME.
    BIL...............................  Billings Logan                     1
                                         International
                                         Airport--MT.
    BTV...............................  Burlington                         2
                                         International
                                         Airport--VT.
    BZN...............................  Gallatin Field                     1
                                         Airport--MT.
    CAE...............................  Columbia                           1
                                         Metropolitan
                                         Airport--SC.
    CAK...............................  Akron-Canton                       1
                                         Regional Airport--
                                         OH.
    CHA...............................  Chattanooga                        1
                                         Metropolitan
                                         Airport.
    CHS...............................  Charleston                         2
                                         International
                                         Airport/AFB--SC.
    CID...............................  The Eastern Iowa                   1
                                         Airport--IA.
    CRP...............................  Corpus Christi                     1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    DAB...............................  Daytona Beach                      1
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    DSM...............................  Des Moines                         1
                                         International
                                         Airport--IA.
    EUG...............................  Eugene Airport/                    1
                                         Mahlon Sweet Field.
    EYW...............................  Key West                           1
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    FAI...............................  Fairbanks                          1
                                         International
                                         Airport--AK.
    FAT...............................  Fresno Yosemite                    1
                                         International
                                         Airport--CA.
    FNT...............................  Bishop International               1
                                         Airport--MI.
    FSD...............................  Joe Foss Field--SD..               1
    FWA...............................  Ft. Wayne                          1
                                         International
                                         Airport--Baer
                                         Field--IN.
    GRB...............................  Austin Straubel                    1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    GRR...............................  Gerald R. Ford                     2
                                         International
                                         Airport--MI.
    GSP...............................  Greenville-                        2
                                         Spartanburg
                                         Airport--SC.
    HRL...............................  Rio Grande Valley                  1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    HSV...............................  Huntsville-Madison                 1
                                         County Airport--AL.
    ICT...............................  Wichita Mid-                       1
                                         Continent Airport--
                                         KS.
    ISP...............................  Long Island                        2
                                         MacArthur Airport--
                                         NY.
    ITO...............................  Hilo International                 1
                                         Airport--HI.
    JAN...............................  Jackson                            2
                                         International
                                         Airport--MS.
    JNU...............................  Juneau International               1
                                         Airport--AK.
    LAN...............................  Capital City                       1
                                         Airport--MI.
    LBB...............................  Lubbock                            1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    LEX...............................  Blue Grass Airport--               1
                                         KY.
    LGB...............................  Long Beach Daugherty               2
                                         Field Airport--CA.
    LIH...............................  Lihue Airport--HI...               1
    MAF...............................  Midland                            1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    MDT...............................  Harrisburg                         1
                                         International
                                         Airport--PA.
    MFE...............................  McAllen-Miller                     1
                                         International
                                         Airport--TX.
    MLB...............................  Melbourne                          1
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    MLI...............................  Quad Cities                        1
                                         International
                                         Airport--IL.
    MOB...............................  Mobile Regional                    1
                                         Airport--AL.
    MSN...............................  Dane County Regional               1
                                         Airport--WI.
    MSO...............................  Missoula                           1
                                         International
                                         Airport--MT.
    MYR...............................  Myrtle Beach                       1
                                         International
                                         Airport--SC.
    PHF...............................  Newport News/                      1
                                         Williamsburg
                                         International
                                         Airport--VA.
    PIE...............................  St Petersburg-                     2
                                         Clearwater Int'l
                                         Airport--FL.
    PNS...............................  Pensacola Regional                 1
                                         Airport--FL.
    PSP...............................  Palm Springs                       1
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    PWM...............................  Portland                           1
                                         International
                                         Jetport--ME.
    RIC...............................  Richmond                           3
                                         International
                                         Airport--VA.
    ROA...............................  Roanoke Regional                   1
                                         Airport--VA.
    ROC...............................  Greater Rochester                  2
                                         International
                                         Airport--NY.
    SAV...............................  Savannah                           1
                                         International
                                         Airport--GA.
    SBA...............................  Santa Barbara                      2
                                         Municipal Airport--
                                         CA.
    SBN...............................  South Bend Regional                2
                                         Airport--IN.
    SFB...............................  Orlando Sanford                    2
                                         Airport--FL.
    SGF...............................  Springfield/Branson                2
                                         Regional Airport--
                                         MO.
    SHV...............................  Shreveport Regional                2
                                         Airport--LA.
    SRQ...............................  Sarasota Bradenton                 3
                                         International
                                         Airport--FL.
    SYR...............................  Syracuse-Hancock                   1
                                         International
                                         Airport--NY.
                                                             ---------------
          Total.......................  ....................              82
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Provide a similar schedule for other emerging technology
    that will be used to screen passengers for explosives.
        Answer. Below is the deployment plan for emerging technology in
    fiscal year 2007. These deployments will enable the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) to screen all passengers designated for
    additional screening and a random number of passengers selected to keep
    the equipment in continuous use. TSA is currently developing a
    strategic plan for our passenger screening program which will establish
    our goals for screening passengers for explosives and provide a
    deployment schedule by airport.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             # of
                 Technology                 units            Location
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Explosives Trace Portals............     \1\ 92  1 per 3 checkpoint
                                                      lanes at Category X &
                                                      I airport
    Automated Explosives Spot Sampler...         93  1 at each Category II
                                                      checkpoint
    Automated Carry-On Bag Explosives            27  1 at each Category X
     Detection Sy-  stem.                             airport
    Whole Body Imaging..................         91  1 per 8 checkpoint
                                                      lanes at Category X &
                                                      I airports
    Cast and Prosthetics Scanner........        210  1 at each Category X
                                                      checkpoint
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ This is the final phase of deployment to complete the 1 per 3 lanes
      ratio.

        Question. Provide a list of all certified ETP technology.
        Answer. The following Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs) have been
    reviewed by TSA, and are qualified for screening aviation passengers
    for explosives:
      --Smiths Detection Sentinel II; and
      --GE IonTrack Entry Scan3.
        Question. Provide a list of all ETP technology that is being
    evaluated by DHS for certification.
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
    to work with the two current manufacturers of Explosives Trace Portals
    (ETP) to further refine system performance and operational suitability.
    At the present time, no other vendors have submitted an ETP for TSA
    evaluation.
        Question. How many airports have explosives detection ``puffer''
    technology?
        Answer. There are currently 94 Explosives Trace Portals installed
    at 37 airports.
        Question. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, what percent of airline
    passengers were screened with this technology?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2005 and early fiscal year 2006, the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was in the early stages of
    deployment of Explosives Trace Portals (ETP). Currently, there are 94
    ETPs deployed at 37 airports. The ETPs are used to screen passengers
    requiring additional screening and a random number of passengers to
    keep the units in continuous use. The actual percentages of people
    screened using this technology is considered Sensitive Security
    Information and cannot be disclosed to the public. TSA would be happy
    to provide the Committee with this information in the appropriate
    forum.

                               CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

        Question. How many contract officers are employed at TSA? How does
    that level compare to industry and Federal Government standards?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration currently has 72
    contract specialists and 32 of the specialists are contracting
    officers.
        The generally accepted benchmark for staffing for the procurement
    function is ``cost to spend.'' This metric divides the total dollars
    obligated by the direct manpower costs associated with the contracting
    function. In fiscal year 2005, TSA's Office of Acquisition operated at
    a 0.348 percent cost to spend. The Center for Advanced Purchasing
    Studies (http://www.capsresearch.org) is recognized as the industry
    expert organization regarding benchmarking for the acquisition
    function. Their applicable standard for the acquisition function is 2.1
    percent.
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a
    standard for the contracting function of 1.2 percent to 1.9 percent.
    The DHS Chief Procurement Officer established a staffing goal of 1.2
    percent in fiscal year 2006. TSA requested $7.5 million for an
    additional 30 FTE and 61 positions in fiscal year 2007.
        Question. How many additional contract employees will be hired
    based on the fiscal year 2007 request?
        Answer. Based on the fiscal year 2007 request, the Transportation
    Security Administration expects to hire an additional 61 staff.
        Question. What percentage of the TSA budget in fiscal year 2006 is
    spent on contract oversight?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2006, the Transportation Security
    Administration's (TSA) total budget authority is $6.3 billion and TSA
    is executing approximately $2 billion in contracts. The total budget
    for acquisition, the office that performs contract oversight functions,
    is $20.9 million (payroll, compensation and benefits, and operating
    expenses), and this is approximately 0.3 percent of TSA's total budget
    authority.
        Question. Would the fiscal year 2007 request increase that
    percentage? If so, by how much?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request increases
    the acquisition budget by $7.5 million. The percentage of the
    Transportation Security Administration's budget authority spent on
    contract oversight increases to 0.45 percent.
        Question. Of TSA's full budget authority in fiscal year's 2005 and
    2006, what amount is spent on contracts?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awarded
    $2.1 billion on contracts in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2006, TSA
    expects to award approximately $2 billion on contracts.
        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 request is planned for
    contracts?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates
    executing approximately $2 billion of contracts from the total budget
    authority in fiscal year 2007.
        Question. Please explain TSA's Investment Review Board process.
        Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) acquisition
    programs are categorized into four investment levels (1-4) based on
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) criteria, with Level I being the
    most significant. Program levels determine the review forum for each
    Key Decision Point approval. Level 1 and 2 investments have an
    acquisition value over $50 million and are reviewed at both TSA and
    DHS. The TSA Investment Review Process (IRP) is the initial review
    point for Level 1 and 2 programs and the final review point for Level 3
    and 4 programs. Level 1 and 2 programs, once approved at TSA, continue
    to the DHS IRP.
        The TSA IRP contains two components, the Business Management
    Council (BMC) and Investment Review Board (IRB). Both components ensure
    alignment of capital investments with DHS mission and goals, identify
    program risks, and assess the program's current cost, schedule, and
    performance status. The BMC is the initial review point for all TSA
    programs before proceeding to the TSA IRB. The TSA IRB is the final
    approval authority for Level 3 and 4 programs and assesses the
    readiness of Level 1 and 2 programs before proceeding to DHS.

                                CUSTOMER SERVICE

        Question. What are TSA's performance measures for customer service?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    measured its customer satisfaction using airport customer satisfaction
    surveys. Below are the areas of customer satisfaction measured and the
    results from the customer satisfaction surveys for fiscal year 2003-
    fiscal year 2005.

        Question. Are TSA's goals being met in those areas?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration is currently
    evaluating the metrics that are being captured to ensure that we are
    measuring elements that are meaningful and that will truly provide
    information that will lead to process improvements. Simultaneously, we
    will continue using the metrics in place and have set an overall
    satisfaction goal of at least 81 percent for fiscal year 2006 and 82
    percent for fiscal year 2007.

                                    STAFFING

        Question. Last year, TSA warned against a reduction in funding for
    screeners on the basis that passenger wait times would be longer and
    training costs would be higher. Based on the funding reduction for TSA
    screeners in fiscal year 2006, have those concerns become reality?
        Answer. Prior to November 2005, system wide average wait times were
    stable, averaging just 3 minutes. Since then, average wait times have
    increased, as evidenced by the table below.
        While it is not surprising that wait times might rise over the
    holiday months, the continued rise in wait times in February indicates
    that even with the efficiency improvements from the December 22, 2005
    Standard Operating Procedures changes, the wait times experienced by
    passengers has increased.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Month                       Oct 2005   Nov 2005   Dec 2005   Jan 2006   Feb 2006   Mar 2006
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Average Wait Time.............................       2.91       3.18       3.62       3.39       3.62       3.85
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Please provide a comparison of passenger wait times at
    high peak periods in fiscal year 2006 to the same periods in previous
    fiscal years.
        Answer. A useful period comparison of peak period travel is the
    winter holiday. Actual passenger traffic was down 3.5 percent this past
    winter holiday period, while Transportation Security Administration
    (TSA) staffing was down 10 percent due to the staffing reductions
    required for fiscal year 2006. TSA staff were more productive, handling
    7.3 percent more passengers per Transportation Security Officer than in
    the previous year. However, passenger wait times during this past
    winter holiday period increased 8.4 percent over the same period of
    2004/2005.
        Question. With a shrinking screener workforce, how will TSA pull
    screeners off normal security lines and place them at dedicated
    Registered Traveler lines without increasing wait times for normal
    passengers?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
    expect the implementation of the Registered Traveler program to
    increase the required number of Transportation Security Officer (TSO)
    Full Time Equivalents. TSA does not anticipate a need to move any TSOs
    from normal security lines nor do we foresee increases in wait times
    for passengers.
        Question. Please provide a chart that displays airport management
    staff by airport versus all other staff.
        Answer. The requested information is provided in the table below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                           Law                                                                                 TSO:
                Apt ID                          Airport name                    Cat          State/U.S.  enforce   FSD &    Air   Screener       TSO:        TSO: bag   TSO:       TSO:       pasgnr     TSO:       TSO:      TSO:   Airport
                                                                                             territory    & reg.   Staff   cargo    mangr   administrative  screening   other  maintenance  screening  training  undefined   total    total
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ABE...........................  Lehigh Valley Int'l Airport........  II...............  PA.........        2       7       1        4   ..............         8   ......  ...........        35         7   .........       50       64
    ABI...........................  Abilene Regional Airport...........  III..............  TX.........        2       1  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........         9         1   .........       15       20
    ABQ...........................  Albuquerque Int'l Sunport Airport..  I................  NM.........        6      12       1        4            8            52   ......  ...........        98         9   .........      168      199
    ABR...........................  Aberdeen Airport...................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        7
    ABY...........................  Southwest Georgia Regional Airport.  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        9        9
    ACK...........................  Nantucket Memorial Airport.........  III..............  MA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        6        7
    ACT...........................  Waco Regional Airport..............  III..............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         9         2   .........       15       17
    ACV...........................  Arcata-Eureka Airport..............  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         9   ........  .........       11       12
    ACY...........................  Atlantic City Int'l Airport........  II...............  NJ.........        1       7  ......        3            2            12   ......  ...........        28         2   .........       44       57
    ADQ...........................  Kodiak State Airport...............  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        9        9
    AEX...........................  Alexandria Int'l Airport...........  IV...............  LA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........        11         2   .........       17       18
    AGS...........................  Bush Field Airport.................  III..............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............        10   ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       24       24
    AHN...........................  Athens/Ben Epps Airport............  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        7        7
    AIA...........................  Alliance Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        5
    AKN...........................  King Salmon Airport................  III..............  AK.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........  .........        1   .........        4        5
    ALB...........................  Albany Int'l Airport...............  I................  NY.........        2       9       1        4            5            42   ......  ...........        63         2   .........      112      134
    ALO...........................  Waterloo Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  IA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        4        5
    ALS...........................  Alamosa-San Luis Valley Arpt/        IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        4        4
                                     Bergman Fld.
    ALW...........................  Walla Walla Regional Airport.......  IV...............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        8        8
    AMA...........................  Amarillo Int'l Airport.............  II...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        2            1            20   ......  ...........        21         4   .........       46       50
    ANC...........................  Ted Stevens Anchorage Int'l Airport  I................  AK.........        9      13       3        6            8            65   ......  ...........        90         2   .........      165      204
    AOO...........................  Altoona-Blair County Airport.......  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        6        6
    APF...........................  Naples Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  FL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
    APN...........................  Alpena County Regional Airport.....  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        4        4
    ART...........................  Watertown Int'l Airport............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
    ASE...........................  Aspen Pitkin County Sardy Field....  III..............  CO.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        6
    ATL...........................  Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport...  X................  GA.........       12      23       4       25           33           482   ......          5         565        39          1     1,124    1,221
    ATW...........................  Outagamie County Airport...........  II...............  WI.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        20         2   .........       30       32
    ATY...........................  Watertown Airport..................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
    AUG...........................  Augusta State Airport..............  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
    AUS...........................  Austin-Bergstrom Int'l Airport.....  I................  TX.........        6      13       1        4            3            76   ......  ...........       119         6   .........      204      230
    AVL...........................  Asheville Regional Airport.........  II...............  NC.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        15   ......  ...........        15         9   .........       39       43
    AVP...........................  Wilkes Barre/Scranton Int'l Airport  III..............  PA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............        10   ......  ...........        13         5   .........       27       28
    AZO...........................  Kalamazoo/Battle Creek Int'l         III..............  MI.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             6   ......  ...........        16         3   .........       25       27
                                     Airport.
    BDL...........................  Bradley Int'l Airport..............  I................  CT.........        6      14       2        9           40            78   ......          1         124        15   .........      257      328
    BED...........................  Hanscom Field......................  III..............  MA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         4        (0)  .........        7        7
    BET...........................  Bethel Airport.....................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
    BFD...........................  Bradford Regional Airport..........  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        7        7
    BFF...........................  W. Nebraska Reg'l A/P, W.B. Heilig   IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         1         2   .........        6        7
                                     Field.
    BFL...........................  Meadows Field, Bakersfield Airport.  III..............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........        15   ........  .........       17       19
    BGM...........................  Binghamton Regional Airport........  III..............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        17   ........  .........       18       18
    BGR...........................  Bangor Int'l Airport...............  II...............  ME.........        1       7  ......        3            2            11   ......  ...........        31         3   .........       48       61
    BHB...........................  Hancock County Bar Harbor Airport..  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
    BHM...........................  Birmingham Int'l Airport...........  I................  AL.........        3      11       1        5            5            45   ......  ...........        49        14   .........      111      136
    BIL...........................  Billings Logan Int'l Airport.......  II...............  MT.........        4       7  ......        1            1            16   ......  ...........        29         3   .........       50       63
    BIS...........................  Bismarck Municipal Airport.........  III..............  ND.........        2       6  ......        2   ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       18       28
    BJI...........................  Bemidji-City Airport...............  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        7
    BKW...........................  Raleigh County Memorial Airport....  III..............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       12       12
    BKX...........................  Brookings..........................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    BLF...........................  Mercer County Airport..............  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        6        6
    BLI...........................  Bellingham Int'l Airport...........  III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         8   ......  ...........        10         2          1        21       21
    BMI...........................  Bloomington-Normal Airport.........  III..............  IL.........        1       4  ......  ........  ..............         9   ......  ...........        13         3   .........       25       30
    BNA...........................  Nashville Int'l Airport............  I................  TN.........        8      14  ......        6            5            96   ......  ...........       107         2   .........      209      242
    BOI...........................  Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field.....  I................  ID.........        5      17  ......        5            6            25   ......  ...........        59         4   .........       95      128
    BOS...........................  Logan Int'l Airport................  X................  MA.........       13      18       4       18           69           177   ......  ...........       503        10   .........      759      880
    BPT...........................  Southeast Texas Regional Airport...  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         8         2   .........       13       14
    BQK...........................  Glynco Jetport.....................  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         9   ........  .........        9        9
    BQN...........................  Rafael Hernandez Airport...........  III..............  PR.........        1  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        18   ........  .........       24       25
    BRD...........................  Brainerd-Crow Wing Airport.........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    BRL...........................  SE Iowa Regional Airport Authority.  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        3        3
    BRO...........................  Brownsville/South Padre Int'l        III..............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         7   ......  ...........         8   ........  .........       16       18
                                     Airport.
    BTM...........................  Bert Mooney Airport................  III..............  MT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        9       10
    BTR...........................  Baton Rouge Metropolitan Airport...  II...............  LA.........  .......       7  ......        4            1            14   ......  ...........        27         2   .........       45       57
    BTV...........................  Burlington Int'l Airport...........  II...............  VT.........        1       6  ......        4   ..............        14   ......  ...........        56         1   .........       71       82
    BUF...........................  Buffalo Niagara Int'l Airport......  II...............  NY.........        4      10       2        4   ..............        57   ......  ...........        97         8   .........      162      182
    BUR...........................  Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport..  I................  CA.........        3      11       1        4            2            25   ......          1         103         6   .........      138      160
    BWI...........................  Baltimore-Washington Int'l Airport.  X................  MD.........       13      14       3       13           24           171   ......  ...........       434        10   .........      639      706
    BZN...........................  Gallatin Field Airport.............  II...............  MT.........  .......       1  ......        1            1            19   ......  ...........        26         1   .........       48       51
    CAE...........................  Columbia Metropolitan Airport......  II...............  SC.........        2       6  ......        2   ..............        24   ......  ...........        32   ........  .........       56       66
    CAK...........................  Akron-Canton Regional Airport......  II...............  OH.........  .......       1  ......        3            1            19   ......  ...........        30         4   .........       54       58
    CDC...........................  Cedar City Municipal...............  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        6        6
    CDR...........................  Chadron Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        5
    CDV...........................  Merle K (MUDHOLE) Smith............  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        8        8
    CEC...........................  Crescent City Airport..............  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        7        7
    CEZ...........................  Cortez Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
    CGI...........................  Cape Girardeau Regional Airport....  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
    CHA...........................  Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport...  II...............  TN.........  .......  ......  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........        22         3   .........       34       36
    CHO...........................  Charlottesville/Albemarle Airport..  III..............  VA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       17       18
    CHS...........................  Charleston Int'l Airport/AFB.......  II...............  SC.........        3       8       2        2            2            29   ......  ...........        46   ........  .........       77       94
    CIC...........................  Chico Municipal Airport............  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         7   ........  .........        7        7
    CID...........................  The Eastern Iowa Airport...........  II...............  IA.........        1       2  ......        3   ..............        18   ......  ...........        34   ........  .........       52       59
    CIU...........................  Chippewa County Int'l Airport......  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
    CKB...........................  Benedum Airport....................  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5         3   .........       12       13
    CLE...........................  Cleveland Hopkins Int'l Airport....  I................  OH.........        9      19       2        7           18            92   ......  ...........       185        15   .........      311      365
    CLL...........................  Easterwood Airport.................  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         7         2   .........       13       15
    CLT...........................  Charlotte/Douglas Int'l Airport....  X................  NC.........        5      12       3        9            7            81   ......  ...........       170        19   .........      277      313
    CMH...........................  Port Columbus Int'l Airport........  I................  OH.........        6      14       1        5            4            69   ......  ...........       107         9   .........      190      221
    CMI...........................  University Of Illinois-Willard       III..............  IL.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       14       15
                                     Airport.
    CMX...........................  Houghton County Memorial Airport...  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        5
    CNY...........................  Canyonlands Field Airport..........  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        4        4
    COD...........................  Yellowstone Regional Airport.......  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        8        8
    COS...........................  Colorado Springs Municipal.........  I................  CO.........        3      12  ......        3   ..............        44   ......  ...........        49         2   .........       95      113
    COU...........................  Columbia Regional Airport..........  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    CPR...........................  Natrona Int'l Airport..............  IV...............  WY.........        1       5       1        2            1             3   ......  ...........         6         2   .........       11       21
    CRP...........................  Corpus Christi Int'l Airport.......  II...............  TX.........        2       7       1        2   ..............        16   ......  ...........        18         3   .........       37       49
    CRQ...........................  McClellan-Palomar Airport..........  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       14       14
    CRW...........................  Yeager Airport.....................  II...............  WV.........        3       5       1        1            5             9   ......  ...........        22         7   .........       42       57
    CSG...........................  Columbus Metropolitan Airport......  III..............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........       13       13
    CVG...........................  Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Int'l   X................  KY.........        9      16       2        7           10            97   ......  ...........       168         4   .........      279      323
                                     Airport.
    CWA...........................  Central Wisconsin Regional Airport.  III..............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........        12         2   .........       20       21
    CYS...........................  Cheyenne Airport...................  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        6        6
    DAB...........................  Daytona Beach Int'l Airport........  II...............  FL.........        4       8  ......        3   ..............         8   ......  ...........        32         4   .........       44       59
    DAL...........................  Dallas Love Field..................  I................  TX.........        7      13       1        6           23            54   ......  ...........       111        15   .........      203      253
    DAY...........................  James M. Cox Dayton Int'l Airport..  I................  OH.........        3      10       2        3   ..............        41   ......  ...........        61         1   .........      103      121
    DBQ...........................  Dubuque Regional Airport...........  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        8        8
    DCA...........................  Reagan Washington National Airport.  X................  VA.........       10      15       1        6           25            87   ......  ...........       244         3   .........      359      416
    DDC...........................  Dodge City Regional Airport........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        4        4
    DEC...........................  Decatur Airport....................  IV...............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        7        7
    DEN...........................  Denver Int'l Airport...............  X................  CO.........       13      22       3       15           11           206   ......  ...........       464        33   .........      714      778
    DFW...........................  Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport....  X................  TX.........       18      32       3       29           37           606   ......  ...........       650         9   .........    1,302    1,421
    DHN...........................  Dothan-Houston County Airport......  III..............  AL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       13       14
    DIK...........................  Dickinson Municipal Airport........  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    DLG...........................  Dillingham Airport.................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           2             2   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        4        6
    DLH...........................  Duluth Int'l Airport...............  III..............  MN.........        1       6  ......        4   ..............         9   ......  ...........        11         3   .........       23       34
    DRO...........................  Durango-La Plata County Airport....  III..............  CO.........        2       1  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........         6         1   .........       14       18
    DRT...........................  Del Rio International Airport......  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    DSM...........................  Des Moines Int'l Airport...........  II...............  IA.........        4       7       1        3            1            24   ......  ...........        36         5   .........       66       83
    DTW...........................  Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport.  X................  MI.........       13      21       3       14           19           259   ......  ...........       454        11   .........      743      812
    DUJ...........................  Dubois-Jefferson County Airport....  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    DVL...........................  Devils Lake........................  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    EAR...........................  Kearney Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        6        6
    EAT...........................  Pangborn Memorial Airport..........  IV...............  WA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        7        9
    EAU...........................  Eau Claire.........................  III..............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         2         2   .........       10       10
    EGE...........................  Eagle County Regional Airport......  III..............  CO.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        9       10
    EKO...........................  Elko Regional Airport..............  III..............  NV.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........        11   ........  .........       13       14
    ELD...........................  El Dorado..........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......          1           2         1   .........        6        6
    ELM...........................  Elmira-Corning Regional Airport....  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........        14         1   .........       19       20
    ELP...........................  El Paso Int'l Airport..............  I................  TX.........        6      13       1        3            2            60   ......  ...........        62        10   .........      134      159
    ENA...........................  Kenai Municipal Airport............  IV...............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        5        5
    ENV...........................  Wendover Municipal Airport.........  III..............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        1        1
    ERI...........................  Erie Int'l Airport.................  III..............  PA.........        1       3  ......        3   ..............        15   ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       29       36
    ESC...........................  Delta County Airport...............  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
    EUG...........................  Eugene Airport/Mahlon Sweet Field..  II...............  OR.........        1       5  ......        3   ..............        19   ......  ...........        20         1   .........       40       49
    EVV...........................  Evansville Regional Airport........  III..............  IN.........        1       2  ......        1   ..............         9   ......  ...........        18         2   .........       29       33
    EWN...........................  Craven County Regional Airport.....  IV...............  NC.........        1  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         9   ........  .........       10       11
    EWR...........................  Newark Int'l Airport...............  X................  NJ.........       17      13       2       22           55           414   ......  ...........       584        22          1     1,075    1,184
    EYW...........................  Key West Int'l Airport.............  II...............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........         8   ........  .........       13       15
    FAI...........................  Fairbanks Int'l Airport............  II...............  AK.........        4      11  ......        2            9            17   ......  ...........        23         6   .........       55       82
    FAR...........................  Hector Int'l Airport...............  III..............  ND.........  .......       4  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........        17         2   .........       28       34
    FAT...........................  Fresno Yosemite Int'l Airport......  II...............  CA.........        2       4  ......        1            2             7   ......  ...........        42         3   .........       54       63
    FAY...........................  Fayetteville Regional Airport......  III..............  NC.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        18   ........  .........       25       27
    FHU...........................  Sierra Vista Municipal Airport.....  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
    FKL...........................  Venango Regional Airport...........  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        8        8
    FLG...........................  Flagstaff Pulliam Airport..........  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        10   ........  .........       10       10
    FLL...........................  Ft Lauderdale-Hollywood Int'l Arpt.  I................  FL.........        6      14       1       19           21           244   ......          1         434        10   .........      709      770
    FLO...........................  Florence Regional Airport..........  IV...............  SC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        8        8
    FMN...........................  Four Corners Regional Airport......  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       14       14
    FNL...........................  Fort Collins-Loveland Municipal....  III..............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
    FNT...........................  Bishop Int'l Airport...............  II...............  MI.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............        21   ......  ...........        31         3   .........       56       59
    FOD...........................  Fort Dodge.........................  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
    FSD...........................  Joe Foss Field.....................  II...............  SD.........        4       4  ......        2   ..............        16   ......  ...........        13         2   .........       32       42
    FSM...........................  Fort Smith Municipal Airport.......  III..............  AR.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             5   ......  ...........         9         2   .........       16       18
    FWA...........................  Ft. Wayne Int'l Airport--Baer Field  II...............  IN.........  .......       2  ......  ........           1            16   ......  ...........        22         4   .........       43       46
    GBD...........................  Great Bend.........................  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        4
    GCC...........................  Gillette-Campbell County...........  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
    GCK...........................  Garden City Municipal Airport......  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
    GEG...........................  Spokane Int'l Airport..............  I................  WA.........        5      12       1        4            4            25   ......  ...........        71         5   .........      106      132
    GFK...........................  Grand Forks Mark Andrews Int'l Air-  III..............  ND.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       16       17
                                      port.
    GGG...........................  Gregg County Airport...............  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        7        7
    GJT...........................  Walker Field Airport...............  III..............  CO.........        1      10  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        14         2   .........       28       42
    GLH...........................  Mid Delta Regional Airport.........  IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    GNV...........................  Gainesville Regional Airport.......  III..............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       15       18
    GPI...........................  Glacier Park Int'l Airport.........  III..............  MT.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............        14   ......  ...........        15   ........  .........       29       30
    GPT...........................  Gulfport-Biloxi Int'l Airport......  III..............  MS.........        2       5  ......        2            1            15   ......  ...........        25         5   .........       46       56
    GRB...........................  Austin Straubel Int'l Airport......  II...............  WI.........        3       6  ......        3   ..............        19   ......  ...........        22         3   .........       43       55
    GRI...........................  Central Nebraska Regional Airport..  III..............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        4        5
    GRK...........................  Killeen-Fort Hood Regional Airport.  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........        22         2   .........       29       30
    GRO...........................  Rota Int'l Airport.................  I................  Mariana      .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        2        2
                                                                                             Islands.
    GRR...........................  Gerald R. Ford Int'l Airport.......  II...............  MI.........        5       7       2        2   ..............        39   ......          1          51         8   .........       99      116
    GSN...........................  Saipan Int'l Airport...............  II...............  Mariana            1       7  ......        1            1            27   ......  ...........        28         1   .........       57       67
                                                                                             Islands.
    GSO...........................  Piedmont Triad Int'l Airport.......  I................  NC.........        5      11       1        4            2            35   ......  ...........        75        12   .........      124      146
    GSP...........................  Greenville-Spartanburg Airport.....  II...............  SC.........        2       7  ......        2   ..............        31   ......  ...........        43   ........  .........       74       85
    GTF...........................  Great Falls Int'l Airport..........  III..............  MT.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             6   ......  ...........        21         3   .........       32       34
    GTR...........................  Golden Triangle Regional Airport...  IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        8        8
    GUC...........................  Gunnison County Airport............  III..............  CO.........        1  ......  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        6
    GUM...........................  Antonio B. Won Pat Guam Int'l......  I................  GU.........        6      13       1        3            4            60   ......  ...........        56        10   .........      131      158
    HDN...........................  Yampa Valley Regional Airport......  III..............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        9       10
    HGR...........................  Hagerstown Regional Airport........  IV...............  MD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        7        7
    HIB...........................  Chisolm-Hibbing Municipal..........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        2        2
    HII...........................  Lake Havasu City Municipal Airport.  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
    HLN...........................  Helena Regional Airport............  III..............  MT.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........        13         1   .........       20       21
    HNL...........................  Honolulu Int'l Airport.............  X................  HI.........       10      17       4       10           30           224   ......          2         304         8   .........      567      637
    HOM...........................  Homer Airport......................  IV...............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        5        5
    HON...........................  Huron..............................  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        2        2
    HOT...........................  Hot Springs........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         2         2   .........        5        6
    HOU...........................  William P. Hobby Airport...........  I................  TX.........        5      12       1        7            9            67   ......          1         132   ........  .........      208      242
    HPN...........................  Westchester County Airport.........  II...............  NY.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        30   ........  .........       41       45
    HRL...........................  Rio Grande Valley Int'l Airport....  II...............  TX.........        2       7  ......        2            1            13   ......  ...........        33   ........  .........       47       59
    HRO...........................  Harrison...........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        5        5
    HSV...........................  Huntsville-Madison Cnty Airport....  II...............  AL.........        2  ......       1        3            1            17   ......  ...........        29         4   .........       52       59
    HTS...........................  Tri-State Airport..................  III..............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......        1            2             4   ......  ...........        11         2   .........       19       21
    HVN...........................  Tweed-New Haven Airport............  IV...............  CT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        8        9
    HXD...........................  Hilton Head Airport................  IV...............  SC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        9        9
    HYA...........................  Barnstable Municipal Airport.......  III..............  MA.........  .......       2  ......        1   ..............         3   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        9       12
    HYS...........................  Hays Regional Airport..............  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
    IAD...........................  Washington-Dulles Int'l Airport....  X................  VA.........        9      19       5       13           41           273   ......          2         265         1   .........      582      669
    IAH...........................  George Bush Intercontinental         X................  TX.........       14      22       5       17           25           400        1  ...........       491         3   .........      919    1,002
                                     Airport.
    ICT...........................  Wichita Mid-Continent Airport......  II...............  KS.........        4      10       1        4   ..............        30   ......  ...........        40         6   .........       76       95
    IDA...........................  Idaho Falls Regional Airport.......  III..............  ID.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        11         1   .........       19       19
    IFP...........................  Laughlin/Bullhead City Airport.....  III..............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1      .........  ......  ...........         8   ........  .........        9       10
    IGM...........................  Kingman Airport Authority, Inc.....  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        4        4
    ILE...........................  Killeen Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        1        1
    ILM...........................  Wilmington Int'l Airport...........  III..............  NC.........        1       3  ......        2   ..............        11   ......  ...........        17         2   .........       30       36
    IMT...........................  Ford Airport.......................  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        6        6
    IND...........................  Indianapolis Int'l Airport.........  I................  IN.........        9      13       3        7           14            68   ......  ...........       182         3   .........      267      313
    INL...........................  Falls International Airport........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    IPL...........................  Imperial County Airport............  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        7        7
    IPT...........................  Williamsport Regional Airport......  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         6         1   .........        8        8
    IRK...........................  Kirksville Regional Airport........  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
    ISN...........................  Sloulin Field Int'l Airport........  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    ISO...........................  Kinston Regional Jetport...........  III..............  NC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        6        6
    ISP...........................  Long Island MacArthur Airport......  II...............  NY.........        2       9  ......        2            2            25   ......  ...........        58         2   .........       88      103
    ITH...........................  Tompkins County Airport............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............  .........  ......  ...........        15   ........  .........       15       16
    ITO...........................  Hilo Int'l Airport.................  II...............  HI.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............        15   ......  ...........        30         1   .........       47       50
    IWD...........................  Gogebic County Airport.............  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
    IYK...........................  Indian Wells Valley Airport          IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        6        6
                                     District.
    JAC...........................  Jackson Hole Airport...............  III..............  WY.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......        2
    JAN...........................  Jackson Int'l Airport..............  II...............  MS.........        5       8  ......        4            2            32   ......  ...........        50   ........  .........       84      103
    JAX...........................  Jacksonville Int'l Airport.........  I................  FL.........        5      11       2        7            7            20   ......  ...........       102        10   .........      138      170
    JBR...........................  Jonesboro..........................  IV...............  AR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        5
    JFK...........................  John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport......  X................  NY.........       27      15  ......       25           56           570   ......  ...........       952        45   .........    1,622    1,746
    JHW...........................  Chautauqua County Airport..........  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        7        7
    JLN...........................  Joplin Regional Airport............  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        5        5
    JMS...........................  Jamestown..........................  IV...............  ND.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        4
    JNU...........................  Juneau Int'l Airport...............  II...............  AK.........        5       6  ......        3   ..............         6   ......  ...........        32   ........  .........       38       52
    JST...........................  Johnstown-Cambria County Airport...  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         8   ......  ...........         8   ........  .........       16       16
    KOA...........................  Kona Int'l Airport.................  I................  HI.........        2       8  ......        2           (0)           32   ......  ...........        52   ........  .........       84       96
    KTN...........................  Ketchikan Int'l Airport............  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        19   ........  .........       27       28
    LAN...........................  Capital City Airport...............  II...............  MI.........        1       9  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        24         3   .........       41       53
    LAR...........................  Laramie Regional Airport...........  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    LAS...........................  McCarran Int'l Airport.............  X................  NV.........       12      16       3       13           42           274   ......          4         610        20   .........      949    1,036
    LAW...........................  Lawton/Ft. Sill Regional Airport...  IV...............  OK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             7   ......  ...........         4         1   .........       12       13
    LAX...........................  Los Angeles Int'l Airport..........  X................  CA.........       16      27       8       35           91           836   ......  ...........       985        20   .........    1,931    2,108
    LBB...........................  Lubbock Int'l Airport..............  II...............  TX.........        3      12       1        3            5            19   ......  ...........        26         4   .........       54       78
    LBE...........................  Arnold Palmer Regional Airport.....  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       10       10
    LBF...........................  North Platte Regional Airport......  III..............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        6        6
    LBL...........................  Liberal Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    LCH...........................  Lake Charles Regional Airport......  IV...............  LA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........       11       11
    LEB...........................  Lebanon Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  NH.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
    LEX...........................  Blue Grass Airport.................  II...............  KY.........        2       3  ......        2   ..............         6   ......  ...........        34         2   .........       43       50
    LFT...........................  Lafayette Regional Airport.........  III..............  LA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........        15         2   .........       24       25
    LGA...........................  LaGuardia Airport..................  X................  NY.........        7      13       2       10           35           227   ......  ...........       446         3   .........      711      779
    LGB...........................  Long Beach Daugherty Field Airport.  II...............  CA.........  .......       2  ......        4            2            34   ......  ...........        69   ........  .........      105      113
    LIH...........................  Lihue Airport......................  I................  HI.........        1       9  ......        2            1            28   ......  ...........        38         4   .........       71       84
    LIT...........................  Little Rock National Airport.......  I................  AR.........        6      10       1        5   ..............        36   ......          1          46        14   .........       97      119
    LMT...........................  Klamath Falls Airport..............  IV...............  OR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         5         1   .........        7        7
    LNK...........................  Lincoln Municipal Airport..........  III..............  NE.........        2       3  ......        2          (46)           31   ......  ...........        51         3   .........       40        1
    LNS...........................  Lancaster Airport..................  IV...............  PA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
    LNY...........................  Lanai Airport......................  III..............  HI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........        10   ........  .........       14       14
    LRD...........................  Laredo Int'l Airport...............  III..............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       16       16
    LSE...........................  La Crosse Municipal Airport........  III..............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         9         2   .........       18       18
    LWB...........................  Greenbrier Valley Airport..........  III..............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
    LWS...........................  Lewiston Nez-Perce County Reg'l Air- III..............  ID.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        8        8
                                       port.
    LYH...........................  Lynchburg Regional Arpt............  IV...............  VA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       14       15
    MAF...........................  Midland Int'l Airport..............  II...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        2            2            12   ......  ...........        24         2   .........       40       45
    MBL...........................  Manistee County Blacker Airport....  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        2        2
    MBS...........................  Saginaw-MBS Int'l Airport..........  III..............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        18         2   .........       31       34
    MCI...........................  Kansas City Int'l Airport..........  I................  MO.........        7      15       2       12   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......       36
    MCK...........................  McCook Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  NE.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        4        4
    MCN...........................  Middle Georgia Regional Airport....  III..............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        6        6
    MCO...........................  Orlando Int'l Airport..............  X................  FL.........        8      15       2       20          (30)          353   ......  ...........       403        70   .........      797      812
    MCW...........................  Mason City.........................  IV...............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
    MDT...........................  Harrisburg Int'l Airport...........  II...............  PA.........        2       8       1        4   ..............        19   ......  ...........        34         6   .........       58       73
    MDW...........................  Chicago Midway Airport.............  I................  IL.........        6      16       1        8           15           127   ......  ...........       232        34   .........      408      453
    MEI...........................  Meridian Regional Airport--Key       IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
                                     Field.
    MEM...........................  Memphis Int'l Airport..............  I................  TN.........        5      10       3        7            6            96   ......          4         135        19   .........      260      291
    MFE...........................  McAllen-Miller Int'l Airport.......  II...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        14   ......  ...........        24         3   .........       41       45
    MFR...........................  Rogue Valley Int'l-Medford.........  III..............  OR.........  .......       2  ......        1   ..............         7   ......  ...........        12         2   .........       21       24
    MGM...........................  Montgomery Reg'l Airport (Dannelly   III..............  AL.........        2       8  ......        2   ..............         5   ......  ...........        12         3   .........       20       32
                                     Field).
    MGW...........................  Morgantown Municipal Airport.......  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........       11       13
    MHK...........................  Manhattan Regional Airport.........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        3        3
    MHT...........................  Manchester Airport.................  I................  NH.........        1      18       1        6           11            36   ......  ...........        95         1   .........      143      179
    MIA...........................  Miami Int'l Airport................  X................  FL.........       24      15  ......       24          105           684   ......  ...........       722   ........  .........    1,510    1,678
    MKE...........................  General Mitchell Int'l Airport.....  I................  WI.........        5      12       2        4            3            66   ......  ...........       137         7   .........      213      239
    MKG...........................  Muskegon County Int'l Airport......  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             3   ......  ...........         5         3   .........       11       12
    MKK...........................  Molokai Airport....................  III..............  HI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       13       13
    MKL...........................  Mckellar-Sipes Regional Airport....  IV...............  TN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        5
    MLB...........................  Melbourne Int'l Airport............  II...............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        3   ..............        11   ......  ...........        23   ........  .........       34       38
    MLI...........................  Metro Airport Authority of Rock      II...............  IL.........        4       9       1        2   ..............        19   ......  ...........        34   ........  .........       53       69
                                     Island.
    MLU...........................  Monroe Regional Airport............  III..............  LA.........        1       5  ......        1   ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         4   .........       20       28
    MOB...........................  Mobile Regional Airport............  II...............  AL.........        3       9  ......        3            1            16   ......  ...........        32         4   .........       53       69
    MOD...........................  Modesto City County Airport H Sham   IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        9        9
                                     Field.
    MOT...........................  Minot Int'l Airport................  III..............  ND.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       12       13
    MRY...........................  Monterey Peninsula Airport.........  III..............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........        16         2   .........       23       24
    MSL...........................  NW Alabama Reg'l Airport...........  IV...............  AL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    MSN...........................  Dane County Regional Airport.......  II...............  WI.........        2       8  ......        3   ..............        26   ......  ...........        34         6   .........       66       79
    MSO...........................  Missoula Int'l Airport.............  II...............  MT.........        3       5  ......        1            1            15   ......  ...........        19         2   .........       36       46
    MSP...........................  Minneapolis-St. Paul Int'l Arpt....  X................  MN.........       13      26       3       15            8           221   ......          1         278        81          2       592      657
    MSS...........................  Massena Int'l Airport..............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
    MSY...........................  New Orleans Int'l Airport..........  I................  LA.........        8      13       2        7           22            60   ......  ...........        97        19   .........      197      249
    MTJ...........................  Montrose County Airport............  III..............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         8   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       15       15
    MVY...........................  Martha's Vineyard Airport..........  III..............  MA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        6        7
    MWA...........................  Williamson County Airport..........  IV...............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
    MWH...........................  Grant County Airport...............  III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        7
    MYR...........................  Myrtle Beach Int'l Airport.........  II...............  SC.........        2       6  ......        3            2            36   ......  ...........        36         1   .........       76       89
    NSF...........................  National Screener Force............  NSF..............  ...........  .......  ......  ......  ........          17           201   ......  ...........       292        44   .........      554      571
    OAJ...........................  Albert J Ellis Airport.............  IV...............  NC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         7   ........  .........       11       11
    OAK...........................  Metropolitan Oakland Int'l Airport.  I................  CA.........        7      14  ......        7           17           119   ......  ...........       166        12   .........      313      359
    OGG...........................  Kahului Airport....................  I................  HI.........        4      12  ......        2   ..............        44   ......  ...........        72         9   .........      125      143
    OGS...........................  Ogdensburg Int'l Airport...........  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
    OKC...........................  Will Rogers World Airport..........  I................  OK.........        4      13  ......        5            1            44   ......  ...........       102        10   .........      157      180
    OMA...........................  Eppley Airfield....................  I................  NE.........        5      12       1        5   ..............        48   ......  ...........        77        15   .........      140      163
    OME...........................  Nome Airport.......................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        1        1
    ONT...........................  Ontario Int'l Airport..............  I................  CA.........        6      13       2        6   ..............        95   ......  ...........       112         5   .........      212      239
    ORD...........................  O'Hare Int'l Airport...............  X................  IL.........       17      42      11       23            1           643   ......          3         769         8   .........    1,424    1,517
    ORF...........................  Norfolk Int'l Airport..............  I................  VA.........        4      11  ......        5            1            59   ......          3          91         6   .........      159      180
    OTH...........................  North Bend Municipal Airport.......  IV...............  OR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        7
    OTZ...........................  Kotzebue ``Ralph Widen Memorial''    III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        1        1
                                     Airport.
    OWB...........................  Owensboro Davies County Airport....  IV...............  KY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    OXR...........................  Oxnard Airport.....................  IV...............  CA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        7
    PAH...........................  Barkley Regional Airport...........  IV...............  KY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3         2   .........        8        8
    PBI...........................  West Palm Beach Int'l Airport......  I................  FL.........        3      12       2        8   ..............        80   ......          1         133         1   .........      216      241
    PDT...........................  E. Oregon Regional Airport.........  IV...............  OR.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         7         1   .........       11       11
    PDX...........................  Portland Int'l.....................  I................  OR.........        9      15       2        6           19           168   ......  ...........       232         1   .........      420      471
    PFN...........................  Panama City-Bay County Int'l         III..............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       17       19
                                     Airport.
    PGA...........................  Page Municipal Airport.............  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
    PGV...........................  Pitt-Greenville Airport............  IV...............  NC.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       11       11
    PHF...........................  Newport News/Williamsburg Int'l Air- II...............  VA.........  .......       1  ......        1            1            17   ......          1          18         1   .........       37       39
                                       port.
    PHL...........................  Philadelphia Int'l Airport.........  X................  PA.........       11      14       4       18           28           241   ......          3         435         5   .........      713      789
    PHX...........................  Phoenix Sky Harbor Int'l Airport...  X................  AZ.........       17      30       2       19           35           301   ......          3         462        13   .........      814      918
    PIA...........................  Greater Peoria Airport.............  III..............  IL.........  .......       2  ......        2   ..............        13   ......  ...........        17         1   .........       31       35
    PIB...........................  Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional Airport  IV...............  MS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    PIE...........................  St Petersburg-Clearwater Int'l       II...............  FL.........  .......  ......  ......        3            2             7   ......  ...........        27         3   .........       40       44
                                     Airport.
    PIH...........................  Pocatello Regional Airport.........  III..............  ID.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         6         1   .........       13       14
    PIR...........................  Pierre Regional Airport............  IV...............  SD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    PIT...........................  Pittsburgh Int'l Airport...........  I................  PA.........       14      16       2        6           21            82   ......          1         184         7   .........      296      355
    PKB...........................  Wood County Airport................  IV...............  WV.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         5   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       11       11
    PLB...........................  Clinton County Airport.............  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        8        9
    PLN...........................  Pellston Regional Airport..........  IV...............  MI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       13       13
    PNC...........................  Ponca City.........................  IV...............  OK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
    PNS...........................  Pensacola Regional Airport.........  II...............  FL.........        4       8  ......        2            2            29   ......          1          36         5   .........       72       88
    PPG...........................  Pago Pago-American Samoa...........  III..............  AQ.........  .......       3  ......        1   ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         3   .........        7       11
    PQI...........................  Northern Maine Regional Airport....  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        6        6
    PRC...........................  Prescott Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         8   ........  .........        8        8
    PSC...........................  Tri-Cities Airport.................  III..............  WA.........  .......       8  ......        5   ..............         6   ......  ...........        27         3   .........       36       49
    PSG...........................  Petersburg Airport.................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        6        6
    PSM...........................  Pease Int'l Airport................  III..............  NH.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         6   ........  .........        6        6
    PSP...........................  Palm Springs Int'l Airport.........  II...............  CA.........  .......       7  ......        2            3            21   ......  ...........        36         7   .........       68       80
    PUB...........................  Pueblo Memorial Airport............  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1         1   .........        3        4
    PUW...........................  Pullman/Moscow Regional Airport....  III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           2             4   ......  ...........         4         1   .........       10       12
    PVC...........................  Provincetown Airport...............  IV...............  MA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
    PVD...........................  T F Green State Airport............  I................  RI.........        4      14       1        6           11            79   ......  ...........       116        18   .........      224      260
    PWM...........................  Portland Int'l Jetport.............  II...............  ME.........        4       8       1        3   ..............        30   ......  ...........        69   ........  .........       99      115
    RAP...........................  Rapid City Regional Airport........  III..............  SD.........        2       5  ......        2   ..............        11   ......  ...........        17         2   .........       30       39
    RDD...........................  Redding Municipal Airport..........  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        12   ........  .........       12       13
    RDM...........................  Roberts Field......................  III..............  OR.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         7   ......  ...........        13   ........  .........       20       21
    RDU...........................  Raleigh-Durham Int'l Airport.......  I................  NC.........        6      13       2        9           10            91   ......          1         154         2          3       260      300
    RFD...........................  Greater Rockford Airport...........  III..............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       17       18
    RHI...........................  Rhinelander/Oneida County Airport..  IV...............  WI.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        8        8
    RIC...........................  Richmond Int'l Airport.............  II...............  VA.........        2      10       1        4   ..............        39   ......  ...........        46         5   .........       90      107
    RIW...........................  Riverton Regional Airport..........  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           2             2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        7
    RKD...........................  Knox County Regional Airport.......  IV...............  ME.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    RKS...........................  Rock Springs-Sweetwater County.....  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        4        5
    RNO...........................  Reno/Tahoe Int'l Airport...........  I................  NV.........        4      14  ......        5            1            54   ......  ...........        98         4   .........      157      181
    ROA...........................  Roanoke Regional Airport...........  II...............  VA.........  .......       3  ......        1   ..............        16   ......  ...........        16   ........  .........       32       36
    ROC...........................  Greater Rochester Int'l Airport....  II...............  NY.........        3       8  ......        4   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......       15
    RST...........................  Rochester Int'l Airport............  III..............  MN.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             6   ......  ...........        10         1   .........       17       19
    RSW...........................  Southwest Florida Int'l Airport....  I................  FL.........        3      13  ......        7            3            41   ......  ...........       156        14   .........      215      241
    RUT...........................  Rutland State Airport..............  IV...............  VT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         5   ........  .........        5        5
    SAF...........................  Santa Fe Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  NM.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        5        6
    SAN...........................  San Diego Int'l Airport, Lindbergh.  I................  CA.........        6      18       1       15           20           168   ......          5         280        40   .........      512      572
    SAT...........................  San Antonio Int'l Airport..........  I................  TX.........        6      14       2        8           10            81   ......  ...........       115         8   .........      214      254
    SAV...........................  Savannah Int'l Airport.............  II...............  GA.........        4       7  ......        3            2            30   ......  ...........        40   ........  .........       72       88
    SAW...........................  Sawyer Int'l Airport...............  IV...............  MI.........        1       1  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         6         1   .........       13       15
    SBA...........................  Santa Barbara Municipal Airport....  II...............  CA.........        2       6  ......        3            1            14   ......  ...........        22         4   .........       40       51
    SBN...........................  South Bend Regional Airport........  II...............  IN.........        2       5  ......        2            2            13   ......  ...........        28         5   .........       47       58
    SBP...........................  San Luis Obispo County Airport.....  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........        10         2   .........       18       19
    SBY...........................  Salisbury/Wicomico County Reg'l Air- IV...............  MD.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........        11   ........  .........       11       11
                                       port.
    SCC...........................  Deadhorse Airport..................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    SDF...........................  Louisville Int'l Airport...........  I................  KY.........        2      10       3        2            5            47   ......  ...........        67         8   .........      128      150
    SEA...........................  Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport.......  X................  WA.........       15      13       3       16           34           298   ......          5         469        22   .........      827      907
    SFB...........................  Orlando Sanford Airport............  III..............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        4   ..............        20   ......  ...........        51   ........  .........       72       77
    SFO...........................  San Francisco Int'l Airport........  X................  CA.........        9      11       5       13   ..............  .........  ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........  .......       38
    SGF...........................  Springfield/Branson Regional         III..............  MO.........        2       6  ......        4   ..............        20   ......  ...........        26         4   .........       49       61
                                     Airport.
    SGU...........................  St. George Municipal Airport.......  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         3   ......  ...........         6   ........  .........       10       11
    SHD...........................  Shenandoah Valley Airport..........  IV...............  VA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    SHR...........................  Sheridan County Airport............  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        5        6
    SHV...........................  Shreveport Regional Airport........  II...............  LA.........        2       8  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        28         5   .........       48       60
    SIT...........................  Sitka ``Rocky Gutierrez'' Airport..  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       19       21
    SJC...........................  San Jose Int'l Airport.............  I................  CA.........        7      13  ......        8           19            98   ......          4         189   ........  .........      311      358
    SJT...........................  San Angelo Regional Airport........  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             4   ......  ...........         8         1   .........       15       16
    SJU...........................  Luis Munoz Marin Int'l Airport.....  X................  PR.........        6      14       3       15            9           166   ......  ...........       237        11   .........      423      471
    SLC...........................  Salt Lake City Int'l...............  I................  UT.........        9      16       2       12           15           205   ......          7         240         5   .........      473      527
    SLK...........................  Adirondack Regional Airport........  IV...............  NY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        5        5
    SLN...........................  Salina Municipal Airport...........  IV...............  KS.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        4        4
    SMF...........................  Sacramento Int'l Airport...........  I................  CA.........        8      15       1        8           25           103   ......  ...........       153         6   .........      287      344
    SMX...........................  Santa Maria Public Airport.........  IV...............  CA.........  .......       1  ......  ........           1             3   ......  ...........         4         1   .........        9       11
    SNA...........................  John Wayne Airport.................  I................  CA.........        6      14       1        7           19            68   ......  ...........       152   ........  .........      239      285
    SOW...........................  Show Low Regional Airport..........  IV...............  AZ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        1        1
    SPI...........................  Capital Airport....................  III..............  IL.........        1       1  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........         9         1   .........       15       18
    SPS...........................  Sheppard AFB/Wichita Falls           III..............  TX.........  .......       1  ......        1            1             9   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       16       18
                                     Municipal Airport.
    SRQ...........................  Sarasota Bradenton Int'l Airport...  II...............  FL.........        2       7  ......        3            1            28   ......  ...........        39         1   .........       70       83
    STC...........................  St. Cloud Regional Airport.........  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         4         2   .........        9        9
    STL...........................  Lambert St Louis Int'l Airport.....  X................  MO.........       10      16       2       13            8           120   ......  ...........       242         4   .........      374      422
    STT...........................  Cyril E. King Int'l Airport........  II...............  VI.........        2       9  ......        3            1            35   ......  ...........        39         1   .........       76       90
    STX...........................  Henry E. Rohlsen Airport...........  III..............  VI.........  .......       3  ......        1            1            12   ......  ...........        20   ........  .........       33       38
    SUN...........................  Friedman Memorial Airport..........  III..............  ID.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         4   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        8       10
    SUX...........................  Sioux Gateway Airport..............  III..............  IA.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         3   ......  ...........         6         3   .........       12       14
    SWF...........................  Stewart Airport....................  III..............  NY.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............         9   ......  ...........        18         2   .........       30       33
    SYR...........................  Syracuse-Hancock Int'l Airport.....  II...............  NY.........        4      13       1        6            2            53   ......  ...........        64   ........  .........      118      144
    TBN...........................  Forney Army Airfield...............  IV...............  MO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    TEX...........................  Telluride Regional Airport.........  IV...............  CO.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2   ........  .........        5        5
    TLH...........................  Tallahassee Regional Airport.......  II...............  FL.........        4       8  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        28         6   .........       49       63
    TOL...........................  Toledo Express Airport.............  II...............  OH.........  .......       4  ......        2   ..............        16   ......  ...........        25         4   .........       46       52
    TPA...........................  Tampa Int'l Airport................  I................  FL.........        6      21       2       17           14           174   ......          4         316        17   .........      525      585
    TRI...........................  Tri-Cities Regional Airport........  III..............  TN.........  .......  ......  ......        1   ..............         8   ......  ...........        14   ........  .........       22       23
    TTN...........................  Trenton-Mercer Airport.............  IV...............  NJ.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    TUL...........................  Tulsa Int'l Airport................  I................  OK.........        3      10       1        5            1            44   ......  ...........        70         1   .........      116      135
    TUS...........................  Tucson Int'l Airport...............  I................  AZ.........        6      13       1        5   ..............        79   ......  ...........        72         2   .........      154      179
    TVC...........................  Cherry Capital Airport.............  III..............  MI.........        1       6  ......        1   ..............         7   ......  ...........        16         3   .........       26       34
    TVF...........................  Thief River Falls Regional Airport.  IV...............  MN.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         1   ........  .........        3        3
    TWF...........................  Joslin Field, Magic Valley Regional  IV...............  ID.........  .......  ......  ......        2   ..............         3   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        7        9
                                     Airport.
    TXK...........................  Texarkana Regional Airport.........  III..............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        7        8
    TYR...........................  Tyler Pounds Field Airport.........  IV...............  TX.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........         5         1   .........       10       11
    TYS...........................  McGhee Tyson Airport...............  II...............  TN.........        1       6  ......        4   ..............        22   ......  ...........        32         4   .........       58       69
    UIN...........................  Quincy Regional Airport-Baldwin      IV...............  IL.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         3         1   .........        6        6
                                     Field.
    UNV...........................  University Park Airport............  III..............  PA.........  .......       1  ......        1   ..............         5   ......  ...........        12         2   .........       19       21
    VCT...........................  Victoria Regional Airport..........  IV...............  TX.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........         2         2   .........        5        5
    VDZ...........................  Valdez Airport.....................  IV...............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        3        3
    VEL...........................  Vernal/Uintah County Airport.......  IV...............  UT.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         4   ........  .........        4        4
    VLD...........................  Valdosta Municipal Airport.........  IV...............  GA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         6   ......  ...........         5   ........  .........       11       11
    VPS...........................  Okaloosa County Air Terminal.......  II...............  FL.........  .......       1  ......        2            1             9   ......          1          27         3   .........       40       44
    WDG...........................  Enid Woodring Municipal Airport....  IV...............  OK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         2   ......  ...........         2         1   .........        5        5
    WRG...........................  Wrangell Airport...................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........         3   ........  .........        5        5
    WRL...........................  Worland Muni Airport...............  IV...............  WY.........  .......  ......  ......  ........           1             2   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        3        4
    XNA...........................  Northwest Arkansas Regional Airport  II...............  AR.........  .......       1  ......        2   ..............        14   ......  ...........        27         3   .........       44       47
    YAK...........................  Yakutat Airport....................  III..............  AK.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         3   ......  ...........  .........  ........  .........        3        3
    YKM...........................  Yakima Air Terminal-McAllister       III..............  WA.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............         4   ......  ...........        16         2   .........       22       22
                                     Field.
    YNG...........................  Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport.  III..............  OH.........  .......  ......  ......  ........  ..............  .........  ......  ...........         7   ........  .........        7        7
    YUM...........................  Yuma Int'l Airport.................  IV...............  AZ.........  .......       1  ......  ........  ..............         1   ......  ...........        11   ........  .........       12       13
                                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          TOTALS..................  ...................................  .................  ...........      807   1,757     174    1,062        1,357        14,890        1         74      23,279     1,393          9    41,004   46,162
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Report shows the annualized FTE burn for PP02 ending February 4, 2006, rounded to the highest whole FTE.
    Categories of TSO FTE burn are reported via timesheets and manual pay transactions. Manual pay transactions do not normally include labor distribution and are categorized as Other or Undefined.
    TSO and other totals include prior pay period adjustments reported in PP02.
    Reporting systems show HQ personnel located at airports by duty location, not airport code/name, so they are reported separately.

                                  NO-FLY LIST

        Question. At a recent Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity
    Advisory Committee meeting, it was revealed that nearly 30,000 airline
    passengers were mistakenly placed on the Federal ``terrorist'' watch
    list. Why is the number so high?
        Answer. At a meeting of the Department of Homeland Security Data
    Privacy Advisory Committee on December 6, 2005, TSA testified that
    ``over 30,000 members of the traveling public have submitted the
    Passenger Identity Verification Form and have received relief since the
    TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress was created in November
    2004.'' TSA did not say, nor did we imply, that these individuals were
    ``mistakenly placed'' on the Terrorist Watch List.
        Through TSA's redress process, the overwhelming majority of these
    persons were determined to have names that were the same as, or similar
    to, individuals appropriately on the Terrorist Watch List. In these
    circumstances, TSA provides the passenger with appropriate information
    and notifies the airlines of the name match or similarity through
    submission of a Cleared List. While this redress process does not
    ensure that a passenger's travel will always be free of delays, it
    helps to streamline the check-in process at airport ticket counters.
        In accordance with the requirements of Homeland Security
    Presidential Directive #6, the Transportation Security Administration
    (TSA) consolidated its watch list operations within the Terrorist
    Screening Center (TSC) and integrated the No-Fly List into the TSC
    Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), also called the Consolidated
    Terrorist Watch List. TSA personnel assigned to the TSC conduct a
    comprehensive review of nominations to the No-Fly List to ensure their
    accuracy and completeness. Once these actions are complete, TSA
    disseminates the List to air carriers.
        By using a consolidated No-Fly List within the TSDB, TSA greatly
    improved the coordination of intelligence and law enforcement
    information supporting the program. Additionally, during the past year
    the agencies that nominate subjects to the No-Fly List revalidated
    their submissions and deleted or modified their records. These actions
    have enhanced the quality of data.
        TSA also has developed a comprehensive and user-friendly redress
    process for persons who believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly
    delayed, denied boarding, or flagged for additional screening at our
    Nation's airports. Many individuals experience these problems due to
    the similarity of their names to those of individuals who are
    appropriately on the Terrorist Watch List. A passenger may initiate the
    TSA redress process by submitting a completed Passenger Identity
    Verification Form to the Office of Transportation Security Redress at
    TSA headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a
    determination of whether the redress process may aid in expediting a
    passenger's airline check-in process, and inform the passenger
    accordingly. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as other
    information about TSA's redress process has been posted on TSA's public
    website. To access this information, go to http://www.tsa.gov, click on
    ``Travelers and Consumers'' at the top left of the page, choose ``TSA
    Customer Service'' from the column on the left, and then click ``TSA
    Watch Lists Clearance Procedures'' which is located about three-
    quarters of the way down the page.
        TSA understands that the process is not perfect, and we will
    continue to analyze the system and improve upon the work done thus far.
        Question. What measures are being put in place to remedy this
    problem?
        Answer. In order to minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches,
    the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) consolidated its watch
    list operations within the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and
    integrated the No-Fly and Selectee Lists into the TSC Terrorist
    Screening Database (TSDB). TSA personnel assigned to the TSC conduct a
    comprehensive review of nominations to the No-Fly and Selectee Lists to
    ensure their accuracy and completeness. Once these actions are
    complete, TSA disseminates the Lists to air carriers.
        By using consolidated No-Fly and Selectee Lists within the TSDB,
    TSA greatly improved the coordination of intelligence and law
    enforcement information supporting the program. Additionally, during
    the past year the agencies that nominate subjects to the No-Fly List
    revalidated their submissions and deleted or modified their records.
    These actions have enhanced the quality of data and removed persons
    from the No-Fly List that should not have been on this list. The Secure
    Flight program will continue to build on these enhancements and will
    use a more sophisticated and consistent watch list matching system to
    minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches.
        Question. What is the process for redress?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
    of Transportation Security Redress is currently developing redress
    procedures for addressing any situation where individuals believe they
    have been incorrectly delayed or prevented from flying on an airplane
    under the future Secure Flight program. TSA will maintain a record of
    individuals who have been misidentified as individuals on a watch list,
    which will contain identifying information necessary to authenticate
    the identity of each individual, in order to avoid repeated delays and
    minimize the occurrence of incorrect matches by the Secure Flight
    program.
        Currently, the air carriers conduct the watch list matching
    function, and carriers handle the process differently from one another.
    A primary advantage of the Secure Flight program is that the Federal
    Government will conduct the watch list matching function, thus creating
    a more consistent process that will tie into the redress mechanisms.
        At the present time, passengers who experience delays in obtaining
    a boarding pass because they have a name that is similar to a person on
    the No-Fly or Selectee Lists may choose to participate in the TSA
    Redress Program by submitting a TSA Passenger Identity Verification
    (PIV) form, along with requested information, to TSA. The information
    provided through the PIV form assists TSA in distinguishing passengers
    from persons who are, in fact, on the watch lists. If TSA determines
    that the passenger who submitted the PIV form is not the person on the
    No-Fly or Selectee Lists, TSA will notify the passenger of that finding
    and contact the appropriate parties, such as the airlines, to help
    streamline the check-in process at the airports.

                                   RECOVERIES

        Question. Section 531 of the fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Act
    provides specific authority for recoveries. Has TSA realized additional
    recoveries and if so, has a spend plan been developed?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not
    realized any recoveries in fiscal year 2006 to date, although it does
    expect to realize modest recoveries in the fourth quarter.
        Fiscal year 2006 recoveries are expected to be significantly
    smaller than the over $100 million in recoveries reported in fiscal
    year 2005. The large fiscal year 2005 recoveries resulted primarily
    from the close-out of contracts awarded during the TSA start-up in
    fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003.

                               PERIMETER SECURITY

        Question. Has a competitive process for perimeter security pilots
    been put in place? If so, how many pilots will TSA enter into with the
    $5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006? Please describe each
    pilot.
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    currently evaluating options to competitively award the $5 million for
    perimeter security. Responsive projects may include perimeter sensors,
    intelligent camera systems, biometric devices, technologies to detect
    and track potential intruders, and communication capabilities to
    provide appropriate alarm and response notification. TSA anticipates
    award of the grants by the end of calendar year 2006.

                                      EDS

        Question. For EDS procurement, if funding were maintained at the
    fiscal year 2006 level, how much would be needed for installation?
        Answer. If funding for Explosives Detection System (EDS)
    procurement were maintained at the fiscal year 2006 funding level, the
    total funds required for installation would be $432,836,269. This
    includes the mandatory aviation security capital fund of $250M, which
    will primarily be used for LOIs.
        Question. Provide a list of all certified EDS technology.
        Answer. The following is a list of all Explosives Detection Systems
    (EDS) certified for checked baggage screening:
      --GE InVision CTX-1000
      --GE InVision CTX-2500
      --GE InVision CTX-5500
      --GE InVision CTX-9000
      --L-3 eXaminer 3000
      --L-3 eXaminer 6000
      --Reveal CT-80
      --Analogic 6400
        Question. Provide a list of all EDS technology that is being
    evaluated by DHS for certification.
        Answer. Several Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) are scheduled to
    be tested for Transportation Security Administration certification.
    This includes EDS models that have already been certified but are
    undergoing adjustments to their hardware or software, requiring them to
    be re-certified, similarly to new systems.
        Re-certifications:
      --Analogic AN 6400--Certification of Software: Standard threat mass
            detection algorithm to improve detection performance.
      --GE InVision CTX 5500--Certification of Hardware: standard x-ray
            computer obsolescence.
      --Reveal CT-80--Certification of CT-80: Modified Gantry speed (60 to
            90 rpm) to increase system throughput and modified detection
            algorithm to improve detection performance.
        New Certifications:
      --L3 eXaminer 3DX 6500
      --Analogic XLB
      --Analogic King Cobra
      --GE InVision CTX 9800
      --SureScan
        Future:
      --Long term research and development efforts for checked baggage
            screening under the Manhattan II project may result in
            prototype technologies for evaluation. These technologies
            employ nanotechnology, tomosynthesis, terahertz based systems,
            neutron based systems, and trace detection systems.
        Question. Provide a LOI funding chart by airport (showing cost by
    fiscal year, amount required for each year, amount funded by TSA, total
    at 75/25 reimbursement cost share, total at 90/10 reimbursement cost
    share, and total project cost).
        Answer.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Govt Share--75    Fiscal year 2003   Fiscal year 2004   Fiscal year 2005   Fiscal year 2006   Fiscal year 2007
                               75/25                               LOI Total Cost        percent         reimbursement      reimbursement      reimbursement      reimbursement      reimbursement
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ATL........................................................    $125,000,000.00        $93,750,000  .................     $15,000,000.00     $26,250,000.00     $26,250,000.00     $26,250,000.00
    DEN........................................................      95,000,000.00         71,250,000        $17,812,500      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00  .................
    DFW........................................................     139,249,812.00        104,437,359  .................      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00  .................
    LAS........................................................     125,000,000.00         93,750,000  .................      15,000,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00
    LAX........................................................     341,956,000.00        256,467,000  .................      55,000,000.00      67,155,666.67      67,155,666.67      67,155,666.67
    SEA........................................................     212,000,000.00        159,000,000  .................      33,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      42,000,000.00
    PHX........................................................     122,000,000.00         91,500,000  .................      13,000,000.00      26,166,666.67      26,166,666.67      26,166,666.67
    BOS........................................................     116,000,000.00         87,000,000         29,000,000      29,000,000.00      29,000,000.00  .................  .................
                                                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Total................................................   1,276,205,812.00     957,154,359.00      46,812,500.00     212,624,953.00     269,447,286.00     240,447,286.00     187,822,333.00
                                                                ====================================================================================================================================
    ATL........................................................     125,000,000.00     112,500,000.00  .................      15,000,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00      45,000,000.00
    DEN........................................................      95,000,000.00      85,500,000.00         17,812,500      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00      17,812,500.00      14,250,000.00
    DFW........................................................     139,249,812.00     125,324,830.80  .................      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00      34,812,453.00      20,887,471.80
    LAS........................................................     125,000,000.00     112,500,000.00  .................      15,000,000.00      26,250,000.00      26,250,000.00      45,000,000.00
    LAX........................................................     341,956,000.00     307,760,400.00  .................      55,000,000.00      67,155,666.67      67,155,666.67     118,449,066.67
    SEA........................................................     212,000,000.00     190,800,000.00  .................      33,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      42,000,000.00      73,800,000.00
    PHX........................................................     122,000,000.00     109,800,000.00  .................      13,000,000.00      26,166,666.67      26,166,666.67      44,466,666.67
    BOS........................................................     116,000,000.00     104,400,000.00         29,000,000      29,000,000.00      29,000,000.00  .................      17,400,000.00
                                                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Total................................................   1,276,205,812.00   1,148,585,230.80      46,812,500.00     212,624,953.00     269,447,286.00     240,447,286.00     379,253,205.00
                                                                ====================================================================================================================================
    75/25 vs. 90/10 difference.................................  .................     191,430,871.80  .................  .................  .................  .................    -191,430,872.00
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 PILOT PROGRAMS

        Question. Provide a list and status of all TSA pilot programs
    planned, ongoing, or completed including the cost of each pilot.
        Answer. BEST Pilot.--During September and October of 2005, the Bus
    Explosives Screening Technology (BEST) pilot was conducted by the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in partnership with
    Greyhound and Peter Pan bus services. The goal of this first ever pilot
    was to evaluate the use of screening technologies in a motorcoach
    environment to screen passengers, checked baggage, and carry-on items
    for explosives.
        Status.--The pilot was completed.
        Cost.--The total cost for the first BEST pilot was approximately
    $407,000 in fiscal year 2005 funding.
        HAZMAT Truck Security Pilot.--TSA awarded contracts to Science
    Applications International Corporation and General Dynamics to design
    and build a centralized prototype truck tracking center capability. The
    pilot will also develop a set of protocols capable of interfacing with
    existing truck tracking systems and with, as applicable, Federal, State
    and local government intelligence operations centers, and Federal law
    enforcement and first responder agencies.
        Status.--The pilot is on-going. After the pilot phase is complete
    (target date: May 2007), TSA will base decisions about the program's
    future on the results.
        Cost.--From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, Congress
    appropriated $11.5 million for this pilot. Approximately $6 million has
    been obligated to date.
        Missouri Pilot.--Beginning April 2006, TSA will implement a pilot
    project with the State of Missouri to conduct security plan evaluations
    with the trucking industry. The purpose of this pilot is to monitor and
    evaluate industry performance by leveraging Federal, State, and local
    resources. The pilot will be based on the use of the Corporate Security
    Review (CSR) program that TSA currently conducts with all 50 State
    department of transportation agencies, motorcoach, and school bus
    companies.
        The CSR Missouri Pilot will allow TSA to train 44 Missouri State
    troopers on security plan evaluation techniques; evaluate data
    submitted to TSA for monitoring company and industry security planning
    and implementation performance; conduct more than 300 evaluations by
    September 2006; and evaluate and expand the pilot to States with large
    concentrations of trucking companies. By utilizing existing safety data
    from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), TSA will
    apply a risk-based selection process to determine what carriers or
    motor coach or school bus companies need greater scrutiny.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
        Cost.--It is estimated that this pilot will cost approximately
    $400,000.
        Secure Automated Inspection Lanes (SAIL) Program, Phase III: SAIL I
    & II assessed vehicle and passenger screening technology separately in
    ferry pre-boarding environments. SAIL III will leverage lessons learned
    to apply to a pilot operation in a large ferry operation that includes
    both vehicle and passenger screening.
        Status.--The pilot is in the planning stage.
        Cost.--$225,000.
        Maritime Passenger, Vehicle, and Baggage Screening Research and
    Development Grant.--This pilot program will deploy screening equipment
    into the maritime passenger domain that will be ultimately operated and
    tested by the maritime transportation operators. In the pilot, TSA will
    select screening equipment for various maritime passenger and vehicle
    operations throughout the United States and work with operators to
    develop screening procedures tailored to their existing operations.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
        Cost.--$3.6 million.
        Passenger Rail and Rail Transit Information Pilot.--The purpose of
    this pilot program is to ensure that transit security information
    gathering, synthesis, and sharing at the Federal Government level is
    coordinated, effective, and timely. The pilot brings together Federal
    partners to develop processes for information sharing and
    communications protocols and to eliminate duplication and close
    potential gaps. Objectives include enhancing domain awareness, ensuring
    decision makers at all levels have a comprehensive and accurate picture
    of the State of passenger rail and rail transit security, and
    streamlining procedures in order to improve communication with
    stakeholders during both normal operating periods and emergencies. The
    initial phase of this information pilot is being tested in the National
    Capital Region with the aim of extending the initiative nationwide and
    across modes once the process is fully developed.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
        Cost.--$330,000.
        Integrated Intermodal Information System--Domestic.--The purpose of
    this pilot is to continually spotlight suspicious activity in high
    threat domestic supply chains and provide actionable, near-real time
    advisories.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing.
        Cost.--$600,000.
        Southern Regional Radiological Pilot Program.--This pilot
    operationally tests and evaluates new, innovative nuclear/radiological
    detection security technologies (portable), and accompanying response
    protocols and procedures.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected by December
    2007.
        Cost.--$4 million.
        Transportable Radiation Monitoring Systems.--This pilot's objective
    is to develop and field test a concept of operations for deployment of
    transportable radiation monitoring systems.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected by December
    2006.
        Cost.--$2 million.
        Southeast Transportation Corridor Radiological Detection Pilot.--
    This pilot focuses on the deployment of transportable radiation
    monitoring systems at selected weigh stations along a southeast
    intermodal freight corridor.
        Status.--The pilot is ongoing with completion expected in fiscal
    year 2007.
        Cost.--$1.2 million.
        Hazardous Materials Carrier Training.-- This pilot will develop and
    deploy training for HAZMAT shippers and carriers in how to conduct
    vulnerability self-assessments.
        Status.--The pilot is in the training development/planning stage
    with completion expected by July 2007.
        Cost.--$1.7 million.
        Seals Pilot.--This pilot will evaluate the applicability and
    effectiveness of tamper-evident seals in the air cargo environment.
        Status.--The pilot is planned to start in July 2006.
        Cost.--$500,000
        Hazardous Materials Initiative.--TSA commissioned this initiative
    to study the feasibility of equipping individual railroad tank cars
    with real time tracking devices and constructing a national tracking
    system. Phase I (market survey) and Phase II (equipment testing) are
    complete. Phase III will develop a concept of operations for a national
    tracking system.
        Status.--Phase III is ongoing.
        Cost.--Phases I and II were $175,000. Phase III is expected to cost
    $109,341.
        Multi-Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSET)--TSA seeks to
    enhance the current network of security systems outside the aviation
    mode by deploying teams that include Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) and
    Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI) to other
    transportation sectors. These deployments will enhance the agency's
    ability to leverage a variety of resources to quickly and effectively
    raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the
    country.
        Status.--Six initial pilot deployments were completed in December
    2005, and eight additional pilot deployments were completed as of June
    2006. Planning for future deployments to other transportation venues is
    ongoing.
        Cost.--Incidental Travel and Pay, Compensation, and Benefits for
    team member participants.
        Field Skills Inventory Pilot.--The goal of the TSA Employee Skills
    Inventory (SI) is to allow TSA to quickly identify workforce
    capabilities that would benefit the agency's mission in many
    situations, including:
      --Task forces
      --Details
      --Emergency response situations
      --Gap analysis
      --Employee career development
      --Succession Planning
        Status.--The planned launch date is April 2006.
        Cost.--None.
        Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Project Gandalf.--This pilot
    addresses business processes at the FAMS Mission Operations Center
    (MOC) for ``day of'' mission schedule changes. The Gandalf optimization
    algorithm uses a rigorous set of business rules in selecting targeted
    critical flights in a rapid and logical manner. This new mission
    scheduling optimization tool-set will bring the FAMS core business
    capabilities into the latest technology realm and will design from the
    ground up a system that is tailored to specific FAMS requirements.
        Status.--Initiated in January 2006, this is an ongoing program
    which should be completed at the start of fiscal year 2007. After the
    pilot phase is complete, TSA will base decisions about the program's
    future on the results.
        Cost.--$260,000 of Science and Technology funding has been expended
    to date.
        Reveal CT-80.--This pilot evaluated the operational effectiveness
    and suitability of newly certified Explosives Detection System (EDS) at
    various airports.
        Status.--Pilot was completed.
        Cost.--$4.7 million.
        Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs).--This pilot evaluated the
    effectiveness and suitability of ETPs for passenger screening for
    explosives at various airport checkpoints.
        Status.--Pilot was completed.
        Cost.--$3.5 million.
        Break Bulk Air Cargo Explosives Detection System (EDS).--This pilot
    evaluates the effectiveness and suitability of EDS at various air cargo
    facilities.
        Status.--Pilot is ongoing.
        Cost.--$19 million.20. Airport Access Control Pilot Program
    (AACPP): This pilot evaluates the effectiveness of off-the-shelf access
    control technology.
        Status.--Pilot is ongoing with scheduled completion at the end of
    CY 2006.
        Cost.--$19.6 million.
        Hardened Unit Load Device (HULD).--This pilot evaluates the
    effectiveness and suitability of HULD for the transport of air cargo
    and baggage on passenger aircraft.
        Status.--Pilot is ongoing.
        Cost.--$5 million.
        Automated Carry-On Bag EDS.--TSA competitively selected two vendors
    (Analogic and Reveal) to provide prototype checkpoint EDS systems.
    Units will be deployed to the field to assess effectiveness and
    suitability after they are certified and successfully complete
    laboratory testing.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Cost.--$2.5 million.
        Cast and Prosthesis Scanner.--This pilot will test and evaluate the
    effectiveness and operational suitability of cast and prosthesis
    scanner technology at a hospital and then in the field after safety
    testing is completed.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Cost.--$440,000.
        Passenger Hands and Personal Effects Scanning.--This pilot will
    assess effectiveness and suitability of using ETD technology to screen
    individuals for explosives.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Cost.--$200,000.
        Bottle Liquid Scanner.--This pilot will test and evaluate the
    effectiveness and suitability of technologies to screen bottles for
    flammable liquids.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Cost.--$200,000.
        Emerging Next Generation EDS.--This pilot will test and evaluate
    emerging EDS, including King Cobra and SureScan.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Cost.--$4 million.
        Information Sharing Environment--This pilot will develop an agency-
    wide approach, framework, and roadmap for information sharing among all
    TSA stakeholders.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage and is scheduled to begin
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Cost.--To be determined.
        Unpredictable Screening Program (USP) Pilot.--This pilot is
    designed to implement additional screening measures (e.g. sending
    additional individuals through secondary screening) on a schedule which
    would appear random to someone trying to predict TSA's screening
    procedures. The ``unpredictability'' of these measures is intended to
    complicate the ability to develop plans to circumvent screening
    procedures.
        Status.--Pilot is complete.
        Cost.--No additional cost is associated with this pilot.
        Baggage Handler Pilot.--The goal of this pilot is to help determine
    the feasibility, benefits, costs, risks and other potential
    consequences of using baggage handling personnel to support TSA
    screening operations. This program is one of several initiatives being
    undertaken to mitigate the higher than average Transportation Security
    Officer (TSO) on-the-job injury rate.
        The pilot program will be implemented as an Other Transaction
    Authority (OTA) with an airport operator and/or carrier to determine
    whether or not it is more economical to accomplish through the Federal
    sector or to privatize the effort.
        Status.--Pilot is in the planning stage. TSA expects to implement
    the necessary agreements by summer 2006. Once launched, the pilot will
    run 4 months.
        Cost.--$2.64 million.
        Glove Pilot.--This pilot is being designed to test gloves with
    different thicknesses to determine if data validate the assumption that
    using thicker (and more expensive) gloves is a cost effective way to
    reduce the number of TSO hand and finger injuries and the workman's
    compensation claims associated with those injuries. The pilot will be
    conducted at several large airports with a history of such claims.
        Status.--The pilot is currently in the planning and market research
    phase.
        Cost.--To be determined.
        Question. For pilots that have been completed, have any been
    transitioned into full scale programs? If so, please indicate those
    programs.
        Answer. Cockpit Access Security System (CASS) for Domestic Air
    Carriers:
        Prior to 9/11, domestic air crewmembers were routinely authorized
    to ride in the flight deck jumpseat as an effective means of
    transportation. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, all jumpseat
    access by non-operational flight crewmembers was suspended. The
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) later issued directives
    that allowed non-operational crewmembers to access the flight deck
    jumpseat provided the air carriers develop a system to verify the
    identity of crewmembers and their employment status.
        CASS, an initiative proposed by member carriers of the Air
    Transport Association (ATA), is a network of databases containing
    employment and security information for individuals authorized to enter
    the flight deck, as regulated by Federal Aviation Regulations. TSA
    commenced a 6-month pilot program to test CASS on May 1, 2004.
    Participation in the pilot program was limited to domestic flights of
    ATA member air carriers, of which 17 currently participate. Because of
    the initial success of the 6-month pilot, CASS was extended several
    times at the request of the participating air carriers.
        CASS operates by interlinking participating air carriers' employee
    databases through a central router. When an employee of a participating
    air carrier makes a request to occupy the flight deck jumpseat, an
    inquiry is made through CASS, allowing the gate agent to immediately
    access the requester's identification information and employment
    status. As another layer of security, the captain of the flight
    verifies the requester's FAA pilot and medical certificates before
    giving final approval to board.
        CASS is an important security initiative as it adds another layer
    of security to protect the flight deck of air carrier aircraft and
    provides a customer service benefit air carriers afford to their
    pilots. First, the system adds a real-time vetting for individuals
    seeking to access the flight deck. Second, it adds another qualified
    individual to the flight deck who can assist the crew in an emergency.
        Air Carriers provided very positive feedback of the pilot and
    supported the permanent establishment of CASS. CASS was approved as a
    permanent program effective September 23, 2005 and is now available to
    all eligible domestic air carriers limited to domestic flights. The
    Reveal CT-80 and Explosives Trace Portal (ETP) pilot programs were
    deemed successful and the TSA has begun deployment of both types of
    equipment at additional airports. Specifically, the TSA will deploy
    over 70 Reveal CT-80 units and over 100 ETPs in fiscal year 2006.
        Question. Does TSA plan to transition any of these pilots to full
    scale programs? If so, please indicate those programs.
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    requested fiscal year 2007 funding for emerging technology; however,
    purchase of this equipment is dependant on the success of the
    technology during the pilot programs. For other on-going pilots,
    decisions will be made after the results of the pilots have been
    evaluated.
        Question. The fiscal year 2006 conference report requires TSA to
    enter into a small number of pilots with airports to improve their
    baggage screening process through creative financing options. Please
    describe ongoing or planned pilots, the schedule associated with each
    pilot, results to date, and next steps.
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    currently exploring with industry partners the means to encourage
    innovative financing to accelerate the deployment of optimal baggage
    screening systems through a cost sharing study. This cost share study,
    mandated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
    2004 (Public Law 108-458), should be completed later this year and will
    outline the options available. Once those options are determined, pilot
    projects will be planned using these financing mechanisms.

                              REGISTERED TRAVELER

        Question. For the Registered Traveler program, how will the fee the
    individual traveler pays be determined? For instance, how are costs
    such as capital improvements for space and TSA personnel to operate the
    lanes factored in?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects
    that the user fee will be market-driven with the price established by
    private sector providers. The fee will reflect the providers' capital
    investment, operating expenses, and financial incentives, as well as an
    amount to be remitted to TSA to cover the Agency's direct costs in
    facilitating the program. The TSA-portion of the fee will be
    established through a notice published in the Federal Register in
    accordance with Section 540 of the Department of Homeland Security
    Appropriations Act, 2006 (Public Law 109-90).
        The private sector providers will have the option of making capital
    investment in approved screening equipment, additional screeners, and/
    or space for separate Registered Traveler screening in accordance with
    their business plan and in coordination with the airport operator and
    TSA.
        Question. What exactly will the Registered Traveler fee pay for?
        Answer. The total RT participant fee will consist of two parts: the
    TSA-set portion and the private sector portion. The private sector
    portion of the fee will be set and collected by the enrollment
    providers. TSA's activities under RT will be completely funded through
    the fees set by TSA in the Federal Register notice, which is currently
    under development. This fee will include components related to the
    management of the program, the security threat assessment, technical
    infrastructure required to operate the program, and vendor compliance
    with the specified program standards.
        Question. Aside from direct appropriations for the Registered
    Traveler program in prior fiscal years, will TSA use other direct or
    fee funded resources to operate this program?
        Answer. For fiscal year 2007 budget forecasts, the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) estimated $20 million in total fee
    collections. TSA will revise its fee collection forecasts as soon as
    more information about program design and private sector costs become
    available.
        Question. How many airlines will have to pay for construction of
    new lanes dedicated for Registered Travelers?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    proposing a public/private partnership in which the government and
    private vendors will team to provide both services and structure to the
    RT program. The sponsoring entity (airport or airline) will be
    responsible for all costs associated with adding new passenger
    screening lanes. Requests for additional lanes will be subject to
    airport and TSA approval based on the unique operational set-ups of the
    individual airports and their checkpoints. TSA-approved checkpoint
    equipment for new RT lanes will be authorized for purchase by the
    service provider or sponsoring entity, depending on the physical
    constraints of the respective location.
        Question. While joining the Registered Traveler program is
    voluntary, what assurances do participants have that data used to
    verify their identity won't be compromised?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    currently considering which databases, both commercial and non-
    commercial, will be included in the Registered Traveler (RT) Program's
    watch list vetting process. Once a determination has been made, TSA
    will be working with private sector entities to develop standards for
    securing the data in order to protect the personally identifiable
    information collected about applicants. The Privacy Impact Assessment
    that will be published prior to the program launch will describe
    privacy protections and data integrity safeguards for an ongoing RT
    Program. In addition a Privacy Act System of Records Notice will
    describe what data will be collected, how it will be used in the watch
    list vetting process, how it will be stored and shared, and how it will
    be transmitted to ensure its integrity and security.

                                 SECURE FLIGHT

        Question. On February 9, 2006, TSA shut down the Secure Flight
    program and initiated a full scale audit of the program. How long will
    this process take? Please provide a revised schedule for the Issuance
    of a Regulation for Secure Flight.
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    conducting a comprehensive audit in order to ensure that security,
    privacy, and a unified Federal strategy are at the foundation of the
    Secure Flight system and processes. While it should not take an undue
    amount of time to finish, until that audit is completed and a path
    forward for the program is decided upon, it would be premature to
    speculate on the timeframe for Secure Flight milestones, including the
    Secure Flight Regulation. TSA will be vigilant in keeping the Committee
    apprised of all developments in relation to Secure Flight and looks
    forward to working with Congress on this important program.
        Question. When will TSA address all of the concerns raised by GAO?
        Answer. Work on the Secure Flight Program is continuing. The
    announced comprehensive audit will ensure that security, privacy, and a
    unified Federal strategy are at the foundation of the Secure Flight
    system and processes. Currently, the program is focusing on the areas
    of concern raised by the Government Accountability Office regarding
    program management, availability of technical documentation at the
    appropriate level of detail, and the overall end-to-end business
    process.
        Certification of Secure Flight's compliance with the 10 mandates
    will occur through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The
    program is in the process of defining specific certification
    requirements for review by the appropriate DHS entities. Secure Flight
    certification will begin after initial results from operational testing
    are available.
        Question. Has TSA complied with all of the provisions related to
    the Secure Flight program in the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations
    Act, including the prohibition on the use of commercial data?
        Answer. Certification of Secure Flight's compliance with the 10
    mandates will occur through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
    The program office is in the process of defining specific certification
    requirements for review by the appropriate DHS entities. Secure Flight
    certification will begin after initial results from operational testing
    are available.
        Question. What is the unobligated balance for Secure Flight?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 appropriation, less the 1 percent
    rescission, provided $56.1 million for the Secure Flight program, with
    an additional $3.7 million in carryover funds. As of June 21, 2006, the
    Transportation Security Administration has obligated approximately $18
    million. Therefore, the unobligated balance is $41.8 million.
        Question. Is the $40 million requested for fiscal year 2007 still
    necessary in light of the ongoing audit of the program?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    currently rebaselining both the cost and the schedule to ensure that
    TSA has addressed gaps found as part of the audit. TSA will share the
    results of this rebaselinging with Congress once completed.

                                   AIR CARGO

        Question. What is the status of the 100 air cargo inspectors funded
    in the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations Act?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    developed an allocation plan for those additional resources, and the
    hiring process is almost complete. The remaining two sections will be
    made by mid-July 2006.
        Question. What criteria must be met to become a ``known shipper''?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration has established
    specific criteria that must be met before an air carrier or a freight
    forwarder (also known as an indirect air carrier) can qualify a shipper
    as ``known.'' Those criteria are contained in the carriers' standard
    security programs, but they are Sensitive Security Information and may
    not be publicly disclosed. In general, however, the air carrier or
    freight forwarder must verify that certain business relationship
    standards are met between the carrier and the shipper, and must also
    verify the shipper's legitimacy.
        Question. How often must a shipping company be recertified to be
    maintained in the Known Shipper Database?
        Answer. The requirements to qualify (and recertify) a shipper as
    ``known,'' as well as the specifics surrounding use of the
    Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Known Shipper Database,
    are contained in the indirect air carrier (IAC) and air carriers'
    security programs, which are Sensitive Security Information and
    therefore, may not be publicly disclosed. TSA Aviation Security
    Inspectors routinely audit IAC and air carrier records to ensure
    compliance with the known shipper requirements.
        Question. How many ``Known Shippers'' are there?
        Answer. Approximately 400,000 known shippers are currently
    contained in the TSA Known Shipper Database. Currently, indirect air
    carriers (IACs) and air carriers have the option of voluntarily
    submitting their list of known shippers to the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) for inclusion in the TSA Known Shipper Database,
    or they can maintain their own internal known shipper listing. TSA does
    not maintain documentation on the number of shippers contained on the
    internal known shipper lists of IACs, and air carriers that do not
    currently participate in the TSA Known Shipper Database. However, TSA
    estimates that this population of known shippers is approximately 1.5
    million.
        The Air Cargo Final Rule, issued May 17, 2006, made participation
    in the TSA Known Shipper Database mandatory for all air carriers and
    IACs. TSA will now have the ability to more accurately ascertain all
    known shippers.
        Question. Currently, how does TSA determine if air cargo is an
    elevated-risk?
        Answer. Currently, all cargo originating from a source other than
    known shippers is considered elevated-risk cargo and is not permitted
    to be transported on passenger aircraft.
        Question. If cargo is identified as an elevated-risk, what security
    procedures are taken?
        Answer. Currently, cargo that originates from a source other than
    known shippers is considered to be of elevated-risk and must not be
    transported on passenger aircraft. Furthermore, cargo that originates
    from known shippers is subject to random screening by the air carriers,
    who must screen the percentage of cargo specified in their security
    programs using Transportation Security Administration-approved
    screening methods.
        Question. TSA has been developing the Freight Assessment System for
    sometime but no such system has been deployed. When will this system be
    deployed?
        Answer. The Freight Assessment System (FAS) is currently in its
    Proof-of-Concept (POC) stage, which includes a data analysis and risk
    assessment evaluation. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    is reviewing the results of the first iteration of the POC, which was
    completed on January 27, 2006. The final iteration of the POC is
    scheduled to be completed by June 30. Upon a successful completion of
    the POC, TSA plans to move forward with an operational pilot that will
    precede the development and implementation of the FAS. It is expected
    that implementation of the FAS will begin in fiscal year 2007.
        Question. What resources are included in the fiscal year 2007
    request for this system?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $55
    million for Air Cargo includes $5 million for the continued development
    of the Freight Assessment System.
        Question. How much will be needed to fully implement the Freight
    Assessment System?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
    estimates the lifecycle cost for developing and deploying the Freight
    Assessment System would be approximately $140 million. However, TSA
    intends to conduct an alternatives analysis and to re-baseline the
    program upon completion of the Proof-of-Concept to determine whether
    the system can be brought to market faster and more economically.
        Question. What synergies will there be, if any, with the CBP
    National Targeting Center?
        Answer. One of the guiding principles of the Freight Assessment
    System (FAS) development is that industry should not have to provide
    the same information to different Government agencies. Another guiding
    principle is that the FAS should leverage, to the maximum extent
    possible, other risk assessment systems and capabilities within the
    Department of Homeland Security. Consequently, TSA partnered with U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the design of the FAS to ensure
    that it is fully harmonized with CBP's targeting methodology. Once the
    FAS Proof-of-Concept is complete, we will re-engage with CBP to
    determine how best to leverage CBP's targeting hardware and
    infrastructure.
        Question. What are the costs associated with the Freight Assessment
    System in fiscal year 2007?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request of $55
    million for Air Cargo includes $5 million for continued development of
    the Freight Assessment System (FAS). A total of $5.8 million for FAS is
    included in the fiscal year 2006 spend plan, which is scheduled to be
    under contract before the end of fiscal year 2006 and will fund
    continued development of this key program.
        Question. Where will the work associated with the Freight
    Assessment System be performed?
        Answer. The Freight Assessment System is a complex system that will
    require the participation of multiple vendors to develop, working from
    multiple locations. Several alternative architectures are under
    consideration, and TSA expects to select a deployment approach before
    the end of the fiscal year.
        Question. TSA indicated that initial feasibility studies for blast
    resistant cabin and cargo liners were promising. Has TSA completed the
    prototype for both passenger cabin and cargo hold liners?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    initiated a project to develop proof-of-concept cargo hold and
    passenger cabin blast resistant liner designs and prototypes. This
    project is now being administered by the Department of Homeland
    Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T). The project is
    currently in the preliminary stages of identifying candidate liner
    design materials that are appropriate for use in liner construction
    from both a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness
    perspective, as well as a blast resistance perspective. Explosives
    testing, as well as determination of FAA airworthiness compliance
    (material flammability requirements) testing, is underway on candidate
    composite material configurations that may be suitable for use in
    protection of the aircraft.
        Upon completion of the current material screening process and
    finalization of material selection, expected in the fourth quarter of
    fiscal year 2006, engineering design concepts for cargo hold and
    passenger cabin liners will be developed in the second quarter of
    fiscal year 2007. Upon finalization of the liner design concepts,
    prototypes will be fabricated and blast tested by DHS S&T within actual
    aircraft structures. These tests, expected in the third quarter of
    fiscal year 2007, will determine conformance to explosive mitigation
    requirements and ability of the concepts to adequately protect the
    aircraft.
        Question. When would such a system be ready and what plans does TSA
    have to retrofit existing aircraft with this new technology?
        Answer. Explosive resistant liner design concepts could be ready as
    early as the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007, assuming that the
    liner design concepts developed and tested are deemed successful in
    mitigating internal explosive effects without catastrophic structural
    damage to the aircraft.
        It is too early in the life cycle of these products to determine a
    strategy for implementation. A cost/benefit analysis will be conducted
    to determine if these products provide a good value and security
    benefit. The Transportation Security Administration will base
    subsequent retrofit decisions on the technical merit of the solution
    and also consider issues such as cost variables to include
    installation, maintenance, and additional weight impact. Any
    implementation strategy will involve close coordination with the
    Federal Aviation Administration, airframe manufacturers, and airlines
    from both a technical and regulatory perspective.
        Question. Why has the TSL not established certification standards
    for air cargo screening equipment?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    established protocols for equipment used for screening cargo and
    drafted a preliminary standard for cargo screening equipment similar to
    the standard established for checked baggage screening technologies.
    The draft standard distinguishes between break bulk and containerized
    air cargo, and between perishable and non-perishable commodities. It
    also stresses the importance of attaining a low false alarm rate. TSA
    is working with the Science and Technology Directorate to further
    develop the standards for air cargo screening technology solutions.
        Question. What would be the cost of establishing and executing such
    standards?
        Answer. The development of the standards may require lab testing to
    establish threat thresholds. These costs would become part of the
    research and development funding in the Department of Homeland
    Security's Science and Technology Directorate budget. The cost of
    executing a standard for air cargo screening technologies would be
    dependent upon the maturity of the systems presented for evaluation
    once the standards are published.
        Question. Why has the Department failed to finalize security
    standards for air cargo as required in the Intelligence Reform Act?
        Answer. TSA issued the Air Cargo Security Final Rule on May 17,
    2006. The Rule introduces significant changes to current regulatory
    requirements for four major sectors of the air cargo industry:
    airports; passenger air carriers that transport cargo; all-cargo air
    carriers; and indirect air carriers (also known as ``freight
    forwarders'').

                                  CANINE TEAMS

        Question. As of November 2005, TSA had six certified TSA mass
    transit canine teams. TSA anticipated that 30 teams would complete
    training by May 2006. When will TSA fully deploy those teams to the 10
    transit systems identified in November?
        Answer. Twenty-nine teams are currently deployed with the remaining
    team in training. Each of the 10 major mass transit systems identified
    in the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) rail initiative
    will initially receive three TSA certified canine teams along with
    associated training and equipment, for a combined total of 30 new
    canine teams. Each mass transit system will commit three handlers for
    training at the TSA Explosives Detection Canine Handler Course in San
    Antonio, TX. This training is provided at no cost to the mass transit/
    rail system or law enforcement agency participating in the National
    Explosives Detection Canine Team Program.
        Question. Have any of the participating transit systems dropped out
    of the program? If so, why?
        Answer. All of the original systems that committed to entering the
    program are still participating. After attending the course of
    instruction at the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
    (NEDCTP) Training Academy, and working with the NEDCTP staff members in
    the field, many of the participating systems have requested that
    additional assets be deployed.
        Question. Does TSA plan to expand this program to other transit
    systems in fiscal year 2007?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    established an ambitious schedule to staff the currently planned 30
    mass transit canine teams. Within the base of funds requested, TSA may
    staff canine teams at additional mass transit locations based on
    potential second year cost efficiencies. As TSA receives interest from
    other mass transit systems, the agency will evaluate each request and
    determine any new locations using risk-based criteria.
        Question. How many canine teams are dedicated to air cargo?
        Answer. Although explosives detection canine teams are not
    dedicated exclusively to screening cargo, nearly 365 TSA-certified
    explosives detection canine teams across the Nation's aviation domain
    currently support cargo screening activities on a routine basis. The $7
    million in additional funds will also assist the program with expanding
    the number of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams
    throughout the Nation by the end of 2006, elevating the number of these
    valuable multi-role canine teams from 365 to 420 in the aviation arena.
    This approach will provide greater flexibility for these limited, yet
    highly versatile, resources.
        The mobility of these highly trained teams remains a critical
    element in our unpredictable security response option. The fact that
    TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams are not solely
    dedicated to cargo screening activities allows these teams to meet on-
    site threats at a moment's notice for multiple purposes anywhere in the
    airport environment. As part of its efforts to increase canine cargo
    screening activities, the NEDCTP has established a ``Cargo Training
    Warehouse Lab'' at its training facility at Lackland AFB, in San
    Antonio, TX. As a result of this initiative, every canine team that
    leaves the NEDCTP training center is trained to screen cargo in an
    effective manner.

                                 SURGE CAPACITY

        Question. If intelligence indicates that transit systems are being
    targeted by terrorists, does TSA have the resources to deploy personnel
    and technologies to assist transit authorities in a short period of
    time?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    building, training, and testing teams to enhance its ability in this
    regard. In a March 2006 exercise, TSA provided Amtrak with law
    enforcement teams with surveillance detection capability, to
    Philadelphia, New York, and Washington, DC. These teams, called Multi-
    Modal Security Enhancement Teams (MMSETs) included Federal Air Marshals
    (FAMS) and Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSI). These
    resources possess a broad range of capabilities that allow TSA to help
    protect against multiple threats and introduce elements of
    unpredictability into security processes. TSA teams do not supersede
    local security forces or their jurisdiction when deployed into public
    transportation systems. Rather, the MMSETs supplement local
    capabilities with the unique strengths and expertise TSA brings to the
    transportation security mission.
        TSA initiated several pilot deployments in public transportation
    systems during the week of December 13-18, 2005. Additional pilot
    deployments will occur throughout the current year. The objective is to
    gain the necessary knowledge and experience in public transportation
    modes and with specific public transportation systems to develop and
    maintain an effective security enhancement capability. The MMSET
    deployments expand the agency's capacity to leverage a variety of
    resources in a flexible manner based on threat, so that we can quickly
    and effectively raise the bar of security in any mode of transportation
    anywhere in the country.
        Prior to these pilots, TSA deployed resources on an ad hoc basis
    during periods of heightened alert and National Special Security
    Events. On July 7 and July 21, 2005, STSIs deployed jointly with
    Federal Rail Administration Safety Inspectors to major Rail and Rail
    Transit Operations Centers to monitor security postures and provide the
    Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) with security
    situational awareness in response to the London bombings. Inspectors
    also deployed to support recovery efforts in the aftermath of
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and to provide enhanced security for the
    Presidential Inauguration and the Super Bowl. STSIs also deploy to
    support investigations of transportation security incidents.
        If passenger or cargo screening becomes necessary, TSA can deploy
    members of the National Screening Force and Transportation Security
    Officers (TSO) from select airports. The Office of Security Technology
    would coordinate with the venue to make any facility modifications
    necessary to deploy equipment. Additionally, TSA could deploy canine
    resources quickly. In response to the terrorist bombings against rail
    systems in Spain in March 2004, Secretary Tom Ridge announced that the
    Department of Homeland Security would create a two-phased approach to
    assist mass transit/commuter rail systems within the United States. The
    first phase was the development of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) mass
    transit canine program to assists State and local law enforcement
    agencies and transit authorities. The purpose of the RDF is to provide
    expanded capability to mass-transit systems within the United States by
    assisting State, local, and transit authorities in the event of an
    increased threat situation. The RDF is designed to reduce
    vulnerabilities to mass transit/commuter rail systems by providing a
    coordinated explosives detection canine capability, as well as a
    deterrent effect against potential attacks.
        Because of groundwork laid in that effort--preplanning and
    acclimation within the mass transit/commuter rail environment--TSA was
    able to rapidly deploy canine teams following the summer 2005 incidents
    in London. TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams were
    deployed across the country to support mass transit/commuter rail
    systems that were in close proximity to their assigned airports within
    hours of notification of the bombing events in London. TSA coordinated
    activities with program agencies to deploy teams to conduct random
    sweeps of platforms, conduct searches of unattended items, and provide
    a physical deterrence, where possible. TSA has also expeditiously
    provided explosives detection canine teams to Amtrak at its request on
    several occasions, including during the Republican National Convention,
    the Presidential Inauguration, and in New York during the fall 2005
    security alert.
        Along with the canine teams, at the request of Amtrak, TSA deployed
    some of the technology field-tested in the Transit and Rail Inspection
    Pilot (TRIP) for screening passengers and baggage in a rail environment
    to the Republican National Convention in August 2004 and Presidential
    Inauguration in January 2005.
        Question. Does TSA have the authority to shift funding from other
    TSA accounts to the Surface Transportation appropriation for short
    periods of surge capacity without requesting a formal reprogramming?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Bill (Public Law 109-
    90), section 503(c), provides flexibility to TSA in terms of transfers
    and reprogramming (i.e., ``not to exceed 5 percent of any appropriation
    made available for the current year,'' without increasing an account
    ``by more than 10 percent by such transfers''), but such actions
    constitute a permanent change in funding.
        The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) may exercise other
    options to develop and apply surge capability without the need to
    transfer or reprogram funds. For example, under the Multi-Modal
    Security Enhancement Team (MMSET) program, TSA may deploy resources to
    provide surge capacity for enhancing security in public transportation
    systems. The teams may consist of varying combinations of Federal Air
    Marshals (FAMs), Surface Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs),
    Aviation Security Inspectors (ASIs), and explosives detection canine
    teams. The teams provide both a visible deterrent and covert detection
    capability. Use of TSA resources assigned in the geographical area of
    the public transportation system ensures that costs remain minimal and
    within available funding.

                         FEDERAL AGENCY HEAD SCREENING

        Question. Do Federal agency heads receive special treatment at
    airports? If so, why?
        Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) passenger and
    property screening procedures do not provide for an automatic screening
    exemption for heads of Federal agencies or commissions, nor are any
    such exemptions being contemplated. However, like any individual under
    armed protective escort by a Federal law enforcement officer (LEO) some
    senior officials may not be required to proceed through a passenger
    checkpoint upon presentation of proper identifying documents by the
    armed Federal LEO escort (credential, badge, and Government-issued
    photo ID). Under these circumstances, the identities of both the LEO
    and the individual under protective escort must be verified by a TSA
    representative. Screening checkpoint logbook entries must be made for
    both the LEO and the individual being escorted.

                            OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE

        Question. What is the status of the Operation Safe Commerce Pilots?
        Answer. Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) is currently in its third
    phase. In Phase II of OSC, 18 pilot projects focused on the
    vulnerabilities of containers moving through the supply chains. They
    concentrated on mitigating the identified vulnerabilities through the
    deployment of technologies and business practices. OSC Phase III is
    comprised of 4 pilot projects and a series of four testing phases that
    address specific points of vulnerability in the supply chains.
        Question. How are these results being incorporated into CSI, CTPAT,
    Science and Technology Research, and other container security
    operations?
        Answer. Federal coordination and oversight of Operation Safe
    Commerce (OSC) is an interagency effort. Members of the OSC Executive
    Steering Committee (ESC) include representatives from the U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection (CBP), The Department of Transportation (DOT),
    The United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA), the Department of State, and the Department of
    Commerce. The Federal Partners provide valuable insight and guidance in
    the management of OSC, and as such, G&T strives to provide full access
    to the end results of the demonstrations as they become known. In
    addition, Program Management staff from the DHS Office of Grants and
    Training (G&T) has coordinated closely with S&T in the third phase of
    OSC to ensure an alignment with S&T Directorate initiatives that are of
    a similar nature.
        CBP is an important partner because the lessons learned from OSC
    help improve their Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-
    Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). CSI establishes
    coordination with host government customs services to examine high-risk
    maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports before they are loaded
    on board vessels destined for the United States. C-TPAT is a public-
    private and international partnership focused on improving baseline
    security standards for supply chain and container security.

                                  COAST GUARD
                                   DEEPWATER

        Question. The Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is currently the 37th
    oldest of the world's 39 like-sized naval fleets. The Coast Guard
    Commandant has testified that Coast Guard ships and planes are in a
    ``declining readiness spiral''. The Deepwater program won't be
    completed until 2026. However, according to a recent DHS report on gaps
    in Coast Guard operational capabilities, none of the Coast Guard's
    cutters have met their readiness goal in the past 5 years. Coast Guard
    patrol boats are operating at levels lower than they were in 1998, and
    that gap will not be closed until 2012. Coast Guard maritime air
    patrols are below1998 levels, and that gap will not be closed until
    2014.
        Has the Coast Guard considered accelerating Deepwater since the
    program was re-baselined?
        Answer. Although the Coast Guard fleet readiness continues to be
    below acceptable levels, the Coast Guard has been able to meet or
    exceed the majority of its mission performance targets, in part due to
    the enhancements provided to legacy assets by the Deepwater program.
    The President's fiscal year 2007 budget request makes a strong
    statement regarding the criticality of funding the Deepwater program.
    The program is now funded at approximately 40 percent more than the
    $572 million funding level for fiscal year 2007, as compared to the
    fiscal year 2002 planning factors. Full funding in fiscal year 2007
    helps to restore readiness to a higher level, and allows the Coast
    Guard to continue development of additional capabilities to be realized
    as a result of enhancements such as:
      --Accelerated HH-65 conversion to a Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter,
      --New National Security Cutter production to replace the legacy 378
            foot High Endurance Cutters,
      --Additional CASA Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
      --Accelerated post 9/11 capabilities for HH-60 aircraft for airborne
            use of force,
      --A new Fast Response Cutter with enhanced post 9/11 capabilities
            will be accelerated to replace the aging 110 foot patrol boat
            fleet; and
      --Legacy asset maintenance and sustainment, including the Medium
            Endurance Cutter Mission Effectiveness Project.
        The Deepwater post 9/11 Revised Implementation Plan, as approved by
    the Administration, will recapitalize and modernize the Coast Guard
    surface and aviation assets with robust maritime security and safety
    capabilities that are critical to operational success across all Coast
    Guard missions, now and in the future. Further acceleration of the
    program is not being considered at this time.
        Question. What would the cost be if the Coast Guard accelerated the
    program to be completed in 10 years?
        Answer. A preliminary estimate of $21 billion in funding would be
    required to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 10
    years.
        Question. What would the cost be if the Coast Guard accelerated the
    program to be completed in 15 years?
        Answer. A preliminary estimate of $23 billion in funding would be
    required to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 15
    years.
        Question. Would there be cost savings compared to the current 25
    year plan?
        Answer. Expediting the Deepwater program for completion over the
    next 10 or 15 years would generate a cost avoidance of approximately $1
    to $3 billion. However, annual appropriations of more than $2 billion
    per year for several years would be required to complete the program in
    a 10-year period, and more than $1.5 billion per year for several years
    would be required to complete the program in a 15-year period.

                               DRUG INTERDICTION

        Question. In November 2005, GAO reported that ``according to JIATF-
    South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime cocaine movements
    reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean
    because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected movement in
    time.'' The same report noted that Coast Guard and CBP officials were
    concerned that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in
    light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities. The
    same officials noted that the long-term implications of likely declines
    in transit zone assets have not been addressed.
        Has the Coast Guard begun to address this problem? What solutions
    are being pursued?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's long-term plan to mitigate the decline in
    the number of assets in the transit zone is the Deepwater Acquisition
    Project. Deepwater is the Coast Guard's long-term asset
    recapitalization and modernization project. As Deepwater assets come
    into service, the Coast Guard will be able to address declines in
    transit zone assets. In the short-term, the Coast Guard is managing
    existing assets to best meet operational requirements across all of its
    mission areas.

                      COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS RELOCATION

        Question. The request indicates that the Coast Guard Headquarters
    relocation will include other Federal tenants with similar security
    requirements. Please provide a list of other Federal tenants that will
    be relocating to the St. Elizabeths campus.
        Answer. DHS is planning to relocate other functions to St.
    Elizabeths West Campus in addition to the U.S. Coast Guard in order to
    improve operational effectiveness and organizational efficiency. The
    Department of Homeland Security is currently developing a Program of
    Requirements (POR) to identify total real estate needs throughout the
    National Capital Region (NCR).
        Currently, DHS organizations are housed in 61 buildings throughout
    the NCR. These dispersed locations constrain the coordination,
    cooperation and synergy among components and headquarters. Once the POR
    is completed, the Department of Homeland Security will be able to
    identify the specific activities that will relocate to St. Elizabeths,
    as well as the plan to house all remaining DHS functions throughout the
    NCR.
        Question. A prospectus for the design of the Coast Guard
    Headquarters has been approved. What is the status of the prospectus
    for construction of the Headquarters building?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2007 construction prospectus was approved
    by OMB and signed by GSA on February 14, 2006. It has been sent to
    GSA's authorizing committees on the Hill--the House Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on
    Environment and Public Works. The prospectus has not yet been approved
    by the House and Senate authorizing Committees. Attached is a copy of
    the construction prospectus and fact sheet approved by OMB and signed
    by GSA.

                      NATIONAL CAPITAL AIR DEFENSE MISSION

        Question. When will the Coast Guard assume control of the National
    Capital Region Air Defense Mission?
        Answer. The Coast Guard plans to assume the NCRAD mission in late
    fiscal year 2006. Our target start date is 01 September 2006. The exact
    date is contingent upon the timing of Congressional approval of a DHS
    request to transfer $4 million of fiscal year 2006 funds to USCG.
    Approximately 5 months after the approval, the Coast Guard will be able
    to assume the mission. The required 5 month lead time is due to the
    long lead time required to order critical ground support equipment,
    conduct personnel transfers and conduct aircrew training.
        Question. The request includes $13 million (including transfer of
    $5 million from CBP) for operational costs to operate the mission and
    $49 million for the acquisition of 5 helicopters. If the $5 million
    transfer from CBP is not approved, how will the Coast Guard absorb
    costs?
        Answer. If the $5 million in recurring funding is not transferred
    from CBP, the Coast Guard would have to review its program budgets to
    identify internal cost re-allocations that could be proposed to
    Congress for reprogramming. A likely source of funds would be the base
    counter-drug helicopter operations budgets.
        Question. If the request is provided, when will the new HH-65Cs be
    available for operation?
        Answer. If funding is received, the Coast Guard plans to purchase 5
    helicopter airframes in fiscal year 2007. These helicopters will
    subsequently be outfitted at the Coast Guard's Aircraft Repair and
    Supply Center (AR&SC) and be ready for operations by early fiscal year
    2008.
        Question. What assets will the Coast Guard use in the interim?
        Answer. The Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the National
    Capital Region Air Defense (NCRAD) mission will be supported by
    existing fleet aircraft (HH-65C) typically used to support cutter
    deployments/special missions until additional helicopters can be
    purchased and outfitted.
        The use of these cutter deployment/special mission helos will be
    offset by exercising the last year option of our MH-68 armed helo
    service contract, which will provide 8 armed helos & 1,000 additional
    cutter days deployed at sea (DDAS) until the contract expires in Jan
    2008. Originally the Coast Guard planed to replace the leased MH-68
    helos with newly armed MH-65C helicopters in Jan 2007. Utilizing the
    last year option of the MH-68 service contract will allow the Coast
    Guard time to purchase and outfit additional HH-65 helicopters by the
    time the MH-68 service contract expires in January 2008.
        Question. Will additional acquisition costs be necessary in the
    out-years? If so, how much?
        Answer. The National Capital Region Air Defense mission will
    require additional AC&I funds in the out-years.
        In fiscal year 2007, the Coast Guard's AC&I budget requests $48.5
    million for the acquisition of five helicopters, air intercept
    equipment, ground support equipment, and facility upgrades at Coast
    Guard Air Station Atlantic City.
        In fiscal year 2008, as listed in the Capital Investment Plan, the
    Coast Guard intends to request $18 million AC&I for the last two of the
    seven helicopters needed to support the NCRAD mission.
        Question. Is the Coast Guard considering fixed wing aircraft for
    the NCRAD mission?
        Answer. No.

                               POLAR ICEBREAKERS

        Question. The National Academy of Sciences recently released
    recommendations addressing the condition of the Coast Guard's polar
    icebreaking fleet. What resources would be necessary to comply with the
    report's recommendations?
        Answer. The National Academy of Sciences report made the following
    recommendations for the Nation's polar icebreaking fleet:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                NAS recommendation                     Potential cost
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States should reliably control   N/A--the United States
     at least 1 heavy icebreaker to break into   currently controls 2
     McMurdo station.                            vessels.
    The United states should maintain           N/A--the United States
     dedicated, year-round icebreaker            currently operates the
     capability for the Arctic.                  Healy as an Arctic
                                                 icebreaking and research
                                                 vessel.
     In the short term, the required            Between $30 and $50 million
     maintenance should be performed to make     annually in fiscal year
     at least one Polar class ship mission       2007 budget authority.
     capable over the next 4 to 8 years.
    Management of the U.S. icebreakers should   N/A--Under the current USCG-
     reside with the U.S. Coast Guard and it     NSF Memorandum of
     should have appropriate operational and     Understanding, the costs to
     maintenance budgets to fulfill U.S. Coast   conduct the polar
     Guard missions that require icebreaking.    icebreaking programs are
                                                 fully paid for by the
                                                 National Science
                                                 Foundation.
    In the short-term, NSF should revert to     N/A--Under the current USCG-
     being a user and should continue to         NSF Memorandum of
     negotiate financial agreements to pay for   Understanding, NSF is the
     icebreaker services when U.S. Coast Guard   user of the icebreaking
     ships are employed.                         vessels, while Coast Guard
                                                 operates them.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        In addition, the report recommends that funds for operation and
    maintenance of the Polar Icebreaking fleet be appropriated directly to
    the Coast Guard. The fiscal year 2006 budget proposed, and Congress
    subsequently appropriated, Polar Icebreaking funds to National Science
    Foundation. The fiscal year 2007 budget does not propose any changes to
    this funding approach.

                                  PATROL BOATS

        Question. To close the operational gap for 110 foot patrol boats
    today, how many additional 110's would be necessary?
        Answer. Assuming the following: All WPB 110s & 123s are able to
    achieve readiness[?] targets, four 110s are out of service per year for
    mid-life extensions, continued support of six 110s for Operation
    Enduring Freedom and five U.S. Navy WPC-179s remain in service for the
    Coast Guard, the Coast Guard would need three additional Deepwater-
    capable patrol boats to fill the current operational gap.
        Question. Has the Coast Guard considered buying new patrol boats to
    bridge the operational gap until the Fast Response Cutter is built and
    deployed? What would the cost be?
        Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard has considered buying new patrol boats
    to bridge the operational gap until the Fast Response Cutter is built
    and deployed. There are several commercially available boats that would
    be suitable, Deepwater-capable patrol boats. The Coast Guard has not
    submitted to industry a Request for Information (RFI) that would allow
    us to accurately determine the cost of a new patrol boat.
        Question. Is there a manufacturing line available to build new 110
    foot patrol boats for the Coast Guard fleet?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is not aware of any production facility in
    the United States that is currently building new 110 foot patrol boats.
        Question. When will the Coast Guard relinquish the 179 foot patrol
    boats currently being leased from the Navy?
        Answer. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Navy States that
    the Coast Guard will retain custody and operational control of five
    WPC-179s through fiscal year 2008. Additionally, this MOA States that
    the Coast Guard may take ownership of the WPC-179s after 1 October 2008
    if requested by the Vice Commandant and approved by the Vice CNO. Other
    options available to the Coast Guard include requesting an extension to
    the current MOA with the Navy or renegotiating a new agreement all
    together.
        Question. How will the Coast Guard make up for the operational
    capability the 179 foot patrol boats currently provide?
        Answer. The loss of the 179-foot patrol boats (WPCs) at the end of
    fiscal year 2008 is accounted for in the Patrol Boat (WPB) Availability
    Report provided to Congress. Our patrol boat report assumes the 6 110-
    foot patrol boats deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom will return
    home as we return the 179-foot patrol boats to the Navy, however, there
    is no guarantee that this will occur.
        The Coast Guard is currently exploring various alternatives should
    attempts to extend or renegotiate the 179-foot patrol boat Memorandum
    of Agreement with the Navy not be successful.
        Question. Did the Operational Gap Analysis report take into account
    the loss of the 179 foot patrol boats?
        Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard did take into account the loss of the
    179 foot patrol boats at the end of fiscal year 2008 (September 30).
    The report assumes that the loss of the 179-foot patrol boats to the
    Navy will correspond with an offsetting gain by the return of the 6
    110-foot patrol boats currently deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom.
        Question. For the 110 foot Service Life Extension program, how long
    will each cutter being rehabbed be out of service?
        Answer. Each Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) will remove a 110-
    ft patrol boat (WPB) from service for approximately 12 months.
        Question. What is the maximum number of patrol boats that can be
    rehabbed at one time without impacting Coast Guard operational
    capabilities?
        Answer. Each 110 foot patrol boat (WPB) that enters the Mission
    Effectiveness Project (MEP) will be unavailable for operational use for
    approximately 12 months. The optimal balance of acceptable operational
    impact and timely MEP completion is four MEPs per year.
        Question. Could the 110 foot Service Life Extension program be
    accelerated if funding were available?
        Answer. As indicated in the Coast Guard's Patrol Boat Availability
    Report to Congress (dated 2/3/2006), the Coast Guard's current 110 foot
    WPB Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) plan strikes the best balance
    between the needs of the Service's operational commanders and the
    Deepwater spend plan.
        The need to minimize the patrol boat operational hour gap is the
    most significant determining factor. Each 110 foot WPB MEP requires 1
    year of drydock availability. As noted in the report, each MEP will
    have an impact on the patrol boat operational hour gap and the Coast
    Guard's ability to perform its missions.
        If Coast Guard efforts to mitigate the patrol boat hour gap
    produced results beyond current expectations, the Coast Guard would
    consider the costs/benefits of accelerating the 110 foot WPB MEP
    production cycle.
        Question. If funding were available, how long would it take to
    procure and missionize new 110 foot patrol boats with operational
    capabilities?
        Answer. There are several commercially available boats that could
    be suitable Deepwater-capable patrol boats. The Coast Guard is
    investigating options and studying requirements, but has not submitted
    to industry Requests for Information (RFI) that would allow us to
    accurately determine the amount of time it would take to procure and
    missionize new patrol boats with operational capabilities.
        Question. Of the eight 110 foot patrol boats that have been
    stretched to 123 feet, what was the original cost estimate compared to
    the final cost?
        Answer. The Original Contract Price (including Economic Price
    Adjustment) for hulls 1 through 8 was $67.1 million (average $8.4
    million per hull). The projected Final Price, less Request of Equitable
    Adjustment (REA), is $80.3 million (average $10.04 million per hull).
    Resolution of the REA submitted by ICGS and project close-out costs may
    result in a figure slightly higher than the average $10.04 million per
    hull cost.
        Question. Last year, the Coast Guard asserted that new and improved
    ``condition measures'' would be established by the end of fiscal year
    2005 that link cutter condition to mission capability. Please provide
    these measures to the Committee.
        Answer. The Coast Guard has developed condition measures that more
    directly link cutter condition to mission capability. A clearer
    relationship between engineering subsystems and mission performance
    will enable a better return on maintenance investments and the best use
    of limited maintenance resources.
        Coast Guard naval engineers have developed two cutter condition
    measures:
      --``Percent of time fully mission capable'' (PTFMC) and
      --``Average number of casualties per operational day'' (ANOCOP).
        The PTFMC and ANOCOP measures will provide a direct link between
    specific cutter engineering subsystems and mission degradation. These
    metrics are expected to be completed by mid-calendar year 2006.
        In fiscal years 2004-2005, a team was assembled to construct asset
    condition matrices that incorporate engineering casualty reporting
    (CASREP) data and performance data maintained in the Coast Guard's
    Readiness Management System (RMS). The team identified and linked
    thousands of shipboard engineering subsystems across every cutter class
    and their direct impact/contribution to each Coast Guard mission. The
    condition measures are currently being tested/validated for use in the
    Coast Guard's Readiness Management System.

                              RESPONSE BOAT MEDIUM

        Question. Please provide a deployment schedule (including
    locations) for the Response Boat Medium program.
        Answer. The Response Boat-Medium Project is currently in the middle
    of source selection for the second procurement phase (production
    contract). Contract award is planned for the forth quarter of fiscal
    year 2006. The delivery location and schedule will be based on contract
    award date, issuance of delivery orders, the contractor's integrated
    master schedule, and operational testing and evaluation (OT&E). The
    delivery locations identified by the Response Boat Siting Study are
    included in the table below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Unit                            City                    State                     Zip
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FIRST DISTRICT:
        STA EASTPORT.....................  Eastport...............  ME.....................  04631
        STA JONESPORT....................  West Jonesport.........  ME.....................  04649-9998
        STA SOUTHWEST HBR................  Southwest Harbor.......  ME.....................  04679-5000
        STA ROCKLAND.....................  Rockland...............  ME.....................  04841-3498
        STA BOOTHBAY HARBOR..............  Boothbay Harbor........  ME.....................  04538-0327
        STA SOUTH PORTLAND...............  South Portland.........  ME.....................  04106-0007
        STA PORTSMOUTH HBR...............  New Castle.............  NH.....................  03854-0600
        STA MERRIMACK RIV................  Newburyport............  MA.....................  01950-2897
        STA GLOUCESTER...................  Gloucester.............  MA.....................  01930-5004
        STA BOSTON.......................  Boston.................  MA.....................  02109-1027
        STA POINT ALLERTON...............  Hull...................  MA.....................  02045-1198
        STA PROVINCETOWN.................  Provincetown...........  MA.....................  02657-9999
        STA CAPE COD CANAL...............  Sandwich...............  MA.....................  2563
        STA CHATHAM......................  Chatham................  MA.....................  02633-3499
        STA WOODS HOLE...................  Woods Hole.............  MA.....................  02543
        STA MENEMSHA.....................  Chilmark...............  MA.....................  02535-9707
        STA BRANT POINT..................  Nantucket..............  MA.....................  02554-2293
        STA CASTLE HILL..................  Newport................  RI.....................  02840-3798
        STA POINT JUDITH.................  Narragansett...........  RI.....................  02882-6229
        STA NEW LONDON...................  New London.............  CT.....................  06320-5593
        STA NEW HAVEN....................  New Haven..............  CT.....................  06512-3698
        STA EATONS NECK..................  Northport..............  NY.....................  11768-1094
        STA MONTAUK......................  Montauk................  NY.....................  11954-9801
        STA SHINNECOCK...................  Hampton Bays...........  NY.....................  11946-3233
        STA FIRE ISLAND..................  Babylon................  NY.....................  11702-4600
        STA JONES BEACH..................  Freeport...............  NY.....................  11520-5001
        STA NEW YORK.....................  Staten Island..........  NY.....................  10305
        STA SANDY HOOK...................  Sandy Hook.............  NJ.....................  07732-4999
        STA BURLINGTON...................  Burlington.............  VT.....................  05401-5226

    FIFTH DISTRICT:
        STA WASHINGTON (DC)..............  Washington.............  DC.....................  20032-0702
        STA MANASQUAN INLET..............  Point Pleasant Beach...  NJ.....................  08742-2642
        STA BARNEGAT LIGHT...............  Barnegat Light.........  NJ.....................  08006-9999
        STA ATLANTIC CITY................  Altantic City..........  NJ.....................  08401-1986
        STA CAPE MAY.....................  Cape May...............  NJ.....................  08204-5078
        STA PHILADELPHIA.................  Philadelphia...........  PA.....................  19147-4395
        STA OCEAN CITY...................  Ocean City.............  MD.....................  21842-4240
        STA CHINCOTEAGUE.................  Chincoteague...........  VA.....................  23336-1809
        STA WACHAPREAGUE.................  Wachapreague...........  VA.....................  23480-0370
        STA CAPE CHARLES.................  Cape Charles...........  VA.....................  23310-0621
        STA MILFORD HAVEN................  Hudgins................  VA.....................  23076-9700
        STA PORTSMOUTH...................  Portsmouth.............  VA.....................  23703-2199
        STA LITTLE CREEK.................  Norfolk................  VA.....................  23520-5200
        STA CRISFIELD....................  Chrisfield.............  MD.....................  21817-1656
        STA CURTIS BAY...................  Baltimore..............  MD.....................  21226-1797
        STA OXFORD.......................  Oxford.................  MD.....................  21654-1323
        STA ANNAPOLIS....................  Annapolis..............  MD.....................  21403-5099
        STA ST. INIGOES..................  Saint Inigoes..........  MD.....................  20684-0008
        STA ELIZABETH CITY...............  Elizabeth City.........  NC.....................  27909
        STA OREGON INLET.................  Nags Head..............  NC.....................  27959-9731
        STA HATTERAS INLET...............  Hatteras...............  NC.....................  28537-9999
        STA HOBUCKEN.....................  Hobucken...............  NC.....................  28537-9999
        STA FORT MACON...................  Atlantic Beach.........  NC.....................  28512
        STA WRIGHTSVILLE BEACH...........  Wrightsville Beach.....  NC.....................  28480-2099
        STA OAK ISLAND...................  Oak Island.............  NC.....................  28465

    SEVENTH DISTRICT:
        STA GEORGETOWN...................  Georgetown.............  SC.....................  29440-2412
        STA CHARLESTON...................  Charleston.............  SC.....................  29401-1817
        STA TYBEE........................  Tybee Island...........  GA.....................  31328-1400
        STA BRUNSWICK....................  Brunswick..............  GA.....................  31523-0577
        STA MAYPORT......................  Atlantic Beach.........  FL.....................  33139-5101
        STA PONCE DE LEON INLET..........  New Smyrna Beach.......  FL.....................  32169-2041
        STA PORT CANAVERAL...............  Cape Canaveral.........  FL.....................  32920-4402
        STA YANKEETOWN...................  Yankeetown.............  FL.....................  34498-0360
        STA SAND KEY.....................  Clearwater.............  FL.....................  33767-2899
        STA ST. PETERSBURG...............  St. Petersburg.........  FL.....................  33701-5099
        STA CORTEZ.......................  Cortez.................  FL.....................  34215-9999
        STA FT. MYERS BEACH..............  Fort Myers Beach.......  FL.....................  33931-2221
        STA FORT PIERCE..................  Fort Pierce............  FL.....................  34949-3039
        STA LAKE WORTH INLET.............  Riviera Beach..........  FL.....................  33404-2406
        STA FORT LAUDERDALE..............  Dania..................  FL.....................  33004-3079
        STA MIAMI BEACH..................  Miami Beach............  FL.....................  33139-5101
        STA ISLAMORADA...................  Islamorada.............  FL.....................  33036-3317
        STA MARATHON.....................  Marathon...............  FL.....................  33050-2199
        STA KEY WEST.....................  Key West...............  FL.....................  33040-6695

    EIGHTH DISTRICT:
        STA PANAMA CITY..................  Panama City............  FL.....................  32407-5898
        STA DESTIN.......................  Destin.................  FL.....................  32540-1289
        STA PENSACOLA....................  Pensacola..............  FL.....................  32508-5231
        STA DAUPHIN ISLAND...............  Dauphin Island.........  AL.....................  36528-4603
        STA PASCAGOULA...................  Pascaboula.............  MS.....................  39568-1228
        STA GULFPORT.....................  Gulfport...............  MS.....................  39502-1198
        STA NEW ORLEANS..................  New Orleans............  LA.....................  70124
        STA VENICE.......................  Venice.................  LA.....................  70091-9998
        STA GRAND ISLE...................  Grand Isle.............  LA.....................  70358-0158
        STA SABINE.......................  Sabine.................  TX.....................  77655-1108
        STA GALVESTON....................  Galveston..............  TX.....................  77553-1912
        STA FREEPORT.....................  Freeport...............  TX.....................  77541-8934
        STA PORT O'CONNOR................  Port O'Connor..........  TX.....................  77982-0057
        STA PORT ARANSAS.................  Port Aransas...........  TX.....................  78373
        STA SOUTH PADRE ISLAND...........  South Padre Island.....  TX.....................  78597-6497

    NINTH DISTRICT:
        STA BUFFALO......................  Buffalo................  NY.....................  14203-3189
        STA NIAGARA......................  Youngstown.............  NY.....................  14174-9999
        STA ROCHESTER....................  Rochester..............  NY.....................  14617-1098
        STA OSWEGO.......................  Oswego.................  NY.....................  13126-1396
        STA ALEXANDRIA BAY...............  Wellesley Island.......  NY.....................  13640-2112
        STA ERIE.........................  Erie...................  PA.....................  16505-0130
        STA FAIRPORT.....................  Grand River............  OH.....................  44045-0038
        STA CLEVELAND HBR................  Cleveland..............  OH.....................  44114-1092
        STA LORAIN.......................  Lorain.................  OH.....................  44052
        STA MARBLEHEAD...................  Marblehead.............  OH.....................  43440-5000
        STA TOLEDO.......................  Toledo.................  OH.....................  43611-9999
        STA BELLE ISLE...................  Detroit................  MI.....................  48207-4376
        STA ST. CLAIR SHORES.............  St Clair Shores........  MI.....................  48080-1391
        STA PORT HURON...................  Port Huron.............  MI.....................  48060-2998
        STA TAWAS........................  East Tawas.............  MI.....................  48730-9506
        STA SAGINAW RIVER................  Essexville.............  MI.....................  48732-9602
        STA MARQUETTE....................  Marquette..............  MI.....................  49855-3864
        STA SAULT STE. MARIE.............  Sault Saint Marie......  MI.....................  49783-9501
        STA ST. IGNACE...................  Saint Ignace...........  MI.....................  49781-1899
        STA CHARLEVOIX...................  Charlevoix.............  MI.....................  49720-0258
        STA STURGEON BAY.................  Sturgeon Bay...........  WI.....................  54235-1099
        STA MANISTEE.....................  Manistee...............  MI.....................  49660-1315
        STA MUSKEGON.....................  Muskegon...............  MI.....................  49441-1068
        STA GRAND HAVEN..................  Grand Haven............  MI.....................  49417-1741
        STA ST. JOSEPH...................  Saint Joseph...........  MI.....................  49085-1042
        STA MICHIGAN CITY................  Sheboygan..............  WI.....................  53081-4649
        STA CALUMET HARBOR...............  Chicago................  IL.....................  60617-5197
        STA KENOSHA......................  Kenosha................  WI.....................  53140-2998
        STA MILWAUKEE....................  Milwaukee..............  WI.....................  53207-1997
        STA TWO RIVERS...................  Two Rivers.............  WI.....................  54241-3095
        STA PORTAGE......................  Dollar City............  MI.....................  49922-0350
        STA BAYFIELD.....................  Bayfield...............  WI.....................  54814-0467
        STA DULUTH.......................  Duluth.................  MN.....................  55802-2492

    ELEVENTH DISTRICT:
        STA SAN DIEGO....................  San Diego..............  CA.....................  92101-1079
        STA LA/LONG BEACH................  San Pedro..............  CA.....................  90731-0208
        STA CHANNEL ISLANDS HARBOR.......  Oxnard.................  CA.....................  93035-4397
        STA MORRO BAY....................  Morro Bay..............  CA.....................  93442-1319
        STA MONTEREY.....................  Monterey...............  CA.....................  93940-1497
        STA SAN FRANCISCO................  San Francisco..........  CA.....................  94130-5013
        STA VALLEJO......................  Vallejo................  CA.....................  94590-0644
        STA GOLDEN GATE..................  Sausalito..............  CA.....................  94965-2289
        STA BODEGA BAY...................  Bodega Bay.............  CA.....................  94923-0037
        STA RIO VISTA....................  Rio Vista..............  CA.....................  94571-2099
        STA LAKE TAHOE...................  Tahoe City.............  CA.....................  96145-0882
        STA NOYO RIVER...................  Fort Bragg.............  CA.....................  95437
        STA HUMBOLDT BAY.................  Samoa..................  CA.....................  95564-9999

    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT:
        STA CHETCO RIVER.................  Harbor.................  OR.....................  97415-0328
        STA COOS BAY.....................  Charleston.............  OR.....................  97420-0629
        STA UMPQUA RIVER.................  Winchester Bay.........  OR.....................  97467
        STA YAQUINA BAY..................  Newport................  OR.....................  97365-0076
        STA TILLAMOOK BAY................  Garibaldi..............  OR.....................  97118-0167
        STA CAPE DISAPPOINTMENT..........  Ilwaco.................  WA.....................  98624-0460
        STA GRAYS HARBOR.................  Westport...............  WA.....................  98595-0568
        STA QUILLAYUTE RIVER.............  La Push................  WA.....................  98350-0009
        STA NEAH BAY.....................  Neah Bay...............  WA.....................  98357-0120
        STA PORT ANGELES.................  Port Angeles...........  WA.....................  98362
        STA BELLINGHAM...................  Bellingham.............  WA.....................  98225-2940
        STA SEATTLE......................  Seattle................  WA.....................  98134-1192
        STA PORTLAND.....................  Portland...............  OR.....................  97217
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   OIL SPILLS

        Question. There were over 3,800 oil spills caused by Hurricanes
    Katrina and Rita, with more than 8 million gallons spilled from
    Hurricane Katrina alone. What implications do these spills have on the
    Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund?
        Answer. The level of funds in the OSLTF as of January 2006 was $710
    million.
        To date, there have been no Hurricane Katrina or Rita expenses
    charged to the Fund. All Katrina and Rita oil pollution response
    activities thus far have been funded by either Stafford Act funding or
    by a responsible party. The Coast Guard has received $178 million in
    Stafford Act funds for coastal zone hazardous materials response, and
    the EPA has received a similar amount for inland zone response. These
    funds are expected to be sufficient through April 30, 2006. If response
    requirements continue to be identified without additional Stafford Act
    funding, it is possible that additional response costs will be incurred
    by the OSLTF.
        A bigger threat to the OSLTF is from claims. While none have been
    received to date, third parties who have been economically damaged may
    file claims for reimbursement, as well may Natural Resource Trustees
    seek reimbursement from the Fund. Responsible Parties (RPs) who have
    spent their own money in response to the spills may also try to claim
    reimbursement for costs exceeding their limits of liability or for all
    costs using an ``Act of God'' defense. These claims would have to be
    evaluated on a case by case basis. If such claims meet the requirements
    of OPA 90 they would represent legitimate claims against the fund. It
    is unclear how much has been spent by the major refineries and other
    facility owners in their response to these hurricane related spills.
        The size and number of potential damages and Natural Resource
    Damage (NRD) claims that could impact the fund is currently difficult
    to estimate with any degree of certainty.
        If impacts to the OSLTF from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita begin to
    manifest themselves, the Coast Guard will notify DHS, OMB and Congress.
    Since claims are only paid if there are funds available, we could delay
    payment, or seek supplemental appropriations until the OSLTF is solvent
    enough to make claims payments, all other forecast assumptions
    remaining the same.
        Question. Does the Coast Guard expect to have sufficient resources
    in the Fund to address spills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as well
    as other claims?
        Answer. The size and number of potential damages and natural
    resource damages claims that could impact the OSLTF is currently
    difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty.
        If impacts to the OSLTF from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita begin to
    manifest themselves, the Coast Guard will notify DHS, OMB and Congress.
    Since claims are only paid if there are funds available, the Coast
    Guard could delay payment or seek supplemental appropriations until the
    OSLTF is solvent enough to make claims payments, all other forecast
    assumptions remaining the same.
        Question. Please provide a funding forecast chart through 2014.
        Answer. The current OSLTF forecast, anticipating the resumption of
    revenue (approximately $200 million per year), from the per barrel oil
    tax in April, 2006 as approved in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 is
    projected to remain healthy if pasat trends continue and there are no
    significant Hurricane related impacts to the OSLTF (figure (a)).
        It is impossible to estimate the claims that may materialze from
    Hurricane Katrina damages, and whether the OSLTF will be statutorily-
    required to pay such claims.

                        NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

        Question. Please provide a chart of costs the Coast Guard has
    incurred in support of National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The
    chart should display the cost associated with each NSSE in which Coast
    Guard support was provided.
        Answer. The Coast Guard has not participated in any NSSEs in fiscal
    year 2006, and there are none scheduled with a maritime nexus for the
    remainder of fiscal year 2006.

                          MTSA COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS

        Question. In response to an fiscal year 2006 QFR, the Coast Guard
    asserted that it planned to begin an evaluation of its facility
    inspection efforts in June 2005, complete the field portion of the
    evaluation in September of 2005, and produce a final evaluation in
    December 2005. What conclusions were made in the final evaluation?
        Answer. Coast Guard Headquarters and Area staffs developed and made
    available an online survey to be completed by inspectors and direct
    supervisory staff involved with Maritime Transportation Security Act
    (MTSA) facility compliance examinations. The responses to questions
    directly related to compliance inspections included:
        A majority of responses (78.3 percent) indicated that unannounced
    security spot checks on facilities are more effective in determining
    compliance than full, scheduled annual examinations. As a result,
    Captains of the Port (COTPs) are more actively performing unannounced
    spot checks in addition to the scheduled annual examinations. A
    security spot check form to aid COTPs in these type inspections was
    created and made available to facility inspectors.
        83.2 percent of the respondents indicated that existing enforcement
    tools (tickets, civil penalties, etc.) are adequate to compel
    compliance with MTSA regulations.
        79.3 percent of the respondents indicated that the Coast Guard's
    compliance guide (inspection checklist for annual examinations) is a
    good resource for conducting and documenting MTSA examinations.
        83.9 percent of the respondents indicated that standardized reports
    accessible to unit personnel for tracking annual examinations, spot
    checks, and deficiencies for all MTSA facilities would be useful. As a
    result, Coast Guard Headquarters staff developed these standard
    reports, which are now available to COTPs within the Readiness
    Management System (RMS).
        79.2 percent of the respondents indicated that the overall MTSA
    facility compliance program (annual compliance examinations and random
    spot checks) is effective.
        Question. How many regulated facilities and vessels must maintain
    compliance with MTSA regulations?
        Answer. Vessels: Approximately 10,900 U.S. flag vessels comply with
    MTSA and/or International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.
    The number of foreign vessels that must comply with the regulations
    issued under the authority of MTSA includes vessels that actually visit
    the United States and meet one of the applicability criteria in the
    MTSA Regulations.
      --In 2004, 6,119 foreign vessels met that criterion.
      --In 2005, approximately 8,100 foreign vessels met that criterion
        Facilities: Approximately 3,200 facilities comply with the security
    plan requirements of MTSA. The Coast Guard conducts annual compliance
    examinations for all of these facilities to ensure continued compliance
    with their approved security plans.
        Question. How many random inspections does the Coast Guard make on
    an annual basis?
        Answer. The Coast Guard conducted 2,201 random compliance
    examinations of vessels in 2005.
        The Coast Guard conducted approximately 5,100 random security spot
    checks of U.S. facilities in calendar year 2005.
        Question. How much is included in the fiscal year 2007 budget for
    compliance inspections?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 Budget request does not
    specifically identify funding for compliance inspections, however, the
    Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 Operating Expense base funding for
    Marine Transportation Security Act (MTSA) implementation includes $69.4
    million for vessel and facility security plan review, foreign port
    assessments and Port State Control for foreign vessel security plans.
    These activities largely (but not exclusively) support compliance
    inspections support of MTSA.

                               WORKPLACE INJURIES

        Question. The conference report accompanying fiscal year 2006 DHS
    Appropriations Act included a requirement to report on technologies for
    reducing occupational safety and health risks. That report included
    useful information on ways to reduce risk through the use of modern
    information tools. The report also lists deficiencies in these
    programs. For example, the data systems lack documentation, which means
    they can be lost and are hard to update; they are not integrated and
    they are not connected to other systems, which means that there is
    little to no opportunity for creating synergistic benefits.
        Does the fiscal year 2007 budget include the resources to correct
    these identified deficiencies? If not, what is the cost to address
    these deficiencies?
        Answer. The Department is engaged in numerous functional
    integration initiatives to provide synergies among component agencies.
    The Department's Information Technology (IT) Infrastructure
    Transformation Program (ITP), led by the Office of the Chief
    Information Officer, will integrate the IT infrastructures of the 22
    legacy components into ``One Infrastructure.'' The ITP is intended to
    eliminate duplicative and stove-piped infrastructures and provide
    common capabilities and services for all components to leverage.
    Investment in the ITP will benefit DHS component agencies by providing
    economies of scale while promoting DHS integration and improving
    information sharing and interoperability. The amount of IT investment
    funding from components to support the ITP is still under deliberation
    and any such proposal will be fully vetted with the Congress prior to
    any actions being taken.
        While the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 budget does not include
    specific resources to address the deficiencies listed in the report for
    all DHS components, it is important for DHS to work closely with the
    Coast Guard to identify solutions for reducing risk by using
    information tools that are being developed through DHS's ITP.
    Integration and appropriate documentation of data systems, human
    factors analysis systems and aviation safety systems (as discussed in
    the referenced occupational health and safety report) will be critical
    to any potential Department-wide initiatives to manage safety and
    occupational health IT systems.

                          UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
                              CAMPAIGN PROTECTION

        Question. Please provide a historical chart showing the actual
    costs for the campaign protection program. For each election since
    1968, provide the number of candidates that received Secret Service
    protection.
        Answer.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Number of      Protection
                                  Year                                protectees \1\       days         Cost ($000)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2004............................................................               4             553         $65,347
    2000............................................................               7             673          49,233
    1996............................................................               6             508          26,816
    1992............................................................               7             663          35,809
    1988............................................................              12           1,399          37,629
    1984............................................................              11           1,152          28,547
    1980............................................................              12           1,669          25,001
    1976............................................................              19           2,448          16,274
    1972............................................................              16           1,273           6,374
    1968............................................................              16           1,222           2,981
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Includes spouses.

        Question. The Secret Service already has a dedicated amount of
    funding for National Security Special Events. Why does the Secret
    Service need a dedicated appropriation for Presidential Campaigns?
    Please describe the difficulties in executing the Candidate Protection
    Program under current law and how a dedicated appropriation will
    resolve those issues.
        Answer. The Secret Service receives $2.5 million annually for
    National Special Security Events (NSSE). The proposal is for a new no-
    year appropriation that places NSSE funding and presidential campaign
    funding in a no-year account that is separate from the Service's annual
    funding. This proposal will allow for easier tracking of the funds, and
    will take these funds out of the annual appropriation process used to
    appropriate funding required to operate the Secret Service.
        Currently, the Secret Service budgets for Presidential Campaigns
    three out of every four fiscal years. Funding is required the year
    before the start of the Campaign to purchase equipment and to train
    personnel to work the campaign; funding is required during the campaign
    year for candidate/nominee protection, the conventions, residence
    security and other political events; the year following the main
    campaign year funding is required for the last month of candidate/
    nominee protection, post election security and the Inauguration.
    Although the current method of budgeting does not pose a significant
    problem, the Presidential Campaign is a predictable mandatory workload
    increase that happens every 4 years, and because of the mandatory
    nature of this major event the Department believes that a base should
    be established to ensure that funding is available every 4 years for
    this event. By providing a base amount of funding each year in a
    separate account, only to be used for campaign activities, enough money
    will be available at the start of each campaign and throughout the
    campaign cycle. If the funding is not required, it will be non-recurred
    from the base.

                                    STAFFING

        Question. What is the status of the 71 positions funded in fiscal
    year 2006?
        Answer. The Secret Service is actively recruiting to fill the 71
    positions funded in our fiscal year 2006 budget. Of the 71 positions
    funded, 51 positions are for special agents, 11 positions are for
    physical security specialists, and 9 positions are for intelligence
    research specialists. To date, (18 physical security specialist and 17
    special agents) of the 71 positions have been filled. Announcements
    advertising special agent, physical security specialist, and
    intelligence research specialist positions have been posted, and are
    being acted upon, with a number of applicants in the final stages of
    the clearance process. Further, a Nation-wide recruiting initiative
    begins in April which targets these and other positions. The Secret
    Service will have identified and made job offers for the remaining
    vacant positions by the end of the fiscal year.
        Question. When will the 71 positions be on board?
        Answer. The 71 positions should be filled by the end of fiscal year
    2006. We project that all basic training should be completed, and the
    new recruits fully operational, by the beginning of calendar year 2007.
        Question. A February 2006 report entitled, Investigative and
    Protective Workload Re-Balancing, States ``to effectively address and
    achieve the balance recommended by the Committee between the
    investigative and protective workloads, the Service would require the
    additional staffing of 675 special agents, 114 uniformed officers, and
    395 other mission critical support (MCS) personnel.'' The report states
    that this could be achieved over a 5-year period.
        What are the costs to carry out this plan?
        Answer. As part of a continual strategic planning process, and in
    an effort to address the efficiency, alignment and adequacy of its
    human capital, the Secret Service has identified workforce strategies
    and staffing requirements to keep pace with increasing work volumes,
    both protective and investigative, and minimize the impact of excessive
    overtime on our workforce.
        Although the special agent and uniformed officer positions are
    needed immediately to rebalance the field's workload and allow
    sufficient resources to continue to support existing and new protective
    operations, recruiting, background investigation, training, and
    supervisory capacity, constraints limit the number of new applicants
    the Secret Service can reasonably accommodate in a single year. The
    Secret Service proposes a measured approach, addressing staffing
    requirements over a 5-year period.
        It would take an estimated $150,000,000 to cover first year costs
    of hiring the 1,184 positions (675 special agents, 114 Uniformed
    Division officers, and 395 professionals). This is based on current
    salary and support costs levels. However, we would need to carry out
    this hiring over a number of fiscal years, and this would add to the
    total cost (outyear Federal pay raises, increased cost of health
    benefits, non-pay inflation).
        To cover the full outyear costs (annualizing the salary after the
    first year, and covering the full-performance level salaries) would
    require approximately another $95,000,000.
        Question. What are the current monthly overtime levels for special
    agents and uniformed division personnel?
        Answer. For the last full fiscal year (fiscal year 2005), overtime
    levels for average monthly overtime for special agents on protective
    details was 75 hours and 67 hours for special agents assigned to field
    offices. During this same time, uniformed officers averaged 33 hours of
    overtime per month. (Source: Tonya Gray, ADM/MNO)
        Question. How do those levels compare to other law enforcement
    agencies within the Department of Homeland Security?
        Answer. CBP response: During fiscal year 2005, CBP Border Patrol
    Agents averaged 44 hours of overtime worked per month and the
    Agriculture Officers averaged 21 hours of overtime per month.
        We continue to work with other DHS components to obtain this
    information.
        Question. How do those levels compare with other law enforcement
    agencies in the Department of Justice?
        Answer. DOJ provided the following data for uniformed law
    enforcement officers during fiscal year 2005: FBI law enforcement
    officers averaged 36 overtime hours per month; the Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) officers averaged less than 1
    hour per month; and the U.S. Marshal Service officers averaged 24 hours
    per month. The fiscal year 2005 monthly overtime for non-uniformed
    agents was considerably less, with the FBI and ATF averaging less than
    2 hours per month, while the U.S. Marshal Service agents averaged 6
    hours per month.
        Question. What ratio of staffing between investigations and
    protection has the Secret Service concluded to be appropriate?
        Answer. In order to ensure field office staffing for a balanced
    workload between investigative work and protective work, the Secret
    Service has identified an optimal mix between investigations and
    protection workload at approximately 65 percent investigations to 35
    percent protection. The Secret Service has established as an optimal
    campaign year target, a 50-50 percent split of field special agent time
    devoted to investigations and protection.
        Question. What level of overtime for special agents and Uniformed
    personnel has the Secret Service concluded to be appropriate?
        Answer. In 1999, the Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on Special
    Agent Retention and Workload Balancing was formed to address the
    special agent staffing needs of the Secret Service, especially the
    field (at that time, the field was devoting half of its time to
    protection and half of its time to investigations). Also at issue was
    the need to improve the quality of life of special agents. This group
    determined that an effort should be made to reduce overtime levels to
    those similar to fiscal year 1994, recommending that special agents
    work no more than 20 hours of scheduled overtime per month (above the
    standard 10-hour day that includes 2 hours of law enforcement
    availability pay). Although this level of overtime was not necessarily
    viewed as optimal, it was seen as an improvement over the average 73
    hours of overtime worked per agent per month at that time.
        In 2000, the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Secret Service
    Uniformed Division Staffing Review was formed to make recommendations
    designed to assist the Secret Service in improving retention and
    enhancing worklife for its uniformed officers. This group made several
    recommendations to address staffing levels and overtime issues.
    Included was a recommendation that the Secret Service should attempt to
    achieve a target level of 16 to 18 hours of overtime per officer per
    month.

                        NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

        Question. What is the current unobligated balance in the National
    Special Security Events Fund?
        Answer. $4,934,000 is the balance currently in this fund, and
    includes current year and carry-over funding.
        Question. For each designated NSSE over the past 3 years, what were
    the costs incurred by the Secret Service and the costs incurred by the
    other Federal agencies that provided support for the event? For
    instance, if CBP or the Coast Guard provided air support or manpower
    for a particular NSSE, what were their associated costs?
        Answer.

        Question. Has the Secret Service reimbursed any other Federal
    agency for costs incurred to support a NSSE?
        Answer. The Secret Service budgets for known traditional protective
    events such as a political convention and the Inauguration. If one of
    these traditional events is designated an NSSE, the Secret Service
    would have funding available to pay travel and overtime costs for
    agents from other agencies and the military who are supporting the
    Service's protective mission.
        However, when events that are not traditional Secret Service events
    are designated an NSSE, the Secret Service does not reimburse other
    agencies.
        Question. Why should the Secret Service have a dedicated fund to
    pay for NSSE's when other Federal agencies that provide support for
    these events do not?
        Answer. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive #62 named the
    United States Secret Service as the lead agency for planning,
    designing, and implementing security for events designated as National
    Special Security Events (NSSEs). This Directive called for a funding
    mechanism to be created to cover the costs of this new responsibility
    within 120 days. No funding mechanism was created.
        In the past the Service has proffered several options for
    establishing funding mechanisms for providing the resources needed to
    provide security for events designated as NSSEs. These options were
    presented to various entities within the Department of the Treasury,
    particularly the Under Secretary for Enforcement, as well as the Office
    of Management and Budget. These options included permanent, indefinite
    appropriations, to be controlled by various entities, with funding
    available to all involved with providing security for these events. To
    date, none of these options has been accepted, nor has an alternative
    solution to the issue of funding these events been established.
        Question. Would a DHS Fund to cover all component NSSE costs be a
    better solution?
        Answer. By statutory authority, the Secret Service coordinates,
    plans and implements the security at National Special Security Events.
    At these events the majority of the costs are incurred by the Secret
    Service. Because many times the Secret Service does not know that an
    NSSE is going to occur in time to budget for the event, funding needs
    to be available to pay for the NSSE that occurs outside of the budget
    cycle. The Department would support any method that assures that
    funding is available to cover the expenses for providing security for
    designated NSSEs.

                                     TRAVEL

        Question. Since 2-year funding authority was provided to the Secret
    Service for protective travel, how much has the Secret Service carried
    over on a year to year basis? Provide a chart showing the carryover
    amount for each year since Congress granted the 2-year authority.
        Answer. Protective travel funds carried forward:
      --fiscal year 2001: $7,856,456
      --fiscal year 2002: $10,017,610
      --fiscal year 2003: $16,231,510
      --fiscal year 2004: $5,853,395
      --fiscal year 2005: $8,113,174
        Question. Is $18 million still an appropriate ceiling for 2-year
    travel funding?
        Answer. Yes. The Secret Service spends approximately $100 million
    per year on travel, with many employees traveling at any one time. This
    leads to numerous outstanding travel vouchers at the end of a fiscal
    year. Trying to estimate the amount of travel expenses not yet
    vouchered at the end of the fiscal year is very difficult. Without this
    2-year authority, use of limited travel dollars would be a lot less
    efficient than it is. The $18,000,000 2-year authority works very well
    for the Service.

                                ARMORED VEHICLES

        Question. How many vehicles are there in the armored vehicle
    program? Please describe a description of the fleet and the purpose
    each vehicle serves.
        Answer. This response is classified and will be provided to the
    Committee under separate cover.

                               PROTECTION FUNDING

        Question. According to the DHS End of Year Execution Report for
    fiscal year 2005, the Secret Service exceeded obligational authority
    for the Protection of Persons and Facilities program activity by
    approximately $20 million. Why hasn't a reprogramming notification been
    sent to Congress?
        Answer. The official reprogramming notification was submitted and
    has been subsequently approved by the Congress.
        Question. What measures are being put in place to better account
    for costs in this activity as they occur?
        Answer. The Service will continue to review and report to the
    Committee on Appropriations obligations by program, project, and
    activity on a monthly basis. Using this information and any additional
    information regarding what the future activity level will be, the
    Service will make assessments regarding the need for a reprogramming
    notification.
        At the point where the Service becomes aware that a notification of
    a proposed reprogramming of funding between programs, projects, and
    activities is necessary, the Service will immediately notify the
    Department. This will be followed, within two workdays, by submission
    to the Department of a letter requesting a reprogramming of funds.
        The Service will make every effort to ensure that all relevant
    information regarding the costs being incurred, and likely to be
    incurred, by program, project, and activity is gathered and analyzed.
    By doing this, we will recognize the need for a formal reprogramming
    notification at the earliest possible moment.
        Question. Please provide a list of Federal agency heads other than
    the Secretary of Homeland Security receiving Secret Service protection.
    Pursuant to Section 522 of Public Law 109-90, has the Secret Service
    entered into any agreement to perform protection for the head of a
    Federal agency other than the Secretary of Homeland Security? Please
    describe each agreement and the associated costs for each.
        Answer. The Secret Service currently provides protection to the
    Secretary of the Treasury on a reimbursable basis. A Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU) has been provided to the Treasury Department from
    the Department of Homeland Security defining all costs associated with
    the Treasury Secretary's protection. The MOU estimates the
    reimbursement to the Secret Service in the amount of $4.1 million.
        Question. Please provide a list of all individuals receiving Secret
    Service protection.
        Answer. This response is classified and will be provided to the
    Committee under separate cover.

                            PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE
                           NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL

        Question. The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
    was signed into law on October 18, 2006 and required that, in
    accordance with the Department's implementation plan, the final
    National Preparedness Goal shall be issued by December 31, 2005. As of
    March 6, 2006 the final Goal has not been issued. Why has final
    issuance been delayed?
        Answer. The National Preparedness Goal is critical to addressing
    many of the recommendations identified by the Administration and
    Congress in the analysis of the responses to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
    and Wilma. In addition, other significant recent initiatives, such as
    the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza require us to ensure the
    Goal is consistent and synchronized with these initiatives. The
    Department is reviewing the Goal on an accelerated timeline in concert
    with other specific recommendations regarding, for example, the
    National Response Plan and National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The
    Interim National Preparedness Goal was released on March 31, 2005. The
    Department intends to release the final Goal within the next few
    months.
        Question. When will the final Goal be issued?
        Answer. The Department intends to release the Goal within the next
    few months.
        Question. What is the impact to State and local governments?
        Answer. State and local governments are already implementing the
    Interim National Preparedness Goal. In fiscal year 2005, grant
    recipients were required to align their homeland security strategies
    with the National Priorities contained in the Interim Goal. States and
    Urban Areas were also encouraged to adopt the capabilities-based
    approach for planning, training and exercises. The release of the Final
    Goal in the next several months will ensure these efforts reflect the
    important lessons of Hurricane Katrina, Rita and Wilma.

                             HURRICANE PAM EXERCISE

        Question. What lessons were learned from the 2004 Hurricane Pam
    Exercise and how were those lessons incorporated into the fiscal year
    2007 budget?
        Answer. As an initial matter, the President has included $20
    million in its fiscal year 2007 budget request to continue catastrophic
    disaster planning activities. This will allow FEMA to continue to
    review and enhance our operational capabilities as well as to provide
    direct technical support to certain high risk areas for localized
    catastrophic disaster planning.
        In developing the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan,
    ``Hurricane Pam'', a series of planning workshops were conducted in
    2004 and 2005. Planning topics considered to be the most urgent and
    complex were discussed by State and Federal representatives in the
    workshops such as hurricane pre-landfall issues, search and rescue,
    temporary medical care, sheltering, temporary housing, school
    restoration, and debris removal. Additional important topics included
    access control and reentry, billeting of Federal response workers,
    distribution of ice, water and power, donations management, external
    affairs, hazardous materials, temporary housing, temporary medical
    care, and dewatering of levee enclosed areas.
        Catastrophic planning is an iterative process and will incorporate
    products and results from the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic
    Hurricane Planning effort, lessons learned from the 2005 and 2006
    hurricane seasons, and results available from the New Madrid
    catastrophic earthquake planning activities. More specifically,
    activities planned include the following:
      --Continuing the planning initiatives for the New Madrid Seismic Zone
            and Southeast Florida and initiating catastrophic disaster
            readiness for response and recovery for additional high-risk
            communities;
      --Continuing the development and implementation of initiatives that
            support the critical areas of high-risk locality planning, mass
            care, temporary housing, decontamination, and logistical
            support. Specific proposals within each critical area will
            support topics such as the following;
      --Improving logistical support to include increased efficiency in
            delivery of Federal resources;
      --Ongoing evacuation and mass care services planning with high risk
            localities as well as cities and States that are identified as
            potential hosts for large numbers of evacuees;
      --Training and exercises to evaluate/implement operational
            requirements for conducting response and recovery activities in
            contaminated areas;
      --Developing and assessing innovative housing solutions;
      --Implementing technology enhancements that support the expedited
            application and delivery of needed assistance under the
            Individual and Public Assistance programs; and
      --Developing strategies to enhance the engagement and coordination of
            private sector resources in response and recovery operations.

                              GRANT DRAWDOWN RATE

        Question. By grant program, what is the award date, the obligation
    rate and the drawdown rate for funds for each quarter in fiscal year
    2005 and so far in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. The Department's principal source of homeland security
    assistance to State, local and tribal governments is through the
    Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). In fiscal year 2005, the HSGP
    was comprised of the six programs--the State Homeland Security Program
    (SHSP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the
    Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), the Emergency Management
    Performance Grant (EMPG), the Metropolitan Medical Response System
    (MMRS), and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP). In fiscal year 2006, the
    HSGP was comprised of the same programs with the exception of the EMPG
    program. In fiscal year 2006, the EMPG program exists as a separate
    program.
        During fiscal year 2005, the award dates for grants to the States
    and territories under the HSGP varied depending on the time required to
    review and finalize each individual grant award application. The first
    of the fiscal year 2005 HSGP grant awards were made on February 14,
    2005, with the last the fiscal year 2005 HSGP grant awards being made
    on June 1, 2005. During fiscal year 2006, only the EMPG grant awards
    have been awarded to date. Forty-seven fiscal year 2006 EMPG grant
    awards were made on February 3, 2006 and the remaining 11 fiscal year
    2006 EMPG grant awards were made on February 15, 2006. The fiscal year
    2006 HSG program awards are still pending review and final award
    decisions expected at the end of May, 2006, as stipulated by Congress.
        The charts below contain information on total award amounts,
    obligation amounts, obligation rates, drawdown amounts and drawdown
    rates by quarter for both the HSGP and the EMPG for fiscal year 2005
    and fiscal year 2006 (to date).

                               NATURAL DISASTERS

        Question. When natural disasters strike the United States each
    year, first responders go to the scene with the same equipment,
    training and exercise that they receive for terrorism.
        Has DHS considered including natural disasters as part of the risk
    criteria for grant funding distribution?
        Answer. The statutory intent of the State Homeland Security Program
    (SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) is focused on
    enhancing capabilities to address Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
    Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE), agriculture, and cyber terrorism
    incidents, therefore, natural disaster risk is not included. As many
    States and localities remain ill-prepared for the unique detection,
    prevention, and response aspects of terrorism, homeland security grant
    programs should continue their focus on terrorism-related threats--
    though many of these capabilities are of great value for natural
    disaster response.
        A number of other DHS grant programs--including the Emergency
    Management Performance Grant Program, Citizen Corps Program, and the
    Metropolitan Medical Response System Program--are more all-hazard in
    nature. These programs are targeted to particular constituencies such
    as emergency management, community preparedness, or public health and
    medical communities but support preparedness activities across the full
    range of natural and manmade hazards.
        Question. What was the result, including any obstacles encountered?
        Answer. Congress has rejected language that would encourage State
    and local emergency managers to also address planning for homeland
    security threats. This may serve to perpetuate a lack of coordination
    between planning for natural disasters and terrorism-related events. In
    addition, the program has encountered difficulty in defining clear
    goals and objectives.

                        TRANSIENT POPULATIONS ACCOUNTING

        Question. How, specifically, are transient populations accounted
    for in grant programs where funds are distributed based on risk? If
    this answer is classified, please provide it in that format.
        Answer. The graphic below illustrates the risk methodology used in
    the process to determine eligibility for the fiscal year 2006 Urban
    Areas Security Initiative. In May 2005, DHS hosted a one-day
    stakeholders meeting in Washington, DC to solicit input and feedback on
    the fiscal year 2005 risk formula used to determine eligible urban
    areas and associated funding allocations for the UASI Program. Several
    of the recommendations from those stakeholders were incorporated into
    the fiscal year 2006 formula, including data on transient populations
    (e.g., tourists and commuters).

                    EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS

        Question. Emergency Management Performance Grants are proposed to
    be cut by $13 million, 7 percent, in the fiscal year 2007 budget.
    Secretary Chertoff recently commented to the Emergency Managers that
    paying for State and local personnel expenses is not in the Federal
    interest. EMPG has traditionally supported personnel expenses so that
    local communities would have the manpower to plan and coordinate.
    Additionally, a report to Congress by the Secretary, entitled The
    Nationwide Plan Review, provides a status on catastrophic planning in
    all States and in the Nation's largest urban areas. Overall, States and
    large cities report they lack confidence in their own ability to manage
    catastrophic events.. Federal seed money that is matched with State and
    local dollars makes it possible to bring all the partners together
    across all disciplines of responders and all layers of government. The
    National Preparedness Integration Program proposed in the fiscal year
    2007 budget claims to make more robust the Federal side of catastrophic
    planning by using Federal Preparedness Coordinators to build and
    maintain positive relationships with identified partners.
        If local governments do not have the capacity to build an emergency
    management program, isn't it a Federal responsibility to help them?
        Answer. Fundamental to the mission of the Department of Homeland
    Security is the mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and
    consequences that stem from acts of terrorism and natural disasters.
    This mission however, is a shared responsibility and a shared
    commitment of Federal, State, local and tribal governments. As a
    partner in this effort, the Federal government is assisting State and
    local jurisdictions to identify and build essential capabilities.
        As part of its effort, the Department issued the Interim National
    Preparedness Goal in March, 2005. The final Goal will be issued within
    the next several months. The Goal provides a common framework to build,
    sustain, and improve national preparedness for a broad range of threats
    and hazards, regardless of origin. Achieving the National Preparedness
    Goal requires that the emergency management discipline play a vital
    role in support of the goal, as well as the implementation of the
    levels of capability described in the Department's Target Capabilities
    List. As the coordinator for disaster response operations, the
    emergency management discipline is essential to the prevention,
    protection, response, and recovery efforts necessary when disasters or
    other incidents of national significance occur at the State and local
    level, and when Federal assistance is needed.
        The fiscal year 2007 Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
    request is consistent with the Administration's $170 million budget
    request in fiscal year 2006. The Department continues to support the
    EMPG program's efforts to helps States achieve target levels of
    capability to sustain and enhance the effectiveness of their emergency
    management programs. The EMPG funding request for fiscal year 2007 is
    sufficient for States to continue to develop intra- and interstate
    emergency management systems that encourage partnerships among
    government, business, volunteer, and community organizations based on
    identified needs and priorities for strengthening their emergency
    management and catastrophic planning capabilities.
        Therefore, to sustain and enhance emergency management
    capabilities, including those in support of the goal, the EMPG program,
    in conjunction with the Department's other sources of homeland security
    funding for State and local jurisdictions, is designed to assist these
    jurisdictions achieve the target levels of capability to sustain and
    enhance the effectiveness of their emergency management programs.
        Question. It was stated in the fiscal year 2006 Senate Questions
    for the Record, ``Further, the integration of EMPG into the Homeland
    Security Grant Program umbrella results in synergies with other related
    homeland security assistance programs. In addition, this integration
    also has facilitated efforts by States/local jurisdictions to leverage
    homeland security assistance to accomplish goals and objectives in
    their homeland strategies.'' How specifically has this happened?
        Answer. The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) program
    was separated from the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and
    managed as a stand alone grant in fiscal year 2006 to expedite the
    Nation's emergency management community. G&T continuously evaluates its
    programs, including soliciting stakeholder feedback, to ensure that
    programs support better support Federal, State, and local goals.
        G&T is committed to ensuring that EMPG, HSGP, and other
    preparedness programs are aligned with the National Preparedness Goal
    and the National Priorities, which guide the goals and objectives in
    State and urban area homeland security strategies. EMPG funding will
    help align emergency management efforts with the Emergency Management
    Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard structure, the National Emergency
    Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program (NEMB-CAP), the
    National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management
    System (NIMS).

                                   CYBERSTORM

        Question. What lessons were learned from CyberStorm?
        Answer. The DHS cyber exercise team is currently compiling the
    lessons learned for our Cyber Storm Exercise After Action Report (AAR),
    but preliminary results indicate there was tremendous value gained by
    all of the participants. Cyber Storm provided a non-attribution
    controlled environment for our private sector, State, and international
    government and interagency partners to examine cyber incident response;
    information sharing mechanisms; procedures for establishing situational
    awareness; public-private sector decision making; and communicating
    appropriate information to the public during a cyber incident of
    national significance. The exercise brought together the response
    communities within the energy, information technology,
    telecommunications, and transportation sectors, as well as the National
    Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) and Interagency Incident
    Management Group (IIMG)--the interagency bodies responsible to respond
    under the Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP).
        While DHS, State governments, and many of the critical
    infrastructure owner-operators have significant experience in physical
    disaster and counter-terrorism incident response, never before have the
    cyber implications for critical infrastructure, as well as the
    collective cyber incident response community, been exercised
    simultaneously at the strategic and operational levels. The first-ever
    nature of the exercise scenario and player interaction provided a
    significant opportunity to operationalize the Cyber Annex to the NRP,
    raise awareness of the criticality of cyber preparedness at the senior
    leadership level, foster significant cross-sector collaboration, and
    identify areas that require future effort to ensure the Nation's
    preparedness. Highlights from Cyber Storm include:
      --The NCRCG and IIMG exercised their NRP responsibilities together
            for the first time;
      --State players worked multiple and challenging scenario events not
            normally encountered and fostered new collaboration levels with
            the Multi State-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
            US-CERT, and their own emergency management structures;
      --Faced with the challenge of simultaneous events, private sector
            players correlated incidents across sectors, with non-
            traditional partners, while concurrently responding to a robust
            incident pace;
      --Sector ISACs stressed their operational capabilities beyond their
            comfort zone, tested and validated prototype communication/
            situational awareness tools, and worked cross-sector
            coordination outside of the norm; and
      --International coordination between government CERTs tested formal
            and informal tools, thresholds, and protocols for crisis
            communication/collaboration for the first time that will
            provide the baseline and lessons learned for future
            cooperation.
        The interdependencies, gaps in response structure, and positive
    cross-sector collaboration (between infrastructure sectors, Federal and
    State, international and domestic) are all critical parts of Cyber
    Storm lessons learned and will have enduring impact throughout each of
    the player communities and in the collective.
        Question. How have those lessons been incorporated into the fiscal
    year 2007 budget?
        Answer. Most of the lessons learned were process or procedurally
    focused and DHS is moving rapidly to implement suggested improvements
    and changes. For those specific instances where additional funding or
    resources are required, we will prioritize these needs within the
    budget allocation process for this year as well as out years--again
    moving with all due expediency to meet critical needs for enhanced
    cyber security.
        Based on the lessons learned during Cyber Storm, National Cyber
    Security Division (NCSD)/US-CERT is dividing the corrective actions
    into two areas: funding required and no additional funding required.
        NCSD is currently focusing on the items that can be rectified
    quickly and without additional financial investment. These immediate
    actions include, but are not limited to, procedures, policy and
    practice development, and organizational changes. Since Cyber Storm,
    US-CERT has already implemented organizational changes based on
    exercise findings regarding resource limitations found in having
    multiple facilities perform similar functions, i.e. incident handling.
        Prior to Cyber Storm, NCSD had an existing project plan to test and
    evaluate incident databases and event correlation tools for
    implementation into US-CERT operations. These technology solutions are
    expected to resolve certain exercise lessons learned and were already
    designated as projects to be funded with fiscal year 2007 funds. The
    tools being evaluated will greatly enhance US-CERT's ability to track
    incidents, provide timely and calculated responses, and assist in
    providing overall situational awareness.
        Further, NCSD/US-CERT has additional government positions that will
    be filled in the near term. These government additions will help to
    guide the existing contractor staff and program tasks to completion.

                                  FIRE GRANTS

        Question. For FIRE grants, how many applications were received for
    fiscal year 2005?
        Answer. A total of 20,972 applications were received for the fiscal
    year 2005 Assistance to Firefighter Grant funds.
        Question. What was the total value of the fiscal year 2005
    requests?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2005 applications received under the fire
    grant program reflected a request for $2,642,756,563 in Federal
    dollars, though this does not reflect considerations of basic
    eligibility or how such applications would have been scored in the peer
    review process.
        Question. How many applications were funded and at what dollar
    value?
        Answer. To date, under the fiscal year 2005 fire grant program,
    5,731 of the applications received, totaling $586,377,025.00 in Federal
    dollars have been funded. As of this date, $21 million in fiscal year
    2005 funding remained available for award.
        Question. Describe what first responder missions have been
    accomplished (using measurable benchmarks) in fiscal year 2004 through
    fiscal year 2005, that justifies the proposed $252 million (46 percent)
    cut in fiscal year 2007.
        Answer. Since the programs beginning in fiscal year 2001, the fire
    grant program has provided nearly $2.5 billion to local fire
    departments. The program has not developed any benchmarks that directly
    measure the impact of the program at the local or national level.

                                     SAFER

        Question. For SAFER grants, how many applications were received for
    fiscal year 2005?
        Answer. The Department has received 2,985 applications under the
    fiscal year 2005 SAFER grant program.
        Question. What was the total value of the fiscal year 2005
    requests?
        Answer. Applications received under the fiscal year 2005 SAFER
    program requested a total of $1,145,822,782 in Federal dollars, though
    this does not reflect considerations of basic eligibility or how such
    applications would have been scored. The non-Federal cost (local
    contribution) share of the grant requests brings the total to
    $2,889,274,945.
        Question. How many applications were funded and at what dollar
    value?
        Answer. To date, the Department has funded 137 of the fiscal year
    2005 SAFER applications received totaling $61,356,528.00 in Federal
    dollars. Several decisions are still pending and it is anticipated that
    the total amount of grants will be near the program's $65 million
    appropriation.

                            INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS

        Question. How will DHS coordinate with the Department of Commerce
    on the interoperability grant program authorized in the fiscal year
    2006 Budget reconciliation package?
        Answer. In order to implement the interoperability grant program,
    the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) within DHS and National
    Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), located
    within the Department of Commerce are discussing options to determine
    the most efficient way to administer this grant program. One option
    under consideration is to delegate administration of the program
    through an Inter-Agency Agreement to G&T. This would leverage existing
    capabilities of G&T for administering grant awards to State and local
    units of government since 1998, and build on DHS initiatives to
    strengthen interoperable communications.
        Question. Will DHS recommend beginning the program in fiscal year
    2007?
        Answer. The specific timing of the program has not been determined
    as the ``borrowing authority'' is based on projected auction receipts,
    but initial implementation could begin in fiscal year 2007.

                                INTEROPERABILITY

        Question. What progress has been made on Interoperability standards
    since April 2005?
        Answer. Since April 2005, the Department of Homeland Security's
    (DHS) SAFECOM program, in partnership with the National Institute of
    Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Justice's
    National Institute of Justice (NIJ), have been working with industry
    and the public safety community to accelerate the development of
    Project 25 (P25) standards. Since that time, both the pace and scope of
    standards development activities have increased dramatically. Basic
    protocol standards that specify the functionality and capability of
    these interfaces have now been completed and are being adopted.
        The following list defines three of the standards and summarizes
    progress as of March 2006:
      --Inter-RF Subsystem Interface (ISSI).--The ISSI enables different
            manufacturers' radio subsystems to interoperate and allows for
            radios to roam from one system to another. Completion of the
            ISSI is progressing rapidly with Telecommunications Industry
            Association (TIA) balloting of a key ISSI protocol standard
            achieved in January 2006 and completion of the standard
            expected in March 2006. The public safety community can expect
            ISSI products to be available in 2007.
      --Fixed/Base Station Subsystem Interface (FSSI).--The FSSI enables
            voice and control information to be transferred between a base
            station and radio subsystem or dispatcher's console. A
            completed FSSI standard was approved publication as a TIA
            standard in January 2006. The public safety community can
            expect FSSI products to be available in late 2006.
      --Console Subsystem Interface (CSSI).--The CSSI connects a
            dispatcher's console to the radio subsystem and allows voice
            and control information to be transferred between the two.
            Further development of the CSSI is dependent on completion of
            the ISSI and FSSI protocol specification standards. The public
            safety community can expect CSSI products to be available in
            2007.
        Question. What are the impediments to establishing such standards?
        Answer. Time is the most significant impediment to the development
    and establishment of interoperability standards. The National
    Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-113)
    requires that Federal agencies and departments use technical standards
    that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies.
    The process for developing such voluntary consensus standards is quite
    rigorous and lengthy.
        OMB Circular No. A-119 defines the process by which the voluntary
    consensus standards body reaches consensus. The process is designed to
    allow for openness, balance of interest, due process, an appeals
    process, and consensus, which is defined as ``general agreement, but
    not necessarily unanimity, and includes a process for attempting to
    resolve objections by interested parties, as long as all comments have
    been fairly considered, each objector is advised of the disposition of
    his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the consensus body
    members are given an opportunity to change their votes after reviewing
    the comments.'' While designed to ensure quality, this process takes
    considerable time.
        Question. Is there a measure to determine if local, State and
    Federal entities are more interoperable than previously? If so, how is
    this measured?
        Answer. G&T and the SAFECOM program worked together to ensure that
    a tactical-level emergency interoperable communications capacity is
    developed and tested in 77 urban areas in the Nation. This initiative
    builds on an effort led by SAFECOM and G&T in fiscal year 2004 called
    RapidCom that focused on achieving tactical-level emergency
    interoperable communications in ten major urban areas. The fiscal year
    2005 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) requires each Urban Area
    (77 Total) to develop a Tactical Communications Plan (TICP). For those
    States and territories that do not have a designated urban area they
    must designate a multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area or region as a
    substitute. There are a total of 77 Urban Areas and multi-jurisdictions
    metropolitan areas that are required to submit a TICP. The TICP must be
    submitted by May 1, 2006 and these plans will undergo a review process
    led by subject matter experts, Federal officials, and peers. Once the
    review process has been completed each Urban Areas and multi-
    jurisdiction metropolitan areas will then have to test their plan via
    an exercise. At the conclusion of the exercise, an after action reports
    (AAR) will be created to present clearly the issues the public safety
    community must address to achieve meaningful communication
    interoperability. This AAR is a review of the major issues identified
    during the exercise and it will contain a list of recommendations to
    improve regional communication and interoperability. Included in the
    AAR, as an appendix, will be an improvement plan which will document
    specific steps the region can take to improve their interoperability.
    Through the TICP, exercise, and subsequent AAR process, the Department
    can examine potential shortfalls, fill communication gaps, and improve
    communication interoperability.

                       FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS COORDINATORS

        Question. How many Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPC) are
    currently on board? How long have they been on board?
        Answer. The Federal Preparedness Coordinator is a new position and,
    currently, there are no FPCs ``on board.''
        Question. Where are they located and what are their
    responsibilities?
        Answer. The current plan calls for there to be 11 Federal
    Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs). Ten of them will be based in FEMA
    Regional office cities, and co-located with the FEMA regional offices.
    The 11 FPC will be the Director of the Office of National Capital
    Region Coordination, who will be dual-hatted as an FPC and continue to
    be based in the Office of National Capital Region Coordination.
        FPCs are responsible for coordinating a wide spectrum of Federal,
    State, and local domestic incident planning, preparedness, and
    relationship-building activities in advance of any specific threat or
    incident. On a day-to-day basis, the FPC will undertake a range of
    activities to ensure that all homeland security partners within the
    FPC's assigned geographic areas of responsibility are prepared for an
    Incident of National Significance. The area of responsibility for each
    FPC will be the urban area where he or she is based, as well as other
    high-risk and high-population urban areas in the vicinity. This means
    that all Urban Area Security Initiative metropolitan areas in the
    country will have an FPC responsible for coordinating preparedness
    activities.
        The FPC's specific responsibilities related to preparedness will be
    to:
      --Contingency Plan Review.--Coordinate with a preparedness assessment
            work group for the review of urban area contingency and
            continuity of operations plans--and lead any subsequent follow-
            up action needed--per direction contained in HR 2360, to
            ``report on the status of catastrophic planning, including mass
            evacuation planning in all 50 States and the 75 largest urban
            areas.''
      --Preparedness Review and Monitoring.--Assess the status of
            preparedness in their areas of responsibility in accordance
            with the National Preparedness Goal and guidance provided by
            the Secretary and U/S for Preparedness.
      --Exercise Coordination and Review.--Coordinate planning for, and
            participate in, local, regional, and national-level homeland
            security exercises and drills.
      --Establish Local Relationships.--Build relationships with key
            stakeholders (DHS operational elements, other Federal agencies,
            State and local government officials, and the private sector).
      --Situational Awareness.--Maintain situational awareness of available
            resources and capabilities, existing operations, and possible
            threats in the FPC's areas of responsibility.
      --Public Communications.--Serve as a preparedness public
            communications focal point for DHS in the assigned areas of
            responsibility.
      --Special Event Planning.--Coordinate local area Federal support for
            designated Level I and Level II Homeland Security Special
            Events occurring within the FPC areas of responsibility.
      --Incident Response Planning.--Coordinate resource and operational
            planning in preparation for incident response, in concert with
            the FEMA Regional Director, and other Federal, State, local,
            tribal and private sector partners.
        Question. Are they co-located with other DHS or government
    employees?
        Answer. Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) will be co-located
    with FEMA regional offices. (Except for within the Office of National
    Capital Region Coordination (ONCRC), where the Director of the NCRC
    will be dual-hatted as an FPC.) In addition, each FPC will have a small
    staff, including detailees from across DHS, who will also be based in
    the FEMA Regional Offices. It is expected that FPCs will be integrated
    with DOD liaisons who will also work out of FEMA regional offices.
        Question. Do they coordinate or work with other DHS or government
    employees? If so, how and what specific results have come from the
    coordination?
        Answer. DHS Directorate for Preparedness field staff will work
    closely with the 11 Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) and their
    staffs, particularly the Office of Infrastructure Protection Protective
    Security Advisors (PSAs) and the Office of Grants and Training (G&T)
    Preparedness Liaison Officers. PSAs will have a ``dotted-line''
    reporting relationship to the FPCs, while the G&T Preparedness Liaison
    Officers will maintain their existing reporting relationships but
    collaborate closely with the FPCs and their staff. This will allow FPCs
    to be the lead Directorate for Preparedness staff in the field and be
    the primary interface for preparedness issues with State, local, and
    tribal governments as well as the private sector.
        In addition, FPCs will work closely with FEMA Regional Directors to
    ensure that, in the event of an incident, DHS would have a unified
    response team in place based on pre-established relationships. The
    importance of the relationship between the FPCs and FEMA Regional
    Directors is demonstrated by the fact that FPCs will be co-located in
    FEMA regional offices. The FPCs will work to leverage the efforts of
    FEMA Regional staffs, trusted relationships, and individual points of
    contact. FEMA Regional Directors are responsible for maintenance of
    Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) and Regional Interagency
    Steering Committees (RISCs) under the NRP. These resources can provide
    an abundance of information both during the planning and preparedness
    stages which will be the primary focus of the FPCs, as well as during
    incident response.
        Absent a specific threat or incident, the FPC will help to
    coordinate preparedness activities across DHS components and missions
    within his or her areas of responsibility. It is important that the FPC
    coordinate with and leverage key DHS field component entities: FEMA,
    Preparedness Liaison Officers, Protective Security Advisors, ICE, CBP,
    TSA, USCG, and USSS. The FPC plan recognizes the need to preserve
    existing DHS component entity field relationships and agency statutory
    roles. Therefore, existing component organizational structures,
    reporting relationships, and chains of command will not be changed by
    the introduction of FPCs.
        Outside of DHS, efforts will be made to build relationships with
    local Federal representatives with a focus on key NRP signatory
    agencies. Many of these agencies will have a large role in the Joint
    Field Office during an incident, and pre-existing relationships will
    prove highly beneficial. More specifically, FPCs will initiate
    relationships with two distinct entities within their areas of
    responsibility--the members of the RISC and the Federal Executive Board
    (FEB). Each of these bodies offers the FPC the perspective of key
    officials who support Federal incident management efforts.
        The FPC will also make a focused effort to build a strong
    relationship with the local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Health and Human Services (HHS)
    officials, the U.S. Attorney's Office, ATAC, Joint Terrorism Task Force
    (JTTF), and the Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Coordinating
    Officer (DCO). The DCO will be a conduit to U.S. Northern Command's
    (NORTHCOM) Joint Task Force (JTF) or JTF commander in the absence of an
    established JTF.
        The FPC will participate, as appropriate, in deliberations and
    crisis planning with NORTHCOM staff elements leveraging the DCO
    relationship where feasible. The FPC will, where appropriate,
    coordinate with DOD, other Federal, State, tribal, local and private
    sector stakeholders to ensure contingency plans are appropriately
    aligned.
        This interaction between the FPC and other locally-based DHS
    components, as well as other Federal partner agencies, will enable the
    FPC to leverage the capabilities of many important locally-based
    Federal assets in support of developing integrated and synchronized
    preparedness activities across the country.
        Question. How will the proposed new initiative, the National
    Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP), relate to the current FPCs?
        Answer. Specifically the NPIP includes about $7.5 million for FPC
    related activities at the local level. The mission of the NPIP is to
    create, organize, enable and monitor initiatives to integrate and
    synchronize national preparedness. The FPCs will play a key role in
    achieving that mission given that National preparedness is only
    possible when Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private
    sector and the American people are working collectively toward a shared
    goal of enhanced preparedness.
        Through the NPIP, FPCs will provide DHS with an important and
    functional field presence to collaborate and build partnerships with
    State and local government, and private sector homeland security
    stakeholders within the FPC's assigned geographic areas of
    responsibility and to ensure that these stakeholders are working
    together and are thoroughly prepared. Currently, such field level
    coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and DHS does not have always
    have visibility into how high-risk areas are prepared to deal with
    homeland security incidents.
        FPCs will change that by providing vehicles for regular
    coordination, strengthening the linkages between officials responsible
    for responding to possible homeland security incidents. Our Nation
    cannot afford for Federal, State and local government officials to have
    to build working relationships and common approaches to incident
    management amidst the fog of a major incident--such as Hurricane
    Katrina or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Instead, these relationships
    need to be built through frequent collaboration during steady State
    activities, as well as through common, well-understood, and practiced
    approaches to incident response prior to such an approach being needed.

                              TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

        Question. How many times has technical assistance been requested
    and for what purpose?
        Answer. Beginning in fiscal year 2005 to present (October 1, 2004-
    February 28, 2006), the Technical Assistance Division (TAD) of the
    Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has
    received 872 Technical Assistance (TA) Delivery Requests. Of these
    requests, 857 TA services were delivered as follows:
      --1 Arch Angel TA;
      --104 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR) TA;
      --8 Chemical Protective Clothing TA;
      --15 Continuity of Operations Planning and Continuity of Government
            (COOP/COG) TA;
      --6 Critical Infrastructure Mitigation (CIM);
      --6 Data Review Project Technical Assistance;
      --249 Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program
            (DPETAP);
      --2 Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) TA;
      --2 Emergency Response Synchronization Matrix TA;
      --9 Enhancing Grants Management Capacities for State Administrative
            Agencies (SAAs) TA;
      --3 Fusion Process Pilot Orientation TA;
      --7 Initial Strategy Implementation Plan (ISIP) TA;
      --209 Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program
            (ICTAP);
      --1 Mayoral Workshop;
      --1 Prevention and Deterrence Surveillance Concepts TA;
      --6 Prevention and Deterrence TA;
      --54 Program and Capability Review (PCR) TA;
      --14 Public Information Plan Development TA;
      --4 Regional Response Planning TA;
      --3 Regionalization Support TA;
      --42 Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Orientation and TA;
      --4 Terrorism Incident Annex (TIA) TA;
      --51 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP);
      --53 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Port and Mass Transit TA
            Program; and
      --4 UASI Regional Planning TA.
        Question. Have any applications for technical assistance been
    refused? If so, why?
        Answer. Of the requests received during this time (October 1, 2004-
    February 28, 2006), the Technical Assistance Division (TAD) of the
    Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and Training (G&T) has
    referred a small number of requests to other entities better suited to
    respond to the nature of the request, and has been unable to fulfill
    fifteen requests for technical assistance.
        Ten requests for DPETAP services have not been fulfilled in fiscal
    year 2006 as G&T has directed a higher proportion of its funding to
    grants. In addition, 5 requests for ICTAP service deliveries were not
    fulfilled due to the fact that the requests were submitted from the
    State level and the tactical program is funded to support only Urban
    and metropolitan areas.

                                   EXERCISES

        Question. How many exercises has the Preparedness Directorate been
    involved in? When, where and what was exercised? Who else participated
    (i.e. local, State, Federal partners)?
        Answer. The Preparedness Directorate has participated in 67 major
    exercises since February 25, 2003. Table A: ``Preparedness Directorate
    Exercises'' (below), is a listing of the 67 exercises by name, date of
    exercise, location, topic of exercise, and scope of participation. In
    addition to these major events, the Preparedness Directorate has
    provided direct support to more than 200 State and local exercises over
    the same period, including workshops, seminars, drills, tabletop
    exercises, command post exercises, and full-scale exercises.

                                                                              TABLE A.--PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE EXERCISES
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   No                               Exercise name                            Date                 Location             What was exercised?                 Who participated?
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Fiscal year 2006

    67.............................  Red, White, and Bloom......................  July 3, 2006.............  Columbus, OH.....  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                                 the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plan of Columbus,   evaluators
                                                                                                                                 OH.
    66.............................  Regions I & II Hurricane Preparedness Exer-  June 20-22, 2006.........  New York, NY.....  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                       cise.                                                                                     functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                                 2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                    partners
    65.............................  Operation Wildcat..........................  June 20, 2006............  Wilmington, DE...  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                                 the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plan of             evaluators
                                                                                                                                 Wilmington, DE.
    64.............................  Dallas/Ft. Worth Exercise..................  June 20, 2006............  Arlington, TX....  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                                 the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plan of Dallas,     evaluators
                                                                                                                                 TX and Ft. Worth TX.
    63.............................  College World Series Exercise..............  June 20, 2006............  Omaha, NE........  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                                 the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plan of Omaha, NE.  evaluators
    62.............................  Top Officials (TOPOFF) 4 Command Post        June 19-23...............  National Capital   WMD search and render safe;        Federal Interagency; State,
                                      Exercise.                                                               Region.            Continuity of Operations/          local, non-governmental
                                                                                                                                 Continuity of Government;          organization, and private sector
                                                                                                                                 Catastrophic incident response.    partners
    61.............................  Annual Airport Disaster Exercise...........  June 8, 2006.............  Nashville, TN....  DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                                                 the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plan of             evaluators
                                                                                                                                 Nashville, TN.
    60.............................  South Carolina Hurricane Isabella Full-      June 7, 2006.............  Charleston/        DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                      Scale Exercise.                                                         Dorchester/        the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                              Berkeley           Communications Plan of             evaluators
                                                                                                              Counties, SC.      Charleston, SC.
    59.............................  Region II Hurricane Preparedness Exercise    June 4-5, 2006...........  San Juan, PR.....  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                      (PR, VI).                                                                                  functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                                 2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                    partners
    58.............................  Regional IV Hurricane Preparedness Exercise  May 31-June 1, 2006......  Atlanta, GA......  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                                 functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                                 2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                    partners
    57.............................  Operation Helping Hand.....................  May 24, 2006.............  Los Angeles        DHS-mandated exercise to validate  State and local agencies;
                                                                                                              County, CA.        the Tactical Interoperable         Preparedness Directorate
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plan of Los         evaluators
                                                                                                                                 Angeles and Long Beach, CA.
    56.............................  New Orleans/Baton Rouge Full-Scale Exercise  May 23-25, 2006..........  Baton Rouge, LA..  Full-Scale Exercise to prepare     Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                                 for hurricane season; DHS-         agencies; Preparedness
                                                                                                                                 mandated exercise to validate      Directorate evaluators
                                                                                                                                 the Tactical Interoperable
                                                                                                                                 Communications Plans of New
                                                                                                                                 Orleans, LA and Baton Rouge, LA.
    55.............................  Region VI Hurricane Preparedness Exercise..  May 17-18, 2006..........  New Orleans, LA..  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                                 functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                                 2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                    partners
    54.............................
    53.............................  Region III Hurricane Preparedness Exercise.  May 3, 2006..............  Philadelphia, PA.  Coordination of critical response  Federal, State, and local
                                                                                                                                 functions in anticipation of       governments; non-governmental
                                                                                                                                 2006 hurricane season.             organizations and private sector
                                                                                                                                                                    partners
    52.............................  Gallant Fox IV Tabletop....................  March 6, 2006............  National Capital   Pentagon Force Protection          Federal, State and local agencies
                                                                                                              Region.            Exercise designed to practice
                                                                                                                                 and test Federal, State, and
                                                                                                                                 local response to an incident
                                                                                                                                 involving the Pentagon and
                                                                                                                                 surrounding region.
    51.............................  Blue Cascades..............................  March 1-2, 2006..........  U.S. Pacific       Infrastructure interdependencies   United States and Canadian
                                                                                                              Northwest.         in the Pacific Northwest region.   Federal, State/Provincial, local
                                                                                                                                                                    and private sector agencies
    50.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral IV................  Feb. 21-24, 2006.........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                                 interagency information needs
                                                                                                                                 through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                                 capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                                 spectrum of threat environments.
    49.............................  Mass Casualty Exercise.....................  Feb. 9, 2006.............  National Capital   Designed to assess and identify    Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            gaps in the U.S. Government's
                                                                                                                                 (USG) ability to mount a
                                                                                                                                 coordinated medical response to
                                                                                                                                 a mass casualty event.
    48.............................  Cyberstorm 2006............................  Feb. 6-10, 2006..........  National Capital   Homeland Security response and     International, Federal, State,
                                                                                                              Region             recovery mechanisms related to a   local, and Private Sector
                                                                                                              (geographically    cyber incident of national
                                                                                                              dispersed          significance.
                                                                                                              effects).
    47.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral III...............  Jan. 23-27, 2006.........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                                 interagency information needs
                                                                                                                                 through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                                 capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                                 spectrum of threat environment.
    46.............................  Catastrophic Assessment Task Force #1......  Dec. 10, 2005............  National Capital   Assess USG policy and resources    Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            as they relate to an influenza
                                                                                                                                 pandemic.
    45.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral II................  Dec. 5-9, 2005...........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                                 interagency information needs
                                                                                                                                 through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                                 capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                                 spectrum of threat environments.
    44.............................  Avian Flu Public Affairs Exercise..........  Dec. 1, 2005.............  National Capital   Designed to assess public affairs- Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            specific departmental
                                                                                                                                 preparedness, roles and
                                                                                                                                 responsibilities, and inter-
                                                                                                                                 departmental coordination
                                                                                                                                 relative to Pandemic Avian
                                                                                                                                 Influenza.
    43.............................  IIMG Pandemic Influenza....................  Nov. 29, 2005............  National Capital   Interagency coordination issues    Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            related to preparing for,
                                                                                                                                 responding to, and recovering
                                                                                                                                 from a pandemic influenza
                                                                                                                                 outbreak.
    42.............................  DHS Avian Flu Exercise.....................  Nov. 18, 2005............  National Capital   Designed to assess departmental    Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            preparedness, roles and
                                                                                                                                 responsibilities, and inter-
                                                                                                                                 departmental coordination
                                                                                                                                 relative to Pandemic Avian
                                                                                                                                 Influenza.
    41.............................  Determined Challenge.......................  Nov. 7-30, 2005..........  National Capital   Department and Agency (D/A)        Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            Continuity of Operations (COOP)
                                                                                                                                 preparedness.
    40.............................  Mercury 05.................................  Oct. 17-21, 2005.........  Australia........  Australian multi-jurisdictional    Australian National and State/
                                                                                                                                 prevention and response            Territory agencies
                                                                                                                                 capabilities; terrorism threats/
                                                                                                                                 attacks.
            Fiscal year 2005

    39.............................  Thor's Hammer II--Spiral II................  Sept. 12-16, 2005........  National Capital   National Security Space            Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            strategies to satisfy national/
                                                                                                                                 interagency information needs
                                                                                                                                 through timely delivery of
                                                                                                                                 capabilities across a wide
                                                                                                                                 spectrum of threat environments.
    38.............................
    37.............................  Coalition Warrior Interoperability           May 31-June 24, 2005.....  National Capital   U.S. combatant command and         Federal
                                      Deliverable 2005.                                                       Region.            international community
                                                                                                                                 investigation of command,
                                                                                                                                 control, communications, and
                                                                                                                                 computers (C4) solutions that
                                                                                                                                 focus on relevant and timely
                                                                                                                                 objectives for enhancing
                                                                                                                                 coalition interoperability.
    36.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-4.............  May 26, 2005.............  National Capital   Focused on continuity programs     Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            against the backdrop of a
                                                                                                                                 credible nuclear threat/incident.
    35.............................  Top Officials 3 (T3) Large Scale Game......  May 3-5, 2005............  National Capital   Designed to explore strategies to  International, Federal, State,
                                                                                                              Region.            positively address the medium-     Tribal, and local governments
                                                                                                                                 and long-term impacts and          and private sector
                                                                                                                                 recovery issues from an Incident
                                                                                                                                 of National Significance.
    34.............................  T3 Full Scale Exercise.....................  April 4-8, 2005..........  National Capital   Prevention and response in the     International, Federal, State,
                                                                                                              Region.            context of a chemical and          Tribal, and local governments
                                                                                                                                 biological attack on U.S. soil;    and private sector
                                                                                                                                 included cyber activity.
    33.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-3.............  Mar. 10, 2005............  National Capital   Critical homeland security policy  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            and operational issues in the
                                                                                                                                 context of a chemical event.
    32.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-2.............  Feb. 15, 2005............  National Capital   Critical homeland security policy  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            and operational issues in the
                                                                                                                                 context of a biological even.
    31.............................  Port of NY/NJ Economic Strategy Wargame....  Feb. 9-11, 2005..........  New York.........  Designed to better define the      Federal, State, local and private
                                                                                                                                 primary issues of concern for      sector
                                                                                                                                 private industry when national
                                                                                                                                 security issues arise within a
                                                                                                                                 vital economic arena.
    30.............................  Chemical Security Exercise.................  Feb. 1-2, 2005...........  National Capital   Vulnerabilities and threats to     Private sector
                                                                                                              Region.            chemical infrastructures.
    29.............................  Silver Links Tabletop......................  Dec. 1, 2004.............  Toronto, Canada..  Regional, cross-border             United States and Canadian
                                                                                                                                 infrastructure interdependencies   Federal, State/Provincial,
                                                                                                                                 and associated vulnerabilities     local, and private Sector
                                                                                                                                 in the Great Lakes/Northeast       agencies
                                                                                                                                 Region.
    28.............................  Senior Officials Exercise 05-01............  Nov. 10, 2004............  National Capital   Critical homeland security policy  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            and operational issues generated
                                                                                                                                 by a hypothetical terrorist
                                                                                                                                 suicide bombing campaign in the
                                                                                                                                 United States.
    27.............................  Corporate Emergency Exercise...............  Nov. 4, 2004.............  Baytown, TX......  Private Sector coordination with   Private sector
                                                                                                                                 DHS during a terrorism incident
                                                                                                                                 at a chemical facility.
    26.............................  Silver Links Workshop......................  Nov. 4, 2004.............  Quebec City,       Regional, cross-border             United States and Canadian
                                                                                                              Quebec.            infrastructure interdependencies   Federal, State/Provincial,
                                                                                                                                 and associated vulnerabilities     local, and private Sector
                                                                                                                                 in the Great Lakes/Northeast       agencies
                                                                                                                                 Region.
    25.............................  Purple Crescent II.........................  Oct. 26-27, 2004.........  New Orleans, LA..  Regional interdependency           Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                                                 shortfalls aimed at making the     sector
                                                                                                                                 New Orleans region disaster
                                                                                                                                 resistant.
    24.............................  Multilateral Cybersecurity Conference......  Oct. 20-22, 2004.........  Berlin, Germany..  Designed to discuss and highlight  International (15 countries)
                                                                                                                                 issues related to the formation
                                                                                                                                 of a Global Watch and Warning
                                                                                                                                 Network among national level
                                                                                                                                 cyber security organizations.
            Fiscal year 2004

    23.............................  National Capital Region Council of           Sept. 27, 2004...........  National Capital   National Capital Region's          Federal, State and local
                                      Governments.                                                            Region.            capability to respond to
                                                                                                                                 multiple simulated weapons of
                                                                                                                                 mass destruction (WMD) terrorist
                                                                                                                                 attacks.
    22.............................  Senior Officials Exercise #4...............  Aug. 19, 2004............  National Capital   Impacts of a ``Redo'' threat       Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            condition, anticipating and
                                                                                                                                 minimizing unintended
                                                                                                                                 consequences associated with
                                                                                                                                 going tom ``Red,'' and
                                                                                                                                 developing an Interagency
                                                                                                                                 Incident Management Group (IIMG)
                                                                                                                                 ``playbook'' for elevating the
                                                                                                                                 Homeland Security Advisory
                                                                                                                                 System (HSAS) to ``Red.''.
    21.............................  Determined Promise 04......................  Aug. 4-5, 2004...........  Richmond, VA.....  Prevention and response in the     Federal, State and local
                                                                                                                                 context of air threats to
                                                                                                                                 Alaska, Canada, and the
                                                                                                                                 continental U.S., chemical
                                                                                                                                 attacks in VA and CA, and a
                                                                                                                                 radiological release in CA.
    20.............................  Cybersecurity Workshop.....................  Aug. 4-5, 2004...........  National Capital   Courses of actions among           Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            organizations involved in
                                                                                                                                 responding to cyber attacks.
    19.............................
    18.............................  Joint Warrior Interoperability Deliverable.  June 14-25, 2004.........  National Capitol   Designed to give Federal D/As the  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            opportunity to view and assess
                                                                                                                                 technologies that allow for
                                                                                                                                 interagency information sharing.
    17.............................  Cascade Fury II............................  May 25-27, 2004..........  Alta, Wyoming....  Coordinated crisis management      Federal and State
                                                                                                                                 support to quickly restore the
                                                                                                                                 transportation infrastructure in
                                                                                                                                 the event of a major disaster or
                                                                                                                                 emergency.
    16.............................  Forward Challenge 04.......................  May 11-13, 2004..........  National Capital   Federal COOP Plans in the context  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            of a failed terrorist attack in
                                                                                                                                 the National Capital Region.
    15.............................  T3 CPX.....................................  May 10-13, 2004..........  National Capital   Designed to give key leadership    Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            the opportunity to analyze
                                                                                                                                 threats and direct prevention
                                                                                                                                 counter measures, protect
                                                                                                                                 economic security and critical
                                                                                                                                 infrastructures, and develop
                                                                                                                                 appropriate Courses of Action.
    14.............................  Eligible Receiver..........................  May 3-7, 2004............  National Capital   Designed to exercise the           Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            Interagency in homeland defense
                                                                                                                                 and homeland security processes
                                                                                                                                 in the context of a nuclear
                                                                                                                                 threat.
    13.............................  California Spills of National Significance.  Apr. 20-22, 2004.........  California.......  Initial National Response Plan     Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                                                 (NRP) and the National Incident    sector
                                                                                                                                 Management System. Other key
                                                                                                                                 areas that were addressed:
                                                                                                                                 economic, national security,
                                                                                                                                 cross border, and political
                                                                                                                                 issues.
    12.............................  Dark Portal................................  Feb. 24, 2004............  National Capital   Designed to address the potential  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            impact of a combination of cyber
                                                                                                                                 and physical attacks against
                                                                                                                                 various critical infrastructures
                                                                                                                                 with the intent to undermine
                                                                                                                                 domestic and international
                                                                                                                                 confidence in the U.S. banking
                                                                                                                                 and finance sector.
    11.............................  Thor's Hammer Wargame......................  Feb. 23-27, 2004.........  National Capital   National Security Space--concept   Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            of operations (CONOPS) and
                                                                                                                                 investment strategy.
    10.............................  Unified Defense 04.........................  Feb. 14-15, 2004.........  National Capital   DHS incident management roles and  Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            responsibilities as defined in
                                                                                                                                 Homeland Security Presidential
                                                                                                                                 Directive-5 and validation of
                                                                                                                                 the Initial NRP and National
                                                                                                                                 Information Management System
                                                                                                                                 (NIMS).
    9..............................  Senior Officials Exercise #2...............  Jan. 30, 2004............  National Capital   Designed to review plans that      Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            will guide a Federal response to
                                                                                                                                 a catastrophic WMD event in a
                                                                                                                                 U.S. City.
    8..............................  Operation Heartland........................  Jan. 27-26, 2004.........  National Capital   Policy-level issues inherent to a  Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                              Region.            terrorist attack on critical       sector
                                                                                                                                 transportation infrastructure
                                                                                                                                 focusing on the entire spectrum
                                                                                                                                 of security.
    7..............................  Scarlet Cloud II...........................  Dec. 19, 2003............  National Capital   Management and response in the     Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            context of a biological
                                                                                                                                 terrorist incident including:
                                                                                                                                 the application of Federal
                                                                                                                                 authorities, movement
                                                                                                                                 restrictions, issues in
                                                                                                                                 implementing a mass prophylaxis
                                                                                                                                 effort, and public risk
                                                                                                                                 communication and fostering
                                                                                                                                 critical continuing public
                                                                                                                                 support.
    6..............................  Scarlet Cloud..............................  Nov. 19, 2003............  National Capital   Management and response in the     Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            context of a biological
                                                                                                                                 terrorist incident including:
                                                                                                                                 the application of Federal
                                                                                                                                 authorities, movement
                                                                                                                                 restrictions, issues in
                                                                                                                                 implementing a mass prophylaxis
                                                                                                                                 effort, and public risk
                                                                                                                                 communication and fostering
                                                                                                                                 critical continuing public
                                                                                                                                 support.
    5..............................  Livewire...................................  Oct. 27-31, 2004.........  National Capital   Existing communications and        Federal, State, local and Private
                                                                                                              Region.            decision-making processes needed   sector
                                                                                                                                 to counter a well-planned, large-
                                                                                                                                 scale cyber attack.
            Fiscal year 2003

    4..............................  Determined Promise 03......................  Aug. 18-28, 2003.........  NV, CO, National   Designed to train USNORTHCOM in    Federal
                                                                                                              Capital Re-        homeland defense and Military
                                                                                                              gion.              Assistance to Civil Authorities
                                                                                                                                 (MACA) missions.
    3..............................  Top Officials 2............................  May 12-16, 2003..........  Seattle, WA,       Response to a simulated release    International, Federal, State and
                                                                                                              Chicago, IL.       of WMDs in two U.S. cities.        local
    2..............................  IAIP Tabletop Exercise.....................  Mar. 11, 2003............  National Capital   Coordination, integration, and     Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            information sharing processes
                                                                                                                                 and responsibilities.
    1..............................  IAIP Watch Exercise........................  Feb. 25, 2003............  National Capital   Coordination processes between     Federal
                                                                                                              Region.            the organizations making up and
                                                                                                                                 supporting the IAIP and to
                                                                                                                                 validate the IW/IC Standard
                                                                                                                                 Operating Procedure (SOP)
                                                                                                                                 document.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         FIRE SERVICE NEEDS ASSESSMENT

        Question. What is the current status of updating the national needs
    assessment for the Fire Service?
        Answer. The original needs assessment was published in December
    2002. A second study was requested in the 2005 appropriations. This
    study consists of 2 parts: the new national needs assessment and a
    matching analysis of Assistance to Firefighter Grants to needs
    identified in the 2002 study. The U.S. Fire Administration is
    completing final revisions to the needs assessment.

                          DETECTION OF ANIMAL DISEASES

        Question. What capacity do we have as a Nation to do animal disease
    surveillance (especially in response to avian flu)? Is the capacity
    robust?
        Answer. The leads for these efforts are U.S. Department of
    Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) and we defer
    to those departments for details of their efforts. The Department of
    Homeland Security assists these efforts in the development of
    diagnostic tests for use in the USDA National Animal Health Laboratory
    Network and strengthening the capacity (number of tests they can
    perform and time required to perform them) in these laboratories. The
    Department of Homeland Security also assists in the training of Foreign
    Animal Disease Diagnosticians and Practitioners to recognize foreign
    animal diseases introduced into the United States. With respect to
    avian flu specifically, supplemental funds were requested for the
    purpose of advanced development of rapid detection tests of animals for
    advanced surveillance at borders and ports of entry. The Department of
    Homeland Security also is the lead for the National Biosurveillance
    Integration System (NBIS) intended to provide near-real-time
    situational awareness of biological incidents, including animal
    diseases. NBIS is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase development
    plan. Planned NBIS surveillance data inputs will include data sources
    from both USDA, HHS, and DOI.
        Question. What system do we use and who is in charge of it? What is
    DHS's role in monitoring the system?
        Answer. We defer to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S.
    Department of Interior (DOI) for information regarding their systems.
    The Department of Homeland Security-led National Biosurveillance
    Integration System (NBIS) is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase
    development plan and is monitored by DHS personnel 24/7. NBIS provides
    near-real-time situational awareness to DHS through the National
    Biosurveillance Group (NBSG) of Federal agency partners.
        Question. Is the system connected to the public health system in
    real time?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security National
    Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) receives data inputs from
    both animal health surveillance and public health systems and provides
    near-real-time situational awareness to DHS and NBIS partners. NBIS
    surveillance data inputs will include data sources from and U.S.
    Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Interior, and Health and
    Human Services/Centers for Disease Control.
        Question. What animals are we testing (zoo, wildlife, livestock,
    domesticated animals)? When? And where do the test results go?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security does not perform
    testing of animals but refers testing to U.S. Department of
    Agriculture's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service and the U.S.
    Department of Interior.
        Question. If there is a threat, how is the information communicated
    to the local level?
        Answer. If there is detection of animal diseases, whether it is in
    the domestic animal population or in nature, the local surveillance and
    health networks will be the first to know. Every State has a State
    Health Director and a State Veterinarian. They work very closely
    together. They practice and exercise their programs together, which
    brings together a network of public and animal health professionals
    from the local level. Regardless whether there is an incident such as
    Mad Cow Disease, West Nile Fever, rabies, or bird flu, the public
    health and animal health specialists at the ground level respond and
    report to the State Health Department and State Veterinarian. The State
    agencies then report any potential threat to the Centers for Disease
    Control and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Protocols in place
    ensure that DHS receives the information.
        Question. What funds has DHS directed specifically toward the
    detection of zoonotic threats in non-agricultural species?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has not directed funds
    toward the detection of zoonotic threats in non-agricultural species.
    Statutory responsibility for wildlife species resides with the U.S
    Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior.
        Question. What type of coordination exists between Department of
    Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services and
    the Department of Agriculture to link veterinary diagnostic
    laboratories to do surveillance of interest to agriculture as well as
    public health?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead for the
    National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) intended to provide
    near-real-time situational awareness of biological incidents, including
    animal diseases. NBIS is currently in Phase II of its 3 phase
    development plan. NBIS surveillance data inputs will include data
    sources from and U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of
    Interior, and Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease Control.

               INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND INFORMATION SECURITY
                            OWNERSHIP OF KEY ASSETS

        Question. In a November 2005 report entitled Vulnerability
    Assessments for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, DHS
    identified 1,849 priority assets as part of the National Asset Data
    Base? The report notes that 80 percent of the Nation's critical
    infrastructure assets are owned by the private sector. How many of the
    1,849 priority assets are owned, operated, or administered by a foreign
    company, and how many of those foreign companies are controlled by a
    foreign government?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently
    working closely with the Department of Commerce to determine the
    availability of data on critical infrastructure and key resources and
    to determine ownership of these assets. The Department of Commerce has
    the responsibility for compiling and maintaining the data that supports
    the analysis of ownership issues. As yet, DHS is not in a position to
    determine which priority assets are owned, operated, or administered by
    a foreign company; or which of those foreign companies are controlled
    by a foreign government. As the availability of data to DHS improves,
    so will our understanding of this often complex and multi-faceted
    issue.

                                    STAFFING

        Question. Under 2SR, how many of the 803 total FTE funded for IAIP
    in fiscal year 2005 were transferred to IPIS?
        Answer. The total number of IPIS FTE transferred under 2SR was 430.
        Question. How many are currently on-board?
        Answer. The number of IPIS FTE currently on board is 286.
        Question. How many hiring selections remain?
        Answer. Of the 159 remaining hiring selections, 21 FTE are waiting
    for security clearances and 15 FTE were allocated to IPIS in fiscal
    year 2006.
        Question. What is the planned FTE level for IPIS in fiscal year
    2007?
        Answer. The planned FTE level for IPIS in fiscal year 2007 is 445.
    This is the same level as fiscal year 2006 FTE.

                    NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN

        Question. When will the revised National Infrastructure Protection
    Plan (NIPP) be completed?
        Answer. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) consists
    of the NIPP Base Plan and the 17 Sector-Specific Plans. The NIPP Base
    Plan is complete and was formally released on June 30, 2006. Subsequent
    updates and revisions to the Base Plan will be published, as necessary,
    to reflect changing infrastructure protection needs and increasingly
    refined best practices. As annexes of the NIPP Base Plan, the Sector-
    Specific Plans will be completed 180 days after the issuance of the
    NIPP Base Plan.
        Question. The budget proposes an increase of $39 million for the
    NIPP. The budget justification provides no information on this increase
    or how it will be used. Provide a full justification on the genesis of
    this funding, what it will be used for, and how it will strengthen the
    security of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) request for
    National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) activities will support
    the implementation of the NIPP Base Plan as well as the development,
    management, and implementation of the Sector-Specific Plans (SSP). This
    funding also will support NIPP programmatic operations and assist the
    Sector-Specific Agencies in the NIPP-related outreach and engagement
    activities across each of the Critical Infrastructures and Key
    Resources (CI/KR) sectors.
        The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) intends to leverage
    the NIPP framework to realize progress in several important areas.
    First, the development of a stronger and steadfast partnership between
    IP and the several Federal agencies assigned sector-specific
    responsibilities. Cooordinated development of Sector Specific Plans and
    other essential elements (such as vulnerability assessment tools and
    methodologies) will provide the underpinnings of a successful,
    efficient risk management program. Second, in partnership with other
    Federal agencies, IP will develop and put into place an essential
    element of risk management, i.e., consistent metrics. IP expects to
    further define structural elements of the NIPP, in order to enable and
    ideally expand participation in our overall risk management strategy,
    especially to private sector owner-operators, State, local and tribal
    governments, as well as to our Federal partners who are not designated
    sector specific agencies. This approach will accelerate and improve
    sector agency progress by facilitating the collection, normalization,
    and prioritization of assets and protection programs based on
    comparative risk across all 17 CI/KR sectors.
        The NIPP provides the framework and sets the direction for
    implementing a coordinated, national infrastructure protection effort
    and is based upon a risk management framework that takes into account
    threats, vulnerabilities and consequences when prioritizing CI/KR
    protection activities. The comprehensive NIPP will be supported by SSPs
    that will detail the application of the risk management framework and
    performance metrics for each of the 17 specific sectors. IP will
    support the implementation of protective programs using cross-sector
    and sector-specific efforts to assure a balanced and effective approach
    across all sectors and sub-sectors.
        Sector-specific partnerships are vital elements of the National
    Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and are integral to its success.
    IP intends to use the fiscal year 2007 funding to support the
    development and implementation of sector partnerships and related
    actions across the 17 CI/KR sectors with specific activities targeted
    at the most critical sectors. The list of actions below is the initial
    estimate of requirements. However, the proposed spend plan is designed
    to be flexible so DHS can address higher priority needs as the Sector
    Specific Plans required by the NIPP evolve over the coming months and
    identify critical sector shortfalls.
      --$1.0 Million.--Establishment and support for the State, Local, and
            Tribal Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to serve as a
            forum for State, local and tribal homeland security advisors to
            participate in CI/KR protection efforts.
      --$0.5 Million.--Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council
            (CIPAC) operations. Contractual support to manage and
            coordinate council activities and to ensure compliance with
            established policies.
      --$2.5 Million.--Education and Outreach Support. Assist Sector
            Specific Agencies (SSA) by developing and producing a Sector
            Specific Plan training curriculum and by developing and
            reviewing outreach and engagement plans and national CI/KR
            protection awareness programs to assure a balanced approach
            across all sectors.
      --$1.0 Million.--Program Management Support. Assist SSA with required
            reporting, development of response processes, identification of
            resource requirements and assistance with the preparation of
            budget support materials.
      --$3.0 Million.--Sector Specific Agency (SSA) Responsibilities.
            Perform sector-specific work supporting DHS SSA
            responsibilities for the nuclear, emergency services, and
            chemical sectors and identify protective program needs and the
            protective programs that satisfy those needs.
      --$15.0 Million.--Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset
            Protection Program (RAMCAP). Develop specific RAMCAP modules
            for the Water Treatment, Wastewater Treatment, Pharmaceutical
            Manufacturing, Mass Transit Rail, Mass Transit Surface, Freight
            Rail Yards, Bridges, Dams, Locks and Levees, and Pipelines
            sectors and sub-sectors.
      --$7.0 Million.--Targeted Comprehensive Reviews. Perform targeted
            Comprehensive Reviews of the Transportation (Commuter and Mass
            Transit Rail), Urban Commercial Zones (Metroplexes, e.g., Time
            Square, Vegas Strip, etc.), and Dams sectors and sub-sectors.
      --$9.0 Million.--IP NIPP Management Responsibilities. NIPP
            management, administrative, coordination, and support
            responsibilities including oversight activities associated with
            coordination of the Sector Specific Agencies.
        Question. Will the process to distribute this funding be
    competitive?
        Answer. This funding is devoted to the development and
    implementation of sector-specific plans and the necessary tools and
    techniques, including the application of a common risk management
    strategy and performance metrics for each of the 17 sectors. All of the
    planned procurements will be awarded using the normal contracting
    process. If Sector Specific Agencies have shortfalls that are of
    critical national interest and request assistance from DHS, we will use
    a yet-to-be developed process to evaluate the need and assign the
    relative priority for funding. When higher priority needs are
    identified as sector specific plans evolve and critical sector specific
    shortfalls surface, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP)
    intends to validate the needs and review potential funding
    alternatives. IP recognizes the probability that as this process
    unfolds, certain risks will be identified where the potential
    consequence of attack and/or vulnerability of an asset is not
    tolerable, even in the short term. Where such risks exist, IP will
    partner with Federal agencies, owner-operators, and State and local
    governments in order to identify and implement immediate risk-reduction
    measures.
        Question. What is a Sector Specific Partnership?
        Answer. Sector partnerships between government and the private
    sector are formed in all critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/
    KR) sectors via the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).
    This sector partnership model is used to promote and facilitate sector
    and cross-sector planning, coordination, collaboration, and information
    sharing for CI/KR protection involving all levels of government and
    private sector owners and operators.
        Question. What is a Sector Specific Agency?
        Answer. Sector-Specific Agencies are specific Federal departments
    and agencies identified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive
    (HSPD)-7 with lead responsibility for the protection activities in
    specified CI/KR sectors.
        Question. The NIPP budget refers to education and training of
    Federal, State, and local officials and private sector stakeholders.
    Who are the stakeholders? Please be specific.
        Answer. The NIPP security partners stakeholders include those
    Federal, State, regional, territorial, local, or tribal government
    entities; private sector owners and operators and representative
    organizations; academic and professional entities; and certain not-for-
    profit and private volunteer organizations that share in the
    responsibility for protecting the Nation's critical infrastructure and
    key resources (CI/KR). For example, in the Dams Sector, some of the
    stakeholders include the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
    Department of Interior/Bureau of Reclamation (DOI/BOR), United States
    Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Energy (DOE), United
    States Army Corps of Engineering (USACE), Tennessee Valley Authority
    (TVA) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), United States Coast
    Guard (USCG), four State dam safety officials (CA, NJ, WA, OH), Xcel
    Energy--MN, New York City Dept. of Environmental Protection--NY, New
    York Power Authority, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)--CA (Chair of SCC),
    National Hydro Association (NHA), and the United States Society on Dams
    (USSD) among many others. A similar diverse cross-section of
    stakeholders exists for each of the 17 CI/KR sectors.
        Question. How is this training different than what is provided
    through the DHS Grants & Training Office?
        Answer. The training referred to in the NIPP budget specifically
    deals with understanding the risk management concepts that are central
    to the implementation of the CI/KR protection activities outlined in
    the NIPP.
        Question. Why was the NIPP moved from Protective Actions to the
    Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership activity?
        Answer. This transfer of funding from Protective Actions (PA) to
    Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnership (CIOP) in fiscal year
    2007 is congruent with the request for increased funding within CIOP in
    order to consolidate NIPP and sector specific plan budget activities
    within the Directorate for Preparedness, Office of Infrastructure
    Protection (OIP). The OIP is responsible for 5 of the 17 Critical
    Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors: chemical, nuclear
    reactors, materials, and waste, commercial facilities, dams, and
    emergency services. In fiscal year 2006, PA is responsible for
    development and initial implementation of the Sector Specific Plans
    (SSPs) for chemical, nuclear, and commercial facilities. CIOP is
    responsible for the development and initial implementation of the dams
    and emergency services SSPs. CIOP also has responsibility for the
    development of the NIPP and implementation management and measurement
    for all 17 CI/KR sectors. The initial implementation of these plans
    will be completed in fiscal year 2006, causing a shift in execution in
    fiscal year 2007 from PA to CIOP to full implementation, sector
    engagement, outreach, measurement, and education programs, more
    consistent with the CIOP mission.

                        NATIONAL SPECIAL SECURITY EVENTS

        Question. The budget includes $5.413 million to support National
    Security Special Events (NSSEs) and other events. As the Federal
    coordinator of security at NSSEs, what involvement does the Secret
    Service have in determining the use of this funding?
        Answer. The ``Support to National Special Security Events (NSSEs)
    and Other Events'' line, funds DHS planning and support to Special
    Events as directed by the Secretary as well as Office of Infrastructure
    Protection Continuity of Operations planning, exercise participation
    and facilities support. Included in the roughly 1,800 ``special
    events'' that DHS assesses, prioritizes and supports each year--based
    on assessed risk--there are typically less than a dozen NSSEs . The
    Directorate for Preparedness' Contingency Planning and Support Division
    (CPSD) provides planning and resource support on an as-needed basis for
    NSSEs as requested by and in coordination with the U.S. Secret Service
    (which is the Department lead for NSSEs). This request ensures that IP
    can provide appropriate support to the Secret Service. In addition,
    CPSD identifies for the Secretary's approval and appointment USSS
    nominees with appropriate skills and training to serve as the Principal
    Federal Officials for NSSEs.
        Question. What types of protective measures are deployed with this
    funding?
        Answer. DHS tailors the nature and level of support to each event
    based in part on local capabilities. DHS support ranges from naming a
    PFO or Federal Coordinator and providing appropriate planning and
    threat support to deploying staff and their support equipment (e.g.,
    communications).
        Question. What happens to equipment deployed once the event is
    over?
        Answer. Deployed equipment is generally used by DHS personnel and
    returns with them. DHS requires that DHS-loaned equipment deployed in
    support of an event be returned to DHS following the event.
        Question. For fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 (to date)
    provide a breakdown of how this funding was expended, by NSSE.
        Answer. In fiscal year 2006, the activity entitled Protect National
    Security Special Events (NSSEs) and Other Events within the subprogram
    Field Operations and Support, funds the research, analysis, and
    planning to prioritize, rank and assess over 1,800 special events every
    year. The funds are not used to support NSSEs directly, but provide
    analytical and coordination functions in order to identify, coordinate,
    protect, and monitor events of national significance. The significance
    of these events requires special planning and coordination between
    Federal and private stakeholders ensuring that the required protective
    measures are implemented as necessary. The Office of Infrastructure
    Protection (OIP) develops a comprehensive list of special events, and
    the list includes a risk-based assessment and relative prioritization
    of each event that Department of Homeland Security, Department of
    Justice and other national, State and local authorities use to
    determine security requirements, as well as, plan incident response and
    management activities. After analyzing and prioritizing the special
    events, OIP recommends and coordinates the assignment of a senior
    Federal official for selected special events or NSSEs. When
    appropriate, OIP then develops and publishes, in coordination with
    national, State and local officials, an Integrated Federal Support
    Plan, summarizing the responsibilities and plans of the various
    stakeholders and authorities.
        During fiscal year 2005, there were only two National Security
    Special Events (NSSEs): the Presidential Inauguration (18 Jan 2005);
    and the State of Union Address (2 Feb 2005). Office of Infrastructure
    Protection (OIP) participation in both of these events was minimal. At
    this time, our financial system does not provide expense information at
    this level. If requested by the Secret Service, who has primary
    responsibility for NSSEs, OIP would provide support in the following
    ways:
      --Provide personnel to participate in pre-event planning;
      --Conduct Site Assistance Visit and Prepare Buffer Zone Protection
            Plan;
      --Provide radiation detectors to local law enforcement officials for
            use during the event;
      --Man a 24/7 operations center during events to collect and
            disseminate intelligence information;
      --Conduct training for local security personnel;
      --Conduct exercises to prepare for events; and
      --Provide Subject Matter Experts to event planners if requested.

                           VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

        Question. The budget proposed to reduce funding for vulnerability
    assessments by 42 percent, from $12.7 million to $7.382 million. Why is
    such an important component of the IPIS portfolio reduced by 42
    percent?
        Answer. The Administration fully understands the Committee's
    concern and fully agrees that vulnerability assessments are an
    important component of the Infrastructure Protection and Information
    Security portfolio. The funds requested for fiscal year 2007 are based
    on the level of assessment activity that actually occurred in fiscal
    year 2006 and takes into account the progress and efficiencies made to
    date in performing site assessments. The requested funding level will
    enable an ongoing program of thorough site assessments, yet, that level
    does not necessarily result in a concurrent reduction in the number of
    vulnerability assessments conducted during fiscal year 2007. The focus
    of vulnerability assessments has shifted to the Buffer Zone Protection
    Program (BZPP) in order to leverage the capability of State and local
    authorities to perform their own vulnerability assessment. IP will
    continue to provide guidance, technical assistance, and validation to
    ensure consistency and accuracy.
        The fiscal year 2007 budget expectation is based on a higher level
    of expertise and training of State and local authorities, the Nation-
    wide presence of Protective Security Advisors to reach out to critical
    infrastructure stakeholders and perform some vulnerability assessment
    data collection, and the benefits derived from increased efficiencies
    due to better-defined processes in data collection and staff knowledge.
        In addition, the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) is
    placing a greater emphasis on the accelerated development and
    deployment of assessment methodologies that are executable by owner-
    operators and tailored to specific types of infrastructure. This
    program, called RAMCAP, has now put into the field a number of
    ``modules'' that have proven highly effective at capturing critical
    data regarding consequentiality and vulnerabilities in a manner that
    supports normalization of results by IP.
        As these several more innovative approaches to the assessment
    mission begin to take effect, the need for IP to dispatched teams from
    Washington into the field. to conduct individual assessments has
    declined.

                               CHEMICAL SECURITY

        Question. Your fiscal year 2007 budget proposes $10 million for a
    Chemical Security Office, which will evaluate the risk of chemical
    facilities and establish security standards for them, but this funding
    would not be available until fiscal year 2007, further delaying the
    effort to secure chemical facilities. Why are you kicking this can down
    the road and not pursuing enforceable standards for the chemical
    facilities now?
        Answer. The Department is pursuing chemical security legislation in
    Congress. Assistant Secretary Robert Stephan testified before both the
    House and Senate about the need for comprehensive chemical security
    legislation. Additionally, the Department's Office of Legislative
    Affairs and technical experts from the Department have met with Members
    from both the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate on this
    important legislative initiative. The Department remains eager to
    support Congress as they work to grant DHS the authority needed to
    secure the chemical sector from terrorist attack.
        Question. Why hasn't the Department played a lead role by
    submitting legislation to the Congress?
        Answer. The Department continues to work with the Congress on
    chemical security legislation. The Department has outlined a number of
    core principles to guide the development of a regulatory framework:
      --Recognize that not all facilities present the same level of risk
            and that the most scrutiny should focus on those that, if
            attacked, could most endanger public health and cause economic
            harm
      --Develop enforceable, reasonable, clear, and equitable performance
            standards
      --Set performance standards based on the types and severity of
            potential risks posed by terrorists and facilities should have
            the flexibility to select among appropriate site-specific
            security measures that will effectively address those threats
      --Design any new authority to recognize the progress many responsible
            companies have made since 9/11 and build on that progress
        We hope the Congress will consider these principles as they work to
    pass this important piece of legislation. Additionally, the Department
    has not waited for legislation to assist in securing the Nation's
    chemical sector.
      --Prior to the formation of the Department of Homeland Security,
            responsibility for the Nation's critical infrastructure was
            scattered over various Federal agencies. Now one agency is
            responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government's efforts to
            protect critical infrastructure across all sectors, including
            chemical facilities
      --The Department works in close coordination with Federal, State, and
            local governments as well as private sector partners to develop
            and coordinate plans to protect our complex critical
            infrastructure systems
        This coordination has resulted in physical security enhancements in
    and around chemical facilities, including strengthening law enforcement
    coordination, improving access control, adding multiple buffer zones,
    implementing surveillance and detection technologies, and improving
    response and preparedness capabilities in the chemical, petrochemical,
    and related sites of immediate concern to help protect our Nation, our
    citizens and our way of life.

                                      FEMA
                                MASS EVACUATION

        Question. In February, Secretary Chertoff submitted a report to
    Congress, as directed in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
    Appropriations Act, entitled The Nationwide Plan Review, providing a
    status on catastrophic planning in all States and in the Nation's
    largest urban areas. Overall, States and large cities reported they
    lack confidence in their own ability to manage catastrophic events with
    their current plans. Not surprisingly, plans that have been updated
    and/or exercised recently (within the last 2 years) are considered, by
    the entity, more likely to be adequate.
        The fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations Act also
    included a provision that directs the U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security to develop guidelines for State and local governments to
    coordinate mass evacuation plans. Plans are to include, where
    appropriate, the pre-positioning of items such as food, water,
    medicine, and interoperable communications equipment that would be
    required in a mass evacuation. Additionally, the legislation encourages
    the Department to consider the need for such pre-positioned equipment
    in allocating first responder funds. DHS is commended for taking the
    provision to heart and including in the fiscal year 2006 grant guidance
    that States should include their needs for mass evacuation planning in
    their grant applications.
        The nationwide report is a clear indication that we have a lot of
    work still to do. In the State of West Virginia, the vulnerability in
    this case is exposed when you consider those fleeing from an incident
    in the National Capitol Region. West Virginia has a strong and capable
    Governor who constantly works to be prepared to unexpectedly host
    thousands and provide those passing through with food, water, and gas
    for the capable, and medications and other assistance for those with
    special needs.
        What is DHS doing to be ready for mass evacuations?
        Answer. While protecting its citizens is a responsibility of the
    State and local elected/appointed officials and is codified in State/
    local laws and statutes, DHS Preparedness grant programs can provide
    support for the development of State and local emergency response
    plans, which should provide for the evacuation of their citizens.
    State/local emergency response plans should clearly lay out timing
    parameters and roles and responsibilities associated with carrying out
    evacuations, as well as account for special needs populations and
    people who do not have their own means of transportation.
        FEMA can assist in a mass evacuation, in part, by providing
    reimbursement to local and State jurisdictions under the Public
    Assistance Program, in cases of declared Federal emergencies.
        Currently, under DHS leadership, a preliminary self-assessment has
    been completed by State and local officials of catastrophic planning in
    all 50 States, 6 territories, and our 75 largest urban areas under the
    Nationwide Plan Review conducted by the Preparedness Directorate and
    released on June 16, 2006. Currently underway is a second phase of this
    review, which includes site visits by teams of former senior State and
    local homeland security and emergency management officials to validate
    emergency plans, identify deficiencies, and make specific
    recommendations to improve catastrophic emergency planning, including
    evacuation issues.
        Prior to Katrina, FEMA, through its National Hurricane Program
    (NHP), had undertaken hurricane evacuation studies in 22 States,
    regional areas, and territories. Through these studies, NHP develops
    the products and tools for State and locals to conduct evacuation
    planning and operationally to conduct the actual evacuations. NHP
    develops the technical information that is used by State and local
    governments to develop an evacuation plan. This includes information
    such as the evacuation clearance time, transportation analysis, hazard
    analysis, and behavioral study. The evacuations and the planning
    involved are a State and local responsibility using the tools and
    products developed by the FEMA. The budget for the NHP is $2.91 million
    per year, and approximately $2.9 million goes directly to the States
    through grants.
        DHS/FEMA is also partnering with the Department of Transportation
    (DOT), whose primary role is to provide and coordinate transportation
    assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. The National Response Plan
    designates DOT as the lead support agency to DHS/FEMA for Emergency
    Support Function 1/Transportation, and calls for DOT to: (1) process
    and coordinate requests for Federal and civil transportation support;
    (2) report damage to transportation infrastructure as a result of the
    incident; (3) coordinate alternate transportation services; (4)
    coordinate the restoration and recovery of transportation
    infrastructure; (5) perform activities conducted under the direct
    authority of DOT elements such as those related to air, maritime,
    surface, rail, and pipelines; and (6) coordinate and support
    prevention, preparedness, and mitigation among transportation
    infrastructure stakeholders at the State and local levels.
        Question. Has there been discussion of using the Stafford Act
    Disaster Relief Fund to preposition water, fuel, food, and
    communications equipment for mass evacuations? If not, why not?
        Answer. FEMA appropriately uses the authorities of the Stafford Act
    and the Disaster Relief Fund to pre-position water, food,
    communications equipment, and other supplies and commodities to support
    the needs of communities and individuals in disaster situations;
    however, this material is not distributed for use until the President
    declares an emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act.

                            PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION

        Question. Please provide a list of grant awards made through the
    Pre-disaster Mitigation program?
        Answer. The following chart list all Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM)
    grants awarded (obligated) since the inception of the program in fiscal
    year 2003.

        PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2005
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Plans & projects   Management costs
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year 2003 Pre-Disaster          $89,662,430.94      $4,682,582.21
     Mitigation Competitive Program
     \1\..............................
    Fiscal year 2003 Disaster                3,419,889.00         115,680.00
     Resistant Universities Program
     \2\..............................
    Fiscal year 2003 Planning Set-          13,313,576.00  .................
     aside \3\........................
    Fiscal year 2005 Pre-Disaster          148,741,988.18       2,998,433.35
     Mitigation Program \4\...........
                                       -------------------------------------
          Total.......................     255,137,884.12       7,796,695.56
                                       =====================================
          Grand Total Pre-Disaster
           Mitigation Grant
           Obligations................             262,934,579.68
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2004 and
      fiscal year 2005.
    \2\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2004 and
      fiscal year 2005.
    \3\ Fiscal year 2003 funds that were awarded in fiscal year 2003 and
      fiscal year 2004.
    \4\ Fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 funds that were awarded in
      fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006.

           FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                AWARDED FED
                                           SUBGRANT TITLE          SHARE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
        CT............................  Elevation of Homes       $641,025.00
                                         in the Cosey Beach
                                         Area of East Haven.
        CT............................  Home Elevation             64,575.00
                                         Project in Milford,
                                         Connecticut.
        CT............................  Stratford Home             56,700.00
                                         Elevation Project.
        CT............................  Town of East Haven         75,206.25
                                         Elevation Non-RLP
                                         Home Elevation.
        MA............................  Metro Boston Pre-         224,962.50
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        MA............................  Town of Winthrop          145,503.00
                                         Flood Mitigation
                                         Project.
        MA............................  Quincy, MA Housing        449,935.00
                                         Elevation and
                                         Retrofitting.
        NH............................  Regional Planning         360,000.00
                                         Hazard Mitigation.
        VT............................  State of Vermont PDM-     450,000.00
                                         C Mitigation
                                         Planning.
        VT............................  River Road                140,440.50
                                         Mitigation Project.
        NJ............................  Carneys Point Pre-      1,162,923.00
                                         Disaster Flood
                                         Mitigation Program.
        NY............................  Nassau County Hazard      224,812.50
                                         Mitigation Planning
                                         Initiative.
        PR............................  Municipality of Las        45,000.00
                                         Piedras Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            30,000.00
                                         Humacao Pre-
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Assistant Program.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard Local         60,000.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Cano-  vanas.
        PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                         Salinas.
        PR............................  Pre-Disaster               30,000.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Catano.
        PR............................  Municipality of            39,000.00
                                         Yabucoa PDM
                                         Planning.
        PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                         Ceiba.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Aibonito PDM
                                         Planning.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard               56,250.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Barranquitas.
        PR............................  Municipality of            48,750.00
                                         Florida Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                         Patillas Planning
                                         Application.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Aquas Buenas
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                         Corozal.
        PR............................  Municipality of            52,800.00
                                         Coamo Local
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Maunabo Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of Toa        52,500.00
                                         Baja Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            73,500.00
                                         Guynabo Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of San        75,000.00
                                         Juan Multi Hazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            60,000.00
                                         Trujillo Alto
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Fajardo Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                         Loiza.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard               52,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         City of Guayanilla.
        PR............................  Municipality of            46,875.00
                                         Comerio Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Preparation of             52,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Yauco.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard               22,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Juana Diaz
                                         Municipality.
        PR............................  Municipio de Vega          30,000.00
                                         Alta.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Orocovis Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard               45,000.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Arroyo.
        PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                         Hatillo.
        PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                         Morovis Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of            41,250.00
                                         Naranjito.
        PR............................  Municipality of            36,750.00
                                         Penuelas Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipality of San        53,499.00
                                         German Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Multi-hazard               56,250.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Ciales.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Lajas Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard               45,000.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Anasco.
        PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                         Lares Mitigation
                                         Plan Application.
        PR............................  Municipality of            56,250.00
                                         Maricao Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        PR............................  Municipio de Las           48,750.00
                                         Marias.
        PR............................  Multi-Hazard               30,000.00
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Municipality of
                                         Rincon.
        PR............................  Municipality of San        52,500.00
                                         Sebastian.
        PR............................  Municipality of            45,000.00
                                         Villalba.
        PR............................  Municipality of            52,500.00
                                         Luquillo Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        MD............................  Prince George's            75,000.00
                                         County Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        PA............................  Township of Abington    3,000,000.00
                                         Flood Mitigation
                                         Project.
        WV............................  West Virginia Multi-    2,743,153.50
                                         Jurisdiction
                                         Mitigation Project.
        AL............................  Valley Creek            2,946,569.85
                                         Floodplain Property
                                         Acquisition and
                                         Demolition-
                                         Birmingham, Alabama.
        AL............................  Jefferson County,         226,641.75
                                         Alabama Pre-
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Acquisition Project.
        AL............................  Village Creek           2,490,315.26
                                         Property
                                         Acquisition and
                                         Demolition-City of
                                         Birmingham.
        FL............................  City of Plantation         14,775.00
                                         Fire Station Number
                                         1 Wind Retrofit.
        FL............................  City of Plantation         87,784.50
                                         Central Water
                                         Treatment Plant
                                         Shutter Retrofit.
        FL............................  Sarasota County            53,639.00
                                         Bishop Nevins
                                         Academy, Dome F--
                                         Hurri-  cane.
        FL............................  City of Plantation E       28,287.00
                                         Water treatment
                                         Plant.
        FL............................  Broward County            728,512.00
                                         Courthouse 201 SE
                                         6th Street.
        FL............................  City of Plantation         26,894.23
                                         Fire Station #2.
        FL............................  City of Plantation         25,358.00
                                         Fire State # 3 Wind
                                         Retrofit.
        FL............................  City of Plantation         18,639.63
                                         Fire Station #5
                                         Retrofit.
        FL............................  Sarasota County            84,585.00
                                         Bishop Nevins
                                         Academy, Dome A--
                                         Hurricane Shelter
                                         Retrofit.
        FL............................  Sarasota County            61,587.00
                                         Bishop Nevins
                                         Academy, Dome E--
                                         Hurri-  cane.
        FL............................  North Lauderdale--        112,500.00
                                         Wind Retrofit Bay
                                         Doors at Fire
                                         station #44.
        FL............................  North Lauderdale--        112,500.00
                                         Wind Retrofit,
                                         Municipal Complex.
        FL............................  City of Miami--Fleet      564,968.00
                                         Maintenance Garage
                                         Retrofit Storm
                                         Shutters and Door.
        FL............................  Bishop Nevins              41,240.25
                                         Academy Dome B Wind
                                         Retrofit.
        FL............................  Wellington Community       41,250.00
                                         Center--Wind
                                         Retrofit Project.
        FL............................  Miami-Dade Co.            654,598.50
                                         School Board
                                         Jefferson Annex
                                         Wind Retrofit.
        FL............................  City of Plantation         22,224.00
                                         Fire Department.
        FL............................  University of Miami     1,912,929.75
                                         Rosenstiel Medical
                                         Research Building.
        FL............................  University of Miami       429,975.00
                                         Wind Retrofit of
                                         Mailman Center for
                                         Child Development.
        FL............................  University of Miami       370,884.75
                                         Professional Arts
                                         Center Wind
                                         Retrofit.
        FL............................  Myers Telecomm.           171,093.75
                                         Center Wind
                                         Retrofit.
        FL............................  City of Opa-locka--     1,418,295.75
                                         Localized Flood
                                         Control.
        FL............................  City of New Smyrna        137,625.00
                                         Beach Drainage
                                         Improvement Project.
        FL............................  Elevate Dixie County       18,750.00
                                         Equipment Shed.
        FL............................  Volusia Elevation 4        52,612.50
                                         Cunningham Drive.
        FL............................  Broward County          2,433,750.00
                                         Oakland Park NE 6th
                                         Ave Drainage
                                         Project.
        FL............................  Broward County          2,625,075.00
                                         Oakland Park
                                         Kimberly Lake
                                         Drainage Pro-  ject.
        GA............................  Augusta-Richmond          146,307.75
                                         County, Hollywood
                                         Subdivision
                                         Acquisition
                                         Demolition Project.
        GA............................  State of Georgia          615,000.00
                                         Multi-Hazard
                                         Planning
                                         Application #1.
        GA............................  State of Georgia          746,250.00
                                         Multi-Hazard
                                         Planning
                                         Application #2.
        GA............................  State of Georgia          656,250.00
                                         Multi-Hazard
                                         Planning
                                         Application #3.
        GA............................  City of Thomasville       174,855.75
                                         Passmore Street
                                         Acquisition.
        GA............................  Chatham County            674,475.00
                                         Lamarville Woods
                                         Subdivision
                                         Acquisition
                                         Demolition Project.
        GA............................  City of Rome,             804,864.37
                                         Brookwood Avenue
                                         Housing Acquisition.
        GA............................  City of Savannah          370,023.94
                                         Acquisition and
                                         Demolition Project.
        GA............................  Columbia County--         271,333.50
                                         Ridge Crossing
                                         Drainage
                                         Improvements.
        GA............................  City of Jesup and       1,099,698.00
                                         Wayne County Law
                                         Enforcement, EOC &
                                         911 Complex Wind
                                         Retrofit.
        GA............................  Peachtree City--          167,437.50
                                         Tinsley Mill
                                         Condominium
                                         Drainage
                                         Improvement.
        GA............................  Bartow County Ember       313,537.50
                                         Way-Penny Lane
                                         Flood Mitigation
                                         Pro-  ject.
        GA............................  Bacon County CR 343       140,779.86
                                         Drainage
                                         Improvement.
        KY............................  Big Sandy Area             76,450.00
                                         Development
                                         District Pre-
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Project.
        KY............................  BRADD Regional             96,819.09
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        NC............................  Mecklenburg County         75,000.00
                                         Multi-
                                         Jurisdictional
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        NC............................  Kure Beach              2,713,218.00
                                         Acquisition and
                                         Demolition of a
                                         condominium complex.
        SC............................  North Charleston           24,446.58
                                         District--Mitigatio
                                         n Project-Hurricane
                                          Doors.
        SC............................  PDM Plan Monitoring        14,163.75
                                         and Follow-Up
                                         Activities.
        SC............................  Litchfield Beach           18,750.00
                                         Weir Replacement
                                         Project.
        TN............................  Rutherford Co.            165,022.50
                                         Midland Fosterville
                                         Rd. Mitigation
                                         Project.
        TN............................  Tennessee State           397,383.60
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        TN............................  Wilson County             154,656.75
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa   Grand Traverse Band        64,800.00
         and Chippewa Indians.           Pre-Disaster
                                         Mitigation Project.
        IL............................  Kane County RepLoss        75,000.00
                                         Area Mitigation
                                         Plans.
        IL............................  Kane County Critical      150,000.00
                                         Facility Audits.
        IL............................  Lake County               307,125.00
                                         Elevations.
        IL............................  Lake County             1,489,737.00
                                         Acquisitions.
        IN............................  City of Fort Wayne &       50,000.00
                                         Adams County
                                         Acquisition Project.
        IN............................  State of Indiana          500,000.00
                                         HAZUS-MH Planning
                                         Grant.
        Lac Vieux Desert Tribe........  LVD Tribal Pre-            18,813.00
                                         disaster mitigation
                                         plan.
        OH............................  City of Fairfield,      2,578,844.99
                                         Ohio Acquisition
                                         Project.
        St. Croix Chippewa of           St. Croix Chippewa         71,295.00
         Wisconsin.                      of WI Risk
                                         Assessment & Pre-
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Planning.
        WI............................  Kewaunee County All        27,000.00
                                         Hazards Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        WI............................  Lac du Flambeau Band       36,000.00
                                         of Lake Superior
                                         Chippewa Indians
                                         PDM planning grant.
        WI............................  Ho-Chunk Nation            55,130.00
                                         Planning Grant.
        WI............................  Calumet County All         22,500.00
                                         Hazards Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        WI............................  Florence County PDM        33,750.00
                                         Planning Grant
                                         Application.
        WI............................  Deer Park (Village)        99,090.00
                                         Acquisition Project.
        WI............................  Portage County            590,739.00
                                         Electric Utility
                                         Protection.
        WI............................  Pittmans Point and        103,950.00
                                         Barber Lane
                                         Mitigation Project.
        WI............................  Kenosha County Fox        297,300.00
                                         River Flood
                                         Mitigation Program--
                                         FINAL.
        WI............................  City of Middleton          12,909.00
                                         Clovernook
                                         Subdivision
                                         Waterway
                                         Stabilization
                                         Project.
        AR............................  Fairview Safe Room        663,495.75
                                         Project.
        AR............................  Euper Lane                441,970.50
                                         Elementary Safe
                                         Room.
        AR............................  Ballman Elementary        441,970.50
                                         Safe Room.
        AR............................  Trusty Elementary         441,970.50
                                         Safe Room.
        AR............................  Bonneville Safe Room      441,970.50
        AR............................  Sutton Elementary         441,970.50
                                         Safe Room.
        AR............................  Beard Elementary          441,970.50
                                         Safe Room.
        AR............................  Albert Pike               441,970.50
                                         Elementary Safe
                                         Room.
        AR............................  Spradling Elementary      441,970.50
                                         Safe Room.
        AR............................  AR. Planning........      455,109.75
        NM............................  County of Torrance         29,250.00
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        TX............................  Texas Multihazard         225,000.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        TX............................  City of Jersey          1,507,005.00
                                         Village Home
                                         Elevation Project 2.
        TX............................  PDM-03-Z-02.........    2,595,429.48
        TX............................  PDM-03-Z-01.........    2,969,373.75
        TX............................  PDM-03-G-01.........    1,477,686.23
        TX............................  Revised 200 Magnolia       94,725.00
                                         Rd.
        IA............................  Farley Pre-Disaster         1,131.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Mechanicsville Pre-         1,508.25
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Clinton Pre-Disaster        6,031.50
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Clinton County Pre-         6,031.50
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Preston Pre-Disaster        1,130.96
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Cedar County Pre-           6,031.50
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Tipton Pre-Disaster         1,507.50
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  West Branch Pre-            1,507.50
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Epworth Pre-Disaster        1,130.96
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  DeWitt Pre-Disaster         1,507.50
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Cascade Pre-Disaster        1,507.50
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  City of Anthon Pre          4,500.00
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Planning.
        IA............................  Hornick Pre-Disaster        4,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Lawton Pre-Disaster         4,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Moville Pre-Disaster        4,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Sergeant Bluff Pre-         4,500.00
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Sloan Pre-Disaster          4,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        IA............................  Woodbury County Pre-        4,500.00
                                         Disaster Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Hazard Mitigation           5,250.00
                                         Plan Update for the
                                         City of Hudson.
        IA............................  City of Glidden             2,625.00
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  City of Rippey              1,875.00
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  City of Lamont              5,250.00
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan Update.
        IA............................  City of Perry PDM           3,750.00
                                         Planning.
        IA............................  City of Paton, Iowa--       2,499.75
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        IA............................  Cedar Falls               450,000.00
                                         Utilities Flood
                                         Protection Project.
        KS............................  City of Olathe            765,000.00
                                         Effluent Pump
                                         Station.
        MO............................  Stockton Community        175,500.00
                                         Center/Library Safe
                                         Room.
        MO............................  Pierce City Fire          119,700.00
                                         Station Safe Room.
        MO............................  Pierce City Pre-           31,500.00
                                         Disaster Hazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CO............................  City of Fort Collins    2,697,188.00
                                         Spring Creek Basin
                                         Mitigation projects.
        MT............................  Petroleum County Un-       17,550.00
                                         Interruptible Power
                                         Supply.
        UT............................  J. Willard Marriott     2,994,037.76
                                         Library, University
                                         of Utah, Seismic
                                         Upgrade.
        WY............................  Flood Control           1,593,514.87
                                         Improvements of I-
                                         180 & Morrie Ave.
                                         Crow Creek
                                         Crossings.
        American Samoa................  Fagaalu Village,          665,673.00
                                         American Samoa
                                         Flood Hazard
                                         Mitigation Project.
        American Samoa................  Pago Pago village,      2,150,979.00
                                         American Samoa
                                         Flood Hazard
                                         Mitigation Project.
        AZ............................  Pima County Hazard         93,750.00
                                         Mitigation Project.
        AZ............................  Local Hazard              413,565.00
                                         Mitigation Planning.
        AZ............................  Pima County/Canada      3,000,000.00
                                         del Oro Flood
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Pro-  ject.
        CA............................  State of California     1,734,798.75
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Planning Program.
        CA............................  Sonoma County Pre-        224,085.35
                                         Disaster
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan-
                                         ning.
        CA............................  San Diego County          603,761.25
                                         Multi-
                                         jurisdictional
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  Ventura County             81,000.00
                                         Regional
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  ABAG San Francisco        450,000.00
                                         Bay Area Pre-
                                         Disaster Hazards
                                         Mitigation Planning
                                         Project.
        CA............................  Cities of Huntington      101,251.71
                                         Beach & Fountain
                                         Valley Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  Los Angeles County         97,500.00
                                         Standard Multi-
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan (DMA 2000 HMP).
        CA............................  Sacramento County          77,344.73
                                         All Hazards
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  City of Redlands          115,828.21
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  UC Berkeley, Loss         287,055.00
                                         Estimation Model
                                         and Multi-Hazard
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Development.
        CA............................  California Fire           643,500.00
                                         Alliance Community
                                         Planning Project
                                         for hundreds of
                                         LHMP's.
        CA............................  City of Rancho             22,837.50
                                         Cucamonga Hazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  Yuba County Hazard      1,132,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  City of Los Angeles       400,000.00
                                         Local Hazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        CA............................  City of Napa Borreo       654,700.35
                                         Building Seismic
                                         Retrofit Project.
        CA............................  County of Sacramento    1,400,267.25
                                         Flood Mitigation
                                         Grant Program.
        CA............................  Urban Wildland            244,087.50
                                         Interface Network--
                                         UWIN Redlands.
        CA............................  Lake City-Humbug          114,369.01
                                         Roadside Fuel break.
        CA............................  Empire Mine Fuel          157,265.17
                                         break Project.
        Cortina Indian Rancheria......  Cortina Indian             83,475.00
                                         Rancheria PDM
                                         Planning--October
                                         2003.
        Hopland Band of Pomo Indians..  Hopland Tribe              32,600.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        Mooretown Rancheria...........  Mooretown Rancheria       193,142.25
                                         Pre-Disaster
                                         Mitigation Project.
        Northern Mariana Islands......  CNMI Fire Station         120,292.00
                                         Roll-Up Doors
                                         Retrofit.
        Confederated Tribes of the      Umatilla Indian           111,173.00
         Umatilla Indian Reservation.    Reservation Multi-
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        ID............................  Canyon, Ada, Elmore       103,162.00
                                         Co. All Natural
                                         Hazard Assessment
                                         and Mitigation Plan.
        OR............................  Oregon University       2,841,978.75
                                         System: Earthquake
                                         Building
                                         Rehabilitation 2003.
        OR............................  Oregon Mid/Southern       374,719.50
                                         Willamette Valley
                                         Multi-jurisdiction
                                         Natural Hazards
                                         Plan.
        OR............................  Clackamas County          204,000.00
                                         CCOM/EOC Seismic
                                         Upgrade Project.
        OR............................  Clackamas County Tri-     249,967.50
                                         City Wastewater
                                         Treatment Facility
                                         Seismic Upgrade
                                         Project.
        OR............................  City of Oregon City       682,500.00
                                         Mountain view
                                         Reservoir Seismic
                                         Retrofit.
        OR............................  City of Canby/Canby       229,275.00
                                         Telephone Central
                                         Offices Seismic
                                         Upgrade.
        Shoshone-Bannock Tribe........  Fort Hall All              30,000.00
                                         Hazards Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        Skokomish Indian Tribe........  Skokomish Multi-          128,233.00
                                         Hazard Pre-Disaster
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         2004.
        WA............................  Snohomish County          150,000.00
                                         Natural Hazard
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        WA............................  Grays Harbor County        50,000.00
                                         Comprehensive
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        WA............................  Pre-Disaster               37,500.00
                                         Mitigation Plan.
        WA............................  Thurston County           371,962.00
                                         Salmon Creek Basin
                                         Elevation Project.
                                                             ---------------
          Total Plans and Projects for  ....................   89,662,430.94
           Fiscal Year 2003 PDM
           Competitive.
                                                             ===============
    MANAGEMENT COSTS:
        CT............................  CT PDMC Management         83,750.63
                                         Costs 10 percent.
        MA............................  Commonwealth of            56,568.97
                                         Massachusetts 2003
                                         PDM-C Management
                                         Costs Application.
        NH............................  NH Management Cost..       36,000.00
        VT............................  State Management           56,703.24
                                         Costs.
        NJ............................  Grants Management          29,349.00
                                         Costs.
        AL............................  AEMA Management           867,450.00
                                         Costs.
        FL............................  State of Florida          500,631.75
                                         Department of
                                         Community Affairs,
                                         Division of
                                         Emergency
                                         Management.
        GA............................  Management of State       566,493.80
                                         of Georgia PDM-C.
        NC............................  NCDEM PDM Grant           216,843.00
                                         fiscal year 2003
                                         Management Cost.
        TN............................  Tennessee Technical        70,640.00
                                         Assistance and
                                         Management Costs.
        IL............................  IEMA management            63,000.00
                                         costs.
        OH............................  Ohio EMA TA/              257,884.00
                                         Management Cost.
        WI............................  State PDM-C               132,609.00
                                         Management Costs.
        AR............................  Technical Assistance/     283,916.15
                                         Management Costs 2.
        IA............................  State of Iowa              53,177.54
                                         Management Costs
                                         Application.
        CO............................  State of Colorado TA/      56,250.00
                                         Management Costs.
        UT............................  State of Utah PDM-C        50,000.04
                                         Management Costs.
        WY............................  State of Wyoming           23,902.73
                                         PDMC-2003 Technical
                                         Assistance.
        American Samoa................  Territorial               281,665.00
                                         Emergency
                                         Management
                                         Coordinating Office/
                                         American Samoa.
        AZ............................  AZ Division of             62,274.00
                                         Emergency PDM
                                         Management Grant.
        CA............................  State of California       854,215.14
                                         Technical
                                         Assistance/
                                         Management Cost
                                         Application.
        Cortina Indian Rancheria......  Cortina Indian              8,347.50
                                         Rancheria
                                         Multihazard
                                         Mitigation Plan
                                         Management Costs--
                                         Final.
        Northern Mariana Islands......  CNMI Management            12,029.20
                                         Costs PDM-C 2003.
        Confederated Tribes of the      Unatilla Indian             5,558.22
         Umatilla Indian Reservation.    Reservation Multi-
                                         Hazard Mitigation
                                         Plan.
        ID............................  Idaho State                 3,000.00
                                         Management.
        Skokomish Indian Tribe........  Sub grant Technical        12,823.30
                                         Assistance
                                         Application.
        WA............................  Washington State           37,500.00
                                         Technical
                                         Assistance/
                                         Management Costs.
                                                             ---------------
          Total Management Costs for    ....................    4,682,582.21
           Fiscal Year 2003 PDM
           Competitive.
                                                             ---------------
          Total Obligated for Fiscal    ....................   94,345,013.15
           Year 2003 PDM Competitive.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

           FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            AWARDED FEDERAL
                                         SUB-APPLICANT           SHARE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
        CA..........................  San Jose State                 $99,957
                                       University.
        CA..........................  University of                   67,100
                                       California-
                                       Berkeley.
        CA..........................  University of                  100,000
                                       Southern
                                       California.
        CO..........................  University of                  100,000
                                       Colorado-Boulder.
        FL..........................  University of Miami            226,500
        FL..........................  Florida                        100,000
                                       Agricultural &
                                       Mechanical
                                       University (FAMU).
        FL..........................  Florida                         99,759
                                       International
                                       University (FIU).
        GA..........................  University System              100,000
                                       of Georgia.
        KY..........................  University of                   94,958
                                       Louisville.
        LA..........................  Tulane Power Plant.             18,113
        LA..........................  Southern University            100,000
                                       (LA).
        LA..........................  University of New               99,750
                                       Orleans.
        MA..........................  Colleges of the                100,000
                                       Fenway.
        MA..........................  Mass. Institute of              99,750
                                       Tech.
        MO..........................  Metropolitan                   100,000
                                       Community College.
        MS..........................  University of                   75,000
                                       Mississippi.
        NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....             80,000
        NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....             24,000
        NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....             57,000
        NC..........................  UNC-Wilmington.....            110,000
        ND..........................  North Dakota State             100,000
                                       University.
        ND..........................  IT Sitting Bull                100,000
                                       College.
        NV..........................  University of                   50,000
                                       Nevada-Reno.
        OH..........................  University of Akron            100,000
        OK..........................  University of                   75,000
                                       Central Oklahoma.
        OR..........................  University of                  100,000
                                       Oregon.
        SC..........................  Horry-Georgetown                89,002
                                       Tech.
        TN..........................  University of                  100,000
                                       Memphis.
        TX..........................  Texas State                     75,000
                                       Technical College.
        TX..........................  Texas University-               97,500
                                       Medical Center.
        VA..........................  Radford University.             31,500
        VA..........................  Virginia State                  75,000
                                       University.
        VA..........................  Virginia Tech......             75,000
        WA..........................  University of                  200,000
                                       Washington-Seattle.
        WA..........................  University of                  300,000
                                       Washington-Seattle.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Plans and Projects    ...................          3,419,889
           for Fiscal Year 2003
           Disaster Resistant
           Universities.

                                                          ==================
    MANAGEMENT COSTS:
        MA..........................  Massachusetts                   20,625
                                       Emergency
                                       Management Agency.
        GA..........................  Georgia Emergency               10,000
                                       Management Agency.
        KY..........................  Kentucky State                   3,749
                                       Emergency
                                       Management.
        NC..........................  North Carolina                  27,100
                                       State Emergency
                                       Management.
        TN..........................  Tennessee State                 10,000
                                       Emergency
                                       Management.
        OK..........................  OK Emergency                     7,500
                                       Management.
        CO..........................  CO Emergency                    10,000
                                       Management.
        CA..........................  CA Emergency                    26,706
                                       Management.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Management Costs for  ...................            115,680
           Fiscal Year 2003 DRU.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Obligated for Fiscal  ...................          3,535,569
           Year 2003 Disaster
           Resistant Universities.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

           FISCAL YEAR 2003 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                REGION                 RECIPIENT      AWARDED FEDERAL SHARE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1............................  CT..............                 $248,375
    1............................  ME..............                  248,375
    1............................  MA..............                  248,375
    1............................  NH..............                  248,375
    1............................  RI..............                  248,375
    1............................  VT..............                  248,375
    2............................  NY..............                  248,375
    2............................  NJ..............                  248,375
    2............................  PR..............                  248,375
    2............................  VI..............                  248,375
    3............................  DE..............                  248,375
    3............................  MD..............                  248,375
    3............................  PA..............                  248,375
    3............................  VA..............                  248,375
    3............................  DC..............                  248,375
    4............................  AL..............                  248,375
    4............................  FL..............                  248,375
    4............................  GA..............                  248,375
    4............................  KY..............                  248,375
    4............................  MS..............                  248,375
    4............................  NC..............                  248,375
    4............................  SC..............                  248,375
    4............................  TN..............                  248,375
    5............................  IL \1\..........                  225,820
    5............................  IN..............                  248,375
    5............................  MI..............                  248,375
    5............................  MN..............                  248,375
    5............................  OH..............                  248,375
    5............................  WI..............                  248,375
    6............................  LA..............                  248,375
    6............................  NM..............                  248,375
    6............................  OK..............                  248,375
    6............................  AR..............                  248,375
    6............................  TX..............                  248,375
    7............................  IA..............                  248,375
    7............................  MO..............                  248,375
    7............................  NE \1\..........                  172,256
    7............................  KS..............                  248,375
    8............................  CO..............                  248,375
    8............................  MT..............                  248,375
    8............................  ND..............                  248,375
    8............................  SD..............                  248,375
    8............................  UT..............                  248,375
    8............................  WY..............                  248,375
    9............................  AZ..............                  248,375
    9............................  CA..............                  248,375
    9............................  NV..............                  248,375
    9............................  HI..............                  248,375
    9............................  American Samoa..                  248,375
    9............................  Guam............                  248,375
    10...........................  WA..............                  248,375
    10...........................  OR..............                  248,375
    10...........................  ID..............                  248,375
    10...........................  AK..............                  248,375
                                                    ------------------------
          Total Obligated for      ................               13,313,576
           Fiscal Year 2003
           Planning.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Recipients did not request full award amount ($248,375).

           FISCAL YEAR 2005 PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANT OBLIGATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         SUBGRANT TITLE    AWARDED FED SHARE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PLANS AND PROJECTS RECIPIENT:
        CT..........................  Central Naugatuck          $101,050.00
                                       Valley Council of
                                       Governments Pre-
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CT..........................  Capitol Region Pre-         322,500.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CT..........................  NWCCOG-PDM2005.....          40,856.63
        CT..........................  City of New Haven            22,500.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        MA..........................  Ell Pond Flood            1,745,700.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Project.
        MA..........................  Merrimack Valley             73,650.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MA..........................  Pioneer Valley Pre-         224,962.50
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MA..........................  Metro Boston North/         206,868.75
                                       West Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MA..........................  Dukes County Pre-            30,000.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MA..........................  City of Newburyport          23,700.00
                                       All Hazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        MA..........................  Central                     112,500.00
                                       Massachusetts
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MA..........................  Pre-Disaster                 11,249.99
                                       Natural Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plans
                                       for Hawley and
                                       Heath.
        MA..........................  Nantucket All-               44,253.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        MA..........................  Massachusetts MH            111,100.00
                                       Planning Grant on
                                       behalf of
                                       Northeastern
                                       University.
        ME..........................  Town of Canton Pre-       3,000,000.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Acquisition and
                                       Demolition of
                                       Floodplain
                                       Properties.
        NH..........................  City of Claremont,          112,500.00
                                       NH Culvert
                                       Project--Sugar
                                       River Drive.
        NH..........................  Regional Planning           400,200.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation.
        NH..........................  Fire Hazard                 120,000.00
                                       Mitigation
                                       Enhancement Plan,
                                       Statewide NH.
        NH..........................  Water Resource              134,810.00
                                       Planning for
                                       Improved Emergency
                                       Response for
                                       Firefighting in NH.
        VT..........................  VT Fluvial Erosion          337,497.62
                                       Hazard Risk
                                       Assessment.
        VT..........................  Norwich University           41,346.11
                                       Disaster Resistant
                                       Planning.
        NJ..........................  Hudson County Local         880,000.00
                                       Mitigation
                                       Strategy.
        NJ..........................  Essex County Multi-       1,176,187.50
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Mitigation
                                       Strategy.
        NY..........................  Town of Rockland NY       1,115,250.00
                                       Property
                                       Acquisition
                                       Project.
        NY..........................  Town of Rockland            122,663.62
                                       Storm water
                                       Management Culvert
                                       Mitigation Project.
        NY..........................  Village of Fairport         133,705.87
                                       Blackwatch
                                       Subdivision--Under
                                       ground Electrical
                                       Conversion.
        NY..........................  Village of Port              22,500.00
                                       Chester Multi-
                                       Hazard Local
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NY..........................  Town of                     140,000.00
                                       Southampton;
                                       Prepare Town-wide
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        NY..........................  County of Albany,            75,000.00
                                       New York
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NY..........................  Town of Woodbury             50,625.00
                                       N.Y. Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Project.
        NY..........................  Town of                      24,000.00
                                       Eastchester, N.Y.
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NY..........................  Genesee County All           60,002.77
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        NY..........................  Orleans County               45,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Multiple
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Mitigation Project.
        NY..........................  Pelham Village               25,012.50
                                       Comprehensive
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        NY..........................  Rensselaer County            41,056.00
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NY..........................  Suffolk County All-       1,117,904.25
                                       Hazard Multi-
                                       jurisdictional Pre-
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NY..........................  Briarcliff Manor's           45,562.50
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        NY..........................  Broome County Multi-         75,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        NY..........................  Town of Islip                93,750.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        NYIT........................  Seneca Nation               108,750.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning.
        MD..........................  Prince George's             967,305.00
                                       County Tor Bryan
                                       Estates.
        MD..........................  University of               178,425.00
                                       Maryland College
                                       Park Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        PA..........................  Lebanon County               43,930.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        PA..........................  County of Montour            48,000.00
                                       Multi-
                                       jurisdictional
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        PA..........................  Building Disaster         1,694,257.25
                                       Resistant
                                       Universities for
                                       the PA State
                                       System of Higher
                                       Ed.
        PA..........................  Snyder County                27,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan Project.
        PA..........................  County of                    45,416.64
                                       Huntingdon
                                       Multihazard Multi-
                                       jurisdictional
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        PA..........................  Berks County Multi-          90,000.00
                                       jurisdictional
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        PA..........................  Blair County Hazard          27,855.68
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        PA..........................  Armstrong County            105,000.00
                                       Multi-
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        PA..........................  Clarion County               38,465.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        VA..........................  George Mason                112,500.00
                                       University All-
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Planning.
        VA..........................  Expanding and               205,185.00
                                       Revising
                                       Chesapeake's
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        FL..........................  University of Miami         350,174.99
                                       RSMAS Marine
                                       Campus Hurricane
                                       Retrofit.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              125,642.96
                                       System--Ambulatory
                                       Care Center--East.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              411,945.48
                                       System--Ambulatory
                                       Care Center--West.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              394,664.40
                                       System--West Wing.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              168,168.55
                                       System--Central
                                       Wing.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              310,641.58
                                       System--South Wing.
        FL..........................  University of Miami       2,214,674.99
                                       School of Medicine
                                       Hurricane Retrofit
                                       (Multiple).
        FL..........................  Jackson Health               82,150.68
                                       System--North Wing.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health            1,404,397.15
                                       System--East Tower.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              670,029.33
                                       System--Mental
                                       Health (Highland
                                       Pa-  vilion).
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              413,526.79
                                       System--Rehabilita
                                       tion Building.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              296,373.67
                                       System--Rehabilita
                                       tion Annex.
        FL..........................  Jackson Health              295,326.82
                                       System--Institute
                                       Building.
        FL..........................  Roof Reinforcement/         119,250.00
                                       Cutler Ridge
                                       District Station.
        FL..........................  City of North Miami          37,500.00
                                       Police Facility
                                       Window Replacement
                                       Project.
        FL..........................  Miami Children's            395,687.21
                                       Hospital Pre-
                                       Disaster Wind
                                       Mitigation Project.
        FL..........................  Miami Children's             55,933.00
                                       Hospital
                                       Satellite, Pre-
                                       Disaster Wind
                                       Mitigation Project.
        FL..........................  Eckerd College              117,750.00
                                       Mitigation Plan/
                                       Risk Assessment.
        GA..........................  DeKalb County--JAX        2,827,165.50
                                       SQUARE ACQ1.
        GA..........................  DeKalb County--           2,625,750.00
                                       15ACQ.
        GA..........................  DeKalb County--JAX          942,388.50
                                       SQUARE ACQ2.
        GA..........................  City of Warner               96,622.00
                                       Robins Acquisition
                                       Project.
        GA..........................  City of Savannah            741,384.47
                                       Acquisition
                                       Demolition 2005
                                       Project.
        GA..........................  City of Atlanta           1,076,772.75
                                       Acquisition--Fisca
                                       l Year 2005--PDM.
        GA..........................  City of Atlanta           1,634,372.66
                                       Elevation--Fiscal
                                       Year 2005--PDM.
        GA..........................  State of Georgia            301,875.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Planning
                                       Application.
        NC..........................  Acquisition &               337,881.00
                                       Demolition in
                                       Myers Park Manor--
                                       Charlotte, NC.
        NC..........................  Acquisition &             2,113,660.50
                                       Demolition along
                                       Cullman Ave.--
                                       Charlotte, NC.
        NC..........................  UNCW Mitigation              13,500.00
                                       Plan.
        NC..........................  North Carolina DEM          319,794.00
                                       Grant to Update
                                       State 322 Plan.
        NC..........................  UNC-CH 2005 PDM             339,087.80
                                       planning app 2.
        SC..........................  Low country COG               8,781.00
                                       Inclusion of all
                                       Communities into
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        TN..........................  Rutherford County         1,116,112.50
                                       Greenwood
                                       Acquisition
                                       Project 2005.
        TN..........................  Rutherford County           583,912.50
                                       Twin Oaks
                                       Acquisition
                                       Project 2005.
        TN..........................  Metro Nashville           1,971,765.00
                                       2005 Home Buyout.
        TN..........................  Giles County Hazard          30,000.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        TN..........................  University of                56,250.00
                                       Tennessee
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        IL..........................  DuPage County,               75,000.00
                                       Illinois Natural
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        IN..........................  Town of Dyer Multi-          30,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        IN..........................  City of Hammond              37,500.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IN..........................  Hancock County               30,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IN..........................  DeKalb County Multi-         30,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        IN..........................  Noble County Multi-          30,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        IN..........................  Steuben County               30,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IN..........................  Indiana's Boundary        1,821,750.00
                                       River Mitigation
                                       Planning
                                       Initiative.
        MI..........................  Robinson Township         2,428,156.50
                                       PDM Property
                                       Acquisition
                                       Project 1.
        MI..........................  Robinson Township         2,654,815.50
                                       PDM Acquisition 2.
        MI..........................  Michigan                     56,250.00
                                       Technological
                                       University
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MN..........................  McLeod County All            24,750.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        MN..........................  Douglas County All           24,750.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        MN..........................  Grant County All             24,750.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        MN..........................  Wabasha County All           23,273.22
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  City of Darlington          187,500.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Project.
        WI..........................  Marinette County             37,500.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  Waupaca County               33,918.00
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning.
        WI..........................  Brown County All-            74,994.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  Manitowoc County             71,349.00
                                       All-Hazards
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Waushara County All-         35,250.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  Lafayette County             15,874.50
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Sheboygan County             39,750.00
                                       All-Hazards
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Jackson County               45,000.00
                                       Wisconsin
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Dunn County Natural          30,000.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  Forest County All            22,500.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  Langlade County All          22,500.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        WI..........................  La Crosse County             60,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Buffalo County               45,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Wisconsin Emergency         141,818.00
                                       Management
                                       Planning
                                       Application.
        WI..........................  Iron County                  40,152.00
                                       Wisconsin Pre-
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       Development.
        WI..........................  Jefferson County             45,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazards
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WI..........................  Ozaukee County               37,500.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        AR..........................  Fort Smith School           531,329.97
                                       District Safe Room
                                       at Carnall Elem-
                                       entary.
        AR..........................  Fort Smith School           531,329.97
                                       District Morrison
                                       Elementary Safe
                                       Room.
        AR..........................  Van Buren School          1,129,368.75
                                       District High
                                       School Safe Room.
        AR..........................  Mansfield School            412,077.00
                                       District High
                                       School Safe Room.
        AR..........................  Alma School               1,056,555.58
                                       District Safe Room
                                       Application.
        AR..........................  Mansfield School            412,077.00
                                       District Middle
                                       School Safe Room.
        AR..........................  Fort Smith School           531,329.97
                                       District Cavanaugh
                                       Elementary Safe
                                       Room.
        AR..........................  Johnson County               30,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        AR..........................  Pope County Hazard           30,000.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  Caddo Kiowa                 440,999.90
                                       Technology Center,
                                       Fort Cobb,
                                       Oklahoma, Safe
                                       Room Construction.
        OK..........................  City of Dewey Multi-         13,500.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Stillwater           60,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  Tulsa County Multi-          60,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Guymon               15,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Sand                 39,999.50
                                       Springs Multi-
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Ada Multi-           30,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Okmulgee             30,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Holdenville          15,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  McLoud School                19,999.99
                                       Natural Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Muskogee             75,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        OK..........................  City of Tahlequah            21,000.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        TX..........................  City of Nacogdoches         226,831.56
                                       Property
                                       Acquisition
                                       Project.
        TX..........................  Travis County               386,486.04
                                       Acquisition/
                                       Demolition--12
                                       Homes in Timber
                                       Creek.
        TX..........................  Pilot List                2,666,167.06
                                       Application #1.
        TX..........................  Pilot List                2,455,071.76
                                       Application #2.
        TX..........................  Pilot List                2,645,354.48
                                       Application #3.
        TX..........................  Pilot List                2,120,046.52
                                       Application #4
                                       Pasadena.
        TX..........................  Acquisition and           1,855,157.53
                                       Demolition 1.
        TX..........................  Acquisition and           2,215,919.64
                                       Demolition 2.
        TX..........................  Acquisition and           2,542,723.31
                                       Demolition 3.
        TX..........................  Acquisition and           2,657,445.36
                                       Demolition 4.
        TX..........................  City of Laredo               73,230.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Project.
        TX..........................  City of Southlake            30,000.00
                                       HAZMAP.
        TX..........................  City of Arlington           166,545.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Action
                                       Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Forest City          43,200.00
                                       Flood Mitigation
                                       Project.
        IA..........................  City of Hampton              45,936.21
                                       Project to Protect
                                       Critical
                                       Facilities From
                                       Flooding.
        IA..........................  Council Bluffs-             362,396.25
                                       Valley View Drive
                                       Acquisition.
        IA..........................  City of Davenport            10,710.00
                                       PDM Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Kossuth County Pre-           6,375.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Pre-Disaster                 11,999.96
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning--Mills
                                       County, Malvern,
                                       and Hastings, Iowa.
        IA..........................  Iowa 322 Update....         163,200.00
        IA..........................  Pre-Disaster                 30,148.00
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning--Seven
                                       Pottawattamie
                                       County Cities.
        IA..........................  City of Tripoli               5,250.00
                                       Local Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       Application.
        IA..........................  City of Clear Lake            6,375.00
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Britt Pre-            6,375.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Northwood             6,375.00
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Lenox                 2,250.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Wapello County               31,997.35
                                       Multi-Jurisdiction
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Springbrook Pre-              2,835.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Union County                  8,999.40
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Charlotte Pre-                3,645.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Ringgold County              10,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Shellsburg,           3,000.00
                                       Iowa, Pre Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Lost Nation Pre-              3,645.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Low Moor Pre-                 3,645.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Peosta Pre-Disaster           3,645.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Sageville Pre-                3,645.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Delhi Pre-Disaster            3,645.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  LaMotte Pre-                  3,645.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Stuart Pre-           3,375.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Ames All-Hazards             58,406.65
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Norway,               3,000.00
                                       Iowa, Pre Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Davis County Multi-          19,989.90
                                       Jurisdiction Multi-
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Mason City            7,500.00
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Clayton County,               6,375.00
                                       Iowa, Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       Update.
        IA..........................  City of Oxford                1,500.00
                                       Junction
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Luzerne,              3,000.00
                                       Iowa, Pre Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Story County, Iowa,          33,777.97
                                       Multi-
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plans.
        IA..........................  Welton Pre-Disaster           2,835.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Delmar Pre-Disaster           3,645.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Ayrshire              3,750.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Kimballton            2,625.00
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Vail Pre-             2,000.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Sherrill Pre-                 2,835.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Akron Pre-Disaster            3,150.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Plymouth County Pre-          4,500.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Merrill Pre-          4,500.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Graf Pre-Disaster             2,835.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Lee County Pre-              34,687.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        IA..........................  Louisa County Pre-           34,686.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        IA..........................  City of Ruthven               3,750.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  Polk County Multi-          150,579.53
                                       jurisdictional
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation  Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Truesdale             3,750.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Lakeside              3,750.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Grant.
        IA..........................  City of Sheldon               6,000.00
                                       Multi-hazard Pre-
                                       Disaster Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Westfield             3,150.00
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        IA..........................  City of Madrid,               6,000.00
                                       Flood Mitigation
                                       Project.
        KS..........................  Sedgwick County             237,000.00
                                       Public Safety
                                       Center.
        KS..........................  Ottawa County, Ks.            4,248.75
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        MO..........................  Pierce City School-         973,017.36
                                       Shelter.
        MO..........................  City of Brentwood           592,500.00
                                       Property Buyout
                                       Mitigation.
        MO..........................  City of                   1,713,319.00
                                       Independence Power
                                       & Light PDM 2005-
                                       2008.
        MO..........................  Willow Springs R-4          656,580.00
                                       High School and
                                       Middle School
                                       Tornado Shelter.
        MO..........................  City of Butler               31,500.00
                                       Mobile Home Park
                                       Shelter.
        MO..........................  West Plains R-VII         2,050,324.54
                                       School District
                                       Tornado Shelter.
        MO..........................  City of Houston,            145,612.50
                                       Missouri Flood
                                       Loss Prevention
                                       Buyout Project.
        MO..........................  Smith Hatchery Road          48,750.00
                                       Bank Stabilization
                                       Project.
        MO..........................  Blue River                1,273,630.50
                                       Community Safe
                                       Room.
        MO..........................  Sullivan County             336,942.00
                                       Missouri Bridge
                                       Mitigation Project.
        MO..........................  Clay County/                120,727.00
                                       Paradise Pointe
                                       Marina Tornado
                                       Shelter.
        MO..........................  Seymour Special             140,335.12
                                       Road District
                                       Skyline Bridge.
        MO..........................  Clay County/Camp            120,727.00
                                       Branch Marina
                                       Shelter.
        MO..........................  Longview CC               2,553,285.50
                                       Community Safe
                                       Room.
        MO..........................  Maple Woods               2,398,602.75
                                       Community Safe
                                       Room.
        MO..........................  Penn Valley               3,000,000.00
                                       Community Safe
                                       Room.
        MO..........................  BTC Community Safe          993,852.75
                                       Room.
        MO..........................  University of                79,317.41
                                       Missouri--Rolla
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        MO..........................  Kansas City Metro            88,702.50
                                       Area Storm Shelter
                                       Plan.
        NE..........................  Village of Elmwood            1,687.50
                                       All-Hazards
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NE..........................  Village of South              2,250.00
                                       Bend All-Hazards
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        NE..........................  Hall County All-             68,389.96
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        CO..........................  North Cheyenne               71,754.26
                                       Canyon Fuels
                                       Mitigation Project.
        CO..........................  Regional Detention        3,000,000.00
                                       Pond at Police
                                       Station 2 (38th &
                                       Holly).
        CO..........................  City of Colorado            217,632.00
                                       Springs Landslide
                                       Damaged Homes
                                       Acquisition and
                                       Removal-2 Homes.
        CO..........................  Grand County Pre             22,721.25
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        CO..........................  Montrose County              70,875.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CO..........................  Jefferson County,           225,000.00
                                       Colorado.
        CO..........................  Colorado PDM-C               80,000.00
                                       Planning Grant
                                       Fiscal Year 2005.
        MT..........................  Remaining and               208,500.00
                                       Unfunded Montana
                                       Communities
                                       Planning Grant
                                       Application.
        MT..........................  Montana University          255,016.60
                                       System Multi-
                                       Hazard Planning.
        ND..........................  North Dakota 345 kV       1,511,250.00
                                       Transmission
                                       Structure
                                       Replacement.
        ND..........................  City of Fargo Drain         987,000.00
                                       10 Flood
                                       Mitigation.
        SD..........................  Marshall County Pre-          7,012.50
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Kingsbury County              7,012.50
                                       Pre Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Clark County                  7,012.50
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Grant County                  9,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Miner County                  7,012.50
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Charles Mix County            4,968.75
                                       Pre-Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Spink County Multi-           5,250.00
                                       hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        SD..........................  McPherson County              7,012.50
                                       Pre Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Faulk County Pre              7,012.50
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Day County Pre                9,000.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Roberts County Pre            9,000.00
                                       Disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        SD..........................  Perkins County                4,500.00
                                       Multi-hazard,
                                       Multi-
                                       jurisdictional Pre-
                                       disaster
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        UT..........................  City of Orem Fire            75,000.00
                                       Station 1 Seismic
                                       Retrofit--300 East
                                       1000 South, Orem,
                                       UT.
        UT..........................  City of Orem Fire            75,000.00
                                       Station 2 Seismic
                                       Retrofit--911
                                       North Main St.
                                       Orem, UT.
        UT..........................  Layton City Fire            268,608.75
                                       Station
                                       Reconstruction &
                                       Retrofit.
        UT..........................  JVWTP Structural          1,791,750.00
                                       Seismic Retrofit.
        UT..........................  Utah Enhanced PDM           131,187.50
                                       Plan Grant
                                       Application.
        UT..........................  University of Utah          537,340.77
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WY..........................  City of Cheyenne          2,764,684.31
                                       Dry Creek Sheridan
                                       Reach Flood
                                       Control Project.
        WY..........................  Campbell County,             18,750.00
                                       City of Gillette,
                                       Town of Wright
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WY..........................  Pre-disaster                 15,000.00
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       for Lincoln Co.,
                                       WY.
        WY..........................  Sublette County               6,000.00
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Project.
        WY..........................  Northwest College            19,875.00
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WY..........................  Update and                   21,420.00
                                       Expansion of
                                       Wyoming Multi-
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        AZ..........................  State of Arizona             56,250.00
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       Input into AzHMPS.
        AZ..........................  Hazard Mitigation           231,000.00
                                       Planning for
                                       Tribal Governments.
        CA..........................  Pasadena City Hall        3,000,000.00
                                       Seismic Upgrade &
                                       Rehabilitation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  City of Huntington        3,000,000.00
                                       Beach Ca. Civic
                                       Center Seismic Ret-
                                         rofit.
        CA..........................  SF Bay Area Rapid         2,999,999.98
                                       Transit District
                                       Mitigation Project.
        CA..........................  University of             3,000,000.00
                                       California San
                                       Francisco Medical
                                       Center Seismic Saw-
                                       Cut Project.
        CA..........................  Joseph P. Bort            2,976,000.00
                                       Metro Center
                                       Seismic Retrofit
                                       Mitigation Project
                                       (Oakland, CA).
        CA..........................  City of Santa Clara       1,268,801.99
                                       at Grade Water
                                       Tanks Seismic
                                       Retrofit
                                       Mitigation Project.
        CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             48,436.64
                                       Water District,
                                       Reservoir Site 1B,
                                       Seismic Mitigation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                       Water District
                                       Seismic
                                       Mitigation--New
                                       Lurin Reservoir.
        CA..........................  Western Municipal           119,092.50
                                       Water District
                                       Seismic
                                       Mitigation--La
                                       Sierra Reservoir.
        CA..........................  Victor Valley Water         201,000.00
                                       District Seismic
                                       Mitigation--Zone
                                       #2.
        CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                       Water District
                                       Seismic
                                       Mitigation--Markha
                                       m Reservoir.
        CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                       Water District
                                       Seismic
                                       Mitigation--Jim
                                       Jack Reservoir.
        CA..........................  Western Municipal           116,895.00
                                       Water District
                                       Seismic
                                       Mitigation--Roosev
                                       elt Reservoir.
        CA..........................  Cal State                   862,425.00
                                       University San
                                       Bernardino
                                       Physical Sciences
                                       Seismic Mitigation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  Hall of Justice           2,067,577.50
                                       West Courthouse
                                       Seismic Hazard
                                       Miti-  gation.
        CA..........................  Los Gatos                 1,008,350.25
                                       Courthouse Seismic
                                       Hazard Mitigation.
        CA..........................  Palo Alto                   236,514.00
                                       Courthouse Seismic
                                       Hazard Mitigation.
        CA..........................  Cal State San               850,570.75
                                       Bernardino
                                       Biological
                                       Sciences Seismic
                                       Mitigation Project.
        CA..........................  Cal Poly Pomona           2,166,354.00
                                       Science 3 Seismic
                                       Mitigation Project.
        CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley            109,496.98
                                       Water District,
                                       Reservoir Site 1C,
                                       Seismic Mitigation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             35,973.82
                                       Water District,
                                       Reservoir Site 4B,
                                       Seismic Mitigation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             26,841.52
                                       Water District,
                                       Reservoir Site 5B,
                                       Seismic Mitigation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  Cucamonga Valley             31,407.67
                                       Water District,
                                       Reservoir Site 6C,
                                       Seismic Mitigation
                                       Project.
        CA..........................  Victor Valley Water         137,250.00
                                       District Seismic
                                       Mitigation--Zone
                                       #3.
        CA..........................  County of Butte             122,155.98
                                       Multi-
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  Arroyo Grande,               51,281.25
                                       Grover Beach, and
                                       Lucia Mar Unified
                                       School District
                                       PDM.
        CA..........................  City of Palmdale             98,325.00
                                       Local Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  Fresno County Local         230,951.34
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  Amador County Multi-         43,875.00
                                       jurisdictional
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        CA..........................  City of San Marcos          124,500.00
                                       Wildland Urban
                                       Interface Hazard
                                       and Risk
                                       Assessment.
        CA..........................  City of La Canada            45,000.00
                                       Flintridge
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  City of Pismo Beach          48,750.00
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        CA..........................  Humboldt County             117,000.00
                                       Multi-Agency Multi-
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        CA..........................  Mendocino Emergency         142,124.42
                                       Services
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Project.
        CA..........................  CA MHMP Enhancement         624,325.00
                                       for Alluvial Fan
                                       Flood Hazards.
        CA..........................  City of Tustin--             56,250.00
                                       Local Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  City of Yuba City            30,000.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        CA..........................  La Habra Local               56,250.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  City of Mill Valley          26,600.29
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Planning Grant.
        CA..........................  City of Novato               39,758.25
                                       Multi Hazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        CA..........................  City of Larkspur             37,499.76
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Planning Grant.
        CA..........................  Clovis Unified               58,974.00
                                       School District
                                       Multi-hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       Development.
        CA..........................  Santa Barbara                61,425.00
                                       School Districts
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation  Plan.
        CA..........................  Imperial County             101,368.50
                                       Multi-
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CA..........................  Eastern Municipal            56,250.00
                                       Water District
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CAIT........................  Picayune Rancheria           51,480.00
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning.
        CAIT........................  PDM-C..............         112,800.03
        CAIT........................  Blue Lake Rancheria          55,338.75
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CAIT........................  Pauma-Yuima Band of          46,170.00
                                       Mission Indians
                                       HMP.
        CAIT........................  Santa Ynez Tribal            60,657.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        CAIT........................  Pala Band of                 76,500.00
                                       Mission Indians
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        HI..........................  County of Kauai--           135,000.00
                                       Dev of New Wind
                                       Design Code
                                       Provisions and
                                       Risk Assess Plan.
        HI..........................  University of               261,821.00
                                       Hawaii System
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Pro-
                                       ject.
        NV..........................  State of Nevada              60,063.50
                                       HAZUS-MH Planning
                                       Grant.
        NVIT........................  Pyramid Lake Paiute          19,500.00
                                       Tribe Pre-disaster
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        AK..........................  Hooper Bay and               14,040.00
                                       Paimiut All
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        AK..........................  Dillingham Hazard             7,515.30
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        AK..........................  Kodiak Island                41,723.25
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        AK..........................  Lake & Peninsula             19,416.75
                                       Borough Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        ID..........................  Caribou County               22,500.00
                                       Public Safety All
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan-  ning.
        ID..........................  Twin Falls County            41,250.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        ID..........................  Gooding County               41,250.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        ID..........................  Cassia County All            41,250.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        ID..........................  North East Idaho            337,530.00
                                       Regional
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        ID..........................  Idaho State Hazard          201,503.84
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       2008.
        ID..........................  Lincoln County               41,250.00
                                       Multi-Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        ID..........................  Camas County Multi-          41,250.00
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Plan.
        IDIT........................  Duck Valley Indian           35,025.00
                                       Reservation All
                                       Hazard Plan.
        OR..........................  Clackamas River           1,570,836.00
                                       Water System
                                       Seismic and Ice
                                       Storm Retrofit
                                       Project.
        OR..........................  Douglas County/             731,512.50
                                       Roseburg Public
                                       Schools Seismic
                                       Mitigation Project.
        OR..........................  City of Beaverton         1,015,087.50
                                       City Hall Seismic
                                       Upgrade.
        OR..........................  Scappoose Fire              162,750.00
                                       Station Seismic
                                       Upgrade.
        OR..........................  City of Lake Oswego         187,500.00
                                       Seismic Upgrade
                                       Grant Application.
        OR..........................  Columbia River Fire         281,400.00
                                       & Rescue Fire
                                       Stations Seismic
                                       Ret-  rofit.
        OR..........................  University                1,977,996.00
                                       Demonstration
                                       Projects: OSU and
                                       WOU.
        OR..........................  Mid-Columbia &              932,237.25
                                       Southeast Oregon
                                       Multi-Jurisdiction
                                       Mitigation Plan
                                       Development.
        ORIT........................  Burns Paiute Tribe--         42,267.50
                                       Multihazard
                                       Mitigation Project.
        WA..........................  S. Lake Union               534,921.75
                                       Armory Seismic
                                       Upgrade.
        WA..........................  Frances Anderson            782,190.00
                                       Center.
        WA..........................  School Seismic            3,000,000.00
                                       Retrofits.
        WA..........................  Cedar River/Rainbow       1,212,127.50
                                       Bend Acquisition.
        WA..........................  City of Westport,            30,000.00
                                       Washington Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WA..........................  Whitman County              111,728.46
                                       Multi-
                                       Jurisdictional
                                       Natural Hazards
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WA..........................  Washington State            377,619.00
                                       University
                                       Statewide Hazard
                                       Mitigation
                                       Planning Project.
        WA..........................  Washington State            493,125.12
                                       Region 5 (Pierce
                                       County) Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WA..........................  Grant County Multi-          40,458.91
                                       jurisdictional
                                       Hazard Mitigation
                                       Planning Sub grant.
        WAIT001.....................  Pre-Disaster                111,685.80
                                       Mitigation Update
                                       Project.
        WAIT004.....................  Tulalip Reservation          17,200.00
                                       State-level Hazard
                                       Mitigation Plan.
        WAIT005.....................  Sauk-Suiattle                16,959.96
                                       Indian Tribe All
                                       Hazards Mitigation
                                       Plan.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Plans & Projects for  ...................     148,741,988.18
           Fiscal Year 2005 PDM.

                                                          ==================
    MANAGEMENT COSTS RECIPIENT:
        CT..........................  CT 2005 PDM                  48,691.16
                                       Management Costs.
        MA..........................  Commonwealth of             448,408.00
                                       Massachusetts 2005
                                       PDM-C Management
                                       Costs Application.
        ME..........................  Maine Management            196,816.50
                                       Costs PDM-C 2005.
        NH..........................  New Hampshire State          86,962.50
                                       2005 Management.
        GA..........................  GA State Management         777,179.00
                                       Costs.
        NC..........................  NC State Management         312,392.39
                                       Costs.
        SC..........................  SC State Management         211,800.00
                                       Costs.
        TN..........................  Tennessee 2005 PDM           75,000.00
                                       Technical
                                       Assistance.
        MI..........................  State of Michigan           185,309.50
                                       2005 PDM
                                       Management Costs.
        WI..........................  State PDM-C                 112,740.00
                                       Management Costs.
        IA..........................  State of Iowa 2005          118,888.92
                                       Management Costs.
        ND..........................  State of North              249,825.00
                                       Dakota Technical
                                       Assistance Grant.
        SD..........................  State of South                8,379.75
                                       Dakota-Office of
                                       Emergency
                                       Management.
        UT..........................  State Management            137,064.68
                                       Cost for fiscal
                                       year 2005.
        WY..........................  Wyoming Office of            23,715.00
                                       Homeland Security
                                       fiscal year 2005
                                       PDM--C Management.
        ORIT........................  Burns Paiute Tribe--          3,566.25
                                       Management
                                       Oversight.
        WAIT005.....................  Hazard Management             1,694.70
                                       Plan.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Management Costs for  ...................       2,998,433.35
           Fiscal Year 2005 PDM.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Obligated for Fiscal  ...................     151,740,421.53
           Year 2005 PDM.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. How have these projects proven themselves when disaster
    strikes?
        Answer. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program provides funds to
    States, territories, Federally-recognized Indian tribal governments,
    and communities for hazard mitigation planning and the implementation
    of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. The PDM program is
    designed to reduce the risk to populations, structures, and critical
    infrastructure from natural disasters.
        These funds provide for the protection of lives and properties from
    flood damage through acquisition, elevation, relocation, and/or flood
    proofing; protection to critical facilities from flood damage through
    drainage, infrastructure, and utilities projects; protection of
    properties from hurricane wind damage; saving lives through the
    construction of tornado storm shelters; protection to public facilities
    against seismic damage; and providing the framework for communities to
    analyze risk and better plan to protect their communities from
    disasters.
        The findings of the Multihazard Mitigation Council demonstrate that
    on average, a dollar spent by FEMA on hazard mitigation (actions to
    reduce disaster losses) grants provide the Nation about $4 in future
    benefits. To date, PDM has provided $272.5 million to fund 709 hazard
    mitigation plans and projects. Once PDM grants are implemented at the
    local level, it generally takes several years to complete the hazard
    mitigation activity. Since grant awards began in 2004, not enough time
    has passed to evaluate actual PDM project performance. Below are
    examples of activities that are ongoing with PDM funds across the
    county.
    Darlington, Wisconsin--All-Hazard Mitigation Plan and Acquisition
            Project
        Darlington began its success in PDM with a planning sub-grant in
    2002 which resulted in the City's All-Hazard Mitigation Plan. With a
    long history of damaging floods, the City is taking action to reduce
    the number of repetitively flooded properties.
        One of the latest projects funded through the PDM program is the
    purchase and removal of a light industrial building located in the
    floodway. Having flooded four times in the past 60 years, the building
    has sustained structural and content damage as well as business
    interruption losses. The building will be demolished and the site will
    become part of the Pecatonica Riverside Park, which is heavily used by
    the general public.
        As of January 2006, 19 commercial buildings were flood proofed and
    another 14 were purchased and removed from the floodplain, through PDM
    and FEMA's other grant programs--the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
    (HMGP) and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program.
    Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida--Wind Mitigation
        A total of 32 hurricanes have struck Southern Florida in the past
    100 years. Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami is one of the Nation's
    busiest hospitals, serving a population of 2.3 million. It is also the
    major teaching facility for the University of Miami School of Medicine.
    Jackson Memorial plans to harden its buildings against windstorms using
    a ``see thru'' shutter system for doors and windows that are engineered
    and installed to comply with local building codes.
        Other structures in Miami Dade County that have been similarly
    retrofitted have suffered only superficial damage, such as chipped
    paint, during high-wind events, including Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma.
    City of Birmingham, Alabama--Acquisition Project
        The City of Birmingham has an aggressive goal to remove properties
    that are subject to repeated flooding. Both the City of Birmingham and
    the State of Alabama, with support from FEMA's Region IV Office, have
    successfully used the PDM grant program to further this goal. In 2003,
    Birmingham received a PDM grant of $2,490,315 to purchase 65 flood
    vulnerable properties. The grant monies helped to relocate 55 families
    and turn a hazardous area into recreational parkland in perpetuity.
    Bay Area Rapid Transit District, California--Earthquake Mitigation
            Project
        In the highly seismic area of San Francisco, the Bay Area Rapid
    Transit (BART) system, which carries over 310,000 commuters by fixed
    rail and bus each workday, found its critical Train Operations Center
    to be at significant risk of collapse and liable to fall in on the
    underground portion of the building in the event of an earthquake.
        BART is using its PDM grant to raze the above-ground portion of the
    building and move the entire operation underground. This will reduce
    the potential for damage, increase the safety of BART employees, and
    help to maintain normal transportation routes for the Bay area
    following an earthquake.

                               FEMA FUNDING LAPSE

        Question. Are there plans to use the section 504 authority to
    expedite hiring in fiscal year 2006? If not, why not?
        Answer. FEMA plans to submit Congressional notification to use 50
    percent of the unobligated balances remaining at the end of fiscal year
    2005, as permitted by Section 504 of the Department of Homeland
    Security Appropriation Act of 2005. These funds will be used to meet
    priority resource needs including personnel expenses deferred due to
    the response and recovery requirements for Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
        Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes a new
    initiative that creates a new bureaucracy in the Preparedness
    Directorate to do the same thing that FEMA used to do. The National
    Preparedness Integration Program (NPIP) is proposed to fund improved
    catastrophic planning; enhanced emergency communications systems; the
    aligning of preparedness planning for Federal, State, and local command
    and control processes; harmonized medical coordination; and development
    of innovative ideas and methods for preparedness. This action appears
    to widen the chasm between preparedness and recovery by stove-piping
    FEMA and the Preparedness Directorate.
        What is the overall strategy to ensure that meaningful and
    effective planning efforts are coordinated among levels of government
    and within the Department, that those in command and control know each
    other prior to an incident, and that first responders have trained and
    exercised together, before they respond to the next disaster--no matter
    what the hazard?
        Answer. Results of the Department's Second Stage Review (2SR)
    separated the former Office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure
    Protection (IAIP) into the new Office of Intelligence and Analysis
    (I&A) and the Directorate for Preparedness. As acknowledged by the
    Conferees to the fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriation in the Conference
    Report, the new Directorate for Preparedness will assess and prioritize
    policies and operations to enhance preparedness for a natural disaster
    or terrorist attack. The conferees directed the Directorate to work
    with the Director of FEMA to continue an all-hazard approach for
    preparation, response, and recovery to any type of disaster, and this
    concerted approach is under way.
        The overall strategy to ensure that meaningful and effective
    planning efforts are coordinated among levels of government and within
    the Department is summarized in the report, The Federal Response to
    Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. The report recommends that DHS
    should establish an interagency team of senior planners with
    appropriate emergency management experience to conduct a comprehensive,
    90-day review of the NRP and NIMS. As part of this review, all agencies
    will be required to develop integrated operational plans, procedures
    and capabilities for their support to the base NRP and all ESFs and
    Support Annexes.
        In addition, the Lessons Learned Report recommends that DHS
    integrate and synchronize its preparedness functions by fully
    implementing 2SR.
        To ensure that those in command and control know each other prior
    to an incident, and that first responders have trained and exercised
    together before they respond to the next disaster, the NPIP will
    install Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs). FPCs will execute
    NPIP related activities at the local level. The mission of the NPIP is
    to create, organize, enable and monitor initiatives to integrate and
    synchronize national preparedness. The FPCs will play a key role in
    achieving that mission given that National preparedness is only
    possible when Federal, State, local and tribal governments, the private
    sector and the American people are working collectively toward a shared
    goal of enhanced preparedness.
        Through the NPIP, FPCs will provide DHS with an important and
    functional field presence to collaborate and build partnerships with
    State and local government, and private sector homeland security
    stakeholders within the FPC's assigned geographic areas of
    responsibility and to ensure that these stakeholders are working
    together and are thoroughly prepared. Currently, such field level
    coordination is done on an ad hoc basis and DHS does not have always
    have visibility into how high-risk areas are prepared to deal with
    homeland security incidents.
        FPCs will change that by providing vehicles for regular
    coordination, strengthening the linkages between officials responsible
    for responding to possible homeland security incidents. Our Nation
    cannot afford for Federal, State and local government officials to have
    to build working relationships and common approaches to incident
    management amidst the fog of a major incident--such as Hurricane
    Katrina or a pandemic influenza outbreak. Instead, these relationships
    need to be built through frequent collaboration during steady State
    activities, as well as through common, well-understood, and practiced
    approaches to incident response prior to such an approach being needed.
        Question. How does this budget reflect that strategy in a way that
    funds will not lapse, the right people are working together, and
    Americans are made safer?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 Budget Request funds the
    strategy outlined above by directing spending through the NPIP to our
    most urgent preparedness integration priorities. The NPIP will serve as
    the Department's lead in coordinating, implementing, and monitoring
    initiatives to integrate and synchronize national preparedness efforts
    at the Federal level, the State and local levels, and throughout the
    private sector.

                               RETOOLING OF FEMA

        Question. On February 13, 2006, Secretary Chertoff announced a
    retooling of FEMA. What resources are needed to accomplish each
    outlined goal and where will the funds come from?
        Answer. The first steps in FEMA retooling are being applied to the
    current focus in FEMA's preparations for the upcoming hurricane season
    through improvements to our response and recovery functions, such as
    victim assistance, logistics, and communications.
        Retooling initiatives in place or underway for the 2006 hurricane
    season include:
      --Implementation of Phase I of the Total Asset Visibility commodities
            tracking program in Regions IV (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN)
            and VI (AR, LA, OK, NM, TX).
      --Pre-positioning of emergency supplies through inter-agency
            agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and private
            partners.
      --Increased customer service capability through increased victim
            registration capacity.
      --Public Assistance and Individual Assistance Techncial Assistance
            Contract improvements.
      --Implementation of improved internal controls and anti-fraud
            protections (ChoicePoint).
      --Expanded housing inspection capacity.
      --IT and facility improvements at both the Regions and Headquarters
            for improved situational awareness.
      --Implementation of a program to allow contractors to register on-
            line to provide an immediately accessible, nationwide list of
            resources for debris removal.
      --Pre-designated mission assignments with other Federal entities to
            facilitate immediate response requirements.
      --Improved emergency communications capabilities including upgraded
            and expanded Land Mobile Radios and High Frequency (HF)
            equipment integration; and
      --Implemented aggressive hiring initiatives to fill critical
            vacancies.
        The majority of funding for FEMA retooling and 2006 hurricane
    season preparations is sourced from the Disaster Relief Fund. FEMA is
    still in the process of refining these initiatives and identifying the
    specific short and long-term costs.

                                LESSONS LEARNED

        Question. In February 2006, the White House released a report, The
    Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, with 125
    recommendations. What resources are need to accomplish each outlined
    goal and where will the funds come from?
        Answer. The Department is currently engaged in comprehensive
    efforts to identify lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina
    response, both on its own and through an interagency working group.
    Many of these lessons have already led to recommendations upon which
    the Department is moving forward and implementing changes using
    currently available resources and authority. Because of the timing of
    the report, recommendations considered for implementation are not
    specifically addressed in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget. The
    Department is identifying available resources within the fiscal year
    2006 budget and considering options for fiscal year 2007 as review and
    implementation work moves forward. We look forward to working with this
    committee on any budgetary resource changes that may be needed in the
    future.
        Question. What legislative changes are needed to implement the
    recommendations?
        Answer. The Department is currently engaged in comprehensive
    efforts to identify lessons learned from the Hurricane Katrina
    response, both on its own and through an interagency working group.
    Many of these lessons have already led to recommendations upon which
    the Department is moving forward and implementing changes. As this work
    continues, the need for legislative changes to existing authorities may
    emerge. We look forward to working with this committee on any
    legislative changes which may be needed.

                                 FEMA STAFFING

        Question. How many FTEs, by Budget Activity (breaking out
    Preparedness (Readiness), Mitigation Response and Recovery also), is
    FEMA authorized to hire in fiscal year 2004, 2005 and 2006?
        Answer.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Fiscal      Fiscal     Fiscal      Fiscal     Fiscal
                            Activity                          year 2004  year 2004   year 2005  year 2005  year 2006
                                                             authorized    actual   authorized    actual    enacted
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Readiness, Mitigation, Response, & Recovery:
        Readiness..........................................         377        295         377        271        176
        Mitigation.........................................         105         92         105         90         95
        Response...........................................         368        366         388        355        379
        Recovery...........................................         194        163         194        165        172
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------
          Total, RMRR......................................       1,044        916       1,064        881        822
                                                            ========================================================
    Administrative & Regional Operations \1\...............         971        820         884        825      1,032
    Public Health Programs.................................          91         83          40         88         40
    Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program \2\........          90         77          90         78  .........
    National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund..................          55  .........          55  .........         15
    Disaster Relief........................................       2,290      3,330       2,290      5,458      3,493
    Cerro Grande Fire Claims...............................          12         10           5          2  .........
    Flood Map Modernization Fund...........................          33  .........          33         13         33
    National Flood Insurance Fund..........................         271        238         271        241        270
    Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program Account........           2          3           3          3          3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Includes the Office of the Under Secretary.
    \2\ REP was transferred to the Preparedness Directorate in fiscal year2006.

        Question. How many were or are on board?
        Answer. The chart below reflects the positions on board.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Fiscal year
                                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year    2006 on board
                                Activity                              2006 positions   2006 est. FTE  as of February
                                                                                                         18, 2006
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Readiness, Mitigation, Response, & Recovery:
        Readiness...................................................             200             176             161
        Mitigation..................................................             104              95              87
        Response....................................................             427             379             330
        Recovery....................................................             181             172             156
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          Total, RMRR...............................................             912             822             734
                                                                     ===============================================
    Administrative & Regional Operations............................           1,072           1,032             749
    National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund...........................              55              15  ..............
    Flood Map Modernization Fund....................................              33              33              25
    National Flood Insurance Fund...................................             270             270             237
    Disaster Assistance Direct Loan Program Account.................               3               3               3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note: Excludes Disaster Relief Fund and Public Health Programs.

        Question. How many vacancies will be filled by funds provided
    through supplemental appropriations bills enacted after August 2005?
        Answer. The supplemental appropriation (Public Law 109-148)
    included 80 full time permanent positions and funding for the staffing
    of the Gulf Region Acquisition Center and Office of the Chief Financial
    Officer. The fiscal year 2007 request includes funding to support these
    positions on a permanent basis. FEMA plans to fill all of the
    positions.

                               FEMA FUNDING LAPSE

        Question. In fiscal year 2005, FEMA lapsed $11 million, 6 percent,
    of the funds in the Preparedness, Mitigation, Response and Recovery
    account. What specifically were these funds to be used for and what did
    not happen at FEMA because the funds were returned to the Treasury?
        Answer. Because of FEMA's focus on responding to hurricanes
    Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, funding planned for Federal Incident Response
    Support Teams (FIRSTs), medical surge efforts, and filling vacant
    positions lapsed.

                          HURRICANE KATRINA CONTRACTS

        Question. In response to Hurricane Katrina, how many FEMA contracts
    were made?
        Answer. FEMA awarded 3,479 contract actions.
        Question. How many were sole sourced?
        Answer. There were 227 new contracts that were sole source awards.
        Question. Identify the cruise ships contracts. How many contracts
    were made?
        Answer. The Military Sealift Command awarded a total of four
    contracts for cruise ships to support Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.
    One contract was awarded to Scotia Prince Lines for the vessel SCOTIA
    PRINCE. Carnival Cruise Lines was awarded three contracts for the
    HOLIDAY, ECSTASY and SENSATION. The respective contract numbers as
    follows:
        N00033-05-C-5610--Scotia Prince
        N00033-05-C-5611--Carnival Sensation
        N00033-05-C-5612--Carnival Ecstasy
        N00033-05-C-5613--Carnival Holiday
        Question. How many were sole sourced?
        Answer. None. The contracts were competitively procured.
        Question. How were the contracts solicited?
        Answer. The Military Sealift Command released a Request for
    Proposals through its standard, web-based competitive solicitation
    process.
        Question. What was the cost per bed occupied?
        Answer. The average daily per-person-cost (or bed occupied) was
    $307.18, calculated by dividing the contract total obligated amount by
    the total passenger counts for the three Carnival ships.
        Daily costs were calculated by dividing the contract total
    obligated amount by the number of days, then dividing that figure by
    the number of passengers, as described below.
        Contract Amounts (Total obligated, including reimbursable cost
    limits):
      --Ecstasy--$82,713,000
      --Holiday--$62,153,000
      --Sensation--$91,133,000
        (A) Contracts' total obligated amount $235,999,000.
        Passenger Days (Total passenger count for the period of occupancy):
      --Ecstasy--329,204
      --Holiday--135,464
      --Sensation--303,603
        (B) Total passenger days 768,271
        A divided by B=$307.18 per passenger daily cost.

                               MAP MODERNIZATION

        Question. Through the Map Modernization Program how many maps have
    been updated?
        Answer. As of the end of fiscal year 2005 for the Flood Map
    Modernization Program, FEMA estimates that:
      --Digital flood map products were available for 39 percent of the
            Nation's population.
      --11 percent of the stream miles mapped was based on new, updated, or
            validated engineering analysis, covering 4 percent of the
            population.
      --Digital flood map products covered 15 percent of the land area of
            the continental United States.
        Question. How many are left to update?
        Answer. Between the end of fiscal year 2005 and the end of fiscal
    year 2010, the following actions are planned:
      --Digital flood map products will be available for an additional 53
            percent of the Nation's population. Map Modernization will
            provide updated maps for 92 percent of the population by 2010.
      --30 percent of the stream miles mapped will be based on new,
            updated, or validated engineering analysis, affecting 40
            percent of the Nation's population.
      --Digital flood map products will cover an additional 50 percent of
            the land area of the continental United States. Map
            Modernization will cover 65 percent of the land area of the
            continental United States by 2010.
        Question. Of the updated maps, how many used new scientific data
    and what type of data (i.e. topographic, etc.), not just technology,
    was used in the update process?
        Answer. Thirty percent of the stream miles mapped will be based on
    new, updated, or validated engineering/scientific analysis, affecting
    40 percent of the Nation's population. For these updates, FEMA is using
    new or updated scientific data such as topographic data, base maps,
    stream gage data, rainfall data, engineering analyses, and land
    surveys. In addition, FEMA has used Geographic Information Systems
    (GIS) to compile the updated maps and is making these maps available
    through a web-based mapping information platform.
        Question. In fiscal year 2006, questions for the record, it was
    stated that FEMA is ``on track to complete the project by 2010, should
    the funding requested through 2008 be provided.'' Does this remain
    true?
        Answer. FEMA is still on track to complete the project by 2010,
    should the funding requested through 2008 be provided.
        Question. What is the projected cost through 2008?
        Answer. FEMA estimates that it will need approximately $200 million
    in appropriated funds in both fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 for
    the Flood Map Modernization Program.

                                   EXERCISES

        Question. How many exercises has FEMA been involved in? When, where
    and what was exercised? Who else participated (i.e. local, State,
    Federal partners)?
        Answer. Since May 2003, FEMA has been involved in the following
    exercises:

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                Capabilities
               Exercise Name                       Dates                   Location              exercised          FEMA participants    Other participants
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TOPOFF 2..........................  May 12-16, 2003...........  Multiple locations...  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                            and command,           Coordination Center   Homeland Security
                                                                                            control, and           (NRCC) at FEMA        (DHS)/Office for
                                                                                            coordination at top    Headquarters; FEMA    Domestic
                                                                                            officials level.       Regions V and X.      Preparedness (ODP)
                                                                                                                                         (Sponsors)
    Determined Promise 2003...........  September 2003............  Las Vegas, NV........  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                            and coordination       Coordination Center   Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                            with DOD.              (NRCC) at FEMA.       Northern Command
                                                                                           Headquarters; FEMA
                                                                                            Region IX; FEMA
                                                                                            Response Division,
                                                                                            Operations Branch,
                                                                                            Planning Section.
    Crisis Management Exercise........  2003......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  North Atlantic
                                                                                            and coordination                             Treaty Organization
                                                                                            with DOD.                                    (NATO)/Department
                                                                                                                                         of Defense (DOD)
    Unified Defense...................  February 2004.............  .....................  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                            and coordination       Coordination Center   Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                            with DOD.              (NRCC) at FEMA        Northern Command
                                                                                                                   Headquarters; FEMA    (Sponsors)
                                                                                                                   Region VI; Response
                                                                                                                   Division,
                                                                                                                   Operations Branch,
                                                                                                                   Planning Section.
    CWID..............................  2004......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  Department of
                                                                                            and coordination                             Defense (DOD)
                                                                                            with DOD.
    Crisis Management Exercise........  2004......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  North Atlantic
                                                                                            and coordination                             Treaty Organization
                                                                                            with DOD.                                    (NATO)/Department
                                                                                                                                         of Defense (DOD)
    Determined Promised 2004..........  2004......................  Richmond, VA.........  Response capabilities  FEMA Region III.....  Department of
                                                                                            and coordination                             Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                            with DOD.                                    Northern Command
                                                                                                                                         (Sponsors)
    Forward Challenge.................  2004......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters;    Department of
                                                                                            and coordination       FEMA Office of        Defense (DOD)
                                                                                            with DOD.              National Security
                                                                                                                   Coordination.
    Livewire..........................  2004......................  .....................  .....................  FEMA HQ and FEMA      ....................
                                                                                                                   Region I.
    TOPOFF 3 CPX......................  2004......................  .....................  .....................  FEMA Headquarters...  Department of
                                                                                                                                         Homeland Security
                                                                                                                                         (DHS)/Office for
                                                                                                                                         Domestic
                                                                                                                                         Preparedness (ODP)
                                                                                                                                         (Sponsors)
    Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant  March 9-10, 2005..........  Brattleboro, VT......  Six person team to     Mobile Emergency      ....................
     Drill.                                                                                 support NPP drill.     Response Support
                                                                                                                   (MERS) Detachments.
    Defense Interoperability            March 11-28, 2005.........  .....................  Response capabilities  Mobile Emergency      Defense Information
     Communications Exercise (DICE)                                                         and coordination       Response Support      Systems Agency
     2005.                                                                                  with DOD.              (MERS) Detachments.   (DISA)/Joint
                                                                                                                                         Interoperability
                                                                                                                                         Test Command (JITC)
    TOPOFF 3..........................  April 4-10, 2005..........  Multiple locations...  Response capabilities  National Response     Department of
                                                                                            and command,           Coordination Center   Homeland Security
                                                                                            control, and           (NRCC) at FEMA        (DHS)/Office for
                                                                                            coordination at top    Headquarters; FEMA    Domestic
                                                                                            officials level.       Regions I and II.     Preparedness (ODP)
                                                                                                                                         (Sponsors)
    Chemical Stockpile Emergency        May 8-12, 2005............  .....................  Response capabilities  Mobile Emergency      ....................
     Preparedness Program (CSEPP).                                                                                 Response Support
                                                                                                                   (MERS) Detachments.
    Radiological Emergency              May 23-27, 2005...........  Brattleboro, VT......  Response capabilities  Mobile Emergency
     Preparedness Exercise.                                                                                        Response Support
                                                                                                                   (MERS) Detachments.
    Grecian Firebolt 2005.............  June 1-24, 2005...........  .....................  Joint Secure           Mobile Emergency      Department of
                                                                                            Communications         Response Support      Defense (DOD)/ASC
                                                                                            Exercise.              (MERS) Detachments.
    Pinnacle Exercise.................  June 20-25, 2005..........  .....................  National level         Mobile Emergency      Department of
                                                                                            response               Response Support      Homeland Security
                                                                                            capabilities           (MERS) Detachments;   (DHS)
                                                                                            demonstration.         FEMA's Office of
                                                                                                                   National Security
                                                                                                                   Coordination.
    Northern Edge/Alaska Shield.......  August 15-19, 2005........  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Region X;        Northern Command
                                                                                                                   Mobile Emergency      (Sponsor), Alaska
                                                                                                                   Response Support      Command
                                                                                                                   (MERS) Detachments.
    Dingo King 2005...................  August 20-24, 2006........  Kings Bay, GA........  National Nuclear       FEMA Region IV;       Department of
                                                                                            Weapon Accident        Mobile Emergency      Defense (DOD)/
                                                                                            Exercise- Response     Response Support      Defense Threat
                                                                                            capabilities and       (MERS) Detachments.   Reduction Agency
                                                                                            coordination with                            (DTRA) (Sponsors)
                                                                                            DOD.
    Joint User Interoperability         August 1-30, 2005.........  .....................  Interoperable          Mobile Emergency      United States Joint
     Communications Exercise (JUICE)                                                        communications.        Response Support      Forces Command
     2005.                                                                                                         (MERS) Detachments.   (USJFCOM)
    Ardent Sentry 2005................  September 2005............  .....................  Response capabilities  National Response     ....................
                                                                                            and coordination       Coordination Center
                                                                                            with DOD.              (NRCC) at FEMA
                                                                                                                   Headquarters;
                                                                                                                   Response Division,
                                                                                                                   Operations Branch,
                                                                                                                   Planning Section.
    Crisis Management Exercise........  2005......................  .....................  Response capabilities  FEMA Headquarters...  North Atlantic
                                                                                            and coordination                             Treaty Organization
                                                                                            with DOD.                                    (NATO)/Department
                                                                                                                                         of Defense (DOD)
    Defense Interoperability            February 20-March 3, 2006.  .....................  Defense                MERS--Denton          Defense Information
     Communications Exercise (DICE)                                                         interoperability       Detachment.           Systems Agency
     2006.                                                                                  exercise/testing.                            (DISA)/Joint
                                                                                                                                         Interoperability
                                                                                                                                         Test Command (JITC)
                                                                                                                                         (Sponsors)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   PERSONNEL

        Question. How many permanent and temporary personnel left FEMA
    during fiscal year 2005 and how many were replaced?
        Answer. During fiscal year 2005, there were 5,715 employee
    separations from FEMA and 6,051 employee accessions, for a turnover
    rate of 20.32 percent.
        Question. How many have left in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. During fiscal year 2006, as of February 4, 2006, there have
    been 644 employee separations from FEMA and 4,822 employee accessions--
    for a turnover rate of 2.29 percent.
        Question. How many trained temporary personnel were/are available
    to FEMA in fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2006?
        Answer:
        Fiscal year 2001--2,521
        Fiscal year 2002--2,865
        Fiscal year 2003--3,289
        Fiscal year 2004--3,330
        Fiscal year 2005--5,458
        Fiscal year 2006--11,790
        All of FEMA's temporary Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs)
    receive training. Because DAEs are permitted to list themselves as not
    available for deployment, the number of DAEs available at any given
    time will vary. The numbers provided for prior years reflect total DAEs
    deployed for various disasters during the fiscal year. Fiscal year 2006
    numbers reflect those currently on board as of 5/13/06.

                      CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
                        BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM

        Question. What is the estimated total cost of the business
    transformation program?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2007, USCIS plans to spend $112 million ($47
    million as requested in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget and $65
    million from mandatory). As part of planning efforts in fiscal year
    2006, USCIS is completing the business transformation strategy which
    will inform activities beyond 2007.

                                CIS INITIATIVES

        Question. Please provide a basic description of the SAVE and EEV
    programs including: (a) which one employers currently check to
    determine status of their employees; (b) when the SAVE program started;
    (c) what prohibitions have been placed on the program; (d) and what
    portion of the costs are covered by fees paid by whom.
        Answer. The SAVE Program.--The Immigration Reform and Control Act
    of 1986 (IRCA), required the former Immigration and Naturalization
    Service (now U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)), to
    establish a system for verifying the immigration status of non-citizen
    applicants for, and recipients of, certain types of Federally funded
    benefits, and to make the system available to Federal, State, and local
    benefit issuing agencies and institutions that administer such
    benefits. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE)
    Program was established in September 1987, and is the USCIS office
    responsible for administering DHS programs involving customer access to
    immigration status information contained in the SAVE Verification
    Information System (VIS). The VIS database consists of information
    drawn from the Central Index System (CIS) and the TECS/IBIS system, and
    contains over 120 million records. There are currently 197 agencies
    with over 190,000 Federal, State, and local government users
    participating in SAVE. In fiscal year 2005 SAVE responded to more than
    10.5 million immigration status verification queries from these users.
    SAVE customers access status information via the web, a personal
    computer with modem, 3,270 terminals, or batch method. The SAVE
    Federal, State, and local government users pay a per query cost for
    using the SAVE system. These query costs are paid directly to Computer
    Sciences Corporation, the contractor which operates and maintains the
    VIS database for the SAVE Program.
        The Basic Pilot (Employment Eligibility Verification).--In 1996,
    the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
    (IIRIRA), provided for the implementation of the Basic Pilot program
    for a 4-year period. Congress twice extended authorization for the
    Basic Pilot to its current authorization deadline of November 2008. The
    USCIS SAVE Program and the Social Security Administration (SSA) jointly
    conduct the Basic Pilot Program. The program involves verification
    checks of the SSA and DHS databases, using an automated system to
    verify the employment authorization of newly hired employees.
        The Basic Pilot was implemented in November 1997. By statute, the
    Basic Pilot is a voluntary program, and free to employers who
    volunteer. The Basic Pilot was originally available to employers in the
    States of California, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, New York and Texas;
    however, in December 2004, the pilot was expanded to employers in all
    50 States and the District of Columbia. There are currently more than
    5,500 employers enrolled in the Basic Pilot representing more than
    23,500 employer sites. Basic Pilot performed more than 980,000 queries
    in fiscal year 2005.
        By statute, the Basic Pilot cannot be used to pre-screen job
    applicants; to re-verify employment authorization; or to verify
    employment authorization for those employees who were hired prior to
    the company joining the Basic Pilot Program. Presently, the Basic Pilot
    is available through a Web-Based access method. The USCIS is currently
    paying for the Basic Pilot query costs from general immigration benefit
    application fees.
        Question. Also describe the role that the Social Security
    Administration plays in these processes.
        Answer. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is a SAVE agency
    user. SSA uses the SAVE system to verify the immigration status of non-
    citizens and naturalized citizens applying for Supplemental Security
    Income benefits and non-citizens applying for Social Security Numbers.
        Additionally, the SSA is jointly conducting the Basic Pilot program
    with USCIS. All Basic Pilot queries, whether the employee claims to be
    a citizen, national, or non-citizen, first go to the SSA database for
    verification. When the information cannot be verified through the
    automated system, the employee must contact an SSA field office to
    correct any discrepancies in the SSA record in order to confirm their
    employment authorization. All non-citizen queries also go to USCIS for
    verification of work authorization status.
        Question. What is the timeline for implementing SAVE and EEV?
        Answer. The SAVE Program has been in existence since September
    1987. The Basic Pilot Program was implemented in November 1997.
    Language mandating an Employment Eligibility Verification (EEV) Program
    is included in several pending pieces of legislation. Should
    legislation be passed mandating an EEV program, USCIS has estimated
    that it will take 12 to 18 months, from the time that USCIS receives
    funding through appropriations, to fully implement the program. The
    President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests $111 million to improve
    and expand Basic Pilot in anticipation of a mandatory, national
    program. This funding will cover start up infrastructure improvements
    including increases in personnel, increased operating efficiency
    through automation of features and a reengineered process, and the
    increasing accuracy of DHS databases and data on individuals used in
    the verification process. These operating efficiencies are intended to
    reduce the reliance on manual verification and the need for personnel
    for this function.
        Question. What part of the EEV request is not tied to pending
    legislation?
        Answer. A total of $111 million in the President's fiscal year 2007
    budget request is in anticipation of legislation requiring a national
    mandatory employment eligibility verification program. In addition to
    the $111 million, the President's budget also requests $20.5 million to
    support the existing base operations of the Basic Pilot and SAVE
    programs, and $4 million to support expansion of SAVE to meet the
    requirements of the REAL ID Act. Therefore, a total of $24.5 million
    out of a combined total of $135.5 million relating to immigration
    verification activities is not tied to pending legislation.

                                 CIS PERSONNEL

        Question. How many status verifiers are there and where are they
    located?
        Answer. There are currently 159 Immigration Status Verifier
    positions. The charts below show where these positions are located.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                AUTHORIZED
                             OFFICE                              POSITIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    HEADQUARTERS:
        National Records Center (Contact Reps)..............              24
    FCO POSITIONS:
        Immigration Status Verifiers........................             135
                                                             ---------------
          Total.............................................             159
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       BREAKDOWN OF POSITIONS BY LOCATION
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Office                             Authorized
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    HEADQUARTERS:
        Headquarters........................................              15
        National Records Center.............................               9
    EASTERN REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
        Atlanta.............................................               2
        Baltimore...........................................               3
        Boston..............................................               2
        Buffalo.............................................               3
        Cleveland...........................................               1
        Detroit.............................................               1
        Miami...............................................               8
        Newark..............................................               4
        New Orleans.........................................               2
        New York............................................               8
        Philadelphia........................................               2
        Portland, Maine.....................................               1
        San Juan............................................               3
        Washington..........................................               3
    SUBOFFICE:
        Albany..............................................               1
        Charlotte, NC.......................................               1
        Charlotte Amalie, VI................................               1
        Hartford............................................               2
        Norfolk.............................................               1
        Pittsburgh..........................................               2
        Providence..........................................               1
        St. Albans..........................................               1
        Vermont Service Center..............................               1
    CENTRAL REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
        Chicago.............................................               2
        Dallas..............................................               4
        Denver..............................................               2
        El Paso.............................................               2
        Harlingen...........................................               2
        Houston.............................................               2
        Kansas City.........................................               1
        Omaha...............................................               1
        San Antonio.........................................               2
        St. Paul............................................               1
    SUBOFFICE:
        Salt Lake City......................................               1
        St. Louis...........................................               1
    WESTERN REGION DISTRICT OFFICE:
        Anchorage...........................................               1
        Honolulu............................................               2
        Los Angeles (Perm)..................................              24
        Los Angeles (Term)..................................              17
        Phoenix.............................................               1
        Portland, Oregon....................................               1
        San Diego...........................................               3
        San Francisco.......................................               6
        Seattle.............................................               2
    SUBOFFICE:
        Guam................................................               1
        Las Vegas...........................................               1
        Reno................................................               1
                                                             ---------------
          TOTAL.............................................             159
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            USER FEE REFORM PROPOSAL

        Question. Please provide details on the comprehensive immigration
    enforcement user fee reform rulemaking.
        Answer. Details of the Department's plans for this reform
    rulemaking are still under review.

                           TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS

        Question. What is the status of the proposed legislation?
        Answer. To date, the legislation has not been enacted by Congress.
        Question. If legislation is not enacted, what is the impact on the
    fiscal year 2007 budget?
        Answer. Fee revenues would be $20 million less than projected in
    the budget. Other immigration benefit applications would continue to
    subsidize the processing of temporary protected status applications due
    to the statutory fee cap.

                             SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
                                  RAIL PILOTS

        Question. In fiscal year 2005, $10 million was funded to develop
    and conduct simulated real-world exercises to validate a training
    program for the use of commercially-available equipment against suicide
    bombers in commuter and passenger rail environments. How has the public
    responded to this program?
        Answer. As part of the rail security pilot program at the Port
    Authority Trans-Hudson Rail Station at Exchange Place, screening of
    passengers occurred in two phases at the turnstile check-point: (1)
    Screening of the passenger and (2) Screening of baggage. Passengers
    proceeded through metal detectors, X-ray systems, physical search, and
    trace detection techniques--all of which were adapted to address a
    potential attack by a suicide bomber or via an improvised explosive
    device (IED) that has been left behind.
        Upon completion of this rail security screening, passengers were
    asked to voluntarily respond to the Rail Security Pilot Passenger
    Survey, a seven-item, self-report questionnaire concerning the
    passenger's screening experience and opinions regarding the screening.
        Results of the survey indicated that many passengers felt that they
    were not adequately informed that the screening process was voluntary
    or that they had the right to refuse the screen and board their train
    at another station. However, the results also indicated that:
      --The majority of passengers did not feel uneasy about going through
            the screening process;
      --Passengers felt the screeners were extremely professional,
            courteous, and respectful;
      --The screening process, on average, did not require too much time;
      --Passengers were moderately in favor of future additional security
            testing of explosive detection technologies in rail stations;
            and that
      --Passengers strongly agreed that improving rail security is worth
            the additional time needed to go through the screening process.
        Overall survey results suggest that rail passengers had a favorable
    security screening experience and support efforts to improve rail
    screening.
        Question. Is there any funding included in the fiscal year 2007
    budget to expand this program to other transit systems?
        Answer. No funding is included in the fiscal year 2007 budget to
    expand this program to other transit systems.
        Question. Does S&T plan to expand this program to the bus
    environment?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate plans to expand this screening concept
    to a bus terminal. Passengers will be screened in two phases at a
    check-point: (1) screening of the passenger and (2) screening of
    baggage. Passengers will proceed through an array of technologies such
    as walk-through metal detectors, X-ray systems, physical search and
    trace detection techniques--all of which will be adapted to address the
    suicide or leave-behind Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threats.

                                    MANPADS

        Question. $340 million has been appropriated to date for the
    development of countermeasures to protect commercial aircraft from the
    threat of Man Portable Air Defense Systems. The fiscal year 2007 budget
    indicates that findings will be presented to the Administration and
    Congress to aid them in making an informed decision to address
    protection of commercial airlines from the threat of MANPADS. When will
    that report be submitted to Congress?
        Answer. Congress has appropriated $231.9 million through fiscal
    year 2006 to the S&T Directorate's Counter-MANPADS program to develop
    and demonstrate the migration of existing Counter-MANPADS technologies
    to the commercial airline industry. The Counter-MANPADS Phase II report
    has been prepared and is in the inter-agency review process. It will be
    provided to Congress as soon as the process is complete.
        Question. What process will the Administration follow in
    determining whether such technological countermeasures should be
    purchased and deployed on commercial aircraft?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate will provide to Congress this spring a
    Counter-MANPADS Phase II report containing cost and performance
    information that can be used as part of the decision-making process.
    The report will also provide information to assist with deciding the
    next steps in applying this technology to protect commercial airlines.
    Specific information that will be provided in the report includes the
    technical results of the Counter-MANPADS system demonstration, data and
    analysis on the installation of the systems on commercial aircraft, and
    current estimates for the cost of installing as well as maintain and
    support the systems in a commercial aviation environment.

                               CHEMICAL DETECTION

        Question. In testimony last year before the Subcommittee, former
    Assistant Secretary Parney Albright stated that S&T was working very
    closely with the Office of Domestic Preparedness on guidance that will
    allow grants to be used by transit authorities to deploy a chemical
    detection system, better known as PROTECT. While some transit
    authorities have purchased individual detectors, only three have
    deployed the PROTECT system. Assistant Secretary Albright stated ``that
    there are something like 30 metro systems around the country--that
    would then basically take the system and install it. It is really
    inexpensive.''
        Why have only 3 systems installed such a system?
        Answer. The decision to install the Program for Response Options
    and Technology Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is
    at the discretion of each transit system. Following the system's
    successful demonstration in Washington, DC, New York City and Boston,
    the PROTECT system became available for installation in other transit
    systems. Procurement and installation of PROTECT systems can be funded
    by the Transit Security Grants Program administered by the DHS Office
    of Grants and Training (G&T). The Transit Security Grant Program
    includes funds for rail transit security, targeted to specific urban
    areas for the prevention and detection of explosive devices and
    chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents. Acquisition of
    the PROTECT system is permissible under this program. The S&T
    Directorate is assisting G&T with technical data package development
    and is prepared to offer technical assistance in the deployment of the
    system through this program.
        Question. What is the cost to purchase and operate PROTECT?
        Answer. The average cost to equip a single transit station with the
    Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement for Chemical
    Terrorism (PROTECT) system varies between $250,000 to $1 million to
    install, dependent upon the complexity of the station. Annual
    maintenance costs average approximately $50,000 per station.
        Question. If S&T operates the Bio-Watch system for bio-threats, why
    shouldn't S&T operate the PROTECT system for chemical threats?
        Answer. The Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancement
    for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is designed for chemical
    attacks within facilities or in localized areas, whereas BioWatch is a
    monitoring system for wide-area biological attacks. PROTECT is also
    designed for specific stakeholders such as transit facilities, and the
    response to an emergency has to be immediate to effectively mitigate
    the event and save lives. PROTECT is integrated with the local
    emergency operations centers (EOC) in the region and designed so that
    it would fit into and utilize existing infrastructure such as camera,
    information technology, and communication systems. Because PROTECT is
    integrated with existing infrastructure, the operating costs remain
    relativity low and are mainly associated with sensor maintenance. The
    sensors, once installed, require an adjustment period which can be
    lengthy to address local chemical interferences from various sources
    (exhausts, cleaning solutions, nearby businesses, etc.). These are best
    addressed locally. Therefore, PROTECT can be effectively owned and
    operated directly by the individual stakeholder.
        Since PROTECT is currently allowed through the Transit Security
    Grant Program, individual transit systems voluntarily make the decision
    to install the system such as Baltimore. Baltimore is in the process of
    installing their own system using a combination of grants and operating
    funds. Many other transit systems have shown an interest in PROTECT.
        The S&T Directorate has successfully installed systems in three
    transit systems and does have experience through the BioWatch program
    in deploying a monitoring and response system nationally. PROTECT,
    however, differs from BioWatch in the response actions which need to be
    locally controlled to ensure an effective and timely response. Thus,
    any Federally funded program to ensure broad installation of PROTECT
    would be best served by requiring that stakeholders commit to incurring
    and maintaining operating and maintenance costs once the installation
    and transition period is complete.

                                TUNNEL DETECTION

        Question. What is S&T currently doing to develop technology and
    other deterrents to border tunnels?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is developing border protection pattern
    discovery and prediction technologies that will provide a new
    capability to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This
    capability will enable the rapid fusion of disparate information
    sources to discover geo-spatial, behavioral, and temporal patterns and
    indicators that will provide ICE field agents with local scene
    awareness and actionable intelligence. This technology will be
    developed within ICE's Office of Intelligence to facilitate the
    derivation of patterns and indicators that address operational missions
    such as: (1) crossing routes and staging areas for cross border
    smuggling, (2) crossing patterns by group that will help identify the
    number of organized groups involved and their respective signatures,
    (3) crossing patterns by tactic that will help identify distinctive
    signatures for specific tactics, such as drug and human smuggling, (4)
    the identification of links and patterns between illegal border
    crossing and criminal activity within the United States, and (5) tunnel
    activity indicators to help discover the likely next tunneling start
    and end points.
        In addition, the S&T Directorate is working with the Office of
    Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department
    of Defense (DOD) to find technology solutions for tunnel detection
    along the Southern and Northern borders of the United States.
        The S&T Directorate participated in the Tunnel Detection Technical
    Support Working Group (TSWG) meeting held in January 2006 and the Joint
    Task Force-6 Tunneling Conference held in June 2004. The S&T
    Directorate is also engaged with NORTHCOM's Futures Group in relaying,
    discussing, and leveraging potential technologies that satisfy DOD and
    DHS's tunnel detection needs. The S&T Directorate's Border &
    Transportation (B&T) Portfolio met with NORTHCOM officials in August
    2005 to discuss specific opportunities to collaborate and leverage each
    organization's expertise.
        CBP is also coordinating with a number of sources that could
    possibly provide technology that will meet CBP's detection needs. These
    sources include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
    Sandia Laboratories, and the Border Research Technology Center. There
    is currently no proven technology that can detect the types of tunnels
    that have recently been encountered. Some promising research and
    development is being done by Sandia Laboratories, but at this time, its
    field utility is unknown.
        Question. What level of funding has been contributed to this effort
    to date and what, if any, funding is included in the fiscal year 2007
    request?
        Answer. Funding for border protection pattern discovery and
    prediction was $700,000 in fiscal year 2005 and $1.2 million in fiscal
    year 2006. No funds are directly associated with detection of border
    tunnels in the fiscal year 2007 budget request.

                               AIR CARGO SECURITY

        Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory awarded nine
    contracts to develop new technologies that would provide enhanced
    security for containerized air cargo inspection and U.S. mail
    inspection transported on passenger aircraft.
        Please provide a notional schedule from testing of these systems to
    deployment, including costs for each step of the process.
        Answer. In September 2004, the Transportation Security Agency
    commenced a long-term research and development Air Cargo Inspection
    Project for development of new technologies in screening containerized
    and mail cargo. In fiscal year 2006, laboratory test and evaluations
    for eight technologies are planned. Pending availability of funding and
    satisfactory program progress, this will be followed by a 3-year effort
    (fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010) for the system development phase
    and testing of technologies that have passed the laboratory test and
    evaluation. Based on the number of technologies that show potential for
    screening containerized and mail cargo during the system development
    phase, the operational test and evaluation phase will commence in
    fiscal year 2011.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Estimated
                            Development phase                            duration     Projected cost   Funding year
                                                                         (months)       (millions)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Phase 1--Preliminary Design/Detailed Design.....................              24           $24.0            2005
        Proof of Concept Testing....................................              12             2.4            2006
    Phase 2--System Development:
        Sub Phase I.................................................               8            12.0            2007
        Sub Phase II................................................               8            12.0            2008
        Sub Phase III...............................................               8            12.0            2009
    Phase 4--System Test............................................               8             4.0            2010
    Phase 5--Pilot Site.............................................               4             8.0            2011
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          Total.....................................................              72            74.4  ..............
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              NEXT GENERATION EDS

        Question. How much is budgeted for Manhattan II in fiscal year
    2007?
        Answer. Funding for Phase II (systems development) of the Manhattan
    II project for fiscal year 2007 has been tentatively identified in the
    amount of $14.2 million. This is based on three contracts to be awarded
    for screening system development and the development of a system
    architecture to support the screening solutions.
        Question. Based on information provided by the Transportation
    Security Lab (TSL), deployable systems will be available starting in
    fiscal year 2010. However, the Subcommittee has learned that a
    comprehensive audit of the program is underway. What budget and
    deployment schedule implications does this have on the program?
        Answer. There is a cost-sharing study being conducted by the
    Transportation Security Agency (TSA) in response to direction received
    from Congress in fiscal year 2005. A preliminary draft of the results
    from this study is being prepared. Based on the final results of this
    study, the strategic plan developed by TSA in fiscal year 2005 may
    change, which will have an impact on future budget and deployment
    requirements.
        Question. Has there been discussion of charging industry for
    certification of EDS by the TSL?
        Answer. In the mid-90's, when the Transportation Security
    Laboratory (TSL) was part of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
    a reimbursable agreement was established charging industry a maximum of
    $50,000 for explosives detection system (EDS) certification testing.
    Unfortunately, this process was never re-established as the TSL was
    transferred from the FAA to the Department of Transportation and
    finally to the Department of Homeland Security (first within the
    Transportation Security Administration and then to the S&T
    Directorate). TSL is pursuing reincorporation of this process.
        Question. What is spent on the certification process?
        Answer. In order to accurately determine a fair and reasonable
    charge for the industry, the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL),
    in cooperation with the S&T Directorate, is currently assessing the
    costs associated with the use of laboratory time, laboratory materials,
    government and contractor labor used in the execution of explosive
    detection systems (EDS) certification testing. The certification
    process for EDS consists of five primary components: certification-
    readiness testing (CRT); pre-certification testing; certification
    testing; post-certification testing; and post-test data analysis and
    reporting. For any given system submitted to the TSL for EDS
    certification, the duration and cost of each of these elements varies,
    depending on the maturity, capability and throughput of the system
    under evaluation. The time that a given system is under evaluation also
    varies, but typically can range anywhere from as short as 6 weeks to as
    long as 6 months. Given these and other factors, at present we estimate
    an industry maximum for EDS certification would be established at
    approximately $250,000.

                                   BORDERSAFE

        Question. What technologies have been certified and deployed
    through the BorderSafe program?
        Answer. Three main areas of technology have been deployed through
    the BorderSafe program. They include tools and technologies that
    support data merging and visualization; handheld, wireless access to
    regional and national law enforcement databases; and regional law
    enforcement information sharing. Specific examples are highlighted
    below.
      --A spatial temporal visualization (STV) and criminal activity
            network (CAN) toolset designed by the University of Arizona's
            Artificial Intelligence Laboratory was deployed to the Tucson
            Police Department (TPD). The STV tool enables TPD crime
            analysts to plot suspicious or criminal incidents near critical
            infrastructure and explore distribution of those incidents by
            time period. The CAN tool integrates Customs and Border
            Protection (CBP) License Plate Reader data with a local TPD
            criminal record data set to reveal links among subjects who
            routinely crossed the border and are known offenders in the
            Tucson region.
      --Impact for customers:
        --BorderSafe merged Federal and local law enforcement data sets for
                analysis and visualization. As a result, 35 vehicles with a
                history of crossing the border and known links to criminal
                activity in Tucson were referred to CBP for alert status.
        --BorderSafe's visualization tools identified a number of high-
                frequency border crossing vehicles with Mexican license
                plates and known associations to local Tucson crime
                networks.
      --A wireless data access application (known as Global Query) was
            developed and deployed to the San Diego Automated Regional
            Justice Information System (ARJIS)--a California Joint Powers
            Agency that includes over 70 law enforcement organizations in
            the counties of San Diego and Imperial. The wireless Global
            Query application enables field officers to use a handheld
            device to concurrently query a number of commonly used regional
            and national law enforcement databases, including: San Diego
            local records management and officer notification systems
            (local booking photos, county warrants); the National Crime
            Information Center (NCIC) (wanted persons, temporary
            restraining orders, and deported felon alerts); and the
            California Department of Motor Vehicles (registration, drivers
            license, and stolen vehicle information). The wireless Global
            Query application is currently used by more than 150 Federal,
            State and local law enforcement officers from 15 different
            agencies and taskforces in Southern California.
      --Impact for customers:
        --Hits on the deported felon watch list by BorderSafe program
                participants using the wireless Global Query application
                have led to over 200 identifications and arrests in the San
                Diego region.
        --An FBI agent registered a ``suspected terrorist'' hit using the
                wireless Global Query application.
        --The 20,000th fugitive for the San Diego U.S. Marshal's Violent
                Crimes Task Force was arrested after a record check was run
                through BorderSafe's wireless Global Query application.
        --DHS Border Patrol agents using the wireless Global Query
                application arrested 10 Brazilian subjects for being
                illegally smuggled into the United States. The driver of
                the vehicle was charged with felony alien smuggling.
        --Hundreds of suspect and fugitive identifications have been made
                in the field by local law enforcement and Federal task
                force members running records checks and retrieving digital
                photographs via BorderSafe's wireless Global Query
                application.
      --A commercial law enforcement information and knowledge management
            system was deployed to San Diego ARJIS to consolidate records
            management data from 18 Southern California jurisdictions. Data
            query access to the system was made available to the entire
            ARJIS user community (over 70 law enforcement organizations),
            and a data sharing protocol and virtual private network (VPN)
            was implemented to allow information sharing between ARJIS and
            the Tucson Police Department. VPNs were also implemented in
            Southern Arizona to support information sharing between the
            Tucson Police Department regional node and law enforcement
            agencies in Mohave County, Kingman, Bullhead City, and Lake
            Havasu City.
      --Impact for customers:
        --One day after implementation of the BorderSafe network connection
                between San Diego and Tucson, a TPD analyst with only the
                name of a suspected Tucson crime ring leader obtained the
                suspect's driver's license and mug shot photos from ARJIS.
                His photos were shown to an informant who positively
                identified the suspect, leading to his apprehension and
                arrest.
        --Through BorderSafe's systems integration and network deployment
                initiatives, a TPD Sergeant found information and photos in
                ARJIS relevant to gang related criminals and their
                associates in the Tucson region. This information was used
                to enhance ongoing TPD investigations by positively
                identifying gang suspects and broadening the scope of
                surveillance of their known associates.
        Question. The budget indicates that the Southwest regional test bed
    will include two additional local jurisdictions along the border in
    fiscal year 2007. Where?
        Answer. During fiscal year 2007, the BorderSafe program's southwest
    regional test bed will expand to include two additional jurisdictions
    located in New Mexico and Texas.

                            TRANSIT SECURITY PROJECT

        Question. Through the Transit Security Project (TSP), S&T assists
    transit agencies in developing tactical countermeasures to reduce risk
    to transit systems from various terrorist threats. What actionable
    measures have been taken by transit systems as a result of the TSP?
        Answer. Since the Program for Response Options and Technology
    Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT) system is currently
    allowed through the Transit Security Grants Program, administered by
    the DHS Office of Grants and Training (G&T), individual transit systems
    voluntarily make the decision to install the system. Baltimore is in
    the process of installing their own system using a combination of grant
    and operating funds. Many other transit systems have shown an interest
    in PROTECT. Following the system's successful demonstration in
    Washington, DC, New York City and Boston, the PROTECT system became
    available for installation in other transit systems via the grant
    program.
        Question. Is S&T working with the Grants & Training Office to make
    clear that these countermeasures are allowable under the current
    transit security grant guidance?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is working directly with the Transit
    Security Grants Program administered by the DHS Office of Grants and
    Training (G&T). The S&T Directorate also assists G&T with technical
    data by serving as the point-of-contact for questions and is prepared
    to offer technical assistance in the deployment of transit security
    systems through this program.

                                COAST GUARD R&D

        Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget reduces the amount of funding
    in the Coast Guard's budget for R&D. How much in the fiscal year 2007
    budget for S&T is dedicated to R&D for Coast Guard activities? Please
    specify each program and in which portfolio the work is being
    performed.
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is dedicating $2.8 million in fiscal
    year 2007 for research and development for Coast Guard activities.
    Approximately half of the budget in the Coast Guard Portfolio will be
    directed towards efforts in the Boarding Program, which focuses on
    providing and improving capabilities for boarding officers. The balance
    of the effort will be devoted to advancing and adapting technologies in
    the Compel Compliance Program, which concentrates on stopping or
    controlling threatening vessels and people in the maritime domain.

                                  R&D FUNDING

        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    dedicated to port security R&D? Please specify each program and in
    which portfolio the work is being performed.
        Answer. The Border and Transportation Portfolios' cargo security
    program supports port security. The fiscal year 2007 budget request for
    this program is $16 million.
        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    dedicated to air cargo R&D? Please specify each program and in which
    portfolio the work is being performed.
        Answer. For fiscal year 2007, $12 million was requested to continue
    the system development and test phase of the Aviation Cargo Security
    Pilot, which is evaluating promising commercial off-the-shelf aviation
    screening technologies. This work is being conducted through the
    Explosives Portfolio and is coordinated with the Transportation
    Security Administration.
        In addition, the fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
    continuation of the Air Cargo Pilots initiated in fiscal year 2006
    included $5 million and an additional $5 million for mid- and long-term
    R&D to support the development and identification of technologies for
    screening air cargo. The screening of air cargo will be based on a
    multi-layered approach due to the various types of cargo commodities,
    packaging types and transportation devices (break bulk, container,
    palletized, skids) that are part of the air cargo supply chain. One
    technology cannot meet all air cargo screening requirements and
    therefore and multi-effort R&D program must be maintained to develop
    and test technologies that meet government screening requirements as
    well as minimizing the economic impact on the air cargo supply chain.
        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    dedicated to container security R&D? Please specify each program and in
    which portfolio the work is being performed.
        Answer. The R&D Cargo Security fiscal year 2007 budget is $16
    million. This program is conducted through the Border and
    Transportation Portfolio. The $16 million funds S&T Cargo Security
    Programs which include the Advanced Container Security Device and
    Container Security Device (CSD), the Marine Asset Tag and Tracking
    System, Security Carton, Advanced Material Container, Advanced
    Screening and Targeting and Supply Chain Security Architecture
    Programs.

                                  R&D FUNDING

        Question. What lessons have been learned, if any, from the
    Operation Safe Commerce program?
        Answer. The last phase of Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), Phase II,
    provided insight into container security. During that phase,
    vulnerability assessments were conducted by the 18 pilot projects
    across the supply chains. These assessments included detailed
    examinations of customary operating procedures and infrastructure. They
    revealed that container security is composed of degrees of security and
    relied equally on technology and best practices. The pilot projects
    showed that security could be improved through a combination of
    improved business practices and enhanced technology. Best practices
    which were people driven often varied and were largely dependent upon
    outside factors such as local conditions, infrastructure, and
    traditions.
        Lessons Learned:
      --There are 13 standard security control points that provide the
            foundation to assess and model container threat scenarios,
            vulnerabilities and security counter measures.
      --Supplier
      --Factory
      --Empty Container Storage/Dray
      --Drayage of Cargo to Consolidator (if stuffing is not at factory)
      --Container Stuffing/Sealing (Consolidation)
      --Container Storage (Foreign)
      --Drayage to terminal (from factory to consolidator)
      --Foreign Terminal
      --Ocean Commerce
      --U.S. Terminal
      --Inland Drayage or Rail Transport (U.S.)
      --Deconsolidation (U.S.)
      --Business processes/information transmission
      --Technologies tested in Phase II did not adequately protect against
            a motivated adversary. Commercial technology was successfully
            used and integrated with business processes. However, even
            though many of the technologies demonstrated in the OSC pilots
            provided enhanced security, there were significant deficiencies
            noted in total detection. Most door seals were readily
            defeated; cargo in other containers interfered with sensor
            detectors; and biological and chemical detectors proved
            unreliable. Fixed reader technology faced many challenges. The
            dynamics of the supply chain forced many projects to change
            their routes; there were labor resistance, and the proprietary
            operation of the technology. Technology alone is not sufficient
            to protect the Nation's cargo against the introduction of
            contraband or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
      --There are no incentives to motivate commercial stakeholders to
            invest in container security measures. Container commerce is
            extremely cost sensitive and investment in discretionary
            security measures could place a stakeholder in a disadvantage
            commercially.
      --Basic security information is not available to the supply chain
            stakeholders. There is no facilitation of information sharing
            concerning supply chain security regarding relevant threats,
            vulnerabilities and security requirements between private
            industry and government. When anomalies were discovered there
            were no protocols in place to respond and investigate.
            Reporting protocols and guidance were developed within the OSC
            project by US CBP and the OSC Federal partners.
        The formation of supply chain partnerships can enhance container
    security. Container commerce is global and involves many stakeholders
    including the United States Government, foreign governments and
    commercial stakeholders.
        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    dedicated to transit security R&D? Please specify each program and in
    which portfolio the work is being performed.
        Answer. Within the fiscal year 2007 budget request, $183.73 million
    is included for research and development that can support transit
    security technologies. This work is being conducted across all S&T
    Directorate Portfolios, and much of this effort supports other Homeland
    Security mission requirements as well as transportation security.

                    TRANSIT SECURITY R&D PROJECTS AND FUNDING
                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Fiscal year
                 Portfolio                  Project name           2007
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Border and Transportation.........  Automated Pattern               0
                                         Discovery.
    Critical Infrastructure Protection  Automated Scene                 2.1
                                         Understanding/
                                         Insider Threat
                                         Countermeasures.
    Standards.........................  Blast Resistant                 0.32
                                         Trash Receptacles.
    Threat Awareness..................  Biometrics and                  2.6
                                         Deception Detection.
    Biological Countermeasures........  BioWatch............           94.0
    Critical Infrastructure Protection  CIP Decision Support            5.8
                                         System.
    Critical Infrastructure Protection  Control Systems                 0.5
                                         Security.
    Counter-MANPADS...................  Counter-MANPADS                 4.9
                                         Program.
    Rapid Prototyping.................  Emerging Civil                  7.4
                                         Aviation Defense
                                         Technologies and
                                         Commercial Aircraft
                                         Protection Program.
    Critical Infrastructure Protection  Focused Sector                  3.0
                                         Studies.
    Critical Infrastructure Protection  National CIP R&D                0.9
                                         Plan.
    Border and Transportation.........  Rail Security:        ..............
                                         Chlorine Mitigation.
    Emergent and Prototypical           Transit Security                1.0
     Technology.                         Project.
    Explosives........................  Aviation Security...           52.98
    Explosives........................  Suicide Bombers/                8.23
                                         Leave-Behind IEDs.
                                                             ---------------
          TOTAL.......................  ....................          183.73
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Automated Pattern Discovery (Border and Transportation).--Fusion of
    disparate data sources that maps threats across basic geographic,
    infrastructure, demographic, behavior, and time data. Impact: Provides
    decision makers the ability to rapidly assess a situation,
    automatically derive locations of high risk and vulnerability,
    prioritize asset allocation, and to assess their effectiveness over
    time.
        Automated Scene Understanding/Insider Threat Countermeasures
    (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--Visual interpretation tools that
    will be able to detect packages left-behind in rail cars. Impact:
    Enhanced monitoring and forensic video technologies for protection of
    mass transportation.
        Blast Resistant Trash Receptacles (Standards).--Will provide
    performance standards and test methods for blast resistant trash
    receptacles, allowing users to make informed purchase decisions.
    Impact: Initiated for transit systems, this project coordinated with
    the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER)
    Program will build industry and law enforcement consensus about
    performance standards and test methods for these receptacles. We are
    coordinating with the DHS Office of Grants and Training for these
    standards.
        Biometrics and Deception Detection (Threat Awareness).--Robust
    multi-mode Biometric recognition systems for signature acquisition at a
    distance to increase recognition accuracy and efficiency for
    identification and deception detection. Impact: These systems provide
    an interviewing aid for intelligence & law enforcement and real-time
    screening at air, land, and sea portals with little or no negative
    impact on screening throughput.
        BioWatch (Biological Countermeasures).--Early warning system
    designed to detect the intentional release of select aerosolized
    biological agents; network informs Federal, State, and local emergency
    management authorities about the extent of the release and assists in
    the rapid response to a biological terrorist act. Impact: Provides
    protection to several highly trafficked rail systems to provide early
    detection of a biological terrorism attack. Through the expansion of
    the BioWatch system to high-threat U.S. cities, air, rail, and other
    transportation systems will be equipped with detection capability at
    the discretion of the local decision makers.
        CIP Decision Support System (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
    A suite of computer models that analyze and quantify the consequences
    to and interdependencies of the 17 infrastructure sectors (including
    transportation). Impact: Awareness of interdependencies, and cascading
    effects on the transportation sector.
        Control Systems Security (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
    Developing security measures and protocols for Supervisory Control and
    Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
        Impact.--Security for these systems which are vital in rail and
    waterway transportation.
        Counter-MANPADS Program (Counter-MANPADS).--Protect commercial
    aircraft from shoulder-launched missiles (Man Portable Air Defense
    Systems). Impact: Migration of existing Counter-MANPADS technologies to
    the commercial airline industry seeks to protect commercial aircraft
    while ensuring that resulting countermeasures systems have minimal
    impact on air carrier and airport operations, maintenance, and support
    activities.
        Emerging Civil Aviation Defense Technologies (Rapid Prototyping)
    and Commercial Aircraft Protection Program (Border and
    Transportation).--Studies aircraft susceptibility/vulnerability
    reduction, and countermeasures related to sabotage.
        Impact.--Will study pilot vision protection, aircraft structural
    hardening, reduction in vulnerabilities, thrust-only control/propulsion
    controlled aircraft, CBRE threats, and effects of hazardous items that
    elude screening.
        Focused Sector Studies (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
    Identify measures to mitigate the effects of an attack or other hazard
    to critical infrastructure. Waterway transport, locks and dams, is
    under consideration for a study. Impact: Awareness of vulnerabilities,
    consequences of attacks on modes of transportation.
        National CIP R&D Plan (Critical Infrastructure Protection).--
    Coordination vehicle for all Federal research and development in
    protection of critical infrastructure sectors, including
    transportation. Impact: Improved coordination and awareness of Federal
    R&D in transportation security.
        Rail Security: Chlorine Mitigation (Border and Transportation).--A
    Chlorine Rail Hazard effort to study methods and technologies to
    mitigate the likelihood of an incident and the effects if an incident
    occurs. Impact: Will reduce the risk and effects of an accidental or
    intentional incident involving an extremely hazardous substance such as
    chlorine.
        Transit Security Project (Emergent and Prototypical Technology).--
    Characterize the threat of conventional explosives on critical
    structural elements of transit systems (subways); and assist transit
    agencies to analyze feasible countermeasures to reduce risk to
    structures from conventional explosives threat. Impact: HS support of
    the Transit Security project primarily includes (1) specific R&D
    activities for the prevention of and response to a WMD event, and (2)
    approaches to review and evaluate, as well as customize and extend, S&T
    Directorate technologies for the transit industry based on the unique
    characteristics of the transit environment.
        Aviation Security.--Complete the air cargo pilot to evaluate
    available technologies to screen break-bulk air cargo. Evaluate and
    ready for qualification, the prototype automated carry-on baggage
    explosives detection system. Improve and evaluate current passenger
    explosives detection systems. Continue the development of advanced
    systems to screen people for both explosives and weapons. And as
    improved systems become available, evaluate for certification or
    qualification checked baggage EDS, checkpoint screening, and cargo
    screening systems.
        Suicide Bombers/Leave-Behind IEDs.--Pilot available and prototype
    explosives detection and mitigation countermeasures in operational
    environments to protect critical infrastructure. Develop prototypes of
    advanced systems to screen people for suicide bombs.
        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    dedicated to border security R&D? Please specify each program and in
    which portfolio the work is being performed.
        Answer. Within the Conventional Missions (Border and Transportation
    Portfolio), the R&D Border Security fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    $36 million. The breakout is: $20 million for Border Watch (includes
    support to Secure Border Initiative, CBP UAV sensors evaluation) ; and
    $16 million for Cargo Security.
        Question. How much of the fiscal year 2007 budget request is
    dedicated to interoperability R&D outside of the SAFECOM program?
    Please specify each program and in which portfolio the work is being
    performed.
        Answer. Interoperability research and development (R&D) within the
    S&T Directorate is conducted through the Office for Interoperability
    and Compatibility (OIC). The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $29.74
    million for interoperability related R&D includes $25.39 million for
    SAFECOM and $4.34 million for program areas outside of SAFECOM. The
    chart below specifies the breakout of interoperability related R&D
    programs. It should be noted that these estimates are subject to change
    depending upon the final appropriation amount.

                  OFFICE FOR INTEROPERABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY
                              [Millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Fiscal year
                          Program areas                            2007
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Communications (SAFECOM) \1\............................            25.4
    Equipment...............................................             3.1
    Training................................................              .4
    Other...................................................              .8
                                                             ---------------
          Total.............................................            29.7
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ All of the Communications budget supports SAFECOM.

                    DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)

        Question. What percentage of the DNDO budget is directed to each of
    the three layers identified--exterior, border, and interior?
        Answer. A majority of the programs included in the DNDO budget
    request have applications across several, if not all, of the three
    architecture layers. For instance, technologies developed with funds
    requested for both systems development and transformational research
    and development (a total of $209 million) could have applications in
    operations within the United States, at the U.S. border, and overseas.
    Equally, these technology programs will feed potential acquisition
    programs beyond those executed by the DNDO and are not represented in
    the DNDO budget request. The systems engineering and test and
    evaluation efforts that support these technology development programs
    also have application across several, if not all, of the three
    architecture layers.
        With that being said, the request for Systems Acquisition, which
    results in detection systems being deployed to specific geographic
    locations, can be clearly allocated to each of the layers. Of the $178
    million requested for Systems Acquisition, $157 million will support
    the deployment of technologies to the Nation's borders (primarily at
    ports of entry), while an additional $21 million will provide a
    detection ``surge'' capacity for the Nation's interior. No funds
    requested through the Systems Acquisition PPA will fund deployment of
    technologies exterior to the United States.
        Question. Since most of the ``exterior'' layer encompasses
    primarily detection and interdiction efforts by other agencies like the
    Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, what authority will DNDO
    have over those agencies in the development and deployment of the
    global architecture?
        Answer. The DNDO has been given the mission of ``centralized
    planning with decentralized execution.'' While the DNDO will not have
    oversight over other agencies responsible for implementing portions of
    the global architecture, it will continue to advocate beneficial
    programs to the Administration, as well as the Congress, and identify
    duplicative or ineffectual programs when necessary, with proposed
    improvements.
        Question. Why does the budget propose to combine both the
    acquisition budget and the longer-term R&D budget together in the same
    appropriation account?
        Answer. At a macroscopic level, all activities of the DNDO are
    aligned to a single, fairly specific goal--the prevention of nuclear
    and radiological terrorism. As such, the Department chose to combine
    all clearly identifiable requests for this purpose into a single
    appropriation for the DNDO. At the same time, the Department did decide
    to segregate acquisition funds into a separate PPA to provide clarity
    regarding investments in long-term research and development and
    procurement activity.
        The decision to combine these activities into a single
    appropriation is supported by the reality that technology development
    and acquisition programs move across a gradual transition from the
    systems development phase to the acquisition phase, with the joint
    goal, from a performance-based standpoint, of fielding capable systems
    to counter the given threat. It is this intrinsic integration that led
    the Department to combine these activities into a single appropriation.
        Question. Would DNDO be better served if long-term research and
    development was separated from the acquisition of technology and
    systems that are available today?
        Answer. The Department believes that the appropriations structure
    included in the fiscal year 2007 President's Budget adequately allows
    the DNDO to complete its mandated mission, while at the same time
    providing the necessary visibility into the use of appropriated funds.
        Question. The Government Accountability Office has expressed
    concerns about the reliability of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals
    (ASP) technology. The budget proposes $20 million to expand crystal
    manufacturing capacity to meet ASP requirements for gamma detectors in
    fiscal year 2007-10. In fiscal year 2006 $12 million is proposed to be
    spent on this capacity development. According to the DNDO budget, a
    limited number of ASP portals will not be piloted in the field until
    fiscal year 2007.
        Given GAO's concerns about the ASP technology, why is so much
    funding going towards expanding the capacity of an unproven technology?
        Answer. First, it should be noted that the total investment planned
    for the Sodium Iodide Manufacturing Program is $32 million, concluding
    in fiscal year 2007. The decision to begin to invest in this expansion
    of domestic production capacity is supported by initial results from
    DNDO testing of ASP systems, which validated spectroscopic capabilities
    when compared with polyvinyl toluene, or PVT-based systems and
    demonstrated, in some cases, a four times improvement in performance
    against threat-like objects and a 60 percent reduction in alarms
    generated by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM).
    Additionally, in light of DNDO projection to expand the rate of
    acquisition of ASP systems in the coming year, DNDO requirements will
    exceed current crystal production capacity by as early as fiscal year
    2007.
        Given the proven performance of ASP systems during DNDO
    qualification testing in late fiscal year 2005 and the long timescales
    involved in this type of capitalization program, the DNDO believes it
    prudent begin this investment immediately. By doing this, the
    industrial base will be prepared to meet expanding DNDO needs in fiscal
    year 2007 and beyond.
        Question. What is the total investment DNDO plans to make to expand
    the capacity?
        Answer. The total investment planned for the Sodium Iodide
    Manufacturing Program is $32 million, of which $12 million will be
    provided in fiscal year 2006 and $20 million will be provided in fiscal
    year 2007.
        Question. The cost of the ASP Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) is
    roughly three times the cost of PVT-RPMs. Based on the initial testing
    of the ASP technology, has DNDO performed a cost-benefit analysis
    comparing the two technologies?
        Answer. Though initial procurement costs of ASP RPMs are likely to
    be higher than those of PVT-based RPMS, the total life-cycle and
    operations costs for ASP systems are likely to be approximately equal
    to those of PVT-based systems. The primary reason for this is the
    greatly reduced secondary inspection rate associated with ASP systems,
    which will result in the need for less CBP officers (and RPMs) to be
    dedicated to labor-intensive secondary inspections, and an accompanying
    improvement in the overall flow of goods and people.
        The DNDO and CBP are currently conducting a joint analysis to
    determine the most cost-effective means of deploying ASP systems to the
    Nation's POEs. This analysis will take into account performance
    information gathered through DNDO testing and current cost estimates,
    as well as operational metrics such as throughput rates, NORM rates,
    and personally-owned vehicle (POV) rates at individual ports. The
    analysis will lead to a strategy that deploys ASP systems only to
    locations where the benefits of these systems (when compared to
    current-generation technologies) is required to maintain screening
    operations at acceptable detection thresholds without impeding the flow
    of people and goods. Overall, this deployment strategy will provide the
    optimum mix of current and next-generation systems while maintaining a
    fiscally responsible approach to the program.
        Question. In light of the threefold increase to acquire ASP-RPMs,
    what benefits will they provide over RPMs currently deployed?
        Answer. Beyond the reductions in secondary costs outlined in the
    previous response, ASP systems address a substantial capabilities gap
    in the currently deployed architecture by increasing the probability of
    detecting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials, while decreasing
    the probability of falsely alarming on NORM or innocent radioactive
    materials (such as granite tiles, ceramics, and kitty litter) or
    incorrectly dismissing nuclear material. ASP systems use their ability
    to identify the source of detected radiation through spectroscopic
    isotopic identification to accomplish this.
        With current-generation systems, which only indicate the presence
    of radiation but provide no information as to its identity, operational
    requirements often require a `sensitivity threshold' to be set to
    alleviate the need for labor-intensive and time-consuming secondary
    inspections. ASP systems do not implement this type of threshold.
    Rather, ASP portals systems automatically detect all sources of
    radiation--and use the identification capability to sort the threat
    material from the innocent sources of radiation. The use of
    spectroscopic identification will dramatically reduce false positives--
    and allow for considerably improved throughput at high-volume ports,
    while simultaneously improving our security.
        Question. According to the DNDO budget, qualification tests for a
    rail portal monitor system will occur in May of 2007. When does DNDO
    anticipate a full rate production decision?
        Answer. Contingent upon ASP contract award in the summer of fiscal
    year 2006, the DNDO is currently anticipating systems qualification
    testing for rail variants of the ASP system by May 2007. Given this
    timeline, the DNDO anticipates a full rate production decision for the
    rail variant by the summer of fiscal year 2007.
        Question. Does DNDO plan to pursue similar systems to screen air
    cargo? If so, is this work being coordinated with the Transportation
    Security Laboratory?
        Answer. If operational requirements to screen air cargo emerge
    (beyond what is currently being done at international mail facilities
    and planned at international airports), and these requirements
    necessitate additional capabilities provided by ASP systems when
    compared to current-generation technologies, the DNDO would pursue ASP
    variants for this mission. If this occurs, the DNDO would fully
    coordinate with TSL (as well as TSA, S&T, and CBP) to incorporate ASP
    systems, as appropriate, into other technology solutions currently
    under development.
        Question. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposes a $7 million
    increase for red teaming. Within that budget request, what specific
    exercises to identify vulnerabilities in Federal, State, and local
    operations are planned?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request includes funding for
    both the Preparedness Directorate's National Exercise Program and for
    DNDO activities. The DNDO intends to conduct red teaming exercises
    across the entire global nuclear detection architecture, to include
    both operational assets such as RPMs at the Nation's borders and
    support assets such as technical reachback and the Nuclear Assessment
    Program. The exact exercises to be conducted in fiscal year 2007 have
    yet to be identified. The DNDO anticipates standing up a red teaming
    ``cell'' by April 2006. This cell will develop adversary playbooks
    (without prior knowledge of DNDO capabilities) that can be used to
    evaluate all portions of the deployed and operated architecture. As
    part of this effort, the DNDO red team will participate in the Top
    Officials 4 Exercise (TOPOFF 4) in November 2007. Beyond these red
    teaming activities, the budget request will also fund a series of net
    assessment activities, including an analysis of open source
    information.
        Question. Will any of the funding be used for red teams to
    penetrate border entry points?
        Answer. While the exact nature of the exercises to be conducted in
    fiscal year 2007 is still under development, the DNDO intends to
    conduct red teaming exercises against multiple components of the global
    detection architecture, including border entry points. In addition,
    aspects of the TOPOFF 4 exercises, in which the DNDO will participate,
    will likely involve the evaluation of border entry point operations and
    their overall effectiveness.
        Question. The budget request includes $21 million for the ``SURGE''
    program. What equipment and systems will be purchased with the funding?
        Answer. The DNDO is currently conducting a requirements analysis
    for the ``Surge'' program, with a targeted completion date of April
    2006. Following this analysis, the DNDO will identify standardized
    equipment that would be acquired, with a goal of initiating procurement
    in early October 2006. The DNDO anticipates that equipment will
    primarily consist of a mix of vehicle-based and human portable
    detection systems.
        Question. What type of capacity to rapidly respond will this
    funding provide?
        Answer. The ``Surge'' program is still in the planning and
    requirements analysis phase, and final determinations for overall
    capacity have yet to be made. Initial planning estimates focus on
    providing the appropriate amount of detection systems to equip
    approximately 250 operators with vehicle-based mobile systems and
    human-portable (backpack and handheld) systems. The requested funding
    will also allow the DNDO to pre-train a number of operators that can
    then be leveraged to train additional operators rapidly in the event of
    a heightened alert. The DNDO is still in the process of exploring
    several operational concepts for the fielding of equipment, including
    Federal/State/local hybrids and concepts for full State and local
    operations using Federally-loaned equipment.
        Question. Where will these systems be stored?
        Answer. The ``Surge'' program is still in the planning and
    requirements analysis phase, but initial DNDO plans focus on pre-
    positioning assets with DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)
    teams, so as to leverage existing USG infrastructure. If this option
    ultimately proves to not be viable, additional options that might be
    available for consideration include DOE National Laboratories, DOD
    storage and logistics facilities, and FEMA storage locations.
        Question. What measures are being taken to coordinate with Federal,
    State, and local governments to prepare for scenarios where rapid
    deployment of these systems would be necessary?
        Answer. The DNDO will begin engaging with select State and local
    agencies to develop a range of scaleable deployment strategies based on
    various potential threat scenarios in late fiscal year 2006. Based on
    these interactions, the DNDO plans to conduct the first full-scale
    ``Surge'' training program by December 2006, with the first systems
    validation test occurring in January 2007. The DNDO will then expand
    this training to additional State and local operators in preparation
    for TOPOFF 4 in November 2007.
        Question. The budget request includes $13.5 million for Systems
    Architecture development. Based on the fact that other Federal
    Departments such as Energy, State, and Defense are all part of the
    global nuclear detection and interdiction structure, are those agencies
    contributing funding towards the development of the global
    architecture?
        Answer. While multiple agencies across the Federal Government are
    part of the global nuclear detection architecture, the responsibility
    for developing and documenting the architecture resides with the DNDO.
    Other agencies, however, play an important role in the development of
    the nuclear detection architecture. The Departments of Energy and
    Defense, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, CBP, and the
    U.S. Coast Guard have each detailed staff members to the DNDO Office of
    Systems Engineering and Architecture to ensure that input and concerns
    of each agency are represented in architecture development and
    recommendations. However, because the DNDO is the lead agency
    responsible for the design of the global nuclear detection
    architecture, all funds for its development are included in the DNDO
    budget request.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

     BORDER CROSSING CARD--THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE (WHTI)
                                 IMPLEMENTATION

        Question. Open Ultra High Frequency (UHF) was designed to track
    pallets--it is not a secure technology. Why then is the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) supporting an open UHF standard for the border
    crossing card?
        Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the
    type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border
    traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting
    privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially
    documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven
    CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as
    well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in
    primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one
    would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for
    these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard
    for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that
    the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The
    ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed
    through a two-step process initiated by first running the document
    across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks
    it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could
    thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding
    implications for land border thru-put.
        We are also considering whether documents containing personal data,
    such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice
    documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer
    to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS
    and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such
    as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
        Question. Why will DHS not support the ISO 14443 standard that is
    being used on ePassports?
        Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the
    type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border
    traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting
    privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially
    documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven
    CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as
    well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in
    primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one
    would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for
    these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard
    for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that
    the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The
    ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed
    through a two-step process initiated by first running the document
    across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks
    it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could
    thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding
    implications for land border thru-put.
        We are also considering whether documents containing personal data,
    such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice
    documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer
    to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS
    and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such
    as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
        Question. DHS will have to install readers for the ePassport that
    is based on the secure ISO 14443 technology, which is not compatible
    with open UHF technology. How much more will an entirely second set of
    readers and interface cost if DHS selects an open UHF standard for the
    PASS card?
        Answer. DHS is working with the Department of State to evaluate the
    type of reader technology that will most cost-effectively keep border
    traffic moving at acceptable response times while also protecting
    privacy and enabling future functionality (e.g., potentially
    documenting land border exit from the United States). Existing, proven
    CBP land border trusted traveler programs (NEXUS, SENTRI and FAST), as
    well as US VISIT's I-94 card pilot, currently use a UHF standard in
    primary lanes. Abandoning the current technology for a different one
    would require a change in standards at land border primary lanes for
    these existing programs. Moreover, even a proximity detection standard
    for a PASS card would likely differ from the ePassport technology that
    the Department of State is currently planning to implement. The
    ePassport requires Basic Access Control (BAC) and can only be accessed
    through a two-step process initiated by first running the document
    across a Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) reader, which effectively unlocks
    it, and then running it across a platen to read it. Utilizing BAC could
    thus be expected to increase response times, with corresponding
    implications for land border thru-put.
        We are also considering whether documents containing personal data,
    such as the e-Passport, merit different levels of protection vice
    documents that contain no personal data but merely serve as a pointer
    to information in a database. To further address privacy concerns, DHS
    and the State Department are exploring other mitigation strategies such
    as a storage pouch to shield a card when it is not in use.
        Question. When will a final decision be made on the PASS card
    technology?
        Answer. This is still being discussed between DHS and DOS, but the
    goal is to begin issuing the new passport cards by the spring of 2007.
        Question. I have several questions about how DHS plans to fund the
    implementation of the border crossing card, which are as follows:
        How much money in fiscal year 2007 has DHS requested for border
    crossing card implementation?
        Answer. The budget doesn't request specific funding for issuing the
    new passport cards.
        Question. I have noted several areas that will require significant
    resources, including information technology; hardware, including the
    PASS Card readers at borders; road work and other infrastructural
    improvements; and training for DHS, CBP and other staff who will try to
    make this program work efficiently on the border.
        Please tell me your plans and budget requests in the specific areas
    of information technology; hardware, such as the card readers;
    infrastructure; and training, as related to WHTI.
        Answer. Up-front funding needs associated with PASS Card
    infrastructure are currently being assessed and were not included in
    the fiscal year 2007 budget.
        Question. How does DHS propose to implement WHTI and have it
    operational by January 1, 2008?
        Answer. We are working with the Department of State to get a Notice
    of Proposed Rule Making published and to develop the best strategies to
    implement the technology piece of WHTI, taking into account privacy
    issues as well as comments from the public from the Advance Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making.
        Question. Is that deadline realistic?
        Answer. DHS believes that it will be able to implement required
    elements by January 1, 2008. DHS is working with Department of State to
    get the Notice of Proposed Rule Making published and to develop the
    best strategies to implement the technology piece of WHTI, taking into
    account privacy issues as well as comments from the public from the
    Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making.
        Question. If that deadline is unrealistic, then should Congress
    consider modifying it?
        Answer. DHS believes that WHTI is an important border security
    initiative that will standardize and secure travel document
    requirements and believes that it will be able to implement required
    elements by January 1, 2008.
        Question. I would like to work with you to ensure that WHTI is
    implemented in a manner that considers security, commerce and community
    ties.
        In your opinion, does agency discretion allow for implementation in
    phases, such that the government can assess what works and what does
    not?
        Answer. DHS and the State Department have proposed to implement
    WHTI in two phases, first for the air and sea environment, and second
    for the land border environment. Both agencies believe that this will
    allow for an orderly implementation, since more travelers in the air
    and sea environments currently possess travel documents and due to the
    complexities of the land border environment, where additional
    technology must be part of the solution. The regulatory rule making
    process requires the government to evaluate and consider comments from
    the public, giving us the opportunity to review potential solutions to
    help implement WHTI. DHS is also evaluating existing programs and
    pilots for potential solutions.
        Question. In your opinion, does agency discretion allow you to test
    pilot programs before implementing the WHTI?
        Answer. Yes. We expect to build upon existing pilots and programs
    such as FAST (Free and Secure Trade) and NEXUS, which are currently
    operational at many CBP facilities.

                    NORTHERN BORDER AND BORDER PATROL AGENTS

        Question. I have fought hard since September 11, 2001, to increase
    the number of border patrol agents on the Northern Border and was glad
    to see a request for approximately 1,500 new agents in the President's
    budget. It was unclear to me, however, whether the request includes any
    new agents for the Northern Border.
        Of the roughly 1,500 new positions, how many are designated for the
    Northern Border?
        Answer. The 1,500 new Border Patrol Agents requested in fiscal year
    2007 will be deployed initially to the Southwest Border where there is
    the largest concentration of apprehensions and gaps in terms of our
    ability to secure the border. While the focus of the new hires is the
    Southwest Border, consideration is given to relocate experienced agents
    to the Northern Border based on current deployment levels and threat
    assessments. It is anticipated that up to 10 percent of the new hire
    amount could be considered for relocation to the Northern Border,
    again, depending on deployment levels, technology, organizational
    capacity and threat assessment at the time the deployments are being
    considered.

                         LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

        Question. I was pleased to see that the President's budget request
    included an additional $4 million for operations at the Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (ICE) Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). The
    LESC responds to over 600,000 annual inquiries on criminal illegal
    aliens from local, State and Federal law enforcement agencies
    throughout the country 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The workload at
    the LESC is growing significantly as DHS and ICE are tasking the center
    with additional duties to assist even more local, State and Federal law
    enforcement authorities.
        Please provide to me the details for what these additional funds
    will be used at the LESC.
        Answer. The funding will support the hiring of 66 additional
    employees at the LESC.
        Question. Due to the ICE hiring freezes over the past several
    years, I would imagine that the staffing levels at the LESC have fallen
    below authorized levels of FTEs. Will some of the additional funds be
    used to hire additional full time employees at the Center?
        Answer. Yes. The funding will support the hiring of 66 additional
    employees at the LESC.

                                   DERBY LINE

        Question. While reviewing the General Services Administration (GSA)
    budget submission for the coming year, I noticed that no money is
    included in the President's proposal for the Derby Line port expansion
    project. In fact, there are seven Southern Border stations on the list
    and not one from the Northern Border. While GSA submits the formal
    request for projects, I understand that DHS compiles and prioritizes
    the list.
        Senator Jeffords and I worked very hard last year to secure the
    money needed by the State of Vermont to upgrade its road network
    leading up to the Derby Line port. We fought hard to ensure Federal
    funds were available to address what was otherwise an unfunded mandate,
    so I therefore have several questions about this situation.
        Is DHS committed to completing the Derby Line project? If so, is
    there enough money available currently to continue the port expansion?
        Answer. DHS is committed to the Land Ports of Entry Modernization
    Program. Derby Line was a priority project, which we forwarded in our
    fiscal year 2005 request to the General Services Administration (GSA).
    GSA has completed the Feasibility Study and Design. Unfortunately, GSA
    must weigh their entire project for all Federal agencies and Derby Line
    was not submitted in their fiscal year 2007 budget. DHS has notified
    GSA that Derby Line will be its highest priority project in its fiscal
    year 2008 submission to GSA.
        Question. What is your timetable for upgrading the facilities at
    border stations across Vermont--especially those for which funding was
    reprogrammed last year?
        Answer. The DHS and CBP Capital Investment Program (CIP) is
    undergoing continuous modifications as Strategic Resource Assessments
    (SRAs) are completed. We have just recently completed site surveys for
    all land ports of entry located in the New England States. The SRAs
    will assess the current facility conditions and use updated land ports
    of entry (LPOE) standards to determine the facility's operational
    requirements. We will then extend our models out 30 years and see what
    our total requirements should be in the future. The SRA will help guide
    us in establishing our priorities based on data collected and
    conditions of the land ports of entry (LPOEs) and rank them
    accordingly.
        Currently, our Capital Improvement Plan has proposed the following:
    Derby Line, VT, as top priority for fiscal year 2008; Richford, VT, in
    fiscal year 2009; Beebe Plains, and Richford (Pinnacle Road), VT, in
    fiscal year 2010; Norton, VT, in 2011 and Highgate Sprints, VT, in
    2012. The CIP is updated annually based on the results of the SRA. We
    will be updating the CIP in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2006 for the
    fiscal year 2008 program and initiate the formulation of the fiscal
    year 2009 program with the General Services Administration.
        Question. What commitment can we expect from DHS make to upgrade
    the Northern Border when it has not requested any funding for
    construction projects?
        Answer. DHS has recently completed design standards for small ports
    of entry. The completion of the design standards will allow DHS and the
    General Services Administration to compress the project delivery
    schedule, and will allow DHS to seek funding for the replacement of
    more than 102 small ports along our northern border over the next 15
    years.
        Question. Will you keep me informed on the progress of border
    upgrades in Vermont?
        Answer. DHS, in concert with General Services Administration (GSA),
    will provide program updates at critical points along the program
    planning and construction delivery process.

                                I-91 CHECKPOINT

        Question. As you may recall, DHS established a temporary checkpoint
    on Interstate 91 in Hartford, Vermont, from December 2003 to May 2005.
    While we occasionally heard about CBP making a drug-bust or identifying
    an expired visa there, it seemed to me that the checkpoint did far more
    to harass law-abiding Vermonters than to protect their security. I was
    not the only person who felt this way. In fact, former Republican
    Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, criticized the Hartford checkpoint
    as an unnecessary government intrusion.
        Last May, DHS announced that the temporary checkpoint would be
    dismantled and the Border Patrol agents there redeployed to the
    Southern Border. You can imagine my surprise, then, when I recently
    learned that DHS has quietly begun conducting a feasibility study to
    see whether it should build a permanent checkpoint on I-91. I
    understand that the study was initiated about a month ago and should be
    complete in 6 months.
        What about the situation on the Southern Border has changed so much
    that shifting 25-30 Border Patrol agents to a checkpoint 92 miles from
    the border with Canada makes any sense?
        Answer. Border Patrol tactical traffic checkpoints, such as the one
    located on Interstate 91, are a critical component of CBP's multi-
    layered border security strategy. This strategy was developed to
    maximize resources and increase the certainty of arrest of anyone
    attempting to illegally enter the United States. The Border Patrol
    traffic checkpoint on Interstate 91 is operated intermittently as a
    strategic component, meaning that there may be extended periods of time
    that the checkpoint is not operational. Available resources and
    intelligence dictate when the tactical traffic checkpoint on Interstate
    91 will be operational. When the Interstate 91 Traffic Checkpoint was
    ``dismantled,'' it was in fact temporarily not operational. Since the
    tactical Border Patrol checkpoint was instituted on Interstate 91 in
    December of 2003, apprehensions have included 688 illegal alien
    apprehensions, 27 illegal aliens from special interest countries, and
    154 pounds of marijuana valued at $693,000. These apprehensions include
    numerous criminal aliens with convictions and outstanding warrants for
    rape of a child, arson, fraud, assault & battery, domestic assault,
    burglary, fraudulent documents, re-entry after deportation and
    multitude of others with serious immigration or criminal records.
    Furthermore, when the national threat level was raised post September
    11, 2001 the Interstate 91 checkpoint was operational 24 hours a day 7
    days a week. Staffing to facilitate this operation required that
    detailed agents be brought into Swanton Sector to augment the normal
    cadre of agents. Once the threat level was lowered the detailed staff
    were returned to their normally assigned Sectors and the responsibility
    of manning the Interstate 91 traffic checkpoint was returned to Swanton
    Sector. There have never been plans to cease Border Patrol tactical
    checkpoints on Interstate 91 nor were there any plans to permanently
    reassign Northern Border agents to the Southern Border during 2005.
    Since the national threat level was lowered the agents that operate the
    Interstate 91 traffic checkpoint are permanently assigned to the
    Newport Border Patrol Station in Swanton Sector. These agents are
    assigned routine Border Patrol duties when they are not assigned to the
    checkpoint.
        Question. How do you intend to pay for the construction and
    redeployment?
        Answer. If permission to build permanent checkpoints were granted,
    the construction would be identified and submitted as an unfunded
    requirement. The local Sector Chief would address the redeployment of
    personnel as needed.
        Question. Will you keep me informed on the progress of your study
    and decision-making?
        Answer. The Interstate 91 Border Patrol traffic checkpoint
    feasibility and environmental impact study was funded and initiated on
    January 13, 2006. It is estimated that the study will be completed in
    Spring 2006. The results of the study and any decisions on project
    advancement will be shared with your office through CBP's Office of
    Congressional Affairs.

                               HURRICANE KATRINA

        Question. It is difficult to locate hard numbers about the numbers
    of dead or missing resulting from Hurricane Katrina. The press has
    reported that 1,300 persons are dead and that approximately 3,200
    individuals are still listed as ``missing'' or ``whereabouts unknown.''
        Almost 6 months after the hurricane hit, these numbers are
    staggering. It may be that more people were killed in the hurricane
    than were killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11.
        Why are so many names still listed as missing? What is the
    government doing to locate them?
        Answer. As and initial matter, it must be noted that the States
    have the sovereign responsibility for declaring deaths and
    investigating reports of missing individuals. The State medical
    examiner, in particular, is usually responsible for declaring deaths
    and all numbers come from the States.
        DHS supportes the effort to collect data on missing people through
    the Find Family National Call Center (FFNCC), the national collection
    point for information on missing family members or those who may have
    perished in Hurricanes Katrina or Rita from the State of Louisiana. The
    center seeks to reunite families and to help locate and recover the
    remains of loved ones. The FFNCC is a joint effort between the State of
    Louisiana, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
    Services.
        Callers to the FFNCC are asked to provide any available information
    about their missing loved ones, including:
      --A physical description;
      --Doctors' and dentists' names;
      --A medical history, including any dental work or joint replacements;
            and
      --Unique characteristics like tattoos, scars and birthmarks.
        In, addition, Family members may be asked to release dental
    records, as they are particularly useful in identifying the deceased.
    The health professionals, staff and volunteers at the FFNCC are trained
    to provide sensitive, confidential assistance. All information gathered
    by the FFNCC is held in the strictest confidence and used only for the
    purpose of identifying and reuniting family members.
        The Center also coordinates with other organizations including, the
    Salvation Army, Louisiana Nursing Home Association and the National
    Center for Missing and Exploited Children.
        In addition, FEMA has opened a Victim Identification Center (VIC)
    in Carville, LA. The VIS is on a 32-acre site that is designed to
    process, identify and store human remains found following the
    hurricanes. The center replaces a temporary facility that had been
    operating in St. Gabriel for almost 3 months.
        The VIC began the processing of human remains on November 29. The
    facility works with the FFNCC to help identify the remains of
    individuals who perished as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
        Forensic data obtained at the VIC is cross referenced against data
    collected from calls to the FFNCC. This includes fingerprints, X-rays
    and dental records to identify victims.
        DNA analysis may also be used to identify victims when all other
    means have been exhausted. Once a body's identification is confirmed,
    the parish coroner must sign the death certificate. The State medical
    examiner will then authorize the release of the body to the funeral
    home of the next of kin's choice.
        FEMA has also supported the American Red Cross's Family Links
    Registry program which provides evacuees with family reunification
    support. FEMA promoted this effort and other similar family linkage
    efforts by including web linkages on the FEMA Katrina webpage and in
    press releases appropriate.
        In addition, FEMA has worked with the National Center for Missing
    and Exploited Children (NCMEC) since last October. FEMA facilitated the
    sharing of information in its disaster assistance database with NCMEC
    to enable contact between separated family members.
        As of June 1, 2006 the FFNCC lists 210 persons still missing or
    unidentified.

                                 AVIAN BIRD FLU

        Question. Two years ago, we had a shortage of winter flu vaccine.
    We never received satisfactory answers from the Bush Administration
    about why it had not planned and prepared better.
        If it cannot prepare for the seasonal flu, which is an annual
    occurrence, what does that tell us about the government's ability to
    prepare for large scale pandemics or biological terrorist attacks?
        Answer. The shortage of influenza vaccine experienced 2 years ago
    occurred when a manufacturer encountered production problems and could
    not fulfill its orders for vaccine. The Centers for Disease Control
    (CDC) and Prevention, within the Department of Health and Human
    Services (HHS), provided leadership in working with the provider
    community and State and local Health Departments to target early stocks
    of vaccine to high-risk groups most vulnerable to influenza. HHS/CDC
    also acquired more vaccine on international markets to bring our
    vaccine supply levels near to the previous year's totals.
        This incident highlighted a need to create a robust vaccine
    manufacturing capacity within this country, which was one of the
    keystones of the President's $7.1 billion pandemic flu Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations request to Congress. In fiscal year 2006
    Congress provided $3.8 billion for the President's plan and a portion
    of these funds will be used to stimulate U.S. vaccine manufacturing
    capacity.
        The future benefits of the investment include having contractual
    arrangements with these companies to manufacture enough pandemic
    influenza vaccine whenever a pandemic emerges; having a healthy
    influenza vaccine manufacturing industry in the United States, capable
    of making enough annual influenza vaccine for every person in the
    United States which is the current recommendation of public health
    experts; U.S. vaccine manufacturers would be able to sell influenza
    vaccines abroad (a good business proposition and international public
    health situation); and some cell-based vaccine manufacturers may also
    be able to use their new technologies for production of needed
    childhood vaccines.
        Question. Now, we see the bird flu migrating westward. What
    assurance can you give to the American people that the United States
    will be prepared should this deadly virus reach our shores?
        Answer. The U.S. Government is prepared to provide a scalable,
    tailored Federal response that capitalizes on the lessons learned from
    the recent SARS events in Asia and Canada. Individual Departments are
    preparing Pandemic Influenza-specific plans to implement their roles
    and responsibilities under the Pandemic Strategy. The Department of
    Homeland Security is the lead for overall domestic incident management
    and will coordinate the Federal response; HHS is responsible for the
    U.S. medical response; USDA is the lead for a domestic veterinary
    response; and DOS coordinates with international partners.
        The Federal Government intends to utilize a regional command,
    control, and coordination structure to coordinate Federal response
    activities. Joint Field Offices will be pre-identified and will be
    activated based on the outbreak trends and requests for assistance. The
    Secretary of Homeland Security is prepared to pre-designate and deploy
    a Principal Federal Official as required. Timely, factual, and
    consistent public messaging will be coordinated across the USG through
    the use of a National Joint Information Center (JIC) located at DHS and
    a local JIC in the vicinity of the outbreak. Communications will be
    maintained 24/7 with State, local, tribal, private sector, and
    international entities through established coordinating mechanisms.
        Question. By when will the government be fully prepared?
        Answer. Preparedness for a pandemic requires the establishment of
    infrastructure and capacity, a process that can take years. The
    Strategy affirms that the Federal Government will use all instruments
    of national power to address the pandemic threat. The HSC
    Implementation Plan outlines three hundred and twenty-five specific
    tasks that must be completed. Each task has a lead agency and
    coordination agencies identified, with the majority of items having a
    timeline for implementation which range from 3 to 36 months. For a
    small number of the items, no timeline has been identified.
        Question. The H5N1 avian flu virus strain was initially identified
    in Southeast Asia, but has rapidly spread across the rest of Asia, into
    Africa, and outbreaks in birds have now been found in seven European
    nations. The United Kingdom has also positively identified the virus in
    quarantined birds coming from Southeast Asia. It may only be a matter
    of time until it reaches our shores, which leaves many of us concerned
    that the United States is not doing nearly enough to assist with
    surveillance and prevention of and preparation for this deadly virus
    abroad and at home.
        The fiscal year 2006 Defense Appropriations Act reserved for
    international avian flu efforts $3.8 billion, of which $47.3 million
    was designated for the Homeland Security Department for necessary
    expenses to train, plan and prepare for a potential outbreak of highly
    pathogenic influenza. However, the fiscal year 2006 Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations request that the Administration recently
    submitted to Congress included no request to continue our national
    efforts to combat the avian flu and prepare for a possible avian flu
    epidemic.
        I was surprised to see no request for such funding, given that we
    had heard rumors that the Administration planned to ask Congress to
    devote an additional $2.3 billion this year for prepare for a bird flu
    epidemic.
        Secretary Chertoff, does the Administration plan to submit to
    Congress a request later this year to continue our national efforts to
    help in global efforts to combat the avian flu, as well as prepare for
    a possible avian flu epidemic here at home?
        Answer. The Department has five active working groups that are
    defining additional actions and requirements based on emerging data and
    information. Our first priority is to ensure that the $47 million
    already provided achieve the objectives laid out by the Administration,
    and we will also leverage other DHS programs in support of these
    efforts.
        Question. If so, please describe the request that you anticipate
    submitting as a supplemental related to detection and prevention of
    avian flu.
        Answer. At this point, the Department does not envision requesting
    a supplemental in 2007. However, any budgetary needs for fiscal year
    2007 and beyond will be determined and, if necessary, requested by the
    Administration through its normal processes to address all relevant
    agencies' needs.
        Question. What resources and strategies will be deployed by the
    Department to help States and local officials cope with the possibility
    of an outbreak?
        Answer. Recognizing that the Federal Government will be equally
    degraded during an actual pandemic event and will be limited in its
    ability to provide on-the-ground medical resources, DHS and other
    agencies are assisting State and local officials with preparedness
    activities. DHS has developed a planning guide geared to businesses
    which will very shortly be available on the United States Government
    Pandemic Flu website (www.pandemicflu.gov). The Department, in close
    coordination with the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and
    Human Services, and Treasury, continues to develop initial plans and
    pilot projects to address State, local, and private sector preparedness
    for this possible event. Full-scale deployment of comprehensive
    training and exercise programs will increase public and private sector
    readiness and overall preparedness across the entire Nation. These
    programs will also assist with development and validation of State,
    local, and private Sector mitigation strategies to ensure efficient and
    effective use of all available public and private sector resources to
    minimize national economic impacts and associated national security
    implications.
        The Federal response structure is designed to be scalable and
    tailored to the outbreak; therefore, its command, control, and
    coordination structure can expand as required. This structure is based
    on concepts outlined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
    and further defined in the National Response Plan (NRP). The Department
    is working to ensure that appropriate DHS leaders are in place to
    assist in the coordination of a Federal response during a pandemic. We
    have pre-identified five locations across the Nation where Joint Field
    Offices could be established should the situation warrant, and will
    pre-designate a national pandemic coordinator. As in any disaster,
    these Joint Field Offices will be the primary conduits through which
    States and local governments request support from the Federal
    Government.
        Question. By all accounts, the current capacity to develop an avian
    flu vaccine is inadequate. Even if a vaccine is developed, it will take
    time to produce the millions of doses needed to protect our citizens.
    Some health officials have urged the need for other countermeasures
    such as medications that would fight an infection or increased usage of
    personal protective equipment.
        What steps is the Administration taking to not only increase
    vaccine manufacturing capacity, but to research and stockpile other
    countermeasures?
        Answer. A portion of the funds Congress provided in the Emergency
    Supplemental pandemic appropriation will be used to stimulate a robust
    U.S. vaccine manufacturing capacity.
        The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has plans to
    purchase or subsidize the purchase of 81 million treatment courses of
    antivirals over a 2 year period, much of which will be stored in the
    Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The fiscal year 2006 HHS budget
    allows HHS to purchase 20 million treatment courses of antivirals for
    subsequent distribution States and localities and to subsidize the
    purchase of 31 million treatment courses by them (HHS will provide a 25
    percent subsidy; $170 million has been designated for this).
        To further encourage the development of new medical countermeasures
    against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents
    and to speed their delivery and use should there be an attack,
    President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union address proposed and
    Congress subsequently enacted Project BioShield. Project BioShield
    provides the Department of Health and Human Services with several new
    authorities to speed the research, development, acquisition, and
    availability of medical countermeasures to defend against CBRN threats.
    In exercising the procurement authorities under Project BioShield, HHS
    has launched acquisition programs to address each of the four threat
    agents deemed to be Material Threats to the U.S. population by the
    Department of Homeland Security [Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), smallpox
    virus, Botulinum toxins, and radiological/nuclear agents]. For example,
    HHS has used Project BioShield to award two contracts for vaccines
    against anthrax and one contract for a liquid formulation of a drug to
    protect children from radioactive iodine exposure following nuclear
    events. These countermeasures are being added to the SNS that currently
    includes vaccines, antibiotics to counter infections caused by anthrax,
    plague, and tularemia, antitoxins, chemical antidotes and radiation
    emergency medical countermeasures. However, we recognize that more can
    and must be done to aggressively and efficiently implement Project
    BioShield.
        Finally, with regard to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), that
    could be used to handle a pandemic, the current SNS inventory contains
    1,006,830 N95 respirators and 1 million pairs of gloves.
        As part of the Emergency Supplemental allocation for pandemic
    influenza, funds have been targeted to acquire supplies and equipment
    to enhance preparedness for a response to a Pandemic Influenza event,
    including personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare providers
    such as N95 respirators, surgical masks, gloves, and face shields, as
    well as syringes and needles. Decisions on what items to procure are
    being made by subject matter experts in HHS.
        Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The initial target of
    providing for 25 million people has been staged over a 2 year cycle.
    Based on the assumption of 4 masks and 4 pairs of gloves per
    individual, acquisitions in fiscal year 2006 will provide PPE for in
    excess of 20 million people. The balance of the targeted coverage (5
    million people) will be acquired in the following year.
        Low Waste Syringes and Needles. Initial procurement includes low
    waste syringes and needles to support the administration of the
    proposed 20 million H5N1 vaccines doses.
        Question. When Hurricane Katrina hit, and in the days and weeks
    after, many Federal officials took a ``blame the locals'' approach for
    what went wrong with disaster response. Last week, Department of Health
    and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt told both the National
    Governors' Association and the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit not
    to count on Federal agencies to save them should a flu pandemic strike.
    Specifically, Secretary Leavitt said, ``Any community that fails to
    prepare with the expectation that the Federal Government will come to
    the rescue will be tragically wrong.''
        I am concerned that, rather than preparing adequately for the bird
    flu, Federal officials are lowering expectations and hinting that a
    lack of preparedness will be the fault of State and local authorities.
    However, like with Katrina, we have been warned well in advance of the
    potential for disaster.
        Secretary Chertoff, is the Administration advocating an ``every
    State for itself'' approach? Where is the Administration's leadership
    on this issue?
        Answer. If a pandemic should strike this country, every sector of
    society could fall victim. It would affect infrastructure from our
    ability to keep grocery store shelves stocked, to keeping the lights on
    and communications systems working. It would affect local and State
    government workers as well as Federal Government workers. Many of the
    same people we would depend on for help and services in time of an
    emergency will be affected by whatever disease strikes us.
        When Secretary Leavitt told both the National Governors'
    Association and the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Summit not to count on
    Federal agencies to save them should a flu pandemic strike, he was
    giving State leadership a simple and honest message. The message needs
    to be heard by all local and State officials who have any
    responsibility for local or State emergency response. Additional
    questions regarding the context of Secretary Leavitt's message should
    be directed to HHS.

                               ALL-STATE MINIMUM

        Question. I am disappointed that once again President Bush's
    proposed budget for fiscal year 2007 reduces from 0.75 percent to 0.25
    percent the all-state minimum formula, which I authored. This is a base
    amount used for the distribution of funding under the State Homeland
    Security Grant Program and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
    Program. This formula assures that each State receives a minimum of
    0.75 percent of those grants to help support their first responders'
    basic preparedness needs.
        Not only would this change result in the loss of millions in
    homeland security funding for the fire, police and rescue departments
    in small- and many medium-sized States, but also deal a crippling blow
    to their efforts to build and sustain their terrorism preparedness.
        Mr. Secretary, does this Administration want to shortchange rural
    States and roll back the hard-won progress we have begun to make in
    homeland security by slashing the protections provided to us by the
    all-State minimum?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2007 request for the State
    Homeland Security Program proposes a 0.25 percent minimum allocation
    for all States, territories, and the District of Columbia to ensure
    funding to address basic preparedness needs with the balance of the
    funding to be allocated based on risk and need. Since the threats
    confronting the Nation respect neither jurisdictional nor geographic
    boundaries, limited resources must be allocated and applied in an
    effective and efficient manner to achieve the greatest return on our
    national investment in homeland security by addressing the greatest
    risks and needs.
        The 9/11 Commission has recommended that ``Federal homeland
    security assistance should not remain a program for general revenue
    sharing. It should supplement State and local resources based on the
    risks and vulnerabilities that merit additional support.''
        All States, whether small, medium, or large, have been provided
    over $14 billion in DHS preparedness funding since the attacks of 9/11
    to build and sustain preparedness capabilities. A 0.25 percent minimum
    allocation would be coupled with any additional funding based on risk
    and need. That allocation process would address the risks and needs of
    both large and small States, and would not be calculated soley based on
    population.
        Question. Would you agree that homeland security is a national
    responsibility shared by all States, regardless of size?
        Answer. Yes, homeland security is a national responsibility shared
    by all levels of government. The National Preparedness Goal is truly
    national in scope, communicating a vision that engages Federal, State,
    local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental
    partners, and the general public to achieve and sustain risk-based
    target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to,
    and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives,
    property, and the economy. The Expanded Regional Collaboration National
    Priority included in the Goal highlights the need for embracing
    partnership across multiple jurisdictions, regions, and States in
    building capabilities cooperatively. Successful regional collaboration
    allows for a multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary approach to
    building capabilities for all four homeland security mission areas,
    spreading costs, and sharing risk across geographic areas.
        Question. Do you agree that each State has basic terrorism
    preparedness needs and, therefore, a minimum amount of domestic
    terrorism preparedness funds is appropriate for each State?
        Answer. While there is no consistent defintion of ``basic terrorism
    preparedness needs'' a minimum allocation of domestic terrorism
    preparedness funds for each State is appropriate.
        The 0.25 percent minimum allocation proposed in the President's
    fiscal year 2007 request will provide States, territories, and the
    District of Columbia with funding continuity. However, since the
    threats confronting the Nation respect neither jurisdictional nor
    geographic boundaries, limited resources must be allocated and applied
    in an effective and efficient manner to achieve the greatest return on
    our national investment in homeland security by addressing the greatest
    risks and needs.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, would you agree that the mission of the
    Department of Homeland Security extends beyond terrorism threats, and
    that States must prepare for and have the ability to respond to all
    types of homeland security threats, such as natural disasters and other
    emergencies?
        Answer. The mission of the Department of Homeland Security includes
    safeguarding the Nation from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or
    other emergencies and leading national response and recovery efforts to
    acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other emergencies. The
    National Preparedness Goal, which outlines preparedness priorities for
    Federal, State, local governments, private sector, and the general
    public, is all-hazard in nature and is predicated on the importance of
    capabilities-based planning as a means to enhance our preparedness.
    Capabilities-based planning is not focused on a particular scenario or
    threat, but rather pushes us as a Nation to plan under uncertainty to
    provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards
    while working within an economic framework that necessitates
    prioritization and choice.
        Question. If you do not support applying the 0.75 percent minimum
    to the State Formula Grants Program, what compromise between 0.75
    percent and 0.25 percent for the distribution of funds would you
    support?
        Answer. As indicated in the President's fiscal year 2007 budget
    request, the Administration supports the .25 percent minimum, which
    will allow over 85 percent of the State Homeland Security Grant Program
    to be awarded based on risk, need, and potential effectivness.

                        STATE AND LOCAL FIRST RESPONDERS

        Question. President Bush often says that he wants to ensure that
    our State and local first responders receive the resources necessary to
    do the job the American public expects them to do. I find that hard to
    believe, though, when I read that he proposes nearly $400 million in
    overall cuts to funds for State Homeland Security Grant Program,
    Emergency Management Performance Grants and other programs administered
    by the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
    Preparedness that directly benefit police, fire and medical rescue
    units. Furthermore, the President's budget eliminates funding for the
    Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention program. The Administration
    justifies these cuts by stating it does not believe those funds are
    ``targeted'' to homeland security capabilities.
        I believe, however, that the current Administration has failed to
    make first responders a high enough priority by consistently
    underfunding homeland security efforts of every State.
        The Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force Report argued that our Nation
    will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting critical
    emergency responder needs through this decade's end if current funding
    levels are maintained. Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds
    available are still not enough to protect from, prepare for and respond
    to future domestic terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
        Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that to be truly protected from,
    prepared for and able to respond to terrorist attacks we must look to
    increase the funds to our Nation's State and local first responders,
    rather than decrease them, as proposed by the President?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request is a strong commitment
    to the Nation's first responders. As always, the Department believes
    that homeland security is a shared mission and thus a shared
    responsibility between the Federal Government and our State and local
    partners. The Federal Government should not be expected to bear all
    homeland security costs. Instead, the Department expects and
    anticipates that States and localities will devote significant funds to
    enhance their security and thereby help to improve the Nation's level
    of preparedness.

         ADMINISTRATION PLANS FOR DUBAI PORTS WORLD TO TAKE CONTROL OF
                    SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS AT SIX U.S. PORTS

        Question. I have several questions about the Administration's
    controversial decision to approve the takeover by Dubai Ports World
    (DPW) of significant operations at six U.S. ports.
        I was pleased by the Administration's recent decision to accept
    DPW's request that the U.S. government conduct a proper full 45-day
    security review, a review that the President previously said was
    unnecessary. This review may reassure a concerned public that DPW's
    management of port operations in the United States will not affect our
    Nation's safety. However, this development does not excuse the
    Administration from its earlier decision to ignore a mandate in the law
    for a thorough review process. Yet again, on an issue of national
    security, the Administration chose to go it alone, operated in secret
    on a national security issue, and then said to the American people,
    ``just trust us.'' Like with the domestic spying program and prior
    assertions on interrogation policy, this Administration operates as if
    it is above the law.
        Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the Committee on Foreign
    Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which expedited what review
    was conducted. That leads me to ask for the following information from
    you:
        What role did you play in the CFIUS review of the proposed
    transaction?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security was represented in the
    CFIUS review of the DPW case by Assistant Secretary Stewart Baker, who
    coordinated across the Department with the relevant intelligence,
    operational, and legal components.
        Question. Please describe the role the Department of Homeland
    Security in the negotiation and review of the deal.
        Answer. In these cases, DHS considers whether the acquisition may
    affect national security broadly construed, focusing in particular on
    the acquisition's potential impact on critical infrastructure and other
    homeland security factors, as well as traditional measures of national
    security. In the CFIUS process DHS determines: (1) whether DHS already
    has sufficient legal or regulatory authority to address any threat to
    homeland security that might be raised by the transaction; (2) whether
    DHS has homeland security concerns about the parties to the
    transaction; and (3) whether the homeland security concerns can be
    resolved with binding assurances from the parties to the transaction.
        In this particular case, DHS and other CFIUS member agencies
    requested and received intelligence assessments about DPW and received
    briefings from the company. Further, as a matter of prudence, DHS
    sought and received binding assurances that, among other things, (i)
    P&O, the subject of the acquisition, would continue to participate at
    not less than the current level in certain port security programs and
    best practices, and (ii) P&O would provide any records upon DHS's
    request.
        With these assurances, DHS believed that there was no basis for
    contesting the transaction.
        As you know, DPW has agreed to sell the U.S. component of P&O to an
    unrelated U.S. buyer and to ensure that it is managed independently of
    DPW until that time.
        Question. Did you or anyone else on behalf of the Department of
    Homeland Security raise any national security concerns about this
    transaction?
        Answer. DHS did not have specific concerns about this transaction.
    In reviewing DPW's proposed acquisition of P&O, DHS concurred with the
    intelligence community and the other CFIUS agencies reviewing the
    transaction that DPW's acquisition presented no current threat to U.S.
    national security. Nevertheless, given DHS's responsibility for
    critical infrastructure protection and port and maritime security, DHS
    wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that DPW would not present a
    future risk to national security by taking adverse action sometime in
    the future and therefore obtained certain written assurances from DPW,
    including: (i) that DPW would participate in certain port security
    programs that are voluntary for other companies but would become
    mandatory for DPW because of its written assurances; and (ii) that DPW
    would provide, upon request, any records maintained regarding DPW's
    operations in the United States.
        Question. What security precautions, if any, were requested?
        Answer. As indicated above, DHS decided that it would be prudent to
    obtain certain security assurances from DPW. DPW committed to
    participate in various U.S. cargo inspection and security programs that
    are only voluntary today. These programs include DHS's Customs-Trade
    Partnership Against Terrorism (``C-TPAT'') and Container Security
    Initiative (``CSI''), and the related Department of Energy Megaports
    program. These programs protect U.S. ports by screening cargo before it
    approaches U.S. shores.
        DPW also agreed to assist U.S. law enforcement agencies (Federal,
    State, and Local) and to disclose any information concerning the
    operation of the company's U.S. facilities, equipment, or services and
    to provide any relevant records that may exist of foreign efforts to
    control operations in any of its U.S. facilities.
        DPW further agreed to maintain P&O's existing security policies and
    procedures at the U.S. facilities--including security personnel--and
    provide written notice to DHS if those policies or procedures change so
    that DHS can address any concerns.
        Finally, DPW also agreed to operate any facilities they would own
    or control in the United States as a result of the acquisition with the
    current U.S. management structure, to the extent possible.
        Question. In an undated document released yesterday, the Coast
    Guard expressed concerns about intelligence gaps concerning foreign
    ownership of port assets. Were you aware of these concerns? Did you act
    upon them?
        Answer. The referenced concerns must be placed in context. The U.S.
    Coast Guard resolved its intelligence concerns in the context of the
    original CFIUS review. Further, DHS considered the intelligence
    community reporting on this case and no unresolved concerns were
    raised.
        Question. Why did the Administration decide to not adhere to the
    45-day review process established by the Byrd Amendment?
        Answer. The Department of the Treasury, as Chair of the CFIUS, is
    better positioned to respond to questions regarding CFIUS's
    interpretation of the Byrd Amendment.
        Question. What led to the January 6, 2006, letter of assurances to
    the Department of Homeland Security in connection with this
    transaction?
        Answer. In reviewing DPW's proposed acquisition of P&O, DHS
    concurred with the intelligence community and the other CFIUS agencies
    reviewing the transaction that DPW's acquisition presented no current
    threat to U.S. national security. Nevertheless, given DHS's
    responsibility for critical infrastructure protection and port and
    maritime security, DHS wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that
    DPW would not present a future risk to national security by taking
    adverse action sometime in the future.
        Question. Is the January 6, 2006, letter intended to be a binding
    contractual obligation? If so, how would it be enforced and by whom?
        Answer. The January 6, 2006 assurances letter from DPW to DHS
    constituted a legally binding agreement. If DPW were to have breached
    the agreement, DHS had full authority to conduct detailed inspections
    of all containers or other cargo handled by the operator and authority
    over the terminal itself so that DHS could protect national security.
        Both the terms of the assurances letter and the CFIUS regulations
    provide CFIUS with authority to reopen its review of a transaction
    where the parties have made a material misrepresentation or omitted
    material facts.
        DHS would have had recourse to all available remedies under
    contract law. For example, the Government could have asked a court to
    order DPW to perform any provision that the Government believed DPW had
    breached, or to pay damages for costs that resulted from such breach.
        Question. What subject matter and personal jurisdiction would our
    courts have over the Dubai principals?
        Answer. As noted in our response to QFR 3683, above, U.S. courts
    would have had subject matter and personal jurisdiction over any of the
    terms of the assurances letter entered into between DP World and DHS.
    In addition, DHS would have had other available remedies that would not
    have required resort to a court, including the full authority to
    conduct detailed inspections of all containers or other cargo handled
    by the operator and authority over the terminal itself so that DHS
    could protect national security.
        Question. What would remedies be available to the United States if
    the contractual obligations were not fulfilled?
        Answer. As stated above, DHS would have had recourse to all
    available remedies under contract law. In addition, DHS could have
    reinstituted CFIUS proceedings and potentially ordered the transaction
    to be unwound.
        Question. Was legal analysis conducted to ascertain whether the
    special assurances offered in the January 6 letter could be enforced?
    Please provide any such analysis and related documents.
        Answer. While not obtained in every case, it is not unusual for one
    or more CFIUS agencies to obtain an assurances letter from a party in
    CFIUS. These letters are contractual arrangements between the parties,
    and terms are enforceable like other contracts.
        DHS's Office of General Counsel reviewed the terms of the January
    6, 2006 assurances letter but did not issue a specific, written opinion
    relating to the ability of DHS to enforce any or all of the contract
    terms.
        Question. Who is the ``responsible corporate officer'' who will
    serve as a point of contact for DHS in each U.S. facility owned or
    controlled by Dubai Ports World, Ports, Customs and Free Zone
    Corporation, and Thunder FZE?
        Answer. Dubai Ports World announced in February 2006 that it would
    sell the P&O facilities in the United States to an American company.
    Until that point, the P&O security officer continues to serve as the
    point of contact at the formerly P&O U.S. facilities.

                             CONCLUSION OF HEARING

        Senator Gregg. The subcommittee will stand in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Tuesday, February 28, the
    hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
    reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

                                  ----------

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                           NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

        [The following testimonies were received by the
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
    The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2007 budget
    request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]

          Prepared Statement of the American Psychological Association

        Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, the American
    Psychological Association (APA) represents 150,000 members and
    affiliates, and works to advance psychology as a science, a profession,
    and a means of promoting health and human welfare. Psychologists are
    involved in a broad spectrum of programs within the jurisdiction of
    this Subcommittee. For example, psychologists manage the Social and
    Behavioral Research Program within the Threat Awareness Portfolio of
    the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. Psychologists also provide
    expertise as members of the Homeland Security Science and Technology
    Advisory Committee and the Academe and Policy Research Senior Advisory
    Committee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Psychologists
    serve as Principle Investigators directing the activities of two of the
    five University-Based Centers of Excellence and student psychologists
    are becoming the next generation of Homeland Security experts training
    under the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
        Overall, APA has been pleased to see the increasing emphasis DHS is
    placing on behavioral and psychological science within the department.
    However APA is also concerned about how pending DHS reorganization and
    proposed budget cuts might undermine long range planning for
    psychological and behavioral research programs within the department.
    Finally, DHS must remain ever-mindful that behavioral research
    necessarily involves systematically collected and analyzed empirical
    data that cannot be replaced by the well-intentioned but perhaps ill-
    informed speculation of experts or contractors who lack training in the
    behavioral sciences.
        The Threat Awareness Portfolio was cut 35 percent from fiscal year
    2005 to fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an
    additional 6.4 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that
    Congress restore the proposed 6.4 percent cut and fund the Threat
    Awareness Portfolio at or above the $43 million fiscal year 2006
    appropriation.
        The Threat Awareness Portfolio (TAP) in the Science and Technology
    (S&T) Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsors
    research to inform, develop, and test tools and methodologies to assess
    terrorist threats, understand terrorism, and improve national security.
    There are three broad program areas within TAP, one of which is the
    Social and Behavioral Research (SBR) Program. The SBR Program sponsors
    social science and behavioral research to support the missions of DHS
    and the broader law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well
    as promote the safety and security of the American public.
    SBR Program Description, Strategic Goals, and Areas of Research
        The SBR Program was developed with four strategic aims. The program
    leverages the theories, data, and methods of the social and behavioral
    sciences to improve the detection, analysis, and understanding of the
    threats posed by individuals, groups, and radical movements; it
    supports the assessment of the psychosocial impacts of catastrophic
    events and the validation of public communications and education
    programs to increase the American public's all hazards preparedness and
    response capabilities; it facilitates information exchange across the
    Federal Government to enhance the knowledge and coordination of
    Federally sponsored social and behavioral science research related to
    national security and preparedness; and it develops mechanisms to
    provide senior policymakers with social and behavioral science theories
    and data that can inform their decisions. To achieve these aims, the
    SBR Program supports numerous coordinated activities that incorporate
    social and behavioral science into coherent, integrated techniques and
    methodologies. These activities fall within four broad research and
    development areas that support each of the strategic goals of the SBR
    Program.
        First, the program's activities inform the ability of operational
    end users (including personnel involved with border and transportation
    security, customs enforcement, and intelligence analysis), to detect
    threats and conduct accurate risk assessments. With continued support,
    these efforts will produce two main products--models of behavioral and
    linguistic cues that indicate whether an individual is likely engaged
    in deception or is intent on doing harm; and an integrative model of
    the ideological, organizational, and contextual factors associated with
    a group or radical movement's likelihood of engaging in violence.
        Second, the program supports coordinating research in public
    education and communication aimed at increasing the American
    population's ability to prepare for and respond to natural and man-made
    catastrophic events and developing quantitative assessments of
    psychosocial vulnerabilities. With continued support, these efforts
    will test and evaluate the effects of various theoretically sound
    messaging and education programs on public all-hazards preparedness and
    response, as well as develop an index to measure the psychosocial
    impact of catastrophic events.
        Third, the program sponsors activities to improve the coordination
    of social and behavioral science research related to national security
    and preparedness by supporting various methods of information sharing
    across the Federal Government. With continued support, these efforts
    will produce integrated symposia and workshops attended by relevant
    Federal partners and a participatory web-based system for sharing
    information on Federally funded social and behavioral science research
    related to national security and preparedness.
        Fourth, the program assembles leading thinkers on the social and
    behavioral aspects of terrorism and national security to participate in
    study sessions and web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to
    the SBR Program and DHS as a whole. With continued support, this group
    will produce white papers and briefings on a range of topics (see
    appended description of DHS Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
    Program).

        IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENT BY INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF THREATS

        To protect the nation effectively, it is essential to improve our
    ability to assess the potential threats posed by individuals as well as
    the larger terrorist groups and movements to which they may belong. In
    fiscal year 2007, the SBR Program's activities will continue to build
    upon work completed in fiscal year 2006 to improve our ability to model
    whether an individual is intent on doing harm or engaged in deception,
    as well as improve our ability to model the likelihood that a group
    will engage in violent activity. Additional work will be sponsored to
    compare how models based on open source material differ from models
    developed on classified data.
    Improving Awareness of Individual Threats--Project Hostile Intent
        An ongoing program, Project Hostile Intent aims to detect and model
    the behavioral cues that indicate an individual's intent to do harm
    and/or deceive The cues examined in Project Hostile Intent are those
    that can be assessed remotely and in real time, and the procedures and
    technologies required to collect these cues are non-invasive and
    amenable to integration into busy operational contexts. In addition to
    detecting these cues, this project examines whether this process can be
    automated through the use of sensors and detection algorithms and,
    subsequently, integrated with other technologies aimed at identifying
    individuals who pose threats to the homeland, e.g., biometric tools and
    databases. The targeted customers of this research are Customs and
    Border Patrol and Transportation Security Administration personnel.
    Improving Awareness of Group Threats
        Another SBR Program research priority is improving our ability to
    determine the intentions of various domestic and foreign groups who may
    pose a threat to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad. The
    central activity in this area is the Motivation and Intent (M&I)
    Project, aimed at developing models to inform analysts' assessments
    regarding whether a group intends to engage in violent activity to
    further its goals. In future years, work in this area will be further
    expanded to incorporate the modeling of radical movements and the
    violent activity associated with such movements. In addition, several
    projects will be sponsored to augment the M&I effort by providing
    additional data or addressing gaps in the current social and behavioral
    science research. The tools, methodologies, and knowledge developed
    through this research program will improve the efficiency and accuracy
    of intelligence analysis by identifying key social and behavioral
    science variables to consider when assessing the likelihood that a
    group may intend to act violently.
                The Motivation and Intent (M&I) Project
        In fiscal year 2005, the SBR Program initiated funding of the M&I
    Project. This activity draws on social science data and theories to
    develop analytic models aimed at determining the ideological,
    organizational, and contextual factors associated with a group's
    likelihood of engaging in violence. The goal of this on-going effort is
    to develop an integrated framework that enables analysts to examine the
    impact of various social and behavioral science variables on a group's
    intent to engage in violence. The project will model the factors
    associated with violent activity carried out by both domestic and
    foreign groups. APA believes that this work could be augmented by
    research to understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect
    to target selection (i.e., does target selection depend on
    circumstances such as differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed
    to other considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand
    how specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into
    tactic selection.
                Update and Maintenance of the Global Terrorism Database
        The SBR Program has supported the updating of a coded and
    computerized database comprised of more than 69,000 terrorist incidents
    recorded worldwide from 1970-1997 as well as the initial coding and
    inclusion of incidents that have occurred from 1998 to the present.
    While this worthwhile activity will continue to be supported in fiscal
    year 2006 and beyond, APA believes a complementary database of
    government responses to terrorism would also be helpful as terrorists
    appear to adapt and counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
                Quantitative Analysis of Terrorist Perspectives and
                        Behaviors
        The SBR Program also will sponsor activity to incorporate
    perspective analysis into the M&I Project. This project will involve an
    analysis of the perspectives of multi-level (individual, group, and
    subculture) actors in a country or region in which various terrorist
    groups of interest operate. An underlying conceptual framework will be
    created informed by social and behavioral scientists and other subject
    matter experts who are familiar with the region, politics, and actors
    of interest. The framework will extract patterns in actors' foci and
    attitudes from various sources of data (e.g., media statements and
    materials from actors' websites). This activity will add a unique
    capability as it will allow an analyst to make more informed decisions
    regarding agents' intentions based on the perspectives of multiple
    actors in a region of interest.
        In addition, a team of social and behavioral scientists will
    quantify the perspectives of these actors and conduct statistical
    analyses relating these perspectives to various types of activities
    (for example, engaging in violence, condoning violence, participation
    in the political process, etc.). This effort will allow for the testing
    of social and behavioral science theories drawing on the unique source
    of data provided by the perspective analyses of various actors. It will
    also allow for a scientifically rigorous analysis of trends in actors'
    attitudes and behaviors based on an analysis of actors' perspectives
    and detailed chronologies of their behaviors. The findings from this
    project will inform the M&I Program's modeling efforts and allow for
    the refinement of the conceptual framework that forms the basis for the
    perspective analysis.
                Systematic Comparison of Open and Classified Data Sources
        The SBR Program will sponsor work that conducts a detailed
    comparative analysis of open source data and classified data,
    specifically focused on the information used to identify the motives
    and intents of actors of interest. This activity will identify the
    relative strengths of these two types of data and explore what types of
    information they provide to help an analyst determine the intentions of
    individuals and groups. The research in this area will provide detailed
    comparative information on open source and classified data that will
    better inform decisions regarding whether and/or when to rely on open
    source data, and the applicability of academic research to intelligence
    analyses.
    Improving Risk Assessment and Risk Communication
        Research in the social and behavioral sciences can examine how best
    to help the American population prepare for and respond to natural and
    man-made catastrophic events, thereby reducing one component of
    national vulnerability. Public communication and education strategies
    for natural and man-made catastrophic events are key components of
    DHS's overall preparedness and response missions, and sponsoring
    research on the efficacy of these communications is a stated priority
    of the SBR Program.
        However, current risk communications strategies should be informed
    by decades of existing research which have produced consistent findings
    regardless of the category of risk under study. Such research shows
    that people want the truth, even if it is worrisome and as such, candor
    in risk communication is critical. People can absorb only a limited
    amount of new information at a time and as a result risk communications
    must prioritize and organize critical facts according to the way the
    target audience naturally thinks. Further, people have an inherent
    difficulty in understanding certain kinds of information (e.g. that
    repeated exposure to small risks increases their overall risk) so risk
    communications must accommodate the known strengths and weaknesses of
    the target audiences thought processes. Additionally, emotions can
    cloud people's judgment in predictable ways that interferes with
    decision making so those charged with communicating risks must do so
    respectfully in order to facilitate reasoned decision making. Even the
    most experienced communicators cannot accurately predict how messages
    will be interpreted on novel topics or with unfamiliar audiences. Thus
    messages must be systematically evaluated for both intended and
    unintended reactions before they are disseminated. In emergency
    planning exercises, people exaggerate their ability to predict others
    behavior, as a result social and behavioral scientists need to be
    included in such planning teams to ensure that plans are based upon
    science rather than intuition. Finally, people generally make sensible
    and effective decisions if communicators deliver relevant, timely and
    accurate information.
    Improving Federal Information Sharing and Collaborative Research
            Efforts
        A priority of the SBR Program is the development of effective
    methods for information sharing among Federal agencies tasked with
    addressing various aspects of national security and preparedness. Not
    only will such information sharing increase the effectiveness and the
    ability of the government to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad,
    it will also increase collaborative research efforts and reduce
    unnecessary duplication. The initial effort will consist of workshops
    focused on issues related to national security and will later expand to
    the provision of web-based dialogue and interaction to facilitate
    information exchange.
    Providing Policymakers Social and Behavioral Science Information--The
            Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
        The Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership (Partnership)
    Program assembles leading thinkers on the social and behavioral aspects
    of terrorism and national security to participate in study sessions and
    web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to the SBR Program,
    DHS, and the nation as a whole. It was created to describe the
    significant roles that social, cultural, economic, and psychological
    factors play in the threats we face and our counter-threat activities
    and provide a mechanism for communicating social and behavioral
    research findings to policymakers. In fiscal year 2006, at the request
    of the DHS Policy Directorate, the Partnership will examine the impact
    of U.S. policies on radicalization in the United States. It will also
    hold study sessions on topics related to (1) assessing the intent of
    terrorist groups and (2) determining the long-term impacts of a
    terrorist attack with improvised nuclear device.
        APA recognizes that recent events such as hurricane Katrina, as
    well as forecast events such as a pandemic flu outbreak, have forced a
    realignment of the Department's strategic goals to prioritize the
    strengthening of public resilience in responding to the diverse threats
    facing us. That will mean evaluating Departmental investments in terms
    of their contribution to, among other things, strengthening
    communities, securing trust in government, providing multi-threat
    response capabilities and enhancing economic and institutional
    recovery.
        Accomplishing these tasks will require attention to social and
    behavioral variables in three contexts:
      Predicting the public's response to various threats (e.g., to what
            extent will people understand warnings, trust authorities,
            support one another in the face of threats, rebound from
            trauma).
      Understanding the limits to analyses and plans, so that citizens and
            officials have realistic expectations of the confidence to
            place in them.
      Communicating about threats, so that people receive the specific
            information that they need for effective action, in a credible,
            comprehensible form.
        These issues are relevant to preparation, response, and recovery
    for all threats. While the Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
    has begun to address these issues, APA believes the Department would
    benefit from an in-house Center for Translational Social and Behavioral
    Science Research tasked with ensuring that our homeland security plans
    are grounded in the best available science.
        Although the center should be located in the Science and Technology
    Directorate, it should provide services to the entire Department. For
    example, it would be a resource for creating scientifically sound,
    behaviorally realistic communications, usability standards, risk
    analyses, and emergency plans. It would also identify fundamental
    issues, to be studied by the University Centers of Excellence and
    others.
        The Center proposed is similar to the Office of Behavioral and
    Social Sciences Research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
    which celebrates a 10 year anniversary this year and leverages a modest
    budget to coordinate interdisciplinary and translational behavioral and
    social science research across the twenty-seven Institutes and Centers
    of NIH. This initiative would address a significant gap in the
    Department's science and technology resources, while providing an
    essential input to implementing the Department's commitment to risk-
    based decision making.

             UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS--DHS SCHOLARS AND FELLOWS PROGRAM.

        APA has been very pleased to see how well behavioral and social
    scientists are represented in the DHS Scholars and Fellows awards.
    However, we are concerned that cuts to the fiscal year 2006 budget and
    proposed cuts to the fiscal year 2007 budget will serve to disrupt a
    critical career pipeline for the next generation of Homeland Security
    scientists. If the proposed fiscal year 2007 budget is enacted, DHS
    will cut Scholars and Fellows support by one third. Especially this
    year, as the Administration and Congress focus on the American
    Competitiveness Initiative, we strongly recommend that the subcommittee
    restore full funding of the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
        University Programs were cut 11 percent from fiscal year 2005 to
    fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an additional
    16 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that Congress
    restore the proposed 16 percent cut and fund the University Programs at
    or above the $62 million fiscal year 2006 appropriation.
      department of homeland security report language for fiscal year 2007
    Proposed by the American Psychological Association
                Science and Technology Directorate
        The Committee understands that terrorists are people and terrorism
    is behavior, therefore understanding the importance of the behavioral,
    psychological and social sciences to countering terrorism and homeland
    security is paramount. The Committee applauds DHS strong support of a
    full range of behavioral and social science research.
        The Committee recommends DHS implement a Center for Translational
    Social and Behavioral Science Research tasked with ensuring that our
    homeland security plans are grounded in the best available science. The
    Committee believes such a center should be a resource for creating
    scientifically sound, behaviorally realistic communications, usability
    standards, risk analyses, and emergency plans and should also identify
    fundamental issues to be studied by the University Centers of
    Excellence and others.
        The Committee appreciates that the psychological consequences of a
    manmade and natural disasters are likely to be widespread and long
    lasting and that events like hurricanes Katrina and Rita are known to
    have caused stress and anxiety in Americans of all ages, ethnicities,
    and disparate geographical locations. Mental health practitioners must
    be trained to deal with the particular aftermath that such events
    impose. The Committee encourages DHS to ensure that mental health
    research, particularly longitudinal research, is focused on how to
    respond, mitigate and inoculate the populace as effectively as
    possible.
        The Committee also recognizes, however, that the social and
    behavioral sciences have a much larger role to play than the single
    domain of mental health. The technological devices and infrastructure
    that are created in support of counter-terrorism and homeland security
    efforts will be only as effective as the humans who interact with them.
    Because many instances of protection against devastating loss since 9/
    11 involved human alertness to unusual behavior, the Committee
    recognizes that a significant portion of the most effective defense
    against domestic attack will be human agents. In addition, the
    Committee acknowledges that as we devise innovative technological
    systems to thwart terrorists, the most dangerous terrorist will be one
    who knows how to modify his or her behavior so as to circumvent these
    systems. Therefore, the Committee believes that effective counter-
    terrorism technologies must be developed in concert with the social and
    behavioral sciences.
        The Committee encourages DHS to pursue research on the assessment
    of the human dimensions (social, cultural, and behavioral) in which
    networks exist, such as first-response teams, emergency management
    teams, communication systems, intelligence networks, terrorist groups,
    and U.S. government (Federal, State, and local) departments and
    agencies. Systems analysis and systems engineering are powerful tools
    for understanding how these networks function. However, the Committee
    recognizes that these tools will be useful only to the extent those
    human behavioral variables are appropriately described and incorporated
    into the analyses.
        The Committee is concerned about the utility of the Homeland
    Security Advisory System and encourages DHS to include an on-going
    evaluation of its effectiveness. The Committee encourages DHS to
    support research on risk assessment and the communication of risk in
    order to understand the framework in which the communicator operates as
    well as the knowledge base and competence of the audience. The
    Committee recognizes that an effective and meaningful alert system
    involves knowing how to articulate the goals of the communication
    including whether to inform only, or to inform and change behavior.
        The Committee encourages further development of animal models for
    the assessment of chemical, radiological and biological agents that
    might be used as weapons of attack and the pharmacological
    countermeasures required to neutralize or reverse their effects. The
    Committee recognizes that animal models are useful not only as
    indicators of the apparent physiological responses to such agents, but
    careful measurement of their behavior (motivation, learning,
    aggression) can serve as more sensitive indices of both long- and
    short-term effects of such weapons. Further, the Committee recognizes
    animals also are potential targets of attack in the agricultural
    sector, so that longitudinal data on animal behavior can serve as
    valuable baseline data against which to detect attacks by biological
    agents that may be either slow- or fast-acting.
        The Committee recognizes that understanding how humans process
    information is critical to developing new technologies for information
    gathering and intelligence analysis. The Committee encourages
    additional research to ensure that such technologies optimally
    accommodate the human user. Further, the Committee encourages DHS to
    support research that applies basic learning algorithms to data-mining
    systems. Such systems can then become language-independent and analyze
    text for meaning rather than simply the identification of keywords.
        The Committee recognizes the value of robotics in performing
    dangerous work and in substituting for human surveillance. The
    Committee encourages DHS to support research on human-machine
    interaction to optimize the functions of both the human and machine in
    this partnership. The Committee recognizes that it is imperative to
    understand how best to design robotic systems to interact effectively
    with their human controllers and partners. The Committee believes that
    human behavior cannot be perceived as a weak link in this interaction
    because human cognitive, perceptual and motivational capacities are a
    given and the machine system must be built to complement the human
    user.
        The Committee recognizes the profound effect that terrorism can
    have on social systems and encourages DHS to support research on how
    attitudes and beliefs about terrorism affect consumer confidence,
    population mobility, decisions about child-care, job behaviors, and
    attitudes towards immigrants, religion, political institutions and
    leaders. The Committee encourages further research on understanding the
    short- and long-term effects of stereotyping and marginalization of
    groups as well as research on hate-crimes and the emergence and
    maintenance of fundamentalist, extremist, and anti-government groups
    within the United States and outside the United States.
        The Committee recognizes the potential for massive disruption by
    those who would distribute erroneous or system-destructive information
    into the Internet, the telecommunications infrastructure, embedded/
    real-time computing systems, and dedicated computing devices. The
    Committee recommends DHS support research to analyze the behavior,
    motivations and social contexts of known instances of successful
    ``hacking''. The Committee encourages DHS to research effective
    safeguards that our consistent with the behaviors of the humans that
    use these systems.
        The Committee recognizes that emergency management, evacuation, and
    the design of egress systems are operable only to the extent that we
    know how humans behave in emergency situations. The Committee
    encourages research on human behavior under duress and encourages
    research on designing emergency systems and infrastructure (operation
    and communication systems, buildings, roads and tunnels, stadiums) that
    facilitate the most effective behavior in emergency situations.
        The Committee recognizes there is a need to put as much attention
    into government responses to terrorism as into terrorist acts
    themselves. There are a number of data bases recording particulars of
    terrorist attacks, but none so far that record government responses
    (legal, military, political, policing; strategy and tactics) on the
    same time line as the terrorist attacks. The committee believes this
    information is critical to track because terrorists appear to adapt and
    counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
        The Committee recommends that DHS also encourage research to
    understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect to target
    selection (i.e., does target selection depend on circumstances such as
    differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed to other
    considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand how
    specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into
    tactic selection.
        The Committee realizes there is a need to understand how groups
    move from radical protest or social movement to terrorism and to
    examine the trajectories by which individuals move to terrorism.
    Whether an individual joins a protest group or social movement which
    escalates to the level of terrorism or joins an existing terrorist
    group, the background and experience and psychology of individuals
    recruited to terrorism in these two ways may be quite different. Moving
    to terrorism as a member of a continuing group is more like a slippery
    slope, whereas moving to terrorism by joining an existing terrorist
    group is more like making a decision.
        The Committee urges DHS to developing data bases of terrorist
    rhetoric for important terrorist groups over time. If terrorists there
    are rhetorical differences between protest groups that do and do not go
    on to commit terrorist acts such differences might be useful for
    directing countermeasure resources. When the rhetoric is not in
    English, English speaking researchers need the rhetoric translated so
    that they can apply text analysis tools in seeking rhetorical
    predictors.
        The Committee appreciates the DHS focus on jihadist terrorism but
    recognizes that it also needs to prepare for a resurgence of domestic
    terrorism. Neo-Nazi, constitutionalist, and white militia violence
    emerged after the Soviet threat disintegrated; similarly it can be
    expected that these groups and their violence will reemerge as the
    threat from Al Qaeda fades. There is a danger in focusing only on
    jihadist terrorism. The Committee suggest that National surveys with
    unobtrusive questions (what percent of world's population is white?)
    could begin to track the popularity of ideas associated with the idea
    that the U.S. Federal Government is the enemy.
        The Committee notes that thus far, Islamic communities in Europe
    have been more involved in jihadist violence than Islamic communities
    in the United States. The Committee urges DHS to continue to research
    the determinants of support for violence among diasporas and develop
    theories of diaspora experience in relation to home country politics
    and especially support for violence in relation to home country
    politics.
        The Committee understands that Al Qaeda is less an organization
    than a brand name or sympathy group with many local franchises now. The
    anarchist movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s had a similar
    quality, and due to the international nature of the anarchist threat
    governments leaders reached unprecedented cooperative agreements in
    trying to suppress the anarchists. The Committee recommends that DHS
    conduct a review of research on anarchist terrorism at the beginning of
    the 20th century in an effort to apply lessons learned for suppressing
    Al Qaeda.
        The Committee urges DHS to continue research on the psychology of
    negative intergroup emotions. Most analyses of terrorism and terrorist
    motives makes reference to fear, hate, anger or humiliation but the
    Committee understands there is very little empirical research on hate
    and humiliation. Further while there is research on anger and hate it
    appears to focus on the interpersonal level which may be very different
    than anger and hate at the intergroup level. The Committee recognizes
    that episodes like Abu Ghraib highlight the problem in understanding
    intergroup emotions which are twofold: understanding the relation
    between interpersonal and intergroup emotions, and understanding in
    particular intergroup emotions of hate, humiliation, and shame.
        The Committee recommends that DHS continue to review criminology
    literature and research related to gangs, especially youth and prison
    gangs, to better understand how different types of terrorist groups on
    the basis of recruiting, decision making, and desistence. The Committee
    believes that through research comparing terrorist groups that do and
    do not split, DHS might learn how to encourage internal conflict and
    splitting within terrorist organizations. Further, the Committee notes
    that there are cases, such as the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation
    of Armenia, and Egyptian Group after Luxor, in which terrorist activity
    drops quickly from high to low levels. As the dynamics of endings are
    not necessarily the reverse of the dynamics of beginnings, the
    Committee believes it should be useful to study such cases to learn how
    to encourage desistence.
        The Committee notes that terrorists are sometimes but not always
    seen as representing the group or cause they claim to be fighting for.
    Psychological research has emphasized attributions to individual actors
    with little attention to attributions to groups, and the attributions
    of interest are moral responsibility more than the usual psychological
    focus on perceived ``causes'' of behavior as trait-based or situation-
    based. The Committee encourages DHS to conduct additional research on
    attribution theory to better understand how actions of a few are
    sometimes but not always attributed to the group the individuals come
    from.
        The Committee urges DHS to continue to study why some groups move
    from local to international terrorism. Most terrorism begins in
    response to local issues, and relatively few groups escalate to
    international attacks. The Committee believes we need to understand
    when and how this kind of escalation occurs. The Committee notes that
    most data bases focus on international terrorist attacks and may
    discount data about earlier local attacks by the same groups. The
    Committee believes that by studying local terrorist groups whose
    actions remained local DHS would have a basis for comparison with local
    groups that transitioned to international attacks.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association

        APTA is a nonprofit international association of over 1,600 public
    and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
    rail operators; planning, design, construction and finance firms;
    product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
    associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
    serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical
    transit services and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public
    transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
    members.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
    testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems.
    We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look
    forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2007
    appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security.

                                   ABOUT APTA

        The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
    nonprofit international association of more than 1,600 public and
    private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
    rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms;
    product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
    associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
    serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
    transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
    public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
    APTA member systems.

                                    OVERVIEW

        Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical
    infrastructures. We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of our
    industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6
    billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit
    service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million
    times each weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily
    travelers on the Nation's airlines.
        Safety and security are the top priority of the public
    transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve
    security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since
    then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United
    States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency
    preparedness programs and technology from their own budgets with only
    minimal Federal funding. Last year's events in London and the previous
    year's events in Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen
    security on public transit systems and to do so without delay. We do
    not need another wakeup call like the terrorists attacks on rail
    systems in London and Madrid.
        We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the
    documented needs, we respectfully urge Congress to provide at least
    $560 million in the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations
    bill for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue
    to address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment
    needs. Funding at this level annually would allow for dramatic
    improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year
    period. Federal funding for additional security needs should provide
    for both hard and soft costs as described below and will be in addition
    to investments as transit systems continue to provide from their own
    resources. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to
    the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can in turn
    provide that amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards
    program which includes participation with our Federal partners to
    assist with the development of transit security standards. In addition,
    we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the
    Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).

                                   BACKGROUND

        In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine
    what actions they needed to take to improve security for their
    customers, employees and facilities. In response to the survey, transit
    agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in
    transit security investment needs. State and local governments and
    transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is
    important that the Federal Government be a full partner in the effort
    to ensure the security of the Nation's transit users.
        In fiscal year 2003, transit security was allocated $65 million in
    Federal funds from DHS for 20 transit systems. In fiscal year 2004, $50
    million was allocated from DHS for 30 transit systems. For the first
    time in fiscal year 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150
    million for transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the
    $150 million, transit is to receive approximately $130 million--almost
    $108 million for rail transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also,
    passenger ferries are slated to receive an additional $5 million for
    security from a separate account. In fiscal year 2006, Congress
    appropriated $150 million for transit, passenger and freight rail
    security. DHS is currently deciding how to allocate this funding among
    the modes of transportation. We are very appreciative of this effort.
    However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done.
        Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security
    needs. Based on APTA's 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000
    rail stations do not have security cameras. According to our 2005
    Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars,
    and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras. Fewer
    than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems
    (AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus when an
    emergency occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack
    these AVLs. Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological
    detection system. In addition, only two transit authorities have a
    permanent chemical detection system. A partnership with the Federal
    Government could help to better address many of these specific needs.
        We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $600
    million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the fiscal
    year 2007 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security
    grants for transit, seaports, railways and other facilities. We are
    also disappointed that the Administration did not include a specific
    line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to
    working with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate
    transit security funding that begins to address unmet transit security
    needs throughout the country.
        We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS
    Federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed
    directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating
    Agencies (SAA) on a regional basis. We believe direct funding to the
    transit authorities would be more efficient and productive. The
    Administration's process and conditions that have been put into effect
    have created significant barriers and time delays in getting the actual
    funds into the hands of transit agencies.
        As I noted in previous testimony, APTA is a Standards Development
    Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry. We are now
    applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit
    industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards
    as well. We have already begun to initiate our efforts for security
    standards development and we have engaged our Federal partners from
    both the DHS and Department of Transportation in this process. Through
    these initial meetings, I am pleased to advise that our Federal
    partners have agreed to support these efforts. We look forward to
    working with the Administration and Congress in support of this
    initiative. We respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the
    DHS so that it can in turn provide that amount in grant funding to the
    APTA security standards program which includes participation of our
    Federal partners to assist with the development of such standards and
    practices consistent with what we have already seen through the Federal
    Transit Administration (FTA). Our efforts in standards development for
    commuter rail, rail transit and bus transit operations have been
    significant and our status as a SDO is acknowledged by both the FTA and
    the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The FTA and the
    Transportation Research Board have supported our standards initiatives
    through the provision of grants.
        We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of
    Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a
    leadership role in advancing research and technology development to
    enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.

                              INFORMATION SHARING

        Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit
    systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their
    security plans and procedures and have been very active in training
    personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to respond to
    emergencies. As well, to the extent possible within their respective
    budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their
    services through the introduction of additional technologies such as
    surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems.
    While the transit systems have been diligent, they have been unable to
    fully implement programs without more assistance from the Federal
    Government.
        A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare
    and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security
    intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to
    informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public
    Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision
    Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems
    throughout the United States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2
    million was provided to APTA by the Federal Transit Administration to
    establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours
    a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources,
    including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems
    following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that
    the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access
    security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC
    operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate method of providing
    security intelligence through DHS's newly created Homeland Security
    Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to
    create a useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear,
    however, that while the HSIN may become an effective resource, it does
    not match the 24/7 two-way communication functions provided through the
    Public Transit ISAC. However, we believe that consistent, on-going and
    reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit
    ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security
    intelligence. Therefore, we respectfully urge Congress to provide
    $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
        In addition, APTA's membership includes many major international
    public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid
    Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with
    the European-based transportation association, the International Union
    of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated
    in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia to give United States
    transit agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address
    transit security both here and abroad.

                          COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY

        Following the attacks on London, APTA was asked to assist the TSA
    in conducting a teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to
    discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing
    the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat
    levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems
    and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These
    costs totaled $900,000 per day for U.S. public transit systems or an
    estimated $33.3 million from July 7 to August 12, 2005 during the
    heightened state of ``orange'' for public transportation. This amount
    does not include costs associated with additional efforts by New York,
    New Jersey and other systems to conduct random searches.
        Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to
    upgrade security. For example, New York's Metropolitan Transportation
    Authority (NY-MTA) is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure
    the safety and security of its transportation systems in what are among
    the most extensive security measures taken by a public transportation
    system to date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000
    motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter rail facilities
    as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late last year
    with the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY-MTA plans to spend
    over $1.1 billion between now and 2009 on transit security.

                           SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS

        Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
    has invested some $2 billion of its own funds for enhanced security
    measures, building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At
    the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to
    determine how we could build upon our existing industry security
    practices. This included a range of activities, which include research,
    best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and
    surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of
    how to create a more secure environment for our riders and the most
    critical security investment needs.
        Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
    enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
    maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
    meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
    for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
    development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
    security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
        Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
    which they required additional Federal investment for security
    improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
      --Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
            enforcement personnel
      --Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
            heightened alert levels
      --Training for security personnel
      --Joint transit/law enforcement training
      --Security planning activities
      --Security training for other transit personnel
        Priority examples of security capital investment improvements
    include:
      --Radio communications systems
      --Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
      --Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
      --Automated vehicle locator systems
      --Security fencing around facilities
        Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
    priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
    devices.
        Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
    for the transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit
    authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which
    would set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal
    funding assistance. Transit systems have already carried out many of
    the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and
    setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of
    these measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened
    alert is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with
    you in addressing these issues.
        As you know, in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
    Appropriations bill (Public law 109-90), TSA can hire rail inspectors
    using an $8 million appropriation. We have concerns about this
    provision. We believe that funding for the inspectors would be better
    spent on things that would support the industry such as surveillance
    cameras, emergency communication and other systems rather than
    highlighting security issues without providing the necessary resources
    to address them. We look forward to working with you in addressing our
    concerns.

                       ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS

        Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
    level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
    working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
    address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs. In
    light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive Committee
    has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee
    addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our
    initiatives. This committee will also serve as the mass transit sector
    coordination council that will interface with DHS and other Federal
    agencies forming the government coordinating council.
        In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA
    supported two TCRP Panels that identified and initiated specific
    projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to
    Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation.
        In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental
    in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness
    tools and resources. Many of these resources were developed in close
    partnership with the FTA and we are presently focused on continuing
    that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also,
    APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
    transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
    on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise
    the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
        APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail,
    bus, and rail transit operations. Within the scope of these programs
    are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and
    Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's
    increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Management Audit
    Programs have been modified to place added attention to these critical
    elements.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs
    post 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
    transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public
    transportation industry has made great strides in transit security
    improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. Therefore, we
    respectfully urge Congress to provide at least $560 million in the
    fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill
    for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue to
    address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs.
    Funding at this level annually would also allow for dramatic
    improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year
    period. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the
    Department of Homeland Security so that DHS can in turn provide that
    amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards program which
    includes participation of our Federal partners to assist with the
    development of transit security standards and practices consistent with
    what we have already seen through the FTA. In addition, we respectfully
    urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
        We have also found that investment in public transit security
    programs, resources and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in
    preparation and response to natural disasters as well. We look forward
    to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department
    of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We
    again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony
    on these critical issues and look forward to working with you on safety
    and security issues.
                                     ______

       Prepared Statement of the International Association for Emergency
                                    Managers

        Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me this opportunity to provide
    testimony on the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        I am Michael D. Selves. I am currently the Emergency Management and
    Homeland Security Director for Johnson County, Kansas. Johnson County
    constitutes the Southwest suburbs of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area
    and, with a population of approximately a half million, is the most
    populous county in Kansas. I currently serve as the First Vice
    President of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)
    and am providing this testimony on their behalf. I am also a Certified
    Emergency Manager (CEM), and have served IAEM over the past 5 years as
    chair of the Government Affairs Committee. For the past 11 years I have
    been an active participant in the National Association of Counties,
    chairing their Subcommittee on Emergency Management, as a charter
    member of their Homeland Security Task Force as well as serving 2 years
    on their Board of Directors. I was appointed by Department of Homeland
    Security Secretary Ridge to his task force on State and local Homeland
    Security funding.
        The International Association of Emergency Managers has over 2,700
    members including emergency management professionals at the State and
    local government levels, the military, private business and the
    nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
    our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the
    crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
    local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
    recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our
    members include emergency managers from large urban areas as well as
    rural counties.
        Hurricane Katrina has unequivocally demonstrated the need for
    strong emergency management programs at the Federal State and local
    levels. As emergency management professionals, we know the only way
    plans, preparations and equipment can be brought to bear in a disaster
    is through the planning efforts--of people . . . people whose job it is
    to bring all elements of a community together to make the plans work
    and who will be there when the time comes to implement those plans. For
    this reason, we are limiting our statement to one single critical
    issue: We respectfully request your assistance in increasing the
    funding for the Emergency Management Program Grant (EMPG).
    Emergency Management Performance Grant
      --Request the $13,100,000 funding cut be rejected and the amount
            increased to $256 million to begin addressing the shortfall.
      --Request that EMPG funding be maintained in a separate account as in
            the fiscal year 2006 Congressional action and not combined with
            other grant programs.
        Increase funding for EMPG.--Appropriations Committee report
    language referred to the program as ``the backbone of the Nation's
    emergency management system.'' In order to maintain this system and
    build the capacity required to meet the greatly increasing demands,
    additional investment is needed.
        However, the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2007
    proposes to reduce the funding from the $183,100,000 appropriated in
    fiscal year 2006 to $170,000,000. According to a biennial study
    conducted by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in
    2004 there is a shortfall of $260 million. We respectfully request that
    EMPG be increased $86 million over the fiscal year 2007 request for a
    total of $256,000,000 to begin addressing this shortfall.
        Maintain EMPG as a separate account.--We also urge you to continue
    to maintain EMPG as a separate account. The President's budget includes
    this program in the ``State and Local'' account with a number of other
    grant programs. EMPG is different from the other programs in this
    account. EMPG has existed for over 50 years and supports all hazards
    emergency management, including terrorism. In addition, it is a
    performance based continuing program with deliverables and requirements
    that must be met in order to receive funding the next year.
        EMPG is critically important.--We believe it is the single most
    effective use of Federal funds in providing emergency management
    capacity to State and local governments. No other source of homeland
    security funding is based on a consensus building process determining
    outcomes and specific deliverables backstopped by a quarterly
    accountability process. In fact, we feel this program would more
    accurately be described by the name Emergency Management Assistance
    (EMA) because of the unique requirements for deliverables and
    accountability it imposes--unique among all other homeland security
    sources of financial assistance.
        In addition, this unique program has never experienced ``backlogs''
    of unspent funds because it is built on the experience and refinement
    of over 5 decades of proven effectiveness and efficiency. EMPG
    assistance requires a 50 percent State or local match, thus creating
    the much-needed ``buy-in'' not present in many other grant programs.
    Actually, the ``buy-in'' in this program is significantly greater due
    to the fact that currently many local jurisdictions are receiving 20
    percent or less. In addition many local jurisdictions receive no
    funding at all because of shortage of funds.
        Examples of the critical benefits of EMPG are the following:
      --This program provides funding for the emergency managers who
            perform the role of the ``honest broker'' at the State and
            local level and who establish the emergency management
            framework for preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation.
      --EMPG funding provides the people who are legally responsible for
            creating a ``culture of preparedness'' at the State and local
            level.
      --EMPG funding also provides many of the personnel who can be
            deployed across State lines to assist other States in case of
            disaster through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
            (EMAC). During the 2005 response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
            65, 919 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets
            were deployed from 48 States, the District of Columbia, the
            Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Over 2100 missions were
            performed.
      --EMPG funding has assumed a greater importance in light of recent
            catastrophic events and the responses to those events. For
            example, the President and the Department of Homeland Security
            (DHS) have tasked State and local government emergency managers
            with the responsibility to review their Emergency Operations
            Plans regarding the issue of evacuation.
      --EMPG supports the people who have had the added responsibility of
            administering homeland security funding programs and additional
            planning efforts since 2001. While we agree the National Plan
            Review is a vitally important project, floods, tornadoes and
            other disasters simply haven't stopped happening.
        Without more funding and people we can't reach the level of
    preparedness our Nation deserves and our citizens demand.
        The recent White House report on the response to the Hurricane
    Katrina contains 125 recommendations. A significant number of these
    recommendations are ``top-down'' initiatives which require the
    collaboration and coordination efforts of State and local emergency
    managers in order to be fully implemented. We also know that genuine
    solutions to broad based issues like emergency management can only
    succeed if they recognize the primary importance of State and local
    governments.
        One way to sum things up is to acknowledge that beautiful plans
    written without the input and agreement of key stakeholders on roles
    and responsibilities will gather dust on shelves. A plan that works and
    has broad based buy in may be ugly and patched, but it lives, breathes
    and works, just like the people who implement it in a disaster.
        EMPG provides people who build partnerships.--The single most
    critically important thing EMPG funding provides is emergency
    management personnel at the State and local level. People are the most
    important investment this program makes because without them nothing
    else works. Emergency Management is a people process. I would like to
    point to my own jurisdiction--Johnson County, Kansas--as an example.
        Even before Katrina, we were engaged in the process of evaluating
    and revising our local emergency operations plan. I can tell you that
    this plan truly has broad buy in and acceptance within our
    jurisdiction. This happened because 16 subcommittees involving more
    than 120 people for 8 months of effort developed the 16 annexes of our
    plan. Because of the extensively and intensively people-based approach
    of this process, all of our officials--from our elected local
    leadership and senior management to front-line first responders--know
    and accept their roles and responsibilities. This would not have
    happened without EMPG funding providing the personnel in my office to
    facilitate this process. And the end result is very important. If we
    shake hands before the disaster, we won't have to point fingers
    afterwards.
        Emergency Management personnel at the State and local level have
    long involved private enterprise and faith-based groups in their
    inclusive, all-hazards planning process. For example, many of the State
    and local governments that hosted Katrina survivors fully integrated
    private and faith based organizations in their reception planning.
    These organizations' contributions ranged from providing critically
    needed supplies to serving as counselors and community emissaries for
    potential new residents of our communities.
        In conclusion, we believe this program must be maintained and
    sustained at a level which ensures that we continue to have a strong,
    truly national, system of emergency management in America. I sincerely
    thank you for this opportunity to express our deep concerns.
                                     ______

            Prepared Statement of the National Border Patrol Council

        The National Border Patrol Council thanks the Subcommittee for the
    opportunity to present the views and concerns of the 10,500 front-line
    Border Patrol employees that it represents regarding the resources
    necessary to provide effective homeland security now and in the future.
    Initially, it is important to recognize that there are numerous aspects
    of homeland security, and each of them must receive adequate funding
    and support in order for the overall program to function properly.
    Deficiencies in any part(s) of the system will weaken the entire
    structure, enabling terrorists and other criminals to exploit these
    vulnerabilities. Thus, it is imperative that all of these matters are
    addressed concurrently. Beyond the obvious need to substantially
    increase the number of personnel in all of the Department of Homeland
    Security's programs, there is an equally pressing need to enhance the
    infrastructure that supports these programs.
        It is beyond dispute that our borders are out of control. Millions
    of people cross them illegally every year, and only a small percentage
    are apprehended. While most of these people are merely seeking to
    improve their economic lot in life, a small but significant percentage
    of them are criminals who take advantage of our open borders, and a few
    terrorists undoubtedly do the same. In order to restore a semblance of
    order to this chaotic situation, the root cause of illegal immigration
    needs to be addressed by turning off the employment magnet that lures
    impoverished people to our country. This will require a significant
    revision in the existing statutes so that employers are able to easily
    determine who has a right to work in this country and are discouraged
    from ignoring or disobeying the law through the certain imposition of
    tough penalties. A single, counterfeit-proof document must serve as the
    foundation of this approach. In order enforce this new law, substantial
    additional resources will need to be allocated. At a minimum, 10,000
    criminal investigators should be added for this purpose.
        Even though the adoption of the foregoing measures would eliminate
    most illegal border crossings by people seeking employment, it would do
    nothing to diminish the flow of criminals and contraband. Stopping this
    illicit activity will require a sophisticated network of detection
    devices coupled with substantial increases in Border Patrol agents to
    respond to such intrusions and apprehend the violators. The additional
    1,500 agents requested by the Administration for the upcoming fiscal
    year is entirely inadequate for this purpose, and should be increased
    to 2,500. Thereafter, the size of the Border Patrol should be increased
    by at least the same amount every year until a total of at least 25,000
    agents are deployed.
        The number of inspections personnel at the Ports of Entry also
    needs to be increased significantly to allow for a more thorough
    inspection process without disrupting the flow of legitimate traffic.
    This will require an expansion of the existing facilities in some
    locations, and the building of additional facilities in areas where
    that is impractical. Moreover, the failed ``One Face at the Border''
    initiative needs to be discarded in favor of a system that fosters
    specialization in each of the complex areas of immigration, customs,
    and agriculture laws.
        The number of detention beds and personnel to guard detainees also
    need to be augmented significantly. The promise of ``catch and return''
    is meaningless unless it can be backed up by sufficient resources.
        In order to adequately patrol the thousands of miles of coastal
    areas and other waterways along the boundaries of the United States,
    the Coast Guard also needs substantial increases in personnel.
        The number of Federal Air Marshals has been allowed to dwindle to
    dangerously low levels. A significant increase in the ranks of these
    employees is also critical to efforts to bolster homeland security.
        It is important that the occupations supporting the foregoing
    programs also be increased commensurately. Far too often, these
    important resources are neglected when the primary occupations are
    augmented, resulting in needless inefficiencies.
        The addition of significant numbers of new employees will present
    many challenges. First and foremost, it will be necessary to make these
    occupations more attractive in order to recruit and retain sufficient
    numbers of highly-qualified personnel. Law enforcement agencies
    throughout the country are currently experiencing difficulties meeting
    their recruitment goals, and many of them are finding it necessary to
    increase salaries and benefits to remain competitive.\1\ The Border
    Patrol just raised its entry level age from 37 to 40, reflecting the
    difficulties it is facing in attracting a sufficient number of
    qualified recruits. In many areas of the country, the pay and benefits
    of Federal law enforcement agents already lag behind that of their
    State and local law counterparts. In order to become more competitive
    in this job market, the Federal Government needs to upgrade its pay and
    benefits, and take other steps to ensure that these jobs are deemed
    desirable.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``Police Finding It Hard to Fill Jobs; Forces Use Perks And
    Alter Standards,'' The Washington Post, March 27, 2006, page A-1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The pay of many of the Department of Homeland Security's
    occupations needs to be raised substantially. This includes, but is not
    limited to, Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection
    Officers, Immigration Enforcement Agents, and Law Enforcement
    Communications Assistants. Moreover, the demoralizing practice of
    requiring many of the Department's law enforcement employees to work
    long hours of overtime without any compensation needs to be remedied by
    placing all employees under the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards
    Act. Also, all of the Department's law enforcement officers need to be
    afforded law enforcement retirement coverage.
        The pay-for-performance plan that is being implemented throughout
    DHS must be discarded in favor of a fair and predictable pay system.
    The pay of dedicated employees should not be left to the whim and mercy
    of arbitrary and capricious supervisors, many of whom are ordered to
    withhold pay increases in order to offset budgetary shortfalls in other
    areas.
        Additionally, the labor-management relations provisions of the
    Homeland Security Act must be repealed. These draconian measures serve
    no legitimate purpose, and will in fact deter employees from exposing
    fraud, waste or corruption. Because they institutionalize the unfair
    treatment of employees, they will also discourage the best and the
    brightest from serving in the Department.
        Although all Federal agencies have the authority to pay generous
    recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances, the
    Department of Homeland Security rarely exercises it because little or
    no money is budgeted for that purpose. This unwise practice needs to be
    remedied. Similarly, the Department needs additional money for the
    purpose of funding personnel relocations. Themovement of personnel from
    one location to another is essential to the success of the
    organization.
        Counter-productive enforcement schemes such as the Border Patrol's
    ``strategy of deterrence'' need to be abandoned in favor of effective
    strategies. The notion that criminals and terrorists will be dissuaded
    from crossing the borders illegally because Border Patrol agents are
    positioned at quarter-mile fixed intervals along the border is absurd.
        Surveillance technology can be a useful enforcement tool,
    especially in detecting violators who are attempting to illegally cross
    our borders. The temptation to rely upon such devices to replace
    trained law enforcement officers needs to be resisted, however. Even
    the most sophisticated of these devices is incapable of apprehending a
    single violator. At best, most of these devices are only capable of
    providing snapshot views of intrusions, and their utility is thus quite
    limited. The high cost of complex devices such as unmanned aerial
    vehicles renders them less cost-effective than manned aircraft such as
    helicopters.
        The Department needs to provide all of its officers with instant
    access to databases that allow them to quickly determine if a person is
    wanted for the commission of a crime or suspicion of terrorist
    activities. Disturbingly, almost none of the Department's vehicles have
    portable computers.
        Many of the Border Patrol's vehicles are long overdue for
    replacement. It is senseless to spend large amounts of money repairing
    vehicles that continually break down because of their age and the wear
    and tear of law enforcement use.
        Numerous DHS employees are wearing body armor that is not suited
    for the types of dangers that they face and the environment in which
    they operate. Moreover, the weapons issued to these employees are no
    match for those utilized by the criminals that they face.
        The communications system utilized by many of the Department's
    employees is antiquated and inadequate. There are numerous areas where
    employees routinely operate without the ability to communicate with
    each other because the radio network does not provide coverage. This
    hazardous situation needs to be remedied.
        Many employees do not have hand-held global positioning system
    devices to assist them in navigating around the vast areas that they
    are responsible for patrolling. Moreover, the supply of night vision
    equipment is inadequate, and much of it is outdated.
        Hiring large numbers of employees will require an expansion of the
    existing training facilities. The small size and deplorable condition
    of the Border Patrol's facilities in Artesia, New Mexico are cause for
    particular concern. The infrastructure of that community cannot support
    an operation of the magnitude needed to properly train several thousand
    agents every year, and serious consideration needs to be given to
    finding a new location that is more suited to this purpose.
        As significant numbers of additional personnel are added to all
    parts of the country, it is important to plan ahead and ensure that the
    facilities in those locations are large enough to ensure that the
    operations run efficiently.
        Although most of the infrastructure needs identified herein can
    easily be met through proper planning, the chronic deficiencies in
    these areas demand an approach that incorporates them into the hiring
    process. A funding formula that factors all of these needs into the
    cost of a full career must be developed, adjusted from time to time,
    and followed.
        While the expense of providing effective homeland security may seem
    steep at first glance, it pales in comparison to the cost of failing to
    do so. The investment in the infrastructure of America's homeland
    security must begin now. Further delays will leave our Nation
    needlessly vulnerable to further attacks by those who want to destroy
    us.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association

    Introduction
        Thank you Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
    members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
    with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) fiscal year 2007 budget. I am Bruce Baughman, the President of
    the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the
    Alabama Emergency Management Agency. In my statement, I am representing
    the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are
    the State emergency management directors in the States, the U.S.
    territories, and the District of Columbia. NEMA's members are
    responsible to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland
    security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural,
    man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.
        As you consider the budget for fiscal year 2007, emergency
    management in our country has received greater attention as a result of
    the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Though, funding has not followed
    from the Federal Government to assist in meeting the needs for all-
    hazards emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation
    activities. Over the past year, our Nation's emergency management
    system has been tested by the extensive natural disasters that we have
    faced. In all, there were 48 major disaster declarations, 68 emergency
    declarations, and 39 fire management assistance declarations. Every
    single State was impacted by one of these declarations, including the
    District of Columbia, and all but two of the U.S. territories. 48
    States were impacted enough by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to warrant
    declarations for Federal assistance, whether the States were disaster
    areas or the States took in significant numbers of evacuees. States
    have been mandated to complete comprehensive reviews of evacuation
    plans and other emergency plans with no Federal support. At the same
    time, emergency management continues to prepare for the threat of
    terrorism with new requirements coming from the Federal Government such
    as updating State plans to reflect the National Response Plan (NRP),
    training emergency responders on the new National Incident Management
    System (NIMS), and implementing the National Preparedness Goal mandated
    by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on National
    Preparedness with no additional Federal financial assistance to meet
    Federal mandates. The multi-hazards emergency management system
    continues to be the means to practice and exercise for devastating acts
    of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the Nation for
    hurricanes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, and floods. We
    respectfully ask for your Committee to consider the role of emergency
    management as you address the fiscal year 2007 appropriations and ask
    for your serious consideration for Federal support for the Emergency
    Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) to build State and local
    emergency management capacity.
        The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
    support to State and local emergency management programs through actual
    dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
    address three critical issues regarding the proposed Federal budget for
    Department of Homeland Security:
      --Extreme concern for proposed cuts to the Emergency Management
            Performance Grant (EMPG) program while requirements increase
            for State and local governments;
      --The need for Federal support for the Emergency Management
            Assistance Compact (EMAC); and
      --Concerns related to the status of reorganizations at the Department
            of Homeland Security.

                  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING

    EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness/Readiness
        Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every State
    must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the
    capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist
    State and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness
    activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when our
    country is recovering from one of the largest natural disasters and
    making strides to improve the Nation's emergency preparedness/
    readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be cut by $13.1
    million. EMPG is the backbone of the Nation's all-hazards emergency
    management system as the only source of direct Federal funding to State
    and local governments for emergency management capacity building. EMPG
    is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at both the
    State and local levels. EMPG is primarily used to assist States in
    maintaining personnel for State and local emergency management
    programs, and consequently the Nation's emergency response system. EMPG
    is being used to help States create and update plans for receiving and
    distribution plans for commodities and ice after a disaster, debris
    removal plans, and plans for receiving or evacuating people.
        The State and local government partnership with the Federal
    Government to ensure preparedness dates back to the civil defense era,
    yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on
    State and local governments. With the recent expanded focus on
    terrorism and the increased demands of the Federal Government to assist
    in implementation of Federal initiatives like the NRP, the NIMS, and
    HSPD8, EMPG becomes more important as a means to ensure State and local
    involvement and compliance with new systems.
        NEMA completed a Quick Response Survey in March 2006 to assess the
    impacts of the proposed cut to the EMPG program. Of the 42 States
    responding, 90 percent of the States will have to cut staff ranging
    from one person to more than 50 positions. If the cut is included in
    the budget: 20 States will have to cut between 1-10 positions; 10
    States will have to cut between 11-30 positions; 4 will have to cut
    between 31-50 positions; and 4 will have to cut more than 50 positions.
    In the same Quick Response Survey, 83 percent of responding States
    report that the majority of EMPG funds go to local grants, so the
    impact of the cut would be greatest on local governments.
    State and Local Match
        EMPG is the only program in the Preparedness Account within the
    Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and
    local level. The match is evidence of the critical partnership of State
    and local governments to address the urgent national security need for
    emergency planning for all disasters regardless of the cause. EMPG
    requires a match of 50 percent from the State or local governments.
    According to the NEMA 2004 Biennial Report, budgets for State emergency
    management agencies nationally were reduced by an average of 23 percent
    in fiscal year 2004, yet at the same time States were continuing to
    over match the Federal Government's commitment to national security
    protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal year 2004, which is a
    80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution.
    EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
        During last year's hurricane season, the interdependencies of the
    Nation's emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the
    success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
    EMAC enabled 48 States, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands,
    and Puerto Rico to provide assistance in the form of more than 2,100
    missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000
    civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the
    impacted States. The estimated costs of these missions may exceed $829
    million and the missions and requests for aid are continuing. Of the
    personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,448 were National Guard
    personnel and 19,431 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to
    provide assistance were supported by the EMPG program. The nature of
    the Nation's mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all States to
    have appropriate capabilities for all disasters and EMPG allows States
    and local governments to build this capability both for their own use
    and to share in through EMAC. Additional resources are needed to build
    emergency response capabilities on a national basis and to ensure the
    system can handle the demands of natural disasters including
    catastrophic events and other emergencies no matter where they occur.
    Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
        While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after 10
    years of straight-lined funding, the program still needs significant
    investment to accomplish its goals. The final fiscal year 2006 DHS
    conference report provided an additional $5 million for the program,
    but after the across the board cut, the program was left with $183.1
    million. We appreciate all of the efforts of members of Congress and
    the Administration to allow for these increases. The current cut comes
    at a time when emergency management needs to address shortfalls and new
    threats. EMPG needs adequate and predictable resources in order to
    sustain the increased demand for preparedness/readiness. Continued
    funding increases are necessary to make up for a decade of degradation
    of funding and increased State and local commitments because funding
    has not kept pace with inflation or with increasing demand. The
    increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls estimated
    in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2004 to be over $264 million for all 50
    States. The current shortfall is $260, because of a $3.1 million
    increase in fiscal year 2006.
        The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on
    the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that
    responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The
    proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $10 million. These
    cuts mean that emergency management would be saddled with increased
    mandates, while coping with decreases to an already modest budget. In
    budget consideration for fiscal year 2003, 2004, and 2006, Congress
    affirmed the importance of EMPG in appropriations bills in language
    addressing the significance of the program and increased the levels of
    funding for the program twice. Prior to these modest increases, the
    program had been straight lined for over a decade and even with these
    increases the program's growth rate has not kept pace with inflation
    over the last 15 years. Additionally, Congress affirmed the intent of
    the program as all-hazards and dedicated to supporting personnel during
    consideration of the fiscal year 2006 budget. NEMA is appreciative of
    Congress' recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we
    respectfully ask that Congress aggressively address the programs
    shortfalls with an additional $87 million in funding for EMPG for
    fiscal year 2007, for a total of $270 million.
        Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with
    these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006
    Quick Response Survey found that if States were to each receive an
    additional $1 million in EMPG funding for fiscal year 2007, States
    would use the following percentages for the following activities: 88
    percent of States responding would update plans including evacuation,
    sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters and others; 83
    percent would provide more training opportunities for State and local
    emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide more
    preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct
    more State and local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for
    State and local NIMS compliance.
        EMPG's modest Federal increases in helped the program grow, but
    shortfalls continue to force an unequal burden on State and local
    governments. States are continuing to increase their out of pocket
    costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for local programs.
    The shortfall means that many communities that would like to implement
    a full-time, professional emergency management capability cannot do so
    because of shortfalls in Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily
    used as a pass-through program for local governments, so the shortfall
    affects our smallest localities that are often those most in need of
    emergency preparedness planning. Currently, States and local
    governments are over matching the Federal Government's commitment to
    national security protection through EMPG by $96 million according to
    the 2004 NEMA Biennial Report.
    Accountability Measures
        Many States have various accountability measures in place to track
    the use of EMPG funding and NEMA supports the development of a national
    system that quantifies the uses of the funding. In fact, NEMA through
    the National Homeland Security Consortium is working closely with the
    new Preparedness Directorate at DHS to work collaboratively on
    performance metrics for HSPD-8 and performance metrics for the Response
    Capabilities in the TCL. The DHS effort will help to develop a national
    picture of EMPG metrics as well. At the same time, States already have
    measures in place at the State level to track the use of EMPG funding
    in their States. Some of the measures in place reported in the 2006
    Quick Response Survey include: 95 percent of responding States have
    reporting requirements; 76 percent of States responding require the
    development of State-wide goals that must be met with the funds; 61
    percent of the States responding call for local governments to
    demonstrate performance against goals that are written by local
    jurisdictions; 42 percent of responding States implement corrective
    action plans if goals are not met with funding; and 45 percent of
    States tie program funding to meeting the standards in place with the
    voluntary Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) for State
    and local emergency management agencies.
    EMPG as a Separate Account
        The President's Budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 suggests
    combining the EMPG account with the Citizen Corp account to form a
    formula-based grant account. NEMA strongly disagrees with this
    approach, as EMPG must be maintained as a separate line item account as
    Congress has affirmed since fiscal year 2003. Congress agreed at that
    time that the program account needed to be visible and easy to find in
    the budget because of the importance of the program. The separate
    account is critical because the program is the only all-hazards grant
    program being administered through the Grants and Training Office to
    emergency management agencies. Further, the separate account allows for
    EMPG to be tracked and has raised visibility on the importance of the
    program among members of Congress. Additionally, we suggest that
    Congress maintain the method of distribution for EMPG, similar to the
    language in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations, however continuing to
    allocate the funding through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs)
    continues to cause delays in some States. NEMA supports language that
    would expressedly restore the grants allocation to State emergency
    management agencies, to facilitate the process of getting funding to
    emergency management agencies at the State and local level faster.
    All-Hazards Approach
        The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring
    national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
    numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
    emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
    prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
    Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for
    adequate emergency management needs from the ground up. Instead of
    making significant investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must
    maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our
    response system for all disasters regardless of cause--EMPG. We
    strongly ask for Congress to ensure predictable and adequate funding
    levels for the EMPG in fiscal year 2007.

              BUIDING OUR NATION'S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC

        The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest
    deployment of interstate mutual aid in the Nation's history through the
    Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned
    previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines
    from all member States to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
    Florida, and Texas. EMAC Operations in Louisiana are still underway.
    The process enabled National Guard, search and rescue teams, incident
    management teams, emergency operations center support, building
    inspectors, and law enforcement personnel to immediately assist the
    requesting States in need of support. The National Guard even chose to
    continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the
    organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking
    abilities EMAC provides.
        EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor
    Lawton Chiles. The system was developed through the members States of
    the Southern Governors' Association to establish mechanisms to enable
    mutual aid among member sates in emergency situations. The Southern
    Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by
    participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs
    nationwide applicability by the National Governors' Association and
    FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (Public Law 104-321). Currently 49
    States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of
    Columbia are members of EMAC. Hawaii is currently considering
    legislation to become a party to the compact during their current
    legislative session. EMAC requires member States to have an
    implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC
    Operations Manual. EMAC takes care of issues such as reimbursement,
    liability protections, and workers' compensation issues.
        Prior to the historic 2005 deployments, EMAC's largest previous
    deployment was during the 2004 Hurricane season in Florida, Alabama,
    and West Virginia, which enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the
    form of more than $15 million in human, military, and equipment assets
    and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days
    of continuous response operations. NEMA utilized the grant funds to
    work with an independent consulting company to complete a 2004 After
    Action Report, that identified areas for continuous improvement for the
    EMAC systems and EMAC has worked to draft a strategic plan to implement
    the lessons learned into practice. NEMA is currently working to
    complete an After-Action Report on the 2005 season, with a meeting of
    stakeholders, assisting States, requesting States, and others later
    this month. The report is expected to be complete by September 2006 and
    the strategic plan will be amended to reflect new lessons learned. The
    support of EMAC is critical to helping offset the costs of disasters
    and maintaining the need for a massive Federal workforce for response
    to catastrophic disasters. The beauty of EMAC is that it provides
    assistance to those in need, but allows others to assist and learn from
    disasters in other States.
        In order to meet the ever-growing need for and reliance on
    interstate mutual aid, EMAC is seeking $4 Million over 3 years to
    continue to build EMAC capabilities. This funding will allow EMAC to
    focus on the implementation of lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina
    and Rita such as Training and Education, Resource Typing and
    Credentialing, and Information and Resource Management. Since EMAC's
    inception in 1993, EMAC was funded by member States until 2003. In
    2003, FEMA funded EMAC with a 3 year grant of $2 Million. This funding
    expires in November 2006. This funding has been used for administrative
    support of EMAC, development of the EMAC Operations system whereby all
    resources deployed under the Compact are tracked from when it is
    requested until reimbursement is paid, and the 2004 and 2005 after
    action reports.

                          SECOND STAGE REVIEW AND FEMA

        As the Congress looks at the lessons learned and recommendations
    for reform included in reports following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
    we ask that NEMA's members be consulted regarding further changes to
    the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Most importantly,
    consideration needs to also be given to the connectivity between FEMA
    and the Preparedness Directorate within DHS, since all FEMA's
    preparedness functions were moved out into this new Directorate. When
    the Second Stage Review proposal was announced, NEMA articulated grave
    concern in a July 27, 2005 letter to the Department of Homeland
    Security regarding the Second Stage Review (2SR) creating a
    Preparedness Directorate that would be primarily focused on terrorism.
    The letter to Congress highlighted the lack of the Department's focus
    on natural-hazards preparedness and the inability to connect response
    and recovery operations to preparedness functions, as any unnecessary
    separation of these functions could result in a disjointed response and
    adversely impact the effectiveness of Departmental operations.
    Nevertheless, we understand that the 2SR is moving ahead and look
    forward to finding ways to connect the new Preparedness Directorate
    with FEMA. We fear that if those interrelationships are not made the
    result could mean that many State and local governments will be meeting
    FEMA for the first time when as disaster occurs in their State because
    of the separation of functions. We hope to work with Congress to ensure
    linkages of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation functions
    in the all-hazards approach to emergency management.
        NEMA also calls on Congress to consider the needs of the FEMA in
    this year's budget process, to restore the agencies ability to respond
    to all disasters. Our Nation is same point as the Nation was after
    Hurricane Andrew in 1992, questioning organizational structures,
    leadership, the roles of Federal, State, and local government, funding
    for FEMA and emergency management and even citizen preparedness. No
    Federal agency is more qualified structurally and statutorily than FEMA
    to help our Nation respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA has the
    direct relationships with State and local governments because of the
    grant programs and the disaster relief programs authorized through the
    Stafford Act. FEMA is the only Federal agency authorized under the
    Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (42 U.S.C.
    5121 et seq.) to carry out duties on behalf of the President. The 1978
    Reorganization Plan 3, which created FEMA, also gives FEMA the
    responsibility for all of the functions of emergency preparedness and
    response. The plan States:
        ``This reorganization rests on several fundamental principles.
    First, Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to
    major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official
    responsible to the President and given attention by other officials at
    the highest levels. The new agency would be in this position.''
        FEMA is and should be the agency of choice to coordinate the
    functions of the Federal Government in response to disasters,
    regardless of their cause.
        FEMA has the ability to tap into the emergency responder community
    to build relationships through training and exercises. FEMA also has
    the skills to work cooperatively with State and local elected and
    appointed officials to work towards comprehensive recovery. FEMA has
    the coordinating function in the Federal Government and should have the
    ability to tap all the resources at the Federal level to respond to a
    disaster. However, all these areas need to be strengthened with an all-
    hazards focus to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments are
    building relationships before a disaster and understand how to work
    together cohesively. FEMA also needs financial support to maintain and
    build their capacity.
        The time to stop the cycle of degradation of emergency management
    functions by reorganization after reorganization is now and we must
    systematically improve our Nation's emergency response system through
    verified lessons learned and not reactionary decisions. We hope that
    Congress will partner with NEMA as they move forward to consider
    changes to DHS organizational functions and the role of FEMA.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The last year has proved our Nation's continuous vulnerability
    against all-hazards of many sizes. We will be faced with recovery on
    the Gulf Coast for many years to come and we cannot ignore the
    predictions for the coming Hurricane season. We must continue to build
    national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. In this
    year's appropriations process Congress will make critical decisions
    that shape the future of emergency management in this country. As you
    begin your consideration, we ask you to recognize the importance of
    adequately funding the EMPG program in building capacity through people
    at the State and local level for all disasters. I thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your
    partnership.

           LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    American:
        Psychological Association, Prepared Statement of.............   259
        Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of.....   266

    Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
        Questions Submitted by.......................................    73
        Statement of.................................................     5

    Chertoff, Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security....     1
        Prepared Statement of........................................    12
        Statement of.................................................     8
    Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................    66

    Gregg, Senator Judd, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire:
        Opening Statement of.........................................     1
        Questions Submitted by.......................................    55

    International Association for Emergency Managers, Prepared
      Statement of...................................................   270

    Mikulski, Senator Barbara A., U.S. Senator From Maryland,
      Prepared Statement of..........................................    37

    National:
        Border Patrol Council, Prepared Statement of.................   272
        Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of......   274

    Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................    71

                                 SUBJECT INDEX

                                  ----------

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                                                       Page
    Additional:
        Committee Questions..........................................    55
        Funds for Preparedness and FEMA..............................    12
    Administration Plans for Dubai Ports World to Take Control of
      Significant Operations at Six U.S. Ports.......................   255
    Advanced Training Center.........................................   117
    Agrodefense......................................................    66
    Air Cargo........................................................   152
        Security.....................................................   235
    All-State Minimum................................................   253
    Arbitration Decision on the Fiscal Year 2005 Awards..............   119
    Armored Vehicles.................................................   179
    Avian Bird Flu...................................................   250
    Aviation Security Passenger Fees.................................    61
    BRAC Report......................................................    93
    Border:
        Crossing Card--the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
          (WHTI) Implementation......................................   245
        Infrastructure Supplemental..................................    56
        Patrol Duties................................................   120
    Bordersafe.......................................................   236
    Breached Bond....................................................   121
    Business Transformation:
        Office.......................................................    73
        Program......................................................   230
    Campaign Protection..............................................   176
    Canine Teams.....................................................   154
    Cargo Container Security.........................................    71
    Chemical:
        Detection....................................................   234
        Plant Security Legislation...................................53, 54
        Sector National Strategy.....................................    54
        Security.....................................................   205
    Citizenship and Immigration Services.............................   230
        Initiatives..................................................   230
        Personnel....................................................   231
    Civil Rights.....................................................    99
    Classified Briefing on the Dubai Port Deal.......................    25
    Coast Guard......................................................   157
        Headquarters Relocation......................................   158
        R&D..........................................................   238
    Competitive Sourcing Personnel...................................    78
    Container Security Initiative (CSI)..............................   111
    Contract Oversight...............................................   128
    Contracting out Report...........................................    78
    Customer Service.................................................   128
    Customs and Border Protection....................................   108
        Air and Marine...............................................   115
        And NCRC Mission.............................................   108
        Inspectors at our Ports......................................   111
        Presence at Airports.........................................   110
    Cyberstorm.......................................................   184
    Deepwater........................................................   157
        Recapitalization.............................................    67
    Departmental Management..........................................    73
    Derby Line.......................................................   247
    Detailees to the:
        Department...................................................    80
        White House..................................................    78
    Detentions.......................................................   122
        Of Animal Diseases...........................................   200
    DHS:
        Active Duty:
            Fingerprint Vetting Policy...............................    41
            Military Fingerprint Vetting Policy......................    42
        Headquarters.................................................    77
        Organizational Structure and FEMA's Capabilities.............    46
        Port Security Approach.......................................     9
        Requested to Garner Administrative Support of the
          Congressional Border Security Infrastructure Initiative....    25
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)........................65, 242
    Drug Interdiction................................................   158
    Dubai Ports......................................................    39
        Deal.........................................................    43
        World (DPW)..................................................   112
    EDS..............................................................   144
    Emergency Management Performance Grants.........................60, 183
        Program......................................................    70
    Ending Catch and Release.........................................    55
    Enforcement of Customs Laws......................................   109
    Executive Sedan Service..........................................    75
    Exercises......................................................190, 227
    Exit.............................................................   101
    Explosives Trace Portals.........................................   123
    Federal:
        Agency Head Screening........................................   156
        Preparedness Coordinators....................................   187
    FEMA.............................................................   206
        Contract Awards..............................................    71
        Funding Lapse..............................................223, 226
        Staffing.....................................................   225
    Fire:
        Grants.......................................................   185
        Service Needs Assessment.....................................   200
    First Responder Grants--Risk and Threat Factors..................    58
    Fiscal:
        Accountability Mechanisms to Minimize Spending, Waste and
          Fraud......................................................    30
        Year 2007 Budget Request.....................................    18
    Grant Drawdown Rate..............................................   181
    Guantanamo Facility..............................................   123
    Homeland Security Budget and Anomalies...........................     6
    How Often has DHS (Coast Guard) Exercised the Power to Suspend
      Ships From Entering Into the Port Coming Into the United
      States?........................................................    10
    Hurricane:
        Contracts....................................................   226
        Katrina......................................................   249
        Pam Exercise.................................................   180
    I Staff..........................................................    97
    IDENT-IAFIS......................................................   101
    Ice Contract With Kellogg, Brown and Root........................   120
    Improve Maritime Security and Create Better Transportation
      Security Systems to Move People and Cargo More Securely and
      Efficiently....................................................    21
    Improved Border Security.........................................     5
    Improving Nationwide Catastrophic Planning.......................    58
    Infrastructure Protection and Information Security...............   201
    Inspections:
        At Air Ports of Entry........................................   113
        Of Arriving Saudis...........................................   109
    Intensive Supervision Program Expansion..........................   123
    Interoperability.................................................   186
        Grants.......................................................   186
    I-91 Checkpoint..................................................   248
    Katrina Oversight Board..........................................    31
    Law Enforcement Support Center.................................122, 247
    Length of Stay...................................................   121
    Lessons Learned..................................................   224
    Local CIS Ombudsman..............................................    93
    MAXHR............................................................    77
    Major Initiatives and Accomplishments............................     8
    MANPADS..........................................................   233
    Map Modernization................................................   226
    Mass Evacuation..................................................   206
    Military Immigrant Backlog.......................................    40
    Morale Problems at DHS...........................................    98
    MTSA Compliance Inspections......................................   175
    National:
        Capital Air Defense Mission..................................   167
        Disasters....................................................   182
        Infrastructure Protection Plan...............................   201
        Preparedness:
            Goal.....................................................   180
            Integration Program......................................    62
        Special Security Events...............................175, 178, 203
    Necessity of Senior Leadership Longevity and Potential
      Inefficiencies Due to DHS Enormity.............................    45
    Next Generation EDS..............................................   236
    No-Fly List......................................................   143
    Northern Border:
        And Border Patrol Agents.....................................   247
        Carryover Funds..............................................   118
    Office of:
        General Counsel..............................................    92
        Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA)...............................   121
        Screening Coordination and Operations........................61, 92
    Oil Spills.......................................................   172
    Operation:
        Centers......................................................    94
        Safe Commerce................................................   157
    Other Key Accomplishments........................................    16
    Outbound Inspections.............................................   114
    Ownership of Key Assets..........................................   201
    Pandemic Influenza...............................................    57
    Pass Cards.......................................................    34
        Technological Infrastructure.................................    27
    Patrol Boats.....................................................   168
    Perimeter Security...............................................   144
    Personnel........................................................   230
    Pilot Programs...................................................   147
    Polar Icebreakers................................................   168
    Port Security....................................................    29
        Allocations..................................................     9
        Automated Targeting Systems..................................    60
        Funding......................................................    34
    Pre-Disaster Mitigation..........................................   207
    Preparedness Directorate.........................................   180
    Procurement Report...............................................    77
    Protection Funding...............................................   179
    R&D Funding....................................................238, 239
    Rail Pilots......................................................   233
    Recoveries.......................................................   144
    Registered Traveler..............................................   151
    Reported DHS Reservations About the Dubai Port Deal..............    24
    Responding to Letters From Congress..............................   120
    Response Boat Medium.............................................   170
    Retooling of FEMA................................................   224
    Risks and Threats................................................    66
    Safer............................................................   185
    Science and Technology...........................................   233
        Management...................................................    65
    Secure Flight....................................................   151
    Senior Leadership Travel Initiative..............................    93
    Shipping Containers..............................................   113
    Staffing..................................................129, 177, 201
        For Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) Act Grants..    60
    State and Local First Responders.................................   254
    Strategic Border Initiative......................................   103
    Strengthening Maritime Security..................................    26
    Supply Chain Security Specialists................................   118
    Surge Capacity...................................................   155
    Technical Assistance.............................................   189
    Temporary:
        Protected Status.............................................   233
        Worker Program...............................................    49
    Ten Print Capacity Overseas......................................   102
    Transient Populations Accounting.................................   182
    Transit Security Project.........................................   238
    Transportation Security Administration...........................   123
        Hiring Freeze................................................    47
        Passenger Fee Increase.......................................    48
    Travel...........................................................   179
    Tucson Sector Checkpoints........................................   117
    Tunnel Detection.................................................   235
    Tunnels..........................................................   114
    United States Secret Service.....................................   176
    User Fee Reform Proposal.........................................   232
    US VISIT.........................................................   101
        Exit Tracking Capability.....................................    57
    Virgin Island Substation.........................................   120
    Visa Waiver Program (WVP)........................................   101
    Vulnerability Assessments........................................   204
    Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.............................   102
    Workplace Injuries...............................................   176
    Worksite Enforcement.............................................   121

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