[Senate Hearing 109-312]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-312
POLICY OPTIONS FOR IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 18, 19, AND 20, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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IMPROVING SECURITY IN IRAQ--JULY 18, 2005
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Fellow in Strategy,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 27
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Hagel, Hon. Chuck Hagel, U.S. Senator from Nebraska.............. 65
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 1
McCaffrey, GEN Barry R., USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey
Associates, LLC, Arlington, VA................................. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Pollack, Dr. Kenneth M., director of research and senior fellow,
Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
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ADVANCING IRAQI POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT--JULY 19, 2005
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 105
Prepared statement........................................... 105
Feldman, Dr. Noah, professor of law, New York University, New
York, NY....................................................... 99
Prepared statement........................................... 102
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 81
Marr, Dr. Phebe, senior fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace,
Washington, DC................................................. 83
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Van Rest, Judy, executive vice president, International
Republican Institute, Washington, DC........................... 92
Prepared statement........................................... 94
------
ACCELERATING ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN IRAQ--JULY 20, 2005
Barton, Frederick D., senior advisor, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 159
Prepared statement........................................... 161
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 172
Prepared statement........................................... 172
Crane, Dr. Keith, senior economist, RAND Corporation, Arlington,
VA............................................................. 151
Prepared statement........................................... 152
Dodd, Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut.............. 149
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 147
Mohamedi, Fareed, senior director, Country Strategies Group, PFC
Energy, Washington, DC......................................... 164
Prepared statement........................................... 165
Murkowski, Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska........................ 150
(iii)
IMPROVING SECURITY IN IRAQ
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MONDAY, JULY 18, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Alexander, and Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee is called to
order. Today the committee launches a series of four hearings
on Iraq. Each of these hearings will focus on one aspect of
Iraq policy. As the American people and policymakers debate our
course in Iraq, I believe the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee can contribute greatly by being a bipartisan forum
for advancing ideas to improve the situation. Our intent in
these hearings will be to go beyond describing conditions in
Iraq or assessing what is working and what is not. Our goal
will be to examine options for making things better.
With the help of our experts, we will consider whether
changes in military tactics, alliance strategy, resource
allocations, or other factors should be adopted. I am hopeful
that this process will inform our own policymaking role, as
well as help stimulate constructive public debate on forward-
looking alternatives.
Traditionally, Congress has looked to the executive branch
for foreign policy guidance and expertise. We should always
carefully consider the recommendations of the President of the
United States and his team, who are charged with implementing
foreign policy. But I believe that our oversight role involves
more than critiquing the President. Congress should also
examine ideas and express its own views on critical issues.
At the end of this four-hearing series, the Foreign
Relations Committee will have held 30 full committee hearings
on Iraq in the last 30 months of time. In addition, we have
held numerous other hearings that have partially touched on the
subject of Iraq. We have maintained this focus because success
in Iraq is critical to the United States national security.
Permanent instability in Iraq could set back American interests
in the Middle East for a generation, increasing anti-
Americanism, multiplying the threats from tyrants and
terrorists, and reducing our credibility.
We know that the planning for postwar Iraq was inadequate.
We should not pretend, however, that a few adjustments to our
reconstruction strategy or an extra month of planning could
have prevented all the challenges we now face in Iraq. Even in
the best circumstances, political and economic reconstruction
of Iraq after the overthrow of an entrenched and brutal regime
was going to stretch our capabilities, our resources, and our
patience to the limit. We are engaged in a difficult mission in
Iraq, and the President and the Congress must be clear with the
American people about the stakes involved and the difficulties
yet to come.
Almost 1,800 heroic Americans have died in Iraq during the
past 2 years. During the insurgency thousands of Iraqi Muslims
have been killed by other Muslims, including, most recently, a
group of small children deliberately targeted by a suicide
bomber. Like the recent terrorist attacks in London, the
continuing insurgent attacks in Iraq are tragic, senseless, and
often indiscriminate. Each day the Iraqi people are living with
the fear caused by similar irrational, barbaric acts, but they
continue to show their resilience. The Iraqi people get back on
the buses, and open their shops for business. They return to
their jobs as police officers, teachers, and doctors. They
continue to hope that life will become normal and that the
violence will end.
Today we take on the responsibility of examining options
for improving security in Iraq. Tomorrow we will address
options for advancing Iraqi political development. On Wednesday
we will turn our attention to the Iraqi economy. Finally, on a
date to be determined, we will assess the regional dynamics
related to the situation in Iraq as we ask questions about the
impact on Iraq of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
We have determined that these hearings will follow a unique
format. Discussion in each hearing will be organized around
four policy options for improving the situation in Iraq.
Accordingly, after Senator Biden and I have offered our opening
comments, instead of hearing comprehensive statements from the
witnesses, we will put the first policy option and associated
questions before our expert panel.
Just as a matter of housekeeping, I will read the question
and recognize one of the witnesses to commence his or her
answer to that question. Each witness in turn will provide his
or her views on the option being presented. Then we will put
the second option before them, then the third, then the fourth
and so on.
Recognizing that options exist beyond our published hearing
plan, we will ask our witnesses if they would like to offer any
additional ideas for improving security that have not been
discussed previously.
After this sequence, committee members will be recognized
in turn to address questions on any of the policy options to
any member of the panel. My hope is that through the expertise
of the witnesses, and the questions of the members, we can
achieve a systematic evaluation of the options presented for
improving Iraqi security. After the hearings, the committee
will publish a record of all the policy options we have
discussed.
This morning we will ask our experts whether the basic
counterinsurgency strategy that we are pursuing is the right
one. We will ask whether it is possible to prevent infiltration
of Iraq by foreign insurgents and whether it is feasible for
other nations to assume a greater share of our border security
burdens. We will ask how we can improve the critical process of
training Iraqi forces, so that greater numbers of Iraqis will
be capable of assuming the full range of security duties. We
will examine whether changes should be made to the current
United States force structure in Iraq.
In this endeavor, we are joined by three distinguished
experts. First, we welcome Dr. Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow
and Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy at The Brookings Institution. Dr. Pollack has provided
exceptional security analysis to this committee in the past,
and we are pleased that he has returned today.
We also welcome GEN Barry McCaffrey, President of BR
McCaffrey Associates. General McCaffrey, who has recently
returned from a trip to Iraq and Kuwait, served as a professor
at West Point after his distinguished military career, which
included experience across the Middle East.
Finally, we are pleased to welcome back Dr. Anthony
Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Cordesman
also has recently returned from a research visit to Iraq.
We thank our witnesses for joining us and we look forward
to their insights.
I would like to recognize now the distinguished ranking
chairman of our committee, Senator Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding these hearings. We have indeed had a number of
hearings examining ideas and new ideas and alternative ideas,
and we have jointly and separately drawn from those ideas and
made our own recommendations to the administration.
Quite frankly, not many have been listened to. One of my
frustrations I expressed to you--and I am sure you must feel
it, although I speak only for myself--as we began this hearing
is that there are no administration witnesses on the schedule
for this series of four hearings. I think that is important for
one significant reason. We all know no foreign policy can be
sustained, especially General McCaffrey, being in the field and
being wounded in Vietnam and leading troops in Vietnam, no
foreign policy can be sustained, no matter how well informed,
without the informed consent of the American people.
The American people--it is not a judgment on my part about
the policy. It is a judgment by the American people. The
American people clearly have begun to lose faith that we have a
sense of how to proceed in Iraq, that we have a strategy for
winning. I do not believe that it is the body counts, as tragic
as it is, that is causing the diminution of support for our
effort, but I think it is a failure to understand or believe we
have a winning strategy.
I compliment the President for having made his speech a
couple weeks ago now. But I think it is important the President
and the administration witnesses come before us in our
oversight capacity, not just to seek new ideas, but to
literally oversee the administration's policy and let us know
what their benchmarks are, what their objectives are, and how
they are proceeding, because I otherwise think we are going to
continue to lose the support of the American people unless
something dramatically changes on the ground, which could be, I
am hoping. I am always hopeful. Because I think we not only
want the President to succeed in Iraq; his success is America's
success and his failure means America has a problem.
I still--I am one who still believes, as I think we all do
up here, that we can succeed in Iraq. By ``success,'' I want to
redefine it here, or define it again, I should say. I am not
looking for Jeffersonian democracy. I never have been. I am
looking for a country that is secure within its own borders,
that is not a breeding ground or a haven for terror, that is
not a threat to its neighbors, where everybody thinks they have
a piece of the action. We will begin the process, which will be
long and arduous.
It has now been 6 weeks since I have returned from Iraq.
There are some good things that are happening. But the security
situation is still very, very much in doubt. With General
Petraeus' efforts, some very positive things are happening, but
I believe General Abizaid, in his recent assessment, is correct
that the insurgency's strength is about the same as it was 6
months ago, not in its last throes.
Iraqi forces are gradually improving. I wish we would stop
talking about 172,000 trained Iraqi forces. They are in
uniform, but all of the folks I spoke to on the ground were a
long, long way. What it does in my view is undermine the
administration's credibility with the American people. If we
have 172,000 trained Iraqi troops and 130,000 American, 140,000
American troops, they ask me in my district why, with over
300,000 troops, are we not doing better? You know, it is a
problem. They know we ain't telling the truth.
Since a month ago, we have been in contact with General
Petraeus. Things are even improving beyond what it was 5 weeks
ago.
There has been some progress with the Sunnis. It seems to
me that we have turned a political corner of sorts and that
they have realized they have to get in the game. But that is a
long way from being able to actually have a political strategy
that is likely to work.
The thing that I have found--and I am anxious to hear our
witnesses--I found when I spoke to our military folks for the
first time they were talking about, not the probability, but
the possibility of a civil war. They were talking about things
breaking down, not getting better. Now again, I do not want to
exaggerate it. It is just that it is my fifth trip--I went a
couple times with my colleagues on my left--and this is the
first time I started hearing about that.
I came back--and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman--and
spent a lot of time with a lot of people, including one of the
witnesses. I have tried to, like you do, we all do on this
committee--one of the great, great benefits and privileges of
this committee is the best minds in the country will come and
talk to you and sit down with you and visit with you. I went
visiting on a regular basis with half a dozen--it's a rotating
group, but essentially the same half a dozen of three- and
four-stars who have in the past, like General McCaffrey, had
significant responsibilities, including CENTCOM as well as
NATO.
Everybody I spoke to in the field, and spoke to back here,
talks about something that is different than I think we are
going to hear today, that is encouraging--we may hear something
different--about what constitutes a counterinsurgency, that,
really, it is hard to figure out what our counterinsurgency
plan is. Again, these guys--they happen to be all men in this
case. I told General McCaffrey this. Folks are talking about
you cannot deal with a counterinsurgency unless you can occupy,
at least for a while, the territory and you can not do a whole
lot if the border is totally porous, and I understand we are
going to hear today that maybe there is not a reasonable
prospect of being able to do anything about the border.
At any rate, I am anxious to hear what the witnesses have
to say. I have an inordinately high regard for all three of the
witnesses and I think the way you are proceeding is a really
very good format for us to use, targeting what, at least, is on
our mind. It may be that the witnesses will conclude not all of
it is relevant, what we are asking. But at least they will tell
us.
I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be placed,
the remainder of my statement be placed in the record as if
read, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, too, welcome our witnesses. This is a
superb panel. And I applaud the other hearings you've held to explore
policy options in Iraq.
I am frustrated, though, that none of the witnesses before us
today, or scheduled in the days ahead, work for the administration.
I have said from the outset and repeat today: No foreign policy can
be sustained without the informed consent of the American people.
The American people have not been informed about the reality on the
ground and the very difficult challenges that lie ahead. They do not
believe we have a coherent, realistic plan for success. And the gap
between the administration's rhetoric and the reality on the ground has
created a credibility chasm that is endangering public support for our
efforts in Iraq.
I give the President credit for starting to level with the American
people in his recent speech. But to fully regain their trust and
support, I believe it is very important for the administration to set
clear benchmarks for progress and to report on them to us, in public,
on a regular basis.
I want the President to succeed in Iraq. His success is America's
success; his failure means America has a problem.
I believe we can still succeed in Iraq. I define success as leaving
Iraq better than we found it. Not a Jeffersonian democracy, but a
country with a representative government in which all the major
communities have a stake; a country that is not a breeding ground or a
haven for terrorists; and a country that is not a threat to us or its
neighbors. Full stop.
Based on my recent trip to Iraq--my fifth trip there--I believe we
need to change course, not simply stay the course, if we are to
succeed.
There are some positive developments. But the security environment
in Iraq remains precarious. I found considerable evidence to support
General Abizaid's recent assessment that the insurgency's strength is
about the same as it was 6 months ago.
The Iraqi security forces are very gradually improving thanks to
the leadership of General Petreaus.
But let's not kid ourselves when we hear reports of 172,000
``trained and equipped'' Iraqis. When my constituents in Delaware hear
numbers like that, they ask why we still have 139,000 American troops
in Iraq. The answer is because very few of those forces are trained to
the only standard that counts--the ability to operate independently,
without our support.
A month ago, just a handful of the more than 100 Army battalions
met that standard, while many more could operate alongside the
coalition or with strong backup.
The January elections were a remarkable achievement, but the
goverment in Baghdad has very limited capacity and reach beyond the
green zone. This has created a power vacuum that is being filled by
Sunni insurgents, foreign fighters, local militias, mafia gangs, and
agents of neighbors like Syria and Iran.
Ethnic tension is rising to the point where civil war, though not
yet a probability, is a real possibility.
In the absence of security and governing capacity, reconstruction
cannot go forward. Iraqis will not put their faith in the government,
and we will not be able to withdraw responsibly.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' ideas on meeting the
security challenge. Here is what I believe we must do:
First, we must take advantage of foreign offers to train Iraqi
forces outside Iraq. Iraqi recruits could then focus their energy on
learning instead of simply staying alive.
Second, we should accelerate the training of an Iraqi officer
corps. That is one of the keys to standing up an Iraqi military that
won't melt when it comes under fire. We should train large numbers of
midranking Iraqi officers here in the United States and encourage NATO
allies to do more of the same in their countries.
Third, we should press our NATO allies to come up with a small
force of some 3-5,000 to help guard Iraq's borders. NATO has the plans
for such a mission; the President needs to lead to give the alliance
the political will to implement those plans.
Fourth, we need a serious field mentoring program for newly trained
Iraqi police recruits. It is wrong to throw freshly minted and ill-
equipped police officers against suicidal insurgents and desperate
criminals. They must be partnered with experienced officers--initially
international police professionals and ultimately Iraqis.
Fifth, we must refocus the Iraqi Government on a plan to eventually
integrate militias in Iraq. Integration won't be easy. But without it,
you cannot build a unitary, functioning state.
Mr. Chairman, security is about much more than having competent
security forces. Real security depends on a political process in which
all the major communities believe they have a stake. It requires a
reconstruction program that increases electricity, clean water, sewage
treatment, and jobs in a country where unemployment is estimated at
more than 40 to 50 percent. We will hear more about that in the days
ahead.
I look forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. Your statement will be placed in the record
in full. I thank the distinguished ranking member.
Senator Biden. I welcome the witnesses and thank them for
being here.
The Chairman. We will proceed now with the witnesses. Let
me state the first option for comment by our witnesses. In this
case I will ask Dr. Pollack to comment first, then General
McCaffrey and Dr. Cordesman. Option one is: Should the
coalition revise its current counterinsurgency strategy in
Iraq? To follow up to that: Should the coalition and Iraq
security forces create safe zones and put more emphasis on
fighting street crime and organized crime, deemphasizing the
hunt for insurgents, so that Iraqi economic and political life
can take root? Should the coalition attempt to take advantage
of divisions within the insurgents, for example Sunni
nationalists versus foreign jihadists? Can a political solution
be reached with Sunni insurgents and could this lead to Sunni
cooperation in isolating, capturing, or killing the
international insurgents?
Would you proceed with your thoughts on this area, Dr.
Pollack?
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND
SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator
Biden, other assembled Senators. Thank you for giving me this
opportunity to come before you to speak on this critical topic.
As you have all repeatedly pointed out and I think very
correctly, security undergirds the entire reconstruction of
Iraq. Our problems with security are hampering, if not
crippling, both the political, economic, and social development
of the country. I increasingly believe that we have the wrong
strategy in Iraq.
Ultimately, with security there are two overarching and
interlocking problems that we face in Iraq. The first is a
diverse insurgency, but one rooted on the Sunni tribal
community with an admixture of other elements. The second is
the state of semilawlessness that exists elsewhere and
throughout the country as a result of the security vacuum that
we have left throughout much of the country.
Our current strategy is one that I would describe as being
one of postconflict stabilization, and its principal goal is to
try to enforce security simultaneously across the entire
country, largely by concentrating the available coalition
forces, and primarily American forces, on those areas of
greatest insurgent activity to try to quell them quickly and
prevent them from spreading.
This approach has several problems because of these two
interlocking and overarching problems that we face. First of
all, it plays into the classic failure of counterinsurgency
operations, when in particular you do not use a true
counterinsurgency strategy. The government forces, in this case
the coalition forces, move into an area, they take down an
insurgent stronghold, but, of course, the insurgents do not
stay to fight. It is not in their nature to do so. It is not
their objective to do so. They flee. They melt back into the
population and, as a result, the major conventional assault has
little impact on the actual strength of the insurgents.
The insurgents then move on into other areas, and when our
own forces, when the coalition forces, then shift on to follow
them to their new strongholds, we often leave too few forces
behind to secure the area that we have just taken down. The
result is that we continuously chase insurgents across the
country, we have little impact on their actual strength or even
their ability to operate, and we continuously allow the
insurgents to creep back into areas that we have already had to
pacify.
The second problem is that by pulling our troops out of the
populated areas, by focusing them, I would say inordinately, on
hunting down the insurgents in their strongholds and in their
lairs, we have left far too few troops in the rest of the
country to secure the vast bulk of the Iraqi population,
particularly the Shi'a and the urban Sunnis, who desperately
want reconstruction to succeed, but are increasingly distraught
by our failure to provide them with basic security both against
the insurgents and against typical crime, organized and
unorganized, and to provide them with the basic services, like
electricity and clean water and sanitation and gasoline and
jobs, all of which are crippled by these first two security
problems, by the problems of the insurgency and by the general
lawlessness in the society.
In addition, even where our troops are trying to guard the
population, oftentimes our methods are counterproductive. We
have placed a tremendous emphasis on force protection, on the
protection of our own forces. While obviously force protection
has got to be a major concern of United States and coalition
forces, we have at times put that priority at the expense of
the Iraqis' own security.
Our troops stay in heavily defended cantonments. When they
get out, they typically get out in motorized columns that move
very quickly through Iraqi areas. There is very little
presence. There is very little patrolling. There is very little
sense of real security provided by our troops for the Iraqi
people themselves.
As a result, Iraqis are increasingly frustrated because 2
years on they do not see any real benefits from our continued
occupation of the country, and they have come to resent our
occupation, not because they want us to leave, not because they
do not want us there, but because they do not see us as
providing them with the first benefits of reconstruction, basic
security, and basic services.
What I argue that the United States ought to adopt and what
I increasingly hear from field-grade officers, American field-
grade officers in Iraq and back here in the United States, is a
true counterinsurgency strategy. Very briefly, very broadly,
what would a counterinsurgency strategy look like for Iraq? It
would be based on the classic model of a counterinsurgency
strategy, which is typically referred to as a spreading inkspot
or a spreading oil stain.
The idea would be to start with a smaller area, do not try
to secure the entire country simultaneously, because frankly we
do not have the forces in place to do so. Instead, we would
start by securing a smaller portion of the country, one where
the population would be already supportive of reconstruction.
Of course, there are huge swaths of Iraq where the vast bulk of
the population is enormously supportive of reconstruction and
their anger at us is not because we are there, but because we
are not there and not providing them with the security and the
services they so desperately desire.
We would concentrate our forces principally in that area or
in those areas to make them safe for the Iraqis, to make them
safe for Iraqi life to revive, for the Iraqi economy to revive,
for Iraqi political affairs to revive at the local level. We
would use foot patrols, a general presence, and an emphasis on
law and order in these safe zones.
We would then pour in economic resources into these safe
zones to give the Iraqis tangible material benefits from our
presence. We would help them to help their economy to revive.
We would help them to rebuild their political processes at the
local level and they would do so in an environment made safe by
the coalition presence there.
This process of pouring in resources, combined with the
general greater safety, would create much greater popular
support for our presence and would ultimately--and historically
this has been the only solution to the problem--would solve the
intelligence problem that we face in Iraq. The problem is you
can never find all the intelligence you need if what you are
doing is simply chasing insurgents. As the British learned in
Northern Ireland and again in Malaya, as we learned in Bosnia
and Kosovo, the only way that you get the intelligence that you
need is by convincing the people that they are safe and that
they are benefiting from your presence. Under those
circumstances, the people come forward with all of the
intelligence that you need and it becomes extraordinarily
difficult for the insurgents to operate.
We would also use these safe areas, these secure zones, to
train indigenous Iraqi forces, both formal training, the kind
of training that we have been doing in Iraq, but also informal
training, the training that takes place after a unit has
finished its basic training, its basic training cycle, but
still needs to have unit cohesion, command relationships, and a
sense of connection with the community all gel, all of which
can only happen in actual operations in safe areas where there
is a permissive environment in which these units can cut their
teeth and not be stressed by high-intensity operations.
The success of the secured areas should make other Iraqis,
those outside the secured areas, more desirous of having us
expand our presence, and as the number of indigenous forces
that we train came on line and actually developed capability
grew we would then use that expanded security presence to
spread into other areas of Iraq as well. This is why this
strategy is typically called, traditionally called, a spreading
inkspot strategy.
In so doing, the goal of this would be to deprive
insurgents of a popular base and, in so doing, cause them to
wither. This again is the classic model of counterinsurgent
operations. It is how insurgencies have been typically defeated
in the past and it is typically only when a government force
has failed to employ this kind of strategy that they have
failed, that is, failed to defeat the insurgency.
It has a proven track record and, what is more, we have
seen instances in Iraq where this strategy has been made to
work. Wherever we have taken the time to put our people on the
street, establish presence, mix with the Iraqis, establish
mixed forces where the Iraqis are working with Americans, so
that the Iraqis see both an American face and an Iraqi face to
the presence, it has worked.
Before the January elections we did this in cities like
Mosul. We sent out foot patrols, and the Iraqis were stunned,
and during that period of time security greatly increased in
those cities where we did it.
Fallujah is, in some ways, another good example. Fallujah,
I would say, is an example of both the good and the bad. We
took down Fallujah, we chased out the insurgents.
Unfortunately, they moved to other areas and, as we have seen,
there has been no actual diminution of the lethality or the
extent of the insurgency.
We did leave some forces behind in Fallujah. We left the
Marines behind, who actually have a very good record in
counterinsurgency operations, and to some extent Fallujah is
better than it was before we took it down because we did leave
a residual presence, and we have tried to put some economic
resources in to take advantage of that somewhat better security
environment.
But we failed to put in enough troops and we have failed to
make good on all of the economic commitments to Fallujah, and
as a result the insurgents are creeping back, and I know that
General McCaffrey will tell you more about the fact that
Fallujah is, as yet, nothing to write home about.
Mr. Chairman, I think that there is a strategy that can
work in Iraq. It is the strategy that I have just outlined and
which I have gone into much greater detail in my written
testimony. But I think that we need to recognize that it is not
a strategy without a price. Politically, it will be very
difficult. It will take a long time, at least the decade-plus
that Secretary Rumsfeld outlined, and it is one that will
require us to admit to having made some mistakes and to force
us to actually shift, very significantly, our approach to
reconstruction in Iraq--very painful political choices.
I think if we are willing to do that, I think there is a
way out of this. I think that success is entirely possible in
Iraq, because so much of the population wants reconstruction to
succeed. But I think it is incumbent upon us to adopt a true
counterinsurgency strategy to deal with the twin problems of a
full-blown insurgency and the state of semilawlessness that we
have continued to allow the country to wallow in.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research and
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, thank you for allowing me to come
before you to discuss the future of Iraq, and particularly our efforts
to secure that country to make reconstruction possible. As you have
both repeatedly reminded us, the reconstruction of Iraq is a vital
interest of the United States, just as it is vital to the people of
Iraq. As we all know, and have repeatedly had reinforced to us,
security is absolutely critical to the broader reconstruction effort.
Without security, reconstruction will fail. And until we have dealt
with the pressing problems of security, it will be impossible for us to
perceive, let alone solve, many of the other matters troubling Iraq. If
we get security right, everything is possible, although nothing is
guaranteed.
I have confined my remarks to the four options you have outlined. I
will begin with your first option, and address each in turn.
Option 1: Should the coalition revise its current counterinsurgency
strategy in Iraq?
Mr. Chairman, I believe that after 2 years of trying to secure Iraq
with our current strategy, it is becoming increasingly clear that we
have the wrong strategy for the job. Our current approach probably was
the appropriate strategy in the immediate aftermath of the fall of
Baghdad, but the inadequate number of troops we brought to Iraq and a
series of other mistakes rendered this approach largely infeasible.
Today, our problems have metastasized, and I believe that we must
fundamentally change our strategy to cope with the new challenges we
face.
Our effort to secure Iraq faces two overarching and interlocking
problems: A full-blown insurgency and a continuing state of semi-
lawlessness. Both are equally important. Reconstruction will likely
fail if either is unaddressed. I believe that current U.S. strategy in
Iraq is misguided because it is not properly tailored to defeat the
first problem and largely ignores the second.
Today, and since the fall of Baghdad, the United States has
employed what I would call a ``post-conflict stabilization'' model of
security operations. The key element of this strategy is providing
simultaneous security for the entire country by concentrating coalition
forces on those areas of greatest unrest to try to quell the violence
quickly and keep it from spreading. Had the United States brought
sufficient ground forces to blanket the country immediately after the
fall of Saddam's regime--as many warned--and had we not made a series
of other mistakes, like failing to provide our troops with orders to
maintain law and order, to impose martial law and prevent looting, I
think this strategy might very well have succeeded.
However, our continued reliance on this approach is failing. To
borrow a military term usually employed in a different realm of
operations, today we are reinforcing failure. By continuing to
concentrate our overstretched forces on the areas of greatest insurgent
activity we are depriving most of Iraq's populated areas of desperately
needed security forces, and by emphasizing offensive search-and-sweep
missions, we are making ever more enemies among Iraq's Sunni tribal
population. In other words, we are failing to protect those Iraqis who
most want reconstruction to succeed and we are further antagonizing the
community that is most antipathetic to our goals.
This approach runs directly contrary to the principal lessons of
counterinsurgent warfare.
In 1986, Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, then a major in the Army,
published what is widely regarded as the seminal work on American
military performance in Vietnam, titled ``The Army and Vietnam.'' In
this book, Krepinevich demonstrated that the Army high command--for
reasons entirely of its own choosing--largely refused to employ a
traditional counterinsurgency strategy against the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army Forces. The Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)
repeatedly shut down other efforts, by the Marines and by Army Special
Forces, to employ a traditional counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.
Krepinevich further demonstrated that these stillborn COIN campaigns
had all proven far more successful before they were terminated than
MACV's cherished offensive operations.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know why it is that the United States has
not yet adopted a traditional counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. I
suspect that it is for reasons far more mundane and far better
intentioned than MACV's rationale was in that earlier war, because I
know General Abizaid to be a superb soldier and a wise commander.
However, whatever the rationale, it is clear that the United States has
so far failed to employ a traditional counterinsurgency strategy in
Iraq, just as we did in Vietnam, and as a result we are failing in Iraq
just as we failed in Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, if you were to pick up a copy of Dr. Krepinevich's
book, you would find, I think, a great many chilling passages. Passages
where Krepinevich explains how history has demonstrated that a
guerrilla campaign can be defeated, and how the United States failed to
employ such a strategy in Vietnam. These passages are unsettling
precisely because they so closely echo our problems and mistakes in
Iraq today. We are once again failing to use a true COIN strategy in
Iraq, and committing too many of the very same errors we made in
Vietnam.
The crux of a traditional counterinsurgency strategy is never to
reinforce failure, but always to reinforce success. As Mao Zedong once
wrote, the guerrilla is like a fish who swims in the sea of the
people--thus, if you can deprive the guerrilla of support from the
people, he will be as helpless as a fish out of water.
The goal of a true-COIN campaign is to deprive the guerrilla of
that access. The COIN force begins by securing a base of operations by
denying one portion of the country to the insurgency. This portion can
be as big or as small as the COIN force can handle--the bigger the COIN
force available, the larger the area. Within this area, the COIN force
provides the people with security, in all senses of the word. In Iraq,
this would mean security from insurgent attack as well as from ordinary
(and organized) crime. In so doing, the COIN force creates a secure
space in which political and economic life can flourish once again.
Ideally, the COIN force would pour resources into this area to make it
economically dynamic and take advantage of the security the COIN
campaign has provided, both to cement popular support for the COIN
campaign and to make it attractive to people living outside the secure
area so that they will support the COIN campaign when it shifts to
their region.
The increasing attractiveness of these safe areas also solve the
intelligence problem that COIN forces inevitably face. Ultimately,
there is no way that a COIN force can gather enough intelligence on
insurgent forces through traditional means to exterminate them.
Instead, as the British learned in Northern Ireland, the only way to
gather adequate information on the insurgents is to convince the local
populace to volunteer such information, which they will do only if they
are enthusiastic supporters of the COIN campaign and feel largely safe
from retaliation by the insurgents. When these conditions are met, the
counterinsurgents enjoy a massive advantage in intelligence making the
further eradication of the insurgents easy, and almost an afterthought.
In addition, the COIN forces use these ``safe zones'' to train
indigenous forces who can assist them in subsequent security
operations. Once this base of operations is truly secure and can be
maintained by local indigenous forces, the COIN forces then spread
their control to additional parts of the country, performing the same
set of steps as they did in the original area.
Dr. Krepinevich describes this set of interlocking features as
follows:
After the army has driven off or killed the main guerrilla
forces, its units must remain in the area while local
paramilitary forces are created and the influence of the police
force is reestablished. The paramilitary forces should be drawn
from among the inhabitants of the area and trained in
counterinsurgency operations such as small-unit patrolling,
night operations, and the ambush. Resurrection of the local
police force is equally important. Properly trained, the police
can make an invaluable contribution to the defeat of the
insurgents by weeding out the political infrastructure, thus
preventing the reemergence of the insurgent movement once the
army departs.
Thus, if the paramilitary forces can perform the local
security mission, and if the police can extinguish the embers
of the insurgent movement through suppression of its
infrastructure, the people will begin to feel secure enough to
provide these forces with information on the movements of local
guerrilla forces and on the individuals who make up the cells
of the insurgent movement. But before any of this can occur, it
is necessary for the government's main-force army units to
demonstrate that they will remain in the newly cleared area
until such time as the people are capable of assuming the bulk
of the responsibility for their own defense. Should the army
depart the area before the paramilitary units and the police
force are capable of effective operation, it will have
accomplished nothing. The insurgent infrastructure will quickly
reemerge from hiding, and the guerrillas will return to
reassert their control. The temporary control reestablished by
the government must be followed by the implementation of
measures designed to achieve permanent control. Thus, the
counterinsurgent must direct his efforts, not toward seeking
combat with the insurgent's guerrilla forces, but at the
insurgent political infrastructure, which is the foundation of
successful insurgency warfare. Keep the guerrilla bands at
arm's length from the people and destroy their eyes and ears--
the infrastructure--and you can win.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., ``The Army and Vietnam''
(Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 13-14.
This approach is typically referred to either as a ``spreading ink
spot'' or a ``spreading oil stain'' because the COIN forces slowly
spread their control over the country, depriving the guerrillas of
support piece by piece until, in Krepinevich's words, ``Once the
security of the population and its attendant resources is accomplished,
the initiative in the war will pass from the insurgent to the
government. The insurgent will either have to fight to maintain control
of the people or see his capabilities diminish. If the insurgents
decide to fight, they will present themselves as targets for the
government mobile reaction forces.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key, as Krepinevich and every other expert on counterinsurgency
operations observes, is to start by securing the population and
providing them with material incentives, in the form of real security
and a thriving economy, that will cause them to reject the insurgency
and support the COIN campaign. This is why a COIN strategy is best
understood as a strategy of reinforcing success, because the
counterinsurgents concentrate their forces where their support is
strongest, and where they therefore can do the most good.
Instead, the approach we are employing in Iraq--concentrating our
forces in Iraq's western provinces where the insurgents are thickest
and support for reconstruction weakest--means reinforcing failure. Such
an approach has repeatedly resulted in failures in guerrilla warfare
throughout history. Our efforts to ``take the fight to the enemy'' and
mount offensive sweep operations designed to kill insurgents and
eliminate their strongholds have failed to even dent the insurgency so
far, and likely will continue to do so, as was the case in Vietnam and
other lost guerrilla wars. Here is Dr. Krepinevich on the false promise
of hunting guerrillas:
Should government forces attempt to defeat the insurgency
through the destruction of guerrilla forces in quasi-
conventional battles, they will play into the hands of the
insurgent forces. Insurgent casualties suffered under these
circumstances will rarely be debilitating for the insurgents.
First, the insurgents have no need to engage the government
forces--they are not fighting to hold territory. Second, as
long as the government forces are out seeking battle with the
guerrilla units, the insurgents are not forced to maintain
access to the people. Therefore, the initiative remains with
the guerrillas--they can ``set'' their own level of casualties
(probably just enough to keep the government forces out seeking
the elusive big battles), thus rendering ineffective all
efforts by the counterinsurgent to win a traditional military
victory.
As a result of these circumstances, the conventional forces
of the government's army must be reoriented away from
destroying enemy forces toward asserting government control
over the population and winning its support. Government forces
should be organized primarily around light infantry units,
particularly in phases 1 and 2 of the insurgency. These forces
must be ground-mobile in order to patrol intensively in and
around populated areas, keeping guerrilla bands off guard and
away from the people. The counterinsurgent must eliminate the
tendency fostered by conventional doctrine, to cluster his
forces in large units. Only when the insurgency moves into
phase 3 will the need for substantial numbers of main-force
conventional units arise.
Winning the hearts and minds of the people is as desirable
for the government as it is for the insurgent. This objective
can only be realized, however, after control of the population
is effected and their security provided for. Developing popular
support often involves political participation--at least on the
local level; public works--irrigation ditches, dams, wells; and
social reform--land reform, religious toleration, access to
schools. These actions are designed to preempt the insurgent's
cause, as, for example, land reform in the Philippines during
the Huk rebellion . . . Nevertheless, even though the attempts
to co-opt the insurgents may prove successful in winning the
hearts of the people, they will be for naught unless the
government provides the security necessary to free the people
from the fear of insurgent retribution should they openly
support the government.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid, pp. 11-12. [Emphasis in original].
Against a full-blown insurgency, such as we are facing in Iraq,
offensive operations cannot succeed and are ultimately
counterproductive. The guerrilla does not need to stand and fight but
can run or melt back into the population and so avoid crippling losses.
If the COIN forces do not remain and pacify the area for the long term,
the guerrillas will be back within weeks, months, or maybe years, but
they will be back nonetheless. Meanwhile, the concentration of forces
on these sweep operations means a major diversion of effort away from
securing the population. In Iraq, this has left the vast bulk of the
population largely unprotected both against insurgent attacks and
normal crime--organized and unorganized.
Moreover, the tactics of our offensive operations have contributed
to the alienation of the Sunni tribal community, driving many otherwise
agnostic Iraqis into the arms of the insurgents. Many American units
continue to see the targets of their raids as enemies and treat them as
such--invariably turning them and their neighbors into enemies
regardless of their feelings beforehand. Often, the priority American
formations place on force protection comes at the expense of the larger
mission--the safety, psychological disposition, and dignity of Iraqis.
Busting down doors, ordering families down on the floor, holding them
down with the sole of a boot, searching women in the presence of men,
waiving around weapons, ransacking rooms or whole houses, and
confiscating weapons all come with a price. Because too much of the
intelligence that the United States is relying on is poor, it is not a
rare occurrence that houses raided turn out to be innocuous. In some
cases, the wanted personnel may have been there at some point and fled,
but in others no one in the house was guilty at all. Indeed, too often,
U.S. Forces are directed to raid a house or arrest a person by someone
else who simply has a grudge against them and turns them in to the
Americans as an insurgent to settle a personal score.
An example of both the potential of true counterinsurgency
operations and the danger of refusing to employ them can be found in
the experience of the Iraqi town of Fallujah. Until the fall of 2004,
Fallujah was a major insurgent stronghold. The town was then taken by
U.S. Forces in a full-scale conventional assault in which, American
commanders touted as major victories both the number of insurgents
killed and the psychological gains of taking this stronghold from the
enemy. However, within just a few months, the insurgents had reemerged
with no noticeable impact on their operations or lethality. On the
other hand, unlike many other towns in the Sunni triangle, a fair
number of American and Iraqi Forces remained in Fallujah after the
assault, providing it with greater security than in most neighboring
towns, but not as much as was the case immediately after the assault
when large numbers of American ground troops were present. Likewise,
the United States and the Iraqis did begin to pump resources into the
city, and reached out to local shaykhs to try to form a new political
process, and to give local residents an incentive to participate in the
national political process. As a result, Fallujah has been a modest
success story. However, because promised funds have not been
forthcoming, because the Marines in Fallujah are spread thinly and the
Iraqi Forces are not indigenous--and are often Shi'a--the insurgency
has begun to make a come back in Fallujah.
Thus Fallujah demonstrates what a successful approach might look
like, but only if it is handled properly. And unfortunately, Fallujah
is more the exception than the rule. Elsewhere in Iraq, U.S. Forces
clear the areas without staying in force, without leaving behind
indigenous security forces willing and able to secure the area, and so
without leaving the kind of security environment that would make it
possible to try to revive either the local economy or the local
political process.
Southern Iraq and the persistent popularity of Muqtada as-Sadr--and
other, similar figures--is another example of the problems created by
our current security strategy. The predominantly Shi'i southeast of
Iraq is overwhelmingly supportive of reconstruction, yet we find
growing frustration with reconstruction, the United States, and the
transitional Iraqi Government throughout that community. Why? Because
the people are still plagued by organized and random crime, which makes
their economic life difficult, keeps unemployment high and incomes low,
contributes to frequent power outages and gasoline shortages, and
prevents the restoration of clean water and sanitation, among other
problems. This frustration, allowed to fester over time, is driving
Iraqis into the arms of the Muqtada as-Sadr's of Iraq, whose message is
a simple one: The Americans are either unwilling or unable to provide
you with the basic necessities of life, but we can. They employ the
model that Hizballah and Hamas have used to such success, providing
tangible, material benefits in return for support. This is exactly what
Muqtada as-Sadr provides the residents of Sadr City and what other
shaykhs, alims, and other would-be potentates provide other Iraqis in
different parts of the country.
This is a disastrous course that could push Iraq into fragmentation
and civil war. It is already convincing any number of groups--and not
just the Kurds--that they should pursue autonomy from the central
government, which is increasingly seen as out of touch, corrupt, and
wholly focused on its own (irrelevant) squabbles over power.
Mr. Chairman, this analysis leads me to the conclusion that the
United States must dramatically reorient our strategy for securing
Iraq. We must adopt a true counterinsurgency strategy, of the
traditional ``spreading oil stain'' variety. We must simultaneously
recognize that even if we do so, securing Iraq is going to take a very
long time. In this respect, I was heartened to hear Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld acknowledge that success in Iraq would likely require
over a decade. He is surely right, but he is only likely to be right if
the United States adopts the right strategy to do so.
Painted in broad brush strokes, a true counterinsurgency strategy
for Iraq would focus on securing enclaves--Kurdistan, much of
southeastern Iraq, Baghdad, and a number of other major urban centers,
along with the oilfields and some other vital economic facilities--
while, initially, leaving much of the countryside to the insurgents.
The coalition would consolidate its security forces within those
enclaves, thereby greatly improving the ratio of security personnel to
civilians, and allowing a major effort to secure these enclaves to
allow local economic and political development at a microlevel. The
coalition would likewise redirect its political efforts and economic
resources solely into the secured enclaves--both to ensure that they
prosper and because those would be the only areas where it would be
worth investing in the short run. Such a strategy might, therefore,
mean foregoing such things as national elections or rebuilding the
entire power grid, because they might be impossible in a situation
where the coalition forces had abdicated control over large areas of
the country.
The concentrated security focus should allow local economic and
political developments to make meaningful progress, which in turn
should turn around public opinion within the enclaves--making the
Iraqis living in the enclaves more willing to support the
reconstruction effort and, hopefully, making those Iraqis outside the
enclaves more desirous of experiencing the same benefits.
Once these enclaves were secured, and as additional Iraqi security
forces were trained or foreign forces brought in, they would be slowly
expanded to include additional communities--hence the metaphor of the
spreading oil stain. In every case, the coalition would focus the same
security, political, and economic resources on each new community
brought into the pacified zone. If implemented properly, a true
counterinsurgency approach can succeed in winning back the entire
country. However, it means ceding control over swathes of it at first
and taking some time before Iraq will be seen as a stable, unified,
pluralist state. Nevertheless, it may be the only option open to us if,
as is the case at present, the U.S.-led coalition cannot control large
parts of the country and cannot keep the peace in those areas where it
does operate.
At a more tactical level, a true COIN campaign in Iraq would make
securing the Iraqi people its highest priority. American Forces in
Iraq, unfortunately remain preoccupied with force protection and with
tracking down the insurgents who are attacking them, and as a result
they are providing little security to the Iraqi people. U.S. Forces
generally remain penned up in formidable cantonments. They are cut off
from the populace and have little interaction with them. In the field,
they come out to attend to logistical needs and to conduct raids
against suspected insurgents. In the cities, they generally come out
only to make infrequent patrols--which are virtually always conducted
mounted in Bradley fighting vehicles or HMMWVs--the ubiquitous
``Humvees'' or ``Hummers''--at speeds of 30-50 kms per hour. Indeed,
prior to the January elections, American Forces did--temporarily--
engage in foot patrols in cities like Mosul and the result was an
immediate, but equally temporary, increase in morale and support for
the U.S. presence.
It is a constant--and fully justified--complaint of Iraqis that the
Americans have no presence and make no effort to stop street crime or
the attacks on them by the insurgents. Many British officers, and some
Americans, too, argue that the United States should instead be
employing the kind of foot patrols backed by helicopters and/or
vehicles that the British Army learned to use in Northern Ireland, and
that all NATO Forces eventually employed in the Balkans. This is the
only way that American Forces can get out, reassure the Iraqi
civilians, find out from them where the troublemakers are, and respond
to their problems.
Adopting a true counterinsurgency strategy, coupled with its
attendant tactics such as guarding population centers and key
infrastructure, foot patrols, presence, and the eradication of crime
and attacks on Iraqis would doubtless expose U.S. personnel to greater
risks. However, they are absolutely necessary if reconstruction is to
succeed in Iraq. There is no question that force protection must always
be an issue of concern to any American commander, but it cannot be the
determining principle of U.S. operations. American military forces are
in Iraq because the reconstruction of that country is critical to the
stability of the Persian Gulf and a vital interest of the United
States. In their current mode of operations, our troops are neither
safe nor are they accomplishing their most important mission.
Consequently, executing that mission must become the highest concern of
U.S. military commanders, and their current strategy--focusing on force
protection and offensive operations against the insurgents--is
misguided. If it does not change, the reconstruction may fail outright
and all of the sacrifices of the American people and our service men
and women will have been for nothing.
Option 2: Could the United States successfully press its allies to
increase aid and provide manpower to protect Iraq's borders and prevent
foreign infiltration?
Mr. Chairman, at some level the answer to this second question is
undoubtedly, ``yes,'' but I do not see it as an ``option'' that would
solve our problems in Iraq. At best, it might help ameliorate our
current problems, but no more.
Given how little Iraq's neighbors seem to be doing to arrest the
steady flow of Salafi jihadists, Sunni tribesmen, and others into the
country, it is unexceptionable to suggest that they could not be doing
more than they currently are.
Syria is the country that we have focused our attention on,
although it is hardly the case that they are the only problem, or
probably even the major source of the problem. Many U.S. and foreign
intelligence analysts believe that far more foreign fighters are
infiltrating into Iraq through Saudi Arabia. I have little faith in
technical fixes to the problem of infiltration across the long Syrian
border, simply because it is so long and long borders are notoriously
difficult to seal--our own problems with Mexico being an obvious case
in point. Many Sunni tribes span the Iraq-Syria border and there is
considerable trade.
Certainly, a political solution might persuade the Syrians to do
more to police the border, but our expectations should remain modest
here as well. Should we wish to try, I see only a policy of real
carrots and real sticks as having any real likelihood of success. The
Syrians need to have positive incentives to cooperate and see real
threats if they do not. However, we must keep our hopes for such a
policy in check. Syria's handling of its border is part of the larger
issue of Syrian relations with the United States that remains very much
undecided in Syria right now. Indeed, it may be necessary to craft a
much broader set of carrots and sticks with Syria designed to get at
the whole range of United States-Syrian differences if we are to have
any real prospect of success. The Syrian regime is deeply divided over
its course, particularly with regard to its relations with the United
States. Until Damascus decides what kind of country it wants to rule,
and what its relationship to the region and the world should be, it is
unlikely to make major changes on any piece of its foreign policy,
especially as one as tightly bound to that broader set of issues as its
relationship with Iraq.
Consequently, tackling infiltration across the Syrian border may
require a new American policy to Syria, and the Syrians revamping their
own broad foreign policy goals. Neither seems likely in the short term.
With regard to infiltration across the Iranian border, the news is
both worse and better. Worse because all of the problems related to
Syria--a long border, intermingled populations spanning it, a
government divided over its relations with Iraq and the United States,
and an inability to isolate its Iraq policy from the overarching
question of what kind of country it wants to be--all go double for
Iran. The situation is better, however, because Iran is not the problem
when it comes to the Iraqi insurgency. The insurgency is overwhelmingly
Sunni and while not everything that Iran is doing in Iraq is helpful to
us, they are not providing any significant degree of assistance to the
Salafi Jihadists, Sunni tribesmen, former regime officials, and various
other groups who comprise the bulk of the insurgency.
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey are all staunch United
States allies and it is likely that more could be accomplished with
them, but also not without a price. All four of these countries is wary
of American intentions in Iraq, and fearful that whatever our
intentions may be, we are not making the kind of effort that will
result in a stable Iraq. All four are Sunni Muslim nations with
differing degrees of skittishness about the emergence of a Shi'i-led
Iraq. On top of this, the Turks have their own longstanding concerns
about Kurdish separatism. All four--but particularly the Saudis--have
been ambivalent at best about slowing the flow of goods and supplies
across their border to Iraq. And it is complicated by the fact that
there is a portion of Saudi society that actively favors the Sunni
``jihad'' against the United States and the Shi'a in Iraq.
The governments of all of these countries have not been bashful
about their own concerns in Iraq, and their price for greater
cooperation is likely to be a straightforward one: A greater say in the
reconstruction of Iraq. This is a tricky proposition, but not an
unworkable one. Indeed, the solution is probably overdue.
The United States and the new Iraqi transitional government should
convene a contact group consisting of all of Iraq's neighbors--
including Iran and Syria. This group would meet frequently and
regularly to receive information about reconstruction issues important
to them, and to provide advice both to the Iraqis and to the United
States regarding developments inside Iraq. The function of the contact
group should be purely advisory--neither we nor the Iraqis should be
bound by its recommendations but that advice should not be ignored
lightly either. In a great many cases, simply tempering a policy to
make it more palatable to Iraq's neighbors, or merely acknowledging
their concerns and providing a full explanation of why their
recommendation will not be the one adopted, can make a considerable
difference. In return for their expanded role, all of the neighbors
should be presented with detailed, and concrete plans for stemming
illegal traffic across their borders and theft membership in the
contact group can be made conditional upon their meeting these
criterion.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, none of these measures is likely to
have more than an indirect impact on the success or failure of
reconstruction in Iraq. As noted in my response to Option 1, the
insurgency is only one of our problems in Iraq, and the insurgency is
not principally driven by external factors.
Our intelligence regarding Iraq has consistently established that
foreign fighters comprise only a small percentage of the insurgents in
Iraq. What's more, anecdotal reporting suggests that foreign-born
jihadists are playing a less important role in the insurgency. Early on
in the conflict, the foreigners brought with them critical know-how in
terrorist and guerrilla operations that the Iraqis largely lacked.
However, today, more than 2 years after the fall of Baghdad, the Iraqis
have learned what they need to know and so are much less reliant on the
foreigners for training. Likewise, while it was once the case that
suicide bombings in Iraq seemed to be the exclusive purview of the
foreign-born jihadists who came to Iraq to martyr themselves, this is
no longer the case. The evidence is sparse, but it does seem to be the
case that a growing percentage of suicide attacks are being carried out
by Iraqis themselves.
Thus, even if you could somehow hermetically seal Iraq's borders,
doing so would be unlikely to extinguish the insurgency, nor would the
elimination of the insurgency solve all of Iraq's problems. The best
intelligence indicates that the bulk of the insurgency is drawn from
Iraq's Sunni tribal population, a great many of whom were recruited for
Saddam's Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard, the Fidayin,
and other key security forces. They have lost their prestige and their
paychecks; they have been dispossessed by a society they once ruled;
and they are fearful that we intend to put the Shi'a and the Kurds into
the same position of authority their community once occupied--and that
they will be oppressed in the same manner that they once oppressed the
Shi'a and the Kurds. Thus there are plenty of Iraqis fighting us out of
fear and a lack of anything else to do.
As I have argued elsewhere, there are much better ways to make
major dents in the insurgency. One method would be to allow the Iraqi
economy to revive in a manner that it so far has not. Many of Iraq's
angry young men would probably be quite a bit less angry if they had
jobs, steady sources of income, and all of the benefits that come with
it.
Another approach would be to effectively buy off the Sunni shaykhs.
Although our intelligence remains sketchy, it is clear that an
important element of our problems with the insurgency comes from the
active participation or passive acceptance by a huge range of Sunni
shaykhs. In some cases, they appear to be ordering the young men under
their authority to take up arms against the United States and the new
regime because they feel politically and economically excluded from it,
and they are well aware of the corruption of the new government, and
probably exaggerate it to themselves, because they do fear a Shi'ite
dictatorship, and because no one is paying them not to. In other cases,
they simply make no effort to stop their tribesmen and followers from
participating because they have no incentive to do so.
However, for centuries, if not millennia, the central government in
Baghdad successfully paid these shaykhs to cooperate with the regime
rather than fighting against it. This seems unpalatable to American
ears, but it is part of Iraq's societal traditions. The tribes of the
west and south were never fully under central government control and
would often fight against it or simply ignore its efforts at law and
order unless they were paid not to do so. But in return for such
payments--which could come in the form of government contracts,
infrastructure development, and other forms of aid, not just cash--the
shaykhs generally were quite content to avoid attacks on the goverment
and even to keep order in those areas effectively beyond Baghdad's
control.
In the 20th century, the shaykhs were often paid not to attack and
even to police the roads, bridges, power lines, and pipelines the
insurgency currently targets. At times when relations between the
shaykhs and Baghdad soured, attacks on this infrastructure invariably
increased.
Moreover, the shaykhs have shown a willingness to ``do business''
with a wide range of governments in Baghdad: The Ottomans, the British-
backed monarchy, various Iraqi military dictators, and Saddam's
Stalinist regime. Of course, all of these regimes were all Sunni-
dominated, at least for their facade, and it does remain to be seen
whether they would give such fealty to a Shi'a-led government, but
there is every reason to expect that, coupled with an effort to
increase Sunni tribal representation in the new government, the Sunni
shaykhs would be willing to decrease or even end their support for the
insurgency. To a great extent, it would mean giving this key segment of
the Sunni community a real stake in the success of the new Iraqi
Government--just as we have talked about doing right from the start--
and doing so in a very tangible way.
Indeed, anecdotal reporting indicates that whenever American
military and political personnel have reached out to local Sunni
shaykhs, and provided them with material incentives to cooperate, they
have been willing to do so, at least on a selective basis. This, too,
provides evidence that it should be possible to co-opt many, perhaps
most, of the Sunni tribal shaykhs and get them to stop fighting us and
instead help us.
Even if we were to successfully find ways to buy off the Sunni
tribal shaykhs, we should not expect this to end the insurgency
altogether. The Sunni shaykhs probably could convince a significant
number of their followers to desist, either by their authority, or by
the patronage they would in turn buy among their people with the
resources we would be paying them. However, because the insurgency is
so diverse, others would likely fight on: The foreign fighters, of
course; homegrown Salafi jihadists, of whom there is also a significant
number; true regime ``dead-enders'' who have so much blood on their
hands that they could never expect anything but a hangman's noose from
a new, democratic Iraqi Government; and a number of others of diverse
motives. But it is clear that this would be a greatly diminished cohort
from present numbers.
Thus, if you are looking to weaken the insurgency, shutting down
Iraq's borders can't hurt, but doing so will be much harder and less
likely to have real impact than convincing Iraq's tribal shaykhs to
withdraw their support from the insurgency. The first approach assumes
that the insurgency is principally a foreign-driven phenomenon, which
it unquestionably is not, the latter relies on traditional Iraqi
techniques to get at what is largely a homegrown problem.
Option 3: Should the United States reprioritize the training schedule
of Iraqi Forces and support more training in other countries?
With regard to the specifics of the actual training of various
Iraqi security personnel, my understanding is rudimentary at best, but
I know of nothing particularly amiss. Instead, let me offer some
comments regarding the duration, goals, and location of training.
Without question, longer training schedules are better than shorter
ones. Iraq's security forces need to be taught a range of military
skills. However, of equal or greater importance, they need to be given
the psychological tools to handle their very difficult
responsibilities. They need to be integrated into multiethnic
formations. They need to be convinced that reconstruction is the best
course for Iraq and that their own sacrifices are crucial to the
success of reconstruction. They need to believe that what they are
doing is of immediate benefit to their country, their people, their
sect, their town, and their family. They need to be able to trust their
comrades, their American and coalition allies, and themselves. All of
that takes a great deal of time.
In addition, even after their formal training is completed, Iraqi
units need time to further gel. Unit cohesion needs to be formed in
training, but it is inevitably tested by the first operations that a
formation undertakes. So, too, with the confidence of Iraqi recruits.
So, too, with the leadership skills of their officers. What's more, the
process of vetting--weeding out those unsuited for the tasks at hand,
or those working for the enemy--is a lengthy one, and it is not
infrequent for soldiers and officers to do well in training but fail
once placed in actual combat situations, especially if the initial test
is an extremely challenging one.
For all of these reasons, it is critical that Iraqi units begin
their operational tours under the most permissive conditions. They need
to crawl before they can walk. This has not always been the case,
although Iraqi and American friends tell me that it is increasingly so.
If so, this is a very positive development. However, it once again
emphasizes the length of the training process and the need to do it
right and do it slowly. Nothing will undermine morale across Iraq's
security forces--and undermine Iraqi confidence in reconstruction--so
much as large-scale disintegration of their formations in combat, as
was the case when units were rushed into combat in the spring of 2004.
As far as the goals of training are concerned, while we do need
some highly capable Iraqi units capable of conducting special forces
type missions to help assault insurgent strongholds, of far greater
utility will be large numbers of competent and trustworthy Iraqi
formations capable of conducting basic protection missions--patrolling,
searches, ambushes, point defense, infrastructure defense, and the
like. Again, these are the tasks that are critical to victory in
counterinsurgent warfare, as our experiences in Vietnam and elsewhere
have repeatedly demonstrated.
As far as the location of training is concerned, I don't think
beggars should be choosers. Training forces out of country has positive
and negative elements. Obvious positives include greater access to
higher caliber trainers and reduced likelihood of attack by insurgents.
Another less obvious benefit of such training is that taking a group
out of their accustomed environment might change their perspective and
encourage the formation of bonds of loyally to one another. Negatives
include the distancing of the group from mainstream society and the
possibility that the training will be less realistic--or simply less
tailored to the circumstances they will face. In addition, there is the
possibility that the population at large will be suspicious of them and
may even treat them as foreign ``agents.''
On the whole, I see these various plusses and minuses as
effectively canceling one another out. As a result, I see the key issue
as our need to train as many Iraqis as we can, and be able to provide
them with the luxury of time and proper training--not to mention the
related issue of proper equipment--so that they are someday able to
shoulder the burden we need them to. If there are countries willing and
able to provide such training abroad--and if not sending Iraqi units or
personnel abroad would limit that training--then so be it. Our need for
properly trained Iraqi security forces, in all senses of the words
``properly trained,'' should be decisive given the rough equivalence in
the liabilities and incurred compared to the benefits to be derived.
Option 4: Should the President change the force structure of the United
States presence in Iraq?
Mr. Chairman, I believe that it would be of tremendous benefit for
the United States to significantly increase the number of high-caliber
foreign troops in Iraq. Ironically, this is vital if the United States
sticks with its current approach to security, which I have already
described as a ``post-conflict stabilization'' model; but is only
desirable, not necessary, if the United States shifts to a true
counterinsurgency strategy.
We simply do not have the troops on hand--American, allied, or
fully capable Iraqi--to handle the number and extent of the tasks at
hand. We do not have the forces available both to provide security in
Iraq's populated areas and to suppress the insurgency in western and
southern Iraq. In truth, we do not have sufficient troops for either
one of those missions independently. As a result, with our current
force structure, we can reduce towns in the Sunni triangle, but we
cannot secure them long term. Inevitably, the forces needed to take
down an insurgent stronghold must move on to the next one, allowing the
last to quickly slip back into guerrilla control. This is a classic
mistake of counterguerrilla warfare and it is tragic that we are
repeating it. Moreover, our focus on trying to come to grips with the
insurgents and clear out their strongholds has largely denuded southern
and central Iraq's cities of sizable coalition forces, leaving them
prey not only to insurgent attacks, but to crime and lawlessness more
generally.
If we stick with our current strategy, I see no alternative to a
major increase in coalition forces over the next 2-3 years, probably on
the order of 100,000 or more troops, if it is to have any chance of
success. At some point, if our training program is allowed to mature,
we will have several hundred thousand capable Iraqi security personnel
able to take over responsibility for most, if not all, of the security
mission. However, we are still several years away from that day, and in
the interim, someone will have to make up for that deficit. Given the
reluctance of our allies to provide significant numbers of ground
troops, only the United States can do so, although providing so many
more ground troops for several years to come may necessitate a thorough
restructuring of U.S. ground forces more generally.
At the risk of being redundant, let me repeat this point for the
sake of clarity: We do not presently have adequate numbers of troops in
country to execute the strategy that we have set out for ourselves--
setting aside the question of whether this strategy can succeed at all.
As a result, we have provided too little basic security for the bulk of
Iraq's population, and have inadequate forces even to suppress the
insurgency in western and southern Iraq. Only a massive increase in
troop strength--which the Iraqis will be unable to provide for several
years--is likely to remedy that problem.
Could we simply muddle through with the inadequate forces we have
on hand. Perhaps. However, this would be a huge gamble for the United
States, Iraq, the region, and perhaps the world. As I noted earlier,
there are powerful centripetal forces in Iraq that are gaining
influence because of our failure to deal with the various problems of
the insurgency and basic insecurity. We may be able to keep them at bay
until several years down the road when sufficient Iraqi Forces become
available to address these missions. But doing so strikes me as
reckless and irresponsible.
Moreover, any objective analyst would have to recognize that the
chances of this bet paying off look poor at this time. The Iraqi people
are frustrated and growing more so. And it is this frustration that is
our greatest threat. Because it is out of frustration with the
inability, or unwillingness, of the United States and the transitional
Iraqi Government to deliver on basic security--and the basic services
like electricity, gasoline, clean water, and jobs for which basic
security is the prerequisite--that Iraqis are beginning to turn to
local shaykhs, alims, and other would-be warlords to provide them what
the reconstruction authorities cannot. Thus it seems, at least, equally
likely that the current trend will produce a slide toward fragmentation
and civil war, as it is that it will allow for muddling through until
the Iraqis can handle the security situation by themselves.
Another advantage of adopting a true counterinsurgency strategy,
however, is that while it would certainly benefit from the addition of
more troops, it is not required. COIN strategies work by building
popular support and using that popular support to deny support to the
insurgency, as well as to generate indigenous forces capable both of
fighting the insurgency and providing protection to ever greater
portions of the population. When employed correctly, it is a self-
generating and self-sustaining strategy, which it is why it is able to
defeat the converse strategy that lies at the heart of any insurgency.
The size of the initial commitment of resources principally influences
only the length of time that the COIN strategy takes to work. Thus, in
theory, one could begin with nothing but a platoon, although starting
with such a tiny force pool means that it would take an extraordinarily
long time for the COIN strategy to succeed.
In Iraq, we are fortunate to have a very large segment of the
population that is at least passively supportive of the goals of
reconstruction, as well as a force base of over 150,000 American,
Iraqi, and coalition troops. That is a pretty good starting point for a
true COIN strategy. It looks even better when one considers that the
Kurdish population is fully supportive of reconstruction--at least in
the sense of desiring an end both to the insurgency and to the state of
semilawlessness in much of the rest of the country--and already has the
security forces to effectively police their own territory,
With these forces alone and employing a true COIN strategy, the
coalition could probably secure much, perhaps all, of southern Iraq
with its strongly pro-reconstruction Shi'a and urban Sunni populations.
Along with Iraqi Kurdistan, this is a very good start, and suggests a
reasonably rapid window of success, perhaps as little as 8-10 years,
although probably more like 10-15, because it is the nature of COIN
strategies to work slowly. It would be difficult, with only the forces
on hand to also secure central Iraq, possibly including Baghdad and
some of the key infrastructure of that area like the Bayji oil
refinery, as well as roads, power lines, and oil pipelines connecting
the north and the south.
An alternative initial pacification effort could include Baghdad,
and given its importance to Iraq, there is a compelling logic to do so,
but in this case, the forces on hand probably could then only secure a
more limited number of the Shi'i cities of the south, leaving large
chunks of an otherwise supportive population outside of the initial
``secure'' zone, and possibly driving them into the arms of the
opponents of reconstruction. In other words, a true COIN campaign would
have difficulty including both Baghdad and all of southeastern Iraq in
its initial security zone with only the forces currently on hand.
It is for that reason that even a COIN strategy would greatly
benefit from more fully trained forces right from the start. The
addition of another 30-50,000 troops might prove sufficient to make it
possible to begin the COIN campaign by securing both Baghdad and key
sites in central Iraq and nearly all of southeastern Iraq--in addition
to Kurdistan. This is a very preliminary assessment that would require
considerable additional planning and analysis, but it does seem likely
at first blush.
This would obviously be a far more desirable starting point, since
it would mean including both the large Shi'a population of southeastern
Iraq as well as the vital capital within the initial ``oil stain'' of
the COIN campaign. Under these circumstances, it might be possible to
achieve success within as little as 5-8 years, although 8-10 years
still seems more realistic.
Thus, under any circumstances, more first-rate forces in Iraq would
be highly desirable, although if we persist with our current strategy,
then they are indispensable.
There is one last element of this option that needs to be
addressed, and this is the question of whether more U.S. troops will
help or hurt the cause of reconstruction. I am wholly of the opinion
that, on balance, they will greatly help the cause of reconstruction.
First, it is wrong-headed and perverse to suggest that more
American troops in Iraq will simply stimulate more terrorist attacks,
either because they will provide more targets or because they will
generate more animosity. As for the insurgents, they have repeatedly
demonstrated that they oppose not just the United States presence, but
the entire project of reconstruction and--for the Sunnis who comprise
the vast bulk of the insurgency--the ascendance of the Shi'ite
majority. The insurgents have committed far more acts of violence
against other Iraqis than they have against American Forces. What's
more, they have made clear that they believe they are already waging a
civil war against the Shi'a, whom the Salafi jihadists regard as
apostates and for whom they reserve far greater venom than for infidel
Americans.
All of the evidence we have indicates that were U.S. Forces to
leave Iraq, the insurgents would be even less restrained and would
greatly increase their attacks on the new Iraqi Government, on the
Shi'a, on the Kurds, and on anyone else they don't like. If you don't
believe me, ask any Iraqi Shi'ite, any Iraqi Kurd, or any Sunni Iraqi
who simply wants to lead a normal life; they are terrified of the hard
core of the insurgency for this very reason.
Second, it is wrong to simply postulate that Iraqis want the
Americans out, and that their resentment of the American presence is a
major source of the violence there. Iraqi views about the American
presence are very complicated and, at times, contradictory.
As best I can glean, both from public opinion polling and my own
contact with Iraqis from across the ethnic and religious spectrum, most
Iraqis dislike the U.S. occupation, but they regard it as more than a
necessary evil. Because of the fears I have just described, and because
they are realistic about the state of their country, the vast majority
of Iraqis know that it is vital for American Forces to remain in Iraq
for the foreseeable future because the alternative is chaos and civil
war. However, Iraqis are deeply frustrated by the course of
reconstruction. They are frustrated that 2 years after the fall of
Baghdad they still face electricity and gasoline shortages, that much
of the country still lacks clean water and sanitation, that
unemployment remains so high, and that they still do not feel safe in
their own country. This frustration is compounded by their sense that
American soldiers go to great lengths to protect themselves and do
little to protect them. Indeed, many Iraqis say that our obsession with
force protection for our own troops comes at their expense; not only do
our force protection measures greatly inconvenience them, but they will
argue that these measures actually decrease their own security. For
instance, the long lines to get through security check points around
American bases become prime targeting grounds for insurgents and
criminals.
Often times, this frustration gets expressed--especially in badly
constructed public opinion polls--by the sentiment that the United
States ``should just leave Iraq.'' However, a bit more digging usually
reveals the more subtle and, I have found, far more common, opinion
among Iraqis that they want us to stay, but they just wish that we were
doing more to help them with what really matters to them.
I think it's probably likely that increasing the number of U.S.
Forces in Iraq and redeploying them to Iraq's populated areas, and to
guard key infrastructure, would probably be resented by some Iraqis. I
think a great many others, however, would feel that it was a move long
overdue. Especially if additional American Forces were deployed to
provide security for the bulk of Iraq's population, were deployed in
mixed formations with Iraqi units, were deployed on regular foot
patrols and encouraged to get to know the residents of the
neighborhoods in which they were stationed, all of the evidence
suggests that Iraqi attitudes would range from grudging acceptance to
positive relief.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Pollack. Let me
mention that all of your testimony, prepared testimony, as well
as that which you have delivered, will be made a part of the
record. That will be true for each of our witnesses. We
appreciate the careful preparation you have given to the
hearing and your remarkable opening statement.
General McCaffrey, would you offer us your thoughts?
STATEMENT OF GEN BARRY R. McCAFFREY, USA (RET.), PRESIDENT, BR
McCAFFREY ASSOCIATES, LLC, ARLINGTON, VA
General McCaffrey. Well, Senator, let me thank you and
Senator Biden and the other members of your committee for the
chance to come down here and share some of these ideas. I very
much appreciate the very determined and active leadership that
all of you have shown on this issue.
I just had a terrific session with Congressman Duncan
Hunter over on the House Armed Services Committee and was able
to remind them that Article I of the Constitution, the lead on
shaping and forming our Armed Forces, in particular, lies in
the Congress, not in the administration. So I think the
resurgence of attention to these issues in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and the war on terror is timely and warranted.
Let me also say I am appreciative of the opportunity to
appear with Ken Pollack and Tony Cordesman, both of whom have
works that I use in my own classes at West Point and I have
great respect for their work and their insights.
I have just returned from another periodic visit in support
of our joint military commanders, GEN John Abizaid, GEN George
Casey, our tactical commander on the ground, LTG John Vines,
and a brilliant young officer, LTG Dave Petraeus who, as we
have mentioned, has been charged with forming the Iraqi
security forces. I do not know of a more talented and
determined person we could have put in charge of that effort.
Going directly to the first question at hand, the nature of
the counterinsurgency and how well are we doing at it, let me,
if I may come into this from a slightly different perspective.
It seems to me we finally have a strategy. We went in there
with no notion at all except to knock down a million-man active
and reserve army. We had no phase two. It was astonishing to me
the egregious misjudgments of Secretary Rumsfeld and some of
the civilian leadership in the Pentagon. I think they were
warned very categorically, and very directly, by many of us
prior to that war that we would end up with 26 million people
and we had not confronted the coercive security forces of the
Saddam regime.
That is, obviously, water under the bridge. I think this
brilliant man John Negroponte and John Abizaid, the two of them
have crafted a policy, a strategy, which to my astonishment,
just having gone in and having compared it to the Jerry Bremer,
LTG Rick Sanchez efforts, appears to be gathering momentum.
That strategy, number one, says create a legitimate Iraqi
State. Get a constitution, get a referendum, get an election,
get the Sunnis back in the political process. I think,
collectively, the Sunnis, to my surprise, have decided that
they want to get back in control of Iraq, but this time they
are going to get back in the political process. I think there
is a very high likelihood of political integration of the
Sunnis between now and December, although clearly this is high
risk and nonlinear political development.
I think the second part of our strategy is build the Iraqi
security forces. I think Senator Biden has pointed accurately
to some terrific overstatements in the past couple years in
which we have kluged together numbers that included oil derrick
security guards as being the equivalent of trained military
forces.
Having said that, I think this fellow Dave Petraeus, backed
up by John Abizaid, our Arabic-speaking, extremely experienced
joint commander, I think we have finally got this thing moving
in the right direction. I do not know what the right number is;
170,000 on paper--my gut instinct was there is probably 60,000
or more of them out there right now that actually are armed and
determined to create a new Iraqi State. Some parts of Iraq,
some parts of Baghdad, they are actually the lead elements. I
think the majority of operations now in country have at a
minimum Iraqi participation, if not Iraqi lead.
So build the ISF; that is the effort. I hope we focus on
that, though, because I consider it grossly underresourced. If
we are spending $5 billion a month fighting an active coalition
campaign and then you look at the level of effort on creating a
250,000-man force of border patrol, customs agents, police, we
are not in the ball game yet in providing the resources we
need. We can talk about it more, but I wrote a Wall Street
Journal op-ed: We ought to be talking about 120 Blackhawk
helicopters, about 2,000 up-armored Humvees, about a couple of
thousand M-113 up-armored vehicles.
We are not even close to that. We have got these Iraqi kids
out there with AKs, badly engineered light trucks, no
maintenance system, no logistics system, no command and
control. We've got to get serious about it.
The one parallel besides the domestic politics that strikes
me as eerily similar to Vietnam is the failure to focus on
creating the Iraqi security forces as the dominant aspect of
our strategy. Petraeus is saying it, Abizaid is saying it, but
are we actually giving them the tools they need to do their
job?
Then third, we are doing economic reconstruction. Somebody
ought to bring before this hearing, there is a brilliant young
engineer, BG Tom Bostic. We are about to give him his second
star. The last time I was there the economic reconstruction was
a zero. This time around I saw a couple of thousand projects
that are painfully under way, corruption being the single
biggest threat to the economic reconstruction of Iraq.
Then finally, we are doing counterinsurgency. I would take
a slightly different viewpoint than Dr. Pollack. I think the
counterinsurgency is the least important aspect of what we are
doing. Every Iraqi police battalion, commando battalion, is
worth 15 U.S. Army or Marine battalions in downtown Baghdad,
Talifar, Ramadi. They can spot somebody who is Syrian. They
know things are out of order.
So I think our primary contribution--the Marines are doing
a brilliant job out in Anbar Province doing spoiling attacks
and trying to reestablish the border. But I do not think the
counterinsurgency piece is actually central to what is going on
in Iraq.
I think, essentially, we are so dangerous to screw around
with, meaning ``we'' the United States Armed Forces, the
jihadists, a tiny element of that struggle, are now targeting
Iraqi police and innocent civilians as opposed to going after a
Third Infantry Division platoon in Baghdad.
I would also argue that the massive slaughter of the
innocents that these foreign jihadists are carrying out is the
least relevant part of the problem. They will not bring down
the Iraqi Government. They will not prevent the consolidation
of a new political system and they darn sure are not a major
threat to the U.S. Armed Forces.
What we have to worry about, it seems to me, is preventing
this civil war that is going on now--that is what we are
looking at, is a low-grade civil war--from spinning out of
control, either by lack of wisdom or premature withdrawal. By
next summer, in my judgment--we have got 17 combat brigades
there right now--we will be forced into a drawdown and have 10
brigades or less on the ground by next summer. The Army and
Marines are starting to come apart under this overly aggressive
foreign policy in terms of the resources we have in national
security.
So I thank you for allowing me to offer those initial
ideas.
[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of GEN Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), President, BR
McCaffrey Associates, LLC, Arlington, VA
10 observations from iraq: june 2005
1. Superb Status of Armed Forces Unchanged (courage, discipline,
leadership).
2. Effectiveness of MNF-I Command and Control and Interagency
Process is impressive.
3. Growing effectiveness of the Iraqi Armed Forces and Police:
169,000 troops fielding 100(+) battalions. (60,000(+) armed and
effective.)
4. Sunni Political Participation--they will vote in December.
5. Ineffectiveness of U.S. Public Diplomacy--media and military
failure.
6. Sustaining the War--Inadequate Base of Army and Marines.
7. Engineering work in Fallujah--an angry city in ruins.
8. Add Helicopter mobility to ISF: 120(+) Blackhawks.
9. Add armor to ISF: 2,000(+) M113A3s Up-armor plus Transparent
Turret; 2,000(+) Up-armor Humvees; 500(+) ASUs.
10. General Officer turnover and Impact on Region. (General
Abizaid/General Casey/Lieutenant General Petreaus/Lieutenant General
Vines--a collective national treasure.)
______
Memorandum for: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subject: Trip Report--Kuwait and Iraq; Saturday, 4 June, through
Saturday, 11 June 2005
1. Purpose
This memo provides feedback reference visit 4-11 June 2005 by GEN
Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), to Kuwait and Iraq.
2. Sources
a. GEN George Casey, Commander, MNF-I--one-on-one discussions and
staff briefings.
b. LTG JR Vines, Commander MNC-I--one-on-one discussions and staff
briefings.
c. LTG Dave Petreaus, Commander, Multinational Security Transition
Command--one-on-one discussions/briefings.
d. LTG Robin Brims (U.K. Army), Deputy Commanding General of MNF-
I--one-on-one discussions.
e. Charge d'Affairs James Jeffrey--office call one-on-one with U.S.
Embassy Iraq.
f. MG Tim Donovan (USMC), Chief of Staff, MNF-I--one-on-one
discussions.
g. MG Steve Johnson (USMC), Acting Commanding General, II MEF--one-
on-one discussion and staff briefing.
h. BG Peter Palmer and BG John Defreitas--MNF-I Operations and
Intel briefings.
i. MG Rusty Findley (USAF) and Colonel Bill Hix--MNF-I Campaign
Action Plan Brief.
j. BG Tom Bostick--Army Corps Engineers. Gulf Region Division
Brief.
k. MG William Webster, Commanding General, Multi-National Division
Baghdad--General Officer Briefing and 3rd ID Battle Staff briefing.
l. 2nd Brigade 3rd ID Commander and Staff Briefing. Bagdad security
operations.
m. Ambassador Ahraf Oazi and U.N. Iraq Delegation--Lunch Meeting
with Special Representative to the Secretary General of the U.N. in
Iraq.
n. MG Robert Heine, Acting Director IRMO (U.S. Embassy
Reconstruction Program Officer)--one-on-one discussion/briefings.
o. MG Hank Stratman--Political-Military-Economic Brief, U.S.
Embassy.
p. MG Eldon Bargewell, Joint Contracting--one-on-one discussions.
q. Field Visit. U.S. Marine Infantry Battalion. Fallujah.
r. Field Visit. U.S. Army Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Vicinity
Tikrit.
s. Briefing Iraqi Army Brigade Commander. Fallujah.
t. Briefing by U.S. Army Embedded Training Team. Fallujah ISF Army
Brigade.
u. Briefing USMC Embedded Trainer. Fallujah Police.
v. Briefing U.S. Army Captain. Embedded Training Team. ISF Army
Infantry Battalion--Vicinity Tikrit.
w. Briefing Iraqi Army Colonel. ISF Training Center. Vicinity
Tikrit.
x. Lunch discussions. Iraqi Army Battalion XO, S3, SGM. Vicinity
Tikrit.
y. Live Fire Demo/Briefing. Iraqi Army Commando Battalion.
z. Demo/Briefing Iraqi Police ERU (Emergency Response Unit).
Baghdad.
aa. Field Sensing Session. U.S. Army Combat Division. Fifteen U.S.
Army Company Grade Officers.
bb. Field Sensing Session. U.S. Army Combat Battalion. Junior
Enlisted Soldiers.
cc. Field Sensing Sessions. U.S. Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Senior
NCOs.
dd. Discussion Sessions. Two U.S. Contractor Teams (Logistics and
Security)--Senior Leadership.
3. The Bottom Line--Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom: June
2005
1st--U.S. Military Forces in Iraq are superb. Our Army-Marine
ground combat units with supporting Air and Naval Power are
characterized by quality military leadership, solid discipline, high
morale, and enormous individual and unit courage. Unit effectiveness is
as good as we can get. This is the most competent and battle-wise force
in our Nation's history. They are also beautifully cared for by the
chain-of-command--and they know it. (Food, A/C sleeping areas, medical
care, mental health care, home leave, phone/e-mail contact with
families, personal equipment, individual and unit training, targeted
economic incentives in the battle area, visibility of tactical
leadership, home station care for their families, access to news
information, etc.)
2nd--The point of the U.S. war effort is to create legitimate and
competent Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance. We are
at a turning point in the coming 6 months. The momentum is now clearly
with the Iraqi Government and the coalition security forces. The Sunnis
are coming into the political process. They will vote in December.
Unlike the Balkans--the Iraqis want this to succeed. Foreign fighters
are an enormously lethal threat to the Iraqi civilian population, the
ISF, and coalition forces in that order. However, they will be an
increasing political disaster for the insurgency. Over time they are
actually adding to the credibility of the emerging Iraqi Government. We
should expect to see a dwindling number of competent, suicide capable
jihadist. Those who come to Iraq--will be rapidly killed in Iraq. The
picture by next summer will be unfavorable to recruiting foreigners to
die in Iraq while attacking fellow Arabs.
The initial U.S./U.K. OIF intervention took down a criminal
regime and left a nation without an operational state.
The transitional Bremer-appointed Iraqi Government created a
weak state of waning factions.
The January 2005 Iraqi elections created the beginnings of
legitimacy and have fostered a supportive political base to
create the new Iraqi Security Forces.
The August Iraqi Constitutional Referendum and the December-
January election and formation of a new government will build
the prototype for the evolution of an effective, law-based
Iraqi State with a reliable security force.
January thru September 2006 will be the peak period of the
insurgency--and the bottom rung of the new Iraq. The positive
trend lines following the January 2006 elections, if they
continue, will likely permit the withdrawal of substantial U.S.
combat forces by late summer of 2006. With 250,000 Iraqi
security forces successfully operating in support of a
government which includes substantial Sunni participation--the
energy will start rapidly draining out of the insurgency.
3rd--The Iraqi security forces are now a real and hugely
significant factor. LTG Dave Petreaus has done a brilliant job with his
supporting trainers.
169,000 Army and police exist in various stages of
readiness. They have uniforms, automatic weapons, body armor,
some radios, some armor, light trucks, and battalion-level
organization. At least 60,000 are courageous Patriots who are
actively fighting. By next summer--250,000 Iraqi troops and 10
division HQS will be the dominant security factor in Iraq.
However, much remains to be done. There is no maintenance or
logistics system. There is no national command and control.
Corruption is a threat factor of greater long-range danger than
the armed insurgency. The insurgents have widely infiltrated
the ISF. The ISF desperately needs more effective, long-term
NCO and Officer training.
Finally, the ISF absolutely must have enough helicopter air
mobility--120+ Black Hawk UH 60s--and a substantial number of
armored vehicles to lower casualties and give them a
competitive edge over the insurgents they will fight. (2,000
up-armor Humvee's, 500 ASVs, and 2,000 M113A3s with add-on
armor package.)
4. Top CENTCOM Vulnerabilities
1st--Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling
U.S. domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of
Army and Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected meltdown of the
Army National Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months.)
2nd--Alienation of the U.S. Congress or the American people caused
by Iraqi public ingratitude and corruption.
3rd--Political ineptitude of Shi'a civil leadership that freezes
out the Sunnis and creates a civil war during our drawdown.
4th--``The other shoe''--a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria,
Iran, or Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political
energy.
5th--The loss or constraint of our logistics support bases in
Kuwait. Clearly we need constant diplomatic attention and care to this
vital ally. If Kuwait became unstable or severely alienated to U.S.
military objectives in the region, then our posture in Iraq would be
placed in immediate fatal peril.
6th--Open intervention by Iranian intelligence or military forces
to support rogue Shi'a Iraqi insurgency. (Assassination of Sustani--
armed rebellion by Sadr.)
7th--Continued undermanning and too rapid turnover in State
Department interagency representation in Iraq.
8th--Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior
leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective
national treasure.
General Abizaid's value to the war effort based on his
credibility to U.S. Military Forces--and ability to communicate
and relate to the Iraqi emergent leadership--cannot be
overstated.
The combination of a three-star tactical Headquarters (LTG
John Vines is the most experienced and effective operational
battle leader we have produced in a generation)--and an in-
country four-star strategic commander (GEN George Casey) has
improved the situation from the overwhelmed, underresourced
Bremer-Sanchez ad-hoc arrangement.
LTG Dave Petreaus has done a superb job building the ISF.
Relationships are everything in this campaign. We need to lock
in our senior team for the coming 24 months.
Suggest that the three key U.S./coalition military HQS of
Casey-Petreaus-Vines need to stop unit rotation and go to
individual replacement rotation.
The very senior U.S. military leadership needs their
families based in a Kuwait compound with periodic visits
authorized. (We did this with General Abrams and his senior
leaders during the final phase of Vietnam.)
5. The Enemy Threat
1st--The Iraqi insurgency threat is enormously more complex than
Vietnam.
There we faced a single opposing ideology; known enemy
leaders; a template enemy organizational structure; an external
sanctuary which was vital to the insurgency to bring in
fighters, ammunition, resources; and relative security in urban
areas under Allied/Vietnamese government control.
Iraq is much tougher. The enemy forces in this struggle are
principally Sunni irredentists--but there is also a substantial
criminal class determined to murder, rob, kidnap, and create
chaos.
We also face a small but violent foreign jihadist terrorist
element. These terrorists do not depend on foreign sanctuary.
They can arm themselves with the incredible mass of munitions
and weapons scattered from one end of Iraq to the other.
Finally, Iraq is encircled by six bordering nations--all of
whom harbor ill-will for the struggling democratic Iraqi State.
2nd--On the positive side of the ledger:
High Sunni voting turnout and political participation in
December will likely set the conditions for the downhill slide
of the insurgency.
The insurgency can no longer mass against coalition forces
with units greater than squad level--they all get killed in
short order by very aggressive U.S./U.K. combat forces. The
insurgents have been forced to principally target the weak
links--the Iraqi police and innocent civilians. This will be a
counterproductive strategy in the mid-term. It has been forced
on them by the effective counterinsurgency operations and
information operations of coalition forces.
Insurgents now have a reduced capability to attack coalition
forces by direct fire: 80 percent (+) of the attacks are
carried out with standoff weapons or suicide bombings (mortars,
rockets, IEDs).
Suicide IED attack is enormously effective. However, it will
soon likely become a fragile tool. The jihadists will begin to
run short of human bombs. Most are killed or die while carrying
out missions which are marginally effective. This must be a
prime enemy vulnerability for coalition information warfare
operations.
We must continue to level with the American people. We still
have a 5-year fight facing us in Iraq.
3rd--The Fallujah Situation:
The city has huge symbolic importance throughout Mideast.
Unrealistic expectations were raised on how rapidly the
coalition could rebuild.
The city appears to be an angry disaster. Money doesn't
rebuild infrastructure--bulldozers and workers and cement do.
The coalition needs an Iraqi/coalition effort principally
executed by military engineers--and thousands of Iraqi
workers--to rebuild the city. We need a ``Pierre L'Enfant'' of
Fallujah.
Police stations are planned but barely started. The train
station is mined and the trains do not function. Roads must be
paved. We need to eliminate major signs of U.S.-caused war
damage, etc.
6. Coalition Public Diplomacy Policy is a Disaster
1st--The U.S. media is putting the second team in Iraq with some
exceptions. Unfortunately, the situation is extremely dangerous for
journalists. The working conditions for a reporter are terrible. They
cannot travel independently of U.S. military forces without risking
abduction or death. In some cases, the press has degraded to reporting
based on secondary sources, press briefings which they do not believe,
and alarmist video of the aftermath of suicide bombings obtained from
Iraqi employees of unknown reliability.
2nd--Our unbelievably competent, articulate, objective, and
courageous Battalion, Brigade, and Division Commanders are not on TV.
These commanders represent an Army-Marine Corps which is rated as the
most trusted institution in America by every poll.
3rd--We are not aggressively providing support (transportation,
security, food, return of film to an upload site, etc.) to reporters to
allow them to follow the course of the war.
4th--Military leaders on the ground are talking to people they
trust instead of talking to all reporters who command the attention of
the American people. (We need to educate and support AP, Reuters,
Gannet, Hearst, the Washington Post, the New York Times, etc.)
7. Summary
This is the darkness before dawn in the efforts to construct
a viable Iraqi State. The enterprise was badly launched--but we
are now well organized and beginning to develop successful
momentum. The future outcomes are largely a function of the
degree to which Iraqi men and women will overcome fear and step
forward to seize the leadership opportunity to create a new
future.
We face some very difficult days in the coming 2-5 years. In
my judgment, if we retain the support of the American people--
we can achieve our objectives of creating a law-based Iraqi
State which will be an influencing example on the entire
region.
A successful outcome would potentially usher in a very
dramatically changed environment throughout the Middle East and
signal in this region the end of an era of incompetent and
corrupt government which fosters frustration and violence on
the part of much of the population.
It was an honor and a very encouraging experience to visit
CENTCOM Forces in Iraq and Kuwait and see the progress achieved
by the bravery and dedication of our military forces.
The Chairman. Thank you, General.
Dr. Cordesman.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE FELLOW
IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, let me express my thanks as well to
the committee for the opportunity to appear here. Let me also
begin with a caution. Some 30 years ago at the collapse of the
forces in Vietnam, the ARVN, I was the Director of Intelligence
Assessment and I was asked to do an analysis of our
intelligence on both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese and the
ARVN.
As part of that assessment, we prepared two chronologies.
One was a chronology of all the brilliant ideas we had
implemented to try to defeat the North Vietnamese and Vietcong.
The other was a chronology of all the brilliant ideas we had to
try to train and fix the ARVN forces.
I do not believe there is any classic approach to
counterinsurgency. I think people write very interesting
classic books about the issue, and it is very easy to put
forward suggestions when you are 7,000 miles away--as long as
you do not have to figure out how much time is involved, the
disruptive effect on current plans, how many men are involved,
what the cost is, whether the end result will be interoperable
or standardized, what the political and internal costs are.
In short, I think you need to be very careful about these
options, because as long as they are a strategic generalization
it can always sound very convincing. The problem is we have a
long history of going from generalization to failed practice.
Let me be more specific about the three elements of the
option, that is option one. It is not an option; it is two or
three very different suggestions. I do not believe that there
is any practical chance of creating safe zones. Watching what
has happened in Baghdad, in Mosul, and elsewhere, the truth is
that to create security simply takes too many men, even in the
areas which are relatively stable provinces. As you look at the
history of bombings, attacks, and sabotage, the fact is we are
talking a vast amount of effort.
I do not believe that we are unpopular because we have
failed to secure Iraq. In the Oxford Analytica polls, the early
polls of our presence in Iraq, some 67 percent of the Arab
Sunnis polled saw the invasion as illegitimate. The figure was
roughly 37 percent of Shiites. Well over a third, even then, of
Arab Sunnis supported attacks on coalition forces. Then it was
11 percent of the Shiites.
If we are going to deal with these problems, it is going to
have to be by pursuing the strategy that General McCaffrey has
summarized. It is by creating Iraqi forces, Iraqi politics, and
Iraqi governments that can establish security. It is going to
have to be a combination of denying the insurgents sanctuaries
and areas to operate in and expanding operations in the areas
that are threatened. From what I have seen, we also need to
recognize that these differ sharply by city and by governorate.
This is not something that can be dealt with in terms of
generalizations.
I somewhat disagree with the point that Senator Biden has
raised. He is perfectly correct in saying that when we talk
about 172,000 trained and equipped troops many of these are not
combat capable to act on their own. But as we saw during the
election, even forces that are not particularly capable in
terms of standing on their own can perform useful functions.
Out of those, out of the 172,000 today, 63 to 64,000 are
regular police, another 30,000 are special security forces,
which provide area security in the so-called safe zones. Those
units are just becoming ready, and in my written testimony I
outline the pattern of readiness.
They will take probably a year at a minimum to reach
critical mass and readiness. Yet, they are moving toward that.
As they expand and develop capability, they will provide the
kind of security in the areas that we can use these forces in
while the army units and other units can begin to move into the
west.
But I would absolutely agree with General McCaffrey, none
of this is going to happen unless there is an inclusive
political structure that brings a large number of Sunnis into
it, as well as the kind of sticks which make it clear to the
Sunni insurgents, who can be persuaded to change their mind,
they cannot continue to operate safely and easily and have
sanctuaries.
I also would have to say that Fallujah, Ramadi, and the
rest, even parts of Baghdad, or for that matter Basra and
Mosul, demonstrate that it is not enough to have politics. You
also need to have governance. One of the basic problems we have
is it is not just the United States which cannot occupy space.
Today if Iraqi troops go in, far too often no governance
follows them up, or provides a structure of functioning
government to supplement the presence of forces. That is
critical, because for all of the skills and talent we bring,
Americans rote at 6-month, 3-month, 9-month, and 1-year
intervals. There is a major shortage of civilians to supplement
the U.S. military in civil-military and political areas that I
do not believe is correctable. The truth of the matter is not
only are we seen as occupiers and crusaders in far too many
areas, we simply lack continuity and area expertise. We simply
are not there long enough to achieve the kind of effectiveness
that only Iraqis can achieve.
Now let me answer two other questions that the committee
has asked. Should the coalition attempt to take advantage of
divisions within the insurgents, e.g, the Sunni nationalists
versus the foreign jihadists? I think this begins with a wrong
assumption. Politically it is all very well to blame the most
extreme bombings on foreign insurgents. People have said there
are no such Iraqi bombings. When I was there people talked
about 10 percent as being Iraq. When I then asked how many of
these bombings could you really quantify as to what country
they came from and who the bombers really were, the fact is we
had no basis for making these judgments.
Now, the committee may be able to get more detail in
executive session, but we are making, as we have in the past,
far too many generalizations about the nature of the
insurgency. There is the same filtering process going from the
field to the center through to Washington and then into the
political structure, that I saw in Vietnam, in Somalia, or for
that matter Lebanon.
There has to be much better transmission of the hard data
and intelligence and far fewer sweeping generalizations. Having
said that, it is not the United States that can take the lead
in negotiating between Sunni and Shiite and Kurd. General
McCaffrey pointed out--and I think this is the key--if Iraq is
to work in any form, there must be an Iraqi political structure
which is inclusive. We need to give as much effort as we can to
helping the Iraqis become inclusive, and then use as much
influence as we can to keep them inclusive.
I saw leaders in Iraq committed to inclusiveness, but I saw
people under them, Sunnis fearing being purged, Shiites wanting
to purge, Kurds wishing to basically separate themselves from
the government.
Senator Biden raised the risk of civil war. It is very
real. This is a very fragile political structure. I do not
believe that the constitution will perform miracles, even if it
is passed in a referendum, and I think the political process is
going to take as long as making Iraqi forces effective, and it
is going to take United States focus on that.
Similarly, when we talk about, can a political solution be
reached with the Sunni insurgents and could this lead to Sunni
cooperation; yes. But here again, let me say that political
inclusiveness is something the Iraqis have to do, and from what
I have seen a lot of the reason that Sunnis want to be in the
political process. First, they see that the election has put
Kurds and Shiites in control of the oil money and the power,
and second, they see themselves in an area where, as the less
extreme Sunni groups, they are not winning. There is ever more
turmoil and uncertainty and instability and they are not secure
from United States and Iraqi forces.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Fellow
in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC
introduction
One key issue in answering questions is whether they are the right
questions to ask. Let me begin my testimony by stating that the
``options'' and questions the committee has asked us to address are not
necessarily the right options and questions. There are five major
reasons why this is the case.
First, the questions as presented in the form of the four
``options'' do not really describe options, and include mixes
of different issues and questions. As a result, the answers to
each option have to mix positive and negative responses that
are not directly connected. In my responses, I have chosen to
address each question separately.
Second, from a purely military perspective, the committee
does not address what may be the most important option, or set
of issues, affecting the current U.S. effort in Iraq: Whether
the mix of Iraqi military, regular police (those on the street
or in stations, in traffic or on highways, and at the borders),
and police units (Emergency Response Unit and Special Police;
the latter include Special Police Commandos, Public Order
Brigades, and the Mechanized Police Brigade) that is gradually
coming online in combat-ready form will be effective in
replacing coalition forces, how soon this is likely, and what
kind of, and when, reductions in U.S. and allied forces will be
possible.
The coalition may have made serious mistakes in developing
Iraqi forces in the past, but a recent trip to Iraq indicates
that it is now beginning to have far more success. If current
plans are successfully implemented, the total number of Iraqi
military, regular police, and police units that can honestly be
described as ``trained and equipped'' should rise from 96,000
in September 2004, and 172,000 today, to 230,000 forces by the
end of December 2005, and 270,000 by mid-2006. The December
total could be a bit lower due to the extension of the police
basic course from 8 to 10 weeks, one of several initiatives to
raise the quality of the police and military forces.
There will be a good balance of military, regular police, and
police units. Plans call for about 85,000 military in the MOD
by December, and 145,000 special police and police in the MOI.
The 85,000 in the military will include about 83,000 in the
army (including the ``national'' forces originally envisioned,
along with the former National Guard; also including combat
support, service support and training units). The remaining
manpower will include the Special Operations Forces and the Air
Force and Navy. About 100,000 of the personnel in the MOI will
be station/traffic/patrol police; in addition, nearly 20,000
more will be in the Special Police and the Emergency Response
Unit. The remainder covers the Border Forces, the Highway
Patrol, and Dignitary Protection. By June 2006, the total
number in the Iraqi Security Forces (military, regular police,
and police units) will go to approximately 270K, The MOD will
have about 90,000, and the MOI will have about 180,000--
provided that there is no change in the currently planned level
of regular police.
Included in the numbers of individuals trained and equipped
will be significant numbers of combat battalions. In July 2004,
just after the Iraqi resumption of sovereignty, neither the
Iraqi military nor the Iraqi police had any battalions that
could be deployed nationally. Under current plans, the numbers
of combat battalions in the MOD will total around 106 by
December of this year. On top of this, Iraq will have 35
brigade and 10 division headquarters providing command and
control of MOD forces. Of these headquarters elements, some
will be relatively mature, but at least a small number of each
will still be relatively ``young'' or inexperienced.
In fact, much of the force generation effort will have
shifted to giving Iraqi combat forces the combat support and
combat service support units they need. By December, Iraq will
have fielded four Motorized Transportation Regiments (working
on the goal of one per division). Iraq will also have generated
six bomb disposal companies (with the goal of one per
division). In addition, nearly 70 Headquarters and Service
Companies will have been generated (although some equipment
shortages will remain). The goal for these Headquarters and
Service Companies is one per battalion. There will be slightly
under 30 combat battalions in the police units of the MOI.
By June 2006, the numbers of MOD battalions is planned to
reach 114. The number of the MOI battalions will remain
unchanged, although their training will have been improved
through recently initiated advanced programs.
Iraqi planning for Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (to
protect oil infrastructure initially and possibly other
infrastructure later) is not mature enough yet to give a solid
estimate of how many of those forces will be available on any
given timeline. The MNF is, however, working with the MOD to
help ``professionalize'' the first four or five of these units.
Third, the committee has chosen to separate its military
options and questions from the need for an overall strategy to
deal with Iraq. In practice, the most important options for
military success may not involve changes in military forces and
tactics. This is a political struggle. No purely military
options can substitute for success in creating an effective
political structure that is both inclusive and protects the
rights of minorities, representing each major ethnic and
sectarian faction. No military option can substitute for the
creation of effective patterns of governance at the national,
regional, and local level--including the presence of both
police and civil authorities, especially a fair judicial system
and humanitarian detention facilities. No option based on force
can substitute for economic security; dollars are as important
as bullets. No American use of force can be decoupled from
public diplomacy that convinces Iraqis that the United States
and its allies will phase out their presence as Iraqi forces
become effective. (Note.--Careful with this one. Seems to
suggest some one-for-one tradeoff as Iraqi forces become
effective, coalition forces can go home, but only if the
security success has been accompanied by political and economic
success.)
Fourth, for the same reasons, the committee ignores the most
critical weakness in U.S. policy and programs in Iraq that
currently affects the prospects for military success. The
United States seems to have succeeded in restructuring its
effort to create effective Iraqi forces. Senior U.S. officials
have pressed the Iraqis hard to create an inclusive political
system and there are clear signs of limited success,
particularly in the Sunni representation on the Constitution
Drafting Committee. Although without any specific timeline,
President Bush has said that the United States will eventually
withdraw all of its military forces from Iraq, and this, at
least, seems to reassure Iraqis that the United States has no
intention of permanently occupying Iraq or maintaining military
bases.
In contrast, much of the U.S. economic aid effort is an
incompetent and ineffective nightmare. While the reprogramming
of aid to meet short-term security needs has served a vital
purpose in substituting dollars for bullets, and some projects
have been successful, far too much money has been spent and is
being spent on U.S.-conceived efforts that pour money into U.S.
and foreign contracts, spend that money outside Iraq or on
overhead and security, and do not lead Iraq toward effective
economic development. This spending has failed to create jobs
and investment activity that has a meaningful macroeconomic
scale or that will act to meet the needs of key sectors and
governorates. The USAID and Department of Defense aid planning
and contracting effort is a self-inflicted wound that needs to
be replaced by Iraqi planning and management as soon as
possible.
Finally, the committee's ``options'' do not address the
military problem of shaping Iraqi forces that can affordably
deal with both the risk of prolonged low-level terrorism and
insurgency, and the need to defend Iraq's borders. This need,
for continued coalition aid that goes beyond counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency capability cannot be ignored while the
present ``war'' is being won. It is a critical issue with long
lead times that must be addressed as soon as possible in terms
of shaping mid- and long-term Iraqi force development.
Decisions need to be taken about the level of Iraqi forces that
the Iraqi budget can actually afford, and U.S. aid and advisory
plans to support this effort. These issues were not critical
while Iraqi forces were small and light; they are critical as
they become large and seek to acquire armor, artillery,
aircraft, and ships.
Option 1--Should the coalition revise its current counterinsurgency
strategy in Iraq?
At this point in time, the key issues affecting strategy are not
military, but politics, governance, aid, and economics. The United
States and the Iraqi Government have largely ``cast the die'' in
military terms, and the issue is not one of strategy as much as finding
ways to ensure that the development of Iraqi forces will actually
succeed.
The committee's questions under this option do, however, raise
important individual issues:
Should the coalition and Iraqi security forces create safe
zones, and put more emphasis on fighting street crime and
organized crime, deemphasizing the hunt for insurgents, so
Iraqi economic and political life can take root? Such an
approach ignores the fact that Iraqi forces are already being
developed into three major components: Military, regular
police, and police units. It is true that the fact that
insurgents and terrorists can attack almost anywhere in Iraq,
even when the coalition and/or Iraqi forces are conducting
operations in the border area or in so-called secure areas.
Such coalition and Iraqi military and security efforts simply
make it harder for them to do so.
However, this situation would be much worse if major ongoing
efforts were not being made to defeat them directly in the
areas where they have the most strength and to deny them
sanctuaries. Furthermore, reductions in present
counterinsurgency operations outside ``safe areas'' will tend
to cede control to the most extreme and violent groups and make
it even harder to include Sunnis in such areas in Iraq's
political process and economic development.
Should the coalition attempt to take advantage of divisions
within the insurgents--e.g. Sunni nationalists vs. foreign
jihadists? The answer is ``Yes''; but only as a secondary and
supportive endeavor to the efforts made by the Iraqi
Government, and with great care to avoid being seen as somehow
dictating government actions or still acting as an occupier.
This question puts the lead role in the wrong place. The United
States should--and does--encourage the Iraqi Government to be
as inclusive as possible and to bring as many Sunnis into the
political process as possible; this should not be a U.S.-led or
coalition-led strategy. The coalition may need to make some
tactical accommodations with insurgents, but any major
negotiations must be led by the Iraqis.
Can a political solution be reached with Sunni insurgents,
and could this lead to Sunni cooperation in isolating,
capturing, or killing the international insurgents? The basic
assumption in this question is wrong. Tying Islamic extremist
groups in Iraq to foreigners, and to al-Qaeda and Zarqawi,
addresses only one part of the threat and ignores the large
part--perhaps the true nature--of the threat. The most
dangerous ``international insurgents'' can operate in Iraq
because they are part of Islamist extremist groups with large
Iraqi membership. The key will be to split the more moderate
and pragmatic Iraqi Sunni groups from such extremist groups,
and give them an incentive to support government operations
against such extremist groups or take action on their own.
Option 2--Could the United States successfully press its allies to
increase aid and provide manpower to protect Iraq's borders and
prevent foreign infiltration?
The main goal should be to increase the presence of Iraqi forces in
securing the border and in providing security to governance in troubled
areas. The MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MOD are already working to help Iraq
regain control of its borders in the tough spots (primarily the border
with Syria) as soon as possible. This will take time and is already in
its early stages. But reconstruction of the border forts in those
areas, generation of additional border guards, generation of additional
Iraqi Army units, and support for the Ports of Entry (where Department
of Homeland Security Border Support Teams are helpful) are all
underway.
Border Transition Teams will begin linking up with Iraqi Border
Guard units in the weeks ahead as well; they're already in Iraq and
completing their final prep. This is a large and complex effort, but it
is at least underway and will be very important to reduce the number of
foreign suicide bombers and movement of funds/leaders. It will also
have major impact on smuggling, which saps some of Iraq's economic
power. It will also require additional equipment and technology, such
as backscatter x-ray machines (already finding contraband at the Ports
of Entry) and the PISCES system (which requires significant database
development to be effective in the mid-term).
In contrast, it is unrealistic to think that other coalition
members or nations are going to help in the border areas that are
really contested as the following answers to the committee's detailed
questions indicate:
Is there a reasonable prospect that allied or friendly
governments would agree to increase their military
participation for this purpose, which is perceived as less
dangerous than patrolling Iraqi hotspots? The answer is ``No.''
It would take very large forces to make even the slightest
difference, and foreign countries are no more likely to deploy
troops to remote areas than elsewhere. Moreover, small,
isolated deployments would rapidly become targets, while
staying in large bases would be pointless. As various coalition
partners end their role in Iraq, some say they will be willing
to turn their forces from combat to training. This means that
it may be realistic to preserve some contributions that are now
planned to decline, but it is unrealistic to assume that any
such forces would go to ``hot'' areas on the border.
What would the United States have to do to convince allies
to participate in this manner? Would this free up significant
numbers of U.S. troops for other duties, or would the gains be
insignificant? The United States would have to form a
``Coalition of the Mercenary'' or the ``Compelled,'' and either
drag unwilling allies into the mission or pay them off. The
savings in U.S. manpower would be negligible at best. The
United States would have to provide secure logistic support and
rapid deployment capabilities to protect such units.
Can foreign infiltration of Iraq be stopped by enhancing
border security? Some reductions may be possible, but most
infiltrators consist of men, not supplies. Border security and
customs posts will remain corrupt, infiltration can shift to
different border points, and better covers and documentation
will always allow infiltrators to enter the country. Attempts
to provide reasonable security at the borders should continue,
but the primary battle, in any case, will be inside Iraq and
not at the border.
If foreign infiltration of Iraq could be stopped or slowed
significantly, how much impact would that have on the
insurgency? It would have an impact over time, particularly on
suicide bombings, but it could just as easily lead to a
widening of the attacks on targets outside Iraq. The question
may assume that Iraq has become the target of foreign Sunni
Islamist extremists. It has not. It is a target, along with
many other countries as the fighting in Afghanistan and the
rest of Central Asia, infiltration into countries like Saudi
Arabia, and the London and Madrid bombings clearly demonstrate.
Option 3--Should the United States reprioritize the training schedule
of Iraqi forces and support more training in other countries?
A detailed analysis of the current MNF-I and MNSTC-I effort to
train and equip Iraqi forces is attached, and it is requested that this
be included in the record.\1\ It indicates that this effort has been
comprehensively reorganized over the course of the last year, that it
now includes far better readiness standards and significant allied
contributions, and the two main issues to be addressed are providing
the full range of civilian advisors needed to supplement the military
in training the police forces, and how Iraqi forces should acquire
armor and other heavier weaponry over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Three detailed papers are available: ``Staying the Course? What
Can be Done in Iraq,'' ``Iraq's Evolving Insurgency,'' ``Iraqi Force
Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?'' All can be found in PDF
format in the ``Iraq Briefing Book'' section of the CSIS Web site at
www.csis.org/features/iraq.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Progress in unit generation is necessarily much slower than
progress in creating trained and equipped individuals. According to
some press reports, the Iraqi Army had a total of 81 operating combat
battalions by late May 2005, but a new evaluation matrix developed by
MNF-I rated only three of those battalions at the top level of
readiness and capability. (At the top level of readiness, a unit is
capable of independent operations without coalition support). [Bradley
Graham, ``A Report Card on Iraqi Troops,'' Washington Post, May 18,
2005, p. A10.] Only one of 26 brigade headquarters had such a rating.
However, many other combat battalions were still contributing to the
fight, either with some support provided by coalition forces (the
second level of readiness) or fighting alongside coalition forces (the
third level).
If one included all of the special police battalions, the press
reported that the total force had risen from 81 battalions to 101, but
the number of battalions rated in the top category of mission
capability only rose from 3 to 5. Although the other operating combat
battalions were contributing to the counterinsurgency to varying
degrees, MNF-I concluded that it needed to make further major increases
in the number of U.S. advisory or ``transition teams'' embedded in
Iraqi units and was seeking to deploy rapidly 2,500 more soldiers by
mid-June.
Coalition leaders are concerned that detailed reports on the
ranking of Iraqi forces will be used by insurgents to focus attacks on
weaker units, but coalition experts summarized the status of Iraqi
forces in mid-June as follows: No special police units and less than a
handful of army units were rated ``fully capable'' of independent
counterinsurgency operations. Some 40 percent of the special police
units and 20 percent of army units were rated capable of leading
operations with coalition support. Some 40 percent of the special
police units and 45 percent of army units were rated capable of
conducting counterinsurgency operations when ``fighting alongside''
coalition units. Less than 10 percent of the special police units and
20 percent of army units were rated as ``forming'' or incapable of
conducting counterinsurgency operations.
Put differently, more than 60 Iraqi Army combat battalions could
then perform a counterinsurgency role when operating with coalition
forces; more than 20 combat battalions were capable of
counterinsurgency operations, but needed some specific coalition
support to do so. In the case of special police forces--which included
the Public Order Brigades, the Mechanized Police Brigade, and the
Special Police Commando Brigades, there were roughly 27 battalions
authorized and 14 actually operational, all of them either fighting
alongside or with coalition support. A long way from a perfect force,
but a vast improvement over a single active battalion in July 2004.
Looking toward the future, the focus of Iraqi and MNF efforts has
clearly shifted from force formation to force effectiveness, and the
MNSTC-I goal is to ``graduate'' most remaining units from basic/small
unit training at Level 3 (``Fighting Alongside'' coalition forces).
Their progression to Level 2 or Level 1 will follow on varying
timelines. Some ``graduated'' units may still be assessed as Level 4
(Forming), but they should be the exception.
Are Iraqi troops being deployed before they are ready in an
attempt to demonstrate progress? This may have been the case
through the spring of 2004. It no longer seems to be an issue.
As is noted above, far better readiness and training standards
are being applied.
Should there be a more gradual training schedule to allow
Iraqi units to develop greater cohesion and capabilities before
exposing them to hostilities? Iraqi forces are deployed into
more-demanding missions only on the basis of their actual
performance, as reflected by their transition readiness
assessment. The coalition transition teams that guide them
through their initial training and equipping remain with them
as they transition to operational status and as they are slowly
introduced to more-demanding missions over time. Keeping them
in training status would make things worse, not better. Their
involvement in appropriate operations will give them needed
experience and ensure that leaders and other ranks are
competent and active while they build practical cohesion and
capability.
Should the number of Iraqi security forces be increased by
integrating the Badr brigade (an anti-Saddam Shi'a militia
group), the Peshmurga (Kurdish forces), or other local militias
into the Iraqi Army or National Guard? Would the political
ramifications of such integration outweigh the security
benefits? The problem lies in the word ``integration.'' If it
means properly vetted, fully trained, and dispersed as
individuals into a wide range of units to create truly national
forces, the answer is ``Yes.'' In the real world, Iraqi forces
have been recruiting militia members as individuals for almost
a year--as part of the Transition and Reintegration of Militias
program. Success in these endeavors has been mixed. Total
dissolution of militias will take time and serious negotiations
and will probably be successful only when the political parties
see the militias as no longer required because the central
government is providing adequate security.
MNF-I and the Iraqi Government have avoided bringing militias
in as entire elements for very good reasons. The temptation of
using militias as an expedient short-term measure to establish
control somewhere in Iraq has a major long-range downside. The
biggest single challenge to the Iraqi leaders is to get all
ethnic groups, political parties, religious sects, etc., to
work together as part of the Iraqi State and political
processes. This means militias should not be legitimized and
that the government should retain the monopoly on the
legitimate use of power.
There may be a need to find some mission for selected militia
units that will ensure they do not become involved in ethnic/
sectarian struggles, but Iraq does not need low-grade ethnic
and sectarian forces. It needs effective national forces.
Furthermore, not every militia has the goal of remaining a
paramilitary force. For example, the Badr Corps (not Brigade)
is trying to be known as the Badr Organization and to shed its
militia image for a political role. This process may be simply
rhetorical, and has certainly not been completed, but offers
the possibility of another approach to the problem.
Can we increase the number of troops trained in other
countries, such as France, Jordan, and Egypt? Or will these
countries provide training only if the cost is picked up by the
United States? Iraq now has at least 10 major training
facilities, the better part of a training brigade, special
skill training elements/schools, and countless ranges, shooting
houses, and other training facilities--and they prefer to train
their troops at home, as it's cheaper, done by Iraqis, and
avoids expensive/dangerous movements.
There already are typically well over 3,200 Iraqis out of
country in training at any given time. Iraqis are taking
advantage of training offers that are fully funded and provide
the training they really want and can't do for themselves yet,
such as the German training of Iraqi engineer unit cadre and
trainers, which now train Iraqis at Tadji in the UAE. They have
other individuals all over the world in short and long courses.
But the movement of large elements is costly, difficult, and
time-consuming to the Iraqis.
The United States can always push for additional increases,
and might have limited success (probably only token). The end
result in terms of problems in interoperability and men simply
seeking good foreign assignments might, however, outweigh any
benefits. Any apparent cost savings would probably be mythical
in the case of Egypt or Jordan; they would end up being paid
for by other aspects of U.S. foreign aid.
Will we be diverting training assets in Egypt and Jordan
that would be better devoted to training Palestinian security
forces? The Jordanian training facilities are operating now at
essentially full capacity. Egyptian capabilities require on-
the-scene study.
Should we put more emphasis on training Iraqi military
officers in the United States in an effort to create
professional military leadership? The MNF-I and MNSTC-I are
pushing hard to create lasting institutions in Iraq. These
programs are having considerable success acquiring Iraqi
instructors, and being tailored to local combat conditions. It
is always valuable to train cadres in the United States to
ensure that foreign military officers understand U.S. concepts
and values, but this seems a doubtful way of having much impact
on Iraq's near-term force capabilities. Some limited amounts of
training are being accomplished in various elements of the U.S.
professional military education and training system, but the
effects of such training may not be felt for years.
Option 4--Should the President change the force structure of the U.S.
presence in Iraq?
If the President has the magic wand necessary to create new forces,
and is willing to ignore the impact on our All-Volunteer Force
structure of increasing deployments, he should make three immediate
changes in the U.S. force posture in Iraq. First, he should deploy far
more military specialists in civil-military and counterinsurgency
operations with suitable language and area skills. Second, he should
extend all tours for the duration so that U.S. troops acquire real
operational expertise and establish stable and lasting personal
relations with Iraqis. And third, he should supplement the U.S.
military with large numbers of skilled and highly motivated civilian
counterparts to handle the wide range of civil missions in the field
that are now badly undermanned or handled by the U.S. military. U.S.
commanders in Iraq have every reason to ask why other agencies do not
provide the civilians need to support many types of operations, and
``Where is the rest of the U.S. Government?''
Do we have the right number and types of troops in Iraq?
Unless we can suddenly create far more forces of the kind we
need, the number seems adequate. The problem is more force
quality than force quantity. As is suggested above, we have
serious limitations because we started this war with a global
force structure oriented for conventional war. The need for
change has been recognized, at least in some quarters. Change,
however, takes time, and must be made with caution. The U.S.
Army is already reorganizing and serious efforts are underway
to create more deployable forces with the necessary training
and area and language skills. These, however, will probably
take several more years to have a major impact. (Note.--You
really don't answer the question about the number; you do well
with the types.)
In the short run, should the United States increase the
number of troops in Iraq to provide greater security in support
of critical political milestones, such as the writing of the
Constitution, the October constitutional referendum, and the
December 2005 elections? The commander of MNF-I should have
this flexibility. There should, however, be a clearly apparent
need for such action and one that the Iraqi Government and
Iraqis clearly recognize and accept. Significant additional
mission-capable Iraqi forces should be available by this fall
and winter. Wherever possible, Iraqi forces are what Iraqis
should see protecting them.
Would an increase in U.S. troops have a discernable impact
on security? The problem with this question is that it ignores
the quality, expertise, and motivation of the U.S. troops
involved. Having more highly motivated and expert U.S. troops
deployed in areas with limited political visibility and impact
would always be desirable. The United States can always surge
troops for specific needs by altering rotation rates or using
the theater reserve. Short of a magic wand, however, it is not
clear where the United States could get enough of the right
kind of troops to make a major increase on a long-term basis
that would provide major new mission capabilities, or how it
could deploy large numbers in time to be effective without
seriously affecting the length of deployments and future
integrity of an All-Volunteer Force.
Would it upset Iraqi public opinion? Or should we begin
drawing down some forces based on the presumption that the U.S.
troop presence fuels the insurgents and undergirds their
propaganda? We need to emphasize Iraqi forces, not U.S. Forces,
but we also need to understand that it is the visibility and
actions of U.S. Forces, not just numbers, that affect Iraqi
resentments. No coalition presence will ever be acceptable to
true hardliners, whether they are Sunnis or
Shi'ites like Sadr.
PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
My personal priorities and recommendations have already been
addressed above, but there are several points that may be worth
stressing. If Iraqi military, security, and police forces are to be
created at anything like the levels of strength and competence that are
required, the United States needs to take--or reinforce--the following
steps:
United States and Coalition Policy Priorities
Accept the fact that success in Iraq is dependent on the
ability to create effective counterinsurgency forces in the
Iraqi police and military forces as soon as possible, and that
this is a top priority mission. U.S. and other coalition forces
can win every clash and encounter and still decisively lose the
war after the war.
Make it fully clear to the Iraqi people and the world that
the United States and its allies recognize that Iraqis must
replace U.S. and coalition forces in ``visibility'' and
eventually take over almost all missions.
Keep reiterating that the United States and its key allies
will set no deadlines for withdrawal--or fixed limits on its
military effort--and will support Iraq until it is ready to
take over the mission and the insurgents are largely defeated.
Fully implement plans to strengthen Iraqi forces with large
numbers of U.S. transition teams as soon as possible, but
clearly plan to phase out the teams and eliminate Iraqi
dependence on them as soon as is practicable.
Keep constant pressure on the Iraqi Government to improve
its effectiveness at the central, regional, and local level in
supporting Iraqi forces and in providing aid and governance
efforts that match the deployment and mission priorities of the
security and police forces. (This is an area where the rest of
the U.S. Government truly needs to help, particularly with
developing the ministerial capabilities needed to complement
our successes with the military and police.) Push the Iraqi
Government toward unified and timely action toward promoting
competence and removing incompetent personnel.
Make the supporting economic aid effort as relevant to the
counterinsurgency campaign as possible, and link it to the
development of Iraqi Goverment and security activity effort in
the field. The aid effort must become vastly more effective in
insurgent and high threat areas. One of the most senior
officers pointed out as early as mid-2003 that, ``Dollars are
more effective than bullets. Physical security is only a
prelude to economic security.''
Take a much harder look at the problems in Iraqi governance
at the central, regional, and local level. Force the issue in
ensuring suitable Iraqi Government coordination,
responsiveness, and action. Tie aid carefully to the reality of
Iraqi Government civil efforts to put government in the field
and follow up military action with effective governance.
Make it clear that the United States and Britain will not
maintain post-insurgency bases in Iraq, and that they will stay
only as long as the Iraqi Government requests and needs their
support.
Accept the need for a true partnership with the Iraqis and
give them the lead and ability to take command decisions at the
national, regional, and local levels as soon as they are ready.
Make nation building real. Some work already being done with
this with the Provincial Support Teams and the Provincial
Reconstruction and Development Councils.
Accept the reality that the United States cannot find
proxies to do its work for it. NATO may provide helpful aid in
training, but will not provide major aid or training on the
required scale. Other countries may provide politically useful
contingents, but United States, British, and Iraqi forces must
take all major action. Continue efforts to build coalition
support, but don't provoke needless confrontations with allies
or other countries over levels of troops and training aid that
the United States simply will not get. Concentrate on the
mission at hand. [For a discussion of the futility of placing
too much emphasis on NATO, see ``NATO Fails to Agree on Iraq
Training Mission,'' Washington Post, July 29, 2004, p. A18.]
Priorities for Iraqi Force Development
Continue pressure on the government to be as inclusive as
possible in every activity, to find some inclusive and federal
approach to draft the new Constitution, to keep the Iraqi
forces and civil service ``national'' and avoid purges of any
kind, and do everything possible to avoid the risk of
escalating to civil war.
Prepare and execute a transition plan to help the new Iraqi
Government that emerged out of the January 30, 2005, elections
understand the true security priorities in the country, and
ensure it acts as effectively as possible in developing
effective governance and efforts to create Iraqi forces. Create
an effective transition plan for the December 2005 elections.
Resist U.S. and Iraqi Government efforts to rush force
development in ways that emphasize quantity over quality, and
continue the focus on leadership, creating effective units, and
ensuring that training and equipment are adequate to the task.
Continue efforts to ensure that the ethnic and religious
makeup of all facets of the Iraqi military and security forces
are ethnically and religiously diverse to prevent any one group
or religion from feeling persecuted by the rest.
Continue the development of Iraqi military and police forces
that can stand on their own and largely or fully replace
coalition forces as independent units. In particular, continue
development of the combat support and combat service support
forces that will enable Iraqi operations following the
departure of coalition forces, including transportation,
supply, military intelligence, military police, etc. Give Iraqi
military and police forces the equipment and facilities they
need to take on insurgents without U.S. or other support and
reinforcement.
Ensure that the ``defeat'' of criminal elements receives
high priority. Make creating an effective police and security
presence in Iraqi populated areas a critical part of the effort
to develop effective governance.
Pay careful attention to the integration of the former Iraqi
National Guard into the Iraqi Army. Careless integration risks
creating a force that is larger, but not effective. This cannot
be dealt with by treating the merger simply as a name change.
Focus on the importance of political security. Security for
both Iraqi governance and Iraqi elections must come as soon and
as much as possible from Iraqi forces. Iraqi forces will not be
ready to undertake such missions throughout the country through
mid-2005 and probably well into 2006, but they are able now to
have local and regional impact. Wherever they are operating,
they must be given the highest possible visibility in the roles
where they are most needed. Careful planning will let them
contribute significantly to the success of the constitutional
referendum in October and to the full national election at the
end of 2005.
Create command, communications, and intelligence systems
that can tie together the Iraqi, United States, and British
efforts, and that will give the new Iraqi Government and forces
the capability they need once the United States leaves.
Carefully review U.S. military doctrine and guidance in the
field to ensure that Iraqi forces get full force protection
from U.S. commanders, and suitable support, and that U.S.
forces actively work with, and encourage, Iraqi units as they
develop and deploy.
Further develop the Iraqis' ability to engage in public
affairs and strategic communications. Make sure that Iraqi
information is briefed by Iraqis, and not by coalition
spokesmen.
Reexamine the present equipment and facilities program to
see if it will give all elements of Iraqi forces the level of
weapons, communications, protection, and armor necessary to
function effectively in a terrorist/insurgent environment.
Ensure a proper match between training, equipment, facilities,
and U.S. support in force protection.
Encourage the Iraqi Government to provide reporting on Iraqi
casualties, and provide U.S. reporting on Iraqi casualties and
not simply U.S. and coalition forces. Fully report on the Iraqi
as well as the U.S. role in press reports and briefings. Treat
the Iraqis as true partners and give their sacrifices the
recognition they deserve.
Finally, it is not enough to do the right things; the United States
must also be seen to do the right things. This means the United States
and its allies need to develop not only a comprehensive strategy for
Iraq that ties together all of the efforts to improve Iraqi forces
described above, but also a strategy that can publicly and convincingly
show Iraq, the region, and the world that the United States is
committed to the kind of political, economic, and security development
that the Iraqi people want and need.
U.S. public diplomacy tends to make broad ideological statements
based on American values. It tends to deal in slogans, and be
``ethnocentric'' to put it mildly. What Iraqis need is something very
different. It is confidence that the United States now has plans to
respond to what they want. They need to see that the United States is
tangibly committed to achieving success in Iraq, and not an ``exit
strategy'' or the kind of continuing presence that serves American and
not Iraqi interests.
This means issuing public U.S. plans for continued economic and
security aid that clearly give the Iraqi Government decisionmaking
authority, and administrative and execution authority wherever
possible. It means a commitment to expanding the role of the United
Nations and other countries where possible, and to working with key
allies in some form of contact group. It also means providing
benchmarks and reports on progress that show Iraqis a convincing and
honest picture of what the United States had done and is doing; not the
kind of shallow ``spin'' that dominates far too much of what the U.S.
Goverment says in public.
Another key to success is to have a public strategy that formally
commits the United States in ways that, at least, defuse many of the
conspiracy theories that still shape Iraqi public opinion, and the
private views of many senior Iraqi officials and officers. The United
States can scarcely address every conspiracy theory. Their number is
legion and constantly growing. It can and must address the ones that
really matter.
There are three essential elements that U.S. and coalition public
diplomacy must have to be convincing:
Make it unambiguously clear that the United States fully
respects Iraqi sovereignty, and that it will leave if any
freely elected Iraqi Government asks it to leave, or alter its
role and presence in accordance with Iraqi views.
Make it equally clear that the United States has no
intention to dominate or exploit any part of the Iraqi economy,
and will support Iraq in renovating and expanding its petroleum
industry in accordance with Iraqi plans and on the basis of
supporting Iraqi exports on a globally competitive basis that
maximizes revenues to Iraq.
Finally, make it clear that the United States will phase
down troops as soon as the Iraqi Government finds this
desirable, and will sustain the kind of advisory and aid
mission necessary to rebuild Iraqi forces to the point where
they can independently defend Iraq, but will not seek permanent
military bases in Iraq.
This latter point is not a casual issue. Nothing could be worse
than trying to maintain bases in a country with Iraq's past and where
the people do not want them. Virtually from the start of the U.S.
invasion, Iraqis have been deeply concerned about ``permanent bases.''
Yet even some of the most senior Iraqi officials and officers have
privately expressed the view that the United States was seeking to
create some 4 to 18 such bases.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Cordesman.
Let me raise a second area for our discussion, and in this
case I am going to ask you, General McCaffrey, for the first
comment, then Dr. Cordesman, and then Dr. Pollack. Could the
United States successfully press its allies to increase aid and
provide manpower to protect Iraq's borders and prevent foreign
infiltration? Is there a reasonable prospect that allied or
friendly governments would agree to increase their military
participation for this purpose, which is perceived as less
dangerous than patrolling Iraqi hot spots?
What would the United States have to do to convince allies
to participate in this manner, and would this free up
significant numbers of U.S. troops for other duties or would
the gains be insignificant? Can foreign infiltration of Iraq be
stopped by enhancing border security, and if foreign
infiltration of Iraq could be stopped or slowed significantly,
how much impact would that have ultimately on the insurgency?
General McCaffrey, would you comment on this area of
consideration?
General McCaffrey. Senator, it seems to me there is no
question that having allies active, with robust rules of
engagement, with strong political backing, who bring their own
resources, would be a vital addition to this struggle,
certainly to garb ourselves in legitimacy of a broader mandate,
to have U.N. support. All of this would be to the good.
I personally believe the misjudgments of the first year,
actually, will prevent us ever getting significant support out
of any of our major allies--the Japanese, Western Europe, Latin
America. It is just not going to happen. No one in their right
mind would step into this mess this late in the game.
I think most of our coalition--and although I am grateful
and respectful of their individual sacrifice, the soldiers on
the ground--I think they bring little to bear on the problem,
with the exception of these terrific British forces. The rest
of them do not make much impact in the situation. Some of them
are a positive drawback. I mean, these--and I am sympathetic to
the Japanese Self-Defense Force problems, but they literally
have to be guarded while they are in Iraq.
It is not going to happen. We are just not going to get
people to come in and establish security on the borders, or
even to put significant training resources into Iraq. Now, I
also think that the few hundred people crossing the border,
many of them out of Syria, bunches of people coming in out of
Iran, massive movement cross-border, intelligence operatives,
political operatives, et cetera, and certainly the Saudi border
is completely unguarded--we can attempt to establish an Iraqi
border presence. The Marines are doing that right now, trying
to put back in all the posts that were rolled up.
But that is not going to stop small determined numbers of
people from entering to become jihadists. I also think it's
fairly transparent that we do not have, unlike Vietnam, an
external enemy who has to move munitions and money and
leadership and training bases and sanctuary. That is not what
we are dealing with. Poor Iraq may have had 900,000 metric tons
of munitions scattered from one end of this country to another.
Every farmer now has a hundred 155 artillery shells buried in
the back yard. They are all carrying automatic weapons.
So I do not think our problem is external. Our problem is
internal. I really endorse, fully endorse, the comments of Dr.
Cordesman along those lines.
Now, I would also suggest to you--and this is sort of a
parallel observation--the foreign jihadists who come to Iraq
get killed in Iraq and fairly rapidly. I think many of them
find, to their horror, that they came to get war stories to go
back to Kuwait or Algeria and find out they have been
volunteered to be a human bomb.
Those attacks in the short run are going to be a problem
for the insurgency. It is going to, in my judgment, add
legitimacy to a viewpoint by the Iraqi people that they need
the police and the army to protect them.
I think the other thing that struck me as a major
shortcoming of our so-called allies, what we lack is political
and economic significant support in the Arab world, and in
particular, from Sunni Muslim governments. Where are the
Egyptians, the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, to come in and tell this
minority, 20 percent of Iraq, who are most of the violence we
are facing, most of the political opposition, and for them to
enter and say: It is okay, cooperate; we will back you up, but
we want you to get into the government. Where are the public
visits of the Saudi Foreign Minister and the chief of the armed
forces and others that would come in and say: Look, we are
going to try and help you. Never mind significant economic
investment on the order of $5 billion a month from the
surrounding oil powers.
So again, I think one thing we have been remiss in the
first 2 years of the intervention was some maladroit diplomatic
support for some very brave U.S. military efforts. But I think
the rhetoric of old Europe and the rhetoric really of saying
that the military contributions are insignificant and,
therefore, the political contributions follow, has led us to a
situation in which it is unlikely that our allies are going to
play a serious role in this. And if we put the attention
anywhere, it ought to be among the Islamic world: Stand with
us, create a new state.
But those six surrounding nations, not a one of them has
the best interests of a law-based democratic Iraq at heart.
The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. I think that General McCaffrey has raised
the key issues here. I was stationed in Iran. I spent, I guess,
20 or 30 visits to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war and previous
years. I have been along the Saudi border and the Syrian border
in the past. Frankly, I think the idea that you can secure
those borders against the level of infiltration that takes
place today, which is largely simply young men coming in as
volunteers, plus limited numbers of sniper rifles, and a few
night-vision devices is unworkable. Nobody has ever been able
to secure those borders against smuggling and the idea that
U.S. or foreign troops are going to somehow stop everybody who
is a foreign young man who comes in through the trade routes or
the legitimate lines of communication, or stop gear from being
smuggled in on any border, strikes me as unrealistic.
Right now you have a reasonable number of border forts
under construction. Looking at what it is going to take to
train the border police for the Iraqis, my guess is that it is
a minimum of a year, before enough will be ready. However, if
it is not Iraqis working with Iraqis--and corruption will be a
constant problem even then--having foreign troops wander
through various Iraqi villages and lines of communication near
the border is going to make people angry without really
accomplishing a great deal.
It also does not take many outsider volunteers to sustain
the threat. I heard different figures when I was in Iraq. But
out of the detainees, there seem to be about 600 to 700
foreigners out of over 15,000 Iraqis. If that is the case, the
problem is not really foreign terrorists. It is rather that we
have a serious problem with Iraqi insurgency, although it is
quite clear that foreign young men are being recruited and used
basically as bomb detonation devices.
The other caution I would give you is, if you do not have
those foreign young men, is it all that much harder to place
bombs that do not use a human being to commit suicide in the
same areas in the same attacks, simply using remote detonators
or other devices? The answer is probably not. It may not have
the same political impact to Islamists, but it is not going to
solve the problem.
I think at this point the only way that we could get more
troops to perform this kind of mission would be a coalition of
the mercenary or a coalition of the pressured, and frankly, I
think the mission is not the one that I believe we should put
effort into. I think it is far more--if we are going to put
pressure on our allies, what do we want? Well, we'd like to see
more debt forgiveness. We would like to see a forgiveness of
reparations. There are lots of economic and other concessions
and forms of aid which would be more important than getting
token border defense contributions.
It would be more useful to have people training the Iraqi
border force with the numbers we are likely to get than it
would be to put a few people on a few border forts. External
pressure to try to get more Syrian cooperation may or may not
work. Certainly, working with the Saudis, who have a physical
problem simply in securing the border, would be an issue. We
cannot talk to Iran, but we might wish to have Britain or
others talk to Iran and clarify a lot of the uncertainties
about infiltration on that border.
Without getting into detail that I do not think is
appropriate this morning, the problems we have with Turkey
along the Turkish border are such where we might wish to see if
there is some way, at least, to establish a better relationship
between them, the Kurds, the Iraqis, and ourselves than exists
today. But those only illustrate the kind of problems that
General McCaffrey raised. Each of the neighbors is an issue,
not just the border.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Pollack.
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by saying that I largely agree with both
General McCaffrey and Dr. Cordesman on this issue as well. I
think that the claims that shutting down the border with Syria
or with other countries--most of the information that I have
seen indicates that, in fact, infiltration from Saudi Arabia is
at least as great, if not a greater, problem than infiltration
from Syria, but that closing down those borders is a little bit
like shutting the barn door after the bull has left the stable,
the horse has left the stable.
It assumes that Iraq's insurgency is largely a foreign-
inspired movement, which our intelligence has repeatedly shown
it not to be. It is overwhelmingly homegrown. Anecdotal reports
that I have heard from Iraqis indicate that that foreign
element, even though we make a great deal of it, is actually
less important now than it was 2 years ago. Two years ago the
Iraqis did not know how to mount insurgent or terrorist
operations and were heavily dependent on foreign jihadists to
show them how to do things--how to make bombs, how to set up
IEDs, how to set up operational plans and do everything else
for themselves. Today they have internalized most of those
lessons and they are increasingly less dependent on foreigners
for the know-how.
Likewise, we tend to blame foreigners for most of the
suicide attacks, but there is increasing amounts of information
to suggest that even those are increasingly being committed by
Iraqis themselves.
So shutting down the borders would obviously be nice. It
certainly could not hurt, but I do not think it is going to
solve the problems that we have in Iraq.
If we would like to garner additional support on the
borders, I certainly think that there are some things that we
can do. But again, even these are going to be modest, and again
we should keep in mind the overarching point which I think all
three of us have made, which is that the borders are not the
real problem in terms of security in Iraq.
One solution, one idea that we might try, is a contact
group involving Iraq's neighbors. One of the claims that we
have repeatedly heard from our allies--from the Turks, the
Jordanians, the Saudis, and the Kuwaitis--is that they do not
feel that they have enough of a say in Iraqi reconstruction and
in political and economic developments, let alone security
developments, inside the country. We might create a constant
contact group at which all of Iraq's neighbors would be
participating, along with the Iraqis and ourselves, and we
would, at least, give them the opportunity to receive regular
briefings on developments inside Iraq and provide a regular
forum at which they could express their views.
They would have to understand that this would be a purely
advisory function and we and the Iraqis would not be compelled
to accept their advice. But nevertheless, it would give them a
sounding board. My own experience in the U.S. Government, both
at the CIA and at the White House, has demonstrated to me that
oftentimes just allowing our allies a say in the matter can be
very helpful in securing some additional support from them.
I will also say that I tend to agree with General
McCaffrey's opening statement that because of the way that we
handled both the war and the immediate reconstruction projects,
I think it very unlikely that we are going to get major
contributions from our allies.
That said, I certainly think that it is possible to get
more and I think that we certainly ought to try to get more.
For me, this comes back to the central question of security
that we have been dealing with. I think it unlikely that we are
going to get large foreign contingents of ground troops. I just
do not see that in the cards. Many of our most enthusiastic
allies do not have the forces to send and those that do seem to
be most reluctant to actually commit them.
What we could conceivably get, and what we have been
notably lacking, are personnel with the know-how to deal with
the political and economic circumstances of reconstruction.
Before the war I had the opportunity to go and speak with the
352nd and 354th Military Civil Affairs Battalions, located out
here in Maryland, who are the ones who are the point of the
spear in terms of heading up the civilian economic
reconstruction efforts on the part of the military in Iraq.
Before they went in I spent an afternoon with them to try to
help them understand the problems that they were likely to face
in Iraq.
One thing I heard continually from their officers was: Are
we going to have the United Nations with us? Because what they
said was: When we were in Bosnia, we did not do development, we
did not do reconstruction; we guarded the people who were
actually doing the development and reconstruction. The people
who were doing development and reconstruction were led by the
UNDP, who could pull in enormous numbers of people with the
requisite skills and experience from around the world who knew
how to do these things.
Those people are notably lacking in Iraq and in many
circumstances our own forces and our own personnel are being
forced to learn on the job, and in some cases they have done
brilliantly, in other cases less so. But across the board there
are simply too few of them.
Now, those skills are out there. There are more personnel
in the world who have those skills and could be very helpful in
Iraq. But they will not come because of the security situation.
I will very respectfully disagree entirely with my good
friend Dr. Cordesman's comments earlier about the ability to
create safe zones in Iraq. It is possible. We have done it in
Iraq. We have done it elsewhere. Other nations have done so, as
well. But it is about making the security of the Iraqi people
and their populated areas the first priority, something that we
have notably failed to do in Iraq. As a result the cities are
not safe and we cannot get foreigners to come to Iraq and to
participate in the process.
As a final point, let me add that we have all been talking
a great deal about the legitimacy of the Iraqi political
process and I, absolutely, 100 percent, agree with both General
McCaffrey and Dr. Cordesman. What I would suggest, though, is
that when you talk to Iraqis their ideas about legitimacy are
less rooted in what we look at. They are not really interested,
to tell you the truth, in what that constitution has to say.
For them the legitimacy of this government is all about its
ability to deliver on basic security, electricity, clean water,
sanitation, jobs, and the other necessities of life. That is
what they have continuously looked both to us and to these new
Iraqi governments which we have successively put in place to
deliver. The legitimacy, which is absolutely critical for
success, is all about security, because the only way that the
Iraqis are going to get those things is if their urban areas
and their infrastructure is secure, and it is entirely within
our ability to provide security for, at least, parts of Iraq,
in fact, major parts of Iraq.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, doctor.
We will have a third area of discussion. On this occasion I
am going to ask Dr. Cordesman to make the first comment, to be
followed by Dr. Pollack and then by General McCaffrey. Should
the United States reprioritize the training schedule of Iraqi
forces and support more training in other countries? Are Iraqi
troops being deployed before they are ready in an attempt to
demonstrate progress? Should there be more gradual training
schedules to allow Iraqi units to develop greater cohesion and
capabilities before exposing them to hostilities? Should the
number of Iraqi security forces be increased by integrating the
Badr Brigade, an anti-Saddam Shi'a militia group, the Pesh
Merga, the Kurdish forces, or other local militias into the
Iraqi Army or the National Guard? Would the political
ramifications of such integration outweigh the security
benefits?
Can we increase the number of troops trained in other
countries, such as France, Jordan, and Egypt, or will those
countries provide training only if the cost is picked up by the
United States? And would we be diverting training assets in
Egypt and Jordan that would better be devoted to training
Palestinian security forces? Should we put more emphasis on
training Iraqi military officers perhaps in the United States,
in an effort to create professional military leadership?
Dr. Cordesman, would you begin our discussion on these
issues of security training?
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, if you had asked me this question a
year ago I think I would have said that we had failed to ever
begin. At that point in time we had actually more people being
reported as being in the Iraqi police, military, and security
forces than we have today but we only had one battalion worth
of Iraqi forces actually in service in the army and no
battalion equivalents being deployed.
But, things have changed. A lot of reference has been made
to General Petraeus. I think that you could give the same
praise to the people under him at almost every level. I think
it is important to give it to General Abizaid and to General
Casey, and certainly to the missions that visited Iraqi under
both General Ikenberry and under General Luck, because a lot
has changed.
When we look at Iraqi force strength as of May 2005, we had
put a great deal of emphasis on getting battalion-level
elements ready and in some form where they could perform
missions. You now had, counting the National Guard, 81
battalions, not one.
Now, many of those were not fully ready. You only had 1 out
of 26 brigades with an operating headquarters. There was not
combat or service support. But to put forces in the field who
could establish a presence and move toward some kind of
security in urban and other areas was a tremendous change. And
if you threw in the special police units, which to me are much
more critical in urban security and in providing the kind of
counterinsurgency efforts needed to establish security in
stable areas than the Iraqi Army or United States or foreign
troops, the number went up to 101 battalions.
The problem--and here I have to say Senator Biden is
correct in raising the issue--is those numbers are impressive,
but their readiness is still so low that it is going to take
between 1 year and 2 years to bring to the kind of levels we
need and probably 6 months to a year to really get to the kind
of levels where major coalition reductions would be possible.
Out of those 101 battalions, the top level of readiness,
which is the ability to operate on their own, only applied to
5. If you look at the other units involved--and all of them
could do something--only about 40 percent were capable of
performing the kind of missions where they could provide rear
area security, where they could provide the kind of stability,
the political structures, economic structures, that were really
needed.
That is still, however, a tremendous improvement, and I
have broken out the details in the testimony I have given. The
systems involved are too new to make some clear projections,
but my guess is that by the end of this year, if this works,
then you will have enough troops in some of the urban areas so
you can get security.
Now, let me note that the ability to make this work is
again political. For example, there are two councils and,
effectively two mayors, operating in Baghdad. In Basra, even
though you had a Shiite group that was the alliance dominate,
the actual local government in Basra is essentially a Shiite
Islamist government which is basically bypassing at this point
much of the police force. In Mosul you have major security
divisions along very clear lines and to move police in is only
gradually beginning to happen.
So this is a political issue, not just a military one. Let
me be a little more specific about your questions. Are Iraqi
forces being deployed before they are ready in an attempt to
demonstrate progress? No. But they are being deployed before
they are combat-ready. The system General Luck recommended was
to put 10-man training teams into each battalion and each major
combat and service support element to have those units help
develop leaders, to work to develop each unit, so the leaders
that stay are the leaders who can lead, and to take the
reality, which is many of the people we recruit are not people
who are going to stay, and build up the units with the people
who will stay so they actually can come on line as effective
forces.
No amount of training in the rear, no amount of exercises,
is going to create effective Iraqi forces. If you wait for
everybody to have dotted all of the i's on some theoretical
checklist, you are basically going to end up with no real
capability and a tremendous waste of time.
Should a more gradual training schedule to develop Iraqi
units, to develop greater cohesion and capabilities, be
adopted? No. Frankly, the schedule you have is about as
effective as it is going to be. The truth is that the
recruiting structure, even though it has been greatly improved,
is always going to have a very high rate of attrition. So is
the leadership structure. You are going to have to put these
people gradually into different missions, raise them up to the
point where they can operate on their own, from the less
demanding to the more demanding missions. This is not something
where people can sit around in a base and be trained.
Should the number of Iraqi security forces be increased by
integrating the Badr Brigade, the Pesh Merga, and other local
militias? A lot of that, to the extent that it is going to
happen, has happened. It is already a serious problem in terms
of the Badr Corps, not the Badr Brigade. Fortunately, the Badr
Corps seems to be more interested in politics now than any kind
of military adventures. But it is already seen as a force which
is operating against the Sunnis as a potential cause of civil
war.
Taking these units and putting them into the Iraqi police
or army on any terms acceptable to them is simply not a
feasible solution. In the case of the Pesh Merga, some units
are already operating. Others under the TAL agreement, which I
think many people in Iraq as Iraqis still endorse, were to
become the border security force as a way of preserving some
kind of Kurdish force elements without having them be divided
or creating divisive units. I think that nothing could be worse
than trying to use these militias to solve a military problem
at the cost of making the political problem worse. And having
watched some of them in operation, I think that the idea that
they are going to perform anything other than ethnic or
sectarian missions is a dangerous illusion.
Can we increase the number of troops trained in foreign
countries? Sure, you can always do that at the margin. The
problem is scale. Much of this would be on the so-what
category. Okay, you can get a few more people trained here and
there, maybe even several hundred or several thousand. But
given the numbers involved, what you also get is a lot of
people rotating in and out to foreign countries. It should not
come as a surprise to the committee that the people who
desperately want to go overseas for training, or outside Iraq,
are not always among the most highly motivated of the forces.
Nor does bringing them back always produce the best results.
They have, actually, often a very serious rate of desertion
after they are required to return.
You have already got about 3,200 Iraqis training outside
Iraq. I think that you need to be very careful about the idea
that we can get any kind of scale that matters.
Diverting training assets in Egypt and Jordan that should
better be devoted to the training of Palestinian forces? I
think you have done as much in Jordan as you possibly can
already. There is not any surplus capacity to take on
Palestinian forces at this point. Egyptian capabilities I
cannot generalize on, but I think you need to be very careful
about exactly what you are training the Palestinians to do.
Finally, more emphasis on training Iraqi military officers
in the United States in an effort to create military
professional leadership. Let me go back. What we need are
people who will stay in their units, lead in their units, who
have the kind of experience to deal with the missions that need
to be developed. It is true over time we need people to go to
academies, to staff schools, to the equivalent of a national
war college or defense university, but those people are not
what we need most at this point in time. The kind of
reorganization that has taken place in the MNF training effort
and in the MNSTCI training effort is a lot more practical than
sending people overseas, something that needs to be done
constantly over time, but is not a way to win a
counterinsurgency battle.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, doctor.
Dr. Pollack.
Dr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, let me start by saying that I
completely agree with Dr. Cordesman's comments, and I know also
that General McCaffrey is going to spend a good deal of time
also talking on the training program that we have. So let me
confine my remarks to making a somewhat broader point.
I think all three of us would agree that we now have in
place, in fact, a very good training program for Iraqis. Again,
I am sure that General McCaffrey will talk more about that. He
may want to tweak it. But I think, overall, it is a good
training program.
Let me also say that while we are praising U.S. military
officers for doing a good job and I heartily agree with the
praise that has already been lavished on Generals Abizaid,
Casey, and Petraeus, there is one other person who is worth
mentioning, and I think that this is, for me, the crux of the
problem with regard to training, and that is General Eton, who
occupied the job that General Petraeus has before General
Petraeus. I think that General Eton and his team also came up
with a very good program, an initial program.
The problem with the initial program, devised by General
Eton and his team and the American coalition forces who were
brought in to try to start things up, was political pressure,
quite frankly. The word from Washington was: Generate more
Iraqi battalions, get them on line because we desperately need
manpower. And it was the short-circuiting of that original
training program which caused the problems that we have now.
Now, again, we have a new training program in place. I
think it is a very good one. I think the main issue out there
is allowing it to take its course. I completely agree with Tony
Cordesman's point that training is a process and it is a
process that is both formal and informal. There is training
that has to go on in the barracks, there is training that has
to go on in classrooms, there is training that has to go on in
exercise fields. But there is also training that needs to go on
in actual operations. It is a long process and we need to allow
that process to develop.
I think that Tony, again, correctly pointed out the
distinction between troops that have some degree of readiness
and those that are fully combat capable. We need to allow all
of the Iraqi units to come up to full combat capability.
I think the key question that we are all asking ourselves,
and that is inherent in the entire nature of these hearings, is
the question of how we get from here to there. I think we all
agree that the long-term solution to security in Iraq is a
fully capable Iraqi force that is capable of simultaneously
dealing with the insurgency and providing law and order
throughout the country. But we are not there yet, and it is
unclear how long it is going to take.
As I wrote in the New York Times a couple weeks ago, before
he left General Petraeus took the opportunity to pull me aside
at an event that he and I were both at, to try to drill home to
me his feeling that it would take 3 to 5 years to stand up the
Iraqi security forces that he needed to do the job. I still
think that number is exactly right, and 3 years may actually be
optimistic, looking at developments right now.
So the question before us is how we get from here to there.
I think that the big question for us is whether we have the
right strategy now to get us to that point, at some point in
the future, or do we need to start making changes.
The Chairman. General McCaffrey.
General McCaffrey. I do endorse the comments of Dr.
Cordesman. In fact, one of the things I think that is unique
about his work has been to painstakingly go through and get
numbers that I trust. I have gotten to be a real skeptic about
much of what I read unless I saw it myself on the ground.
A couple of thoughts. First of all, there is no question
that we have a huge responsibility to train and equip and
design the right kind of Iraqi security forces. I am not sure
the distinction between police commando battalions and army
units is all that important. They tend to be light infantry
units, hopefully with good intelligence, that have a will to
fight.
I think we are off an order of magnitude on the resources
we have provided that effort. When Negroponte got in there he
and Abizaid and Casey and Petraeus finally got it organized. It
is starting to happen. I think the last number I saw was 3
billion dollars' worth of material is coming in country. So you
do see AK-47s, light radios, light trucks, some body armor, 22
SWAT teams that have the same stuff as the NYPD. It is starting
to move, there is no question.
More has to be done. Some of them are long lead-time items.
I would be astonished if we do not have a minimum right now as
an example of 1,500 aircraft in country. We cannot leave unless
there is an Iraqi helicopter mobility force. It takes a year to
get some kid to fly a Blackhawk. We have got to buy them, and
the price tags on those things are going to look monumental
unless you compare it to the costs of staying in Iraq for 10
years at $5 billion a month.
But I see no foresight yet to get us up to the level of
effort we need to create an ISF that will allow us to withdraw,
and I think we need to push in that direction.
I also have argued we have got to lock our senior military
and political, diplomatic leadership and CIA into that war for
the next 24 to 36 months. I have argued to the chairman of the
JCS and others: Go get a compound in Kuwait and keep people
like Petraeus there for 24 months. We are on the line. The
State Department people are rotating in and out, 90 days, 180
days. The most important people in this effort are not rifle
company commanders. They are political officers in the U.S.
Embassy and USAID people.
Now, let me also, though, back off this issue. Train and
equip; yes. The Iraqi military were the Germans of the Middle
East. These are some of the most brutal, courageous people in
uniform within a thousand miles of that country. They fought 7
years of war against the Iranians. They took ferocious
casualties. They fought the Brits, the Americans, the Saudis.
They have conducted brutal internal counterinsurgency.
We should not kid ourselves that--we are fighting, by the
way, an insurgent force that is out of this minority of the
Sunni population. I say there is probably 20,000 of them
actively involved in taking shots at us, maybe as many as
80,000 active sympathizers. Our problem is not organizing the
Iraqi Armed Forces. It is creating the political conditions
upon which these people think it is worth fighting and dying
for: Either the provincial leadership, the urban leadership,
the national leadership, religious leadership, or someone. That
is why police and army fight and that is what has been lacking,
and I think is now beginning to appear because of the January
elections and so the general notion--and Sistani's leadership
and others--many of the Shi'a, many of the Kurds, are
grudgingly seeing a reason to create a federal security force,
and that is starting to happen.
Again, if the constitution, regardless of its final shape,
creates Sunni inclusion in the government, I think we will see
more reaction.
I would also suggest to you that--and I think I may be a
lone voice on this one--when we said we are going to disarm the
militias, the Pesh Merga need to go away, it struck me as the
height of naivete. Why would anybody in their right mind in the
Kurdish leadership agree to disarm and throw their future in
the hands of a federal Iraqi State is beyond me. Why would the
Shi'a, who got slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands--300,00
Shi'a dead, maybe 180,000 Kurds, out of the Iraqi Sunni
dictatorship. Why would either group disarm?
So my own notion is we ought to recognize that there is a
place for them, certainly in countercriminal operations,
counterinsurgency in their own regions. Maybe they ought to be
in the national uniform. But we should not expect that the
Iraqis, at any level, will or should voluntarily disarm.
Nor should we, in my view, expect that in the short run we
are going to get a Sunni police battalion to go into Ramadi on
its own and conduct active intelligent counterinsurgency
operations. It will not happen until they think the Sunnis are
in the political process.
Finally on the training notion, in country, out of country.
I watched this process in Afghanistan also with great interest.
I think the single most effective thing is John Abizaid and
George Casey and Petraeus have put these training teams inside
Iraqi battalions. A lot of them are Marine and Army Reservists
and National Guard. A Utah State Police, Marine major I talked
to--it is not surprising to me they immediately fall in love
with the people they are training. They are happy they are
there. They have a huge sense of courage to stay out there and
live out there with these unknown foreign units. They are
starting to have an impact.
I have had a lot of conversations in small groups with
Iraqi officers--the leadership of an infantry battalion, two
Republican Guard officers, a sergeant major with 14 years in
the Hamurabi Division. The three of them told me: Hey, you gave
us our chance, our lives are unimportant; we intend to seize on
this and create a new Iraq. And I believe them. I might add
when I say that, I started my Vietnam experience as an adviser
with a Vietnamese airborne infantry battalion. I think it is
actually taking hold.
Now, the other thing Generals Abizaid and Casey have done
is, they have put a U.S. Marine or Army battalion linked into
each of these emerging army battalions. That is having a huge
impact. I went up to the 1st of the 30th Infantry southeast of
Tikrit. Their infantry battalion is collocated with them. They
are actively out there, but the people kicking down the door--
and by the way, they are trying to teach them to knock on the
door and ask for permission to enter. The entry forces are
Iraqi, not United States Army. I think that is having an
impact.
Finally, I agree with Dr. Cordesman. We have got a limited
number of fighters and people who are good leaders in that
emerging Iraqi security force. The last thing we want to do is
send them to Germany for the year course in how to be a police
officer in Munich or to send them to West Point for 4 years to
emerge with a balanced education.
These people are in the same situation we were in 1941;
250,000 troops to 16 million in the space of 36 months. The
Iraqis have got to stay there and fight because I would argue
by the end of next summer we are going to be halfway out of
Iraq, and hopefully with a stabilizing backup force. But we are
reaching end game.
I went into Fallujah, an angry, ruined city, which I
personally do not believe three-quarters of the population is
back in there; 250,000 people? Come on. I saw 900 threatening
looking males driving around the city. But when you get in
there, the Iraqi police now are manning the checkpoints. The
entry control points are Iraqis and the Marines are backing
them up.
Again, thank God for--and I think Dr. Cordesman is right.
It is not just Petraeus. There is a lot of Army Reservists
doing this also and Marine Reservists. They have got a huge
sense of momentum going. But we need an infusion at a serious
level of equipment and then we need to let the political
process create legitimacy under which these Iraqi young people
will fight.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General.
Let me raise now a fourth area, and I will ask Dr. Pollack
to initiate the dialog on that, and then General and Dr.
Cordesman. Should the President of the United States change the
force structure of the United States presence in Iraq? Do we
have the right number and types of troops in Iraq now? In the
short run, should the United States increase the number of
troops in Iraq to provide greater security and support of
critical political milestones, such as the writing of the
constitution, the October constitutional referendum, the
December 2005 elections?
Would an increase in United States troops have a
discernible impact on security? Would it upset Iraqi public
opinion? Or should we begin drawing down some forces, based on
the presumption that the United States troop presence fuels the
insurgents and undergirds their propaganda?
Dr. Pollack.
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator.
Let me begin my response by starting with the end of your
last question, because I think it is actually related as much
to this one. This is the question of the militias in Iraq. I
completely agree with Dr. Cordesman that the militias are not
ready to go away, nor are they ready to be integrated into some
larger force.
This is part of the dilemma that we face in Iraq. The
dilemma we face is that we have not created the circumstances
in Iraq in which it is politically, economically, or militarily
conceivable to do away with those militias. Frankly, those
militias are very popular in many parts of Iraq because they
are the only forces that are providing day-to-day security for
the Iraqi people.
In fact, what I have seen over the past year is the
proliferation of militias throughout Iraq, and to a great
extent you see all throughout Iraqi, local alims, local
sheikhs, other figures who are gathering weaponry, gathering
ammunition, and tapping personnel to say, if the balloon goes
up, if civil war breaks out, will you be there to fight for the
neighborhood, and putting together their own militias.
This, I think, is a clear sign that the militias are not
ready to go away because we have not yet solved the security
problems of the country.
Keeping simply the needs of Iraq in mind, moving from that
to the bigger picture, would it be useful to have more troops
in Iraq? Yes, it would be more useful to have more troops in
Iraq. I think regardless of our strategy it would be more
useful to have more troops in Iraq. I would argue that if we
continue with the current strategy that we have been employing
it is absolutely essential because, again, while it is the best
solution to have Iraqis performing these missions for us, we
are a long way from having the numbers of fully capable Iraqi
forces who can do these things.
The interim, the period between now and when we will have
those forces available, is very important, because in that
interim if things go awry the country could easily slide into
the civil war that Senator Biden talked about in his opening
statement. That civil war is on the minds of Iraqis. It is
always in the back of their heads. It is something that they
fear on a regular basis. It is one of the reasons why they
continue to tolerate and, to some extent, are enthusiastic
about our continuing presence, despite the fact that we
continue to disappoint them in our inability to provide them
with basic security and basic services.
Strangely, I think that if we continue with our current
strategy, it is absolutely essential to have more forces in
Iraq and, in fact, it will require a massive infusion of
troops, because, at present, we do not have the fully capable
forces capable of both suppressing the insurgency, as we are
attempting to do, and providing security for the Iraqi people,
and only a massive increase in forces will allow us to do those
two things simultaneously.
The alternative which I have suggested, a true, a
traditional counterinsurgency approach, a spreading inkspot, a
spreading oil stain, would greatly benefit from more troops,
but it is not essential. In point of fact, it is one of the
reasons why I am increasingly drawn to this, because it is
possible to begin this kind of a counterinsurgency strategy
with a smaller contingent of forces. Certainly the contingent
of forces that we have on hand, given the widespread support of
reconstruction, is actually a very significant amount of forces
and probably would allow us to start building an enclave,
building safe zones, in a very significant chunk of the country
already.
But this is the whole point of a traditional
counterinsurgency strategy. You start with only a portion of
the country. You make it secure, you make people enthusiastic
about it, and as you train additional indigenous forces that
allows you to spread out and encompass ever-greater regions of
the population.
So it would certainly be useful to have more troops because
the more troops that we have the larger the area that we could
start off pacifying. But if we stick with our current strategy,
as I said, I think it is absolutely critical that we do so.
Now, let me come to the question that you raised at the end
of your option, which is: Would it be counterproductive to
increase American troop levels in Iraq? There I will say
unequivocally ``No''; it would not. I think it is truly
perverse to argue that the presence of American troops are
actually causing the terrorist attacks and insurgency. This is
simply false. The insurgents attack the Iraqis as much, if not
more, than they attack American forces. As Dr. Cordesman
pointed out, the insurgents believe that they are waging the
beginning of a civil war.
The removal of American forces would not eliminate the
insurgency or the terrorist attacks. It would simply unleash
that civil war.
As for whether it would create greater animosity among
Iraqis, here it is a little bit thornier. It is true that
Iraqis resent, many Iraqis resent, our presence in the country.
It is also true that some Iraqis simply have soured completely
on our presence. I think that there truly are Iraqis who may
have welcomed us in 2003 and today just want to see us go at
all costs. But it has been my experience and reading the public
opinions carefully--and I think you do have to read them very
carefully because they are often very misleading--because
oftentimes it is the only moment that Iraqis have to speak
truth to power.
But reading them carefully and listening to Iraqis on a
regular basis, what I consistently hear from Iraqis is, if you
start out asking them about the American presence they will say
something along the lines of: Why do you not just leave? But if
you push them hard, if you try to get beyond that initial
point, what you typically hear from them is some version of:
Actually, we do not want you to go at all; what we want is, we
want you to actually do something for us; we want you to
provide us with the security and the basic services that we
have been clamoring for for 2 years and frankly what I think is
perfectly reasonable for them to expect 2 years after the fall
of Baghdad.
I think that for the Iraqis an infusion of additional
American or other coalition forces, if somehow we could find
those troops, would grudgingly be accepted. In many quarters it
would be welcomed. But it would only be welcomed if those
forces were used to actually provide security for the Iraqi
people themselves. If our forces continue to operate the way
that they have and if we continue to have the priorities that
we do, then I think that the Iraqis will look at it and say:
Why are you bringing more forces into our country if you are
not helping us? Under those circumstances it could breed
greater animosity.
But it gets to the point that Senator Biden made at the
beginning. Just as I believe he is correct that the American
people are not concerned so much at the rising body count,
although that is obviously tragic for every family who has a
member of that list, they are more concerned about the strategy
and their sense that we do not yet know what we are doing in
Iraq.
So, too, I think is that the case for the Iraqis. They are
less concerned with the number of American troops in our
country than what it is we are doing in their country.
That, of course, brings me to the last point, which is
where do you find these troops? Frankly, Senator, I do not have
a good answer for that question. As I said, the problem that we
face is a short- to medium-term problem. It is the question of
what we do between now and 5 years from now, when we probably
will have large indigenous Iraqi forces that are capable of
shouldering most if not all of the mission at hand.
But there is a long road between then and now. And while I
think it would be extremely beneficial to increase our troop
presence in Iraq, I think it would be very difficult, given our
current force structure, to do so over the long term. I do not
dispute General McCaffrey's point about how we are hurting both
the Army and the Marines by this protracted deployment and how
we have handled it. It is one of the reasons why I think that
it may be time to look at the general force structure of the
U.S. military.
We created a military in the wake of the cold war that was
sized for certain missions. I think the Iraqi mission has
demonstrated that that military is incapable of handling this
mission, and this mission is critical, is vital to the national
interests of the United States.
In the short term, I think we probably can plus-up our
forces. Alternatively, as I said, we can move to a true
counterinsurgency strategy, which will be a very politically
difficult choice to make because it probably will mean saying
we are not going to provide security for parts of the country
and we are going to focus our efforts on parts that we think we
can secure and there are going to be parts of it that are going
to wind up looking like the Wild West, and it is going to take
us quite some time before we can get there. That is going to
be, politically, very unpalatable.
But I think that may be our only solution, at least in the
immediate term. Over the longer term, again we will train Iraqi
forces, but we probably should be thinking about how we can
reexpand our own order of battle so that we can start
committing greater forces to Iraq and be able to sustain them
without breaking the Army and the Marines.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Pollack.
General McCaffrey.
General McCaffrey. Well, I would clearly agree that we have
a 5-year challenge facing us in Iraq. It will probably take
that long to create a legitimate Iraqi State, get economic
reconstruction under way, and create Iraqi security forces that
are fully capable of, on their own, maintaining internal order
and protecting the country.
But I think the next 18 months are crucial. In my judgment
we are running out of domestic political support rapidly. The
U.S. National Guard, this huge professional, disciplined force,
is in a stage of meltdown and within 24 months will be coming
apart. The wheels are coming off the National Guard.
The U.S. Army now using year combat tours. Most of our
fighting forces are rolling into their third combat tour since
9/11. The Marines are running 7 months, a little bit better way
of operating it, a very different force structure requirement.
They are starting into their fifth combat tours.
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are incapable of sustaining
this campaign. The question of more United States military
forces for Iraq at the start is a moot point. They are not
there. They will not be there. We can surge one, two, three
brigades for the election. We will probably do that. This game
is coming to an end.
By next summer the National Guard combat brigades will have
been used up unless we fundamentally change the rules of the
game. Right now it says mandatory 24-month callup once in 5
years. If we change it, we will accelerate the self-destruction
of the Guard. But they are expended as of this summer, so we
are now back to Active-Duty Army and Marines. Who are rapidly
trying to create a fourth brigade in each U.S. Army division
using the same manpower, two-battalion brigades. To some extent
it is a shell game that will work as long as we are only doing
counterinsurgency in Iraq. So the bottom line is there will not
be any more United States forces for Iraq.
Now, the second point. Personally, I would argue the last
thing we are in Iraq to do is to conduct counterinsurgency
operations to pacify the country and to win their hearts and
minds. That ideology, that language, belongs in a different
environment. It seems to me we have done a tremendous gift to
the Iraqi people and the region by destroying the Saddam regime
and its coercive tools. Now what we are trying to do is create
a new political government, create new Iraqi security forces,
and get out of there.
So I would hope by December 2006 you would see perhaps
three U.S. Army and Marine divisions outside the urban areas,
particularly near Baghdad, but not involved in
counterinsurgency in any way, but only backing up the emergent
security force.
Finally, it seems to me that the larger issue, for your
committee and the Armed Services Committee to face, is not
Iraq. We are not going to--my guess is we have got about a .80
chance of pulling this off by the end of next summer. I am
reasonably optimistic this is--we are in a race against time,
lack of political will on the part of the American people being
the big factor. I would be surprised if we do not pull it off.
But we have got the wheels coming off the U.S. Armed
Forces. We are running our capital fleet into the ground. It is
not being rebuilt. Some time in the next 5 years, Castro is
going to die. We are going to have a million Cuba refugees at
sea. We are going to have an incipient civil war on the island.
We are going to have to think through Venezuela and our oil
energy. We are going to have to deter aggression against
Taiwan. We are going to have to add military legitimacy to the
political dialog with North Korea.
We are--and now the rhetoric coming out of the QDR is let
us go to a one-war capability, meaning you cannot use even the
force you have got because you have told the world when you
commit it, it is gone, there is no backup. So I think we are
underresourced and I believe in personal judgment--I join many
others--I think Secretary Rumsfeld is in denial of the evidence
in front of his eyes that this military structure is not
achieving its purpose and that we have to transform.
I would also probably take partial issue with Dr. Pollack,
the military we had was a World War II military, a cold-war
military, it is tanks and artillery, and these guys just do not
get it. That military took down the Afghan situation in under
100 days. That military went in and took down a million-man
army. The only cohesive force in Iraq for the last 2 years have
been U.S. Army and Marine company commanders and battalion
commanders, not on counterinsurgency, but on economic
reconstruction. That is who built city councils.
We are not new to the counterinsurgency game, for God's
sake. We have been doing this for 200 years, starting with
fighting our own indigenous warrior, Native Americans. I think
when you look at downtown Iraq, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle,
the Stryker units up north, the combination of armor and
special ops and intel and Army aviation, the force structure is
pretty good.
It is not to argue against transformation. We get some real
problems out there to change SOCOM's credentials and resourcing
in particular. But I do not think the U.S. Armed Forces are the
key factor, the bottom line, in Iraq right now. They are so
tough, so disciplined, so determined, that the insurgency is
leaving them alone. The insurgents are not operating in units
bigger than squad-sized units. They had 50 of them attack Abu
Ghraib 60 days ago and we killed damn near all of them almost
immediately.
They have stopped using mortars in most cases against our
troop cantonments and they are going to rockets because when
they do we use counterbattery and nail the shooter, or overhead
systems or Predator.
So I think the military is doing a terrific job. What we
need is this new Ambassador on the ground and a 36-month
strategy to get us out of there and to leave a determined Iraqi
Government with its own security forces.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. I think that both Dr. Pollack and General
McCaffrey have raised an issue which is not related directly to
your questions, but absolutely critical. It is somewhat
striking that 6 years after we began talking about force
transformation we have one practical example, which is General
Schoomaker's reorganization of the Army, and no meaningful
future year defense program, no meaningful cost containment of
procurement, no plans to reorganize our force structure in
terms of the Reserves, the Guard, or any of the other elements
that address not only this contingency, but any other
contingency that we face.
I do not know if we are going to talk our way through
another quadrennial defense review, but at this point all I can
say is, who cares? I learned when I worked in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense if you are not shaping the budget it is
all nonsense. What we have had, frankly, is 6 years, to be
polite about it, in which we have not shaped the budget. And if
all of those studies were burned tomorrow, who would ever know?
That, unfortunately, has set the groundwork that we now
have to face. Whether or not I agree with Dr. Pollack--and I do
not--on how I would use the troops, I would love to have more
people with language skills, civil-military experience. I would
love to have people who could actually stay long enough and
provide the continuity that is the key, regardless of how you
are using people.
But we have not got them. We have already over-rotated the
people who are really good and we really need. Putting more men
and women in simply for the sake of more men and women is not
going to serve a purpose. If we cannot answer the question of
where skilled people are coming from, the question, as General
McCaffrey has said, is moot.
I have to say there is one area where we could potentially
find more people and where it would serve a purpose of, I
think, really helping in the areas which are relatively secure.
I found it amazing how few foreign service officers, who are
career officers, have actually volunteered, who are actually
performing duties in the field. In many cases these are people
who are taking extended tours. A small part of the foreign
service is taking on far too much of the job, supplemented in
many cases by young contract personnel.
One real issue here is why do we not have the civilian
counterparts for the military? That is one of the critical
aspects of the police training effort. One problem has been the
Department of Homeland Security, other elements of the civilian
side of the government. These are skills the military do not
have. They are also skills we have not really drawn on.
If I was to look at a priority where there may be some
leeway for action, that is one of the critical ones. A more
general issue for this committee is do we need a foreign
service trained to hide in the embassies and pursue its careers
in Washington, and if not should we change retention,
promotion, and recruiting fundamentally?
In a world where we talk about wars on terrorism and
constant risk, having a foreign service oriented toward its own
security and having civilian agencies which cannot be the
military counterpart is a warning that goes far beyond Iraq.
Now let me address the more specific issues here. I do not
believe that it is 3 to 5 years before we find out whether
Iraqis can perform the security mission. I agree with General
McCaffrey that in the next 6 to 18 months we either pull this
thing together or we do not. We are going to pull it together
by finding out whether Iraqi forces come on line, not in full
strength, but enough strength to make a difference, in areas
which are more secure. We are going to find out whether Iraqi
governants can actually deploy outside Baghdad and handle the
regional issues involved, and we are going to find out whether
Iraqi politics are inclusive.
We are going to find out whether we can hold together the
relationship between the Kurds and the Arabs, something that is
basically uncertain. We are going to find out whether the
Shiite areas which are relatively secure can establish, not
security in any classic sense, but governance, of which
effective police forces and security forces are part. Basra is
a warning. United States-British troops could not address a
single problem that is a security problem in Basra today. All
they could do is add to the tensions between Shiite groups.
Over far too much of the south that is the case.
Iraqi pulls it together with Iraqi security and police
forces or General McCaffrey's 80-percent chance of success
comes a lot closer to mine, which is 50 percent and dropping.
Similarly, in the Sunni areas we either can put people into
the field who can govern, who can be a police force, and at the
same time pressure Sunnis while the inclusive structure works
or we fail.
That to me is the key set of priorities, and U.S. troops
simply are not capable of handling it. We may have to surge
them. There may be a need, even at the cost of even further
future problems for our all-volunteer force structure, to pull
in specialized units to meet specialized needs. But sheer
numbers, 10,000 men and women, what on earth does that mean?
Ten thousand men and women with what capability to do what?
I was trained from the start in the Department of Defense
that whenever you start quoting total manpower numbers you have
become irrelevant. I think in general that is one of the
problems here. If you cannot say who to do what, when, and
where, this is the kind of strategic generalization that does
more harm than good.
But let me make a final point here, and that is, would it
upset Iraqi public opinion, is there hostility? I here--I do
very much disagree with Dr. Pollack. I think in much of the
south people sincerely do not want any kind of foreign military
presence. In most Sunni areas I do not think they want us to do
security missions.
I think this is a very sincere nationalism, antagonism. It
goes beyond Islamists. It is something I watched in Iraqi from
1971 onward and I do not believe it has changed on the basis of
my recent visits to Iraq. That is why I think, one way or
another, either the Iraqis do this or we fail, and we need to
understand that and begin to accept the risk.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman.
In our invitation to the witnesses we indicated that at
this point there would be an opportunity for each of you to
make concluding points or to reinforce something that you have
said in view of what others have said. You have all been
interacting remarkably in any event, but let me at this point
ask you, Dr. Pollack, if you would like to make a final
comment.
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I have said
all that I need to say about my views about our military
strategy and the need to adopt a traditional counterinsurgency
approach. Let me make just a couple of additional points and I
will make them very briefly.
I do think that we need to adopt as well a new political
approach. I think that this is critical and we have all been
talking about the importance of both the political and economic
environments in Iraq to solving the security situation. I have
repeatedly come back to the security situation because in my
conversations with Iraqis, in my conversations with Americans
working out in the field with Iraqis, it is security that is
the first problem. It is security that is hampering the
political and economic reconstruction programs, and, therefore,
if we do not tackle security and start to make changes there, I
think it very difficult to deal with the political and economic
solutions, which are critical elements in the reconstruction of
Iraq and the solution to dealing with the insurgency and the
broader problems of the country.
But one of the problems that we have facing us--and it is a
point that I made with regard to General McCaffrey's very apt
point about the importance of a legitimate political process--
is that the Iraqis see this as a legitimate political process.
It is all well and good for the United States to stand up and
say this is a legitimate process, but if the Iraqis do not buy
it it is meaningless, because, back to Dr. Cordesman's earlier
point and his repeated point, that we need Iraqis who are
willing to fight and die for this country.
Unfortunately, what we have increasingly seen is that for
many Iraqis a piece of paper that looks very nice to us does
not necessarily do it for them. In particular, one thing that I
am increasingly hearing from Iraqis and seeing in both press
reports and in United States Government reports is increasing
disconnect between the Government in Iraq, in Baghdad, in the
green zone, and the rest of the country. I am very frightened
when I hear Iraqi friends talking about ``those people in
Baghdad,'' meaning the new transitional governments, whom they
seem to believe are not really interested in their lives and
are not making much of an effort to help them, largely because
they do not see any sort of improvement in the basic material
aspects of their lives--security, electricity, these other
factors that I have mentioned repeatedly.
This is a tremendous problem. Iraqis complain about the
corruption that General McCaffrey mentioned. They complain
about the corruption within the government itself. Here I want
to be very careful. As best I can tell, most Iraqis very much
like Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari. They believe that he is not
corrupt and that he is very well-intentioned. But other members
of their government do not seem to get that same impression, or
give that same impression to the rest of the country.
There is enormous corruption in the country. As I wrote in
the New York Times, the Iraqi oil ministry seems to be nothing
but a sieve. I would urge this committee in particular to try
to get to the bottom of where that money is going, because it
is an awful lot of money that ought to be going to the Iraqi
people and does not seem to be.
But our focus has been on this political process in
Baghdad, and that political process needs to succeed. Do not
get me wrong, please. It is necessary. It is a necessary
element of success. But it is not sufficient. For Iraqis to see
this political process as being legitimate, they need a
connection to their government which does not yet exist.
Many of these political parties have not made an effort to
put down roots in the community, to recognize what the
complaints are of their constituents, and to try to bring them
real material benefits. As a result, Iraqis often feel
disconnected from what we claim is their political leadership
in Baghdad, and increasingly they are looking to go their own
way.
It is why you increasingly hear calls for autonomy, not
just from Kurdistan, but from the Shi'a areas of southeastern
Iraq, and that is extremely troubling. Again, that is the road
to civil war.
As a final point, since we have been jousting all morning,
let me make one final rejoinder to Dr. Cordesman, which is his
statement that the Iraqis either do this or we fail. I am in
mortal danger of that statement. I think that is an enormous
gamble. What I have seen from the Iraqis in Iraq, studying them
for 17 years--and I recognize that Tony's numbers are double
mine--the Iraqis cannot do this for themselves.
We need to help them get past the first hurdles, and these
are big hurdles, because they cannot do it for themselves. They
are not culturally, politically, or socially inclined.
Just one point. Let us remember that this is a society that
for 30 years Saddam reinforced to the notion that they should
not do for themselves, that the state should do everything for
them and that Baghdad should be the arbiter of all
decisionmaking in the country. When you get out into the
countryside of Iraq and you talk to American personnel,
military and civilian talking to Iraqis, they will say this
again and again and again: We cannot get the Iraqis to do it
for themselves. They expect us, they expect Baghdad, to do
everything for them.
It is going to take time to get past that, and it is going
to take time before we have an Iraqi military that is capable
of dealing with the security system. Just saying that it is
either sink or swim, the Iraqis are going to do it, or not, in
6 or 18 months, frankly, I would say that the chances of
success are a lot less than 80 or 50 percent.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Pollack.
I just have to interject at this point that under my
distinguished friend Joe Biden's chairmanship, we had a good
number of hearings before the war commenced. And distinguished
persons just like yourself sat in front of us. Many of them
were what I have termed to be the ``dancing-in-the-street
crowd.'' They claimed that we would be welcomed, there was no
need to have a whole lot of troops out there; the Iraqis, once
rid of Saddam, would take care of their situation.
Obviously, these views were not well founded, but
nevertheless that was then; this is now. And I appreciate your
testimony this morning very much.
Let me just indicate----
Senator Biden. I think the record should note Dr. Pollack
was not one of them.
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator Biden.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden, for making that
interjection.
Senator Biden. Others were more inclined to think that.
The Chairman. Well, we will not go there.
The fact is that there is not an easy bifurcation between
security, politics, and economics. On Wednesday, as a matter of
fact, we hope to discover where the oil money is or how much
there is, because, somehow, despite the fact that security must
be provided, and likewise a constitution or a political
framework, someone must pay for all of this. Revenues must be
raised in Iraq. There must be a functioning economy. So we want
to discover all of these things sort of ad seriatim in the
early days of this week.
General McCaffrey, do you have some final comments?
General McCaffrey. Well, I provided an after-action report,
Senator Lugar, to you and your members of the committee.
The Chairman. Yes.
General McCaffrey. I tried to bring together some of the
insights, to include a listing of the vulnerabilities I thought
we faced, because I think the situation--essentially, I came
back this time saying, reminding myself how impressed I was by
the courage, the dedication, and skill of the U.S. Armed
Forces. We have never had more creative, brave young men and
women in uniform in our history. They are doing a remarkable
job.
The second observation, I thought we are finally getting--
Negroponte and Abizaid and Casey put together a decent
strategy. I told them the strategy should not be classified; it
ought to be up on billboards outside all of their encampments.
Essentially it says we are going to create an Iraqi State and
Iraqi security forces and we are leaving in some measured way.
Then finally, I think I saw some chance that the Sunnis
would decide to participate politically instead of just
fighting.
Now, balancing that, a couple of other observations. I
steadfastly, and certainly on TV or radio, never allowed myself
to be drawn into a comparison of Vietnam and Iraq. To be blunt,
there are no political or economic or national security
comparisons, except possibly U.S. domestic politics. But one
thing struck me this last time. I was able to move around the
whole country because I had this terrific young group of kids,
Texas National Guard, security, two Blackhawks, two Apaches,
advance parties, et cetera.
Baghdad is 10 times more complex and dangerous than Saigon
ever was. I used to live in an air-conditioned BOQ and drive,
normally with two beers under our belts, down to Vung Tao to
the beach with two bodyguards. This whole situation in Iraq is
a real demanding, dangerous enterprise, where we have huge
national security interests at stake. I personally would
underscore in my judgment we had better pull this off. If it
requires further resources or sacrifice on the part of the
American people, we will be making a terrible misjudgment if we
do not stay the game.
Finally, sort of a minor observation. About one of the few
things I was critical of the U.S. Armed Forces leaving country
was our public diplomacy, our press policy, our media policy. I
think the media are starting to send the second team to Iraq.
It is dangerous. They are using unknown Arabic stringers to do
their reporting. They are focusing on the bomb blasts with
borrowed video. They cannot get out of their hotels, and the
U.S. Armed Forces had better support them.
Conversely, the Pentagon--I, debriefing this trip, said,
can you imagine in World War II; we would have had a guy like
Petraeus, who was widely hammered around Washington for
appearing on the front page of Time Magazine or something--can
you imagine taking in World War II some brave-hearted battle
leader with a doctorate from Princeton who is telegenic and
likes creating Arabic forces and telling him to stay out of the
eyesight of the American people?
What are we doing? The most trusted institution in American
society now are the U.S. Armed Forces, hands down. They are up
in the 80th percentile or higher. Our battalion and brigade and
division commanders ought to be responding to the American
people on TV and to the print media, and they are not doing it.
So I think there is room for a little energy to get that
process going. A free press, there will be no argument in this
hearing room, is essential to what we are trying to achieve
there.
I thank you, sir, to you and your committee for the
opportunity to share these ideas with you.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate your comments very much.
On the last one, in another forum, I am going to be testifying
at a Wednesday hearing on the media shield law. It strikes me
this is another media shield situation. We really need to have
persons who are articulate and well-informed talking about
Iraq.
Senator Biden. That is uniforms and not suits at the
Pentagon.
The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. Thank you.
This is an enormous gamble and the stakes are
extraordinarily high, and they go far beyond Iraq. They affect
the gulf, our strategic energy interests, the overall problem
that we are struggling with, which is Islamist extremist
terror.
I agree that it is going to take years. I have no idea how
many, whether it is 5, 10, or 12. The point is not that we can
set the calendar. The point is we cannot set the calendar and
we need a prolonged commitment.
But I think General McCaffrey made the point, perhaps we
all have made it in different ways, we have got to get through
the next 18 months to get to those other periods. When I talk
about Iraqi forces, I do not mean they will be ready. We will
need significant United States troops until Iraqi forces can
take over, and I do not know when that is. What I am certain of
is that if the current procedure for training and expanding the
role of Iraqi forces fails, we do not have a backup with United
States military presence or anyone else.
We have a political calendar where we can make many
slippages in time or content. Iraq already had a good
constitution. It did not really help very much. Perhaps having
a better one may help or it may not. I think in the real
world--Ken touched on the issue--the constitution counts when
it touches on three things: Money, mostly how the oil money
gets allocated; power, who has the power in the center; and
then federalism or regionalism, how do you protect the
minorities. Everything else is a little too Jeffersonian to
reach Iraqi hearts and minds.
The election that is coming may, or may not, make things
better. We may see a lot more selfish ethnic, sectarian, and
service politics. But what we have to have is unity and avoid
civil war. To me, the exit strategy that is inevitable is we
cannot fix Iraq if Iraq attacks itself, and we have to bear
that in mind and I hope you will bear it in mind in your
hearings on the political and economic dimension.
We have talked here about a number of issues on the
military side. Let me conclude with a few points--you asked for
recommendations--that really do not relate to the military
side, but to the other aspects of U.S. policy that I think are
critical.
I believe we face three major enemies in Iraq. One is the
mainstream of Sunni insurgents, the other is Islamist
extremists, and the third is the management of the aid process
here in Washington. We have now committed as of this week $19
billion out of $20 billion in aid money. Ken noted the problems
in figuring out where the oil money is going. I think time and
again it does not matter whether we have completed most of
these projects. If we drew a map, they will be in the wrong
area, they did not affect real world service, and they are not
sustainable.
The reporting going to this committee and to the public is
like the Russian reporting. It is a number of project starts
with a member of project completions, nothing on meeting
project needs, no mapping of who it influences. It also is
putting U.S. contractors, U.S. security teams, foreign
contractors, and foreign security teams everywhere that it is
operating. Whatever the hostility may be toward U.S. troops, I
suggest the committee might want to drive behind some of those
personal security detachments for contractors some day and see
how they behave and see the level of hostility that is there.
When we talk about Iraqi corruption, let me say that Iraqi
corruption is infinitely preferable to ours. At least most of
the money will be spent in Iraq and stay there.
I think you need to ask some very searching questions in
your next hearing. I see that Ambassador Khalilzad has already
talked about moving the management of aid to the Iraqis into
the Embassy and to the team in Iraq, and I think anything you
do to bypass USAID in Washington and the defense contracting
effort in Washington will be as effective a counterinsurgency
action as anything you can do militarily. They are part of the
threat, not part of the solution.
Let me say in terms of public diplomacy here, General
McCaffrey and Ken also raised a critical issue. What bothers me
is our inability to communicate in Iraqi terms clearly and
unambiguously that we will not be guilty of the conspiracy
theories that they see us as most potentially guilty of, and
those essentially are permanent bases versus advisory efforts,
taking the oil, taking the land.
We do not seem to have the public diplomacy here to support
the public diplomacy in the field, and the public diplomacy in
the field is badly underfunded and badly underpersoned simply
because it is not given the seriousness it needs. So that adds
to the aid dimension another issue.
I think we have not touched on international organization.
I do not believe we can go for foreign troops. I do believe we
badly need to go for foreign help, and Ken mentioned the idea
of having some kind of contact groups, of expanding our role
here. I think that is absolutely critical.
Let me just make one final point about oil, and I think it
sums up what the committee might want to focus on. I get a
little surprised when I look at my watch and find it is 2005
and I then read the status report from the Department of State
as of 13 July 2005 and read: ``On July 10th, bilateral energy
consultations were held between the Iraqi Oil and Electricity
Ministries and the U.S. Departments of Energy and State
covering issues such as developing a needs assessment into
Iraq's natural gas utilization for power generation.''
We have spent $19.1 billion out of $20.9 billion and we do
not have a clear assessment of the needs for Iraq's major
source of revenue? We face a situation next year where the
Iraqi budget is in excess of $18 billion. That is virtually the
total of its entire oil revenues. And you have not even started
planning for your $30 billion supplemental in aid for Iraq for
the coming fiscal year. There is something wrong here that goes
far beyond the military dimension.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Cordesman.
Let me just indicate, before we begin our questioning, how
much we appreciate the preparation each of you have made and
even more the testimony you have given this morning. I think
each one of us has benefited tremendously from the intellectual
stimulation and also, hopefully, more than that from the action
steps that we would feel impelled to take listening to the
three of you talk.
But now we want to ask some questions of you. We will have
a 10-minute round and maybe more as members may have additional
questions. I would like to begin my portion by asking you,
General McCaffrey, in your testimony, in your written
testimony, you suggest the period between January to September
2006, that is next year, would be the peak of the insurgency.
Can you discuss a bit more this conclusion? In other words, all
three of you have identified this period from July 2005 to the
end of 2006 as roughly the 18 months of critical time.
You have introduced, General McCaffrey, the suggestion that
6 months from now, more or less, the insurgency may pick up and
continue on in its strongest form for maybe that 8- or 9-month
period. What is your thought about that?
General McCaffrey. Well, it will be interesting to see what
I say in January 2006.
My sort of gut instinct was that the new Ambassador we are
going to send in there to replace Negroponte is a national
treasure. This fellow has a tremendous sense of dealing with
these kind of issues. I think if we can lock Abizaid and some
of the other senior military leadership in place, the current
trend lines say if the Sunnis come into the government--and I
actually--I have been sort of fascinated listening to my two
colleagues here, in particular the notion that they used to
have a decent constitution anyway, but it made no impact. So if
we can get a constitution that is not viewed as malignant to
the Sunnis and if there is a vote, and if there is a
pluralistic government of some sort in January, and if the
construction of the Iraqi security forces continues on its
current lines, in which by December we are alleging we will
have even more people on the ground, 60 to 100,000 that are
determined to try and support this political process, then I
think that would be the high point of the insurgency.
I have said all along the foreign jihadists, the suicide
bombers, the slaughter of the innocents, the nailing of the
Iraqi police forces as they are lined up to take rollcall, will
not materially affect the outcome of this conflict. What we are
watching in Iraq is: Can you take three warring factions--the
Kurds, the Shi'a, and the Sunni--cobble together some loose
federal structure, and have some way of capitalizing on their
oil income and creating law and order?
I am betting that, the current trend lines, we will
probably see January be the high point of the insurgency, and
then by, hopefully, the end of next summer, as we are forced
into large-scale drawdowns of our military forces, that the
Iraqis will be there to pick up the energy.
The Chairman. Each of you in a way talked about our
problems, our military structure. The drawdown seems to be
there in the vision. It seems to be with all three of you. But
as you are pointing out, success, whether it is the 80 percent
you suggested, General McCaffrey, or the 50 percent you
suggested, Dr. Cordesman, is dependent upon these factors of
the inclusion of all the parties in the government and their
respect for this constitution. That means respect for a process
that has allocated oil revenues, or for a sense of federalism
or autonomy, as that might be a part of the constitutional
structure. The Kurds have certainly called for this, others
maybe, so that there will be some loyalty felt by all the
parties toward the center and, therefore, some willingness to
fight for it.
When Prime Minister Jafari came to this country recently to
visit with our President, he stressed against the skeptics that
August 15 really is important to get the constitution done. You
have barely got some of the Sunnis around the table. You just
appointed a few the other day. What is being written? How in
the world can you cobble together a constitution by the 15th?
Some have even suggested a little fudging, that it might go
on until September 15 even if the August 15 deadline was sort
of kept there. But in any event, there is going to be a
constitution and a referendum, apparently. But the referendum
has some tough qualifications. As I recall, there must be a
two-thirds majority in each of the 18 governmental provinces
now, which means a lot of people will need to be on board to
get those kinds of pluralities.
But even then, Prime Minister Jafari was optimistic that
this is going to happen. They proceed on to the elections,
which will then lead to the legitimacy of this elected
government that we are talking about, that will have the
support of everybody. There will be some sense as you suggest,
I think, Dr. Cordesman, that power is recognized there and is
accepted, that the oil revenues situation has been worked out,
and that even regionalism, the sense of the Kurds, some sense
of autonomy there, has been worked out. They want to be Iraqis
as opposed to Kurds and a greater Kurdistan. That is the reason
Jafari was saying we have got to proceed right along with these
deadlines; these are not to be debated, despite the practical
considerations.
What is your judgment, Dr. Pollack, on how likely it is
that the August 15 deadline, or some reasonable deadline soon
thereafter, will be met with a constitution? Will this
referendum in 18 districts, a two-thirds vote, happen with good
participation by Iraqis, with maybe more Sunnis coming out this
time? Likewise, will the officers that are selected under this
constitution in December or January or whenever that event
occurs, be accepted? Are they going to be the kind of people
who say, we are Iraqis now?
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think there is a reasonable expectation that August 15
will happen with--will come to pass and there will be a
constitution agreed upon. I do not think it is a certainty and
I would not want to assign a probability. On the one hand, we
have seen the members of this government squabble over almost
everything imaginable and the delays that we saw in the
formation of this government suggest that we could just as
easily see them unable to come to an agreement.
The TAL was very much a compromise document. It was
something that very few Iraqis really liked. Repeatedly they
have looked at the TAL, they have taken runs at the TAL, and
they have basically decided to leave the TAL intact because
they have not yet wanted to have the kind of all-out fight they
seem to believe that opening up the TAL again will require.
Now, that is not necessarily bad. As we know from our own
experience, constitutions are compromise documents. No one gets
everything that they want from a constitution. And I suspect
that there were any number of people who walked away from our
constitutional convention very unhappy, bitterly disappointed
by the compromises that were reached there. But ultimately it
was good enough to make it work.
What, of course, is critical in all of this is whether the
Iraqis see those compromises as good enough to respect it and
to live with it.
I think it is conceivable that we could get to August 15
and have a constitution, and it is also conceivable to me that
those compromises, which while unpalatable to a greater or
lesser degree by a whole range of Iraqis, could ultimately be
accepted.
Let me say, Senator, that my greater concern is that this
will all be seen as ultimately irrelevant to the great many
Iraqis. I think that if we have a--if we do get a good
constitution on August 15 you probably will see a lot of Iraqis
come forward to vote and to approve it in the referendum. For
me this is very much like the January 30 elections, which were
as much expressions by Iraqis of a determination to make
reconstruction work as it was actual approval of the candidates
who were being elected.
Now, the UIA, the United Iraqi, list was very popular--
sorry, the Inter-Iraqi Alliance--was very popular because Grand
Ayatollah Sistani told people that this was the group that he
wanted in place and because Jafari himself was popular and
Hakim has a following, other members of the coalition were
themselves somewhat popular.
But I think it is very important to keep in mind that for a
great many Iraqis they voted and they voted for the United
Iraqi Alliance in expectation that this was going to be the
group who finally did bring them security and basic services,
and that same group is becoming increasingly frustrated with
this government because they are not providing those security
and basic services that they seek.
My fear is we could have a constitution, we could have a
referendum, we could have an election in December, and we may
find ourselves in exactly the same spot a year from now because
that new government is just as unable to provide the Iraqis
with the basic necessities that they demand and are entitled to
as this one and all of the past ones have.
The Chairman. I thank you for that.
Let me just conclude my portion by saying our focus today
was on Iraqi security, but in the course of that you have all
made comments that I think are important about United States
armed force structure and our security, as we face a whole list
of potential challenges throughout the world. We are trying to
think conscientiously about how we can allocate the resources
that are required in terms of manpower and money and what have
you to Iraq, recognizing that there is a rest of the world out
there.
So this is, hopefully, a wakeup call for all of us about
the ambitions of our foreign policy. Whether we have ambitions
or not, the needs of our national defense as well, require that
we take a look at vital security issues.
Senator Hagel, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for your efforts and honest, realistic
analysis of our current position in Iraq. I am grateful, as I
believe all who have had the opportunity to listen to you for
the last 2\1/2\ hours, for your wise counsel based on
significant experience, and certainly that includes recent
experience, recent, I would put it, within the timeframe of the
last 3 years, because each of you has been involved in framing
up the challenges even prior to our invasion of Iraq and have
been very steadfast in your continued honest analysis of the
realities of what we are up against.
I would want to comment on a point that the chairman just
made. General McCaffrey, you have alluded to it in your summary
remarks, and that is the magnificent conduct of our troops in
Iraq. I know you have just been there and have briefed some of
us personally, as you have done here today, and I assume you
have had an opportunity to brief senior members of the
Pentagon.
I do not believe it is a matter of whether our troops have
performed as magnificently as they have or not. In fact they
have. In fact, we have loaded on our military so much burden
and so much responsibility that I think it is part of the
reason, as each of you have alluded to, some more than others,
that we are in danger of destroying our National Guard and our
Reserves as well as our Active-Duty Force.
General McCaffrey, you are one of those young officers that
came out of Vietnam after a couple of tours, as well as Norm
Schwartzkopf and Colin Powell and another dozen or two dozen,
who stayed in the military and said we are going to rebuild it,
we are going to make it the kind of military that is worthy of
our country and our people, and you did.
I, too, am very concerned about what is happening to our
military and our force structure. You, General, have
articulated that point rather well, as Dr. Cordesman has
referred to it as well as Dr. Pollack. I think we have to be a
little careful that we do not connect this magnificent conduct
and the kind of responsibility we have loaded on our military
and the job they are doing with the policy.
As a matter of fact, the issue was in Vietnam and Korea,
every time we have asked our young men and women to make the
ultimate sacrifice and serve this country, in an unquestioned
way--and I would even say--and General, you were there and I
was there--I think our forces in Vietnam fought very valiantly.
They were not near as well trained as the forces in Iraq, nor
probably as well led, certainly not as well equipped.
But what we must assure our military and their families is
that we have a policy worthy of their service and their
sacrifices. That is the issue here. The issue is not whether
our troops have performed admirably, and they have. Also,
whether we are loading so much on them that they cannot
perform, in fact, can never be successful at what we are asking
them to do.
The three of you have made it very clear, and I happen to
agree. This is an issue, this war, this area of conflict, that
will be determined by a successful political outcome. It will
not be as a result of the military. The military is a very
significant piece of that, as you all three have noted--
security, stability, allowing Iraqis an opportunity to develop.
But in the end, it will be the Iraqi people who will decide.
I would say, in light of that, when the three of you make
some clear points of corruption, endemic corruption, which I
hear from all sources in and out of our government, in and out
of the military side of our government, the civilian side--that
is an issue that we are going to have to deal with and, as you
have noted, Dr. Cordesman, in your summary comments, hopefully
we will get into some of the specifics of that this week at our
next set of hearings.
But if there is so much rot so deep down in that
institution over there, then we do a great disservice to our
service men and women asking them to give their lives for
something that is not quite as noble as we like to portray it,
or as our leaders like to portray it to the American people.
The honesty of this effort is key in my opinion, and that
is why the three of you and others we will hear from this week,
your input is so important.
Let me ask just an aside. General McCaffrey, I suspect you
have had an opportunity to brief senior members of the
Pentagon, I do not know, National Security Council people,
others. I do not know who you have briefed. Let me ask Doctors
Pollack and Cordesman: Have you been called in by any senior
members of the administration to get your take recently on
Iraq? Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. I have talked to some of the officials who
are designated for Iraq, but I have not talked to people in the
administration.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Pollack.
Dr. Pollack. Certainly no one senior in the administration
on the issue of Iraq, certainly lower level, working-level
people have consulted with me on a regular basis.
Senator Hagel. Well, I will talk to Mr. Hadley, the
National Security Adviser, and I suggested to him, as well as
others in the administration at the highest levels of this
administration, to reach out to people like the three of you
and listen to the three of you and others. We are bubbled up to
a point I think where we are disconnected from some very basic
and dangerous dynamics of reality over there.
Anyone who has heard the three of you this morning, and
discount half of what you have said, it is still damn
disturbing. I am not surprised with what we heard. But the
administration would do well to reach into another universe of
thinking and experience like the three of you.
Thank you very much.
Now, question. I would like to get the three of your
thoughts on the Iran-Iraq relationship. As we know, the Prime
Minister of Iraq, a number of his Cabinet Ministers are in
Iran, have just completed talks there. How deep, how wide is
that relationship? Should it develop? What kind of challenges
does it present? Is it helpful? Does this lead to a wider sense
of a United States-Iranian opportunity for a relationship?
Any way you would like to take this, the three of you, I
would appreciate hearing from you, but specifically focus on
Iraq's challenges over the next couple of years. Can Iran play
a role there? Should they? How close should that relationship
develop? Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, it is inevitable that there will be
a relationship, that it will be strategically critical to Iraq,
as it will be to Iran, and that whether we like it or not it is
going to be a relationship which Iraq has to focus on and focus
on visibly. Just as the Saudis, with much less incentive, had
to reach out to Iran and reach a modus vivendi with Iran, Iraq
absolutely has to. It has to deal with the border issue. It has
to convince in many ways Iran that there is as little incentive
to interfere as possible.
There is the problem of reparations. There is the problem
of religious traffic across the border. You can go through a
whole list of issues where they have to work things out.
Fortunately, the issue of oil and transportation has somewhat
been eased. The Shatt-
al-Arab is essentially obsolete. Basically, modern shipping and
oil traffic will not be moving through there.
But even in terms of border incidents and waterway issues,
one of the things that Iraq is going to have to deal with
sooner or later is expanding its shipments out through the
gulf, and if you look at the hydrology of the gulf to get
efficient oil shipments it is going to have to change its
current mooring positions. These are just a few of the cases.
I do not know how Iran will play this out. I think it could
be very dangerous. If Iran sees anything approaching a civil
war buildup in Iraq, it is going to obviously back the Shiite
side. If anything approaching an American power vacuum exists
in Iraq, Iran is going to attempt to deal with that. If Iran
comes into confrontation with us, I am not sure it can resist
trying to play the Iraqi card in a negative way.
But my impression at this point in time is that Iraq knows
where to stop. The current leadership is not going to take
risks that have Iraq seriously involved in training or security
or advisory presences that would somehow threaten Iraqi control
of Iraq; that Iran sees the situation at least for this moment
as to its own advantage. We are effectively fighting a set of
threats in their interest.
But if you ask me what this Iranian Government will be 2
years from now or the moment it comes under pressure or the
moment it sees the political structure in Iraq fail, then I
think the current status could change very rapidly and very
unpredictably and almost inevitably for the worse.
Senator Hagel. General McCaffrey.
General McCaffrey. I agree with Dr. Cordesman's comments. I
think there are--I listed one of the vulnerabilities of CENTCOM
of our current Iraqi policy being the possibility of Iranian
intervention, most likely in a covert form, active intelligence
agents, money, cross-border operations, but potentially if the
thing started to spin out of control late next year, with
active military support to protect the Shi'a from being
slaughtered by the Sunnis again. I do not think they will
tolerate it.
There are two other background factors, one of which is
widely known, but I would argue is underappreciated. It seems
to me that our vital ally on the ground which is at great
jeopardy is Saudi Arabia. Now, if you wanted to ask me who I am
worried about, it is Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, perhaps, the two of them kluged together. They have
an enormous fear, as we all know, of a Shi'a domination of the
oil-producing regions of the gulf. The Saudi eastern oil fields
are largely Saudi Shi'a population. If you look at Iraq, the
layout of their oil reserves, much of them, particularly if
Kirkuk goes back to the Kurds, end up in non-Sunni hands.
So I think there is a political animosity that will unite
much of the Sunni leadership in the Middle East against
Iranian-Iraqi cooperation.
Finally, it is nuclear weapons. The Iranians are going
nuclear. They are going to achieve, in the next 5 years, some
modest capability, 10 to 20 weapons. It will change
dramatically the military balance of power in the Persian Gulf.
The U.S. Navy will no longer go into the gulf without
understanding they are literally placing 10 to 15,000 sailors'
lives at risk. I do not see us currently having either the
military power or the political will to deal with the several
completely unpalatable options to deal with that.
So flash forward 3 to 5 years. Iran is a nuclear power and
with a huge capability to influence events in Iraq; a situation
from which we will be withdrawing.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Pollack.
Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Senator. I also completely agree
with Dr. Cordesman's comments. I think they are right on the
money. Let me just amplify a couple of them because I think
they are important.
Iran-Iraq relations are going to--are deep and will
continue to deepen. There is no way that we can stop them and
it would be foolish of us to try to do so. One of my fears is
that there are elements within this government who see the
Iranian bug bear around every corner, believe that any Iranian
influence is inherently evil, and are fighting that influence
with everything they can, not recognizing that they are doing
tremendous damage to our relations with the new Iraqi
Government and to the new Iraqi Government's ability to
function. Iran will have a major influence in Iraq. We need to
recognize that and accept it.
By the same token, we should not see that influence as
necessarily pernicious. As Tony has pointed out, and I think he
is absolutely right, the Iranians are most afraid of chaos in
Iraq. They hear the same things that we do, they see the same
information we do. They, too, know that civil war is a very
real possibility in Iraq and that is their greatest concern.
As a result, I think we need to recognize that we have had
tremendous tacit cooperation from the Iranians over the last 2
years. The Iranians have been telling their various allies
inside of Iraq to participate in the process, the political
process that we have established. They have been restraining
various hotheads in Iraq who have wanted to act unilaterally,
to fight other groups, to engage in assassinations and
terrorist campaigns of their own, and that has been extremely
helpful to us.
The Iranians have not done it out of any goodwill for us.
They have done it, as Tony pointed out, purely because it is in
their interest to do so. My guess is that that will continue to
be the case, again as Tony points out, until one of three
things happens: We succeed; we fail and the place starts to
come apart; or we decide to try to mount military operations
against Iran. Under any of those circumstances, then I think
you could see Iran's perspective on Iraq changing.
If we succeed, you know what? That is a problem I would
very much like to have. If we succeed in Iraq and our problem
is what do we do about the Iranian competition over a
successful Iraq. If we fail, I think Tony is absolutely right.
The Iranians will get into Iraq as quickly as they can, and
they have set up a massive intelligence network inside Iraq to
be able to move--to allow them to move very quickly to arm
proxies, to set up safe havens, to create buffer zones, and to
go to war with various groups that are going to be allied
against them.
One point I would make, just a tweak to Tony's comments, is
that I suspect that a civil war on Iraq may not see Shi'a
versus Sunni; it may see fragmentation and different Shi'a
groups against different Shi'a groups and against different
Sunni groups. Under those circumstances, the Iranians will be
looking, and I think they already are looking, to identify
their allies and their adversaries in Iraq and move very
quickly to help their allies and hurt their adversaries as best
they can.
Obviously, the big unknown out there is--actually there are
two, and Tony alluded to at least one of them. One is what are
the Iranians going to do. They do have a new President. It is
unclear if that new President will have any impact whatsoever
on Iranian foreign policy. Their foreign policy so far has
been, in the last 5 years, pretty consistent and arguably quite
pragmatic, if not terribly pro-American. That is fine. We can
live with it.
If they change their policy, then things could start to be
different inside of Iraq. But by the same token, I think we
need to recognize that American policy toward Iran is very much
up for grabs, and some of the more aggressive policies we have
heard outlined toward Iran could have very serious
repercussions for us in Iraq.
As I said, we have greatly benefited from Iran's tacit
cooperation in Iraq. If we go to war with Iran, then we will
have very little incentive to continue to maintain that
cooperation over Iraq.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for a really
useful morning. I hope they had the television on in other
buildings downtown.
As usual, my friend from Nebraska asks the $64 question: Is
our policy worthy of our military? The answer is a flat ``No;
it is not.'' In my view we have no discernible regional policy.
I have not been able to divine it.
We talk about Iran--and I had not planned on mentioning
this, but Iran has certain interests as well. They do not want
any permanent U.S. bases. They want a quick exit but leaving
stability behind.
Everybody forgets--you guys do not because you are so used
to it. But you know, Persians have a bare majority in Iran. The
idea of the consequence of a civil war, a sectarian war, in
Iraq goes a lot further than just what the consequences are on
other countries in the region, what the consequences are
internally in Iran.
Our policy thus far has been a disaster. General, I think
there is a reason why--I will not bore you with; I have bored
you already privately with my views about my conversations over
the last 3 years with foreign leaders who could have helped and
offered to help, and I believe they offered to help, and the
way we dealt with it.
There is an old bad joke about George playing center field.
You basically said it. George plays center field; in the first
two innings he has five errors. The coach pulls George out and
says: Tony, you are in, and he puts Cordesman into center
field.
The first pitch, a routine fly ball to Cordesman hits his
glove; he drops it, error. The coach goes nuts, calls time out,
and says: Tony, you are out of there. As Tony Cordesman is
crossing the third base line the coach grabs him by the number
and says: What is the matter with you, Cordesman? Cordesman
looks at the coach and says: Coach, George screwed up center
field so badly no one can play it.
Well, the truth of the matter is that is part of our
problem. We have screwed up center field so badly,
economically, politically, and I would argue in terms of
military strategy from the suits, not the uniforms, that
anybody who tells me--if I go one more time and someone tells
me that we have given the military everything they want--that
is simply not true, not true, not true, not true.
In five trips to Iraq, I find an ascending willingness on
the part of flag officers to say out loud: Hey, I do not have
what I need. Because they figured out they are going to wear
the jacket, they are going to be the ones blamed, they are
going to be the ones blamed for a bad policy.
Well, enough of my talking about that. Let me point out,
this notion of U.S. interests and intentions, we have a big
problem. I asked the question of this administration why we
will not say we do not want any more bases there, just flat
out: We will not have a permanent base there. Guess what? They
have not resolved that issue internally. That is one of the
reasons why we do not have a good public diplomacy, General.
They do not know what to say. They do not know what to say as
to what our policy is.
The reconstruction policy, to quote a great chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, it is incompetent, incompetent,
incompetent. The corruption, as you point out, it is not just
Iraqi corruption. It really is incredible to me. It is
incredible to me the way in which every time we have been
there, from the first time the three of us showed up together
to the last three times. It seems to me like--Webster seems to
me like a guy who can shoot straight and knows what he is
doing, head of the 3rd ID.
He shows me, just like his predecessor Chiarelli did of the
First Cav: Give me PCV pipe, let me run it from the back of the
homes into the Tigris River so there is not 3 feet of water or
2 feet of sewage sitting in the front yard and, guess what, my
troops do not get shot at as much. And he showed me these big
overlays only you guys can do, the Powerpoint deals. Take away
the garbage, turn on the air conditioning a little bit, a
couple more hours a day.
Our commander of the Third ID calls it, he refers to ``the
greening of Iraq.'' He does not mean it in a positive way. You
can see from a helicopter, the one you flew in, the same ones I
flew last time. We wonder why foreign policy guys do not sign
up, foreign service guys. Guess what, they do not get the
Blackhawk I get. They do not get to travel at 100 feet off the
ground at 150 miles an hour so there is no problem if I were to
be shot at, with four guards with me.
That is the reason they are not volunteering. They do not
get to go outside. They do not get the protection you got,
General. They do not get the protection I got. Go to Fallujah?
Give me a break, go to Fallujah. Get your rear end shot off
going to Fallujah.
So what I have a problem with is figuring out how do we do
more of the same. This is a race against the clock. Let me
understand what I glean from you guys, and with the
disagreements there seems to be pretty much a consensus. One,
you have got to train the Iraqis. Ultimately they have got to
do the job. They cannot be trained sufficiently to be able to
take over major responsibility, big chunks, in less than a
year.
Tony, you and I may argue about how well they are trained
and I can go back and read your statement from February and
read mine from the same. We really have no difference. You know
the reason they worked in the election, our military shut down
the country. No one was allowed to drive a car. No one was
allowed to move. They were able then to man a checkpoint. That
made sense.
But if we did not shut down the country, lock it down, they
could not do it. But we all agree that they are on their way. I
think Petraeus is first-rate. I have been a fan of his since he
was up in the north, and I hope to God they do not take him out
of there. He is the single best thing we have got going on the
ground, in my view, and he is making real progress.
But number one, everyone agrees it is going to take some
time, in the year-plus category, to train up these guys. To
create the political conditions to win, we have to do two
things. We have to have elections, participation. But we found
out when Sunnis get shot at they do not show up. What makes
anybody think the Sunnis in the second round are going to show
up, even if they helped write the constitution, if, in fact,
the circumstance in the triangle is physically no different for
them? Maybe, maybe, maybe.
Second, you know, every poll I have seen and every Iraqi I
have spoken to says to me, in my five trips: I cannot walk out
my front door. You name me a city in America that would support
George Washington reincarnated as President if they could not
walk out the front door, were afraid to walk down the street,
to send their kids down to the local store to pick up a
grocery.
So every one of them rates crime in the street higher than
anything else. So I do not know how we avoid your position, Dr.
Pollack, about we have got to do something to change the
condition on the ground. I guess the thing we do is we train
more Iraqis, but we need more time to train more Iraqis.
Now, we have 6 to 18 months and that will tell the story.
Iraqi troops, what happens outside Baghdad, and whether or not
people can move around. Yet we are going to be asking the
American people in the meantime, who are leaving us in droves--
because one thing I think the five of us all agree on, we
cannot afford to lose here.
So I end up back to the position that I think Iraqi
attitudes do relate in part to their safety. I do think that
the strategy, if you talk to our folks on the ground, as you
guys have, all of you, they say: Look, they're trying to figure
out if you get the Sunnis in on the deal, then you can isolate
the jihadists. And the Sunnis are still the biggest problem in
the insurgency, but if you get them in on the deal--we need a
political solution. It is not going to lend itself to a
military solution.
But the one thing I disagree with you, General, is I think
that the jihadists play a larger role here.
Now, what are the Sunnis outside doing? I sit--and I agree
with all of you. The one thing every place I go, I spend a lot
of time, after the first of the year 4\1/2\ hours alone with
Mubarak at his request. I spent a lot of time with the King. I
spent a lot of time in the region. All I hear from all these
guys is one thing, Dr. Cordesman. We cannot have a Shi'a state,
we cannot have a Shi'a state, we cannot have a Shi'a state.
Everybody who is Sunni looks first to Shi'a. It is amazing
to me. Then when we say--when they offer to train or do more,
we say to them: We cannot have them train or doing more because
they are Sunni, our folks are saying.
As I look at the security--and I will end, Mr. Chairman. I
look at the security my last trip--and you guys have all done
the same thing--I met with the Prime Minister, the Defense
Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament. We have got a Badr
Brigade and we have a Pesh Merga. We all agree it would be
ridiculous for either of them to agree to disband. We do not
have enough American forces. Whether we should or should not
have had them, they are not enough. And we do not have an Iraqi
Army trained up yet.
Every Sunni I spoke with said: Senator, do not send anybody
into my neighborhood that ain't Sunni. The Sunnis are not
joining that military. So send the Badr Brigade into the Sunni
Triangle, send the Pesh Merga by any other name into the
triangle, I think you really do have a civil war, you really do
have a civil war.
So what I keep coming back to is, as much as we say our
presence is one that is rejected, every single person I spoke
to this time, including the most reactionary Shi'a, who I will
not name but I will tell you privately said: You got to stay,
you got to stay.
So it leads me to this conclusion and I will stop, and if
you would want to comment I would appreciate it, but I fully
understand if you do not because the hour is late. One, I do
not know how we move further without following up on some of
Dr. Cordesman's ideas, and I think they are good because I also
have suggested similar things, so you might think I would think
they are good.
One is we need benchmarks here. How can we measure success
or failure if the administration does not state what their
intention is? The idea we are now sitting down and doing an
assessment of oil? What are the benchmarks? What is the goal?
What are we setting out? What is the thing we measure success
or failure against, except sit back there and say, I am going
to trust these guys for another 2 years, these same brilliant
guys who brought us this strategy?
The second thing I do not understand is--and I think our
new Ambassador--I fully concur with you, General, he is first-
rate. I think you are going to see him do, I pray, that he is
going to take all this stuff out of the hands of Brown and Root
and the rest. And let us say they are all good guys, honest,
wonderful people. As one person said to me--and I will not name
his name, a flag officer: Do not build me a tertiary sewer
treatment plant; give me the PCV pipe. Do not tell me you are
going to change the whole water supply system; give me
generators that I can use right here, right now.
The only guys--the 2,000 projects you talked about are all
military. They are the only guys who know how to do it. But
that is not where most of the money is going; 90 percent of it
is not. Now, they just made an adjustment and they are going to
put a little bit more after--what are those funds called?
Commander's Emergency Response Funds. We should give it all to
them, figuratively speaking.
The third thing is we need foreign help. We need more
people in on the deal. Not only do we need a contact group that
is, I would argue, broader, Dr. Pollack, broader than you
suggested. I am just a plain old politician and let me point
out to you that if in my State we had been invaded by--the
southern part of the State had massacred the northern part of
the State, we had to write a new Delaware Constitution, we are
going to bring the State together, we want to keep it within
its existing borders, and I am from the northern part of the
State and I say, by the way, you know what we could do, we have
got to include more of those southerners in this government--
walking into that constituency that just lost their brother,
mother, sister, aunt, uncle, father, I would get my head ripped
off.
But if I walked in and said, you know what, everybody in
the United States of America, the other 49 States, are giving
us aid; they are insisting we have to include them. If we do
not, we get no help. That is the reason why.
These Sunni leaders know they have to get in on the deal
and the Shi'a leaders know they have to let them in. But it is
that second, third, and fourth strata. So I would suggest we
kind of missed something without understanding the political
dynamic of what it takes for a political leadership to stand
before its constituency, and it is a constituency of sorts--it
is tribal, but it is a constituency--and make these cases.
So I really think we have to, and I hope you can weigh in
with the administration. We need a contact group. We need some
benchmarks. We need some means of measuring what we are about
to do and not lay it all on Petraeus, who is doing a heck of a
job.
So those are my comments. Anybody that wants to respond to
them, I would appreciate it. If you do not, I fully understand.
General McCaffrey. Senator Lugar, I apologize. I must get
on a plane to Los Angeles or I will be beaten by the supper
group that is waiting for me. I thank you for the honor of
being here. I have great respect for your leadership and thank
you for allowing me to participate.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Biden. Again, there is no need to respond, but I
would invite it if either one would like to.
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, let me just make one very brief
response. I think what bothers me a lot is the sheer complexity
of this. You mentioned benchmarks. A lot of this is also very
local and very regional now, and necessarily in our hearings we
focus more on gross national trends. Whatever we do out there,
we need to have a much better picture of what is going on in
given cities, in given provinces. We need to make clear
distinctions in tribal groupings and so on.
What strikes me as strange, in addition to the lack of any
meaningful articulated grand strategy, is the inability we have
outside the military, where we do tend to map areas of risk, to
truly say what is it we are doing, what we are trying to pull
together, how we are supporting the Iraqis.
I hope as you go through the hearings to follow you are
going to ask people to deal with the complexity of these
issues, to go beyond the sort of sweeping strategic
generalizations which far too often are used in the politics or
these strange nationwide measurements of where the aid goes
without any indication of what is happening economically in
those areas, how it interacts with the politics and how that
interacts with the security situation, because frankly it seems
that we have forgotten every lesson we learned in Vietnam about
trying to figure out what is happening and what we are really
doing and what the effects are, or we have managed to classify
it to the point where none of the people involved seem to know.
Senator Biden. That is exactly what I mean by benchmarks. I
am not talking about one grand strategic plan. I want to know
whether or not in each of the cities there is another 20
minutes of electrical power going on. I want to know whether or
not their intention is to provide in city A, B, C, or D
additional generating capacity. I want to know whether or not
they intended on having a county council or a city council
elected and whether or not they got it elected. I want to know,
but I have not been able to, except when I go to Iraq and sit
down and almost always, notable exceptions, with a man or woman
in uniform.
Short of that, I do not know where to go to get it, and,
therefore, the ability to measure this is almost impossible.
Dr. Pollack. Sir, let me just add on. It is interesting, I
think, that Tony and I fixed on the same point that you made in
your remarks, which I think are so important. Your point about
giving most or even all of the money directly over to the
CERFs, to the Commanders Emergency Relief Funds, strikes me as
being in the same vein. I think that there is a role for these
kind of macrolevel questions that we have been discussing
today, in part because I think we have some of the macrolevel
approaches wrong. But as Tony is pointing out, we also really
need to take a microlevel approach and that is because, in
large part, if reconstruction is going to succeed in Iraq it is
much more likely to succeed from the bottom up than the top
down.
We have mostly been taking over the last year and a half,
maybe even 2 years, a mostly top-down approach, in part because
we panicked because we did not have a plan to do it bottom up
and it was easier to reach out to the top down, in part because
I think the security situation is such that it is much easier
to sit in a room with Ibrahim Jafari and 20 other Ministers
than it is to send people out into the field, exactly as you
have suggested. It is dangerous out there and our people get
killed because it is dangerous out there.
But I am very, very nervous about that approach. It has not
worked well in the past in other places and it is not working
terribly well in Iraq, and it is creating many of the different
problems--political, economic, and military--that we have been
talking about. So it is absolutely critical.
I will make a broad generalization about making broad
generalizations, which is that it is critical, as Tony
suggested, to get down to the microlevel to find out what is
going on in every city and every province and every
neighborhood of Iraq, because that is where reconstruction is
going to work. It is, of course, also where we have had a
number of success stories. We have all heard any number of
anecdotal reports about the local foreign service officer or
the local military-civil affairs person or some other group who
has been able to do something at the village level and have
really been able to connect with the Iraqi people, and, of
course, that is critically important.
But, of course, we do not have enough people and we do not
have enough resources to be doing that broadly across the
country. We also have these macrolevel problems that are
hindering these microlevel solutions and preventing these
microlevel solutions from either being sustained or catching on
and spreading or becoming part of a larger trend.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Just out of curiosity, either at CSIS or
Brookings Institution do you have graphics of Iraq that show
province by province, maybe as national news magazines in our
country would have, coloring--some are red, some are orange,
some are yellow, depending upon a scale of 10, security is 9-
plus here, 7.0 here, or thereabouts? Or maps that indicate per
capita income, if that is an appropriate figure, or
unemployment?
I am curious because I share Senator Biden's thought about
benchmarks. But I am just wondering who in the world anywhere
has such a critical aid when we are trying to gauge success,
not just success militarily. The American people look at all
this in terms of political support and economic support and so
forth for all this. This is a critical time in terms of our own
internal country dialog.
I am just curious what sort of resources there are out
there that we may be missing.
Dr. Cordesman. Well, Senator, I cannot speak for Brookings.
The truth is an awful lot of the data that is being provided on
Iraq is national. A lot of it will not survive engagement with
any kind of investigation as to where it came from. Often the
data come from an Iraqi ministry and some of the Iraqi
ministries measure some things quite well. We do not do a
particularly good job of reviewing that data or transmitting
it. Often when we do it does not come in with the
qualifications or the limitations involved.
There has been some survey work done by the UNDP. It has
some significant statistical problems with it, but it does get
into some of these areas. It goes outside the ministries. But I
think one answer to this is that we really do not take a
significant account of what the Iraqi governments are saying. A
lot of the time local governments or provincial governments
also gather this data. We cannot go into the field and get it,
and frankly it does not come forward. If it is being gathered
in the Embassy, I do not know whether it is there. I think it
is in some of our Embassy teams present.
So it is not that the data are not there potentially. It is
that they are not really being tied together. As for what the
Pentagon has in its Situation Room, that is a mystery to me,
but I think it is in some ways a more reassuring view of the
data that is generated and provided in Baghdad, and it does not
get into a lot of these issues.
As Ken pointed out, we really do need to know, because,
otherwise, to me the classic example is Basra. We have there a
Shiite Islamist government which is not part of the mainstream
alliance, running its own police force. Ken pointed out it has
some of its own economic goals. And if it was not for press
reporting, I do not think any of us, or listening to the
British, any of us would be aware that there is a major problem
in Basra from anything that is being said in reporting in the
United States.
Senator Biden. Can I interrupt on that one point? You know,
there are surveys that have been done and we, the United States
Government, presented to us as of July 6 an assessment of the
goals on bridge and road construction, education, judicial,
civil society, transportation, and how close we have come to
meeting our targets.
But we can do household surveys in each of these
provinces--they are a sophisticated group of folks--to
determine everything from whether or not the trash is being
picked up to whether they have potable water to whether they
have any health care. It is not absolute, but it is a better
means by which--and to the best of my knowledge we are not
doing that. We are not doing that on a detailed basis to get a
read as to where the needs are.
I just raise that as an example of what I mean by
benchmarks. I am just trying to figure out how we begin to
assess any of this. Your point, doctor, is correct. But for the
fact--I mean, where would we read some of that stuff?
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, let me just give you one example.
The ministry dealing with municipalities did a water survey,
indicated that something like 30 percent of the Iraqis now have
a reliable source of potable water. They did break it down.
Now, I suspect those results were not that accurate in the
west. But it is not as if some of this is not being done.
As for outside telephone surveys or the other kinds of
surveys which are being used, let me say that most of us have
forgotten more statistics than we ever knew and that seems to
apply to many of those pollsters. The samples are simply
ridiculous and the results are ridiculous and the lack of
control questions are ridiculous. So I would much rather see if
we cannot fix the Iraqi process of governance, which has got to
work anyway, than rely on more surveys, many of which seem to
have four or five pressworthy questions without controls.
Senator Biden. I guess what I am saying, I would like to
know what our administration's policy is as to how to fix the
Iraqi Government. I would just like to know what it is.
The Chairman. Let me just add another question that comes
from things that both of you have written. Dr. Pollack, your
book on Iraq was tremendously influential to many of us as we
came up to that situation. Now your book on Iran is very
helpful. Dr. Cordesman's work is legion. We all clip that and
put it in our files.
One of the background things that you touched upon, and
that I really was struck by, at a recent Aspen Institute
congressional event on Islam regarding borders. I deliberately
brought that up in our questions. But a good many people in the
region do not see the borders that were arbitrarily put in by
Great Britain or France or what have you after World War I as
especially relevant to their lives. They are still thinking in
terms of the Saudi Peninsula or the Ottoman Empire or various
other configurations of people, and as we have heard today, as
Shiites or as Sunnis or as differentiations of these groups.
This whole business of trying to get people to think about
being Iraqis, of actually seeing a nation state that would have
the cohesion we are talking about as being successful, is still
viewed by some as a bridge too far. Now, others would say,
well, 50 years have passed and there are a lot of people who
have a sense of being Iraqi, including many Kurds, and so
forth. And we all hope that that is so, so that a nation state
is conceivable, as opposed to either civil war or a
fractionalization, even without war, in which people simply go
off on their own way with their militias and have their own
situations.
My hope is that, since you both are influential, you will
continue to discuss the history of the situation and the
expectations of people, so that all of us will have that kind
of a background, of what a very large achievement that would be
if, in fact, this group of people find themselves as Iraqis, if
they are able to support a constitution for whom they have some
allegiance, to share oil revenues, whether they be in Kirkuk or
wherever ultimately.
This is why it is important again for us all to understand
how big the place is in terms of differentiation of localities
and provinces. Otherwise we may be discovering, not separate
nations and states, but strange alliances with other countries
that are around. We are going to take that up as a part of our
hearing. We will explore how people get together with the
Iranians. We will focus not on the relationship of Iraq and
Iran, but on specific parts of the countries that come together
on some other basis than arbitrary borderlines that we may have
had before.
I just make this as an observation. You all talked about
it, but I think it was simply important to add.
Finally, let me just say that I appreciate the fact that,
as Senator Biden said earlier, at least those of us who were
sitting there at that point--the Senator, myself, and I am
certain Senator Hagel would share that view, and all of you--we
are discussing this today from the premise that we must
succeed. That was the purpose of this hearing and of the full
series of hearings. This is not to be a forum in which somehow
we discuss why we fail and why inevitably we must go downhill
from here.
We understand the lay of the land, I think. We know,
realistically, how daunting the challenges are. But the purpose
of this is to try to illuminate the facts and ways of
collecting data or arguments that are beyond this, and
conveying this information to other policymakers. I would just
say, for whatever reassurance it is, we intend to share broadly
with members of the administration the papers that you have
written, the record of the series of hearings. We are hopeful
that they will find them as profitable as the members have
today.
I thank both of you very much, and General McCaffrey as
well, for remarkable testimony and the contribution you have
made. So saying, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
ADVANCING IRAQI POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, and Dodd.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today the Committee on Foreign Relations again meets to
discuss Iraq, specifically how our Government can help advance
Iraqi political development.
Last January we witnessed the strong desire of Iraqis to
achieve a working democracy when 8 million Iraqi citizens
risked their lives to exercise their new freedom to vote.
The resulting Iraqi leadership is working under difficult
circumstances to include Iraqis, Shi'as, Kurds, and Sunnis,
something never before achieved in an Iraqi Government. The
cooperation among Iraqi groups has occurred despite the efforts
of the insurgents to provoke a civil war or undermine the
fledgling government institutions by perpetuating deadly
attacks.
But the political situation is fragile, and success will
require much compromise, as well as progress in the security
and the economic spheres. Even as we discuss options for
enhancing the development of Iraqi political institutions, we
are mindful that relevant deadlines are fast approaching.
The Iraqi Government must draft a constitution by August
15, and organize a referendum on it that is planned for October
15. National elections for a permanent government would follow
by December 15, 2005.
These political milestones have come to be seen as integral
to the overall goals of solidifying Iraqi political stability,
overcoming the insurgency, and, ultimately, withdrawing United
States forces from Iraq.
In the last several weeks Iraqis on the Constitution
Drafting Commission have indicated that significant progress
has been made on the constitution, and this is encouraging
news. But polling data indicates that there is still a great
deal of uncertainty among Iraqis about exactly what is ahead in
this process.
Recognizing the importance of the aggressive constitutional
and electoral time lines to our own interests, we'll be asking
our experts today whether the time line is achievable, and what
ramifications might occur if deadlines are changed or missed.
We'll examine whether the current timetable remains the best
option for advancing political development. We will also focus
on whether it's possible to change the political climate
through a public education campaign, how we can forestall a
Sunni-Shi'a conflict, and how we can help cultivate Iraqi
leaders who will tolerate inclusive political interaction
without resorting to violence or other exclusionary tactics.
Yesterday the committee examined options for improving the
security climate in Iraq. Today we will proceed with the same
format that yielded an excellent discussion in Monday's
hearing.
Our discussion will be organized around four policy options
for improving the political situation in Iraq. Accordingly,
after Senator Biden and I offer opening comments--and Senator
Biden will be recognized when he comes to the hearing--instead
of hearing comprehensive statements from the witnesses, at that
point we will put the first policy option and associated
questions before our expert panel. Each witness in turn will
provide his or her views on the option being presented.
Then we will put the second option before them, and then
the third and fourth.
Finally, recognizing that options exist beyond our
published hearing plan, we will ask our witnesses if they would
like to offer any additional ideas for improving political
development in Iraq that have not been discussed.
After this sequence, committee members will be recognized
in turn to address questions to any member of the panel. My
hope is that through the expertise of the witnesses, and the
questions of the members, we may achieve a systematic
evaluation of the options present for improving the Iraqi
political situation.
We are very pleased to welcome a distinguished panel of
experts to help us with this inquiry today. Dr. Phebe Marr is a
senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. She has
been a valuable advisor to our committee on matters pertaining
to Iraq, and she has testified before us on many occasions.
Ms. Judy Van Rest is the executive vice president for the
International Republican Institute. From April 2003 to July
2004, she served as senior advisor for Governance and director
of Democratic Initiatives for the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
Dr. Noah Feldman has also testified before us previously.
He is a professor of law at New York University, and in
addition to his academic work, he has advised the Coalition
Provisional Authority on constitutional law issues.
These experts have spent a great deal of time analyzing the
Iraqi political situation, and we're grateful that we can draw
upon their experiences and insights today.
As I mentioned at the outset, we'll commence our hearing
with the first set of questions, and I will ask--after I've
read this material--for Dr. Marr to respond, then Ms. Van Rest,
and then Dr. Feldman, in that order. And we'll rotate. The
first responder for the second question will be Ms. Van Rest.
You'll have an opportunity to lead off then, and Dr. Feldman on
the third, and then back to you, Dr. Marr, on the fourth.
Option number one: Should the coalition encourage Iraqis to
forgo writing a full constitution at this time; or should we
encourage a strict adherence to the current deadlines for
finishing a constitution?
Does the current compressed timetable for drafting and
approving the constitution aggravate the destablizing
differences among the parties?
Delay would involve setting aside thorny issues that could
undermine national cohesion like regional autonomy, the status
of Kirkuk, the role of Islam, and others.
Instead, should we be encouraging Iraqis to promulgate a
miniconstitution covering electoral law, and other items on
which agreement can be reached? Would agreements on limited
subjects build momentum toward cooperation on more difficult
items; or should we stick to the current schedule by pressing
for a completed constitution by the deadlines that have already
been established?
What pressures, if any, can or should the coalition exert
on the Iraqi Government to adopt either of these courses?
Dr. Marr, would you lead off? And we welcome you again to
the committee today.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, SENIOR FELLOW, U.S. INSTITUTE OF
PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Marr. Thank you very much, and I'd like to thank the
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, especially
yourself, Mr. Chairman, for addressing these issues and for the
opportunity to testify.
I must add that my views here are my own, and not
necessarily those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does
not advocate specific policy positions.
In my view the coalition should take its lead from the
Iraqis and should not be seen to be intervening directly in the
constitutional process, although it can certainly offer help
and encouragement behind the scenes.
The Iraqis, as you say, are intensely engaged, at the
moment, in negotiations on the constitution and have indicated
that they think that they can complete most of the necessary
compromises and the drafting process by the deadline.
If that is actually the case, it would seem presumptuous of
us to urge them to take more time. However, as seems more
likely, particularly with the news yesterday and today that the
drafting proves more difficult, or Iraqis, themselves, indicate
that they need more time, we should be encouraging them to take
it, not forcing a deadline. In short, pressure for the deadline
should not be coming from us.
Rather, our message should be the achievement by Iraqis of
a better instrument, one that satisfies Iraqi needs rather than
a symbolic achievement of meeting a deadline.
There are several incentives behind the drive to meet the
deadline. One is the United States agenda, the need to prove to
the United States public that progress is being made in Iraq.
A second is the Iraqi election schedule and the desire by
the current government to prove itself by meeting the deadline
and by moving to another more permanent election.
Third is the oft cited need to keep people's feet to the
fire. Without a deadline the process could drag on indefinitely
postponing the hard work of compromise, rather than facing the
issues.
Lastly, there's the symbolic fallout of missing the
deadline, which could be seized on by the insurgents for
propaganda.
But these arguments, especially the last, in my view, do
not outweigh the argument for taking more time, if needed, to
produce a better constitution. Additional time should be
evaluated on the basis of what can be achieved with it.
For example, in the short term, there could, perhaps, be
better public education and outreach on the constitution; a
second benefit might be a greater inclusion of the Sunni
community.
But it must be admitted that several issues will be just as
difficult to resolve in 6 months as on August 15. One is the
thorny issue of Iraqi identity. The constitution will be
expected to lay down a few principles on this subject. What
will it say about nationalities? And will that satisfy the
Kurdish need for a distinct identity? What about Iraq as part
of the Arab world? And if Iraq is declared an Islamic State
will that formulation provide space for secularists, non-
Muslims, women?
But the second issue is, perhaps, the most difficult; that
is the issue of federalism and the distribution of power
between the central government and various provincial and local
units.
This involves, as you know, defining the provincial and
local units. This solution must deal with the Kurdish regional
government, whether Kirkuk and other territories are included
in it, and the powers of the local units, especially the KRG
and the central government, particularly, with respect to
collection and distribution of revenue.
Connected with this is the issue of ownership and
management of Iraq's resources, especially oil. Will this be
vested in the central government, or Iraq citizens, or will
some of these resources accrue to local and regional
governments?
There will have to be a compromise and an understanding on
these issues before the broad outlines of a constitution and
stability in Iraq can take shape. If compromise cannot be
reached, or at least, some broad principles laid down by August
15, then Iraqis should be allowed to extend the deadline as
provided in the TAL.
It's not clear that simply putting out a miniconstitution
with agreement on what they can achieve in the short term and
postponing these critical issues is a solution. Neither the
identity issue, nor the federal issue, are likely to be solved
with any finality in a few weeks or even a few months. But by
putting them off indefinitely it may make them more difficult
to solve later as special interests become entrenched.
Rather, Iraqis should be encouraged to think of this
constitution as the first of many steps in the process of
knitting their society and their country together and in
democratizing it.
Whether by August 15 or January 15 they should be
encouraged to achieve a flexible formula for sharing power
among communities and achieving a balance of power between the
center and the periphery. They will need to come out with a
constitutional framework firm enough and broad enough to
provide for a stable, effective, government with enough
sovereignty and legitimacy to instill confidence in Iraq's
future at home and abroad.
This is particularly important for foreign investors who
will not want to sink money into a country whose government
does not appear to be stable. But this instrument must also be
flexible, able to be modified by some acceptable public
process, over time, to allow for growth and development on the
ground.
What can and should the coalition do to advance this aim?
First, stop pressure and public policy statements on the
need to meet the August 15 deadline. Let the Iraqis take the
lead, but let them know privately and publicly that if they
need more time they should take it.
Second, make equally clear, however, that the time is not
limitless, that the TAL provisions do need to be met and that
the time extension for some reasonable draft should be met,
certainly, by January 15, if not before.
Thus the momentum, which is already underway on the
constitution, will be maintained.
Third, encourage all concerned to view the constitution as
a framework, an initial step in Iraq's constitutional life
which can be adjusted, over time, in a public process to
accommodate change. The constitution itself, of course, should
provide for such a process.
And fourth, encourage a more realistic attitude, especially
in the United States, over what to expect of the constitution.
Too much weight has been placed on the constitution as a
turning point, and a means of curtailing the insurgency.
Like the election, the draft constitution will be a
positive step, but, in itself, is not likely to have more than
a marginal effect on the insurgency. Tying the two together is
a political mistake.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phebe Marr, Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of
Peace, Washington, DC
I would like to thank the members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, particularly Chairman Lugar and Ranking Member Biden, for
holding this hearing today, and for the opportunity, once again, to
offer my views on the political situation in Iraq and to suggest some
ideas for increasing the chances for success in Iraq. I want to add
that the views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of
the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy
positions.
The committee has posed a number of penetrating questions and
options and asked for our analysis and suggestions. They have not been
easy to answer because they touch on issues which go to the heart of
the difficulties confronting Iraqis and the coalition forces. But I
will do my best to address them.
1. Should the coalition encourage Iraqis to forgo writing a full
constitution now, or encourage strict adherence to current deadlines
for finishing the constitution?
The coalition should take its lead from the Iraqis and should not
be seen to be intervening in the constitutional process, although it
can offer help and encouragement behind the scenes. The Iraqis are
intensely engaged at the moment in negotiations on the constitution,
and have indicated that they think they can complete most of the
necessary compromises and the drafting process by the deadline. If that
is actually the case, it would seem presumptuous of us to urge them to
take more time. However, if, as seems likely, the drafting proves more
difficult or Iraqis themselves indicate they need more time, we should
be encouraging them to take it--not forcing a deadline. In short,
pressure for a deadline should not be coming from us. Rather, our
message should be the achievement by Iraqis of a ``better'' instrument,
one that satisfies Iraqi needs, rather than the symbolic achievement of
meeting a deadline.
There are several incentives behind the drive to meet the deadline.
One is the U.S. agenda--the need to prove to the U.S. public that
Iraq's political process is moving ahead, that progress is being made,
and that the U.S. commitment has some measurable achievements--sorely
needed in the face of insurgent attacks. A second is the Iraqi election
schedule and a desire by the current Iraqi Government to prove itself
by meeting the deadline and consolidating power by moving to another,
more permanent election, as soon as possible. Third is the oft-cited
need to keep people's ``feet to the fire.'' Without a deadline, the
process could drag on indefinitely, postponing the hard work of
compromise, rather than facing the issues. Lastly, there is the
symbolic fallout of missing the deadline which could be seized on by
insurgents for propaganda value. But these arguments--especially the
last--do not outweigh the arguments for taking more time, if needed, to
produce a better constitution.
Additional time should be evaluated on the basis of what can be
achieved with it. Here one must make a distinction between what could
be achieved if the deadline were advanced a few more months, and what
may take years or decades to achieve. In the short term, one thing that
could be better achieved would be public education on the constitution
and feedback from the public in time for consideration in the draft.
Some effort has been made in this direction; but not enough. If the
drafting committee could indicate, at the end, that they had considered
public opinion, it might make a difference in public acceptance and the
feeling the public had a stake in the process. A second beneficial
outcome might be greater inclusion of the Sunni community. Sunnis have
been included in the drafting process but more time might allow greater
consultation and mobilization of support. Third, perhaps most
important, more time could help in crafting a new electoral law that
was more inclusive, if the constitutional committee were so inclined.
Many Iraqis are suggesting that the law put more emphasis on districts
and provinces, but this would require a census and other measures,
which are time consuming. Time should not dictate something as
important as the electoral law.
But several issues will be difficult to resolve on August 15--and
probably just as difficult on January 15. One is the issue of Iraqi
identity. Is there an Iraqi identity and if so what is its nature? The
constitution will be expected to lay down a few principles on this
subject that various communities inside--and outside--Iraq will be
watching carefully as a pointer to Iraq's future. What will the
constitution say about ``nationalities'' inside Iraq and will it
satisfy the Kurdish need for a distinct identity? What about Iraq as
part of the Arab world? A statement that satisfies Arab nationalists,
especially among the Sunnis, may not sit well with Kurds and some
Shi'a. And if Iraq is declared an Islamic State, will the formulation
provide space for secularists and non-Muslims? Even the Iraqi flag, as
a symbol of Iraqi identity, will be contentious.
Second is the issue of federalism and the distribution of power
between the central government and various provincial and local units.
This is undoubtedly one of the most contentious issues. First, it
involves defining provincial and local units and their territorial
boundaries. This solution must deal with the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) and whether Kirkuk and other territories are included
in it. It could also involve creating larger regional units, for
example, in the region around Basra. Will the current 18 provinces
continue to exist? Will provinces be defined on a territorial basis or
will there be an ethnic or sectarian component? And what will be the
powers of the local units (especially the KRG) and the central
government, especially with respect to the collection and distribution
of revenue?
Third is the issue of ownership and management of Iraq's resources,
especially oil. Will this be vested in the central government, or in
Iraq's citizens as a whole. Or will some or all of these resources
accrue to local and regional governments? Lastly is the issue of
national security, the formation of a national army and the role of the
various militias with respect to the central government.
There will have to be a compromise and an understanding on these
issues before the broad outlines of a constitution--and stability in
Iraq--can take shape. If they cannot be reached, or, at least, some
broad principles laid down--by August 15, then the Iraqis should be
allowed to extend the deadline as provided for in the TAL. It is not
clear that simply putting out a miniconstitution, with agreement on
what they can achieve in the short term and postponing these critical
issues, is a solution. Neither the identity issue--which involves
relationships among Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities--nor the
federalism issue, which involves power sharing among communities and
territorial units, are likely to be solved with any finality in a few
weeks or even months. But putting them off indefinitely may well make
them more difficult to solve later as special interests become
entrenched. Rather Iraqis should be encouraged to think of this
constitution as the first of many steps in the process of knitting
their society and their country together and in democratizing it.
Whether by August 15 or January 15 they should be encouraged to
achieve a flexible formula for sharing power among communities and for
achieving a balance of power between the center and the periphery. They
will need to come out with a constitutional framework firm enough and
broad enough to provide for stable, effective government, with enough
sovereignty and legitimacy to instill confidence in Iraq's future at
home and abroad. This will be particularly important for foreign
investors who will not want to sink money into a country whose
government does not appear to be stable. But this instrument must also
be flexible, able to be modified by some acceptable public process over
time, to allow for growth and development on the ground. Iraq's new
identity; the relationship between the center and the provinces; and
between its various communities will take decades to grow. The
instrument that is written now should provide a framework for that
growth, including the possibility of future discussions and
modification. Any thought that a product achieved on August 15--or
January 15--will be ``final'' is folly. But simply putting off
difficult questions indefinitely is not an acceptable solution either.
What can/should the coalition do to advance this aim?
Stop pressure and public policy statements on the need to
meet the August 15 deadline. Let the Iraqis take the lead, but
let them know, privately and publicly, that if they need more
time, they should take it.
Make it equally clear, however, that the time is not
limitless; that the TAL provisions do need to be met, and that
the time extension for some reasonable draft should be met by
January 15. Thus the momentum already underway will be
maintained.
Encourage all concerned to view the constitution as a
framework, an initial step in Iraq's constitutional life, which
can be adjusted, over time, in a public process to accommodate
changes. The constitution, itself, should provide for such a
process.
Encourage a more realistic attitude, especially in the
United States, over what to expect of the constitution. Too
much weight has been placed on the constitution as a ``turning
point'' and a means of curtailing the insurgency. Like the
election, the draft constitution will be a positive step, but,
in itself, is not likely to have more than a marginal effect on
the insurgency. Tying the two together is a political mistake.
2. Should the coalition conduct a public education campaign
designed to stimulate interest in the constitution and discussion of
the insurgency?
This is much easier to answer. The Iraqi Government--not the
coalition--should conduct a public education campaign on the
constitution but this campaign should not include discussion of the
insurgency. These are two separate--though related--issues, which
should not be mixed. Doing so would tie the constitution and its
content to the insurgency; divert attention from the main subject and
fix the two together in the public mind. It could put the constitution
at risk and provide a new target for insurgent attacks. Worse, it could
make the constitution's success appear contingent on insurgent activity
and tie the government's agenda to the insurgency. The agenda should be
in the hands of the elected government. Discussion of the
constitution--as the blue print for Iraq's future--should stand on its
own. But the public discussion should make clear that the political
process is open to all and is the appropriate vehicle to achieving
political goals--not violence--in the new Iraq.
Whether a ``massive'' campaign can be conducted under present
conditions is questionable, but certainly considerable public activity
can be undertaken on the constitution and its various provisions.
Discussion of these issues is important to invest society in the
political process and the government to follow. Certainly issues can be
debated in the media--press, radio and TV; in university and school
settings; and within limits, in townhall settings. These steps will
have a number of virtues. This activity is mandated in the TAL and
following TAL procedure will demonstrate adherence to the rule of law.
Even more important, it will help build civil society. Various civic
groups formed to educate the public will be the basis for future
interest and ``watchdog'' groups. (Already a number of these have
formed and are operating.) This will lay the basis for future political
participation.
Special effort should be made to persuade Sunnis to lead the
process in Sunni areas and to encourage Sunni participation in the
discussion. The opportunity to participate in and influence the
constitutional process is essential to give Sunnis a feeling that they
have a stake in the future.
I have a problem with the timing of the process, however. A public
education campaign needs to be undertaken both before and after the
final draft is submitted, so that the public feels it has a say in its
content. While some activity has been initiated in this area, the
efforts have been little and late. As the deadline nears, it is
unlikely that such efforts will bear much fruit; hence, Iraq may be
missing a chance to help invest the public with a feeling that it has a
stake in its outcome. This is another reason to extend the timeframe
somewhat.
There is still an opportunity for public education after the draft
is submitted and before the referendum and this is essential, not only
for the vote on the constitution, but for the political process to
follow. It is assumed that the constitution will elaborate principles
to be followed by legislation filling in specifics in many areas. The
public campaign can educate various sectors of society on their rights
and obligations as specified in the constitution and how it will affect
them. The groups which undertake this campaign will be essential
building blocks in furthering this legislation and bringing the public
and its various sectors into the process.
3. Should we take steps to forestall a Sunni-Shi'a conflict?
In some ways the question may misdefine the issue. Rather than a
Sunni-Shi'a conflict, the conflict is much broader, and involves all of
Iraq's communities in a search for a new identity. In fact, there are
two complex processes going on. The first is an increasing polarization
of the Iraqi polity among both ethnic and sectarian communities--Kurds
and Arabs as well as Shi'a and Sunnis--as Iraq searches for a new
political identity and a new political center of gravity. As is well
known, the elections in January of this year put into office a majority
Shi'a ticket--the United Iraqi Alliance--which got 48 percent of the
vote; 51 percent of the seats in the assembly; and a Kurdish ticket
which polled 26 percent of the vote and got 27 percent of the seats.
Parties, such as the Iraqi list, led by Ayad Allawi, and the Iraqiyyun,
led by Ghazi al-Yawar, which ran on a more centrist, nonsectarian
platform, together polled only a little more than 15 percent of the
vote. Sunnis, many of whom boycotted the election or failed to vote for
other reasons, gained only 17 seats in the assembly, 6 percent of the
total. The elections reflected a reality that Iraqi politics now runs
largely on the foundation of cultural identity, not on the basis of
interests or party platforms. Helping to move Iraq away from this
polarization and encouraging a sense of national identity. should be
one of the coalition's long-term goals.
But it is well to keep in mind that both the Shi'a and the Kurds
have been disciplining their own communities and preventing retribution
and retaliation--up to a point. This has been successful largely
because these two groups have benefited by inheriting power in the new
regime, although this discipline may be breaking down on the ground. A
Shi'a rejectionist, Muqtafda al-Sadr has been temporarily silenced, in
part by military action, but more importantly by being brought into the
political process. While Sadr himself did not run for election, he
allowed his supporters to do so. They did well in the southern
provinces and, through their participation on the UIA ticket, got a
substantial number of seats in the assembly, and even some in the
Cabinet. The Kurdish leadership, which tends to be pragmatic, has
skillfully managed a younger generation of more extreme nationalists,
best represented in the referendum movement, again because Kurds have
been included in power; indeed, a Kurd is President of the Republic.
In the end, rather than a Shi'a-Sunni conflict what we see is that
of rejectionists of a new government and a new political order. This is
the second, more critical process, most virulently manifested in the
insurgency. Most of the rejectionists are Sunnis; most of the
government and those shaping the new order are Shi'a and Kurds. But the
Sunni rejectionists need to be understood, not simply as a sectarian
group but as a community whose leaders once occupied power, not as
Sunnis but mainly as nationalists, and now find themselves to be an
increasingly marginalized minority. They not only resent their loss of
power and status, but fear discrimination and victimization by the new
ruling groups. Many have also lost employment and economic benefits as
well. Moreover, the Sunnis are fragmented and generally without a
strong spokesman or spokesmen who can speak for a broad sector of the
community, although some groups are coming forward.
In general Sunni rejectionists can be divided into several
different categories. Extremists, such as the Islamic salafists and
jihadis, tied to al-Qaida, and former Saddam loyalists engaged in the
general violent mayhem in Iraq, are generally beyond the pale and
cannot, and should not, be propitiated. But a number of other Sunni
oppositionists--army officers, former Ba'th Party members, nationalists
opposed to ``occupation'' and unemployed youth riled by current
conditions--can probably be brought into the fold of the new regime in
time and with the proper incentives. Conversations with Sunni
oppositionists indicate that their concerns are (a) occupation and the
foreign presence; (b) loss of power and prestige; (c) lack of Sunni
representation in the political process; (d) increased sectarianism;
and (e) the lack of a rule of law and security, especially for their
community.
Attempts to alleviate this problem should focus on addressing these
problems. Several suggestions can be made.
First, encourage the government to bring Sunnis into the political
process. Progress has already been made through Sunni representation on
the constitutional committee. A media campaign to solicit opinions on
the constitution would further this process. If more time is needed to
provide security in Sunni areas and to make sure a level playing field
emerges in preparation for elections--both the vote on the constitution
and the next parliamentary election--encourage the government to
provide it.
Second, encourage a revision of the election law which moves from a
single countrywide election list to a more district-based system, which
assures Sunni areas seats in the assembly regardless of who votes, and
allows local leaders to emerge in Sunni provinces.
Third, encourage the current government to revisit the de-
Ba'thification program. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the
educated middle class--especially academics and professionals like
doctors and lawyers--who may have been party members but who have no
criminal records, feel alienated and left out. This class is
particularly turned off by increased sectarianism, and by de-
Ba'thification which discriminates against them. Many are leaving, thus
depriving Iraq of much-needed expertise. A better vetting system, which
focuses on individual behavior and records, rather than a blanket
category such as party membership, would help. But it has to be borne
in mind that this is still an extremely sensitive issue for the new
Shi'a and Kurdish leaders, who will need encouragement to move in this
direction.
Fourth, many Sunnis complain of a lack of rule of law and security.
Strengthening the court system, the prison system, and the police
system would also help. While this is a long-term effort, it is
particularly necessary in Sunni areas and in Baghdad. Much of the
security threat is due to common crime, especially kidnappings.
Focusing on developing local police in local areas, and getting
international help for the effort, could allow coalition forces to pull
out of difficult cities, alleviating some of the problems of the
military presence in Sunni areas. Many Sunni professionals could also
be employed in the legal justice system, if strict standards of
meritocracy are employed.
Lastly, outside mediation might have some benefit but it needs to
be handled carefully, lest it be seen as interference, especially by
the new Shi'a-dominated government. Many key members of the new
government have long been in opposition to the Sunni-dominated Ba'th
regime. They face persecution, imprisonment, killing of relatives and
long exile at their hands and hence fear and often distrust them. This
fear and distrust is reciprocated by Sunnis, particularly since many of
the Sunnis who need to be brought into the process may, indeed, have
had contact with those using violence against the regime or have been
supporting it. Hence, involvement by key figures in neighboring Arab
Sunni States may be regarded with suspicion. However, including some
Arab leaders in an international delegation--particularly if the
delegation also included Shi'a--might be a good idea.
Any mediation effort involving neighboring states would need a
clear definition of its mission and what it could do to influence and
mitigate the ``Sunni'' problem. The current government would be
interested in efforts to control the border; efforts to control
finances flowing to insurgents; public support for the electoral
process and the new constitution; and public rejection of violence.
International and regional efforts along these lines, in return for
Iraqi Government efforts to bring more recalcitrant Sunnis into
government and local police forces, might be helpful.
4. How can the coalition cultivate new leaders in Iraq and insure
that they will interact politically, rather than using violence?
I am currently involved, as a fellow at USIP, in a study of Iraq's
emerging political leadership and their various visions for the future
of Iraq. In conjunction with this project, I have made two trips to
Iraq--one in December to northern Iraq to interview Kurdish leaders and
one in May and June to Baghdad and Basra to talk to the newly elected
members of the assembly and the government and others working at the
provincial level. These interviews revealed a rich mix of political
leaders emerging with considerable promise for the future, although
that promise may take some time to mature.
The problem of replacing Iraq's leadership once Saddam and the
Ba'th had been removed has always been one of the most difficult facing
Iraq and the coalition. After 35 years in power, Saddam loyalists and
the Ba'th Party were deeply entrenched not only in the military and
security services, but in the bureaucracy and the education
establishment as well. If many had been left in power at lower levels,
continuity might have been greater, but there would have been little
change from the past and leaving them in would have alienated the
opposition which was spearheading the change. Removing and disbanding
the previous pillars of state--the option chosen by the coalition--has
allowed for entirely new leadership to emerge, but it has deeply
alienated the previous official class and created a large vacuum at the
center of power. Filling this vacuum, has been difficult.
New leadership can come essentially only from two or three sources.
One is the reintroduction of elements of the previous regime, vetted
for security purposes. The second is from exile opposition groups who
have been operating outside of Iraq for decades; and the third is from
the indigenous Iraqi population, most of whom have had little or no
leadership experience. Essentially, the coalition opted for the second
solution, disbanding the army and the party and essentially bringing in
a large group of exile opposition leaders, mainly from the West. This
group dominated the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) and its associated
Cabinet formed in 2003.
In this first attempt at government, the CPA attempted to balance
all of Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups and also brought in most
political parties--other than the Ba'th--that had played a role in Iraq
previously. But the dominant members of the IGC, at this stage, were
Western-educated Iraqis with long residence in, and familiarity with,
the West. Many, though not all, were relatively secular. The shift to
an interim government in 2004 did not essentially change that pattern,
but the election of January 2005 brought an expression of popular will
and a shift to new leadership which probably better reflects future
trends in Iraq, although it is too soon to make firm predictions on
that score. Several points need to be made about this leadership to
understand the leadership challenge facing Iraq.
First, the current government, like its predecessors, is dominated,
at its upper ranks, by exiles who have spent most of their formative
years outside Iraq, or in the case of the Kurds, running their own
government in the north. But there has been a change in these exiles.
Whereas earlier regimes--the IGC and Interim government--were led
mainly by Western-educated and Western-oriented oppositionists, the new
government is not. Some of these earlier politicians are still present,
but key positions are now in the hands of the Shi'a religio-political
parties of the UIA and the Kurdish parties. The Shi'a members of the
opposition have often spent time, not in the West, but in Iran, or Arab
countries like Syria and Lebanon. They are Arab Iraqis but are
interested in instilling more of an Islamic identity in Iraq. So in one
sense, Iraq has exchanged one set of exiles for another. But for now,
new political leadership from inside Iraq--though it is emerging--has
still not made its way to the top leadership posts in any significant
numbers.
Second, turnover in posts at the top has been substantial, creating
lots of opportunities for social mobility, but little to gain
experience. The same phenomenon is true at local and provincial levels
where discontinuity may be even greater. In the current government,
over 60 percent of Cabinet Ministers are new to the job. And even those
who are not new, have only held a post at that level for a year or so
in a previous Cabinet. Even then, many have been shifted from one
ministerial post to another, giving them little time to put down roots.
While some of this change is to be expected in a situation of radical
change, it means that most new leaders still have little experience in
running a state. Even well-trained exiles, to say nothing of indigenous
Iraqis, will need time and a learning process to acquire this
experience.
One exception to this rule is the Kurdish leadership occupying
positions in the central government and in the KRG. They have acquired
considerable experience and maturity, often through the school of hard
knocks, from running government in the north; dealing with the failure
of a civil war; holding (imperfect) elections; and in dealing in
foreign affairs with neighbors and with Europe and the United States.
It is not surprising that their area is quiet and gradually becoming
more prosperous. The question with the Kurds, however, is how committed
they are to building Iraqi institutions in the center, as opposed to
those in the north and how to draw this experienced leadership further
into the rebuilding of Iraq.
Experience in government also exists among academics and former
bureaucrats some of whom were ex-Ba'thists and affiliated with them.
But are they flexible and open enough to deal with the new situation?
Many are still alienated by the loss of their status and fearful of
discrimination. The question here is how to bring them in and
compensate for their loss of status and prestige. Distrust between new
and old must be dispelled and ways found to get both groups working
together. There is some progress here, but it needs to be excelerated.
Lastly there is the problem of differing visions of the future Iraq
and where the various leaders would like to take the country. Arab
Sunnis, and certainly ex-Ba'thists, want a unified country, empty of
foreign forces, with a strong central government and a rule of law and
meritocracy--all of which would favor them. Kurds want a federation
with a high degree of self-rule. They are largely secular and look for
a separation of mosque and state; and they support the continued
presence of U.S. troops for protection. The dominant Shi'a coalition
wants to affirm the Islamic character of Iraq and strengthen the role
of Islamic law; is wary of U.S. forces but needs them temporarily to
assure continuation of its majority rule; and favors elections which it
hopes will assure its continued political dominance. And indigenous
leaders would like to ease out the exiles to make room for themselves.
All of these differences will have to be reconciled and political space
made for different groups to live, compete and thrive. This will take
years, but the process is already underway with Iraq's first free
election and the negotiations for a constitution. In fact, the ongoing
political process is one of the bright spots in a sometimes bleak
picture.
How can this process be facilitated and how can the coalition help?
First and foremost, every effort should be made to open Iraq to the
outside world. While exiles have had some exposure to the outside,
those inside have had little. Education at every level has deteriorated
and Iraqis, especially professionals, are hungry for outside expertise
and contact. Give it to them. Visitors programs, fellowships, and
scholarships to study at United States and European universities and
colleges, providing computers and library facilities to universities
and centers, and similar programs need to be encouraged and funded.
While these are already underway--and have been successful--much more
needs to be done. The greater interpersonal contacts that ensue will
establish networks that can be built on in the future. One of the most
positive aspects of my trips was in finding young people, in their
twenties and thirties, who wanted to come to the States to study
political and social sciences--not engineering and computers science--
for the first time in decades. We should encourage that.
Second, concentrate on the younger generation which is Iraq's
future. While the vision of most of the 40- and 50-year-olds in
leadership has already been formed--and often in divergent ways--those
in their adolescence and early adulthood are still flexible. And we
should avoid stereotypes. For example, among the most hopeful and
promising experiences of my trip to Baghdad was in talking to this
generation, including several young people from Sadr City, often
thought of as a poverty ridden slum and a nest of radical Islamists
following Muqtada-l-Sadr. One was a husband and wife team involved in
local municipal government; both were graduates of universities and one
was interested in pursuing a Ph.D. thesis on U.S. foreign policy, but
he needs more training in English. He should get it. Another was a
remarkable young woman in her early thirties, who had been encouraged
by her family to get an education as a doctor. She had almost achieved
her goal when Saddam was overthrown. She was appointed to her
neighborhood council, and in a new enthusiasm for politics, she ran the
gamut from neighborhood to district to city council member; then was
appointed to the interim national council of 2004 and finally ran, as
an independent, for the new National Assembly--and won, all in two
short years. She has elected a political career and wants to come to
the States to learn, first hand, how to engage in one. What better way
to invest in future leadership than to provide her--and others like
her--with this opportunity.
Third, encourage and strengthen the many civil society groups that
are already blossoming, despite dire security conditions. Help newly
emerging think tanks with funding they may need to get started and
support the interest groups that are emerging during the constitutional
process. Encourage training and conferences that bring diverse groups
together in an environment that allows hands-on discussion and
potential resolution of conflicts. The institution, which is funding my
research, USIP, is a good example, though not the only one, of the many
ways in which these activities can be supported, through grants to
local civic action groups; training exercises; support for the
constitutional process, and the like. IRI and NDI are doing yeoman work
as well. These activities often do not make the deadlines but they are
critical for developing future leadership with the skills and attitudes
necessary for compromise.
Fourth, strengthen government capacity, both at the national and
local levels. The political process is, justifiably, sucking up much of
the time, energy, and resources of Iraq's elite. Meanwhile, the more
mundane aspects of government--delivery of electricity, garbage
collection, security--are neglected or given over to freelancers and
contractors who may be corrupt or worse. Building government structures
and an honest bureaucracy, which can carry this load and employ the
population, especially at local levels, would greatly enhance Iraq's
ability to carry on and to garner popular support, while it struggles
to settle the difficult political problems at the national level.
Encouraging a civil service administration based on meritocracy would
be a good step in this direction.
Lastly, economic development--by and for Iraqis--must take place,
despite the security situation. All evidence suggests that this
element--and the security that goes with it--is the number one priority
of the population, not the political process. The constitutional
process, while important, must be supplemented by growing prosperity
and a strengthening of the middle class. Over time, nothing will better
tamp down ethnic and sectarian tensions; help mitigate past feelings of
victimization and fears of reprisal; and provide a new and better
vision for Iraq's future and for its youth, than more economic growth.
The public must be given new opportunities and alternative visions for
Iraq's future which can only come from widening economic opportunities
and real freedom of choice. A failure to couple economic development to
the political progress being made may produce an Iraqi version of what
has just occurred in Iran--the election of a religiously conservative
President supported by the neglected working classes. The potential
indigenous leadership in Iraq today is not hidden secularists and
liberals, but the Sadrist movement, which gains support by its nativist
claims (its leaders have not spent time outside of Iraq) and its
championship of the poor, uneducated, and jobless. The best way to
combat this combination is to make sure (a) that the political process
continues to be open to these groups, and (b) that the younger
generation of underprivileged, such as those Sadr City residents I met,
are nurtured, encouraged, and given access to the outside world.
The views above reflect the testimony at the hearing; they do not
represent formal positions taken by the Institute, which does not
advocate specific policies.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Van Rest.
STATEMENT OF JUDY VAN REST, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Van Rest. Thank you very much for this opportunity to
testify before this committee. I have lived in Washington and
worked in the field for a long time, in the democracy field for
almost 15 years, and this is my first opportunity to testify
before the Senate. So I appreciate this chance, and hope that I
do you proud.
On this question of whether the coalition should encourage
Iraqis to forgo writing a full constitution at this time, I
believe that the coalition must continue to encourage adherence
to the August 15 deadline for the Iraqi National Assembly's
adoption of a complete constitution.
The risks of a drawn-out process outweigh the potential
benefits. This is an option that should be strongly resisted,
and adopted only as absolute last resort. Several arguments
support this view.
First is that most Iraqis, according to a recent IRI
National Opinion Poll, indicate that they do not favor an
extension of the August 15 deadline for the Iraqi National
Assembly to complete the writing of a draft constitution. And a
majority of political leaders from across the ethnic and
religious spectrum also remain committed to the August 15 and
October 15 deadlines for adoption of the final constitutional
text, and it's ratification, respectively.
[Note.--The ``IRI National Opinion Poll'' mentioned
throughout this hearing will not be printed due to length but
will be retained in the permanent record of the hearing and can
also be accessed on the IRI Web site: http://www.iri.org/pdfs/
NovemberSurvey Presentation.ppt.]
Beginning with the June 28, 2004, hand over of power, and
more recently, with the January 30, 2005, national elections,
we have witnessed the Iraqi people's desire and determination
to meet the objectives set out in the transitional
administrative law for the full restoration of Iraq's national
sovereignty, and the creation of constitutional democracy by
the end of the year.
We should support these intentions and the momentum they
have generated.
If the constitutional committee fails to present the
assembly with a draft constitution for approval before August
15, or if the assembly fails to meet the deadline for its final
adoption of a draft, the coalition should seek to persuade
Iraqi legislators to extend the deadline for approval of a
complete constitution for a period of no longer than 30 days. A
more extended prolongation of the process would allow political
focus to shift away from this crucial task. It could also
undermine what opinion research has consistently shown to be
the public's stubborn and critically important phase in the
country's forward momentum.
Second, delinking the most contentious issues from the
broader body of the constitutional text and dealing with them
in a separate and less time-constrained negotiation could have
serious negative consequences. The risk of further
deterioration in relations between Iraq's three principal
communities grows in proportion to the duration of the time it
takes to resolve these issues. The longer these key issues
remain unsolved the more likely it is that the positions of the
major interested parties will harden. The continuing evolution
of facts on the ground will increasingly threaten to overtake
and complete negotiations. The longer the period of legal
fluidity is allowed to exist the less likely it is that
mutually satisfactory outcomes can be achieved with respect to
these issues.
We must also consider that absent inclusion of provisions
on such key issues as federalism and the religious character of
the state, how far Iraq's Government would be able to move
ahead in building legal and institutional structures pursuant
to elements of the constitution that do get adopted.
For example, without the form and structure of Iraq's new
federalism agreed upon and in place, efforts to establish a
national budgeting process and develop and implement fiscal
policy could be hampered or rendered impossible.
Likewise, efforts to move ahead confidently with legal and
judicial reforms will be retarded to the extent that issues
pertaining to the relationship between religious and civil law,
and the roles of civil and religious adjudicating institutions,
are left unsolved.
I believe we should continue to support the current
deadlines for adoption and ratification of a complete
constitution until such time as developments lead us to
conclude, beyond a doubt, that one or both of these deadlines
present an impossible target. If an extension of the August 15
deadline, in particular, becomes absolutely necessary it should
be measured in weeks and not months so as to avoid loss of
momentum and political focus.
And the constitution that the Iraqi public is finally asked
to ratify should be a complete document that addresses all of
the key issues. Opening the door to prolonged debate on these
politically sensitive matters will only serve to more sharply
contrast the differences between major ethnic and religious
groups and contribute to further polarization.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Rest follows:]
Prepared Statement of Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice President,
International Republican Institute, Washington, DC
Option 1--Should the coalition encourage Iraqis to forego writing a
full constitution at this time, or should we encourage a strict
adherence to the current deadlines for finishing a constitution? Does
the current compressed timetable for drafting and approving the
constitution aggravate the destabilizing differences among the parties?
Delay would involve setting aside thorny issues that could undermine
national cohesion, like regional autonomy, the status of Kirkuk, the
role of Islam, etc. Instead, should we be encouraging Iraqis to
promulgate a miniconstitution covering electoral law and other items on
which agreement can be reached? Would agreements on limited subjects
build momentum toward cooperation on more difficult items? Or should we
stick to the current schedule by pressing for a completed constitution
by the deadlines that have already been established? What pressures, if
any, can or should the coalition exert on the Iraqi Government to adopt
either of these courses?
Response. The coalition must continue to encourage adherence to the
August 15 deadline for the Iraqi National Assembly's (INA) adoption of
a complete constitution. The risks associated with a prolonged or
multistage process, and with delinking the most contentious issues from
the broader body of the document, would outweigh the potential
benefits. This is an option that should be strongly resisted and
adopted only as an absolute last resort. Several arguments, I believe,
support this view.
First, most Iraqis, according to a recent IRI national opinion
poll, indicate that they do not favor an extension of the August 15
deadline for the INA to complete the writing of a draft constitution.
And a majority of political leaders from across the ethnic and
religious spectrum also remain committed to the August 15 and October
15 deadlines for adoption of a final constitutional text and its
ratification, respectively. Beginning with the June 28, 2004, handover
of power, and more recently with the January 30, 2005, national
elections, we have witnessed the Iraqi people's desire and
determination to meet the objectives set out in the Transitional
Administrative Law for the full restoration of Iraq's national
sovereignty and the creation of constitutional democracy by the end of
this year. We should, unequivocally, support these intentions and the
momentum they have generated.
What should our position be if the INA's Constitutional Committee
should fail to present the assembly with a draft constitution for
approval before August 15, or if the assembly, having received the
committee's draft, should fail to meet the deadline for its final
adoption? The coalition should seek to persuade Iraqi legislators to
extend the deadline for approval of a complete constitution for a
period of no longer than 30 days. A more extended prolongation of the
process would, in my view, allow political focus to shift away from
this crucial task. It could also undermine what opinion research has
consistently shown to be the public's stubborn and critically important
faith in the country's forward momentum.
Second, delinking the most contentious issues--including the nature
of Iraq's new federalism, the status of Kirkuk, and the role of Islam
in Iraqi law and State institutions--from the broader body of the
constitutional text, and dealing with them in a separate and less time
constrained negotiation, could have serious negative consequences.
The risk of further deterioration in relations between Iraq's three
principal communities grows, I believe, in proportion to the duration
of the time it takes to resolve these issues. The longer these key
issues remain unresolved, the more likely it is that the positions of
the major interested parties will harden. The continuing evolution of
``facts on the ground'' will increasingly threaten to overtake and
complicate negotiations. We are already seeing evidence of this
dynamic, for example, in Kurdish efforts to alter the demographic
makeup of Kirkuk and strengthen the institutional legitimacy of Kurdish
regional militias, and in the south of the country, where some
religious groups are attempting to exert increasing influence within
the university system. The longer the period of legal fluidity is
allowed to exist, the less likely it is that mutually satisfactory
outcomes can be achieved with respect to these issues.
We must also consider, absent inclusion of provisions on such key
issues as federalism and the religious character of the state, how far
Iraq's Government would be able to move ahead in building legal and
institutional structures pursuant to elements of the constitution that
do get adopted. For example, without the form and structure of Iraq's
new federalism agreed upon and in place, efforts to establish a
national budgeting process, and develop and implement fiscal policy,
could be hampered or rendered impossible. Likewise, efforts to move
ahead confidently with legal and judicial reforms will be retarded to
the extent that issues pertaining to the relationship between religious
and civil law, and the roles of civil and religious adjudicating
institutions, for example, are left unresolved.
In sum, I believe that we should continue to support the current
deadlines for adoption and ratification of a complete constitution
until such time as developments lead us to conclude, beyond doubt, that
one or both of these deadlines present an impossible target. If an
extension of the August 15 deadline, in particular, becomes absolutely
necessary, it should be measured in weeks and not months so as to avoid
loss of momentum and political focus. And the constitution that the
Iraqi public is finally asked to ratify should be a complete document
that addresses all of the key issues. Opening the door to a prolonged
debate on these politically sensitive matters will only serve to more
sharply contrast the differences between major ethnic and religious
groups and contribute to further polarization.
Option 2--Should the coalition conduct a massive public education
campaign designed to stimulate interest in the constitutional
referendum and discussion of the insurgency? This would include holding
townhall meetings carried on radio and television on the future of
Iraq. Could such a campaign reach the Iraqi people and would Iraqis
participate despite threats of retribution? Would unscripted townhall
meetings enhance the credibility of the message, thereby building
public disdain for the insurgency and support for Iraqi political
development? Could security be provided to prevent terrorist attacks
during the townhall events?
Response. Let me start by saying that I believe we are now at a
point in the process where the role of public education is most
crucial.
Unlike an election, where voters are asked to express a personal
preference from among a list of options or candidates, the
constitutional referendum will ask Iraqis to support the product of
many compromises--some of them touching extremely sensitive cultural
and political nerves. People will not have the option of choosing only
that which suits them, as they can in an election. Iraqi voters will
have to understand the compromises that went into writing the
constitution and, despite the fact that there will be elements in it
with which they personally disagree, conclude that it offers the best
hope for moving the country forward and improving their lives. They
will have to reach this conclusion, moreover, despite what will almost
assuredly be opposition from more radical and hard-line elements within
their respective communities.
To succeed in encouraging and preparing voters to make this choice,
a comprehensive, consistently visible and broad-based public education
campaign is absolutely essential. We must, however, distinguish between
a ``coalition campaign'' and an ``Iraqi campaign.'' What is crucial is
to insure that Iraqis are provided with the support that they need to
design, produce, and implement a campaign to educate the population
about the process that is underway, the issues under discussion, the
content of the constitution, and the importance of participation in the
referendum scheduled for October 15.
I am pleased to say that such a campaign has, in fact, been
initiated and that it is gathering momentum with each day that passes.
The International Republican Institute (IRI), whose programs in Iraq
are being funded by American taxpayers through USAID and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED), has been a principal motivator and
supporter of these programs. Other American organizations, first among
them the National Democratic Institute (NDI), are also contributing to
this effort through their own civic and political networks in regions
across the country.
Though not in the context of townhall meetings, as we know them in
the United States, much is already being done at the grassroots level
to inform Iraqis' about the constitution. IRI is supporting a broad
array of civic groups that are involved in a coordinated nationwide
voter education campaign to raise public awareness of constitutional
democracy and the constitutional drafting and referendum process in
Iraq. Led by Iraqi civic groups working under the banner of the Civic
Coalition for Free Elections, the campaign, entitled ``A Constitution
for Everyone,'' consists of direct voter contact through workshops
based on an IRI-developed curriculum and printed materials. Using
prepared flip charts and distributing some 600,000 copies of the
``Constitution for Everyone'' pamphlet, 1,400 workshops are planned--
more than 100 have already taken place--and we hope to reach more than
60,000 voters in all 18 of Iraq's governorates.
It is also encouraging to note that the members and leadership of
the INA's Constitution Committee are themselves becoming more active
and engaged in public education efforts. IRI has been in close contact
with the Constitutional Committee over the past several weeks to offer
assistance to its outreach efforts. In addition to offering weekly
focus group reports on questions important to the constitutional
drafting, IRI has already produced four television interviews with
Constitutional Committee leadership, in which they have discussed
process and content issues and answered questions from the public about
the constitution. One of the programs featured the committee's
chairman, Sheik Hamudi. Another featured women members of the committee
in an effort to focus discussion on issues of particular interest to
women. These 30-minute programs, of which more are to follow, are each
being aired several times on major Iraqi television networks and will
reach an audience of millions.
IRI is also producing the Constitution Committee's first public
service announcements (PSAs) and helping it develop and eventually
distribute printed material. Our public opinion and focus group
research, I am pleased to say, is being actively utilized by the
committee in the design and development of these products.
Iraqi women, through organizations such as the Rafadine Women's
Coalition and the Women's Leadership Institute, are also doing a great
deal to advocate for women's rights in the constitution drafting
process and to publicize key issues through outreach to women across
the country. IRI's Constitutional Consulting Team, composed of six
eminent legal and academic specialists, is providing counsel to the
leadership of these and other organizations, and IRI is supporting the
production of their public education materials and their television
broadcasts. I am also very encouraged by the extent to which the
Minister of Women's Affairs, Dr. Azhar Al Shakly, has taken a
leadership role in the public education effort. Later this month, in
fact, Minister Al Shakly will be hosting two national women's
conferences in Baghdad on issues related to the constitution. These
events will be highly visible and provide added focus and momentum to
the public education effort on behalf of women's rights in the new
constitution.
Option 3--Should we take new steps to forestall a Sunni-Shi'a
conflict? Is international and Arab intervention feasible? Could an
international working group that includes participation by Sunni Arabs
from outside Iraq--Jordanians, Egyptians, and others--help broker
negotiations between the parties? Is there some other vehicle that
could provide technical support and mediation services for Sunnis and
Shi'as to come to a peaceful accommodation? Could credible Sunnis be
enlisted to participate in this process? Should de-Ba'thification be
revisited?
Response. At every transition point on Iraq's path to democracy--
including the handover of sovereignty in June 2004 and the election of
the Iraqi National Assembly in January 2005--some very bright people
said it could not be done, the ethnic, sectarian, and geographic
divides were too great, the risk of violence was too high, and that
even civil war was imminent. Yet, time after time, Iraqis have proven
them wrong.
Now, the actions of determined insurgents have again raised fears
that the situation is on the brink of collapsing into conflict because
of Sunni-Shi'a divides. History has shown us that divisions between
these two branches of Islam can lead to conflict. In Iraq, Saddam
Hussein's 35 years of murderous rule, including widespread abuses
against the Shi'a majority, only contributed to suspicions between the
two sects.
Yet, once again Iraqis have expressed confidence that the
democratic institutions they are creating offer them the political
framework for resolving these differences and moving toward greater
cooperation and trust as they build a united Iraq together.
No one should be surprised that Sunni-Shi'a issues are part of the
debate surrounding the drafting of a new constitution and the new Iraq.
Rather, the fact that this debate is taking place should be viewed as a
major step forward. This view was expressed by one Iraqi leader during
a meeting with IRI staff. While he and fellow Iraqis argued about what
system of government should prevail, he paused to comment, ``Under
Saddam I would not even debate such issues in my own head. Now we are
free to debate them among ourselves.''
This commitment to democratic debate and a confidence in the
framework is found across Iraq and across various sectors of society.
Notably, it is found among Sunnis. We have seen Sunni representatives
brought into the constitution drafting process. We have heard Sunni
leaders say they made a mistake by not participating in the January
election, a mistake they are encouraging their followers not to make in
the upcoming elections.
The evidence is not only anecdotal. Support for, and confidence in,
democratic solutions among Iraqis has been expressed time and again in
the nationwide polling done by IRI (``Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion''
\1\) The latest survey revealed that nearly 73 percent of Iraqis
believe that the new Iraqi transitional government is representative of
the Iraqi people as a whole. Among self-identified Sunnis, the
percentage is 67.4 percent. For Shi'a it is 78.3 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The survey can be accessed at: http://www.iri.org/pdfs/
NovemberSurveyPresentation.ppt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equally revealing is the strong support for coming elections; 75.6
percent of Iraqis say they are very likely to vote in the upcoming
constitutional referendum. Again, support is strong among both Sunni
and Shi'a, at 63 percent and 83 percent, respectively.
It is also worth noting that polling data reveals that the Sunni-
Shi'a divide is not that wide in comparison to self identification as
Iraqis. Twice as many Sunni most strongly identify with their country
in relation to the number who identify with their ethnic group. For
Shi'a, four times as many identify with their country. When comparing
strongly identifying with country to identification with religion, the
ratio for Sunnis is 3:1 and for Shi'a it is 2:1. National identity is a
necessary component in creating a willingness to make the compromises
necessary to bridge the gaps that might otherwise be created by more
divisive elements.
These numbers are being reflected by action on the ground. Across
the country, courageous Iraqis are standing up to those who would use
violence to undermine the move toward a peaceful and democratic Iraq.
IRI is working with numerous Sunni and Shi'a organizations,
including clerics associations to educate Iraqis about the constitution
drafting process and support for elections as a way of creating a more
peaceful and prosperous Iraq today and for future generations.
It is in this context that the response to what steps should be
taken to avoid Sunni-Shi'a conflict should be found. The answer is to
support the Iraqis in finding their own solutions, including that of
de-Ba'thification, within the democratic political framework to which
they have committed themselves. The Sunnis and Shi'as are already
engaged in accommodation through political channels. Leadership is not
advocating such violence for civil war. Such elements, while tragically
conspicuous, are marginal forces. The United States and its coalition
partners would do well to encourage, even pressure, neighboring
governments and those of other Islamic States in the region that
benefit from stability in Iraq to be more outspoken in their
condemnation of terrorist violence in the name of Islam.
Option 4--How can the United States cultivate emerging leaders
among the various political actions in Iraq and ensure that they will
interact politically, rather than using violence or exclusionary
political tactics? Is such involvement feasible, or would it be
counterproductive? How divergent are the views among the various new
leaders on such issues as democracy, the appropriate political
structure, the role of religion, or future relations with the West and
Iraq's neighbors, and can the United States influence these views?
Response. As outlined above, Iraqis are finding their own voice and
leaders in support of political interaction rather than violence or
exclusionary tactics.
IRI and NDI have taken an active role in supporting this effort.
Drawing on 20 years experience of assisting countries emerge from
authoritarian rule to democracies, with technical training, we are
helping Iraqis to build the political parties, civil society,
government institutions, and other components necessary to have
representative government. Encouraging this process is an important
part of helping the majority in their fight for freedom against those
whose agenda is hatred and violence.
We do so keeping in mind that democracy is not an off-the-rack
concept. One size does not fit all. Rather, democracy works best when
it is tailor made. Basic elements are universal, but style and fit
vary. By concentrating on providing training and support for the basic
elements, we are helping the Iraqis to fashion a new free and
democratic Iraq.
One of the primary ways of doing this is by drawing on the
experience of other countries. Central and Eastern Europe provides
particularly helpful examples for the Iraqis to study. For example,
trainers from Romania are well received because Iraqis can relate to
someone who was imprisoned or had a family member killed by an
oppressive dictator but who is now part of a successful transition away
from authoritarian rule.
Successful transitions in the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and the
Czech Republic as well as other regions in countries such as Indonesia,
have all proved useful in providing Iraqis case studies for what has
worked, and what hasn't, in making the move to a free and democratic
society.
These lessons are not only learned from trainings or exchanges.
IRI's staff in Iraq includes those who helped to lead such transitions
in their own home countries of Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Part of
their motivation is to bring others the support they received when they
were activists for freedom. It is a lesson that has not been lost on
Iraqis.
As for opinion on issues of democracy and related topics, I would
again cite a few results from the most recent national poll conducted
by IRI:
I will now read to you a list of human rights that have been
recognized by the international community. On a scale of 1 to
5, how important do you think it is that they be part of Iraq's
new constitution? Those choosing very important:
71.4%--select and change their government through peaceful,
fair elections
70%--fair and public trials
69.1%--no discrimination based on religion, race, sex or
ethnicity
67.8%--no torture or degrading treatment/punishment
65.9%--individual privacy, including the family, home and
correspondence
65.7%--no arbitrary arrest or detention
60%--freely practice religion
55.8%--free speech and press
51.9%--own and sell property
41.8%--organize political, civic or labor organizations
Which do you think would be the most appropriate system for
a future Iraqi government?
33.36%--mixed parliamentary/presidential
30.3%--parliamentary
22%--religious
Which of the three branches of government do you think
should exercise the most power or influence in Iraq's future
government?
41%--executive
27.9%--divided equally
9.9%--legislative
Were Iraq to have a presidential system, which of the
following methods would you prefer to select the president?
72%--direct election by the Iraqi people
12.9%--appointed by national assembly
5%--appointed by clerics or religious leaders
Which would be the best way to organize the structure of the
national and governorate levels of government?
76.2%--maintain current system of 18 governorates
12.1%--group governorates according to geographic regions
5.1%--allow governorates to determine regional groupings
Some people say that religion has a special role to play in
the government while others believe that religion and the
government should respect one another but remain separate. Do
you believe that:
48.1%--religion has a special role to play in the government
45.9%--religion and government should respect one another by
not impeding on the rights roles and responsibilities of
the other
Which of the following statements most closely fits your
view of the role of Islam in the creation of laws and
legislation?
39.8%--Islam should be the main source (among many) of
legislation and laws in Iraq
34.7%--Islam should be the sole source of legislation and
laws in Iraq
12.3%--Islam should be one source (among many) of legislation
and laws in Iraq
To what extent do you agree or disagree that people or
groups who could not (or did not) participate in the January 30
elections have the right to contribute to writing the
constitution?
35.7%--strongly agree
35.2%--agree
8%--disagree
Do you think that the new TNA should keep the 25 percent
quota for women in the National Assembly in the new
constitution?
51.6%--yes, it should remain the same
25.5%--yes, but it should be higher
10.1%--yes, but it should be lower
3.1%--no
The Chairman. Thank you very much Ms. Van Rest.
Dr. Feldman.
STATEMENT OF DR. NOAH FELDMAN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Feldman. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee,
thank you so much for this opportunity.
There are essentially three different factions on this
constitutional committee, the elected Shi'a, the elected Kurds,
and the unelected Sunnis. Each has a different perspective, I
think, on the issue in front of us, and I think that should
influence our policy decision.
The Shi'a and the Kurds have a constituency because they
were elected, and as a consequence of that they want to move
forward relatively quickly because it's in their interests to
satisfy a constituency that's very frustrated with what has, on
the whole, been a relatively slow progress.
That's understandable. They're also the two sides that have
the most experience negotiating constitutional deals. They've
been dealing with each other for the better part of 3 years
now. Beginning before the war, they negotiated the transitional
administrative law together. They're very well experienced in
this kind of negotiating, and their positions are relatively
clear, both to them and to many of their constituents, because
they've done this deal once before.
And the reason that there's been so much progress so far in
drafting, on the part of this constitutional committee, is that
the players are not operating on a blank slate. They understood
the deal in the transitional law, they understood the deal that
they cut privately before the selection of the Prime Minister
and the President, and they've been in the process of putting
that deal into place.
The Kurds have a further interest, which is an interest in
making things happen as quickly as possible because of their
perception, accurate in my view, that they have greater
influence the further we are from a big public political
debate. The more influence we put on the process, the Kurds
believe, the greater their influence. This is because they
feel--and I'll return to this a bit later--that the ordinary
Iraqi, the ordinary Arab Iraqi, will experience sticker shock
on looking at the provisions of the federalism arrangements
that are set out in the TAL.
Now the Sunni members, the Sunni Arab members, of the
constitutional committee are in a completely different position
because they were not elected. And I think they're the ones
whose view on whether we should go forward quickly or whether
we should delay the process, or on whether we should come up
with some sort of a compromise, which I'll mention, probably
should weigh the most heavily with us. So let me say why they
think this, and also why I think their view should weigh
heavily for us.
They are central, these Sunni Arabs are central to the
process of bringing the Sunni community, which is--some of
which, at least, is sympathetic to the insurgency, not all--
into the political process so as to marginalize the extremist
jihadi wing of the insurgency, which will, of course, never
compromise on its own.
These relatively brave--and I'll say more about that in a
moment, too--Sunni Arab members of the committee are putting
themselves on the line and may need to be able to show their
potential constituency, the people whom they want to represent
when they run for office in the near future, that they actually
got something done in these constitutional negotiations.
If it looks to the Sunni population as though these Sunni
members, 10 voting members and 15 nonvoting members, were named
to the committee and then rubber stamped a deal that had
already been privately done by the Shi'a and the Kurds, then
they will be discredited with their own constituency. All of
the work--the good work in my view--that the United States and
other coalition partners have done to convince the Shi'a and
the Kurds to bring Sunnis into the political process will be
lost if it turns out that the Sunnis themselves, that is to say
the ordinary Sunni Arab, sees the participation of his putative
representatives as having been empty. That's a substantial
danger.
Now some of the members of this committee will probably
want to move to elections relatively quickly because they want
to get Sunnis into elected office, they understand the boycott
was a huge mistake, and they want elections relatively quickly
to begin the process of reversing that boycott.
So they may want to move forward quickly, but they will be
hampered by two things. One, the danger that they'll be seen as
rubber stampers, which is bad for them; two, the distinct
possibility that when their constituents get a look at the full
degree of Kurdish autonomy that's envisioned by most of the
people who are close to this process, that they will be
unwilling to vote for the constitution because of what I
described earlier as sticker shock. They may believe it over
time, just as the Shi'a Arab community has come to accept a
fair amount of autonomy for the Kurdish regions.
Their constituents, too, might over time develop this view.
That's how it happened among the Shi'a; it took some time. And
if that is to be the case then they may judge that some delay
is appropriate. I don't think they would want too much delay
because of the realities of needing an election. If they wanted
some delay on that, something short of the 6 months, I don't
think that it would be the right policy to oppose their getting
that delay because they would be doing it in the hopes of
getting the Sunni constituency on board. If they think they
won't get the constituency on board because of it, then they
won't push for a delay, they'll just push for the elections
relatively soon to get their jobs in office.
Now the delicacy of the situation of these members of the
committee is enormously significant here, and in written
comments that I submitted last week, I said that their personal
safety was in danger. And unfortunately, today, we saw a very
tragic substantiation of just that, and I'm sure we all share
the sorrow over the fact that one member of the committee, who
was a voting member, and another member, who was a nonvoting
member, were killed, and their driver was killed as well.
This is the kind of thing that is preventable to the extent
that we can provide security for them, and we ought to be doing
that, at least if they're willing to accept it. It is the kind
of thing that is terribly harmful and it's similar in kind to
the attacks on the Ambassadors of non-Iraqi/Sunni Muslim
countries who have been in the country recently.
The reason that the jihadi wing of the insurgency is
attacking these folks is, precisely, that they see them as the
route to a negotiation between the government, as it stands,
and the moderate wing of the insurgency, and I use the word
``moderate'' in a very--in quotation marks if you will, because
they are, of course, involved in a violent armed insurgency and
so in that sense they're not moderate at all. What I mean by
moderate is only those people who might be willing,
pragmatically, to cut a deal with the government.
Now the reason I bring this up is just to mention that the
jihadi wing of the insurgency will do everything it can to
discredit the constitutional process and discredit the people
who are participating in it, and, obviously, to try to kill
those people if they can't discredit them.
We, therefore, need to encourage Shi'a and Kurdish
politicians to make sure that the Sunni politicians involved in
the constitutional process have something to show for the fact
that they're risking their lives. We need that, not out of a
pure sense of honor, although I suppose that might be part of
the picture, we need it because we need the constitution not to
make the insurgency worse. If what emerges is a constitution
that's ratified by Shi'a and Kurds, and they could well ratify
it, and is opposed by Sunnis, it will harden the divisions in
the country.
So while I agree with Dr. Marr that the constitution alone
can't solve the insurgency--that would be asking too much of
the constitution--it can make things worse if it's not seen as
fully inclusive.
So I believe that the U.S. policy, at this point in time,
should be to follow the wishes of the members of the
constitutional committee, and particularly the Sunni members,
to make certain that they have something that they can deliver
to their constituents, and can be seen to deliver to their
constituents, that's also acceptable to the Shi'a and to the
Kurds.
A last word on deferral strategies. One thing these Sunni
members of the committee might want, and this may be true of
some of the Kurds and Shi'a on the committee as well, is that
they may want a partial constitutional deal that reflects
agreement where they can get it, and defers questions where
they can't get it. Now this form of compromise is, as Ms. Van
Rest says, risky. In the long run there's always--in fact, not
just a possibility, there's almost a certainty that unresolved
issues will come back and resurface as serious problems down
the line.
Nonetheless, deferral is a hallmark of successful
constitution writing, because very often the only alternative
to a deferral in a deal is no deal at all. Our constitutional
history certainly reflects that, perhaps not in the most
creditable way, because as we all know the true deal that had
to be struck in Philadelphia in 1787 was the deal over slavery,
and the Founding Fathers compromised on that question and we
paid the price of the Civil War ultimately for it.
But in the interim we did, in fact, have a functioning
Republic, and I think it is relatively clear that we would not
have had a Union and a ratified Constitution had that deal not
been struck.
Now, fortunately, the compromises that have to be made and
the questions of deferral that will have to happen in Iraq are
nowhere near as morally problematic as slavery was. They are
questions of federalism and they are questions of religion to a
lesser degree. But it basically amounts to leaving things like
the Kirkuk question out of the equation at present, using just
the most general principles.
Similarly, perhaps even leaving the question of the
allocation of resources by region, which will be a very
contentious and difficult issue, out of the equation in any
explicit way. So I'm not disagreeing with Ms. Van Rest when she
says that these will be problems down the line, I'm sure she's
right that there will be. I'm suggesting that the alternative
might be having no constitution just now, or even in the next 6
months. And so under those circumstances it may well be that
deferral is a constitutional solution that we may not be very
happy with, but it may be the best thing going, and I think
probably the Iraqis on the committee are the ones best placed
to determine that.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Feldman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Noah Feldman, Professor of Law, New York
University, New York, NY
TIMING OF THE CONSTITUTION
Because of the addition of Sunni Arab Iraqis who were not elected
members of the national assembly, the final composition of the
constitutional committee charged with drafting a permanent Iraqi
Constitution was not determined until the early days of July, 2005.
This leaves the members of the committee with three choices: (1) Moving
rapidly to release the constitutional draft for debate in the national
assembly and eventual submission to a referendum on ratification; (2)
delaying the formulation of a draft so as to encourage participation by
the newly appointed Sunni members of the committee; or (3) offering a
compromise between these two positions, producing a draft of a partial
constitution now, and deferring some major constitutional questions
until later.
It is likely that the key decision among these options will be
driven by the newly appointed Sunni members of the committee. These
committee members face an extremely difficult and delicate challenge.
On one hand, they understand that the Sunni boycott of Iraq's first
post-war election was disastrous for their constituency. The sooner a
new constitution is ratified, the sooner they can run for office in the
hopes of giving Sunnis an elected voice in the government. A delay in
ratification of the constitution would mean a delay for new national
elections. This gives the Sunni committee members an incentive to
encourage the rapid release of a constitutional draft. Furthermore,
these members have now received a certain degree of national
recognition, and most or all of them could be expected to stand as
candidates in the new elections.
On the other hand, the Sunni members of the constitutional
committee must demonstrate to their potential constituency that Sunni
participation on the committee has had a material impact on the
substance of the new draft constitution. If it looks to the Sunni
public as though the constitutional committee members chosen to
represent them have merely rubber stamped a previously existing
constitutional draft negotiated before their appointments by Shi'a and
Kurdish members of the committee, the Sunnis on the committee could
well be discredited, and the new constitutional draft with them. It is
extremely important for the Sunni committee members to have an impact
in the drafting process, and what is more, to be seen to have such an
impact.
The Sunnis on the constitutional committee are crucial participants
in the nascent movement to get Sunni Arab Iraqis involved in Iraq's new
political process, with the eventual goal of ending the insurgency by
weakening support for it in predominantly Sunni areas. The outcome of
this political process is by no means certain. The Sunnis on the
constitutional committee need to be able to show results in order to
advance the process. Violence is likely to continue while
constitutional process proceeds, certainly perpetrated by the jihadi
wing of the insurgency, but also by other insurgents when they think it
will advance the Sunni cause.
The more visible gains accomplished by Sunni leaders, the more
ordinary Sunnis will come to see politics as preferable to violence as
a means to accomplish their ends. In particular, the goal of those
pursuing the political process must be to discredit the violent jihadi
wing of the insurgency, which rejects political compromise altogether.
It is no coincidence that the jihadi wing of the insurgency has been
kidnapping and killing diplomats from Sunni Muslim countries in Iraq.
Those diplomats have the potential to forge connections between a
pragmatic Sunni leadership and the new Iraqi Government. The jihadis
understand such connections as a major threat to their goal of keeping
violent insurgency alive and resisting political compromise of the kind
that more pragmatic insurgents--as well as much of the undecided Sunni
Arab community--find potentially appealing. Killing these diplomats is
aimed at the specific strategic goal of blocking political progress
designed to bring the Sunni community into a pragmatic and nonviolent
relationship with new Iraqi Government. The Sunni members of the
constitutional committee are, therefore, also themselves at risk, both
politically and in terms of their personal safety.
Meanwhile, the Shi'a and Kurdish members of the constitutional
committee would like to see a rapid move to the release of a
constitutional draft. As elected officials, they share desire to end
street progress to an increasingly frustrated public. On the Kurdish
side, there is a lingering (and warranted) concern that an extended
constitutional process might lead to the loss of some of the gains that
Kurds have made in convincing, at least, the Shi'a political leadership
to accept substantial de facto Kurdish regional autonomy under the
rubric of federalism.
The best posture for U.S. policy at this juncture is to express the
view that, if the Sunnis appointed to the constitutional committee
prefer some circumspection so as to consider the draft constitution and
promote the interests of their constituents, the other members of the
committee should show substantial concern for this desire. Having
labored to bring these Sunni members to the committee, with the goal of
developing Sunni politics and eventually marginalizing violent
insurgents, the United States would not be well served by an approach
that ran roughshod over Sunni interests in a way that rendered Sunni
political participation useless.
It may well be that the Sunni members of the constitutional
committee would themselves prefer some sort of compromise option, with
the deferral of many of the difficult constitutional decisions that are
ahead. If so, such a compromise should be perfectly acceptable from the
U.S. standpoint. Deferral is a standard strategy for constitution
drafting under difficult circumstances. It does not work indefinitely,
as the American Civil War demonstrates. But it can accomplish the
short-term goal of shifting, at least, some underlying tension into the
political realm and away from the use of force.
THE RATIFICATION PROCESS
It is crucial that, unlike the Transitional Administrative Law,
which by necessity was drafted privately and was not subject to
national ratification, the final Iraqi Constitution be ratified through
a process that involves substantial public involvement and discussion.
Only such a public process can save the constitution from the
inevitable criticism, which will be heard in Sunni areas of Iraq as
well as elsewhere in the Muslim world, that it is the product of
political elites sequestered in the green zone, who may have been
elected, but who govern at the sufferance of the coalition.
This said, the United States should be extremely cautious about
designing or directing a public campaign, either to promote or discuss
the constitution. Instead, the coalition should stand prepared to fund
efforts in this direction designed by members of the national assembly
and the constitutional committee. The Transitional Administrative Law
provides for a popular referendum on the constitution, thus affording a
formal measure of democratic legitimacy. Beyond this formal structure,
the new Iraqi Government needs to develop its own, distinctively Iraqi
process for discussing and analyzing the constitution. United States
officials are poorly placed to determine the right format or forum for
such debates.
The town meeting is a particular form of political expression
developed in a particular time and place and today not widely used even
in the United States. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution designed a
republican, representative form of government, not a direct democracy,
and even the ratification conventions that took place in the 13 U.S.
States were not open meetings, but involved representatives selected by
localities and State legislatures. The ``town meeting'' as such does
not have its roots in Iraqi political culture. Instead, Iraqis will
probably develop some sort of model of consultative discussion more
closely linked to the traditional Arab institution of the majlis.
It is to be emphasized that when a new constitutional draft is made
public, many ordinary Iraqis will experience a kind of ``sticker
shock'' with respect to some of its more innovative aspects, especially
those concerning federalism. An immediate, open, public discussion will
generate some angry rejection of the degree of independence to be
enjoyed by the Kurdish region. By the same token, religious radicals
intent on destabilizing the constitutional process could well criticize
the draft as insufficiently Islamic--a process which would be perfectly
natural in public speeches or on television, but which would be
potentially destabilizing if it were to take place in town meetings
designed to debate the new constitution.
The members of the constitutional committee have now had experience
considering political realities and compromising on the basis of them.
They must have the opportunity to explain the draft they have developed
to their constituents in their own way. We must be vigilant about
unwittingly undermining their efforts through a well-intentioned but
ill-executed policy of encouraging town meetings.
AVOIDING SHI'A-SUNNI VIOLENCE
The jihadi wing of the insurgency has continued to make great
efforts to provoke all-out civil war between the Sunni and Shi'a
communities in Iraq. In particular, attacks on Shi'a civilians, holy
places, and prominent clerics are specifically aimed at causing Shi'as
to break their restraint, Were it not for the steadying hand of
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, it is entirely likely that violent
retaliation would already have occurred on a significant scale. The
great risk continues to be an attempt on the life of Sistani himself,
which, if successful, would both provide enormous cause for retaliatory
anger and remove the primaries barrier to its expression. It would be
astonishing if such an attempt were not being planned at present. Many
of the jihadis consider Shi'a Muslims to be heretics, and there is no
reason to expect that they would show any respect at all for the person
of Sistani.
To avoid the outbreak of serious interdenominational violence, it
is necessary to develop a network of contacts who can speak credibly on
behalf of the Sunni community, and even, indirectly, on behalf of the
pragmatic, largely ex-Ba'thist or ex-military wings of the insurgency.
The Sunnis appointed to the constitutional committee may be considered
the vanguard of such a group. Some Sunni clerics may also be useful for
this purpose, especially if they would be willing to meet with Shi'a
clerics on terms of equality. Diplomats from Sunni countries can play
some constructive role in this process by identifying potential Sunni
spokesmen. But ultimately, there is no substitute for elected Sunni
officials serving in the same government bodies as their Shi'a
counterparts. Developing a formalized mechanism outside of political
institutions for communicating to Sunnis is likely to marginalize those
political institutions, with serious long-term consequences.
THE EMERGING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
The highly fluid political situation in Iraq is generating a new
group of political leaders who are acting as entrepreneurs filling a
gap in the market. More such leaders will emerge in the coming years,
both from within existing political parties and from without. The only
generalization that is appropriate is that these leaders are quick to
learn and shape the rules of the emerging political sphere. They have
general ideological goals, but are typically willing to work with
anybody to achieve them, and those goals are themselves open to rapid
change and development.
Muqtada al-Sadr is the model of these new political players. From
challenging democracy as un-Islamic, he moved to participating in
elections. From fighting the coalition through his militia, he moved to
accepting coalition money for projects in neighborhoods he controls. He
challenged Sistani directly, then acknowledged the latter's authority.
None of these is a marker of any underlying moderation; each was a
tactical decision taken in the light of circumstances.
The chief failing of U.S. policy with regard to Sadr has been its
uncertainty. The coalition needs to decide whether to co-opt and buy
off potential militants or arrest and kill them. Fluctuations in policy
are counterproductive given the general uncertainty and fluidity on the
ground in Iraq.
More broadly, given the U.S. force posture in Iraq, a policy of
pragmatic accommodation with new political leaders is necessary. That
means that even those who have in the past taken up arms against the
coalition must be engaged where there is a chance of redirecting them
to political, rather than military means. The key is to insist that any
interlocutor must not simultaneously be involved in violence, and to
demonstrate that giving up violence is rewarded with stature and money.
This provides an incentive for mainstreaming that is crucial to
encouraging politics in lieu of violence. Some contacts with violent
insurgents will probably continue sub rosa, and that is not necessarily
a bad thing if it encourages other insurgents to choose politics over
violence on the ground of self-interest.
Such interlocutors may be former Ba'thists, militia members, or
others. (Two members of the constitutional committee are reported to
have been members of the Ba'th Party.) If they will participate in
peaceful politics, they should not be excluded on the basis of past
membership alone. Of course criminals must be brought to justice--but
in the short term, it is far more important to create political contact
with all factions, especially those who presently threaten the future
of the Iraqi political process.
The Chairman. At this moment I'd like to recognize Senator
Biden, the ranking member, for an opening comment.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. I apologize for being
late and I got to read your statement, Dr. Marr, which I always
do, before you testified, and while you were testifying.
I think you've all summarized this pretty clearly, and I
think that we all acknowledge that unless we get the Sunnis
into the deal, whatever the deal is, constitution or otherwise,
there is no resolution in Iraq, and so it's a difficult call.
But I just want to thank you all for taking the time to be
here, your testimony, and you're about to answer questions for
us, is really genuinely helpful where I think there are very
few absolutely clear-cut answers here.
And so I will ask that my statement be placed in the
record, Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
Senator Biden [continuing]. And yield to you for gaining
whatever--there is.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
I would like to second the chairman's welcome to our distinguished
guests. The issues before us today are as important to our success in
Iraq as they are complex.
Our commanders on the ground have emphasized that military means
alone are not sufficient to defeat the insurgency. Ultimately, true
security and stability can only be achieved through a political
accommodation among Iraq's major communities and factions.
The constitutional debate in Iraq will play a significant role in
determining whether there will be such an accommodation. I am hopeful
the constitution can be drafted on time, though it will require
consensus-building, compromise, and late nights.
With less than 4 weeks to go, a number of contentious issues must
be litigated, including: Federalism, the status of Kirkuk, the sharing
of resources, and the role of Islam and women's rights, to name but a
few.
But even if all goes well, we shouldn't expect to see a perfect
document on August 15. It's worth remembering that our own Constitution
was 13 years in the making, and it remains a living document to this
day.
Assuming that the Iraqis succeed in putting together a draft
constitution, there will remain several profound challenges.
The first is getting the Sunni Arabs into the political process en
masse, Iraq is scheduled to have two more elections this year--a
constitutional referendum in October and another parliamentary election
in December.
Many Arab Sunnis boycotted January's parliamentary elections. I
believe many others were kept away from polling stations by fear. It is
absolutely essential to convince this silent Sunni majority to
participate in the process and to claim a seat at the table in Iraq's
first constitutionally elected government.
Our second challenge is ensuring that the constitution is more than
just words on a piece of paper. This requires accountability and
transparency; security and judicial institutions that respect
individual dignity, human rights, and the rule of law; and a government
whose reach extends beyond the green zone.
An equally profound challenge is sectarianism. On my first visit to
Iraq 2 years ago, very few Iraqis would openly identify themselves as
Sunni or Shi'a--it was considered inappropriate.
Now, it is all too common--the result of a breakdown in Iraq's
social and security order and the brutal agenda of a small group of
religious extremists. We saw a horrific example of this agenda with
last weekend's attack on a mosque south of Baghdad, which has claimed
100 lives.
Thus far, the Shi'a religious establishment has succeeded in
keeping the desire for revenge after such attacks in check, but there
is evidence of a growing number of reprisal killings against Sunnis.
The tentative political progress in Iraq risks being washed away if
this rising tide of sectarianism is not stemmed.
I repeat what I said yesterday. I believe that we can still succeed
in Iraq. By success, I mean leaving Iraq better than we found it--a
country with a representative government in which all major communities
believe they have a stake, and a country that is not a haven for terror
nor a threat to us or its neighbors.
I believe that there is an Iraqi nationalism that unites, at least,
Iraqi Arabs. I believe that Iraq's Kurds, because they understand the
realities of their neighborhood, recognize that autonomy in a federal
Iraq is a much more realistic option than independence.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We'll proceed then through the remaining three sets, and
then have questions from members of the committee.
Now the second set. I'll ask you, Ms. Van Rest, to make the
first comment on this occasion.
Should the coalition conduct a massive public education
campaign designed to stimulate interest in the constitutional
referendum and discussion of the insurgency? This would include
townhall meetings carried on radio and television on the future
of Iraq. Could such a campaign reach the Iraqi people, and
would Iraqis participate despite threats of retribution?
Would unscripted townhall meetings enhance the credibility
of the message, thereby building public disdain for the
insurgency, and support for Iraqi political development? Could
security be provided to prevent terrorist attacks during the
townhall events?
Would you please proceed?
Ms. Van Rest. We are clearly at the point in this process
where the role of public education is quite crucial. The
constitutional referendum is complicated for Iraqis. When they
go to the voting booth it will not be simply a matter of voting
for a particular coalition or name of a person, but there are
some complicated issues that they may not agree with, and they
need to understand how the process went along so that they
understand the compromises made and have a full and complete
understanding that while they may not agree with in the
constitution, nevertheless, this may be the best way forward
for Iraq.
Public education campaigns by Iraqis are essential. They
need to be done not by the coalition but by Iraqis themselves.
What is crucial is to ensure that Iraqis are provided with
support, that they need to design and produce and implement a
campaign to educate the population about the process that is
underway, issues under discussion, the content of the
constitution, and the importance of their participation in the
referendum scheduled for October 15.
I am pleased to say that we are very much involved in
supporting a campaign by a variety of Iraqi organizations
across the country. This is something that we have been doing
along with our colleagues at the National Democratic Institute
to help get the word out about what the process is. We did this
prior to the January 30 election, and what we discovered is
that there are no end of Iraqi individuals and groups willing
to risk their lives to conduct public education.
Let me give you some idea of what is going on now. The
workshops that are going on are not in the context of the
townhall meetings as we know them, but they are more like small
gatherings across the country. We're supporting an array of
civic groups that are involved in a coordinated nationwide
voter education campaign to raise public awareness of
constitutional democracy and constitutional drafting and the
referendum process. Led by Iraqi civic groups working under the
banner of the Civic Coalition for Free Elections of which there
are about 80 organizations.
The campaign, which is entitled ``A Constitution for
Everyone,'' consists of direct voter contact through workshops
based on IRI developed curriculum and printed materials. There
are scheduled around 1,400 of these workshops across the
country. They have begun in a very intensive way, and there
have been more than 100 workshops that have been conducted to
date.
In addition, we have been working with the constitutional
committee to help them become more active and engaged in
outreach to the public. We have weekly focus groups that
provide them with information on the important questions of the
constitutional drafting, we have already produced four
television interviews with the constitutional committee
leadership in which they have discussed process and content and
answered questions from the public about the constitution. One
of the programs features a chairman, Sheik Hamudi; another,
featured women members of the committee in an effort to focus
discussion on issues of particular interest to women.
There are more of these 30-minute programs to follow; they
are being aired on the major Iraqi television network and will
reach an audience of millions.
In addition, we are helping the constitutional committee
produce public service announcements. We're in the process of
doing that. And we're also helping them distribute--or print
and distribute--various things such as posters and pamphlets
around the country.
Finally, Iraqi women are so very active in civic education.
We work with several women's coalitions to get out the word
about what is going on with the process and how they can have
some sort of input into the drafting. And their efforts are
ongoing constantly. Today, for example, a group called the
Women's Leadership Institute held a public meeting and then
they met with members of the constitutional drafting committee
to share their views on what they believe should be in the
constitution with regards to human rights and women's rights.
We also have on hand a constitutional consulting team and
they are legal and academic specialists who are helping out
with conducting different workshops and sessions with various
Iraqi groups.
And, finally, we are giving support to the Minister of
State for Women's Affairs in her efforts to hold national
conferences to discuss issues of human rights and women's
rights.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Feldman.
Dr. Feldman. It is crucially important that the members of
the constitutional drafting committee have the opportunity to
argue to the general public in Iraq their case, to explain why
they've drafted what they have drafted.
That said, I think there are some significant concerns that
we should be aware of with respect to the United States
directing, and being seen to direct, a public education
campaign, especially one that focuses on the town meeting. And
I think those concerns are really three.
The first is that the town meeting forum, as we think of
it, an open town meeting where anyone can get up and speak his
mind if he or she--if the person is willing to stand in line
behind a microphone, it's not an indigenous political forum to
Iraq. It's not an indigenous political forum even in much of
the United States, although it is used in some places like my
native New England.
But the truth is that under such circumstances where anyone
can get up and speak, the odds are very high, I would almost
guarantee that in many cases some of the strongest and most
vocal opponents of the constitutional process will be the ones
who dominate these meetings. And I'll say a word in a moment
about what it is that they're likely to say. But I think that's
the first concern.
In Iraq a model for public engagement developed by the
members of the constitutional drafting committee itself is much
more likely to be effective, and it will probably follow--
speaking in very general terms here--something like the
consultative majlis model that is more commonly used in the
Middle East, it will be discursive and dialogic if you will,
but it would not be an open mike sort of situation. And may I
add that the ratification conventions in the United States,
when we ratified our own constitution, were not open
microphone--well, there were no microphones, but they were not
open-access affairs. People were selected, or elected, to
participate in those constitutional conventions, and I don't
think that undercuts the fundamentally democratic nature of the
process, especially given that here there's going to be a
democratic referendum on the constitution.
The second concern is what I referred to earlier as sticker
shock. There's been a process for Shi'a Iraqis in particular,
Arab Iraqis that has not yet been undergone by Sunni Iraqis,
when they are informed of just how much autonomy the Kurdish
region has requested and is likely to get in the final
constitutional draft. Many, many Iraqis remain uncomfortable
with what is, let's be honest, de facto autonomy for the
Kurdish region under many, many particular circumstances under
the rubric of federalism. And a states' rights position, much
stronger than states' rights, not only now in the United States
but at any point in our history.
It is likely that many people first introduced to this
concept, especially in the Sunni areas, are going to react very
negatively, and they're going to react negatively in public,
and such meetings would be a natural forum for them to do so.
Now some public expression of their shock is perfectly
appropriate, and I expect we'll see it in newspapers and on
television and probably in some public rallies. Having that
happen in these meetings is likely to be very destablizing to
the process of constitutional ratification, and I do not think
it's an exaggeration to say that it would raise, at least, some
possibility of a public groundswell against the constitution,
which I think would be a very serious matter indeed.
I would add to this the role of Islam as a factor that is
likely to become much intensified in open meeting style
debates. The Islamists, both on the Shi'a and the Sunni side--
we haven't heard so much from the Sunni Islamists, yet, in
Iraq, but I promise you we're going to, in this ratification
process--are excellent at essentially taking over public
meetings and insisting on the insufficiently Islamic nature of
any public governmental decision. They will not be concerned
about the fact that behind closed doors a negotiation has
already occurred in which Islam has been delicately balanced
against democracy in a very, very precise formulation which
will require a constitutional scholar to make any sense of it,
and even then will probably make very little sense.
We are opening the door potentially to an Islamist
countermovement against the constitution, and among the Sunni
Islamists, who, as I said, we have not heard from very much
politically, but who are most closely connected to the jihadi
wing of the insurgency. You're talking about a constituency
that could do real harm to the constitutional process, and is
guaranteed to try to do so. So I have some concern about that
constituency and its participation as well.
The last point is the desire for people who participate in
meetings that are designed as part of the ratification process
to be participating in meetings that actually matter. In other
words, just as at our constitutional ratifying conventions in
the States many people got up and said we don't like this
constitution without a bill of rights, we demand that a bill of
rights be added, and we vote to ratify only on the condition
that a bill of rights be added, many people in Iraq
participating in such meetings will want there to be changes to
the document. The idea that they are being asked to debate
something the text of which is fixed, and the text of which
cannot be changed prior to the referendum, is likely to be an
extremely unpleasant one for many people. And I say this partly
based on personal experience in Iraq. I think there is a grave
likelihood, at this point, that people who are already
skeptical of the democratic process will say, why are we being
asked to talk about this if a decision has already been made?
If we can't do anything about it, why are we being asked to get
up and express our views?
That, too, is a potential source of frustration. So since
there is no contemplated mechanism for returning back to the
drafting committee after the point at which the debate has
occurred, you are going to get frustration in the general
public, in this case, just at the whole constitutional process,
a sense of frustration and perhaps of having tried to
participate politically but not having been able to do so, with
the only protest mechanism available being a no vote.
I would just close my comments by mentioning that many,
many rational observers thought--before the recent
constitutional referenda in Holland, in the Netherlands, and in
France--that no reasonable voter in either of these countries
could potentially vote against the constitution because the
consequences were much too serious. Now admittedly they're not
quite as dire in Europe as they would be in Iraq, but it is the
case that many Iraqis would be prepared to vote against the
constitution if they were sufficiently frustrated with the
process. We must be very careful to avoid a situation in which
we unwittingly, but in a well-intentioned way, facilitate a
process that actually leads people to be dissatisfied with
their constitution rather than happy with it.
The Chairman. Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr. Well, I find myself in agreement on at least two
points with my colleagues, and perhaps some caveats on the
others.
I found this question much easier to answer. Like others, I
feel that it's the Iraqi Government, not the coalition, which
should be conducting any public education campaign on the
constitution. I also feel that this campaign should not include
a discussion of the insurgency.
I do want to elaborate a little on that because I feel that
these are two separate, though related, issues which should not
be mixed. Doing so is going to tie the constitution and its
contents to the insurgency, divert attention from the main
subject, and fix the two together in the public mind. Worse, it
could make the constitution's success appear contingent on
insurgent activity and tie the government's agenda to the
insurgency.
So the discussion of the constitution, as a blueprint for
Iraq's future, should stand on its own, although, of course,
the public discussion should make clear that the political
process is open to all, and it's the appropriate vehicle to
effect political goals, not violence.
I believe that there should be a campaign conducted to set
the constitution before the public. The way the question is
phrased--whether it should be massive, whether it should be a
townhall forum--I think is less important. I think, as Judy has
said, there are certain ways in which this can be done in the
Iraqi context which won't necessarily invite a lot of
propagandistic speeches. Certainly, as she has said, campaign
can be conducted through the media, through the press, perhaps
in university and school settings, perhaps in the more
traditional settings and so on.
There are two virtues to doing this. One is that it helps
build civil society which is very important. Various civic
groups formed to educate the public will be the basis for
future interest and watchdog groups, and, as has been
indicated, a number of these have already been formed and are
operating. And I want to add that special effort should be made
to persuade the Sunnis in their area to lead this process, to
encourage Sunni participation. It's very important that they
get invested in the process, and develop a feeling that they
have a stake in the future.
Now, along with Dr. Feldman, I, too, have a problem with
the timing of this process. I believe that a public education
campaign needs to be undertaken, both before and after the
draft is submitted, so that the public feels it has some say in
the content. I agree that if you just spread the constitution
before them and indicate they simply have an up or down vote,
there's going to be frustration. And you might get a down
rather than an up vote. This is one reason why I think a small
extension in the time might be helpful.
You can't write a constitution in a townhall, that's
perfectly clear. But there are instances where the public,
through interest groups such as those formed by women and
others mentioned in the bill of rights, can have some input.
They will feel that they're being listened to and taken account
of. They will have a more vested interest in the outcome.
So I would like to make sure that this public education
process has some feedback into the constitution committee
before the draft is finalized. Needless to say, I also feel
that there needs to be some kind of opportunity for public
education once the draft is completed, for several reasons.
First, people do need to understand what their rights and
obligations are under the constitution. Second, I think various
interest groups and other civic societies involved in this
process will be the building blocks for the legislation that
will fill in the details on this constitution. Third, they will
bring the public and its various sectors into the process;
that's very important, too.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for those responses.
Now let us proceed to a third set of questions. Should we
take new steps to forestall a Sunni-Shi'a conflict?
Is international and Arab intervention feasible in that
process?
Could an international working group that includes
participation by Sunni Arabs from outside Iraq, namely
Jordanians, Egyptians, and others, help broker negotiations
between the parties? Is there some other vehicle that could
provide technical support and mediation and services for Sunnis
and Shi'as to come to peaceful accommodation?
Could credible Sunnis be enlisted to participate in this
process?
And finally, should de-Ba'thification be revisited?
I call upon you, Dr. Feldman, to initiate the responses.
Dr. Feldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The jihadi wing of the insurgency is engaged in an all-out
effort to create a true civil war in Iraq, and the reason we
don't have a civil war is just that, although, there are
massive killings of Shi'a civilians by some Sunnis there have
not been substantial retaliations in killings of Sunni
civilians by the Shi'a. There's really just one reason that
that hasn't happened so far, and that reason is Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, who has the kind of moral credibility in the
country to call on his constituency to act with restraint.
It is certain that an attempt on the life of Ayatollah
Sistani is being planned. It would be unimaginable that no one
was trying to kill him. An attempt will be made and one can
only hope and pray that it will be unsuccessful.
Nonetheless, we need to be well aware that that is not a
far flung or unlikely scenario. Already several of his senior
aides have been successfully assassinated, and again it's taken
tremendous restraint on his part to be able to advise the Shi'a
community, which is aided by a traditional political
quiescence, but which will not hold on to that forever, that
they ought to hold back and preserve the peace.
So we definitely need some mechanisms that might be able to
restrain, especially in a crisis situation like that one, and
that would function under ordinary conditions as well.
Now some participation of Sunni diplomats from outside of
Iraq is certainly helpful, and we can deduce that it is
potentially helpful from the fact that the jihadi wing of the
insurgency thinks it might be helpful, which is why they're
trying to assassinate those diplomats.
It will now be much more difficult than it was the first
time, and it was not easy the first time, to draw those other
Sunni Arab countries into the process of negotiation by sending
fresh diplomats. They, themselves, have security concerns,
understandably, and it's a tremendous blow to their national
prestige, and to their national interests, when they lose an
ambassador. That's a serious business for obvious reasons that
I don't need to explain to the committee.
So I think we probably have, to some degree, exhausted, at
least, the public version of that kind of diplomacy, and we may
have to rely more on private versions of diplomacy of other
Sunni-Arab countries going forward. It doesn't mean it can't be
done privately in an effective way.
There are essentially two groups of interlocutors that we
could use in the Sunni-Arab community to try to make this
happen. The first are Sunni clerics. These are very often not
the people whom one would choose as interlocutors because to
make them interlocutors is to empower them, and they're not
people that have been elected, and they often have views and
values deeply opposed to those of both the coalition and also
held by the Iraqis.
On the other hand, before elections happen, they are often
the only people who are capable of speaking in an indirect way
on behalf of those who were participating in the insurgency.
They could be encouraged to meet on equal terms with Shi'a
clerics, in cleric-cleric meetings that would be informal sorts
of contacts, nongovernmental, but which might, in the long run,
be a first step in the direction of having some line of
communication that would be available in a crisis situation.
It's not going to be an easy thing to do. Many of them lived
happily alongside Shi'a for many years but if you push them,
theologically, as the jihadis are doing, it's difficult for
them to avoid the conclusion that, in fact, the Shi'a are, at
best, heterodox and, at worst, heretics. That's a serious
concern on their part. But some sort of clergy-clergy contacts,
I think, should be encouraged and could be encouraged.
The second group one could speak to on the Sunni-Arab side
are essentially ex-Ba'thist or ex-military or both, members of
the--what I described earlier again with apologies, is it a
moderate or the pragmatic wing of the insurgency, that is
people who don't see the end game as a permanent jihad but
instead see the end game as some sort of a negotiated solution
with the other side.
We are already talking in some limited ways to those
people. Some of them are participating in politics, and indeed,
at least two of the members of this constitutional committee
who are Sunnis are reputed to have been former Ba'thists at
some stage of their careers. That's a good thing because this
situation, although these are not people whom one would like to
deal with, we have very little other choice if we want to stave
off the possibility of more extensive violence.
The background for all of this is just to keep in mind that
the insurgency itself needs to be split, and that the jihadi
wing is never going to negotiate, is never going to enter into
reasonable deals, and that anyone who belongs to that line of
the insurgency, or claims to belong to it, or is even openly
allied with it, should be excluded from these sorts of
contacts, but that there are others in the insurgency who do
not feel this way and who can be won over--and to be blunt
about it, bought out through this process. And I think we need
to be open to dealing with those folks as we have already
slowly begun to do.
The Chairman. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Phebe Marr.
Dr. Marr. I think in some ways this question may misdefine
the issue a little. Rather than simply a Shi'a-Sunni conflict,
I think the conflict is broader, and as I said before, involves
all of Iraq's communities as they search for new identity.
In fact, I think there are two processes going on; one is
an increased polarization of the Iraqi polity along both ethnic
and sectarian lines--Kurds and Arabs as well as Shi'a and
Sunnis as Iraq searches for this identify and a new political
center of gravity. The elections in January revealed this
polarity, putting into power an essentially Shi'a ticket with a
majority and a very strong Kurdish ticket in the second place.
Those with centrist or nonsectarian views either lost the
election, or got very few votes.
In any event, helping to move Iraq away from this
polarization and encouraging a sense of national identity,
particularly in speeches, messages and so on, should be one of
the coalition's long-term goals. But I agree with Noah Feldman,
it's well to keep in mind that both the Shi'a and the Kurds
have been disciplining their own communities and preventing
retribution and retaliation, up to a point, where they can.
This has been largely successful because both of these groups
have benefited by attaining power in the new regime.
In the end, however, rather than a Shi'a-Sunni conflict,
what I see is rejectionist resisting the new government and a
new political order. This is most virulently manifested in the
insurgency. Most of the rejection comes from Sunnis; most of
those in the government and those shaping the new order are
Shi'a and Kurds. But the Sunni rejectionists need to be
understood, not simply as a sectarian group but as a community
whose leaders once occupied power, not as Sunnis but mainly as
nationalists. Now they find themselves to be an increasingly
marginalized minority that not only resent their loss of power
and status, but fear discrimination and victimization by the
new ruling groups. And many have lost employment and economic
benefits as well.
As Dr. Feldman has said, they can be divided into several
different categories. Like him, I would put the jihadists and
the ``Salafists,'' who are extremist, beyond the pale. I would
also put beyond the pale, Saddam loyalists engaged in violent
mayhem. But I agree that a number of the other Sunni
oppositionists--army officers, former Ba'th party members,
nationalists opposed to occupation, and unemployed youth riled
by current conditions--probably can be brought into the fold of
the new regime in time, and with the proper incentives.
Conversation with these oppositionists indicate they have
roughly four or five concerns. They are, first, the issue of
occupation and the foreign presence; second, the loss of power
and prestige; third, the lack of Sunni representation in the
political process; fourth, increased sectarianism; and fifth,
the lack of a rule of law and security, especially for their
community.
Attempts to alleviate this problem should focus on
addressing these problems. I would make several suggestions.
First, as everyone has said, encourage the government to bring
Sunnis into the political process.
Progress has already been made on this--considerable
progress--and if more time is needed on the constitutional
process to do that, I would urge that we provide it.
Second, encourage revision of the electoral law to move the
process away from a single countrywide election list to a more
district-based system, which I'm going to say more about later.
This would ensure Sunni seats in the assembly regardless of how
many voted and would certainly go down well in Sunni areas.
Third, encourage the current government to revisit the de-
Ba'thification program. Anecdotal evidence suggests that much
of the educated middle class, especially academics and
professionals like doctors and lawyers, who may have been party
members but have no criminal records, feel alienated and left
out. Many are leaving Iraq. A better vetting system, which
focuses on individual behavior and records rather than a
blanket category such as party membership, would help. But it
has to be borne in mind that this is an extremely sensitive
issue for the new Shi'a and Kurdish leaders. This was brought
out in many conversations I had with them in Baghdad.
Fourth, Sunnis complain of a lack of rule of law and
security. They're not alone in this, of course. Over the long
term, strengthening the court system, the prison system, the
police system, would help. I mention this because I think it's
important to remember that not all of this violence is due to
insurgency. A lot is due to common crime. If you could separate
the police problem from the insurgency problem, strengthen the
local police, especially Sunni police in Sunni areas, it would
allow the coalition to take its forces out of cities and
alleviate some of that problem.
Lastly, outright mediation might have some benefit. But,
frankly, I think it has to be handled carefully lest it be seen
as interference, especially by the new Shi'a-dominated
government. As for including key figures in neighboring Arab-
Sunni States we have to be careful here, too. That would be
helpful, but many of them may be regarded with suspicion by
this government. However, including some Arab leaders in some
kind of an international delegation might be a good idea. But
any mediation effort involving neighboring states would need a
clear definition of its mission, what it would be expected to
do to influence and mitigate the Sunni problem.
The current government is interested in efforts to control
the border, to control the finances flowing to insurgents, to
get public support for the electoral process and the new
constitution, and to encourage public rejection of violence.
International and regional efforts along these lines, in return
for Iraqi Government efforts to bring more recalcitrant Sunnis
into the government and into local police forces, might be
helpful.
I would like to just add two points to what Dr. Feldman has
said about who might mediate for the Sunni community. Religious
leaders are one group, but let us not forget tribal leaders,
who are often very pragmatic, who have local constituencies,
and who certainly ought to be brought in, at least in the short
term, as negotiating partners.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Marr.
Ms. Van Rest.
Ms. Van Rest. Thank you. To follow up on my colleagues
remarks, what I want to describe is what we're seeing from our
working in Iraq through these various groups. We are witnessing
a determination among all the groups, Sunni, Shi'a, Kurds, even
the smaller groups, to work together toward the goal of a
united Iraq.
One thing that we have been seeing is that there is no end
of debate among the Sunni and the Shi'a about what type of
government they should have, and indeed they are taking some
joy in embracing the opportunity to have the debate because as
we have heard from several of them, including one recently,
that ``under Saddam I would not even debate such issues in my
own head and now we are free to debate them among ourselves.''
There is a commitment to democratic debate and confidence
in the framework across Iraq and across various sectors of
society. It is found among Sunnis. We have seen Sunni
representatives brought into the constitutional drafting
process, we have heard Sunni leaders say they made a mistake by
not participating in the January elections, and a mistake that
they are encouraging their followers not to make in upcoming
elections.
There is wide support for democratic solutions by Iraqis as
shown in our polls. Support for, and confidence in, democratic
solutions among Iraqis has been expressed time and time again
in nationwide polling, which we have attached to the testimony
in greater detail.
The latest survey has revealed that nearly 73 percent of
Iraqis believe that the new Iraqi transitional government is
representative of the Iraqi people as a whole, among self-
identified Sunnis the percentage is 67.4 percent, and for the
Shi'a it is 78.3.
Equally revealing is the strong support for coming
elections; 75.6 percent of Iraqis say they are very likely to
vote in the upcoming constitutional referendum. Again, support
is strong among both Sunni and Shi'a at 63 percent and 83
percent, respectively.
It is also worth noting that the polling data reveals that
the Sunni-Shi'a divide is not that wide in comparison to self-
identification as Iraqis. Twice as many Sunni most strongly
identify with their country in relation to the number who
identify with their ethnic group; for Shi'a four times as many
identify with their county. When comparing strongly identifying
with country to identification with religion the ratio for
Sunnis is three to one, and for Shi'a two to one.
National identity is a necessary component in creating a
willingness to make the compromises necessary to bridge the
gaps that might otherwise be created by more divisive elements.
These numbers are being reflected by action on the ground.
Across the country courageous Iraqis are standing up to those
who would use violence to undermine the move toward a peaceful
and democratic Iraq. IRI is working with numerous Sunni and
Shi'a organizations, and as my colleague Noah suggests, we're
also including cleric organizations, and as Phebe mentioned, we
have tribal organizations working to educate Iraqis about the
constitutional drafting process and support for elections as a
way of creating a more peaceful and prosperous Iraq.
It is in this context that the response to what steps
should be taken to avoid Sunni-Shi'a conflict should be found.
The answer is to support the Iraqis in finding their own
solutions, including that of de-Ba'thification within the
democratic political framework to which they have committed
themselves. Sunnis and Shi'as are already engaged in
accommodations through political channels, leadership is not
advocating violence for civil war, such elements while
tragically conspicuous are marginal forces.
The United States and its coalition partners would do well
to encourage, even pressure, neighboring governments and those
of other Islamic States in the region that benefit from
stability in Iraq to be more outspoken in their condemnation of
terrorist violence in the name if Islam.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We'll proceed now to the fourth option. We'll start with
Dr. Marr in the response.
How can the United States cultivate emerging leaders among
the various political factions in Iraq, and ensure that they
will interact politically rather than using violence or
exclusionary political tactics? Is such involvement feasible,
or would it be counterproductive? How divergent are the views
among the various new leaders on such issues as democracy, the
appropriate political structure, the role of religion, future
relations with the West and Iraq's neighbors? Can the United
States influence these views, or should we attempt to influence
those views?
Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr. Thank you. I'm currently involved, as a fellow at
USIP, in a study of Iraq's emerging political leadership and
their various visions for the future of Iraq. In conjunction
with this I've made two trips to Iraq; one in December to talk
to the Kurdish leadership and one in May and June to Basra and
Baghdad to talk to the newly elected members of the government.
These interviews reveal a rich mix of political leaders
emerging with considerable promise for the future, but that
promise is going to take time to mature. The problem of
replacing Iraq's leadership, once Saddam and the Ba'th regime
was removed, has, in my opinion, always been one of the most
difficult problems facing Iraq and the coalition. Removing and
disbanding the previous pillars of state has allowed for a new
leadership to emerge, but has also created a large vacuum at
the center of power. Filling this vacuum has been difficult.
New leadership can come essentially from three sources. One
is a reintroduction of elements of the previous regime vetted
for security purposes; the second is from exile, opposition
politicians who've been outside of Iraq for decades; and the
third is from the indigenous Iraqi population, most of whom
have had little or no leadership experience.
Essentially the coalition opted for the second solution;
bringing in a group of exile opposition leaders mainly from the
West. This group dominated the early governments under the CPA
and the interim government, but the election now has produced
an essential change in that pattern and brought the expression
of popular will and a shift to new leadership, which probably
reflects future trends in Iraq.
Several points need to be made to understand this
leadership and the challenges it poses.
First, the current government, like it's predecessors, is
dominated in its upper ranks by exiles who have spent most of
their formative years outside of Iraq, or in the case of the
Kurds, running their own government in the north. Whereas
earlier regimes were led mainly by Western-educated and
Western-oriented oppositionists, the new government is not. Key
positions are now in the hands of the Shi'a religio-political
parties and the Kurdish parties. The members of this opposition
have often spent time not in the West but in Iran or in
neighboring Arab countries like Syria or Lebanon.
The Shi'a are Arab-Iraqis but they are more interested in
instilling an Islamic identity in Iraq. In one sense, Iraq has
exchanged one set of exiles for another. The indigenous
leadership from inside Iraq, though it's emerging, has still
not made its way to the top of the leadership group.
Second, turnover in posts at the top has been substantial,
creating lots of opportunity for mobility but the need to gain
experience. The same is true at local and provincial levels
where discontinuity may be even greater. Something like 60
percent of the current Cabinet Ministers are new to the job.
Some of this change is to be expected in an era of radical
change, but it means that the new leaders must gain more
experience in running a state. This will take time.
The one exception to this rule is the Kurdish leadership.
They have acquired considerable experience and maturity, often
through the school of hard knocks, in running a government in
the north. And it's not surprising that their area is quiet and
gradually becoming more prosperous. The question with the
Kurds, however, is how committed they are to building Iraqi
institutions in the center as opposed to those in the north,
and how to draw this experienced leadership further into the
rebuilding of Iraq.
Lastly, there's the problem of differing visions of the
future of Iraq and where the various leaders would like to take
the country. In my initial interviews I have found a certain
amount of overlap, but there are also differences. Arab-Sunnis,
Kurds, and the dominant Shi'a coalition have different views
that need to be reconciled. That process is being dealt with
through the constitutional process and elections. Of course,
it's going to take time, but in my view the ongoing political
process is one of the bright spots in a sometimes bleak
picture.
How can this process of accommodation be facilitated? How
can the coalition help?
First and foremost, every effort must be made to open Iraq
to the outside world. While exiles have had some exposure to
the outside, those inside have had little. Education at every
level has deteriorated and Iraqis, especially professionals,
are hungry for outside expertise and contacts. Let's give it to
them. Visitors programs, fellowships and scholarships to study
in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, computers and
library facilities in universities and centers, need to be
encouraged and funded. This is being done--I think these
programs are successful--but I'd rather see more money
appropriated for those things and less to some others.
One of the most positive aspects of my trip was in
discovering young people in their twenties and thirties who
wanted to come to the States to study political and social
sciences, not engineering and computer science, for the first
time in decades. We should encourage that.
Second, let's concentrate on the younger generation which
is Iraq's future. While the vision of most of the 40- and 50-
year-olds has already been formed, often in divergent ways,
those in their adolescence and early adulthood are still
flexible. And we should avoid stereotypes.
For example, among the most hopeful and promising
experiences of my trip to Baghdad was in talking to this
generation, including several young people from Sadr City. We
often think of Sadr City as a poverty-ridden slum, a nest of
Islamic radicals, but these young people dispelled some of that
impression, as far as I was concerned. One was a husband and
wife team involved in local municipal government. Both were
advanced graduates of universities and one was interested in
pursuing a Ph.D thesis on U.S. foreign policy, but he needs
more training in English. He should get it.
Another was a remarkable young woman in her early thirties
who had been encouraged by her family to get an education as a
doctor. She was just about to take her board exams when Saddam
was overthrown. She was appointed to her neighborhood council,
and then in the space of 2 years she went from the neighborhood
council to the district council to the municipal council. She
was appointed to the national interim council in 2004, she ran
as an independent for the national assembly and she's just been
elected. She wants to have a political career and to come to
the States to learn firsthand how to engage in one.
What better way to invest in the future than to provide her
and others like her with this opportunity.
Third, encourage and strengthen the many civil society
groups that are already blossoming, despite dire security
conditions. Help think tanks get funded, support interest
groups that are emerging, encourage training and conferences
that bring diverse groups together in an environment that
allows hands-on discussions and potential resolution of
conflicts.
The institution, which is funding my research, USIP, is a
good example of this activity, though not the only one. IRI and
NDI are doing yeoman work as well. These activities do not make
the headlines but they're critical to developing future
leadership and the skills and attitudes necessary for
compromise.
Fourth, strengthen government capacity, both at national
and local levels. The political process is justifiably sucking
up much of the time, energy, and resources of Iraq's elite.
Meanwhile, the more mundane aspects of government--delivery of
electricity, garbage collection, security--are neglected or
given over to free lancers and contractors who may be corrupt
or worse. Building government structures and an honest
bureaucracy would greatly enhance Iraq's ability to carry on
and to garner popular support while it struggles to settle
these difficult political problems at the national level.
Encouraging a civil service administration based on
meritocracy would be a good step in this direction.
And lastly, economic development by, and for, Iraqis must
take place despite the security situation. All evidence
including the polls from IRI suggests that this element, along
with security, is the number one priority of the population.
The constitutional process must be supplemented by growing
prosperity and the strengthening of the middle class. Over
time, nothing will better tamp down ethnic and sectarian
tensions, help mitigate past feelings of victimization and
fears of reprisal, and provide a new and better vision for
Iraq's future and its youth.
A failure to complete economic development--to couple
economic development to the political progress being made--may
produce an Iraqi version of what has just occurred in Iran; the
election of a conservative, religiously oriented, President
supported by a neglected working class. The potential
indigenous leadership in Iraq today is not hidden secularists
and liberals, but the Sadrist movement, which is gaining
support by its nativist claims. Its leaders have not spent time
outside of Iraq, and it is championing the poor, uneducated,
and jobless.
The best way to combat this situation is to make sure,
first, that the political process continues to be open to these
groups, and second, that the younger generation of
underprivileged, such as those Sadr City residents that I met,
are nurtured, encouraged, and given access to the outside
world.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Marr.
Ms. Van Rest.
Ms. Van Rest. I agree with Phebe on all the things she said
about the importance of exchange programs bringing youth to the
universities and the like. In addition to that, IRI and NDI,
through various grants to indigenous organizations, have been
doing work on the ground helping emerging leaders and emerging
groups begin to learn the process of how to work in a
democracy.
As you all know the institutes have been doing this for a
long time. We have more than 20 years experience in assisting
countries to emerge from authoritarian rule to democracies, and
with our technical training ongoing, we are helping Iraqis
build political parties, civil societies, government
institutions, and other components necessary to have
representative government.
We do this--keeping in mind that democracy is just not an
off-the-rack concept, one size does not fit all, but what we do
know from our experience is that there are basic elements that
are universal in a democracy and as we have with many other
countries around the world we are continuing to assist them in
fashioning their own new and free democratic Iraq.
I would also like to point out that it is a long-term
process as well. We have in the most recent example--well, we
have had several experiences, but Ukraine is an example that I
like to point out, we have been working there for more than 10
years and as we saw last fall that the Ukrainian people finally
took the bull by the horns and decided that they, indeed,
wanted to have their own democracy.
In addition to helping Iraqis with training in their public
education, civic organizations, we're also drawing on the
experience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We have
a good many on our staff who are from Serbia and Ukraine. We
also have trainers--we've had trainers come in from Romania,
for example, and these trainers are very well received because
Iraqis can relate to someone who was imprisoned or had a family
member killed by an oppressive dictator but who is now working
in successful transition away from authoritarian rule.
Successful transitions in the Slovak Republic, Lithuania,
and the Czech Republic as well as other regions in countries
such as Indonesia, have all proved useful in providing Iraqis
with case studies. For example, we took a group of Iraqi
election officials to observe elections in Indonesia and other
countries prior to the January 30 election.
IRI staff in Iraq are folks who have helped to lead
transitions in their own countries and this is something that
is very much appreciated by Iraqis we work with.
With regard to the opinion on issues of democracy and
related topics I would like to refer to our polls. We conduct
them on a regular basis, we have a poll currently in the field.
The most recent poll is attached and, as you can see, there is
information that we hope will inform the committee and others.
For example, one question is: ``Were Iraq to have a
Presidential system which of the following methods would you
prefer?'' and the majority of people want direct elections.
That continues, no question about it. Yet, there are also
differing opinions on what role religion should play.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Feldman.
Dr. Feldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with much of
what my colleagues say on this question. I would just emphasize
that in the tremendously uncertain circumstances of present-day
Iraq, the fluidity of the political situation is such as to
encourage the emergence of a new generation of leaders, who are
themselves extremely open to rapid changes both in their
techniques and also in what appear to be their illogical
commitments.
Let me take as an example the most notorious, but also the
most influential, young leader, that's Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadr
began by challenging democracy as un-Islamic. One of his first
big public speeches was a statement that Islam and democracy
could not work together. He then moved on to participating in
the elections. He began fighting the coalition violently
through his Mahdi army, and indeed engaged in some very brutal
fighting with U.S. forces, and yet he moved from that point to
accepting coalition money for projects in neighborhoods that he
and his political parties control.
Sadr also challenged Ayatollah Sistani directly, in an
extremely overt way, rather shocking to the Shi'a community,
but he ended up acknowledging Sistani's authority when push
came to shove.
Now none of these is a marker of a moderate, this is not a
moderate we're talking about. These are markers of someone who
is learning as he goes, and who is ultimately willing to be
extremely pragmatic, politically, in order to accomplish his
goals. He still has general ideological preferences for
something like an Iranian-style model of governance, but he's
willing to work within the circumstances that he finds, which
are circumstances that are rapidly changing. And one reason
that he has survived thus far--there are two reasons he's
survived. The first reason he survived is that the United
States was not firm in its initial determination to get rid of
him. If our decision had been to arrest him early on we could
have done so at an early stage. That's the first reason he
wasn't--he succeeded.
The second reason, though, is precisely that he's been
extremely flexible. I think the new generation of political
leaders that are emerging in Iraq now share, not necessarily
his particular ideological preferences, but they share this
feature of tremendous flexibility, willingness to adapt to
rapidly changing circumstances.
Now what does that mean in a practical way for the United
States? It certainly means that, at the grassroots level, we
should be interested in educating people because if they are
flexible, educating them in U.S. approaches and ideas can
actually be effective.
But it also means that we need to be realistic about what
they will do when they go back to their country. It is not
realistic to think that exposure to a Western-style education
will make Western-style Democrats out of them. It's equally
likely, or probably more likely, that such exposure will make
them more sophisticated in dealing with us, a value to them----
Senator Biden. It depends on their professor.
Dr. Feldman. Everything does, as we'd like to believe in
my, otherwise, largely irrelevant profession.
So the truth is that we need to expect that we're going to
be forced to deal with lots of extremely practically minded
young politicians who will be willing, essentially, to say or
do whatever is necessary for them to get ahead politically. And
we have to be prepared to deal with them if we are adopting a
strategy of dealing with them. What's problematic is if we
adopt an equivocation strategy. What doesn't work is to say on
day one, we're going to arrest you or kill you, and on day two,
you are our ally in this democratizing process. Either one will
work, often under lots of circumstances, but you've got to
choose one and then stick with it, and I think that may be a
general principle in life, but in this case it seems
particularly true.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now let me mention that at the beginning we said each of
you would have an opportunity, at this stage, to add a final
comment, something that has come to your mind, questions that
have not been raised.
Dr. Marr, have you had such inspirations at this point?
Dr. Marr. Well, I've certainly been inspired by my
colleagues here, but I did come with a suggestion that I think
is worth looking at. Again, the lead has to be taken by the
Iraqis, but after looking at polarization, looking at the
election, and talking to many leaders, I'm seized with the idea
that one of the things that would be most beneficial in Iraq in
damping down this ethnic and sectarian polarization, would be a
revision of the electoral law. The fact that it was a single-
list system seems to have contributed to the polarization. If,
in fact, you could mix and match these provisions--it doesn't
have to be all or nothing--but if a new electoral law could be
drafted which shifts more in the direction of districts or
provinces, a law that assures provincial representation in
Parliament, this would shift the balance in the election to
local and regional leaders who have constituencies. We can't be
entirely sure--elections are always a question--but I think
that would help. And there are many people in Iraq who
suggested such a revision to me.
For example, let's take many tribal leaders. I'm not a big
fan of tribalism, but many of these leaders are educated,
they're relatively sophisticated and they're practical and they
have constituents. This would shift the system in the direction
of constituents with interests and leaders with a need to
``bring home the bacon'' rather than political parties with
ideological frameworks. It would even help on the Kurdish
issue.
If we have any opportunity to suggest something, I propose
this. We may not even need to suggest it because I think
there's a contingent--quite a contingent--in the Iraqi
political spectrum that would like that. Revising the election
law may take more time, and may involve some kind of a census,
but if this issue comes up we can give some good advice to
Iraqis; that's my suggestion. That's worth taking a look at.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Van Rest.
Ms. Van Rest. As I alluded to, in my last remarks, I think
from our point of view, it's very important to understand how
long it takes to help people in other countries realize their
own democracy, and so, therefore, I'm just--and I know that
there is a great understanding on this committee of this, is
that we need to be in there with other groups, not only NED and
IRI and NDI, but other organizations who can continue to help
Iraqis as they develop in setting up their institutions, in
learning how to operate within a democracy. It doesn't happen
overnight, which I know is a very simplistic thing to say, but
it is something that we know takes a very long period of time,
and so that is what I would like to offer as something we need
to keep our eye on with regards to democracy-building programs.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Feldman.
Dr. Feldman. I would just very briefly emphasize that
there's an intimate connection between the progress on
security, or a lack of progress on security, and the
constitutional progress. I sometimes think that Iraq is like
watching a split screen. On one side of the screen is this
constitutional process that all in all has gone pretty well.
It's had steps backward and it's had steps forward, but it's
made reasonable progress, and even though Sunnis did not
participate in the election there are now Sunnis involved in
the political process, and they will be involved to some degree
in the final constitution.
On the other side of the screen, meanwhile, is the
continued violence that we do see, literally, on our television
screens every day, which is deeply destablizing to the
political process in that it makes it look like a show. It
makes it look as though the political process is disconnected
from reality, and that's deeply harmful not just to our
interests in Iraq--because it makes it much more difficult to
achieve a political balance there which would enable us to
begin to drawdown forces--it's also terribly damaging to our
broader efforts in the region to encourage political processes
that look a bit more like democracy than those that presently
exist. Because opponents of democratization in all of the
countries in the region regularly say--now this is a new
argument, they didn't have this argument before Iraq, but their
new antidemocracy argument is, look how destablizing democracy
is. Open up political processes and suddenly you'll have
suicide bombers, you'll have people all over the streets,
you'll be in a very, very risky situation. And that is, in the
long run, just as harmful to our interests in the region as it
is to our particular and very immediate problems in Iraq
itself.
So I would just emphasize that inasmuch as we care a lot
about the political process, and today we've been emphasizing
those aspects of the political process that are good, or that
can be improved, but we recall that as you've had even other
panels thinking about this issue to realize that there's a
close and central link between these, and that we could very
easily end up with the best constitution ever ratified in an
Arab country--and, in fact, I'm relatively confident that we
will end up with such a constitution, at least measured by that
metric--and that it will possibly mean very little in practical
terms if we don't have the security to enable it to actually
operate in practice.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate,
likewise, my colleagues' patience. Nevertheless, you have set
the stage magnificently. We'll begin our questioning with 10-
minute rounds, and I'll start my 10 minutes by making comments.
First of all, I compliment to you, Ms. Van Rest, for giving
us this poll from the International Republican Institute. Now,
the poll we have in front of us is April 11 through April 20,
so this is 3 months ago. You're in the field now----
Ms. Van Rest. Yes.
The Chairman. You polled the whole country. People said 47
percent most identified with their country, 18 percent with
their religion, 16 percent with their ethnic group, 11 with
tribe, and 4 with city and town.
So this is almost half who identify with the country, that
is, being Iraqi is the most important thing, as opposed to
being a Shiite. On the other hand, if you break this down, as
you have, by the major groups, Kurds don't see it quite that
way. They would identify with their ethnic group. At least 37
percent think that's the most important thing, as opposed to
Arabs, of whom only 12 percent think that's the most important.
But if you're talking about ``my country,'' Arabs, by 50
percent, identify with the country, and 28 percent of Kurds are
in this situation. So, as is often the case, in aggregating
statistics, why, we have very different views in terms of prime
loyalty. And then you get to perhaps the most important issue
requiring a governmental solution--we heard this yesterday from
our panel--security remains a distinct challenge. Not the
insurgency sort, but walk out the door in the morning to go
safely to school, things of this kind.
In this poll, interesting enough, inadequate electricity
was the winner, unemployment second. Well, that's
understandable. National security came in third, and high
prices, and far down the line came crime, terrorists, and
health care, for example. Maybe these are situations for more
affluent organized societies, when lights go on, for example.
And there is some sense that you can make some money and have a
job if there's 50 percent unemployment.
We're going to discuss the economy tomorrow because we've
all discovered--maybe aside from security concern walking out
the door--after you walk out the door, you hopefully walk to a
job, or some destination. And if there is not a society to
enforce those opportunities--well, to say the least, this is
destablizing to whatever is going on downtown in the
constitution building.
Having said all that, my thoughts come down to, first of
all, this basic question that I raised with respect to the poll
that the Republican Institute did. I'm still wrestling with
what sense do Iraqis have of wanting to be Iraqis. I don't say
this in a divisive way, but clearly one of the most horrible
outcomes of all this will be civil war. Or even some degree of
disintegration, that is, parts of the population, as we know
it, affiliating with somebody else on the basis of tribe or
religion. Dr. Marr, in guiding us in our studies of Iraq,
didn't describe it as an artificial country, but some have told
of people drawing a line around the land mass we today call
Iraq, maybe the British, the French, others after World War I,
encompassing some disporate people, putting a tyrant over them,
Saddam being, maybe, the last iteration of this, but suddenly
the tyrant is gone and now we have to face, well, there you
are.
In the midst of this, the Kurds, as we've discovered, given
some protection by our aircraft and their location, did develop
a certain degree of self-government. Not surprisingly, they are
demanding a pretty high degree of autonomy in this, a federal
principle. Furthermore, they have very strong bargaining
positions. Kurd leaders, who have come to visit with members of
our committee, individually or collectively, are saying that
Kirkuk is extremely meaningful to us. And the oil that is
involved in this is equally so.
So we could say, well, now listen, Iraq has got to be Iraq,
you're all Iraqis, and there needs to be a sharing of the oil
wells, and, likewise, some recognition of whom Kurds might be
pushing out of Kirkuk, or who's coming and going from this
situation.
And they said, well, that's all well and good, but,
nevertheless, this is our bottom line. As we are negotiating
here, it's not just simply how many members of the assembly we
have, or whether it's a two-thirds majority, or so forth, it's
more fundamental. Where do we stand in all this?
And, of course, we'll get into our fourth hearing, during
which some of the other countries around will be discussed, but
the Turks have indicated very visibly and publicly that they
want the Kurds to be thinking about being Iraqis, clearly
incorporated in Iraq, not flirting with desires for greater
Kurdistan again involving Syrians, Iranians, and Turks, because
if so, then we have a whole set of new conflicts even as we're
trying to settle one that is fundamental here.
And I will conclude with this broad question. The thing
about being Iraqi is, there is this problem that you've
discussed. We have some very sophisticated people in that
assembly dealing with this. As you said, Dr. Feldman, we have
maybe one of the best constitutions we could have hoped to come
from such a situation.
But it appears the United States displaced Saddam Hussein.
By and large we rejoiced, the Iraqi people rejoiced, and the
world I think, by and large, even if they didn't want to
participate in it, rejoiced that he's gone.
And we made some assumptions then about democracy. We felt
that this is the shining moment for democracy arising in this
particular country, in this very difficult neighborhood. And
now there are some who would say fair enough, but on a scale of
10 it doesn't have to be a 9-plus. Maybe if we come out with a
6-plus or something we may claim that headway was made.
Well, maybe so, but as some of you have said, and others
who are looking at this example around there may say, well,
what's the tradeoff--stability versus a democracy rated as a 6-
plus on a scale of 10 that is somewhat unstable.
If the Chinese statesman was comparing what we have today
in Iraq with his own situation, he might say, ``We're getting 9
percent real growth in China. We have an authoritarian regime,
and as a control, it works for us. Let the business people make
their money, but stay out of city hall. Our way ensures
security and crime fighting, whereas you idealistic people who
are all hankering about democracy are looking at an economy in
Iraq where people are unemployed, there's not much real growth,
there's insecurity and you don't know where the oil money is
going.''--we'll talk about that tomorrow during our hearing on
the economy--but you understand, what's the world to think as
they look at all this?
Fundamentally, is there going to be a way out of this, in
your judgment? Will the sense of being Iraqi be sufficient? At
the end of the day, will the basic elements finally compromise,
however they get to that point, and, likewise, will they have
enough pride in the situation that they actually cut
corruption? Will they manage to get the outside investment that
will be required to get the kind of employment levels or the
economy that they want? Will they work with other countries so
that their security remains sufficient, and they're not invaded
by somebody else either surreptitiously or overtly while they
are getting their fledgling democracy going? Is there enough
stability here, enough sense that this is likely to work,
leaving aside the timetables of how long we stay, anybody
stays, and so forth? Is there something here that is
sufficiently Iraqi to assure that?
Dr. Marr, I think you've thought about this issue for a
bit, and will you give your judgment?
Dr. Marr. Yes, thank you very much.
On balance it's going to be difficult but my answer to you
is ``Yes.'' Over the long term, probably. Iraq could fail, it
could break down into Lebanon. However, I don't think a civil
war between the communities will ensue or the kind of war we
see now--the rejectionists versus something new--will continue.
I'm actually investigating this very issue of identity. I'm
relying on IRI polls and others for the opinion of general
population but I'm trying to determine through intensive
interviews with leaders of various kinds--provincial and
national, younger and older--how they view this issue. My
conclusion, in general, is that the real difficulty lies with
the Kurds and whether they feel ``Iraqi.'' This problem has
grown tremendously in the last couple of decades.
I do want to say something about your characterization of a
new state and a dictator. Iraq had a lot of history before
Saddam. Governance is a long-standing problem, but the British
came in with much the same problem. Over a long period of time
they did institute an imperfect parliamentary system, and we do
have to remember that Kurds participated, to a great extent, in
that. We had Kurdish Prime Ministers, Kurdish Ministers of
Interior, Kurdish members of Parliament, and so on.
Then the polity began to fragment and there was disruption
especially after 1958. But the fact that the Kurds have been
governing themselves for the last--what is it now--13, 14
years, and that education has been in Kurdish for that time--
has created a younger generation for whom there has been no
interaction with Iraq, and who don't know Arabic. The older
generation is more pragmatic, they speak Arabic, they have a
memory of having interacted with the rest of Iraq. But
integration is going to be more difficult for the Kurds than
others.
There certainly is a sense of Iraqi identity among the Arab
population, but in my view this has weakened over time--
certainly in Saddam's time, and recently. Why? Because many of
the new leaders are not secular nationalists, they're people
for whom religion and Islamic identity is increasingly
important. This doesn't mean they're not Iraqi; they are Arab,
and Iraqi, but the Islamic identity has become increasingly
important.
And we're now going to have some problems with the Sunnis
who feel separate, which they didn't before. We have this issue
in the constitution right now--whether Iraq is part of the Arab
world. That's a rubric for whether identity is more Arab or
Iraqi, but I think this is a less serious issue among the Shi'a
and Sunni Arab population than it is with the Kurds.
Just one more word about the Kurds. I believe that the
Kurdish identity issue will improve in time, if things go
better, we get some kind of constitution which the parties can
agree on, and we get economic development. I keep emphasizing
the economics because I think that's equally important to the
political process.
Economic opportunities are going to create different
visions; something else to think about, something else to work
for. The insurgency has succeeded in accomplishing two things
in my view. It has succeeded in cutting Baghdad off from the
rest of the country. I suspect all of you who have been to
Baghdad know what I mean. If you're in the green zone in
Baghdad you don't travel north, you don't travel south. And, of
course, the insurgency has cut the country off from outsiders
wishing to come inside. This is not helping integration. I
believe integration will take place on the ground when people
in the north come down to Baghdad to do business, when they go
to Baghdad University, or Mosel University, when they have to
interact on a personal level. That is going to knit people
together and provide some lessening of this intense feeling of
separation, among communities but for that we're going to have
to get security.
One last thing I keep mentioning to the Kurds; over time,
they're going to have to make a decision on whether it's worth
it to try to get independence. It is going to be terribly
difficult to get recognized, by us, by the neighbors, and, of
course, the cost of independence is going to be huge. They
cannot protect their borders. They haven't been able to do so
before, they can't do so now. If they don't get independence
they'll be able to undertake some economic development, but
they will not be able to develop those oil resources in the
north and there will be constant limit on what they can
achieve.
One of the things I keep reminding them of, is that in
their worst case scenario they could end up like northern
Cyprus, part of a country which is not independent, but which
has opted for ethnic separatism. They may be left behind as,
hopefully, the rest of Iraq picks up and develops.
So they have a problem as well, and it really is worth
their effort to create a better Iraq, a neighborhood in which
Kurds feel safer.
The Chairman. I'll leave it at that. I'd like to ask the
other panelists the same question, but we've run well over my
time, and I want to recognize my colleague, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. I've always been
impressed by Dr. Marr, and had a chance to hear from her in my
office here and I appreciate it. But I've been generally
impressed by both of your testimony.
I'd like to start with you, Ms. Van Rest. I must tell you
this may not be fair but I think your outfit is doing something
very, very important along with your Democratic counterpart,
and I'm going to go to the floor and try to make sure you get
another $28 million because I understand you're going to be
ratcheted down. You're going to have to start to pull back, you
and the whole NDI, and I think that would be a disaster, and we
got an $18 billion bill for Iraq up there, and I'm going to try
very hard to earmark $60 million for both operations.
And second, Senator Dodd, I hope I'm not stealing his
thunder, pointed out to me--this is pretty impressive, the
methodology of this poll, face-to-face interviews of 2,705 when
85 percent of our diplomatic corps never is able to walk
outside the green zone, when there's very little intercourse at
all out there. Impressive.
And I have one very quick and may seem like an unrelated
question, why Dahouk. Why was that excluded, was it security
reasons up there?
Ms. Van Rest. Yes, there are some security reasons up
there.
Senator Biden. Because you don't hear much--at least I
don't hear much about that. You hear about Mosel and you hear
about Ramadi, but I didn't realize that that was----
Ms. Van Rest. There are some security issues there.
Senator Biden. Let me--in the short time I have left I'd
like to raise--I'm going to try to talk about it, and maybe if
we get a chance to come back, Sunni participation, a little bit
more about the Kurds, the insurgents, splitting the insurgency,
the political process and how it's impacted by the issue of
lack of security, and the timing of the constitution.
But let me start off with Sunni participation, and if you
can give me brief answers, understanding that we'll have to,
maybe, expand on another round.
Everybody acknowledges that the Sunnis have to be in on the
deal, the Shi'a acknowledge it, the Kurds acknowledge it, they
know the way that law that we know, but the law that the
Americans know is the one guiding them now, says if any three
provinces opt out it's out, so they know they got to get them
in the deal.
But Dr. Feldman, you talk about splitting the insurgency,
and we all understand what you mean, they're not moderates, but
in a relative sense it's moderate. It seems to me that the one
way, the most likely way for that to occur is for us to get to
the point where there's another election, not a referendum on
the constitution, but an actual election for Sunni
participation. And in my discussions with the Speaker of the
Parliament, and with my discussions with the Secretary of
Defense, they were emphatic about the need to--because they're
all hanging out there. I mean very individually hanging out
there, they're among the group you're talking about taking real
courage to, you know, get in the deal here, that they need
elections.
I'm attracted by the prospect, and mainly because I
suggested it, but you articulated it much better, Dr. Feldman,
about the possibility of deferral. I agree that if we can have
the election on time it's the best way to go. But that's
problematic.
I want to make sure I understand what you mean by deferral.
The way I've been talking about it is the possibility that you
actually defer the process of the written constitution that
requires a referendum vote until there is a general election.
Not preferable way, but I worry about you can't write the
constitution, or you write it and it effectively excludes
Sunnis even though they participate. It ends up the
constitution fails under the existing criteria for acceptance,
or it somehow gets jammed and you end up with the Sunnis
fundamentally opposed to what's been agreed upon, highly
unlikely one or the other would happen; maybe both.
And so talk to me a little bit more about the notion of, as
a fall-back position, the deferral idea.
Dr. Feldman. Well, Senator Biden, I think there are two
ways to think about the deferral question, and let me try to
deal with each of them.
Obviously, the reason we're in this situation is that
Sunnis didn't participate in the elections the first time, they
made a total miscalculation and now----
Senator Biden. Or I would argue the miscalculation, which
Dr. Marr said as well, we should have organized this not on a
nationwide basis, we should have organized this on a provincial
basis so that you get a certain number of delegates even if
only two people vote.
Dr. Feldman. I entirely agree.
Senator Biden. In my view.
Dr. Feldman. I think you're both absolutely right about
that. In any case once we were in a situation where that wasn't
the case, we faced a second problem of the fact that that way
the transitional law is set up, we're expected to have the
ratification vote prior to the election. Then the question is
how could we change this?
One option would be--and I think this is closer to the
deferral that you were speaking of--literally, to say that we
don't need to finish the constitution now, let's just hold the
elections first to give the Sunnis a second try as it were, a
second bite at the apple on the elections.
Now if that were doable, and perhaps it is still doable, I
would be strongly in favor of that. I think it would be a good
solution. Some of the Shi'a and the Kurds would say, well, my
goodness, this is unfair, they should have voted the last time,
and the answer would have to be something like, you're right,
and we know you're right, but better this than the alternative.
In practical terms, though, I suspect that it will not be
possible to convince either the Shi'a, the Kurds, or perhaps
even the present administration to adopt that radical a change
in the TAL framework.
The leads to a second form of deferral which you might call
soft deferral, and this begins with your idea, Senator, and
then offers the following twist on it to meet circumstances.
This view would, essentially, say that the present parties
will sign something that they will call the constitution for
purposes of the TAL.
Senator Biden. Yeah, okay.
Dr. Feldman. It will, however, be limited in its scope and
many crucial issues will be deferred by its own terms until
after there have been elections and we have Sunnis involved.
That is imperfect from the standpoint of permanence, of
course, but I think would be--it's a way of preserving the
essence of your idea even if it turns out to be the case that
we can't get people to agree to it informally.
Senator Biden. Again, not my idea in the sense that it's
preferable, but it was chilling to me the meetings I had with
the present elected and appointed representative in the Iraqi
Government over Memorial Day. Chilling the way in which they--
and I'm just going to speak generically--spoke of one another.
It was chilling, it was anything but a coherent government, and
they all had their own--understandably--axe to grind.
For example, I was told by one Senator if you think the
Peshmerga the Badr Brigade integrated or not into a Iraqi Army
where Shi'as--Sunnis aren't joining is going to be able to be
the vehicle to bring peace in the Sunni areas, give me a break.
I mean, you know, we view them as more invaders than you, which
leads me to my second question.
How--and I'd ask any and all of you if there's time, and
then I'll wait until the second round, there's a significant
discussion among the military side of the equation here. You
talk to the former generals, the security types who approach
this from purely a security point of view, there's a debate
about how much our presence is the cause of the insurgency, and
how much our absence would impact on the insurgency. And you
get both answers. You get one it is not the major reason for
the insurgency, it's larger than that, and if we did leave it
would get worse; and you get the other point of view which is,
hey, it's a big deal if we got out of there at a smaller
footprint then, in fact, things would get better.
And so, as it relates to the Sunnis, again I did not--this
time I didn't even get to Fallujah, Ramadyh, or anywhere else,
I was just in Baghdad.
And by the way, it was a lot worse than the first time I
got there. I mean it gets worse and worse every time I've gone.
And so I don't mean to suggest--in a sense I feel like when I
go there I'm in a cocoon, that you know, my inability to get
out--
The chairman and I were able to walk around, literally, the
first time we were there downtown. And it's just fundamentally
changed.
Anyway, having said that, my impression from the Sunnis
with whom I got to meet inside the green zone, most of whom
were related to the government, some were not, including
military personnel, were that they would rather have us there
now. The last thing they want to do is ask us to leave now,
Sunnis. Sunnis. Yet there's an overwhelming sense that no, no,
no--the Sunnis, if right now there is a secret ballot they'd
all say get out of here, all go home. All coalition forces.
What is the read? First of all, what is the public opinion
beyond what it says here? Do you have a sense what that is? And
both you doctors tell me what you think about the impact of
U.S. presence as it relates to Sunni attitudes of
participation, toward their participation in this outfit.
Ms. Van Rest. I'll just try to address it from our
viewpoint. We work--we don't have offices in the green zone, we
work in the red zone. Because of security issues for staff, out
of necessity, we really do rely on the Iraqi groups we work
with, we spend a lot of time doing more training, ``training-
the-trainer'' kinds of programs so that they can branch out.
It's one of those things where, while Iraqis, number one,
are grateful for our assistance, they really want to be on
their own. I'm not sure how they feel about, if our presence
there militarily is the reason for the insurgency; on the other
hand, they're very clear that they want us to leave, but not
now.
And they--I think it's just one of those things where we're
constantly going to have to take stock of--continue to talk to
them, it's a little bit of a, maybe, schizophrenic situation
for them because they want their independence, they need our
assistance, and so I think that that's what we're just going to
have to continue to address.
Senator Biden. My time is up, but a short answer from
either one of your colleagues?
Dr. Marr. I've looked at this and actually we've done some
thinking about it among my colleagues at USIP. We gave
something to the new Ambassador to think about.
We all know you can't generalize about the Sunnis. We have
to peel them back from insurgency like the onion.
Those folks, the pale, we're all in agreement on, but there
are different layers of opposition, and it's already breaking.
The National Dialogue Council includes Sunnis. The IIP, the
Iraqi Islamic Party has indicated its willingness to
participate. The Council of Vlama has not yet done so. How
about ex-Ba'th officers? There are a whole lot of people who
fit in this category--academics, for example, who have shadowy
parties. These people can be brought in to the process. I don't
want to use the word co-opt, but they need to be constantly
brought in, split off. This process is already taking place,
and we ought to do everything we can to encourage that.
I don't know about deferral, or having an election first,
but this is a process which is happening. There are Sunni
possibilities there. We have names. Frankly, these are the
people whom we have to rely on. There are some tribal leaders,
as well, who have to be identified province by province and
area by area. They have constituencies. There's no sense in
dealing with people who can't bring some other people in.
Dr. Feldman. Very briefly. I think it's not schizophrenic
for people both to deeply wish we would leave and recognize
that the risks of that are enormous at the moment.
I do think that in most of the Sunni areas the sense is,
broadly, that we are on the side of the Shi'a and the Kurds,
which to a certain extent is true. And as a consequence many
people in those areas think that if we would leave that would
strengthen their position. Some in the insurgency, actually,
would want to retake the country. Others think that's
unrealistic, but think they would be better off vis-a-vis the
Shi'a and the Kurds if they were fighting on their own without
us on the other side.
And so there's probably a range of views about that. The
people in the green zone that you met I would suspect, who are
Sunnis, are in serious trouble if we leave, and I'm not
surprised to hear that they would like us to stay put.
Senator Biden. Thank you, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me begin by
apologizing to the chairman for not being present yesterday
during the first round of these hearings. For weather reasons I
couldn't get a plane out of Connecticut to get down here in
time, so I want to apologize for missing yesterday.
But thank you immensely for having these hearings, these
are tremendously valuable and I know colleagues are busy with
so many other things here, but it's so, and the way you've
orchestrated it as well, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for the
way you've laid this out, and asking some basic questions and
giving the panel an opportunity to go through all of that has
been tremendously helpful.
I gather my colleague from Delaware made note of the fact
that he regretted, yesterday, the administration has not been
present in all of this, and I know that's not the fault of the
chairman at all, but I want to second his concerns about it.
It's--the President started the dialog a week or two ago in
talking about this issue. He needs to do more of it. Exactly
the point that Senator Biden has made, and I think you've made
as well, Mr. Chairman, that it's one thing to be concerned
about public opinion in Iraq and how things are moving there,
but I happen to subscribe to the notion that if the President
continues to have eroding support here on this policy that the
question will be answered even before the Iraqis may have
answered the question.
So his engagement and the administration's engagement, in
this conversation, is extremely important, in my view, and I
regret that they're not here to participate.
A couple of questions, and I thank all three of you, it's
been very, very interesting, and very, very helpful. I, too,
was struck with this survey and rather impressed that 200
interviewers can get out all across the country and conduct
these interviews, and I want to raise a couple of questions, if
I can.
First of all, I want to get to the notion of how you
communicate what's going on, and I thought about some of your
points about holding town meetings are precarious. Even in New
England I might point out they're precarious. I think the last
one I had some years ago, when I finally decided I'd do student
forums rather than open public forums, someone showed up
dressed as Abraham Lincoln and he got into a fist fight with a
world federalist, and that was the end of the town meeting, and
they were the story the next day and I decided I wasn't going
to provide a forum any longer for that kind of activity.
Senator Biden. If the Senator would yield for a second----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Senator Biden. I have a similar experience. I held 2 years
ago, in a Boys Club in a place called Bear, Delaware, a town
meeting, and 13 members of the Ku Klux Klan showed up.
Senator Dodd. So to make your point, you know, who shows up
at these town meetings, and how they use them for their own
benefits, can be contrary to your stated goals of what you'd
like to have occur at these things.
But what I was thinking, as you were talking, you know, the
founding of this Republic, it was a Federalist papers, that was
the pamphleteer was the way of communicating, and the public
was there making the argument as to why those provisions of the
Constitution, and there's got to be some equivalent in this day
of the Internet, and, of course, the ability with wireless
communication skills to be able to allow the Iraqi people to be
a witness to debate and discussion. I don't know if there's
something comparable to a C-Span, but if there is I would hope
that in the time that remains, we'd be looking at means by
which the Iraqi people, through radio or television, could sort
of listen in to this debate that's going on. And I presume it's
a good heated debate between the various factions so that while
they're not participating themselves in a real way they're
conscious of the fact that their points of view are being
articulated during those discussions.
I think that has a lot to do with confidence building about
whether or not my voice, my point of view, is being heard as
they develop these points of view.
So, again, I'm going to go through a couple of questions
here and then give you a chance to respond to all of them. And
maybe that's not realistic but it seems to me that's one sort
of answer here.
Second, I don't know if any of you--and I'm just curious--
this Sy Hersh article. I don't know if you had a chance to read
it in the New Yorker and so forth, and wondered if you got a
chance to make any conclusions about the correctness or
incorrectness of his conclusions about--and to the extent then
that this would have an adverse impact on the present process.
The point being for those who may not have seen the article
is that we were so deeply involved in influencing the outcome
of that election in terms of even doctoring numbers and
funneling money to preferred candidates, revealing the
itinerary of election observers, voter intimidation, ballot
stuffing, it's a pretty extreme set of conclusions, but Sy
Hersh has not been wrong every time he's written an article,
and, in fact, he's been right on a number of occasions.
And I'm curious as to whether or not you have any
observations about it?
Then, I'd like to raise the issue, Mr. Feldman, that you
talked about, and others did as well. But I was too struck with
some of these numbers that the chairman raised in the survey
done by IRI. And the conclusion on page nine of the survey,
it's right direction/wrong direction. Ms. Van Rest, I'm
interested in your survey done, why do you think Iraq is
heading in the right or wrong direction? In the wrong direction
column why is it going in the wrong direction? Security is the
number one answer. The lack of it, I presume, almost 34
percent. And yet when you go down the list terrorism shows up
at 6 percent. And I'm just curious as to why there seems to be
a disconnect between the lack of security and terrorism. What
is going on in the minds of a respondent when there's so much
of a difference where you've given the fact that--now granted
this survey was done in April and we're in July, and there's
been a spiked increase, so maybe in the April setting--I can't
recall specific events, it may have been relatively flat, but,
nonetheless, it's Iraqis who are dying. We're losing our
soldiers, from time to time, in numbers none of us like at all,
but compared to the Iraqis who are losing their lives on a
daily basis I'm struck by the fact that they would not consider
that. And maybe they are in the answer to the security
question, but why they don't relate terrorism, or do they not
see it as terrorism? Maybe that's part of the answer.
And I'd like you to try to shed some light for me on that
particular point as to why those numbers are different.
And lastly, I wonder if you might--I've been very curious
as to why we haven't taken advantage of our new found
relationship with Libya. Khadafi has foresworn his accumulation
of nuclear weapons, Senator Biden had a unique opportunity to
actually address the Libyan legislature. The administration
lists it as a major accomplishment, and I agree with them, I
think this was a phenomenal result. Libya is a 97 percent Sunni
country. I've been told that they are supportive of what we're
doing, at least generally speaking, and curious if you might
calibrate among those countries in the region who was in a
better position to help us influence broader Sunni
participation in the Iraqi process of the neighboring states.
We all talk about Jordan and Egypt, but I never hear anyone
mention Libya, and I'd be curious as to whether or not you
think there's an opportunity there that we may not be taking an
advantage of to the extent that there is a new found
relationship here.
Those are a lot of questions but I wonder if you might
respond to them.
Dr. Marr. I'd like to take on the terrorism question
because I think I understand that.
Terrorism broadly means what you and I read in our
newspaper every day. The suicide bomber who undertakes massive
killings in a marketplace or a mosque, something that people
can't be sure of, that's uncertain. And targeting American
forces which affects us, but not them.
But I want to go back to something I mentioned in passing.
Frankly, for the ordinary Iraqi, crime that we recognize as
crime is a greater threat. For example, the kidnappings that
are taking place in Baghdad, particularly among the middle and
upper class people; assassinations of people who work for the
government, of many university professors, doctors, and so on.
Middle and upper class Iraqis--particularly people of substance
are leaving Iraq because of this crime.
That's one of the reasons why I think we should focus
analytically and politically on that particular issue. This is
more a policing issue. Getting more police would free up
resources and forces to deal with the insurgents. These crimes
are not always connected to the insurgency, but this is an
issue that is devastating.
Of course--we have to recognize that the insurgency is
concentrated in a region, too--mostly Baghdad and the triangle
rather than the north and the south.
I also have some views on the neighbors and Libya. It often
looks to us as though we should involve the neighbors, but
inside Iraq, if you talk to Iraqis, particularly these in
government--with the Kurds and with many of these new Shi'a
leaders who are oriented in a different direction, it's pretty
clear, involving the neighbors is not going to be helpful. Some
of the remarks that I've heard from these people indicate that
if you start to involve the Arab world, which is mainly Sunni,
it's going to provide support for the Sunni population. There's
suspicion of the Ba'thists; they're not in favor. So you've got
to keep in mind that this is not a friendly environment for
some of these regional partners. Libya would be a real stretch
for the Iraqis. It's hard for me to see how the Libyans could
mediate there.
But even if we use Egyptians, Jordanians, and others among
certain elements in Iraq, there's a great deal of suspicion of
them. So we've got to be careful and sensitive.
Ms. Van Rest. I'd like to comment on the question about
direct assistance to political parties as discussed in the
article.
I know you all know this, but the National Endowment and
the party institutes have been on record that we work with
parties across the board. We don't pick any favorites, giving
assistance to the parties in terms of training, communications
training, and the like, and helping them to figure out how to
develop messages, that kind of thing. And these are the
techniques that have worked through the years in helping
parties develop.
So I think we've been on record with that before, but that
characterizes our assistance.
Senator Dodd. Let me just say, by the way, and I'm glad
Senator Biden intends to offer some additional resource. We've
had some--I remember some very close votes going back through
the years, and I think by a margin of one vote, one year, we
were able to sustain the National Endowment for Democracy. That
was hotly opposed by many people who saw this as some great--
and I think the record of the NED and the respective two-party
organizations have been terrific, it was long overdue that we
weren't more directly involved in building parties--and by the
way, let me focus on the party aspect of that too. I think one
of the problems we've been involved in is we've tried to be
neutral about this to such a degree that our support for civil
society in a lot of places is very nice, but most of the people
in civil society don't run for public office. And a great
spokesman and so forth may show up but they never want to get
out and knock on the screen door, and I wish we did more with
the parties. I love civil society in these countries but we
need to pay more attention to people who are actually willing
to put their name on a ballot and go out and run for public
office, and too often we ignore them, fearful we're going to be
seen as being partisan in some way, and pay attention, the
civil society groups which are wonderful but rarely want to
engage in the kind of day-to-day politics you need to do if
you're going to succeed.
I didn't mean to digress, but I think it's a point that
needs to be made.
Dr. Feldman. A couple of quick points. First, with respect
to where the debate is going to happen, Senator. Those of us
who had some--who were involved in the transitional
administrative law process--have been a bit surprised by the
way the constitutional committee has operated, because the
transitional administrative law contemplates that the elected
national assembly will actually debate the constitution, and
that would be--and was imagined to be--the natural forum for a
public televised debate to be visible on Iraqi television and,
indeed, on regional television where it would also have a
substantial effect. And that debate would also be open to the
possibility of changing the constitutional drafted text after
the process of the debate, because the thing would not have, as
it were, the text would not have gone out for ratification yet.
I think it's still not too late to do that. I think that's
contemplated by the transitional law. It doesn't require any
changes, and I think it would be plausible to interpret the
transitional law in the following way: To say that by August 15
the committee is charged to produce a text, and it can do so.
And then at that point the national assembly would have an
opportunity to debate that, and there is, at least, until
October 15 for ratification referendum. And that date could
perhaps be extended, perhaps a little bit, at least, insofar as
this is the Middle East and deadlines are never understood by
anybody to be absolutely hard and fast.
So I think there is a possibility for that, and I think it
would be an ideal context for the debate to occur. It would be
an opportunity for Iraqis to see the people whom they elected
actually involved in the constitutional process.
With respect to the Seymour Hersh article, I did see it. In
fact, I spoke to Mr. Hersh several times in the process of
preparing the article, and I think he even quoted a couple of
things that I said to him there. And I think what is most
striking to me about the article is that I urged, and I think
others urged him, to try to see if he could find some sort of
statistical proof of this suggestion about ballot stuffing, or
substantial changes in outcomes.
The one statistic that he pointed to there, which is at
least worthy of closer attention--I don't think it proves
anything, but it's worth looking at, is the statistic that says
that then-Prime Minister Ayad Allawi received a much larger
number of votes at the national level for his party than the
same party received at the local level.
In other words, that there was substantial ticket
splitting. Now it's entirely possible that there was simply
ticket splitting, that people were choosing--and this point was
addressed in the article--that local people were voting for
parties where they knew the local players, but they wanted a
strong hand at the national level. That's a perfectly plausible
explanation, nothing in the article that I've seen disproves
that.
It's certainly a statistic worth looking at more closely
because the truth is that any allegations on this front are
highly risky. We know this from the situation in Afghanistan
where a single and ultimately unsubstantiated rumor led to some
significant violence. Here, too, there could be a real
process--perhaps not of direct violence, but, at least, of the
discrediting of some of the people who are, after all, most
positively inclined toward us. So it may have ended up
backfiring.
A last thought on this, and this is something that is much
closer to the expertise of the members of the committee than to
mine, but the article at least implied that there may have been
some disrespect for the legislative input of Members of the
Houses of Congress in the process of whatever decision was
made. I, of course, have no way of knowing if any of that is
accurate or not, but it seems to be of the greatest concern.
Senator Dodd. And about Libya, do you have any----
Dr. Feldman. I do. Two thoughts on Libya. I basically agree
with Dr. Marr.
The first is that Libya is noted for its--you mentioned
that they're Sunni, which is true, but the President--or
President is the wrong word--but Colonel Khadafi is noted for a
very heterodox form of Sunni Islam, let's just say, going
alongside his other personal idiosyncracies. I think we can
probably say that without giving any offense. And I think that
he would--this is known throughout the region, and I think that
would make him, to some degree, disqualified from the
perspective of many local Sunnis.
The other is simply, and Senator Biden can speak to this
since he was just there, it may be too soon to place any
particular trust or extra credibility in someone who's track
record--I totally agree with the substantial accomplishments
that have brought him to where he's been brought, but his track
record is, obviously, not one that inspired confidence, and I
think there are other stories out there about him that are,
even if unsubstantiated, the fact that such stories are
circulating strongly suggests that he might not be the kind of
person we'd want to strengthen in this way.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Dodd. I appreciate
very much Senator Biden addressing the appropriation bill
that's on the floor now, and the need for moneys for the NED
and the party institutes, and Senator Dodd's strong endorsement
of that. I would just add a third voice.
During the 9 years that I was a member of the NED Board, I
was tasked to get the money every year, and this was sometimes,
as Senator Dodd knows, a precarious prospect, but I had----
Senator Biden. You had to overcome some Democratic
opposition as I recall.
The Chairman. So I was relieved that when I left the board,
the place was still there. They've been doing much better since
I left the board, I might add.
Senator Dodd. No correlation whatsoever.
The Chairman. There has been recognition of its value.
There is an important thing that is occurring on the ground in
Iraq that is largely unrecognized. Let me compliment those of
you who have been involved at any level with this.
And second, I just want to note Dr. Feldman's comments
about the TAL. How might this evolution of the constitution
occur? In various of your comments today, you've mentioned when
we got into this that you wonder how the people of Iraq will
discover what is in the constitution, or evaluate it, and if
they do so, is it a document that they can change?
One of the truths that I perceive with this set of hearings
is that it really is not too late for things on the ground to
be influenced by the conversations that we're having here. They
are a public forum, and we mentioned yesterday that we will
make all this fully available to our administration and to
others who are involved in our administration in Iraq for
whatever value it may be.
But it seemed to us at the time that we needed some
stimulation of some ideas as to how we proceed. This may be a
useful one, because we discussed today the question of do we
delay, or do we semidelay, or do we have a finished product, or
semifinished one? These are critical questions.
I think this is a technical issue and maybe some of you can
offer some thoughts. I think the TAL calls for a two-thirds
majority in each of the 18 jurisdictional provinces of Iraq. A
two-thirds majority is a daunting task in many situations, but
to get that in all 18--and am I right, or does anybody know the
rules of the game here, because this is the impression that
I've obtained while listening to others who know much more
about it than I do.
Dr. Feldman. Mr. Chairman, I don't have the TAL in front of
me, but as I understand it, the constitution would be ratified
by a simple majority vote unless it were the case that two-
thirds of the voters in, at least, three provinces expressly
rejected the constitution. So that's where the two-thirds came
in.
The Chairman. So it's a negative influence that--but two-
thirds in three situations?
Dr. Marr. That would take care of the Kurds, but it would
also take care of the Sunnis. The Shi'a, of course----
The Chairman. Because in one of those two groups you could
produce the three negative----
Dr. Marr. They can veto.
Dr. Feldman. And the other point, just to mention on that
front, Senator, is in a pinch many on the Shi'a side never
formally accepted that aspect of the transitional law. And I
think they did so in part because they objected to what they
saw as the counter majoritarian feature of the possibility of a
veto.
In practice, I think, though it's well understood by
everybody that if that many people disagree with the
constitution, there will be a serious problem in considering it
to be ratified.
But there might be, it's not inconceivable that it would be
held ratified by some people even if it didn't satisfy that
requirement.
The Chairman. Well, given the real world outside with the
French and the Dutch rejection of the European constitution,
almost everybody in the world now knows these things might
happen.
Now, over in the European Union, which is a pretty well-
organized political operation, it's not exactly clear what they
plan to do about this. So Luxembourg went on and had a
referendum and passed it, and others may--they were all ready
for one anyway, and didn't want to deny their voters. But, at
the same time, the thought was originally that if the French
did this, why you might finally return to France again, and
say, now look, everybody else has ratified the constitution,
why don't you have another look at it. So then, maybe, the
French have another vote and they vote to ratify it. But now it
appears that that's not exactly going to work.
So, let's say that for some reason, and maybe it's close,
but you get rejection in the Kurd area or the Sunni area, so
that, as a result, we finally got through the deadlines of the
constitution, we have gone through the referendum, there was a
vote, the country was not shot up in the process, people got
out in good numbers, but you don't have a satisfactory outcome.
Now what is the process then? Or is there a process?
Dr. Feldman. The TAL does contemplate that potentially
happening. It suggests national elections would follow, and
then the constitution--the National Assembly would be
reconstituted.
The Chairman. So you have the national elections anyway?
Dr. Feldman. So there's a second bite at the apple
available.
The Chairman. The December 15 elections happen, so life
goes on from August 15 to October 15 to December 15, but having
then had these national elections, you've returned then to the
constitutional business?
Dr. Feldman. And you give it a second try, and the
transitional administrative law remains--by its own account
remains law throughout this period.
The Chairman. Now, does the transitional law account for
who would be elected in the December 15 event? In other words,
sometimes, maybe some of us have erroneously said, well, you
adopt the constitution and it provides for the officers of the
country that are going to be elected. But if the constitution
hasn't been adopted, who is it that gets elected on December 15
that doubles back then to write the constitution?
Dr. Feldman. Well, unless the present electoral law were
changed in the way that Dr. Marr was suggesting we'd have the
same--the same electoral law would be in place and we'd have
the same nationalist proportional representation election. It
is possible, though, that the National Assembly sitting after
failure to ratify the constitution could itself pass a new
electoral law.
The Chairman. I see.
Dr. Feldman. The only difficulty would be the ordinary
political one of getting a group of elected officials to pass a
law that would change the way that they were elected.
The Chairman. But in any event I appreciate that, because
we really have not had too much clarification in most news
accounts of what is going to happen. Usually the story is, is
it conceivable that there will be a constitution by ``x'' date,
quite apart from will there ever be an election, and does
anybody believe they're going to get to the third round in this
calendar year.
And most people will say, probably not, given the fact that
the Sunnis just got to the table, or various other things were
occurring.
But all of you seem to be reasonably confident from your
statements that these things are going to happen. Now there may
be some variation as to what occurs, with the failure of the
constitution along the way, maybe even an interim suggestion of
who gets elected. But there may be flexibility in this group
that is doing this to be able to talk about these things. They
come to station even in the midst of insurgency and the lights
going out and the other problems that we're talking about. That
in itself is remarkable and commendable and to be supported.
But it's a very different sort of story from either total
collapse or some sort of remarkable victory in which everything
is tidied up, we leave, and life goes on.
This is outside the scope of what we're talking about
today, but the Republican Institute poll does put a heavy
premium on electricity as a very very important item, with
unemployment coming fairly shortly thereafter. I'm curious how
in the poll could there be such support on a matter that would
normally be in one of our own domestic polls, the right-track/
wrong-track question. If you asked in the United States right
now, do you think our economy is on the right track or the
wrong track; a good number of people would come up with the
wrong track. And this is the United States of America, with 5
percent unemployment and so forth. Here, out in Iraq, according
to this poll, 66 percent or so, if I read correctly, thought
the country was on the right track.
So I'm just extremely curious, given these grave problems
of security, or electricity, or unemployment, or so forth,
where is this residual optimism coming from? Is this a valid
reading or was it April and maybe they are feeling differently
in July?
Do you have a thought?
Dr. Marr. Can I just say--I know Judy is going to answer
this--I think we have to recognize how regional this insecurity
is. People in the Kurdish north are not affected as much by the
security, and much of the south, while it has some turbulence,
is also not affected. That's probably a healthy majority--at
least a majority. But we're really focusing on Baghdad and the
Sunni areas in talking about insurgency.
The Chairman. I see.
Ms. Van Rest. That was part of it. The other thing is, is
you're absolutely correct. I mean polls are a snapshot at that
particular time that seemed to be on the forefront of the
people who--the electricity problem was on the forefront of
those folks minds, you know, it was beginning probably to get
quite hot having--I just remembered that surprisingly how hot
it gets early on.
The Chairman. Well over a 100 degrees.
Ms. Van Rest. Yes, I think today was 120, one of our staff
said, so I think it will be interesting to see how this next
poll turns out, and, of course, we will make that readily
available to everyone.
The Chairman. We'll appreciate that.
Ms. Van Rest. On the subject of optimism just, you know, on
a personal note, having lived there a year and having the
actually honor of being tasked with outreach to Iraqi women,
initially, and then more into just civil society in general,
which also included political parties, but civic organizations
and youth groups, et cetera. I just can't emphasize enough the
optimism that Iraqis have about their future. It really--I
don't know how they keep it up frankly. I do keep in very good
contact with Iraqi colleagues. I was there last December,
probably will take another trip this fall, and so I feel like I
have a little bit--even though I've been home for a year--a
little bit of an understanding of the pulse of Iraqis in
general, and it is about their future.
It's really tough right now, no question, but really
compared to other countries it's pretty impressive.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for that personal
testimony. I would just reiterate again, that I'm sure all of
our Senate group feels a debt to all three of you for the
extraordinary experiences you've had and your ability to
articulate these in trying to think ahead with us on public
policy.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. I echo that view. I
mean, this is really very helpful.
One of the things, the generic point that the chairman was
making about one of the reasons why these hearings are held, is
to generate ideas, to try to be sort of a cauldron for ideas
and debate that hopefully percolate through this town and
through the administration, through the Congress, and maybe
beyond.
And I think it's important to note if you observed that
those of us on both sides of the aisle who have made it a
vocation of ours to try to understand Iraq, to try to
understand the region, and have spent hundreds of hours trying
to learn from you all, and from our own experiences. If you
notice we don't disagree. If you notice there's not a Democrat/
Republican--not just here in this committee, but those who if
you ask if the press said name the 10 or 12 or 15 or 20
senators most involved with American foreign policy, and who
make it their business, there's virtually no fundamental
disagreement among any of us. And I think that's an important
point to make.
All we're trying to do, and I know you know it but
sometimes, you know, assumption is the mother of all screw ups,
well sometimes assumptions aren't grounded in reality. The
truth of the matter is, we all desperately want to see this
succeed as you do, which leads me to this point, one of the
reasons I'm still optimistic, notwithstanding the incredible--
in my view, speaking for myself--screw ups, and failures that
were warned about in advance, and were overwhelmingly clear,
and the failure to change course on some tactical matters since
the statute came, and notwithstanding that, the reason I'm
still optimistic is your point, Ms. Van Rest, about the Iraqis.
My mother has an expression, she says honey, if you're hung
by your thumbs long enough you get used to it. And the irony
here is that there's some truth to that, that the Iraqis--it
doesn't surprise me at all they'd say electricity is the
biggest problem and I'm optimistic. In a strange sense no more
than it did years ago by saying we want arms control and a
bigger defense budget in the United States, they seem to be
totally consistent.
But having said that leads me to this--I'd like to posit a
potential scenario and get you all to respond to it. I think,
Dr. Feldman, and I've really been impressed by your testimony,
I think that one of the reasons why we're surprised that in the
initial iteration and discussion relating to the TAL it was
kind of envisioned, at least by me which you all did, it was a
good job, was that we really would have this process of
constitution writing, there really would be a debate,
essentially, from August to October, in this assembly that had
been elected before the constitution was written. That would
have the impact of informing the Iraqi people of, at least
generically, what was at stake here, the big issues, and then
there would be a referendum, and then there would be a vote.
But I think what changed it, and this is a question as well
as a statement, what changed it was, in my view, understandably
and predicable, at the time the election took place, the slow
turnout of Sunnis, and significant turnout of the rest of the
country so that everybody started scrambling saying the Sunnis
will not view, as legitimate, a debate in this assembly where
they're not elected.
And so the Iraqis came up with a way to go out and
significantly increase the participation of the Sunnis in an
unelected capacity, voting and nonvoting, in the constitution
writing, which, essentially, sort of renders counterproductive
in the minds of many that I spoke to in Iraq, having this
debate in this assembly where there aren't Sunnis.
Which leads me to this point, my guess is, this is the
plain old politician in me, this is not any sort of foreign
policy insight, this is just plain old politician in me, if I
had to bet--and I don't want to bet, but if I had to bet my
daughter's graduate school tuition, which is almost equal to my
salary it seems, on this I would say what's likely to happen is
that a constitution is written in time, there is a referendum,
three provinces or governance turn it down by a two-thirds
vote, there is a general election again, the Sunnis participate
in this process this time, then the process is underway again.
If I'm sitting there and I am in one of the Sunni provinces
and I conclude that I am one of the moderate, quote,
insurgents, and I regret having participated in the first
place. I mean it's kind of interesting what we found when I
went with one of our colleagues here to be, quote, the official
observer for the Palestinian elections. Hamas came out and said
don't vote, don't vote, don't vote, don't vote, and then they
realized the night before that folks were going to vote and
they said, well, vote for Charlie, vote for Charlie, vote for
Charlie, vote for the guy who's going to screw things up,
because they figured out, at the very end, their boycott wasn't
going to work.
It's kind of after the fact, it seems to me, that a
significant number of Sunnis who aren't the jihadists or
jihadist sympathizers, have reached that conclusion.
But if there were any organizational capacity within the
Sunni triangle areas and the three governorships that used to
be, I'd be urging two-thirds no-vote in order to get me in the
game so that I was actually part of the process. Ironically,
that does not depress me. That does not make me think that all
is lost.
Now a lot can happen between the cup and the lip on that
one. It may be there's so much chaos that flows from that
quickly that you can't predict. But I wonder whether you'd--not
whether or not I'm right, and I'm not sure--I mean on my bet,
what do you think happens, and this is really a tough question
and if you don't want to respond you don't have to, what do you
think happens if, in fact, there is a rejection, and the way it
reads is the referendum--it says the constitution will be
approved if ratified by a majority of Iraqi voters and if two-
thirds of the voters in three or more of Iraqi's 18 governances
do not reject.
Then it goes on to say, your point, Doctor, the TNA will be
dissolved--this is if a referendum rejects, the TNA will be
dissolved, election for a new national assembly will be held no
later than December 15. The new national assembly and a new
Iraqi transitional government will then assume office no later
than the 31st and will continue to operate under the TAL. This
new national assembly will be entrusted with writing another
draft permanent constitution, drafting deadlines would be
adjusted so that this process can conclude within a period not
to exceed 1 year.
Is the center, Doctor, strong enough to hold, not spinning
out of control here, if in fact, the anticipated possibility
becomes a reality? And that is, there's a rejection and a
general election.
I know no one knows, but can you give me your best judgment
if the scenario envisioned as a possibility actually occurs,
what do you think happens. And you get to say I don't know, and
you know, not respond if you don't want to because I realize--
I'm not being a smart guy, you're all extremely well regarded
and having you go way out on the limb on this stuff is, you
know, maybe not fair to ask you to do.
Dr. Feldman. I would just make one preliminary comment and
then try to take a crack at it. The preliminary thought is that
I agree that many Sunni politicians might prefer the scenario
you described. The only catch is that if you were one of the
Sunnis who is serving on the constitution committee, for
example, then the rejection of the constitution, unless you
come out of the committee and oppose it, undercuts you for the
purposes of the election.
Senator Biden. Oh, I agree with that.
Dr. Feldman. So the other Sunni politicians, I agree, might
well be in a situation where they would prefer this outcome
because it's a way of redoing the election and getting a second
bite at the apple.
I think that the center could hold, for the following
reason, those who would probably be reelected from the Kurdish
areas and the Shi'a areas in the second-round election would
probably be close to the same people that are there today. I
mean there would be some changes as a result of people's
frustration with the lack of success of the constitutional
process, but I think we would probably see much of those same
set of people, and then there would be elections in the Sunni
areas and we would probably see greater participation.
I do think it would be negative with respect to the
security situation though, in part because it might embolden
insurgents who believe that a rejection of the constitution
suggests that the Sunni population is in support of the
insurgency. And here's where as much as we would like to delink
the constitution from the insurgency, and I agree with Dr. Marr
that we would like to delink it, I don't think it's
realistically doable. The opposition to a constitutional
ratification process in the Sunni areas will present itself as
connected to support for the insurgent movement. And so I
think, although the center might hold in the sense that Shi'a
and Kurds would get back in office, the cost in terms of
strengthening the insurgents through a public democratic
representation would be a very, very great cost indeed.
I would just add one last thought, it's possible that even
in the Sunni areas they might not be able to manage two-thirds
rejection----
Senator Biden. I agree.
Dr. Feldman [continuing]. And I think that one high-risk
scenario is that you get something short of two-thirds in three
provinces, say two provinces go two-thirds and one province
only goes 61 percent against, then you've got the equivalent of
a broad popular Sunni rejection of the constitution, but under
the provisions of the TAL the constitution is ratified. So you
have people saying we've got a constitution and others saying,
but it doesn't mean anything to us.
Senator Biden. One of the things that I think is really
important here is when I was speaking to--and by the way as I
mentioned, I don't want to mention individual names but there
were Sunnis who we met outside the green zone in the red zone,
who made the private argument to us that we thought you are our
biggest problem, but you're not; our bigger problem is the
Peshmerga or the Badr Brigade, our biggest problem is somebody
other than you, we want you the heck out of here but not now.
But it seems to me one of the really important elements,
the extent that anyone, any official from any non-Iraqi source
is being sought for advice from this committee that's doing the
writing. If you said to me, I got to write one provision into
this constitution, no one knows I wrote it, it would be viewed
as spontaneously an Iraqi idea. I would write into this
constitution an amending process that was readily available and
not as difficult as ours. Not as difficult as ours. And my
impression is there are both Shi'a and Kurds who understand
that, Kurds less willing to take that chance than Shi'a because
the Kurds have more to lose in an amending process.
It's interesting to me when Senator Hagel and I went to
Irbil in December 2002, before the war. We got smuggled in and
we were asked to address the Kurdish Parliament in Kurdistan. I
came away with two distinct feelings; one, there was an
overwhelming assessment, Doctor, even among the younger leaders
that independence was not an option in their lifetime. As much
as things have changed and they've become more independent,
they've also become more realistic about Iran and Turkey.
But the second thing that came clear to me was they already
had a constitution drafted. They already had their--I mean they
asked us to endorse it. I mean they actually had a written
document, which we didn't do.
So I acknowledge that the Kurds are--my view is, that the
Kurds would like nothing better than independence, but it seems
to me they are more realistic than they were 15 years ago about
that prospect. And they also, though, put a higher premium on
actual autonomy, I mean republic, but autonomous republic.
But I have digressed, and I apologize. The point is, do you
think that they're seized with the notion that there's a need
for an amending process that is not inflexible in order to pull
this country together in light of the failure of Sunni
participation in the electoral process in the first round?
Dr. Marr. I put some of this in my testimony. I don't know
whether they are or not, because any constitution, of course,
has to have some amending process. But I agree with you. I
would put a lot of emphasis on this. There has to be a balance
between permanence and change. People need to feel they've come
to some kind of general consensus which could persist for some
reasonable period of time, but the constitution also has to be
flexible enough for them to grow into. If we have any influence
we should be encouraging them not to feel this constitution is
grounded in cement, that it can't be changed tomorrow or the
next year.
I would also like to address your initial scenario. First
of all, if we get a rejection and a continuation of the TAL and
Iraqis have to take a second crack at the constitution, the
Sunnis have another problem we haven't talked about. They're
split and fragmented. The old Ba'th crowd is out. They are
required to reject Ba'thism and there is no new Ba'th party or
a substitute for it. They're fragmented in a number of ways.
That's why I keep coming back to the electoral law. The way the
electoral law is structured now, it favors people who can get
an alliance together. That's what we saw in this election--a
Shi'a alliance, a Kurdish alliance, and so on. I don't think
the Sunnis are going to be able to do well enough, under the
current law, to compete successfully.
So I'm not so keen about a second shot under the same
electoral law which, in fact, doesn't bring them into
government.
I'm not so sure we need town meetings, but we certainly
need a process whereby Sunni leaders who control
constituencies--whether tribal, religious, or professional--do
educate their population to a certain extent so that they don't
get up the day after the vote and suffer sticker shock.
Senator Biden. Do the Sunni participants in the writing of
the constitution, and I don't know them individually enough to
know how much swack they have, but do they have enough--I mean
I can envision if the people participating that would have been
brought in, if they had real constituencies among the Sunnis
they would essentially do what we did in a different form in
the process of writing our Constitution, the Federalist papers,
they would go back to their key constituents and try to sell
them on that process, just for their own well being. I mean I
can't imagine whoever the Sunnis are, and I don't know them
well enough to know, I admit I don't know who the dozen or so
key people are, Sunnis, in writing the constitution. If I were
them, for my own safety's sake as they say, I would be
backtalking to the tribal leader who's a Sunni saying, look,
Dick, the reason why we're doing this is this, and I really
think we can--is there any evidence that that process is--I
don't know how we would know that, but is there any evidence of
that sort of germination taking--because that's the place--I
mean if you think about it I realize it's totally different in
terms of electronic media access, microphones, et cetera, but
who did--our leaders in writing that Constitution I might add,
in 100-degree weather they went to the second floor in
Philadelphia so no one could hear what they were doing, okay? I
mean they didn't want any part of anybody knowing what was
going on. They literally went to the second floor in
Philadelphia, and it's hot. It was designed not to let people
know what was going on.
And, then, when we finally came to sell it, it was an elite
to elites, it was the equivalent of how many people in America
read the editorial page. It was the Federalist papers where
documents were essentially editorials among and in the only
major newspapers in America for the express purpose affecting
elites. It didn't affect the guy farming in Dover, Delaware,
and if he read it, it would be difficult to digest.
And so the process and the way it worked here even if there
had been media it would not have been to the vox populi, it
would have been to the elites.
And so what I--I guess what I'm grappling with here and I'm
sorry to take this time, Dick, but what I'm grappling with here
is, it seems to me, the key is less a town-meeting forum than
communication to the elites, and as you point out, Doctor, and
all of you have mentioned, there are identifiably, in each of
these provinces, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 50 people. They are the
professors, they are the doctors, they are the lawyers, they
are the tribal leaders, they are the former officeholders that
are still around. And so that seems to me there's got to be
some way--and again I'm just thinking in terms of pure
political organization here, of being able to get to the
elites. And so that's a long, long trailer to a very short
question, these Sunnis who are in the deal now, in writing the
constitution, do any of them or collectively do they have
sufficient standing among the elites in the Sunni communities
to be able to at least make a case to the elites in the Sunni
community?
Dr. Marr. They have some standing, but I wouldn't say it is
overwhelming. They include the Iraqi Islamic Party, the
National Dialogue Council, which has reached out to others, and
so on. We won't know their success until it happens. To be very
brief, that's one of the reasons why I think a little extension
in time would help. It would allow some of this process to take
place before they get sticker shock--not through the town
meetings but----
Senator Biden. That's an interesting point.
Dr. Feldman. Just to add one word to that, they don't know
if they have that clout yet or not. They will try, but they're
not automatically guaranteed a hearing, and they're certainly
not guaranteed people listening to them, but I think they will
try.
Senator Biden. But you get a sense that they realize their
futures depend on it, right?
Dr. Feldman. Yes.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you again for your devotion of
3 hours to our edification and hopefully the edification of a
broader group of people who have been witnessing the hearing,
and who will read the record. We thank you for the statements
that you have written, all of which will be made a part of the
record, in addition to the polling data which we have all
acknowledged is very important.
I thank members of the committee, and the hearing is
adjourned. We look forward to continuing on Iraq tomorrow
morning.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]
ACCELERATING ECONOMIC PROGRESS
IN IRAQ
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Murkowski, Biden, Dodd, and
Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
is called to order. The Committee on Foreign Relations meets
for the third of our series of hearings on Iraq.
Today we will examine ways that we might accelerate
economic development of that country. During the last 2 days,
our committee has had excellent discussions of how to improve
security and advance political development in Iraq. The
witnesses in both of those hearings emphasized that
demonstrable economic progress is truly one of the keys to
defeating the insurgency and to establishing a stable Iraqi
Government.
As Dr. Ken Pollack observed, in our hearing on Monday, the
legitimacy of the Iraqi Government among Iraqis may be more
dependent on the government's ability to deliver the
necessities of life than on their support for a constitution,
or even their political identification with Iraqi leaders. If
Iraqis perceive that their daily lives are improving, they are
more likely to take risks to oppose insurgents and to restrain
factional groups that seek to fragment the country.
The Foreign Relations Committee has frequently reviewed the
progress of reconstruction spending and other economic
development efforts by the coalition. At various intervals,
since the invasion of Iraq, we have expressed the urgency of
moving forward more quickly with reconstruction projects and of
improving the percentage of aid that actually benefits Iraqis.
Thousands of reconstruction projects have been completed so
far. Schools, hospitals, and roads have been built. Tens of
thousands of police and security forces are being trained, and
more than 150,000 Iraqis are at work in United States-funded
jobs.
But many parts of Iraq still lack a reliable
infrastructure, particularly with regard to electricity and
clean water. This is a source of great frustration to the Iraqi
people.
The Iraqi economy has many scars from the last quarter
century, which was dominated by war, sanctions, and the command
kleptocracy of Saddam Hussein. Since 1980, Iraq's GNP has
remained flat. An economy that produced 3.7 million barrels of
oil per day in 1979, today struggles to produce half that
amount. Sabotage is costing Iraq an estimated $600 million per
month in lost oil export revenues and even more in repair
costs.
Corruption has been reported, most prevalently in the
Ministry of Oil, but it also exists in other Ministries and
sectors. Some suggest as much as one-third of imported refined
oil products are being illegally diverted.
Despite these difficulties, the Iraqi economy has great
potential in the post-Saddam era. A full restoration of the oil
sector would increase employment and improve government
revenues. Underscoring the potential economic impact of greater
personal freedoms, Iraq has seen as many as 3 million new phone
subscribers and more than 100,000 new Internet subscribers
since the fall of Saddam. Salaries, especially for government
workers, have risen markedly, up 10 or 20 times their prewar
levels, according to official government wage charts.
Iraq also has substantial agricultural capacity. In the
late 1970s, 30 percent of the Iraqi labor force was employed in
agriculture, producing wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates,
cotton, and livestock. Today, agriculture remains the third
largest value sector and the largest employer. I am hopeful
that significant USAID and coalition efforts will enable Iraqis
to begin to fill their own grocery shelves and to decrease
reliance on costly government-provided food baskets that most
Iraqis continue to receive.
Today, we will ask our witnesses to comment on a number of
subjects. We are particularly interested in how the oil sector
can be revived and protected from corruption and sabotage. We
also will discuss whether our economic development strategy
should be more decentralized and whether it should emphasize
creating jobs and demonstrating tangible improvements in the
everyday lives of Iraqis.
In addition, we will explore what type of statistical
indicators could be produced to provide a clear and credible
picture of economic progress in Iraq. Such indicators would be
designed both to inform policy decisions and to give the Iraqi
people a better notion of what is happening in their country.
We will proceed with the same format that yielded excellent
discussions in our hearings on Monday and Tuesday. Our hearing
will be organized around four policy options or sets of
questions for accelerating economic progress in Iraq.
Accordingly, after Senator Biden and I have offered our opening
comments--and I will recognize the distinguished minority
leader when he comes in--we will put the first policy option
and associated questions before our expert panel. Each witness,
in turn, will provide his views on the questions being
presented.
Then we will present the second option and then the third
and the fourth. Finally, recognizing that ideas exist well
beyond our published hearing plan, we will ask our witnesses if
they would like to offer additional thoughts on improving the
Iraqi economy that have not been thus far discussed.
After this sequence, committee members will be recognized,
in turn, to address questions to any members of the panel. My
hope is that through the expertise of our witnesses and the
questions of our members we can achieve a systematic evaluation
of the options presented for accelerating economic progress in
Iraq.
We are especially pleased to welcome a very distinguished
panel of experts to help us with our inquiry. Dr. Keith Crane
is a senior economist at the RAND Corporation. He served on the
Coalition Provisional Authority staff during 2003. I would also
like to observe that Dr. Crane did his doctoral work at Indiana
University, which gives special credentials to his testimony
today.
Mr. Frederick Barton is senior advisor in the International
Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and has taken several research trips to Iraq since the
end of the war.
Mr. Fareed Mohamedi is the senior director of the Country
Strategies Group at PFC Energy, has been studying the economies
of oil-producing nations in the Middle East for many years.
These experts have spent a great deal of time analyzing the
Iraqi economic situation. They have presented remarkable
papers. Let me just say at the outset that they will be made a
part of the record in full. We are grateful we can draw upon
their experience and their insights.
Let me ask my colleagues, Senator Dodd or Senator
Murkowski, if they have any opening greeting or comment.
Senator Dodd.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, once again--I said this
yesterday--I regret I missed Monday's hearing. I was delighted
to participate in almost all of yesterday's hearing and I am
going to try and be here as much, today, as I can. This is
tremendously valuable.
I want to thank our three witnesses in anticipation of your
comments. If the quality of your testimony even comes close to
what we have heard over the last 2 days, it is tremendously
valuable for those of us here. I regret that more of our
colleagues are not here to take advantage of this, but with the
news last night at 9 p.m.--in fact, Senator Lugar and I just
left, testified together before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
As all three of you are aware, a lot is going on up here.
But this is tremendously helpful. I believe that C-SPAN is
covering this, so I am sure our colleagues on this committee,
in their offices, can listen in to what is being said, as well
as it being transmitted to the public. This is exactly what we
ought to be doing more of: Educating people in this country and
elsewhere about what is actually happening on critical areas
that are ultimately going to determine the success or failure
of our efforts here in Iraq.
So I am very grateful to the chairman. I think he has set
up a wonderful way of doing this, of giving you the opportunity
to lay out in four or five critical question areas that all of
us appreciate are right on target as to what we ought to be
addressing, and to give us some ideas about how we, then, can
offer constructive ideas to the administration and others to
implement these policies.
Again, I will express my regret that it saddens me that the
administration has not been before this committee to talk about
this subject matter. It is a pleasure to have you here and we
should listen to you, but it would be also helpful to have the
administration come forward and share its ideas.
The chairman has said this. Senator Biden has said this. It
deserves being repeated. Just as it is important to build
public support within Iraq for the efforts being made to
provide them with a stable and free government in the future,
the support here at home is critical to that success. And being
candid and open with the American public about the successes,
as well as the shortcomings, of policies helps sustain public
support for a very complicated and difficult mission. When an
administration is reluctant, for whatever reason, to share its
observations here, then you undermine that public support and
you have a deteriorating support for this effort.
I hope that will change in time because this is of
strategic importance, the outcome of this issue. So I am very
grateful to the chairman and very interested in hearing what
our witnesses have to say about--as the chairman said, this is
maybe the critical issue. If we can get this right and our
security issues work well to provide space and if the Iraqi
people see that the quality of their daily lives improves; that
there is a job, that their health care, their sanitation, their
transportation systems will work and provide them with a decent
living--and I do not mean ``living'' in economic terms,
specifically, but a decent living set of circumstances--then I
think all the other things can flow.
In the absence of that, if you do not get this right, I do
not care how many troops you put on the ground in Iraq, I do
not care how big the police force is, you will not ultimately
build the kind of support you need to have in Iraq.
So I think this may be the critical piece to our discussion
over these 3 or 4 days, and I thank the chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Murkowski, do you have an opening thought today?
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to
commend you for your initiative in moving forward with this
particular panel in the series that you have done. I regret
that I have not been able to attend the two prior ones. In
looking at the schedule, though, I looked at this one and said
this is one that I cannot miss.
As the good Senator has just pointed out, the success in
Iraq really does depend upon the economic health, the well-
being of the individuals that are there. If we can get this
piece right, I agree with you that it all does begin to fall
into place. But it is a precarious initiative when you try to
do the rebuilding and you are faced with sabotage, you are
faced with corruption, you are faced with just the downfall of
everything that we try to put up.
So we need to know. We need to be able to measure how are
we doing, and the Iraqi people need to be able to measure as
well and to know that progress is being made.
So again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for what you are doing. I
appreciate the testimony that we will hear from those who have
gathered today, and I do hope that the entire Congress is
looking to this particular panel that you have put together as
we move forward in looking at what is happening in Iraq.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.
Now I want to offer the first block of considerations. Let
me say that I will ask Dr. Crane to comment first, to be
followed then by Mr. Barton and Mr. Mohamedi. Then we will
rotate the batting order. During the second block, we will ask
Mr. Barton to start and then Mr. Mohamedi and then, finally,
back to Dr. Crane for the fourth group; and then, as we
indicated, your final comments.
Should the coalition do more to shift additional economic
development resources and emphasis from Baghdad to the
provinces? What have been the challenges in achieving this aim?
Will strengthening regional and local authorities outside
Baghdad speed delivery of services and broaden the tangible
benefits of aid, and are the currently formed provincial
reconstruction councils up and running and having the desired
impact?
Dr. Crane, would you begin our discussion.
STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH CRANE, SENIOR ECONOMIST, RAND
CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA
Dr. Crane. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today as part of this important set of
hearings on policy options for Iraq. As an economist, I guess I
respectfully disagree about the importance of economics. I
should not denigrate my own profession, but security is really
important. There is a great deal of lawlessness in Iraq, not
just with the insurgency, and until people and businesspeople
feel comfortable on the streets, are not afraid of kidnapping
or robbery or extortion, the economy is going to have a great
deal of problems getting on its feet and going. So I would
really like to underline the importance of efforts on security,
especially in terms of our assistance programs.
Returning to the question. Despite the frustrations many of
us have had with dealing with the Iraqi central government,
there really is no way to do an end run around the central
government. I think a number of people have found
municipalities, the local levels, a little more responsive, but
the key focus of our assistance really needs to be on getting
the central government working better.
This can be done through mentoring, improving tendering,
improving contracting. Also we need to have a focus on getting
financial management information systems up and operating
outside of the Ministry of Finance. But the problem, currently,
is Iraq has a very, very centralized government, a centralized
state, and the municipalities and provincial governments really
do not have the power or the decisionmaking authority to make
these, to make decisions in terms of assistance.
Finally, turning to the question of the provincial
reconstruction councils. In some ways, I think this perpetuates
some of the mistakes we have made in the past. Much of our
assistance effort has been focused on having the United States
do it. I know in the United States we have a very can-do
attitude, but in the end the Iraqis are going to have to
reconstruct their government. The focus really should be on
trying to channel as much of our assistance through the Iraqi
Government, make sure that we have effective contracting and
auditing and accounting systems in place so we can actually
help them rid themselves of the corruption and the problems
that they have had in their own operations.
But, unfortunately, when we kind of charge ahead and try to
do things outside, around the government, in many ways we
weaken the legitimacy of the government. Also, we are going to
be out of there some time in the near future. What we really
want to have in place is a government that effectively works.
To the extent that we do focus on the regional and
municipal governments, I think the municipal governments are
the best place to go. They need some assistance in budgeting,
contracting, recordkeeping, and needs assessment and those
types of initiatives can be quite useful. But unfortunately,
they are very dependent on the central government and we need
to get our focus in terms of trying to coordinate between the
regional bodies and the central government by focusing our
efforts there.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Crane follows:]
Prepared Statement of Keith Crane, Senior Economist, RAND Corporation,
Arlington, VA\1\
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today as part
of this important set of hearings on policy options for Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
Option 1--Should the coalition do more to shift additional economic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
development resources and emphasis from Baghdad to the provinces?
What have been the challenges in achieving this aim? Will
strengthening regional and local authorities outside Baghdad speed
delivery of services and broaden the tangible benefits of aid? Are the
recently formed Provincial Reconstruction Councils up and running and
having the desired impact?
Because the Iraqi Government remains highly centralized and because
there is still no constitutional basis for devolving authority,
technical assistance needs to be concentrated on making the core
Ministries of the central government function more efficiently, not on
channeling assistance through provincial and municipal government
institutions that lack the constitutional authority to make and control
expenditure decisions. Major efforts to strengthen regional and local
authorities should wait until the new constitution defines their
authority. The Provincial Reconstruction Councils are up and running.
It is too soon to determine whether they are having the desired impact.
They do suffer because they are a U.S. Government initiative as opposed
to an Iraqi Government institution.
Unless they become part of the Iraqi Government's operations, they
are unlikely to survive the eventual U.S. drawdown.
Helping local governments to better manage their affairs is a
laudable goal. But until the legislative and executive authority of
these institutions is constitutionally defined, governorate and
municipal governments will remain weak. Currently, governorates and
municipalities rely on the central government for virtually all their
revenues. They have little independent expenditure authority. As long
as the Ministries remain the de jure and de facto centers of power,
assistance should be targeted on helping the core Ministries to better
manage their affairs, despite the attractions of focusing on provincial
or municipal authorities with whom it is often easier to work. This
said, the Iraqi Government will be more effective, if more government
functions are decentralized, A modest effort to help improve the
abilities of local governments to operate would be useful.
Building the capacity of Iraqi central government institutions to
run its own affairs, especially to provide security to its citizens, is
the most critical task for U.S. assistance programs. The most important
Ministries on which to focus are: Interior, Defense, Justice, the
Judiciary, Finance, Oil, Electricity, Health, Education, and
Municipalities and Public Works. One of the most important lessons of
the last 2\1/2\ years, a lesson well known by development experts, is
that building electric power generating or water purification plants is
a waste of resources if the host government is unprepared to operate
and manage the facilities or the systems of which they form a part.
This has been the case in Iraq. Within 18 months, IRRF II funds are
likely to be completely spent. Assisting Iraqi Ministries to better
manage their own affairs before assistance funds run out is key to
ensuring that the provision of government services will improve even as
U.S. assistance declines.
Option 2--Should the coalition, in conjunction with the Iraqi
Government, increase resources and emphasis on creating jobs and
demonstrating tangible progress on the ground?
It has been suggested that WPA-type programs for trash cleanup,
local repairs, and the like would let Iraqis see visible progress and
make their daily lives more bearable while putting money into the
pockets of the unemployed. Would this strategy work? Could the
coalition help the prospects for a functioning economy by encouraging
shops and small businesses through microcredit, small grants, loans,
and other programs?
The real problem in Iraq is poverty, not unemployment, as shown by
a recent in-depth study of living conditions in Iraq.\2\ Make-work
schemes are a stopgap measure and are of questionable utility at this
point of time in Iraq. At this juncture, assistance needs to be focused
on improving the environment for economic development. First and
foremost, this means the coalition and the Iraqi Government need to
give first priority to improving security. No economy with the levels
of violence and crime that currently exist in Iraq can sustain rapid
growth. Second, assistance needs to be targeted on improving the
capacity of the Iraqi Government to function effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Iraq Living
Conditions Survey 2004, Volume 1, Baghdad, 2005, at www.undp.org.
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MAKE-WORK SCHEMES
In a long series of opinion polls, high percentages of Iraq's
citizens have consistently stated that their number one concern is
security. Surprisingly, the same polls have consistently shown that
most Iraqis have an optimistic view of their economic future. However,
unless security improves, Iraq will not enjoy sustained growth; with
security and sensible economic policies, Iraqis should enjoy sustained
increases in living standards.
Employment, or the lack thereof, has been a contentious issue in
Iraq. Difficulties in finding work and dissatisfaction with job
opportunities ranks as a chief concern in opinion polls of Iraqis.
Young men looking for work have reportedly been a major source of
insurgents. The ``National Development Strategy 2005-2007'' states that
unemployment is as high as 50 percent.\3\ Other sources cite figures
ranging to 40 percent.\4\
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\3\ The Iraqi Strategic Review Board, Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation, ``National Development Strategy 2005-2007,''
Interministerial Committee on the National Development Strategy,
Baghdad, May 2005, p. 5.
\4\ Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Iraq Index, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, May 9, 2005, p. 24, www.brookings.edu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These estimates of unemployment rates are seriously flawed. The
only two credible estimates based on nationwide surveys have been
conducted by Central Organization for Statistics and Information
Technology of Iraq (COSIT), the Iraqi equivalent of a combination of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
One set of estimates based on COSIT definitions estimates that
unemployment rose from 16.7 percent in 1997 to 28.1 percent in October
2003, dropping to 26.8 percent in 2004.\5\ The other survey, conducted
using the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition of
unemployment, finds that 10.1 percent of the labor force is
unemployed.\6\ The ILO definition, accepted internationally, best
captures actual economic activity of households. It defines
unemployment on the basis of whether one has worked in the week prior
to the survey; other surveys often ask the interviewee whether they
consider themselves unemployed, not whether they have worked. Because
individuals employed outside their chosen profession frequently respond
that they are unemployed, even though they work in some other capacity,
unemployment rates are often exaggerated in surveys that do not focus
on whether the respondent worked recently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology,
``Report of the Employment and Unemployment Survey Results 2003 Year,''
January 2004, p. 15; The Iraqi Strategic Review Board, Ministry of
Planning and Development Cooperation, May 2005, p. 27.
\6\ Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Iraq Living
Conditions Survey 2004, Volume 1, Baghdad, 2005, p. 104, at
www.undp.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other data support this view of an economically active, albeit poor
male citizenry. Labor force participation ratios, the share of the
population in the workforce, are similar in Iraq to other countries in
Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Ratios for men
between the ages of 15 and 65 run 69 percent; those for women are much
lower, at 13 percent. The private sector is the largest employer. Most
people who work in the private sector are self-employed. They either
operate their own businesses or work as day laborers. Detailed studies
by anthropologists of street vendors, subsistence farmers, and day
laborers, common occupations in Iraq, find that these individuals spend
considerable time working each day. They do not receive a monthly
paycheck from an employer; their incomes depend on demand for their
services. This state of affairs is not unusual in other countries. In
the United States, a large number of people run small businesses,
farms, drive trucks, or work in construction. Their incomes depend on
the profitability of their businesses or what jobs they have lined up.
However, in Iraq, productivity and hence incomes are low. In contrast,
U.S. citizens work in an economy in which they are highly productive,
generating much greater incomes.
The Iraqi Government is also a major employer (Figure 1). In poorly
monitored Ministries, some workers treat their government salary as a
stipend and spend most of their energy pursuing private activities
after, or during, work or using their positions to seek bribes. In many
cases, Iraqi Government workers supplement their incomes by working in
the private sector as well. For example, many Iraqi doctors work in the
public health care system, but also take private patients.
I make these distinctions not to minimize Iraqi complaints or
perceptions of unemployment, but so as to focus on the real problem,
which is poverty, not the absence of economic activity. Because self-
employment is often poorly paid in Iraq, when alternative, better-paid
employment is available, self-employed individuals quickly take them.
This is why participation in make-work schemes has been high.
In some instances, make-work schemes can ease social pressures by
taking demobilized soldiers off the streets. However, in general the
creation of short-term jobs in an attempt to placate the local
population, partly in response to the perceptions of high unemployment,
can be a problematic use of assistance. Make-work schemes, if done
poorly, can and often do result in a reduction in average real incomes,
in other words by wasting tax revenues on work that does not add value
to the society, the schemes make the country and its citizens poorer,
not wealthier. Poorly run programs can teach bad work habits, as well
as good. Make-work jobs may teach people that advancement results from
connections or putting in time, not hard work, and can discourage
initiative. Furthermore, if the jobs are truly short-term, the programs
can breed more ill will than gratitude, as recent hires find themselves
laid off once the program expires. There is substantial anecdotal
evidence to show that make-work programs employ insurgents without much
effect on political views. In some instances, insurgents have
participated in make-work schemes during the day, then fought the
coalition at night.
Some short-term projects can contribute to private business
development. Road rehabilitation programs can generate economic rates
of return averaging 20 to 30 percent by reducing transport costs. They
can be undertaken by local businesses and involve local resources
(gravel, bitumen, labor). Issuing contracts for small private companies
is a good use of funds and teaches good habits. The contractor, if
subject to adequate oversight, learns to bid, to manage his business,
and to keep his workers happy and working. The contractor's emphasis on
making the contract profitable results in appropriate motivations for
his workers. Moreover, entry into these businesses is usually easy. The
more entrepreneurial workers learn from their employers and then start
their own businesses, using their current employer as an example of
what can be done.
TARGETED LENDING AND MICROLOANS
The key economic policy task in Iraq is to create an economic
environment conducive to private sector activity. Successful
development needs a favorable economic environment (low inflation, a
sound financial system, a legal and commercial framework conducive to
business, etc.); the use of markets to allocate goods, services, labor,
and capital; security for persons and property; low transactions costs
(the ability to travel, communicate, and transport goods easily and
cheaply); and the human and physical capital to take advantage of these
conditions.
Improving the operation of Iraq's financial system would be an
important contribution to financial stability and growth. The current
system is underdeveloped: Financial assets as a share of GDP are
minuscule; financial services contributed only 1.0 percent to GDP in
2000 and no more in 2003. Banks have a very weak capital base. Bank
employees, state and private, lack training in assessing credit risk.
In other transition and developing countries, banking systems like
Iraq's, characterized by a few large state-owned banks and a smattering
of small, private banks, have become timebombs. Because of political
pressures to lend and the inability to properly evaluate credit risk,
the banking system tends to make bad lending decisions at this point in
the recovery. When these loans go bad 3 to 4 years down the road, the
banking system implodes; the government has to bail out the system at
great cost while the economy goes into recession.
CPA rightly focused on improving the banking system through
training, restructuring, and encouraging foreign investment in the
industry. All three initiatives, especially foreign investment, have
been highly successful in other developing and transition economies.
Building trust in financial transactions is a key part of this process:
Central Bank of Iraq oversight of the banking system will contribute
heavily in this regard. Creating a proper regulatory environment and
facilitating the development of banking services should result in
improvements in the speed and reductions in the costs of financial
transactions, increasing financial intermediation as a share of GDP and
improving capital allocation. These changes could add 3 to 4 percent to
long-term GDP as the share of financial services in GDP moves to levels
more typical of medium-income developing countries.
Other financial sector policy initiatives need to be pursued with
care. In a number of countries, small-scale microcredit programs have
been successful in giving poor households an economic start, but
programs rarely cover costs because making and collecting payments on
small loans is so expensive. These programs are difficult to expand
quickly. Successful microcredit programs entail a great deal of hands-
on work within communities. Quality, not quantity, is key to the
success of microlending programs as it is with many other assistance
programs.
Directed lending to small- and medium-sized businesses has had a
mixed track record in developing countries. Default rates, especially
early in the transition, are often high and bad loans have contributed
to banking collapses and recessions. As shown by the high degree of
liquidity in Iraqi banks, small businesses are currently financing
investment through retained earnings. Later in the recovery, banks will
begin to provide loans to small business as their ability to judge
creditworthiness and evaluate projects improves. However, with growth
in GDP of an estimated 51.7 percent in 2004 and a projected 16.7
percent in 2005, there are no signs that the small business sector is
severely constrained by the lack of credit at this point in time.
No transition economy has successfully developed mortgage lending
in the early years because of high rates of inflation, the high level
of economic uncertainty, the absence of information on personal
creditworthiness, the large numbers of people without steady incomes,
and the lack of objective assessments of the value of buildings.
Assistance in setting up titling offices and systems, collecting
information on property sales, removing regulatory and tax
disincentives to property sales, and preparing legal changes to make
foreclosure easier would prepare the groundwork for the development of
a national mortgage industry; but in my view subsidized mortgages has
been a poor use of assistance elsewhere. Housing is relatively
expensive everywhere in the world; as a consequence, to reach a
substantial number of people, mortgage subsidies are very expensive. If
programs are kept small, they reach modest numbers of people.
CERP FUNDS
A substantial amount of assistance in Iraq has consisted of smaller
grants provided to local communities from Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP) funds. This program has been very popular with
commanders, as it is perceived as providing quick results that are
readily apparent to local populations. Despite their popularity and the
very substantial sums of money recently provided to commanders through
CERP, it is not clear how useful these expenditures are in terms of
fostering sustained growth, permanent employment, or even in
counterinsurgency efforts.
A number of analysts have argued that in the aftermath of a
conflict, highly visible, quick impact projects are important to sway
popular support for the new regime. If this was the case in Iraq, the
opportunity has been lost. Coalition forces have been in the country
for nigh on 2\1/2\ years. In many parts of the country, popular
opinions about the coalition have coalesced around one view or another.
For example, it is not clear whether a highly visible U.S. program of
rebuilding Fallujah would have a significant impact on perceptions of
the United States in that city.
There is a case for the use of grants for small short-term targeted
projects as part of an effective counterinsurgency effort. In the case
of Iraq, the use of short-term targeted expenditures on neighborhood or
town projects coordinated with other counterinsurgency efforts have
received high marks in Baghdad and the north. On the other hand,
commanders have sometimes focused on construction projects that, once
completed, have not been effectively utilized by the community or have
been targeted for destruction by insurgents because of their U.S.
origin. Commanders have been confronted with pressure to give
construction contracts to politically powerful individuals rather than
the lowest bidder; a practice that would help perpetuate a culture of
corruption in Iraq. In short, with CERP funds less may be more in a
number of instances.
Option 3--Should the coatition put more emphasis on overcoming the
twin curses of the oil sector: Corruption and sabotage?
Can the coalition work with the Iraqi Ministries to develop and
fund a full scope program to enhance security of the oil production and
distribution infrastructure and combat corruption in the Iraqi oil
industry? Should the coalition and the Iraqis develop emergency
pipeline repair teams, work with local tribes to protect pipelines, and
offer incentives or rewards for those who turn in corrupt oil industry
personnel? Within the oil sector, where is the corruption problem
greatest? Would oil resources be more productively used for the benefit
of the Iraqi people if they were managed regionally, instead of by the
central government?
Corruption in Iraq is primarily a problem of opportunity. If the
opportunities disappear, corruption will decline. Thus policies need to
be focused on reducing or eliminating opportunities for graft and
corruption. The largest source of corruption in Iraq is the theft and
diversion of gasoline and diesel fuel by government officials. Although
the scale of this activity is impossible to measure accurately, one
contractor reportedly stated that a third of imports of gasoline and
diesel fuel ``disappear.'' These will run on the order of $2 billion in
2005, roughly a tenth of Iraqi GDP. Eliminating this opportunity by
liberalizing gasoline and diesel prices is the single most important
economic policy change needed in Iraq today. The second most severe
source of corruption by value is government contracting. Working with
the Iraqi Government to create transparent, simple accounting and
competitive contracting systems, is a very important economic policy
measure for reducing corruption. Transparent, simple accounting
systems, coupled with ``whistle-blower'' protections and severe
sanctions, are important for combating the third most important source
of corruption by value: Garnishing wages by more senior civil servants.
It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of liberalizing
gasoline and diesel fuel prices for the health of the Iraqi polity and
economy. Currently, gasoline and diesel fuel are sold at about a nickel
a gallon; smuggled into neighboring Turkey, they can be resold for more
than $5 a gallon. Confronted with these nonsensical differences in
prices, no society is immune from corruption. It is pervasive in the
downstream activities of the Ministry of Oil. The severity of
corruption is revealed in the lengths to which those involved are
willing to go in order to preserve their access to state resources. The
last two executives in charge of refining and product distribution were
reportedly shot by organizations involved in stealing fuel, not
insurgents. The first executive was wounded; the second was killed.
These people were not victims of the insurgency, but of corruption.
The economic costs of fuel subsidies form the single greatest
economic problem facing the Iraqi economy. Controlled fuel prices are a
particularly pernicious form of subsidization. In the case of Iraq, the
IMF estimates that fuel price subsidies cost the country $7 billion in
2004, a third of GDP.\7\ Of this, $2 billion was in hard cold cash used
to import gasoline and diesel fuel from its neighbors (some of which
was immediately resold to them at knockdown prices). The rest is the
loss to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance from foregone revenues. With a
budget deficit equal to 43 percent of GDP in 2004 and an estimated 28
percent of GDP in 2005, the Iraqi Government cannot afford to squander
its resources this way; at a minimum, U.S. policies should not support
this waste.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ International Monetary Fund, Iraq: Use of Fund Resources--
Request for Immediate Post-Conflict Assistance, Washington, DC,
September 24, 2004, pp. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These subsidies do little to alleviate poverty. Economists at the
Coalition Provisional Authority estimated that less than one-fifth of
the subsidy goes toward liquid petroleum gas and kerosene, the two
fuels of most important to poor households. The rest subsidizes
truckers, many of them foreign, or car owners, few of whom fall into
the bottom of the income distribution.
Subsidized fuel has created a host of economic and security
problems. Because fuel is cheap, consumption is far higher than if
Iraqis paid the true value of the fuel. The Iraqi Government is unable
to satisfy this excess demand, so motorists find gasoline and diesel
fuel in short supply and queue. Queuing wastes the time of drivers and
truckers and creates hordes of irate motorists; witness Basra and
Phoenix in the summer of 2003.
Unless refined oil product prices are liberalized, Iraq will always
be beset by corruption. Although not a politically popular move, the
alternative is worse. In the case of Iraq, one would be hard pressed to
prove that the security situation would be worse following price
increases than it has been over the past several months. Which is more
of a threat to Iraqi security today: Day in and day out, three-mile
lines of irate motorists waiting 24 hours in 120 degree weather to fill
their tanks? Or complaints by foreign truckers and potential blockades
by taxi drivers from protests in the immediate aftermath of a price
increase? Price increases are not politically popular, but neither are
shortages and lines. Moreover, price liberalization provides a solution
to lack of supplies by unleashing market forces. Price controls
exacerbate the problems.
There are better and worse ways of raising prices. Despite their
unpopularity, controlled prices have been raised hundreds of times
around the world. Governments that lay out a strategy for increases,
discuss impending increases well in advance, explain where the
additional revenues will flow, and then provide concrete evidence of
how the price increases have improved supply or made additional public
expenditures feasible generally have emerged unshaken, although less
popular. Weak, politically unpopular governments that make surprise
increases in prices in periods of economic decline after promising not
to raise prices are prone to face riots.
Sabotage in the oil industry stems from a variety of sources and
motives. Iraqis tap product pipelines (gasoline and diesel fuel) to
steal fuel for resale. Some tribes sabotage crude pipelines so as to
blackmail the government into paying them not to damage the
infrastructure, and insurgents attack the pipelines to reduce
government revenues.
The provision of security for the oil industry is the
responsibility of the Ministry of Oil and the security Ministries.
Because of the distorted pricing system and highly centralized way in
which oil revenues are channeled in Iraq, the national oil company,
which is overseen by the Ministry of Oil, has few financial incentives
to guard the oil infrastructure effectively. Because all export
revenues go directly to the Ministry of Finance, the oil company relies
on budget support for its operations. Managers do not suffer from
pipeline breakdowns nor benefit greatly from preventing sabotage. This
state of affairs calls for change. The most successful state-owned oil
companies around the world are operated as independent, profit-
maximizing companies. Management, supervised by an independent board of
directors appointed by the state, is rewarded for pursuing profits and
penalized for losses. Products are priced by markets. In this
environment the state-owned company has financial and governmental
incentives to combat sabotage and theft and takes measures accordingly.
Option 4--Should the coatition and the Iraqi Government create a
reliable set of indicators of when and where economic progress has been
made?
If the coalition or the Iraqi Government published regular updates
on such figures as hours of electricity generated per day, gallons of
fresh water supplied, number of beds in working hospitals, children in
school, economic activity, oil production, unemployment, incidents of
violence and the like for various regions and cities, could this
successfully demonstrate progress to the Iraqis and the Americans and
also point to areas where more effort is needed? Which would be most
useful? Could such statistics be created free from political influence
and would they be seen as credible?
The Iraqi Government should focus on improving the timeliness and
accuracy of those statistics currently collected and ensure that they
are disseminated as broadly and quickly as possible. The coalition may
contribute to this effort with technical assistance to the Central
Organization of Statistics and Information Technology under the
Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. However, it is
generally counterproductive for the coalition to collect and
disseminate its own statistics outside of Iraqi institutions. The
coalition needs to help Iraq set up systems to collect and disseminate
information after the coalition has left the country, not to create an
autonomous system of statistical collection of dubious validity for
current operations.
The collection and dissemination of timely, accurate statistics is
a government function throughout the world. Iraq is no exception. The
Iraqi Government and Iraqi citizens and businessmen need reliable
statistics to run their affairs efficiently and make considered
decisions, The Iraqi Government has a large statistical office, COSIT,
headed by individuals with graduate training in statistics from
reputable foreign universities. Under Saddam, the office regularly
published statistics on inflation within 10 days of the end of the
month, a very credible record. More recently, the office undertook a
massive, methodologically rigorous survey of living conditions in Iraq
with funding from the Kingdom of Norway and with the assistance of UNDP
and the Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies.\8\ The work
provides the only credible recent information on living conditions in
Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Iraq Living
Conditions Survey 2004, Volume 1, Baghdad, 2005, at www.undp.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although COSIT has shown it can generate accurate, reliable
information in a timely manner, the organization currently faces
incentives to hoard or delay the release of information. The provision
of bonuses and financial penalties coupled with performance audits
would likely serve to greatly improve the quantity, quality, and
timeliness of statistics collected by COSIT. These national statistics
would entail collecting many of the regional and municipal statistics
cited above, which could also be disseminated to help assess changes in
conditions by governorate or municipality.
In most instances, COSIT, in conjunction with other Iraqi
Ministries, should be able to collect standard statistical information
on its own. However, in two instances, numbers of violent Iraqi deaths
(including insurgents, security forces, and noncombatants) and numbers
of attacks, the coalition could assist the statistical agency in its
work. These two indicators, deaths and attacks, are the most important
for tracking trends in security in the country. They are probably the
two most important pieces of information for the Iraqi public to make
judgments on how security in the country is evolving.
In my view, a number of the economic indicators on which the U.S.
Government has focused would not sway public opinion and have not been
useful for evaluating economic or political progress in Iraq. In some
instances, these indicators have had counterproductive effects. For
example, the focus on spending assistance quickly has contributed to
waste without any noticeable effect on Iraqi public opinion. To focus
on jobs created by infrastructure projects does not make sense in the
context of a strategy of trying to improve public services through
capital-intensive investments, The mixture of inputs, outputs, and
outcomes in current reporting at times serves to obfuscate more than
clarify.
Congress should think carefully about its own demands for
statistics and evaluation. In many instances, the perfect becomes the
enemy of the good. A number of colleagues who work in the government
have been requested to provide evidence of program effectiveness that
is not possible under any conditions, let alone in a war-torn economy
like Iraq's. It is impossible in any society to definitively link
refurbishment of schools to academic progress. Instead of requesting,
for example, numbers of jobs generated by construction programs,
Congress would be better served if it requested detailed strategies of
how particular assistance programs are to help the Iraqi Government
improve its abilities to create a basis for sustained economic growth
in the country.
Opinion polling suggests that, unsurprisingly, Iraqis feel they
have a pretty good handle on their own economic situation. They have
much more difficulty in assessing the security situation. They also
have suspicions about U.S. strategies and exaggerated expectations of
what U.S. assistance will do. More important than providing a steady
stream of data on electric power output, number of projects, or dollars
spent, the U.S. Government needs to repeatedly send the following
messages: The U.S. Government is in Iraq to help the Iraqi Government
get on its feet and will then leave. It does not seek to remain in Iraq
permanently. Two, the reconstruction of Iraq is the responsibility of
the Iraqi people. The United States has attempted to provide a leg up,
but Iraq, not the United States, will operate and pay for electric
power, water, and other utilities. The sooner Iraq moves to restructure
the Ministries and companies involved and to bill and collect payment
for services rendered, the quicker Iraqis will have reliable water and
electric power.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Crane.
Mr. Barton.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK D. BARTON, SENIOR ADVISOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Barton. Good morning. Senator Lugar, thank you for the
invitation. Senator Dodd, Senator Murkowski, it is good to be
here with you.
As you might remember, we first appeared before you in the
summer of 2003 when we were back from the first independent
review of the reconstruction that we conducted for Secretary
Rumsfeld. At that time we spoke of a closing window of
opportunity. Well, today, we have a tighter, tougher situation,
with many fewer opportunities because of the choices made and
the opportunities missed and the fear of many violent attacks.
But what we must have is an economic strategy that is at
its core an anti-insurgency strategy. Daily life will only
improve if people believe that the entire enterprise is moving
in the right direction. We cannot just hope for the best. We
have to expand opportunities and hope that they will contribute
to Iraq's safety.
We must, I believe, present an alternative vision that
reaches directly to the people, provides them with dramatic and
positive changes in their lives, makes it clear that they are
in charge of their futures, not the United States, not Baghdad,
and certainly not the insurgents.
This is not a time for creeping incrementalism or for
tradition. Opportunities are few and the new direction must be
clear and communicated, massively communicated. The core idea
is to put the Iraqi people first. Every program and every
approach, every expenditure, needs to ask: Are we maximizing
the engagement and the ownership of individual Iraqis; are we
giving them more opportunities to take charge of their futures?
Few initiatives up to now have made this their central
organizing principle. Today there is not only no choice, but
this is also the wisest way to go. This does not mean throwing
money at people. It does mean cutting out the middlemen, be
they in Kuwait or in the central government or in large
contracts. It does mean increasing the velocity of money
movement, putting the people on the side of increased oil
production, and staying focused on what matters.
These ideas will be popular with Iraqis. Our earlier
studies and measures of citizens in Iraq, including ``Progress
or Peril,'' suggested that. These ideas are also consistent
with the American political tradition of the right and the
left, ``of the people, by the people, and for the people,'' and
also of our pragmatism, because this is the wisest course at
this time.
These ideas are also counterinsurgent and counter-Iraq's
past, where control, inside deals, intimidation, favoritism,
and cronyism ran the show. This is an approach that
acknowledges that the wisdom of the crowd, or people power, is
preferable at a time of near-chaos, untested and unprepared
political leadership with too full of an agenda, living with
the overhang of a command economy in a difficult region.
There will be resistance. Iraq's developing elites are
waiting for their turn. Our government will hide behind
``obligated funds,'' ``past practices,'' and the Iraqi
sovereignty when it is convenient. Insurgents will see the
radical challenge this presents. Former Ba'thists will
recognize that life will not return to the status quo ante.
Only Iraq's people will favor these notions. There is a
greater advantage beyond capturing the public imagination.
These ideas can be implemented. In the 25 post-conflict
situations that I have been in, central governments without
insurgencies cannot deliver services. The mere act of
organizing takes almost all of their time. We have seen,
through the global transfer of remittances, that money can move
from an uneducated immigrant, across the world to a relative in
the most rural part of Haiti or Afghanistan. We have also seen
traditional State-owned enterprises, including in Senator
Murkowski's State, offer--give stock to all the citizens of a
State or a country. We have also seen commodity distributions
replaced by buying power. The examples abound.
So putting people first also has a further charm. It is the
best available way to provide us with more options and moves
just at the moment that the Iraq chessboard is looking more
like a stalemate. As a guiding vision, putting people first
provides us with the choices in every area--politics, security,
as well as economics and social well-being.
At the heart of the economic strategy is to get people more
engaged, with greater ownership, and to expand the centers of
activity. Swarm theory and distributed networks is now the best
way to move ahead. The United States should make it clear we
favor these approaches. We want Iraq's Government to set aside
any recidivist intentions to return to state-centered control,
and that we have confidence in the wisdom of Iraq's crowd: Its
people.
On option one, I would like to just focus on one example:
Cut out the middlemen. The best foreign aid many of us have
seen is when the United States is fighting a war in your
neighbor's country. Things are going well right now in Kuwait
and in Jordan. Probably it is their glory day, the best
economic times in history. So we have to look and see how much
of that action we can move into Iraq.
I would offer one example that has been studied and shows
promise--Basra. A few miles away, there is a ton of action in
Kuwait and there is almost nothing going on in Basra. We have a
rather modern airport. It will need some improvements and some
are being worked on under a lot of U.S.-funded contracts and
others. But capacity there is zero to 10 percent, less than 10
percent. Some people told me zero percent, but let us say it is
up to 10 percent. It is not being used. There is an airport
that could take planes from all over the world. It sits in the
middle of the desert. It can be secured. Things can be
warehoused. A lot of action that is going on, and that then is
going to be convoyed into the country, is not touching base in
Iraq first.
The same thing with the ports. Our questioning has
suggested that maybe the ports are up to 50-percent capacity at
this point. Use the Iraq ports versus using everybody else in
the region. It is just a first obvious choice.
The same thing with the rails. The rail network needs to be
rebuilt, but it has that same kind of potential. Yes, they will
need management help, but actually we have already done that
fairly well. USAID funded a management contract at Khor az
Zubayr which reportedly produced a $20 million profit after 1
year. So fairly good management, not a concession deal, which
is what the Danes did in Umm-Qasr, but nevertheless real
potential.
To more quickly answer your specific questions, I say
``yes'' to the councils, ``yes'' to thousands of others. We
really need many, many more outlets. We do not have the time to
wait for a government to take shape and be efficient and honest
and all the other things. It is going to have great difficulty
finding, in the next 2 years, if it has not already failed in
some of those areas.
We have got to get Baghdad onto this program at the top,
but not in the implementation. This will do more to cut
corruption, speed economic activity, and engage the Iraqi
people than most of what has been done up to now.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frederick D. Barton, Senior Advisor,
International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC
Thank you Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, your Senate colleagues and
staff. It is a pleasure to be with you again.
The task before us in Iraq has never been an easy one. Renewing
Iraq's economy after decades of Saddam's totalitarian rule would have
been a challenge even in the most peaceful of conditions. With the
insurgency, it has proven near impossible.
The security, political, and economic situations in Iraq today must
be seen as part of an integrated whole. Improving Iraq's economy will
not drive success by itself, but it is essential to making progress.
Fewer choices remain today because of missed opportunities.
Any successful strategy will reach well beyond Baghdad to empower
local governing councils, independent authorities, and individuals.
When you get to this stage of reconstruction, it is imperative to pick
winners and to give them the means to succeed.
PUTTING THE IRAQI PEOPLE FIRST
My belief is that the status quo, or even the status quo executed
more efficiently, will not achieve the desired results this
administration and its Iraqi partners are looking for.
Iraq requires a dramatic shift in the way we do business. We need
to put the Iraqi people first, and we need to operate in a more
creative, entrepreneurial, and agile way. We cannot hunker down in the
green zone and expect results. Nor can we expect that the Iraqi central
goverment will be able to deliver.
What does it mean to put the Iraqi people first, in terms of your
four questions?
Don't count on the central government to find the people.
Get the money moving faster.
Give Iraqis a direct stake in their oil flow.
Create integrated benchmarks that matter.
This shift will not be easy. We will worry about the loss of
control, of oversight, of leverage. We will feel pressure to carry out
our work in traditional ways. The reality is that success in post-
conflict reconstruction depends on more than stamping our name on a
list of projects completed, goods delivered, or elections successfully
run.
Post-conflict reconstruction must not be ideological or utopian or
build off the grandiose concept of ``nation-building.'' Rather, it must
offer a pragmatic view that engages local people and encourages the
expansion of their basic rights and freedoms.
My belief is that employing such a strategy will be as important to
defeating the insurgency as training the Iraqi Army.
Option 1: Don't count on the central government to find the people
Development cannot stall in the central Ministries or stop at
Baghdad's city limits. The key challenge in Iraq today is making sure
reconstruction funds find the people. Some reports have it that 60
percent of the $18 billion in reconstruction funds the United States
pledged to disburse by the end of 2004 have not yet reached Iraqis.
There is a constant tension in post-conflict reconstruction between
meeting immediate interests and needs and building long-term capacity.
We should work to strengthen and support the Iraqi Government, but we
must recognize that not everyone in it will be able to escape static
models of the past or eschew corruption. We must do an end-run around
those who do not share our urgency and principles.
The inefficiencies of the central Ministries are a big part of the
problem in Iraq today. The CPA's overemphasis on the Ministries from
the beginning was unrealistic and poorly executed. The current climate
in Baghdad encourages large-scale corruption. Too little of this money
ever finds its way outside of the capital.
To ensure that reconstruction resources get outside the capital and
into the hands of ordinary Iraqis, we need to pick winners rather than
go through traditional channels, and we need to make sure resources are
distributed in an open and transparent way. Less should be planned
through central Ministries, and more should flow through reliable Iraqi
partners in government and civil society.
One available efficiency is to cut out middlemen and move business
into Iraq. Basra, for instance, could serve as a hub for goods now
moving through Kuwait. Its airport is working at under 10-percent
capacity, and its two ports at less than 50 percent. Transforming Basra
into a hub for Iraq will require a greater investment in both security
and management, but it is possible, and should be tried.
Baghdad's role should be to establish a national economic vision
that captures the public's imagination. This has not happened yet. As I
will detail later in my testimony, I believe this could be centered on
a national wealth-sharing plan for oil revenues.
The insurgency will make getting beyond Baghdad difficult, but the
more that we can channel aid in a decentralized, grassroots fashion,
the more diffused our presence will be throughout Iraqi society, the
greater the number of Iraqis will be involved, and the smaller, more
agile a target we will provide to those wishing to do us harm.
Option 2: Get the money moving, faster
Creating jobs is an important element of post-conflict
reconstruction. Jobs get potential insurgents off the streets and put
money into the hands of Iraqi families. My belief, however, is that a
WPA-style jobs program is unlikely to instill Iraqis with any real hope
for the future or stake in the reconstruction effort. Such programs
tend to pay low wages, employ people in menial tasks, and engage them
for only short periods of time. Job creation may serve as a stopgap
measure, but a more far-reaching strategy is needed.
Microcredit, small grants, and loans disbursed on the local level
are a far better option. What we need is to build a network of several
thousand distributors who can help channel money into their communities
where it is needed most. Local governing councils, civil society
organizations, or women's groups that have a presence on the ground
could help to implement these programs. It's been done successfully in
equally tough places as Iraq. The Iraqi Government will not be able to
move these funds fast enough into the communities.
Our own funding methods must be faster and more flexible. Emergency
response funds are a key component of such a strategy, but the U.S.
military must not be the only outlet. Right now the U.S. military
controls 70 percent of the $18 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund. We should broaden the number of local actors who have access to
emergency funds. Programs that can demonstrate an Iraqi contribution
should be prioritized.
One of the largest carryovers of the prewar period is the food
basket that is provided to all Iraqis. It has been estimated to cost up
to $18 billion per year, and is used for the centralized purchase of
basic commodities, for distribution networks, and for other expenses.
Iraqis would rather have the cash and make their own decisions on how
to use it. Putting the money in their hands would generate more
consumer power, accelerate money flows, and reduce the influence of the
old state-centered model. The direct distribution of cash would also
enhance the banking system and help develop local market competitors,
much like we have seen with remittances.
Option 3: Give Iraqis a direct stake in their oil flow
Iraq's biggest economic asset remains its oil wealth. From the
perspective of the ordinary Iraqi, however, there is little tangible
benefit from oil. Many Iraqis believe the U.S. Government still has
designs on Iraqi oil. Corrupt Iraqi Government officials may also steal
profits before they ever reach Iraqi people. Insurgents sabotage
infrastructure in order to thwart reconstruction progress. Ordinary
Iraqis do not have enough of a stake in the results.
A plan must be designed in cooperation with the Iraqi Government to
use oil revenue to build the long-term capacity of Iraq and to meet the
immediate needs and interests of the Iraqi people. Here is a sketch of
a two-part plan.
The first part is to give Iraqis a direct stake in maximized
production by instituting a wealth-sharing plan where each Iraqi family
receives a certain amount of money in a personal account every year to
spend on health, education, or livelihood. By depositing $500 per
person into bank accounts, we will also capitalize a fledgling banking
industry. The initial cost of such a program would be around $5
billion.
Such a plan could increase incentives for Iraqis to assist their
government and coalition forces in protecting oil infrastructure. It
will require bridge funding, however, since Iraq's oil production is
unlikely to move from 2 million to 4 million barrels per day until 2010
under the best-case scenario. The United States, should consider
contributing to this bridge funding, as it will send a clear signal
that we are seeking to use oil revenues to empower the Iraqi people
rather than benefit from Iraq's wealth.
The second part is to develop a board of overseers comprised of
Iraqi officials, regional and international partners, and Iraqi civil
society that could be charged with directing a portion of oil revenue
to Iraqi public goods and tangible infrastructure projects. Such a
board could solicit ideas from the Iraqi public and put the choice to
referenda.
The positive consequences that would flow from this plan could
ripple across sectors, providing hope not only for Iraqi's economic
well-being but for the security situation and our goals of democratic
governance.
Option 4: Create integrated benchmarks that matter
Our project at MS conducted a survey of Iraq's overall
reconstruction progress in 2004. We offered measurable benchmarks for
success on the basis of government, media, and polling reports, as well
as interviews and focus groups we conducted on the ground. Our findings
showed then, and the same is true now, that economic progress in Iraq
is directly tied to progress on the security front.
Knowing when Iraq has reached the tipping point--when Iraqis have a
legitimate chance to sustain progress on their own--is not an easy
task. Claims of success or failure are often perceived as merely
political spin. But measuring allows decisionmakers to observe trends
during ongoing interventions and to make mid-course corrections that
advance the stabilization process, reduce political and financial
costs, and save lives.
Measuring progress is not merely an exercise to collect a random
assortment of statistics on the numbers of children in school, numbers
of beds in working hospitals, and the like. The danger in this is that
we often count what is easily measurable rather than what matters most.
Measuring must be part of an integrated framework of goals and
indicators.
Iraqis, themselves, must play a role in defining progress and
measuring success. We can work with the Iraqi Government and civil
society to help to articulate this plan and to gather measurements. The
process must be open and transparent to the Iraqi people and the
international community alike. The risk of insurgents targeting key
benchmarks, if the plan is made public, is a red herring. Insurgents
already know what is vital to success and what is not--sometimes better
than we do.
CONCLUSION
A new approach in Iraq should emphasize a decentralized approach
and Iraqi ownership in the process, create long-term employment through
microcredit and small loans, offer a viable plan for oil-wealth sharing
and human capital investment, and a method to reliably measure
progress. In short, trust more in the Iraqi people.
Trusting the Iraqi people has been missing for too long. In January
2005 I argued with two colleagues in the New York Times that we should
let the Iraqis decide our tenure in a referendum that asks if we should
stay or go. Doing so could affirm our commitment to empowering the
Iraqis and steal the thunder from the insurgents. If the majority of
Iraqis vote for us to stay, we have a mandate in Iraq we can use to win
Iraqi hearts and minds. If Iraqis vote for us to go, we will leave
based on the popular will of the Iraqi people--supporting our reason
for being in Iraq in the first place.
It is difficult to imagine broad economic progress in Iraq today
without a greater sense of public safety. Many are pinning their hopes
on processes to build the formal government, from constitution writing
to elections. I believe it is more important to encourage an authentic
Iraqi political voice to emerge, one that will make its people proud
and reassure them that their leaders represent their best interests.
This might be the only true hope to convince Iraqis to come together
and stand up to the insurgency.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Barton.
Mr. Mohamedi.
STATEMENT OF FAREED MOHAMEDI, SENIOR DIRECTOR, COUNTRY
STRATEGIES GROUP, PFC ENERGY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Mohamedi. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for inviting me,
and to the panel, Senators.
I share with my friends here that security is, of course,
of paramount importance, but I feel that the issue of
decentralization is a very sensitive and potentially dangerous
one if it is handled wrongly. Given the fragility of the
central government of Iraq, its bureaucratic disarray, its
financial shortages, and the lack of coercive means to assert
authority around the country, and the centrifugal forces in the
region, in the regions, an overt shift of emphasis and support
by the coalition away from the center would have a very
disruptive effect.
I think this is particularly true in the sector that we
know a little bit about and that is the oil sector. If the oil
sector is allowed to fragment and be taken over by locals, then
you will have local control over those revenues and that will
essentially mean that they do not need to be part of a larger
Iraq. Then you will have something, in our opinion, that took
place in Russia, where the sector effectively fragmented and
people grabbed the assets.
But also, short of that and short of, in a sense, the
political implications of that, on a very practical economic
sense, you break down the operations and operational efficiency
of the infrastructure when you fragment it. I mean, when the
looting took place and the south was cut off from the north, in
terms of power lines, you had a really hard time rebalancing
the system and you lost quite a bit of power in terms of
running that system. So you need to have a coordinated system
from an operational point of view.
But I do think that the coalition can play a very important
role in Iraq in terms of strengthening local delivery and local
institutions that deliver national goods. I think that
coordination is very important. It was, as my colleagues here
have previously said, a very centralized system. I think that
in that sense to build up local capacity to enhance regional
delivery of public goods is very important.
That is all.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mohamedi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fareed Mohamedi, Senior Director, Country
Strategies Group, PFC Energy, Washington DC
option 1
Should the coalition do more to shift additional economic development
resources and emphasis from Baghdad to the provinces?
The issue of decentralization is a sensitive and potentially
dangerous one. Given the fragility of the central government in Iraq--
bureaucratic disarray, financial shortages, and the lack of a coercive
means to assert authority--and the centrifugal forces in the regions,
an overt shift of emphasis and support by the coalition away from the
center could have a disruptive effect at this point. This is
particularly true in terms of the oil sector. Gaining control over
local assets, which are part of a larger integrated whole, and attempts
to then grab the revenue streams from crude oil, gas, and refined
products sales and exports will become the objective of the regional
governments or authorities. Once regional governments gain sufficient
financial independence, a push for greater autonomy and eventually
secession is quite possible.
Short of this eventuality, an uncoordinated investment/development
program, which gives regions priority over a national one, could lead
to greater problems for the economy from an operational point of view.
This, to a certain extent, already happened with the electricity sector
when transmission lines leading from the south were cut off to ensure
that the region had sufficient supplies. In order to rebalance the
national electric power system, the coalition had to rebuild these
lines at great expense. This is one example, but one could see the same
problems in other infrastructure, transport, trade, and services areas.
Without a national system, fragmentation and increased inequality will
impair long-term growth and prevent recovery in the short term.
Will strengthening regional and local authorities outside Baghdad speed
delivery of services and broaden the tangible benefits of aid? Are the
recently formed Provincial Reconstruction Councils up and running and
having a desired impact?
Picking up on the point above, if the objective is long-term peace
and stability in Iraq, then a national development program, which is
produced by a democratic government at the center and administered by a
national and regional bureaucracy, is essential. Beyond enhancing local
security, an essential short-term and long-term goal for the coalition
should be to build up the capacity of both the national and regional
institutions in implementing economic development plans. Here the
Provincial Reconstruction Councils could play a constructive role,
especially if they enhance local capacity to carry out national plans,
provide effective feedback and advise the center on local conditions. A
dual role for national and local institutions in the development
process will ensure national integration, economies of scale, be a
check on local power monopolization and lessen the potential for
corruption. It will also ensure the spread of best practices and reduce
regional disparities.
In this process of enhancing the capacity of both national and
local institutions, the coalition and other aid donors should
coordinate their efforts and play from the same score. An uncoordinated
aid effort would have the same effect on Iraqi long-term development
and short-term recovery as uncoordinated regional economic efforts.
OPTION 2
Should the coalition, in conjunction with the Iraqi Government,
increase resources and emphasis on creating jobs and demonstrating
tangible progress on the ground?
A major increase in short-term funding for jobs programs,
microcredit and small business development is highly advisable,
particularly if it is done through national institutions (in
coordination with regional/local institutions). Moreover, it must be
done on an equitable basis across the country and targeted at the most
needy groups. Emergency response funds distributed by the United States
military have been effective in the absence of national and local
institutions and should be continued and expanded. However, these must
be portrayed for what they are: Short-term relief. Already the Iraqi
State budget provides massive subsidies and income support to the Iraqi
population, which is to some extent crowding out longer term
investment. Short-term relief should not become long-term income
support. That will lead to a sense of entitlement typical of most of
the gulf countries surrounding Iraq.
In the longer term, as a national development program takes off,
contracting practices have to be improved to ensure a larger part of
the reconstruction effort benefits local companies which employ Iraqis.
Local content regulations also have to be implemented to achieve this
objective. It is through local content requirements that the aid used
to rebuild the infrastructure of the country will create backward
linkages into the economy and enhance longer term employment, which the
shorter term work programs and emergency funding get off the ground.
OPTION 3
Should the coalition put more emphasis on overcoming the twin curses of
the oil sector: Corruption and sabotage?
The twin curses of corruption and sabotage could result in further
debilitating the only source of government revenue and, given the size
of government expenditures in the national economy, it is virtually the
largest source of private income as well. In the recent past, and in
the short term, sabotage is the biggest problem the oil sector faces.
It has prevented the use of the Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey and
reduced exports by around 300,000-400,000 b/d from the northern oil
fields. It is a constant threat to oil production and export facilities
in the south. Through attacks on power infrastructure, feeder
pipelines, and refineries themselves, sabotage has reduced the amount
of refined products that can be supplied to the local market and
imposed an additional burden on the treasury because of the need to
import products from a tight regional and global oil/products market.
Corruption has been a lesser problem but theft and misuse of resources
have been contributors to supply disruption and the prevention of
rebuilding the sector. Political interference in the sector, for
reasons of financial gain or control over decisionmaking, has also been
a big problem from time to time and has led to inappropriate personnel
decisions and ultimately to hampering reconstruction efforts.
In the long term, corruption could become a critical factor in the
underdevelopment of the oil sector and the Iraqi Government. In fact,
if oil sector corruption is not prevented, it will undermine the goal
of building a democratic society in Iraqi. Iraq is the last huge oil
frontier. This distinction is magnified by perceptions around the world
that oil reserves are peaking, especially in those countries where
private oil companies have easy access. Therefore, many private
companies and consuming, country governments concerned about the
scarcity of resources will be tempted to offer what ever it takes to
secure resources in such a potentially prolific oil sector. The
situation is equally desperate for the Iraqi political class. The need
for resources, the ambiguity and uncertainty of power dynamics in the
country and the need and temptation to use money to secure power to
fill the vacuum created by the invasion has increased the receptivity
of Iraqi officials to engage in corruption. The combination of factors
makes it more likely than not that the development of the sector and
the country will be distorted by this reality unless enormous efforts
(some which we recommend below) are made to prevent it.
Beyond these two sets of problems, another issue is emerging
rapidly and could severely exacerbate problems in the oil sector and
reduce revenues to the government. Due to sabotage, lack of funds,
disorganization and physical aging of the oil fields, below-the-ground
problems with lraq's oil fields are resulting in a stagnation of crude
oil output and the potential for catastrophic declines in the near
future. The Kirkuk oil field's production capacity has fallen to
600,000 b/d from a prewar level of 700,000 b/d and could, under
conservative estimates, collapse quite sharply to half the current
capacity.
In the south, 12 years of sanctions, combined with a lack of well
workovers to maintain production post-invasion, have taken their toll.
Foreign contractors report high water cuts, clogged well strings, and
declining productivity per well. Iraqis are apparently using handmade
shaped charges for reperforations, there is little, if any, functioning
well instrumentation and there is no current seismic data or reservoir
modeling work (although some foreign companies have attempted to begin
work on the latter). Some wells have responded to recompletion work,
but there is a real need for fracturing and acidizing techniques to be
applied. The Oil Ministry has either been unable to organize such
efforts or has pursued other priorities, and given security concerns in
the relatively benign south, the cost and logistics of bringing in such
large-scale operations may prove insurmountable. The result has been
lower production, higher water cuts, and more lower quality Mishrif Pay
output. According to reports, the quality of Basra light has declined
from 32 API and 1.95 percent sulfur to 31.5 API and 2.7--2.8 percent
sulfur.
As production has declined at the workhorse Rumaila field, the
Southern Oil Company, which is in charge of operations in the south,
has sought to increase production at West Qurnah field to make up the
difference. However, work delays there threaten production. Meanwhile,
the water injection facilities (particularly Garmat Ali) that were
meant to help restore production in Rumaila and elsewhere are running
at only 55-60 percent of prewar capacity, causing further production
and well losses. Bureaucratic impediments have also made it difficult
to procure the chemicals and spare parts needed to operate revamped
facilities.
Even with the current high oil prices, the Iraqi Oil Ministry must
find some way to efficiently spend its capital budget to sustain
production capacity in the one area capable of more or less unhindered
exports. The recent reshuffle of personnel by the Oil Minister Bahr al-
Uloum elevated less-experienced managers at the expense of seasoned
technocrats. This has reduced the effectiveness of what little funds
the government has. The result may be a greater reliance on foreign
expertise. The Iraqi Drilling Company's recent announcement that it is
seeking an international strategic partner should be seen in this
light, and is likely to be a precedent followed by a number of other
Oil Ministry companies.
That said, relying on foreign expertise will necessitate improved
security, even in the south. Security problems have slowed and undone
some of the work already carried out by Western contractors and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers after the invasion, and failing to improve
the situation will hold back Western international oil companies with
the necessary expertise and capital back going forward. However,
coalition military forces are unlikely to protect the foreign oil
workers and their sophisticated equipment, particularly in the south
where U.K. forces are seeking an accelerated handover to Iraqi security
forces. International oil companies, meanwhile, are likely to regard
the cost of providing private security on the scale necessary as
prohibitive, even if they were willing to take the risk with their
personnel. Thus, the subsurface work necessary to prevent declining
production will simply not get done fast enough in the medium term, if
at all.
The oil sector has four critical roles to play in the future
development of the Iraqi economy.
First, it will provide the revenues to support and later
revive what is now, essentially, a failed state. That will buy
Iraq time from a humanitarian and institutional point of view
to get its true economic development process going.
Second, if done correctly with the appropriate local content
regulations, investment by the Iraqi National Oil Company
(INOC) to rebuild capacity to around 3-3.5 million b/d
(preinvasion capacity) and by international oil companies
(IOCs) to build new capacity beyond 3-3.5 million b/d in
conjunction with INOC could massively contribute to the local
economy. Creating strong ties between the oil and nonoil sector
is critical for employment generation, skills development and
in order to retain a greater part of the oil rents at home. Oil
and gas, as an industrial input, could also serve as an
important incentive to invest in Iraq, especially for energy-
intensive industries such as petrochemicals, steel, aluminum,
and copper.
Third, as Iraq seeks external investment to develop its huge
untapped oil reserves, foreign investors in the nonoil sector
will look at developments in the oil sector with great
interest. In the first case, they will view relations between
international oil companies and the government as an indicator
of how they will be treated and what investment conditions
could be like. Moreover, as foreign investment goes in, they
will view this as an expansion of the local market and be
interested in taking advantage of new economic opportunities.
Fourth, the institutional development of the national oil
company into an efficient and dynamic business unit, could set
the pace for corporate development in the economy. Around the
world, national oil companies that have developed talent and
strategic prowess have become the domestic pacesetters and
transferred and spread these skills to other industries. As the
sector develops and matures, the national oil company could
also be the pacesetter in privatization programs. This is a
powerful signal to international capital markets that Iraq
would be open for business.
Putting Iraq on this virtuous cycle of development--oil sector
restoration leads to revenue increases which leads to infrastructure
development and ultimately to the spawning of a self-generating private
sector--will require effective political and institutional
arrangements, security, and international initiatives to reduce
corruption.
For an effective institutional setup, two issues are critical.
First, a political deal has to be struck between the
principal political parties so that an effective oil sector
development model can be chosen. An effective oil sector
development model includes several key ingredients including
high-level political and economic strategy coordination (in
order to answer the question ``what does Iraq want from its
oil/gas sector over time?''), operational autonomy for the NOC
(choosing best practices), transparency in contracting, access
to the best skills from the private sector and democratic
control over oil/gas receipts.
Second, since the oil and gas assets are national assets,
are spread throughout the country and needed for national
development, national government control is essential for
optimal development of the sector. This will ensure national
unity (see above), seamless integration, rational sectoral
operations and enhance optimal long-term development potential.
Breaking the sector apart and managing it regionally will be
disastrous for Iraq as a political entity and lead to
increasing regional divergence, monopolization of revenues by
key groups for parochial purposes and ultimately lead to
greater instability.
The design of the sector will determine the future viability of a
democratic unified Iraq. If the sector is controlled by a few, it will
serve the needs of a few. This was clearly apparent in the Saddam
Hussain regime. Ensuring democratic control should not be mistaken for
operational autonomy. National policies can be set by the central
government in coordination with the regions and then the sector can
follow these policies in the most effective manner. Breaking the
operations up regionally would fracture the sector and possibly lead to
local control which, in turn, would lead to political problems.
Similarly, revenues should not be divided by region. This is the
situation in Nigeria and has led to countless problems of regional
competition for resources. But, as in Nigeria during the 1960s, oil
producing regions should not be neglected to point where the region is
compelled to violently gain control over, its part of the sector.
Today, in Nigeria local groups extort money from private companies
working in their regions. This is also a possibility in Iraq in the
future. So a balance between meeting central and regional needs with
effective democratic controls is essential for the optimal development
of the sector and the political economy of Iraq.
Security is the single biggest impediment to smooth operations of
the Iraqi oil and gas sector and a huge blockage to further
development. For the most part, the national oil company, the Oil
Ministry, and local and national security forces have struggled to keep
the sector operational with mixed success. More effective security in
protecting pipelines, refineries and ports will require more, not less,
support from the coalition forces and a larger presence of the Iraqi
security personnel. A wider political resolution to the internal
conflict will also be critical. At present the expectation in the
sector is that there will be less coalition involvement in security of
infrastructure and that the Iraqi forces will take some time to become
fully effective. Moreover, there are fears that the violence against
the oil and gas sector is moving south so there could be more
disruptions in the larger of the oil producing regions of Iraq. Over
the longer term, no foreign company will be willing to invest in Iraq
without effective security. In fact, the fear is that the presence of
foreign personnel will exacerbate the security situation if a long term
political solution has not been struck.
Preventing corruption is essential for the future development of
the sector and for ensuring the Iraqi people gain the most from their
national patrimony. One effective means of preventing the misuse of the
sector for private or political gain would be to set up effective
constitutional constraints and systems. The coalition could guide the
various Iraqi political parties to ensure the constitutional provisions
meet this requirement. Another effective means of preventing corruption
would be to enlist the help of international companies, multilateral
institutions and governments to come together to set up conventions to
stanch it from the outside. There are a number of international
transparency initiatives which could be subscribed to. However, a
specific initiative, with Iraq in mind, could reduce the competitive
pressures to indulge in corruption and greatly enhance the development
process.
OPTION 4
Should the coalition and the Iraqi Government create a reliable set of
indicators of when and where economic progress has been made?
Improving public information is essential to improve the trust of
the Iraqi people in the new government. However, the most important set
of metrics that the Iraqi people are looking for are reduction in
actual crime and political violence, improvement of physical deliveries
of public services and jobs/income growth. An improvement in all three
of these variables will have a marked improvement on public perceptions
of the new government and its ability to deliver progress.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Mohamedi.
Let us proceed to the second options, and I will ask you to
give the first response after I have restated the options, Mr.
Barton. Should the coalition, in conjunction with the Iraqi
Government, increase resources and emphasis on creating jobs
and demonstrating tangible progress on the ground? It has been
suggested, for example, that a WPA-type program for trash
cleanup, local repairs, and the like would let Iraqis see
visible progress and make their daily lives more bearable,
while putting money into the pockets of the unemployed.
Would this strategy work? Could the coalition help the
prospects for a functioning economy by encouraging shops and
small businesses through microcredits, small grants, loans, and
other programs? Should we increase the amount of emergency
response funds distributed by U.S. military, especially in
areas where the civilian economic and infrastructure is not yet
in place?
Mr. Barton. Senator Lugar, we are doing quite a lot in this
area right now. Some of the estimates we have seen are up to
200,000 people who are receiving some kind of daily job help.
I have real reservations about this as having much promise.
Generally, these jobs are very short term. They last up to 6
weeks, maybe a little longer. They oftentimes are in repetitive
functions that do not really build the capacity there in the
country. They are centrally run, which means that they are slow
to get going. So they have significant disadvantages.
That does not mean that they could not work, but I think
they have to address those inherent weaknesses that are
usually--that usually come with the international model and the
international assistance. So if we make them longer, if we make
them tied to something that has a longer term value, then I
think there is some promise there. But I do not think it is
really anywhere near as attractive an alternative as finding
existing enterprises and helping them grow.
One of the problems in these post-conflict places is that
the currents are very strong. So swimming against the tide is a
difficult task and we are much better off if we can find
anything that is going on and build upon it. As you mentioned
in your comments, the telephone industry has had a fairly good
period. Obviously, the television and the communications
industry in general has been one of investment during this
period of time.
The markets tend to have quite a lot in them. There is a
consumer expansion. The economy, as a whole, is growing by most
estimates, so there are things going on. Finding those things
that are going on and giving them the juice to grow more is a
better way for us to spend our money and I think it will be
faster as well.
So, generally, what we are looking for as we look at the
economy of these places is what is practical. To set up new
structures and new programs when it is hard to get anything
done and you cannot get a public official from one place to
another just does not make a lot of sense.
So that would be the last part of the argument, which is
that we really need to widen the circle of trusted partners. We
have done quite a good job, the new Iraqi Government and the
international community, in identifying and building capacity
in a lot of places. But we are going to have to have more
confidence in their ability to deliver than we have up to now.
Up to now it has been very much of a control model and
generally in post-conflict places you are much better off if
you are a shepherd, if you are just saying, we are going toward
that wall, let us all try to go this way, as opposed to, come
into my corral and I will take you over there. It is just not
going to happen in Iraq right now, and for all the reasons that
you know.
Finally, the foreign responsibility here. I think our
responsibility is to make sure that those funds are distributed
fairly, that we watch for cronyism, we watch for regional
favoritism, we watch for the things that will undermine the
public confidence, which again there are abundant examples of,
and in this kind of a rumor-filled environment they will travel
much farther than they would necessarily in a place where you
have some checks and where people feel that justice might be
possible.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Mohamedi.
Mr. Mohamedi. I do believe that increasing the funding for
jobs programs, microcredit, small business development, are a
good idea. I think they would be done through national
institutions. They should be done on an equitable basis. I
think we should avoid this cronyism and giving the ability of
certain local elites to create new patronage networks.
However, I do not think that--these programs should be
regarded as what they are, that is short-term relief, and not
be left behind as a burden on the government budget. Already
there is a huge subsidy component in the budget, a lot of
relief. So I think that would leave a long-term legacy that we
do not want really to do.
I also think that nothing replaces good job creation and
part of our aid program should start to really focus on
contracting practices that enable local businesses, and
particularly the issue of local content and local businesses
providing to industries like the oil industry and gas industry,
et cetera.
From a longer point of view, a longer term point of view, I
think one issue that should be brought up is the whole issue of
foreign debt. I looked at the IMF figures the other day and,
basically, the debt service for Iraq will be about $10 billion,
which is the amount of the net financial requirements of the
budget, basically, is $10 billion. So if you remove the debt
payment they would not have to borrow.
So it is, in a way, ironic that they will be borrowing $10
billion every year just so their debt situation will stay the
same. So I do not think that is a long-term sustainable
situation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Crane.
Dr. Crane. I concur with both my colleagues about the fact
that make-work schemes are really a stopgap measure and often
are of questionable utility, especially at this point in time.
The real problem in Iraq is not unemployment; it is poverty.
The only good survey of what is taking place in Iraq today,
which was conducted through UNDP, found the unemployment rate
at 10.1 percent by standard international levels. The problem
in Iraq is that people are very--are very low productivity. It
is a country very similar to those in the rest of the Middle
East, where you have normal high male-labor-force
participation, women in many ways excluded from the labor
force, but most of these people work in the informal sector.
They run small shops, they are day laborers. Their income
depends on what they do, much like many other people in the
United States who drive a truck or work construction.
But, in the case of Iraq, the economic environment has been
such that it is very difficult for people to prosper. So the
big focus should not be on creating make-work jobs that, in
many cases, destroy value and saddle the Iraqi Government with
another very large government subsidy, but it is to really
clear the way as much as possible to make it possible for these
small businesses to prosper and grow.
Looking at the question of targeted lending and microloans,
microcredit has been successful in many parts of the world. It
is expensive. There are no microcredit programs, to my
knowledge, that really can fund completely the cost of
collection and making loans. They are often supported by
international financial institutions or donors. Nonetheless,
they are a good way to transfer money.
However, it is often a case of quality as opposed to
quantity. Badly run programs which do not make borrowers adhere
to repaying the debt, that kind of dole-out money without
looking at the different projects, can actually lead to be
counterproductive.
This condition is even more important in terms of targeted
lending to small- and medium-sized businesses. The Iraqi
financial industry is in its infancy. It is very
underdeveloped. What we have seen in other transition economies
is that if there is a big push to make loans without regard to
creditworthiness, to push money through the system at this
point in time, 3 to 4 years down the road Iraq will have a
banking crisis as these loans are not repaid and the economy
will go into recession.
At this point in time, the growth in Iraq is really driven
by these small businesses, sole proprietorships, and they fund
their own development out of their own credit.
Finally, I would like to say a few things about CERP
programs. This is going to be a politically unpopular
statement. They have been very popular with commanders. I think
in small doses they have been quite effective. As I understand
it, currently $3 billion have been allocated to CERP programs.
I could be wrong, but it is a very large sum of money.
Our commanders are busy fighting a war in Iraq. They are
not development specialists. They are not individuals who are
really trained or have the time to look at investments in terms
of water, electric power, sewage. Many commanders have done a
wonderful job there, but this is--in this case, less is
probably more. This is in my view too large of a sum of money
and this money should be really targeted through our other
assistance programs, like USAID or PCO, through the Iraqi
Government. Commanders have other things to do with their time
rather than run development programs.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Crane.
These first two sets of issues, as you all perceived as
witnesses with Senators listening to you, try to address
comments coming to our committee in the past about
centralization as opposed to decentralization. How do you move
it out of Baghdad and should you do so in the first place? As
Dr. Mohamedi has pointed out with regard to the oil wells, you
have a big distribution problem, given the fact that we are
trying to get people to think as Iraqis.
These are issues that keep swirling about. I appreciate
what you have brought to the discussion. Likewise the WPA idea.
We had a crisis in our country back in the thirties. Many
people point out that one way of getting at it is to get some
visible results, to have people out there with money. Yet, at
the same time, as you have pointed out, some of the
consequences of this, including the $10 billion of debt service
of the past, would be a lot of debt service for the future.
So that the visible results, real jobs, real
sustainability, and in the midst of it, the security problems.
So it's all well and good for us to be talking about
decentralization as if this was a normal affair, when all of
you have been on the ground and know that it is not. But I
appreciate that discussion.
Now, let me break before we address the third issue, which
will address the oil business, to recognize the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent
that my comments be placed in the record as if read.
The Chairman. They will be placed in full.
Senator Biden. And by way of explanation, I was down in the
Judiciary Committee guarding the bill I have cosponsored, that
you and Senator Dodd have introduced, the shield law for the
press, and that is why I was not here on time. I am not sure
how good a job I did. The best part was I did not speak at all,
so maybe there is a chance. [Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that it is fair to say that the reconstruction program in
Iraq has been a disaster.
Of the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated at the urgent
request of the President in the fall of 2003, just $7 billion has been
spent.
And well over half of that has been spent either directly on
building Iraqi security forces or on security-related costs for
reconstruction projects.
We have repeatedly missed deadlines for increasing power and oil
production. As temperatures approach 120 degrees, Iraqis still have
only about 8 hours of electricity a day. Almost half don't have regular
access to clean water. And most estimates place unemployment at about
40 to 50 percent.
General Webster, the commander of the Third Infantry Division,
talks about the need to clean up what he calls the ``Green lawns and
Green streets'' of Baghdad. Green is the color of raw sewage as seen
from the air.
For anyone who doesn't think there is a direct correlation between
the living conditions and job prospects for ordinary Iraqis and their
support for the insurgency, spend 5 minutes with any of our military
commanders.
They will tell you that long power outages, reconstruction delays,
factories standing idle, and jobless young men all contribute to the
steady supply of recruits to fill the ranks of the insurgency.
I look forward to hearing the ideas that our witnesses will
present. I believe that we need to do four important things.
First, we must establish realistic goals and make clear what we're
doing to overcome the shortfalls.
For example, the goal was to generate 6,000 megawatts of
electricity in Iraq by last summer. Today, we're at just over 4,000
megawatts. But demand is nearly twice that and we've scaled back our
goal to 5,500 megawatts by December.
The administration said oil would pay for Iraq's recovery. Yet Iraq
is still falling some 750,000 barrels a day short of the target of 3
million per day. At current prices, that's a shortfall of $10 billion a
year.
Second, we must have accurate measures of the delivery of essential
services if we want to know what difference reconstruction is making.
Third, we must focus resources on smaller projects that make an
impact in the lives of ordinary Iraqis.
Most Iraqis are simply looking for an improvement in their standard
of living, not state-of-the-art infrastructure.
A general in Iraq told me that instead of building a tertiary
sewage treatment plant, we should be running PCV pipe from people's
backdoors to the river so they don't walk out their front doors into 3
feet of sewage.
In parallel, we should increase the amount of reconstruction funds
given directly to U.S. military commanders--one of the few success
stories in reconstruction. I've seen for myself the difference these
funds make in giving our commanders a weapon to make Iraqis happier and
our troops safer.
Fourth, we have to develop the capacity of Iraqi Ministries.
This is the third Iraqi Government in less than 2 years, and there
could be a fourth by the end of the year. We know the difficulty of
transitions between administrations every 4 years. Imagine the
challenge in Iraq when the management team of a barely functional
government changes every few months.
We have to help the government deal with rising corruption, which
is badly eroding public confidence.
And we must press our allies to help train Iraqi personnel. The
British have proposed partnering individual countries with a cluster of
Iraqi Ministries. We should follow up on this idea.
There is a direct correlation between Iraqis supporting their
government and children going to school, men and women going to jobs,
sick people having a doctor, families getting the electricity they need
to stay cool, and police protecting citizens from robberies and
kidnapping.
In short, if the economy and reconstruction don't succeed, it's
difficult to imagine the insurgency being defeated.
I look forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. We appreciate your endorsement.
Senator Dodd. Senator Lugar, Senator Murkowski, and Senator
Hagel may make additional comments on that.
The Chairman. That will come later in the hearing.
All right, let us move on to the third set. Should the
coalition put more emphasis on overcoming the twin curses of
the oil sector, namely corruption and sabotage, right now? Can
the coalition work with the Iraqi Ministries to develop and
fund a full-scope program to enhance security of oil production
and distribution infrastructure, and also at the same time
combat corruption in the oil industry?
Should the coalition and the Iraqis develop emergency
pipeline repair teams, work with local tribes to protect
pipelines, offer incentives or rewards for those who turn in
corrupt industry personnel?
Within the oil sector, where is the corruption problem
greatest? Would oil resources be more productively used for the
benefit of the Iraqi people if they were managed regionally
instead of by the central government?
I will ask you to start on this issue, to which you have
given a great deal of thought and scholarship, Mr. Mohamedi.
Mr. Mohamedi. Thank you.
I think that the twin curses of corruption and sabotage are
very much with us and are going to continue to play, at least
in the short to medium term, unless we do something about the
security issue. I mean, that is the primary problem right now;
short-term problem. It has debilitated the pipeline, export
pipeline to Turkey, which has reduced the amount that the
northern fields can produce, and, in fact, cut production by
something like 3 to 400,000 barrels a day.
Attacks on power plants and feeder pipelines, refineries,
all then lead to shortages of product, refined product, which
then adds to the burden on the treasury because you have to
import this product.
The corruption issue has been, to a certain extent, a
lesser but still a very important issue in terms of diversion
of supplies and diversion of products, as you mentioned earlier
on. But I think the corruption issue will be a very critical
factor in the future as the sector is further developed, as
foreign companies come in.
We are at a very pivotal point right now when it comes to
the Iraqi oil sector and in terms of the world oil industry.
You have very few new places to go to for international oil
companies and there is a sense out there, as China comes on the
market, as India comes on the market, that there are going to
be insufficient resources. At this particular critical point of
peak oil and energy insecurity, you have this huge sector
coming on line. So there is enormous potential for graft and
bribery and corruption to take place.
So there is an enormous demand from the outside, and then
on the inside there is an enormous need for money. The two
create the perfect conditions for some pretty rotten stuff.
Beyond this, I would like to say a couple of things on the
short run, that you have got a potential for catastrophic
declines in the northern oil fields because of insufficient
work that has been done by the Ministry and because of the lack
of security the foreign contractors could not get in there and
do some of the work. And you have got aging problems in the
southern fields, which are starting to now push production down
to something like 1.5, 1.8 million barrels a day in the south.
The combination is we are seeing production stagnate at
around under--around 2 million barrels a day or under. And if
there is this catastrophic decline in the north, you could see
production falling in the future, which will really hurt your
revenue streams.
Beyond this and back to the longer term in terms of
structuring the sector, I think that if you do not get the
sector, the sector of the structure right, in my opinion you
will not get the future politics of Iraq right, because if you
have someone capture the sector he will turn it into, he or she
will turn it into a private preserve for themselves and then go
back to the old system of patronage, the old political economy
that was there.
Oil has to be in a sense very much--both the sector and the
revenues from it have to be very democratically controlled.
Having said that, I think it is important not to miss out on
the opportunity to give the sector a certain operational
autonomy. So strategy is controlled by democratic forces,
institutions, but the operations are done by the sector itself.
One last point on the corruption issue. We have thought
that the U.S. Government and others should embark on an
initiative to bring international oil companies, multilateral
institutions, governments together to sign onto an
anticorruption initiative and to create transparency--means to
create transparency, so that you do not have the use of
corruption to access the sector.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Crane.
Dr. Crane. Corruption is primarily a problem of
opportunity. In any society, if you do not have proper controls
or proper incentives, unfortunately, corruption rears its head.
In the case of Iraq, the major largest source of corruption has
to do with controlled prices of gasoline and diesel fuel.
Gasoline and diesel fuel go for a nickel in Iraq. You can walk
across the border and sell it for five bucks a gallon. With
these types of opportunities or incentives facing people,
people obviously become corrupt.
The second largest source of corruption in Iraq has to do
with government contracting. Here again, the question here is
in terms of opportunity. Whenever you have transparency, open
competitive contracting systems, it becomes much more difficult
to engage in corruption.
Finally, a third source of corruption, not as large as the
others, has to do with the employment of ghost workers or
garnishing individuals' wages. When I was in Iraq we had a riot
by police as their commanders attempted to take 25 to 30
percent of their wages.
It is really impossible to overemphasize the importance of
liberalizing gasoline and diesel fuel prices for the health of
the Iraqi polity and economy. It is a question not only of
corruption; it is really of the ability of the economy to grow.
I have followed 40, 50 economies in my life, especially when I
was in the private sector. I have never seen a more distorted
economy than Iraq's and this is fundamentally due to refined
oil product prices.
The cost of these subsidies is extraordinary. They run $7
billion a year. Our entire aid program to Iraq, in the course
of 3 years, is going to be less than is being currently wasted
on subsidies.
These subsidies do nothing, or very little, to alleviate
poverty. Most of the subsidy goes to, in the case of diesel
fuel, industrial manufacturers, people running generators,
Turkish truckers, Kuwaiti truckers. In the case of gasoline,
car ownership in Iraq is heavily concentrated in the upper
income levels. Very few of the bottom income levels in Iraq
could even afford, even think about affording a car. We did
some work at CPA; 80 percent of the $7 billion goes into diesel
and gasoline.
The reluctance to liberalize prices has often been stated
because they see it as a security concern. Although not
politically popular, it is hard for me to see that the security
concern--that security could be worse trying to guard lines of
irate motorists, day in and day out, who wait 24 hours in order
to fill up in 120-degree weather.
We have had a number of instances where prices have been
liberalized. Hundreds of times throughout the world, people,
governments, have had to raise these prices. In fact, when I
was in Baghdad we had a number of Finance Ministers from the
former Soviet Republics in Central and Eastern Europe came in
and said how they did it. It is important to discuss this with
the population, prepare them well in advance, explain where the
additional revenues will flow, and make sure that the public is
well aware, and make sure that every motorist can get his last
cheap tankful of gas before prices go up.
But nonetheless, the government really needs to follow
through with this. It is true that some very weak, very
politically unpopular, dictatorial governments have confronted
riots when they have raised prices. These are in very specific
situations and usually result from surprise increases, in which
case the population has not been forewarned or in which there
had been no public discussion.
Turning briefly to sabotage. Sabotage in the oil industry
is not just a problem of insurgency. Many Iraqis tap product
pipelines for gasoline and diesel to steal fuel for resale. A
number of tribes actually sabotage crude oil pipelines so they
can blackmail the government into paying them to guard the same
pipelines that they have just damaged. And in many cases
insurgents attack the pipelines.
All of these are problems. However, the provision of
security for the oil industry is really a responsibility of the
Ministry of Oil and the security Ministries. Again, I have
never seen such a distorted, inefficient arrangement in terms
of--centralized arrangement in terms of running the oil
industry, as I have in Iraq.
I agree with my colleague, there needs to be a
decentralization of control, incentives for managers in the
national oil company to run their operations correctly. I will
guarantee that, given the correct economic incentives and
decentralization of control, the managers of the national oil
company of Iraq will take a much, much more concerted and much
more focused effort in order to guard their pipelines, guard
their assets, than they currently do, if the government would
try to create a modern, state-owned oil company.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Cramer.
Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. I would like to answer yes to your larger
question: Yes, that we do need to put more emphasis on this,
because this has to work. If the oil does not work in Iraq, it
is really difficult to have much of a discussion about an
economy in Iraq.
But I do think that this is also another issue that needs a
larger galvanizing idea. You have heard from my colleagues the
number of things that have to be done right to get to a point
where we are going to be better off, and to do all those things
in the best of circumstances is extraordinarily unlikely.
So my hope here is that we go for a larger, galvanizing
idea. What I would suggest is that we, obviously, have to get
people--get the people of Iraq on the side of greater
production, so you do not have what was just being described as
tribes holding the government hostage, but maybe the individual
members of the tribe questioning whether that is a good idea.
I do not believe that we should see the fragmenting of
production. But the heart of this is wealth-sharing. That
wealth-sharing argument is going to compound the difficulties
of the constitutional process. It has not been resolved. It has
not been addressed directly, and I would suggest that a good
wealth-sharing model might be one that gives one-third of the
revenues to the central government, one-third of the revenues
to the governants, and one-third of the revenues to the people.
I think it will have a political beauty to it as well as a
practical value of getting most of the public on the side of
increasing production, which is ultimately where our interests
coincide. The United States interests and the interests of the
Iraqi people have to be closely aligned if we are going to see
the value.
If that sounds too rich--and that is one of the arguments
that people will make against this, that, oh, we cannot afford
it, the Iraqi Government cannot afford it, it is impossible,
they can barely make do with what they have right now--I would
suggest that what we might do is we start with a focus, and the
focus could be consistent with this counterinsurgency economic
strategy that I am suggesting, and that is focus on the youth
market, and perhaps just bite off a piece of the population at
large, the 40 percent of people who are under 18, the 10
million or so young people who have been undereducated over the
last 20 years, and set up personal education accounts for them.
It is not hard to do. An example would be $500 per Iraqi
under 18 for education. That would capitalize--that would cost
about $5 billion to set up and on a renewing basis it would be
virtually nothing. That would be--that would also have the
additional benefits--and this is one of the ideas that we
really have to keep in mind, as we are looking at these post-
conflict countries is, whenever you do anything, you have to
make sure that it has two or three benefits, because you do not
have the time to just do one-offs.
What we see in these post-conflict countries is 100
successful projects and somehow one signal failure. That is
exactly what is going on. If you read the reports on all the
successful things that we are doing, the country is going south
and yet all the projects are going north. How does that work?
So, in this particular issue, the beauty of setting up
these kinds of accounts is that you capitalize the banking
system and the financial services, if you can call it that, in
this country at the same time. You essentially provide money
for other economic activities, such as local loans, which again
is something you have to do because it is not going to come
from the center. You are just not going to get--you do not have
the infrastructure or the opportunity with the insurgency to
get out there.
Again, would the international community consider front-
loading such an idea if there is, in fact, a period where we
need until 2010 to get the production, the oil production, up
to the point where it will produce these kinds of assets? I
suspect that would be necessary. I think that is not a big
price to pay in light of what it is costing us per month to be
there right now.
I think it would also give us the opportunity for greater
management oversight and greater transparency, which in the
transition is a pretty good idea and a good place for us to
spend our time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Barton. I know that
idea will form a part of our discussion as members ask
questions.
Let me proceed to our final set of thoughts: Should the
coalition and the Iraqi Government create a reliable set of
indicators of when and where economic progress has been made?
If the coalition or the Iraqi Government publish regular
updates on such figures as hours of electricity generated per
day, gallons of fresh water supplied, numbers of beds in
working hospitals, children in school, economic activity
generally, oil production specifically, unemployment, incidents
of violence for various cities and regions, could this
successfully demonstrate progress to the Iraqis and, likewise,
to Americans who are watching all these areas and wanting to
know how much success is being obtained?
Which figures would be the most useful, and could such
statistics be created free from political influence and would
they be seen as credible?
Dr. Crane, would you have a go at that?
Dr. Crane. Statistics are important, obviously, and, in
fact, the collection and dissemination of timely, accurate
statistics is a government function throughout the world. Iraq
is no exception. However, I think, sometimes in the past 2
years that we have neglected the fact that we have, again,
attempted to do an end run around the proper collection of
statistics.
Iraq has a very large statistical office. It is called
COSIT, or the Central Organization for Statistics and
Information Technology. The directors have graduate degrees in
statistics. Unfortunately, they have not had proper incentives
over the past 2 years to really issue those statistics and
collect statistics in a rapid, timely manner. They have, in
some sense, seen it more in their interest to withhold
information, to delay the release of information, than to
provide it quickly and accurately.
Consequently, our real focus there is not for us to go
ahead and try to create our own statistical collection
techniques outside of the Iraqi Government, because we are
going to leave some day. What we need to do is, again, focus on
creating incentives within the bureaucracy, through bonuses and
financial penalties coupled with performance audits, to improve
the quality, quantity, and timeliness of the statistics
collected by COSIT.
If any of your staff have an opportunity to look at this
new study that came out by UNDP, it is really quite amazing
what they have done, and COSIT did this study. They, of course,
were paid by outsiders in order to do it, but it is the only
good view of what the economic and living standards are in Iraq
today.
In my view, a number of the economic indicators, on which
the United States Government has focused, would not sway public
opinion and are really not very helpful for evaluating economic
and political progress in Iraq. In some instances, I think the
indicators have had counterproductive effects.
I think, for example, the focus on spending assistance
quickly has contributed to waste without any noticeable effect
on Iraqi public opinion. I remember when the supplemental was
passed I kind of hit my head and said the size of this
supplemental is equal to the total GDP of Iraq. If you could
imagine pumping $11 trillion into the U.S. economy in 1 year
and then withdrawing that the next year, the economic
dislocations are extraordinary. So many times slower is better.
I also note the focus on the jobs created by infrastructure
projects really does not make a lot of sense. The
infrastructure projects are designed to create, to provide
electricity, water. They are really not designed to make work
for short-term job gains.
I also think, sometimes, Congress should think carefully
about its own demands for statistics and evaluations. Some of
my colleagues in the government have been requested to attempt
to link things like refurbishment of schools with decline in
what is happening in the insurgency or increases in education.
You cannot do that in any country. There just is not the type
of linkages between having a painted wall and how children
perform in school.
I think what is important, what Congress could really do,
is request much more detailed strategies of how particular
assistance programs are going to help the Iraqi Government
improve its abilities. This is one thing I still find sadly
lacking in terms of our own assistance programs. What is it
that we are trying to do? What is the strategy?
Maybe, unsurprisingly, I think opinion polls find that the
Iraqis have a pretty good handle on their own economic
situation. In fact, it is the one area in which Iraqis are
fairly optimistic.
Where the message is not getting through is not in terms of
how many megawatt hours of electricity are being generated each
month or oil production or oil exports. The messages not
getting through to Iraqis are twofold: One, that the United
States Government is in Iraq to help the Iraqi Government get
on its feet and will then leave. It is surprising the number of
Iraqis think that we want to be there permanently. This is much
more important than any of this economic information.
Second, a message, that I think we have downplayed but
really need to get through, is that the reconstruction of Iraq
is the responsibility of the Iraqi people. It is not our
country, it is their country. We are going to give them a leg
up to get going, but the United States is not going to operate
and pay for electric power, water, and utilities going forward.
The Iraqis are going to have to pay for those services
themselves, and I think the sooner that we make this clear in
our own assistance programs I think the better off we will all
be.
The Chairman. Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you. I certainly want to second much of
what Keith said and will not repeat that.
We spent quite a lot of time on measuring progress. We
produced a report last year and a followup that was called
``Progress or Peril'' and it tried to develop a more integrated
model, because we realized that the way people live their lives
is not based on one indicator or even a handful of indicators.
It tends to be a series of indicators across security, economic
and social well-being, justice and reconciliation, and
participation, political participation.
We found that we could also do some of the work that Keith
was describing by hiring local Iraqis and we did, in fact, do
our survey by hiring seven Iraqis to travel around the country,
because we knew we could not. We could not even get the
Canadian diplomat, who we had engaged to train the Iraqis, into
the country for several weeks and finally had to do it up in
the north.
But when they did get out and spoke to several hundred of
their fellow countrymen, they found that there was a surprising
level of optimism, based on Iraqis knowing that they had some
wealth and the fact that they were looking ahead. I doubt that
if we went there today, that we would see quite the same sort
of feeling.
But, nevertheless, measuring progress we believe is
absolutely critical. It is not done in most of these post-
conflict settings. If we went in today to Haiti, for example,
people would wonder where on the track we are. We always seem
to be running around in circles and people say, have we not
done this before? And there is an awful lot about Iraq that is
taking that form and shape as well, right now.
So the advantage of measuring progress is, at the very
least, you have a baseline. So if you know where you started
and you are going in the right direction, then you can see
whether you are making progress. Right now what we have is a
series of measurements that say how much we have spent, how
many projects we have completed, and those are basically inputs
and outputs and they have very little to say about impact or
whether people--the outcome of this spending or these efforts
really matter. So we would emphasize those particular elements
of any measure of progress.
On the second part of this, which is sort of what to do
with the information, we found in Iraq that the people are very
hungry for information. They are starved for information. They
have come out of a period where virtually nothing was
trustworthy. What could you believe? So, consequently, seeing
tends to be believing.
But it is also a marketplace where they are hungry
consumers and so we have to increase the kinds of information,
the channels of information. It gets back to something we spoke
about here 2 years ago, which is how could we go into a
communications situation like this and set up one television
network, when we should have said, how about 27 television
networks? Why would we only have one $50 million contract to
one operator that had never done it before, when there is a
huge country and a huge need and for $500 million we could have
been the tidal wave of Iraqi information?
We missed that option. Still have to do that. There is
still that need to explain everything we are doing. We can help
the government, as Keith suggested. I think it makes sense for
the government to have the capacity to do some of these
measures and what-not. But obviously the people need this
information to make wise choices. They need knowledge about
where we think there may be instability that particular day.
They need to know how much electricity they are going to have.
How could you possibly plan your life under the
circumstances that you have right now? How hard is that to do?
We have a traffic report every single day as we drive into
this, or if there is a train-line problem or whatever. All of
that information is available to us readily.
Senator Biden. Why are you looking at me when you say
``train''? [Laughter.]
Mr. Barton. We have that kind of option. But I do not see
that being part of our thinking.
Again, we are working with a group of people, political
leaders, who have essentially one model that they know. It is a
state-centered model and they are not in this exploding
consumer marketplace that has to be addressed. So it is again
putting the people first and figuring out what they need.
Information is at the heart of making wise choices. We cannot
possibly deliver the wise choices for people on an individual
basis. This is the only way to do it as far as I am concerned.
So finally, the last thing I would like to say is that if
we do kind of trust the marketplace more--however you want to
categorize it, because you can say this from the left or the
right; it is essentially the same idea--we have to be
prepared--and this is really, I think, your responsibility--to
not punish the results of this, because the results are going
to be like they are everywhere else. It is going to look a lot
like a bell curve and 20 percent of it is going to be
successful and 20 percent of it is going to be abject failures,
and in the middle, what we are trying to do in Iraq, as we are
trying in every post-conflict place, is to get the middle to
lean toward the success quite a bit more. Right now the middle
is leaning toward the failing side.
But those 20 percent of failures, which we are going to
have, we cannot spend all of our time worrying about the fact
that there is some lost money, some misdirected programming,
that somebody ran off to London or whatever it happened to be,
because from my way of thinking in these cases it is not as if
every bomb that we drop is a smart bomb. They may be called
that, but they do not always hit the right targets, as we well
know. It is the same in these kinds of cases. There is an awful
lot of loss and inefficiency. But what we are trying to do is
to juice up this marketplace and get it going, and I believe
that getting this kind of information, these sorts of measures,
and a much-expanded communications will help with that.
The Chairman. I would just observe, Mr. Barton, this is
almost like a keynote address for our hearing. The need for
information in Iraq and in this country is just enormous. As
pointed out, you testified and others did a year ago, 2 years
ago, and we are still working at this. But this is one reason
for having these sets of hearings, because I think maybe my
staff is hiding these reports from me so I do not know what is
going on in Iraq and, therefore, have an irrational urge to ask
all of you to penetrate the gloom and work through the details.
But I suppose there is, in fact, more information. You have
mentioned, Dr. Crane, that Iraqis themselves are turning out
some statistics, and that is sort of a new idea for me today.
Others may understand all that goes on in Iraq now, these
people collecting this information. But at the same time, what
meaning it has to anybody, or your reports from your
foundation, is an extremely important question. How do you
ensure distribution?
So I would just encourage each of you, as you have new
reports, please just send one directly to me and to Senator
Biden, because we would like to know, and my guess is, so would
the other members of our committee.
With that anecdotal reflection, Mr. Mohamedi, would you
observe your thoughts on this?
Mr. Mohamedi. I really do not have much to add to my
colleagues here, who have done an outstanding job of answering
this question. I think, basically, to reiterate, the metrics
that the Iraqi people are interested in are reduction in actual
crime and political violence, improvement in physical
deliveries of public services, and jobs and income growth. I
think that is what they are really looking for.
I think our role also should be in a sense, to communicate
sort of in a sense, a meaning of life issue and not concentrate
so much on leaky faucets, in the sense that we are there to
provide fairness and reconciliation and ultimately the right
conditions for a better future. I think that we missed in
providing that message right after the occupation because of
the mishandling in general of the occupation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will proceed, now, to questions of committee members. We
will have a 10-minute round and, perhaps, an additional one as
members may require that in questions to be asked of any member
of the panel.
I will begin my 10 minutes. After the constitution and the
election of the officials, a government exists. There is a
budget for this government now. It is not well-known to any of
us, although I suppose, once again, if we did greater research
we could try to find out what the anticipated revenues and
expenditures are. One of the thoughts generally, around the
world, is that the oil revenue will be a large component of
governmental revenue, whether it be at the central government
or the provincial governments; and furthermore, that that is a
pretty good thing as far as the Iraqis are concerned, given the
price of oil increasing.
Without getting into a market forecast, there are many who
would say that there are many governments around the world
right now that may very well profit from $60 a barrel or $70 or
$80 as the case may be. Certainly the Iraqis could, if, in
fact, they have the oil to sell, the sabotage does not occur,
the maintenance occurs, and, in fact, there is a fairly good
transparency, with the checks and balances of democracy, as
some of you have pointed out, so that somehow revenues aid all
of the people.
I would just ask, parenthetically, what other sources of
revenue are likely to be useful? Are the concepts of
corporation taxes, income taxes, and sales taxes part of the
ethos of the country? Granted they are going to be passing
their tax bills, with whatever advice we might give as to what
system it might be. But I am just trying to think, how does
this government pay for itself, and then deal with the $10
billion debt service that you mentioned overhangs all of this
from the past?
We have raised, from time to time around the country, the
question of how debt reduction is going, debt forgiveness? Have
we forgotten all about that? Have people given up compassion at
this stage, and are they sort of stuck with that, so that as we
pass on and they have to run it themselves, they are left with
this situation?
Finally, I would just ask for any of you to comment, if you
have not had a chance to, on the suggestion that Mr. Barton
made, this extraordinary idea of wealth-sharing of the oil
revenue. Other countries have thought about this. Norway, for
example, has had a far-sighted program, understanding the oil
may not be there forever and it is a national heritage. Mention
has been made of our own State of Alaska. Senator Murkowski
touched upon this.
You suggested, Mr. Barton, the perhaps extraordinary idea
of personal accounts for those 18 years and younger, who are 40
percent of the population. It is an intriguing idea. It may not
be a part of the Iraqi ethos, as they take a look at the
situation. It may be a bridge too far, even if it might be good
advice from ourselves.
But discuss, all of you, how is the country going to pay
for itself down the trail and retire whatever debt is left over
that we have not thought about? Will oil do it in one form or
another, or what else is going to be required?
Would you start with this, Dr. Crane? Would you have a go
at it?
Dr. Crane. There has been an Iraqi budget for 2004 and a
2005 budget. They are actually working on a 2006 budget.
Unfortunately, last year the budget deficit was 46 percent of
GDP.
The Chairman. 46 percent?
Dr. Crane. 46 percent. We think ours is large.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Crane. And this year it is upward in the 20 percent.
This has been financed, of course, by programs that we have
provided and was also financed by some of the Oil-for-Food
moneys that were available through New York.
The budget, 90 percent and upward of budget revenues come
from oil exports.
The Chairman. 90 percent?
Dr. Crane. 90 percent. And it is moving upward to 98
percent.
In addition to that, there is a 5-percent tariff that has
been imposed and there are some few other little taxes that go.
But it is primarily oil that provides, covers the budget costs.
This gets into, I guess, two questions. There has been some
pushes--there is an income tax that hits some people and a
corporate income tax as well, which is not collected. It is
just for joint stock companies and, as we said before, most
people work for themselves.
One of the problems of trying to impose or create a modern
tax system on a country like Iraq is, it creates enormous
opportunities for corruption. In the former Soviet Republics,
where I have worked quite a bit, customs agents are thieves,
and people who go into the business are in it for the bribes.
So, at least for the next 3 or 4 years, it makes a lot more
sense to keep the fiscal side based on oil revenues just to
prevent the creation of a typical Middle Eastern bureaucracy,
which is out there to destroy business, to hold people up, to
subvert the process of commerce. In fact, even today if you go
up to Dohuk--when I was there we had trucks lined up 4 days on
the border. They would go through seven individuals, drinking
tea, who were waiting for bribes to let them through. As
anybody who knows anything about trucking knows, to have your
truck driver sitting there for 4 days on the border is
extraordinarily expensive.
So part of the problem I have with using oil funds or
having an allocation to the Iraqi people is that that money is
already bespoken for. In fact, there is not enough there, and
the Iraqi Government has pretty optimistic views of what the
donor community is going to be doing in 2006, 2007, 2008, to
cover planned budget deficits.
In addition, this year, in terms of the budget, we have
seen a dramatic bumping up in terms of the number of
individuals who are employed by the government and at the same
time less expenditures on the capital side. So despite the high
oil prices, also a great deal of this oil revenue has gone
missing.
Turning to your question about debt forgiveness, Iraq just
has not been servicing its debt. So, although, maybe they owe
$10 billion, they have not been paying it. In the IMF agreement
of last year, the Paris Club group has forgiven much of the
debt contingent on the Iraqis adhering to that agreement. They
have not so far. They are already out of compliance, and again
this goes back to these very, very large, $7 billion, an
extraordinary amount of money, which is wasted on refined oil
product subsidies.
The Chairman. Well, let me just say just in capsule now, a
46-percent deficit and that is essentially being paid for by
our money plus a little bit of other international. So, at the
time we withdraw militarily--and we may be withdrawing
monetarily--now, you are saying they sort of understand that
down the trail in a way. But still this is a big chunk of the
deficit being paid for by us as a part of our work on the
military-diplomatic side.
Now, sort of secondly, since 96 percent or so of the money
comes from oil to begin with, really you are advocating, maybe
wisely, do not start an internal revenue service there because
you will just simply set up another bureaucracy of corruption
and complexity. It would be much more straightforward, if you
get right the oil thing and it is transparent, to collect the
money the old-fashioned way for the central government, but not
enough even if you collect all of it, and if the prices of oil
go up, so that ultimately something else has to happen in terms
of economic gain in the country.
Finally, you have suggested, at one point, $7 billion being
spent in subsidies now, so that they can have nickel gasoline
that you can sell for $5 across the border, and whether,
politically, you can ever remove all this, but still it may be
easier than some other situations, that if you finally get that
right likewise, with the world economy and oil, you pay for it
domestically what the cost is, too.
The Chairman. Those are interesting.
Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. I would like to pick up on a number of things
you said. I think one of your last comments, that we cannot
prepare to withdraw monetarily necessarily as early as we can
if we ever get to the military question, is something that we
have to consider, because, generally, our military presence
does drive our financial contributions, and we may not have
exactly that luxury if we want to see a favorable outcome here.
On the first issue of sort of money, the money that is
going to come into Iraq basically is oil money and
international assistance and, in a hierarchy, remittances from
outside of Iraq. Customs is really, even though exactly what
Keith said is true, it is still one of those things you can get
right. There are places that customs works around the world and
it tends to be a pretty reliable source of revenue, and there
is a lot of action right now to look to.
Then, I think you have to look at taxes that will hold in
the context, which will be luxury taxes, probably at hotels and
what-not--there are a lot of those that are being collected
informally in some of these places--the communications that you
mentioned earlier. Look to areas where there is some success
and where there are some transactions taking place, where you
can actually see how many transactions are taking place and you
could make those taxable. And then fees are probably the
simplest way of doing it.
I do think that this is--cutting subsidies, as you just
suggested, is another good idea. How much, as Keith suggested,
is a delicate matter. But I do not think we have--there has not
been a really good discussion of this. It has been seen as sort
of an ideological debate: Do it, or it is stupid, as opposed to
maybe we could do something and it might help a bit.
I do think that this is another place on the tax issue
where wealth-sharing needs to be considered, because you do not
want everything going back to the center. One of the reasons
that I like decentralization in these places is because you are
going to have such uneven performance, and one big Minister or
Ministry performing unevenly is a multibillion dollar problem,
whereas 17 governors misperforming, basically, hardly ever adds
up to a billion. So you do in a way bring the problem down to
scale, which you have to do, because in a place like Iraq and
in most post-conflict places, the problems are larger than we
can imagine. So you are taking the impossible and making it
addressable, as opposed to taking a problem and logically just
making it work.
The second thing on the debt service, we did the original
paper on this issue back in 2003, in the beginning of 2003, and
we created this $300 billion number, which we then footnoted
like crazy to suggest, do not take it to the bank but it is the
best number we could come up with. I think that the issue has,
as Keith suggested, has been set aside, but it has not been put
to rest.
So the United States has actually been a very constructive
player and I think our Treasury and former Secretary Baker
really took the lead on this issue; took it to the world
community, and they have gotten everybody to agree to sort of
an 80-percent buyoff number, 80-percent forgiveness number.
I believe that Saddam's overhang needs probably the full
bankruptcy treatment. If you do not go over 95 percent, you are
going to have a legacy problem which is going to sink Iraq's
Government when it gets to the point that people start
expecting it, something of it.
What we have done is we have bought time. We have
essentially told all of our allies and everybody else: Let us
settle on this number, everybody is going to get something, go
away for a few years until this thing gets cleaned up. That is
not exactly a solution. So I think that is the operative model
that we have used so far.
We have let other things continue. The reparations from the
Kuwait war are probably something that should have been shut
down. We happen to be the champions of it. It was a good idea
at the time. It is not a good idea now. How much farther do we
let these things go on? So that the U.N. Compensation
Commission, which we are a big part of, is now near the end of
its life. But it has got multibillions of dollars of payments
that are still owed to people as a result of settlements that
came out of that process. That is real money that is going to
slow down the recovery or that we are going to have to replace
with our own contributions.
So I think that the debt issue has a counterinsurgency
economic quality to it as well, which is to let the people of
Iraq know that they are finally free of Saddam and that we, in
fact, are on their side on this issue. So it does fit within
that same kind of thematic idea that we have been trying to
develop.
Finally, on the wealth-sharing, there are a lot of people
who say you cannot afford it. That may be the case, but if that
is the case then fronting $5 billion when essentially we are
spending that kind of money on a rather, almost a weekly basis,
is not a bad notion if we believe that it has the potential to
capture the imagination of the Iraqi people. There is a
political cost. How can the people of the world be expected to
give money to a country that has oil? But what we are trying to
do is to figure out a way to have this thing end
satisfactorily, and that is why I think it is worth doing.
I think that Keith's concern that it is not affordable
diminishes if, in fact, we could stabilize the oil issue and
get to 2010 with probably $50 oil. Most experts are not
suggesting it is going to drop dramatically in the near future.
And we are probably looking at 4 million barrels a day by 2010.
That is more than twice the present production. So there might
be some liquidity in there. If there is an objection to
fronting the money, maybe we create the loan fund that does it
and then we expect some sort of payback over 5 or 10 years.
That is not impossible in this case. I think it would be a
very good investment and I think it is possible to do it. Right
now, as we take it, there is about $30 billion of net, is what
oil produces after its own domestic consumption in the country.
So it is not a bad pool to look at.
Those are just some points to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, that is really tremendous testimony. I
think we are faced with the practical thought that, at some
point, we might be successful in stopping the insurgency, the
Iraqis may adopt a constitution, they may elect people, may
have some degree of confidence in what they are doing, and
suddenly they will have 46 percent of their budget that is not
there, and all the debt. As you say, we made these agreements,
but the issue has not quite been put to rest. If we leave
before it is put to rest and we move on to some other topic,
and here these folks are left, and we have congratulated them
on democracy and on a remarkable turnaround, but they are
bankrupt year after year, there might be no possibility of this
thing making it.
This is why it seems to me this hearing or these questions
are tremendously important for anybody interested in the future
of the country, because they will not go away. Somebody has to
be paid. The legacy of Saddam, as you say, has to be addressed
and even the legacy of these payments to Kuwait, which are a
delicate matter, but very important to bring up.
Yet life goes on for the Iraqis and everybody else who is
involved, without much discussion. So I hope we can encapsulate
each of the ideas that you are bringing to the fore in some
report from our committee that we can share with others, who I
think really need to be thinking about this agenda even as we
have been privileged to this morning.
With the indulgence of my colleague, I will ask Mr.
Mohamedi for his thoughts and then I will turn to my colleague.
Mr. Mohamedi. I think that building nonoil revenues is
essential for the long-term economic development of Iraq. I
have seen so many Middle Eastern oil-producing, and Asian oil-
producing, and Latin American oil-producing, countries that got
hooked into the oil trap. We know all the issues around that.
So I think it is very important we have an opportunity right
now to develop nonoil, a system to capture nonoil revenues.
I will get into that in a little bit. But I just want to
get back to oil revenues. I disagree with this issue of
fracturing oil revenues or partitioning it off between federal
or central, provincial, and people. I think that will lead--
especially if you divide it in an automatic formula between
central and provincial, you will get a Nigeria situation. In
Nigeria the politics has organized itself, the subregional
politics, to capture national rents. So you have got this
constant fracturing that is going on and constant strife
looking for that.
I think that the issue of dividing that oil revenue should
be done on the central level through a political--democratic
political process.
On the issue of sending some part of that revenue stream to
the people directly, I think in a sense, it is an attractive
idea. I do agree with the issue that there is not enough money
right now. But there could be revenue streams coming in, in the
future, from future oil production growth and future royalties
and taxes that foreign companies could be paying in. And I
think that would be an idea, that if some of it goes off to
individuals or families in Iraq that could help with national
buy-in. It would help with the idea of foreign direct
investment. And if you then attach an income tax to that, you
could possibly create the basis of rolls--of tax rolls--because
people would be getting something and then they will be
deducting it. So that could be the future of an income tax
system, which in a sense, I think, would be good for the future
of the country.
Finally, the foreign investment that will come in from the
oil sector has two components to it. One, it will be, we think,
and if this is done correctly and without corruption, that
there will be things like signature bonuses, which can be put
into a major development fund which can fund development
projects in the nonoil sector. Hopefully they will not end up
in the pockets of leaders or Ministers or whatever and
transferred to Switzerland.
The other part will be taxes and royalties that will be
coming in and that will enhance government oil revenues in the
future. There is quite a bit of money there if you think that
in say 20 years this country could be producing 6 million
barrels a day. I think it is a bit premature to expect that we
will be producing--Iraq will be producing--4 million by 2010. I
think that we just do not have the time to do that on a
political level and just the pure physical level of investment.
Finally, I think that if Iraq is to integrate back into the
international capital markets, which will be an important
source of long-term development finance, as you said, we really
have to resolve this, the debt issue. I think the quicker it is
resolved, Iraq could come back and be a responsible borrower on
the international markets.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your
testimony. This all has sort of an Alice in Wonderland quality
to it to me. It sounds like I am being facetious. I am not.
Senator Lugar used the phrase in another context ``a bridge too
far.'' With the significant number of mistakes we have made the
last 2 years and the failure in my view to learn from them,
this is getting to be a bridge pretty far.
When you were here, Mr. Barton, you were here with Mr.
Hamre and the Hamre report. You talked about the window closing
and the window would close by that fall, a year ago. I still
think we can salvage success. But boy, it is getting harder.
We are talking about long-term financial and budgetary
opportunities and constraints for a functioning government in
Iraq down the road. We are talking 2010. Pray God that is our
problem in 2010.
I have difficulty, especially every time I come back from
Iraq, avoiding the mistake--and sometimes it is a mistake--of
connecting directly our economic input and impact with
political and security outcomes.
Now, Mr. Crane, you have been very articulate. You take a
long view and a pessimistic view, which is--I mean, I am not
criticizing either. I am just observing, at least, how it comes
across to me. And you make the case, as well as Mr. Barton. We
have to--and I have made the same speech a year ago--we have to
have a better benchmark to determine what constitutes impact.
We say we are going to build or help open x number of
schools, or we are going to pump y barrels of oil, or
whatever--not we; they. And whether or not we do that does not
tell us much about whether or not the impact is what we hope
and intend. What is the impact we are trying to have? The
impact we are trying to have is to impact on the possibility of
developing a stable government where everybody feels, every
major constituency feels, they have a stake in the outcome, if
not a democracy, that has the capacity to function.
That is as good as it gets for me. I know we talk about
democracy. Hopefully, I am wrong, but probably not in my
lifetime anything we consider, I consider a liberal democracy.
So I find myself coming back and being seized, Dr. Crane,
with the notion that, which you have said would not be a
popular notion--it may or may not be--but CERP funds, because I
sit there with a commanding general who flips up on a screen a
Powerpoint presentation that shows--and I take him at his
word--shows that we had x number of attacks on his forces in
the following, in a certain grid here; when he took the
literally, not figuratively, foot and a half of sewage off the
front streets and literally piles of garbage 12 to 14 feet high
and cleared them, subsequently the following 4 months he had no
attacks on his forces in that spot; and where you actually had
the street cleaned--and this happened to be in this one
instance I am telling you in Sadr City--when you had the street
cleaned, when people were able to walk out to the equivalent of
the corner grocery store, they had informants telling them: By
the way, around the corner there are some jihadists; around the
corner there are some insurgents. And it has changed the safety
and security of not only the people on the ground who live
there, but our forces.
Now, I have a tendency to extrapolate from that, and I
acknowledge in a model you may flip up it does not follow, that
it is the only place I have seen--and again, I have only been
there five times--it is the only place I have seen a
correlation between an investment and an outcome.
When Senator Lugar and I were there early on, one of the
things that became very apparent to us--I speak for myself; I
think he agrees, but I do not want to put words in his mouth--
is that any nation that could take down Saddam Hussein as
swiftly and as surely as we did, obviously can get the electric
running 24 hours a day immediately, obviously can provide
potable water for everybody, obviously ought to be able to make
the streets safe.
So I acknowledge we suffer from an expectation game here,
that the expectations appear to me to be unrealistically high
for what we had the capacity to do, no matter how well we did
it. But the failure to come close to meeting expectations I
think has--this is the plain old politician--a dramatic impact
on the willingness of people to essentially place their bet on
the government as it is emerging and place their bet on us
being a positive force.
Which is a long way of leading me to what I keep coming
back to, Mr. Barton, what I think is a central problem today
and a significant mistake we made, but I think is correctable
still, and I want to address that. That is what you have all
said in one way or another, access to information by Iraqis, by
the people.
To this day, to the best of my knowledge we have not
broadcast widely that we do not expect to remain permanently in
Iraq, have permanent bases. Now, I may be wrong about that.
Maybe we have stated that as a policy. But I do not think
anybody in the region thinks it or knows it.
I do not think, from my observation--the first time we were
there and we were flipping, there's channels like VH-1 on
television. Who would listen to it except somebody who's watch
a test pattern on a TV tube? It was so absolutely boring,
uninformative, sporadic.
So my question is this. Is it possible--excuse me. Why is
it not still possible for us to move from the single model that
is a failure, in my view, to the model of--facetiously you said
100--to 20, to 50? Is that beyond our reach? Is there no
ability to go back and sort of repair that, to change or
produce or encourage or whatever more outlets for information
in the country?
That is my first question: Is it too late? Yes, you, Mr.
Barton.
Mr. Barton. Who knows if it is too late, but I think it is
still worth doing, because as long as you are spending
multibillion dollars a month in the place you are obviously
making a serious effort at trying to change the environment the
way you want to.
I happen to believe it is absolutely central to our moving
ahead. Now, I would say that if you were to put a billion
dollars on the table and say, we would entertain anything from
new television networks to cable systems to bloggers to
Internet stations, and we would just like to see what the
universe of responses might look like, you would be
overwhelmed. You would have more than you have the resumes,
when you put a job on the market in your office, I can assure
you of that.
So there would be a wide series of plays, and it should go
everywhere from Disney down to 12 teenagers who have a good
idea on how to reach these folks. So I would say that
opportunity is there still. I think--but again, you have got to
encourage the entrepreneurial side. You have got to make sure
that it has the Iraqi play in it, which I think you will get a
huge Iraqi play. It is a very young market.
What was the first thing we heard? Everybody got satellite
dishes. What is the second thing we heard? Everybody has gotten
cell phones, even though we were trying to control that market.
So the market has taken off without us and we are still trying
to do this corraling effect: Let us control it, let us set the
rules for how you put on a station.
When we had our very first conversations with the people
who were running this TV station in Baghdad, the operation that
we were setting up, you know what their concern was at that
time? They are getting too independent; those newscasters that
we set up are actually saying things that may be news. Their
first notion was: Shut them down.
We said: What, are you nuts? Start five more stations or
five more news operations. Do not even think about shutting
them down. That is so anti-American in its core concept. Why
would you want to be associated with that idea?
So I firmly believe that there is still an opportunity.
There is clearly an opportunity in the region. There is clearly
an opportunity. One of the suggestions we made to Jerry Bremer
was: Hire a thousand unemployed Iraqi students--not hard to
find. Give them cameras, send them out to record what is going
on in their country every day, and then all you have got to do
is have a little editing shop that runs fresh cuts of what is
happening, good news, bad news, all day long. People are
interested. It will be like C-SPAN. There is going to be an
audience for it.
So there are lots of ideas there. Every one of these ideas
is in place, somewhere in the world, a thousand times by now.
It is not just America, it is not just in South Bend. People
have started their own little communications systems
everywhere, and we could definitely make that thrive.
Again, I believe it would be hugely counterinsurgent. There
will be the fear that maybe the insurgents will use it. Guess
what, they are figuring out how to do everything already much
faster than we are doing it. So we have got to--we are not
going to control their marketplace. We have to overwhelm their
marketplace, and that is why I like the tidal wave concept
here.
Senator Biden. Well, I happen to agree with you. By the
way, those satellite dishes pick up Al-Jazeera and pick up
everything else. It is not like they are picking up pro-Western
or progovernment or prodemocratic forces and voices. It is not
like there is a plethora of those out there. I think you are
right, I think we take our chances.
I realize my time is up, Mr. Chairman, but if I may, with
your permission, ask one more question.
I am at a loss as to why, to use maybe an unfair slang
expression, why we cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. I
am at a loss as to why we cannot, Dr. Crane, focus on the
significant longer term necessary institutional changes that
are required, including projects that are required, whether
they are a tertiary sewage treatment plant for Baghdad or
whether it is a long-term plan to be able to invest in the oil
wells so their maximum production capacity is able to be met
down the road.
At the same time, it seems to me the incredible amounts of
money we are expending, why we do not adopt the notion--and I
think most of us on this committee have adopted it--as Mr.
Barton says, 20 percent of the money we are going to invest
there is going to be an absolute total abject waste.
You know, there used to be a professor at the Wharton
School--I did not go to the Wharton School, but I am told by my
friend, Ted Coughlin, who went there. He said his professor
used to quote John Wanamaker, the retailer. He said: You know,
I know that 50 percent of my advertising is a waste of time; my
problem is I do not know which 50 percent.
If we do not approach this investment policy and
reconstruction policy in Iraq with a similar frame of mind, I
do not know how we get anywhere. We cannot manage our own
economy all that well, let alone something that we are taking
from 30 years of shambles in the middle of an ongoing war. So I
guess what I am driving at here is, I do not know why we
cannot, for example, rhetorical question: Why did we not take
advantage of the British suggestion of the European Union
providing experts to essentially adopt an agency, to actually
bring in people like you, Dr. Crane, from Europe who knew what
they were talking about, who were able to have a concrete input
and working with the Iraqis in each of the Ministries, and
actually try to use a civilian input to help them get them up
and running?
Maybe it is because it takes too much organizational skill
to do it but we decided it was not worth doing. I do not know,
but it confuses me why we did not.
So I will end with this, and I am not asking you to respond
now, but for the record if you are willing, or even give me a
call and sit with me in my office, what are the practical,
small-bore things that we can be doing now in a society, sir,
that I think is still significantly tribal in structure?
I mean, I do not get why we do not walk into some of the
medium-sized cities and towns in the country and say to the
local, in effect--and I realize it is misleading to use this
kind of terminology because people have a different image--the
local leader and say: Here, build this dirt road from point A
to point B.
We sat in a--it was a moment I had some hope, and I promise
I will end with this. A moment I had some hope. Senator Lugar
and I and as well as our friend, Senator Hagel--and this is how
much things have changed in terms of security as well--got in a
car, drove out to a mosque that had been partially bombed out,
in a neighborhood that--on the fringe of two neighborhoods, one
of which I am guessing had the equivalent of 2,000 homes in the
neighborhood identified and another neighborhood of almost
equal size, and it, to my recollection, seemed to be
essentially on the border, ``the border'' meaning the line, the
street line, all within Baghdad.
I witnessed a remarkable thing. You had a very bright young
lieutenant, American, in uniform, standing at the bottom of the
stage with two people setting up, two tables at angles up on
what looked like a high school gymnasium stage, and somewhere
between, my recollection is, 20, 30, 40 community leaders,
whether they were leaders in the sense that they were the best-
known guy on their block or not.
They were talking about--I remember the one example. We
were running a water line and the question was they were
debating as to whether or not there was enough PCV pipe that
was going to be available when it hit the road that separated
the neighborhoods, whether they could get the water into the
next neighborhood.
They were actually having a town meeting about it. And I
thought, wow. And this young lieutenant was so impressive. He
was sitting there saying: Now look, you got to do this and you
guys do this; we will get you this. And they were making their
decisions.
But it was about simple things: Can you turn the spigot and
water come out? So I cannot figure out how we get those small-
bore projects. If it is 117 degrees, if, in fact, there is
sewage in my front yard, if, in fact, there is no prospect for
the air-conditioning to be able to be on more than 6 to 8 hours
a day, and my two sons do not have a job and I do not have one,
you got a problem.
So a famous Senator who served on this committee once said:
Maybe we need a bunch of mayors over there with a little bit of
walking-around money, in the best sense of that word, some of
which will be wasted.
So, I guess what I am trying to say is: Why can we not do
what are those things that are going to have the kind of
immediate impact that politicians need to be able to generate
consensus, to be able to govern, that they need?
I am finished and if you want to comment, fine. But you do
not need to. We have held you very long already.
Dr. Crane. I do not disagree with all that you have said,
but I think one of the mistakes we have made, we have tried to
do too many end runs in Iraq. And it is not our purpose to have
the Iraqis like us. It is our purpose to have the Iraqis look
at their government as legitimate. I think all too often what
we have ended up doing is we have been focused on making
ourselves look good rather than trying to figure out how to
make the government at all levels----
Senator Biden. Now I see what you are saying. I did not
understand. That was part of your point before. I do not
disagree with that.
Dr. Crane. I think Major General Chiarelli's program in
Sadr City was excellent, but it was not all CERP funds. He,
himself, says it was Office of Transition Initiatives, and it
was linked together. One of the things when I talked to him was
that, about garbage pickup, he did not hire people for 6 weeks
and lay them off after the garbage was done. He actually
contracted it out to local businesses, and that became a
service that they were held accountable for that was turned
over to the municipality.
It is precisely these things that get us out of the
picture. We do not want us to be the contractors. We want the
Iraqi Government to get those skills.
Senator Biden. Can I pursue that with you just a second?
Dr. Crane. Sure.
Senator Biden. Chiarelli, when I spoke to him--you are
exactly right and you know more about it than I do. But when I
spoke to him he raised the specter, had he not had the ability
to have that startup money and had he sat there, there would be
no initiative, either from the CPA at the time or from the
local governance entity. But what he was able to do is what
Webster is trying to do now with the 2nd I.D., is trying to
build on that.
So we are saying the same thing. I misunderstood you. The
idea of going out and sinking a well, which may be needed, and
then walking away without figuring out who controls the well,
how there is access to the well, the local governance entity
being able to have some impact on that--one of my problems here
is that we seem--it is my problem with the contracting
generally on a larger scale. The contracting generally on a
larger scale seems to take the Iraqis out of the equation in
terms of--look, there are some really competent Iraqi
contractors. There are competent Iraqi businessmen.
Now, granted I do not know enough to know, because we had
the de-Ba'thification problem, how many of the competent people
were the people who were on the take or part of the deal and
were the bad guys. Do you follow me? But it seems to me one of
the reasons I am anxious for our new Ambassador to get up and
running, I think he gets what you are saying. I think he gets
it.
You just clarified something for me. I misunderstood,
doctor, about what you were saying. I agree, there has got to
be a mechanism for handoff to make this thing permanent.
Dr. Crane. One last point here. It is not how much, it is
how. I think I am a little bit disturbed with people who just
say, go out, spread the money around. One of the real
disappointments for me in Iraq was, as I was saying, that what
you want to do is you want to go out there and make sure every
single contract is competitively bid, so these Iraqi companies,
they know that finally life has changed. It is no longer who
you know, it is no longer that life is rigged against you.
Some of the concerns I have had in terms of spending--and
this goes to CERP funds. I think CERP funds have been great. I
think $3 billion is probably too much of a good thing. But I
have also seen this in terms of shortcuts in contracting. It is
extraordinarily important to have everybody know this is as
clean a bid as it can be, and then people have confidence that
life is different, and then you see a startup of contractors,
entrepreneurs.
Senator Biden. Do you think we could do that in a timely
way?
Dr. Crane. Yes.
Senator Biden. In other words, I happen to agree with you
again. I think we could. I do not think it necessarily slows
the process so the sewage sits in the front street a year
longer. It may sit on the front lawn another 2 days or 3 weeks.
But the idea that we cannot competitively bid this in country I
think is--I do not think that is accurate.
Dr. Crane. It speeds it up. It will speed it up.
Senator Biden. I am sorry to go so long.
Mr. Barton. Just a couple quick responses. This period now,
because it is so fragile, tends to be--the microeconomics tend
to be more important than the macroeconomics. You have got to
get through the microperiod to get to the macro. It does not
mean that you are not walking and chewing gum at the same time,
but do not expect that your macroactivities are really going to
produce anything that is going to be felt in this most
immediate moment.
So I think that I also want to just reinforce what Keith
said, that the process is really the product. What we are
talking about here is change. The status quo ante does not work
in a place like Iraq. If we go back to the way things were, I
do not think many people will think that that was a significant
success.
So change is really the central concept here. So you have
to have, when you go to these local initiatives--and I do
believe that we have lots of agents. I think that if you did
have a thousand flowers blooming strategy in Iraq you would
have lots of people that are out there ready to go, but they
have not had liquidity.
The liquidity has been more--the little liquidity that we
have had has been in our control and we have not trusted these
people to have really some money to actually fix a pothole
yourself. So I think that side is still a huge opportunity that
exists, whether it is a women's center or a local governing
council or whatever, as we spoke about earlier.
But then you are going to have to get to critical mass, and
that is sort of how do you connect this thing so it is not just
a thousand points of light that are all flickering, but it
actually comes together and means something. I think one way
you do it is you get enough of it going on, which is
essentially what you were saying regarding sort of the Great
Society or the post-riot period or whatever, the implementation
of some of those programs.
I think liquidity here is terribly important, terribly
important. If you look at the U.S. Government, the CERP funds,
OTI, and AID, there are not a lot of places that you have
liquidity where somebody can actually go in and put the money
to the problem and to the potential, as opposed to: I have got
AIDS money, I have got child vaccination money, I have got
education money.
Let people be--the beauty of walking-around money is that
it can solve the problem rather than your bringing your
prescription to what exists in the place.
Senator Biden. One of the reasons for my observation, and
it may be unfair--I am not making this judgment; I am just
making this observation. One of the reasons I think that CERP
funds have become so attractive is there is such a, rightly or
wrongly, dissatisfaction with our contracting, no-bid
contracting methods here, and the billions of dollars we are
spending with American companies in the lead. I am not making a
political--I am not doing this demagoguing stuff that big
companies--I am not saying that.
But that is the perception. That is the perception that I
think is fairly widely held. So part of this frustration,
doctor, part of this frustration for guys like me saying, well,
I would rather Chiarelli have the money than I would be
focusing it in on the programs where we are finding out we are
spending 40 to 45 percent of it on security and they are hiring
private security guards.
Anyway, I thank you guys very, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your testimony.
The Chairman. Do you have a comment, Mr. Mohamedi?
Mr. Mohamedi. One quick comment, and that is that you
talked about tribes and using tribal leaders to do local work.
I think if you need to get a little job done I think that is
not a bad idea. But I do not think that Iraqis are
multidimensional. The tribal affiliation is one aspect of their
identity. It is a much more complex situation.
The other thing is that if you create those type of
linkages and demote the national government and bureaucracy and
effective bureaucracy, I think you are contributing to
fracturing and creating local elites and all of that.
Senator Biden. I think that is a legitimate point. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
We thank you, gentlemen, for a very, very thoughtful
contribution, which we have cherished and which we are hopeful
will be spread among those who will read the hearing reports
and other summaries we may make of it. But we thank you for
working with us. We may, in fact, have more hearings in due
course, so please stay closely in touch.
Saying this, why, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]