[Senate Hearing 109-236]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-236
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: BUILDING PEACE IN A HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 44
Henry, Hon. Ryan, Principal Deputy, Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, Washington, DC... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Lugar...................................................... 45
Kunder, Hon. James R., Assistant Administrator for Asia and the
Near East, USAID, Washington, DC............................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Pascual, Hon. Carlos, Ambassador, Coordinator for the Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Sharp, LTG Walter, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint
Staff, Department of Defense, Washington, DC................... 16
.............................................................
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Lugar...................................................... 45
(iii)
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: BUILDING PEACE IN A HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENT
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard
Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar and Chafee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee meets today to
continue our examination of how the United States can improve
its capacity to undertake stabilization and reconstruction
missions abroad.
Over the years, we have observed our Government cobble
together plans, people, and projects to respond to post-
conflict situations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq,
and elsewhere. The efforts of those engaged have been valiant,
but these emergencies have been complex and time sensitive.
Our ad hoc approach has been inadequate to deliver the
necessary capabilities to deal speedily and efficiently with
complex emergencies. In an age of terrorism, it is especially
important we be prepared to undertake these missions, because
we have seen how terrorists can exploit nations afflicted by
lawlessness and desperate circumstances. They seek out such
places to establish training camps, recruit new members, and
tap into a global black market in weapons technology.
In 2003, this committee organized a distinguished Policy
Advisory Group made up of U.S. Government officials and outside
experts to give members advice on how to strengthen our ability
to plan and to implement these post-conflict missions. After
much study, it was clear that we needed a well-organized and
strongly led civilian partner to work with the military in
complex emergencies. And it was our judgment that the State
Department was best positioned to lead this effort.
As a result of our deliberations, I introduced, with
Senators Biden and Hagel, the Stabilization and Reconstruction
Civilian Management Act of 2004, and this committee passed it
unanimously. That bill is included, with some modifications, as
title VII in Senate bill 600, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 2006 and 2007, which is now on the Senate
Calendar.
The bill puts the State Department at the center of the
civilian reconstruction and stabilization effort, while
coordination between State and Defense would continue at the
NSC level. The executive branch already has moved to implement
elements of our bill. Indeed, an Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization was organized at the State Department last July.
The new Office is conducting a governmentwide inventory of the
civilian assets that might be available for stabilization and
reconstruction tasks.
It is also pursuing an idea, proposed in our bill, of a
rapid response corps to greatly reduce the time required to
mobilize post-conflict stabilization personnel. It will work
closely with the Secretary of State to assist in the
coordination of policy and in developing cooperative
arrangements with foreign countries and nongovernmental
organizations.
President Bush said last month that this new State
Department Office would be dedicated to, quote ``helping the
world's newest democracies make the transition to peace,
freedom, and a market economy,'' end of quote from the
President.
I am hopeful that the Office will develop the concept of a
250-person active duty corps that is contained in the
legislation we presented. In Army terms, that is less than a
small battalion of well-trained people--a modest but vigorous
force multiplier that would greatly improve our Nation's
stabilization capacity.
This corps of civilians could be composed of State
Department and USAID employees as well as former military
personnel who have the experience and the technical skills to
manage stabilization and reconstruction tasks in a hostile
environment.
At her confirmation hearings earlier this year, Secretary
Rice expressed enthusiastic support for enhancing standing
civilian capacity to respond to post-conflict situations. In
answer to one of my questions, she said, and I quote,
``Creating a strong U.S. Government stabilization and
reconstruction capacity is an administration national security
priority,'' end of quote from the Secretary.
She asserted that, quote ``experience has shown that we
must have the capacity to manage two to three stabilization and
reconstruction operations concurrently. That means [we need]
staff in Washington and in the field to manage and deliver
quality programs,'' end of quote.
Secretary Rice is working to make the State Department an
effective interagency leader in post-conflict operations. I
consider this new mission to be one of the most important long-
term defenses that the State Department can mount against
future acts of terrorism.
We are pleased today to welcome a panel of experienced and
distinguished witnesses. Ambassador Carlos Pascual is
testifying before the committee for the first time in his new
job as State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Development. He has stayed in close contact with our committee
during his tenure, and we appreciate his willingness to
exchange ideas and to brief us on plans.
Mr. James Kunder is USAID's Assistant Administrator for
Asia and the Near East. In addition to his work at USAID, he
was a valuable participant in the committee's Policy Advisory
Group process, which examined stabilization and reconstruction
issues 2 years ago.
Also joining us are Mr. Ryan Henry, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and LTG Walter Sharp, Director
of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff. Any
discussion of how we should organize the building of peace in a
hostile environment must take strong account of Defense
Department expertise and insight. We are grateful to all of our
witnesses for coming this morning, and we look forward to an
important discussion.
If Senator Biden arrives, I will call upon him for an
opening statement if he wishes to present one. And we will call
upon each of the witnesses for their statements, which we will
hear in full before commencing questions from the panel of
Senators, who I hope will join me during the course of our
hearing.
Let me mention that the statements should be in this order.
First of all, Ambassador Pascual, and then second, Mr. Henry,
and then third, General Sharp, who I understand has verbal
remarks, no written message--but, nevertheless, we welcome his
comments in any form--and then Mr. Kunder.
Let me just say at the outset that all of the prepared
statements will be placed in the record in full, so you need
not ask permission for that to occur. It will.
And you may proceed in any way you wish to summarize, but
do not truncate unduly. This is a panel that is meant to be
heard, not simply to be questioned, because the information
that you impart, not only to Senators, but through this hearing
to the general public, is very much welcome.
I call now upon my friend, Ambassador Pascual, with whom I
have enjoyed wonderful association during his tenure in the
Ukraine and in various other places. And we thank you for your
taking on these new responsibilities.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS PASCUAL, AMBASSADOR, COORDINATOR FOR
THE OFFICE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pascual. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
appreciate very much having this opportunity to address you
this morning to discuss what I consider to be one of the
greatest national security challenges of our time, the
management of conflict.
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Biden
and the members of the appropriations committees in the House
and the Senate for the $7.7 million in funding that the Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
received in the fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental. And
your efforts in that were absolutely crucial in securing that
funding for us. Thank you.
These funds are really essential to build our core
functions, and they are going to be put to use immediately for
some of our projects in Sudan. I am very pleased to be here
today with Under Secretary Ryan Henry, with General Skip Sharp,
with assistant administrator Jim Kunder.
Managing conflict is too great a challenge and too complex
a task for one office alone. It must be a joint effort
coordinated across our Government. And seated here with me, Mr.
Chairman, are three of our key partners.
As this committee has recognized, the management of
conflict requires a paradigm shift in the way we think about
international relations.
The 20th century's premise that the struggle between strong
powers principally threatens security and stability, and that
international security is driven by rational actors
scrutinizing one another was turned on its head on September
11.
On that morning, we saw one of the poorest countries in the
world become the base of operations for the deadliest external
strike the United States has faced in its history. It made us
fundamentally reexamine our assumptions about national
security.
One constant in this world is that voids will be filled. In
the absence of legitimate governance, those voids will be
filled with terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation,
trafficking, and other threats to our national interest.
There is no moment of greater challenge and risk than when
countries emerge from conflict or civil strife. It simply is
not enough, as you said, Mr. Chairman, to rely on ad-hoc
responses.
We have no choice but to adapt and develop new tools to
meet the challenges of today. It was in this context that the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
was created last year.
We have been charged with creating a joint operations
capability within the U.S. Government to prevent or prepare for
conflict. This truly has been a bipartisan governmentwide
initiative.
I would like to thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for
your leadership on this issue. It has provided a foundation on
which we have been able to build. You and your staff have been
stalwart proponents, of building stronger stabilization and
reconstruction capabilities. The administration appreciates
your commitment and your leadership on these issues.
In the executive branch, S/CRS has been fortunate to
receive tremendous support from the President, Secretary Rice,
as you very adequately and appropriately quoted, and Dr.
Hadley. We have received resounding support from national
security principals and from our colleagues in the combatant
commands.
In April 2004, the National Security Council approved the
creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization. In December, we went back to update them on
our progress, and they unanimously reaffirmed their support for
S/CRS, and approved the direction in which our operating models
have developed.
S/CRS is a unique office. It is a State Department Office
with interagency responsibilities. Responding to conflict with
unity of effort is broader than the mandate of any one agency.
This mission can require peacekeeping, coordination with
military operations, peace negotiations, political
transformation, civilian police functions, support for the rule
of law, and economic and humanitarian assistance. In light of
the breadth of agency responsibilities, we must focus on
ensuring a common U.S. Government voice and not a collection of
individual agency responses.
The State Department is charged with implementing the
President's foreign policy agenda in coordination with the NSC.
And as such, NSC principals unanimously agreed with the
recommendations that this committee has put forward to
establish S/CRS in the State Department.
Our mandate must consider the full spectrum of conflict.
Sustainable peace requires more than stabilization. We need to
help people take ownership of the transition, so that they can
change the very fabric of their societies and redefine
governing structures that foster freedom, inclusiveness, and
reconciliation. It requires uprooting the ills that led to
conflict in the first place. These are complicated tasks and we
cannot succeed if our only means of responding is crisis.
We need to understand how we can prevent conflict, or if
that is not impossible, we must be able to prepare in advance
to respond more effectively.
We are improving our early warning capabilities and linking
early warning to early response. We are developing better
planning capabilities, such as a common template for civilian
agencies in the military for stabilization and reconstruction
planning.
We are developing more effective tools for coordination of
a crisis response in Washington and in the field. We are
putting in place mechanisms to facilitate communication between
first responders and policymakers so that decisionmakers
receive grounded truth and timely information, and so those on
the front lines receive guidance on priorities and objectives.
To build these capabilities, the administration has
requested $124.1 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget. This
includes $24.1 million to support core office functions,
training, and exercises. The Department's full personnel
request would support initial development of an active response
corps within the Department.
The administration is requesting $100 million for a
conflict response fund, which would serve as a flexible account
to quickly channel resources into programs, thereby speeding
response and impact.
This will also give us time within the administration and
Congress to identify longer term funding. I want to stress, Mr.
Chairman, my commitment to work closely with Congress and this
committee on the use of this fund.
In addition, the administration is seeking a transfer
authority, which my colleagues from the Department of Defense
will further describe, that would be subject to determinations
by the Secretaries of State and Defense and would allow the
State Department to draw down up to $200 million for
stabilization and reconstruction activities from the Department
of Defense budget.
These resources are fundamental to achieving impact on the
ground. The sooner we can get programs started that allow
people to see conditions improve for their families and
country, the better the chance we have of helping a country get
on the right trajectory to stability and peace.
The legislative effort launched by this committee has
galvanized support and attention. Your legislation is very much
in line with the administration's efforts, as you have just
outlined, Mr. Chairman.
We fully support your initiative to authorize a conflict
response fund with flexible authorities, so it can be used
rapidly and to authorize additional personnel management
flexibility.
The chairman and Senator Biden's proposals call for a
response corps from State and USAID, as well as a response
readiness reserve. We, indeed, must develop the capacity to
manage crisis response as well as to deploy to the field.
The operating concepts we propose will allow for improved
central Washington management through staffing of my Office,
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. They
provide for a rapid diplomatic response capability through an
active response corps and a standby corps that can back up
first responders.
We are developing ways to strengthen existing contract
response mechanisms. We will fill gaps by creating what we have
called a Global Skills Network that draws on NGO, private
sector, think tank, and university capabilities. An operational
database will catalog U.S. Government capabilities.
Looking to the longer term, we are working with Joint
Forces Command on a study to assess the cost effectiveness of
reserve models that will result in alternatives that we will
discuss with this committee and we will seek your views.
The skills and resources we are requesting are not just
investments for the future. They are needed right now, most
urgently in Sudan.
In close coordination with the NSC, the Department's Africa
Bureau, USAID, and the Department of Defense, we are pulling
together a unified U.S. Government strategy for Sudan, and the
implementation of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as
advancing peace in Darfur and to bring that conflict to an end.
We are working with the Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau
on Cuba to develop a framework for United States strategy for
the immediate period after Fidel Castro's death. We have been
working with the Department's Africa Bureau on conflict
prevention and mitigation strategies in the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
Just a month ago, we cohosted a policy exercise that pulled
together the interagency community and international
participants from the European Union, the United Nations, and
other partners to strengthen planning for the DRC's upcoming
election.
If we can better coordinate U.S. resources and can better
leverage the capabilities of the international community, the
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, we stand a
better chance of effecting the dynamics on the ground and ever
critical transitions after a conflict.
To put this into perspective, in the case of Iraq, by
changing the dynamics enough to allow us to just withdraw one
division 1 month earlier, we would be able to save $1.2
billion. We save hundreds of millions by allowing peacekeepers
to end operations sooner if we can get on the ground more
quickly and more effectively.
Funding the types of initiatives S/CRS is developing is not
only an investment in peace and democracy, it saves money. Even
more importantly, it saves lives by removing our troops from
harm's way. We owe it to our troops, to the American people, to
our national prestige, to those around the world who struggle
to emerge from conflict, to improve our capabilities.
We appreciate the resources you are providing through the
supplemental, and we hope that you will continue to support our
efforts. Thank you for your attention and I will be happy to
answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pascual follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for the
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State,
Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today to share with you our progress and to
support the President's FY 2006 budget request for the Department of
State and to discuss with you the elements related to stabilization and
reconstruction. I am particularly pleased to be here so I can thank
you, Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, for your leadership on this
issue. I'd also like to recognize the support from Chairman Dreier and
Congressman Farr who have supported the development of this Office.
Over the past 15 years, the United States has been involved in 17
significant stabilization and reconstruction operations. Since the cold
war there have been 41 stabilization and reconstruction programs that
have been carried out internationally. This isn't just an engagement
like Iraq or Afghanistan. It's also an issue of Haiti and Mozambique
and Somalia and Bosnia and Kosovo and Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia and
Sierra Leone and East Timor and Nicaragua, and the list goes on.
The task of dealing with and managing conflict, as well as
addressing post-conflict responses, has become a mainstream part of our
foreign policy challenges today. The question before us now is whether
we should improve the way we organize ourselves to address foreign
policy challenges head on, or continue the ad-hoc approach that has
characterized our efforts in the past. The administration and many
others agree that a more coherent approach would allow us to achieve
the kinds of results that support our national interests, that help
save lives and that are consistent with American values.
If we do not address this challenge, the costs are also clear.
Failed or failing states become voids that will be filled with
terrorism, with trade in narcotics, trafficking in people, and with
other illegal activities that in the end, inevitably, become a threat
to our national interests. The countries where al-Qaida had established
its base were Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan; it is not a coincidence
that they were failed states, where there was a void, where those with
some money who could influence leaders could establish a base of
illegal operations. What we face today is a question of how we stand up
to this national security challenge.
CREATION OF S/CRS
It was in that context that administration created the Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS),
specifically with the mandate to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize
U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-
conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in
transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a
sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy. This
mission statement has several key elements.
First, we are focusing on prevention of conflict, where we can,
because the costs of prevention are always less than intervention.
Second, we stress the word ``institutionalize'' in the development
of U.S. Government capacity, so we can learn from prior experiences and
not respond in an ad-hoc way to each new crisis.
Third, if we must respond to conflict, we need to have the goal of
putting that country on a path toward being a sustainable and peaceful
democracy and market-oriented state. We must place such a goal at the
forefront of our planning and engagement. It is much more difficult to
get onto the correct vector 6 months or a year and a half down the road
than it is at the beginning. So those choices that we make at the
outset are absolutely crucial.
Before I describe the plans for our Office in greater detail, let
me first outline a few important assumptions. We are working on the
basis that we need to have the capacity to concurrently manage two to
three stabilization and reconstruction operations at the same time. As
I mentioned earlier, history and experience since the end of the cold
war have taught us this is the case.
Further, for stabilization and reconstruction operations to
succeed, they generally require a longer term involvement, usually on
the order of 5 to 10 years. It requires effective long-term management
through regular institutional mechanisms, but as part of a cohesive USG
strategy. The S/CRS coordination role will cease as normal state and
civilian operations take hold. Therefore if an agency is going to be
working on a program in year seven, they must be involved in the design
from the beginning to ensure program continuity and accountability.
Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization cannot be the effort
of just one office. Our Government cannot undertake a responsibility
which is so broad and so deep, that covers so many different potential
countries over so many years, without recognizing there must be a
centralized office that leads, coordinates, and is a center point for
joint operations.
However, this central point cannot be a substitute for those other
successful capabilities that already exist throughout the Government.
Therefore, one of the goals for our Office is to make recommendations
within the policy and budget development processes as appropriate to
support the capabilities required across the USG--to meet
reconstruction and stabilization challenges. Another requirement is to
engage with the military, international partners, and nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector to develop their capacities and
to coordinate with them in planning operations.
STATUS OF OFFICE
S/CRS was mandated by a decision taken by National Security Council
Principals in April 2004. The Office was established in July 2004.
Eight positions and $536,000 were reprogrammed in FY 2004 with
congressional support. The FY 2005 supplemental request included
funding for S/CRS to continue building this capability in advance of
the FY 2006 budget request. With the support of this committee,
especially Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, as well as the support of
many members including, Chairman Cochran, Chairman McConnell, Senator
Leahy, Chairman Wolf, and Congressman Farr, we received $7.7 million in
the enacted FY 2005 supplemental. This funding will allow us to provide
reconstruction and stabilization management support for Sudan including
coordinating the United States efforts underway to implement the Sudan
peace agreement and assistance to Darfur. This funding, however, will
not be sufficient to solidify the Office's staffing or provide for a
civilian rapid response capacity.
Using nonreimbursable details, we have 35 staff in what is an
interagency office in the State Department. We have staff from the
State Department, USAID, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs, Joint Forces Command, the Corps of Engineers, Department
of the Treasury, and the Intelligence Community. This has been
essential to create a capability that not only provides a range of
skills, but gives us the capacity to reach back to individual agencies
for support.
We have established a Policy Coordinating Committee on
stabilization and reconstruction. We have eight interagency working
groups that have been created to address: Transitional security; rule
of law; democracy and governance; infrastructure; economic and social
well-being; humanitarian issues; management; and monitoring and
resources.
We have established extremely strong connections with our
colleagues in the military, especially with Regional Commanders. There
has been no greater supporter of the concept of developing a strong
civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability than our uniformed
military. What we have heard at every single combatant command is that
soldiers have been increasingly pushed to take up responsibilities that
they were not trained to do. The military wants to work with us so that
civilians can deploy with them to undertake civilian activities,
allowing our Armed Forces to concentrate on those activities for which
they should be responsible. We need to have a partnership--a
partnership in planning that begins at the outset and is interlinked
all the way through training, exercises, and finally the process of
stabilization and reconstruction.
From this modest base, the task that we face is to institutionalize
an even broader and stronger capability in our Government, so that we
really address conflict management and conflict responses as a national
security priority. This will require dedicated management resources and
new models of operations that must be built and supported. This is what
our budget request supports.
FUNCTIONS OF S/CRS
S/CRS will pursue five core functions:
Monitor and Plan: Identify states and regions of greatest
risk and importance, and lead U.S. planning focused on these
priorities to avert crises, when possible, to prepare for them
as necessary. Integrate planning and exercises with the
military.
Prepare Skills and Resources: Establish and manage an
interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an
immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance
until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively.
Civilian response corps and standby civilian capabilities will
be developed.
Mobilize and Deploy: Coordinate the deployment of U.S.
resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with
international and local partners to accelerate transitions from
conflict to peace.
Leverage International Resources: Work with international
organizations, international financial institutions, individual
states, and NGOs to harmonize approaches, coordinate planning,
accelerate deployment of assets, and increase the
interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral
operations.
Learn from Experience: Incorporate best practices and
lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning,
exercises, and operational capabilities that support improved
performance.
In undertaking these functions, S/CRS will not duplicate missions
of USAID or other implementing agencies. However, resources are
required to fill critical management gaps; necessary functions that are
not currently being performed.
BUDGET REQUEST
The President is seeking funding in the FY 2006 budget request to
establish the Office and begin to prepare the capacities we need to
respond to conflict in a comprehensive, integrated, and effective way.
The FY 2006 budget includes $24.1 million in State Operations funds for
S/CRS operations and to support the creation of an Active Response
Corps in the Department of State. The FY 2006 request also includes
$100 million in a Conflict Response Fund that will allow the State
Department to rapidly initiate programs in failed or failing states
when the window of opportunity is open widest and while longer term
funding sources are identified.
This first phase request focuses on building core leadership,
coordination, and response capabilities in the Department of State and
providing baseline funding to support rapid field responses essential
to creating positive dynamics for successful R&S operations.
As we learn lessons from this phase on operational requirements and
resource needs, we will factor these lessons into redefining our
operational models and future requests to make them effective. We will
consult with the Congress throughout this process.
PERSONNEL RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS
We have learned the importance of having an effective capacity to
mobilize and deploy in both Washington and overseas and have the people
that are necessary to be able to do that. It takes training, planning,
exercises, and effective mechanisms for deployment. In the model that
we propose, we have analyzed the capabilities that we need inside of
the Government, the capabilities that we need in our external partners,
and the resources that are necessary to make this all work and operate
together. While we will utilize the skills and resources of existing
programs and personnel to plan and respond, there are additional
resources needed to make those work effectively and to speed response
efforts.
Washington Management--S/CRS Staff: To lead and coordinate USG
efforts requires a dedicated core staff. S/CRS will play this
role and act as a force multiplier. S/CRS will facilitate the
planning and the monitoring process; coordinate the management
in Washington and create a capacity for coordination in the
field; take the leadership role in outreach to the
international community; develop an institutional memory by
extracting lessons learned and injecting that back into our
operations.
This staff would have the following specific ongoing responsibilities:
Build and maintain skills and capabilities necessary for
rapid response.
Develop and manage a response corps.
Develop deployment capabilities and rosters.
Develop deployment mechanisms with the military.
Develop and lead the interagency processes for planning and
response.
Develop templates for response efforts, processes, metrics,
and reporting.
Lead the interagency process to monitoring instability--
focus attention on risks of instability.
Manage planning, exercises, and relationships with the
military.
Develop and oversee programs for training of specific
skills.
Create and maintain a lessons-learned capacity--
systematically institutionalize lessons in our operations.
Lead crisis prevention exercises.
Manage resources through tracking, reporting, and financial
controls.
Serve as a focal point within the U.S. Government to engage
other countries and international organizations on
stabilization and reconstruction.
During management of a conflict response S/CRS staff would:
Establish an interagency management group with regional and
functional skills to provide leadership and integration of
effort.
Develop the strategic framework for response.
Synchronize and integrate interagency efforts.
Monitor and report.
Form the core of teams deployed to the field to help develop
the overall strategy.
Deploy to bolster planning capacity at Regional Combatant
Command.
Deploy with military.
Lead initial assessments in the field and support the
embassy, if one is in place.
Manage surge from State and other agencies and private
sector.
Our budget request supports 54 positions for S/CRS. To add
additional needed capabilities we would continue to have detailees from
other agencies with a goal of 80 people total. This is a fairly modest-
sized staff considering the requirements.
Active Response Corps (ARC): The Department needs the
capability to quickly establish or increase a diplomatic
presence on the ground.
The FY 2006 budget request proposes to develop a corps of 100
people within the State Department, both Foreign and Civil Service
employees with a mix of skills--political, economic, diplomatic
security, administrative, law enforcement--so we can increase the
presence in an embassy that has been drawn down, or establish a
diplomatic operation, by turning to a pretrained group of people. This
pre-identified group of people would first participate in a training
and exercise program. They would then be placed in jobs in regional and
functional bureaus but with the understanding that if a team for first-
responders and deployments is required, the ARC would be the team that
you could turn to. Graduates will form a cadre of standby capabilities
within the Department.
Ongoing Responsibilities of ARC members:
--From Management Bureaus, to:
Develop and manage reserves.
Develop new management platforms for interoperability and
deployment support.
Provide emergency field support.
--From Regional Bureaus, to:
Identify and monitor countries at risk of instability.
Engage in conflict prevention strategies.
Provide crisis response surge capacity for backstopping.
--From Functional Bureaus, to:
Engage in coordinating development of peace building
capacity.
Leverage international engagement.
Facilitate civil-military coordination on broad issues.
During an operation, members of the ARC would be:
First responders:
--Deploying when the State Department must establish a transitional
or post-conflict ground operation, such as an interim
embassy or U.S. office.
Diplomats:
--Tying assistance to overall foreign policy objectives.
--Engaging with local leaders.
--Assessing needs and making recommendations.
--Coordinating with the international community on policy and
strategy.
--Managing the influx of technical personnel.
Surge Capacity to rapidly fill gaps, such as:
--Staffing the Washington management team.
--Participating in the planning group at military command.
--Deploying with the military into the field.
--Serving as the liaison with international organizations and NGOs
on the ground.
--Advising on transitional economic policies.
I encourage the Congress to fully support the requested personnel
resources that will enable us to identify people from within the
Department to start developing this cadre of employees.
Technical Corps: We will also need to, in the future, develop
an additional cadre of technical specialists outside of the
Department of State we could quickly tap and put in the field,
specialists who could design an activity and be available to
actually then oversee and supervise that activity over time.
PROGRAM DELIVERY RESOURCES REQUIRED
In addition to having the people that are necessary to manage and
monitor and ensure that there is an effective response, there is a
requirement to mobilize and deploy quickly. Our planning efforts will
synchronize key programs through a range of government mechanisms and
in partnership with international actors. However, we need to have both
rapid mechanisms for initiating programs as well as rapidly deployable
people to perform the technical assistance and other services on the
ground. We need to have sufficient prepositioned global funding
mechanisms (such as indefinite quantity contracts) in a range of key
areas such as transitional security, the rule of law, infrastructure,
humanitarian transition, economics, governance and participation, so we
do not have to start the contracting process and the competition during
a crisis, delaying our response. In cases where it is particularly
important to have a common doctrine and common training, we need to do
that in advance.
In order to do that, we must have resources to make sure that those
mechanisms are in place with firms, with individuals, with NGOs, with
think-thanks, with universities and resources to train individuals as
necessary. We have also begun analysis of whether it would make sense
to have something in the civilian world that is akin to the military
reserve which could include different skills that might extend the base
of constabulary police, judges, civil administrators, city planners,
economists, and other skills. We will assess whether it's more cost
effective to obtain those skills through a reserve or through a
contract or other roster mechanism.
To be able to mobilize such resources quickly, we have proposed a
$100 million Conflict Response Fund that will support initial program
activities in a crisis situation to provide the administration with an
immediate source of funding to respond to a crisis and to provide the
administration and the Congress additional time to address longer term
requirements.
To use the fund, the Secretary of State would need to determine
that a post-conflict response is in our national interest, consulting
with the Congress and sending notifications when resources from the
fund are required. Such an account would fund programs that promote
stability, advance the rule of law, facilitate transitional governance
and political legitimacy, and address immediate social and economic
needs. These programs' funds would normally be spent in the course of a
post-conflict response. The difference in making them available quickly
is that they would:
--Influence the dynamic and viability of post-conflict operations.
--Maximize impact of USG interagency instruments.
--Leverage matching international responses.
--Allows time to seek other funding mechanisms for long-term through
regular budget processes.
LEGISLATION AND AUTHORITIES
We have first looked at what we can do now with existing
authorities and mechanisms and then reviewed what additional
authorities and mechanisms would not be helpful. The administration's
Foreign Relations Authorization Act request for fiscal years 2006 and
2007 contains authorities required to provide this flexibility and we
hope the Congress acts favorably on our request. We look forward to
working with the Congress toward enactment of legislation that meets
the administration's needs.
We need very much the personnel flexibilities requested by the
administration so that we have additional tools for hiring people under
a variety of mechanisms for temporary or quick response work as well as
flexible authorities requested for the Conflict Response Fund contained
within the FY 2006 budget request.
CONCLUSION
We have incorporated lessons learned from a range of post conflict
operations into the development of our Office. What we have learned is
that there is a need for management resources and authority to lead a
coordinated response. From the military we have taken the lesson of
joint operations, planning, exercises, and a capacity to coordinate
them all. By having key staff identified in advance, able to play these
management roles, able to plan, to exercise, to train, to put in place
the kind of advance mechanisms that I have discussed and, with some
resources, actually get them into the field quickly, we can save lives,
save money, and advance our international prestige.
To give you an example, consider the $124 million that is called
for in the FY 2006 request. If we are able as a result of getting into
the field more quickly, at a critical moment, and to affect the
dynamics in the course of a stabilization operation, and as a result
take just one Army division out of the field 1 month earlier, we would
save the taxpayers $1.2 billion, according to the Pentagon. If we can
end an international peacekeeping operation 6 months earlier, net
savings could amount to hundreds of millions, depending on the size and
nature of that peacekeeping operation. Not only is investment in the S/
CRS initiative a necessary thing to do from a policy perspective, it
will, in the end, save us money and quite possibly lives.
Thank you for allowing me to explain this key initiative in the
President's FY 2006 budget request for the Department of State. I
welcome the opportunity to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Pascual.
The Chairman. I call now upon Mr. Henry for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. RYAN HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Henry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear
before you and your committee today with Ambassador Pascual,
and my colleagues from both the Joint Staff and the U.S. Agency
for International Development. And I have submitted a statement
for the record, and would like to take you up on your offer to
summarize some key points.
The Department of Defense strongly supports the Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the
State Department and its mission to mobilize capabilities for
stabilization and reconstruction for operations abroad.
As our National Defense Strategy and National Military
Strategy make clear, some of the most significant threats to
our national interests in the early 21st century will stem from
instabilities, extremism, terrorism, and criminality that is
generated within weak states.
The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq, of Liberia and
Haiti, during the first term of this administration and other--
and places elsewhere have reinforced that addressing the
threats requires a comprehensive government approach to both
stabilization and reconstruction.
The Department of Defense has a key role to play in
establishing a secure environment. But the expertise of other
U.S. Government departments and agencies in promoting essential
services, the rule of law, the development of civil society and
elected governments, and the institution of a market-based
economy is essential in establishing a stable-nation state.
S/CRS will play a critical role in coordinating the work
across all departments and agencies within the Government, and
the Department of Defense stands ready to respond positively.
The ability of S/CRS to coordinate our Government's
response and mobilize civilian capabilities quickly will save
lives and treasure.
Preventing conflict and rapidly establishing a sustainable
peace after conflict are critical objectives. Because the
Department of Defense understands the need for early measures
to prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from
becoming conflicts, we have provided a significant amount of
support already to S/CRS.
We have six personnel as liaison and expert advisors to the
Coordinator. We have arranged participation in multiple
conferences, seminars, trainings, and most especially, military
exercises on the behalf of S/CRS.
We have funded a feasibility study on the development of a
civilian response force. We are offering support to S/CRS's
planning efforts. And we have provided advice and assistance to
the development of different operational concepts that might be
used by the Coordinator.
We are funding model-based predictive tools to identify to
states of concern, and we have sponsored a legislative proposal
and a defense authorization bill to help State fill the
civilian deployment gap until S/CRS and the State Department
are able to do so.
I would also like to take a moment to highlight DOD's
legislative proposal in support of S/CRS and the issue of
funding the Coordinator generally.
The Department of Defense strongly supports the President's
budget for both State and S/CRS, and so they can continue the
capability--developing capabilities for reconstruction and
stabilization.
In the near term, DOD would like to help S/CRS fill the gap
in its ability to deploy in a crisis. The administration's
recommended section 1204 of the defense authorization bill
proposes to fill this gap by offering a transfer authority in
drawdown of up to $200 million for goods, services, and
additional funding for S/CRS when they need to deploy. And I
would urge the committee to support the State and S/CRS budgets
in full.
We are hoping the Senate Armed Services Committee, under
Chairman Warner, will also support the inclusion of our
recommended section 1204 to enable the deployment of the
Coordinator's activities.
The main goal of DOD's support to S/CRS is to integrate
civilian and military efforts across the spectrum of peace and
conflict. In addition to the ongoing support already mentioned,
DOD plans on focusing the integration of civilian and military
efforts in three broad areas--training and exercising, planning
and operational needs. And I will discuss these briefly.
Joint training and education ensures that the civilian and
military personnel who deploy to the field have common
operating assumptions and understand how to work together.
Similarly, the purposes of joint exercises is to provide
the civilian and military personnel an opportunity to test what
they have learned before they deploy. Joint planning helps
identify civilian and military roles and responsibilities and
ensure that the civilian and military personnel know what to
expect from their counterparts when they are deployed.
The main challenge here is in developing a robust civilian
planning capability that is comparable and compatible with the
current military planning process.
Achieving jointness in the area of operational needs
requires comprehensively addressing the current shortfall in
trained and deployable civilians for reconstruction and
stabilization in missions abroad.
This will require expanding the current mechanisms and, in
some cases, establishing new ones. For instance, there is an
abundance of untapped talent in State and local governments and
nonprofit and private sectors.
S/CRS and DOD have already begun working together toward
jointness and training and exercising, planning and the
development of operational needs. But there is still much work
to be done. It will require the full funding of the President's
budget this year and in future years.
The establishment of S/CRS is a first critical step to
transforming the way our Government addresses the pressing
security requirements and responds to the stabilization and
reconstruction missions around the world.
We cannot realize this vision of the committee and the
President in championing S/CRS without continued backing from
the Hill. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Henry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
appear before you today with Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department, as well
as my colleagues from the Joint Staff and the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
Ambassador Pascual and his staff have done an excellent job in
standing up the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S.
Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-major
conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in
transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a
sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.
In the coming years, the work of S/CRS will be critical to
achieving U.S. national security goals. As the National Security
Strategy and the National Military Strategy make clear, some of the
most significant threats to U.S. national interests in the early 21st
century stem from the instabilities, extremism, terrorism, and
criminality generated within weak states.
Because of the centrality of these threats in the war on terrorism,
DOD is working diligently to make stability operations a core
competency of our Armed Forces. However, as the experiences of
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere demonstrate, the military can not
accomplish these missions alone.
Efforts must be made to build the capacity of our partners abroad
and augment the ability of civilian components of the USG to respond
rapidly and effectively. The ability to mobilize civilian resources
quickly is as important as the ability to mobilize military resources
in achieving U.S. national security goals.
DOD SUPPORT TO S/CRS TO DATE
DOD is strongly committed to supporting S/CRS in its efforts to
increase civilian capacity to respond to stabilization and
reconstruction missions around the world. The ability of civilian
components of the USG to prevent conflict and/or establish a
sustainable peace will save lives and money by either obviating the
need for military force in the first place or helping our troops come
home more quickly.
Since the establishment of S/CRS in July 2004, DOD has provided a
significant amount of support to S/CRS, including:
Sending five to six liaisons at a given time to S/CRS.
Inviting S/CRS to participate in innumerable conferences,
seminars, training classes, and exercises.
Funding a feasibility study on development of a ``Civilian
Response Force.''
Offering support to S/CRS planning efforts.
Providing advice and assistance to the development of S/CRS
operational concepts to coordinate USG efforts at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Sponsoring section 1204 legislative proposal to allow DOD to
help State fill the ``civilian deployment gap'' until S/CRS is
able to do so.
Many of these activities are ongoing. Of particular concern,
however, is DOD's section 1204 legislative proposal in the National
Defense Authorization bill, which would allow DOD to help State fill
the ``civilian deployment gap.''
SECTION 1204 LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The Department of Defense's section 1204 legislative proposal to
support S/CRS has not been included in either the House or Senate FY
2006 defense authorization bills. The proposal would allow the DOD to
transfer up to $200 million in goods, services, sand funding to S/CRS
through FY 2006. DOD goods, services, and funding would bridge a gap in
the S/CRS's near-term ability to deploy quickly to a crisis.
Existing DOD authorities do not have enough flexibility to support
civilian partners. For example, under the Economy Act, DOD can only use
items from existing stocks to support activities that it has that
authority to do itself. Drawdown is slow and prohibits the transfer of
funds or the ability to contract--both vital for stabilization and
reconstruction operations. I urge you to include this provision in the
authorization bill during upcoming floor consideration.
CURRENT FOCUS OF DOD SUPPORT TO S/CRS
The main goal of DOD support to S/CRS is to integrate civilian and
military efforts across the spectrum of peace and conflict. Achieving
this goal requires civilian and military personnel to train together,
plan together, and operate together. Hence DOD efforts in support of S/
CRS are focused on three areas: Training and Exercising, Planning, and
Operational Needs.
TRAINING AND EXERCISING
The Armed Forces of the United States are the best in the world
because they continuously go through cycles of training, exercising,
and operating. Achieving the same skill level on the civilian side of
the USG will require similar repetitive cycles of training, exercising,
and operating.
As a first step, the Department of Defense has opened the doors of
its educational institutions to S/CRS and invited them to multiple
exercises. DOD is also participating in S/CRS efforts to create
training opportunities, such as the new course on stabilization and
reconstruction that the Foreign Service Institute has developed.
The goal is for DOD and S/CRS to train and exercise jointly--with
the DOD learning from S/CRS and S/CRS learning from DOD. Joint training
and education ensures that civilians and military deployed in the field
have common operating assumptions and understand how to work together.
Joint exercising gives civilians and military personnel the opportunity
to test what they've learned before they are deployed.
The Department of Defense would like to expand joint training and
exercising with S/CRS and other civilian components of the USG. The
main limiting factor for S/CRS is time and funding. S/CRS has a total
staff of approximately 35 persons with a heavy workload and day-to-day
responsibilities that often preclude long-term training for themselves
and the development of training opportunities for others.
PLANNING
Building a robust planning capability in S/CRS and other civilian
components of the USG is critical to ensuring future success in
stabilization and reconstruction missions. This is a large and
important task which will involve not only education and training, but
also the creation of new structures.
The Department of Defense realizes the critical nature of this task
and is working to (1) help S/CRS develop a planning capability and (2)
integrate S/CRS and other civilian components of the USG, as
appropriate, into the DOD planning process.
S/CRS staff have made progress in this area. They have begun to develop
a strategic planning template and are learning about the military
planning process. There is much work to do. There is a shared desire to
move forward.
OPERATIONAL NEEDS
The Department of Defense has identified the lack of trained and
deployable civilians as a critical limiting factor in the ability of
the USG to conduct stabilization and reconstruction missions abroad.
Full funding of the Department of State and S/CRS in FY 2006 would
allow it to develop an Active Response Corps consisting of 100
personnel from within the State Department. They are also looking at
expanding contract mechanisms and putting together a USG database of
civilians within the USG.
This is a good start, but a more robust mechanism may be needed. At
the request of S/CRS, DOD is funding a feasibility study for S/CRS on
the establishment of a ``Civilian Response Corps'' managed by a
civilian department or agency. The study is assessing the requirements
and costs of various options contracts, rosters, reserves, and
combinations thereof--for providing a standby civilian capacity for
deployments.
The study is still being worked on, but there are a few conclusions
that can be drawn from previous experience:
(1) Regular training and exercising of a civilian corps is
just as important as with a military reserve. ``Pick-up'' games
rarely work well.
(2) There is an abundance of untapped talent in State and
local governments, and the nonprofit and private sectors.
(3) Contract mechanisms may be sufficient for some skill
sets, but not all (i.e. transitional security).
CONCLUSION
The strategic environment has changed and the USG must keep pace if
it hopes to accomplish its national security objectives and win the war
on terror. Establishing S/CRS is a critical first step to transforming
the way the USG responds to stabilization and reconstruction missions
around the world. It is important to continue transforming the USG to
meet the challenges of war, instability, and peace.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Henry, for
coming this morning.
The Chairman. I appreciate your mention of Chairman Warner.
I would mention we would want to share the full hearing record
with the chairman, with Senator Levin, the distinguished
ranking member, and other members of the Armed Services
Committee, because they share our interest in what we are
talking about today.
Mr. Henry. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. General Sharp. Can we--may we have your
thoughts this morning?
STATEMENT OF LTG WALTER SHARP, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND
POLICY, JOINT STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Sharp. Good morning, sir. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman. And I also appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss this very important initiative. As
you know the primary purpose of our military is to win our
Nation's wars.
With the support of Congress we have had some major
successes during the last 4 years of sustained combat
operations. However, those of us in uniform are acutely aware
of the limits of traditional military power.
Enhancing our post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction capabilities is important in our ability to be
able to prevail. General Myers, General Pace, and the combatant
commanders are committed to helping build the civilian capacity
to plan and execute future stabilization and reconstruction
operations.
We believe stabilization and reconstruction operations need
to become a core competency of all departments of our
Government. Our experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere
have made it clear that our military cannot accomplish this
mission alone.
In addition to building the capacity of our partners
overseas, we must enhance the ability of all departments of our
Government to rapidly plan and respond to a crisis. Only then
can we bring to bear all elements of national power in a
coordinated fashion.
Taking on crises in this manner will allow us to more
rapidly and effectively stop or avert or lessen the depth and
breadth of any problems and contingencies, and most importantly
save both military and civilian lives and money.
Developing this capacity takes leadership and organization.
With the help of this committee and many others, we believe
Ambassador Pascual is providing the right leadership and
building the right organization.
S/CRS is developing a cadre of deployable people who have
skills in the following areas that we think are critical.
First, security--both from developing the police and also the
military side. Second, rule of law--developing the country's
judicial and penal capabilities. Third, an infrastructure--
developing a country's electrical, fuel, and sanitation
systems. Fourth, in the economic and social welfare areas--
helping a country to develop jobs and health services. Fifth,
humanitarian--making sure that food and shelter is available.
And, sixth, governance--helping to establish the ability of a
country to govern and to conduct elections.
This effort is focused on three capabilities that are
particularly important for stabilization and reconstruction
operations. The first required capability for stabilization and
reconstruction is planning. All agencies in the U.S. Government
need to have the types of deliberate and crisis planning
capabilities possessed by our combative commanders, joint task
force commanders, and the joint staff.
Ambassador Pascual and Administrator Natsios have made good
progress not only in developing their planning processes but in
integrating them with the military here in Washington and out
with our combatant commanders.
I would also like to add that Admiral Giambastiani and
Joint Forces Command have taken a very active role in this
endeavor.
The second required capability is to be able to rapidly
mobilize and deploy properly trained civilians when a crisis
arises. Ambassador Pascual and his staff have come up with some
innovative ideas of how to accomplish this, including the
active reserve corps and several expanded contracting
mechanisms that will allow us to quickly build up, then
sustain, our capability for stabilization and reconstruction.
DOD has considerable experience with mobilizing and
deploying Reserve forces in time of crisis. And we have
provided lessons learned and other assistance as required.
There is more work to be done, but we believe we are definitely
on the right track.
The third necessary capability is to exercise these
planning and execution functions. This is essential to ensure
that planning, mobilization, and deployment mechanisms are
sufficiently well developed and integrated with all other
agencies to include the Department of Defense. Here, again,
good progress has been made.
Both S/CRS and USAID has spent considerable time ensuring
that stabilization and reconstruction operations are featured
in all future combatant command exercises.
The necessary training to prepare personnel for these
exercises is being put into place as well. In fact, two
officers from my staff are attending the new Foreign Service
Institute course on stabilization and reconstruction this week.
As I stated earlier, we are committed to helping our
civilian counterparts succeed. I have highlighted many of the
actions that have taken--that we have taken to assist
Ambassador Pascual and his organization.
The chairman, General Myers, also joins with Ryan Henry in
requesting that Congress include the President's section 1204
in the fiscal year 2006 defense authorization bill.
This proposal would allow DOD to transfer up to $200
million in equipment services and money to S/CRS during fiscal
year 2006 and greatly improve Ambassador Pascual's ability to
rapidly deploy in a crisis.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the President has charged us
with a task of improving the responsiveness of our Government
to help nations emerging from tyranny and war. I believe we had
made good progress toward building that kind of robust
organization that can plan, mobilize, and deploy at a pace
equal to the military and provide assistance the President has
called for.
Many challenges remain. However, with the continual help of
this committee and Congress as a whole, we can succeed. Mr.
Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, General Sharp, for your
testimony.
I would like to call now on Mr. Kunder. And I have already
recognized the wonderful contribution you have made to our
group as we began to think about this legislation and the whole
area. It is great to welcome you back today.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JAMES R. KUNDER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Kunder. Thank you, sir. I consider the service on that
advisory group one of the high points of my career and very
much appreciated the opportunity to do that.
I just want to make four points quickly. I appreciate your
telling us we do not have to be too economical with our words,
but we should be economical.
First, I would like to say that we unequivocally and
strongly support the Office that Carlos is leading at the
Department of State. We think this is exactly the right tool at
exactly the right time to organize the overall U.S. Government
effort and to make it more effective in crisis response.
I had the opportunity to open the USAID mission in Kabul,
Afghanistan, after the Taliban fell, and previously I had the
opportunity to serve as Director of USAID's Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance, so I have some experience in crisis
response, having worked in Somalia, Bosnia, southern Sudan, and
other places. And, while what we are discussing may appear to
be an abstract government organization issue, I want to endorse
very much what Ambassador Pascual said about the urgency of
moving forward, because in the field, the inefficiencies in
response, or the slowness in response, is translated into
broken bodies and starving children. So the urgency in the real
world is quite intense that we get these kind of reforms done.
I would also agree very much with what Mr. Henry has said
about the costs in terms of our own soldiers' lives and, of
course, our own children's lives, if we allow these unstable
spots to fester on the face of the earth. So we very strongly
endorse what Carlos is doing.
We also want to note that we think the President and
Secretary of State's choice of Ambassador Pascual was inspired.
We are proud of the fact that he has served in USAID, as well
as the State Department, so we think he has enormous breadth of
experience and a unique perspective. In general, we think that
the Office of Crisis Response and Stabilization is exactly the
right tool.
The second point I would like to make is that we, at USAID,
are trying to organize in response to the impetus that the
committee has provided and the President has provided.
Administrator Natsios, when he took over the job as USAID
Administrator, created a new bureau called the Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, to link
together the various elements that General Sharp was just
talking about, recognizing that humanitarian response,
governance, and crisis response are all critical.
Subsequent to the creation of Ambassador Pascual's Office,
we are looking at reorganizing again in direct response, so
that we can provide the kinds of teams that he will need to
deploy and the capacity that he will need when he gives the
signal to send our U.S. Government joint forces forward.
We have also created a new Office of Military Affairs at
USAID. In the real world, we are dealing with our military
colleagues on a daily basis in the provincial reconstruction
teams in Afghanistan, in the field in Iraq, and in many other
places. But we completely agree that we need to do more joint
training and more joint planning.
So, under the overall umbrella that Ambassador Pascual is
putting together here, we are trying to establish these direct
civilian/military linkages to be more effective in the field.
The third point I would make--and hence the charts up here
and charts appended to my statement--is that, in addition to
structural change, we are trying to do serious operational
research in the process that we are engaged in. This is
something we are doing in conjunction with Ambassador Pascual's
Office and in cooperation with our military colleagues.
The U.S. Government needs to understand better exactly what
to do when we have a crisis. We are looking not just at after
nations have fallen apart, but we are looking at countries that
are beginning to show the signs of instability and trying to
generate resources so that a penny spent now saves the taxpayer
a dollar later.
Across the area that I am honored to manage, we not only
are looking at Afghanistan reconstruction and Iraq
reconstruction, but we are also looking at Nepal, and we are
looking at fraying of the social order in Bangladesh, and we
are looking at Sri Lanka, and we are looking at continued
instability in Mindanao in the Philippines. These charts look
at questions about how we can direct the sources of
instability, government effectiveness versus government
legitimacy, delivery of social services but delivery of social
services in socially acceptable ways. How do we engage the
active Muslim communities in these places, who agree with us on
many questions of child survival and maternal well-being--how
do we mobilize them as assets, rather than enemies?
This kind of operational research, which I just touch on
with these charts, is, I think, a rich area for us all to work
together on.
The fourth point I would touch on in closing is the
question of resources and manpower. I thought one of the most
important findings to come out of the policy advisory group
that you initiated, and which you cited earlier, is the fact
that we have to have some bodies to do this. I have reported to
the committee before--and I am not here specifically to talk
about USAID; I am here as part of the interagency team--but
USAID, from a high point of about 9,000 employees during the
Vietnam war, because of policy decisions made during the
nineties is down to about 2,100 officers worldwide.
We simply, at some point, need the bodies to get out in the
field. So we strongly endorse Ambassador Pascual's call for the
conflict response fund, the $100 million fund, and also the
establishment of some standing capacity so that we can get the
right folks out to the field.
I was listening closely to General Sharp's comments about
the kinds of capacities we need. We completely agree with that.
Right now, within the U.S. Government, we know that in every
crisis there is likely to be a need for demobilizing fighters.
In any one of these crises, informal forces--militia forces,
guerrilla forces, warlord forces--are constituted. We need to
demobilize those fighters and reintegrate them into civilian
life.
Yet we do not have a dedicated capacity anywhere in the
U.S. Government, a cadre of technical experts, who know how to
do that well.
And in closing, sir, I would like to thank the committee
and the Senate and the Congress for their support for beginning
to turn this around. We have gotten authority from the Congress
to increase our hiring at USAID by a couple hundred. It is not
enough, but it is very much welcome. We have brought one of our
new classes of ``new entry professionals'' to this hearing. If
I could ask the chairman's indulgence, we have a group of them
standing in the back of the room, who are coming up for their
first congressional hearing.
The Chairman. Please stand.
Mr. Kunder. This is part of their training in understanding
the importance of the Congress to our work.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Kunder. These are the kind of folks with graduate
degrees who will help rejuvenate some of us gray-haired folks
who have been working in this area.
So with that, I would just close again with our strong
endorsement of Ambassador Pascual's role and the criticality of
sustained support and resources for what he is doing.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Kinder, Assistant Administrator for Asia
and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear
before you again today. I especially welcome the opportunity to testify
on the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization in the State Department (S/CRS) and its role as part of
our national security architecture. We, at USAID, appreciate the
committee's strong interest in, and support for, improving the U.S.
Government's crisis response capability, and the sustained leadership
shown by the chairman, Senator Biden, and other members of the
committee.
Clearly, one of the central lessons of 9/11 is the critical
importance of weak and failing states. The pathologies that emerge from
fragile and failed states readily spread across porous boundaries and
potentially affect entire regions with crime, drugs, disease,
trafficking, and environmental degradation, as well as economic
deterioration and political instability. These states may also be the
scenes of large-scale refugee or internal displacement, and can spawn
widespread human rights abuses.
As the National Security Strategy states, we need to bring to bear
the whole range of tools that are at our disposal--in the domains of
defense, diplomacy, and development--and apply them in a much more
consistent, coherent, and coordinated fashion. The President meant this
in a general sense and as a fundamental prerequisite to a more
effective foreign policy in a period of instability. But the
coordination imperative also applies, specifically, in the case of
failing and failed states where military, diplomatic, and development
endeavors must be brought to bear synergistically.
Failed and failing states are both the incubators of terrorism and
the sanctuary for terrorists. It was no mere coincidence that the
Sudan, Somalia, and Afghanistan served as al-Qaida's training and
staging redoubts. As the National Security Strategy document succinctly
puts it: ``America is now threatened less by conquering states than by
failing ones.'' Regions far away, we now know by painful experience,
are not immune from the consequences that arise from state failure on
other continents. This became all too obvious to this country the
morning of September 11, 2001.
Over the last 15 years, USAID has been involved in six major post-
conflict and stabilization projects, including Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. We have also been significantly
involved in a variety of others, including Cambodia, Mozambique, El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Colombia, and
East Timor. As these lists indicate, the problem is not limited to any
one region of the world, nor is state failure a transient phenomenon.
USAID brings unique strengths that it has gathered from over 50 years
of humanitarian and post-conflict interventions. In a 2001 study, our
Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination found, incredibly, that two-
thirds of the 80 countries, where we were present, had experienced
violent conflict over the previous 5 years.
As this committee has noted in previous deliberations, the USG's
approach to dealing with failing and failed states has, historically,
been ad hoc and reactive. All too often, senior policymakers have
become seriously engaged only at the point when the situation has
deteriorated to such a point that continued inaction has become
unacceptable as a matter of national security or morality. Stated
differently, we have historically tended to engage ourselves at the
point where our interventions are most urgent and least promising.
Because failed and failing states feature prominently in the Global War
on Terror, we must be more proactive and strategic in our response.
The President's initiative in establishing the Office of
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is an important component in
addressing this most important national security problem. USAID
believes S/CRS can play a significant role as part of the new foreign
policy apparatus required to meet the challenges we now face. S/CRS can
help ``fill the gap'' in meeting some of the shortcomings we have
experienced in dealing with failed and failing states over the past
decade and a half, and in better coordinating the civilian response to
crisis, as well as the civil-military strategies, plans, and responses
essential to successful stabilization operations.
As a standing office, S/CRS can help monitor states that are prone
to fragility and bring high-level attention to problems as they
develop. This can help us take steps necessary to shore up weak states.
In the event of failures we cannot prevent,
S/CRS can also help us design strategies that ensure a timely,
effective USG response. In other words, the existence of S/CRS will
allow for timelier interventions that can either prevent or mitigate a
crisis. This will help avoid situations, as in Somalia, where matters
degenerated to such an extent that our only effective alternative was
the application of force. In brief, S/CRS will enable us to act in a
more proactive manner and with a greater array of tools.
S/CRS can play an important role in coordinating with partners in
other countries and international organizations to pool the necessary
resources to deal more effectively with states in crisis. It can play
the same indispensable coordinating role among a range of departments
and offices in the USG, ensuring that the particular expertise and
value-added of each USG agency is reinforcing the overall USG effort.
For these reasons, USAID is a strong supporter of the S/CRS
architecture and has been providing staff and resources to assist the
Office in getting up and running. USAID has seconded 7 senior staff
from the Agency to further CRS's work, and we intend to continue
providing staff support to bolster its capacity in key leadership
areas.
We also believe Ambassador Pascual to be an inspired choice to lead
S/CRS. We are proud that, among the many contributions he has made to
our Nation, he initially came from the ranks of USAID. His
extraordinary breadth of experience and perspective, and his analytical
and leadership qualities, make him an ideal person for the unifying and
innovating role in which the President and Secretary of State have
asked him to serve.
USAID's work in fragile and failing states will be guided by its
new Fragile States Strategy.\1\ With assistance to weak states now at
the center of the national security agenda, USAID has undertaken an
extensive reassessment of how to improve the effectiveness of its
response to the unique challenges posed by fragile states. The strategy
identifies three central goals: Improving the analysis and monitoring
of fragile states; focusing programs on the causes of fragility; and
improving internal business practices to facilitate a rapid and
effective response. The strategy is based on the understanding that
close coordination among the range of USG agencies is essential, which
is why we believe S/CRS has such a crucial role to play.
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\1\ This document has been retained in the permanent record of the
hearing and also can be viewed at the Web site: www.usaid.gov/policy/
2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf.
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It should be noted that the efforts to improve stabilization and
reconstruction capacity in the United States have parallels
internationally, as well. USAID's sister agency in Great Britain, the
Department for International Development (DFID), has also put forward a
fragile-states strategy that closely parallels our own. Fragile and
failing states were also on the agenda of a Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) meeting of the OECD in February. This gathering brought
together some 100 heads of donor organizations, Western development
officials, and representatives from developing countries and afforded
both DFID and USAID the opportunity to unveil their respective
strategies.
Recognizing that USAID must adapt its structures and functions to
the current challenges our Nation faces, Administrator Natsios has made
a number of innovative internal changes, both preceding the
establishment of S/CRS and in sync with the new office. For example,
upon assuming office, the Administrator established the new Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, structurally linking
the Agency's response to the disparate elements often encountered in
failed or failing states: Humanitarian needs; conflict within society;
and democracy and governance issues. Within this new Bureau, Mr.
Natsios created the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, with
the specific mission of tracking failing states and impelling responses
to prevent full-scale state failure.
As we implement our Fragile States Strategy we are now pursuing
further organizational changes within USAID so that we can meet the
Agency's new mandate under the President's National Security Strategy.
This includes organizing to interface effectively with S/CRS, across
the range of USAID's response capabilities. We are concurrently
perfecting an agencywide response platform that links rapid post-
conflict humanitarian and stabilization activities with immediate
planning for longer term recovery. We view this linkage as the real
value-added USAID brings to the USG's reconstruction and stabilization
arsenal. USAID management recognizes that we need to stop the
instability when states fail--to ``staunch the bleeding,'' if you
will--but we also need, simultaneously, to sow the seeds for long-term
reconstruction and development. In military terms, we need to take the
steps that will allow our troops to come home as soon as possible, but
we also need to initiate the long-term development that will help
ensure they will not be called back to the same country several years
later. We are developing a standard structure and system for standing
up and operating a complex emergency task force that can become
operational as quickly as USAID's Response Management Teams (RMTs) for
natural disasters, then transition rapidly to a reconstruction and
development platform. Our initial efforts at such a task force
configuration in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Asian tsunami have taught
us useful lessons, on which we are building.
The President and Secretary Rice have emphasized the centrality of
democracy and freedom, both to our national security and to development
in general. Democracy and human freedom contribute to stability and
prevent state collapse, and further, when states are rebuilding,
democratic, inclusive governance must be incorporated into the
reconstruction process. Without strong democratic systems in place,
reconstruction efforts are left in jeopardy. Democracy, rule of law,
and good governance are the key elements of USAID's Democracy Strategy
that are needed to ensure the success of reconstruction efforts in
fragile and failing states.
The spread of democracy is central to our national security. As the
President has said, new challenges arise from ``terror networks'' that
are aided by ``outlaw regimes'' or live at the intersection of failed
states, poverty, chaos, and despair. It should now be clear that the
advance of democracy leads to peace, because governments that respect
the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbors
and because ``in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the
expense of liberty.''
Good governance, founded on democratic principles, is our best hope
of meeting those challenges before they become threats. USAID has
established, as a core goal, ``the transition to, and consolidation of
democracy and good governance throughout the world.'' To reach that
goal, we focus on three objectives: Expand political freedom and
competition; promote justice and human rights through rule of law; and
strengthen democratic and accountable governance. USAID programs are
implemented by a democracy corps of over 400 democracy and governance
officers who serve in over 80 country and regional missions, and who
are managing $1.2 billion in program resources in 2005 support the
administration's initiative.
USAID is dedicated to ensuring that its resources carry out the
vision of the President, and ultimately the American people, by
supporting the development of prosperous democratic partners for the
United States around the world. Two recent examples of USAID's efforts
in post-conflict democracy building include:
Iraq: USAID played a key role in supporting the Iraqi election
process as well as helping to build democratic institutions in a
country that was misruled with an iron fist for generations. USAID
helped mobilize thousands of Iraqi election staff, many hundred Iraqi
civil society organizations, and helped Iraqi and international
organizations to field domestic election observers, deliver voter
education, and implement conflict mitigation programs. With USAID
support, over 220 core election monitors were trained, and with
additional European Union support, in turn trained as many as 12,000
domestic monitors. One indicator of election success was the higher
than anticipated voter turnout. But most importantly, the 275-member
Iraqi National Assembly (INA)--with 25 percent female representation--
was elected to govern the country, draft a new constitution, and
provide for a national referendum on the constitution and subsequently
a constitutional government.
Afghanistan: USAID has helped Afghanistan move toward the promise
of democracy, stability, and peace. The staging of the Loya Jirga
national assembly in summer 2002, only months after the fall of the
Taliban regime, owes much to logistical support provided by USAID. The
USG was the largest and earliest donor. USAID provided $151.2 million,
including logistical support for the Afghan Transitional Authority to
convene the delegates responsible for ratifying the new Afghan
Constitution. USAID also supported the October 2004 Presidential
elections, when Afghans elected Hamid Karzai. USAID today is deeply
involved in helping to prepare for parliamentary elections currently
scheduled for September 2005--helping Afghans build a legitimate state
with institutions that promote good governance and the rule of law.
An important element of our restructuring for stabilization and
reconstruction efforts is a more formal linkage with the U.S.
Department of Defense at the operational level. Although we have
traditionally maintained a military liaison unit in USAID's Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and while we work closely with
military units in Afghanistan, Iraq, in the tsunami response, and in
many other locales, Administrator Natsios has directed that we
establish improved planning and liaison structures. In response to his
directive, USAID has now created a Military Policy Board, and a new
Office of Military Affairs. The Military Policy Board oversees the
policy interface with DOD, including personnel and training actions.
The new Office of Military Affairs will manage and facilitate USAID's
day-to-day work with DOD, prioritizing and managing training,
conferences and exercises, planning, communications and operations with
the military when crises arise.
The USAID links with S/CRS, our strengthened crisis response
platform, and new Office of Military Affairs will significantly
increase USAID's stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. We
believe these changes will make us a more useful partner to Ambassador
Pascual and his team, as he takes on the challenges he faces, including
the need for a coordinated USG plan and response, the imperative for
additional, flexible resources, and the requirement for filling in the
gaps that still exist within the USG response system.
In closing, I would like to bring to the committee's attention two
areas of policy and operational research in which USAID is active, and
which we hope will contribute to the topic we are discussing today:
Building peace in hostile environments. As part of the development of
USAID's Fragile States Strategy mentioned earlier, we are pursuing
ongoing work to examine fragile states--failing, failed, or recovering
states--and what steps the USG can take to assist them. Our work
attempts to disaggregate the causal factors for fragility, broadly
arrayed as issues of effectiveness and issues of legitimacy. We then
align resources against these factors. The attached chart reviews our
approach to fragile states.
A second area of operational research, shared with S/CRS, is in the
area of refining the post-conflict task framework, and carefully
delineating and sequencing the required tasks, when a nation does slip
into crisis. The second attached chart, prepared for our Iraq program,
serves as a brief indicator of how a ``menu'' of task options is
transformed into a reconstruction strategy. By carefully examining the
task framework, we believe we can contribute to the USG's efforts to
identify programmatic and organizational gaps in the overall
stabilization and reconstruction system.
USAID applauds the committee's staunch support for S/CRS and the
stabilization and reconstruction response systems needed to meet our
national security objectives. I am prepared to answer any questions the
committee may have.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for that strong
testimony. Likewise for introduction of your new associates.
That is so important in understanding this.
Let me just begin the questioning. We will have a 10-minute
round, and I have a lot of questions. So I hope we will have
opportunities to raise those during the course of the time.
I would just mention for those who come into this subject,
sort of in midstream, that without oversimplifying what we are
talking about, it is the fact that there has been perhaps a
long American tradition of going out into the world and
fighting battles successfully and, having done so with
satisfaction that the right side has won, withdrawing, coming
home, and retiring.
And one can argue historically how well or how poorly that
all has worked, but obviously we are in a new cycle of
understanding of this. Afghanistan in the late eighties is a
case in point. Suddenly we did withdraw from Afghanistan. We
withdrew from Pakistan. We, in essence, came home. But not
everything continued well in Afghanistan.
And as we now know, the al-Qaida encampments began training
persons who attacked us here in the United States, not in
Afghanistan. Americans have wondered what happened in the
meanwhile.
Now, essentially we went back to Afghanistan, but the
thought on this occasion was that perhaps we should work
carefully with the Afghans on a government structure there that
would be very helpful for all the people of that country, but,
likewise, helpful for ourselves and for the rest of the world,
so that there would not be a reconstitution of al-Qaida or an
incubator for terrorism in the country.
That is a big commitment, as you have pointed out, a
daunting challenge, Afghanistan, all by itself. And you can
say, ``Well, surely, there must be talented Americans that can
be found somewhere in the country to supplement the role of our
fighters, who are still working their way through the rest of
al-Qaida or the Taliban or so forth,'' and there are. But the
point of our exercise now is to identify these professionals
and maybe others that are an auxiliary, who can be helpful to
them permanently. Just as we could not have envisioned
precisely the outcome in Afghanistan, we have an even more
daunting challenge working with our allies in Iraq.
And as you have pointed out, Mr. Kunder, we have even taken
a look at Nepal and various other countries that you mentioned,
not from the standpoint that we are going in full force to
reorganize their governments, but rather as you said, as
preventive medicine, where there are requests for help and
stability.
Now, since our policy in Afghanistan has been one of
dynamically fostering democracy, and we all rejoice in the
extraordinary number of manifestations of that in the last 24
months of time. Sometimes, along with democracy, if there has
been a very severe dictatorship or autocracy problem, there
comes a certain amount of instability as new institutions take
hold, as requests come for assistance that may, or may not, be
forthcoming if we are not prepared.
In other words, the very dynamism of our foreign policy,
hoping that people can be free as the President suggested in
his inaugural address, right out here on the Capitol steps,
almost denotes a certain degree of instability, albeit creative
and hopeful as it may be.
So this is the reason why the Departments of Defense and
State, USAID, and others have come together. I salute this as a
manifestation of the best of American government.
So, frequently, there are press accounts of disputes, of
people pushing for turf. That even happens with congressional
committees, worrying about jurisdiction and so forth. But this
is a pretty broad subject. We are talking about an imbalance--
about military people, about State Department professionals,
but also people who have experience, maybe in business and
banking and education and political systems and health and
education--all of these things really do not come under any
committee or any department of our Government.
So this requires an enormous amount of cooperation and
sharing. That has been manifested by this panel this morning,
and I salute that.
Well, let me commence questioning with you, Ambassador
Pascual, by getting down to the nitty-gritty of the problem.
The executive branch has requested $24 million for fiscal year
2006 for the Office and $100 million for an emergency fund.
That is funding that members of this committee fully
authorized, but other Members of Congress do not yet understand
the complexity of the problem. And so as a result, the
emergency supplemental fell far short of the request, and some
reports indicated that the House of Representative's mark is
thus far a very low figure for the 2006 funding.
Now, describe to us what will be the impact of this very
modest funding if those rumors or reports were to continue into
actuality, if you cannot get the full $100 million for the
emergency fund. What is that going to mean about the capability
of your Office to be ready for a crisis situation?
Ambassador Pascual. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Thank you for highlighting these issues, for highlighting the
importance of the coordination among the interagency community
as you have stated; and, indeed, for highlighting what
Secretary Rice has really called the need for transformational
diplomacy, of diplomacy that can actually affect changes and
differences on the ground. And your question on resources
really cuts to the core of the capacity of the United States to
have a real and effective transformational diplomacy throughout
the world.
One of the things that I have learned from my military
colleagues is that if we want to be effective on the other side
of a conflict, if we want to be able to respond when the
theater demands us to respond is that we have to have the
capacity ahead of time to plan, to prepare, to prepare skills
and resources, to organize ourselves in advance.
And it is exactly these kinds of issues that are going to
be affected if we do not get the types of resources that we are
seeking. It is also going to affect our capacity to deploy.
Let me be more specific. There are certainly things that we
will be able to do as a result of the limited resources we have
received so far, and if we do receive a lower level of
resources, I think it is important to be frank about that. We
are very--working very hard to improve our Washington
management capabilities.
I do believe that we will be able to manage one post-
conflict response out of Washington with a lower level of
resources, but it will be out of Washington. We will improve
our planning capabilities. We are committed to that. We think
that is essential.
We believe--we will continue to improve our coordination
with the military. We will be able to develop a better
cataloging of contractual capabilities.
What we will not be able to do is to develop an active
response corps that establishes the kind of standby
capabilities that allows us to move into the field effectively
and quickly. It will affect our ability to develop this kind of
civilian reserve that all of us have underscored as absolutely
critical to have, to have that type of transformational skill
that is necessary to affect a conflict early in the process, so
that we can influence the dynamic.
It will affect our capacity to deploy resources to the
field quickly. It will affect our ability to conduct extensive
exercises that allow us to really sharpen the capacity to work
effectively in the field and work through issues in advance.
And, quite frankly, it would also affect our ability to
regularize our staff. Presently, we have about 45 people
working on these issues. Most of those people are there on
temporary arrangements and details, so it is fantastic that the
U.S. Government has brought itself together to do this, but
unfortunately it creates transition and turnover. And if what
we want to do is institutionalize the capability, we have to
have people who are consistent and regular.
So, in effect, Mr. Chairman, what happens if we get those
lower resources is that it relegates us to better planning in
Washington. It really cripples our capability to make a
difference where it counts on the ground, in the field, where
we need to effect the dynamics of change.
The Chairman. I thank you very much for that response.
I want to recognize now, Senator Chafee, who has joined us
in the hearing. I call upon him for his comments and questions.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
gentlemen.
In Rhode Island, we have a number of Liberians that have
fled the violence and chaos of Liberia, and frequently they
suggest to us, ``It would be good if we could go back and help
with any reconstruction in our home country.'' Is there any
apparatus for including people that have fled their home
countries in going back and helping rebuild?
Mr. Kunder. Sir, I think we recognize very much the
importance of expatriate communities with special language
skills, with special contacts, and so forth. In Afghanistan,
for example, both the United States Government and the U.N.
system established programs, specifically, to try to get
diaspora Afghans back in the country. We have regular outreach
meetings to expatriate communities that might be interested in
investing in their countries and so forth.
It is a complex area, because, frankly, there are sometimes
complex dynamics between those who have fled, been forced to
flee, and those who have stayed. And so that those who return
sometimes--there are just complex dynamics. I should leave it
at that.
But, in general, we recognize the extraordinary value added
of expatriate communities, and we have specifically tried to
target them as assets for reconstruction.
Senator Chafee. And you indicated it has worked in
Afghanistan in reaching out to Afghans around the world to come
back. That has been the experience there?
Mr. Kunder. Certainly--I think I can speak for the other
organizations as well--certainly at USAID the investors, the
technical consultants, the counterparts that we work with in
every country in crisis include some significant component of
the expatriate community. So in Iraq, we have got a lot of
Iraqi Americans working for us here in Washington and in
Baghdad. In Kabul, we have got Afghan Americans working for us,
so it is very much a part of the United States Government
response.
Senator Chafee. Yes, sir.
Ambassador Pascual. If I might add to that a little bit?
One of the things that has been very important is the extent to
which communities organize themselves in the United States, and
we can engage with them in a systematic and organized way.
It creates a greater capability, in fact, to be able to
work with those groups and mobilize their skills. Certainly,
one of the strongest examples that we have seen of that
throughout the world is with the Armenian-American community,
which has played a very important and strong role in the
development and reconstruction of Armenia.
We are currently looking at how we can, in fact, mobilize
this type of diaspora capability in Sudan. And there are
tremendous--in fact, there are very large numbers of Sudanese
professionals who are now starting to go back to southern
Sudan, and, hopefully, to northern Sudan to bring a different
perspective and skills and capabilities there.
We are looking at ways in which we can regularize the
process of tapping those skills and capabilities. Inevitably,
as Mr. Kunder said, you have to have a country-specific
response that has the right political mix. But, in fact, if we
can find a way to generalize those--the tapping of those
capabilities, it will be to the good.
And if you have some suggestions for us on groups that we
might contact relative to Liberia, we would certainly be glad
to do so and follow up on that suggestion.
Senator Chafee. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Ambassador, let me just underline a point you made and ask
you to elaborate some more. In his May 18 address, President
Bush cited the creation of a new active response corps, to be,
as he quoted ``on-call.'' And my question would be: Is this to
be a reserve corps, an active duty corps, or how does it fit
with what we were calling for in our report as a response
readiness corps with an active duty and a reserve component?
For example, we had suggested 250 people in the active duty
component, but a much larger reserve of citizens, some retired
military, some former government officials, some just talented
people in our communities, who, in the same capacity as in the
military can be called up to serve their country on various
occasions where those particular talents are involved.
Describe, if you can, more explicitly, what you envision.
Even, granted, we have talked about the constraints, the
finance here, and the need to flesh this out, so that you have
that. But in the best of all worlds and you have got the money,
how does this work in your judgment?
Ambassador Pascual. Thank you. Let me put this in context
of three types of capabilities that we believe are essential to
produce an effective response on the ground. One is leadership
and coordination in Washington; a second is to have the
diplomatic and technical leadership and design capabilities
that can be deployed to the ground; and, third, the skills and
capabilities that are absolutely essential to be able to
implement programs and make them work.
And so we need to have staffing for all three parts of
that. The first portion of that component is led by my Office.
It plays a core leadership and coordination role in Washington
and brings together the interagency community.
In order to have diplomatic and technical leadership on the
ground, we must have, as you exactly suggested in your bill,
to--the capability of deploying diplomats and technical
specialists in a rapid response group that is able to engage
from the outset in many of the core civilian functions that are
fundamental to our diplomatic efforts, such as negotiations on
peace agreements, the development of political arrangements on
the ground, the development of transitional strategies, as well
as the design of some of the key programs that are fundamental
and necessary to promote change and security and stability--as
General Sharp said, in particular, some of those programs that
are necessary in transitional security.
The active response corps is specifically targeted for that
purpose. What we are seeking to have in the State Department is
a group of 100 active response diplomats. They would train
first in a program through my Office. They would participate in
regular exercises. They would generally work in teams of about
33 people each.
The intent is to have a mix of individuals with political
and economic and diplomatic security, and administrative
skills. And what they would be able to do is create--go out to
the field and create the foundation for diplomatic operation if
it does not exist; or if an embassy has been drawn down
significantly or needs technical support in certain specific
areas that they would be able to provide that.
In those moments when those individuals are not deployed,
they would work in Washington in either regional or functional
bureaus on issues related to conflict and conflict response.
Some of this might include early warning activities. It may be
developing the reserve mechanisms that we have been
establishing. It may be working on relations with our
international partners. It may be working on--with individual
bureaus on specific conflict activities that they need to be
able to address.
So, in effect, what we are looking at is a mechanism of
having individuals that are proactively addressing the
questions of conflict and stabilization, and they work in
Washington, are trained and prepared, and then are able to go
out in any of those circumstances that are necessary.
I would just stress that in addition to this, it is still
absolutely crucial to have that capability of the
implementation of programs on the ground. And that is exactly
where your reserve concept comes into play, as was also
underscored by members of this panel here.
And in order to achieve that, what we are doing immediately
is looking at how we expand the contractual capabilities that
we have, because we have those authorities. But if we are going
to create a separate type of reserve mechanism that is akin to
what the military has, that will require new authorities, new
mechanisms, and so we are jointly studying that with Joint
Forces Command, so that if we come back with proposals that we
can demonstrate to you that it is the most cost-effective way
of getting the job done.
The Chairman. Well, that is very helpful, and it leads to a
question I would like to pose to Mr. Henry and General Sharp.
And it is along these lines. If you were to try to design the
ideal civilian counterpart as a partner to the military in
stabilization reconstruction, what would the organization look
like and how would you describe the possibilities for joint
training and planning that would be most useful to bring that
about?
Mr. Henry. I will go ahead and begin, and then turn it over
to General Sharp.
One of the things is we, in the Department of Defense,
consider ourselves a learning organization and adaptability is
a--the coin of the realm. No conflict we go into is like the
last one. There's always lessons learned to be taken from it,
so I think a key attribute needs to be adaptability.
What we would suggest is to put together a structure that
looks compatible based on the lessons learned that we have had
over the last several conflicts, and areas where we needed to
get in a capability like S/CRS will provide, and then the next
step we would take is both train and exercise to it. And we
think that one of the things that makes us such a potent
fighting force is our ability to exercise in as realistic a
scenario as possible.
And that is one of the things we really look forward to in
the establishment of S/CRS, and we have already started to take
advantage of that, is integrating that in with our exercise
program. And one of the things--adaptations we have made now is
that we look at every exercise we do and see where we are doing
stability ops and making sure that that is a key element of the
exercise objectives; from there, to be able to learn and
iterate more and then to adapt as we see real world situations.
But to go in with something that is too static, locked in
concrete is an approach we think works to the disadvantage of
what the real world circumstances might prevent--present us
with.
The Chairman. General.
General Sharp. Sir, just a couple of things to add to that.
First off, I think that it is important to note that we, as the
U.S. Government, I think, really have made progress. As
Ambassador Pascual says, we have a ways to go, but we have made
progress.
I was in Haiti for 6 months during the mid-1990s when the
military went in and tried to help stand up a government and
develop a police corps and run elections. I mean we had some
other help, but it was mostly on our own down there.
I saw a marked difference when I was in Bosnia from 2000 to
2001, where the Embassy was more robust. USAID had great folks
there doing it on the ground, but I guess my--what I saw is we
were not really well coordinated. We had individual stovepipe
organizations that did not have a common overall set of
objectives or goals and coordinating mechanisms to be able to
move forward.
And you move forward then to Afghanistan, and I think we
made great progress in Afghanistan. If you look at what the
provisional reconstruction teams, the PRTs are doing, which I
think we have 24 or 25 throughout the country right now, how
those are working together to pull all elements of not only our
power together, but to try to pull the Afghan Government
together. And it is making tremendous progress there.
The other thing we learned, I think, really in Afghanistan
is the importance of--at the command level properly integrating
and coordinating. What Ambassador Khalilzad and Dave Barno,
General Dave Barno at the time, were able to pull together for
a joint command center, sharing intelligence, sharing strategic
goals, the military believes is really a model of how to do
that. And I think we learned from there to--what General Casey
and Ambassador Negroponte have been able to do in Iraq, again
sharing a lot of abilities to go through there.
The U.S. Government, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, have a
set of strategies with specific objectives and goals that each
one of the departments are measuring themselves, working
together and coordinating as it goes through. So I think there
has been progress made.
When you look, specifically, at what sorts of skills do we
need within these organizations that we are talking about
today--I mean I talked through some of the very specific ones
from police and governance and rule of law, et cetera, but I
also believe that within those there needs to be some skills
specifically in language and cultural awareness. I mean, every
country that we will go into will be different, both from a
language perspective, but probably just as importantly is the
culture, as to what that country is used to as far as these
structures and how we can help them develop those that have
come down.
Ryan and everybody else has talked about the ability to
plan. We, of course, in the military think that that is very
important, and we put a lot of time into that. We all
completely understand that the plan changes, as we say in the
military, as soon as you cross the line of departure, but you
have a plan to base off of, a plan to adjust from.
I think the next important is the individuals in it that
understand the capabilities of other organizations within our
Government and other international organizations. Now, we in
the military in the mid-1980s, thanks a lot to the Congress,
have really learned the importance of jointness and the ability
to understand other military capabilities. The Goldwater-
Nichols really helped us along that way.
I think that it might be smart to take a look at that from
an interagency perspective of the whole U.S. Government. You
know, should senior, or should people as they come up in State
or USAID or the military, be required to spend time in other
organizations in order to be able to use those skills, so that
when we have to deploy to conflict, we all understand each
other.
Continual education, I think, is very important, again of
very great importance in the military, to take young officers,
and all the way up through the line, to be able to continue to
educate them as we go through.
And I think the last one I will just hit on is the
importance of having individuals that understand we are a
nation at war, that we, as a people, I believe, have the
responsibility to all participate in one way or another of
winning that war. And these types of organizations are an
excellent opportunity to have individuals who understand the
importance of selfless service, understand the importance of
being part of something that is larger than themself, to go out
and help other people. So I guess those are the type of
characteristics that I think are important for this
organization.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, General. I think
you have made some profoundly important points. And I will not
repeat all of them, but I made notes as you proceeded. There is
a big difference between our interventions, in which you were
involved, in Haiti and Bosnia--but what is our understanding in
our own Government of what is required--what are the lessons
learned from all this? I noted the point that you made about
people who understand what all of the agencies of our
Government might do, and likewise what our allies, what other
countries, may contribute. This is knowledge that does not come
particularly easily, but it requires assignments across
Agencies that are not, I suppose, more typical in the Defense
Department and in State and elsewhere--learning of what others
are doing in our Government and what talents others may bring
to the table.
That is so important because that is the whole point, I
suppose, of our testimony today in which all of you appear
together and are, in fact, conversant with what each other is
doing--thank goodness--and supportive, and amending the bill as
we proceed. It is important for us in the Congress to
understand lessons from your experiences, because you have been
there.
I just offer anecdotally, sort of triggered by this, my own
very small military experience a long time ago, now 48 or 47
years ago, I was a young intelligence briefer for Admiral
Arleigh Burke, when he was Chief of Naval Operations. One of
the reasons that Admiral Burke employed me was to make the Navy
point of view well known to Members of Congress or Cabinet
members, others that he was able to inveigle into the morning
briefings. But then I had the good fortune to go down to the
basement to see Allen Dulles and the CIA people, along with
other people from other services, who also had points of view,
the Air Force point of view or the Army point of view or what
have you.
This was extraordinarily instructive to me as an advocate
who was loyal to Admiral Burke and the Navy. This was long
before Goldwater-Nichols, and even the joint chiefs came in in
the same way. Since then, our culture has evolved as regards
public service. The complexities of dealing in other nations
really have accelerated that, because if we are to be
successful--as you have stated so well--Americans understand
that the war on terrorism is a long-going thing. It does not
simply involve nation states. In places where there are people
who are declared targets of retaliation, this involves a
civilian component constantly trying to think through, in a
dangerous world, how we contribute.
I think what we are talking about today offers in this
reserve corps, or however we wish to talk about this, a way in
which people of talent in our country, who really want to give
of themselves, will have that opportunity. That is, we are
bright enough to be able to structure the mechanisms that
identify them and finance those activities. So, I thank you
very much for that response.
Mr. Kunder, in your testimony, you described a new Bureau
for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and
pointed out that the Agency would be developing an agencywide
response platform. Just yesterday, as it turns out, we had Mr.
Michael Hess before our committee for his confirmation hearing,
to head up this Bureau. You are appearing back to back,
Wednesday and Thursday.
We are pleased that such a qualified person has been
identified and nominated by the President. But can you go into
more detail about your views of what this ``response platform''
is to be? How will Mr. Hess organize the Bureau? How many
people, for instance, will be involved? And would you consider
these people reserves, to be quickly pulled from various
places? How will you identify the people in his situation?
Mr. Kunder. Thank you, sir. If I may just comment, you were
talking about the specialized response corps that we very much
support Ambassador Pascual on. I think one of the interesting
phenomena in that area is that this is an odd occupational
specialty. I mean, our Nation has a certain number of computer
programmers that move from job to job.
A crisis response coordinator for southern Sudan is an
occupational specialty as well, and there have been
traditionally a cadre of folks who have moved around in this
field. And I can tell you that they are in demand; the demand
far exceeds supply. Because of the number of crises going on
around the world right now, we simply do not have enough. We
have got to invest in creating the kinds of folks who will be
on standby, who can deploy quickly.
One of the interesting phenomena, I was thinking when
General Sharp was talking about Bosnia, about some of our
military officers, because they have served in peacekeeping
operations and post-conflict operations, and these are men and
women who retire often in their midforties full of energy and
experience. We are increasingly seeing what we see with Mr.
Hess, and that is a retired military officer moving into a
management role on the civilian side. And that is an enormous
potential asset for us.
Specifically on the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance, currently that Bureau has within it
some traditional offices that USAID has used to respond to
crises: The Office of Food for Peace that delivers food
assistance around the world, the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, which responds both to natural disasters, tsunamis,
and so forth and also conflict situations.
What the Administrator has proposed is reconfiguring and
adding new offices; creating a new Office of Conflict
Mitigation, a new Office of Military Affairs. These are the
kinds of decisions that Mr. Hess will face, and exactly how we
are going to configure that new bureau so that it best fits
into the structure that Ambassador Pascual is creating.
Currently there are in excess of 100 people in that Bureau.
That is by our standard a pretty significant asset. There is an
inner ring of about 100 people, and the question is how we are
best going to configure those to be the best partner in the
kinds of situations we have been describing.
We have traditionally also maintained an outer ring along
the lines of what Ambassador Pascual was describing earlier of
reserves on call, teams of these kinds of experts who may be
working for the U.S. Government in one crisis, but working for
an NGO in the next crisis.
We maintain rosters. We keep computer databases of their
skill sets, so that if, in fact, we do need a food logistician
in southern Sudan, we literally are able to search our
databases and find an individual who has that kind of relevant
experience.
So we see the need both for an inner circle of U.S.
Government employees who do this full time and are ready to
deploy immediately and then an outer ring of reserves who we
can call upon to supplement that.
The Chairman. This leads me to a question of you,
Ambassador, and that is: Are you working to develop joint
contingency planning with Defense and USAID in southern Sudan?
Can you describe how you are going about such planning, whether
you have civilians ready to go? What is happening there
generally?
Ambassador Pascual. We very much are beginning a process of
doing contingency planning and, in fact, not just contingency
planning, but planning for things that have to happen today in
southern Sudan, but even more broadly than that, how we look at
Sudan in general.
It is absolutely crucial that we have the capacity to look
around--look at the full range of challenges that we are facing
in Sudan in order to be able to bring together our policy in a
way that really makes an impact and has a difference.
It requires us to address immediate humanitarian needs.
There is obviously a pressing and humanitarian and security
situation in Darfur, where violence needs to be brought to an
end. There are issues that need to be addressed in southern
Sudan and in transition areas and in key flash points on
transformation of security forces and demilitarization.
All three of those things need to be done as a platform in
order to create a basic foundation for stability and normalcy,
so that people can actually start to have lives again. And then
from that, we need to be able to build--we need to build in
addressing the infrastructure for economy and social
transformation. We need to build the capacity to actually have
a government that is responsible to its people and which is
transparent and uses its resources in an accountable and
transparent way. And without that kind of government, it is
going to be difficult for Sudan to succeed in peace.
And finally we need to help build the capabilities and the
capacities that exist in the south, so that this is not just an
internationally driven activity, but, in fact, that the
Sudanese have the capacity to bring this process forward into
the long term.
So what we are doing is bringing together with the National
Security Council, with USAID, the Africa Bureau, and the State
Department, with the Department of Defense, a core team that is
looking at each of those areas. And for each of those areas we
are identifying strategic priorities, we are identifying how to
sequence the activities, we are identifying the resource
requirements.
As you might imagine, the resource requirements are huge,
and we are asking very tough questions about what can we do
within existing resources, where we can get international
donors to pick up, what can be done by the resources which are
held by the Government of southern Sudan.
We are in the midst of this process right now. We are in
the process of bringing it together so that we can present it
to our deputies and allow them to review that, and from that
then be able to make the judgments on what is necessary on how
to address some of the resource gaps, which inevitably will
arise from the process.
The Chairman. Well, this is very important information. You
are acutely aware, as anyone would be, of the calls daily from
persons throughout the world as to what our response may be in
Sudan. And the coordination you have described is critical in
each of the areas of competence, as well as geographically, but
we wish you success. And I wanted to try to illuminate that
situation, which is there now.
Let me ask about a potential situation, without being
provocative. It is suggested from time to time that there will
come a day in which the Government of Cuba changes. In a
situation of this variety, as is often raised hypothetically,
would we be prepared in our Government to assist the people of
Cuba under those circumstances?
There are many Americans who have all sorts of plans for us
for Cuba informally. But at the same time this is going to
raise an issue, I suspect, with whichever administration may
face it over time. And that is not the only one of these
situations, but it is one that is very close to us, one that is
often commented on.
What sort of capabilities do you envision your Agency, or
those you are allied with, would have in the event that some
type of planning was required, as well as humanitarian
activity?
Ambassador Pascual. Thank you. Again, an extremely
important issue where we have an opportunity now to look ahead
and be able to plan for the future. And we indeed have been
engaged with my Office together with the Western Hemisphere
Bureau and the State Department and USAID and the Department of
Defense, as well as the Foreign Service Institute, the National
Defense University in looking at this issue.
It is, indeed, the policy of the United States that we seek
a peaceful democratic transformation in Cuba. Last year, the
President tasked Secretary Powell and Secretary Martinez to
pull together a report, which was developed by the Commission
on Assistance for a Free Cuba. That report looks at an
extensive set of activities that are important to undertake to
be able to support a transitional process, or to support a
democratic Cuba when that opportunity arises.
But the key challenge is, in fact, to be able to look at
what kinds of steps are necessary after Fidel Castro's death to
be able to really strengthen and support that transition to
democracy so that it is not just a succession. And in order to
do that, we have been working in policy roundtables and
exercises to be able to learn lessons from other transition
experiences.
We have worked very closely with the individuals and
experts who have been involved in Central and Eastern Europe in
the former Soviet Union, because we learned a great deal there
about political transition and economic transformation, about
how to deal with intelligence services and security services
and what kinds of things need to be asked, how to deal with
security in those transformational situations and how to work
with--effectively, with our allies in that environment.
And so by bringing together that kind of core expertise, we
have been able to put suggestions and ideas on the table that
are now being factored into our policy process.
We have also worked on simulation exercises that force us
to look at different scenarios and ask those tough questions
now, because we know whatever the scenario is that there are
going to be tough questions. And better that we rehearse those
today and understand how we might be able to respond.
So we are actively engaged in this process right now, and
it, I think, is making contributions not only to what we might
do in the future, but greater enlightenment to the kinds of
steps that we can take today to be able to prepare us for that
eventuality.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much for that response,
because it does indicate once again the forward looking aspects
in your testimony. Jointly, gentlemen, you have mentioned Nepal
and other countries that are engaged in change and that may
require assistance. But this requires some thoughtfulness.
General Sharp has said often that people who have language
skills, cultural background, scholarships, understand the
traditions and the people in ways that, maybe, not each one of
our citizens may. We should find those Americans who have those
talents.
Let me ask you, General Sharp, and maybe Mr. Henry would
have a comment on this. In your testimony, both of you have
discussed a section in the Department of Defense authorization
request to the Congress that the Defense Department be
authorized to transfer, if necessary, $200 million in goods,
services, and funding to the Bureau that is headed by
Ambassador Pascual.
Unfortunately, neither the Senate, nor the House
congressional authorizing committees, have included this
provision in their bills. So this leads to the question: Why
the resistance?
I think those of us involved in practical politics have
some idea about the resistance, although, maybe technically
there are some other reasons.
Essentially, many times the defense committees, whether it
be the House or the Senate, do not wish to see defense spending
going elsewhere. They are reticent to do this. From the
standpoint of those dealing with the State Department
situation, it has been an unfortunate fact of life that the 150
account has been perennially downsized whatever the year, and
whatever the circumstances.
We sort of start at the high-water mark here, and we are
fighting all the way through the succeeding stages. Sometimes
we are successful, if we can go to the floor and offer an
amendment restoring all of that which has been lost in the
process, and sometimes gaining some favor. This process is not
new.
On the other hand, what you have proposed is very
important, the potential flexibility that is involved here.
There is a mandate to transfer funds, but it does suggest that
there may be value in doing that. Do you have some thoughts,
General Sharp or Mr. Henry, about how we might reengage the
problem or be more successful?
Mr. Henry. Well, first of all, the thinking on the part of
the administration is that this is something that is actually
keyed at saving both American dollars, taxpayer dollars, but
also hopefully, American lives.
As I said in my statement, we have come to understand the
criticality of early measures in taking and getting in and
engaging on problems so they do not become crises and, then for
us in the defense, so the crises do not become conflicts.
If we find ourselves engaged in a conflict, then the rate
of spending will be significantly higher and, again, we will be
putting the lives at risk of American servicemen and
servicewomen, so that is the reason why we have initiated this.
We think that it is a good investment for all parties
concerned. We look forward to working with all parts of the
Congress to try to work with them on the reasoning behind this.
It is not--the transfer is only based upon the fact that
there would be a demonstrated need that would be agreed upon by
both Secretaries to be able to do this. It is not something
that will be done at all times, but it is a contingency, and
that is the world that we live in in the Department of Defense.
We have developed a standing Army in other branches of the
military, because we realize the world is an unsafe place to
live, and we have to exercise it from time to time. And that is
what we are trying to work with the Congress and, obviously,
the State Department and have that same sort of standing
capability. And we think that as an adjunct to that is the
ability to have this civilian reserve force, to have this
ability to have this real surge capability to which the dollars
would be applied.
General Sharp. Just, very briefly, to add to Mr. Henry's
answer is: We believe that as we fight this war on terrorism,
we are going to have an enemy that moves around quickly, that
crosses borders, that really is not in any location, that we,
as the U.S. Government, need to have some pretty flexible
ability to both be able to surge people, but also money and
across departments in order to be able to try to fight and win
this war on terrorism. That is going to be a critical component
of it.
So I think anything that the Congress can do to, you know,
give the ability to all of these departments to be able to
utilize their capabilities at the maximum as quickly as
possible and utilizing the funding that Congress and the people
of the United States have given and to be able to share that.
And the more that we are of one organization between all these,
I think the more that makes sense.
The Chairman. This may be a question to be raised directly
with Secretary Rumsfeld, but would it be helpful if I were to
contact the Secretary for--and would he be prepared to argue
strenuously the points that you have made with Senator Warner
or the corresponding chairman in the House committee, because I
think that type of intervention is likely to be required for
there to be a change in mood in, at least, the defense
committees.
Mr. Henry. Secretary Rumsfeld, along with the rest of the
Department, feels that this sort of capability is important.
Earlier in response to another question, General Sharp talked
about the idea of joint interagency. As we go into our
Quadrennial Defense Review, this is one of the areas that we
are actually looking for.
We understand that the national security establishment that
was developed in 1947 was one that was focused on what
eventually became a cold war, and we have optimized that over
the last half century in that direction.
Here, we find ourselves faced with a different sort of war
that we are engaged in. And we have to make some adaptions and
modifications to our security structure. And as we see it, it
is probably less stovepipes and more of what we have learned
about in the Department of the inherent value of jointness,
which we have reinforced over and over again, but most
specifically in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the significant
amount of value added you get when you are willing to work an
interdependency--on interdependencies and accept those and work
across lines. And so we think this is a first step, both the
standing up of S/CRS, but also the funding mechanism to go in
that direction.
And so this is something that the Secretary is behind and
we would expect to see similar recommendations and proposals
coming out of the Quadrennial Defense Review about how we can
do this across the Government.
The Chairman. Well, that would be very helpful. I know that
as you have opportunities to brief the Secretary, not only
about this hearing but also about your general understanding of
things, you can be helpful in that respect. We all will attempt
to be if we work together on this.
Mr. Kunder, let me ask--I have had the pleasure of meeting
with 80 USAID mission directors who were in town a couple of
weeks ago. I understand they also met with you and Ambassador
Pascual, at one point during their 3-day meeting here in
Washington.
What reactions did you gauge from the mission directors to
your Office and to the types of ideas that we are presenting
today? Do you have any feeling, either of you, Mr. Kunder or
Ambassador Pascual?
Mr. Kunder. I think I would agree with what Lieutenant
General Sharp said earlier that all employees of the U.S.
Government, certainly in the foreign policy side, have to
understand that we are engaged in a global war on terrorism.
You know our cadre of senior leaders and many of them came
into government in a different world, a more peaceful world.
And many of them were engaged in what they would consider long-
term development or long-term improvements in human progress
around the world. But certainly under the Secretary's
leadership, Secretary Rice's leadership, and under Andrew
Natsios' leadership, both have delivered strong and unequivocal
messages that all of our team is, to some extent, engaged in
the war on terrorism.
I think there has been a broad acceptance of the importance
of the work they are doing as part of that effort, whether they
are doing children's survival programs in West Africa or they
are on the front lines in Iraq or Afghanistan, they understand
the need to be participants in that conflict and win that
conflict. And, second, they also understand the importance of
interagency coordination. This is something that comes second
nature to them already, because they are part of each
Ambassador's country team, in which they serve, on which we
have military attaches and representatives of U.S. Government
Agencies.
So, I think it is not that difficult a transition for them
to understand the kind of coordination that takes place at the
country level and then moving that up to the interagency level
in Washington. So far we have had excellent support for the
whole concept.
The Chairman. Good. Go ahead.
Ambassador Pascual. If I could add briefly, we had an
excellent dialog and exchange when I spoke to the group of
mission directors. And one of the things that I really felt so
strongly about is that all of them were recognizing that they
are at the front lines of transforming realities on the ground,
that they really are change agents, and that they play a new
type of role in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy and
security policy that is different from what we may have seen in
the past. The centrality is a bit different.
I think they all recognize the importance of having a
multiple capacity of different resources brought together in an
effective way. The military often says--uses the term that we
have to look at all elements of U.S. power and how those
elements are brought together on the ground to achieve certain
effects on the ground.
And, indeed, what I found from these mission directors is
that they were focused on how to achieve those effects and how
to coordinate and work with others, particularly some who have
worked in Afghanistan or Iraq have seen some phenomenal
challenges and have come to understand firsthand the importance
of actually having that coordinated capability.
And as was outlined a little bit earlier by Mr. Henry,
particularly what we have seen in the provincial reconstruction
teams, is a real model for the way that the military and
civilians can work together, but the other thing that they
emphasized is that the model works if you get civilians on the
ground.
And if there is one complaint, what we heard, was that it
is absolutely crucial to have a greater capacity to get
civilian capabilities on the ground more effectively, sooner in
ways that people are prepared.
And, if anything, this conversation, I think, has really
highlighted the importance of having a real surge capability
and funding that surge capability. What we have heard from our
military colleagues is that that is the core business of the
Department of Defense is to establish that surge capacity to
train it, to exercise it, and then be able to deploy it.
And what has been so difficult for us on the civilian side
is to build that as part of the operational model that we have
for all that we do that we have to have that surge capability,
and we have to fund it, because if we do not fund it, we do not
create it, we do not have the people, we do not train them, we
cannot make it work.
And I think all of us who have been working on these issues
have come to that similar conclusion that were highlighted very
much when you started this work in 2003 that we have to have
the resources, the authorities, and the capabilities to
actually be able to get on the ground quickly.
The Chairman. I was inspired by the meeting with the 80
directors. First of all, it was an education. We have 80
different situations. We are serving that many--80 countries--
and, to borrow some of your language earlier, preventive
medicine in a way; the success of many of these directors and
their colleagues can make a profound difference in terms of the
future of those countries. Perhaps a future without conflict
and without bloodshed, even within the countries or from their
neighbors.
So, it was very interesting and the individual experiences
that were expressed to me varied, as well as to their reactions
to how their message is received back here by the
administration, by the Congress and what have you. And so I
appreciated it. I think they came altogether for 3 days. It was
an important situation.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Kunder. If I might just say a word, sir. I think that
is how we see the linkage. If there is any value added that we
believe we, at USAID, can bring, it is in that transition from
the crisis response when a country is falling apart, into the
long-term improvement, because as we like to say: We want to
get our soldiers home as quickly as possible, but we also want
to make sure they do not have to go back--have to go back 5
years later to the same place. That is when you get into the
long-term improvements in healthcare and education and economic
systems.
If I could just add one final thought. I think you
mentioned earlier the President's freedom agenda and Ambassador
Pascual mentioned Cuba. I think it is another important lesson
that the investments in human freedom and democracy are
critical on both ends, on the input end and the output end.
If we have open participatory societies and invest in
building political parties and civil society organizations, we
are less likely to have the societies fall apart into conflict.
And then, if they do fall apart, what we have got to do is
build democratic processes as we are trying to do in
Afghanistan and Iraq, so that the long-term stability endures.
And I think this is the linkage between the President's freedom
agenda and the kind of work we are doing here, the critical
link between democracy and governance and stability.
The Chairman. And some of the work that your Agency, USAID,
is doing hopefully may mean that American military personnel
will not need to be involved in 80 countries or in any number
at all to the extent that through thoughtful diplomacy and work
on the ground, we are able to achieve these results for the
people that are involved.
Mr. Kunder. That would be our hope; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Yes. Let me just say that, you know, prior to
a number of talented people coming into Iraq, it was my
observation during visits there with community groups and what
have you, that some of our younger officers, military officers,
were suddenly employed as they needed to be, in that situation,
in capacities that might have been fulfilled by mayors,
superintendents of schools, people who handle these civil
capacities--and they did so remarkably well. Even in their home
communities in Indiana or wherever they were from, they
probably would not have been called upon to take that kind of
responsibility.
But nevertheless, it was not the responsibility they had
anticipated. This is not where their training and background
had led them. But the talents of our military people should not
be underestimated, and we are grateful as they adapt to all
these conditions. What we are talking about today is how we
really have the reinforcements as ready reserve, or a cadre of
people who are able, as opposed to a long lapse or a waiting
time. Sometimes these engagements, even of our military people,
are short lived. Their enlistments run out or what have you,
their commitment.
But let me just ask you, Ambassador, are you having trouble
recruiting people for dangerous situations? And we have talked
about going into harm's way today, and not just in situations
that have been in the military conflict, but some others that,
as a matter of fact, did have considerable amount of personal
risk. And I am just curious about your experience in calling
upon Americans to take up these posts.
Ambassador Pascual. The willingness on the part of the
American civilians to take up these risky assignments in order
to be able to address what people believe is truly a national
security interest has been phenomenal. And it is within the
Government and it is outside of the Government. And, indeed, if
we look at the nongovernmental community, at the people who
have been willing to voluntarily go into these extraordinarily
dangerous and complex situations, because they believe it is
important to help save lives, to address humanitarian needs, to
promote democratic transformation, to give people a chance to
actually influence their future. And I believe that in doing so
that they are not only advancing the prosperity and the
prospects of that country, that they are advancing our own
security, is truly remarkable.
Within the U.S. Government and within the State Department
we have had an all-out effort to ensure that we can indeed
actually staff our Embassies in Afghanistan and Iraq and in
other difficult posts. But the reality is that we need more
people, and we have a limited number of foreign service
officers, we have existing challenging diplomatic missions
around the world. And one of the things that is not helpful to
our long-term diplomacy is that in order to deal with today's
challenges, today's immediate missions, that we simply strip
away people from those other important diplomatic functions----
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Pascual [continuing]. That you and others have
fought to be able to get out there, so that we have the
capacity to actually demonstrate an American presence abroad.
So a key issue, frankly, in being able to recruit and
recruit effectively, is actually to have the resources to
extend our hand to that wider range of people outside of
Government, those people who have the skills and the
capabilities who are willing to either volunteer to participate
in a reserve corp or to serve as contractors, a whole range of
different ways in which we might be able to do this, but we
have to have the resources to bring those individuals in, train
them and give them the capability to actually put their good
will to use.
The Chairman. Well, that is a critical element of this, and
hopefully one of the imports of this hearing will be to
encourage our colleagues to understand that and provide you
those resources.
I can remember in this committee within the last 2 years--I
would be hard pressed to name the date and the time--we
discussed these so-called hardship positions out in our
Embassies in the field. One reason this came up was that in
some cases where there are very, very difficult diplomatic
circumstances for the United States, extremely junior foreign
service personnel were doing the best that they could, because
it had been very hard to identify more senior personnel who had
some experience and some background, who at that particular
point in their lives and careers were willing to undertake
these tasks.
So this is the reason that I raise the question within this
new initiative. We have been down the road before, and I can
understand that situation with the careers of many persons in
the foreign service, that after a while, they fear they have
given a lot of time and thought to their country. They would
like a situation that seemed less dangerous perhaps for
themselves, for their families, for their careers and what have
you, and sort of move on in other situations. But,
nevertheless, this is a dangerous world, as you all have been
pointing out.
The kind of service being offered by persons not only in
our military service, but in our diplomatic service, and now in
this new joint affair often is dangerous. It is going into
harm's way on behalf of all of us, who are, therefore, spared a
great deal of agony in our lives and in our communities.
Well, we just appreciate very much all the thoughtfulness
you have brought to this hearing. You have been forthcoming and
articulate in your testimony. I am certain it is helpful for
public understanding of what you are doing.
Let me just say that I would like to insert a statement of
Senator Biden in the record. I am pleased to do so.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Mr . Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing today--and
for your leadership on this issue. In December 2003, you came to me
with the idea of convening a group of experts to address our ability to
deal with reconstruction and stabilization crises--and I was pleased to
join you in this effort.
Since the end of the cold war, the United States has taken on
stabilization missions once every 18 months, with an average duration
of more than 5 years. We did it in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Haiti,
Somalia, and now Afghanistan and Iraq to name a few. And, in the decade
to come, whether we like it or not, we will do it again. Addressing the
needs in countries that are on the verge of becoming failed states will
continue to be one of our greatest challenges.
Weak states are cracks in the very foundation of our international
system. If left untended--or in other words, if we fail to respond
adequately to stabilization and reconstruction crises--they can and
they will, in my view, threaten the security and well-being of
countries around the world, including the United States. They can
become sanctuaries--as we have seen time and again--for terrorist
networks, organized crime, and drug traffickers.
For all of these reasons, we ignore failed states at our own peril.
As Tom Friedman says, ``If you don't visit a bad neighborhood, it will
visit you.''
And, obviously, it is in our own best interest to act efficiently
and effectively. We should not reinvent the wheel every time we are
faced with a stabilization crisis--cobbling together plans, procedures,
and personnel--as we have been doing. We need to be forward thinking,
comprehensive, and strategic.
That was the logic behind the legislation I was pleased to join the
chairman in proposing in February 2004. Our bill envisions much of what
has become a reality: A State Department office that draws on expertise
from all civilian agencies, as well as the Department of Defense, to
monitor potential crises, create plans and procedures to respond
effectively, and efficiently mobilize people and resources.
I appreciate that the administration has moved in this direction--
and I appreciate the work, specifically, that Ambassador Pascual has
accomplished since his Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization was
established at the State Department last summer. There has been solid
progress over the past year--but, in my view, we are not where we need
to be yet.
I am interested in learning more about how all of you are working
together, and your visions for the future. And we especially want to
know what you need in the way of resources and help from Congress to
get your critically important jobs done. Between the four of you, there
is a tremendous amount of expertise in this room, and I thank all of
you for being here today.
The Chairman. Likewise, we will keep the hearing record
open today in case there are other members, other colleagues,
who might have statements or maybe have questions of you. And
if they do, we would ask you to respond for the record.
I thank all of you. And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Response of Hon. Ryan Henry to Question Submitted for the Record by
Senator Lugar
Question. What is the scope of the newly created Stabilization
Office at OSD that reports directly to the Deputy Secretary? How does
this Office interface with the State Department?
Answer. On May 2, 2005, the Deputy Secretary approved the
establishment of the Defense Reconstruction Support Office (DRSO) to
provide a single DOD focus for coordination of the Department's
operational support of U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan
and Iraq. This Office is located in Washington Headquarters Services
(WHS) and its Director reports directly to the Deputy Secretary.
The DRSO consolidates the functions of the Afghanistan Reachback
Office and the Defense Support Office--Iraq. OSD Policy retains
responsibility for representing the Department on Iraq and Afghanistan
policy matters in the interagency. However the DRSO may engage directly
with the State Department and other U.S. departments and agencies on
pertinent operational matters to ensure the Department provides well
coordinated and responsive operational support for U.S. Government
elements engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq.
______
Responses of LTG Walter Sharp to Questions Submitted for the Record by
Senator Lugar
Question. Could you describe what elements of the Defense Science
Board Summer Study ``Transition to and from Hostilities'' are currently
being pursued by the Defense Department?
Answer. The Defense Science Board (DSB) 2004 Summer Study on
``Transition to and from Hostilities'' made recommendations for the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Government. The Department of
Defense has begun implementation, or is considering implementing, many
of the DSB's study recommendations.
For example, the Department of Defense is developing a stability
operations directive for Secretary of Defense approval. Specific
details are pending Secretary of Defense approval; however, we envision
a policy where stability operations are a core capability--one U.S.
military forces should be prepared to undertake. At such, stability
operations will have attention and priority comparable to combat
operations.
Additional DSB study implementation examples include:
--Combatant commanders are incorporating stability operations into
their planning process and exercise scenarios.
--The Army has identified stability operations and irregular warfare as
two of its key focus areas in the coming years and is working with
the Marine Corps and other DOD components to develop concepts of
organization, such as modularity, that are flexible enough to meet
stability operations requirements.
--Joint intelligence and operations commands are being established at
most of the combatant commands, and formal intelligence campaign
plans are being developed to support military operations.
--The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence established the
Defense Open Source Council that is conducting a comprehensive
assessment of the use of open source information in the defense
intelligence cycle.
--Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) responsibilities
were consolidated under U.S. Strategic Command, which has named the
Defense Intelligence Agency as the Joint Force Component Command
for ISR.
--The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has established a
defense human intelligence (HUMINT) management office.
--The Deputy Secretary of Defense has signed the Defense Language
Transformation Roadmap, directing each Service and combatant
command to designate Senior Language Authorities responsible for
language and regional expertise in their respective commands.
In addition to the initiatives above, the Department of Defense is
also supporting the development of capabilities in other departments
and agencies, principally the State Department's Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).
Question. Could you describe what elements of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Study
(Phase I and Phase II) are currently being pursued by the Defense
Department?
Answer. The insights into defense reform and interagency
integration have helped provide a valuable foundation for the
Department of Defense as part of the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). The Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS)
proposals for defense reorganization, staff streamlining, and achieving
interagency integration are being carefully analyzed, evaluated, and
considered in the QDR Issue Process Team (IPT) for Roles, Missions, and
Organizations. One working group of this IPT has been tasked
specifically with evaluating overlapping functions within the
Department of Defense and then developing and proposing organizational
alternatives. Another Roles, Missions, and Organizations IPT working
group is examining interagency operations and how to achieve more
complete integration, particularly in the areas of homeland defense,
stability and reconstruction, and civil affairs activities.
Question. Do you believe that a study following up from the DSB and
CSIS reports would be appropriate? What are your views on the merits of
undertaking a single study to examine how best to develop in a
complementary manner the capabilities and needs of the State and
Defense Departments and USAID to carry out these missions? Should this
be done by State and Defense jointly, or undertaken by an independent,
nongovernmental organization?
Answer. The DSB and the CSIS are in the best position to determine
if they need to follow up on their respective reports. In general, the
field of stabilization and reconstruction suffers from an overabundance
of reports, not a lack thereof.
The best way for the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
to develop capabilities in a complementary manner is for all three
organizations to continue the dialog they have already begun. The
Department of Defense has developed a close working relationship with
the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) and is developing a close relationship with
USAID's new Office of Military Affairs (USAID/OMA).
Question. Could you describe the concept of the Joint Interagency
Coordination Group and how it is being developed? How do the State
Department and USAID fit into the concept? EUCOM is reportedly already
working with the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies.
Can you describe how this is being structured at EUCOM and the other
combatant commands?
Answer. The ongoing War on Terrorism intensified the need for
military activities to be closely aligned with U.S. diplomatic, law
enforcement, financial control, and intelligence sharing endeavors. In
the weeks following September 11, 2001, the Joint Staff gained approval
from the Deputies Committee to establish a limited Joint Interagency
Coordination Group (JIACG) capability in each combatant command. With
participation from the Departments of State and Justice and the U.S.
Treasury Department, this interim interagency planning capability has
shown great value in prosecuting the War on Terrorism while offering
numerous spin-off benefits to both military and civilian agencies.
There is currently no standardized structure for the JIACG. Its
size and composition depends on the specific operational and staff
requirements at each combatant command.
The emerging JIACG concept calls for an interagency team to deal
with a full spectrum of actions including peacetime engagement, crisis
prevention, major combat operations, and stabilization operations. The
full-spectrum JIACG would be an element of each geographic combatant
commander's staff and would be responsible for establishing and/or
enhancing regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships
between other government agencies (e.g., Department of State, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Treasury Department, USAID, etc.) to more
efficiently and effectively apply the instruments of national power in
support of the U.S. National Security Strategy.