[Senate Hearing 109-226]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-226
NORTH KOREA: AN UPDATE ON SIX-PARTY TALKS AND MATTERS RELATED TO THE
RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 3
Hill, Hon. Cristopher R., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
(iii)
NORTH KOREA: AN UPDATE ON SIX-PARTY TALKS AND MATTERS RELATED TO THE
RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Murkowski, Biden,
Feingold, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
The committee meets today to again review the status of the
Six-Party Talks in Beijing, intended to bring about a peaceful
conclusion to North Korea's nuclear program. One year has
passed since the last round of Six-Party Talks occurred in
Beijing. This delay is troubling because the North Korean
regime's drive to build nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction poses a grave threat to the Pacific region and
American national security. We also are concerned about the
transfer of North Korean weapons, materials, and technology to
other countries or terrorist groups. In addition, we must
remain vigilant to avoid a miscalculation that could
unintentionally lead to war.
Joining us are Ambassador Christopher Hill, the Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and President Bush's chief
negotiator at the Six-Party Talks. He is accompanied by
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, who serves as Special Envoy to the
Six-Party Talks. Both of our witnesses have approached these
negotiations with innovation and energy. We are grateful to
them for their commitment to pursuing a peaceful solution and
for their willingness to share their thoughts with the
committee on multiple occasions.
This hearing takes place at a critical moment in the
efforts of the United States to prevent the expansion of North
Korea's nuclear program. Pyongyang has said recently that it
will return to the Six-Party Talks, which they left a year ago.
But the North Korean regime has not provided a date or
sufficient assurances that this will actually happen.
The committee is eager to hear the witnesses' estimates of
whether this offer is genuine. We also look forward to a clear
explanation of the administration's plan for dealing with the
North Korean nuclear program.
Although I understand that there may be a need for some
ambiguity in the United States policy toward North Korea, it is
not evident that this ambiguity has been constructive or even
intentional. Frequent news reports, and our own conversations
with U.S. officials, suggest that there are many opinions
within the Bush administration over how to proceed with North
Korea. Each of these divergent opinions may have some validity
and may deserve to be debated as part of the policymaking
process. But if our policy is to be effective, our ultimate
course must be internally consistent and explainable to our
allies.
I am particularly concerned that as Secretary Hill and
Ambassador DeTrani have pressed Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and
South Korean officials for cooperation in moving North Korea
back to the table, their initiatives have been complicated by
others who have leaked sensitive information related to
administration strategy.
For example, on May 7 of this year, a Washington Post
article revealed sensitive and confidential details of
discussions held between Secretary Hill and Chinese officials
in connection with the Six-Party Talks. Chinese officials later
protested to United States officials regarding the betrayal of
confidence.
A great deal of planning and expertise has been applied to
United States policy toward North Korea. But the implementation
of this planning must be consistent. With this in mind, I am
hopeful that our witnesses can address a series of questions
that I believe get to the heart of the North Korea dilemma.
First, do we have any evidence that the North Koreans are
serious about ending their intransigence and returning to the
Six-Party Talks? Or are recent statements by Pyongyang merely
an effort to buy time or placate other Asian nations?
Second, if the North Koreans do return to the talks, do we
have a reasonable expectation that some combination of factors
could lead them to agree to a solution that would satisfy our
core objective that their nuclear program be verifiably
dismantled? If so, what are those factors?
Third, will the other countries involved in the Six-Party
Talks be willing to exert the degree of pressure on North Korea
that most observers believe is necessary to achieve a
satisfactory resolution?
Fourth, how will we judge when the Six-Party Talks no
longer represent a viable course?
Fifth, in the event substantive progress is not made in the
Six-Party Talks, what are our options?
Sixth, in dealing with North Korea, how viable is a
strategy of expanded sanctions and isolation, which is favored
by some within the Bush administration? How would such a policy
achieve our objectives?
We want the Six-Party Talks to succeed, and we thank
officials of China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia for their
countries' partnership with the United States in the six-party
process. As I have stated previously, success at the table in
Beijing could lead to an ongoing and perhaps expanded six-party
format, as a venue for discussion on other Northeast Asia
issues.
We welcome our witnesses and look forward to their insights
on this extremely important subject.
At this point, I would like to recognize the distinguished
ranking member of the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening
statement, to be followed by Mr. Hill's statement. Then we'll
probably have a recess, as a rollcall vote is anticipated
sometime around 10 p.m., and return for questioning of the
witnesses.
Senator Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELEWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I welcome both our
witnesses, and thank you for holding this important hearing.
I think it's time to state the obvious--the
administration's policy thus far has been a failure. Not only
have we been unable to constrain North Korea's nuclear program,
but we've also distanced ourselves from our South Korean
allies. Although there seems to be some bit of rapprochement
this past weekend.
Let's be clear--North Korea's leaders are solely
responsible for the choices they've made, and they've made a
series of very bad choices by pursuing nuclear weapons that
threaten the United States and our friends and allies in
Northeast Asia.
But this administration has also made a series of poor
choices, in my view. It has not fulfilled the responsibility to
pursue the policies that stand a realistic chance of mitigating
and ultimately reversing North Korea's threat.
On the President's watch, North Korea has declared itself a
nuclear power, produced enough plutonium to build at least six
or eight nuclear weapons, and made vague threats about testing,
and on the verge of testing a weapon. The North has entered a
Safe Guard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and reactivated its nuclear reactor. In March, the North,
again, unloaded spend fuel from its nuclear reactor, and is now
preparing to harvest more plutonium.
The consequences of all of this are significant. Global
nonproliferation efforts have been wounded, and confidence in
our ability to ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia
have been shaken. Moreover, a financially strapped North Korea
could try to export some material, or even a nuclear weapon
that puts a nuke on the auction block. The bidders will not be
our friends. I'm not predicting that, but that is a
possibility. The route to a nuclear 9/11 would be clear from
that perspective.
And how did all this happen? What can be done to repair the
damage? Over the past 3 years, the administration has been
paralyzed by internal policy divisions, from my perspective.
Most recently, Secretary Rice had to chastise ``a senior
Defense Department official'' for suggesting the administration
was preparing to take the North Korean issue to the United
Nations Security Council. President Bush has failed to resolve
the dispute between those who advocate a policy regime change,
and those who argue for talks to eliminate North Korea's
nuclear weapons in return for sanctions relief, economic
assistance, and diplomatic normalization. This combination of
ambivalence and confusion has produced no recognizable policy
on, perhaps, the most critical security issue we're facing this
day.
North Korea probably produced enough plutonium to build one
or two nuclear weapons in the early nineties, but the North's
nuclear facilities were frozen, and placed under international
monitoring from 1994 to 2002, pursuant to the agreed framework
negotiated by President Clinton. As a result, the North Koreans
did not produce one gram of fissile material between 1994 and
the end of 2002.
Around the time of the 2000 Presidential election, North
Korea began in earnest, a secret, illicit program to produce
highly enriched uranium, suitable for use in nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration rightly confronted Pyongyang regarding
the HEU program on October 2002, but it was not until April
2003 when the United States finally sat down to talk with the
North about the crisis and how it might be resolved. Three
subsequent rounds of talks have failed to yield any measurable
progress, and more than a year has passed since the last round
of talks, at which the United States finally put a draft deal
on the table.
The President says he ``certainly hopes''--that's his
quote--that his policy will work. But hope is not a plan. Our
current path leads to one of two bad outcomes--either the
United States essentially will acquiesce to the North's serial
production of nuclear weapons, or we'll find ourselves in a
military confrontation with a desperate nuclear arms regime.
A third way remains possible. It's time for some hard-
headed preemptive diplomacy. First, I would respectfully
suggest the President should appoint a Special Envoy to
coordinate this policy and represent us at the Six-Party Talks.
No offense to those present today, but it seems to me that we
need someone who can not only make sure that our Government
speaks with one voice, but also engage North Koreans at a level
higher than the Vice Foreign Minister. George A.W. Bush or
James Baker could fit that bill, as many others could.
Second, the President must set priorities. Job one is
ending North Korea's production of plutonium, removing all
fissile material, and dismantling its nuclear-weapons-related
facilities. We should propose a phased, reciprocal, verifiable
deal to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program,
terminate its export of ballistic missiles, and more closely
integrate the North economically and politically into the
international community. The proposal put on the table last
June is not comprehensive enough and does not have enough flesh
on the bones, in my view, to get any reaction. We should
differentiate immediate threats--such as the North's plutonium
stockpiles--from long-term threats such as the pursuit of
uranium enrichment. But at the end of the day, all of the
North's nuclear-weapons-related efforts must cease.
If the President takes these steps, success is not
guaranteed by any stretch of the imagination. But I can
guarantee the current approach will not succeed. Following this
approach is the best chance of getting China fully engaged.
China should do more to lean on North Korea to change course,
but they will only do so if we're making a sincere effort to
engage the North. China and South Korea will not support, in my
view, United States policy of coercive regime change, and the
option should be abandoned.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we have to convince North
Korea that it will pay a very high price for nuclear
adventurism. Nobody wants to appease North Korea, but we must
also demonstrate that a nuclear-weapons-free North Korea will
be accepted by us, despite our dislike for our regime. So far,
I don't believe we've done either. Until we do both, I think
we're running an unacceptable risk of nuclear disaster.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and I
will be listening to see whether we should expect more of the
same from the administration, or whether some new policy is in
the offering, and if so, whether the new policy has ingredients
that promise success. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden, and I
will recognize Secretary Hill. Your full statement will be made
a part of the record, and you can proceed any way that you
wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hill. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
this opportunity to discuss with the committee the efforts of
the United States and like-minded countries to deal with the
threat of North Korea's nuclear programs. Special Envoy for
Six-Party Talks, Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is here with me for
support in this discussion. Ambassador DeTrani does not have a
separate statement, but would welcome the opportunity to
respond to your questions.
I want to emphasize two points today: First, the
President's policy is to achieve the full denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula by peaceful, multilateral diplomacy
through the Six-Party Talks.
Second, to change its place in the world and to get the
benefits of trade, aid, and investment, North Korea must
address the concerns of its neighbors, and in the international
community. To date, it has not demonstrated a readiness to do
so.
While North Korea's nuclear ambition is decades old, our
efforts to deal with it in a comprehensive manner through
multilateral means began only a few years ago. We participated
in three rounds of Six-Party Talks in August 2003, February
2004, and June 2004. Last June we tabled a substantive and
comprehensive proposal. During each session, the United States
met separately and directly with all of the parties, including
the North Korean delegation. While all parties agreed to rejoin
the talks by the end of September, and despite statements that
it remains committed to the six-party process, the North
Koreans have not yet agreed to return to the table on a date
certain, or to respond formally to our proposal.
We've had meetings with all of the parties since June 2004,
including with the North Koreans. Ambassador DeTrani met with
the North Korean U.N. Permanent Representative five times in
the New York channel in August, November, and December, last
year, and May and June of this year.
We engaged in those meetings because we wanted the North
Koreans to hear the United States position directly from us.
These meetings are important to ensure communication, but they
cannot take the place of the negotiations in the Six-Party
Talks.
I'll quote what the President said, last month, on the
North Korean nuclear issue to make the United States position
very clear. ``We want diplomacy to be given the chance to
work.'' As Secretary Rice said recently, we have no intention
to attack or invade North Korea. We deal with North Korea as a
sovereign nation in the Six-Party Talks, and in the United
Nations.
And while, of course, there is a range of options to deal
with the North's nuclear threat, simply ignoring them is not
one of them. Our policy is to pursue a diplomatic solution, but
we need to see results from the diplomacy.
North Korea's unwillingness to return to the table casts
increasing doubts on how serious it really is about ending its
decades old nuclear ambitions. That said, the other parties are
unwavering in their opposition to North Korea's possession of
nuclear weapons. Pyongyang must make a fundamental decision, a
strategic decision that its nuclear programs make it less--not
more--secure, and it needs to eliminate them permanently,
thoroughly, and transparently, subject to effective
verification. We're working together with the other parties to
bring the North Koreans to understand that it's in their own
self-interest to make that decision, and will continue to work
closely with the Congress and with this committee as we
proceed.
So that concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and
Ambassador DeTrani and I look forward to responding to your
questions.
[The statement of the Mr. Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss with the
committee the efforts of the United States and like-minded countries to
deal with the threat of North Korea's nuclear programs. The Special
Envoy for Six-Party Talks, Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, is with me for
this important discussion. Ambassador DeTrani does not have a separate
statement, but would welcome the opportunity to respond to your
questions.
I want to emphasize two points today.
First, the President's policy is to achieve the full
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful multilateral
diplomacy, through the Six-Party Talks. The substantive and
comprehensive proposal we made at the last round of Six-Party Talks,
almost 1 year ago, remains on the table, and we are prepared to discuss
it when the DPRK returns to the talks.
Second, the DPRK has a historic opportunity now to improve its
relations with the international community and to reap the full rewards
of trade, aid, and investment. But to change its place in the world, it
must address the concerns of its neighbors and the international
community. To date, the DPRK has not demonstrated any readiness to do
so.
SIX-PARTY TALKS
The United States has adhered to three basic principles to resolve
the North's nuclear threat. First, we seek the dismantlement,
verifiably and irreversibly, of all DPRK nuclear programs--nothing
less. We cannot accept a partial solution that does not deal with the
entirety of the problem, allowing North Korea to threaten others
continually with a revival of its nuclear program. Second, because the
North's nuclear programs threaten its neighbors and the integrity of
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, the threat can best be
dealt with through multilateral diplomacy. Third, we will not reward
North Korea for coming into compliance with its past obligations.
While the DPRK's nuclear ambition is a decades-old problem, our
effort to deal with it, in a comprehensive manner through multilateral
means, began only a few years ago.
We worked closely with all of North Korea's neighbors to lay the
groundwork for the Six-Party Talks, and the first round was held in
Beijing August 27-29, 2003. All six parties at that first meeting
agreed on the objective of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
The second round of Six-Party Talks was in February 2004. The
parties agreed to regularize the talks, and to establish a working
group to set issues up for resolution at the plenary meetings. At the
second round of talks, the ROK offered fuel aid to the DPRK, if there
was a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its nuclear programs as a
first step toward complete nuclear dismantlement. Other non-U.S.
parties subsequently expressed a willingness to do so as well.
The third working group and plenary sessions at the third round of
talks, held nearly a year ago in Beijing, were useful and constructive.
The United States tabled a comprehensive and substantive proposal,
which the DPRK at the time called ``serious,'' which it certainly was.
All parties agreed to meet again by end-September 2004.
During each of the working group and plenary meetings, the United
States met separately and directly with all of the parties, including
the DPRK delegation.
Despite its commitment to rejoin the talks by end-September, and
its vague statements that it remains committed to the six-party
process, the DPRK has not yet agreed to return to the table. While the
DPRK has made public statements about our June proposal, it has not
responded formally to us.
We have had meetings with all the parties since June 2004,
including the North Koreans. These meetings are important to ensure
communication, but they are not negotiations. They cannot take the
place of the negotiations in the Six-Party Talks to achieve the
dismantlement of the North's nuclear programs or end the North's
international isolation.
Ambassador DeTrani has met with the DPRK Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, Ambassador Pak Gil-yon, five times in the so-
called New York Channel, in August, November, and December of last
year, and in May and June 2005. We engaged in those meetings because we
wanted the North Koreans to hear the United States position directly
from us. The North Koreans indicated they are committed to the six-
party process, but did not agree to return to the table by a date-
certain.
I'll quote what the President said last month, on the North Korea
nuclear issue, to make that position crystal clear: ``We want diplomacy
to be given the chance to work.'' As Secretary Rice said recently, we
have no intention to invade or attack. We deal with North Korea as a
sovereign nation, in the Six-Party Talks and at the United Nations.
While, of course, there is a range of options to deal with the
North's nuclear threat, simply ignoring it is not one of them. Our
policy is to pursue a peaceful diplomatic solution, but we need to see
results from the diplomacy.
Since becoming Assistant Secretary in March, I have traveled to
East Asia three times, meeting with my counterparts in Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and China, to consult on how to move the six-party
process forward. I also met with the Russian senior official in
Brussels in May. My colleagues from those governments have made
frequent visits to Washington. All five parties have called on the
North to return to the talks and negotiate seriously to end its nuclear
programs and its international isolation. The North has cited a variety
of pretexts for refusing to rejoin the talks, even as it restates its
commitment to the six-party process and the goal of a denuclearized
Korean Peninsula. That casts increasing doubt on how serious the DPRK
really is about ending its nuclear ambitions. Frankly, we don't at this
point know the answers.
Certainly, the developments we have seen on the part of the North
Koreans have not been encouraging. Since the last round of Six-Party
Talks just a year ago, the DPRK has failed to abide by its commitment
to another round of talks by September 2004; announced that it had
manufactured nuclear weapons and was indefinitely suspending
participation in the Six-Party Talks; declared itself to be a nuclear
weapons state; announced that its self-declared missile test moratorium
was no longer binding; conducted a short-range ballistic missile test;
reportedly threatened to transfer nuclear material; and announced that
it was reprocessing another load of plutonium from spent fuel rods from
the Yongbyon reactor.
The other parties are unwavering in their opposition to North
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons.
China has the closest relationship with North Korea of any of the
six parties and it is for this reason that we continue to engage the
Chinese leadership on the North's lack of willingness to make a
nonnuclear Korean Peninsula a reality. The Chinese leadership at the
most senior levels has--in recognition of the destabilizing effect a
nuclear Korea could have on its own security interests--delivered
pointed messages to the North on denuclearization and returning to the
talks. We believe China can and should do more. China should do
whatever is necessary to get its neighbor back to the table.
We have excellent coordination with Japan and the Republic of
Korea. President Bush and President Roh, at their June 10 summit in
Washington, agreed to continue to work closely together for the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We are also in regular touch,
at the highest levels, with the Government of Japan, a valued partner
in the six-party process. Russia, too, has expressed opposition to the
possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK.
NORTH KOREA'S OPPORTUNITY
To succeed in achieving the peaceful resolution of the North Korea
nuclear issue, the North has got to return to the Six-Party Talks and
stay there for serious negotiations.
Against the backdrop of the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK appears to be
trying to undertake some measures in response to its disastrous
economic situation. The door is open for the DPRK, by addressing the
concerns of the international community, to vastly improve the lives of
its people, enhance its own security, move toward normalizing its
relations with the United States and others, and raise its stature in
the world.
The United States, working with our allies and others, remains
committed to resolving the nuclear issue through peaceful diplomatic
means. While we are not prepared to reward the DPRK for coming back
into compliance with its international obligations, we have laid out
the path to a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue.
Of course, to achieve a wholly transformed relationship with the
United States, North Korea must address other issues of concern to us
and the international community as well. It must change its behavior on
human rights, address the issues underlying its appearance on the U.S.
list of state-sponsored terrorism, eliminate all its weapons of mass
destruction programs and missile technology proliferation, and adopt a
less provocative conventional force disposition. It must put an end to
such illegal activities as counterfeiting, narcotics smuggling, and
money laundering.
The starting point is the strategic decision now by Pyongyang to
recognize that its nuclear programs make it less, not more, secure, and
to decide to eliminate them permanently, thoroughly, and transparently,
subject to effective verification. We are working together with the
other parties to bring the DPRK to understand that it is in its own
self-interest to make that decision.
We will continue to work closely with the Congress and this
committee as we proceed.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. DeTrani and I
look forward to responding to your questions.
The Chairman. We'll commence a 10-minute series, although I
suspect the first round will end fairly abruptly, as we have
our rollcall vote, and we need to return to that.
Let me just get back to the point that I am trying to make,
and that is apparently, there may be a deliberate ambiguity.
The United States position has been one of promoting regime
change, that is, the end of the government. Comments have been
made about the human rights conditions of the people of North
Korea as unacceptable for any human beings anywhere. And at the
same time, there is a feeling on the part of others that if
diplomacy is to work, that regime change cannot be the
objective. But the regime that we're dealing with needs to have
a feeling that, in fact, we are not going to invade, overthrow
them, but we are going to try to negotiate with them to achieve
the end of their nuclear program. They would remain then as a
regime, a sovereign state, and they would make a decision to
get rid of the program.
What do you have to say about this? It filters back and
forth through not only press commentary, but also some official
comment. It leads not only the North Koreans, but also our
other partners in the Six-Party Talks. Maybe even some
Americans wonder what is, really, our objective in North Korea.
Mr. Hill. Well, our objective, quite simply, is to achieve
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, that's an objective
we share with all of the parties in the six-party process. Now,
sure, we have gone almost a year without a negotiation, so I
think it's understandable why people express some concerns
about this. I think it's understandable why people worry
whether the Government of North Korea is truly interested in
pursuing a negotiation.
But I think, fundamentally, what we're really looking for
is a government in North Korea that will agree to denuclearize,
that is, a government that will change its attitude toward that
subject, and change its behavior on that subject. So we have
made very clear that if the regime in North Korea feels it's
going to be safer, or will do better with nuclear weapons, it's
very much operating under a false assumption. It has to get rid
of these weapons. And I think what's important--even though it
is difficult to wait for a year--but I think it's important to
keep a consistent message, to be very clear of what we need out
of this negotiation.
Understandably, when one waits so long, one looks at
whether the format is right, and certainly one is tempted to
look at the proposals we've made and start changing some of the
proposals, although I would argue that runs the risk of our
negotiating with ourselves, and while the North Koreans sit
without any sense of impatience, or without enough of a sense
of impatience, and wait for us to sweeten the offer, so I think
this is a time when we have to be a little stubborn on this.
The Chairman. Well, we've taken the position that we cannot
deal successfully, bilaterally, with the North Koreans. You've
pointed out that these conversations have occurred sort of on
the fringes of the Six-Party Talks. But all the evidence
appears to be that the Chinese position is one in which they
are not prepared to use the economic pressures that are clearly
there in terms of provision of energy and food for the people
of the country. Also, the South Koreans are certainly
ambivalent to stronger measures in terms of the regime, and as
a matter of fact, they are very, very much fearful of the
prospects of any military action that would have great
ramifications for their country.
Now, given these situations, we plow ahead, indicating that
all of the countries really have to exert pressure. It can't be
unilateral or bilateral negotiations here. What are the
prospects, leaving aside the transigence of the North Koreans,
for dealing with a ``Six-Power Talk'' in which the Chinese and
the South Koreans, to take two, have viewpoints that are hardly
persuasive, in terms of pressures through normal diplomacy?
Mr. Hill. Well, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you that China
has been reluctant to use the full range of leverage that we
believe China has. China has had North Korea as a close friend
and ally for some 50 years now, and China has very close
political connections, very close personal connections with the
leadership, and very close economic connections, and our
request to China is to do what it has to do in order to bring
them to the table. We're not going to tell them how to do that,
we're not going to tell them whether they need to use economic
leverage on their neighbor, but we're going to expect that as
the host to the process that they figure out a way to get
everyone to the table.
While there are differences on tactics, where the Chinese
are reluctant to use pressure, and Mr. Chairman, as you've
said, the South Koreans are also reluctant to use that type of
direct pressure, I want to emphasize there's absolutely no
daylight between us on the issue of disarming North Korea. No
one wants to see North Korea maintained as a nuclear state, no
one is prepared to accept, say, a few nuclear weapons in North
Korea's hands--everyone agrees that North Korea must be
denuclearized, and I would argue that, although the six-party
process has not succeeded in its primary mission, that is, of
the nuclear disarming of North Korea, it has succeeded in
bringing us closer together with these other partners.
I wonder if I could ask Ambassador DeTrani to say a few
words also.
The Chairman. Of course.
Ambassador DeTrani. Mr. Chairman, I would only add that the
proposal we presented in June of last year, the going-in
proposal, the plan was, and the agreement at that time was,
that we would reconvene almost immediately thereafter to
discuss the particulars of the U.S. proposal, and the DPRK
proposal, and the ROK proposal, and the United States was
looking forward to elaborating on what we meant by security
assurances of a multilateral nature, and the whole question of
economic cooperation, and ultimately a roadmap toward a
normalized relationship.
I just want to add, Mr. Chairman, I know it's obvious to
all of us, that we were hoping that we would have that working
group session in August, and then we'd have the plenary in
September. It was the DPRK, at the end of August and then in
September, that made it very clear they were not ready for a
working group session to discuss the respective proposals, and
they weren't prepared to come back to a plenary session to
discuss, not only the proposals, but the whole initiative that
speaks to denuclearization, and the economic cooperation, and
the security assurances they have demanded. So I think the
United States has shown a great deal of flexibility and, I will
say, creativity, in proposing something in June that we were
ready to discuss fully. But it was the DPRK that walked away
from the process, claiming a hostile policy on the part of the
United States. We have pursued this DPRK claim of a U.S.
hostile policy at great length with the DPRK, and we still have
not discovered truly what they meant by a hostile policy. Our
point is, ``Come back to the table and we'll discuss the
particulars,'' and that's where it should be done, and
heretofore, for this past year, they've not been back.
The Chairman. Well, it could be that the North Koreans take
the position that all of the other parties find their situation
to be unacceptable. Regarding the creation of new weapons,
perhaps the parties are not really prepared to do very much
about it. In essence, each has reasons for living with the
predicament, which may be more desirable than more precipitous
actions that change the situation. That even pertains to us. I
would agree that apparently you would formulate a policy in
which you add some economic incentives, some other aspects to
this, but even this has never seemed to be totally agreeable on
our side. To say the least, our administration has not talked
about a comprehensive revamping of the North Korean economy or
incentives to bring them into the world. This has been
contradicted by, it seems to me, arguments that we ought to get
rid of the regime altogether, if that's really our purpose.
This would lead the North Koreans to feel that we haven't made
up our own minds, quite apart from others that are surrounding
them there. It may be one reason that they don't find it
necessary to hasten to the table. But these are just simply
curbstone opinions. The purpose of having an oversight hearing
is to find out from you what is really going on.
Ambassador DeTrani. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one point
on that we made it very clear to the North Koreans, and our
partners in the six-party process, the other four countries,
have made it very clear, that denuclearization is the objective
here. And we are all prepared to look at the security
assurances, the economic package we've spoken about, energy--
looking at the energy needs, upgrading the grid, looking at
training of their scientists, engineers, and roadmap that leads
to normalized relations down the road--these are the issues
that the DPRK insists they need to address and we're prepared
to address them.
What we have not seen, however, on the DPRK side is a very
comprehensive discussion of their nuclear program, and of our
demands that the denuclearization be a comprehensive one. DPRK
avoidance of this discussion may explain why they were not
willing to come back to the table at the end of September.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hill. If I could add, Mr. Chairman, I think your
question speaks to the fundamental issue of why haven't they
come back, and I think it's important to bear in mind, this
nuclear program of theirs is a decades-old program, it didn't
start with Mr. Kim Jong-il, it started with his father. It is a
very fundamental question for them, and I think it's fair to
say that they are not convinced yet that they have to do away
with this program, and I think they are sort of testing our
mettle. They're testing to see whether we're going to get into
endless arguments with our partners, and waiting to see whether
we're going to start negotiating with each other and with
ourselves to sweeten the pot for them, and so they feel there's
some advantage in waiting. And I think what's important for us
to do is to make it clear to the North Koreans that, while we
don't think time is on our side, it's not on their side either.
And indeed, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the issue of South
Korea's policy. The South Koreans at the recent North-South
meetings made very clear to the North Koreans that what they
can do through that channel is going to be very limited, very
limited indeed, as long as North Korea does not negotiate the
end of its nuclear weapons programs.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador,
thank you for being here, we appreciate it very much. You know,
Chris, you indicated that the question asked by the chairman
would make it seem like we're negotiating with ourselves; well,
we are. In case you haven't noticed, we are. You all are
negotiating internally, you don't have it straight. You don't
have it straight. And the idea that there's--I think the single
biggest miscalculation here, two seasoned diplomats and a
seasoned administration now--is that one thing isolation has
produced, a diplomatically immature North.
I have no idea whether they want to give up their nuclear
weapons, whether there's any circumstance under which they'll
give them up. I have two objectives, simply from my standpoint
sitting on this side of the aisle, on this side of the bench, I
should say, and that is, that one of two things--either we get
them to give them up, or if they don't give them up, we make
sure that we are not the bad guy. That we're on the same side
as the rest of the folks in the region, they're there with us.
Right now, no matter what you say, they're not with us. They're
with us generically, but they don't think we've gone far
enough, individually we've been importuned by leaders from
those countries saying, ``What's the deal? What are you guys
doing?''
And look, Chris, you said, Mr. Secretary, you said 1 year
has passed. One year has passed disastrously. We're a lot worse
off in terms of our security today than we were a year ago
today. It will be even worse off a year from now. And so, the
idea that, you know, it's like, ``Well, you know, this is a
negotiation to buy a piece of real estate, you know, it's not
going to go anywhere unless a hurricane blows it away, it's
going to be there, so a year, we can hold out. We can take our
time here.''
I respectfully suggest that time is not on our side either
here, and so it gets down to a very basic thing. It seems to
me, that if you're sitting there, notwithstanding, Mr.
Ambassador, you're correct, you tabled a proposal that--in case
you haven't noticed--a lot of people here in Washington openly
wondered what you meant by it. All kinds of editorials
written--what do you mean by it? If we're wondering what you
meant by it, what do you think they think in the North you
meant by it? See, that's the point I don't get--I don't think
we should be giving anything that you don't think is
appropriate to the North, but the one thing I don't get is that
you can't have a proposal tabled that says normalization is
down the road if these weapons are given up, and then have a
series--which I don't have the time to read--a series of
statements from the Vice President, from the Ambassadorial
Nominee to the United Nations, from the Secretary, from the
Secretary of Defense, and so on, about this regime, and how bad
it--and they are bad guys. They are bad guys.
But the more we talk about them being bad guys, it throws
into question whether or not--are we willing to live with bad
guys who don't have a nuclear capacity, or not? That's the
question the bad guy's asking, at a minimum. And that's what
the Senator keeps asking, and we all keep asking--none of us
think these guys are good guys. They're bad guys. The question
is, are we prepared to live with them? And, even going beyond
that, are we prepared to enhance their nation's economic
circumstances in the process? That's the stuff that sends
shivers up the spines of half of your administration.
It's bad enough we're going to talk about living with the
bad guys, but my Lord, if part of that means an economic
reorganization of the North, a countrywide proposal, a way in
which to move forward, that's like me taking out my rosaries
and holding them up and saying, by the way, there's no trinity
and I'm still a Catholic. It's not possible.
So, I respectfully suggest you are debating with yourself.
Or else too many people are talking for this administration--
not you guys, personally. So, I don't know why you act
surprised when you wonder why it wasn't clear. We're not
negotiating with the Germans, or the Brits or the French, or
even Putin. We're negotiating with a guy who, up to now, has
been a hermit, who's been totally isolated, has had no
diplomatic relations other than with his brother-in-law. So,
I'm really confused by why it's not just simple enough to not
negotiate, but to sit down and say, ``Here's the deal. This is
it. These are the outlines of it, for real, and we're willing
to live with you bad guys.'' Unless you're not. And if you're
not, you're living with other bad guys in other places of the
world, in China there's not all good guys. In other places
you're living with guys not as bad, but sure don't treat their
people real nicely.
And that's what confuses me, and confuses, I think, a lot
of other people. So, in the few minutes I have left, let me ask
just two questions: Are you willing to live with the bad guys
if you have a verifiable agreement that they've given up, not
their prison camps, not their maltreatment of their folks, not
their legal system, not those--if they're willing to give up
nuclear weapons, nuclear capacity to build the weapons, and the
capacity to throw those weapons on missiles. Are you willing to
live with the bad guy? That's my question. Either one of you.
At the risk of being fired, probably, but go ahead, give it a
shot. [Laughter.]
Mr. Hill. Look, we have a negotiation aimed at
denuclearizing North Korea. That's the purpose of the
negotiation. Now, when you ask----
Senator Biden. You're not doing real well at it, Chris.
Mr. Hill. Well, it takes two to negotiate, in this case six
to negotiate, and we only have five.
Senator Biden. Why do you only have five?
Mr. Hill. But, we are prepared to reach a negotiation
which, at the end of the day, would denuclearize North Korea,
and in return, we're prepared to do, and to support several
issues, or several items that I think could help North Korea to
have a much better future.
We are not prepared, however, to be silent on some of these
other issues which you mentioned. We have a duty to ourselves--
--
Senator Biden. Look, I don't mean to interrupt you----
Mr. Hill. We need to be clear about human rights and other
issues, and we'll continue to do that.
Senator Biden. Your statement speaks clearly for itself.
It's a little bit like, when I'm negotiating with somebody
about whether or not they're going to sell me a piece of
property, it's not useful for me to point out how fat they are,
and how they really have, really need some serious dental work,
and you know that ugly car they drive that pollutes the
neighborhood, I'm not going to buy this property until you stop
polluting the neighborhood.
Look, we seem to be able to live with other countries whose
human rights violations are serious, or who support terror or
have been quiet about terror, and who have been involved with
weapons of mass destruction programs, like Pakistan, and who
are engaged in missile proliferation, and who have a
conventional force posture we don't like, and we've operated--
this administration has adopted a policy, I think that's
correct for some of those countries--that says if we go in
there and begin to change the economic circumstance, expose
them, put them into the cold light of day, to use a phrase in a
different context used by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
``sunlight is the best disinfectant,'' that those other bad
things will stop. That they'll stop. Or that they will be
atrophied. But you in your statement say, of course, to achieve
a wholly transformed relationship with the United States, Korea
must address other issues of concern to us, and must change
their behavior in human rights, address the issues underlying
its appearance on the U.S. list of State Department terrorists,
eliminate all weapons, et cetera. So you guys have chock-fulled
this thing, and I understand, if that's your position, I
respect it. But that's the problem we're all having--figuring
out what your position is. And your position is, unless human
rights, terrorist support, WMD, missile proliferation, and
conventional forces are all part of the negotiation, there's
not a deal. That being the case, we've got a problem, because
guess what? The rest of the deal, they ain't ready to get in on
a deal about terror and about these other issues, they don't
relate to it. You know it, and I know it. Because guess what?
If they get in a deal, then you can turn to them and say,
``Hey, what about you? Hey, China, what about you?'' Kind of a
problem, Chris. Kind of a problem, Mr. Secretary. And so, I
just, I don't for a moment countenance their human rights
violations or support of terror, or the rest, but let me tell
you, my dad before he died used to say, ``Son, if everything's
equally important to you, nothing's important to you.'' There's
one thing real important to me right now. How to get rid of all
that plutonium that they've got stockpiled and are building
weapons, the new plutonium they're making, and the HEU they're
seeking how to produce. That is obligation, overwhelming,
number one. And we're not doing that very well, in my view,
because we're still negotiating with ourselves. I thank you
very much, as you can see, I don't feel strongly about this--
thank you. I'm happy for a response, but I----
Ambassador DeTrani. Just one second, Senator. The proposal
that we put on the table speaks to what you're mentioning. The
multilateral security assurances are giving the DPRK those
security assurances, if they denuclearize comprehensively. They
will get the multilateral security assurances that give them
the guarantees.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Human rights abuses at home?
Ambassador DeTrani. We want to get into a discussion of
human rights, we want to get into the discussion of their
ballistic missiles, their illicit activities----
Senator Biden. No, I got ballistic--don't confuse the--I'm
asking specifically. You said you've made that offer. Will that
offer be forthcoming if they say, ``Great, we ain't changing
our human rights behavior at all, and we're still with guys
that we think are liberation fighters.'' Is there still a deal
there?
Ambassador DeTrani. We would not move toward normalization.
That would be a show-stopper on the normalization, but it would
not be a show-stopper, necessarily, on denuclearization and the
security assurances, which was the proposal we put on the
table. The denuclearization and the security assurances and the
economic cooperation speak to the----
Senator Biden. As I understand your proposal--security
assurances are only ``provisional'' until other issues are
addressed, right?
Ambassador DeTrani. That's denuclearization, sir,
comprehensive denuclearization, period.
Senator Biden. So, are provisional----
Ambassador DeTrani. Until there is comprehensive
denuclearization, once their nuclear program is eliminated,
they will get provisional security----
Senator Biden. Oh, I'm sorry, I was under the impression it
said until other issues were addressed, including human rights,
and including, so--so, they denuclearize completely, and we
believe that's the case, we are prepared to give absolute
security assurances.
Mr. Hill. Yes, we are. We are not prepared to have a fully
normalized relationship in the absence of movement on these
other issues.
Senator Biden. I appreciate--I'm over my time, and the
acting chairman's been generous, and there's a vote on, and I'm
going to go vote. I thank you both very, very much.
Senator Hagel [presiding]. Senator Biden, thank you.
Gentlemen, welcome.
You, I'm sure, noted a op-ed in the Wall Street Journal a
couple of weeks ago by former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft. Let me mention a couple of points he made in that
op-ed and then ask for your response.
General Scowcroft argued, in the May 26 piece, that the
United States has allowed North Korea to control the diplomatic
negotiations, while accelerating its nuclear weapons program.
He proposes that United States gain support from China, Japan,
and South Korea to pursue a comprehensive approach that would
demand that North Korea end its nuclear weapons program, in
return the United States would offer the types of security
assurances that Pyongyang has sought from the United States and
work to bring North Korea back into the international
community. Now, listening to the interplay here, and the
exchange, Mr. Ambassador, between you and Senator Biden, then
you agree with what General Scowcroft is saying, and you've
already done that.
Ambassador DeTrani. Our proposal, Senator, speaks to those
issues, exactly. Security assurances, economic cooperation, and
a roadmap toward normalization of relations when other issues
are brought into the picture.
Senator Hagel. So, what General Scowcroft wrote about on
May 26 is not new, you've already put that on the table.
Ambassador DeTrani. We put a general proposal on the table,
Senator, that we would pursue in working groups and then future
plenary sessions, but we never had the opportunity of pursuing
it and getting into the particulars of the proposal.
Senator Hagel. And the other four members of the party of
six are party to that and agree with it.
Ambassador DeTrani. They were all briefed on it and they
were all supportive of the proposal.
Senator Hagel. Do you think the United States should look
at the possibility of being more flexible in negotiations as we
pursue, not only what you have talked about here laying this
proposal down, but looking ahead, flexibility like more
bilateral negotiations, are we prepared, are we thinking in
ways that are enlarging the negotiations?
Mr. Hill. Let me say, first of all, we are prepared to have
bilateral contacts and to meet bilaterally with the North
Koreans within the six-party process. What we do not want to do
is have bilateral contacts reach such a stage that the six-
party process becomes irrelevant, we leave out our partners
who, at the end of the day, are going to have to participate in
a settlement, and we are looking in terms of the economic
package, at substantial amounts of assistance, which would
probably be coming from Japan and South Korea. So, we can't
have a situation where we have shifted to a bilateral mode, and
leave them out of it until the end of it when we give them a
check. So, we need to be close to our partners in this process,
but that does not mean that we can't have these contacts. If we
do have these contacts--and frankly speaking, we would have a
lot more bilateral contacts--if the North Koreans came back to
the six-party process.
Senator Hagel. You agree with Scowcroft's point that the
North Koreans have controlled the diplomatic negotiations while
accelerating their own nuclear program over the last year? So,
the question is: Where have we won here, where have we gained?
Where are we making progress, based on the current policy that
we have?
Mr. Hill. Well, first of all, I think it's increasingly
clear to everybody that the problem in the talks is not the
United States. We have been flexible----
Senator Hagel. Well, I don't think that's the issue, Mr.
Secretary, and I'm not implying that it's our fault. But
obviously, we have not seen progress. Obviously we've got
difficulties here. So, I think most of us, just with an element
of common sense would come to some conclusion that maybe
something's not working. Now, I'm not trying to put the onus on
the United States here, at all. Obviously we've got a
difficult, complicated problem. That moves me to another issue
that I have heard the administration talk about. There seems to
be some confusion, at least coming from different parts of the
administration, on moving this to the Security Council of the
United Nations. What would we gain by that, and what would be
the options? Would we be interested in doing that? There's been
confusion in the press the last 2 weeks of senior
administration officials saying we were close to that decision,
and then others saying, no, we're not close to that. Could you
clarify that, and then give this committee what we would gain,
what we could expect the options to be, if we move to the
United Nations?
Mr. Hill. I think Secretary Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld
clarified this issue, and I will do so as well, which is that
we do not have a plan to bring this to the Security Council,
that's a right we reserve, and we could do so in the future,
but it is not something we're planning to do now. Now, when we
do bring it, or if we do bring it to the Security Council, it
would be for the purpose of achieving something. It's not
simply a question of going to the Security Council for the sake
of going to the Security Council. There has to be a reason, and
there has to be a proposal that we feel we could have the
support in the Security Council to move ahead with. And we are
not prepared, at this point, to go to the Security Council. So,
I think it's important that as we speculate, or as people
speculate, about what could follow the six-party process, the
concern I have is the more speculation there is on what
follows, the more we undermine what, I think everyone agrees,
is the best way to solve this.
Senator Hagel. What would we, for example, what would we be
expecting to achieve, to your point, we would only do this in
order to achieve something--what could we achieve, what would
we be likely to achieve, or what's possible to achieve?
Mr. Hill. Presumably, one would seek a resolution, and one
would seek to have the resolution passed, that is, without
vetoes. And with the requisite nine votes.
Senator Hagel. But what would that resolution achieve? What
would it do? What would tangibly move the effort, denuclearize
the peninsula, as you have noted, is the objective of our
efforts.
Mr. Hill. I'm speaking in very hypothetical terms, which is
very foreign territory for a diplomat, but you could have a
resolution where you put more political pressure on North
Korea, you could have a resolution where you put economic
pressure on North Korea, you could have a resolution that
further isolates North Korea. I think there are a number of
ways one could go, but I think what's important is that you do
it when you have to do it, and when you engage in it, you are
successful. I think what we don't want to do is go to the
Security Council and not be successful.
Senator Hagel. Are we talking about sanctions? Is that a
possibility?
Mr. Hill. Again, our policy is the six-party process, and
our policy is to get this process going, and to get it going by
the common efforts of the five parties to bring the sixth party
to the table, and so I don't want to speculate on what,
precisely, we might do at a latter stage.
Senator Hagel. What are we doing to reengage the talks? As
you have noted, that being your objective to get these talks
moving again so we could----
Mr. Hill. Well, first of all, I want to emphasize we work
very closely with the other parties, and we had a very, very
good set of meetings with the South Korean President, last
week, who came in for a 24-hour visit, about doing all we can
to get the six-party process going. We talked to the South
Koreans about their own inter-Korean dialog, their own contacts
with the North Koreans. I have been engaged with my Chinese
counterparts, discussing various ways they can encourage the
North Koreans back to the table. I've also talked at length
with the Japanese--we're in constant diplomatic contact with
these other parties. In addition to that, Ambassador DeTrani
and the Director of Korean Affairs, Jim Foster, went up to New
York on May 13, and made clear to the North Koreans directly
what we have said, publicly, about our policy toward North
Korea. And last Monday, the North Koreans invited Mr. Foster
and Ambassador DeTrani back for further discussion. The
discussion was very positive. They made clear they are
committed to the six-party process, however, they did not give
the date that we need to have in order for this process to go
forward. So, in short, we are using the contacts directly with
the North Koreans, we are also working with other parties in
the six-party process.
Senator Hagel. So, you feel some element of confidence that
the Six-Party Talks will resume soon?
Mr. Hill. This is a very, very tough issue. We are talking
about a program that's been around for several decades, we're
talking about a country that does not like to play by the
rules, so we're--this is a tough problem, but I am confident
that we are on the right track with the six-party process, and
will eventually get there.
Senator Hagel. And even though we have not seen a lot of
progress and movement here in the last year, you don't think
that there's any reason to expand our thinking as to other
options in dealing with the North Koreans?
Mr. Hill. I think it's important to expand our thinking. I
think it's important to be considering what other options are
out there, what we can possibly do. But I think it's important,
also, not to be talking too publicly about other options,
because I think that undermines the six-party process, that
makes people convinced that we're moving away from the six-
party process, and that is the wrong impression to give.
Senator Hagel. So, I understand if you would not want to,
nor should you, talk about that possibility in an open hearing,
but let me ask you this--is that something that you are
thinking about? Is that something we can talk about privately,
quietly?
Mr. Hill. I think it's important--we need to solve this
problem. We need to solve the problem of North Korean nuclear
weapons. We have a lot of options, but we don't have the option
of walking away from this one. So, we do have to be thinking,
and I read that op-ed piece, I've looked through that op-ed
piece. I read a lot of op-ed pieces because I want to absorb as
much thinking as possible. And of course we have discussions,
and I would be honored to have them with you about how we can
solve this problem, because this problem has to be solved.
Senator Hagel. Ambassador DeTrani, would you care to
comment on anything here that you've just heard?
Ambassador DeTrani. No, Senator, I agree fully with the
Secretary. One point I would make is a lot relies on the DPRK
to make a strategic decision. We could come up with new
proposals, and we've had the bilaterals that complements what
we're doing with the other four countries to get them to
convince the DPRK to come back to the table. And I think what
we've seen is progress working with our, if you'll allow, our
partners. Because as we have approached the DPRK in New York,
saying we recognize them as a sovereign state, no intention to
attack or invade--as the Secretary has made very clear in his
statements, the other countries are saying, ``Why is the DPRK
not coming back to this process, if they're truly interested in
security assurances and economic reforms, movement toward
normalized relations with their neighbors?'' And that's going
to be the pressure, or the element that has to affect, I
believe, in the longer term, the DPRK. Because the United
States has been forthcoming, and I think our partners realize
we have been forthcoming in this process.
Senator Hagel. Well, that leads me back to where I started,
and I'm going to turn back to the chairman, it seems to me
whatever the motivations are--and as Senator Biden noted, and I
think we all appreciate what you're dealing with--no one is
quite sure. So, therefore, I ask again, are we prepared to be
thinking beyond where we have been, about how to accomplish
this? Noble, right effort, we agree with it, but obviously, as
General Scowcroft pointed out in the op-ed, progress has been
very limited, and again, it's not your fault, but it seems to
me we're going to have to think a little bit beyond where we
have been, in order to get where we need to be, or we think we
need to be. Thank you.
Mr. Hill. If I could just add, Senator, that the issue is
to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and nuclear problem,
and we believe the six-party process is the best way to achieve
that, but it's not the only way to achieve that. So, we do need
to look at all options, and all options will remain on the
table. But, we believe the six-party process is still the best
way to go.
Senator Hagel. Well, I would take you up on your invitation
to we sit down and visit a little bit about this, and I'm sure
you'll be talking to the chairman as well in private, as you
have just said, it's not the only way to go, the six-party
process, I just go back to a very simple dynamic here. We're
just not seeing very much progress, and I think that General
Scowcroft's point is--whether you agree or disagree with his
point about negotiations being controlled by the North
Koreans--the fact is, seems to me, in what I have seen, is that
they have positioned themselves even in a stronger position
here over the last year, and that may be true, or may not be
true. But it's my perspective, and I think some others on this
committee, as well as others in this Congress, and if that is
the case, or even let's say it's neutral, it seems to me we're
going to have to be thinking beyond where we've been, in order
to deal with it--as you have very clearly indicated, and we all
agree--a very serious problem.
Mr. Hill. I would look forward to having that discussion
with you and the chairman. I would respectfully disagree with
the notion, though, that the North Koreans are in better shape
as a result of this. I think their economy is in worse shape
than ever. And I think North Korea needs to come to the table,
get rid of these weapons and get on with joining the world,
because as long as they remain isolated like this--and they
isolate themselves by this--they are not going to succeed.
Frankly, if they're worried about their survival, they should
take another course.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. I will
yield to other Senators as they return, but I'll take the
occasion to ask additional questions.
Is there good intelligence sharing among the partners that
we have around the table? Is our limited intelligence
supplemented by what others are able to inform us, not only
about the nuclear issues, but also economic issues in North
Korea and political issues? How would you characterize the
expansion of our knowledge as we take a look at that country?
Ambassador DeTrani. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I believe there
is excellent intelligence sharing with our partners on all
issues that affect the DPRK, not only on the nuclear issue, per
se, but on the socioeconomic situation, et cetera. So I do
believe that's a very strong element of our relationship with
our partners.
The Chairman. Is there equally good sharing with regard to
interdiction of materials that might be attempted to be
exported, say, by the North Koreans? Has there been a concern
that fissile material, or plans, or other aspects of weapons of
mass destruction might be exported for cash, given the
desperate needs of the regime? What sort of cooperation do we
have there?
Ambassador DeTrani. Mr. Chairman, we have excellent
cooperation. Not only PSI, the Proliferation Security
Initiative, has been extremely effective, but the bilateral
relationships with the respective countries on issues that
affect proliferation, have been, I believe, extremely
effective.
The Chairman. This is not an argument with the panel or
with colleagues about the virtue of the Six-Party Talks. I
think that Secretary Hill brought up the interesting and
important point that I think we discovered in another hearing,
that our own relations with the Chinese, with the Japanese,
perhaps with the Koreans, what have you, have been enhanced by
the fact that we are meeting, frequently. Our diplomats are
intersecting with other diplomats in a much more robust fashion
than was the case before the Six-Party Talks. Now, this is not
a rationale to have Six-Party Talks, namely that we all get to
know each other, notwithstanding whether we're making headway
with the North Koreans. But there are plus factors, clearly, in
terms of the strategic situation, Asia, the general security of
people, the confidence of parties, our relations with the
Chinese, the Japanese, and the Koreans. This, in the ultimate
scheme of things, may be tremendously more important, whatever
happens to the North Koreans. So, we've noted that as we have
held the hearings, and we appreciate that.
Let me now recognize Senator Murkowski for a round of
questions. We're on a 10-minute round of questions. Senator
Murkowski, would you like to address the witnesses?
Senator Murkowski. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman,
and good morning, gentlemen. I do apologize, bouncing back and
forth here I haven't had an opportunity to hear most of your
comments this morning, so if my questions go into an area that
you've already been asked, and answered, I do apologize.
I do want to start by repeating comments that I have made
to the two of you in private conversations, or in other
hearings about my support for the overall approach to the Six-
Party Talks and your continued efforts as you try to work
toward greater bilateral cooperation with North Korea in the
context of those talks. I think we all recognize that we would
like to see a uniform policy approach to North Korea, and don't
want to be cutting our negotiating partners out of the talks.
Mr. Hill, when I came in earlier, you had made some
comments that North Korea, I think you used the terminology
``testing our mettle'' and talked about the advantage that may
be gained in waiting. And I think you said that there's no--
it's not to our advantage to wait--but it is also not to North
Korea's advantage to wait. And yet, I guess what I see is that
with the economic assistance that they continue to get from
China, from South Korea--is it truly, is that statement still
so accurate? That it's not necessarily to their advantage to
wait this out? Who wins if they can hold on longer? It seems
like the pressure is more on us because we haven't been able to
push this thing over the edge. We've been waiting now for a
year to try to get something moving, nothing's happening, so
who gains by the waiting?
Mr. Hill. Well, I don't think it's a win-lose situation.
It's certainly not a win-win, I would call it a lose-lose
situation. We obviously want to deal with this problem, we
don't feel time is on our side. The longer this problem goes
on, the longer the problem of a country holding plutonium, and
we know they have it, the greater the risk of proliferation. So
we do feel we're working against the clock on this. But at the
same time, I don't think the North Koreans can sit back with
any sense of accomplishment or satisfaction. First of all,
their economy is truly in abysmal shape, and that's the polite
version of it. Their industrial capacities continue to shrink,
and they continue to have serious problems in agriculture and
just meeting their food needs. In addition, I think they are
always isolated, but even more so now, and I like to think that
is because we've put together this six-party process, and we've
basically held together pretty well, and there's very little
sense of recrimination between the partners. We have worked--as
the chairman mentioned--we've been working very closely with
our other partners, especially China as the host, and I think
we have a very good relationship with China with respect to the
six-party process. We have shown the kind of flexibility
they've been asking for--I might add. We've also worked with
the Chinese, because of the six-party process, on some of the
problems of proliferation as well. And we've been concerned
about North Korean proliferation. So I think it's really helped
our relationship and that cannot come as good news to the North
Koreans.
Senator, you mentioned that North Korea continues to get
assistance from China and South Korea. But I think--I mentioned
this earlier--the South Koreans made very clear to the North
Koreans in their inter-Korean dialog that what they are getting
now, which is pretty modest--we're talking some tons of
fertilizer--is a fraction, a small fraction of what they could
get if they reached an agreement to denuclearize. So, every day
that North Korea does not reach that agreement, North Korea, I
think, is losing; losing considerable assistance that they
would otherwise be getting, especially from South Korea, but
also from the other parties. So, while North Korea has not made
the fundamental decision that it needs to make, to do away with
weapons programs that were started by Kim Jong-il's father, at
the same time it's a tough decision, and I think they're
waiting, waiting whether to make that decision, waiting to see
whether their negotiating position can improve. And I believe
there's no sign that things are improving for them. So, I was
asked earlier about whether I feel that this could eventually
yield results, and I do believe that the logic of the six-party
process is so powerful that I think it can even be heard in
Pyongyang. So, I think we need to be a little stubborn, we need
to understand that we've got a good process, and we need to
avoid negotiating with ourselves, and otherwise avoid having
any sense of recrimination. We're going to stay the course, and
I think this is the right way to get us there.
Senator Murkowski. So, do you give yourself any deadline?
Mr. Hill. You know, I have deadlines in my mind. Obviously
I worry. We're coming up on the 1-year anniversary and we are,
as I've said before, Americans are known as impatient people.
But for Heaven's sake, 1 year is a long time, but I would avoid
artificial deadlines, and focus on how we can solve this
problem, and the six-party process is the best way to solve it.
Senator Murkowski. Let me ask you about the level of
assistance that the United States has been directing toward
North Korea, clearly a lot lower levels than we have had in
previous years--do you think that this is diminishing, or
influencing our leverage with North Korea?
Mr. Hill. We have been--and many people don't realize
this--we've been the largest food-aid provider to North Korea,
largest since their serious agricultural problems began in the
mid-1990s. We continue to monitor the situation very closely,
and as we contemplate a response to the World Food Program's
appeal, we'll do so with three criteria in mind--one, how we
see the situation in North Korea with respect to the production
of grains; two, how we see competing situations elsewhere in
the world, because there's a limited amount of this food that
can be provided, and; three, we need to look at the monitoring
conditions--North Korea has traditionally fallen below the
international standards of monitoring--so that we make sure the
food aid gets to the right recipients. So, I think in looking
at the situation, we do so with those criteria in mind. The
President has made very clear on many occasions, we do not
politicize food aid. We are not tying our food aid to the six-
party process, we are tying it to the needs of the North Korean
people, competing needs, and our ability to make sure it gets
to the right recipients. So, I am not in a position today to
tell you how we will respond to the World Food Program's appeal
this year, 2005, except to say that we will do so on the
merits.
Senator Murkowski. I would certainly agree with the
President's position that we don't want to tie the food aid and
the humanitarian relief to successful implementation, if you
will, of the Six-Party Talks. We also have to recognize that as
we move forward with our food programs, working with the NGOs
that are on the ground for the food distribution, it's through
these entities, through these agencies, that we get a good deal
of our information coming out of North Korea, so that's
something that we want to continue, we don't want to poison
that relationship.
I see that the yellow light is on, but I want to ask you
about Russia's role in the Six-Party Talks, given that Kim
Jong-il has taken a couple of train tours of Russia lately, is
he--what's that relationship there, and is Russia being as
helpful in the Six-Party Talks? You keep referencing China as
well as South Korea, but what about Russia's role?
Mr. Hill. First of all, if I could just make one more
comment on the food aid, there are some very, very courageous
people who live and work in North Korea who are engaged in the
distribution and the monitoring of that food aid. I'm referring
to international NGOs and also people working in the framework
of the World Food Program who have had restrictions on their
activities, especially in the fall of 2004. Now, we understand
the restrictions have been somewhat alleviated this year,
although again, it doesn't reach world standards. But I think
we really owe it to these people who are just courageously out
doing their jobs, to make sure that they can do their jobs.
With respect to Russia's role, Russia is a full participant
in the six-party process. I have spoken with my counterpart,
Ambassador Alexeyev on many occasions and some 3 weeks ago, he
and I met together and had a very, very full discussion of
this. Russia absolutely supports the goals of this. They have
been very clear with the North Koreans where they stand. There
have been no mixed messages coming from Moscow with respect to
the need to North Korea to get back to the talks and do so in a
move to give up their nuclear weapons. Russia has absolutely no
interest in seeing North Korea emerge as a nuclear state of any
kind.
The question, of course, we have is to some extent the same
question we have of the Chinese, which is--given Russia's
historical ties to North Korea, given the fact that they have
very, rather close political connections, in many cases, close
personal connections, and certainly they have some economic
connections--the question is: Are they using all of their
leverage? I think you know, we have made very clear that we
think everybody should be using whatever leverage they have on
this country, and we continue to work with the Russians to get
them to do their part to bring North Korea to the talks, but I
want to assure you that we are in close contact with our
Russian colleagues on this.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Back in the summer of 2003, we got off on
the wrong track for whatever reason, and the Chinese in
particular, PRC, were very critical of us, and some of the
quotes at the time, the Chinese top diplomats were saying the
United States does not have a negotiating strategy beyond using
multilateral talks to pressure North Korea. Wang Li, Chinese
Foreign Minister, was saying the United States was the main
obstacle, and he said how the United States is threatening the
DPRK--this needs to be further discussed in the next round of
talks--and criticized Washington's ``negative policy,'' his
quotes, and then Shu Shu Long, a foreign affairs participant
said, ``there's widespread sense that the United States is the
problem,'' this is way back in the summer of 2003 as we're
trying to get the Six-Party Talks going. Do you think we've
recovered from that debacle of everything that went wrong back
then?
Mr. Hill. Well, let me say from my perspective, I've been
on this account for a couple of months, actually since
February, and we are working very closely with the Chinese.
We're not there yet. It's very frustrating because the North
Koreans haven't come back to the talks, but we're working very
closely, and I think the type of quotes you just read to me
from 2003, I don't think you could find such quotes from the
current time. I think we're working very well, and I think the
onus for why these talks are not going on is now squarely with
the DPRK.
Senator Chafee. And how important is the PRC to these
talks?
Mr. Hill. The PRC is the host to the talks, of course.
They're also the country with, probably, the most leverage, the
most influence, the most strongest relationship with North
Korea, so I would say they're very, very important. That
doesn't mean they're the only element in this, and that's one
of the reasons we occasionally do have direct contacts with the
North Koreans. We cannot tell everything to the North Koreans
through the Chinese, we need to have an ability to go to them
directly, and that's why Ambassador DeTrani has been up to New
York some five times since last fall. But China is clearly very
important.
But, I will say something else, which is, we have a very
fundamentally important relationship with China. We deal with
China on a broad menu of issues. I would put this one at the
high end. This is a very important issue, and what we want to
make sure is that, as we go through this very difficult process
dealing with this country which seems to delight in its
isolation, North Korea, we want to make sure at the end of the
day this process brings us all closer together. And I think
that is what's happening between the United States and China,
the United States and South Korea, in particular. I would add
the South Korean and Chinese relations have been better as a
result of the six-party process. They're in constant
communication. And also Japan which, as you know, has had some
difficulties with its Asian neighbors, especially with Korea
and China. Japan has continued to have very close relationships
with Korea, with South Korea, and China with respect to the
six-party process. So it is working. As the chairman said, it
is perhaps an unintended consequence, some of them can be
favorable. But we are working so well together that one can
sort of think ahead to perhaps a time when the six-party
process will be able to resolve this terrible issue of nuclear
weapons in North Korea, and then perhaps can deal with other
issues as well, because we have a neighborhood in Northeast
Asia that does not have the kind of multilateral ties that it
should have. I mean this is one of the most important regions
in the world where a good percentage of the world's exports,
where the world's industrial production is. And yet there are
not enough multilateral structures. So, perhaps we can look
forward to the day where this six-party process can become part
of that eventual architecture in Northeast Asia. But first
things first, we have to get through this North Korean nuclear
issue.
Senator Chafee. It probably is a keen dilemma to have the
leverage that the PRC has on North Korea, as you said, that the
most leverage, the necessity of having them a key part of these
talks at the same time we're dealing with all the other issues,
particularly the arms buildup, and the Secretary was in
Shanghai addressing that, maybe in some ways counterproductive
to our efforts to get them on the North Korean arms sales to
Taiwan. These are all difficult issues that the United States
needs to balance, and where would you put the priorities of
balancing these issues--you said the top priority is having no
nuclear weapons in the peninsula at the same time we're, if any
arms sales are Taiwan are adversely going to affect PRC's help
in having no nuclear arms in the peninsula.
Mr. Hill. My comment on the relative priority of the North
Korean nuclear issue was to say I would put it in the top tier
of our issues with China. But to be sure, there is no
relationship in the world today that we have that is more
complex than the relationship we have with China. It is across
the board--we deal with them on security issues, we deal with
the Chinese very fundamentally in economic issues as everyone
on this committee well knows. So we have many issues we deal
with the Chinese, and I would put the North Korean nuclear
issue as in the top tier. But I would also put some of the
other issues in the top tier, that is, Taiwan, certainly our
economic relationship.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
Good luck.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Let me just ask about the recent decision by our Government
to discontinue the recovery of United States remains from North
Korea. What was the rationale for that decision, and is it a
part of these negotiations? Or totally outside of them?
Mr. Hill. Well, first of all, I feel at a bit of a
disadvantage to speak about this because I'm from the State
Department, and this is a Defense Department program. But the
issue from the Defense Department was the question of the terms
and the conditions under which these teams would go into North
Korea. And specifically there were communications issues which
the people in the Defense Department were concerned about, that
is, our ability to reach these teams, or the ability of these
teams to reach us at any given hour of the day. This has to do
with if one of them was ill or injured. These are terms and
conditions that are followed pretty much the world over. We
have these recovery operations in many other countries,
including countries that also have very remote areas and are
themselves very challenged for medical services, et cetera. So
I think there was a concern that we could not have, sort of, a
North Korean exceptionalism. That is, they should have more or
less the communications that we have with teams in, for
example, Laos. So it was on that basis that they decided to
suspend these until they could work out better arrangements.
The Chairman. At an earlier hearing that the committee
conducted on North Korea, the whole issue of acceptance of
North Koreans leaving North Korea came to the fore. Last
August, Vietnam transported--as I understand--over 400 North
Korean refugees to Seoul, South Korea. These are persons who
had made their way to Vietnam through China. We understand that
officials in South Korea are still discouraging people coming
from North Korea to the South, quite apart from the 400, just
in individual cases. I raised the question, at the last
hearing, of how receptive the United States should be. In other
words, should our policy be one of allowing North Koreans to
immigrate to the United States to seek freedom in this way?
Now, this policy seems to be, not necessarily ambiguous,
but not very well formulated. What is your judgment about this?
It appears, at least to us, in raising the questions, that
there is real value in North Koreans having an opportunity to
escape to freedom from the regime, as we describe it.
Furthermore, all the parties involved ought to be receptive of
this, although we know the Chinese have gone to extraordinary
means to prevent a single North Korean from getting across the
border. In the past we dealt, for example, with Eastern Europe
in the cold war. The idea of people coming from the East to the
West, we thought, offered considerable progress and leverage in
negotiations. Do either of you have comments about the
immigration policy?
Mr. Hill. Mr. Chairman, we've had, I think, really very
good discussions with the PRC and the Republic of Korea exactly
on this issue, and speaking to the need for the United Nations
Hyde Commission for Refugees to become more of an active player
on the issue of North Korean refugees coming out of North Korea
into China. So, we believe we have made some progress, because
we have defined the issues, and we're speaking of a process
that addresses the concerns, the need. So there is movement. We
continue our discussions with the PRC and with the Republic of
Korea. We have not seen a diminution of interest in receiving
refugees on the part of the ROK. There are security concerns
and there's vetting necessary to determine if people coming
into the country are legitimate refugees seeking refuge in the
ROK, and that applies for the United States also, Mr. Chairman.
We have a process that we do the screening, working with the
ROK to determine who these individuals are, and indeed if they
express an interest in coming to the United States. So they are
vetted accordingly. This is an ongoing process and your points
are very valid, and we are working this very aggressively.
The Chairman. I'm pleased to hear that. It seems to me
there's real value in that process of allowing people to come,
having some persons from North Korea outside the system that
may communicate back into the system, by some stage.
Another question, quickly. We have talked about potential
arguments or discussion within our own administration, but
there are recurring reports that within the North Korean
administration there are the so-called ``hardliners''--persons
who see no value whatever in these negotiations--and that the
best course for North Korea, sad as the case may be for the
people, the economy, and the politics, is to hang on and to
keep the bomb, if they have one. Whereas others, who may be
more familiar with the rest of the world, realize that the
whole society is falling farther and farther behind, in terms
of world competition. This is a world in which these people
have to live almost totally out of the picture. Therefore we
may see opportunity, potentially, in talking about economic
issues, about trade, about people coming back and forth across
boundaries, as perhaps the salvation of a very difficult
predicament.
What is your sense as you meet with the North Koreans about
their own conflicted negotiating positions?
Mr. Hill. Mr. Chairman, we do hear in the bilaterals we
have in Beijing when we had the plenary sessions and working
group sessions, that there is a sense that there is an element
in the DPRK that speaks to retaining a nuclear weapons
capability. From where we sit, we see the ultimate
decisionmaker as Kim Jong-il, and indeed, if Kim Jong-il is
serious about the economic reforms that we see, that have
kicked in since a few years ago, and is very concerned about
international legitimacy, and ultimately normalizing a
relationship with the United States and other countries, we
would think Kim Jong-il could, and would, make that decision to
have a comprehensive denuclearization. While elements in the
military may be clamoring for retention of a nuclear
capability, we do believe the overriding imperative to look at
the economic reforms, the well being of the people who--because
of the economic strains in the system--speak to
denuclearization and international legitimacy, and moving on
that path.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador DeTrani. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the real
tough questions we face, which is to try to get into the minds
of the North Korean decisionmakers, because for them to be
pursuing nuclear weapons programs they bring not only great
hardship, but also I would add, great peril to their country
because one way or the other they're not going to have these
systems. And so the real issue for them is what are the terms
under which they'll give them up.
But one must look at the enormous problems that that
economy faces. It's a country of 23 million people. I mean,
I've served in countries far smaller than that. Twenty three
million souls there, and it is hard to find, when you look at
all of the problems they're currently having in agriculture and
industrial production, health care, et cetera, it's hard to see
how nuclear weapons could play any role, whatsoever, in
addressing these. So, people who advocate these nuclear
programs--and we have to acknowledge that this has gone on for
several decades--do so apparently as an article of faith that
somehow has nothing to do with their objective circumstances,
and everything to do with some notion of prestige. These are
programs that are a dead loser for North Korea, and so one
hopes that eventually the people who really make the decisions
will understand that and come forward, and we can cut a deal
with them.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this important hearing.
Ambassador Hill, how was the recent meeting between
President Bush and the South Korean President received in South
Korea? Did South Koreans find the meeting constructive, or did
it just really confirm the differences between our respective
approaches to the North Korean issue?
Mr. Hill. I track the internal situation in South Korea
very closely, in fact, my family is still living there until my
daughter graduates from high school. The overwhelming response
to last Friday's summit was very, very positive. I think
President Roh and President Bush went into the meeting with a
sense that they had a real common endeavor, and certainly
emerging from the meeting there was a real sense that we were
together on this. President Roh Moo-hyun has been, I think,
very much a proponent of continuing the inter-Korean dialog,
and so are we, because we think that South Korea needs to have
this kind of direct dialog with North Korea and what we look
for from the South Koreans is to be able to coordinate and keep
each other informed as we go forward. And this meeting, I
think, was a very good opportunity to discuss how things are
proceeding in our Korean dialog, and also to coordinate our
approaches on the six-party process, so I would say with great
assurance right now, that we are really in synch with the South
Koreans.
The issues--there are issues that, from time to time, come
up--but right now, we are very much in synch on the issue of
doing all we can to get the six-party process going.
Senator Feingold. Let me ask you about who North Korea's
largest trading partners are, and has their trade increased or
decreased in the last 3 years? What about the level of direct
foreign investment in North Korea?
Mr. Hill. Analyzing North Korean statistics is a full-time
job, but I would say the trade with China has increased in
recent years. I think it's increased primarily because trade
with other countries--notably with Japan--has decreased. In
addition, I think the continued weaknesses of the factories, of
the industrial plant in North Korea, the fact that factory
utilization is at a very, very low percentage is causing
people, individuals, private people, to bring things over the
Chinese border to sell them. So it's a process of reform,
although I think that's too polite a term for it. I think it's
more a process of the general weakness of the state economy
that there is more and more privatization. And this
privatization, I think, is bringing in imports from China. Let
me ask Mr. DeTrani, though, to follow up on this.
Ambassador DeTrani. I totally agree with the Secretary.
Trade has increased with the PRC, investment accordingly has
gone up a bit since we have the statistics. But North Korea is
in dire shape, economically, as we all know.
Senator Feingold. The reason I ask is to get a sense of
their overall--how much pressure they're feeling. So, what I
want to know, is the decrease in Japanese trade and other trade
being made up by sufficient Chinese trade--I know it's probably
hard to quantify--but I'm trying to get a sense if they're
feeling pressure from a loss of trade or not.
Ambassador DeTrani. They feel immediate pressure right now,
Senator, on the food situation, as we recently saw with the
200,000 metric tons of food from the ROK, and they're looking
for an additional 300,000. The agricultural sector is not in
good shape, they may have some problems there, and
infrastructure problems, and so forth. And a number of
investors from Western Europe are looking at their investments
there to determine how viable they are in the short and longer
term. So there are very, very definite systemic economic
problems in the DPRK that speak to these issues.
Senator Feingold. So, if I were to say guess, take a guess
overall, if they are perhaps feeling some pressure because of
overall loss of trade and investment, would that be a fair
statement, despite the increase in trade with the PRC?
Ambassador DeTrani. I would agree with that. South
Koreans--I made this comment earlier before you were able to
attend, Senator--the South Koreans have made very clear to the
North Koreans that what they are able to do in terms of
economic assistance is going to be minimal until the North
Koreans come to the six-party process, and agree to give up
their nuclear program. So South Korea is providing fertilizer
and has some industrial arrangements in a border town called
Kaesong, but overall these programs are going to be very much
attenuated, and the South Koreans made that clear to their
North Korean counterparts a couple of weeks ago at their first
round of this inter-Korean dialog, that these programs are
going to be very, very small until North Korea comes to the
table.
Senator Feingold. Finally, I know this question's been
asked in different forms already, but I'd like to try one other
approach--the Six-Party Talks have been stalled for over a
year, and it seems unclear whether or not recent North Korean
statements about a willingness to return to the negotiating
table will actually result in a resumption of the talks. It
seems that at this point we're simply waiting for the North
Koreans to rejoin the talks while they may well be continuing
to produce nuclear weapons. Why does the administration persist
in pursuing a policy that to date has been--at least in my
view--utterly ineffective, and keeps North Korea in the
driver's seat? Ambassador.
Ambassador DeTrani. Well, we believe that the six-party
process is the best way to proceed. We believe that it brings
all the relevant players to the table, that when there is a
solution, each of these players will have a role to play, and,
therefore, they need to be at the table. The time is long
passed when the United States would negotiate over the head of
South Korea, for example. South Korea is a serious player in
the world, and they deserve a seat at the table. So, we believe
this is the right way to go. We believe it is a flexible and
broad platform on which we can build a number of other
structures, including bilateral talks within that six-party
platform. So we believe that we have the right format for
these, to deal with the problem. Now, the North Koreans have
failed to come to the table. So, of course, it's understandable
that people look at the format, but I don't think we have a
problem of format. I think we have a fundamental problem on the
part of the North Koreans that they are not prepared yet to
give up their weapons. To address that, we need to put pressure
on them, not only our own, but also through other participants
in the process. I think we need to show the North Koreans that
we are unified, and I think we're doing that, and I would say
the pressure is mounting on North Korea to come back to the
table.
To be sure, we are looking at a range of options, but to
speculate about options at this point, especially to speculate
about them in public would, I think, undermine the six-party
process.
Senator Feingold. I understand that and I'm concerned about
that, and I hear what you're saying about having a good format,
but can you give me any evidence that suggests that we have the
right format since we have no sign of success?
Ambassador DeTrani. Well, first of all, the North Koreans
came to the first three sessions of the six-party process, and
the problem has been that at the third session, we tabled a
pretty comprehensive approach. It was a no-kidding approach,
aimed at addressing all of the issues that they have raised
themselves as issues that they felt needed to be solved--that
is, economic assistance, energy assistance, security
guarantees, roadmaps to diplomatic cross-recognition, these are
all the issues that emerged in the earlier sets of talks, and
we, then, tabled a proposal to address all of these. So, it was
a moment where we were all saying, ``It's time to really get to
the table and put your cards down and get on with it.'' And the
North Koreans have chosen not to return. I don't think they
chose not to return because they were tired of the process. I
think they chose not to return because they don't know how to
respond to this very comprehensive approach that we laid on the
table. So, I think they are continuing to make up their minds
about doing away with a multidecades-old program of nuclear
weapons, and they haven't come to a final decision yet.
Senator Feingold. So, are you saying at this point that
there's really nothing more we can do, and we just have to wait
for the North Koreans to change their mind?
Mr. Hill. Well, waiting is not a policy, and what we do is
we work very actively with the other participants in the six-
party process. We're very active with the South Koreans, that
was part of what was going on last week when Roh Moo-hyun was
here at the White House. We're working very closely with the
Chinese. I recently hosted a meeting of the South Korean and
Japanese negotiators and, as you know, South Korea and Japan
have had their problems in recent months, but the six-party
process is an area which both of them have made very clear they
are not going to see that process suffer because of their
bilateral problems. So, we are working very closely with these
parties to see what we can do to put additional pressure on the
North Koreans. I met with our Russian counterpart, and we've
had direct contacts with the North Koreans to make crystal
clear what our position is. So, I think, our approach has not
been to wait, but our approach is to engage our partners and,
in fact, even to engage North Korea directly through these
direct contacts that Ambassador DeTrani has headed up to make
very clear that the offer is on the table and the North Koreans
ought to come back to that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your answer, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Murkowski, do you have additional questions? Senator
Chafee, do you have? Yes, Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Quick followup question to Senator
Feingold's asking about the process and the format and going
back, once again, to the summer of 2003. Our top negotiator,
who resigned, was critical of insisting on the Six-Party Talks
and at the time he said the administration is making a mistake
by refusing to conduct sustained one-on-one negotiations, what
he described as ``drive by meetings'' will not work, ``with a
current approach of talks in a room crowded with diplomats from
several nations. And he said, ``without a change in format, the
prospects for success are very grim.'' And here we are 2 years
later, he said that in the summer of 2003, and as an example he
said that, ``the epitome of the wrong-headed approach came at a
dinner in Beijing in April, after the White House instructed
James Kelly, they must not hold bilateral talks with the North
Korean envoy, Li Ghun. Li cornered Kelly at a dinner anyway,
and announced that North Korea would be willing to end its
nuclear projects if the United States would change its approach
toward North Korea, but Kelly had no authority to explore the
issues with Li, and nothing happened.'' So are we so rigid on
insisting on these Six-Party Talks that opportunities come up
that we all want to go forward, we all want to see progress,
but we're so rigid on insisting on this that we're missing
opportunities?
Mr. Hill. Well, Senator, in the summer of 2003 I was not
engaged in this process, in fact, I think part of that summer I
was up in Narragansett Bay. But I would emphasize to you that
our strong conviction that the six-party process is a broad
enough platform that we can build different structures on it.
We can certainly have whatever contacts, in whatever format,
that we need in order to solve this. So, I think the fact is,
the North Koreans stayed with the process, and only left when
we tabled a comprehensive approach. And, at that point, I think
they realized that we had come to a moment in history where
they had to make a fundamental decision, and I think it's an
example of a country or a people just at that moment not rising
to the occasion. So, I do not believe we have a format problem.
I do not believe we have the problems that were outlined in
2003. I certainly would plan to conduct these negotiations with
an eye not just to straightjacket it into a format, but with an
eye to achieve success, and I would want to take back an
agreement and see if my Government will back me up on the
agreement that I can reach. I know Ambassador DeTrani, who
deals with this every day, is of the same mindset--we want to
solve this problem, we want to solve this problem on its own
merits. And then we want to move on to other problems, because
there's a lot going on in Asia today that we need to be engaged
in as a country. We need to be working closely with China on a
variety of issues, we need to be dealing with problems in
Southeast Asia, and frankly in Northeast Asia, there are enough
other issues that we need to get to those, we need to get
through this problem, and we will.
Ambassador DeTrani. If I may add to Secretary Hill,
Senator, at the two last sessions, the most recent being a year
ago last June, and then prior to that, February 2004, we had
bilateral sessions. The last bilateral in June was over 2\1/2\
hours. We've had working group sessions, two working group
sessions, we've had--as Secretary Hill indicated, a number of
encounters in New York, going up to New York. So we've had
ample opportunity to express our views, but indeed to hear the
DPRK's views. And our views are very clear--we're prepared to
address the security concerns, the economic cooperation, and a
roadmap toward normalization, but we're also very clear on
comprehensive denuclearization to include the uranium
enrichment program that has brought us to the situation that
we're at right now. And that's a decision the DPRK has to make,
should make, and indeed, some would argue, maybe that's why
they weren't back at the table in September. So we have had
ample opportunity--in an open six-party forum--but also in a
bilateral forum, to express all views on that. Indeed, I think
our partners realize we've been very flexible in our approach
to the process of addressing the issue.
Senator Chafee. One quick question. In your own experience,
have those bilateral talks been more productive than the Six-
Party Talks?
Ambassador DeTrani. They have not, Senator. Let me just
tell you, we've crystallized, we've made our positions
extremely clear, we've shown a willingness to hear anything
they have on their side, but with respect to forward movement,
we have not had the forward movement.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chafee.
What sort of public diplomacy--if you can use that word
constructively--are we employing with regard to North Korea?
And if we do not have a program of public diplomacy, through
electronic means, are we able to broadcast into the country?
Are there any computers in the country? Of all of the ways in
which messages get to people throughout the world now, in very
sophisticated ways that are available to us, of what have we
availed ourselves with in this technology?
Ambassador DeTrani. Mr. Chairman, the Voice of America,
Radio Free Asia, certainly the foreign broadcast media, they do
reach the DPRK. A significant amount of jamming goes on, but
these broadcasts are received by a number of the residents of
the DPRK. So there is information coming in, and as Secretary
Hill indicated a minute ago, there is more opportunity
because--if you will--more goods are reaching the DPRK from
China--officially, unofficially, through the black market and
so forth--so there's more information reaching the people,
citizens of the DPRK.
The Chairman. Is there any evidence that this information
leads the citizens to do anything? Or is this absorbed? It's a
very oppressive state. One cannot participate in public
meetings and what have you, but I'm just curious if we have
evidence, knowledge, of whether the outside world, at all,
affects dialog within the country?
Ambassador DeTrani. Anecdotally we've heard where people in
the DPRK have told others there that they are hearing these
broadcasts and comparing them to what they're hearing from the
state broadcasts and so forth. That confuses them a bit, and
they're not sure what the truth is. We hear some of this from
refugees. So the information coming in is certainly a catalyst
for people to think about issues.
The Chairman. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
know I'm the last person between you and getting out of here,
so I'll be relatively brief.
When we had some testimony from you in this committee,
Ambassador Hill, just a couple of days ago, I asked about
China, and unfortunately because of votes and so forth I missed
some of your previous testimony--if I'm going over old ground,
please let me know.
I'm trying to get a sense at this point as to whether we
think that China still retains sufficient leverage over North
Korea in getting them back to the talks, or do we feel that
it's important for us to work through different channels in
order to facilitate the type of constructive dialog that is
necessary?
Mr. Hill. Actually, Senator, we have talked about China,
but it's entirely appropriate that we continue to do so,
because it is a very, very important element in this whole
equation--China is the host of the six-party process, they have
the closest relationship with North Korea, and they have much
more leverage with the North Koreans than any of the other
participants, including Russia.
That said, I think it's important for us not to believe
that China's the only source of leverage on North Korea, and I
think all of the participants need to do their part to get
North Korea to the table. Russia, for example, has some
leverage with North Korea. And frankly, I think we have
leverage with North Korea, and I think it was with that in mind
that we had our contacts with the North Koreans in May and
June, and will continue that in this channel, this so-called
New York channel. The purpose is, we need a channel to give
information, to give messages to the North Koreans, and not to
pass messages through a third party. We need the ability to
pass messages directly. So while we do believe that China is
very much a key country in this six-party process, it's not the
only one.
Senator Obama. Let me ask the question in a slightly
different way. China's strategic interests in this situation--
do they rise to the same level as ours in terms of keeping
North Korea nuclear free? Or, strategically, do they say to
themselves, ``This is something that America cares deeply
about, we're less concerned about it, we may go along and
assist the Americans, or we may not, depending on what our
bilateral relationship is, but it's not something that we
ourselves are particularly invested in.'' Is that their
position? Or do they share the same bottom line concern that
North Korea should not have on operable nuclear weapons
capacity?
Mr. Hill. I think they absolutely share the same bottom-
line position, they have no interest in seeing North Korea
become a nuclear country. They know what that would mean in the
region, they know what that could mean in terms of other
countries believing that they have to go nuclear. I think they
tend to be less concerned than we do about the potential that
North Korea could sell nuclear materials on the black market
and that they could end up with some terrorist organization. We
have a lot of experience tracking how terrorist organizations
operate in the world, and we believe it's quite possible for a
country, if it has fissile material, to try to sell that
through surreptitious channels. We are also keenly aware of the
fact that North Korea, as a state, conducts many illicit
activities in the area, money laundering, and other illicit
trade. So we tend to be more concerned on that score than
sometimes--as a matter of analysis--than sometimes the Chinese
are. It doesn't mean the Chinese would countenance it or say
it's okay. It's just that they don't believe the North Koreans
would do that, and we don't see a reason why they would not try
to do that. So, we do have a difference in perceptions from
time to time. But in terms of the bottom line, the Chinese have
absolutely no interest in seeing North Korea go nuclear, and I
think the Chinese are aware that the United States in Northeast
Asia is going to work with our allies to prevent proliferation.
I mean, none of our allies in the region have gone nuclear. I
think the Chinese understand what we're talking about; we would
expect them to do the same with North Korea.
Senator Obama. Can we maintain a credible threat of
sanctions without the Chinese going along?
Mr. Hill. I think if one gets into the area of economic
sanctions, sanctions would be much enhanced by the
participation of China. North Korea's overland trade is through
Russia to some small extent, and through China to a great
extent; otherwise its trade is by sea. So we realize that we
need China certainly, and perhaps Russia as well, to make
sanctions be very effective. That said, just because something
can't be airtight doesn't mean it ought not to be done.
Senator Obama. Okay, let me go back to a question that
Senator Biden raised. As I would summarize Senator Biden's
basic point--there seems to be a lack of clarity with respect
to what we're asking of the North Koreans. Are we asking,
simply, that they get rid of their nukes, or are we asking that
they get rid of their nukes and also start running their
country in a way that meets the basic needs of the North Korean
people? And, it strikes me that the administration, because of
its strong rhetoric, may have boxed itself in to a point where
it may not be sufficient to focus on the nuclear issue because
North Korea is still going to be on the list of evil empires,
and causing the North Koreans to be wary of changing their
behavior. How do you respond to that question? I know you said
that human rights are important, and it's important that we
continue to talk about those as we do in countries all across
the world. I agree. What is also true, and I think Senator
Biden made this point, is that there are a lot of unsavory
characters that we deal with--we may not want to, but we do--
because there are some larger strategic interests that are
involved. Do you feel at this point that our distaste for the
regime in North Korea precludes us from being able to send them
a strong signal that if you do x then these benefits will
follow?
Mr. Hill. I'd like to say it's the distaste for the
behavior of the regime, that is, for things the regime is
doing.
What we are trying to do is negotiate a settlement of the
North Korean nuclear problem. To be sure, our own ability to
achieve full normalization with North Korea, our own ability to
achieve an excellent bilateral relationship with North Korea is
absolutely tied to resolution of these other issues. We will
continue to speak out on the issue of human rights, for
example----
Senator Obama. Sorry to interrupt, but nobody is
anticipating the United States will suddenly have the same
bilateral relations with North Korea as we do with New Zealand
any time soon. That's not the question. The question is: Can we
say to the North Koreans, if you stand down on your nuclear
weapons, these incentives will follow, and hostilities will be
lessened, even though we expect that they would still be a
regime that violates human rights?
Mr. Hill. We have made very clear to the North Koreans, and
I think the North Koreans understand this, that substantial
benefits will flow from a decision on their part to do away
with their nuclear programs. And that was the purpose of our
June proposal, to put on the table what those benefits are. And
we told the North Koreans to think about it, come back and
respond, and that's what we're waiting for. I think the real
issue here, it's not that they don't know the benefits, but
they simply haven't made the fundamental decision whether they
want to give up on being a nuclear state. And that is the one
outcome that from our point of view, we are not negotiating a
reduction in their nuclear, their fissile material, we are
negotiating an end to the program, an end that they--in a
sense--cannot then rekindle the program at a later date when
they need more economic assistance. It has to be an end. So, I
think that is a very fundamental decision for them, and they
clearly have not been prepared to make that decision.
Senator Obama. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you waiting
for me, and I appreciate both of you taking the time to come
in.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Obama, and I echo those
sentiments. We appreciate both of you and the work that you're
doing. I would simply recognize for the record that you have
appeared before our committee in closed sessions. We felt it
was very important that we have, today, an open session that
could be shared with the American people, as well as the rest
of the world.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]