[Senate Hearing 109-230]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-230
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT: THE SPACE SHUTTLE AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
25-323 WASHINGTON : 2005
_________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
5SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMint, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
CONRAD BURNS, Montana JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 18, 2005..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Lott........................................ 3
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 2
Witnesses
Griffin, Dr. Michael D., Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space
Administration................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Horowitz, Dr. Scott J., Director, Space Transportation and
Exploration, ATK Thiokol, Inc.................................. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Johnson-Freese, Dr. Joan, Chairman, Department of National
Security
Studies, Naval War College..................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
McCulley, Michael J., President and CEO, United Space Alliance... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Li, Allen, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Appendix
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared
statement...................................................... 45
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT: THE SPACE SHUTTLE AND BEYOND
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Science and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:47 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Kay Bailey
Hutchison, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. I am starting because there is a
possibility that at 11:30 we will have to break because of what
we call the 2-hour rule being invoked. And therefore, I am
going to jump right in with our first witness and want to
welcome Dr. Griffin. We very much appreciate all that you have
done in the very short time that you have been in place.
Today's focus is going to be the Space Shuttle and how we are
going to utilize it fully and go forward with a crew return
vehicle. We are very concerned on this Committee, as we have
made clear, and I know you are as well, about the current
status of our ability to fly the Space Shuttle beyond Return to
Flight, how long can we use it, and what your plans are to
bring up the crew return vehicle.
In addition, in the question period I want to say that I
want to start talking about not only the crew return vehicle,
which is, I know, in the top three priorities for NASA, but
what we are planning to do with cargo, a capacity to take the
payloads to and from space that we cannot take on the crew
return vehicle.
You have said to me straight out the Space Shuttle is
flawed. The words are indelibly impressed on my mind from the
last hearing. And therefore, I want to know how we are going to
get equipment and repair-type tools up there, when we have a
crew return vehicle, and where that stands in the priority
list.
It is essential that we learn from mistakes made in the
past, as we develop a new generation of vehicles for human
space flight. We do not have the luxury of time or resources or
making a false start, as we add the new dimension of Moon,
Mars, and beyond. So I hope that we can go one step beyond
where you did in your hearing for confirmation about where you
see the main priorities for NASA, which are Return to Flight,
the Crew Return Vehicle, and the finishing of the Space
Station.
And, of course, as you know, Dr. Griffin, my fourth
priority, but very high on the list and considered essential to
me, is the science research at the Space Station going on a
continuing basis rather than being delayed for the first three
priorities.
So with that, I will welcome my Ranking Member, Senator
Nelson, who is our only senator who has been in space. And let
me say I am glad you are here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
I am pleased to welcome our witnesses here today for this hearing
on Human Space Flight--The Space Shuttle and Beyond. I know you are all
very busy people, and the Subcommittee appreciates your willingness to
be here with us to discuss some very important issues for the future of
human space flight.
I am especially pleased to welcome Dr. Michael Griffin here, who is
perhaps busier than all of us, as he continues to assume the helm of
NASA, assemble his leadership team, and prepare to give the go-ahead
for the Space Shuttle's return to flight.
We begin the focus of today's hearing on the Space Shuttle, because
that is this nation's only human space flight vehicle. The Space
Shuttle continues to represent an incredibly valuable national asset.
We all share, I'm sure, the great hope that it will return to flight in
July as a safer, more capable vehicle than ever before.
This hearing is not intended to delve into the near-term issues or
the steps taken to prepare for Return to Flight. Rather, we hope to
review the role of the Space Shuttle as representing an essential U.S.
capability to fly humans and cargo into space and back to the Earth. We
will hear about the current status of our ability to continue flying
the Space Shuttle, and plans for its use after a successful Return to
Flight. We expect to hear about the need to ensure that the United
States has such a capability and can sustain human space flight into
the future without a serious gap in our ability to do so. We hope to
hear what steps are now being taken and will be taken in the future to
develop a successor to the Space Shuttle in a manner that provides a
smooth, uninterrupted transition from one U.S. human space flight
capability to the next.
With talk--and plans--to retire the Space Shuttle, we must
carefully guard against the premature loss of either skilled expertise
in the workforce or industrial capacity to support and sustain the
Space Shuttle for however much longer it will fly. Members of our
second panel will address these and other issues.
It is essential that we learn from the mistakes made in past
efforts to develop a new generation of vehicles for U.S. human
spaceflight. We do not have the luxury of either time or resources to
make another false start as we add the new dimension of the Moon, Mars
and beyond to this nation's human spaceflight capability.
This hearing is intended to set the stage for what will be the
Subcommittee's ongoing efforts to monitor and ensure the success of
U.S. efforts to sustain an effective, uninterrupted national human
spaceflight capability.
I look forward to our witnesses' testimony and their response to
questions of the Subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Madame Chairman. And I
understand that it is possible that we are going to have to
conclude this by 11:30. Is that correct?
Senator Hutchison. That is correct.
Senator Nelson. OK. Then I will just say, Dr. Griffin, in
the interest of time, I think you have demonstrated
extraordinary leadership. And you have only been on the job a
month. But, of course, we knew that. That is why Senator
Hutchison and I both encouraged your appointment and then your
confirmation, once appointed. So we are very grateful. And I
think that what you have done in trying to lessen the hiatus
between the CEV and the end of the Space Shuttle is not only
commendable, it is absolutely necessary, as well as you taking
a fresh look at whether or not we can go and service Hubble. I
thank you for that.
And I will reserve my comments for questions.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Lott?
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Lott. Thank you, Senator Hutchison. And I am so
pleased that you have taken over this Subcommittee
Chairmanship. Your interest, your knowledge, and your energy
will be very helpful.
And I want to also recognize Dr. Griffin's good work
already. I just sense a change already, which is pretty
impressive. And I am wishing you the best. And we want to be
partners with you in trying to get this very important agency
up and running and doing the kind of job we know it can do.
I know there will be lots of discussion about your plans to
accelerate the Crew Exploration Vehicle acquisition and how
NASA's other programs will be affected by the increased
emphasis on space exploration. I look forward to working with
you to achieve the former while making the latter more
plausible.
I also want to thank you for going forward with the NASA
Shared Services Center decision. I think you made a good
choice. Obviously I am prejudiced in that regard, but there
were a lot of things to consider, a lot of countervailing
pressures. And I think you made the right decision and that the
history of this will show that it will serve NASA well.
I also understand that the U.S. Trade Representative is
providing you with guidance on the use of NASA facilities in
connection with a EADS-proposed U.S. commercial aviation
research and manufacturing facility. And I would urge you to
work as closely as you can with the State of Mississippi and
Hancock County in our state with respect to this proposal.
And so basically, I just wanted to get those things on
record. And at this point it makes me feel good to be able to
come to a NASA hearing and commend a NASA representative for
their effort. Maybe it is just because you are just getting
started, but I hope you can keep it up. Good luck, sir.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Lott. I am very
pleased that you are staying active on the Subcommittee,
because I do want to have a reauthorization of NASA this year.
And I do plan to invigorate our oversight efforts.
Dr. Griffin, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, Senator Lott,
Senator Nelson. I appreciate your very kind remarks.
I will endeavor to continue in the pattern that we have
begun in our relationship, which is to give you the best
answers that I have to the questions that you ask. And if the
answers are difficult, then I look forward to working with you
to make them as palatable as we can. But I will tell you every
time what I believe to be the case.
Senator Hutchison, while you were mentioning that the most
important person for the hearing was here so we could start, I
was actually thinking in my own mind that my role was more like
that of the pig in a ham and eggs breakfast. You cannot start
without me, but I am at the wrong end of the food chain.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Griffin. So with that, I will continue with my formal
remarks.
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the plans
for the Space Shuttle in carrying out the first steps of the
Vision for Space Exploration with Return to Flight and assembly
of the International Space Station, our plans to date for the
Shuttle retirement by 2010, and our progress in minimizing the
gap between retirement of the Orbiter and the first flight of
the Crew Exploration Vehicle.
In presenting the vision last year, the President----
Senator Hutchison. Dr. Griffin, could I interrupt you?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hutchison. You were not planning to read your whole
statement, were you? Could you summarize?
Dr. Griffin. I had an oral statement.
Senator Hutchison. Is it different from your written
statement?
Dr. Griffin. It is. But let me shortcut it in the interest
of time. Let me just go forward and say we are in the middle of
returning to flight. As you know, we delayed by 3 months. We
think that was the right thing to do. The recommendation was
presented to me, and I concurred with it. We are still working
some technical issues. We will go when we can.
We are, as I believe you now know, working vigorously at
NASA to consider alternate options for space station assembly
sequence, looking at how we can complete the station consistent
with our obligations and yet consistent with a Shuttle
retirement date in 2010. I have promised the Congress the
results of this internal study by mid-summer.
We are looking at phasing out Shuttle operations. We have
studied lessons from the Titan IV community. We are considering
how the phase-out of the Shuttle orbiter will be consistent
with the development of a new architecture for the CEV, its
transportation system and human return to the Moon. There are a
number of critical decisions that need to be made in that
regard. And we will be sharing those with you as we go forward.
As I have just said, we have an Exploration Systems
Architecture Study (ESAS) ongoing at headquarters in parallel
with our Space Station assembly study. Preliminary results from
that study also will be made available to the Congress by mid-
summer. And I look forward to working with you as we shape that
up.
And with that, as I have testified previously in my
confirmation hearing and last week, I believe with you that the
gap in human space flight capability, access to space by the
United States between the necessary retirement of the Shuttle
Orbiter and the bringing on line the new Crew Exploration
Vehicle must be absolutely minimized. And I look forward to
working with your Committee and with the Congress as a whole to
achieve that goal.
Thank you. And I stand ready for your questions.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee; thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the status and role
of the Space Shuttle in human space flight, our plans for the Shuttle's
retirement, our progress in minimizing the gap between the retirement
of the Space Shuttle and the introduction of the Crew Exploration
Vehicle.
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision
for Space Exploration. The President's directive gave NASA a new and
historic focus and clear objectives. The fundamental goal of this
directive for the Nation's space exploration program is ``. . . to
advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a
robust space exploration program.'' In issuing this directive, the
President committed the Nation to a journey of exploring the solar
system and beyond, returning humans to the Moon, and sending robots and
ultimately humans to Mars and other destinations. NASA embraced this
direction and began a long-term transformation to enable us to achieve
this goal.
The first steps in enabling the Vision for Space Exploration are to
return the Space Shuttle fleet to flight, to focus the use of the Space
Shuttle on completing assembly of the International Space Station, to
retire the Space Shuttle by 2010, and to replace it as soon as possible
thereafter with the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Given the
importance of ensuring that the Space Shuttle is returned to flight
safely, the Space Shuttle program and, indeed, the whole of NASA has
been devoting its available resources and human capital to ensuring
that this first step is executed to the best of our abilities. Once the
two Return to Flight missions are behind us and we have developed a
higher level of confidence in the knowledge of the Shuttle debris
environment, we can focus a greater level of attention on the important
issues surrounding Space Shuttle transition and the development of the
next generation of human spaceflight vehicles.
Space Shuttle Return to Flight
On April 28, 2005, the Space Shuttle program management recommended
that we extend our planning for the first Return to Flight mission,
STS-114, to support the launch window that opens in July 2005. I
concurred with this recommendation. This change was not the result of
any single problem, but instead reflected the need to take additional
time to perform our verification and validation reviews, and to assess
the results from the External Tank (ET) fueling test performed on April
14, 2005. We knew that there were some open questions going into these
reviews and tests, and we had very detailed plans for developing
answers to those questions. We also understood that the reviews and
tests might raise additional questions before Return to Flight, and
that we would have to be prepared to review our plans and launch
opportunities in light of this. That is exactly what happened. One of
the most notable outcomes was our decision to modify the feed line
bellows area with an electrically powered heater to further reduce or
eliminate the ice that naturally forms in the area.
This decision to insert some additional planning time to support a
mid-July launch opportunity was not made lightly. Everyone in the Space
Shuttle program recognizes that we have an extremely important mission
to carry out, and that completing assembly of the International Space
Station and executing the Vision for Space Exploration cannot happen
until we return the Space Shuttle to flight. At the same time, this
change reflects our continuing commitment to remain focused on safety
of flight considerations and prudent engineering decisions.
Transporting people into space remains risky compared to most other
human endeavors. We must make sure that every decision to send people
on missions into space is made with the utmost concern for their
safety.
Today, work continues in preparation for another ET tanking test
scheduled for as early as tomorrow, May 19, while the STS-114 Shuttle
stack is still at its launch pad. Engineers and technicians are adding
instrumentation to the tank to help troubleshoot two problems that were
detected during its first tanking test on April 14. The instrumentation
will provide data to further analyze and diagnose the cause for these
two problems: the liquid hydrogen sensors that gave intermittent
readings and the liquid hydrogen pressurization relief valve that
cycled more times than standard during last month's test. Following the
tanking test, technicians will prepare for rolling back Discovery to
the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) no earlier than May 24. In the VAB,
Discovery will be removed from its ET and lowered into the transfer
aisle.
It has taken an extraordinary effort to return the Space Shuttle
fleet to flight readiness status. One hundred and sixteen individual
hardware modifications (41 of which were directly related to the 15
Return to Flight recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board [CAIB]) and over 3.5 million work-hours have gone into Return to
Flight, raising the bar, and launch processing activities on Space
Shuttle Discovery alone. Our Return to Flight effort has been focused
on identifying hazards, re-designing current systems to eliminate or
control those hazards, providing means for warning that hazards might
have occurred during flight, and emplacing standardized special
procedures to counter any hazardous conditions that might arise. We
have eliminated the External Tank bipod foam which was the proximate
cause of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident on February 1, 2003. The
crews on board Discovery and the International Space Station will now
be able to detect critical damage to the Space Shuttle's thermal
protection system during the first two development test flights and, in
the unexpected event of severe damage, to take shelter in the
International Space Station until a rescue mission can be launched. We
have gone well beyond the recommendations of the CAIB to reduce risks
and provide additional safety measures through added hardware
improvements and procedural changes.
Return to Flight has been a massive effort, focusing the energies
of every technical discipline across all the NASA Centers and Space
Shuttle contractors on a very specific objective. It has been, in
short, an example of NASA at its finest. I am very proud of this Space
Shuttle team and this Agency for their hard work, their diligence, and
their incomparable expertise and professionalism during these difficult
times.
But returning the Space Shuttle fleet to flight status is only the
first step in the Nation's Vision for Space Exploration. Over the next
few years, the Space Shuttle fleet will resume executing some of the
most complex missions ever attempted in space. The return to Space
Shuttle operations means that NASA can once again return to assembly of
the International Space Station. The first two Space Shuttle Return to
Flight missions, STS-114 and STS-121, are development test and
logistics missions which will focus on carrying cargo to the Station
and thoroughly exercising the extensive hardware and process changes
made during the past 27 months. Following those two flights, the crew
of STS-115 will resume the assembly of the International Space Station.
We will complete assembly of the International Space Station using the
minimum number of Space Shuttle flights necessary.
Space Shuttle Transition--Scope
As the Space Shuttle resumes its mission, NASA will begin tackling
an equally challenging assignment--ensuring a safe and orderly
retirement of the Space Shuttle system by 2010 and a graceful
transition of the Space Shuttle knowledge, workforce, and assets to
future exploration missions. We need to maintain a robust program that
is capable of safely executing the remaining Space Shuttle missions
while, at the same time, not displacing the orderly pursuit of
necessary transition activities.
This effort could very well be one of the largest single planned
transitions NASA (or any federal agency) has ever undertaken. The Space
Shuttle program occupies 640 facilities, utilizes over 900,000
equipment line items, and directly employs over 2,000 civil servants
and more than 15,000 work-year-equivalent prime contractors, with an
additional 3,000 people working indirectly on Space Shuttle activities
at all NASA Centers. Thousands more are employed at the subcontractor
level in 43 states across the country. The total equipment value held
by the Program is over $12 billion. The total facilities value held by
the Program is approximately $5.7 billion (approximately one-third of
the value of NASA's entire facility inventory), mostly at the field
centers. There are also approximately 1,500 active suppliers and 3,000-
4,000 qualified suppliers that directly support the Space Shuttle
program.
Of all these assets, the most important are, of course, the people.
Space Shuttle transition will have an unavoidable impact on NASA's
workforce. The early transition of workforce elements, the need to
retain segments of that workforce, and the transition of program
knowledge to future programs must all be addressed. We will ensure that
this transition treats these dedicated people with the respect they
deserve, and that their knowledge and experience will be captured or
converted as we begin the next phase of exploration. There will be
challenges, but we will ensure that critical skills are retained for
safe mission execution through the operational life of the program.
NASA and the Space Shuttle program will also face significant
challenges in terms of balancing different technical and programmatic
requirements: (1) maintaining access to the necessary equipment,
facilities, and vendors needed through Space Shuttle flyout; (2)
identifying and maintaining those capabilities that may be needed for
next-generation exploration systems activities, and; (3) retiring
unneeded capabilities to free resources that will support future
exploration. For example, because the amount of flight hardware
accumulated (including spares) will be sufficient to meet the current
mission manifest through 2010, several key Space Shuttle hardware
vendors and sub-tier suppliers will be ending their relationship with
the program prior to 2010. Draw-down decisions need to be made with
regard to equipment and facilities which currently support (and are
supported by) the Space Shuttle program. These resources will need to
be characterized and dispositioned in such a way that either supports
exploration goals or removes them from NASA's books.
Many of these decisions depend upon the role that Space Shuttle
knowledge, workforce, hardware, and infrastructure will play in follow-
on launch vehicles. NASA is continuing to analyze next-generation crew
and heavy-lift launch requirements in support of the Vision for Space
Exploration, including the degree to which those requirements could be
met by boosters derived from existing Space Shuttle propulsion
components and systems. Flight-proven Space Shuttle propulsion elements
(including the Space Shuttle Main Engines, the Solid Rocket Boosters,
and the External Tank, as well as some of the existing Space Shuttle
infrastructure and workforce) will be carefully evaluated, as their use
may enable more rapid development of crew and heavy lift capability
than other alternatives like Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (Delta
IV and Atlas V). A decision to use Space Shuttle propulsion elements as
part of our next-generation space transportation architecture would
have a significant impact on Space Shuttle transition planning.
However, since these launch vehicle requirements are not yet fully
defined, current Space Shuttle transition planning must take into
account the risks of prematurely terminating Space Shuttle vendors and
retiring equipment and facilities that could possibly be needed to
fulfill these requirements.
Space Shuttle transition will also be affected by the number and
pacing of flights needed to complete assembly of the International
Space Station. NASA is also currently examining alternative
configurations for the Space Station that meet the goals of the Vision
and the needs of our international partners, while requiring as few
Shuttle flights as possible to complete assembly. This effort will be a
factor in the formulation of NASA's FY 2007 budget, and we will keep
Congressional Committees informed as the study effort progresses.
I believe that Space Shuttle transition will be one of the largest,
most complex, and most emotionally-charged tasks facing NASA during the
initial phases of the Vision. It cannot be started too soon.
Space Shuttle Transition--Processes
The single most important requirement in Space Shuttle transition
is to maintain the highest level of flight and ground safety through
the life of the Program. The last flight of the Space Shuttle must be
just as safe as the upcoming Return to Flight missions. The success of
Space Shuttle transition will also depend upon serving the goals of the
Vision for Space Exploration in such a way that takes maximum advantage
of existing programs and personnel, minimizes the negative impacts of
transition on Space Shuttle team morale and performance, and ensures
full compliance with all relevant federal, state, and local laws and
standards.
Our transition planning began soon after the release of the Vision
for Space Exploration a year ago. While our efforts over the past 2
years have been dedicated to Return to Flight, NASA has also concluded
the exploratory phase of its Space Shuttle transition activities and
has begun to set out the next steps in transition planning. We have
benchmarked phaseouts in other high-technology, systems-intense
programs, including the ongoing retirement of the Titan IV program,
which just had its final launch out of Cape Canaveral on April 29,
2005. The Space Shuttle program has also asked the National Academy of
Public Administration (NAPA) to assist us in our transition activities,
particularly in the development of strategies and plans for the
transition from the Space Shuttle program to the programs that will
implement the Vision for Space Exploration.
Through the recent Integrated Space Operations Summit this past
March, NASA engaged a broad community on a number of issues affecting
both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. For
this past year's annual Summit, NASA chartered one panel specifically
to study Space Shuttle transition. That panel considered several
programs, including the Titan IV, and developed recommendations
intended to lay the foundation for managing Space Shuttle transition
activities. In accordance with these recommendations, the Space
Operations Mission Directorate will establish the position of Space
Transportation System Transition Manager. The initial efforts of this
manager will be to develop the planning as recommended by the
Transition Panel and to look for candidate areas for transition from
the Space Shuttle program. We will select an individual to fill this
position shortly.
The Space Shuttle program recognizes the importance of maintaining
an experienced workforce to safely execute the Space Shuttle's mission
through the end of the decade. The NASA Workforce Flexibility Act of
2004 provides the Agency with vital tools, such as the authority to
provide workforce retention bonuses in critical skill areas, that will
help retain the necessary human capital needed during mission
execution. NASA has nine panels and teams looking at workforce issues
across the Agency, in addition to the Integrated Space Operations
Summit Transition Panel's workforce assessment. We have also invited
human capital experts from government and private industry to advise us
on best practices during Space Shuttle program phaseout.
Many of our contractor partners have begun taking steps (such as
defining critical skill requirements and bringing in human capital
consulting firms) to counter the impact of transition on mission
execution. Provisions in the follow-on to the Space Flight Operations
Contract (which runs through September 2006) will require the prime
Space Shuttle operations contractor, United Space Alliance, to prepare
for sustaining its required workforce, including submitting a critical
skills retention plan.
Accelerating the Crew Exploration Vehicle
A cornerstone of the Vision for Space Exploration is a Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and its associated launch system. The CEV
will be developed in the latter part of this decade and deployed
operationally as soon as possible. The primary mission of the CEV will
be the exploration of the Moon and other destinations, but initially it
will conduct missions in Earth orbit, including missions to the
International Space Station.
Our earlier plans called for operational deployment of the CEV not
later than 2014. As I testified during my confirmation hearing, I
believe that the CEV development must be accelerated in order to
minimize the gap between the 2010 Space Shuttle retirement and the
first operational flight of the CEV. NASA has embarked upon a rigorous
review of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) architecture to determine
opportunities to accelerate the availability of the CEV. This
assessment is a part of the ``Exploration Systems Architecture Study''
(ESAS), which I chartered on April 29, 2005. The product of this
analysis is anticipated by mid-July 2005. Acceleration of the CEV
program will be facilitated by down-selecting to a single contractor
sooner than originally planned, and by deferring other elements of the
exploration systems research and technology plan, like demonstration of
nuclear electric propulsion, not required for the CEV or for the early
phases of human return to the Moon.
The CEV will conduct missions in Earth orbit, including missions to
the ISS, but its primary mission will be to support exploration of the
Moon and other destinations. In addition, NASA's Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate will be responsible for developing and acquiring
crew and cargo services to support the International Space Station, and
funds have been transferred to that Directorate, as reflected in the
May update to the FY 2005 Operating Plan.
NASA needs to communicate our view of the CEV launch architecture
and our requirements, and we will keep Congressional Committees
informed as the ESAS study effort progresses. Going forward, the Agency
will need a launch system for the CEV, one which does not at present
exist. Two obvious possibilities exist by which we might obtain such a
vehicle. The first is to develop a launch system derived from Shuttle
components, specifically the SRB with a new upper stage. The second
option is to upgrade the proposed heavy-lift versions of EELV, again in
all likelihood with a new upper stage. As NASA Administrator, I must be
a responsible steward of our funds, and a key aspect of the Agency's
analysis of alternatives will be to capitalize on existing technical
and workforce assets in a cost-effective and efficient way. NASA's goal
is to develop a CEV capable of operating safely soon after the
retirement of the Space Shuttle.
Summary
Space Shuttle transition represents an enormous challenge for NASA
and for the Nation as a whole. While we have benchmarked other programs
that are similar in scope to the Space Shuttle, the Shuttle is one of
the largest single programs for which an orderly transition to disposal
has ever been required. I do not want, and we should not want, to
repeat the mistakes made in the aftermath of the Apollo program, where
many unique capabilities were shut down abruptly and irretrievably. We
must transition the Space Shuttle in a way that ensures continued
safety in our ongoing operations, maximizes the efficiency with which
we utilize our resources, respects the Space Shuttle workforce, and
protects critical national capabilities that will be needed to support
the Vision for Space Exploration. There will be hard decisions to be
made over the next 5 years. It is vital, however, that we remain
focused on the worthy and ambitious goals laid out by the President on
January 14, 2004.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward
to responding to any questions you may have.
Senator Hutchison. I am so sorry we are having to do this
quickly, because there is so much that we have to say and we
have a great second panel, as well.
But let me ask you first, if I were to ask you what are the
top priorities for the use of the Space Station, the research
that you would do at the Space Station right now, what would
those three priorities be?
Dr. Griffin. The Space Station is very useful as a test bed
for hardware that we will be developing for exploration. Much
of that hardware that we intend to take to the Moon and later
on to other destinations would be better flight tested in lower
orbit close to home. One does not require that such hardware be
tested on a space station, but given that we have one, that
would be the logical place to do it.
There will be, as the years evolve, there will be a number
of scientific experiments that can be palatized and can be
attached to the Space Station, as opposed to necessarily being
on a free-flying spacecraft. Again, if we did not have a Space
Station, we might do otherwise. But having one, we will look
for opportunities to use it.
There will be research that can be conducted on the station
by the virtue of the ability of the station to provide an
extended zero gravity time. Response of human and other
organisms to zero gravity can be examined under controlled
conditions on the station.
The station is limited in its research potential by the
fact that we are not able on the station to combine the
appropriate radiation spectrum for deep space flight together
with the zero G environment.
It is those two environments together that are the truly
relevant environment. And we cannot mimic those. But we can at
least mimic the zero G portion.
Senator Hutchison. There is a consortium of universities
now that takes the medical research that can benefit from being
performed in space and that decides what the priorities are and
then expands on those. Do you foresee within your budget being
able to continue that consortium doing the medical side of the
research that is going on at the Space Station?
Dr. Griffin. Given the priorities that I have stated, that
the Administration has supported, and that I believe are shared
by this Committee, the short answer to your question is not in
full scope. In order of priorities, I need to complete the
return of the Space Shuttle to flight and fly every flight
safely.
We need to complete the assembly of the International Space
Station. Deferring it will likely only cost more money. We
need, very much need, as you have said, to bring the CEV on
line sooner rather than later, minimizing the gap in human
space flight.
One of the few areas of freedom that I have as the
administrator is the, I hesitate to call it a pot, but the pot
of research and technology money that can be, if you will,
bought by the yard. That is one of the few areas where I have
any flexibility at all. If I am to accelerate the development
of the CEV, a good chunk of that money must be used to do so.
Senator Hutchison. Would you provide for me and the
Committee a cost estimate of what the biological research, the
medical research, is, even if it is scaled back perhaps? But
what about the ongoing experiments that we have heard about on
breast cancer tissue? I would imagine that even in your top
priorities, the zero gravity conditions still allow you to look
at the osteoporosis effects on humans and--so that these would
be continuing areas of the medical research that would also be
in your top priority list. But could you also tell us what it
would cost to do the other types of research that can be done
in zero gravity uniquely and are part of the university-based
research consortium so we have an idea of what that budget is?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, Senator, we will. And I will indicate to
you what our priorities would be for the research that would
continue and what we would plan to delay or defer in order to
accelerate CEV.
Senator Hutchison. That would be very helpful. My last
question in this round would be, obviously you are focusing on
the CEV. You have said that the Shuttle itself is flawed,
perhaps because of the heavy payload. I don't know all of the
reasons why. But my question is this: How do you propose and
what is your priority ranking for getting payload to the Space
Station or perhaps even beyond to the Moon, if that is
necessary, if you do not have a Shuttle that can carry payload?
How do you plan to do that? And what are you--where is that in
your priority list when you do not have a Shuttle anymore?
Dr. Griffin. Senator, that is an excellent question. Thank
you. Of course, we have been getting cargo to the Space Station
for the last two-plus years while the Shuttle has been
grounded, through the good offices of our Russian partner, with
a series of progress flights. The progress system is limited in
capacity, but it does feature the capability to do an automated
proximity operations flight plan and automated rendezvous and
docking with the Space Station.
The United States needs to develop that capability, and we
will be doing so. Later this summer, perhaps early fall, we
will be releasing an RFP in the crew and cargo line--I think
you will find that in our budget--that is intended specifically
to address the provision of Space Station cargo resupply, up-
mass, if you will, by commercial means, commercial contracts to
all carriers.
In addition, the Exploration Systems Architecture Study
(ESAS) we are doing over the summer will define a path by which
the government can meet government requirements for cargo to
Space Station, should commercial providers fail to show up. So
we will have two paths.
Going forward, our budget baseline will assume that
commercial cargo carriers will be able to provide those
services to the station.
Senator Hutchison. So bottom line, you do intend for us to
have some capability, besides depending on any other partner,
for that responsibility.
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Madame Chairman.
What happens if the CEV is not ready by 2010 when your plan
is to scrap the Shuttle?
Dr. Griffin. It is my job to convince you that we will have
a development plan for CEV that has it ready by 2010, or as
soon thereafter as we can we will say the date and we will try
to hold to it. I will try to convince you, as we go through the
next few years together, that we are holding to that plan. In
part, the definition of what the CEV is needs to be done with
the constraint that it be buildable, that it be an executable
program and can be fielded shortly after the Shuttle's
retirement.
Senator Nelson. And in that plan would be the plan for the
orderly transition from one to the other?
Dr. Griffin. Exactly. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Of course at that point, we assume that the
Space Station would be up in full bloom and running with a
complete complement of astronauts doing research. Therein is
another reason why we need the follow-on vehicle ready, so that
there is not this hiatus. Given the fact of our experience back
in 1975 in the last Apollo, it was Apollo-Soyuz, we thought we
were going to fly the Space Shuttle in about 1978. And it did
not fly until 1981.
A part of that work force was effectively utilized so that
they did not have to lay them off and that that corporate
memory was all there. What are your plans, what is your
thinking about, if there did occur this hiatus, of how you
would keep that team together?
Dr. Griffin. Senator, I lived through that period as a
working engineer and remember it well. It is not one of my more
pleasant memories from my 35 years in the space business. So
one of the reasons I so strongly support the concerns which
have been expressed about minimizing that gap in human space
flight capability is that I frankly do not want to live through
that experience twice.
Our primary contractor in Space Shuttle, space flight,
launch operations, launch preparations is, of course, the
United Space Alliance. We work with that contractor every day,
every week. We have very close ties with them. We are pleased
with the work. It is our goal going forward in developing a
transition plan from Shuttle to CEV to be hand in glove with
our USA contractor to effect the most orderly transition that
we can.
As I said briefly in my opening statement, we have studied
lessons learned from the Titan IV transition. We have gone back
and studied lessons learned from the Saturn Apollo to Shuttle
transition. Some of those lessons are good ones and some are
things to be avoided. We are paying attention.
There are two basic issues. Any launch system--I referred
earlier to the fact of, the known fact of, it takes about $4.5
billion to keep the Shuttle going whether you fly any flights
or not. The new system must have lower fixed costs or we, the
United States, will not have effected any improvement. Lower
fixed cost means a smaller work force in the sense of a
standing army. So we want to shift money from what it takes
merely to launch payloads into more exciting and new things
that we want to do. So some work force will be transitioned
going forward and other elements of the work force must be
transitioned to new activities. Otherwise we would do nothing
new.
That program must be managed as carefully and in as much of
a forward-looking sense as we possibly can. That is our every
intention.
Senator Nelson. And an additional computation here is that
you will have a full-up, robust, internationally participated
in Space Station that you want to utilize. And suddenly, if you
stop the Shuttle and you do not have the follow-on vehicle to
service that Space Station, you cannot use all of that
investment of multiple tens of billions of dollars up in the
heavens. For example, what would we use as a lifeboat? I guess
we would have to use the Soyuz. Well, then therefore, you have
to drop the level of the crew so you are not using that super
structure up there that we have invested so much in.
What is your thinking there?
Dr. Griffin. I cannot but agree with you. If we have a
station, we need to be able to use it. I do not know how to say
in enough different ways that I am convinced that your concern
about minimizing such gaps in access are on target. We at NASA
are working to eliminate that and to provide a credible plan
for doing so.
Senator Nelson. Well, I commend you on what you have
already done, which is accelerate the CEV and see if that is
doable. But that then begs my next statement, which is, if it
cannot be accelerated, then maybe it is in the interest of the
United States to extend the Shuttle.
Dr. Griffin. Sir, if we do that, then we face the circular
problem. I have a hole in my gas tank, but the money I have to
spend buying the gasoline prevents me from paying the mechanic
to fix the tank.
Senator Nelson. Well, then----
Dr. Griffin. I have to retire the Shuttle in order to have
the money to do the things that you and I both want to do.
Senator Nelson. Understandably. But if the development CEV
does not occur in the expeditious way that you hope and that
you are giving leadership to, and we commend you for that, you
have to have a plan B. Otherwise we are going to waste all that
asset up there.
Just a concluding thought here, Madame Chairman. In a
previous hearing we had brand new testimony about the promise,
for example, that I did not know of the experiments that are
going on on protein crystal growths, experiments that were made
20 years ago and of which there was some question of whether or
not it was financially feasible to do that in orbit, as opposed
to on Earth. But now that we are seeing new promise, as was the
testimony, I still have not received those answers. And I would
like this statement to NASA, please get those answers back to
me.
But if there is that promise of medical breakthroughs on
such things as protein crystal growth on orbit, then that is
just all the more reason why we need to keep that International
Space Station functioning.
Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. I agree.
I would like another round, but we are told that we have to
end at 11:30. And therefore, I am going to ask you to come back
and see us very soon and stay in touch with us. And we will
call our second panel.
Dr. Griffin. I am at your disposal.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you.
[Pause.]
Senator Hutchison. OK. If you would, I would like to ask
you, since we are on a very tight timeframe, if you would each
speak 2 minutes, summarize all of your statements with your
major points. And then we will have a few minutes left for
questions.
I would like to first ask Mr. Michael McCulley, who is the
President and Chief Executive Officer of United Space Alliance.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. McCULLEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, UNITED
SPACE ALLIANCE
Mr. McCulley. Thank you for the opportunity to speak on
this very important subject. It is my privilege to be
representing the 10,000-plus men and women of the United States
Alliance. And I can tell you that virtually everything we are
doing these days is focused on supporting NASA in the Return to
Flight effort.
But having said that, we all realized when the President
gave his vision speech last January, there would be a new world
for USA and that was this world of transition. And so within
minutes of the speech, we started transition planning. It goes
on today. It is a transition that must be carefully and
proactively managed and led.
NASA and USA have taken measures to address that transition
in terms of workforce, facilities, hardware, equipment, test
assets, and also the supplier base. The GAO has also weighed in
on this. And I will not quote, as I was going to do, but they
have done an excellent initial report on our efforts to start
managing this transition.
In addition, NASA and the NASA industry partnership through
the Space Operations Summit have also begun transition
planning, including all of those things that I mentioned
earlier. It also would include retention, recruitment of
critical skills, how we dispose or preserve the assets. It has
resulted in some changes in the Shuttle program office that are
proactive attempts to get a jump on this transition.
In addition, over the years, USA, owned by Boeing and
Lockheed Martin, has had excellent results in previous times
when there has been either an overage or a shortage on one
company's part or the other. We have developed a really good
procedure of transferring employees back and forth. We have
used it very successfully. And I would anticipate that we will
have that in the future, as well.
In addition, Dr. Griffin mentioned the Titan program. I
have been paying very close attention to the Titan program,
which flew its last flight in Florida last month, I have met
with the contracting officers to understand what the Air Force
did with Lockheed Martin is in contract to make changes to
retain critical skills through the last flight. The Space
Flight Operations Contract has a follow-on provision that we
are working on now with NASA. I would anticipate that NASA
would require us in that contract to do more proactive planning
on how we are going to work our way through this transition and
to insure that the last Space Shuttle flight is just as safe as
the next Space Shuttle flight.
Of course, the execution and timing of all these measures
depends on a number of different things, and a number of
different requirements. I am sitting here with a great deal of
uncertainty right now, but I am pleased that Dr. Griffin has
put his teams in place and has said the summertime is their
deadline. So I anticipate by the summer or the fall I will have
a much better idea of what I need to do with specific goals,
requirements and planning horizons.
You had asked about the industrial base and asked me to
comment on that. It is a great question, because many of the
skills and certifications that are in the Shuttle program are
unique to that program. As we begin to fly down, we have a
vendor base out there that we have to carefully manage. Some of
their contracts have options like lifetime buys on materials or
products. Other times we do not have that option.
For example, the United Technologies Company builds the
fuel cells for the Space Shuttle. Well, we are not going to
order any more fuel cells. So we are a very small part of their
business. But I need that skill set in place up until the last
landing on the last flight. And so our contractual arrangements
need to reflect that. And so it changes our contracts and the
way we manage contracts. We are also working that proactively.
In summary, we were created for one customer, and that is
NASA. I have 10,000-plus experts, including myself and my
management team, focused on supporting that customer.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCulley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. McCulley, President and CEO, United
Space Alliance
Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the
Subcommittee. I am Mike McCulley, the President and Chief Executive
Officer of the United Space Alliance (USA).
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address the Subcommittee
on current Space Shuttle operations and the timing and scope of the
planned retirement of the fleet.
It is my privilege to represent the 10,400 men and woman of USA
located primarily in Texas, Florida, and Alabama.
USA is responsible for the day-to-day operations of NASA's Space
Shuttle system, excluding the propulsions elements managed by the
Marshall Space Flight Center. USA was formed in 1996 through
consolidation of 29 Shuttle contracts into one single contract and
organization.
The foremost focus of USA and its employees today is the safe
return to flight of the Shuttle. Beyond this imperative, we are also
working with our NASA customer to face the reality of Shuttle
retirement and do the necessary planning to ensure an efficient, timely
and prudent transition to the CEV.
As the Subcommittee Members are aware, the current exploration plan
contains a gap in U.S. human space flight capability between the
projected retirement of the Shuttle and the availability of a fully
operational Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and its new launch system.
This so called gap has a number of associated issues including U.S.
reliance on foreign nations for human access to space, the need for a
heavy-lift cargo launch capability for cargo to and from the
International Space Station, the potential loss of vital workforce
skills and experience, and related impacts to the U.S. industrial base.
Retention of the critical skills required to fly safely and
successfully throughout the remaining life of the Shuttle program and
the ability to transition those workers with the necessary skills and
competencies to the next generation of launch vehicles, remains a top
priority for NASA and USA. The new NASA Administrator, Dr. Michael
Griffin, has testified that he has established an Exploration Systems
Architecture Study team to examine ways to accelerate the development
of the Crew Exploration Vehicles in order to minimize any gap in the
U.S. capability for human space flight.
USA understands and fully appreciates the need to plan for the
future of our critically important workforce and has taken steps to
develop such a plan. We are also working with NASA on all aspects of
transition planning including: workforce, facilities, hardware,
equipment, test assets, and supplier base.
Transition
There are over 20,000 NASA and contractor employees working on the
Shuttle Program. As the Shuttle is retired, it is expected that a
number of contractor and civil servant employees will initiate personal
retirement, while a number will remain, to continue to support human
space flight by moving to the new exploration programs. However, as
currently envisioned, the number of employees available for this
opportunity could be limited both by the gap between Shuttle retirement
and CEV operational capability, and by the exploration emphasis on
increased operational efficiency. Although there remain uncertainties
with respect to specific plans for implementation of the exploration
Vision, we are continuing to assess options for the future to ensure a
seamless transition for our employees while meeting the needs of our
NASA customer.
Following President Bush's announcement of the Vision for Space
Exploration, NASA, USA and other aerospace industries began an early
initiative to identify and prioritize solutions to address both fly-out
and phase-out of the Shuttle program. The Integrated Space Operations
Summit (ISOS) was held earlier this year to identify the issues
associated with transition planning for workforce, facilities and
industrial base. The Summit considered the risks and challenges for the
retention and recruitment of a critically skilled workforce as well as
strategies for preservation or disposition of space flight assets,
which include real property, equipment, tooling, and test sets. Since
the Summit, NASA's Space Shuttle Program Office has initiated a
transition plan and formed an asset management working group.
As reported by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its
March 2005 Report entitled, ``Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better
Position NASA to Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement,'' p.12:
``United Space Alliance has taken preliminary steps to begin to
prepare for the Space Shuttle's retirement and its impact on
the company's workforce. For example, the company has begun to
define its critical skills needs to continue to support the
Space Shuttle program; has devised a communication plan;
contracted with a human capital consulting firm to conduct a
comprehensive study of its workforce; and continues to monitor
indicators of employee morale and workforce stability. While
these efforts are underway, further efforts to prepare for the
Space Shuttle's retirement and its impact on their workforce
are on hold until NASA first makes decisions that impact the
Space Shuttle's remaining flight schedule and thus the time
frames for retiring the program and transitioning its assets.
Once these decisions have been made and United Space Alliance's
contract requirements have been defined, these officials said
that they would then be able to proceed with their workforce
planning efforts for the Space Shuttle's retirement, a process
that will likely take 6 months to complete.''
United Space Alliance has retained Watson Wyatt's Human Capital
Practice to benchmark industry's effective employee retention programs
and to conduct a comprehensive study of USA's human resource programs
as they relate to current and anticipated workforce retention
objectives. This study is focused on the current situation, as well as
projections out 6 years, regarding human capital investments and risk
mitigation, including, alignment, resources, turnover, selection,
retention, transfer-of-knowledge and investments. The results of this
study will be available this year, thus allowing implementation, as
appropriate, well in advance of 2010.
USA may have the ability to transfer valued workers into its owner
companies, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. USA has been successful in the
past, placing employees at those companies and in assisting employees
in transitioning to other space-related businesses.
USA's human capital systems are monitored continuously with special
emphasis on critical skills required and addressing identified gaps in
these skills as a result of attrition and retirements. These processes
will continue with heightened emphasis throughout the remainder of the
Shuttle Program.
USA will also continue to conduct annual compensation and benefit
surveys and studies that address our labor market competitiveness and
will continue to monitor indicators of potential issues regarding
workforce morale and stability.
The execution and timing of skill retention and transition measures
will depend entirely on the timing, sequence, and options chosen for
transitioning from Shuttle to future exploration programs. Until we
know more about these variables, it will be difficult to predict
specific impacts. For instance, if NASA decides to pursue a launch
vehicle based on current Shuttle components, then the impacts would be
quite different from those of a vehicle program that does not involve
Shuttle components.
USA is actively evaluating and pursuing new business opportunities
in space operations, such as CEV, that could utilize the unique skills
and experience of the current Shuttle workforce. USA is also
participating on the industry team evaluating ways to meet future
launch system requirements with Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle options.
Our Business Development Office is working to position USA to
participate in all future human space flight operations. With unrivaled
capabilities in terms of safety, experience, performance and
innovation, combined with a diversity of skills, USA is uniquely
positioned to play a major role in future human space programs.
Industrial Base
NASA's Space Shuttle budget pays for hardware, engineering,
training, software development, Shuttle processing and many other
things that go into flying the Shuttle. As the program winds down,
there are elements that could phase-out of production, such as, the
External Tank, Space Shuttle Main Engines, and Reusable Solid Rocket
Motors. However, all of these major Shuttle system elements, which are
managed by other NASA prime contractors, may be needed if Shuttle
Derived Vehicles are selected for the exploration transportation
system.
Retaining critical supplies for the Shuttle must be a well thought
out, carefully managed process. One approach is to use lifetime buys
for consumable products that will last to the end of the program.
However, there are some supplies that cannot be purchased in lifetime
buys and cannot be transitioned to other suppliers. In those cases, it
will require keeping a supplier on contract until the end of the
program to support refurbishment requirements, provide on-going
technical support, and retain process certification. NASA and USA
already have many such contracts in place. An example is the Lockheed
Martin contract for tooling and certified technician maintenance to
refurbish and manufacture the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) Wing
Leading Edge. It is not likely that we will need additional RCC
components however, we will require continuing support in the areas of
testing and evaluation of flown hardware, failure analysis, and repair.
A similar situation exists with United Technologies Corporation, which
provides the Shuttle fuel cells. Maintenance of critical skills to
support this hardware component through the last flight is critical.
Many of the skills and certifications needed to support the Shuttle
Program are unique to the program. It is difficult to estimate the cost
or schedule impact to the Shuttle or to the CEV should those skills
begin to deplete. We continue to be a very small part of many of our
suppliers' business bases so, for some, there is little incentive to
invest in or maintain these skills. As we move closer to the last
Shuttle flights and the corresponding reduction in hardware
procurement, this base could become more fragile.
Manifest
You have asked that I also address current Space Shuttle operations
and manifest.
NASA and its industry team have embarked on a proactive Return To
Flight Plan, which not only responds to the CAIB recommendations, but
also ``raises the bar'' by addressing other safety concerns. The
Columbia Accident Investigation Board initially published 15
recommendations for various improvements to be completed before Space
Shuttle Missions could resume. Of the original 15, 12 have been
completed and 3 are in the process of being completed.
NASA and its industry team have made improvements in technical
excellence, communications and decision-making, improved the External
Tank to reduce debris-shedding, instrumented the Shuttle wings to
detect any debris hits during ascent and amassed an array of ground-
based and space-based imagery detection hardware that will give experts
the ability to know if any debris hit the orbiter. If so, NASA is
developing in-flight repair techniques and we have procedures to safely
protect the crew onboard the Space Station if necessary.
NASA and its contractor team are committed to flying the Shuttle
only when all the risks have been appropriately mitigated. We are
working with NASA to support the initial Return To Flight mission, STS-
114, which is currently planned for the July 13-31 launch window.
At present, 28 Shuttle flights are baselined in the manifest-18 for
assembly, 5 for utilization and 5 for logistical support. Relative to
returning to flight, the first two flights, STS-114 and STS-121, carry
much needed cargo to the Space Station and importantly serve as test
flights of the improved Shuttle system. Testing will be conducted using
the Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) to closely examine the Shuttle's
Thermal Protection System and to assess on-orbit repair options and
techniques for tile and the RCC. The remaining 26 Shuttle missions are
manifested as Station assembly and outfitting flights.
The International Space Station (ISS) is currently dependent on the
Space Shuttle for assembly. We are still planning to fly the 28 flights
manifested including the 18 identified as assembly flights but as the
new NASA Administrator testified, NASA is currently examining
alternative configurations for the Space Station. If changes to the
manifest are made, we will work with our NASA customer to evaluate the
impact to the overall program, our workforce and the supplier base.
Operations
United Space Alliance is the leading human space flight space
operations company in the world with experience in all aspects of
ground processing, mission operations and planning, major system
integration, and in-flight operations of multipurpose space systems.
Through its support of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs, USA has
developed an unrivaled combination of experience and capabilities in
space operations. Our workforce and our supplier base have the spectrum
of skills to support NASA's current and future human space flight
programs including:
Mission, manifest and trajectory planning and analyses
On-Orbit assembly, payload deployment and servicing
Extravehicular activity planning and execution
Rendezvous and proximity, operations and docking operations
Space logistics and supply chain management
Space operations software engineering
Advanced space flight technology
Launch and recovery operations
Launch vehicle and flight hardware processing
Mission control operations
Space systems and crew training
Sustaining engineering
Flight crew equipment preparation and maintenance.
Large scale, complex systems integration
Subcontracts management
Conclusion
United Space Alliance is committed to returning the Shuttle to
flight and to supporting a seamless transition from the current program
to future exploration programs. Workforce morale is high as the first
step in the Vision draws near: the launch of Space Shuttle Discovery
mission STS-114. We are committed to supporting NASA in our joint goal
of making each flight safer for the crew than we believed that last one
to have been.
We also support NASA's goal to undertake a journey of space
exploration over the next several decades as outlined in the
President's Vision for Space Exploration. We understand that the
retirement of 3 capable and space-worthy Space Shuttle orbiters is
needed in order to move the Vision forward. Our exceptional workforce
is committed to these goals and deserves our utmost consideration in
the transition to a new system for space exploration.
Let me again thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to come
before you today. I would be pleased to answer your questions.
Senator Hutchison. I appreciate the very difficult job you
are going to have in the, well, next 5 years to 2010 to
maintain all the capabilities and yet knowing what a final date
is, when that final date is set. Thank you very much.
Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is the Chairman of the Department
of National Security Studies at the Naval War College.
Dr. Freese, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, CHAIRMAN,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Dr. Johnson-Freese. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, Senator
Nelson. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today on
the critical issue of the future of manned space flight,
specifically the strategic environment of human space flight. I
have worked on space policy issues for more than 20 years from
many perspectives. And based on that experience, I feel that
human space flight is not just something the United States
should remain actively engaged in; it is an area strategically
it must retain leadership in.
In May 2003, there was a newspaper op-ed piece entitled,
``Next Huge Space Shot, China.'' It began with the sentence,
``Once upon a time, we ruled the universe. Now we're second-
raters in space.'' It concluded with the sentence, ``We have
forfeited the last frontier.'' Convoluted interpretations of
events and leaps of reasonings, like those expressed in that
piece, unfortunately are not uncommon.
Consequently, it is not really surprising that many people
have concluded that with one 21-hour manned space flight, China
has catapulted ahead of the United States in overall space
capabilities, especially human space flight capabilities. While
it is sadly true that the U.S. has not chosen to pursue human
space exploration in a timely and concerted manner, as many
people hoped it would, we are certainly by no means a second-
rate space power because it has pursued a different priority
and slower pace. But there is perception.
Human space flight, human space activity has always had a
strong symbolic significance. Because of the early and
spectacular U.S. successes in the manned space flight arena,
winning the race to the Moon, the U.S. has heretofore been
considered the unchallenged leader in human space activity.
Unfortunately, again, that perception has been slipping.
Now with the Chinese willing to play the tortoise to the
U.S. hare, there is a very real chance that the U.S. will be
outpaced by commitment demonstrated by consistency rather than
speed or substance, creating the perception that the U.S. is
forfeiting its leadership. There are many reasons this should
not be allowed to happen. And I would be happy to go into them
with you.
But as the sole super power, the U.S. must lead the way to
the future. How we lead the way is critical as well and I think
offers the United States an opportunity to demonstrate
inclusive leadership toward generating soft power critical to
advance U.S. policies. The U.S. cinched leadership in human
space flight early on. Now the strategic imperative is to
maintain it.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Johnson-Freese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, Chairman, Department of
National Security Studies, Naval War College
Last week, I challenged my class of 78 college students to, first,
name three of the Apollo astronauts, then, three current astronauts.
Some could name three Apollo astronauts, none could name three current
astronauts, or even one. The Apollo program represents a glorious part
of American history. Neil Armstrong stepping off planet Earth and onto
another celestial body was both a shining moment for Americans, and a
spiritual moment for all mankind. America held the attention and
admiration of the world because it dared to venture into the Heavens.
But too often America is a crisis-response society. Politically
motivated to go to the Moon by the Soviet launch of Sputnik, in less
than a decade the United States was successful beyond anyone's wildest
imagination. Unfortunately, however, we did not choose to stay or to
continue the journey. Instead, we came home and spaceflight has since
been confined to the celestial driveway. Now, except for a few die-
hards, the American public shows more interest in its space museums
than space exploration. But, I will suggest, allowing even the
perception of U.S. leadership in human space to slip has negative
strategic implications for the United States.
Americans take great pride in space achievements. Even at the
height of the Apollo era though, opinion polls showed that the public
sees space exploration as a good thing to do, but expendable when
prioritized against other demands for federal funding, like health
care, education, schools and defense. Subsequently, the human space
program has been struggling since Apollo to find a raison d'etre with
both the public and politicians sufficient to carry human spaceflight
out of the celestial driveway and into the street. The difference
between Apollo and all subsequent human space visions has been the
goals. Whereas Apollo had a strategic goal--``beat the Russians''--
programs since have had science and exploration as their goals and
unfortunately, these goals have not proven sufficient to be competitive
with other demands for federal funds.
While many countries have shown interest over the years in
developing autonomous human space programs, besides the United States
only Russia and China, as of the October 2003 launch of the first
Chinese taikonaut, have been successful. The Russian human space
program was rescued from becoming moribund when it merged with NASA's
human program to develop the International Space Station (ISS). Russia
is still, however, unable to pursue new high-cost initiatives on its
own, due to both economics and because they have learned that
developing and maintaining support for a human space program is hard in
democracies. While the European Space Agency (ESA) and countries like
Japan and India likely have the technical wherewithal to have a
successful human space program, they lack the requisite political will.
In a Catch-22 scenario, however, having to always play a supporting
role to the United States makes it even more difficult to garner public
support and political will for human space activity. While Japan has
long talked about a human space program, being responsible to an
electorate, bureaucratic politics, economics and a cultural adversity
to risk will likely keep them Earthbound. India too, as a democracy,
remains constrained by public perceptions of priorities lying
elsewhere. It is only because China's program is driven from the top
that it has successfully been carried to fruition. So why is China, a
country with 1.3 billion+ people, willing to devote significant
resources to human spaceflight capability?
The Apollo program demonstrated the benefits that accrue to a
nation able to claim a human spaceflight capability. In the movie
Apollo 13 Tom Hanks shows a Congressional delegation around Kennedy
Space Center pointing out constituent jobs in high tech fields that
were politically distributed to all fifty states. Jobs are always a
valued program benefit. Americans expressed interest in science and
technology education unmatched either before or after Apollo.
Technology developed for space translated into economic development.
Dual-use technology with both civil and military applications was
developed. And finally, America enjoyed the prestige of ``winning'' the
space race against the Soviet Union, which translated into a unifying
pride during the contentious Vietnam War era, and also drew Third World
countries to our side during the Cold War when East-West blocks
competed for support.
Those same benefits, jobs, education, economic development, dual-
use technology and prestige are still motivating factors for space
activity. Since the 1950's, Europe has pursued space under the premise
that space activity generated technology, technology generated
industry, and industry led to economic development. China learned from
the Apollo playbook as well. Training and employing workers in high-
technology aerospace jobs in China keeps large numbers of people
employed, which is a Chinese priority. It also demonstrates to the
world that China is able to, as one Chinese commentator put it, ``make
more than shoes,'' thereby supporting their overarching economic
development goal by attracting global industries to China. China is
also experiencing growth in science and engineering education programs
at unprecedented levels. China is clearly interested in modernizing its
military, and, again learning from the U.S. playbook, China has seen
the benefits space can yield in force enhancement capabilities. And
finally, there is prestige. Prestige takes on two dimensions for China:
first, domestically it bestows credibility on the Communist government
much in the same way bringing the Olympics to Beijing does. In regional
and international terms, prestige translates into techno-nationalism,
where perceived technical prowess is equated to regional power. This is
particularly important to China, which has been working hard and been
largely successful at using economics and soft power to transform its
regional image from that of the bully, to a rising power that countries
can work with. For countries like Japan and India, these perceptions
are important.
Speculation about an Asian space race floats on the wind, but it is
unlikely. After the Shenzhou V launch in October 2003, the Indian
science community claimed it too could have accomplished such an
achievement, but had simply chosen not to. That response was intended
to quell concerns from both the Indian public and politicians about
China's technical prowess compared to India's techno-nationalism.
Initial Japanese responses to the launch varied. Space officials
downplayed the technical significance of the event, while nonetheless
congratulating China. A Japanese official spoke to the media directly
in geostrategic terms. ``Japan is likely to be the one to take the
severest blow from the Chinese success. A country capable of launching
any time will have a large influence in terms of diplomacy at the
United Nations and military affairs. Moves to buy products from a
country succeeding in human space flight may occur.'' \1\ One woman on
the street was quoted in Japanese media coverage as saying, ``It's
unbelievable. Japan lost in this field.'' \2\ While Japan's ``losing''
to China through the Shenzhou V launch was more perception than
reality, China's success juxtaposed against power failures on both the
Japanese environmental satellite Midori-2 and on its first Mars probe,
Nozomi, as well as the November 2003 launch failure of two Information
Gathering Satellites (IGS), resulted in calls for a re-examination of
the Japanese program. However, because of the problems initiating and
sustaining human space programs in democracies, combined with unique
internal politics in both countries, the initiation of an autonomous
human program in either Japan or India is unlikely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``China's launch of manned spacecraft welcomed in Japan,''
Japan Economic Newswire, 15 October 2003.
\2\ ``China's launch of manned spacecraft welcomed in Japan,''
Japan Economic Newswire, 15 October 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With China's entry into the exclusive human spaceflight club, the
strategic gameboard was put in motion. Whereas the United States has
pursued a path of simultaneous cooperation and competition with other
countries in various aspects of space, such as cooperating with Europe
on ISS but competing in the commercial launch field, with China the
U.S. approach has been purely competitive. China has been excluded from
partnership on the International Space Station, for many years their
``brass ring.'' The reasoning for the U.S. purely competitive approach
has been technical and political: seeking to stop China from acquiring
sensitive dual use technology, concern that China will be the next U.S.
peer competitor, and not wanting to support the largest remaining
Communist government in the world, especially one charged with human
rights abuses and other practices averse to democratic principles.
While such an approach may be virtuous, realities are such that it
increasingly appears counterproductive.
We have to face an uncomfortable fact here: a country whose
interests may very well some day conflict with our own is going to
pursue a line of technological development that could enhance its
ability to challenge us through multiple venues. And they are going to
be aided in this by other countries, whether we like it or not. While
the U.S. seeks to contain China, much of the rest of the world is eager
to work with China, thereby negating much of the impact the United
States is trying to achieve, and indirectly encouraging activities not
necessarily in the interest of the U.S. Other countries, allies, have
often held passive-aggressive feelings toward space partnerships with
the U.S.: welcoming and grateful for the opportunities, while resenting
being inherently consigned to a supporting role, and feeling that U.S.
partners are often treated more as secondary participants or sub-
contractors on projects. Working with China gives them a chance to
level the playing field.
There is a fairly widespread perception among the U.S. and
international media, and a disconcerting number of the American public,
that a human space race between China and the U.S. is either already
underway or inevitable. China's one human launch into space clearly
demonstrated the maturity of Chinese space engineering. Successfully
launching a rocket is not, however, a scientific breakthrough--the
know-how has been in textbooks for more than fifty years. It does
demonstrate the careful attention to literally thousands of minute
engineering details. But by no means has China leapfrogged over U.S.
capabilities.
China has ambitious human space goals, but a modest, incremental
implementation plan. Officially, their current human program is a three
part plan: man in space, a space laboratory, and a space station.
Beyond that, their ambitions for the Moon and Mars are facing the same
funding and political hurdles as NASA faces in the U.S. In a November
21, 2004 press conference Ouyang Ziyuan, the lead scientist of their
lunar program, talked about the costs and benefits of space,
referencing the Apollo experience. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See: People's Daily Website.
``The lunar exploration project will spur high tech
development, and I cannot calculate how much return there will
be on that investment of 1.4 billion, but the Apollo project
spurred the scientific, technical, economic military and other
development of the 1960s, produced over 3,000 new technologies
of all types with applications useful in everyday life, and was
not only responsible for America's leading position in science
and technology, but it produced enormous political and economic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
change.
It is estimated that for every dollar invested there was an
economic return of 4-5 dollars. We learned a lot about the
Moon, the Earth, and the Sun that is impossible to calculate in
dollar terms. From ancient times to the present China has had
the legend of Chang E, and you could say that going to the Moon
started with China, but to today we have still not left the
Earth. The lunar exploration project will have an incalculably
valuable effect on the ethnic spirit and motivation (of the
Chinese people) and I ask you, how much is that worth?''
While having to justify expenditures, the Chinese will continue
their quest for space as long as sufficient domestic and geostrategic
benefits accrue, and they will solicit international partners.
China's human spaceflight program was largely indigenously
developed, but based on proven designs adapted to make them their own.
They have openly stated their appreciation for the work of the former
Soviet Union toward making their own human spaceflight program a
success. China understands the benefits, fiscal, technical and
political, of cooperation. In the same November 21, 2004 press report,
Ouyang Ziyuan spoke about cooperation. ``International cooperation (in
space exploration) is a necessary development, no single country has
the ability to complete (this undertaking) by itself. Landing on the
Moon is an affair of the entire human race, and we should make our
contribution on behalf of the Chinese race, fulfill the responsibility
of the Chinese race. We want to learn together with others, not close
ourselves off and go our own way.'' A pragmatic move for the Chinese,
there were interested takers to invitations for cooperation.
China has spent approximately $2.2 billion on its Shenzhou program,
whereas NASA's annual budget is in excess of $16 billion. Shenzhou V
was launched in 2003; Shenzhou VI will likely be launched in 2005. From
the Chinese perspective, there was no need to go any sooner, as China
has been able to enjoy its new found status as the third country
capable of human spaceflight, while improving its technical
capabilities, and keeping spending to a manageable level. Nevertheless,
China's ability to successfully launch their first taikonaut while the
U.S. Space Shuttle was grounded added to the perception of China's
technical prowess compared to the U.S., not an inconsequential or
unrewarding benefit for the Chinese. If the Shuttle is still not flying
next Fall when the Chinese launch again, the Chinese will reap further
prestige and publicity at the expense of the U.S. The U.S. has
historically been the reigning human space champion, but there is
always interest--and even tacit support--when a spoiler overtakes, or
even appears to overtake, a champion. The U.S. appears in, and to some
losing, a human space race, because the U.S. has been unable to set and
implement a realistic way forward, and because of U.S. political
reluctance to use cooperation, historically shown successful, to co-opt
and shape the Chinese space program as we have other programs. The
Chinese are playing Tortoise to the U.S. Hare.
It has been suggested that engaging China in a space race would
provide the political will for the U.S. human program to move forward,
as the Soviet Union's activities did for Apollo, or that it would
trigger a spending spree in China with effects similar to those
experienced by the Soviet Union trying to keep up with SDI. Both are
flawed analogies. During the Cold War, two competing superpowers
started from the same point technologically and engaged in an
engineering race. Both were motivated to compete. Now, the Chinese have
no reason to ``race'' the United States. Chinese spending will not
increase to keep up or outpace the United States either, as they fully
understand it is impossible. China needs only to incrementally continue
their human space program to create the perception that it is
``beating'' the United States. China's activities place the U.S. in a
race against itself, to maintain its leadership.
Meanwhile, China will increasingly engage other countries in
cooperative space activity. Technological containment of the U.S.S.R.
took place in another time and under circumstances that are now
impossible to replicate: there is no way to seal China off from the
technologies it seeks. Our best hope, then, is to shape China's future
in space, rather than watch it develop in 20 years--with assistance
from others--into something that we will wish we could have diverted.
China is already working with the European Space Agency on programs
ranging from DoubleStar to Galileo, it worked with Russia on human
spaceflight, and it is courting many Asian countries for projects
involving cooperative work on environmental and disaster monitoring and
management, sometimes through the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation
in Space Organization (APSCO). That the EU considered dropping its arms
embargo against China demonstrates that other countries do not
necessarily share U.S. views about the value or necessity of isolating
China. Over the long term, the reality is that China will increasingly
engage partners in space activity. The question is whether the United
States will choose to deflect or co-opt some of that cooperative
activity in directions of our choosing?
The United States has historically and successfully employed
cooperative space activities to ``shape'' other countries' programs;
guiding them into benign areas of interest and leaving them less funds
to pursue activities less in our interest. Controlled or limited
cooperation has also allowed the U.S. to get a much better idea of
exactly what the priorities and capabilities are in other countries.
Because China's program is still largely opaque, isolating it will only
limit our ability to monitor what they are doing, and perhaps even more
important, their long-term intent. Technology transfer remains a
critical issue. Given that stopping technology transfer to China is
impossible because the U.S. does not have a technology monopoly,
managing it through transfers from the U.S., rather than having China
obtain it from other countries with lesser controls, becomes a
pragmatic option. Further, cooperation with China on space offers the
U.S. leverage in Chinese space activities, gets the U.S. out of a
counterproductive perception of a space race, and offers the U.S. the
opportunity to develop soft power through a human space program with a
goal beyond science and exploration--strategic leadership.
Cooperation in space with China does not excuse the Communist
regime from its commitment to Communism and its abysmal record on human
rights. But indeed it is because China is an authoritarian state at the
crossroads of its political development that it becomes imperative that
America, as the world's leading democracy, step forward and help shape
China's aspirations in space toward peaceful and cooperative ends
rather than see them turned toward more threatening ideological or
military goals. It should also be pointed out that attempting to draw
linkages between space cooperation and other foreign policy goals, like
human rights, is unlikely to be successful. The U.S. tried with the
Soviet Union and only became frustrated. The U.S. can use space
cooperation to co-opt, or shape, Chinese space activity. That is a
worthy goal in itself.
An inclusive cooperative human space program returns to the Apollo
model, a program with a strategic goal, but this time based on
cooperation rather than competition. Cooperation is not easy. But the
ISS experience, and studies conducted by groups such as the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics with long experience in
cooperation models tells us there are ways to manage the issues. \4\ A
first step in any model is to assure that all partners have a vested
interest in success, all partners fully understand their roles, and
that the science and engineering goals are meaningful. We know how to
do it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, for example, a recent AIAA paper by Peggy Finarelli and
Ian Pryke, ``Optimizing Space Exploration through International
Cooperation,'' and the full report of the 7th AIAA Workshop on
International Space Cooperation, www.aiaa.org/IntlCoop.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imagine if you will a few alternative, hypothetical scenarios. If
the United States were to finish the ISS only to then turn it over to
the partners so the U.S. could pursue the Moon/ Mars vision, but then
got mired down in technical or political difficulties, which would not
be hard to imagine, the U.S. could end up the only space-faring nation
not involved in ISS. If the U.S. pursues the Moon/Mars vision with the
ISS partners, but not China; it is China (the developing country)
versus the rest of the (developed) world, magnifying the perceived
importance of each small advancement China makes and every misstep we
make. If the U.S. pursues the Moon/Mars mission alone--other countries
could see working with China as an opportunity to work on a human space
program, and on a more level playing field, creating a U.S. versus
China+ scenario. And finally, some have suggested that the U.S. simply
forego human space activity.
The U.S. must not, however, allow human space leadership to slip
away. Human spaceflight requires pushing the envelop in areas of
science and engineering--in medical fields and areas of life support
systems engineering, for example--otherwise potentially neglected.
While direct benefits to the economy or defense from a particular
program may not always be identifiable in advance, GPS, once a
government program without a clear mission, has certainly demonstrated
that we should not be bound by the limits of our imagination. The
importance that space provides to building science capabilities
generally is not unnoticed elsewhere. China, for example, is acutely
aware that it has a long way to go toward becoming a science ``power''
and it hopes human spaceflight will accelerate its movement up the
learning curve. For the U.S. to maintain its leadership position, it is
therefore imperative that the U.S. stays active in space as well. It is
also important to remember that human spaceflight is part of the U.S.
space agenda, not the entire agenda. We need to maintain a balance in
the U.S. to assure continued preeminence in all aspects of science and
engineering. And finally, space represents the future. It is imperative
that the United States, as the world's leader, remain the world's
leader into the future.
Finally, I encourage this Committee to look into and plan for the
future of human spaceflight from an ``effects-based'' perspective. What
does the U.S. hope to achieve? Is the U.S. looking to maintain its
preeminence in human spaceflight? I suggest we must. If that is the
goal, realistically, we need a rationale beyond science and exploration
to sustain the momentum. Competition once served that purpose but will
not any longer. Indeed competition places the U.S. into a race not in
its best interests. Strategic leadership of a cooperative space mission
off planet Earth offers the U.S. a viable way forward toward
maintaining U.S. leadership while generating significant soft power
globally, soft power necessary toward such strategic goals as
effectively fighting the Global War on Terrorism. I encourage this
Committee to look at space from a strategic perspective, not just from
a science or exploration perspective.
Senator Hutchison. Dr. Scott Horowitz, Director of Space
Transportation and Exploration at ATK Thiokol.
STATEMENT OF DR. SCOTT J. HOROWITZ, DIRECTOR, SPACE
TRANSPORTATION AND EXPLORATION, ATK THIOKOL, INC.
Dr. Horowitz. Thank you, Madame Chair and Senator Nelson.
It is a great honor to be here today. And I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss evolving Space Shuttle systems that will
provide a safe, reliable, and a cost-effective method to ensure
human access to space, along with heavy lift we are going to
need to have to do space exploration and retire the Space
Shuttle by 2010.
It has been a great privilege and an honor to have served
as an astronaut on four Space Shuttle missions. So I have seen
rendezvous in space, the International Space Station, and the
Hubble Telescope up close and personal. And we at ATK are very
excited about the President's vision and support NASA's new
administrator, Mike Griffin, in his efforts to make this vision
a reality.
I firmly believe that we can safely and affordably
transition the Space Shuttle program to support exploration by
leveraging our flight-proven and human-rated elements that
exist today. NASA needs a safe, reliable, and affordable method
of transporting crews to and from Earth orbit and heavy lift
for cargo. That is the bottom line.
And I believe it is tremendously important to learn lessons
from the past and apply them to the future of human space
flight. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board had
concluded, and I quote, ``The design of the system should give
overriding priority to crew safety, rather than trade safety
against other performance criteria, such as low cost and
reusability.'' And I totally agree with this conclusion.
So there are two things we have to address, which is heavy
lift and crew transport. Albert Einstein once said, ``Make
everything as simple as possible, but not any simpler.'' So we
have concepts for a simple, safe way evolving, for example,
using the solid rocket booster and maybe a J-2S from the Apollo
program or another engine to safely get the crew to and from
orbit. In fact, a recent study has shown that this particular
launch vehicle has a forecasted crew safety level of more than
an order of magnitude safer than today's Shuttle.
We also have tremendous capabilities that we can utilize to
support our exploration vision. The propulsion system, for
example, as has been said before, already today propels 240,000
pounds to low Earth orbit. That is over 100 metric tons. So we
have a tremendous capability today. One of the things that I do
as I travel around the country sharing the adventures of flying
in space, is I point out that it is not the thrust of the solid
rocket motors and the Space Shuttle main engines that propel us
to space, but it is the dedication, hard work, hopes and dreams
of the many skilled and talented people that develop,
manufacture, and prepare these systems that carry us to orbit.
Transitioning this workforce to support exploration is
going to be key to our success. In summary, we do have a safe
and a simple solution that we can have soon. We owe it to our
children and future generations to do so.
Thank you very much for this opportunity. And I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Hutchison. Yes. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Horowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Scott J. Horowitz, Director, Space
Transportation and Exploration, ATK Thiokol, Inc.
Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to appear before you. I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss evolving the Space Shuttle systems, and in particular
leveraging the hardware, infrastructure and people to minimize
development schedules and to provide a safe, reliable, cost effective
method to insure human access to space along with heavy lift for
exploration when we retire the Space Shuttle in 2010.
I have had the honor and privilege to serve our country as an Air
Force F-15 fighter pilot, test pilot, and NASA astronaut on four Space
Shuttle missions as a pilot and commander including a microgravity/
science mission, Hubble servicing mission, and two missions to the
International Space Station. Upon retiring from NASA and the Air Force
I joined the ATK Thiokol team as the Director of Space Transportation
and Exploration. These experiences, coupled with a Ph.D. in Aerospace
Engineering from Georgia Tech, have provided me with a unique
perspective on what it takes for our team to conduct successful human
space flight missions.
We at ATK are excited about the President's Vision for Space
Exploration and fully support NASA's new administrator, Mike Griffin,
in his efforts to make this vision a reality. I firmly believe that we
can safely and affordably transition the Space Shuttle program to
support the Exploration program by leveraging the flight-proven and
human-rated elements that exists today. This will enable us to retire
the orbiter, and eliminate any gap in U.S. Human Space Flight
capability. If we can start soon, we can fully meet the demanding needs
of heavy lift and crew transportation more safely, more reliably, and
more affordably than with any other option by the end of the decade.
NASA's need for a safe, reliable, affordable method of transporting
crews to and from Low Earth Orbit can be achieved as we move forward
with exploration. But I believe it tremendously important to learn from
the lessons of the past and apply them to the future of human space
flight. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that ``The
design of the system should give overriding priority to crew safety,
rather than trade safety against other performance criteria, such as
low cost and reusability, or against advanced space operation
capability other than crew transfer.'' I totally agree with this
conclusion. Additionally, in a memo dated May 4, 2004, the NASA
astronaut office offered their consensus on the future by stating:
``Although flying in space will always involve some measure of risk, it
is our consensus that an order-of-magnitude reduction in the risk of
loss of human life during ascent, is both achievable with current
technology and consistent with NASA's focus on steadily improving
reliability'' (Attachment 1: Astronaut Office Position on Future Launch
System Safety, Memo, CB-04-044, May 4, 2004).
The first step is to realize the tremendous capabilities that
already exist and that can be utilized in the future to support our
nations exploration vision. The Space Shuttle propulsion systems are
the most reliable systems in the world. The Reusable Solid Rocket
Motors used in the Space Shuttle launch phase have flown 226 times with
significant engineering, inspection, and testing supporting well
understood operational margins; the Space Shuttle Main Engines have
flown 339 times and have over a million seconds of testing! These
reliable and proven propulsion systems coupled with the External Tank
constitute the Space Shuttle ``propulsive backbone'' and provide us an
impressive capability to lift large payloads to Low Earth Orbit. Every
time we launch a Space Shuttle we send about 240,000 pounds (over 100
Metric Tons) to Low Earth Orbit! More importantly, we have the existing
infrastructure and skills today to produce, launch, and operate this
amazing hardware. As I travel around the country sharing the adventure
of flying in space, I point out that it isn't the thrust of the Solid
Rocket Motors and Space Shuttle Main Engines that propel us to space,
but the dedication, hard work, hopes and dreams of the many skilled and
talented people that develop, manufacture, and prepare these systems
that carry us to orbit. Transitioning this workforce to support
Exploration is key to our success.
By evolving the shuttle's propulsive backbone to provide a heavy
lift launch capability we can engage this talented, skilled workforce,
and utilize our existing infrastructure. Because the orbiter vehicle
sustaining, launch processing, and associated logistics drive the cost
of the existing shuttle program, removing the orbiter will result in a
significant reduction in cost. The propulsion elements of the Space
Shuttle program only make up a fraction of the overall costs, making
utilization of these systems extremely attractive for cost, safety,
reliability, and sustainability. Not only is this launch system very
affordable, it is the lowest cost in terms of dollars per pound to low
earth orbit.
Two primary options are being reviewed to provide heavy lift
(greater than 150,000 pounds)--The first option replaces the orbiter
vehicle with a side-mounted expendable cargo carrier utilizing the
propulsion backbone and the same connections as the orbiter. This
approach minimizes configuration changes while providing the capability
to launch 170,000 to 200,000 lbs to LEO. A second option, providing
capability up to 250,000 lbs to LEO, is to remove the orbiter, move the
main engines below the External Tank, and add an optional second stage
and cargo carrier to the top of the external tank. The modifications
required for option 2 are more extensive than option 1 but option 2 has
the added advantage of being able to provide larger and heavier
payloads to Low Earth Orbit.
Heavy lift capability in the ranges that I have mentioned is
significant in that it offers the lowest risk and highest mission
reliability, and ultimately the lowest cost for exploration missions.
It would take 5 to 7 launches using smaller existing launch vehicles to
accomplish what a single 170,000 to 250,000 pound launch vehicle can
do.
The cost of breaking the exploration missions into numerous smaller
pieces to accommodate a smaller launch vehicle is cost prohibitive.
Each smaller element will have to become a complete spacecraft on orbit
while performing an automated rendezvous and docking and be burdened
with all the systems required to survive and operate in space including
power systems, thermal control systems, propulsion systems, guidance
navigation and control systems, docking systems, etc. Then there is the
cost of the infrastructure required to support the surge rates needed
for multiple launches of smaller launch vehicles that would be required
during a lunar or Mars campaign. This combined with all of the
associated operational costs make the use of smaller launch vehicles
for exploration missions cost prohibitive. Add to that the impact on
mission reliability as a result of performing so many launches and
associated on-orbit assembly operations and one quickly realizes that
the chances of accomplishing multiple moon or Mars missions using
smaller launch vehicles is slim to none.
A heavy lift launch vehicle eliminates costly and complex in-space
docking and on-orbit assembly and all of the associated supporting
hardware, testing, checkout, and sustaining operations. Most
significantly, a heavy lift launch vehicle simplifies the exploration
architecture driving down costs for sustaining and logistics.
In combination with the heavy lift launch capability, it is equally
important to leverage existing human rated propulsion elements and
focus on the safest way to put the crew in space. Utilizing a single
Space Shuttle reusable solid rocket motor for the first stage of the
crew launch vehicle is an ideal application of simplicity. The motor is
already human rated and has an outstanding proven safety and
reliability record. Add to this reusable first stage a previously
developed human rated 2nd stage rocket engine, either a simplified
version of the Apollo engine that took astronauts to the moon, the J-
2S, or a Space Shuttle main engine and you have a very simple, cost
effective launch vehicle solution, built upon human rated heritage.
Albert Einstein once said: ``make everything as simple as possible,
but not any simpler''. The crew launch vehicle that I just described is
the simplest launch vehicle that can deliver almost 50,000 pounds to
Low Earth Orbit. This simplicity and use of highly reliable components
results in the safest launch vehicle possible for transporting
astronauts to space. In fact a recent reliability and crew safety
assessment of the SRB/J-2S Launch Vehicle conducted by Science
Applications International Corporation (Attachment 2: SAICNY05-04-1F, 1
April 2005) concluded ``. . . the SRB/J-2S derived launch vehicle
forecasted crew safety level, as measured in missions where the crew is
lost in a total number of missions, is 1 in 3,145 . . .'' This is an
order of magnitude better than today's capabilities. Another important
feature of this design is that it has sufficient performance to fly
trajectories to orbit that are compatible with a crew escape system.
Other launch vehicles with insufficient thrust require the launch
vehicle to fly higher, steeper, and longer, exposing the crew to
extensive periods (up to three times longer) where a simple ballistic
crew escape is not survivable.
The other major benefit of this evolved approach is that because of
its simplicity and reliance on already developed hardware, this launch
vehicle can be available soon. In fact, a demonstration launch could be
conducted in 2008 and be ready to fly the CEV about when the Shuttle is
scheduled for retirement. We could also have the heavy lift version
ready at about the same time, and by leveraging the resources of the
current shuttle program we could save significant dollars. We have the
talented workforce, facilities, and most of the major hardware
components in hand. By evolving what we have and only developing new
components where needed, we can drastically reduce the cost and
schedule to provide the capabilities we need to safely transport
astronauts to orbit and provide the heavy lift required to conduct
space exploration.
The approach that I have described also provides a means of safely
transitioning from the current Space Shuttle System to the launch
system required to support the Exploration Vision. The SRB/J-2S launch
vehicle could easily be used to carry crew and cargo to the
International Space Station, or be used as a highly reliable payload
carrier to support U.S. assured access to space requirements.
By leveraging the current Space Shuttle resources we have the
ability to get astronauts to/from Low Earth Orbit, an order of
magnitude safer than we do today, for a very affordable cost and on a
schedule that avoids a ``gap'' in U.S. human space flight capability.
We also have the propulsive backbone of the Space Shuttle System today
that is proven and ready to provide a cost effective heavy lift
capability needed to do exciting exploration of the moon and enable us
to reach Mars and beyond. In summary we have a Safe, Simple solution
that we can have Soon. We owe it to our children and future generations
to do so.
Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you, I will
be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
Attachment 1
NASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, TX, May 4, 2004
TO: CA/Director, Flight Crew Operations
FROM: CB/Chief, Astronaut Office
Re: CB-04-044, SUBJECT: Astronaut Office Position on Future
Launch System Safety
The Columbia disaster has precipitated a thorough re-evaluation of
all aspects of space flight. The accompanying paper presents the
Astronaut Office position on launch vehicle safety for the next
generation of human-rated spacecraft.
Kent V. Rominger
Enclosure: Astronaut Office Position on Future Launch System Safety
Executive Summary
The Columbia accident, the selection of a booster for the Orbital
Space Plane (OSP), and NASA's recently renewed interest in exploring
beyond low Earth orbit have led the Astronaut Office to reexamine its
views on launch system safety. Although flying in space will always
involve some measure of risk, it is our consensus that an order-of-
magnitude reduction in the risk of loss of human life during ascent,
compared to the Space Shuttle, is both achievable with current
technology and consistent with NASA's focus on steadily improving
rocket reliability, and should therefore represent a minimum safety
benchmark for future systems. To reach that target, the Astronaut
Office offers the following recommendations.
The Astronaut Office recommends that the next human-rated launch
system add abort or escape systems to a booster with ascent reliability
at least as high as the Space Shuttle's, yielding a predicted
probability of 0.999 or better for crew survival during ascent. The
system should be designed to achieve or exceed its reliability
requirement with 95 percent confidence.
The Astronaut Office recommends that new human-rated launch vehicle
programs follow guidelines, such as those given in the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report and NASA's Human Rating
Requirements (NPG 8705), for safety-conscious management, requirements
definition, concept development, and design selection.
The Astronaut Office recommends that NASA specify and maintain a
set of formal, standardized, complete methods and processes to be used
in predicting the reliability of human-rated spacecraft, and identify
or create an independent body to verify those analyses.
The Astronaut Office recommends that the test program for the next
human-rated launch system demonstrate its reliability through vigorous
ground and flight testing of components and systems. The value of each
test should be leveraged by proving a safe envelope larger than that
expected during operations and by using flight data to validate system
reliability models. After completion of the formal test program, the
vigilance applied during testing to data gathering, analysis, and
flight constraints should continue to be applied during operations.
Reliability should be continuously reassessed.
The Astronaut Office believes that the next human-rated spacecraft
must include a robust full-envelope abort or escape system. The safety
of the overall system depends on the reliability of both the booster
and the abort or escape system. As with the rocket itself, the abort or
escape system reliability must be proven through flight testing.
I. Introduction
Flying in space will always involve some measure of risk.
Astronauts are willing to accept significant risks to further the cause
of space exploration. Nevertheless, the Astronaut Office believes that
future spacecraft can and should be much safer than present systems.
The CAIB, in its 2003 report, advised NASA to adopt flight safety
as its ``overriding priority.'' In hearings following the loss of
Columbia, members of Congress agreed with that recommendation,
emphasizing that improved safety is essential to maintaining NASA's
credibility with both the public and Congress.
Shortly after the Columbia accident, the OSP Program released its
Level 1 Requirements and Operational Concepts. These stated in part
that, ``The vehicle(s) shall initially launch on an [expendable launch
vehicle] ELV,'' referring to the Atlas V and Delta IV ELVs. These
rockets belong to a family of vehicles with a success rate of 0.975.
Even with extensive modifications, they may never achieve a
meaningfully higher success rate. \1\ For comparison, the success rate
of the Space Shuttle if viewed solely as a launch vehicle is 0.991 (one
ascent failure in 113 flights, counting the Columbia accident as an
entry failure because it achieved a safe orbit after launch).
Although history has shown that deadly accidents can occur during
any phase of flight, ascent still poses a major risk to human life. If
we wish to send explorers into space on increasingly ambitious
missions, we must first solve the problem of putting humans into orbit
more safely than is possible with our current launch systems.
The Columbia accident, the selection of a booster for the OSP, and
NASA's recently renewed interest in exploring beyond low Earth orbit
have led the Astronaut Office to reexamine its views on launch system
safety. Although flying in space will always involve some measure of
risk, it is our consensus that an order-of-magnitude reduction in the
risk of loss of human life during ascent, compared to the Space
Shuttle, is both achievable with current technology and consistent with
NASA's focus on steadily improving rocket reliability, and should
therefore represent a minimum safety benchmark for future systems.
II. Flight Safety and Reliability
Flight safety means protecting the lives of the crew as the top
priority, above cost, manpower, reusability, adherence to schedule, and
all other considerations, given that we are undertaking a dangerous
mission and that our resources are finite.
Flight safety is not just a philosophical viewpoint. It is also a
measurable quantity: the reliability of the systems upon which the
crew's safety depends. But according to reliability theory, \2\ it is
not possible to measure a vehicle's reliability exactly. Instead, the
probability of a safe flight must be estimated using mathematical
models, flight history, or a combination of both.
In this paper, we define ascent as the time from crew arrival at
the launch pad until insertion into an orbit that is safe for at least
24 hours, or, in cases where such an orbit is not reached, until crew
recovery by rescue forces on Earth. We will use three statistical
definitions of ascent reliability: predicted reliability, success rate,
and demonstrated reliability.
Predicted reliability is an estimate of reliability, made in the
absence of sufficient flight data, through the use of probabilistic
risk assessment or other trustworthy modeling techniques. Its accuracy
is limited because it relies on an incomplete understanding of the
machine and its environment and usually takes into account only known
failure modes. As flight data becomes available, it can be included in
the models to improve the accuracy of reliability predictions.
A rocket's success rate is the number of times it has safely
reached orbit, divided by the number of times it has been launched. For
piloted missions, we count a flight reaching an incorrect but safe
orbit as a success, since it does not threaten the lives of the crew
even if the mission is lost. Success rate is not the same as
reliability. But with enough launches the success rate will gradually
become an accurate estimate of reliability.
Demonstrated reliability is an estimate of reliability based on the
success rate, with allowances for statistical uncertainty.
Even a ``mature'' launch system with a long flight history has
significant uncertainty in its reliability. To reflect that
uncertainty, every reliability estimate must include a confidence
level, which allows for the possibility that a rocket's modeled
performance or existing safety record, because of analytical errors or
random chance, does not reflect the truth. A standard confidence level
is 95 percent, meaning that there is only a 5 percent chance that the
system's real reliability is outside the bounds of the estimate. \3\ A
lower confidence level means a greater probability that the actual
value of reliability falls outside the range of the estimate. For
rockets carrying people, where low reliability is of greatest concern,
a reduced confidence level corresponds to a greater likelihood of
unrecognized danger.
Demonstrated reliability estimates at 95 percent confidence will be
very low for new systems when the number of flights is small. This is
because even an untrustworthy system can succeed a few times by random
chance. It is just this kind of chance that the confidence level is
intended to compensate for. (Confidence levels are less important if
data from hundreds or thousands of flights is available to reduce the
statistical uncertainty in the reliability estimate to an acceptably
low value. Such a rich test history is characteristic of airplane
programs, but not of launch systems in the past or near future.) Note
that the Shuttle was declared ``operational'' at a time when its
demonstrated reliability could only be said to be better than 0.473
with 95 percent confidence.
We now apply these concepts to the reliability of future human-
rated launch systems. As we discuss below, adding abort or escape
systems to a booster with an ascent reliability at least as high as the
Space Shuttle's could yield a future launch system with an order-of-
magnitude less ascent risk than the Shuttle. Such a system, which the
Astronaut Office believes is feasible using present technology and
production processes, would answer the call for meaningfully improved
flight safety as called for by Congress, the CAIB, \4\ and the
Astronaut Office. \5\ It is also consistent with the ascent risk
requirement accepted by the former OSP Program. This new safety
benchmark corresponds to a predicted probability of 0.999 or better for
crew survival during ascent. If flown enough times, it should
demonstrate the same reliability. To ensure that a new system achieves
its safety requirement, it should be designed to meet or exceed that
value with the standard 95 percent confidence.
The Astronaut Office recommends that the next human-rated launch
system add abort or escape systems to a booster with ascent reliability
at least as high as the Space Shuttle's, yielding a predicted
probability of 0.999 or better for crew survival during ascent. The
system should be designed to achieve or exceed its reliability
requirement with 95 percent confidence.
III. Managing and Designing for Flight Safety
Designing significantly safer space vehicles requires adopting
flight safety as the overarching figure of merit and implementing
measures that have been shown to minimize risk, including those
outlined in the CAIB Report. \4\ Practices of safety-conscious flight
programs include the following: Systems should be assumed to be unsafe
until proven otherwise. Waivers should not be accepted without rigorous
technical justification. Expert advice from outside the organization
should be sought and heeded to assess program management, vehicle
design, construction, test, and operations. Safety must never be
compromised by cost, schedule, or other considerations. The concepts of
programmatic risk (to cost and schedule) and operational risk (to life
and property) must be carefully separated.
Requirements, especially safety requirements, for a human-rated
launch vehicle must be specific, unambiguous, and verifiable. New
programs must follow NASA's Human Rating Requirements (NPG 8705),
protect those requirements from unnecessary ``tailoring,'' weakening,
and abandonment, and ensure that they are met.
Thorough, objective trade studies must be done to identify the
design that best meets the requirements. Choices of technology and
architecture should be guided by flight safety over cost, schedule, or
any other priority.
New programs should choose conservative, simple designs, which are
usually safer. They should adopt proven design standards and analytical
approaches. Designs should preserve healthy margins and factors of
safety, and employ redundancy in critical systems. Human rating should
be designed in, not appended on. Well-understood, high-quality, high-
reliability materials, components, and architectures should be
selected. Hardware and software should be designed to degrade
gracefully rather than fail catastrophically. The system must provide
human insight into subsystems and allow human intervention during
failures. Future improvements and supplementary backup systems must not
be assumed to adequately substitute for a good basic design.
The Astronaut Office recommends that new human-rated launch vehicle
programs follow guidelines, such as those given in the CAIB Report and
NASA's Human Rating Requirements (NPG 8705), for safety-conscious
management, requirements definition, concept development, and design
selection.
IV. Predicted Reliability of New Designs
History has shown that rocket developers may exaggerate the merits
of their systems. An early claim for the Space Shuttle's probability of
crew survival was 0.99999, thousands of times safer than later
demonstrated. \6\ Because safety is the most important consideration
for human-rated space vehicles, predicted reliability must be
quantitatively understood at all stages of design.
A long record of successful flights is the best way to demonstrate
flight safety. When a new system lacks enough flight history to support
reliability claims, test results are the next best choice. During early
development there is no hardware to test, so reliability must be
predicted using state-of-the-art modeling techniques such as
probabilistic risk assessment. Unfortunately, predicted reliability
figures can be suspect, even if they are produced using modern,
standardized techniques. The system developer owns the proprietary data
upon which the models are based and these data are rarely shared for
independent verification. Complex reliability models contain numerous
parameters that are uncertain or subject to interpretation. (Models of
this kind are notorious for being able to produce any answer the
modeler wants to obtain.) Some reliability models treat only component
failures, neglecting human errors in processing and operations.
Finally, most reliability models treat only known modes of failure and
may miss significant risks from unforeseen causes, especially
unintended interactions between parts of a complex system (such as foam
from the Shuttle's external tank striking the wing leading edge).
Greater confidence in predicted reliability numbers can be realized
in several ways. One is to specify standard modeling methods for
producing them. Another is to validate them through independent third-
party verification using separately developed models. It may also be
possible to truth-test reliability models against comparable existing
systems with more precisely known reliability. Many models can be made
more realistic by expanding them to include human errors in processing
and operations as well as the possibility of unanticipated failure
modes. Verification of this kind is difficult to obtain, but the
powerful influence of model reliability estimates in determining the
ultimate safety of the design (and hence the ultimate success of the
program) demands thorough validation of the models and their results.
The Astronaut Office recommends that NASA specify and maintain a
set of formal, standardized, complete methods and processes to be used
in predicting the reliability of human-rated spacecraft, and identify
or create an independent body to verify those analyses.
V. Verifying Flight Safety Through Testing and Operations
Once hardware is built, its reliability can be accurately assessed,
first through testing and later during operations. Because testing will
expose the vulnerabilities in a system more accurately and more
realistically than analysis, vigorous testing to qualify all levels of
the system, including individual and integrated components, on the
ground and in flight is essential. Flight testing should progressively
expand the envelope, following proven aviation practices. Test flights
should identify the system's weakest parts and exercise them most
strenuously. The flight test program must demonstrate that the system's
reliability meets the requirements, either through the sheer number of
tests, through proving a safe envelope much larger than expected during
operations, through validation of system models, or through a
combination of all three.
The formal test program for a new commercial or military airplane
involves hundreds of test flights. The large number of tests yields
complete, precise understanding of the hardware and its performance.
Such a comprehensive test program for a new spacecraft is likely to be
prohibitively expensive. It is therefore expected that the next new
human-rated spacecraft will be much less well understood than the next
new military airplane when it goes into operation. Accordingly, even
after completion of a formal test program, the spacecraft should still
be operated as though it were an experimental vehicle. Operational
practices associated with this paradigm include collection, archiving,
and timely analysis of data on the health and performance of all
systems. All anomalies should be recorded, tracked, and aggressively
investigated. Unresolved anomalies should be considered constraints to
flight. The system's reliability estimates and their underlying models
must be continuously refined to reflect the vehicle's actual
performance. An ancillary advantage of such an operational paradigm is
that it will formally identify and capture ideas that will be useful in
further improving the safety of current and future launch vehicles.
The Astronaut Office recommends that the test program for the next
human-rated launch system demonstrate its reliability through vigorous
ground and flight testing of components and systems. The value of each
test should be leveraged by proving a safe envelope larger than that
expected during operations and by using flight data to validate system
reliability models. After completion of the formal test program, the
vigilance applied during testing to data gathering, analysis, and
flight constraints should continue to be applied during operations.
Reliability should be continuously reassessed.
VI. Improving Ascent Safety with Abort and Escape Systems
The current benchmark for ascent reliability is the Space Shuttle's
success rate of 0.991. Existing commercial rockets have lower success
rates. \1\ Given the low reliability of even the safest existing
rockets, meeting the Astronaut Office's goal of an order-of-magnitude
reduction in the risk of space flight will require making the risk of
losing the crew much smaller than the risk of losing the booster. This
can be achieved by adding abort and escape systems. The ``Astronaut
Office Position on Crew Survivability During Ascent and Entry'' \5\
defines an ``abort'' as a failure case where the crew stays in the part
of the spacecraft normally designed to carry them during entry, as with
an Apollo-style tractor rocket. ``Escape'' means that the crew leaves
the crew compartment after the failure, as with an escape pod, ejection
seats, or bailout capability. A successful abort or escape is one in
which the crew survives abort or escape initiation, separation from the
booster, descent and landing, awaiting rescue forces, and being
securely recovered by those forces. All elements involved in abort or
escape flight, landing, post-landing survival, and rescue efforts are
considered part of the abort or escape system. Portions of the flight
trajectory where abort and escape are impossible are called ``black
zones.'' Because the overall safety of the system depends so strongly
on the abort or escape system, black zones greatly increase overall
flight risk. They should therefore be minimized to the fullest extent
possible. The safest design will include a ``full envelope'' abort or
escape system, which provides the crew with a secondary way to survive
vehicle failures at all points in the flight profile.
Abort and escape systems must operate very quickly and precisely,
may need to withstand the detonation of hundreds of tons of explosive
propellants in close proximity, must perform across a wide and never
fully understood range of conditions, and may drop the crew compartment
onto inhospitable locations on the Earth's surface where the crew might
wait days to be rescued. The reliability of an abort or escape system
must include its ability to save the crew from all credible failures at
all times during ascent, and its ability to protect them after
separation from the rocket until recovery by rescue forces.
Abort and escape systems can never be perfectly reliable.
Historically, about 13 percent of rocket accidents have involved
catastrophic stack failures occurring with so little warning that
notional abort or escape systems likely could not have saved a crew on
board. \1\ Considering the challenges of separation alone, abort or
escape system reliability figures higher than about 0.87 may be
difficult to achieve without specifically designing the booster to fail
only in benign ways. Even if separation from the failing booster is
successful, abort descents, landings, and rescue scenarios are more
difficult to survive than their nominal counterparts, implying an
overall abort or escape system reliability even lower than 0.87.
Because of the abort or escape system's vital role in protecting the
lives of the crew, its reliability estimates must be comprehensive and
realistic during the design phase, and supported by rigorous flight-
testing after hardware exists.
The table below shows how the rate of fatal accidents depends on
the reliabilities of the booster and the abort or escape system. To
clearly illustrate the effect of both parameters, we convert ordinary
reliability figures (e.g., 0.999) to expected numbers of fatal
accidents per 1,000 launches. Presented in this format, the Space
Shuttle's 0.991 ascent success rate becomes 9 fatal accidents per 1,000
launches, and the Astronaut Office safety target of 0.999 is one fatal
accident per 1,000 launches. In the table, green denotes combinations
of booster and abort system reliabilities that meet that target.
Systems with two or fewer fatal accidents per 1,000 launches are shown
in yellow.
Table 1. Fatal ascent accidents per 1,000 launches, for different
values of booster and abort or escape system reliability.
The table shows that if the abort or escape system has a
reliability of 0.900 (chosen as a reasonable upper limit, following the
discussion above and presuming a booster designed not to fail
catastrophically, so that the abort or escape system reliability can
exceed 0.87), the Astronaut Office safety target of 1 fatal accident
per 1,000 launches can be reached only by selecting a booster with a
reliability of 0.990 or better. Existing commercial rockets have
demonstrated reliabilities near 0.950 with 95 percent confidence. \1\
The Space Shuttle, if viewed solely as a launch vehicle, has a high
success rate of 0.991, but applying the standard 95 percent confidence
level puts its demonstrated reliability near 0.960. A new booster
design that avoids complex, fragile, and unproven technologies and
architectures while embracing the more extensive testing, design
margins, process control, instrumentation, operator intervention, and
fault tolerance characteristic of current human-rated flight hardware
might achieve or exceed 0.990 reliability with high confidence.
The Astronaut Office believes that the next human-rated spacecraft
must include a robust full-envelope abort or escape system. The safety
of the overall system depends on the reliability of both the booster
and the abort or escape system. As with the rocket itself, the abort or
escape system reliability must be proven through flight testing.
VII. Launching Humans on Atlas V and Delta IV Boosters
The possibility of using the current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets
to launch a new, piloted spacecraft has led the Astronaut Office to
look closely at the crew safety implications of this option.
According to the OSP-ELV Human Flight Safety Certification
Study Team Report, \1\ the Atlas V and Delta IV rockets do not
meet many of the NASA safety standards specified or referenced
in NPG 8705, the Human Rating Requirements. Major changes
needed to bring the vehicles into compliance would include at
least: adding failure tolerance for critical systems,
redesigning for greater structural safety factors (human-rated
spacecraft use 1.4; Atlas V and Delta IV rockets use 1.25),
adding fault detection and isolation functions, making the
range destruct philosophy compatible with maximum crew
survivability, wiring for insight and intervention by the crew
and ground control, performing the detailed risk analyses
needed for human rating, supplementing process controls in all
phases of production, and flight testing to human rating
standards.
The Atlas V and Delta IV boosters were built to be cost-
effective for their manufacturers, insurers, and customers,
considering the value of the non-human payloads they were
designed to carry. Although cost-effectiveness includes
reliability considerations, safety is not the prime driver for
satellite launches. The expense of human rating these existing
rockets by adding design margins, redundancy, instrumentation,
process control, command capability, and testing, might make
them uneconomical for their original mission and could
potentially be as costly as building a new human-rated booster.
The reliability of Atlas V and Delta IV rockets is not
precisely known because they are too new. Given insufficient
flight data, one method for predicting reliability is to assume
that a new system is about as reliable as a similar, existing
system. The OSP-ELV Human Flight Safety Certification Study
Team \1\ used the flight record of Atlas, Delta, and Titan
rockets developed under U.S. Government contracts and launched
since 1990 to predict the reliability of the Atlas V and Delta
IV. These rockets have been launched 236 times and reached safe
orbits 230 times. The resulting reliability estimate is 0.950
or better with 95 percent confidence. The boosters' potentially
low reliability would place excessive burden on abort
mechanisms to save the crew. The abort or escape system would
need a reliability near 0.980 for the complete launch system to
meet the Astronaut Office crew survivability target. Proposed
abort and escape systems were judged to be incapable of
rescuing the crew from stack detonations occurring with little
or no warning. \1\ These failures occur often enough to prevent
even a high-reliability abort or escape system from meeting its
safety requirement. \1\
Atlas V and Delta IV boosters fly to orbit on highly lofted
trajectories because of second-stage performance limitations
and range destruct line-of-sight requirements. If a piloted
spacecraft had to abort near the apex of such a trajectory, it
would hit the atmosphere at a high speed and a steep angle. The
resulting heat and acceleration loads on the crew compartment
would be severe and possibly not survivable. \7\
In summary, the Atlas V and Delta IV rockets should be measured
against a set of concrete, specific, verifiable requirements for
carrying humans before being selected for that purpose. A safer launch
option might be identified by objectively comparing the advantages and
drawbacks of a range of existing, modified, and new launch systems
relative to those requirements.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
If we wish to send explorers into space on increasingly ambitious
missions, we must first solve the problem of getting humans into orbit
more safely than is possible with our current launch systems.
The Astronaut Office believes that an order-of-magnitude reduction
in the risk of loss of human life during ascent, compared to the Space
Shuttle, is both achievable with current technology and consistent with
NASA's focus on steadily improving rocket reliability, and should
therefore represent a minimum safety benchmark for future systems. This
corresponds to a predicted ascent reliability of at least 0.999. To
ensure that a new system will achieve or surpass its safety
requirement, it should be designed and tested to do so with a
statistical confidence level of 95 percent.
Tough safety requirements can be met in part by adopting the best
practices for the management, design, test, and operation of risky
technology as given in the CAIB Report, in NASA's Human Rating
Requirements (NPG 8705), and in commercial and military aviation.
The burden of proving that a vehicle is safe falls on the
mathematical models, tests, and operational history that measure the
system's reliability. Accordingly, the Astronaut Office recommends that
NASA specify and maintain a set of formal, standardized methods and
processes to be used in predicting the reliability of human-rated
spacecraft, and identify or create an independent body to verify those
analyses. We further recommend that the test program for the next
human-rated launch system demonstrate its reliability through vigorous
ground and flight testing of components and systems. The value of each
test should be leveraged by proving a safe envelope larger than that
expected during operations and by using flight data to validate system
reliability models. After completion of the formal test program, the
vigilance applied during testing to data gathering, analysis, and
flight constraints should continue to be applied during operations.
Reliability should be continuously reassessed.
The Astronaut Office believes that the next human-rated spacecraft
must include a robust full-envelope abort or escape system. The
reliability of both the rocket and the abort or escape system are
limited and must be proven through flight-testing.
It is our hope that NASA will adopt the principles outlined in this
paper to design, build, test, and fly a new vehicle that is much safer
than its existing counterparts. Such a vehicle will help ensure that
our nation retains the capability for human access to space.
References:
\1\ OSP-ELV Human Flight Safety Certification Study Team Report
(2004).
\2\ Trochim, W., The Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2nd Edition.
Atomic Dog Publishing, Cincinnati, 2000.
\3\ Taylor, J.R., An Introduction to Error Analysis: The Study of
Uncertainties in Physical Measurements, University Science Books, Mill
Valley, California, 1982.
\4\ Gehman, H.W. et al. Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Report, 2003.
\5\ Astronaut Office Position on Crew Survivability During Ascent
and Entry. Astronaut Office memo number CB 03-070, 2003.
\6\ Feynman, R.P., Personal observations on the reliability of the
Shuttle. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, Volume II, Appendix F, 1986.
\7\ Orbital Space Plane RAC 2.02a Final Report (2003).
Attachment 2
Executive Summary from SAICNY05-04-1F, ``Reliability and Crew
Safety Assessment for Solid Rocket Booster/J-2S Based Launch Vehicle,''
Joseph R. Fragola, Blake Putney, Joseph Minarick III, Joseph D. Baum,
Benjamin Franzini, Orlando Soto, Rainald Lohner, Eric Mestreau, Richard
Ferricane, 1 April 2005.
NASA's Exploration Mission Directorate is currently developing
plans to carry out the President's Vision for Space Exploration. This
plan includes retiring the Space Shuttle by 2010 and developing the
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to transport astronauts to/from Low
Earth Orbit (LEO). There are several alternatives to launch the CEV,
including Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) and launch
vehicles derived from new and existing propulsion elements. In May
2003, the astronaut office made clear its position on the need and
feasibility of improving crew safety for future NASA manned missions
indicating their ``consensus that an order of magnitude reduction in
the risk of human life during ascent, compared to the Space Shuttle, is
both achievable with current technology and consistent with NASA's
focus on steadily improving rocket reliability.'' The astronaut office
set a goal for the Probability of Loss of Crew (PLOC) to be better than
1 in 1,000. Thus, the challenge becomes finding a launch vehicle that
meets the CEV launch performance requirements while satisfying the
astronaut office crew survivability requirement.
The simplest designs of the EELVs, which offer the greatest
potential for inherent reliability, are the single core variants. These
single core EELVs with an effective crew escape system should provide
the greatest crew safety. Unfortunately, the single core EELVs are
unable to meet the performance needs for the CEV mission, so the higher
performance, more complex, less reliable multi-core ``heavy'' variants
are required making it difficult to achieve the ascent risk goal
proposed by the astronaut office for PLOC to be better than 1 in 1,000.
This dilemma motivated the search for a launch vehicle that could
preserve the simplicity of a single core propulsion system that
utilizes highly reliable human rated heritage components with
sufficient performance to meet the CEV mission needs. The result of
this effort is a 2-stage launch vehicle utilizing a single Space
Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) for the first stage, and a single J-
2S engine for the second stage.
In order to effectively evaluate the reliability and human rating
aspects of all of the various launch vehicle alternatives, a 13 step
``top-down scenario based risk assessment'' methodology was developed.
This approach is based on a phenomenological and engineering based
analysis, which is subsequently used to guide a thorough Probabilistic
Risk Assessment (PRA). This report documents the results of an
evaluation conducted by SAIC on the SRB/J-2S based launch vehicle
concept for launching the CEV based on this methodology.
The SAIC evaluation has determined that the SRB/J-2S derived launch
vehicle forecasted crew safety level, as measured in missions where the
crew is lost in a total number of missions, is 1 in 3,145 at the mean
of the estimated uncertainty distribution with associated uncertainty
bounds of 1 in 11,500 at the 5th percentile, 1 in 1,287 at the 95th
percentile, and 1 in 3,861 at the median or 50th percentile. This
forecast is based on the conservative assumption that all catastrophic
failures of the Space Shuttle SRB are non survivable which analysis
indicates is not the case.
The SRB/J-2S derived launch vehicle is forecasted to achieve this
significant crew safety performance due to the following features:
1. Simple Inherently Safe Design--A single human-rated SRB
first stage matured through years of experience with over 176
flights of the current design for launching crew, combined with
a simple J-2S single engine upper stage evolved from the highly
successful J-2 engine system used on both the second and third
stages of the Saturn V. These stages have been combined in an
inline configuration with the suggested Apollo Command Module
based CEV and Launch Escape System (LES) so as to benefit from
the natural safety distance advantages and broad escape
corridors provided inherently by the inline design.
2. Design Robustness--Historical test results and 1st
principles physics based simulation show that the SRB/J-2S
launch vehicle design is robust, that is, resistant to crew
adverse catastrophic failure, even for the most severe failure
modes.
3. Historically Low Rates of Failure--In the Space Shuttle
system only the 51-L event (a non-catastrophic failure of the
SRB) has marred a perfect record in 226 SRBs, with 176
consecutive successful uses of the redesigned SRBs. This 1 in
226 history, or 0.996 launch success rate is perhaps the best
of the best in launcher history. The J-2S, which completed 273
test firings and accumulated 30,858 seconds of run time, was
developed to be simpler to produce and operate than the J-2
engine system which it derives its heritage. The flight proven
J-2 engine had a significant success record, including a
flawless performance from a crew safety perspective.
4. Non-Catastrophic Failure Mode Propensity--Solid rocket
booster history, and specific design features of the SRB
suggest a propensity for gradual thrust augmentation failures
which present less of a challenge for crew survival in the
inline configuration, should they occur.
5. Process Control--The proposed design offers the benefits of
using propulsion suppliers with mature in-plant process control
systems to minimize human error, which has proven to be a
significant contributor to risk.
6. Failure Precursor Identification and Correction--The design
capitalizes on the significant failure precursor identification
and elimination benefit from recovery, and post flight
inspection of the recovered SRBs.
It is a combination of these six factors, and not any one alone,
which suggest a launch vehicle design that is forecasted to produce the
significant crew safety performance as assessed by this analysis.
Senator Hutchison. And Mr. Allen Li is Director of
Acquisition and Sourcing Management of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, GAO.
STATEMENT OF ALLEN LI, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Li. Madame Chairman, Senator Nelson, Members of the
Subcommittee. As requested, I will focus my brief remarks on
whether NASA is positioning itself to have people with the
proper skills to maintain and operate the Shuttle safely until
the very last flight. And building on Senator Hutchison's
remarks on lessons learned, I will also offer some observations
on NASA's plans to develop a new manned spacecraft.
Over the last 2 years NASA and its contractors have worked
diligently to return the Shuttle to flight. Understandably,
focus has been on STS-114. However, as we approach the day when
Discovery does return to space, as we all hope it will, NASA
will need to pay more attention to activities aimed an ensuring
that its Shuttle workforce has the critical skills needed until
the Shuttle is retired. It is this workforce that is enabling
NASA to soon achieve Return to Flight. It is also the workforce
that will allow NASA to finish the Space Station.
In summary, we found in our March 2005 report that NASA had
made limited progress in planning efforts for sustaining the
Shuttle workforce through the program's retirement. The Shuttle
program has taken preliminary steps, including identifying
lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs,
such as the Air Force's Titan 4 rocket program. And NASA's
prime contractor for Shuttle operations, United Space Alliance,
has also taken some initial steps to prepare for the impact of
the Shuttle's retirement on its own workforce.
However, USA's progress depends on NASA's decisions that
affect contractor requirements through the remainder of the
program. So in essence, it is waiting on NASA.
In our report we identified several factors that have
hampered the Shuttle program's planning efforts. For example,
because of the program's near-term focus on returning the
Shuttle to flight, other efforts that will ultimately aid in
determining workforce requirements have been delayed. In
addition, program officials indicated they faced uncertainties
regarding the implementation of future aspects of the
President's vision for space exploration.
I will end my remarks with two observations on current
plans to develop the Crew Exploration Vehicle, otherwise known
as the CEV. When the Shuttle was initially designed, ease and
maintainability was not a major factor. But it should have
been. A few years ago, I appeared before this Subcommittee when
it reviewed the reasons behind wiring failures in the Orbiter.
As it turns out, some wires, which are bundled, cracked from
maintenance personnel repeatedly stepping on them to access
other parts of the Orbiter. So it seems appropriate for NASA to
remember this lesson and that future reusable spacecraft be
designed with maintenance in mind.
Furthermore, even if the spacecraft is not totally
reusable, producibility will be a factor to consider. This is
important if the CEV is to be the building block for the future
and is produced in different forms over 20 years. It would
appear that NASA would have much to gain by insisting on
designs that can be efficiently produced and thus reduce long-
term costs.
This ends my verbal statement.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Li follows:]
Prepared Statement of Allen Li, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is positioning itself to
sustain the critically skilled Space Shuttle workforce through the
retirement of the Space Shuttle program. NASA is in the midst of one of
the most challenging periods in its history. It must demonstrate that
the Space Shuttle can safely fly again, begin the process of retiring
its largest program, and at the same time prepare for the uncertain
future of space exploration. These challenges are further exacerbated
by the complex task of maintaining the right workforce to support the
Space Shuttle program while ensuring that the skills needed for future
programs are not lost. Over the next several years, thousands of NASA
civil service and contractor employees who support the Space Shuttle
program will be impacted by decisions made about the remaining life of
the program and implementation of exploration goals. These include
decisions about the final number of Space Shuttle flights and about
future programs, such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). As
requested, my testimony today will discuss the actions that NASA is
taking to position itself to sustain its critically skilled Space
Shuttle workforce and the challenges that the agency faces in doing
so--issues we reported on to Senators Inouye and McCain in March 2005.
\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Space Shuttle: Actions Needed to Better Position NASA to
Sustain Its Workforce through Retirement, GAO-05-230 (Washington, DC:
March 9, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, we found that NASA had made limited progress in its
planning efforts for sustaining the Space Shuttle workforce through the
program's retirement. At the time of our March 2005 report, the Space
Shuttle program had taken preliminary steps, including identifying the
lessons learned from the retirement of comparable programs, such as the
Air Force Titan IV Rocket Program. Further NASA's prime contractor for
Space Shuttle operations--United Space Alliance (USA)--had taken some
initial steps to prepare for the impact of the Space Shuttle's
retirement on its own workforce. However, its progress depends on NASA
making decisions that impact contractor requirements through the
remainder of the program. Timely action to address workforce issues,
however, is critical given the potential impact that they could have on
NASA-wide goals. Unaddressed, such issues would likely lead to schedule
delays and overstretched funding for both the Space Shuttle program and
the agency. Both NASA and USA have acknowledged that sustaining their
workforces will be difficult as the Space Shuttle nears retirement,
particularly if a career path beyond the Space Shuttle's retirement is
not apparent to their employees. In addition, the Federal Government is
facing fiscal challenges. Such challenges call into question whether
funding for tools, such as retention bonuses, will be available for the
agency to use to aid in retaining the Space Shuttle workforce.
In our report we identified several factors that have hampered the
Space Shuttle program's planning efforts. For example, because of the
program's near-term focus on returning the Space Shuttle to flight,
other efforts that will ultimately aid in determining workforce
requirements, such as assessing hardware and facility needs, are being
delayed. In addition, program officials indicated that they face
uncertainties regarding the implementation of future aspects of the
President's vision for space exploration (Vision) and have yet to
define requirements on which workforce planning efforts would be based.
Despite these factors, our prior work on strategic workforce planning
has shown that, even when faced with uncertainty, successful
organizations take steps, such as scenario planning, to better position
themselves to meet future workforce requirements.
In our March 2005 report, we recommended that the agency begin
identifying the Space Shuttle program's future workforce needs based
upon various future scenarios the program could face. The program can
use the information provided by scenario planning to develop strategies
for meeting the needs of its potential future scenarios. NASA concurred
with our recommendation, and NASA's Assistant Associate Administrator
for the Space Shuttle program is leading an effort to address the
recommendation. Since we issued our report and made our recommendation,
NASA has taken action and publicly recognized, through its Integrated
Space Operations Summit, that human capital management and critical
skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as it
progresses toward retirement of the Space Shuttle.
Background
On January 14, 2004, the President articulated a new vision for
space exploration for NASA. Part of the Vision includes the goal of
retiring the Space Shuttle following completion of the International
Space Station (ISS), planned for the end of the decade. In addition,
NASA plans to begin developing a new manned exploration vehicle, or
CEV, to replace the Space Shuttle and return humans to the moon as
early as 2015, but no later than 2020, in preparation for more
ambitious future missions. As this Subcommittee is aware, NASA's
Administrator has recently expressed his desire to accelerate the CEV
development to eliminate the gap between the end of the Space Shuttle
program, currently scheduled for 2010, and the first manned operational
flight of the CEV, currently scheduled for 2014. If the CEV development
cannot be accelerated, NASA will not be able to launch astronauts into
space for several years and will likely have to rely on Russia for
transportation to and from the ISS. A 1996 ``Balance Agreement''
between NASA and the Russian space agency, obligated Russia to provide
11 Soyuz spacecraft for crew rotation of U.S. and Russia crews. After
April 2006, this agreement will be fulfilled and Russia no longer must
allocate any of the seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. Russian
officials have indicated that they will no longer provide crew return
services to NASA at no cost at that time. However, NASA may face
challenges to compensating Russia for seats on its Soyuzes after the
agreement is fulfilled due to restrictions in the Iran Nonproliferation
Act. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Iran Nonproliferation Act (Pub. L. 106-178). The Iran
Nonproliferation Act bans the United States from making extraordinary
payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station,
unless the President determines, among other things, that Russia
demonstrated a commitment to prevent the transfer to Iran of goods,
services, and technology that could materially contribute to developing
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or of ballistic or cruise
missile systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Space Shuttle, NASA's largest individual program, \3\ is an
essential element of NASA's ability to implement the Vision because it
is the only launch system presently capable of transporting the
remaining components necessary to complete assembly of the ISS. NASA
projects that it will need to conduct an estimated 28 flights over the
next 5 to 6 years to complete assembly of and provide logistical
support to the ISS. However, NASA is currently examining alternative
ISS configurations to meet the goals of the Vision and satisfy NASA's
international partners, while requiring as few Space Shuttle flights as
possible to complete assembly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Space Shuttle program accounted for 27 percent of NASA's
Fiscal Year 2005 budget request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to retiring the Space Shuttle, NASA will need to first return
the Space Shuttle safely to flight \4\ and execute whatever number of
remaining missions are needed to complete assembly of and provide
support for the ISS. At the same time, NASA will begin the process of
closing out or transitioning its Space Shuttle assets that are no
longer needed to support the program--such as its workforce, hardware,
and facilities--to other NASA programs. The process of closing out or
transitioning the program's assets will extend well beyond the Space
Shuttle's final flight (see fig. 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ To return the Space Shuttle to flight, NASA will conduct two
flights, which are intended to test and evaluate new procedures for
flight safety implemented as a result of the Space Shuttle Columbia
accident. The planning window for the first flight is July 13 through
July 31, 2005.
Retiring the Space Shuttle and, in the larger context, implementing
the Vision, will require that the Space Shuttle program rely on its
most important asset--its workforce. The Space Shuttle workforce
consists of about 2,000 civil service \5\ and 15,600 contractor \6\
personnel, including a large number of engineers and scientists. While
each of the NASA centers support the Space Shuttle program to some
degree, the vast majority of this workforce is located at three of
NASA's Space Operations Centers: Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space
Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center. Data provided by NASA shows
that approximately one quarter of the workforce at its Space Operations
centers is 51 years or older and about 33 percent will be eligible for
retirement by Fiscal Year 2012. \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Number is based on a full-time equivalent calculation. Full-
time equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those of an
employee who works 40 hours per week in 1 year; therefore, the actual
number of employees who work part-time or full-time on the Shuttle
Program is greater than 2,000. The number was calculated by averaging
the number of civil service employees over Fiscal Year 2004.
\6\ The number was calculated by averaging the number of contractor
employees over Fiscal Year 2004. This number includes data from NASA's
prime contractor for Space Shuttle operations, United Space Alliance,
and other NASA contractors. United Space Alliance, established in 1996
as a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Boeing to consolidate
NASA's various Space Shuttle program contracts under a single entity,
and its approximately 10,400 employees are responsible for conducting
the Space Shuttle's ground and flight operations under the Space Flight
Operations Contract. The remaining contractor personnel are associated
with other Space Shuttle components, such as its propulsion systems.
\7\ Data provided by NASA is as of September 30, 2004. GAO did not
perform a reliability assessment of the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Space Shuttle workforce and NASA's human capital management
have been the subject of many GAO \8\ and other reviews \9\ in the past
that have highlighted various challenges to maintaining NASA's science
and engineering workforce. In addition, over the past few years, GAO
and others in the Federal Government have underscored the importance of
human capital management and strategic workforce planning. \10\ In
response to an increased governmentwide focus on strategic human
capital management, NASA has taken several steps to improve its human
capital management. These include steps such as devising an agencywide
strategic human capital plan, developing workforce analysis tools to
assist in identifying critical skills needs, and requesting and
receiving additional human capital flexibilities. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management
Attention, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-133 (Washington, DC: Mar. 22, 2000) and GAO,
Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention, GAO/NSIAD/GGD-00-186 (Washington, DC: August 15,
2000).
\9\ Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume I
(Washington, DC: August 2003); Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual
Report for 2001 (Washington, DC: March 2002); Behavioral Sciences
Technology, Inc., Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change
at NASA (Ojai, California: March 15, 2004).
\10\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-01-263 (Washington, DC:
January 2001); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119
(Washington, DC: January 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
05-207 (Washington, DC: January 2005); GAO, Performance Accountability
Series--Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective, GAO-01-241 (Washington, DC: January 2001); GAO, Major
Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective,
GAO-03-95 (Washington, DC: January 2003); GAO, Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, GAO-01-258 (Washington, DC: January 2001); and GAO,
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, GAO-03-114 (Washington, DC: January 2003); GAO,
Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, DC: December 11, 2003); GAO, A Model
of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, DC:
March 15, 2002); and GAO, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist
for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, DC: September 1, 2000).
See also www.gao.gov/pas/2005.
\11\ Enacted in February 2004, the NASA Flexibility Act of 2004
(Pub. L. 108-201) amends title 5, United States Code, by inserting a
new chapter 98 in that title, which provides new authorities to NASA.
On March 26, 2004, NASA submitted a written workforce plan for using
its new authorities to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Progress Toward Developing a Strategy To Sustain the Space Shuttle
Workforce is Limited
NASA has made only limited progress toward developing a detailed
longterm strategy for sustaining its workforce through the Space
Shuttle's retirement. While NASA recognizes the importance of having in
place a strategy for sustaining a critically skilled workforce to
support Space Shuttle operations, it has only taken preliminary steps
to do so. For example, the program identified lessons-learned from the
retirement of programs comparable to the Space Shuttle, such as the Air
Force Titan IV Rocket Program. Among other things, the lessons learned
reports highlight the practices used by other programs when making
personnel decisions, such as the importance of developing transition
strategies and early retention planning.
Other efforts have been initiated or are planned; examples include
the following:
contracted with the National Academy of Public
Administration to assist it in planning for the Space Shuttle's
retirement and transitioning to future programs; and
began devising an acquisition strategy for updating
propulsion system prime contracts at MSFC to take into account
the Vision's goal of retiring the Space Shuttle following
completion of the ISS.
NASA's prime contractor for Space Shuttle operations, USA, has also
taken some preliminary steps, but its progress with these efforts
depends on NASA making decisions that impact contractor requirements
through the remainder of the program. For example, USA has begun to
define its critical skills needs to continue supporting the Space
Shuttle program, devised a communication plan, contracted with a human
capital consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive study of its
workforce; and continued to monitor indicators of employee morale and
workforce stability. Contractor officials said that further efforts to
prepare for the Space Shuttle's retirement and its impact on their
workforce are on hold until NASA first makes decisions that impact the
Space Shuttle's remaining number of flights and thus the time frames
for retiring the program and transitioning its assets.
The Potential Impact of Workforce Problems and Other Challenges the
Space Shuttle Program Faces Highlight the Need for Workforce
Planning
Making progress toward developing a detailed strategy for
sustaining a critically skilled Space Shuttle workforce through the
program's retirement is important given the impact that workforce
problems could have on NASA-wide goals. According to NASA officials, if
the Space Shuttle program faces difficulties in sustaining the
necessary workforce, NASA-wide goals, such as implementing the Vision
and proceeding with space exploration activities, could be impacted.
For example, workforce problems could lead to a delay in flight
certification for the Space Shuttle, which could result in a delay to
the program's overall flight schedule, thus compromising the goal of
completing assembly of the ISS by 2010. In addition, officials said
that space exploration activities could slip as much as 1 year for each
year that the Space Shuttle's operations are extended because NASA's
progress with these activities relies on funding and assets that are
expected to be transferred from the Space Shuttle program to other NASA
programs.
NASA officials told us they expect to face various challenges in
sustaining the critically skilled Space Shuttle workforce. These
challenges include the following:
Retaining the current workforce. Because many in the current
workforce will want to participate in or will be needed to
support future phases of implementing the Vision, it may be
difficult to retain them in the Space Shuttle program. In
addition, it may be difficult to provide certain employees with
a transition path from the Space Shuttle program to future
programs following retirement.
Impact on the prime contractor for Space Shuttle operations.
Because USA was established specifically to perform ground and
flight operations for the Space Shuttle program, its future
following the Space Shuttle's retirement is uncertain.
Contractor officials stated that a lack of long-term job
security would cause difficulties in recruiting and retaining
employees to continue supporting the Space Shuttle as it nears
retirement. In addition, steps that the contractor may have to
take to retain its workforce, such as paying retention bonuses,
are likely to require funding above normal levels.
Governmentwide budgetary constraints. Throughout the process
of retiring the Space Shuttle, NASA, like other federal
agencies, will have to contend with urgent challenges facing
the federal budget that will put pressure on discretionary
spending--such as investments in space programs--and require
NASA to do more with fewer resources.
Several Factors Have Impeded Workforce Planning Efforts
While the Space Shuttle program is still in the early stages of
planning for the program's retirement, its development of a detailed
long-term strategy to sustain its future workforce is being hampered by
several factors:
Near-term focus on returning the Space Shuttle to flight.
Since the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the program has been
focused on its near-term goal of returning the Space Shuttle
safely to flight. While this focus is understandable given the
importance of the Space Shuttle's role in completing assembly
of the ISS, it has led to the delay of efforts to determine
future workforce needs.
Uncertainties with respect to implementing the Vision. While
the Vision has provided the Space Shuttle program with the goal
of retiring the program by 2010 upon completion of the ISS, the
program lacks well-defined objectives or goals on which to base
its workforce planning efforts. For example, NASA has not yet
determined the final configuration of the ISS, the final number
of flights for the Space Shuttle, how ISS operations will be
supported after the Space Shuttle is retired, or the type of
vehicle that will be used for space exploration. These
determinations are important because they impact decisions
about the transition of Space Shuttle assets. Lacking this
information, NASA officials have said that their ability to
progress with detailed long-term workforce planning is limited.
Despite Uncertainties, NASA Could Follow a Strategic Human Capital
Management Approach
Despite these uncertainties, the Space Shuttle program could follow
a strategic human capital management approach to plan for sustaining
its critically skilled workforce. Studies by several organizations,
including GAO, have shown that successful organizations in both the
public and private sectors follow a strategic human capital management
approach, even when faced with an uncertain future environment.
In our March 2005 report, we made recommendations aimed at better
positioning NASA to sustain a critically skilled Space Shuttle
workforce through retirement. In particular, we recommended that the
agency begin identifying the Space Shuttle program's future workforce
needs based upon various future scenarios the program could face.
Scenario planning can allow the agency to progress with workforce
planning, even when faced with uncertainties such as those surrounding
the final number of Space Shuttle flights, the final configuration of
the ISS and the vehicle that will be developed for exploration. The
program can use the information provided by scenario planning to
develop strategies for meeting the needs of its potential future
scenarios. NASA concurred with our recommendation, and NASA's Assistant
Associate Administrator for the Space Shuttle program is leading an
effort to address the recommendation.
Since we issued our report and made our recommendation, NASA has
taken action and publicly recognized that human capital management and
critical skills retention will be a major challenge for the agency as
it moves toward retiring the Space Shuttle. This recognition was most
apparent at NASA's Integrated Space Operations Summit held in March
2005. As part of the Summit process, NASA instituted panel teams to
examine the Space Shuttle program's mission execution and transition
needs from various perspectives and make recommendations aimed at
ensuring that the program will execute its remaining missions safely as
it transitions to supporting emerging exploration mission needs. The
reports that resulted from these examinations are closely linked by a
common theme--the importance of human capital management and critical
skills retention to ensure success. In their reports, the panel teams
highlighted similar challenges to those that we highlighted in our
report. The panels made various recommendations to the Space Flight
Leadership Council on steps that the program should take now to address
human capital concerns. These recommendations included developing and
implementing a critical skills retention plan, developing a
communication plan to ensure the workforce is informed, and developing
a detailed budget that includes funding for human capital retention and
reductions, as well as establishing an agencywide team to integrate
human capital planning efforts.
Conclusions
There is no question that NASA faces a challenging time ahead. Key
decisions have to be made regarding final configuration and support of
the ISS, the number of shuttle flights needed for those tasks, and the
timing for development of future programs, such as the CEV--all in a
constrained funding environment. In addition, any schedule slip in the
completion of the construction of the ISS or in the CEV falling short
of its accelerated initial availability (as soon as possible after
Space Shuttle retirement) may extend the time the Space Shuttle is
needed. But whatever decisions are made and courses of action taken,
the need for sustaining a critically skilled workforce is paramount to
the success of these programs. Despite a limited focus on human capital
management in the past, NASA now acknowledges that it faces significant
challenges in sustaining a critically skilled workforce and has taken
steps to address these issues. We are encouraged by these actions and
the fact that human capital management and critical skills retention
was given such prominent attention throughout the recent Integrated
Space Operations Summit process. The fact that our findings and
conclusions were echoed by the panel teams established to support the
Integrated Space Operations Summit is a persuasive reason for NASA
leadership to begin addressing these human capital issues early and
aggressively.
Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Senator Hutchison. Dr. Freese, I would like for you to go
back and expand a little bit on the concerns that you have from
a national security standpoint about the United States having
the independent ability to launch and support humans in space.
Dr. Johnson-Freese. Space has always had a very strong
symbolic value. Today we term that techno-nationalism. That
is--science and technology is an indicator of national power.
And with space representing the future, any slippage in U.S.
leadership in human spaceflight capability translates into a
negative indicator of national power.
Countries are acutely aware of that. And specifically,
China is reaping great rewards in techno-nationalism right now
from its very incremental and very spartan, but very ambitious,
human spaceflight program. That creates a perception of
competition, where the Chinese only have to be consistent and
we have to--we are put in a position where we are racing
against ourselves to out-do our past, our glorious space past.
And I think this puts us in a very precarious position.
Senator Hutchison. Is there anything quantifiable about
what we would lose if we could not put humans into space within
a 5-year period, other than perception of power loss?
Dr. Johnson-Freese. Well, again, perception is soft power.
And while that is very hard to quantify, it is very real. There
are some fields, certainly there is medical research and there
are certain fields, life support research, that have to do with
human space flight which has technology benefits that we would
lose in. But my work primarily focuses on the soft power
issues, which I think are considerable.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Li, let me just ask you: What do you
think are the highest risk workforce retention issues that you
see as we get toward 2010, while also trying to get the Crew
Return Vehicle online?
Mr. Li. Thank you for that question. I think at issue here
is if we do not have a plan that is fully understood by the
workforce, they will migrate toward what is best for them. And
that unknown may be not knowing what the program, future
program, will be. And they might in essence leave the Shuttle
workforce, which would be very bad, obviously in terms of
safety.
Senator Hutchison. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. McCulley, you are experiencing that
right now, are you not, with some of your young engineers?
Mr. McCulley. Yes, sir, I am. And one quick anecdotal
story. I have a young man from Pennsylvania who came out of
college and moved to Florida specifically to work on our
nations space programs and in particular, human spaceflight
programs. Last week in the cafeteria at the Kennedy Space
Center he said, ``Mike, what about my future? I've got two
children now and a wife. And there's jobs in Pennsylvania that
I'm aware of. And I'm debating whether or not I should take
it.'' And he is in a very serious internal debate with his
family.
Now I will tell you that at this point we have no problem
at all in recruiting, which has been very, very pleasing, given
the accident. We are having no problems at all getting good
people. I do not think we will have any problem for the next
year or two. But my folks are starting to think about, what do
I do post-Shuttle until we get a more definition? And I applaud
Dr. Griffin's efforts to get that definition sooner rather than
later.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Freese, in our world of politics
perception is not only soft power, it is hard power. But thank
you for telling us about what perception means to the world
with regard to the United States space program. Taking that a
step further, what happens to our perception if our partners,
our international partners up there on the Space Station either
are there because it has been completed or not there because it
has not been completed, and it comes 2010 and there is no Space
Shuttle to service and build the Space Station?
Dr. Johnson-Freese. That is a scenario that I do not think
would be in our best interest. I strongly believe we need to be
co-opting others to work with us inclusively so that we can
avoid a situation where the United States is the odd man out
potentially on the Space Station. And that could occur.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Horowitz, what are the advantages to
using Space Shuttle-derived systems for helping implement this
CEV?
Dr. Horowitz. Thank you, Senator. Well, as everyone else,
we are very concerned about the gap. And the best way to avoid
the gap is to take the equipment that we already have at our
disposal--I mean, we already have the solid rocket booster
first stage of the vehicle that I described. It is already
built and flying today. So we can minimize the amount of
development time, and the cost. And then we can meet the
ambitious schedule of having a Crew Exploration Vehicle ready
to fly in 2010, because we have most of the propulsion
components already. They are already human-rated. And it will
be safer and more effective than anything else we could do.
Senator Nelson. And of course, that will be something that
NASA will be looking at----
Dr. Horowitz. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson.--trying to make that decision, what is best
safety-wise, as well as from a cost and timing schedule.
Thank you, Madame Chairman. This has been an excellent,
excellent hearing. And you have compressed it into 35 minutes.
It is a record, Madame Chairman.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you. It took the cooperation
of everyone involved. And let me just make one last quick
statement. And that is that I do believe that NASA is looking
at and will be working with you, Mr. McCulley, to use many of
the people who are also doing the Space Shuttle for the Crew
Return Vehicle evolution. So I do not think the picture is
totally bleak here. I think there will be a lot of overlap that
will help to keep our best people. And I know that between you
and Dr. Griffin and all of the people in your two organizations
that you will work hard to coordinate that.
I want to remind everyone that all the statements and
additional materials from the witnesses will be made a part of
the hearing record, and also any answers that you might have to
questions that might not have been asked but will be submitted
to you in writing by members will also be made a part of the
record.
Thank you for the cooperation on this very short time
frame. We appreciate it. We have learned a lot in a short time,
and we appreciate your cooperation.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
First, I would like to welcome Administrator Griffin back
to the Commerce Committee. Last month, you came before us as
the nominee to head NASA, and now you are back to have a
discussion on one of your most difficult challenges, moving
human spaceflight out of the Shuttle era.
Of course before we do that, NASA needs to return the
Shuttle safely to flight. You've done a lot of work since
February 2003, and we will all be rooting for you in July. It
is my hope that you've really started to fix what the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board called the ``cultural problems.''
Administrator Griffin, I commend you on delaying the next
flight from May until July so that you could satisfy yourself
of its safety.
The Committee will also be watching closely as you continue
to refine the plans for our next generation space
transportation system. We all agree. A 4-year or longer gap in
the United States' ability to fly humans into space is
unacceptable. We need a safe, robust, capable crew exploration
vehicle and the cargo and lift systems to support it. I hope
that you will help us understand the tradeoffs that will need
to be made to get that system sooner rather than later.
Of course, as we look to the future, we cannot abandon the
past. The Space Shuttle will need to meet an aggressive
schedule over the next 5 years. We need to complete the Space
Station and to use the lab we have built. We should not abandon
the important science NASA does, whether it is the Hubble Space
telescope, Earth science, or aeronautics. I look forward to
working with you and the Members of the Committee to ensure
NASA can keep reaching for the stars.