[Senate Hearing 109-211]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-211
IRAN: WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 19, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 57
Prepared opening statement................................... 57
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota.................. 20
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut......... 15
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin........... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska.................... 16
Kemp, Dr. Geoffrey, director of Regional Strategic Programs, the
Nixon Center, Washington, DC................................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Milhollin, Dr. Gary, professor emeritus, University of Wisconsin
Law School and director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control, Washington, DC........................................ 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida..................... 15
Perkovich, Dr. George, Ph.D., vice president for studies,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC..... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Samii, Dr. Abbas William, Ph.D., regional analysis coordinator
for Southwest Asia and the Middle East, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Washington, DC........................................ 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio................ 25
(iii)
IRAN: WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY
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THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Voinovich, Biden,
Dodd, Feingold, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Before I begin, let me just indicate for the benefit of all
Senators watching our hearing that unfortunately, an objection
has been filed about this committee meeting more than 2 hours
after the Senate comes in. The Senate came in at 9:30, which
means we will be concluding by 11:30. I am sad to mention that,
but nevertheless, that goes with the circumstances.
So we will proceed with Ambassador Burns' testimony and
questioning of him. We will need to restrict our questions so
that we have ample time for our distinguished second panel of
witnesses to be heard. And then we will proceed as long as we
can at that point.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee meets today to
examine issues related to Iran, particularly that country's
pursuit of nuclear weapons. For more than 18 years, Iran hid
its nuclear activities from the world despite being a state
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
To avoid punitive measures after the direction of its
nuclear program was exposed, Iran reached agreement with the
United Kingdom, Germany, and France, the EU-3, to suspend its
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. It also signed the Additional
Protocol, which provided for enhanced U.N. inspections of its
nuclear facilities.
Unfortunately, Iran has failed to ratify the Additional
Protocol. It has refused to give the IAEA complete access to
verify that no weapons activities are occurring, and last week
it threatened to restart its uranium conversion program.
European officials responded by warning Tehran that they
would leave the 2-year-long negotiations should any effort be
made to resume uranium conversion. Since then, Iran has agreed
to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the EU-3 next week in
Europe. The United States has endorsed these negotiations and
has supported the European offer that Iran be allowed to join
the World Trade Organization as an added incentive for full
cooperation on the nuclear issue.
If these talks do not succeed, the next step may be
referral of the problem to the U.N. Security Council. Time is
running out not just for preventing Iranian acquisition of
nuclear materials, but also for the viability of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
We must recognize that Iran is at a stage in its nuclear
development where it can move rapidly toward production of
nuclear weapons if it ceases to be hindered by any constraints.
Enforcing the NPT has always been complicated by the relatively
short time period required to move from legitimate civilian
nuclear power activities permitted under the treaty, to
building nuclear weapons.
The success of the NPT depends on the international
community taking decisive action when evidence emerges that a
nonnuclear weapons state is illegally pursuing nuclear weapons.
As in the Iranian case, warning signs that a country is
cheating may come only a year or less before it is capable of
building nuclear weapons absent any constraints.
The efforts of the EU-3 have slowed Iran's progress, but
the international community still has not coalesced behind a
clear course of action with the potential to stop the Iranian
nuclear program.
The United States already has sanctions in place on Iran
for its decades-long sponsorship of terror. The international
community must be willing to join the United States in imposing
potent economic sanctions if Iran does not comply with its
obligations. Economic benefits could also be offered to reward
Iran for good behavior. Essentially, the United States and its
allies must present the Iranian Government with an unambiguous
choice between economic self interest and pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
Even if the EU-3 succeeds in the short run, we will need to
apply almost constant diplomatic and economic pressure to
ensure that Iran does not continue its nuclear program. Iran
will be an enormous challenge for the United States foreign
policy, which can only be met through the sustained focus and
attention of our highest officials. This diplomatic heavy
lifting includes convincing European nations, and even Russia
and China, that their interests in Iranian trade and energy
supplies are secondary to the extreme risks associated with a
nuclear-armed Iran.
The possibility of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran is
particularly grave because of the Iranian regime's connections
to terrorists. I recently surveyed 85 top international experts
in the field of nonproliferation for a forthcoming report, and
one of the questions that I asked the survey group was whether
a nuclear attack during the next 10 years was more likely to be
carried out by a terrorist group or by a government. Seventy-
nine percent of the experts surveyed believed a nuclear attack
by terrorists was more likely. Consequently, as we look at
nations that are seeking nuclear weapons, their connections to
terrorists become an extremely important factor in determining
our course.
For the ninth year in a row, the State Department's country
reports on terrorism has described Iran as the ``most active
state sponsor of terrorism'' in the world. Iran's continued
arming of Hizbollah is in defiance of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1559, which calls for the withdrawal of foreign
forces and disarmament of militias in Lebanon. Iran's support
for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, also on the United
States list of terrorist organizations, is complicating the
fragile advances toward peace by the Israelis and Palestinians.
For the past decade, United States policy has attempted to
balance between containment of Iranian threats and selective
engagement to take advantage of opportunities created by
reformist elements. We must be decisive in isolating and
pressuring Iran to stop its pursuit of nuclear weapons, but we
should also reach out to the Iranian people with hope that more
pragmatic, rational voices in Iran will prevail.
Iran is holding Presidential elections in June of this
year. If manipulated by the Mullahs as in the past, they are
unlikely to result in a representative government. But Iranian
citizens, just like the Lebanese, Palestinians, Iraqis,
Afghanis, and others, have a strong desire to choose their own
government. The United States supports the Iranian citizens who
are desperate for their voices to be heard, yet fearful of the
Iranian regime's use of oppressive means to prevent dissent.
The United States needs to take care when promoting
democracy and human rights in Iran, given the regime's ability
to taint any individual or group that appears connected to
America. But we need to continue to emphasize that freedom and
human rights, including the right to have a representative
government, are universal values that apply to Iran.
Momentum for change is building in the Middle East.
Elections in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority elections of
President Abbas, and upcoming elections in Lebanon and Egypt
present new opportunities. These movements toward reform and
democracy can bring even greater pressure on countries like
Iran to be more responsive to their people. Our work in Iraq
and our efforts to support Israeli disengagement from Gaza and
the West Bank, while moving forward on the Road Map, may be the
most important contributions we can make to democracy in Iran
and in the region.
Today, we have two outstanding panels that will provide
their perspectives on Iran. First, we will hear from Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns.
Secretary Burns is a good friend of this committee, and we
always look forward to our discussions with him. We also
welcome a second panel of distinguished experts. Dr. Geoffrey
Kemp is director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon
Center. Dr. Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project
on Nuclear Arms Control. Dr. George Perkovich is vice president
for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
And Dr. William Samii is the Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty Regional Analysis Coordinator for Southwest Asia and
the Middle East.
We thank all of our witnesses and look forward to their
insights.
We will be joined shortly by the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Biden, but for the moment we call upon you,
Secretary Burns. We appreciate your coming and we look forward
to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
your welcome here. It is a great pleasure to be with you and
all the distinguished members of this committee. I have
submitted a statement for the record. I will not read that to
you.
The Chairman. It will be published in full.
Ambassador Burns. Exactly. But I would like to make an
abbreviated statement, if that is agreeable to the members.
The Chairman. Excellent.
Ambassador Burns. I will try not to test your patience in
doing so.
Mr. Chairman, Iran remains a very serious foreign policy
challenge for our country and for the democratic world at
large. For nearly a quarter of a century, the United States and
Iran have been without diplomatic relations. We remember the
images of our Embassy hostages. That is seared into the
consciousness of every American. But it is also easy to forget
when you juxtapose that image against another image, that there
were Iranians studying in the United States before that tragic
episode in 1979.
Our argument is not with the Iranian people. It is with the
Iranian Government. It is with that government's threatening
and often very irresponsible behavior. And we have made clear
repeatedly our concerns regarding the Iranian Government's
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery
systems.
We have made clear our concern about Iran's sponsorship of
terrorism, including its direct support of Hizbollah and other
Palestinian terrorist organizations, and its direct opposition
to the existence of the State of Israel. And we have made clear
our concern about Iran's appalling human rights and democracy
record.
Each of these issues is of vital concern to the United
States. In each and every case Iran has the position that has
been inimical to the position of the United States and of the
international community. And at a time when countries across
the region are moving toward greater openness--and we have just
seen Kuwait enfranchise women in the last few days, we have
seen a greater spirit of democracy in the Middle East,
willingness to inculcate the principals of freedom and
openness--Iran is moving in the opposite direction to nearly
all of its neighbors.
Our concerns with Iran are not merely historical. It is the
policies and actions of the Iranian Government that could drive
our own policy. And I would just like to comment, Mr. Chairman,
on three aspects of those policies on human rights, on Iran's
nuclear ambitions, and on Iran's support for terrorism.
Let me start with Iran's freedom deficit, which is
appropriate, given the fact that there have been democratic
elections in Iraq and democratic elections in many other parts
of the world that have been very encouraging in recent months.
The United States believes that the future of Iran should
be democratic and it should be pluralistic. And we support
those who wish to see a transformed Iran from a rigid
theocratic state into a modern country. A peaceful and
democratic Iran, of course, would be a key feature in a
reformed more democratic Middle East. And we believe Iran is a
country in the process of change.
Two-thirds of its people are below the age of 35. Many
young Iranians support the need for a more positive
relationship with the United States. Ironically, the public
image of the United States might be more positive in Iran than
in many other countries in the Middle Eastern region. And so we
sense that there is sentiment among ordinary Iranians for
change, for reform, and democracy, and that sentiment should no
longer be ignored by the ruling elite of the country.
The regime's human rights record has been abysmal. The
government continues to commit numerous serious abuses,
including summary executions, disappearances, torture, and
other inhumane treatment. In the late 1990s, elements of Iran's
Secret Services murdered a number of intellectuals and
journalists and oppositionists.
In 2000, a courageous journalist, Akbar Ganji, was
imprisoned for uncovering what he felt was the truth and
reporting it in his newspaper. Since his imprisonment, many
journalists and even Web bloggers have been taken into prison
where they have been abused and threatened. The Iranian
Government's actions have essentially eliminated the free press
in Iran.
In 2003, an Iranian-Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi,
was beaten to death in detention. The investigation and trial
have been a farce, and the Canadian Government has taken steps
to scale back its own relations with Iran.
During student protests in 2003, 4,000 demonstrators were
arrested, and some of them are still held in Iranian prisons.
There are many examples, Mr. Chairman, of Iranian actions
against journalists, against young people, against students,
who are in prison, beaten, tortured, simply because they are
expressing views that we in our country and in most of the
world would find to be our God-given rights.
On the surface, and if you talk to Iranians, Iranian
Government officials, they will say that they have an active
democracy, in which Iranians participate regularly in national
and local elections. But this is a veneer behind which lies a
perverted process whose integrity is severely compromised by
the oppressive oversight exercised by the hardline theocratic
leadership.
The most egregious example of this extraordinary political
system occurred in the rigging of the February 2004 Majles
elections, in which the guardian counsel disqualified thousands
of reformist political candidates, including more than 85
sitting members of the Majles itself. We have obvious concerns,
given this track record, about the upcoming June 17
Presidential elections, which we fear will be another setback
for the democratic hopes of the Iranian people.
There is every indication that the June elections will not
result in a meaningful expression of the popular will, because
the political process is controlled by an unelected few, and
these unelected leaders dominate Iran's political system. They
have the power to intimidate and then to disqualify political
candidates, and through the exercise of that power they have
stymied a popular demand for freedom.
A thousand Iranians have registered to run in the upcoming
elections, but we believe the Guardian Council may only approve
a dozen or so candidates.
Our administration is deeply appreciative of the support of
the Congress and of this committee's support for the resources
that enabled us to implement the President's freedom agenda. We
have funded a Persian language Web site that essentially serves
as our virtual Embassy in Iran. We post information there about
U.S. Government policy. We post information that might be
helpful to those who support reform in Iran itself.
As you know, we also fund Persian language broadcasts on
Voice of America and Radio Farda. We very much support, we do
not fund, but we very much support, of course, all the private
American radio and TV outlets that have done such a good job of
bringing freedom of expression into Iran itself. And we are
grateful for funds from the Congress that have allowed us to
support the advancement of human rights and democracy in Iran
itself.
These initiatives and programs do require resources, and
the administration will be approaching the Congress for further
resources, so that in working with the nongovernmental
community and the private sector we can make sure that free
ideas are entering Iran itself.
That is the first concern, Mr. Chairman, of our Government.
The second concern is the one that you spent the bulk of your
statement talking about. And by the way, I think we agree with
everything that you said and the way you said it in your
opening statement. But our critical United States concern is
our strong and resolute opposition to Iran acquiring a nuclear
weapons capability.
Iran desires to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that
threatens the peace and security of all of its neighbors and of
the United States. It has demonstrated a track record of
nuclear deception and denial, including an 18-year history of
trying to hide from the world a clandestine enrichment program,
undeclared plutonium separation experiments, and other
suspicious activities. And these have been documented, not by
the United States, but by the IAEA and its Director General,
Mr. ElBaradei.
Iran failed to report the irradiation of uranium targets
and subsequent processing of those targets to separate
plutonium. Iran failed to report the use of imported natural
UF6 for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric
Company.
Iran failed to declare the pilot enrichment facility at
Kalaye Electric, the laser enrichment plant at the Tehran
Nuclear Research Center, and the pilot uranium laser enrichment
plant at Lashkar Ab'ad.
The list of Iran's failures is endless, and it represents,
in our view, the foundation pillars of a clandestine nuclear
weapons development program. We see no sign that Iran has made
the necessary strategic decision to abandon its nuclear
ambitions. Its repeated brinkmanship and its current
negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom is
part of its continuing efforts to divide the international
community on this very important issue.
But we would like to say today that there should be no
misunderstanding in Tehran about the position of our
Government. The international community is united on this
issue. Iran must not be permitted to develop the capacity to
build or deliver a nuclear weapon.
Many in the United States were skeptical of the chances of
success of the EU-3 negotiating effort, but President Bush went
to Europe in February, he talked to President Chirac and
Chancellor Schroeder. He talked to President Putin. He talked
to other officials, and he heard a clear commitment from our
friends and allies that they share our goal of denying Iran a
nuclear weapon, and they recognize that there must be
consequences should Tehran fail to adhere to its declared
international commitments.
Our European partners made clear that Iran must provide
objective guarantees to demonstrate that it is not pursuing a
clandestine weapons program under the cover of a civilian
nuclear energy program. On this point, the bar for Iran must be
set very high, because of its history of deception, which has
undermined the trust of the international community. And in
that sense, to paraphrase a great American President, if we do
not trust, then we really must verify.
During his visit to Europe in February, President Bush
heard from our friends the importance of the United States
supporting the European diplomatic effort, and so we decided,
the President and Secretary Rice decided, that we ought to get
behind the European effort.
On March 11, Secretary Rice announced that we are prepared
to take tangible, practical steps in support of the EU-3
effort. We would no longer block Iran's application to join the
World Trade Organization. And we would consider licensing the
export of spare parts for civilian passenger aircraft to Iran.
And since that time, we have maintained a near constant
dialog with the EU-3 countries. Just the other night, the U.K.
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, spent a large part of the dinner
conversation with Secretary Rice, updating her on the EU-3's
current negotiating round with the Iranian Government.
I speak on a daily basis with my British, French, and
German counterparts, and have since I took this job 2 months
ago, to make sure that they are aware of the positions of the
United States as we support this negotiation.
Mr. Chairman, we believe that the EU-3 deserve our support,
that they deserve our appreciation for their efforts to resolve
this problem peacefully and diplomatically. Iran appears to
have maintained its suspension pledge since November 22, 2004,
but Iran has asserted, and you have seen the statements from
Tehran, from various Iranian officials, including some of the
Presidential candidates, including Mr. Rafsanjani, Iran has
asserted several times in recent weeks that it intends to
resume Iranian conversion activities at Esfahan, which are
covered by its November 2004 agreement with the EU-3.
This would require the breaking of IAEA's seals in place to
monitor that suspension. The European governments have made
clear their deep concern with this possibility, and they have
reaffirmed that these activities would constitute an Iranian
breach of the agreement, ending the negotiating process, and
requiring further action by the international community.
We support the European governments in that conviction. We
have communicated that, in fact, as of this morning, to the EU-
3 governments, and we will continue to do so. We believe that
if that occurred, if the seals were broken, if uranium
conversion took place, then obviously the international
community, lead by the EU-3, would then have to support a
resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors for referral to the
U.N. Security Council.
President Bush, when he has spoken about this issue, as
well as Secretary Rice, have made very clear we support a
peaceful negotiated settlement of this Iranian nuclear problem.
And that is why we support the EU-3 process.
Our message to Tehran today is, adhere to the Paris
agreement. Maintain suspension of all nuclear-related
activities, and negotiate in good faith the eventual cessation
and dismantling of all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
In this sense, the spotlight of the Congress and of our
Government and the international community has to rest squarely
on the Iranian Government.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, and I will abbreviate this section,
our third concern with the Iranian Government has been its
constant and persistent support of terrorist groups in the
Middle East region. And you are exactly right that our State
Department terrorism report has said that Iran is the most
active supporter, state supporter of terrorism in the world
today. We all know that Iran has directed the operations,
funded and supported the operations of Hamas, of Hizbollah, and
of Palestinian rejectionist groups.
We know that Hizbollah is responsible for the deaths of
hundreds of Americans. No terrorist group has killed more
Americans, with the exception of al-Qaida, than Hizbollah. We
remembered what happened in 1983, with the bombing of our
Embassy, with the bombing of the Marine barracks. We remember
the imprisonment and torture of Colonel Higgins, who was
executed by Hizbollah.
We remember all the attacks on America and its allies, and
Iran has supported for more than 20 years the operations and
the intent of these terrorist groups. Iran continues to hold
senior al-Qaida leaders who are wanted for murdering Americans
and others in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings. We have
sanctioned Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. We have
repeatedly called on their regime to cease and desist, and it
has not done so.
In November 2004, at the Sharm El Sheikh Conference, Iran
made commitments to the international community, which it has
not honored. And beyond terrorism and its own treatment of the
incipient Iraqi Government that has emerged in Baghdad, its own
support for warlords in Afghanistan, lead us to believe that
Iran is also playing a negative role in relations with those
two important countries.
So, Mr. Chairman, that is the indictment of the American
Government concerning Iran. We remain separated from them
because of these fundamental convictions that they are going in
the opposite direction from the United States and all of our
allies on these very important issues. And we will remain
resolved, and I think five Presidents have been resolved since
1979, to focus the international spotlight on these actions of
the Iranian Government, and to ensure that we have the ability
with the international community to oppose them, as we must,
and to expect that Iran at some point in the future should
return to the civilized community of nations. Thank you very
much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
INTRODUCTION
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Biden, and distinguished
members of the committee, for the opportunity to discuss with you today
United States policy toward Iran.
Iran remains a serious foreign policy challenge for our country and
the democratic world at large. For nearly a quarter century the United
States and Iran have been without diplomatic relations. With the images
of our Embassy hostages seared so deeply into our collective
consciousness, it is easy to forget that our countries once enjoyed
excellent relations and, only a generation ago, 200,000 Iranians were
studying in the United States. The United States is proud to be home to
a large community of extremely talented Iranian immigrants who preserve
a cultural and personal bridge to Iran where diplomatic contact long
ago broke off.
It is not with the Iranian people, but with the Iranian regime's
threatening and often irresponsible behavior, that our concerns rest.
We have repeatedly made clear our grave concerns regarding the Iranian
Government's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and long-range
delivery systems; its sponsorship of terrorism including its direct
support to Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups; its appalling
human rights and democracy record; its support for violent opposition
to efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East; and its interference in
the affairs of its neighbors--especially Afghanistan and Iraq.
Each of these issues is of vital concern to the United States and,
in each and every case, Iran has a position inimical to that of the
United States and the international community. At a time when countries
across the region are moving toward greater openness, political
participation, and economic freedom, Iran stands in stark contrast.
Our concerns with Iran are not merely historical; they do not
simply reflect the pain felt, real as that pain is, over the storming
of our Embassy more than two and a half decades ago. It is Iran's
actions and policies today that drive our policy. Iranian Government
policies, loosely grouped into three broad categories that I will
discuss briefly today, directly threaten United States interests in the
region and beyond.
In each of these three areas, Iran has a demonstrated track record
of moving backward against the tide of world events. I will start with
Iran's freedom deficit, appropriate given the recent election of
democratic governments in two of Iran's neighbors and the upcoming June
17 Presidential elections in Iran.
IRAN'S DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD
Iran is a great country with a unique history and culture. The
Iranian people have made extraordinary contributions in many fields for
thousands of years. Modern Iran will undoubtedly remain a significant
country in the future of the broader Middle East.
The United States believes the future of Iran should be democratic
and pluralistic. We support those who wish to see Iran transformed from
a rigid, intolerant theocracy to a modern state. A peaceful, democratic
Iran would be a key feature in a reformed, more democratic Middle East.
We believe Iran is a country in the process of change. Some two-thirds
of its people are below the age of 35. Many young Iranians support the
need for a more positive relationship with the United States. In fact,
the United States may have a more positive public image in Iran than in
other countries of the region. We sense that the sentiment among
ordinary Iranians for change--for reform and democracy--is strong. But
that sentiment is ignored by the ruling clique.
Iran suffers from a deficit of freedom. The regime's human rights
record remains abysmal and the government continues to commit numerous,
serious abuses, including summary executions, disappearances, torture,
and other inhumane treatment. In the late 1990s, elements of Iran's
secret services murdered a number of intellectuals and oppositionists.
In 2000, a courageous journalist named Akbar Ganji was imprisoned for
uncovering the truth and reporting it in his newspaper. Since Ganji was
imprisoned, many journalists and even Web loggers have been taken into
prison where they have been abused and threatened. The Iranian
Goverment's actions have essentially eliminated the free press in Iran.
In 2003, an Iranian-Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi, was beaten
to death in detention. The investigation and trial have been a farce
and the Canadian Government has taken steps to scale back its relations
with Iran.
During student protests in June 2003, 4,000 demonstrators were
arrested; a few are still held. In December 2003, Parliamentarian
Mohsen Mirdamadi was beaten by vigilantes as he started a speech in
Yazd. Before the 2004 elections, when reformist members of Parliament
signed a petition to the Supreme Leader asking for more democracy, they
were threatened with arrest and arbitrarily stripped of their
parliamentary immunity.
In fall 2004, for a second year in a row, the United States
cosponsored, and actively supported, a Canadian resolution at the U.N.
General Assembly condemning the human rights situation in Iran. The
Iran human rights resolution passed in the U.N. General Assembly's 59th
Plenary, sending an important signal to the Iranian people that the
international community recognized their suffering and to the Iranian
Government that dialog on human rights was no substitute for concrete
action to improve its record, and that the serious concern about Iran's
overall international behavior would not blunt the international
community's focus on the internal human rights situation.
On the surface, the Iranian Government points to a picture of an
active democracy in which Iranians participate regularly in national
and local elections. But this is a veneer behind which lies a perverted
process whose integrity is severely compromised by the oppressive
oversight exercised by hard-line clerical bodies. One of the most
egregious recent examples of this extraordinary system was the rigging
of the February 2004 Majles elections, in which the Guardian Council
disqualified thousands of reformist candidates, including more than 85
sitting members of the Majles. We commend the bravery and dedication of
the many ordinary Iranians who put their livelihoods at risk to advance
the principles of democracy, religious tolerance, and the
accountability of the government to its own people.
We are similarly very concerned that the upcoming June 17
Presidential elections will represent another setback for the
democratic hopes of the Iranian people. Candidate registration started
Tuesday, May 10 in Iran and ended May 15. At the end of the
registration period, the names of the Presidential candidates will be
forwarded to the 12-member Guardian Council, which then has up to 10
days to assess the eligibility of the candidates. There is every
indication the June election will not result in a meaningful expression
of the popular will, because the political process and the media are
controlled and manipulated by an unelected few--the clerical elite and
their associates. These unelected leaders dominate Iran's political
system, have the power to intimidate and disqualify candidates, and
through the exercise of that power have stymied popular demands for
freedom. Of the over 1,000 Iranians who have registered to run in the
upcoming elections, the Guardian Council is likely to approve less than
a dozen candidates. Indeed, in 2001, only 10 of the 814 registered
candidates were allowed to run. The diminished role of women, in
Iranian political life since the February 2004 Majles elections, is
another clear indicator of the regime's effectiveness in stymieing free
popular will and of its antidemocratic beliefs.
In November 2003 at the National Endowment for Democracy, President
Bush outlined a forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East. He
said that ``60 years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the
lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe--because
in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of
liberty.'' In his 2005 Inaugural Address, the President reiterated
America's support for the people of the broader Middle East and North
Africa in their fight for freedom. ``We will persistently clarify the
choice before every ruler in every nation: The moral choice between
oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally
right.'' President Bush spoke directly to the Iranian people in his
February 2, 2005, State of the Union Address, saying: ``As you stand
for your own liberty, America stands with you.''
The administration is deeply appreciative of Congress's and this
committee's support for the resources that enable us to implement the
President's Freedom agenda and reach out to the Iranian people. A few
examples:
--Since May 2003 we have funded a Persian language Web site that serves
as a ``virtual embassy'' by providing the only channel for both
United States policy statements in Persian as well as a range of
information about democracy, American society and values, and
consular information.
--We are also funding political discussion in Persian on television and
radio broadcasts into Iran under the auspices of the Voice of
America. Recently VOA announced that it was increasing the duration
of these broadcasts. The United States Government also funds news
and music broadcasts into Iran on Radio Farda. This service is
specifically targeted at the large population of younger people in
Iran.
--The FY 2005 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act doubled to $3 million the funds
available to our Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau to
support the advancement of human rights and democracy in Iran. We
are currently reviewing applications for FY 2005; in 2004 we
provided $1 million to document human rights abuses inside Iran and
$500,000 for National Endowment for Democracy programming.
--We have also recently established, with European and Canadian allies,
a Human Rights Working Group that will convene quarterly to share
information and coordinate our approach to the issue.
These initiatives and programs require resources. Our commitment of
funds to support freedom in Iran is tangible evidence of the United
States support for a better future for the Iranian people, and we
appreciate congressional support for our programs and efforts.
The freedom deficit and the severe restriction on free expression
and fair elections is the first of our concerns with Iranian Government
policy.
COUNTERING IRAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
A second and critical United States concern is our strong and
resolute opposition to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
Iran's desire to acquire a nuclear weapon threatens the peace and
security of the United States, our friends and allies, and the
stability of the entire region. Iran's demonstrated track record of
nuclear deception and denial is troubling, including an 18-year history
of trying to hide from the world a clandestine enrichment program,
undeclared plutonium separation experiments, and other suspicious
activities, as reported by IAEA Director General El Baradei. Iran
failed to report the irradiation of uranium targets and subsequent
processing of those targets to separate plutonium. Iran failed to
report the use of imported natural UF6 for the testing of centrifuges
at the Kalaye Electric Company. Iran failed to declare the pilot
enrichment facility at Kalaye Electric, the laser enrichment plant at
the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, and the pilot uranium laser
enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab'ad. The list of Iran's failures goes on
and on and represents--not mere administrative failures--but, in our
view, the foundation pillars of a clandestine nuclear weapons
development program.
We see no sign Iran has made the necessary strategic decision to
abandon what we conclude is an active nuclear weapons program. Iran's
repeated brinksmanship in its negotiations with the ``European Union
Three'' or EU-3, of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, is part of
Iran's continuing effort to divide the international community, weaken
our resolve, and avoid adhering to its international obligations.
On this issue, though, let there be no misunderstanding in Tehran.
The international community stands united: Iran must not be permitted
to develop the capacity to build or deliver a nuclear weapon. Many in
the United States were skeptical of the chances of success for the EU-3
diplomatic effort, given Iran's track record. But President Bush, on
his recent visits to Europe and Moscow, heard a clear commitment from
our friends and allies: We share the goal of denying Iran a nuclear
weapon and recognize that there must be consequences should Tehran fail
to adhere to its international commitments. Our partners made clear
that Iran must provide objective guarantees to demonstrate that it is
not pursuing a clandestine weapons program under the cover of a
civilian nuclear energy program. On this point, the bar for Iran must
be set high: Its history of deception of the IAEA and the world has
undermined the international community's trust. To paraphrase a great
American President: If we don't trust, then we really must verify.
During his visit to Europe in February, the President heard from
our friends of the importance of United States support for the EU-3
diplomatic process, in order to reinforce to the world that the ball
lies squarely in Iran's court to adhere to its agreements. On March 11,
Secretary Rice announced that the United States was prepared to take
tangible, practical steps in support of the EU-3 diplomatic track, and
would no longer block Iran's application to join the WTO and would
consider licensing the export of spare parts for civilian passenger
aircraft to Iran. Since that time, we have maintained a near constant
dialog with the EU-3. For example, the Secretary saw U.K. Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw on Tuesday, and I speak on a daily basis with my
United Kingdom, French, and German counterparts to reinforce our utmost
support for their leadership on this incredibly vital issue to our
shared security interests.
The EU-3 deserves our appreciation for its efforts to resolve
Iran's nuclear challenge through patient, principled diplomacy. Iran
appears to have maintained its suspension pledge since November 22,
2004, but has asserted several times in recent weeks that it intends to
resume uranium conversion activities at Esfaham which are covered by
its November 2004 agreement with the EU-3, and would require the
breaking of IAEA seals in place to monitor that suspension. The
Europeans have made plain their deep concern with this possibility and
reaffirmed that these activities would constitute an Iranian breach of
the agreement, ending the negotiation process and requiring action by
the international community. We support the EU-3 in their commitment to
the Paris agreement signed in November and believe that, if it is
breached, the United States and the EU-3 must support a resolution in
the IAEA Board of Governors reporting Iran to the U.N. Security
Council.
President Bush and Secretary Rice have made clear publicly that we
support a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear
problem. That is why we support the EU-3 process. Our message to Tehran
today is: Adhere to the Paris agreement, maintain suspension of all
nuclear-related activities, and negotiate in good faith the eventual
cessation and dismantling of all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle
activities.
The spotlight must remain on the Iranian Government and on the
requirement that the Iranian Government adhere to its international
commitments. Unfortunately, we see no sign of a strategic decision to
abandon nuclear weapons efforts, and, particularly in the light of
recent threats by Tehran to resume enrichment, we remain deeply
skeptical of Iran's intentions. United States policy toward Iran on
this urgent issue is resolute. As President Bush noted on September 27,
2004: ``We've made it clear, our position is that they won't have a
nuclear weapon.''
IRAN'S DESTABILIZING IMPACT ON THE REGION AND BEYOND
Iran has already used another unconventional weapon--terrorism--
against innocent Americans, Europeans, Arabs, Israelis, and others.
Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world.
The State Department's 2004 Country Reports on Terrorism notes that
``its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence
and Security were involved in the planning and support of terrorist
acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups to use terrorism in
pursuit of their goals.'' Iran's extensive involvement in supporting
terrorism truly puts it in a class by itself.
We are deeply concerned about Iran's connections to numerous
terrorist groups, including those that violently object to the right of
Israel to exist or to any negotiated peace between Israelis and
Palestinians. For example, Iran provides money, weapons, and training
to Hamas, Hizbollah, and Palestinian rejectionist groups. These are
some of the world's most deadly terrorist organizations, responsible
for the killing of thousands of innocents, including Americans.
Hizbollah, for example, has been responsible for more American deaths
than any other terrorist organization in the world apart from al-Qaida.
Furthermore, Iran's support for these groups fuels terrorist violence
in Israel and the Occupied Territories, seeking to undermine the
prospects for Middle East peace at this moment of historic opportunity.
Iran continues to hold senior al-Qaida leaders who are wanted for
murdering Americans and others in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings
and for plotting to kill countless others, Iran has refused to identify
those individuals in its custody.
We have sanctioned Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and called
for the regime to abide by the requirements of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373 to deny safe haven to those who plan, support, or
commit terrorist acts and to affirmatively take steps to prevent
terrorist acts by providing early warning to other states by exchange
of information. Iran should immediately turn over, to face justice, all
al-Qaida related terrorists in its custody or on Iranian soil to
appropriate jurisdictions.
We are also working closely with the United Nations and our key
allies, particularly France, to fully implement UNSCR 1559, which calls
for the dismantling of all armed militias in Lebanon, including
Lebanese Hizbollah, Iran has provided Lebanese Hizbollah with funding,
safe haven, training, and weapons. We all remember that Lebanese
Hizbollah was responsible for the death of hundreds of Americans in
Beirut in the 1980s.
As we meet with our allies from around the world, we take every
opportunity to express our concerns about Iran's support for terrorism
and our concerns about Iranian interference in the efforts to secure a
lasting, just peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. We actively
seek the involvement of the international community to reflect those
concerns in their dealings with the regime, diplomatically as well as
commercially.
Iran must also live up to its commitments to develop productive
relationships with its neighbors, support the new Iraqi Government, and
renounce in word and deed any relationship to individuals or groups
that support instability and engage in terrorism.
Iran is not meeting these commitments with regard to Iraq. Iran
made commitments to Iraq and the international community at the
November 2004 Ministerial Conference in Sharm El Sheikh to assist Iraq
in its security (including border control), to support the political
process, and to practice noninterference in Iraq's internal affairs.
Unfortunately, we see little evidence of Iranian assistance, and
continuing troubling indications of Iranian interference in Iraqi
internal affairs.
We will continue to work closely with the new Iraqi Government to
address all issues related to Iraq's stability and security. In our
dealings throughout the region we continue to stress the importance of
protecting Iraqi sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the success of the worst regime elements in
reasserting control over Parliament, Iranian society is moving in its
own positive direction, Iranians are unhappy about the Guardian
Council's heavy-handed exclusion of reformist candidates from
elections, the government's curtailment of press freedoms, and the
deteriorating human rights situation. In addition, they are frustrated
by the country's chronic unemployment and their government's failure to
provide jobs for the thousands of young Iranians entering the workforce
each year. Structural flaws in the economy can be papered over with
extraordinarily high oil revenues, but they don't go away. Iran is a
great nation which has given the entire world a powerful cultural
legacy and the Iranians have much yet to offer in the years ahead.
It is our hope that United States relations with Iran will change
for the better; but that cannot happen without a change in Iran's
policies in the areas I have discussed. The pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems makes Iran less secure and the region
more unstable. The regime must end its sponsorship of terrorism,
including its direct support to Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionist
groups and begin to help build a better life for all parties involved.
American citizens hear about Iranians who have gone to jail or have
been murdered. How can we be silent when we see individual Iranians
risking everything to achieve the democratic freedoms we ourselves
treasure? How can we turn our backs when the Iranian regime attempts to
subvert the newborn democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan?
We have had no diplomatic relations with Tehran for more than 25
years, through five Presidential administrations from both political
parties. While we are optimistic about Iran's future, the onus to
improve its relationship with the rest of the world is squarely on
Tehran and will be found in concrete actions in the three broad areas I
discussed briefly today. For all the lack of diplomatic contact, there
is no lack of communication about what is necessary to transform this
relationship. The government in Tehran knows what is expected of it,
and must act if it wishes to rejoin the community of civilized nations.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Burns.
We will have a 5-minute round of questions at this point.
And I will commence by asking you this basic question. Analysts
of the situation in Iran have suggested four possible outcomes
in terms of our relations with Iran, one of which is that we
foster regime change. Second, we conduct a military attack on
Iran in the event that they are not forthcoming in terms of
development of weapons of mass destruction. Third, that we
offer very substantial incentives, along with European friends,
and this would have to be a united front, so that Iran's
economy would be perceived by Iranians as prospering to an
extent that they would forego their nuclear experiments. And
fourth, someone suggested that none of the above are going to
work, that we shall simply have to learn to live with a nuclear
weapon in Iran as we have with weapons in various other parts
of the Middle East.
The third option I select, at least as potentially
promising, although without prescribing what our policy ought
to be. I note the New York Times this morning points out that
an Iranian negotiator suggests that perhaps 10 nuclear reactors
provided by Europeans and others might be an incentive to begin
thinking about the economic routes. He disparages the spare
parts for aircraft situation that we have endorsed as almost
disparaging.
Is there a route, in your judgment, along the economic
front, or is this a situation in which your judgment is that
the Iranians might pocket any of the economic incentives and
proceed in a covert way with development of centrifuge
technology and progress toward making a nuclear weapon?
Ambassador Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would answer
your question by pointing to the normal relations that Iran has
with much of the world, and many of our European allies
maintain Embassies in Tehran. They have normal--somewhat normal
political relations. There is trade between the countries and
none of that economic trade, commercial discourse has affected
the Iranian Government in such a way that it would lead the
Iranians to conclude that they should live without a nuclear
weapons capability.
So I do not believe it stands to reason that if the United
States suddenly decided to change the policy of the last five
Presidents, Democratic and Republican, open up the trade gates
in the hopes that that might encourage the Iranians to give up
their nuclear weapons aspirations, that is the standard reason
that would work.
Instead, we have pursued a patient policy, over many
administrations, over more than two decades, of encouraging
peaceful change within Iran, democratic pluralistic change. And
more recently, since February and March of this year, we are on
the course of hoping for a peaceful negotiated settlement of
the nuclear negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran itself.
So, I think the policies of our government have been very
clear and transparent, and that there is no reason to believe
that extra incentives offered by the United States at this
point would make a real difference. We believe that Iran needs
to face the united will of the international community. And we
are there now, because we know that the EU-3 and the Russian
Government are advising the Iranian Government not to break the
current accord, not to go into the plant at Esfahan, not to
break the seals, and not to begin to convert uranium.
Just to get to the last part of your question, Mr.
Chairman, some people have suggested, well, if you would allow
Iran access to peaceful civilian nuclear power, then they would
not want to build a nuclear weapons capability. But the problem
with that is that the Iranians concealed clandestine nuclear
weapons research for 18 years from the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and that is the verdict of the IAEA, not just of
our Government, and of its chairman.
Given that record of deception, we believe that Iran cannot
be allowed to have enrichment and processing capability that
would allow it to produce fissile material, which is the
essential ingredient in a nuclear warhead. And we are focused
on that. And I think we have the agreement of all of our
allies. And so our final goal is the cessation and dismantling
of all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities in Iran itself.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for that response. I
wanted to wait until more members were here, but I am going to
ask the staff of our committee to attempt to work with the
leadership on both the Republican and Democratic sides on the
floor to gain unanimous consent this committee might continue
to meet.
This is an extremely important hearing. I cannot imagine
any argument with regards to judiciary matters on the floor
that supercedes the importance of what is occurring here. So I
am going to make that appeal publically, and I am hopeful that
our leaders will respond, because we do have indications that
thus far that response has not been forthcoming. That means
that we will be shutting down at 11:30, and that will be
unfortunate with regard to the hearing, as well as for other
witnesses.
Senator Dodd, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, the ranking Democrat, Senator
Biden, is not here, and I always hesitate to try and speak for
Senator Biden on any matter. I would certainly hear your
concern on the point you just made and regret as well we are in
this situation, but obviously there is an issue here that looms
large over us, a cloud, so to speak, as we talk about the very
issue before us here.
There is a nuclear option that is pending before the U.S.
Senate and my hope is that matter can be resolved amicably
within the next number of hours. And by creating a little bit
of tension institutionally, it may get us closer to that result
or not. So this is regrettable, because this is a very
important hearing, and I commend you for holding it.
I am going to defer to my colleague from Florida, who has
another engagement, and I will come back to----
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Dodd. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, just in the interest of
felicity, if Chuck Hagel were President I would go on bended
knee and ask him to appoint Ambassador Burns to the United
Nations, and then we would not have any fights here.
Senator Hagel. And I would appoint him.
Senator Nelson. You just ruined Ambassador Burns' career by
that statement. [Laughter.] I believe you might even have
Senator Voinovich's support. [Laughter.] We know that the
Europeans have been negotiating with Iran for some period of
time. What has caused the sudden change of heart in the United
States to decide to work with the Europeans now?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think there was a fair degree
of skepticism within our Government, and other places, about
the Paris Accords in November of last year when it was
announced, because of the long track record that we have
watched, where Iran has hidden many of its clandestine
activities.
When President Bush went to Europe in February, he went to
NATO, had a long discussion with leaders there, had a dinner
with President Chirac, had a day in Mainz, Germany, with
Chancellor Schroeder, and this was the leading issue on the
agenda. And it was clear to the President and Secretary Rice at
the end of that visit that the European leaders shared the same
sentiment that we did, that the end result of these
negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran had to be the cessation
and dismantling of the nuclear fuel cycle activities, and had
to be a place where Iran could not use what they said was a
peaceful nuclear energy program to protect and hide behind it a
nuclear weapons program.
And it was really that trip that then lead Secretary Rice
to have a series of discussions with the EU-3 Ministers in late
February, early March, and that lead to our March 11
announcement that we would support them. And I must say, they
have been very, very faithful partners to us since then.
Now we are not at the table. We chose not to be directly
involved with the Iranians. We are not talking to the Iranians
directly. But we are talking to them every day. One of my jobs,
working for Secretary Rice, is to keep in very close touch.
They have been transparent with us. Our EU allies, they have
been, we think, very tough, as they should be, as they
negotiate this issue.
There is an important meeting next week, probably in
Brussels, next Tuesday, May 24, where the three EU-3 Ministers
will meet with the Iranian negotiator, and we have every reason
to believe that the EU-3 will retain there a very tough
position that will insist that Iran adhere to this accord.
What appears to be happening, if you look at the public
statements out of Tehran--Iran, signed a deal in November, we
will suspend all of our nuclear activities--now they want to
recommence some of those activities and continue the
negotiations. And that does not make any sense.
Senator Nelson. Is this a recognition or acknowledgment
that the former policy of not talking to the Europeans was a
failed policy?
Ambassador Burns. Well, I would not say it was a failed
policy, because I think you have to--we will both remember that
before November 2004 there really was not a serious negotiating
effort with an agreement in place that would provide objective
guarantees that would suspend the nuclear activities of the
Iranian Government, and, hopefully, lead to something even more
rigorous.
And once President Bush had a chance to sit down and talk
directly to the European leaders, he made the decision on
behalf of our Government that we would support them.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I thank Senator Dodd for
yielding me part of his time so that I could go on to this
meeting. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Hagel.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Burns, welcome.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. I noted yesterday in stories that appeared
in most of our newspapers that the Iraqi Foreign Minister, or
the Iranian Foreign Minister, was in Iraq on Tuesday. Could you
share with the committee your thoughts about the Iranian
Foreign Minister being in Iraq a few hours after Secretary Rice
was there, what you know about that visit, what you might
conclude by that Iranian initiative?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you. It is true that
Secretary Rice was the first Foreign Minister to visit the new
government after it was formed. And she was very pleased to do
that in her visit on Sunday. And she had an excellent
discussion with the new Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet.
She met with our military leadership. And then, of course, we
saw the subsequent visit of Foreign Minister Karzai to Baghdad.
And, I guess, according to press reports, he is going to
stay in the country for a few days. It is not surprising, given
the fact that many of the Shiite groups in Iraq have had long-
time contacts with Iran, and some of the current political
leaders and the Shiite community in Iraq had refuge in Iran
during the Saddam period.
What we would hope is the following: That Iran would play a
much more positive and productive role in trying to support
Iraq, as we are trying to support Iraq. But our suspicion has
been that Iran did not play a constructive role in the many
weeks and debates about the formation of the current Iraqi
Government. And the key to a successful future united Iraq is
to see this power-sharing agreement among the Shiite and Sunni
and Kurdish elements, and the Iranians do not seem to have
spent much time supporting that goal of multiethnicity, of
shared power of a united state in Iraq that overcomes the
ethnic and religious differences that have been so much a part
of the fabric of Iraq for a long time.
So our strong advice for Iran would be to be more
constructive about what really needs to be done to help the
Iraqi Government.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Picking up a little bit on
Senator Nelson's line of questioning. If the next Iranian
Government represented by a new President after the elections
next month would position themselves so that they would reach
out to the United States for the United States involvement in
some direct conversations, not negotiations, but direct talks,
what would be our position if that occurred?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, and you will understand, it is
hard to answer a hypothetical question not knowing who the
individuals are and not knowing the context, but I think I can
say that if you look back over the history of our relations
going back to 1979, we have not been without communication.
There has been the Algiers process, where for many years the
lawyers of the State Department and the lawyers of the Foreign
Ministry of Iran have tried to adjudicate some of the claims
that have arisen over the closing of the two Embassies and
complaints by private citizens.
From time to time, over the last more than 25 years,
various administrations have chosen to have discussions in
various capitals with the Iranian Government on discreet
issues.
I think there is a very real sense among those of us
currently in government and those who are in government in the
past, it has not been the United States that has not wanted to
see change in this relationship, it has been Iran.
We have to judge them on their policies and on their
actions. And on terrorism, human rights, and now on nuclear
weapons development, they are going in the opposite direction
of all the other states that are making so much progress in the
Middle East. So we have not been, over the past 25 years,
against communication, but the Iranian Government has pretty
consistently refused to have any interest in normal and
responsible discourse, and they have not changed their
policies.
Senator Hagel. Do you think, however, if the United States
was more engaged in a more direct way that that would have an
effect, if the climate was better? Obviously, we are relying on
our European allies. We are on the outside of that ring,
possibilities that if the environment would be better that that
might have more of an impact or do you think it would not? Or
would it matter?
Ambassador Burns. Obviously, we thought about this
question. You have to think about all the tactics that are
available to any government as you confront a very serious
problem like a nuclear weapons capability in the hands of a
theocratic state.
And it is our judgment that on the nuclear question, the
EU-3 are pursuing a very tough resolute course of action. And
we have supported them. We do not believe that there is any
reason to think that if the United States were at the table the
Iranians would be any more open to further change.
And on the broader question of relations between the two
countries or the nonrelations, in an official sense, this is
really their choice. They have isolated themselves by their
actions. And so our Government is always going to be willing to
look for ways to improve relations with any government in the
world, but Iran has given us no reason to think that that will
be--that that will happen any time soon.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just, if I
can, pick up on a question Senator Hagel raised, and then I am
going to take a couple of minutes and just share some thoughts
on this. First of all, thank you for being here. I commend you
for your fine work you are doing on these issues. They are
complicated and terribly important.
I picked up some reports that following the visit by the
Iranian Foreign Minister to Iraq that there is a proposed--at
least I read about a proposed visit by the Iraqi Energy
Ministry to be going to Iran--and there is some speculation
about the possibility of some joint venturing on energy
projects, which raises the obvious question of the Iraq-Libya
sanctions legislation.
Can you tell us whether or not there is such a proposed
visit in the plans, and what more we can--what you may know
about that.
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator Dodd. We have seen the
press reports about the Foreign Minister's visit to Iraq. I
think we have received some initial very general reports from
our Embassy in Baghdad about the nature of that visit. I am not
aware of a proposed visit by the Iraqi Oil Minister to Tehran.
Senator Dodd. Okay. I want to follow up on that, because,
obviously, it would pose some thorny questions here, obviously,
in terms of sanctions.
Mr. Chairman, let me, if I can, just share a couple of
thoughts on the matter and come back with the limited time we
have here this morning. I do not know of any more important
issue. If you had to prioritize the issues on foreign policy, I
think this one is right at the top, in my view. So it is very
appropriate we are having a hearing to discuss this, discuss
the matter. And obviously, we thank our witnesses, and we have
some wonderful ones here this morning. And my hope is, we can
actually hear from them, but as you point out we may not be
able to under this setting.
I think when it comes to the Iranian question we know a few
things with almost absolute certainty. And I think there is
probably universal agreement about this, although some may
dissent from it. The five points, and there may be others, but
the five points that I sort of identify as being--there is
common agreement. Iran is almost certainly attempting to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and it is in our common
interest to do everything we can to stop them from doing so.
How do we know they are getting the weapons? The country
has hid its nuclear program from the world for nearly two
decades. It is now reluctant to give up its capabilities for a
complete fuel cycle. We know that. And even as part of its
offers to negotiations, Iran is insisting on keeping, at least,
a small nuclear research program. Further evidence, I think
that makes the point, which would eventually provide it with
some capacity to develop weapons-grade fuel. These are not
actions of a country that seeks only to have a nuclear energy
program for civilian purposes.
The second point is, I think that Iran is developing, or
attempting to develop, long-range missiles that would enable it
to project power throughout the greater Middle East and beyond.
Iran claims that its Shahab-4 missile has a range that would
enable it to reach large portions of the Near East and
Southeastern Europe. That places United States bases in Turkey
at great risk. And Iran reportedly bought 12 X-55 missiles from
the Ukraine in 2001. And that would even further extend its
firing range, which should be of grave concern to all of us.
If Iran develops the capacity to arm those missiles with
nuclear warheads, then, of course, there would be serious
consequences on a global level.
The third point, which I think is general agreement, is
that Iran continues to provide material and logistical support
for terrorist groups, such as Hizbollah and Hamas. It seems
quite clear they are doing it. This includes the provisions of
weapons and money. Though it seems that Hizbollah is trying to
increase its role politically in Lebanon, that group's military
activities continue to pose a serious threat to Lebanese
stability as well as to the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts.
Fourth, Iran is attempting, I think, to extend its
influence in the new Iraq. And again, the question by Senator
Hagel and others, and the possibility of joint cooperation in
some areas, certainly should cause us some concern.
Fifth, Mr. Chairman, and I will ask unanimous consent that
further comments to develop these points in the statement
here--the state of democracy in Iran is weak. Despite the clear
movement of people in Iran who want to move in a different
direction, every time they step forward they are barred,
obviously, from holding office or running.
Having said all of that, and again, I do not think there is
any disagreement about that, I want to sort of associate myself
with the comments by Senator Hagel here, because I am of the
view that as a result of these points, we have to engage a bit
more. I just do not think you want to outsource your foreign
policy to the Europeans on this matter. I think it is important
what they are doing, and we ought to be supportive and
cooperative. But I do think it is critical that we engage as
well.
We have a diplomatic relationship with Iran. We have
diplomatic relations with people who are sworn enemies. I think
we make a mistake by assuming some sort of engagement as a sign
of weakness, or that we are in some way condoning or endorsing
activities here. And I am not suggesting full diplomatic
relations at all, but a far more direct engagement. The very
points that are a matter of grave concern, it seems to me,
speak loudly of the importance of having some system by which
we can begin to influence these events, unless we are
confronted, ultimately, with the very dreadful choices that the
chairman has outlined in his initial question to you, which
none of us want to see us have to arrive at, if we can avoid
them.
These questions demand our attention. And I just think, Mr.
Chairman, as one member of this committee, I know I am probably
at odds with most of my colleagues on this committee, and
certainly I know. And Secretary Burns has made it quite clear
that there is a great deal of reluctance for us to move forward
in any kind of a direct engagement here. And he cites good
reasons about Iranian behavior. But it seems to me, despite
that, it is in our common interest here to try and find a way
to become more directly involved here if we are going to solve
any of these five or six issues that I have raised here this
morning with any degree of success in the coming years.
And with that, I will come back with a couple of questions
later on, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate the opportunity to
express that point of view.
The Chairman. Well, I thank the Senator for a very
thoughtful analysis.
Senator Coleman.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do note my
colleague from Connecticut mentioned the ``nuclear option'' and
its relevance, perhaps, to this conversation. I would also note
that the approach taken by my colleagues on the side of cutting
off engagement, perhaps at about 11:30, may be tacit
acknowledgment that sometimes you can put pressure on folks by
cutting off engagement.
Let me turn, however, again to Senator Hagel's question, in
which he talked about the prospects and the hypothetical of a
representative of a new Iranian President reaching out.
The fact is the Mullahs rule Iran, so my question to you
is: What is the prospect, regardless of who the President is,
of having any sort of ability to actually formulate foreign
policy?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think you are right to point
to that issue. If you remember back in 1997 when Mr. Khatami
was elected, there was great hope in the United States and
Europe--I remember at the time, the Clinton administration--
great hope that we might be able to engage a reformist-oriented
Iran, and all the promise of his particular government was not
borne out in deeds, because of this ruling clique that holds
the reigns of power in Iran itself.
And as we look ahead to the June 17 election, it looks like
the Guardian Council will disqualify most of the reformist
candidates. And so the people of Iran will be left with a
choice of, you know, people who do not represent the drive for
reform in Iran. And that would mean that after the new
government is formed on June 17, we would all be left around
the world in trying to communicate or deal with a government
that has not wanted to deal with us and that has not changed in
any way its support for terrorism, its refusal to recognize
even the existence of Israel, and now its support for a nuclear
weapons program, and its abysmal human rights record.
So it is a very difficult situation. I was trying to think,
preparing for this testimony yesterday, is there another
diplomatic relationship like this. And there really is not. We
do sit down with the North Koreans. We are trying to sit down
with the North Koreans, if they would just come to the table,
in the six-party talks. We have an interests section in Cuba.
We talk to the Cubans, have had for many decades. But we have
this very strange relationship with Iran, or nonofficial
relationship with Iran. The key to it is to see a change in
behavior and policies and actions of the Iranian Government,
and we have just not seen any improvement.
Senator Coleman. I believe I have time to ask one other
question. In an interview with USA Today, Kofi Annan said he
hoped the United States and the Europeans would not bring the
issue of Iran's nuclear weapons program to the Security
Council. I do not know whether you have seen the piece. I think
he said he believed we would be too divisive.
I take it you do not share this perspective. At least, it
is my understanding of your testimony. But I ask you whether
you share that. And then I raise another issue: If, in fact,
Iran violates, breaches the Paris accord, what is the
likelihood of bringing China and Russia on board to get
anything through the Security Council?
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator. It is our very strong
hope that Iran will not break the Paris agreement. So that
means, specifically, that it will not go into the plant at
Esfahan, break the IAEA's seals, and begin to convert uranium.
If they do that, then they violate the suspension provision of
the 2004 agreement in Paris.
The European countries have said, the three of them,
including Secretary Straw the other night when he held his
joint press conference with Secretary Rice, that they would
take Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in emergency session,
and then they believe the IAEA would refer the Iranian
violation of the agreement to the United Nations Security
Council. That is what our European partners have said, and, of
course, Secretary Rice has said that we would support that. Now
once it gets to the Council, anything could happen. There could
be a Presidential statement. There could be a U.N. Security
Council statement. There could be much tougher actions leading
to further international sanctions on Iran.
Our strong hope and our message to Tehran today is that
they not take that step to recommence uranium conversion, that
they honor the agreement they have had, that they continue the
negotiations with the EU-3 on a peaceful, diplomatic basis
through the June 17 elections. And if, and when, a new Iranian
Government emerges after those elections, the Europeans would
continue and we would continue our support. But we cannot
support, and I think the Europeans have said they cannot
support, a process where Iran breaks the agreement, breaks
suspension, returns to nuclear activity, but says we want to
continue the negotiations. That is not sustainable.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Secretary Burns. In your
testimony you suggested that the United States may have a more
positive image in Iran than we may think, and you spoke of the
youthful population's desire for reform. Say a little bit, if
you would, about another factor in Iran's political dynamics.
How strong is nationalist sentiment in Iran? What relationship
exists, if any, between Iranian nationalism and popular support
for Iran's nuclear program? If you could just comment on those,
and how much of a factor is this going to be in our ability to
support voices speaking out for reform?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I think it is the really
important question, because it lies at the heart of whether or
not we think Iran can change in the future. What I would like
to say on the first part of your question is that, obviously,
the Iranians are a very proud people. They have a great
history, a very long history, and, in our view, a great sense
of pride among all Iranians, including the younger generation
about what their culture has achieved over a millennia. We are
aware of that, and that is not surprising, given the great and
rich culture of that country.
There is also a second new wave in Iran, and that is the
under-35 population. It is the majority of the population. They
clearly, in their support for Mr. Khatami in 1997, and
subsequent elections, and what they have done in the streets,
and what the university students have done in demonstrating,
they clearly are signaling their desire for change, for greater
rights for women. And women's rights have taken a major hit in
the last couple of years. They have actually drawn back some of
the advances that have been made, the Iranian Government has
done.
So these young people want to live in a more pluralistic
and liberal society, because they have access to the private
radio and TV from Los Angeles and from our great Iranian-
American community in the United States, which is broadcasting
into Iran from Radio Farda and from Voice of America. They know
what the outside world is like. They want to be part of it.
So I think you are right to suggest that there are two
sentiments among the Iranian people. It seems to us, and I
would like to get back to you on this, maybe with a more
considered answer, that the drive for a nuclear weapons program
has not been a major divisive issue within the Iranian society,
and obviously one source of pride. Hard to say. We are not
there on the ground. And that is why I would like to get back
to you----
Senator Feingold. Sure.
Ambassador Burns [continuing]. With maybe some more
considered thought on that. But I think you are right to assert
that there are two perhaps conflicting streams of thought here.
[The submitted answer by Ambassador Burns to the
information requested follows:]
Question. How strong is nationalist sentiment in Iran? What
relationship exists, if any, between Iranian nationalism and popular
support for Iran's nuclear program?
Answer. We believe that there is broad popular support for Iran's
development of nuclear technology. For its domestic audience, the
regime has couched its argument in favor of a nuclear program in terms
of Iranian nationalism. The regime has played to longstanding Iranian
public fears and prejudices by falsely claiming that United States and
European objections are illegal, illegitimate, and seek unfairly to
block Iran's ``right'' to develop nuclear technology.
The regime claims the West is motivated by a fear of Iran and a
desire to limit Iranian scientific and technological advancement as a
means to prevent or retard the Iranian nation from assuming its
rightful leadership role in the region. In making these arguments, Iran
has consistently ignored the requirement that its nuclear activities
must be in conformity with the nonproliferation articles of the treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, in fact, they have not
been. In response to international concerns that its nuclear ambitions
are destabilizing, the regime insists emphatically that its intentions
are peaceful and that use of a nuclear weapon would be ``un-Islamic.''
This assertion by the regime serves to generate domestic support for
Iran's nuclear program, clearly influences Iranian public opinion and,
given the absence of access to nonstate controlled media, complicates
efforts to assess real public support for development of a nuclear
weapon.
Senator Feingold. When I was in Mali in Africa, in January,
I was really struck by the enthusiastic reception that it
seemed like hundreds of thousands Malians gave to Iranian
President Khatami, who was there. Thousands of Malians lined
the streets to cheer his motorcade, and most of them were
children.
What can you tell us about Iran's overall strategy of
outreach and engagement of the developing world?
Ambassador Burns. Well, Senator, we know that Iran, for a
very long time since the revolution, has had a very vigorous
public diplomacy campaign to authorize their brand of Islam
throughout the Muslim world. We know they have been very
vigorous in mosque construction, in supporting religious
communities, and very vigorous in their outreach to their
neighbors. Not surprising. Many countries do that.
The really interesting thing is, if you look at the Middle
East region and look at the trends in the Palestinian community
with the elections in Israel, in Iraq, the trend is--in the
enfranchisement of women in Kuwait that just occurred 2 days
ago--the trend is for greater openness and greater receptivity
to pluralistic ideas. But Iran is marching in the opposite
direction.
And so we wonder if this Iranian public relations offensive
can ultimately be successful in a Muslim world, which we think
gradually is going to have to be more open to different types
of ideas.
Senator Feingold. Well, on a commercial side, how
successful has Iran been in building commercially based
alliances with China and India and Russia, and how much of an
obstacle will that be to our diplomacy?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I cannot give you off the top of
my head the trade figures, but I can tell you that, obviously,
Iran has a vigorous trade relationship with Russia and China,
and with many other countries in the region. We have counseled
our European allies, all of whom have diplomatic relations,
most of whom have Ambassadors, and Iran, that they should be
very careful, especially in dual-use technologies.
The presence of ILSA I think has been--the legislation
since 1996 has been a positive force, an instrument for both of
the last two American administrations in trying to caution our
allies about trade relations with Iran.
Senator Feingold. What are the next steps if Iran does
resume steps toward the uranium enrichment process that is
supposed to be frozen? And what specifically would the United
States pursue in the Security Council, if that happened?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, we have made clear, but I think
more importantly in this case, the European three countries
have made clear that if Iran violates the Paris agreement of
2004, if it breaks the seals and begins to convert uranium, if
it seeks an enrichment capability or reprocessing capability,
it is obviously going to be going in the opposite direction. It
would have violated the agreement. The EU-3 would want to take
action, at the IAEA and the United Nations, and we would
support that. And we said that quite consistently over the last
2 weeks.
Senator Feingold. Have we laid the groundwork so we can be
effective on this in the Security Council, if this happens?
Ambassador Burns. You know, our strong hope is that this is
not going to happen. It is very interesting what has been
occurring publicly in the last 2 weeks. The Iranians have an
agreement. They have been saying publicly in Europe and in
Tehran, ``We might now break the agreement,'' but have not done
it. So we are using, even forums like today, like this hearing,
to say to the Iranians, ``Do not break the agreement. Meet your
commitment to the Europeans. Find a peaceful negotiated
solution to this problem.'' That is our very strong hope.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold, U.S. Senator From
Wisconsin
I thank the Chairman and Senator Biden for holding this hearing
today, and I thank all of the witnesses for their time and their
insights.
I share the deep concern of many Americans regarding Iran's
destabilizing nuclear program and Iran's ongoing support for
international terrorist organizations. And while I share the
administration's enthusiasm--though not all of their strategies--for
promoting democracy around the world, I also recognize that there
appears to be widespread popular support in Iran for nuclear weapons
development, despite other sources of popular dissatisfaction with the
ruling regime.
The serious security issues that we confront in Iran underscore the
vital importance of moving forward on a number of broad policy fronts.
The United States should be deeply engaged in working toward reforms of
the global nonproliferation regime, and particularly the current review
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We must work to build a new
international consensus so that countries cannot legally go right to
the brink of producing a nuclear weapon, making it a little late for
enforcement action once they finally do cross the line. But the
administration has failed to adequately prepare for this important
opportunity.
The United States has limited leverage in Iran, and so must rely on
effective multilateral mechanisms to apply pressure to Tehran. But
again, although the United States is now working with the Europeans on
the Iranian nuclear issue, for too long, and on too many other fronts,
this administration has pursued go-it-all strategies that make it more
difficult to muster international support for action when such support
is vitally needed.
The United States needs unimpeachable credibility in the event that
our intelligence does reveal ongoing Iranian pursuit of nuclear
weapons. But as we all know, U.S. credibility on these matters in the
view of the intelligence failures relating to Iraq--and the overheated,
sometimes misleading rhetoric that the administration used to
characterize intelligence relating to Iraq--is at an all-time low.
These issues--our pursuit of a better nonproliferation regime, our
capacity to generate international support, and our credibility--are
vital to our security. I am concerned that this country is not on sound
footing to confront the difficult choices posed by Iran's policies
today. So while I look forward to today's review of where we stand now,
I also want to highlight the fact that our Iran pro-choices do not
occur in a vacuum. We have to get the context for tackling this
difficult problem if we are to succeed.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Let me give some good news to the committee and all of our
watchers. Very able work by Democratic and Republican staff
members, with cold calls by respective parties, has brought
agreement that there will be a unanimous consent request filed
for the committee to be able to continue and that that will not
be objected to.
So I just want to express publically my appreciation to the
Democratic and Republican persons on the floor and to our
leaders for permitting this to continue, because I believe it
is important and I believe that all members feel it is
important.
Senator Voinovich.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. I am comforted that you are on a regular
communication basis with the EU-3, indicating our interest in
what they are doing. I think that constant communication back
and forth is as effective as if we were at the table.
Second of all, I wonder--I would assess that from what you
said that you think we are making progress, as contrasted with
some people who think that we are not making progress in terms
of Iran and getting them to abide by their agreements. You have
mentioned that the President has talked to President Putin and
others.
What I would like to know is: How much communication have
we had with other members of the Security Council in regard to
what we are doing there? And the reason I am asking that
question is that by having communication with the members of
the Security Council about what is going on and perhaps trying
to influence them to, maybe, pick up the phone and call some
people, that that would put more pressure on Iran to comply
with what the EU-3 are trying to get them to accomplish.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, thank you. I would agree with
your first two points, that we have played an effective role
since March 11 through the daily diplomatic contact, even this
morning, that we have had with the EU-3. We will continue that.
I would also agree there has been progress over the last couple
of months in the sense that there is an agreement in place
between the EU-3 and Iran. It is very specific and it is very
transparent. And it is verifiable by the IAEA. And that had not
been the case for many years prior to that agreement. And that
is one of the reasons why President Bush decided we ought to
support the EU-3 process.
We have worked very closely with other members of the
Security Council. We were in touch with the Russian Government
over the weekend. There was a visit by a Russian official to
Tehran last week on this issue. We have a full debrief. The
Russians have been--and we have been also in constant touch
about this, so that if--if this issue should go to the Security
Council, we would hope for the broadest possible support of all
of its members. And we have talked----
Senator Voinovich. How about the Chinese?
Ambassador Burns. We have had more limited contact with the
Chinese, because the Russians also have a role here, as you
know, because of the relationship that the Russians have had
with the Bushehr facility in Iran. And we have advised the
Russians that here is an opportunity for the Russian Government
to play a very constructive and useful role. And our
understanding, from conversations that I have had with the
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister is that they have counseled
Iran not to break the agreement, not to begin the process of
uranium conversion, and we hope the Russians will continue to
insist upon that in their talks with the Iranians.
Senator Voinovich. The other question I have is: If we are
successful with the peace process in the Middle East between
Israel and Palestine, and we are making some progress on that,
what impact do you think that would have on this whole
situation in terms of Iran?
Ambassador Burns. Well, obviously, it would be a great and
positive----
Senator Voinovich. Does Iran want to go back to before 48?
I mean I do not----
Ambassador Burns. Obviously, it would be a great and
positive development to see a peace agreement. And we are
working, the Secretary and President are working for that every
day. Iran is alone among the states of the Middle East in
refusing to acknowledge the existence of a State of Israel and
its right to exist.
Iran has funded and directed the operations of three of the
major terrorist groups that have inflicted countless casualties
upon the Israeli public in Gaza and in the West Bank, and in
Israel itself. And those groups have killed Americans.
As I said in my testimony, we have not forgotten 1983 and
the hundreds of Americans killed in Beirut, and 1984, when
Malcolm Kerr was killed, the president of the American
University of Beirut. In 1985, when Colonel Higgins was
captured by Hizbollah and tortured, and then executed. And Iran
has supported these groups consistently, and to this very day.
So at a time when you see in Egypt, in Jordan, in the gulf, you
know, policies designed to support the peace negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians, Iran refuses and fuels the
terrorism designed to stop that peace process.
Senator Voinovich. Are the other nations doing anything to
influence them at all?
Ambassador Burns. I think we would have to go through the
relationship that each of them has. I do not think there is a
lot of love lost, frankly, among many Middle Eastern countries
for the Iranian Government and regime, and for the policies
that they have pursued.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Dodd, do you have a final question?
Senator Dodd. Just a couple, Mr. Chairman. Again, I
appreciate the secretary being here. And I am glad we are able
to work out the situation----
The Chairman. I appreciate it.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. So we can go forward on the
floor. Just a couple of questions.
One is, there was a radio interview done by, I guess it was
some months--I think January, when the Vice President, at
least, seemed--and I do not want--I am not going to--I do not
have the quotes here, but, at least, the impressions were in
some quarters that the Vice President was suggesting that the
United States might be willing to back up or back an Israeli
air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.
One, was there an interpretation within the Department that
that is what he was saying, on the one hand. Could you share,
first of all, your comments on that? Do you know what I am
speaking about?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, I do not recall the specific
comments, but I can speak to the issue in general.
Senator Dodd. Why do you not speak to the issue and put
aside for a second whether or not that was the case, because I
think your very interesting interchange with Senator Feingold
is a very worthwhile one. I think it is important, I think, to
make the point. I think it has been made by others, that this
nuclear issue in Iran is not--there is not a bright line
between the reformers and the existing government. There is a
sense of probably collective Iranian pride over this
capability, and that they are beyond the capabilities of
whether or not you could actually take out the Iranian nuclear
program by an air strike is one question I would ask you. You
are very knowledgeable about this. And all of this would
suggest is that this is much more complicated than the Iraqi
strike a number of years ago that the Israelis conducted.
And second, what are the political implications of that
should it occur, in terms of trying to build some relationships
within that more moderate Iranian constituency?
Ambassador Burns. Senator, obviously, this is a very
sensitive question, and it requires a careful response. And the
way I would respond would be to say that our policy is grounded
first and foremost in the conviction that the Iranian people
ought to have the same right to a democratic and free future
that all people should have; that Iran should not be immune
from the more positive changes that we think are under way in
the greater Middle East; and that the basis of our policy in
funding VOA and Radio Farda and the democratization programs
that the Congress has funded, is to support that long-term
change within Iran itself.
Secretary Rice was asked in her first trip to Europe in the
first week of February of this year on countless occasions a
variation of the question that you have just asked. And what
she said on those occasions was that--was that that is not on
the agenda. That type of action is not on the agenda at this
time, because we have resolved to pursue and to support a
peaceful negotiated settlement of the Iran nuclear problem.
Secretary Rice, and the President, and other administration
officials, including the Vice President, have also said on many
occasions that, of course, the United States and the American
President never take any option off the table as well, but it
is very clear that we are pursuing and supporting a peaceful
negotiating process lead by the Europeans. And we have been
very stalwart supporters of that process.
All of this lies within the hands of Iran. If they would
just continue to honor the agreement they signed in November,
then that will lead toward the peaceful negotiated settlement.
Senator Dodd. I do not disagree with that. I just have this
question. Let me move to that question, too, because I do think
it is worthwhile. I was very pleased to see the shift that
occurred with the EU-3 efforts that have been--at least the
perception of some hostility to that particular effort earlier
on. It, at least, appeared to this Senator that it was a change
in tone, and I welcomed that. It was a very smart and proper
move to make, and we are very hopeful that can prove to be
successful.
You are not going to shock me, nor, I believe, that you
would be shocked to hear the Iranians say that as part of this
negotiation they would like the United States to be more
directly involved. I am not going to be surprised to hear that
request forthcoming. Are we prepared to answer that when it
occurs, and if so, what is our answer going to be?
Ambassador Burns. It is interesting that you should raise
it. I would have to--and I will check with some of my
colleagues in the Government. I just took this job 2 months
ago, so my colleagues who were on this beat before I was. But
certainly in my time, in the last few months, we have never
received such a request from----
Senator Dodd. No. I am not suggesting we have. I am
anticipating we might get one, and I am curious as to what our
response would be if we were to received one.
Ambassador Burns. Our view is that the current negotiating
process is the best way forward. And the other thing to keep in
mind is, we are at May 19, there will be elections on June 17.
We cannot now predict what type of government, who will be in
charge in Tehran, what individuals will be sitting across the
table. So, I think, that is not a question that we can answer
right now. So we are content to support the current EU process.
Senator Dodd. Well, I would be very interested, and I am
sure the committee might be, that if it comes up, to re-engage
in conversation about how we might respond to that if it were
to occur, that is a request for our more direct involvement
with the EU-3 as it emerges.
And last, if I can, just to quickly--and again, I wish we
had more time to hear, because you obviously have some
knowledge about all of this. I have been interested to hear
some people comment about the diversity of opposition groups
within Iran itself. It runs a rather broad--a wide spectrum,
rather, for those who are out and out hostile to it, and would
engage in activities that would be more direct, and others who
are looking to engage in opposing the present Government of
Iran through the normal political processes in the country,
albeit, they have had a very difficult time doing that.
Give us a few minutes, if you would, give us some sort of
picture of this spectrum, if you will.
Ambassador Burns. Senator, there is no question in our
minds, given everything that we know about what is happening
within the Iranian society itself, that it is a society in
ferment. It is a very dynamic time in the history of Iran. We
believe there is great disillusionment, particularly among the
younger segment of the population, about the policies of the
current ruling regime, particularly regarding women and the
discriminatory policies that have gotten tougher over the last
few years in denying women basic rights, certainly in the
treatment of journalists and broadcasters by the Iranian
Government, so many of them have been arrested. And in one
case, the one that I talked about in my testimony, tortured and
executed.
And so we believe that the best thing they can hope for is
to see that fermentation continue, and to see a process where
people gradually acquired greater rights, and so that their
influence might be felt more strongly by the regime.
Senator Dodd. How directly can we be supportive? Are we
being supportive? Can we be more supportive? What are we doing
to be supportive?
Ambassador Burns. We are being supportive in some of the
funds we receive from Congress. We are funding Voice of America
radio programs into Iran, which is vital, given the lack of
free information. Radio Farda.
We are now considering actually buying some time on private
American radio and TV broadcasts into Iran to showcase our own
programs and to Iran itself. The National Endowment for the
Humanities has been active. We have formed a human rights group
with some of the other--with our European allies, designed to
put a human rights spotlight on Iranian Government performance.
So, yes; we are involved. We have limits in our ability to
be effective, because we do not have people on the ground. We
do not have an Embassy there. There are very few Americans who
have access to that society because of the sanctions that are
in place. So most of this is done through NGOs. And much of it
is also being done by our European allies and other countries
that have more normal relationships.
Senator Dodd. We have been, though, quietly supportive of
some contacts. I noted the other day that James Billington, the
Librarian of Congress, spent some time in Iran meeting with
people on a cultural level, obviously did so with the approval
of the administration and facilitating that.
Are there other such contacts that we are quietly promoting
without advertising, to a great extent, to develop some
contacts?
Ambassador Burns. There are a few. We have not taken a
position that we should not talk in any way, shape, or form
with the Iranians. There have been diplomatic contacts in
decades past, but none recently, and none on the nuclear issue.
And I would just point you back, do you remember the Bam
earthquake?
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Ambassador Burns. A terrible tragedy there. I remember
Secretary Powell offered assistance. We offered to send a high-
level delegation with a Member of the Senate, with a member of
the President's family to Iran, and that was refused.
So we have taken, in the past, many opportunities to try to
signal our interest in reaching out to normal people there on a
humanitarian basis, and more often than not have been rebuffed.
Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate that. We have other
witnesses to hear from. I would hope that you would continue to
pursue that, because I go back to the point I tried to make at
the outset of my comments here. The importance of engaging--
and, again, I want to emphasize, by that I do not in any way
mean that we are sanctioning Iranian behavior. But I think
keeping that effort up is very much in our common interest to
do so. So I appreciate your testimony. You are very
knowledgeable. And I thank you for being here.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator. And I join Senator
Dodd in thanking you for coming today, Under Secretary Burns.
Ambassador Burns. My pleasure.
The Chairman. We asked that the administration furnish a
witness at the highest level who is best informed with regard
to our policy, and we are grateful that you have been
forthcoming in response to our questions.
I congratulate you again on your tenure as our Ambassador
to NATO. And we just mention this, as all committee members
have on many occasions, that your tenure was very important in
terms of the expansion of NATO's membership, and likewise, the
expansion of the mission of NATO. The work you have done there
has not gone without notice. We just take this opportunity
again to congratulate you and your colleagues who worked with
you in that endeavor.
Well, having said that----
Ambassador Burns. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman [continuing]. We appreciate you coming, and we
now call upon our second panel of witnesses. And that panel
includes Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, director of Regional Strategic
Programs at the Nixon Center; Dr. Gary Milhollin, director of
the Wisconsin Project and Nuclear Arms Control; Dr. George
Perkovich, vice president for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace; and Dr. A. William Samii, regional
analysis coordinator for Southwest Asia and the Middle East, of
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming to the committee this
morning. I will ask you to testify in the order that I
introduced you, and that will be first of all, Dr. Kemp. Let me
just say that each of your prepared statements will be made a
part of the record in full, so you need not ask for permission
that that occur. It will occur. And I will ask you to proceed
as you wish, hopefully summarizing many of your comments so we
can then proceed to questions of the committee.
Dr. Kemp, thank you for coming again to our committee. It
is always good to have you here, and please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL STRATEGIC
PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kemp. Thank you very much, Senator. I am delighted to
be here again. I will give a summary of a summary.
Iran's extensive program to develop an independent nuclear
fuel cycle has reached a point where, short of a
counterrevolution, I doubt if any future Iranian Government
would be prepared to dismantle it. The focus of current
negotiations between Iran, on the one hand, and the United
States and the European Union, on the other, is whether the
Islamic Republic would be willing to end some activities, such
as uranium enrichment, in exchange for assistance for this
nuclear power program.
In my judgment, Iran's leaders will never comply with these
demands unless the United States and the EU can offer the
Iranian Government far more incentives than they have, so far,
been prepared to put on the table.
At the same time, as long as talks are ongoing, they are
unlikely to precipitate a crisis, at least not in the short
term. But absent some fundamental change in the Iranian
leadership, combined with a willingness on the part of the Bush
administration to take big risks, the United States is on
course for a serious crisis with Iran at some point in the
coming months.
No agreement between the United States and Iran on the
nuclear question is possible unless two fundamental changes
occur. First, there must be an Iranian Government prepared to
negotiate with the United States about the fundamental problems
of the bilateral relationship. Second, the administration here
has to be prepared to negotiate on these issues with a regime
that many of its policymakers and supporters wish to get rid of
altogether.
What are the near-term options on this issue? A joint
United States-European Union decision to take Iran to the
Security Council, because of violations of its NPT agreements,
could have a compelling impact on Iran, provided Russia, China,
and other U.N. Security Council members supported it, and
important countries, such as Japan, agreed to end key economic
ties to Tehran.
Under these circumstances, Iran's leaders might blink,
especially if other Middle East developments were, from its
perspectives, going in the wrong direction. Namely, that
American policy was succeeding better than we expect. This
could include an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, an end to the
Syrian occupation of Lebanon in its entirety, the disarmament
of Hizbollah, and the emergence of a pro-American democratic
Iraq.
But these are a lot of ifs. Iran would have to be found in
clear, unequivocal violation of the NPT to get the support from
the majority of the Security Council. So far, the Iranians have
been too clever to allow this to happen. Russia and China both
have huge stakes in Iran, and regard the Iranian Government as
a friendly power. These interests will only grow in the coming
years, especially given China's insatiable need for petroleum
to meet its burgeoning car-owning middle class.
Another alternative that was just briefly discussed here
is, of course, the possible use of force. By this, I mean a
massive military assault by the United States on Iran's
infrastructure that could cause significant damage to the
program. But I think this option would have to assume the
United States had no choice but to declare war on Iran, for
this is what it really would be. Such an act would probably be
unanimously condemned, including by the Bush's administration's
closest ally, Britain.
Given the loss of credibility over United States
intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, proving
that Iran has the bomb will be very difficult unless Iran
obliges us by doing something reckless and out of character,
such as testing a nuclear device.
If these options are not likely to work, what are the
prospects for a political agreement that provides enough
incentives on both sides to take it seriously? In my judgment,
this will only happen if pragmatic, as opposed to ideological
conservatives emerge as decisive players in Iran's June 2005
Presidential elections.
Could a leader such as Rafsanjani, the former President,
contemplate such a deal? Could he sell it to his theocratic
friends? Would the Bush administration be willing to negotiate
with such a man and such a regime? For the United States the
bottom line would have to be the end of Iran's nuclear weapons
program, the end of terrorism against Israel, and cooperation
with us in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For Iran, it would have to mean the end of United States
economic sanctions. And this, I think, is the critical point,
the acceptance of the Islamic Republic as a legitimate player
in the region.
If for whatever reason a radical new approach on the part
of both Washington and Tehran is out of the question, the best
the administration can hope for is that we prepare for the
coming crisis jointly with the Europeans as allies rather than
as loggerheads. And in that regard I have to say, Mr. Chairman,
I was very pleased to hear Secretary Burns' testimony, which
mentioned cooperation with the Europeans more times than I have
heard in 4 years.
In the face of European-Atlantic solidarity, there is a
chance that the Iranians will be prepared to fudge the program
for a few more years. But ultimately, I think we have to accept
there is no way the United States, Europe, or the U.N. Security
Council can stop a country, a proud country of 70 million
people with abundant resources and lots of oil, from getting
the ingredients for a nuclear bomb if that is what their
leaders believe they must have.
For this reason, it would be very prudent to engage in
substantive dialog, not just with our European allies, but
other friends, particularly in the gulf countries, about what
to do if the Iranian bomb becomes a reality, and preemptive war
with Iran is considered the unacceptable option.
Most importantly, and here I reiterate what Secretary Burns
said, the United States and Europe must bite the bullet and
agree with each other on a common strategy that is unambiguous
as to the limits of the carrots and sticks both parties are
prepared to present to Iran's leaders and the international
community.
In other words, we need to draw a much more specific
roadmap to establish clear responses to certain Iranian
actions, such as their decision to convert exofluoride gas or
their resumption of the Iranian enrichment program.
The key, Mr. Chairman, must be to prevent Iran from driving
a wedge between the United States and Europe on this issue.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kemp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic
Programs, the Nixon Center, Washington, DC
The Bush administration and its European allies will soon have to
make some tough decisions on what to do about Iran's nuclear ambitions.
Iran's extensive program to develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle
has reached a point where, short of a radical counterrevolution, no
future Iranian Government will be prepared to dismantle it. The focus
of current negotiations between Iran on the one hand, and the United
States and the European Union on the other, is whether the Islamic
Republic would be willing to end some activities, such as uranium
enrichment, in exchange for assistance with its nuclear power program.
Iran's leaders will never comply, even with these demands, unless
the United States and the EU can offer the Iranian Government far more
incentives than they have so far been prepared to put on the table. At
the same time, as long as talks are ongoing, they are unlikely to
precipitate a crisis, at least not in the short term. But absent some
fundamental change in the Iranian leadership, combined with a
willingness on the part of the Bush administration to take big risks,
the United States is on course for a serious crisis with Iran at some
point in the coming months.
When it comes to Iran's nuclear activities, the Bush
administration, like its predecessors, has tried to balance its formal
wish to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime (which
requires a high degree of international cooperation) with its specific
demands on Iran and the other remaining member of the Axis of Evil,
North Korea.
Iran's leaders and many ordinary Iranians accuse the United States
of double standards and do not take kindly to the admonitions of the
Bush administration and the European Union about the dangers of their
nuclear program, which, so long as it is technically in compliance with
NPT rules, is legal. The Mullah's surmise that the reason they are
under scrutiny by the United States is because of their policies on
other issues, such as support for terrorism and their rejection of
Israel's right to exist. After all, the United States had plenty of
opportunity to shut down the Bushehr nuclear plant when the Shah began
to develop Iran's nuclear program in the 1960s and 1970s. But the Shah
was an ally; the strongest pillar for the defense of the Persian Gulf.
He was a man we could trust and a friend of Israel. He was the ruler
whose country was, to quote President Jimmy Carter in 1978, an ``island
of stability.'' But in a matter of months, a revolution threw the Shah
out, and the United States had to face the radical (and anti-American)
Islamic Republic of Iran. In short, when the United States comes to the
nuclear negotiating tables, whether in Vienna, Geneva, or New York, it
comes with a lot of baggage and its homilies are greeted with great
skepticism not only by Iran, but by many countries who are signatories
of the NPT.
This does not mean that attempts to stop Iran's nuclear activities
are unworthy; an Iranian bomb would radically change the strategic
environment in the Middle East and be a further nail in the coffin of
the NPT. Furthermore, President Bush has made it clear the United
States will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons. Speaking at the
White House on June 18, 2003, Bush stated, ``the international
community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will
not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon.'' This is a clear
statement of policy and cannot be fudged. The question is: How will
Bush and the Europeans implement an agreement with Iran that denies
them the right to develop an independent fuel cycle? The answer is that
they will fail unless Iran's leaders and its public are convinced a
deal is worth their while.
No agreement between the United States and Iran on the nuclear
question is possible unless two fundamental changes occur. First, there
must be an Iranian leadership that is prepared to negotiate with the
United States about the fundamental problems with the bilateral
relationship. Second, the Bush administration has to be prepared to
negotiate on these issues with a regime many of its policymakers and
supporters wish to get rid of altogether.
Aside from a broad band ``grand bargain'' United States-Iranian
settlement, what are the near-term options on the issue? A joint United
States-European Union decision to take Iran to the Security Council
because of its violations of its NPT agreements could have a compelling
impact on Iran, provided Russia, China, and the other U.N. Security
Council members supported it and important countries such as Japan
agreed to end economic ties to Tehran. Under these circumstances,
Iran's leaders might blink, especially if other Middle East
developments were, from its perspective, going in the wrong direction.
This could include an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, an end of Syrian
occupation of Lebanon, the disarmament of Hizbollah, and the emergence
of a democratic pro-American Iraq. But these are a lot of ``ifs.'' Iran
would have to be found in clear, unequivocal violation of the NPT to
get support from the majority of the Security Council. So far the
Iranians have been too clever to allow this to happen. Russia and China
both have growing economic stakes in Iran and regard the Iranian
Government as a friendly power. These interests will only grow in the
coming years, especially given China's insatiable need for petroleum to
meet the needs of its burgeoning, car-owning middle class.
The other alternative is the use of force. A massive military
assault by the United States on Iran's nuclear infrastructure could
cause significant damage to the nuclear program and could have negative
fallout for the conservative autocrats, who are disliked by the
population, and who would be seen to have grossly mishandled relations
to the point where Iran had become a target of United States military
actions. This option would have to assume that the United States had no
choice but to declare war on Iran, for this is what it would be. Such
an act would be unanimously condemned, including by the Bush
administration's closest ally, Britain. Given the farce over United
States intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, proving that
Iran has the bomb will be very difficult unless Iran obliges by doing
something reckless and out of character, such as testing a nuclear
device. There is a strong likelihood that while a military campaign
against Iran would cause great damage, the net effect would be to
reinforce Iran's determination to get nuclear weapons.
If these options are unlikely to work, what are the prospects of a
political agreement that provides enough incentives on both sides to
take it seriously? This will only happen if pragmatic, as opposed to
ideological, conservatives emerge as decisive power players in Iran's
June 2005 Presidential elections. Could a leader such as former
President Rafsanjani contemplate such a deal? Could he sell it to his
theocratic friends? Would the Bush administration be willing to
negotiate with such a man and such a regime? For the United States, the
bottom line would have to be the end of Iran's nuclear weapons program,
the end of terrorism against Israel and cooperation in Iraq and
Afghanistan. For Iran it would mean the end of United States economic
sanctions and the acceptance of the Islamic Republic as a legitimate
player in the region. It might be difficult to persuade the U.S.
Congress to take these steps, especially if other trends in the Middle
East were positive. Likewise, the Iranian security establishment will
be highly suspicious of any deal with the Great Satan. Like their
brethren in the former Soviet Union and present day China, they are
invariably suspicious of the United States and, by and large, have not
traveled outside of their country. Their attitudes are very different
of those of the Iranian bureaucrats who are well aware that Iran needs
access to the world market and more engagement with the United States
to solve its long-term economic problems. The security establishment,
on the other hand, benefits from the confrontation with the United
States, getting abundant money to pursue many programs, including a
nuclear program.
So, all of these signs are cause for pessimism. If, for whatever
reason, a radical new approach (on the part of both Washington and
Teheran) is out of the question, the best the administration can hope
for is that we prepare for the coming crisis jointly with the Europeans
as allies--rather than at loggerheads. In the face of Euro-Atlantic
solidarity, there is a chance that the Iranians will be prepared to
fudge the program for a few more years. But ultimately, there is no way
that the United States, Europe, or the U.N. Security Council can stop a
proud country of 70 million people with abundant resources from getting
the ingredients for a nuclear bomb if that is what its leaders believe
must happen. For this reason, it would be prudent to engage in a
substantive dialog with other allies and friends, especially the gulf
countries, about what to do if the Iranian bomb becomes a reality and a
pre-emptive war with Iran is an unacceptable option.
Most importantly, the United States and Europe must bite the bullet
and agree with each other on a common strategy that is unambiguous as
to the limits of carrots and sticks both parties are prepared to
present to Iran's leaders and the international community. In other
words, the United States and Europe need to draw up a ``Roadmap'' to
establish clear responses to specific Iranian actions such as Iranian
conversion of hexafluoride gas or resumption of the uranium enrichment
programs. The key must be to prevent Iran from driving a wedge between
the United States and Europe.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Kemp.
Dr. Milhollin.
STATEMENT OF DR. GARY MILHOLLIN, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, UNIVERSITY
OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL AND DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Milhollin. Thank you very much, Senator. I am pleased
to appear before the committee. The committee has asked me to
concentrate upon the present negotiations between Iran and
Britain, France, and Germany. Before I do that I would like to
point out that my organization does maintain a very large Web
site on Iran's mass destruction weapons programs. It is known
as IranWatch.org. And I would refer the committee to that site
for additional information and analysis.
I would like to begin by saying that the deal made in
November was conceived to be tactical only. It was conceived to
simply present an opportunity for continued talks and an
opportunity to make a deal. It was not seen as a solution to
the overall problem. That solution, as has emerged, would have
to include action by Iran to give up its ability to make
fissile material; that is, give up its ability to enrich
uranium, and give up its ability to make plutonium. And the
Europeans are clear on that. Neither of these materials is
necessary to run Iran's civilian nuclear program. But the
parties are still very far apart.
In March, Iran proposed that it be allowed to run 3,000
centrifuges. It proposed to be able to restart its conversion
facility, manufacture thousands more centrifuges, up to 50,000,
and at the same time receive additional reactors from the
Europeans. The Europeans consider this a nonstarter, which is
obvious.
So, right now the question is: What is going to happen? Are
these parties ever going to get together? If they do not, then
one possibility is that the present freeze could simply
continue for a while. If that happened, I think we would be
seeing a situation similar to the one that existed after the
agreed framework between the United States and North Korea was
concluded. That is, the North Koreans agreed to freeze their
operation. They did not agree to give it up or to dismantle
their capability. The same question basically is now facing
Iran, that is, how long to keep the freeze in place.
It seems to me that it might depend on two things. First,
how much the suspension is really hurting Iran's nuclear
progress--how much it is pinching. And the second one is Iran's
assessment of how much pain it will receive by being referred
to the U.N. Security Council, because that is what the
Europeans have said will happen if the freeze is broken.
If the case does go to the Council, what will happen? Mr.
Burns sagely declined to elucidate that, but I think we could
probably expect that the United States and the Europeans would
ask for a U.N. resolution under which Iran would agree to
resume the suspension. There seems to be a fair amount of
support for that.
If Iran did not comply, then the question would be a
resolution compelling Iran to suspend. If Iran did not comply
with that, the question would be sanctions. Nobody knows at
this point what that would produce, including the Iranians. So,
I think, in our favor is the fact that the Iranians probably do
not want to face the uncertainties in going down that path at
the United Nations.
On the other hand, we would also face uncertainties. If the
Security Council does little or nothing, what would emerge is
the fact that a country can basically violate its pledges under
the nonproliferation treaty and not be punished, which would be
a great blow to the treaty and a great blow to the
nonproliferation efforts we have made and the structures we
have in place internationally. So everybody has a lot at stake
if this case goes to the U.N. Security Council.
Right now, there does not seem to be the kind of support it
would take for an oil embargo or strong international trade
sanctions, but that support may come after a while. I think,
personally, that we ought to start thinking about where this
chain of events is going to wind up. And Mr. Kemp has mentioned
that.
I do not think international inspections will prevent Iran
from success, and it is pretty clear that the U.N. route is
uncertain. So, I think we ought to get used to the idea of
thinking about what it would be like to live with an Iranian
bomb; because if you just look at all the possible outcomes,
that one is probably more likely than any other, in my
judgment.
So what would such a world be like? What would the United
States do in a world where Iran had the bomb? I think we would
have to consider adopting a policy of containment, just as we
did with respect to the Soviet Union. We would be facing an
overtly hostile nuclear power.
This would mean that we would have to consider extending
our nuclear or conventional umbrella to additional states. I
think that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be candidates. Also, I
think that there would be a period of testing the waters. Iran
would be exploring the boundaries of its new power. Somebody
could make a mistake during this period.
To reduce that risk, I think the United States would have
to formulate and promulgate what are known as red lines, that
is, statements that if certain red lines were crossed, certain
consequences would ensue. That is not a pleasant prospect. So
the question is, how do we avoid that situation, which I think
is, as I said, among the possible ones at this point, and
perhaps the most probable.
The best outcome is for these negotiations succeed. And I
agree with those who have said that we need to put more on the
table for that to happen. Only the United States could provide
security assurances or comfort to Iran. That is just a fact.
And we have to be willing to accept that fact. And we have to
start thinking about what kind of assurances we would be
willing to provide.
We have also heard that it would be helpful if Russia and
China supported this process. I think it is essential for them
to do so. And also it is essential for the neighbors, for
Iran's neighbors to support the process. If all that happened,
if the world presented a united front to Iran, then Iran might
decide that it would be better off without the bomb than with
it.
But if you would just look at the whole situation, I think
it is difficult to be optimistic. You have to say that we are
now in a process which could result in a willingness on the
part of the world community to use sanctions or even the use of
force, but we are not there yet. I do not think we will get
there for a while. And before getting there, I think the United
States and Europe, in particular, would have to convince the
rest of the world that all the other options had been
exhausted. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Milhollin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Gary Milhollin, Professor Emeritus,
University of Wisconsin Law School and Director, Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, DC
I am pleased to appear today before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations to discuss Iran's nuclear program. I direct the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, an organization here in Washington
that maintains a Web site specifically devoted to monitoring Iran's
mass destruction weapon efforts, www.lranWatch.org, to which I would
like to refer the committee for additional information and analysis on
Iran. In accordance with the committee's request, I will concentrate my
remarks upon the present negotiations Iran is conducting with Britain,
France, and Germany.
First, I would like to point out that the deal struck among these
countries in November should be seen as a tactical step. It was
intended to buy time, and to provide an opening for continued talks. It
should not be seen as an answer to the overall strategic question posed
by Iran's nuclear effort. The aim of the Europeans was to get Iran to
freeze its uranium enrichment and plutonium processing work while
negotiations went forward. The Europeans saw this as the best chance of
working toward a long-term solution. That solution would be some
arrangement in which Iran received economic and security benefits in
exchange for giving up its plans to enrich uranium and produce
plutonium. Both enriched uranium and plutonium are used to fuel nuclear
weapons, and Iran does not need to produce either domestically to run
its civilian nuclear energy program.
The parties to these negotiations still seem far apart. In March,
Iran proposed that it be allowed to resume processing uranium at its
conversion plant by July, be allowed to install and operate 3,000
centrifuge machines, and be allowed to manufacture thousands more while
receiving benefits such as additional nuclear reactors that the
Europeans would supply. This is directly opposed to the stated European
position, which is that Iran would have to give up uranium enrichment
as part of any overall solution.
If Iran could operate 3,000 centrifuge machines, it would allow
Iran to master the enrichment process, bringing it a step closer to
being able to produce nuclear weapons. In addition, the machines
themselves might be able to produce enough enriched uranium for two or
three nuclear weapons per year if configured to do so. Iran asserts
that it will only produce low enriched uranium and will immediately
make it into fuel for its reactor at Bushehr. Iran, however, has
already contracted with Russia to supply this reactor's fuel. Thus, it
is hard to see what peaceful purpose the enrichment process would
serve. Iran itself has admitted that its enrichment effort ``cannot be
justified on economic grounds,'' according to a leaked European summary
of the negotiations.
Since the talks began last December, Iran has been threatening to
resume enrichment. Britain, France, and Germany have replied that if
Iran does so, they will support the United States effort to refer the
matter to the U.N. Security Council. They made this clear in a March
letter to the European Union. At the present moment, it is difficult to
predict how the standoff will end. If the Europeans are steadfast in
their opposition to enrichment, Iran will have to decide how long to
abide by the present suspension.
If the suspension continues, it could begin to resemble the one
that existed after the ``Agreed Framework'' was reached between the
United States and North Korea in 1994. Like Iran, North Korea agreed to
freeze its production of fissile material, while retaining the ability
to restart production at any time. The question was how long North
Korea would decide to keep the freeze in place. That same question is
now facing Iran. The answer may depend on two things: How much the
suspension is slowing Iran's nuclear progress, and how much Iran thinks
it will suffer by being referred to the Security Council.
To push forward its enrichment effort, Iran must finish converting
its existing supply of natural uranium to uranium hexafluoride (UF6),
suitable for feeding into centrifuges. It must also manufacture,
install, test, and operate a centrifuge cascade in order to produce
enriched uranium. Is Iran technically ready to do that? If not, then
extending the present suspension is not costly. If Iran is ready, then
the pressure will build to end the talks unless they produce
substantial benefits. Iran has already produced several tons of UF6 and
has tested a 10-centrifuge cascade using UF6. Judging from the
insistence of the Iranians on finishing the conversion process, it
appears that the delay is beginning to pinch.
But to end the talks means facing the Security Council. The United
States and Europe can be expected to push for a resolution calling on
Iran to reinstate the suspension. There already appears to be
widespread support for such a resolution. If the resolution passes and
Iran does not comply, then a subsequent resolution might require Iran
to suspend. Failing to suspend at that point would put Iran in defiance
of the Security Council, a position Iran would not relish. Defiance
might lead to the imposition of sanctions, mild at first, but then
possibly more severe. It is a progression that Iran would have to
consider carefully before deciding to trigger it.
There are also risks for the United States and Europe. It could be
counterproductive to send Iran to the Security Council without a good
prospect that effective action will be taken. If the Council does
little or nothing, it would show that states in violation of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty do not bear any real cost. That could
be the lesson Iran has already learned from North Korea's recent
referral. The Council endorsed six-party talks with North Korea but has
not voted any punitive measures. A repeat performance with Iran would
deal a major blow to the treaty.
An oil embargo or other trade sanctions would impose the most
severe burden on Iran, but there is little chance that such measures
would be adopted unless Iran does something to provoke worldwide
outrage, such as conducting more secret nuclear work, or producing
nuclear weapon components, or dropping out of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. Absent such a provocative act, the political
will to vote strong sanctions probably does not exist, especially on
the part of veto-wielding members such as Russia and China.
Therefore, it is time to ask where this chain of events is likely
to take us. First, there seems to be little doubt that Iran has a
nuclear weapon in mind. All of its actions, so far, point in that
direction. For 18 years it has been deceiving the International Atomic
Energy Agency in order to run a secret and illegal effort to produce
nuclear material that is not needed for Iran's civilian energy program,
but is needed for atomic bombs. If this activity were only for peaceful
purposes, as Iran says, why break the rules and do it secretly? And why
spend money for something that is not needed for civilian energy? The
activity includes building a 40-megawatt heavy water reactor, which
happens to be larger than needed for research, but too small to make
electricity, and just right for producing bomb-quality plutonium.
Indeed, most countries with this sort of reactor are using it to make
bombs, including India, Israel, and Pakistan. The IAEA has also
documented Iran's experiments with polonium, a specialized material
that can serve as a neutron initiator in fission bombs, and Iran has
been observed shopping for the high-precision switches that can trigger
a nuclear explosion. And finally, Iran is building a 1,300-kilometer-
range missile called the Shahab-3, the most practical use for, which is
to carry a nuclear warhead. When one puts all of these activities
together, they add up to a nuclear weapon effort.
Unfortunately, international inspections are not likely to prevent
Iran from achieving this goal. Last November, my organization convened
a roundtable discussion that included two senior veterans of the U.N.
inspection effort in Iraq, during which this point was raised. The
results can be found on www.IranWatch.org. The roundtable concluded
that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to verify that Iran was
not secretly making nuclear weapons under any deal that allowed Iran to
enrich uranium. The inspection burden would either be unacceptable to
Iran or provide inadequate assurance for the rest of the world. Only an
intrusive, specialized inspection regime--perhaps modeled on the U.N.
special inspections organized in Iraq--in which inspectors were allowed
anyplace, anytime access would offer a robust guarantee against
cheating. This would require access to sensitive military sites with no
declared relation to Iran's civilian nuclear infrastructure. Iran is
unlikely to agree to such a regime, which it would see as a grave
infringement on its national sovereignty.
The IAEA should not be asked to do more than it is capable of
achieving. The agency can verify a suspension of activity at known
facilities and it can track nuclear material at these facilities. But
agency inspectors, under any inspection regime, are limited in their
ability to detect secret nuclear processing at undeclared sites.
Further, the IAEA is not equipped to detect any work that deals with
the manufacture and testing of weapon components. Over nearly two
decades, Iran has conducted secret nuclear processing at a number of
sites. Some of these sites were known to the IAEA, others were never
declared. Iran's experience in duplicity will make it doubly difficult
to catch any illicit nuclear work in the future.
If, therefore, inspections won't stop Iran, and effective action is
not likely to be endorsed by the Security Council, and we accept the
statements by relevant governments that military strikes are not in the
offing, it is logical to assume that Iran may actually succeed in
getting nuclear weapons. That poses a question: How would we live with
an Iranian bomb? What would be the main effect on the United States?
As in the cold war, the United States would face an overtly hostile
nuclear power. It would therefore be in America's interest to weaken
that power as much as possible without resorting to force. To do so, we
would probably embark on a new policy of containment. America would use
its resources and influence to undermine Iran on every front.
The United States would be forced to consider extending its nuclear
or conventional umbrella to additional states, as a way of restricting
Iran's influence and persuading these states not to get nuclear weapons
themselves. The most likely candidates would be Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
It would also be natural to expect a period of ``testing the waters,''
in which Iran explores the boundaries of its new power. As in the cold
war, there would be a risk that someone could miscalculate. To reduce
that risk, the United States would have to work out and then announce
some clear ``red lines'' that Iran would be told not to cross.
The United States would also have to deal with Iran as a
proliferation threat. After getting the bomb Iran could pass it to
others. We have learned that Pakistan was a giant source of
proliferation during the years when we were only worrying about
Pakistan itself becoming a nuclear power. Iran might present the same
problem. Its technology could spread through corruption, or its
government could decide to spread the technology as a way of extending
its influence. In addition, we would have to worry about Iran's ties to
terrorist groups, which take on an entirely new meaning in the context
of nuclear weapons.
It would, of course, be better if the United States never had to
face such issues. What is the best chance now for not having to do so?
Negotiations seem to offer the only realistic hope. The United
States has little choice but to join the Europeans in their talks with
Iran. A package of economic, political, and security benefits could be
offered for Iran's cooperation, while at the same time punitive
measures threatened in the event of noncooperation. U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice's endorsement of the talks on March 11 was a good
first step. She also said that the United States would no longer block
Iran's application to be considered for the World Trade Organization or
the purchase of spare parts for its ageing civilian aircraft. These two
decisions were also positive. They helped convince the Europeans that
the United States was behind a negotiated solution, if one could be
reached. To have a chance of success, however, the process must have
help from Russia, China, and Iran's neighbors. All parties would have
to work together to induce Iran to roll back its nuclear effort. If
that were to happen, Iran might eventually decide that nuclear weapons
would have a negative impact on its security, its economy, and its
standing in the world.
The Europeans have a great deal to offer Iran economically. Europe,
unlike the United States, has active commercial ties to Iran and had
been negotiating a trade agreement with Iran before the present nuclear
crisis erupted in 2003. The promise of future benefits in exchange for
cooperation is the main thing Europe has to offer; their denial is
Europe's primary threat.
While economics are important, Iran's nuclear program remains
motivated by security concerns--which Europe is less capable of
addressing--and by Iran's desire to increase its military and
diplomatic power in the region. Only the United States is capable of
providing Iran with adequate security assurances. It should start
thinking about how to do so.
It would also be useful if Russia and China could approach Iran and
underscore the importance of maintaining the current enrichment freeze.
In particular, Russia and China could warn Iran that it should not try
to back out of the freeze by accusing the Europeans of not delivering
on their promises. Iran must understand that it currently lives under a
suspended sentence, thanks to the deal it struck with the Europeans. If
Iran decides to renege, then the sentence--notification to the U.N.
Security Council of its previous inspections violations--would be
applied.
Even with these steps, however, it is difficult to be optimistic.
At the least, negotiations could increase awareness of the danger of a
nuclear-armed Iran among key states in Europe, as well as in Russia and
China, and, therefore, help to consolidate support for sanctions or the
use of force should either be required. Before resorting to such
measures, Europe and the United States would have to convince the rest
of the world that all other options for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran
had been exhausted.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin.
Dr. Perkovich.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE PERKOVICH, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR
STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Perkovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to pick
up on where Mr. Milhollin left off and say that if things do
not change, then the outcome of Iran, at least acquiring the
capability to build nuclear weapons--there is a fine
distinction between that and actually having the weapons--is
the most likely outcome.
And I think that means logically and politically that we
have to do some things to change, also, because how we got to
today is based on 26 years of Iranian behavior, our behavior,
and other countries' behavior. And in that regard I want to say
that Secretary Burns' testimony was remarkably positive and
encouraging, because it represented, I think, a real shift, a
subtle, but a real shift in the United States approach and the
recognition, for example, that we absolutely have to cooperate
and be as one with Europe if we are going to change Iranian
behavior.
And also, there was a recognition in what he said, and how
he said it, that the tone of America's presentation to Iran has
to change, precisely because Iran is a country with a vibrant
civil society, with an active political class, and a great
history. So all of those features of what he said, while
subtle, I think were very important and suggestive of a way
that we could go on.
Let me talk a little bit about what may be a decisionmaking
context in Iran. I was there in March and have been there at
other times, talking to some of their officials, certainly, not
a representative sample.
But my sense is that Iranian decisionmakers feel their
situation is far from desperate. They say the removal of Saddam
Hussein from power in Iraq was a great benefit to Iran. The
removal of the Taliban in Afghanistan was a great benefit to
Iran.
Moreover, the United States campaign for democracy in the
Middle East is a great benefit to Iran; because one of the
consequences of that is that Shiite minorities, which exist in
much of the region, now have a political hope and a greater
opportunity to protect their minority interests than they ever
had before. And there is great solidarity that Iranians feel
for it. So that is welcome. So history, in that way, is moving
in their direction.
People recognize that they have a constitutional problem in
Iran. We have not spoken of it in those terms here. We speak,
correctly, about the problem of nonelected leaders and so on.
But that problem is in their Constitution. So when we talk
about wanting political change and complete popular sovereignty
in Iran, there is a problem that the office of the religious
leader is a constitutional office in Iran. And so we need to
think more about how that change, that clearly many Iranian
people want, and also one we want, how that can come about.
One of the things that I think any visitor in Iran hears
is, people are unhappy with their government. They are
dissatisfied with especially the Mullahs. But then they look
and they say, ``Okay. How do you change that?'' And they look
at Iraq and they say what is happening in Iraq is definitely
not what we want, because what they see is the bloodshed and
the chaos and the violence. And they say, ``We welcome this. It
is to our benefit. But it is not--if that is democracy, we do
not want to go down that road, because lots of people are
getting killed.''
And it harkens back to their own revolution, which even the
leaders of that revolution, in many ways, the young people who
are now leaders, now regret. They now look back on it and say,
``My god, that was--lots of people died.'' They do not want to
return to that possibility. So they are kind of stuck.
Yes, they want political change, but they want it to be
peaceful and gradual, and they do not want it to come at the
tip of a U.S. bayonet. And so they are, in a sense, confused,
but also worried that we are not going to be patient enough to
let them figure out how to change their government.
All of this then forms part of the context in which we are
engaging with Iran on the nuclear issue and these other issues.
It is perceived that what we are trying to do is to keep Iran
from being a developed, advanced technological country, because
Iranian people believe what their government is saying, which
is all they want is to acquire nuclear technology for energy
and to demonstrate prowess. Most Iranian people you talk to say
a nuclear weapon is a terrible idea for Iran. ``It does not
accomplish anything for us,'' they say. ``It brings bad
results, but we want the technology, because great countries
have the technology. We are a great civilization. We are really
smart people. We should be able to do this. And why the United
States is trying to stop us is that you have never gotten over
the revolution. You cannot stand Iran as a nation. We know what
you did with Mossadegh in 1953. You supported a repressive
shah. Now you cannot get over the revolution. And so what you
are trying to do is to retard us from being an advanced
country.'' And so they resist.
They do not say, ``We have to have the bomb.'' They do not
think they are trying to get the bomb. But they want to resist
this kind of outside pressure.
That leads to the conclusion that we have to change our
policy in part. Not the objectives. The objectives Secretary
Burns laid out were right on. Those were exactly the objectives
that we should have. But in order to change Iranian behavior,
we have to recognize that you have to change the political
dynamic in which the Iranians see this issue.
And, I think, there are three key points there. One is that
we cannot do it unilaterally. We need to have with us other
people that Iranians care about, in particular, the Europeans.
Second, coercion, sanctions, and pressure, and denunciations
are not sufficient. And that has been our strategy for the last
26 years. That is insufficient.
So, at a minimum, we have to clarify that if Iran stops
supporting terrorist organizations and accepts that its nuclear
program will be run without indigenous fuel cycle, they will
have a nuclear program, but will rely on foreign supply, if
they do that, that the United States is prepared to guarantee
Iran's security, that the United States will not pose a threat
to Iranian security and will deal with the constitutional
Government of Iran. Even as we think that the Iranian people
should change that Constitution, we will deal with the
constitutional Government of Iran.
We have to convey that we support Iran's technological
modernization and would be willing to work with it on projects
that are technologically advanced through international
cooperation.
And third, I think we have to convey that we have gotten
over the revolution and the hostage crisis. The Iranian people
love the American people. They are not so wild about the
American Government. But when you are visiting in Iran,
anywhere you go people slap you on the back and say, ``Oh, it
is great to see an American. Can I get you anything? America is
a great country,'' and so on.
By the way, visiting our ally, Pakistan, you get a very
different response. But in Iran, people love visiting
Americans. They are not so wild about the U.S. Government. I
think it's very important to signal that we have gotten over
the hostage crisis, and that we are not going to keep the
Iranian people hostage to their government.
There are ways we can deal with particularitives--we can
talk about it in the questions, but I think the general
attitude is key, and is an extrapolation of the subtle shift
that we heard, I think, today from Secretary Burns. I think we
have to move farther in that direction. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Perkovich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. George Perkovich, Ph.D., Vice President for
Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify before the Foreign
Relations Committee. I commend you and the committee for convening this
hearing on Iran. I believe that it is vital to United States and global
interests to integrate Iran into the international community as a state
that does not threaten its near or distant neighbors, that respects its
citizens' human rights, including the right of popular sovereignty, and
that facilitates its talented citizens' contributions to a diverse
international culture. Iranian citizens and leaders ultimately will
determine whether such integration occurs, but the United States, too,
will play a role. I hope this hearing will contribute to this end.
By way of background, I am vice president for studies at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. For the past 23 years I
have concentrated much of my work analyzing nuclear-weapons related
problems in the United States, the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, and
Iran. I have written extensively on nuclear issues and advised several
U.S. Government institutions on policy approaches to them. Most
recently, my colleagues and I at the Endowment have produced
``Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security,'' which
provides comprehensive policy recommendations to deal with all major
nuclear proliferation challenges, including Iran. I have traveled to
Iran three times since 1997, most recently this March, and have
interacted frequently with Iranian officials and scholars through Track
II dialogs.
What Are Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities?
Public accounts indicate that the United States and international
intelligence communities have been unable to paint an accurate, full
portrait of Iran's nuclear program. Perhaps there is some solace in the
likelihood that Iranian officials negotiating nuclear matters also do
not know the full range of activities and intentions in their nuclear
program. Historically, including in the United States, diplomats, and,
sometimes, relevant Cabinet officials and even heads of state, do not
know exactly what their nations' technical establishments are doing
related to the design and manufacture of capabilities that could be
used to produce nuclear weapons. Iran's decisionmaking structure is
factious and informal, making it extremely difficult to ascertain who
intends to do what.
The doubt I have expressed about our knowledge assumes that Iran
may still be conducting undeclared nuclear activities. Such activities
could include current or planned clandestine work to master uranium
enrichment and/or development of know-how and means to fabricate and
detonate a nuclear device. But it is also possible that Iran, after 18
years of lies, deception, and suspicious behavior, is no longer
conducting nuclear activities beyond those that they have declared. The
International Atomic Energy Agency has a couple more outstanding
questions to resolve and then seems ready to conclude that all of
Iran's declared nuclear activities can be explained and accounted for
consistent with Iran's NPT obligation to limit its nuclear activities
exclusively to peaceful purposes. If no clandestine activity is
occurring, then the International Atomic Energy Agency has a good
picture of Iran's nuclear program.
Recall that UNSCOM inspectors and the IAEA actually developed a
good picture of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
capabilities in the 1990s, and that what was assumed missing from this
picture--namely, WMD in Iraq--turned out not to exist. This is because
Saddam Hussein concluded, after the UNSCOM inspectors had proved their
skill and determination, that he could not get away with hiding illicit
weapons work and that the costs of getting caught were too great.
Considering the previous points, intelligence communities should
test their data against the following scenario. From the late 1980s
through 2004 Iran was secretly developing the full-range of
capabilities and knowledge necessary to have the option to build
nuclear weapons. Many of these activities were undeclared. Most, but
not all of them were exposed between 2002-04 as a result of revelations
by Iranian opposition activists and subsequent investigations by the
IAEA. The revelations of Iranian deceit and deception, and the intense
international condemnation and scrutiny through the IAEA, surprised
Iranian decisionmakers and embarrassed informed Iranian society. Many
elements of Iran's political class did not know anything about the now-
documented illicit activities, and concluded that the people
responsible for getting caught had made stupid mistakes. As more elites
began to pay attention to nuclear issues, they learned about the rules
of the nonproliferation regime, and came to the conclusion that if Iran
had played by the rules and not lied it could have acquired
capabilities to enrich uranium (and later to produce and separate
plutonium). A declared nuclear program playing by the rules would give
Iran nuclear know-how, materiel, and prestige sufficient to satisfy its
interests for the foreseeable future, much as Japan has done with its
nuclear program. Conversely, undeclared, illegal nuclear activities
bring risk of detection that badly damages Iran's prestige, leads to
its isolation, and buttresses its enemies. Therefore, Iranian leaders
could well conclude that, for the time being, Iran should desist from
illicit nuclear activities and play entirely by the rules.
If the intelligence community has not already done so, it should be
tasked specifically to assess whether any inflexion has occurred in
data indicating clandestine nuclear activities. Does the case that Iran
is clandestinely trying to build nuclear weapons rely heavily on
activities occurring prior to 2003? Are there more or fewer data points
indicating clandestine nuclear activities in the 2004-05 period than
there were in previous years? Is there reason to think that Iran has
changed its nuclear strategy--activities and intentions--as a result of
having been exposed and put under pressure not only by the United
States, but also by the European Union and the IAEA?
Paradoxically, it will be easier to handle the Iranian and global
proliferation threats if indicators of illicit Iranian nuclear activity
are rising rather than declining. Rising indicators would heighten the
chances of finding the ``smoking gun'' that would prove Iran's
violation not only of safeguards agreements but of the core commitments
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such proof would destroy Iran's
international credibility and severely damage the internal position of
the decisionmakers responsible in Iran, including the Supreme Leader.
Strong indications of ongoing illicit activity also would strengthen
the case for more rigorously interpreting the rules of the
nonproliferation regime--for freezing further net increases in uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation capability worldwide, and for
putting facilities in current producing countries under international
management.
Conversely, if indicators of illicit nuclear activity in Iran are
decreasing, and Iran has decided to strictly adhere to the rules, then
the nonproliferation challenge may become greater. By complying with
all IAEA requirements, Iran could strengthen the case for preserving
the traditional interpretation of rules regulating nuclear technology.
Iran could rally many other countries to preserve the ``right'' of all
treaty-compliant states to acquire uranium enrichment and/or plutonium
separation capabilities. Iran would find more support for its refusal
to accept demands by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (and the
United States) that Iran revise its nuclear plans and rely on
guaranteed international fuel services rather than national uranium
enrichment and/or plutonium reprocessing. By foregoing illicit
activities, and pursuing nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities in strict
adherence with the rules, Iran would make military attacks by the
United States or Israel much more politically risky.
In other words, if Iranian decisionmakers are clever, they will
bring their nuclear program back into compliance with all international
requirements, play by the rules and insist on outmoded ``rights'' to
develop whatever nuclear technology they want under strict
international monitoring and safeguards, and gradually acquire the
know-how, technology, and materiel necessary to produce nuclear weapons
some day, if a dire strategic threat should arise. This scenario, a
variant of the Japanese model, is very difficult to counter, and could
be a model for states beyond Iran.
What Should Our Strategic Objectives Be?
The most immediate objective in dealing with Iran's nuclear
activities is so important that achieving it alone would be a
tremendous boost to international security: Iran should implement an
agreement to develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy without
acquisition and operation of uranium enrichment and plutonium
separation capabilities. This objective recognizes that it will be
politically impossible to seek Iran's abandonment of nuclear technology
altogether. Neither Iran nor many other states would accept this
objective. On the other hand, this objective seeks greater restrictions
on Iran's nuclear activities than required by traditional readings of
the NPT.
Pursuant to the objective of ending activities related to uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation in Iran, states need to clarify the
definition of which particular technologies states have a ``right'' to
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran, backed by many
countries, including perhaps the United States, argues that the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty gives states the ``right'' to acquire uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities as long as such states
comply fully with their safeguard obligations and do not seek to
acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, if and when the IAEA deems Iran to be in
full compliance with its NPT obligations, Iran will refuse to give up
claimed ``rights'' to enrich uranium and/or separate plutonium. The
problem, in this case, would be the international interpretation of
nuclear ``rights,'' not Iran per se. Thus, while the international
community concentrates now on the specific case of Iran, we must also
establish rules that would apply not only to Iran but to subsequent
cases.\1\ The United States and the IAEA and the United Nations High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change all recognize this need
to prevent construction and operation of new uranium enrichment and
plutonium separation facilities in countries that do not now have such
facilities. IAEA Director General ElBaradei has wisely proposed a
moratorium on construction of new fuel production and reprocessing
facilities. International leaders should apply their energies without
delay to this end. U.S. officials should help by recognizing that major
inducements will have to be offered to win support for new rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ States that might see an interest in moving to acquire fuel
production capability include South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey. Brazil
already is constructing a uranium enrichment plant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Persuading Iran to revise its nuclear plans and substitute
guaranteed international fuel services for nationally produced fuel
production and waste processing will require negotiations, including
with United States participation, indirectly at first. These
negotiations, in turn, will require satisfaction of additional Iranian
and international objectives that are directly related to concerns
about nuclear technology. These other germane objectives are
encompassed in the framework under which France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Iran are currently negotiating. The parties commit
themselves to combat terrorism, to address regional security issues, to
negotiate trade cooperation, and to support democracy in Iraq.
The Decisionmaking Context in Iran
Based on a recent visit to Tehran, and ongoing interactions with
Iranian officials and scholars, I offer the following impressions of
the context in which Iranian leaders will decide how to guide their
nuclear and related policies. These impressions are admittedly limited,
derived from interactions with elites in Tehran ranging from advisors
to conservative politicians, Western-trained scholars, students,
reformers, and current officials. The overall conclusion is that
Iranian decisionmakers feel that their situation is far from desperate.
High oil prices have greatly enhanced national revenue and have
allowed the government to keep popular disaffection manageable.
Infrastructure has improved and parks and public spaces are well kept.
Tehran bustles with activity on the streets and construction all
around. Shops are filled with imported electronic goods. Traffic is
horrendous, even as major roadways and a subway have been added. Young
businessmen are optimistic about their economic prospects, though they
would like various economic reforms to be implemented. Yes, people
complain about the government and the economy, as many do in other
societies, too, but one senses awareness that things could be much
worse.
The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, and the defeat of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, have greatly improved the sense of
security. One cannot overstate the intensity of memories of the 1980-88
war with Iraq. So many Iranian families suffered losses in the war and
experienced the fear of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Walking around
Tehran University I saw walls adorned with posters portraying grotesque
photographs of victims of the war--almost 20 years after hostilities
ended. Iranians are relieved that Saddam and his regime are gone. The
Taliban, too, frightened many Iranians with its violent sectarian Sunni
ideology. Iranians felt (feel) that Sunni extremists, including Osama
bin Laden, are terrorists and that Iran--Shiites--are more immediate
targets than Americans. So the United States intervention in
Afghanistan created welcome results.
As a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the broader
United States campaign for democracy, Iranians feel that Shiites are in
the best position ever to have their rights as a beleaguered minority
protected. Iraq now is led by Shiites (the majority there), but even
where they remain a minority, as in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, they
are gaining opportunities to participate in politics and to have their
rights better protected. The overall impression is that history is
moving in beneficial ways.
Notwithstanding the good news for Shiites in Iraq, it is important
to note that Iranians draw cautionary lessons from the turmoil and
bloodshed there: If Iraq represents regime change and a transition to
democracy, it is frightening. Iranians extrapolate from Iraq not the
danger of sectarian conflict--Iran is much more homogenous--but rather
the danger of partisan bloodletting and chaos reminiscent of the early
years of the Iranian Revolution.
From the above, a general impression forms that Iranians do not
want to rock the political boat--shake it a bit, maybe enough ideally
to throw the office of Religious Leader overboard, but not so much as
to capsize it. This fear of capsizing, of major political upheaval,
gives the impetus to established authorities. Average people realize
this and simply retreat from politics and lower their expectations. The
bloodshed and chaos of Iraq shows how much worse things could be and
leads people to hope somehow for incremental peaceful change. Indeed,
Iran's own revolution shows how much worse things could be. Most
urbanites don't like the idea of Iran being seen as a pariah state--it
rubs off on them as individuals, and limits their freedom of movement
and opportunities to participate in international life. They blame
``the mullahs'' for what frustrates them. Corruption is always
obnoxious, but when religious leaders are corrupt, the injury is
doubled by the hypocrisy of its perpetrators. Still, if the choices are
the existing system or political upheaval, people prefer the existing
system and the hope that a new leader will make it work better.
The greatest fear that most of my interlocutors expressed was of
``radical'' conservatives tied to the Revolutionary Guards and newly
potent factions elected to the Parliament. These elements, many of them
veterans of the Iraq war, are financially and ideologically wedded to
relative autarky. They benefit from Iran's economic isolation and would
lose out if the economy and polity were opened up to international
competition. An example of this group's mentality and interests was the
takeover by Revolutionary Guards of the new Imam Khomeini Airport as it
was due to open. The takeover appeared to be economically motivated--
the occupiers wanted to capture the income from airport services--but
the state's incapacity to resolve the issue for almost 2 years has
demonstrated the limitations not only of the elected leadership's power
but also that of the Religious Leader. The airport still sits vacant
and unused.
Iranians also take some comfort from international antipathy toward
the United States Government. Iranians emphatically welcome visiting
Americans and profess admiration for ``America,'' but they also worry
that the United States Government could act aggressively toward Iran.
Awareness of international disaffection toward the United States
Government (demonstrated in many ways, including international polls)
therefore reduces Iranian fears that the United States would risk
aggression against Iran. Liberal-minded Iranians feel that United
States attacks would unify the nation around the government in Tehran
and set back prospects of gradual reform, including efforts to diminish
the role of the nonelected Supreme Leader.
Finally, consistent with these impressions, Iranian elites see the
``nuclear issue'' primarily in symbolic terms. This is not to diminish
the importance of these perceptions. The nuclear issue in Iran, as in
most countries, is an elite affair. Most people's concerns are much
more immediate, prosaic, and close to home. But for elites, the nuclear
issue is about modernity, prowess, national superiority, and
anticolonialism. Iranian officials insist they are seeking nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes within the rights granted under the
NPT. Most discussants in Iran argue that nuclear weapons would do Iran
little good, but that Iran should acquire nuclear technology in order
to modernize. This is not a detailed, rigorous analysis, but rather a
common equation of nuclear technology with modernity--nuclear
technology proves that a society is smart and advanced. Efforts to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology are seen as colonial
discrimination, an effort to keep Iran from becoming an advanced
country. The fact that the United States and Israel are seen to be
leading the charge against Iran deepens the feeling that inherent
hostility toward Iran is driving the dispute, not specific concerns
about particular Iranian activities. Iranian officials smartly play on
this by offering unprecedented monitoring of their nuclear activities
to prove that Iran is playing by the rules. Rejections of these offers
are seen as evidence that the United States-Israeli axis is determined
to keep Iran down no matter what Iran offers.
This description of how the nuclear issue is seen politically in
Iran does not preclude the possibility that the men actually driving
Iranian technological development and policy have elaborated strategic
plans to make use of a nuclear deterrent. The point is that such
discussions do not feature in the political debate over the issue and
over the negotiations with the EU-3. I have reminded Iranian experts
that the evidence indicates that their country is trying to acquire, at
least, the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and asked, ``what
security benefits would you gain from this capability?'' They tend to
answer that the capability to produce a bomb is enough to deter any of
Iran's regional adversaries from militarily threatening it. They point
out that no one would threaten to attack Japan because Japan can
produce plutonium, has stockpiles of the material, and a full range of
missile capabilities. Iranians say they merely want to exercise the
rights that Japan has exercised in playing by the rules.
If the foregoing gives a sense of the context in which Iranians
will decide which outcomes of negotiations would meet their interests,
one last tactical point should be made. Iranian leaders have been
shaken by the negative attention, pressure, and potential isolation
they have experienced over the nuclear issue in the past 2 years. They
do not want the matter referred to the U.N. Security Council in part
because this would be humiliating--an insult to national pride and to
the leadership's protection of national interests. Ostracism of such a
great nation as Persia--Iran--would be a major set back.
Hence, Iranian leaders see themselves in a contest over isolation
with the United States. Iran loses if the United States rallies the
international community to isolate Iran; Iran wins if it can split the
United States (and Israel) from the international community. The
European Union is the pivotal player here. Whoever ``gets'' the
European Union wins, because a combined United States-European Union
front will likely pick up Russia and be able to isolate Iran. Whereas,
if Europe defects from the United States, Iran will not be isolated.
And, if the United States and the European Union split, Iranians feel
they will be able, eventually, to negotiate an accommodation with the
United States on better terms than if the United States and the
European Union are unified in isolating Iran.
What Should the United States Do, Then?
By definition, United States policy toward Iran over the past 26
years has not worked. Otherwise, you would not be having this hearing.
If we keep doing what we have been doing, we are sure to fail. In order
to influence change in Iran, United States policy has to change, too.
The core failure is the refusal of the executive and legislative
branches to agree that something more than sanctions, hostile rhetoric,
and coercion are necessary to induce Iranian authorities to change
their behavior. United States policy, often driven by congressionally
mandated sanctions, focuses on seeking to inflict pain and loss on
Iran. But Iran, like India, in important ways, is too big, too capable,
too proud, and too important for the United States alone to coerce into
major behavior change. Let me be clear: It would be ideal if the United
States could coerce Iran to change its threatening behavior; but as
realists we must admit regretfully that this ideal condition does not
exist. A more realistic approach is necessary.
Change in U.S. policy should be informed by two key points. First,
the United States cannot, by itself, motivate Iranian leaders to change
their most threatening behavior. We need the cooperation, at least, of
Europe, Israel, and in the nuclear area, of Russia, too, at a minimum.
Second, sanctions, denouncements, and other forms of coercion are
insufficient.
Coercive unilateralism does not work against Iran for reasons that
an alternate strategy should exploit. Iran is by far the largest, most
accomplished Islamic state in greater Middle East. Indeed, its proud
national identity long predates Islam. Persia's magnitude and grandeur
limit Iran's susceptibility to bullying. But this same national
identity does make Iranians averse to pariahdom. Right now, the United
States is the leading bully (paired with Israel), which must be
resisted, but has not rallied enough partners to make the truly
troubling threat of pariahdom real for Iran. A more effective strategy
would play to Iran's national identity and at the same time rally
international cooperation necessary to make Iran a pariah if it acts
threateningly.
Because the threat of isolating Iran is key, the United States, by
definition, must develop strategy and tactics with the states needed to
accomplish isolation. The European Union and the United States, plus
Russia, must build robust mutual trust that none will accept a result
short of Iran's willingness to build a nuclear power program that
relies on guaranteed foreign-fuel services and eschews uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation facilities in Iran. That bottom
line must be immovable; once this is firmly agreed, the European Union,
the United States, and Russia must then be willing to cooperatively
devise incentives to raise Iran's interest in such an arrangement and
disincentives to dissuade Iran from pursuing unsafe nuclear policies.
If Iran perceives a unified European-American-Russian front, it can be
expected to conclude that the benefits of accepting the trade-off or
offer are greater than the costs of becoming isolated by the United
States, Europe, Russia, and other states that would join them.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Transatlantic unity on the issue of removing intermediate-range
nuclear missiles from Europe in the 1980s was the key in persuading
Soviet leaders ultimately to accept the zero-option arrangement that
was codified in the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, an outcome
that in the early 1980s seemed no more likely than a successful
negotiation to persuade Iran to desist from operating facilities that
can produce nuclear weapon fuels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The greatest impediment to this strategy has been United States
unwillingness to provide the European negotiators with commitments that
the United States will provide positive inducements commensurate with
the obligations Iran would have to implement as a result of
negotiations. (Washington's eagerness to provide negative incentives is
well known.) The immediate issue is not whether the United States is
willing to negotiate directly with Iranian authorities, but rather
whether Washington accepts the premise that it is imperative to
negotiate--to give and take--with the current constitutional
authorities in Iran. Europeans can conduct the negotiations, but if the
United States is unwilling to provide positive inducements to Iran,
European negotiators are badly handicapped and Iranian decisionmakers
are unable to calibrate whether their interests can possibly be met
through such negotiations.
While the United States and the European Union (and Russia ideally)
must collaboratively devise sequences of specific positive and negative
incentives, the central elements are obvious.
An Iran that does not threaten its neighbors' security
should be reassured of its own security: The United States
should clarify that if and when Iran stops supporting
organizations that purposely target noncombatants with violence
and stops pursuing technologies vital to the production of
nuclear weapons, then the United States will join the European
Union and other relevant countries in reassuring Iran that its
security interests will be respected, notwithstanding our
ongoing support of the Iranian people's desire for full popular
sovereignty.
Iranians also want to be, and be seen as, the most
technologically advanced state in their neighborhood. The
United States, the European Union, Russia, and others should
demonstrably support Iran's technological ambitions, and
suggest impressive technological collaborations that will be
pursued if Iran desists from acquiring nuclear technologies
that make the world insecure.
Iranians--in the government and outside--feel that the
United States is determined to keep Iran down as a nation, as
payback for the humiliation of the hostage crisis. The United
States should cease holding the Iranian people hostage for the
misdeeds of the nonelected elements of their government, and
instead should demonstrate that it wants the Iranian people to
prosper regardless of their government.
Reducing the sense that the United States is obsessed with bullying
Iran is necessary not only to facilitate nuclear negotiations but also
to encourage political change in Iran. Countries being threatened from
outside are less inclined to transition to peaceful democracy: Security
concerns ``argue'' for strong, if not dominant, roles by militaries or
security services, and make open political competition seem too
uncertain, inefficient, and divisive at a time when unity and strength
are imperative. States facing insecurity tend toward strong central
authority and resistance to dissent or even pluralism. Thus, even if
one believed that the United States could, and should, play a decisive
role in causing regime change in Iran, security reassurance is probably
a precondition. (Frontloaded United States security assurances also
would strengthen European leaders' capacity to get tough if Iran
refuses to eschew uranium enrichment. Anti-American European publics
will give their own governments more latitude to pressure Iran if they
see that the United States actually is trying to be nice.)
In addition to conditional security assurances, the United States
should consider three moves that could dramatically buttress the case
for Iran's relying on international fuel services rather than domestic
uranium enrichment or plutonium separation. These moves would
strengthen Iranian public sentiment toward the United States and throw
hostile factions on the defensive, significantly improving the
political context for the ongoing Iran-European Union negotiations and
the leverage of European Union negotiators.
First, and most dramatically, the United States should demonstrate
its interest in letting historical bygones be bygones by releasing the
Iranian financial assets that have been frozen since the revolution.
The Iranian people, most of whom were born after the revolution, want
to move on and want their old-guard leaders to move on. If the United
States demonstrates that it can get over the revolution, it could
strengthen forces within Iran that would like to abandon revolutionary
institutions, people, policies, and attitudes.
Second, the United States should not renew or tighten sanctions
against non-American entities investing in Iran's oil and gas sectors.
To abandon dangerous nuclear fuel-cycle activities, Iranians must have
confidence that they can rely on international markets and cooperation
in meeting their energy needs. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act has only
strengthened Iranian arguments that indigenous nuclear fuel production
is necessary; by letting these sanctions expire, the United States
would change the terms of the debate in Iran and also gain leverage in
Europe for other forms of pressure on Iran. This is an important
tactical step that only Congress can take.
Third, the United States should not impede development of the
proposed natural gas pipeline that Iran and Pakistan would build to
bring gas to India.
Of course, Iran's own actions will shape these possibilities: Moves
to acquire nuclear weapons, to continue support of terrorism or other
subversive activities against neighboring states will cause
countervailing pressures on Iran that will exacerbate insecurity. To
avoid a vicious insecurity cycle, the United States, Iran, and other
relevant actors must establish a regional security forum in which
relevant parties can redress security dilemmas. Iran needs to hear from
its Arab neighbors how its nuclear program and other policies heighten
their insecurity and make them rely more heavily on the United States.
Iran needs a forum where it can express its security concerns and try
to identify conditions under which the United States military presence
in the region could be reduced. The United States and Iraqis need a
forum where Iraq's security needs, especially against infiltrations,
can be addressed collectively. The European Union could facilitate
formation of such a regional security forum.
A Likely Scenario
I close with a scenario that assumes that the United States will
take none of the steps recommended above (the most likely case). No
later than September, Iran will move toward resuming operation of the
uranium conversion plant at Esfaham, and perhaps resuming tests of
centrifuges. Iranian officials will insist that such activities are
entirely within Iran's rights under the NPT, and that they will be
conducted in accord with IAEA safeguards. They will argue that the
demands being made by Europe exceed any legal requirement, and that
Iran is ending its voluntary suspension of enrichment activity because
certain countries--read the United States and Israel--will never relent
in their attempt to make Iran a backward, weak country. At the behest
of these hostile states, the European Union has rejected Iran's offer
of the most intrusive possible monitoring and inspections of its
nuclear activities. Iran will publish what it has offered and let the
world judge who is being reasonable or not. There is nothing more Iran
can do to demonstrate that it will play by the rules in exercising its
right to nuclear technology. Rather than be bullied by the United
States, Iran must rightfully resume its nuclear program.
The United States will seize on Iran's ending of its suspension and
insist that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom should ``do what
they've promised'' and take Iran to the U.N. Security Council. Popular
opinion and many political figures in these countries will balk.
Officials will leak that the United States was unprepared to take steps
that ``everyone'' knew would be necessary to persuade Iran to accede to
demands that it permanently cease uranium enrichment and plutonium
separation activities. ``How can Iran be expected to give up nuclear
capability if the United States is threatening regime change?'' Many in
Europe and elsewhere will argue that the United States intended all
along to repeat the Iraq scenario and manufacture a case for war
against Iran. As the EU-3 waver about when to refer Iran's case to the
Security Council and what action to take in the Council, Members of the
United States Congress will denounce French perfidy and German
equivocation. Trans-Atlantic recriminations will mount. Developing
countries in the IAEA, and in the United Nations, will decry U.S.-led
efforts to ignore their rights and to impose a new form of nuclear
apartheid.
In Iran, the U.S. Congress's reauthorization of secondary sanctions
and the administration's eagerness to refer the Iran case to the
Security Council, straightaway, will strengthen the feeling that Iran
must hunker down to defend its rights to technological development.
Known political reformers do not dissent. Student demonstrations occur
demanding that Iran not give up its nuclear program. The new Iranian
President takes a defiant stance, and all factions of the Parliament
unite to insist on exercising the ``right'' to enrich uranium. Iranian
leaders will travel to China to sign new deals for investment in Iran's
energy resources.
All the while, Iranian leaders calculate that if the United States,
the European Union, and Russia maintain a united front and somehow
refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the Security Council, Iran can then
reinstate the suspension and return to negotiations with the EU-3 with
a clearer sense of what action members of the Security Council would be
prepared to take against Iran, if any. (If the matter got to the
Security Council, and Iran reinstated the suspension, it would likely
be able to rally significant support for its position against a United
States effort led by Ambassador Bolton.) And if the United States, the
European Union, and Russia split over immediate referral to the
Security Council, then Iran has many tactical options.
Among other things, this scenario suggests that the United States
must augment the European negotiating position by demonstrating that
the United States is not unreasonable or ineluctably hostile to Iran,
and that Iran truly has much to gain by modifying its nuclear program.
As further evidence of reasonableness and moderation, the United States
and Europe need to build a bridge of intermediate steps leading toward
the U.N. Security Council. Going to the Council in one leap is a tactic
too easy for Iran to counter, a bluff that could be called. This
testimony has focused on positive inducements that the United States
should be prepared to offer, in many cases through European
negotiators. But the United States and the EU-3 also need to form a
working group to develop an agreed series of escalatory punitive
measures that could lead up to and beyond referral to the Security
Council. These measures need to be coordinated and multilateral, not
unilateral, as the failure of past and current unilateral U.S.
sanctions indicates. EU officials should tell Iranian officials
privately that the European Union and the United States have devised
such an escalatory plan with international public opinion in mind.
Again, this challenge is ultimately about isolation. U.S.
policymakers must ensure that each step they take, and word they utter,
helps the United States and Europe isolate Iran within the
international community, and Iranian leaders within Iranian society.
United States officials should take no steps or speak no words that
help Iran isolate the United States within the international community.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Perkovich.
We appreciate the fact that the witnesses are all listening
to each other and then supplementing these answers. This is
very helpful.
Dr. Samii.
STATEMENT OF DR. ABBAS WILLIAM SAMII, PH.D., REGIONAL ANALYSIS
COORDINATOR FOR SOUTHWEST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Samii. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much
for giving us this opportunity. As was referred to earlier, the
Iranians are going to be holding their ninth Presidential
election in less than 1 month. But also it is a deeply flawed
process, and one of the problems that you are referring to, not
a problem, but the Constitution, it is a deeply flawed
Constitution, which basically disallows any sort of real
democratic process taking place there.
Iranian's efforts to elect officials and reform the system
have failed to yield results. Unelected institutions and
officials can overrule elected ones. The Iranians have also
tried to express themselves politically through the press,
media, Internet, and so on. All these factors have really
failed to yield any results.
But I have to express some caution here. For us to somehow
expect that there is a democratic movement waiting in the wings
ready to move against the regime with plans for its
replacement, I believe, is unrealistic. The government uses
extensive repression against its opponents. More than 100
mostly proreform publications have been closed down since the
year 2000.
The Internet became a popular source for public expression,
but a crackdown against online journalists began in autumn
2004, with complaints of torture while in prison. And also
forced confessions. The Iranian Government has, of course,
linked these issues with the United States and it blames global
network directed from the United States.
We have very high expectations from young Iranians,
something that has been referred to earlier. Some two-thirds of
the Iranian population is under the age of 30, with 46 million
out of a total population of 69 million. However, there are
only 1.2 million university students. So it would be a mistake,
I believe, to expect a great deal from this group.
These are students. Many of them are politically apathetic.
They are more interested in working and earning a living than
in politics. They are discouraged by these pointless elections
and elected officials who never fulfill their promises. The
impact of this has been a brain drain. Young Iranians love
America. They would love to come here to work and gain a decent
living.
The student groups are disunited. The main student
organization underwent some splits in the year 2000. It
allegedly came back together in May of last year, but the
reality of it is that the split still exists. There are also
government-backed student organizations. Again, the government
uses repression against student leaders, and you have people
getting detained by unaccountable security institutions, a
network of secret prisons, which are very similar to the dirty
war that took place in Argentina in the 1970s.
There have been calls for an election boycott by some of
the student groups. Then we have the exile groups that were
referred to in the earlier session. These exiled leaders and
the groups do not have any measurable backing in Iran. The
Mujahedin Khalq organization, known as the MKO or the MEK, is
hated in Iran for siding with Saddam Hussein's regime during
the Iran-Iraq war.
Human Rights Watch yesterday issued a report about the MKO
entitled, ``No Exit, Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO
camps.'' Nevertheless, the regime is concerned about these
exiled groups. It complains frequently about the MKO personnel
in Iraq and demands their extradition to Iran. Also,
demonstrators in October 2001 chanted the name of Reza Pahlavi,
the son of the former monarch of Iran.
There are practical steps that we can take to help the
democratic process in Iran. We should assist carefully selected
nongovernmental organizations. This kind of assistance can
include the provision of laptop computers, satellite phones,
cell phones, and even fax machines. There is no independent
labor organization in Iran. Collective action is rare and
workers are not free to express themselves.
The United States could play a part in organizing workers
and creating independent unions. Ethnic groups also deserve
attention. They complain of discrimination at the hands of the
state, poor programming by state media, jobs going to Persians,
low-quality schools.
In mid-April, ethnic Arabs in southwest Ahvaz rioted
against the government for almost a week, all because of a
false letter which claimed the government planned to move them
to other parts of the country and bring Persians to their
predominantly Arab region.
Prospective Iranian leaders should be identified and their
travel to the United States or other overseas locations
facilitated. Once outside Iran, they could learn more about the
roles played by NGOs in other countries' transitions to
democracy and receive organizational training. Expatriates who
travel to Iran could organize workshops and conduct training.
Just to summarize very quickly, things like pressure from
other countries does have an influence in Iran, especially if
it is connected with sanctions. The international community
must continue to criticize the politicized court system that
closes newspapers and jails journalists, and also criticism
must come for the legal system in Iran, which discriminates
against women and ethnic and religious minorities. Thank you,
sir.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Samii follows:]
Prepared Statement of Abbas William Samii, Ph.D., Regional Analysis
Coordinator for Southwest Asia and the Middle East, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, Washington, DC
Iranians will vote for a new President on 17 June, and some 1,100
prospective candidates registered from 10-14 May. This will be the
ninth Presidential election since the Islamic revolution of 1979, and
Iran's rulers cite the number of elections as evidence of their
theocracy's democratic nature. But these elections are democratic in
name only. Presidential candidates' qualifications must be approved by
a cleric-dominated body called the Guardians Council. The council's six
clerics are selected by the country's top official, another unelected
cleric known as the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers on the council are
selected by the head of the country's judiciary, another cleric
appointed by the Supreme Leader.
Iranians want a voice in running their own affairs, they want to
determine their own fates, and they want relief from the oppressive
theocracy that runs their country. They tried to achieve these goals by
electing a charismatic dark horse with a relatively liberal reputation
as President in 1997 and re-elected him 4 years later. They also voted
in a parliamentary majority of reformists in 2000. However, Iran's
political system, in which unelected institutions have the power to
overrule the elected officials of the executive and legislative
branches, made it difficult to accomplish anything substantive.
Moreover, a timid President Mohammad Khatami failed to use his popular
mandate to push through the measures that could have democratized the
system.
Iranians' political expression is not restricted to the electoral
process. They frequently demonstrate against injustice and incompetence
on the part of state officials. They expressed themselves in the press,
and when that venue was severely restricted by the authorities, they
turned to the Internet. In a recent development, they are using the
Internet to push for a referendum on the country's Constitution.
These developments may lead observers to expect regime change in
Iran. However, most of the factors necessary for a revolution's success
are absent in Iran. Most importantly, there is no unified democratic
movement that is ready to act against the regime and which has plans
for its replacement. For example, students, who were among the most
vociferous political actors in Iran during the last decade, are members
of several groups with divergent views toward the regime. Nor have any
serious leaders emerged--imprisonment and torture has been used against
a brave few in Iran, and the effectiveness of those in exile is
questionable. Finally, there is no agreement on foreign involvement in
opposition activities--organizers of an online referendum welcome this,
but student leaders and mainstream reformist figures oppose it.
Nevertheless, there are measures that could assist and accelerate
the democratic process in Iran. These include logistical assistance to
nongovernmental organizations, the creation of independent labor
organizations, and identification of, and training for, potential
prodemocracy leaders. Furthermore, the international community should
continue to condemn the Iranian legal system, which closes news
publications on the flimsiest of excuses and which does not grant equal
rights to women nor to ethnic and religious minorities.
STIFLING DISSENT
Iranians' dissatisfaction with the regime is never far from the
surface. Townsmen and villagers demonstrate against inadequate
provision of social services, workers protest over layoffs and factory
closures, and students object to poor facilities. After 25 years in
power, the regime has become quite skilled in dealing with such events.
In some cases it just lets the unrest burn itself out by allowing the
demonstrators to gather, shout some angry slogans, and maybe burn some
buses or break some windows. But the security forces contain the
situation, and calm is restored after people have let off steam.
The unhappiness of some Iranians is not confined to personal and
immediate issues, however. They are also disturbed by the limits on
personal and political freedom. In the face of serious press
restrictions, some express their political views via the Internet,
particularly through Web logs (blogs).
The regime has taken a resolute approach to the Internet
dissidents, combining disinformation and repression. In September 2004
an editorial in Kayhan, a high-circulation daily affiliated with the
Supreme Leader's office, accused Iranian journalists, living in and
outside the country, of participating in a United States controlled and
directed network. This network allegedly shaped and manipulated
information originating in Iran, and then relayed it as news to Europe
and then back to Iran.
Around that time--autumn 2004--a number of the online journalists
and bloggers were arrested. According to Reporters Without Borders and
the bloggers' interviews with a Presidential commission in early 2005,
they were kept in solitary confinement and tortured. They were released
after newspapers published their open letters, in which the online
journalists said they'd seen the error of their ways and expressed
gratitude for the kindness they received while in detention. The online
journalists acknowledged participating in a network that involved
``foreigners and counterrevolutionaries'' who were cooperating with
reformist politicians in Iran and ``fugitives'' who left the country.
The letters of contrition referred to illegal Web sites, and their
authors admitted giving interviews to foreign radio stations.
If the regime cannot get to somebody it will go after his family.
In the case of Netherlands-based online journalist Sina Motallebi, the
authorities arrested his father, Said Motallebi, and released him only
after forbidding him from having any contact with international
organizations or the press.
These measures have been quite effective and appear to have forced
some of the Internet activists to withdraw from politics. ``I am
quitting political work for good in Iran,'' activist Hanif Mazrui said
in the New York Times on 26 December 2004. A former detainee who
requested anonymity told the newspaper that he and some of his
colleagues intend to leave the country. On 10 May 2005, the Aftab-e
Yazd daily newspaper reported that 17 bloggers were acquitted, but the
father of one blogger complained in the 14 May issue of the daily that
his son is still in jail and the authorities have not acted on his case
yet.
ONLINE REFERENDUM
The Internet has proven to be an important new vehicle for public
expression. Persian is reportedly the third-most popular language on
the Web, after English and Chinese. For many young Iranians, the Web
logs (blogs) are a means by which boys and girls can communicate and
discuss topics no more significant than movies and hip-hop music.
Internet use took a more political turn in autumn 2004, when a
group of Iranian dissidents and students called for a referendum on the
country's form of goverment. Their Web site (http://www.60000000.com)
encourages people to sign a petition calling for ``a national
referendum with the free participation of the Iranian people, under the
supervision of appropriate international institutions and observers,
for the drafting of a new Constitution that is compatible with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all its associated
covenants.'' The Committee to Organize a Referendum includes prominent
figures such as Harvard University professor and human rights lawyer
Mehrangiz Kar, national religious activist and former Tehran University
president, Mohammad Maleki, and journalist, Mohsen Sazegara, who is
currently in Washington. Moreover, the involvement of Iranian
expatriates and the international community is being encouraged.
Theoretically, the call for a referendum is not so far-fetched.
Article 59 of the current Iranian Constitution says there can be
recourse to public opinion on important economic, political, social,
and cultural issues by holding a referendum if two-thirds of the
legislature approves of this, and article 177 says the Constitution can
be revised by a referendum if the conditions of article 59 are met.
Realistically, it is very unlikely that the current legislature
would permit a referendum to take place. The majority of sitting
parliamentarians are conservatives, and the younger and more activist
ones tend to dominate political discourse. They owe their posts to the
Constitution and the electoral interference of powerful unelected
bodies. They will not seek to undo the arrangement which brought them
to power.
Moreover, the call for a referendum has generated opposition from
mainstream reformist politicians in Iran. Their preference is for
operating within the current constitutional framework, and they also
argue that the call for a referendum leaves a number of important
questions unanswered. For example, what is the relationship between
mosque and state, and what about rights for religious and ethnic
minorities? An organizer of the referendum told the author in early May
2005 that the reformists' opposition stems from their fear of losing
access to power.
The referendum's objective is 60,000,000 signatures. As of mid-May
it has approximately 36,000. The dispute over the referendum and its
lack of realism is one reason for the low interest in it. Another
reason could be that the regime has blocked access to the Web site.
Possibly reflecting frustration over the lack of progress, an organizer
of the referendum, Ghassem Sholeh Sadi, said two approaches to the June
Presidential election are being considered, the New York Sun reported
on 31 March 2005. The original plan was a boycott, he said, but with
fresh inspiration from events in Kyrgyzstan the election could be
turned into an uprising. He did not explain further.
DISUNITED STUDENTS
Observers inspired by the role of youth movements such as Serbia's
Otpor, Georgia's Kmara, and Ukraine's Pora in those country's
revolutions may have similar expectations from their Iranian
counterparts. Indeed, some two-thirds of the Iranian population is
under the age of 30 (46 million out of a total population of 69
million), there are approximately 1.2 million university students, and
the voting age is 15.
Iranian students have a long history of political activism, and
student demonstrations in Tehran and Tabriz in July 1999 rocked the
country and alarmed the regime. Students in major cities protested in
November 2002 after a provincial court sentenced political activist and
university lecturer Hashem Aghajari to death for blasphemy. There were
more demonstrations in June 2003, as university students reacted to
rumors that they would have to pay tuition. The audience at Student Day
speeches every December has gotten increasingly unruly, and in 2004
President Mohammad Khatami was heckled the entire time.
There are many reasons to be skeptical about the student's
revolutionary potential. Many university places are reserved for
children of war veterans and state officials, and they are unlikely to
oppose the regime outright. For others, economic and professional
issues take precedence over politics. Those who must get a university
place on their own merits face a vigorous and demanding examination
process. Hoping that a college degree will help in the quest for a job
when there is double-digit unemployment, they are unlikely to risk
expulsion. In fact, the Iranian media and the country's officials
occasionally bemoan the continuing ``brain drain,'' as educated young
people seek employment overseas.
Those students who are politically active are not very united. The
best-known student organization, the Office for Fostering Unity
(Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat), split in two in early 2002 because of a
dispute regarding support for President Khatami and the reformists.
This situation persisted until May 2004, when members of the two wings
reportedly decided to reunite and elected a new leadership consisting
of older figures.
Nevertheless, the Iranian media continues to describe the existence
of two separate factions. Indeed, members of the majority wing
organized a sit-in at Amir Kabir University in early May to protest the
holding of political prisoners and actions against student activists.
There is a more radical student organization known as the
``Tabarzadi Group'' (named for its founder, the oft-imprisoned
Heshmatollah Tabarzadi). Furthermore, the regime created the University
Jihad and the Student Basij in the early 1980s to monitor on-campus
political tendencies; 1998 legislation created a Basij unit in every
university.
The regime's formal and informal repressive apparatus also limits
the students' potential. The July 1999 unrest, which was triggered by
the attack of uniformed police and plainclothes vigilantes on a Tehran
University dormitory, came to an end after massive arrests and a threat
by Islamic Revolution Guards Corps commanders to President Khatami that
if he did not calm the situation they would take matters into their own
hands. The June 2003 demonstrations ended only after vigilantes
intervened and police arrested some 4,000 people.
The national police force has taken a new tack since several low-
level officers were tried for their part in the 1999 unrest (this was a
show-trial intended to assuage public anger). Rather than using brute
force to suppress dissent, the police try to keep student protestors
and vigilantes apart. Nevertheless, the vigilantes act with support
from state institutions. Furthermore, unofficial parallel security
institutions that do not answer to any elected branch of the government
have emerged. The threat of violence, therefore, is omnipresent.
``Unknown prisons'' is a phenomenon reminiscent of Argentina's
Dirty War in the 1970s. There are many detention facilities that are
not under the purview of the Prisons, Security, and Correction
Organization. The national police, police precincts, the Armed Forces
Judicial Organization, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the
Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the judiciary, and the Revolutionary
Courts all run separate penal facilities that are free of oversight.
Detainees sometimes disappear into this system and are not heard from
for weeks.
The majority of the detainees are eventually released. But rather
than dismissing the charges against them, the authorities merely
suspend the charges. This means that the charges can be reinstated at
any time and the individual can be arrested again. Moreover,
individuals are arbitrarily summoned for questioning. These actions
serve to intimidate individuals and discourage their activism. There
are notable exceptions to this rule. A photograph of student Ahmad
Batebi waving a bloody shirt was published by major international media
in July 1999, and he was subsequently imprisoned for his role in the
1999 tumult and his comments and actions. He and some other students
are still in jail. This serves as a powerful reminder to other young
Iranians.
Economic prioritization, the lack of organizational unity, and the
constant threat of violence and repression has discouraged many
potential activists. Their activism of 8 years ago has changed, with
the Office for Fostering Unity reportedly urging people not to vote in
the June 2005 Presidential elections, in the hope that this will be
interpreted as a vote against the system.
NO LEADERS
Politically active students and promoters of democracy in Iran face
yet another problem--the absence of leadership. Anybody who is
considered a serious threat is imprisoned. Incarceration and the
accompanying dangers of torture, death, or disappearance tend to
discourage all but the most ardent activists. It is reasonable,
therefore, to look to the Iranian diaspora for a possible leadership
figure, but there are few candidates.
One side of the opposition spectrum is represented by the Mujahedin
Khalq Organization (MKO or MEK) which the U.S. State Department
designated a ``foreign terrorist organization'' in 1997. Still
identified as a terrorist organization, the MKO also is known as the
National Liberation Army of Iran (the militant wing of the MKO), the
People's Mujahedin of Iran, National Council of Resistance, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran, and Muslim Iranian Student's
Society (a front organization used to garner financial support). The EU
designated the MKO's military wing as a terrorist organization in May
2002.
The MKO was created in the 1960s and its ideology combines Islam
and Marxism. It was involved with anti-U.S. terrorism in the 1970s, and
it initially supported the 1978-79 revolution. In June 1981, it staged
an unsuccessful uprising against the Islamic regime; many members were
imprisoned while others fled the country. The MKO transitioned from
being a ``mass movement'' in 1981 to having ``all the main attributes
of a cult'' by mid-1987, Professor Ervand Abrahamian writes in his 1989
book, ``Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin.'' The MKO refers to its
head, Masud Rajavi, in religious terms, calling him the rahbar (leader)
and imam-i hal (present imam).
From its Iraqi exile the MKO attacked the Iranian regime's
leadership: A 1981 bombing killed President Mohammad-Ali Rajai and
Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, in 1992 it attacked 13 Iranian
Embassies, and it is behind other mortar attacks and assassination
attempts in Iran. Former President Saddam Hussein granted the MKO
refuge in Iraq, and it helped Saddam Hussein suppress the 1991
uprisings of Shia in southern Iraq and Kurds in the north, so it is not
very popular in Iraq. The MKO fought Iranian forces in the Iran-Iraq
war, and this has discredited the organization among the Iranian
public.
In May 2003, after Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MKO agreed to turn
over its weapons to U.S. forces, and over time most of them have been
restricted to one location, Camp Ashraf. In July 2004, MKO members in
Iraq were granted ``protected status'' under the Geneva Conventions.
The Iranian Government has repeatedly offered an amnesty to rank-and-
file members if they return to Iran, but the amnesty does not extend to
the organization's leadership. A reluctance to return is
understandable: Many MKO members who were imprisoned in the early 1980s
were tortured into recanting, and for a few months in 1988-89 thousands
of MKO and leftist prisoners were executed. Iranian state media
sporadically reports on groups of former MKO members who have returned,
but it is not clear how they are treated.
Some United States commentators have recommended removing the MKO
from the terrorist list and using it as an armed resistance movement
against Iran. There also are suggestions that MKO personnel should be
cultivated as intelligence assets that might re-energize the reform
movement in Iran. It is unlikely that MKO members would be trusted,
since some reformists fought MKO personnel in the war, others created
the security institutions that hunted them down, and most are part of
the current political system. Furthermore, information provided by the
MKO, which does not have the same objectives as the United States, is
likely to be self-serving and unreliable. Using MKO personnel as a
partisan force is appealing, but association with them will discredit
the United States in Iranians' eyes.
The MKO is just one end of the spectrum. There are other expatriate
leaders who have less of a formal organization. For example, Reza
Pahlavi, son of the last Iranian monarch, appears with some frequency
on satellite television programs broadcast from the United States. In
October 2001 the authorities arrested over 1,000 people for rioting
after Iran lost a World Cup qualifying match in Bahrain. Chanting
``Only Reza Pahlavi'' and egged on by the television broadcasts,
rioters attacked banks, ticket kiosks, public telephones, and traffic
signs, as well as police and public vehicles.
It is impossible to quantify these leaders' impact (i.e., the
number of followers). Furthermore, are those who chanted in favor of
Reza Pahlavi in October 2001 truly monarchists, are they old enough to
recall the monarchy, or were they just reacting to the TV broadcasts
and letting off steam? Regardless, they are an annoyance to the regime,
which arrested hundreds of people in 2001 and mentioned the possibility
of reeducation.
Other exile promoters of regime change are secular communists,
constitutionalists, nationalists, and pan-Iranists. There are
organizations with inspiring names such as the Alliance for Democracy
in Iran, Coalition for Democracy in Iran, and the International
Committee for Transition to Democracy in Iran. This listing is not a
comment about any group's objectives, nor does it reflect the size of
its membership. This is not a comment on how representative the
organizations are, either, because there is no way to independently
confirm the extent of support within Iran.
RESPONDING WITH APATHY
In countries where the government depends on tax revenues to fund
its activities, it is answerable to taxpayers and their elected
representatives. In Iran, the government depends mainly on oil revenues
to operate, and it is the public that is dependent on the state.
Commodities such as cooking oil, meat, rice, and bread are available at
subsidized prices, and subsidized gasoline is among the cheapest in the
world. The country's unemployment rate is estimated to be over 20
percent, and hiring quotas for veterans' families and a privileged few
serve to exacerbate the situation. This dependence tends to discourage
those who would oppose the regime.
Apathy appears to be the overwhelming Iranian response to the
country's political climate, the limits on political expression, and
the threat of repression. After participating in large numbers in the
1997 and 2001 Presidential elections (88 percent and 63 percent
turnout, respectively), 1999 municipal council elections (about 64
percent nationwide), and 2000 parliamentary elections (69 percent),
fewer and fewer voters have turned out as reformers failed to deliver.
The council election of 2003 saw a 50-percent nationwide turnout and in
the major cities of Tehran, Esfaham, Shiraz, and Mashhad turnout was
12-20 percent. In the February 2004 parliamentary election, 51 percent
of eligible voters cast ballots, and 6 percent of the ballots were
spoiled or voided. Defacing ballots is a traditional Iranian way of
showing dissent.
Some Iranian activists want to convert public apathy into political
action by advocating a boycott of the 17 June Presidential election. As
candidates registered from 10-14 May, more than 500 Iranians signed a
letter saying they will not vote because the polls are neither free nor
do they serve the public, Radio Farda reported. An Interior Ministry
official conceded that a possible boycott worries the regime. In fact,
this is a lose-lose situation. If Iranians do not vote, the victory of
a conservative candidate is almost certain. The conservatives have
easily mobilized constituencies, such as conscripts and state
employees, so those who bother voting will back conservative
candidates. If Iranians vote in large numbers, the regime will describe
this as popular support and sign of its legitimacy. In the unlikely
chance that a pro-reform candidate is elected, his or her ability to
implement meaningful changes is sharply curtailed.
THE VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES
The United States wants to help the Iranian people. President
George W. Bush has enunciated America's solidarity with the Iranian
people several times. At his 3 February 2005 State of the Union
Address, for example, Bush said ``And to the Iranian people, I say
tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.''
During his February 2005 tour of Europe, Bush again expressed his
support for Iranians' aspirations. ``We also look for Iran to finally
deliver on promised reform,'' he said. ``The time has arrived for the
Iranian regime to listen to the Iranian people and respect their rights
and join in the movement toward liberty that is taking place all around
them.''
Congress is similarly supportive. The recently introduced ``Iran
Freedom Support Act'' states: ``Congress declares that it should be the
policy of the United States to support independent human rights and
pro-democracy forces in Iran.'' (H.R. 282; 6 January 2005) and
``Congress declares that it should be the policy of the United States
(1) to support efforts by the people of Iran to exercise self-
determination over the form of government of their country, and (2) to
actively support a national referendum in Iran with oversight by
international observers and monitors to certify the integrity and
fairness of the referendum'' (S. 333; 9 February 2005). The legislation
authorizes the White House to assist the advocates of democracy in
Iran, and it calls for increased contacts with ``opposition groups in
Iran.''
These are praiseworthy objectives, and the President's statements
remind Iranians that they are not forgotten and should not lose hope.
However, as the discussion above shows, putting these plans into action
would be very difficult. Nevertheless, there are several practical
steps that can help the democratic process in Iran.
Assistance should go to carefully selected nongovernmental
organizations in Iran. This could include the provision of
laptop computers, satellite phones, cell phones, and even fax
machines. The provision of cash is risky but may be
unavoidable, as in the case of Serbia, relatively small amounts
of funding from the National Endowment for Democracy and the
International Republican Institute helped create Otpor offices
and branches in Belgrade and other cities.
There are no independent labor organizations in Iran. A
state-licensed House of Labor purports to represent workers,
but individuals from the House of Labor attacked the office of
an independent labor syndicate and injured its leaders, Eqbal
daily newspaper reported on 10 May. Furthermore, labor actions
are usually connected with problems at individual workplaces,
such as a factory where workers have not received their wages.
Collective action is rare, and workers are not free to express
themselves. The United States could play a part in organizing
workers and creating independent unions.
Prospective Iranian leaders should be identified and their
travel to the United States or other overseas locations
facilitated. Through no fault of our own, there is no United
States Embassy or consulate in Iran, and Iranians who want to
visit the United States must go to Dubai or Istanbul to request
a visa. The process is slow and potentially expensive for the
applicant, and there is no guarantee of success. Washington
should maintain a list of Iranians whose visa applications are
preapproved. Individuals on this list could be political
figures, journalists, academics, and intellectuals, and even
promising young Iranian students. This would encourage them to
visit the United States. Even if travel to the United States is
not feasible, these individuals could meet with democratic
organizers in international locations. Once outside Iran they
could learn more about the roles played by NGOs in other
countries' transitions to democracy and receive organizational
training. Expatriates who travel to Iran could organize
workshops and conduct training.
Pressure from other countries has an influence in Iran,
especially if it is connected with sanctions. The international
community must continue to criticize the politicized court
system that closes newspapers and jails journalists. These
events have become so commonplace in the last 5 years that they
are rarely mentioned in the Western media. International bodies
should call for the dismissal of the notorious press court
judge, Said Mortazavi, who is responsible for many of the press
closures.
Continuing international criticism must be directed toward
Iran's legal system, where the value of one's testimony and the
extent of one's rights are based on gender. Iranian women must
have the same legal rights as Iranian men. International
criticism of this situation will show Tehran that trying to
justify this situation by attributing it to religious and
cultural peculiarities is unacceptable. Similarly, ethnic and
religious discrimination must face continuing and vocal
condemnation.
Some observers believe Iranians should be left alone to sort out
their own political evolution. This is an appealing thought, and if
there was an infinite amount of time it would have a lot to recommend
it. As Iran comes ever closer to becoming a nuclear power, because its
regime sponsors international terrorism, and because the Iranian
Government continues to interfere in Iraqi affairs, waiting is not an
option. A democratic Iran is far less likely to pursue such destructive
policies.
In conclusion, there are steps the United States can take to hasten
Iran's becoming a democracy. The belief that there is a pre-existing
democratic movement or even an effective opposition group, however, is
inaccurate. And although most Iranians undoubtedly favor independence
and self-determination, assisting individuals rather than organizations
without proper planning will be neither efficient nor effective.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Samii.
I would like to recognize now Senator Biden, distinguished
ranking member, who may have an opportunity to give his opening
statement as well as initiate questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. My
Governor was in town and I am sorry I missed Ambassador Burns'
testimony. I would ask that my opening statement be placed in
the record.
The Chairman. It is placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden. And I will wait my turn for questions, if
you would like to begin. Thank you.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Opening Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
With the dispute over Iran's nuclear program coming to a head, our
hearing today couldn't be more timely.
Iran is threatening to break out of an agreement it reached with
the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Germany last November in
which it committed to halt all uranium enrichment and reprocessing
related activity.
Any breakout by Iran must be met with a swift, firm, and united
response by the United States and our European allies.
Just last week, Europe's strong response to Iran's latest threats
to resume enrichment-related activity caused Tehran to back away from
the brink . . . for the time being.
Mr. Chairman, our diplomacy is facing a serious test. We must
urgently develop, with our European allies, a strategy that will
penalize and isolate Iran should it choose to go down the nuclear path.
At the same time, we should agree on credible security and economic
incentives for Iran should it verifiably abandon its quest for nuclear
weapons. The risks of miscalculation are high on all sides.
Iranians of all political stripes seem to share the desire for
nuclear weapons capability, whatever their differences may be on
domestic policy. Tehran may believe that Europe won't follow through
with penalties because of Iran's geopolitical weight, including its oil
reserves.
Europe has consistently demanded that Iran give up a full nuclear
fuel cycle, but it hasn't said what it will do if Iran doesn't.
For our part, it is not clear to me that we have our diplomatic
ducks in a row. Should Iran be referred to the United Nations Security
Council, have we done the spadework with our European partners, with
Russia, with China, to find common ground?
Unfortunately, the record of our diplomacy has been mixed in recent
years. The Bush administration has vacillated between two very
different approaches. At times it signaled support for regime change.
At other times, it engaged in direct discussions with Tehran over Iraq
and Afghanistan.
I was pleased that the President, after his visit to Europe in
February, decided to explicitly support the EU-3 initiative. This is a
significant development. Previously, the administration had simply
thrown cold water on the EU effort.
There is no guarantee that the EU-3 effort will succeed. But by
backing Europe, the President has made it more likely that a decision
by Iran to break out will isolate Iran, not the United States.
So where do we go from here?
I believe we must urgently develop, with Europe, a more detailed
game plan consisting of European sticks and American carrots. Europe
should be willing to support a gradually escalating set of sanctions if
Iran breaks out of its obligations. The United States should be willing
to offer specific economic and security incentives in exchange for a
tough, verifiable agreement with Iran to give up enrichment and
reprocessing.
The bottom line is this: Neither the United States nor Europe can
succeed on their own. But we have a chance of dissuading Iran from
taking a terrible step if we work together.
I am eager to hear from Secretary Burns on progress that has been
made in forging a common approach with Europe and others.
I also want to get a sense of the administration's priorities. To
me, the most clear and present challenge from Iran is its nuclear
program, but it is far from the only challenge that Iran poses.
The world should lend greater support to the Iranian people's
desire for democracy and freedom. Three years ago, I called for an end
to self-defeating restrictions that prevent United States NGOs from
directing aid to Iranians working for democracy. Those restrictions
inexplicably remain in place, even as the reform movement has been
crushed before our eyes.
Iran's support for terrorist groups that seek to undermine an
Israeli-Palestinian peace is unacceptable and must be confronted.
Also, we are now Iran's neighbor, with over 150,000 combined troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And we are, obviously, directly affected when Iranian hardliners
play an unhelpful role in these countries.
We will have to keep working at these other matters, even as we
deal with the urgent issue of Iran's nuclear programs. It is clear that
we have our work cut out for us.
I look forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will have a 10-minute round on this occasion. Let me
begin by once again summarizing some of the thoughts you have
enunciated so well.
Essentially, we have heard in the committee before that the
United States is held in high esteem, especially by the young
people of Iran. As the foundation and others have conducted
polls elsewhere in the world, asking for approval, disapproval,
frequently the United States does not come out well, depending
upon the question. And that might be true in Iran as a whole.
At least the young people, perhaps two-thirds under 30, tend to
like us, as you have just identified.
Now this leads some people to say, ``Well, if that is the
case, they must not have high regard for the Mullahs,'' the old
people that might be moving off stage in due course. Perhaps
so. But as everybody else universally points out, they are not
in a rebellious mood. They are not appearing to be indigenous
cell groups. Political activity, if there has been any, has
been successfully repressed by the government.
And likewise, they may have the view, as you have expressed
in having taken a look at Iraq next door, that they would not
want to see a repetition of bloodshed, disorder, and so forth.
So, as a result, they may just sort of bumble through in the
process hoping for the best.
The Mullahs, understanding that, may appreciate that they
may not be loved, but on the other hand, they do have leverage
and authority. And some among that group, maybe not all,
likewise, maybe have some desire for an Iranian nuclear weapon,
for whatever reasons. Some may want to go short of that.
Now the problem in all of this is how does this ever
resolve itself in Iranian society without there being
substantial debate, some representative institution, somebody
who can object peacefully, vote, and so forth. This is not
clear. It seems to many Americans that things are drifting
despite the fact that two-thirds of the country might like us
to work through a course of nuclear armament.
So this might lead at least a couple of you to suggest,
well, it is best to consider what happens after they have
weapons. What do we do then under those circumstances? And how
well does the NPT work, or is it around at all at this point?
That conference has not been going particularly well in trying
to define what the NPT is these days.
That is unfortunate. And that might be the result of a part
of our policy of maybe being less definitional about what we
wanted from that conference or from the NPT. But I keep having
a feeling that despite the fact that no one really wanted this
to happen, the drift of affairs is that covertly, despite stops
and starts, there might be some attempt to satisfy the
Europeans or us, that somewhere back in the weeds somebody is
still working with centrifuges, attempting to find somewhere in
the world maybe some fissile material that would hurry up the
process. They might get lucky. Somebody might turn up someday
with some material. There is still some around, unfortunately,
that could make that hastier.
We have been left with this issue, which some of you have
suggested, and which I asked in my first round of comment or
questions today, do we take military action? You suggested that
if we did, it would probably be very unilateral, condemned even
maybe by the United Kingdom, quite apart from the United
Nations or anybody else. But we could say, ``After all, that is
our burden. Too bad others do not step up to the plate, but
nevertheless, somebody has got to do the job.''
But then some say, ``Well, how are we certain? We think
that we know where all of these installations are, including
ones we think have been closed down or delayed. But there might
be ones that may be out there somewhere that are not known to
us.'' And, of course, we do not know all that much, I suspect.
With military action, we cause destruction. We maybe change
the course of events, but we do not really get the job done,
necessarily, with regard to the nuclear weapon, if that was the
point. And some have raised the question, well, how good is our
intelligence? Is it better than pre-Iraq? How confident are we,
as we ask the American people for a declaration of war, that we
are after something here? Well, that is a very good question.
And we all need to be raising those issues as we contemplate
that.
Another prospect has been that we do not necessarily go to
war, but we try to get economic sanctions that are of
sufficient quantity and quality that they make a difference.
Maybe they will. There are some who will say that the Iranians
are sensitive to this. Certainly, they would be sensitive if
the world said that we are not going to buy your oil, period.
We are just stopping it. But we are not optimistic enough to
think the world will come to that conclusion.
In fact, many Americans are either pessimistic or cynical,
believing that a good number of countries in Europe and Russia
have trade relations that are very strong, that their
populations would say, ``Hold on here, and before your foreign
policy gets carried away, there is business to be done. There
is unemployment abounding in Europe. No growth. We need both
the energy plus the commerce.'' So that would tend to mainly
bumble along further in that direction.
In essence, almost all of the signs dictate, although we
may talk about going to the Security Council, we have Secretary
General Kofi Annan saying, caution light here. Members might
not act in concert. As a matter of fact, the Russians and the
Chinese may not like the idea at all, and, therefore, we can
debate the issue. But in terms of effective action, once again,
are we left to go unilaterally or with the coalition of the
willing, or do we have this?
So I am looking for some ray of hope in all of this for our
policymakers. I agree with you that those looking for more
engagement will find that there are some who argue that there
ought to be a great deal more. But if there was, if the United
States was fully engaged with these folks right now, and we got
everybody to agree that we go to the Security Council, and we
are still not sure exactly what is going on back in the weeds
in terms of developments, even while we are talking there, what
is the hope for us in all of this?
Is there a glimmer, at least at the end of the day, that
the right policy might lead to, one, no development of nuclear
weapons in Iran? And second, to an Iran that became a normal
nation, that had some general relationships with us, with the
Europeans, with the rest of the world, that would be, in fact,
a country that was able to work in the Middle East
constructively, in an area where there are all sorts of other
controversies, in which sometimes they become involved.
Can anybody offer a glimmer of hope, a scintilla, at least,
of sunlight to the situation? Dr. Kemp, would you like to try?
Dr. Kemp. Not in the short run, Mr. Chairman, but I do
think that if you look at the big picture over the years, it is
clear that the regime is worried about its own internal
stability for the long term, given the demographics, given the
inability of the economy to truly reform. And here, I would say
parenthetically, I think sanctions have had a significant
impact on deterring foreign direct investment in Iran.
Now, I think one of the dilemmas we have is that there is a
great deal of confusion, both in Iran and, I think, here, about
what we mean by Iran going nuclear. I mean it is one thing for
Iran to develop nuclear weapons, put them on a missile, and
declare like Pakistan and India have, that they are a fully
fledged nuclear power.
It is quite another for Iran to develop all the wherewithal
to fabricate a nuclear warhead, but not physically cross the
line, creating a more ambiguous set of circumstances. My
judgment is that most Iranians support the Iranian Government's
arguments that they make in public, namely, that they have the
right to develop the technology. But I am not sure there has
ever really been a debate in Iran about how good it would be
for them to actually have the bomb.
In fact, you find a lot of Iranians who say we oppose the
idea of the bomb. Indeed, the government opposes the idea of a
bomb, they want the technology. And one of the reasons I think
this great ambiguity exists about this is because the Iranians
themselves have to think through very carefully what impact a
bomb in Iran would have on the neighborhood, and, therefore, on
them. I think it is certainly possible that if Iran gets the
bomb, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and possibly even Turkey, would
reconsider their nonproliferation stances.
Certainly, the smaller gulf states would turn to us for
help. There would be huge downsides for the Iranian regime
getting the bomb. And one of the things we can do, I think, is
to encourage more of a debate in Iran about the benefits they
get from crossing this awful red line.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, you approached your question
the way I was about to. High regard. Regime change not likely.
Nuclear capacity desired pretty much across the board;
acquisition inevitable with that capability. And United States,
Europe should stay the course, but we are not really going to
be able to do anything about it. That is the essence of what I
am getting from you all.
If we go to the Security Council, we may get something we
did not wish for, which we have to basically accept or act
unilaterally militarily. And even then that is another
question, accept this inevitability, which basically says a
nation that openly and recently defies the NPT, it is okay.
There is no downside, which is further undermining this already
shaky regime.
I have three questions. One of the things we do not discuss
a lot, at least in my experience, is the impact of acquisition.
The American people hear us say all the time, it would be a
disaster if the Iranians acquired a nuclear weapon and acquired
the capacity to thrust that nuclear weapon some distance from
their borders in a missile.
But there is very little discussion publically about why
that would be so disastrous for the United States. Some suggest
that the likelihood of the Iranians ever using such a weapon,
knowing they would be annihilated if it were done, that this is
one place where the doctrine of assured destruction still has
relevance.
The other question I want to ask you about is the impact
not only of acquisition, but the impact of threats. We hear
from varying quarters. Those of us who spent a lot of time
focusing on this, and experts like yourselves, intelligence
folks, and a whole array of people, are concerned that threats
do not work very well in Iran. They actually may be
counterproductive in terms of dissuading them from pursuing
this acquisition capability.
And it has been said by some that I respect, that sanctions
have even had a perverse impact of not moving the process
forward.
And so I would like to know what you think about the impact
on U.S. interests with acquisition of a nuclear capability, the
impact of physical threats and sanctions, combined, and I would
like to ask the rhetorical question. You have said, Dr. Kemp,
and others have said, that the regime has a long-term concern
about its own stability, although it is not in jeopardy and the
likelihood of some spontaneous uprising of antiregime forces in
Iran is nonexistent in the minds of almost everyone I have
spoken to at this point. But if there is a long-term concern
about their viability, then why is it not a good idea for us to
focus on short-term efforts that have the effect of delaying
the ability to acquire this technical capability?
Do you speak to people who are very steeped in the
knowledge of the construction of, the acquisition of, the
production of, fissile material and the like? It is not an easy
undertaking, and the Iranians are not particularly close to
that process at this point, according to most people that I
have spoken to.
So, does it make sense for us to seek objectives that have,
if nothing else, the ability to maintain inspectors in place on
their centrifuge system, the one site that we know they have.
Is that a good thing? Does that slow up the process?
And is time on the side of the United States and those who
are concerned about the acquisition of a nuclear capability?
And if it is, how do we push this down the lane so that we move
further in the direction of observing the prospect of Iranian
discontent with the theocracy growing.
There is a lot of questions in there, but acquisition, what
is the impact? Impact of the threats and sanctions. And impact
of us having delay as a strategy, increasing the difficulty, in
terms of time, of acquiring the ability to produce their own
fissile material. Anybody?
Dr. Perkovich. Let me jump in a little bit, Senator. I
think, partly because of what Senator Lugar said and what you
said, that the default position is going to be the buying-time
position. I mean that is kind of where you get led through the
logic that none of the options are great, and the options are
not that great for Iran, and so we will buy some time.
Let me try to address the other two questions. The impact
of acquisition, we can all model ways in which you get a
relatively stable outcome or a bad one. The metaphor for me,
which makes me nervous about it, is the Iranians built a new
airport in Tehran, the Imam Khomeini Airport. The day it was to
open, the revolutionary guards took it over.
It has been there, built, ready to go for, I think, going
on 2 years now. No revenue. No nothing. We have an image of the
Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, who somehow can control
everything. But this inactive airport is not something he
welcomes. They have this airport sitting out there for 2 years
with nothing.
So the concern would be that they acquire a nuclear
capability. Who controls it? By which lines of authority? It is
a very kind of circular difficult governmental structure there
to try to figure out. So that would be a worry about
acquisition.
Last, on the impact of threats. I think you have to have--
--
Senator Biden. Is that the totality of the worry? In other
words, what is the case you make to the American people as to
why this is such an absolute disaster, catastrophic, would
change our security circumstances in a fundamental way if Iran
got a weapon?
Dr. Milhollin. Could I respond to that, sir?
Senator Biden. Yes. Is that not----
Dr. Milhollin. I think that the case of Pakistan is the
best piece of evidence that it would be a catastrophe.
For years we were worried about Pakistan itself becoming a
nuclear power. And during that time, we did not realize that
Pakistan was helping other countries become nuclear powers;
that Pakistan was not just a threat on its own, but it was
proliferating. And so we are going to face that problem with
Iran, also.
In fact, I would say that Iran's knowledge probably brings
us there already. That is, Iran is going to have the ability to
extend the ability to make the bomb beyond itself, and will
probably use it to further its foreign policy goals. Other
countries have. The Chinese have for years. So that is one of
the most powerful arguments behind this, I guess you could say,
``catastrophe'' rubric.
I think there is a second one, and that is that we tend to
think that the delivery capability of a nuclear weapons state
is limited by its missiles or its aircraft. I think after 9/11
we should realize that that is not necessarily so. With Iran's
ties to terrorist groups, with the obvious fact that our
borders are porous, I think if the Iranians had a dozen bombs
and were worried about an imminent war with us, I think they
could get one here without putting it on a missile.
Senator Biden. We are really in trouble with Korea, are we
not, right now?
Dr. Milhollin. Well, I think we are. We do not know how
many SQs, how many significant quantities, how many warhead
quantities North Korea really has, and we do not know where any
of them are.
Senator Biden. We know they have. We are not sure, we think
Iran does not have. But we know North Korea does have.
Dr. Milhollin. Well, we know they have enough material to
make probably eight or nine bombs.
Senator Biden. Right.
Dr. Milhollin. We know that they have worked on making
warheads. We know they have probably received a design that
works perhaps from A.Q. Khan. And we know that somebody can
figure it out. I mean, after all, we figured it out in the
forties.
So, if you are just looking at probabilities, you would
have to say that the North Koreans, if they wanted to, could
probably get one here tomorrow. So, I mean, I do not think we
could ever assume that that was not possible. And as time goes
on, that is going to be with us.
But I think there is a glimmer of hope that if we can
continue the freeze, we might see a change in heart in Iran.
That is what happened in Argentina and Brazil. We slowed their
programs down long enough so that there was a political change
in those countries, and instead of becoming nuclear powers,
they did not.
Senator Biden. It seems to me that this is the only
rational strategy proffered thus far, that if you were
President of the United States yourself all the other
strategies that are talked about seem to be beyond the ability
to accomplish in the near term. The one strategy is if we could
accomplish a freeze, that it buys time. Is there any other
suggestion other than that one?
Dr. Kemp. Not really. I mean the other model that has
sometimes been used, which I happen to think will not work in
the case of Iran, is what is called the Qadhafi model. After
all, here is a man who had all the ingredients for WMD, and
gave them all up, lock, stock, and barrel, but in exchange for
one very important thing, regime survival.
And I think that the only lesson we can learn from that is
that this regime does worry that we are interested in regime
change, and, therefore, the extent they see our strategy is to
delay, delay, delay until they topple. They are more and more
encouraged to accelerate their programs so that they have this
insurance----
Senator Biden. But, is not that argument even more profound
when you say to the extent that they see us threaten, threaten,
threaten, the extent that they see us sanction, sanction,
sanction, they are even more encouraged to move more rapidly?
Dr. Kemp. With one caveat, Senator. I think that they--they
are worried about the idea of joint United States-European
sanctions, possibly joined by Russia, China, and Japan. I think
they would be very worried about the impact of those sort of
sanctions on them. They can live with our unilateral sanctions.
Senator Biden. But you do not think that and I do not think
that and they do not think that. They are wiser than that. I
have not heard a single person realistically suggest that there
will be genuine sanctions in Iran. They are making their deal
with China right now, pretty darn smart, with Russia. They have
their own interests that are related--unlikely to cause Russia
to engage in these overall sanctions.
Are any of you seriously suggesting that you think there is
even a 20-percent chance that Europe, Russia, and China would
engage in a full sanction on no purchase of Iranian oil?
Anybody thinking that? What makes you think they think that?
Dr. Milhollin. Well, I do not think you can rule it out
completely. If you get into a defiance situation where they are
defying U.N. resolutions, you do not know what will happen.
Senator Biden. I will make you a bet. Maybe I have been
around here longer than you. I will make you a bet.
Dr. Milhollin. Well, it is uncertain, obviously.
Dr. Kemp. If there were a global recession where we did not
need their oil, it would be a different story.
Senator Biden. That is true. That is true.
Dr. Perkovich. There is one alternative, Senator, that
falls on what both Senators have said, and that is that if we
made the focus broader, in other words, we are not saying that
only Iran cannot have uranium enrichment or plutonium
separation capability, it is a broader requirement, that would
generate a lot more pressure on them.
For example, ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA,
has proposed a moratorium, a global moratorium on constructing
new facilities. If you could get that, then it adds a lot more
pressure on Iran.
The problem is that we oppose it, the Japanese oppose it,
and the Europeans oppose it, because our nuclear industries do
not want moratoria on those things. So then we are back to----
Senator Biden. Bingo.
Dr. Samii. If I may interject also, if we look in terms of
the Presidential election, we will see that Hashemi Rafsanjani,
the former President, he actually advocated Iran having weapons
of mass destruction back in 1988. So it seems unlikely that if
the front runner is suddenly going to have a sea change,
although it might be a little more discreet about it. The other
conservative leaders for the Presidential election, Larijani,
he has dismissed negotiations with the NPT saying--with the EU,
saying that Iran has given away too much in the negotiation
process. Rezai has pretty much said the same thing. He says the
diplomats are trying hard, but they are not very good at their
jobs. So it seems very unlikely to me that any of these
candidates would give up this nuclear capability.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. I
appreciate listening to the thoughts about the IAEA solution,
NPT, and these other situations. We are all searching for
something that makes some difference in all this.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief here. You have been very patient, all of you.
Let me just ask you to quickly comment on this. I used the
word ``engagement.'' And obviously, a lot of things can fall
under the rubric of engagement. But I think you all understand
what I was driving at here, the question of whether or not you
are sort of relying, to the extent we have become reliant on
the Europeans, to be the principal negotiators in this entire
effort.
Tell me how you feel about this notion of us getting more
directly involved with the Europeans, that is, the United
States more directly involved. I know what the Iranian reaction
has been, but I suspect that were we a bit more aggressive in
pursuing our engagement with Iran, there might be a bit more of
a positive reaction there. And I wonder if you would quickly
give an assessment of that.
Dr. Kemp. Well, I quite agree. I think that unless there is
more direct American engagement, there will be no deal at the
end of the day, because the Europeans cannot come up with
enough carrots for the----
Senator Dodd. Right.
Dr. Kemp [continuing]. Iranians--only the United States
can.
Senator Dodd. Right.
Dr. Kemp. And, therefore, what we have to decide is if we
are prepared to go the extra yard and provide more than just a
few aircraft spare parts. Obviously, we have to put much more
on the table. I do not think the government has decided whether
to do that or not.
Dr. Milhollin. I agree with Mr. Kemp. I think that what we
have to do is put the best offer on the table we can put. The
United States has to think about it, work it out with the
Europeans, and figure out what our best shot is. That is, we
have to calculate what it is that we can afford to offer, what
it is we think the Iranians will take, and we have to give it
our best shot.
If that is insufficient, which probably one would say is
more likely to be the case than not, then, at least, we will
have shown the world that we are willing to go that route and
to explore every possibility short of sanctions or force. And I
think even doing that would improve our position.
Senator Dodd. And it probably would increase the
likelihood--I think your point is made. And the possibility of
getting a sanctions regime imposed will increase dramatically
with our direct involvement, I think.
Dr. Milhollin. Yes. And without that, it is going to be
harder for us to achieve that.
Senator Dodd. I agree.
Dr. Perkovich. I would make a distinction between our
participation, physically, in the negotiations with EU and
Iran, which I think is a bad idea, and what my colleagues have
said, our conveyance to our European colleagues that we would
support and are prepared to provide what they need, whether it
be Presidential statements, economic policies, whatever. Having
us in the room----
Senator Dodd. I was not suggesting that necessarily. I am
talking about more direct U.S. involvement here. You are for
that. You presume that is correct.
Dr. Samii, what are your thoughts on that?
Dr. Samii. Sir, all I can say is that the Iranian
negotiating process, in my opinion, seems to always be one of
demanding a great deal, giving away just a little bit, and when
things seem to come to a standstill, then the Iranians will
give yet a little more ground.
Senator Dodd. Right.
Dr. Samii. But they seem to be trying to get much more out
of it than they are giving up. And I think that will continue
to be the process. Rafsanjani, this morning, said that
basically, the Americans should gradually begin to take
positive actions instead of misbehaving with Iran. They should
not expect to see an immediate big reaction in return for a
small action. When these positive United States actions are
forthcoming, the people of Iran and its government will fuel
that idea that the United States is giving up its hostility.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Samii. So they are always demanding things from us.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Samii. And they do not seem to be giving any ground at
all.
Senator Dodd. No. I understand that. I mean, look, I am not
arguing about who we are dealing with here, and obviously, I
could show you some of the statements being made by Members of
Congress in the last month or so on these issues, and I presume
they are being read widely by Iranian officials from time to
time, too. I am trying to get beyond that a bit.
And the point here, that I think has been made by the
Chairman, by Senator Biden, by all of you, as I have heard you,
is that the best likely outcome here is to have something
happen before the Iranians reach the ability, if they have not
already, to really possess these weapons of mass destruction.
That is our greatest hope, that all the other options we are
talking about are just rife with problems, serious, serious
problems. And the question I had was: Can we rely--can we
outsource, in a sense, our participation in that? Will the
Iranians accept that and agree on some formulation here that
would limit their willingness or ability to acquire these
weapons? So I was curious about your comments on the
engagement.
Let me ask you one other question, if I can, because I am
curious about the change. And by the way, I could not agree
more. I think, Dr. Kemp, you made this point. I think others
have. Certainly, there is tremendous, what I see as a
significant change in the administration's view on the EU-3
effort. And I applaud that. Go back, and people can have fun,
if they want, politically about what was going on before. But I
think we ought to welcome and applaud our very significant
engagement, and the comments this morning of Secretary Burn's
support that.
I guess I am sort of curious, as you are watching this as
people who are very astute observers of this situation, what
are the motivations here? Do we wish success of this effort or
is it more tactical, in your opinion?
Dr. Kemp. My view is that I think there was an appreciation
both in Washington and in Europe, that without this coming
together----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Kemp [continuing]. It would fail. The Europeans would
fail in their approach and we would fail in our options. So it
is the only hope. And it is better to go down together, rather
than to go down divided, because of what follows afterward.
Senator Dodd. Any other----
Dr. Milhollin. I think there was also the factor that the
Europeans assured us that if the deal did flounder that they
would deliver in the sense that they would be willing to go to
the United Nations and they would stand side to side with us in
demanding whatever action was appropriate. That is, I think we
got something in exchange for supporting their position.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Milhollin. Which was a promise by them that they would
support us if the process failed.
Dr. Perkovich. I do not think it was just tactical, because
I do not think we have plan B. So tactical makes sense if you
have plan B that you think is a great plan, but nobody here has
a great idea how we solve the nuclear problem. To suggest that
all of this talk about cooperating with Europe is somehow a
ruse because we have a strategy we really think is going to
work, is rather optimistic.
Senator Dodd. Unless you accept the notion that there are
those who believe that there is quite a military answer to all
of this, in which case you have now gone down the road of the
political diplomatic approach, if you will, and that has
cratered and failed. Thus our options are off the table and we
are left with what Secretary Burns talked on earlier, and that
is saying we would never take any option off the table.
There are those who, I think, embrace that view,
unfortunately, within the administration, but I think I would
be naive to assume otherwise.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Dodd. And
we thank each one of you for staying with us and responding to
our questions and engaging in dialog. I suspect that the
committee will have additional hearings on this topic, because
the subject that we have been discussing today will be with us,
I suspect, for a period of time. And our role is to conduct
oversight, but likewise, to be inquisitive, and to try to be
helpful in the formulation of American foreign policy. You have
made great contributions to that with your testimony this
morning.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]