[Senate Hearing 109-188]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-188
CLIMATE CHANGE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TO
RECEIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING THE CURRENT STATE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE ECONOMICS OF STRATEGIES TO MANAGE CLIMATE
CHANGE
__________
JULY 21, 2005
SEPTEMBER 20, 2005
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
______
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RON WYDEN, Oregon
RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CONRAD BURNS, Montana MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
GORDON SMITH, Oregon KEN SALAZAR, Colorado
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Alex Flint, Staff Director
Judith K. Pensabene, Chief Counsel
Bob Simon, Democratic Staff Director
Sam Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
John Peschke, Professional Staff Member
Jonathan Epstein, Legislative Fellow
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearings:
July 21, 2005................................................ 1
September 20, 2005........................................... 67
STATEMENTS
July 21, 2005
Akaka, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii.................. 8
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................ 4
Bunning, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Kentucky.................... 3
Cantwell, Hon. Maria, U.S. Senator from Washington............... 8
Cicerone, Ralph J., Ph.D., President, National Academy of
Science, and Chairman, National Research Council............... 12
Corzine, Hon. Jon, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.................. 2
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico............. 1
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from California............. 3
Houghton, Sir John, Co-Chairman, Scientific Assessment Working
Group, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, London,
England........................................................ 21
Hurrell, James W., Ph.D., Director, Climate and Global Dynamics
Division, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, CO 35
Martinez, Hon. Mel, U.S. Senator from Florida.................... 5
Molina, Dr. Mario, Professor, University of California, San Diego 30
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska................... 6
Salazar, Hon. Ken, U.S. Senator from Colorado.................... 10
Talent, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Missouri................ 11
September 20, 2005
Akaka, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii.................. 68
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................ 70
Corzine, Hon. Jon, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.................. 69
Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico............. 67
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from California............. 71
Gruenspecht, Howard, Ph.D., Deputy Administrator, Energy
Information Administration, Department of Energy............... 72
Grumet, Jason S., Executive Director, National Commission on
Energy Policy.................................................. 94
Morgenstern, Richard D., Ph.D., Economic and Senior Fellow,
Resources for the Future....................................... 101
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska................... 71
Smith, Anne E., Ph.D., Vice President, CRA International......... 78
Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from Wyoming.................... 70
APPENDIXES
Appendix I
Responses to additional questions................................ 125
Appendix II
Additional material submitted for the record..................... 219
CLIMATE CHANGE
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THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V.
Domenici, chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order. First,
let me thank everyone who is here today. I am sure you know
that this is a very significant hearing and a lot of people in
the audience have strong feelings about it. But we are not here
for any show of strength by anybody in the audience. We know
you are here, but we do not need any audience participation.
And so I hope you will accommodate us in that regard.
I circulated a short list reflecting the fact that we are
going to consider today, if we can--if we get twelve people, I
am going to say it now, so if that happens, Senator Bingaman,
if it is noted at any time, then we are going to proceed with
the five pending nominees. I think you are all aware of them,
but in case you are not, I would ask the staff to circulate to
you their names.
If any Senators want any discussion on them, I would
appreciate it if you would indicate that to me quickly, because
as soon as we have requisite Senators, I am going to ask
Senator Bingaman to move with reference to them. For the
witnesses, that is just our own regular business.
I want to first thank the witnesses for taking time off
their busy schedules to come here to provide us with their
views. I commented to Senator Bingaman, when the energy bill
was being considered on the floor, to have this hearing. It
will not be the last hearing on this subject, but certainly for
our committee, it is the first and it is very important.
At the time we discussed this, Senator Bingaman and I were
engaged in serious discussions about what we might agree should
be done about the issue of climate change. I have come to
accept that something is happening with the earth's climate. I
am aware that many in the scientific community are warning us
that something needs to be done.
I am also aware that there are other qualified members of
the scientific community who do not share those views, and
probably even more who are concerned that anything we do will
significantly affect our economy and even our way of life, and
also suggest that maybe whatever we do will not have any
impact. So as I said, we are going to have additional hearings,
and hear from those witnesses who have different views from
what we are going to hear today.
I believe that prudence warns that we consider this issue,
that we hear from scientists, and we hear from economists about
exactly what the role of humans is in all of this, and what the
impact will be if we decide to address it. And what it might be
if we decide to do nothing. So what, how, who, and when seem,
to me, to be questions that have to be answered in my mind.
These are the questions that this hearing and subsequent
hearings will help me answer. That is what, how, who, and when.
With that, we are going to begin the search for answers.
Many already think the answers are there, and that we should
have already drawn conclusions and acted. I think, however,
everyone knows this is a very, very important scientific issue,
and that the results are very important and solutions are very
important.
I hope this committee understands that we intend to move
ahead with a series of activities that will put us into the
middle of this issue, and then we will see how it comes out.
With that, I yield to my friend and colleague from New
Mexico, Senator Bingaman, who has an opening statement.
[The prepared statements of Senators Corzine, Bunning and
Feinstein follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jon S. Corzine, U.S. Senator From New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for holding this
hearing on one of the most pressing issues facing our planet--climate
change. And Senator Bingaman, you have been a major proponent of
effective climate change policy and I want to thank you for your
leadership in this area.
The world's leading scientists have linked the burning of fossil
fuels to global warming that threatens our environment, our health, and
our future. The threat of global warming is real and needs to be
addressed. I am pleased that a resolution put forth by Senator Bingaman
expressing the sense of the Senate that the Senate must take action to
address climate change recently passed on a bipartisan basis. While
this is a step in the right direction, it is absolutely imperative that
Congress take bigger leaps forward to implement a comprehensive,
thoughtful policy that effectively addresses global warming
Massive amounts of evidence show that average global temperatures
are rising. Part of this increase is natural. Temperatures do vary over
short and long terms. Many opponents of climate change legislation
argue incorrectly that the changes in global temperature are due to
these naturally occurring fluctuations. In an attempt to bolster their
claim they cite a ``medieval heat wave.'' They fail to mention,
however, that scientific documentation distinguishes between natural
climate variability and human induced climate change. Scientists have
conducted a number of studies that indicate the climate change observed
over the 20th century is due to a combination of factors--including
changes in solar radiation, volcanic activity, land-use change, and
increases in atmospheric greenhouse gases. Of these, the increase in
greenhouse gases has been the dominant driver of climate change over
the past few decades. And we have the technology to change that. If we
have the will, we can lower the amount of greenhouse gasses released
into our environment.
I have long been a proponent of legislation that would counter this
problem and encourage reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. My
advocacy on behalf of climate change legislation is not limited to the
current Congress. Senator Brownback and I led the way to passing a
greenhouse gas registry and reporting amendment to the Energy Bills in
the 107th and 108th Congresses. M. Chairman, the current voluntary
programs encourage reductions from only a small group of industry
leaders, and have little to no effect on most of the economy. Despite
these well-intended programs, greenhouse gas emissions have risen on
average one percent per year for the last several years. We can do
better. I am disappointed that the bill passed by the House this
Congress included absolutely no language concerning climate change and
the Senate bill did not include enough. The lack of effective climate
change policy is big part of why I voted against the Senate Energy
Bill.
The potential effects of global warming are dire for my state. If
we do not control climate change, New Jersey could face a receding
coastline along the shore, loss of habitat in our beautiful beach towns
like Cape May, and more extreme weather events such as storms and
flooding. This will also impact New Jersey's economy. If our beaches
are threatened, and our coastline damaged, New Jersey will see an
economic impact of catastrophic proportions. Our second largest
industry, tourism, will be devastated.
This is an issue for New Jersey and the rest of the United States,
but it is also an issue for the world. In fact, the United States lags
far behind all of the G8 countries in addressing climate change.
Thankfully, British Prime Minister Tony Blair made this issue central
in the meeting of the Group of 8. The science is increasingly clear
that greenhouse gas emissions produced by humans are changing the
earth's climate. It is also eminently clear the rest of the
industrialized world understands the danger of this problem. Unless
Congress acts, the effects of global warming may be devastating to the
worldwide economy and environment. Recognition by the Senate that
global warming is indeed a problem is a meaningful and important first
step. However, we can not stop here. Congress needs to act boldly and
pass additional legislation that counters this problem. History will
surely judge this body harshly if we fail to do so.
Again, I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for allowing this
Committee the chance to hear from these witnesses before us about this
crucial topic and I look forward to their testimonies.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Bunning, U.S. Senator From Kentucky
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to the hearing today to
discuss the science behind the changes in our planet's climate. We have
all heard from many scientists about disputes over the scientific
evidence. We could all debate the science of climate change all day and
still not agree on how nature has worked to warm the earth and what
role humans play, if any, in that warming.
We need to be careful of moving too quickly in addressing climate
change. Some groups have proposed mandatory caps; I do not believe they
are the answer. But I think it is clear from the comments of the
witnesses before the committee today that the scientific consensus--at
least in this room--is that the most important action that can be taken
is to immediately move to low emission technology and improve energy
efficiency.
This is precisely what we have done in the Senate. We have been
addressing the climate issue with a variety of immediate-impact
policies. I have authored bills and fought for provisions in the energy
bill to expand Clean Coal Technology. Over half of our nation's
electricity comes from coal power plants and adopting new and cleaner
technology would lead to significant emissions reductions. In fact, the
United States is expected to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 14%
by 2012 without any new regulations on emissions.
We have seen good results in improving energy efficiency in the
last decade. Since 1990, U.S. industry has improved its energy
efficiency by 20%. Our automobiles are becoming more efficient also,
running at a higher fuel efficiency today than they did just a few
years ago.
I thank the witnesses for appearing before the committee today and
appreciate their comments. I look forward to continuing the
conversation on this issue and discussing the entire scope of climate
science.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator From
California
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking you and Senator
Bingaman for holding this hearing. I am extremely pleased that Senator
Domenici, in particular, has recognized that climate change is
happening and that it is time we do something about it.
I hope that this hearing provides the answers that some of my
colleagues are looking for in order to pass a bill that will establish
a mandatory cap on greenhouse gas emissions.
As many of my colleagues know, I was extremely disappointed that
the McCain/Lieberman amendment to the energy bill failed. I believe
that this country must act aggressively today to reduce the impacts of
global warming.
And I think the McCain/Lieberman proposal provides the legislative
framework we need to address climate change.
And the reason I believe that is because it is the only policy out
there that has a real, mandatory cap on greenhouse gas emissions.
The scientists here today will describe what ``business as usual''
will mean in terms of global warming. But I would like to talk about
the impacts of inaction and the huge costs of inaction on my state of
California.
Since 1900, California has warmed by 2 degrees Fahrenheit. Annual
precipitation has decreased over much of the state--by 10 percent to 25
percent in many areas. The Environmental Protection Agency estimates
that the temperature in California could rise by as much as 5 degrees
by the end of this century if the current global warming trends
continue.
Increased temperatures will impact the State's water supplies. The
Sierra Nevada snowpack provides the largest source of water for
California. The snowpack equals about half the storage capacity of all
of California's man-made reservoirs. It is estimated that the shrinking
of the snowpack could eliminate the water source for 16 million
people--equal to all of those in the Los Angeles Basin.
We have already begun to see a decrease in the Sierra Nevada
snowpack due to warmer winter storms that bring more rain than snow and
also cause premature melting of the snowpack.
If just a third of the snow pack is lost, it would mean losing
enough water to serve 8 million households. So this is really a major
problem.
Even if we take strong action now to reduce our greenhouse gas
emissions, it is estimated that 27 percent snowpack will remain in the
Sierras at the end of the century.
However, if we do nothing to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions,
there will only be 11 percent of the snowpack left in the Sierras at
the end of the century. This will be catastrophic not only to
California's water supply, but also to the State's agricultural
industry.
That is why I believe we must take strong action today to curb our
greenhouse gas emissions. I hope that this hearing will convince my
colleagues of that as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
having the hearing. This is something which you and I
discussed, and I particularly appreciate you doing it at this
point, when we are right in the midst of trying to deal with
this comprehensive energy bill that we are in a conference with
the House about.
I do think this climate change issue, greenhouse gas
emissions and climate change, are as significant an issue as we
will deal with in the Congress, and I hope very much that this
hearing, as you say, will be the beginning of a deliberative
process that will lead to a responsible action by us.
I also want to thank the witnesses. We have a very
distinguished group of witnesses that have come, some of them
from a long way to be here. We very much appreciate their going
to the extra trouble of being here. We look forward very much
to their testimony. And as you say, I think the purpose, as I
see this, is to educate all of us on what is possible, what is
needed, what the facts are.
I think this is an issue, like many in our political
process, where there is a tendency for us to jump to
conclusions and preconceived opinions without really adequately
understanding the facts, and hopefully this hearing will help
us avoid that in this case. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Now Senators, we have
now quite a number of you here. I would ask you how you think
we should proceed. I want you to know that both Senator
Bingaman and I have a great number of things to do today, but
we can spend most of the morning here. Senator Bingaman cannot.
Senator Bingaman. No. I can be here all morning. I just
thought that the sooner we get to the witnesses, the better.
The Chairman. In light of the fact that we cannot go on
beyond noon, I would not like to do that, because we cannot be
here, I wonder what your pleasure--would you like to make
opening statements, any Senators on our side?
Senator Martinez. I would like to put my opening statement
on the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mel Martinez, U.S. Senator From Florida
Chairman Domenici, I want to thank you for your willingness to hold
this important hearing today to discuss the economic impacts of climate
change strategies and the current state of scientific research in this
area. Few issues have a greater impact, or enlist the same type of
fervor and passion, as the study of human effects on our global
atmosphere. Climate change was a focal point of debate as the Senate
debated the Energy Bill and we were presented a host of solutions that
many of my colleagues passionately championed to mitigate the impact of
releasing greenhouse gases into the air. Today we will hear testimony
from a cross-section of our national scientific community. According to
the National Academy of Sciences, the mean global surface temperatures
have increased by 0.7 degrees since the early 1970s. There is a growing
consensus that the Earth is in fact warming.
Serious questions, however, still remain on exactly what course of
action we should take. And perhaps more importantly, what are the
ramifications of our decisions? What percentage of this global warming
trend comes from human activity and from naturally occurring climactic
changes? Considering that most energy experts predict phenomenal growth
in the use of fossil fuels from India and China, what type of reduction
can the U.S. make on emissions of CO2 that will
significantly affect global temperatures? And finally, what will it
cost our economy in jobs and lost income to meet global climate
objectives? Unfortunately, we do not have finite answers to these
critical questions.
There have been some in the science community that have tried to
link this warming trend with natural disasters like hurricanes, where
four major disasters have battered Florida in the last 10 months. This
notion was especially strong after the 2004 hurricane season, when
Bonnie, Charley, Frances, and Ivan left a devastating mark on my state
that thousands of people are still struggling to recover from their
ravages. In a recent issue of the Bulletin of the American
Meteorological Society, several respected climatologists, researchers,
and policymakers from the National Hurricane Center, NOAA's Hurricane
Research Division, MIT's Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sciences,
and many others found that ``no connection has been found between
greenhouse gas emissions and the observed behavior of hurricanes.''
Another respected climatologist from Florida State University, Dr.
James O'Brien, has stated that the periodic, oceanic phenomenon of the
Atlantic Ocean Conveyor is the real link between hurricane frequency
and intensity. He went on to say in an article published in the Orlando
Sentinel that ``while it is tempting to blame the frequency or
intensity of hurricanes on man, we all must remember how variable
nature is--and specifically in this case, the effect of natural
variations on hurricanes' intensity and frequency is extremely higher
than the possibility of man's interference.''
Despite the misguided attempts made by some scientists and
researchers, we cannot overlook the legitimate, peer-reviewed work of
climatologists that are rightly concerned about sea levels, the
shrinkage of the polar ice cap, and the impact climate change will have
on habitat and threatened animal species. I come from a very
environmentally conscious state, where a large majority of my
constituents live in coastal areas and are concerned that man-made
climate change could potentially threaten the beaches and estuaries
that make Florida such a unique and beautiful place.
There is no doubt that we cannot ignore this issue and that is why
our President has aggressively pursued record levels of research and
development funding to advance our knowledge on the science of climate
change. The Bush Administration has committed $6 billion in funding,
more than any other nation combined, and has committed to an 18 percent
reduction in greenhouse gas intensity from 2002 through 2012; meeting
this commitment will prevent the release of 500 million metric tons
carbon-equivalent emissions into the air. Most recently, Senators Hagel
and Pryor successfully offered an amendment to the Energy Bill that
would authorize $2 billion in direct loans, loan guarantees and other
incentives for the adoption of technologies that reduce greenhouse gas
intensity while directing a federal effort to implement a national
climate change strategy. The President and the Senate are acting, but
we must continue to push forward.
Again, Mr. Chairman I want to thank you for holding this important
hearing today. It is critical that we closely examine the evidence our
scientific community is providing us on the status of our atmosphere
that help us guide our future actions.
The Chairman. Any other Senators besides Senator Martinez?
Yes, Senator.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make sure
that my opening statement is included as part of the record. As
you know, the State of Alaska is kind of the barometer, the
bellwether, as we are looking at what is happening right now on
the ground as it relates to climate change. I think it is
significant, and I would like to make sure that my full
comments are included as part of the record.
The Chairman. Senator, I understand your very grave concern
about this matter, and it will be made a part of the record,
you are assured.
[The prepared statement of Senator Murkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lisa Murkowski, U.S. Senator From Alaska
I've tried to be brief in the past in my opening statements. I hope
that will buy me some leeway today.
Coming from Alaska, which may be the state most affected in the
U.S. by future climate change, I have a great deal of interest in this
issue.
I start by saying that I have a firm belief that something is going
on out there. There is considerable anecdotal and scientific evidence
from Alaska that we have been in a prolonged warming cycle for the past
three decades.
Last year was the warmest in Alaska in recorded history, with
temperatures averaging 5 degrees above normal.
We've seen a general shrinking in glaciers in Alaska, admittedly
not in itself proof of global warming.
We've seen the extent of the Arctic ice pack fall by at least a
million square kilometers from 1970 to 2000, according to at least five
studies. And we've seen the thickness of the pack ice thin.
We've seen permafrost, the frozen soil mixture that underlies much
of northern Alaska, warm threatening the foundation of roads, buildings
and even pipelines.
Earlier this summer scientists at the University of Alaska found
that lakes in Siberia, and more importantly to me near the Tanana Flats
and on the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska and in the Yukon Territory, are
dropping in size and number because thawing permafrost apparently is
allowing water to seep out.
These changes have resulted in a host of biological impacts:
Perhaps a decline in Alaskan king crab stocks that like cold
water;
An increase in spruce bark beetle infestations that have
claimed more than 6 million acres of Alaska spruce since the
beetles survive better in warmer winters;
We've seen birds move to more northern nesting zones;
And we've had reports from Native North Slope villagers that
subsistence harvests are becoming more difficult for everything
from polar bears and walrus to whales, because of the shrinking
pack ice.
The warming temperatures and receding of the pack ice is
intensifying the effects of winter storms, increasing coastal erosion.
On the North Slope of Alaska in the National Petroleum Reserve there is
a wonderful area for waterfowl nesting north of Teshekpuk Lake. Some
worry the area may be harmed by future oil development. But the far
bigger concern is that coastal erosion will devastate and inundate this
prized breeding, nesting and molting area for waterfowl.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change last year projected
that average global surface temperatures will continue to rise by
between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees centigrade above 1990 levels by the end of
this century. Some models indicate that could translate into a far
higher temperature hike in the high Arctic, especially in winter.
But then we hear from University of Alaska researchers that Arctic/
Beaufort Sea temperatures actually fell last summer for the first time
in 29 years.
The science on why the climate has been warming is far from
conclusive.
How much is simply cyclic?
How much is man-induced?
Is it largely driven by the increase in greenhouse gases?
How much of that rise can we realistically arrest given a growing
global population?
1) Clearly we have seen similar or higher increases in temperatures
in the Arctic, and across the planet, at least on four other occasions
during the past 400,000 years--and none of the previous temperature
changes were caused by man.
2) Climate trends certainly look very different, depending upon the
time scale that is being considered. So much of the fear over climate
is based on data from just the past 100 years--a period when admittedly
carbon dioxide levels have risen, from 280 parts per million before the
industrial revolution to more than 375 ppm today. But what is the
evidence, compared to supposition and theory, that that rise is truly
what is fueling current climate conditions?
3) While the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, sponsored by the
Arctic Council, last year suggested that greenhouse gases are
triggering climate change, there is credible evidence that, as George
Taylor, a climatologist at Oregon State University says, a cyclic
increase in solar radiation and/or the changes in the North Atlantic or
Pacific Decadal Oscillations that affect currents and thus sea surface
air temperatures and ice thicknesses, may really be what's at work.
I am certainly willing to start this debate by acknowledging
climate change, but I still need have not seen the conclusive evidence
that carbon emissions are the sole cause of climate change.
However I am willing to take steps NOW to reduce greenhouse gas
releases, as a prudent measure--recognizing that we don't want to
devastate our economy, harming our ability to pay for environmental
protection.
That is why in the Senate energy bill I co-sponsored an effort by
Senator Hagel to spend up to $4 billion to develop technology to
sequester carbon and reduce its discharge into the atmosphere.
That is one reason why I've been pushing in the energy bill for tax
breaks for pumping CO2 underground to enhance oil recovery.
We keep the carbon out of the atmosphere and increase the production of
our domestic oil by enhanced oil recovery--a true ``win-win'' situation
for the nation, especially if we can capture up to another 42 billion
barrels of oil in the process.
For all these reasons I truly am interested in understanding the
impacts of Sen. Bingaman's proposal, patterned after the National
Commission on Energy Policy.
Last month there wasn't enough time to fully understand the huge
implications of the concept, how it would affect the economy, foreign
output of CO2, the competitiveness of not just our energy
sector but of all industries in America. How the initial credits can be
equitably distributed, how the price for future emission credits may
affect the economy, whether the safety value price--$7 per ton--is so
low compared to European costs that the system really is meaningless,
or whether it will become so high that it will have the negative
impacts that many in industry have complained about.
In a perfect world I might want to give the President's February
2002 voluntary initiative to reduce greenhouse gas intensity more time
to work. (He proposed that we cut greenhouse gas intensity by 18
percent by 2012. A level that would emit 500 million metric tons less
carbon to the atmosphere--a responsible goal.)
But I am open to evidence, that prudence directs us to do more now
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. I have much more I could say about
the cap and trade concept, but for this hearing I'll simply listen and
learn and perhaps speak directly to the proposal during a second round
of questions or at a future hearing.
Thank you Mr. Chairman for your indulgence.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. I appreciate the consistent attention that this
committee has given the issue of climate science and adaptation
to global climate change. In the interest of time, Mr.
Chairman, I will submit my full statement for the record.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. Senator From Hawaii
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this hearing on climate
change and the economics of carbon dioxide controls. I appreciate the
consistent attention that this committee has given to the issue of
climate science and adaptation to global climate change. Since I joined
the committee over 10 years ago, we have held a hearing nearly every
year on the general topic.
There is no denying that carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has
reached higher levels than at any time in the history of the earth. We
are implicated--as human beings and as a nation--for our role in
contributing to the buildup. The burning of fossil fuels has
accelerated the situation for the last hundred years and the U.S.
contributes more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere than any other
nation.
I am particularly concerned for islands in the Pacific. There are
changes in our islands in Hawaii that can only be explained by global
phenomena such as the buildup of carbon dioxide. Globally, sea level
has increased 6 to 14 inches in the last century and it is likely to
rise another 17 to 25 inches by 2100. This would be a one- to two-foot
rise. You can imagine what this might mean to port operators, shoreline
property owners, tourists and residents who use Hawaii's beautiful
beaches, and to island nations and territories in the Pacific whose
highest elevation is between 3 and 100 meters above sea level. A
typhoon or hurricane would be devastating to communities on these
islands, not to mention the low-lying coastal wetlands of the
continental United States.
There is an important, but usually overlooked, issue of
environmental injustice to climate change and sea level rise. In
particular, small island states in the Caribbean, such as Nevis, the
Cayman Islands, and Bonaire; in the Pacific, islands of Vanuatu and the
Marshall Islands; or in the Indian Ocean, the Maldives, will bear the
brunt of climate change in the future, even though they account for
less than one percent of the greenhouse gas emissions that are driving
climate changes.
I have talked about my concerns regarding climate change on the
floor and in this committee. I have urged the U.S. to be a leader in
addressing climate change and carbon emissions. We seem to be mired in
inaction--even though the Senate adopted a resolution affirming the
reality of climate change in the Senate's energy bill, H.R. 6. I have
said in the past that we must not get stuck in estimating the costs of
implementing carbon controls. Inaction may not mean much if you are
high and dry in the nation's Capitol, 90 miles from the Atlantic Ocean.
But if you are surrounded by water, the risk of inaction is very real,
and very frightening.
We need a different plan of action instead of focusing on the
relative costs of carbon containment strategies. I propose that we
embrace the just-passed Senate resolution--meaning that we embrace the
reality of carbon dioxide accumulation--and also embrace the
opportunity to use mandatory controls as a way to grow our economy.
There is no doubt that the engineering communities, think tanks,
universities, Wall Street and the commodity traders, and industry can
pull together to made this an opportunity rather than a bleak picture
of increased regulation and job loss. This can be a national
enterprise, a mobilization to contain carbon growth. I would like to
see a national Commission that would focus on the job growth and
technology investment needed to limit or reduce greenhouse gases, and
the steps needed for a strategy to get there. If we embrace this issue
as a nation, I am convinced that our human resources, technological and
scientific expertise, and ``national will'' can beat it and the U.S.
can act as a leader for the rest of the world in reducing carbon
emissions.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony of the
distinguished witnesses today, and I have some questions for them.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Cantwell?
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, I also submit my statement
for the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator From Washington
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this incredibly important
hearing.
I apologize for not being to be here earlier, I had to attend a
concurrent Commerce Committee markup.
First I would like to commend Senator Bingaman for his leadership
on this issue, and his ongoing efforts to develop a bipartisan
legislative solution to finally begin addressing the enormous challenge
global warming poses our nation and our planet. And I want to thank the
Chairman again for agreeing to undertake this hearings process.
Like many of my colleagues, and most Americans, I have grown
increasingly frustrated that, despite overwhelming scientific consensus
that climate change is real and its consequences will be incredibly
harmful to our economy, Congress and the President have failed to
seriously tackle this issue.
I was disappointed that we passed a thousand page energy bill out
of the Senate, but took a pass on dealing directly with one of the
central energy challenges of our time, the threat of global warming.
But today is essentially a new beginning to this debate--in part,
thanks to the fact that the Senate did unanimously adopt a resolution
committing us to develop a mandatory, national, market-based program to
limit greenhouse gas accumulations. While this is a complex challenge,
we have many of our brightest minds considering how to best structure
such a program. Some of those individuals are testifying before us
today, and I thank them for their work.
We can also learn from the example of our international allies,
many of which have enacted comprehensive programs to begin addressing
this worldwide threat. In addition, 28 states and many cities have
developed detailed climate change action plans and other initiatives to
lower future greenhouse gas emissions.
I am proud that Washington state is one of those states taking the
lead. And we have good reason to do so. As a number of my colleagues on
this Committee are aware, the Pacific Northwest is a region totally
unique in the way our energy system is structured. Our river--the great
Columbia River and its tributaries--is the lifeblood of our economy. It
produces 80 percent of Washington state's electricity. But it is also
the engine of our fishing and farming industries, home to our region's
salmon runs, and impacts almost every sector of our economy including
navigation and recreation.
Given the low emissions-intensity of our energy system, it is a
bitter irony that one of the primary impacts of global warming in the
Pacific Northwest may be to change our rainfall patterns in a way that
could shift the dynamics of our great river and power system. The
Columbia is fed by snowpack, and as a testament to the international
aspects of this debate, its headwaters are located north of our border,
in British Columbia's Selkirk Mountains. Some scientists, like those at
the University of Washington's Climate Impacts Group, believe that
global warming may dramatically impact Northwest snowpack by as much as
35 percent in the next 50 years--compared to the historical averages
for 1950 to 1999.
The Columbia is a river of multiple uses, and as our region has
grown the balancing act has become more difficult. Nevertheless, it is
a balance that can be achieved. I am very concerned, however, about the
threat posed to our system by climate change. A significant and
prolonged shift in our region's precipitation patterns would not only
harm electricity generation, it would also impact billions of dollars
of economic infrastructure associated with irrigation systems,
municipal water supplies, even ski resorts that depend on our historic
snowfall patterns.
I know the Chairman said at the outset that there would be
additional hearings on this matter, and I do hope that climate
adaptation issues--particularly in the Northwest--might be an
additional focus. As we attempt to weigh the right legislative approach
to global warming and the costs of tackling the challenge, we must also
take a holistic view of those costs. The global warming trend, left
unmitigated, could severely damage the economy of a region like mine,
where the health of our river--not to mention the health of our marine
ecosystems--are completely intertwined with the fate of many of our
most important industries.
Again, my state's dynamic highlights the fact that it doesn't
matter where the heat-trapping gases originate, they have an impact all
over the world.
This point was made clear to me when I visited a global atmosphere
monitoring station on the very southern tip of the African continent.
Overlooking the vast ocean toward Antarctica, this little station on a
cliff is able to detect the greenhouse gas emissions generated from all
over the Northern Hemisphere and provide data to help calculate the
warming they are causing.
Mr. Chairman, our nation is responsible for a full quarter of the
burden climate change will cause our world. We are potentially talking
about billions, if not trillions, of dollars in cumulative economic
dislocation, and risking millions of lives in the developing world due
to increased extreme weather events, shifts in disease patterns, and
failure of subsistence farming.
That's why I believe we must act and put in place a comprehensive
program to begin reversing this threat as soon as possible.
We are a problem-solving nation. When we are faced with a grave
threat, we roll up our sleeves, put our heads together, and fix our
problems; we don't push them off on our children and future
generations.
Again, thank you for holding this important hearing.
Senator Cantwell. And if I could inquire if it's your
intention to then vote on the action of the hearing at the time
that we receive a quorum?
The Chairman. The five nominees?
Senator Cantwell. Yes.
The Chairman. Absolutely. But they have to be present all
at one time. So if people leave, that is not going to count. We
have to have 12 present. And then they are already before the
Senate. I have just made them part of the Senate. We have had
hearings. The hearings are closed. We have noted no objection
heretofore, so that is how we will proceed, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. Okay.
The Chairman. Senator Salazar.
Senator Salazar. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thanks,
Senator Bingaman, for this important hearing. And I, too, will
have a statement for the record. Thank you.
The Chairman. All right.
[The prepared statement of Senator Salazar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ken Salazar, U.S. Senator From Colorado
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank you and Senator Bingaman
for your desire to work together in the search for effective climate
change legislation--legislation that will move America in the right
direction by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions.
The issue at hand is an important one. We need to address the
problem of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, and the problem
is growing more urgent every year. We need to find a solution that, as
stated in the Sense of the Senate Resolution passed earlier this year,
``will not significantly harm the United States Economy.'' I am certain
that an economically modest strategy is possible.
The Senate version of the energy bill, currently in conference,
makes some steps forward, by slowly but significantly increasing our
production of renewable fuels and renewable energy. As the Chairman as
already indicated, the Senate Energy bill also includes some important
incentives designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by encouraging
the development of new, clean energy technologies. I sincerely hope
these excellent provisions will remain in the energy bill. These
provisions will serve America well, reducing our greenhouse gas
emissions while strengthening our energy security.
But these provisions will not be enough, and that is why meaningful
climate change legislation is needed. I am looking forward to a
rational, and factual, discussion of the problem at hand. In
particular, the economic panel will address concerns regarding the cost
of climate change legislation and its potential effect on various
industries. There are naysayers, who loudly state that any type of
climate change legislation would be devastating on our economy, but
those individuals are misinformed. I believe industries important to
Colorado and to America--such as coal--will continue to thrive under
good climate change legislation, and I look forward to examining that
further in our discussion here today.
The Chairman. We are ready. Then any other Senators that
arrive--Senator Talent, the issue is: Do you want to make a
statement or put one in the record?
Senator Talent. In the record would be fine, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right. We will do that, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Senator Talent follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James M. Talent, U.S. Senator From Missouri
I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for tackling this very
difficult issue.
Like so many of the issues we seem to be facing recently, climate
change is one where the stakes are high on both sides, a lot of money
and forecasting is involved, and there is considerable disagreement
over the degree of the problem and the likely outcome after all of the
money is spent.
I know a lot of bright minds have spent considerable amounts of
time and effort studying climate change and, while we've been at this a
while, the science is relatively new and still has a ways to go to
produce the kinds of answers we'd all like to have.
Nevertheless, I expect that what we'll hear today is that there's a
broad-based consensus that,
1. over the last 100 or so years, the temperature of the
Earth has risen;
2. over that same period, the concentration of greenhouse
gases such as carbon dioxide has also risen;
3. because of this correlation, there is evidence that at
least some of the temperature rise is attributable to the
burning of fossil fuels; and
4. man, therefore, has some level of ability to mitigate the
warming of the Earth through controlling greenhouse gas
emissions.
I don't necessarily disagree with these conclusions, though what
troubles me is the uncertainty that remains with respect to several key
factors underlying any conclusions on climate change, namely
1. to what degree is the current warming due to the numerous
natural, cyclical changes, some of which are measured over
hundreds or thousands of years;
2. to what degree is the current warming due to the burning
of fossil fuels;
3. how sensitive is the climate to changes in greenhouse gas
concentration; and
4. how accurate are the models and the data inputs.
I am curious as to whether, as the science advances, we find that
predictions of excessive temperature increases are in fact overstated.
In either case, the presence of a fair bit of uncertainty as to
what will in fact happen 50, 75, or 100 years from now, coupled with
the global nature of this issue and its economic ramifications, makes
it much more difficult to heed calls for immediate action on climate
change. This is particularly true since it is apparent to most that the
technology needed to make an appreciable dent in global emissions is
not yet available.
What worries me the most are calls for partial solutions to
problems that are not fully defined. For example, one outcome of this
debate could be that the United States invests billions of dollars to
reduce emissions; this cost drives industry and jobs overseas, harming
our economy while not making any improvement in greenhouse gas
concentrations, as developing countries like China and India replace
the manufacturing formerly done in the U.S. without, of course, any
effort to cut emissions.
If this scenario plays out, we end up losing three times--energy
costs go up, jobs disappear, and global emissions are not reduced at
all. This would be particularly painful if we push for this kind of
change prior to the technology being in place to make it possible
without draconian cuts in fossil fuel use, particularly coal.
In all of this, I am not yet convinced whether we will see any
tangible benefits for the large sums of money that are at stake here. I
understand that there is a time when you must make a decision based on
the best available information. But usually you have some degree of
certainty that the chosen option will work, or at least that you know
its true cost. In this case, I am concerned that there is a great deal
of uncertainty with respect to both the likelihood of success and the
cost to achieve it.
Some view the Kyoto Protocol, which is much more demanding than the
Bingaman proposal, as just the beginning, meaning even greater
emissions cuts must be made. I wonder if anyone has done the math on
the cost for going the whole nine yards and cutting emissions to the
level some say we must get to. I think people are afraid of putting
that number in print.
Nevertheless, our energy bill contains a number of incentives for
voluntarily adopting technology to control emissions both here and
abroad. I'm in favor of this approach because it's working already.
In addition, it's the only way we can bring developing countries
like China and India on board.
The electric industry has taken a number of steps to meet the
Administration's target. Edison Electric Institute's members have
committed to voluntarily reduce GHG emissions intensity by 3-5 percent
in the next decade. Other sectors of the economy made similar
commitments in order to help meet the President's goal of 18 percent.
Specifically, in the last 10 years, they have reduced, avoided, or
sequestered 7 million tons of carbon dioxide system wide and are
committed to doing more. Plus, several utilities, including utilities
in my state, are planning to build new coal fired generators using the
latest proven clean coal technology.
I hope as we go forward we will be able to find solutions that
recognize that economic growth and prosperity are the best means of
achieving environmental protection.
The Chairman. Can we have panel number one come to the
table? Dr. Ralph Cicerone, Dr. Mario Molina, Dr. Jim Hurrell,
Sir John Houghton. Could you tell me your name again, Doctor?
Say it for me.
Sir Houghton. Houghton.
The Chairman. Houghton.
Sir Houghton. Correct.
The Chairman. I will never get it right, but pretty close.
Now I do not have to tell everybody who you are. I would not
have to. But I think it is important that we just quickly state
it.
Dr. Ralph Cicerone is president of the National Academy of
Sciences and chairman of the National Research Council. Dr.
Mario Molina is a professor of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary
Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr.
Hurrell is a scientist with Science Climate and Global
Dynamics. And then our friend from England, Sir Houghton, is
co-chairman of the Scientific Assessment Workshop,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Now we are going to proceed in the order which I called
your names, if you will. We are very interested in what you
have to say. On the other hand, we want everybody on this panel
to have an opportunity to inquire. So with that, would you keep
your statements as brief as possible.
Right now, we will inform each of you that whatever
statement you have brought to us will be made a part of the
record. Having said that, if you can abbreviate, fine. If you
cannot, we expect to let you tell us exactly what you want. And
how you want to say it is up to you. Please proceed. We will go
with you first, Doctor.
Dr. Cicerone. Oh. Okay.
The Chairman. In the order that I called the names.
STATEMENT OF RALPH J. CICERONE, PH.D., PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Dr. Cicerone. Thank you, Senator Domenici. My name is Ralph
Cicerone. I am president of the National Academy of Sciences,
as of about 3 weeks ago. I certainly appreciate the opportunity
to be here. There is no question that energy, energy
technology, energy usage patterns are very central to
implications of climate change. So your attention is certainly
necessary and highly desirable from everybody's point of view.
This morning I would like to summarize briefly the current
state of scientific understanding on climate change, based
largely on findings and recommendations in recent National
Academies reports. These reports are the products of study
processes that bring together leading scientists, engineers,
public health officials, and other experts to provide consensus
readings and advice to the Nation on specific scientific and
technical questions.
The earth is warming. Weather station records and ship-
based observations for about the last 130, 140 years indicate
that global mean surface air temperature increased, just since
the 1970's, about \7/10\ of a degree Fahrenheit. In my written
testimony, which you were kind enough to include, I have a
figure of such data, a graph.
The magnitude of the warming does vary locally and from
region to region. However, the warming trend is spatially
widespread, planetary, and it is consistent with an array of
other evidence, including melting glaciers and ice caps, sea-
level rise, extended growing seasons, and changes in
geographical distributions of plant and animal species.
The ocean, which represents, because of the heat capacity
of water, the largest reservoir of heat in the climate system,
has itself warmed by about .12 degrees Fahrenheit, average down
to 750 feet depth just in the last 12 years. And recent studies
have shown that the observed heat storage in the ocean is
consistent with the expected impacts of the human-enhanced
greenhouse effect.
The observed warming, however, has not proceeded at a
uniform rate. For example, there was a bit of a cooling,
especially in the northern hemisphere from 1940 to 1975,
warming until 1940, and then a much more rapid warming since
the late 1970's.
Laboratory measurements of gases that have been extracted
from dated ice cores have shown that for the last hundreds of
thousands of years changes in temperature have closely tracked
atmospheric carbon dioxide amounts, and that carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere is now at its highest level in 400,000 years, as
it continues to rise.
Nearly all climate scientists today believe that much of
the earth's current warming has been caused by increases in
these greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, mostly from the
burning of fossil fuels. And the degree of confidence in this
conclusion is higher today than it was 10 years ago or even 5
years ago, and yet, uncertainties do remain.
As stated in our 2001 National Academy of Sciences report,
the changes observed over the last several decades are likely
mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule out that
some significant part of these changes also reflects natural
variability.
An example of an area of debate of a natural cause of this
warming has involved a question of whether or not the sun
itself has brightened. Fortunately, in the last 25 years or so,
humans have measured the output of the sun carefully enough,
with enough precision, to shed some light on the question. And
although there are still uncertainties due to stringing
together records from different instruments and different
satellites, the most empirical reading of the record, I
believe, shows that the sun's output has not changed. There has
been no trend, aside from the 11-year cycles which were
previously known. And, therefore, it is much more difficult to
say today that the sun's brightening has been the cause of the
warming. It does not command much credence.
As you know, carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere
for many decades, and some part of the climate system respond
slowly to these changes, so that we can predict confidently
that this warming will continue even though other forces are at
play. And the emissions to be--for the concentrations in the
atmosphere to be stabilized would require a long-term attack on
emissions.
The simulations of future climate change, which I hope that
other witnesses speak about more, are that global surface
temperatures will continue to rise, and that in the coming
century, the present century, the rises could be from 2\1/2\ to
about 10 degrees Fahrenheit above 1990 temperatures.
This range reflects not only uncertainties as to details of
the climate system, but also uncertainties in future human
behavior. How many people will there be? What will our energy
consumption patterns be? And what will our sources of energy
be?
We have discussed in many of our reports remaining
scientific uncertainties, what kinds of research are needed.
One of the most telling is having to do with regional and local
climate changes, where prediction is much more difficult, and
yet it is where people want to know what will happen very
clearly.
The possible changes and the frequency of severe events
like droughts and temperature extremes and water needs and
electrical needs that flow from those extreme events represent
some of the most difficult to predict phenomena.
In my written testimony I go on and summarize more of the
current state of scientific understanding, and give a lot of
references. With your permission I will stop here and be
available to answer any questions that I may. Thank you,
Senator Domenici.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cicerone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ralph J. Cicerone, Ph.D., President,
National Academy of Sciences
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. My name is
Ralph Cicerone, and I am President of the National Academy of Sciences.
Prior to this position, I served as Chancellor of the University of
California at Irvine, where I also held the Daniel G. Aldrich Chair in
Earth System Science. In addition, in 2001 I chaired the National
Academies committee that wrote the report, Climate Change Science: An
Analysis of Some Key Questions, at the request of the White House.
This morning I will summarize briefly the current state of
scientific understanding on climate change, based largely on the
findings and recommendations in recent National Academies' reports.
These reports are the products of a study process that brings together
leading scientists, engineers, public health officials and other
experts to provide consensus advice to the nation on specific
scientific and technical questions.
The Earth is warming. Weather station records and ship-based
observations indicate that global mean surface air temperature
increased about 0.7 F (0.4 C) since the early 1970's (See Figure*).
Although the magnitude of warming varies locally, the warming trend is
spatially widespread and is consistent with an array of other evidence
(including melting glaciers and ice caps, sea level rise, extended
growing seasons, and changes in the geographical distributions of plant
and animal species). The ocean, which represents the largest reservoir
of heat in the climate system, has warmed by about 0.12 F (0.06 C)
averaged over the layer extending from the surface down to 750 feet,
since 1993. Recent studies have shown that the observed heat storage in
the oceans is consistent with expected impacts of a human-enhanced
greenhouse effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The figure has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The observed warming has not proceeded at a uniform rate. Virtually
all the 20th century warming in global surface air temperature occurred
between the early 1900s and the 1940s and from the 1970s until today,
with a slight cooling of the Northern Hemisphere during the interim
decades. The causes of these irregularities and the disparities in the
timing are not completely understood, but the warming trend in global-
average surface temperature observations during the past 30 years is
undoubtedly real and is substantially greater than the average rate of
warming during the 20th century.
Laboratory measurements of gases trapped in dated ice cores have
shown that for hundreds of thousands of years, changes in temperature
have closely tracked atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. Burning
fossil fuel for energy, industrial processes, and transportation
releases carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere is now at its highest level in 400,000 years and continues
to rise.
Nearly all climate scientists today believe that much of Earth's
current warming has been caused by increases in the amount of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, mostly from the burning of fossil
fuels. The degree of confidence in this conclusion is higher today than
it was 10, or even 5 years ago, but uncertainties remain. As stated in
the Academies 2001 report, ``the changes observed over the last several
decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule
out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of
natural variability.''
One area of debate has been the extent to which variations in the
Sun might contribute to recent observed warming trends. The Sun's total
brightness has been measured by a series of satellite-based instruments
for more than two complete 11-year solar cycles. Recent analyses of
these measurements argue against any detectable long-term trend in the
observed brightness to date. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the
Sun has been responsible for the warming observed over the past 25
years.
Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for many decades and
major parts of the climate system respond slowly to changes in
greenhouse gas concentrations. The slow response of the climate system
to increasing greenhouse gases also means that changes and impacts will
continue during the 21st century and beyond, even if emissions were to
be stabilized or reduced in the near future.
Simulations of future climate change project that, by 2100, global
surface temperatures will be from 2.5 to 10.4 F (1.4 to 5.8 C) above
1990 levels. Similar projections of temperature increases, based on
rough calculations and nascent theory, were made in the Academies first
report on climate change published in the late 1970s. Since then,
significant advances in our knowledge of the climate system and our
ability to model and observe it have yielded consistent estimates.
Pinpointing the magnitude of future warming is hindered both by
remaining gaps in understanding the science and by the fact that it is
difficult to predict society's future actions, particularly in the
areas of population growth, economic growth, and energy use practices.
Other scientific uncertainties about future climate change relate
to the regional effects of climate change and how climate change will
affect the frequency and severity of weather events. Although
scientists are starting to forecast regional weather impacts, the level
of confidence is less than it is for global climate projections. In
general, temperature is easier to predict than changes such as
rainfall, storm patterns, and ecosystem impacts.
It is important to recognize however, that while future climate
change and its impacts are inherently uncertain, they are far from
unknown. The combined effects of ice melting and sea water expansion
from ocean warming will likely cause the global average sea-level to
rise by between 0.1 and 0.9 meters between 1990 and 2100. In colder
climates, such warming could bring longer growing seasons and less
severe winters. Those in coastal communities, many in developing
nations, will experience increased flooding due to sea level rise and
are likely to experience more severe storms and surges. In the Arctic
regions, where temperatures have risen more than the global average,
the landscape and ecosystems are being altered rapidly.
The task of mitigating and preparing for the impacts of climate
change will require worldwide collaborative inputs from a wide range of
experts, including natural scientists, engineers, social scientists,
medical scientists, those in government at all levels, business leaders
and economists. Although the scientific understanding of climate change
has advanced significantly in the last several decades, there are still
many unanswered questions. Society faces increasing pressure to decide
how best to respond to climate change and associated global changes,
and applied research in direct support of decision making is needed.
My written testimony describes the current state of scientific
understanding of climate change in more detail, based largely on
important findings and recommendations from a number of recent National
Academies' reports.
THE EARTH IS WARMING
The most striking evidence of a global warming trend are closely
scrutinized data that show a relatively rapid increase in temperature,
particularly over the past 30 years. Weather station records and ship-
based observations indicate that global mean surface air temperature
increased about 0.7 F (0.4 C) since the early 1970's. Although the
magnitude of warming varies locally, the warming trend is spatially
widespread and is consistent with an array of other evidence (e.g.,
melting glaciers and ice caps, sea level rise, extended growing
seasons, and changes in the geographical distributions of plant and
animal species).
The ocean, which represents the largest reservoir of heat in the
climate system, has warmed by about 0.12 F (0.06 C) averaged over the
layer extending from the surface down to 750 feet, since 1993. Recent
studies have shown that the observed heat storage in the oceans is what
would be expected by a human-enhanced greenhouse effect. Indeed,
increased ocean heat content accounts for most of the planetary energy
imbalance (i.e., when the Earth absorbs more energy from the Sun than
it emits back to space) simulated by climate models with mid-range
climate sensitivity.
The observed warming has not proceeded at a uniform rate. Virtually
all the 20th century warming in global surface air temperature occurred
between the early 1900s and the 1940s and since the 1970s, with a
slight cooling of the Northern Hemisphere during the interim decades.
The troposphere warmed much more during the 1970s than during the two
subsequent decades, whereas Earth's surface warmed more during the past
two decades than during the 1970s. The causes of these irregularities
and the disparities in the timing are not completely understood.
A National Academies report released in 2000, Reconciling
Observations of Global Temperature Change, examined different types of
temperature measurements collected from 1979 to 1999 and concluded that
the warming trend in global-average surface temperature observations
during the previous 20 years is undoubtedly real and is substantially
greater than the average rate of warming during the 20th century. The
report concludes that the lower atmosphere actually may have warmed
much less rapidly than the surface from 1979 into the late 1990s, due
both to natural causes (e.g., the sequence of volcanic eruptions that
occurred within this particular 20-year period) and human activities
(e.g., the cooling of the upper part of the troposphere resulting from
ozone depletion in the stratosphere). The report spurred many research
groups to do similar analyses. Satellite observations of middle
troposphere temperatures, after several revisions of the data, now
compare reasonably with observations from surface stations and
radiosondes, although some uncertainties remain.
HUMANS HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON CLIMATE
Laboratory measurements of gases trapped in dated ice cores have
shown that for hundreds of thousands of years, changes in temperature
have closely tracked with atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations.
Burning fossil fuel for energy, industrial processes, and
transportation releases carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere is now at its highest level in 400,000 years
and continues to rise. Nearly all climate scientists today believe that
much of Earth's current warming has been caused by increases in the
amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The degree of confidence
in this conclusion is higher today than it was 10, or even 5 years ago,
but uncertainties remain. As stated in the Academies 2001 report, ``the
changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to
human activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant part of
these changes is also a reflection of natural variability.''
Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for many decades and
major parts of the climate system respond slowly to changes in
greenhouse gas concentrations. The slow response of the climate system
to increasing greenhouse gases also means that changes and impacts will
continue during the 21st century and beyond, even if emissions were to
be stabilized or reduced in the near future.
In order to compare the contributions of the various agents that
affect surface temperature, scientists have devised the concept of
``radiative forcing.'' Radiative forcing is the change in the balance
between radiation (i.e., heat and energy) entering the atmosphere and
radiation going back out. Positive radiative forcings (e.g., due to
excess greenhouse gases) tend on average to warm the Earth, and
negative radiative forcings (e.g., due to volcanic eruptions and many
human-produced aerosols) on average tend to cool the Earth. The
Academies' recent report, Radiative Forcing of Climate Change:
Expanding the Concept and Addressing Uncertainties (2005), takes a
close look at how climate has been changed by a range of forcings. A
key message from the report is that it is important to quantify how
human and natural processes cause changes in climate variables other
than temperature. For example, climate-driven changes in precipitation
in certain regions could have significant impacts on water availability
for agriculture, residential and industrial use, and recreation. Such
regional impacts will be much more noticeable than projected changes in
global average temperature of a degree or more.
One area of debate has been the extent to which variations in the
Sun might contribute to recent observed warming trends. Radiative
Forcing of Climate Change: Expanding the Concept and Addressing
Uncertainties (2005) also summarizes current understanding about this
issue. The Sun's brightness--its total irradiance--has been measured
continuously by a series of satellite-based instruments for more than
two complete 11-year solar cycles. These multiple solar irradiance
datasets have been combined into a composite time series of daily total
solar irradiance from 1979 to the present. Different assumptions about
radiometer performance lead to different reconstructions for the past
two decades. Recent analyses of these measurements, taking into account
instrument calibration offsets and drifts, argue against any detectable
long-term trend in the observed irradiance to date. Likewise, models of
total solar irradiance variability that account for the influences of
solar activity features--dark sunspots and bright faculae--do not
predict a secular change in the past two decades. Thus, it is difficult
to conclude from either measurements or models that the Sun has been
responsible for the warming observed over the past 25 years.
Knowledge of solar irradiance variations is rudimentary prior to
the commencement of continuous space-based irradiance observations in
1979. Models of sunspot and facular influences developed from the
contemporary database have been used to extrapolate daily variations
during the 11-year cycle back to about 1950 using contemporary sunspot
and facular proxies, and with less certainty annually to 1610.
Circumstantial evidence from cosmogenic isotope proxies of solar
activity (14C and 10Be) and plausible variations
in Sun-like stars motivated an assumption of long-term secular
irradiance trends, but recent work questions the evidence from both.
Very recent studies of the long term evolution and transport of
activity features using solar models suggest that secular solar
irradiance variations may be limited in amplitude to about half the
amplitude of the 11-year cycle.
WARMING WILL CONTINUE, BUT ITS IMPACTS ARE DIFFICULT TO PROJECT
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which
involves hundreds of scientists in assessing the state of climate
change science, has estimated that, by 2100, global surface
temperatures will be from 2.5 to 10.4 F (1.4 to 5.8 C) above 1990
levels. Similar projections of temperature increases, based on rough
calculations and nascent theory, were made in the Academies first
report on climate change published in the late 1970s. Since then,
significant advances in our knowledge of the climate system and our
ability to model and observe it have yielded consistent estimates.
Pinpointing the magnitude of future warming is hindered both by
remaining gaps in understanding the science and by the fact that it is
difficult to predict society's future actions, particularly in the
areas of population growth, economic growth, and energy use practices.
One of the major scientific uncertainties is how climate could be
affected by what are known as ``climate feedbacks.'' Feedbacks can
either amplify or dampen the climate response to an initial radiative
forcing. During a feedback process, a change in one variable, such as
carbon dioxide concentration, causes a change in temperature, which
then causes a change in a third variable, such as water vapor, which in
turn causes a further change in temperature. Understanding Climate
Change Feedbacks (2003) looks at what is known and not known about
climate change feedbacks and identifies important research avenues for
improving our understanding.
Other scientific uncertainties relate to the regional effects of
climate change and how climate change will affect the frequency and
severity of weather events. Although scientists are starting to
forecast regional weather impacts, the level of confidence is less than
it is for global climate projections. In general, temperature is easier
to predict than changes such as rainfall, storm patterns, and ecosystem
impacts. It is very likely that increasing global temperatures will
lead to higher maximum temperatures and fewer cold days over most land
areas. Some scientists believe that heat waves such as those
experienced in Chicago and central Europe in recent years will continue
and possibly worsen. The larger and faster the changes in climate, the
more difficult it will be for human and natural systems to adapt
without adverse effects.
There is evidence that the climate has sometimes changed abruptly
in the past--within a decade--and could do so again. Abrupt changes,
for example the Dust Bowl drought of the 1930's displaced hundreds of
thousands of people in the American Great Plains, take place so rapidly
that humans and ecosystems have difficulty adapting to it. Abrupt
Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises (2002) outlines some of the
evidence for and theories of abrupt change. One theory is that melting
ice caps could ``freshen'' the water in the North Atlantic, shutting
down the natural ocean circulation that brings warmer Gulf Stream
waters to the north and cooler waters south again. This shutdown could
make it much cooler in Northern Europe and warmer near the equator.
It is important to recognize that while future climate change and
its impacts are inherently uncertain, they are far from unknown. The
combined effects of ice melting and sea water expansion from ocean
warming will likely cause the global average sea-level to rise by
between 0.1 and 0.9 meters between 1990 and 2100. In colder climates,
such warming could bring longer growing seasons and less severe
winters. Those in coastal communities, many in developing nations, will
experience increased flooding due to sea level rise and are likely to
experience more severe storms and surges. In the Arctic regions, where
temperatures have risen almost twice as much as the global average, the
landscape and ecosystems are being altered rapidly.
OBSERVATIONS AND DATA ARE THE FOUNDATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE
There is nothing more valuable to scientists than the measurements
and observations required to confirm or contradict hypotheses. In
climate sciences, there is a peculiar relation between the scientist
and the data. Whereas other scientific disciplines can run multiple,
controlled experiments, climate scientists must rely on the one
realization that nature provides. Climate change research requires
observations of numerous characteristics of the Earth system over long
periods of time on a global basis. Climate scientists must rely on data
collected by a whole suite of observing systems--from satellites to
surface stations to ocean buoys--operated by various government
agencies and countries as well as climate records from ice cores, tree
rings, corals, and sediments that help reconstruct past change.
COLLECTING AND ARCHIVING DATA TO MEET THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE
Most of the instrumentation and observing systems used to monitor
climate today were established to provide data for other purposes, such
as predicting daily weather; advising farmers; warning of hurricanes,
tornadoes and floods; managing water resources; aiding ocean and air
transportation; and understanding the ocean. However, collecting
climate data is unique because higher precision is often needed in
order to detect climate trends, the observing programs need to be
sustained indefinitely and accommodate changes in observing technology,
and observations are needed at both global scales and at local scales
to serve a range of climate information users.
Every report on climate change produced by the National Academies
in recent years has recommended improvements to climate observing
capabilities. A central theme of the report Adequacy of Climate
Observing Systems (1999) is the need to dramatically upgrade our
climate observing capabilities. The report presents ten climate
monitoring principles that continue to be the basis for designing
climate observing systems, including management of network change,
careful calibration, continuity of data collection, and documentation
to ensure that meaningful trends can be derived.
Another key concept for climate change science is the ability to
generate, analyze, and archive long-term climate data records (CDRs)
for assessing the state of the environment in perpetuity. In Climate
Data Records from Environmental Satellites (2004), a climate data
record is defined as a time series of measurements of sufficient
length, consistency, and continuity to determine climate variability
and change. The report identifies several elements of successful
climate data record generation programs, ranging from effective, expert
leadership to long-term commitment to sustaining the observations and
archives.
INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ON CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH MODELS
An important concept that emerged from early climate science in the
1980s was that Earth's climate is not just a collection of long-term
weather statistics, but rather the complex interactions or
``couplings'' of the atmosphere, the ocean, the land, and plant and
animal life. Climate models are built using our best scientific
knowledge, first modeling each process component separately and then
linking them together to simulate these couplings.
Climate models are important tools for understanding how the
climate operates today, how it may have functioned differently in the
past, and how it may evolve in the future in response to forcings from
both natural processes and human activities. Climate scientists can
deal with uncertainty about future climate by running models with
different assumptions of future population growth, economic
development, energy use, and policy choices, such as those that affect
air quality or influence how nations share technology. Models then
offer a range of outcomes based on these different assumptions.
MODELING CAPABILITY AND ACCURACY
Since the first climate models were pioneered in the 1970s, the
accuracy of models has improved as the number and quality of
observations and data have increased, as computational abilities have
multiplied, and as our theoretical understanding of the climate system
has improved. Whereas early attempts at modeling used relatively crude
representations of the climate, today's models have very sophisticated
and carefully tested treatment of hundreds of climate processes.
The National Academies' report Improving Effectiveness of U.S.
Climate Modeling (2001) offers several recommendations for
strengthening climate modeling capabilities, some of which have already
been adopted in the United States. At the time the report was
published, U.S. modeling capabilities were lagging behind some other
countries. The report identified a shortfall in computing facilities
and highly skilled technical workers devoted to climate modeling.
Federal agencies have begun to centralize their support for climate
modeling efforts at the National Center for Atmospheric Research and
the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory. However, the U.S. could
still improve the amount of resources it puts toward climate modeling
as recommended in Planning Climate and Global Change Research (2003).
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS WILL BE UNEVEN
There will be winners and losers from the impacts of climate
change, even within a single region, but globally the losses are
expected to outweigh the benefits. The regions that will be most
severely affected are often the regions that are the least able to
adapt. For example, Bangladesh, one of the poorest nations in the
world, is projected to lose 17.5% of its land if sea level rises about
40 inches (1 m), displacing tens of thousands of people. Several
islands throughout the South Pacific and Indian Oceans will beat
similar risk of increased flooding and vulnerability to storm surges.
Coastal flooding likely will threaten animals, plants, and fresh water
supplies. Tourism and local agriculture could be severely challenged.
Wetland and coastal areas of many developed nations including
United States are also threatened. For example, parts of New Orleans
are as much as eight feet below sea level today. However, wealthy
countries are much more able to adapt to sea level rise and threats to
agriculture. Solutions could include building, limiting or changing
construction codes in coastal zones, and developing new agricultural
technologies.
The Arctic has warmed at a faster rate than the Northern Hemisphere
over the past century. A Vision for the International Polar Year 2007-
2008 (2004) reports that this warming is associated with a number of
impacts including: melting of sea ice, which has important impacts on
biological systems such as polar bears, ice-dependent seals, and local
people for whom these animals are a source of food; increased snow and
rainfall, leading to changes in river discharge and tundra vegetation;
and degradation of the permafrost.
PREPARING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
One way to begin preparing for climate change is to make the wealth
of climate data and information already collected more accessible to a
range of users who could apply it to inform their decisions. Such
efforts, often called ``climate services,'' are analogous to the
efforts of the National Weather Service to provide useful weather
information. Climate is becoming increasingly important to public and
private decision making in various fields such as emergency management
planning, water quality, insurance premiums, irrigation and power
production decisions, and construction schedules. A Climate Services
Vision (2001) outlines principles for improving climate services that
include making climate data as user-friendly as weather services are
today, and active and well-defined connections among the government
agencies, businesses, and universities involved in climate change data
collection and research.
Another avenue would be to develop practical strategies that could
be used to reduce economic and ecological systems' vulnerabilities to
change. Such ``no-regrets'' strategies, recommended in Abrupt Climate
Change: Inevitable Surprises (2002), provide benefits whether a
significant climate change ultimately occurs or not, potentially
reducing vulnerability at little or no net cost. No-regrets measures
could include low-cost steps to: improve climate forecasting; slow
biodiversity loss; improve water, land, and air quality; and make
institutions--such as the health care enterprise, financial markets,
and transportation systems--more resilient to major disruptions.
REDUCING THE CAUSES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The climate change statement issued in June 2005 by 11 science
academies, including the National Academy of Sciences, stated that
despite remaining unanswered questions, the scientific understanding of
climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking
cost-effective steps that will contribute to substantial and long-term
reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions. Because carbon
dioxide and some other greenhouse gases can remain in the atmosphere
for many decades and major parts of the climate system respond slowly
to changes in greenhouse gas concentrations, climate change impacts
will likely continue throughout the 21st century and beyond. Failure to
implement significant reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions now
will make the job much harder in the future--both in terms of
stabilizing their atmospheric abundances and in terms of experiencing
more significant impacts.
At the present time there is no single solution that can eliminate
future warming. As early as 1992, Policy Implications of Greenhouse
Warming found that there are many potentially cost-effective
technological options that could contribute to stabilizing greenhouse
gas concentrations.
MEETING ENERGY NEEDS IS A MAJOR CHALLENGE TO SLOWING CLIMATE CHANGE
Energy--either in the form of fuels used directly (i.e., gasoline)
or as electricity produced using various fuels (fossil fuels as well as
nuclear, solar, wind, and others)--is essential for all sectors of the
economy, including industry, commerce, homes, and transportation.
Energy use worldwide continues to grow with economic and population
growth. Developing countries, China and India in particular, are
rapidly increasing their use of energy, primarily from fossil fuels,
and consequently their emissions of CO2. Carbon emissions
from energy can be reduced by using it more efficiently or by switching
to alternative fuels. It also may be possible to capture carbon
emissions from electric generating plants and then sequester them.
Energy efficiency in all sectors of the U.S. economy could be
improved. The 2002 National Academies' report, Effectiveness and Impact
of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, evaluates car and
light truck fuel use and analyzes how fuel economy could be improved.
Steps range from improved engine lubrication to hybrid vehicles. The
2001 Academies report, Energy Research at DOE, Was It Worth It?
addresses the benefits of increasing the energy efficiency of lighting,
refrigerators and other appliances. Many of these improvements (e.g.,
high-efficiency refrigerators) are cost-effective means to
significantly reducing energy use, but are being held back by market
constraints such as consumer awareness, higher initial costs, or by the
lack of effective policy.
Electricity can be produced without significant carbon emissions
using nuclear power and renewable energy technologies (e.g., solar,
wind, and biomass). In the United States, these technologies are too
expensive or have environmental or other concerns that limit broad
application, but that could change with technology development or if
the costs of fossil fuels increase. Replacing coal-fired electric power
plants with more efficient, modern natural-gas-fired turbines would
reduce carbon emissions per unit of electricity produced.
Several technologies are being explored that would collect CO2
that would otherwise be emitted to the atmosphere from fossil-fuel-
fired power plants, and then sequester it in the ground or the ocean.
Successful, cost-effective sequestration technologies would weaken the
link between fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions. The 2003
National Academies' report, Novel Approaches to Carbon Management:
Separation, Capture, Sequestration, and Conversion to Useful Products,
discusses the development of this technology.
Capturing CO2 emissions from the tailpipes of vehicles
is essentially impossible, which is one factor that has led to
considerable interest in hydrogen as a fuel. As with electricity,
hydrogen must be manufactured from primary energy sources.
Significantly reducing carbon emissions when producing hydrogen from
fossil fuels (currently the least expensive method) would require
carbon capture and sequestration. Substantial technological and
economic barriers in all phases of the hydrogen fuel cycle must first
be addressed through research and development. The 2004 National
Academies' report, The Hydrogen Economy: Opportunities, Costs, Barriers
and R&D Needs, presents a strategy that could lead eventually to
production of hydrogen from a variety of domestic sources--such as coal
(with carbon sequestration), nuclear power, wind, or photo-biological
processes--and efficient use in fuel cell vehicles.
CONTINUED SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS TO ADDRESS A CHANGING CLIMATE
The task of mitigating and preparing for the impacts of climate
change will require worldwide collaborative inputs from a wide range of
experts, including natural scientists, engineers, social scientists,
medical scientists, those in government at all levels, business
leaders, and economists. Although the scientific understanding of
climate change has advanced significantly in the last several decades,
there are still many unanswered questions. Society faces increasing
pressure to decide how best to respond to climate change and associated
global changes, and applied research in direct support of decision
making is needed.
The Chairman. We are going to take Sir John Houghton next,
even though I stated otherwise. Please proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF SIR JOHN HOUGHTON, CO-CHAIRMAN,
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, LONDON, ENGLAND
Sir Houghton. Thank you very much, indeed. I consider it a
privilege to be asked to testify to your committee this
morning. Thank you for inviting me.
On my last visit to the United States in March I was
briefing the National Association of Evangelicals, though a
different body, and was most pleased to find that large and
influential body engaging with this issue of global climate
change, which is the most serious environmental issue which is
facing the world today.
Regarding the science of human-induced climate change as
currently understood, it is actually summarized succinctly in
last month's resolution in the Senate, which states that the
major impacts will come through sea level rise and through
increases in the frequency and the intensity of extreme events,
such as droughts and floods. Those are the most damaging
disasters the world knows.
An example of an extreme for which we can say with some
certainty that the growth of greenhouse gases was largely
responsible is the European heat wave in the summer of 2003
that lead to the deaths of over 20,000 people.
I said more about the science in my written evidence. Here,
I would like to say a little more about the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, which is the source of much of the
scientific information that we have, and about which a lot of
misinformation has been propagated.
I had the privilege of being chairman or co-chairman of the
Panel of Scientific Assessments from its formation in 1988 to
2002. The IPCC's latest report in 2001, it is in four volumes,
each of 1,000 pages each, contains many thousands of references
to the scientific literature. And many hundreds of scientists
were involved in the writing and review processes.
The report went through two major reviews, first by
scientists. And any scientist, who wished, could take part. And
second, by governments. No assessments on any other scientific
topic has been so thoroughly researched and reviewed.
IPCC reports are being produced in a very open process
under the discipline of science, where honesty and balance are
hallmarks of that discipline. Influence from personal or
political agendas were ruled out, and I made absolutely sure of
that in my role as chairman. We had many days of lively debate,
and scientists, of course, are their own best critics.
I remember, after a very hectic meeting, at the end of one
of our reports, two scientists from the aviation industry who
were joined as lead authors for that report, came to me and
expressed their delight with the IPCC experience. They said
never had they before been involved in a report for which the
conclusions were not known before it was written.
Very strong endorsement has been given to the IPCC from the
world's scientific community. Last month, in a completely
unprecedented action, a statement was issued by the science
academies of all the G8 countries, together with the academies
of Brazil, China, and India, endorsing the IPCC's work and
conclusions. With that strong statement from the world's
leading scientists, there can be no doubt about the reality and
seriousness of human-induced climate change.
One of the main tasks of the IPCC has to be distinguished
between what is well known and understood from those areas with
large uncertainty. In 1992, in the Framework Convention on
Climate Change, agreed by all countries, and signed for the
United States by President George H.W. Bush, it was already
stated that enough was known for action to be taken. Since
then, the science has become substantially more certain. IPCC
reports have consistently proved to be too conservative.
Many suggest why do we not just wait and see before taking
action. There are strong reasons for urgent action. The first
is scientific. Because the oceans take time to warm, there is a
lag in the response of climate to increasing gases. So far we
have only experienced a small part of the climate response to
the emissions that have already occurred.
If emissions were halted tomorrow, over the next 30 years
or more we would experience a growing level of impacts at least
two or three times those we have seen already. Further
emissions just added to that commitment.
The second reason for the urgent action is economic. Energy
infrastructure, for instance, in power stations also lasts
typically for 30 to 50 years.
The third reason is political. Countries like China and
India are industrializing very rapidly. I heard a senior energy
advisor to the Chinese government speak recently. He said that
China by itself would not be making big moves to non-fossil
fuel sources. When the developing nations of the West take
action, they will take action. They will follow, not lead.
To move the world forward, we have to be seen ourselves to
be moving. I hope, Mr. Chairman, you will allow me just to say
a little about the need for leadership if I may, in conclusion.
People often say to me I am wasting my time talking about
global warming. The world, they say, will never agree to take
the necessary action. I reply I am optimistic for three
reasons. First, I have experienced the commitment of the
world's scientific community. Second, I believe the necessary
technology is available for achieving satisfactory solutions.
Third, I believe as a Christian that God is committed to his
creation, and that we have a God-given task of being good
stewards of creation, a task that we do not have to accomplish
on our own, because God is there to help us with it.
And then a final paragraph, if I may. In my work with the
IPCC, I have been privileged to work with many climate
scientists in the United States who are world leaders in their
field. The United States is also a world leader in the
technologies required. The overall challenge is to move close
to a zero carbon economy within a generation. The means to do
that are available. The challenge and the opportunities to our
scientists and our industries are very large. But science and
technology are only part of what is needed. The challenge is
global and requires a global solution.
Mr. Chairman, the moves recently made by the Senate to
develop a strategy for addressing the issue of human-induced
climate change are of tremendous importance. Is it too much to
hope that they are the start of a bid for leadership by the
United States in the wide world, as all countries, both
developed and developing, set out to meet this challenge
together? The world is watching what the United States and,
indeed, what this committee will do. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Sir Houghton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sir John Houghton, Co-Chairman, Scientific
Assessment Working Group, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
London, England
I consider it a privilege to be asked to testify to your committee
this morning. Thank you for inviting me. On my last visit to the United
States in March I was briefing the National Association of Evangelicals
and was most pleased to find that large and influential body engaging
with this issue of global climate change--the most serious
environmental issue facing the world today.
THE BASIC SCIENCE OF GLOBAL WARMING
Let me start with a quick summary of the basic science of Global
Warming. By absorbing infra-red or `heat' radiation from the earth's
surface, `greenhouse gases' present in the atmosphere, such as water
vapour and carbon dioxide, act as blankets over the earth's surface,
keeping it warmer than it would otherwise be. The existence of this
natural `greenhouse effect' has been known for nearly two hundred
years; it is essential to the provision of our current climate to which
ecosystems and we humans have adapted.
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution around 1750, one
of these greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide has increased by over 30% and
is now at a higher concentration in the atmosphere than it has been for
many hundreds of thousands of years (Fig 1).* Chemical analysis
demonstrates that this increase is due largely to the burning of fossil
fuels--coal, oil and gas. If no action is taken to curb these
emissions, the carbon dioxide concentration will rise during the 21st
century to two or three times its preindustrial level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figures 1-6d have been retained in committee files.
Fig 1. Concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from 1000
AD and projected to 2100 under typical IPCC scenarios.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ From IPCC 2001 Synthesis Report published by Cambridge
University Press 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fig 2. Variations of the average near surface air temperature:
1000-1861, N Hemisphere from proxy data; 1861-2000, global
instrumental; 2000-2100, under a range of IPCC projections with further
shading to indicate scientific uncertainty.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ From IPCC 2001 Synthesis Report published by Cambridge
University Press 2001.
The climate record over the last 1000 years (Fig 2) shows a lot of
natural variability--including, for instance, the `medieval warm
period' and the `little ice age'.\3\ The rise in global average
temperature (and its rate of rise) during the 20th century is well
outside the range of known natural variability. The year 1998 is the
warmest year in the instrumental record. A more striking statistic is
that each of the first 8 months of 1998 was the warmest on record for
that month. There is strong evidence that most of the warming over the
last 50 years is due to the increase of greenhouse gases, especially
carbon dioxide. Confirmation of this is also provided by observations
of the warming of the oceans.\4\ The period of `global dimming' from
about 1950 to 1970 is most likely due to the increase in atmospheric
particles (especially sulphates) from industrial sources. These
particles reflect sunlight, hence tending to cool the surface and mask
some of the warming effect of greenhouse gases. Global climate
models\5\ that include human induced effects (greenhouse gas increases
and particles) and known natural forcings (e.g. variations in solar
radiation and the effects of volcanoes) can provide good simulations of
the 20th century profile of global average temperature change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Since the IPCC 2001 report there has been a debate in the
scientific literature regarding the statistical procedures for
reconstruction of the proxy part of the record that might affect its
overall shape especially over the 14th to the 19th centuries (the
little ice age period)--see for instance von Storch et al. 2004,
Science 306 621-2. This `hockey-stick' debate, however, does not
significantly influence the main IPCC conclusions regarding the
temperature of the 20th century.
\4\ See recent paper by J. Hansen et al. in Sciencexpress for 28
April 2005/10.1126/science.1110252
\5\ Global climate models run on large computers include all
components of the climate system (atmosphere, land, oceans, ice and
biosphere) with global coverage, include algorithmic descriptions of
all physical processes and integrate the dynamical equations to provide
simulations of current climate or projections of future climate. They
are powerful tools that add together the effects of all the non linear
processes involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the 21st century the global average temperature is projected
to rise by between 2 and 6 C (3.5 to 11 F) from its preindustrial
level; the range represents different assumptions about emissions of
greenhouse gases and the sensitivity of the climate model used in
making the estimate (Fig 2). For global average temperature, a rise of
this amount is large. The difference between the middle of an ice age
and the warm periods in between is only about 5 or 6 C (9 to 11 F).
So, associated with likely warming in the 21st century will be a rate
of change of climate equivalent to say, half an ice age in less than
100 years--a larger rate of change than for at least 10,000 years.
Adapting to this will be difficult for both humans and many ecosystems.
THE IMPACTS OF HUMAN INDUCED CLIMATE CHANGE
Talking in terms of changes of global average temperature, however,
tells us rather little about the impacts of global warming on human
communities. Some of the most obvious impacts will be due to the rise
in sea level that occurs because ocean water expands as it is heated.
The projected rise is of the order of half a metre (20 inches) a
century and will continue for many centuries--to warm the deep oceans
as well as the surface waters takes a long time. This will cause large
problems for human communities living in low lying regions, for
instance in the Everglades region of Florida. Many areas, for instance
in Bangladesh (where about 10 million live within the one metre
contour--Fig 3), southern China, islands in the Indian and Pacific
oceans and similar places elsewhere in the world, will be impossible to
protect and many millions will be displaced.
Fig 3. Land affected in Bangladesh by various amounts of sea level
rise
There will also be impacts from extreme events. The extremely
unusual high temperatures in central Europe during the summer of 2003
led to the deaths of over 20,000 people. Careful analysis shows that it
is very likely that a large part of the cause of this event is due to
increases in greenhouse gases and projects that such summers are likely
to be the norm by the middle of the 21st century and cool by the year
2100.
Water is becoming an increasingly important resource. A warmer
world will lead to more evaporation of water from the surface, more
water vapour in the atmosphere and more precipitation on average. Of
greater importance is the fact that the increased condensation of water
vapour in cloud formation leads to increased latent heat of
condensation being released. Since this latent heat release is the
largest source of energy driving the atmosphere's circulation, the
hydrological cycle will become more intense. This means a tendency to
more intense rainfall events and also less rainfall in some semi-arid
areas. Since, on average, floods and droughts are the most damaging of
the world's disasters (see box), their greater frequency and intensity
is bad news for most human communities and especially for those regions
such as south east Asia and sub-Saharan Africa where such events
already occur only too frequently.
MAJOR FLOODS IN THE 1990S
1991, 1994-5, 1998--China; average disaster cost 1989-96, 4%
of GDP
Mississipi & Missouri, U.S.A.; flooded area equal to one of
great lakes
1997--Europe; 162,000 evacuated and > 5bn $ loss
1998--Hurricane Mitch in central America; 9000 deaths,
economic loss in Honduras & Nicaragua 70% & 45% of GDP
1999--Venezuela; flooding led to landslide, 30,000 deaths
2000-1--Mozambique; two floods leave more than half a
million homeless
Regarding extreme events and disasters, it is often pointed out
that climate possesses large natural variability and such events have
been common occurrences over the centuries. It is not possible, for
instance, when a disaster occurs to attribute that particular event to
increasing greenhouse gases (except perhaps for the 2003 heat wave
mentioned above). So, what is the evidence that they will increase in a
globally warmed world? First, there is our understanding of the basic
science of climate change that I have briefly outlined. Secondly,
increasing evidence is provided from observations. Significant
increases have been observed in the number of intense rainfall events
especially over areas like the U.S.A. where there is good data
coverage. Data from insurance companies show an increase in economic
losses in weather related disasters of a factor of 10 in real terms
between the 1950s and the 1990s. Some of this can be attributed to an
increase in vulnerability to such disasters. However, a significant
part of the trend has also arisen from increased storminess especially
in the 1980s and 1990s.
Thirdly, increased risk of heat waves, floods and droughts are some
of the most robust projections of climate models that take into account
in a comprehensive way all the physical and dynamical processes
involved in climate change. For instance, a study for the area of
central Europe, with doubled atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration
(likely to occur during the second half of the 21st century), indicates
an decrease in the return period of flooding events by about a factor
of five (e.g. from 50 years to 10 years).\6\
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\6\ Palmer, T.N., and Raisanen, J., 2002, Nature, 415, 512-14.
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Tropical cyclones are particular damaging storms that occur in the
sub tropics. They require special mention because no evidence exists
for an increase in their number as the earth warms although an increase
is considered likely in peak wind and precipitation intensities in such
systems. Sea level rise, changes in water availability and extreme
events will cause the most damaging impacts of human induced climate
change.\7\ They will lead to increasing pressure from many millions of
environmental refugees.
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\7\ Many of the studies addressing the cost of global warming
impacts fail to take account of the cost of extremes as is explained in
Houghton, Global Warming: the Complete Briefing, CUP 2004, chapter 7.
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In addition to the main impacts summarised above are changes about
which there is less certainty, but if they occurred would be highly
damaging and possibly irreversible. For instance, large changes are
being observed in polar regions. If the temperature rises more than
about 3 C (approximately 5 F) in the area of Greenland, it is
estimated that melt down of the ice cap would begin. Complete melt down
is likely to take 1000 years or more but it would add 7 metres (23
feet) to the sea level.
A further concern is regarding the Thermo-Haline Circulation
(THC)--a circulation in the deep oceans, partially sourced from water
that has moved in the Gulf Stream from the tropics to the region
between Greenland and Scandinavia. Because of evaporation on the way,
the water is not only cold but salty, hence of higher density than the
surrounding water. It therefore tends to sink and provides the source
for a slow circulation at low levels that connects all the oceans
together. This sinking assists in maintaining the Gulf Stream itself.
In a globally warmed world, increased precipitation together with fresh
water from melting ice will decrease the water's salinity making it
less likely to sink. The circulation will therefore weaken and possibly
even cut off, leading to large regional changes of climate. All climate
models indicate the occurrence of this weakening. Evidence from
paleoclimate history shows that such cut-off has occurred at times in
the past. It is such an event that is behind the highly speculative
happenings in the film, The day after tomorrow.
I have spoken so far about adverse impacts. However, there are some
positive impacts. For instance, in Siberia and other areas at high
northern latitudes, winters will be less cold and growing seasons will
be longer. Also, increased concentrations of carbon dioxide have a
fertilising effect on some plants and crops which, providing there are
adequate supplies of water and nutrients, will lead to increased crop
yields in some places, probably most notably in northern mid latitudes.
However, careful studies demonstrate that adverse impacts will far
outweigh positive effects, the more so as temperatures rise more than 1
or 2 C (2 to 3.5 F) above preindustrial.
Many people ask how sure we are about the scientific story I have
just presented. Let me explain that it is based very largely on the
extremely thorough work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) and its last major report published in 2001. The
scientific literature on climate change has increased enormously over
the last decade. The basic science of anthropogenic climate change has
been confirmed. The main uncertainties lie in our knowledge of
feedbacks in the climate system especially those associated with the
effects of clouds. Recent research has tended to indicate increased
likelihood of the more damaging impacts.
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC)
Let me explain more about the work of the IPCC. It was formed in
1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organisation and the United
Nations Environment Programme. I had the privilege of being chairman or
co-chairman of the Panel's scientific assessment from 1988 to 2002.
Hundreds of scientists drawn from many countries were involved as
contributors and reviewers in these assessments. The IPCC has produced
three assessments--in 1990, 1995 and 2001--covering science, impacts
and analyses of policy options. The IPCC 2001 report is in four volumes
each of about 1000 pages and containing many thousands of references to
the scientific literature.\8\ Each chapter of the Report went through
two major reviews, first by hundreds of scientists in the scientific
community (any scientist who wished could take part in this) and
secondly, by governments. No assessment on any other scientific topic
has been so thoroughly researched and reviewed.
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\8\ Climate Change 2001 in four volumes, published for the IPCC by
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Also available on the IPCC web site
www.ipcc.ch. My book, John Houghton, Global Warming: the complete
briefing, 3`d edition, Cambridge University Press, 2004 is strongly
based on the IPCC reports. Further a review I have recently written
(John Houghton, Global Warming, Reports Progress in Physics, 68 (2005)
1343-1403) provides a concise summary of the science and associated
impacts.
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Because the IPCC is an intergovernmental body, the reports'
Summaries for Policymakers were agreed sentence by sentence by meetings
in which governmental delegates from about 100 countries (including all
the world's major countries) work with around 40 leading scientists
representing the scientific community. It is sometimes supposed that
the presence of governments implies political interference with the
process. That has not been the case. In any event, governments taking
part come from the complete spectrum of political agendas. These are
scientific meetings in which all proposals for changes in the text must
be based either on scientific arguments or on a desire for clearer
presentation. In every case, the process has resulted in documents with
overall improved scientific clarity and balance.
The work of the IPCC is backed by the worldwide scientific
community. A joint statement of support was issued in May 2001 by the
national science academies of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the
Caribbean, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Sweden and the U.K. It stated `We recognize the
IPCC as the world's most reliable source of information on climate
change and its causes, and we endorse its method of achieving
consensus.' In 2001, a report of the United States National Academy of
Sciences commissioned by the President George W. Bush administration,
supported the IPCC's conclusions.\9\ A joint statement issued in June
2005 by the science academies of all the G8 countries together with the
academies of Brazil, China and India also endorsed the work and
conclusions of the IPCC.\10\
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\9\ http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/
\10\ http://nationalacademies.org/morenews/
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Let me comment further on the issues of uncertainty and balance as
expressed in the work of the IPCC. There are very large amounts of data
available to the scientist looking for evidence of climate change.
Examples abound of those who approach the data with preconceived
agendas and who have selected data to fit those agendas--for instance
purporting to prove either that there is little or no evidence for
human induced change or that the world is heading for a future that
could mean the end of the human race. The task of the IPCC has been to
review all the evidence in a balanced manner and honestly and
objectively to distinguish what is reasonably well known and understood
from those areas with large uncertainty. The reports have
differentiated between degrees of uncertainty, where possible providing
numerical estimates of uncertainty. A large part of the IPCC process,
taking many days of scientists' time, has been taken up with discussion
and correspondence about how best to present uncertainty.
Let me mention a further point on the uncertainty issue. In the
IPCC reports, because they are scientific documents, uncertainty tends
to be mentioned frequently giving the impression to the casual reader
that the uncertainty in the conclusions is larger than it is in many
other areas of our experience with which comparison could be made. What
is important to realise is that there is a high degree of certainty
that significant human induced climate change is occurring and will
continue to occur. A forecast of little or no such climate change is
almost certainly wrong.
THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Because of the work of the IPCC and its first report in 1990, the
Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 could address the climate change
issue and the action that needed to be taken. The Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC)--agreed by over 160 countries, signed by
President George Bush Sr. for the U.S.A. and subsequently ratified
unanimously by the U.S. Senate--agreed that Parties to the Convention
should take ``precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where
there are threats of irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures.''
More particularly the Objective of the FCCC in its Article 2 is
``to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that does not cause dangerous interference with the climate
system'' and that is consistent with sustainable development. Such
stabilisation would also eventually stop further climate change.
However, because of the long time that carbon dioxide resides in the
atmosphere, the lag in the response of the climate to changes in
greenhouse gases (largely because of the time taken for the ocean to
warm), and the time taken for appropriate human action to be agreed,
the achievement of such stabilisation will take at least the best part
of a century.
STABILIZATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE
Global emissions of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere from fossil
fuel burning are currently approaching 7 billion tonnes of carbon per
annum and rising rapidly (Fig 4). Unless strong measures are taken they
will reach two or three times their present levels during the 21st
century and stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations or of
climate will be nowhere in sight. To stabilise carbon dioxide
concentrations in accordance with the FCCC Objective, emissions during
the 21st century must reduce to a fraction of their present levels
before the century's end.
The reductions in emissions must be made globally; all nations must
take part. However, there are very large differences between greenhouse
gas emissions in different countries. Expressed in tonnes of carbon per
capita per annum, they vary from about 5.5 for the U.S.A., 2.2 for
Europe, 0.7 for China and 0.2 for India (Fig 5). Ways need to be found
to achieve reductions that are both realistic and equitable.
Fig 4. Global emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel burning
(in billions of tonnes of carbon) up to 1990 and as projected to 2100
under World Energy Council scenarios,\11\ A's and B's with various
`business as usual assumptions' and C for `ecologically driven
scenario' that would lead to stabilisation of carbon dioxide
concentration at about 450 ppm.
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\11\ From Energy for Tomorrow's World: the realities, the real
options and the agenda for achievement. World Energy Council Report
1993.
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Fig 5. Carbon dioxide emissions in 2000 per capita for different
countries and groups of countries.\12\
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\12\ After M. Grubb 2003, World Economics 3, p. 145.
The Kyoto Protocol set up by the FCCC represents a beginning for
the process of reduction, averaging about 5% below 1990 levels by 2012
by those developed countries who have ratified the protocol. It is an
important start demonstrating the achievement of a useful measure of
international agreement on such a complex issue. It also introduces for
the first time international trading of greenhouse gas emissions so
that reductions can be achieved in the most cost effective ways.
Serious discussion is now beginning about international agreements
for emissions reductions post Kyoto. These must include all major
emitters in both developed and developing countries. On what eventual
level of stabilisation, of carbon dioxide for instance, should these
negotiations focus? To stop damaging climate change the level needs to
be as low as possible. In the light of the FCCC Objective it must also
allow for sustainable development. Let me give two examples of
stabilisation proposals. In 1996 the European Commission proposed a
limit for the rise in global average temperature from its preindustrial
value of 2 C--that implies a stabilisation level for carbon dioxide of
about 430 ppm (allowing for the effect of other greenhouse gases at
their 1990 levels). The second example comes from Lord John Browne,
Chief Executive Officer of British Petroleum, one of the world's
largest oil companies, who in a recent speech proposed `stabilisation
in the range 500-550 ppm' that `with care could be achieved without
disrupting economic growth.'
Let us consider carbon dioxide stabilisation at 500 ppm. If the
effect of other greenhouse gases at their 1990 levels is added, it is
about equivalent to doubled carbon dioxide at its preindustrial level
and a rise in global averaged temperature of about 2.5 C. Although
climate change would eventually largely be halted--although not for
well over a hundred years--the climate change impacts at such a level
would be large. A steady rise in sea level will continue for many
centuries, heat waves such as in Europe in 2003 would be commonplace,
devastating floods and droughts would be much more common in many
places and Greenland would most likely start to melt down. The aim
should be therefore to stabilise at a lower level. But is that
possible?
The International Energy Agency (TEA) in 2004 published a World
Energy Outlook that in their words `paints a sobering picture of how
the global energy system is likely to evolve from now to 2030'. With
present governments' policies, the world's energy needs will be almost
60% higher in 2030 that they are now. Fossil fuels will dominate,
meeting most of the increase in overall energy use. Energy-related
emissions of carbon dioxide will grow marginally faster than energy use
and will be more than 60% higher in 2030 than now (Fig 6, reference
scenario). Over two-thirds of the projected increase in emissions will
come from developing countries.
Fig 6. Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning and
profile leading to stabilisation at 500 ppm (a, b and c) and 450 ppm
(d). Emissions data from International Energy Agency scenarios;\13\
reference (a), alternative (b) for developed countries (red) and
developing (blue). For (c) and (d) see text.
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\13\ From World Energy Outlook, LEA 2004.
The Outlook also presents an Alternative Scenario that analyses the
global impact of environmental and energy-security policies that
countries around the world are already considering as well as the
effects of faster deployment of energy-efficient technologies. However,
even in this scenario, global emissions in 2030 are substantially
greater than they are today (Fig 6). Neither scenario comes close to
creating the turn around in the global profile required.
The U.K. government has taken a lead on this issue and has agreed a
target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 60% by 2050--
predicated on a stabilisation target of doubled carbon dioxide
concentrations together with a recognition that developed countries
will need to make greater reductions to allow some headroom for
developing countries. Economists in the U.K. government Treasury
Department have estimated the cost to the U.K. economy of achieving
this target. On the assumption of an average growth in the U.K. economy
of 2.25% p.a., they estimated a cost of no more than the equivalent of
6 months' growth over the 50 year period. Similar costs for achieving
stabilisation have been estimated by the IPCC.
The effect of a reduction of 60% on average by developed countries
is shown in Fig 6(c) together with a scenario for developing countries
that increases by 1% p.a. until 2030 followed by level emissions to
2050. For this the 500 ppm curve is approximately followed but for
developing countries to be satisfied with such a modest growth presents
a very large challenge. Even more challenging for both developed and
developing countries would be the measures required to stabilise at 450
ppm (Fig 6(d)). Governor Schwarzenegger of California has begun to
address this challenge by proposing an even more demanding reduction
target of 80% by 2050.
CAN WE WAIT AND SEE?
In order to achieve reductions on the scale that is required to
stabilize carbon dioxide concentrations, large changes will have to
occur in way we use energy (through energy efficiency improvements) and
generate it (through moves to energy sources with zero or low carbon
emissions). But how urgent are the changes required. It is sometimes
suggested that we can `wait and see' before serious action is needed.
This is an area where policy needs to be informed by the perspective
from science.
There is a strong scientific reason for urgent action. Because the
oceans take time to warm, there is a lag in the response of climate to
increasing greenhouse gases. So far we have only experienced a small
part of the climate response to the greenhouse gas emissions that have
already occurred. If greenhouse gas emissions were halted tomorrow,
climate impacts much greater than we have so far experienced but to
which we are already committed will be realized over the next 30 years
and more into the future.\14\ Further emissions from now on just add to
that commitment. It is for this reason that the June 2005 statement
from the world's major science academies urges all nations,\15\ `to
take prompt action to reduce the causes of climate change and adapt to
its impacts' and to `identify cost-effective steps that can be taken
now to contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global
greenhouse gas emissions, recognizing that delayed action will increase
the risk of adverse environmental effects and will likely incur a
greater cost.'
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\14\ See recent paper by J. Hansen et al. in Sciencexpress for 28
April 2005/10.1126/science.1110252
\15\ http://nationalacademies.org/morenews/
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Two further reasons can be identified for urgent action. One is
economic. Energy infrastructure, for instance in power stations also
lasts typically for 30 to 50 years. As was stated by the leaders of the
G8 countries meeting at Gleneagles in the U.K. earlier this month,\16\
We face a moment of opportunity. Over the next 25 years, an estimated
$16 trillion will need to be invested in the world's energy systems.
According to the IEA, there are significant opportunities to invest
this capital cost-effectively in cleaner energy technologies and energy
efficiency. Because decisions being taken today could lock in
investment and increase emissions for decades to come, it is important
to act wisely now.
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\16\ http://www.g8.gov.uk
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A third reason is political. Countries like China and India are
industrialising very rapidly. I heard a senior energy adviser to the
Chinese government speak recently. He said that China by itself would
not be making big moves to non fossil fuel sources. When the developed
nations of the west take action, they will take action--they will
follow not lead. China is building new electricity generating capacity
of about 1 GW power station per week. To move the world forward we have
to be seen ourselves to be moving.
THE U.K. AND CLIMATE CHANGE
I would like to add a few remarks about the U.K. and climate
change. It was Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who in 1988, speaking
as a scientist as well as a political leader, was one of the first to
bring the potential threat of global warming to world attention.
Subsequent U.K. governments have continued to play a leading
international role in this issue. This year, Prime Minister Tony Blair
has put climate change at the top of his agenda for his presidency of
the G8 and the EU.
This international activity has brought the realisation within the
U.K. government that a big environmental issue such as climate change
needs to be brought much closer to the centre of the government
machine. For instance, Gordon Brown, U.K.'s Chancellor of the Exchequer
has clearly stated the importance of addressing the economy and
environment together. In a recent speech he said,\17\ `Environmental
issues--including climate change--have traditionally been placed in a
category separate from the economy and from economic policy. But this
is no longer tenable. Across a range of environmental issues--from soil
erosion to the depletion of marine stocks, from water scarcity to air
pollution--it is clear now not just that economic activity is their
cause, but that these problems in themselves threaten future economic
activity and growth.'
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\17\ Address to the Energy and Environment Ministerial Roundtable,
15 March 2005; http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/
press/2005/press_29_05.cfm
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THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP
We, in the developed countries have already benefited over many
generations from abundant and cheap fossil fuel energy--although
without realising the potential damage to the climate and especially
the disproportionate adverse impacts falling on the poorer nations. The
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) recognized the particular
responsibilities this placed on developed countries to be the first to
take action and to provide assistance (e.g. through appropriate finance
and technology transfer) to developing countries for them to cope with
the impacts and to develop cost effective sources of energy free of
carbon emissions. The moral imperative created by these
responsibilities is reflected in the statement on climate change made
by the leaders of the G8 countries meeting at Gleneagles in the
following paragraph,\18\ `It is in our global interests to work
together, and in partnership with major emerging economies, to find
ways to achieve substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and
our other key objectives, including the promotion of low-emitting
energy systems. The world's developed economies have a responsibility
to act.'
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\18\ http://www.g8.gov.uk
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People often say to me that I am wasting my time talking about
Global Warming. `The world' they say `will never agree to take the
necessary action'. I reply that I am optimistic for three reasons.
First, I have experienced the commitment of the world scientific
community (including scientists from many different nations,
backgrounds and cultures) in painstakingly and honestly working
together to understand the problems and assessing what needs to be
done. Secondly, I believe the necessary technology is available for
achieving satisfactory solutions. My third reason is that, as a
Christian, I believe God is committed to his creation and that we have
a God-given task of being good stewards of creation--a task that we do
not have to accomplish on our own because God is there to help us with
it. As a recent statement on climate change by scientific and religious
leaders in the U.S. says:\19\ `What is most required at this moment . .
. is moral vision and leadership. Resources of human character and
spirit--love of life, far-sightedness, solidarity--are needed to awaken
a sufficient sense of urgency and resolve.'
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\19\ From Earth's Climate Embraces Us All: A Plea From Religion and
Science for Action on Global Climate Change, July 2004; available form
the National Religious partnership for the Environment at http://
www.nrpe.org/climate_letter.pdf
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In my work with the IPCC I have been privileged to work with many
climate scientists from the U.S.A. who are world leaders in their
field. The U.S.A. is also a world leader in the technologies aimed at
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But science and technology are only
part of what is required. Mr. Chairman, the moves recently made by the
Senate to develop a strategy for addressing the issue of human induced
climate change are of great importance. Is it too much to hope that
they are the start of a bid for leadership by the U.S. in the wider
world as all countries--both developed and developing--set out to meet
this challenge together?
The Chairman. Now we will proceed in the order that we
started.
Dr. Molina.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARIO MOLINA, PROFESSOR,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Dr. Molina. I am very pleased to be here to discuss the
science of climate change and to reflect on the very real
challenge of making sound policy choices in the face of
uncertainty. Climate change is, perhaps, the most worrisome
global environmental problem confronting human society today.
It involves a complex interplay of scientific, economic, and
political issues. The impacts of climate change are potentially
very large, and will occur over a time scale of decades to
centuries.
The actions needed to respond to this challenge require
substantial long-term commitments to change traditional
economic development paths throughout the world. The ultimate
solution to the challenge will require a fundamental
transformation in the production and consumption of energy in
the United States, but also by developed and developing
nations.
I want to address the bulk of my remarks to the threshold
question. Do we know enough about climate change to act now and
to start doing something serious to address this problem? Let
me first comment on what I think the role of scientists should
be in answering this question.
Ultimately, policy decisions about climate change have to
be made by society at large, and more specifically by
policymakers like yourselves. Scientists do not have any
special privilege to make such decisions, but science does play
a fundamental role on this issue.
The climate system is very complicated, and science does
not have all the answers. There are uncertainties in predicting
when and to what extent will the climate change as a
consequence of a given course of human activities. However,
scientists can estimate the probability that the earth's
climate will respond in certain ways.
For simplicity, the climate response is often represented
as the increasing average global surface temperature of the
planet, say, by the end of the century. This information can be
used by policymakers to assess the risks imposed by climate
change and to devise adequate responses to address the
challenge.
Let me simply summarize what we know about climate change,
although we just heard the other witnesses, Dr. Cicerone and
Sir John Houghton already summarizing these. But I firmly
embrace the view expressed in the recent sense of the Senate
resolution, namely that there is a growing scientific consensus
that human activity is a substantial cause of greenhouse gas
accumulation in the atmosphere, ``and that these accumulating
gases are causing average temperatures to rise at the rate
outside of natural variability.''
Simply stated, the world is warming. It is due to our
emissions. More warming is inevitable, but the amount of future
warming is in our hands. Because carbon dioxide accumulates and
remains in the atmosphere, each generation inherits the
emissions of all those who have gone before. Many future
generations of human beings will wrestle with this issue.
Modest amounts of warming will have both positive and
negative impacts. But above a certain threshold, the impacts
turn strongly negative for most nations, people, and for
biological systems.
While there is a growing scientific consensus around the
science of climate change, there is, of course, much that we do
not fully understand about the timing, geographic distribution,
and the severity of the changes in climate, and the economic,
environmental and social impacts of these changes that will
result if greenhouse gases continue to increase. However, not
knowing with certainty how the climate system would respond
should not be an excuse for inaction.
Policymakers frequently, in the position of making
decisions, they do that in the face of uncertainties. Usually,
the presence of uncertainty means that we build extra insurance
to protect against the risk that the consequences may be worse
than expected. It would be better, of course, if we knew
exactly where the perfect balance between costs, risks and
benefits lies, but the fact is that we never have that luxury.
Nevertheless, policymakers and the individuals both must
manage public and personal risks all the time. And we do. Most
people buy car insurance even though they do not know with any
degree of certainty what their individual risk of being in a
car accident might be, just as most doctors would advise an
individual with a history of heart trouble to choose low-fat
foods and exercise despite the many complex and usually
unknowable factors that go into determining any individual
person's risk of having a heart attack.
If we apply the same logic in setting goals for limiting
the risks associated with future climate change, it becomes
very clear that our current course now places us far outside
the kinds of risk thresholds we typically apply in other areas
of public policy.
Put another way, there is now an overwhelming consensus
that failure to limit greenhouse gas emissions would produce a
risk of significant adverse consequences that is far higher
than we find acceptable in other arenas. When facing a
substantial chance of potentially catastrophic consequences and
the near certainty of lesser negative effects, the only prudent
course of action is to mitigate these risks.
And let us be clear, when we speak of potentially
catastrophic consequences in this context, we are talking about
the devastating impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, severe
flood damage to urban centers and island nations as sea level
rises, significantly more destructive and frequent extreme
weather events, such as droughts and floods, seriously affected
agricultural productivity in many countries, exacerbation of
certain diseases, population dislocations and so, on and on.
A reasonable target, in my view, is to attempt to limit the
global temperature increase to less than, say, four degrees
Fahrenheit. Recent estimates indicate that stabilizing the
amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at the equivalent
of twice the pre-industrial value of 280 parts per million of
carbon dioxide, this provides only a 10 to 20 percent chance of
limiting global average temperature rise to four degrees
Fahrenheit.
Put another way, this means that the odds that average
global temperature will rise above four degrees is 80 to 90
percent. Unless society starts taking some aggressive actions
now, we are well on our way to reaching perhaps even a tripling
of pre-industrial carbon dioxide levels with far greater
adverse economic and environmental consequences.
The Chairman. Doctor, I hate to tell you this, but you
better----
Dr. Molina. Okay.
The Chairman. Maybe two more minutes.
Dr. Molina. Two more--I will. I applaud the committee for
its commitment to explore proposals consistent with the sense
of the Senate resolution. And moreover, I commend you for
beginning this exploration with a discussion of climate change.
As you know, I am one of sixteen members of the National
Commission on Energy Policy, and you will hear more about the
Commission from Jason Grumet, our executive director. But one
of my main contributions to the Commission's deliberations was
helping the group understand the challenge of forging sound
climate change in the face of evolving scientific knowledge.
This national commission agreed on some statements, which I
will end my testimony just summarizing this consensus from this
group, which you will hear more about. I quote, ``We understand
that the scientific consensus has emerged that global
temperatures have been increasing at the rate that is outside
the range of natural variability. Continuation of the
greenhouse gas emission trends along business-as-usual lines
could produce changes in climatic patterns in this century that
will produce significant adverse impacts on human societies.''
The second point. ``There are many uncertainties in the
details of the timing and severity of the changes in climates;
economic, environmental, and social impacts of these changes as
well that will result if business as usual prevails. There are
also uncertainties about the availability and costs of energy
supply and energy-induced technologies that might be brought to
bear to achieve much lower greenhouse emissions than those
expected with business as usual.''
``But these uncertainties for further research and
development to try to reduce them, they are not proper cause
for taking no other action to reduce the risks from human-
caused climate change. What is already known about this risk is
sufficient reason to accelerate, starting now, the search for a
mix of affordable technical and policy measures that will be
able to reduce greenhouse emissions substantially, furthermore
to adapt to the degree of climate change that cannot be avoided
without incurring unreasonable costs. This is not only a major
challenge in fashioning a sensible energy policy for the United
States, but it is a challenge that no sensible energy policy
can ignore.''
I thank you for your attention and look forward to working
with the committee in the weeks and months ahead.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Molina follows:]
Prepared Statement of Professor Mario Molina, University of California,
San Diego
Good Morning. I am very pleased to be here to discuss the science
of climate change and to reflect on the very real challenge of making
sound policy choices in the face of uncertainty. Climate change is
perhaps the most worrisome global environmental problem confronting
human society today. It involves a complex interplay of scientific,
economic, and political issues. The impacts of climate change are
potentially very large and will occur over a time scale of decades to
centuries. The actions needed to respond to this challenge require
substantial long-term commitments to change traditional economic
development paths throughout the world. The ultimate solution to the
challenge will require a fundamental transformation in the production
and consumption of energy here in the United States and by developed
and developing nations alike.
I want to address the bulk of my remarks to the threshold question:
Do we know enough about climate change to act now and to start doing
something serious to address this problem? Let me first comment on what
I think the role of scientists should be in answering this question.
Ultimately policy decisions about climate change have to be made by
society at large, and more specifically by policymakers. Scientists do
not have any special privilege to make such decisions, but science does
play a fundamental role on this issue. The climate system is very
complicated and science does not have all the answers: there are
uncertainties in predicting when and to what extent will the climate
change as a consequence of a given course of human activities. However,
scientists can estimate the probability that the earth's climate will
respond in certain ways. For simplicity the climate response is often
represented as the increase in average global surface temperature of
the planet say, by the end of the century. This information can be used
by policymakers to assess the risks imposed by climate change and to
device adequate responses to address the challenge.
Let me begin by simply summarizing what we know about climate
change. I firmly embrace the view expressed in the recent Sense of the
Senate Resolution that ``there is a growing scientific consensus that
human activity is a substantial cause of greenhouse gas accumulation in
the atmosphere, and that these accumulating gasses are causing average
temperatures to rise at a rate outside of natural variability.''
Simply stated, the world is warming.
It is due to our emissions.
More warming is inevitable--but the amount of future warming
is in our hands.
Because CO2 accumulates and remains in the
atmosphere, each generation inherits the emissions of all those
who have gone before. Many future generations of human beings
will wrestle with this issue.
Modest amounts of warming will have both positive and
negative impacts. But above a certain threshold, the impacts
turn strongly negative for most nations, people, and biological
systems.
While there is a growing scientific consensus around the science of
climate change, there is of course much that we do not fully understand
about the timing, geographic distribution, and severity of the changes
in climate--and the economic, environmental, and social impacts of
these changes--that will result if heat-forcing emissions continue to
increase. However, not knowing with certainty how the climate system
will respond should not be an excuse for inaction. Policymakers are
frequently, indeed usually, in the position of making decisions in the
face of uncertainties. Usually, the presence of uncertainty means that
we build in extra insurance to protect against the risk that
consequences may be worse than we expect. It would be better, of
course, if we knew exactly where the perfect balance between cost,
risk, and benefit lies. But the fact is that we never have that luxury.
Nevertheless, policy makers and individuals both must manage public and
personal risks all the time and we do. Most people buy car insurance
even though they don't know with any degree of certainty what their
individual risk of being in a car accident might be, just as most
doctors would advise an individual with a history of heart trouble to
choose low-fat foods and exercise despite the many complex and usually
unknowable factors that go into determining any individual person's
risk of having a heart attack.
If we apply the same logic in setting goals for limiting the risks
associated with future climate change, it becomes very clear that our
current course now places us far outside the kinds of risk thresholds
we typically apply in other areas of public policy. Put another way,
there is now an overwhelming consensus that failure to limit greenhouse
gas emissions will produce a risk of significant adverse consequences
that is far higher than we find acceptable in other arenas. When facing
a substantial chance of potentially catastrophic consequences and the
near certainty of lesser negative effects, the only prudent course of
action is to mitigate these risks. And let us be clear--when we speak
of potentially catastrophic consequences in this context we are talking
about devastating impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity; severe flood
damage to urban centers and island nations as sea level rises;
significantly more destructive and frequent extreme weather events such
as droughts and floods; seriously affected agricultural productivity in
many countries; the exacerbation of certain diseases; population
dislocations; etc.
A reasonable target, in my view, is to attempt to limit the global
temperature increase to less than about 4 degrees Fahrenheit. Recent
estimates indicate that stabilizing the amount of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere at the equivalent of twice the pre-industrial value of
280 ppm carbon dioxide provides only a 10-20 per cent chance of
limiting global average temperature rise to 4 degrees Fahrenheit. Put
another way, this means that the odds that average global temperatures
will rise above 4 degrees is 80 to 90 percent. Unless society starts
taking some aggressive actions now, we are well on our way to reaching
perhaps even a tripling of pre-industrial carbon dioxide levels with
far greater adverse economic and environmental consequences.
The risks to human society and ecosystems grow significantly if the
average global surface temperature increases 5 degrees Fahrenheit or
more. Such a large temperature increase might entail, for example,
substantial agricultural losses, widespread adverse health impacts and
greatly increased risks of water shortages. Furthermore, a very high
proportion of the world's coral reefs would be imperiled and many
terrestrial ecosystems could suffer irreversible damage. The risk of
runaway or abrupt climate change also increases rapidly if the average
temperature increases above about 5 degrees Fahrenheit. It is possible,
for example, that the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets will
melt, raising sea levels more than ten meters over the period of a few
centuries. It is also possible that the ocean circulation will change
abruptly, perhaps shutting down the Gulf Stream.
I applaud the Committee for its commitment to explore legislative
proposals consistent with the Sense of the Senate Resolution and
moreover commend you for beginning this exploration with a discussion
of climate science. As you may know, I am one of sixteen members of the
National Commission for Energy Policy (NCEP). You will hear more about
the Commission from Jason Grumet, our Executive Director, shortly. One
of my main contributions to the Commission's deliberations was helping
the group understand the challenge of forging sound climate policy in
the face of evolving scientific knowledge. Early on in our
deliberations we agreed upon the following brief statement to guide our
policy exploration. I offer it here for the Committee's deliberations:
``(1) We understand that a scientific consensus has emerged
that (a) global temperatures have been increasing at a rate
that is outside the range of natural variability, (b) human
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases have
been responsible for a part of this increase, and (c)
continuation of these emission trends along ``business as
usual'' lines could produce changes in climatic patterns in
this century that will produce significant adverse impacts on
human societies.
(2) There are many uncertainties in the details of the
timing, geographic distribution, and severity of the changes in
climate--and the economic, environmental, and social impacts of
these changes--that will result if ``business as usual''
prevails. There are, likewise, significant uncertainties about
the availability and costs of energy-supply and energy-end-use
technologies that might be brought to bear to achieve much
lower greenhouse-gas emissions than those expected on the
``business as usual'' trajectory.
(3) These uncertainties are cause for further research and
development to try to reduce them, but they are not proper
cause for taking no other action to reduce the risks from
human-caused climate change. What is already known about these
risks is sufficient reason to accelerate, starting now, the
search for a mix of affordable technical and policy measures
that will be able (a) to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions
substantially from the ``business as usual'' trajectory in the
aggregate over a relevant time frame, and (b) to adapt to the
degree of climate change that cannot be avoided without
incurring unreasonable costs. This is not the only major
challenge in fashioning a sensible energy policy for the United
States, but it is a challenge that no sensible energy policy
can ignore.''
I thank you for your attention and look forward to working with the
Committee in the weeks and months ahead.
The Chairman. You may proceed, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF JAMES W. HURRELL, PH.D., DIRECTOR,
CLIMATE AND GLOBAL DYNAMICS DIVISION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, BOULDER, CO
Dr. Hurrell. I thank Chairman Domenici, Ranking Member
Bingaman, and the other members of the committee for the
opportunity to speak with you today on the science of global
climate change. It is a privilege to be here. My name is Jim
Hurrell, and I am director of the Climate and Global Dynamics
Division at the National Center for Atmospheric Research in
Boulder, Colorado.
There will always be uncertainty in understanding the
causes and the processes of climate variability and climate
change, simply because the climate system is an extremely
complex, non-linear system. However, significant advances in
the scientific understanding of climate change now make it
clear that there has been a change in climate that goes beyond
the range of natural variability.
The globe is warming at a dramatic rate, and any claims to
the contrary are not credible. Global surface temperatures
today are more than one degree Fahrenheit warmer than at the
beginning of the 20th century. And the rates of temperature
rise are greatest in recent decades.
Nine of the last 10 years are among the warmest 10 years in
the instrumental record, which dates back to about 1860. Based
on reconstructions of temperature from proxy data like tree
rings and ice cores, several studies have concluded that
northern hemisphere surface temperatures are warmer now than at
any other time in at least the last 1,000 years.
The surface warming is consistent with a body of other
observations that gives a consistent picture of a warming
world. For example, there has been a widespread reduction in
the number of frost days in middle latitude regions. And there
has been an increase in the number of warm extremes. Ocean
temperatures have warmed, and global sea levels have risen 15
to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, as a result. Snow
cover has decreased in many regions and sea-ice extents have
decreased in the Arctic. There has been a nearly worldwide
reduction in mountain glacier mass and extent.
Because today's best climate models are now able to
reproduce the climate of the past century, they are very useful
tools for understanding and determining the changes in forcing
that have driven this observed warming. Forcings imposed on the
climate system can be natural in origin, such as changes in
solar luminosity or volcanic eruptions, or they can be human
induced, such as the buildup of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere.
Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere are now
higher than at any time in at least the last 750,000 years. In
the absence of controls, future projections are that the rate
of increase in carbon dioxide may accelerate and concentrations
could double from pre-industrial values within the next 50 to
100 years.
Climate model simulations that account for such changes in
climate forcings have now reliably shown that global surface
warming of recent decades is a response to the increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases. Moreover, this attribution
of the recent climate change has direct implications for the
future. Because of the very long lifetime of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere, there is a substantial future commitment to
further global change, even in the absence of further increases
and emissions.
In summary, the scientific understanding of climate change
is now sufficiently clear to show that climate change from
global warming is already upon us. Uncertainties remain,
especially regarding how climate will change at regional and
local scales. But the climate is changing, and the rate of
change, as projected, exceeds anything seen in nature in the
past 10,000 years.
Mitigation actions taken now to decrease concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere mainly have benefits 50
years from now and beyond. There is no quick fix. While some
changes might be benign or even beneficial in some geographical
areas, global warming will be disruptive in many ways.
Hence, it is vital to plan to cope with the changes, such
as enhanced drought, heat waves, wildland fires, and flooding.
The science of global climate change is certainly sophisticated
enough at this point to help policymakers make real decisions
now that will benefit the planet in the future.
Again, I sincerely thank you for the opportunity to address
this committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hurrell follows:]
Prepared Statement of James W. Hurrell, Ph.D., Director, Climate and
Global Dynamics Division National Center for Atmospheric Research
INTRODUCTION
I thank Chairman Domenici, Ranking Member Bingaman, and the other
Members of the Committee for the opportunity to speak with you today on
the science of global climate change. My name is James W. Hurrell,
Director of the Climate and Global Dynamics Division (CGD) at the
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Boulder, Colorado.
My personal research has centered on empirical and modeling studies and
diagnostic analyses to better understand climate, climate variability
and climate change. I have authored or co-authored more than 60 peer-
reviewed scientific journal articles and book chapters, as well as
dozens of other planning documents and workshop papers. I have given
more than 65 invited talks worldwide, as well as many contributed
presentations at national and international conferences on climate. I
have also convened over one dozen national and international workshops,
and I have served on several national and international science-
planning efforts. Currently, I am extensively involved in the World
Climate Research Programme (WCRP) on Climate Variability and
Predictability (CLIVAR), and I serve as co-chair of Scientific Steering
Committee of U.S. CLIVAR. I have also been involved in the assessment
activities of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as a
contributing author to chapters in both the third and fourth (in
progress) assessment reports, and I have served on several National
Research Council (NRC) panels. I am also a lead author on the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program's (CCSP) Synthesis and Assessment
Product on Temperature Trends in the Lower Atmosphere.
Throughout this testimony I will refer to both the IPCC and the
CCSP. Briefly, the IPCC is a body of scientists from around the world
convened by the United Nations jointly under the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO). Its mandate is to provide policy makers with an objective
assessment of the scientific and technical information available about
climate change, its environmental and socio-economic impacts, and
possible response options. The IPCC reports on the science of global
climate change and the effects of human activities on climate in
particular. The fourth major assessment is underway (the previous
assessments were published in 1990, 1995 and 2001) and is due to be
published in 2007. Each new IPCC report reviews all the published
literature over the previous 5 years or so, and assesses the state of
knowledge, while trying to reconcile disparate claims, resolve
discrepancies and document uncertainties. For the 2001 Third Assessment
Report (TAR), Working Group I (which deals with how the climate has
changed and the possible causes) consisted of 123 lead authors, 516
contributors, 21 review editors, and over 700 reviewers. It is a very
open process. The TAR concluded that climate is changing in ways that
cannot be accounted for by natural variability and that ``global
warming'' is happening.
The U.S. CCSP was established in 2002 to coordinate climate and
global change research conducted in the United States. Building on and
incorporating the U.S. Global Change Research Program of the previous
decade, the program integrates federal research on climate and global
change, as sponsored by 13 federal agencies and overseen by the Office
of Science and Technology Policy, the Council on Environmental Quality,
the National Economic Council and the Office of Management and Budget.
A primary objective of the CCSP is to provide the best possible
scientific information to support public discussion and government and
private sector decision-making on key climate-related issues. To help
meet this objective, the CCSP is producing a series of synthesis and
assessment products that address its highest priority research,
observation, and decision-support needs. Each of these products will be
written by a team of authors selected on the basis of their past record
of interest and accomplishment in the given topic. The Product on
Temperature Trends in the Lower Atmosphere focuses on both
understanding reported differences between independently produced data
sets of temperature trends for the surface through the lower
stratosphere and comparing these data sets to model simulations.
OBSERVED CLIMATE CHANGE
a. Surface Temperature
Improvements have been made to both land surface air temperature
and sea surface temperature (SST) data during the five years since the
TAR was published. The improvements relate to improved coverage,
particularly over the Southern Hemisphere (SH) in the late 19th
century, and daily temperature data for an increasing number of land
stations have also become available, allowing more detailed assessment
of extremes, as well as potential urban influences on both large-scale
temperature averages and microclimate.
The globe is warming. Claims to the contrary are not credible.
Three different analyses of observations of surface temperature
averaged across the globe show a linear warming trend of 0.6 C 0.2 C
since the beginning of the 20th century. Rates of temperature rise are
greater in recent decades: since 1979, global surface temperatures have
increased more than 0.4 C. Land regions have warmed the most (0.7 C
since 1979), with the greatest warming in the boreal winter and spring
months over the Northern Hemisphere (NH) continents. A number of recent
studies indicate that effects of urbanization and land-use change on
the land-based temperature record are negligible as far as continental-
and hemispheric-space averages are concerned, because the very real but
local effects are accounted for. Recent warming is strongly evident at
all latitudes over each of the ocean basins and, averaged over the
globe, the SSTs have warmed 0.35 C since 1979. The trends over the
past 25 years have been fairly linear; however the global temperature
changes over the entire instrumental record are best described by
relatively steady temperatures from 1861-1920, a warming of about 0.3
C to 1950, a cooling of about 0.1 C until the mid-1970s, and a warming
of about 0.55 C since then. Thus, global surface temperatures today
are about 0.75 C warmer than at the beginning of the 20th century.
The warmest year in the 145-year global instrumental record remains
1998, since the major 1997-98 El Nino enhanced it. The years 2002-2004
are the 2nd, 3rd and 4th warmest years in the series since 1861 and
nine of the last 10 years (1995 to 2004)--the exception being 1996--are
among the ten warmest years in the instrumental record. Based on
reconstructions of temperature from proxy data, like tree rings and ice
cores, several studies have also concluded that NH surface temperatures
are warmer now than at any time in at least the last 1,000 years.
b. Consistency with other observed changes
The warming described above is consistent with a body of other
observations that gives a consistent picture of a warming world. For
example, there has been a widespread reduction in the number of frost
days in middle latitude regions, principally due to an earlier last day
of frost in spring rather than a later start to the frost season in
autumn. There has been an increase in the number of warm extremes and a
reduction in the number of daily cold extremes, especially at night.
The amount of water vapor in the atmosphere has increased over the
global oceans by 1.2 0.3% from 1988 to 2004, consistent in patterns
and amount with changes in SST and a fairly constant relative humidity.
Widespread increases in surface water vapor are also found. Ocean
temperatures have warmed at depth as well, and global sea levels have
risen 15-20 centimeters over the 20th century: as the oceans warm,
seawater expands and sea level rises.
There has been a nearly worldwide reduction in mountain glacier
mass and extent. Snow cover has decreased in many NH regions,
particularly in the spring season and this is consistent with greater
increases in spring than autumn surface temperatures in middle latitude
regions. Sea-ice extents have decreased in the Arctic, particularly in
the spring and summer seasons, and patterns of the changes are
consistent with regions showing a temperature increase. The Arctic
(north of 65N) average annual temperature has increased since the
1960s and is now warmer (at the decade timescale) than conditions
experienced during the 1920-1945 period (where much of the earlier
global warming was centered). In the Antarctic, there are regional
patterns of warming and cooling related to changes in the atmospheric
circulation. The warming of the Peninsula region since the early 1950s
is one the largest and the most consistent warming signals observed
anywhere in the world. Large reductions in sea-ice have occurred to the
west in the Bellingshausen Sea, and on the eastern side of Peninsula,
large reductions in the size of Larsen Ice shelf have occurred.
c. Temperature of the Upper Air
Radiosonde releases provide the longest record of upper-air
measurements, and these data show similar warming rates to the surface
temperature record since 1958. Unfortunately, however, vast regions of
the oceans and portions of the landmasses (especially in the Tropics)
are not monitored so that there is always a component of the global or
hemispheric mean temperature that is missing. Moreover, like all
measurement systems, radiosonde records of temperature have inherent
uncertainties associated with the instruments employed and with changes
in instrumentation and observing practices, among other factors.
Fundamentally, these uncertainties arise because the primary
purpose of radiosondes is to help forecast the weather, not monitor
climate variability and change. Therefore, all climate data sets
require careful examination for instrument biases and reliability
(quality control) and to remove changes that might have arisen for non-
climatic reasons (a process called ``homogenization'') It is difficult
to remove all non-climatic effects, and ideally multiple data sets
should be produced independently to see how sensitive results are to
homogenization choices. This has been the case for the surface record,
but unfortunately much less so for the radiosonde record (although
efforts are increasing.)
For this reason, much attention has been paid to satellite
estimates of upper-air temperatures, in particular because they provide
true global coverage. Of special interest have been estimates of
tropospheric and stratospheric temperatures over thick atmospheric
layers obtained from microwave sounding units (MSU) onboard NOAA polar-
orbiting satellites since 1979. Initial analyses of the MSU data by
scientists at the University of Alabama, Huntsville (UAH) indicated
that temperatures in the troposphere showed little or no warming, in
stark contrast with surface air measurements. Climate change skeptics
have used this result to raise questions about both the reliability of
the surface record and the cause of the surface warming, since human
influences thought to be important are expected to increase
temperatures both at the surface and in the troposphere. They also have
used the satellite record to caste doubt on the utility of climate
models, which simulate both surface and tropospheric warming in over
recent decades.
In an attempt to resolve these issues, the NRC in 2000 studied the
problem and concluded that ``the warming trend in global-mean surface
temperature observations during the past 20 years is undoubtedly real
and is substantially greater than the average rate of warming during
the 20th century. The disparity between surface and upper air trends in
no way invalidates the conclusion that surface temperature has been
rising.'' The NRC further found that corrections in the MSU processing
algorithms brought the satellite data record into slightly closer
alignment with surface temperature trends, but substantial
discrepancies remained. As further noted by the TAR, some, but not all,
of these remaining discrepancies could be attributed to the fact that
the surface and the troposphere respond differently to climate
forcings, so that trends over a decade or two should not necessarily be
expected to agree.
Since the IPCC and NRC assessments, new data sets and modeling
simulations have become available which are helping to resolve this
apparent dilemma. The CCSP Assessment Product on Temperature Trends in
the Lower Atmosphere is assessing these new data, and the preliminary
report (which has been reviewed by the NRC) finds that the surface and
upper-air records of temperature change can now, in fact, be
reconciled. Moreover, the overall pattern of observed temperature
change in the vertical is consistent with that simulated by today's
climate models.
Several developments since the TAR are especially notable:
A second, independent record of MSU temperatures has become
available from scientists at the Remote Sensing Systems (RSS)
Laboratory. Although both the UAH and RSS groups start from the
same raw radiance data, they apply different construction
methods of merging the MSU data from one satellite to the next.
The result is that, while both data sets indicate the middle
troposphere has warmed since 1979, the RSS estimate is
approximately 0.1 C decade-1 warmer than the UAH
estimate. Moreover, the RSS trend is not statistically
different from the observed surface warming since 1979. The
difference in tropospheric temperature trends between these two
products highlights the issue of temporal homogeneity in the
satellite data.
Both UAH and RSS MSU products support the conclusion that
the stratosphere has undergone strong cooling since 1979, due
to observed stratospheric ozone depletion.
Because about 15% of the MSU signal for middle tropospheric
temperature actually comes from the lower stratosphere, the
real warming of the middle troposphere is greater than that
indicated by the MSU data sets. This has been confirmed by new
analyses that explicitly remove the stratospheric influence,
which is about -0.08 C decade-1 on middle
tropospheric MSU temperature trends since 1979.
By differencing MSU measurements made at different slant
angles, both the UAH and the RSS groups have produced updated
data records weighted more toward the lower troposphere. The
RSS product exhibits a warming trend that is 0.2 C
decade-1 larger than that from UAH. In part, this
discrepancy is because adjustments for diurnal cycle
corrections required from satellite drift had the wrong sign in
the UAH record. As a result, a new UAH record is being
prepared, and the current version is regarded as obsolete.
The various new data sets of upper-air temperature are very
important because their differences highlight differences in
construction methodologies. It therefore becomes possible to estimate
the uncertainty in satellite-derived temperature trends that arises
from different methods.
d. Extremes
For any change in mean climate, there is likely to be an amplified
change in extremes. The wide range of natural variability associated
with day-to-day weather means that we are unlikely to notice most small
climate changes except for changes in the occurrence of extremes.
Extreme events, such as heat waves, floods and droughts, are
exceedingly important to both natural systems and human systems and
infrastructure. We are adapted to a range of natural weather
variations, but it is the extremes of weather and climate that exceed
tolerances.
In several regions of the world indications of a change in various
types of extreme weather and climate events have been found. So far,
the most prominent indication of a change in extremes is the evidence
of increases in moderate to heavy precipitation events over the middle
latitudes in the last 50 years, even for regions where annual
precipitation totals are decreasing. Further indications of a robust
change include the observed trend to fewer frost days associated with
the average warming in most middle latitude regions. Results for
temperature-related daily extremes are also relatively coherent for
some measures. Many regions show increased numbers of warm days/nights
(and lengthening of heat waves) and even more reductions in the number
of cold days/nights, but changes are not ubiquitous.
Trends in tropical storm frequency and intensity are masked by
large natural variability on multiple timescales. Increases may be
occurring in recent years, but apart from the North Atlantic basin,
most measures only begin in the 1950s or 1960s and have likely missed
some events in the early decades. Numbers of hurricanes in the North
Atlantic have been above normal in 8 of the last 10 years, but levels
were about as high in the 1950s and 1960s. This pattern continues this
summer, with a very active hurricane season already evident and SSTs at
record high levels.
MODELING AND ATTRIBUTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE
a. Improved simulations of past climate
The best climate models encapsulate the current understanding of
the physical processes involved in the climate system, the
interactions, and the performance of the system as a whole. They have
been extensively tested and evaluated using observations. They are
exceedingly useful tools for carrying out numerical climate
experiments, but they are not perfect, and some models are better than
others. Uncertainties arise from shortcomings in our understanding of
climate processes operating in the atmosphere, ocean, land and
cryosphere, and how to best represent those processes in models. Yet,
in spite of these uncertainties, today's best climate models are now
able to reproduce the climate of the past century, and simulations of
the evolution of global surface temperature over the past millennium
are consistent with paleoclimate reconstructions.
As a result, climate modelers are able to test the role of various
forcings in producing the observed changes in global temperature
temperatures. Forcings imposed on the climate system can be natural in
origin, such as changes in solar luminosity or volcanic eruptions, the
latter adding considerable amounts of aerosol to the upper atmosphere
for up to two years. Human activities also increase aerosol
concentrations in the atmosphere, mainly through the injection of
sulfur dioxide from power stations and through biomass burning. A
direct effect of sulfate aerosols is the reflection of a fraction of
solar radiation back to space, which tends to cool the Earth's surface.
Other aerosols (like soot) directly absorb solar radiation leading to
local heating of the atmosphere, and some absorb and emit infrared
radiation. A further influence of aerosols is that many act as nuclei
on which cloud droplets condense, affecting the number and size of
droplets in a cloud and hence altering the reflection and the
absorption of solar radiation by the cloud. The precise nature of
aerosol/cloud interactions and how they interact with the water cycle
remains a major uncertainty in our understanding of climate processes.
Because man-made aerosols are mostly introduced near the Earth's
surface, they can be washed out of the atmosphere by rain. They
therefore typically remain in the atmosphere for only a few days, and
they tend to be concentrated near their sources such as industrial
regions. Therefore, they affect climate with a very strong regional
pattern and usually produce cooling.
In contrast, greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane
are not washed out, so they have lifetimes of decades or longer. As a
result, they build up in amounts over time, as has been observed.
Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere are now higher than at
any time in at least the last 750,000 years. It took at least 10,000
years from the end of the last ice age for levels of carbon dioxide to
increase 100 parts per million by volume (ppmv) to 280 ppmv, but that
same increase has occurred over only the past 150 years to current
values of over 370 ppmv. About half of that increase has occurred over
the last 35 years, owing mainly to combustion of fossil fuels and
deforestation. In the absence of controls, future projections are that
the rate of increase in carbon dioxide amount may accelerate, and
concentrations could double from pre-industrial values within the next
50 to 100 years.
Climate model simulations that account for such changes in forcings
have now reliably shown that global surface warming of recent decades
is a response to the increased concentrations of greenhouse gases and
sulfate aerosols in the atmosphere. When the models are run without
these forcing changes, they fail to capture the almost linear increase
in global surface temperatures since the mid-1970s. But when the
anthropogenic forcings are included, the models simulate the observed
temperature record with impressive fidelity. These same model
experiments also reveal that changes in solar luminosity account for
much of the warming in the first half of the 20th century. Such results
increase our confidence in the observational record and our
understanding of how temperature has changed. They also mean that the
time histories of the important forcings are reasonably known, and that
the processes being simulated models are adequate enough to make the
models very valuable tools.
b. Commitment to further climate change
The ability of climate models to simulate the past climate record
gives us increased confidence in their ability to simulate the future.
Moreover, the attribution of the recent climate change to increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has direct
implications for the future. Because of the long lifetime of carbon
dioxide and the slow equilibration of the oceans, there is a
substantial future commitment to further global climate change even in
the absence of further emissions of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere. Several modeling groups have performed ``commitment'' runs
in order to examine the climate response even if the concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere had been stabilized in the year
2000. The exact results depend upon the model, but they all show a
further global warming of about another 0.5 C, and additional and
significant sea level rises caused by thermal expansion of the oceans
by the end of the 21st century. Further glacial melt is also likely.
The climate modeling groups contributing to the Fourth IPCC
Assessment Report have produced the most extensive internationally
coordinated climate change experiment ever performed (21 global coupled
models from 14 countries). This has allowed better quantification of
multi-model responses to three scenarios of 21st century climate
corresponding to low (550 ppmv), medium (690 ppmv) and high (820 ppmv)
increases of carbon dioxide concentrations by the year 2100. In spite
of differences among models and the uncertainties that exist, the
models produce some consistent results:
Over the next decade or two, all models produce similar
warming trends in global surface temperatures, regardless of
the scenario.
Nearly half of the early 21st century climate change arises
from warming we are already committed to. By mid-century, the
choice of scenario becomes more important for the magnitude of
warming, and by the end of the 21st century there are clear
consequences for which scenario is followed.
The pattern of warming in the atmosphere, with a maximum in
the upper tropical troposphere and cooling in the stratosphere,
becomes established early in this century.
Geographical patterns of warming show greatest temperature
increases at high northern latitudes and over land, with less
warming over the southern oceans and North Atlantic. In spite
of a slowdown of the meridional overturning circulation and
changes in the Gulf Stream in the ocean across models, there is
still warming over the North Atlantic and Europe due to the
overwhelming effects of the increased concentrations of
greenhouse gases.
Precipitation generally increases in the summer monsoons and
over the tropical Pacific in particular, with general decreases
in the subtropics and some middle latitude areas, and increases
at high latitudes.
c. Increasing complexity of models
As our knowledge of the different components of the climate system
and their interactions increases, so does the complexity of climate
models. Historical changes in land use and changes in the distribution
of continental water due to dams and irrigation, for instance, need to
be considered. Future projected land cover changes due to human land
uses are also likely to significantly affect climate, and these effects
are only now being included in climate models.
One of the major advances in climate modeling in recent years has
been the introduction of coupled climate-carbon models. Climate change
is expected to influence the capacities of the land and oceans to act
as repositories for anthropogenic carbon dioxide, and hence provide a
feedback to climate change. These models now allow us to assess the
nature of this feedback. Results show that carbon sink strengths are
inversely related to the rate of fossil fuel emissions, so that carbon
storage capacities of the land and oceans decrease and climate warming
accelerates with faster carbon dioxide emissions. Furthermore, there is
a positive feedback between the carbon and climate systems, so that
further warming acts to increase the airborne fraction of anthropogenic
carbon dioxide and amplify the climate change itself.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In summary, the scientific understanding of climate change is now
sufficiently clear to show that climate change from global warming is
already upon us. Uncertainties remain, especially regarding how climate
will change at regional and local scales. But the climate is changing
and the uncertainties make the need for action all the more imperative.
At the same time, it should be recognized that mitigation actions taken
now mainly have benefits 50 years and beyond now. This also means that
we will have to adapt to climate change by planning for it and making
better predictions of likely outcomes on several time horizons. My
personal view it that it is vital that all nations identify cost-
effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to substantial
and long-term reductions in net global greenhouse gas emissions. Action
taken now to reduce significantly the build-up of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere will lessen the magnitude and rate of climate change.
While some changes arising from global warming are benign or even
beneficial, the rate of change as projected exceeds anything seen in
nature in the past 10,000 years. It is apt to be disruptive in many
ways. Hence it is also vital to plan to cope with the changes, such as
enhanced droughts, heat waves and wild fires, and stronger downpours
and risk of flooding. Managing water resources will be major challenge
in the future.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address the Committee
concerning the science of global climate change--a topic that is of the
utmost importance for the future of our planet.
The Chairman. And thanks to all of you. Now let us see if
we have enough Senators. Do we?
[Whereupon, a business meeting was held from 10:47 a.m. to
10:49 a.m.]
The Chairman. Now we are going to proceed. We have one set
of panels--or one panel after this. We want to get them up
before noon. But we really do want every Senator that wants to
to ask questions.
I am going to start with you, Senator Bingaman, then with
you, Senator Craig, and go right down the line.
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
One of the issues that I think several of you alluded to that I
think is important to focus on here is the length of time that
gases that we emit today remain in the atmosphere, and the fact
that by continuing to add to the greenhouse gases, we buildup a
store that takes decades and even centuries to settle back out.
I guess that is what eventually happens to the greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere, although I am not sure of that.
Maybe Dr. Hurrell, you could address that, and anybody else
who had a comment as to what the science tells us about the
length of time that these gases are going to remain there and
continue to cause increasing temperatures.
Dr. Hurrell. You are correct, Senator Bingaman. The
lifetime of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is on the time
scale of decades to centuries. And so the buildup of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere continues to accumulate over time. And
so some of the experiments, in terms of the impacts that we do
with climate models, some new types of experiments, are what we
call commitment runs.
For instance, if emissions were capped at today's levels,
what would happen in the future because of the continued
buildup of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere? And
those climate model simulations do indicate that there will be
a continued increase in global surface temperatures that we are
already committed to. Something on the order of approaching
another degree Fahrenheit over the next 50 years. And sea
levels will continue to rise as well.
Senator Bingaman. All right. Dr. Cicerone, did you have any
comment on that?
Dr. Cicerone. Yes, Senator Bingaman. Carbon dioxide is
clearly the most important human-caused greenhouse gas, and I
agree completely with what Dr. Hurrell said. The other
greenhouse gas is methane, which has a residence time of 10 or
12 years. So that it is much more susceptible to short-term
changes and to our increasing the emissions or decreasing the
emissions. We should see changes in methane more quickly.
Nitrous oxide, 150 years. There are some exotic chemicals,
which although present in much smaller amounts, survive for
tens of thousands of years. Sulfurhexaflouride and some pro-
fluorinated hydrocarbons, which were produced inadvertently by
the aluminum industry, which I think has been somewhat
successful in eliminating those emissions. So there is a
spectrum.
One of the greenhouse gases is much shorter lived. It is
ozone produced in ground-level air pollution. Chemistry
reactions may survive only a couple hundred days. But the
principal one is exactly as Dr. Hurrell said.
Senator Bingaman. Let me ask one other question. All the
discussion so far this morning that I have been listening to
relates to incremental changes in climate that we can
anticipate if we continue to emit the level of greenhouse gases
we are currently emitting, or the amounts we are expected to
emit in the future.
What could you tell us about the issue of abrupt climate
change? This is something that I hear about and how does this
relate to what the testimony that you have given on this other
issue?
Sir Houghton. Maybe I should have a go at that. Climate is
a very non-linear system, so that you may go along without too
much change, then all of a sudden something happens, because a
threshold or something has been reached. We do not know of any
very tight thresholds, but we do know that certain things are
happening which could lead to very large effects. And one of
those is the meltdown of Greenland, for instance, a certain
threshold. Greenland is in balance at the moment, roughly
speaking, between a glacier on the outside, and accumulation in
the middle.
Now if that starts to change rapidly, then Greenland will
begin to melt down. It will maybe take a thousand years or
more, but there is seven meters of sea level which lies within
Greenland.
Furthermore, which, of course, has been well publicized in
that film, ``The Day After Tomorrow''--you need not believe all
of it, by any means. You need not believe the speculative
events which occurred afterwards. But the signs on which it is
predicated is the weakening of the Gulf Stream. And all the
climate models, the coupled ocean atmosphere climate models
that couple the two circulations together, show this effect.
As you freshen the water in the higher latitudes, because
of increased precipitation or because of melting ice, then this
stops the water in the ocean becoming so salty. It becomes less
dense, and therefore, it does not sink to the bottom and start
to form the deep ocean circulation, which circulates between
all the oceans. And what happens is that that then weakens the
whole of the Gulf Stream circulation and will have profound
impacts on the weather, particularly of Western Europe, but not
as severe, on the whole globe.
As I say, all climate models show that weakening, while a
few of them show it cutting it off after a few hundred years or
so. There is still a lot of debate about the timing of that.
But the fact that that could occur is really very, very well
understood now, and probably will occur in the future.
There is also the breakdown of the West Antarctic ice
sheet, which is another possible threshold. There are other
things, like release of methane from sources in the deep oceans
or in the ice. That is the further one which we are concerned
about, but the evidence of that is not too strong. But all
these things are there in the wings, or in the possibilities,
which we shall be aware of even if we are concentrating on the
things we are more sure about.
Dr. Molina. Can I add something to that? I just want to
point out that the risks to human society of these abrupt
changes increase rapidly as the amount of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere increases. It is very non-linear. But, to put it
in simple terms, if we double the amount of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere, the risk does not double. Perhaps it quadruples
or perhaps it increases even a factor of ten. So we have a very
non-linear response. We get into a very dangerous situation as
we increase the amount of these gases.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Craig. Let me thank all of you for being here. I
have read many of your works and a lot of the publications over
the last decade and have been fully engaged in this issue, both
as an observer and sometimes a critic. But I have grown to
believe, as many of my colleagues have, that there is a
substantial human effect on the environment. And you have
outlined that in a variety of ways this morning.
My responsibility is best I can, is to question the
science, but at the same time, as the science seems to confirm
human activity as a major contributor. Climate variability is
something that I think we are all very willing to look at and
see as a part of it. So it is very important for us, as
policymakers, to insist that you all get it right as best
science can.
Having said that, let me revert back to where I think I and
others on this committee play the role, and that is in the
policy formed and how we get there. Many of you have said that
no matter what we do, this very big world of ours is a ship
that turns with great slowness. And I am extremely concerned,
in a positive/negative way, about the growth of emerging
economies and their contribution, and what we can do not only
for ourselves, but with them and for them.
Abrupt changes in our approach toward adjusting create
consequences. And, therefore, technologies are extremely
important, I think. Clean technologies, in not only moving us
in the right direction, but moving the world in the right
direction, because this great Nation of ours makes almost
everything that we produce available to the rest of the world.
And we have that tremendous capacity. We just produced
legislation that I think is of substantially greater
significance to climate change than anything we have done to
date.
I have traveled the world. I have been to most of the
climate change conferences. I know the world is now recognizing
that without new technologies it cannot get to where it wants
to get in relation to certain international protocols.
Do you believe and are you all advocates of moving
electrical generation in this country and around the world
toward a non-emitting source? And I, of course, must emphasize
baseload. And do you support new nuclear-generating
technologies to accomplish that? Any of you wish to respond to
that?
Dr. Molina. Perhaps I can make one comment there, which is
along the lines of the report of the National Commission on
Energy Policy where these things are documented to much more
extent.
What I believe personally is that it is very important for
society to leave all options open. And that certainly includes
nuclear energy as well. And given the current circumstances,
the way society deals with nuclear energy, particularly in this
country, including others, unless there is some government
intervention to maintain this option, to make it safer, and to
have it as a possibility for the future, it will not happen,
because there is no incentive for industry to continue doing
that.
So I do believe it is very important, particularly along
those lines that you mentioned, of having new technologies to
move in that direction, to have this option, and for it to be
safe. I will not repeat here the problems that we have had,
since you are probably very familiar with them, but it does
require resources to ensure that this happens. Thank you.
Sir Houghton. May I answer that? I think it is very clear
there is no one solution to the problem of getting to a
situation within a generation of carbon-free energy. There are
many possibilities. And you have mentioned the nuclear one, and
that is clearly one of the options that needs considering.
My personal view on that is I am concerned about
proliferation of nuclear material. The world really--of course,
we are not just looking at the United States, or the United
Kingdom, or Europe.
Senator Craig. No, we are looking at the world.
Sir Houghton. We are looking at the whole world, which
needs these energies. And the proliferation of nuclear material
is something we have to be very careful about. And as a long-
term solution, I would worry about that. Nevertheless, I do
think it has to come into the debate.
The other point I would make is that India and China have a
great deal of coal. China is building a gigawatt power station
every 5 days at the moment. And so some way, somehow we have to
very rapidly move to clean zero carbon coal technology. And
that can be done with sequestration.
I know the European Union is going to talk to China later
this year about the possibility of helping China with that. I
am sure the United States could help China with that also, but
it needs to be done rather soon, because they are moving ahead
so fast with their greenhouse gas emissions.
Senator Craig. Thank you all.
The Chairman. Okay. We are going to go now, I think it is
back to the regular order. Senator Akaka, I think you are next.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cicerone, in your testimony--and I am following up on
Senator Bingaman's question. In your testimony you talked about
abrupt climate change; what is abrupt climate change? And can
you identify any critical thresholds that might be crossed if
we do not take strong action to control carbon dioxide
emissions?
For example, I have heard that at certain temperature
degree increases, large sheets of ice in the Arctic could melt
and collapse, leading to huge increases in sea level. Can you
comment on that and other potential threshold events?
Dr. Cicerone. I will try, Senator Akaka. About 2\1/2\ years
ago or so the Academy did a study and created a report called
``Abrupt Climate Change and the Potential for Surprises,''
largely in response to findings over the last 15 or 20 years
that previously the earth's climate was thought to change
slowly and gradually. But I would say in the last 20 years or
so that scientists, by reading the record of isotopes in
minerals and fossils of living organisms, and water pattern
flows and so forth, we found evidence of previous climate
change on earth. There have been many, many examples of rapid
change.
Changes in ocean circulation, for example, that have
occurred in periods so short that we are not even sure we are
measuring how short they are. Ten to 50 to 100 years instead of
thousands of years. So as more of these examples arose in the
scientific literature, people began to take more seriously the
fact that the earth can change abruptly.
When we try to figure out what those thresholds are, people
have had difficulty, and have not yet been able to explain what
kind of event could trigger a hemispheric or global change that
could occur in 10 to 50 years. I do not think we understand the
mechanisms very well yet, but we have powerful evidence that
there are mechanisms built into this complicated system that
have thresholds connected with them.
So the kinds of examples that Dr. Houghton and Dr. Hurrell
gave early are on our minds. We cannot prove it yet. The most
recent academy report on abrupt climate change with that title
was 2 or 3 years ago. And I can try to extract some more
examples to send.
The Antarctic ozone hole that developed over Antarctica,
fortunate in some respect that it happened over relatively
unpopulated areas, although our colleagues in New Zealand and
Australia and southern Chile do not agree with that statement,
happened for unknown reasons at the time.
Dr. Molina and his research group, and one of the reasons
he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1995, was helping to come up
with the mechanisms that were previously not understood.
Thresholds which could cause ozone depletion to occur very
rapidly in one place of the world, which were not understood
originally.
There must be mechanisms like that in the climate system,
too, which are not fully understood yet. We have ideas,
plausible ideas, but not proof of where these thresholds lie,
in my opinion.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Cicerone, how would you suggest that
island nations and states deal with potential abrupt climate
changes? In other words, how likely are they to occur and is
there anything we can do now to prevent or prepare for them, as
island nations and states?
Dr. Cicerone. I think they generally see the risks much
more ominously than we do, with such a large continent and
Hawaii and Alaska, as part of the United States. The island
nations feel more risk. But generally, the precautions that we
can take, by moving our water treatment plants further up the
river, further up from sea level, to protect them from
saltwater intrusion. Borders that we can put up by moving
installations now to prepare for slower changes.
We have so much technology. We have capital. We have
scientific ability to foresee that many of the island nations
do not have all those ingredients. So they are feeling more
threatened. I have not thought from the point of view of island
nations, but I know that they take these issues more seriously
than we do.
We have been planning over an entire generation of
installations to make moves now, which can be done on a cost
neutral or beneficial basis, which will not be available if the
changes turn out to be sudden, and island nations start to
become submerged.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses, Dr. Cicerone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Let me say to the witnesses, if you wonder what is
happening, there is a vote going on, and we are trying to
accommodate the voters and you, and not close up shop. So we
are going to continue to try to do that.
On our side, Senator Alexander should be next, but he
indicated he was going to vote and then come back. Senator
Murkowski went. She will be back. Senator Salazar. Then Talent,
Thomas. How would we like to proceed? Senator Salazar is not
here.
Senator Thomas, did you come here before Senator Talent?
Senator Thomas. I do not know. Mr. Chairman, I am waiting
for some material anyway.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Thomas. So I am happy to yield to my friend.
The Chairman. We are going to go to Senator Thomas.
Senator Thomas. All right. Fine. Thank you. We need some
scientific effort on how we----
The Chairman. We need a Nobel Prize.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thomas. I appreciate you being here. Certainly, all
of us understand the importance of this issue. It is a
difficult issue. I have been to Milan, to Buenos Aires, to the
Kyoto agreements, and our Kyoto conversations, and that lack of
agreement, I might say. But it is interesting. And we need to
work at it. We are committed to that. I guess the question is:
What do we do?
Sir Houghton, you mentioned your studies. Your third IPCC
assessment was largely based on the Mann so-called hockey stick
graph, which shows neither warming nor ice age. Do you endorse
that study, or do you believe that there is still some work to
be done?
Sir Houghton. If I could just comment on that. The hockey
stick debate is only a very small discussion within the IPCC
process. The hockey stick debate addresses the issue of global
temperature from the year 1000 to the start of the instrumental
record, which began about 1860. Regarding the records since
1860, there is no question of that being correct, because that
is a very good record.
Trying to reconstruct the data for the previous period
involves proxy data. This is data from tree rings, from pollen
sources, from a whole range of indicators of temperature. And
those need calibrating against the instrumental record. That
calibration process and the way this is done----
Senator Thomas. I think my point is that there is a
difference. As you go to these meetings--and what you have said
scientifically is not agreed to by everyone. And so I guess I
am saying do we have----
Sir Houghton. Okay. Let me now explain it----
Senator Thomas. We do not have time to do all the details.
Sir Houghton. No. Well, let me just explain in detail, but
let me just say that the point of issue is just the
reconstruction of that temperature from 1000 to 1860. Now there
are various reconstructions within the literature that is
debated within the reconstruction, about those reconstructions.
There is nothing within any of those constructions which are
being properly published that puts any jeopardy whatever to the
main statements of the IPCC regarding the temperature of the
20th century, the increase in that temperature, and all the
statements you have heard already.
So there is some debate about it, and I do not dispute that
debate. But there is debate about many issues in science, and
the whole science of various parts of the IPCC. And that is not
a big issue. It is not an issue that affects our main
conclusions at all.
Senator Thomas. Well, it affects the conclusions that we
have to make, and you said, as a matter of fact, that we need
to be taking some action. Well, the fact is that we are taking
action. And the question, if you go to Kyoto, why it is a
matter of setting limits, and then some countries trading off
and selling their credits to others. It has to do with economy.
Nothing to do with the environment.
We are spending more than the rest of the world all put
together in doing research--$6 billion a year. I kind of get
the impression that we have not made any decisions and we are
not moving forward. But what more do you think we can do?
Sir Houghton. What more you could do is to address this
issue. And I cannot give you----
Senator Thomas. Well, we spend $6 billion a year addressing
this issue.
Sir Houghton. But that is--it is a big issue. And you have
to look at--I am not an economist, and I am not a politician.
Senator Thomas. No.
Sir Houghton. I am a scientist who comes to this and tells
you there is a real problem. The world is facing a real
problem. Many countries of the world are taking action to meet
that problem. And we just would like the United States to begin
to show some leadership in this area so that they are part of
the solution as well as not part of the problem.
Senator Thomas. I am trying to tell you that we are
spending more than the rest of the world put together----
Sir Houghton. But then you are emitting more than the
world----
Senator Thomas [continuing]. In seeking to do something----
Sir Houghton. You are emitting a very large--you know, you
are emitting----
Senator Thomas. We have an economy here that is larger than
anyone else's.
Sir Houghton. Okay.
Senator Thomas. I mean it is not easy. It is a different
thing to sit there on the scientific end and talk about all
these things. It is quite different to say, ``All right. What
are we going to do about it?'' Now I understand that is not
your role. It is our role. But we need to talk a little about
both sides of the issue. I have used up my time.
Sir Houghton. But Senator, could I just say, we are not
just scientists doing it for the sake of the science. Although
science is very exciting and very interesting. We believe that
there are very severe problems with humankind, severe damages
to your country as a result of this.
Senator Thomas. How about solutions?
Sir Houghton. Severe damages to other countries, too,
because----
Senator Thomas. How about solutions?
Sir Houghton. And the solutions are to move the way we get
our energy from being a----
Senator Thomas. And we are doing more of that anybody else
in the world.
Dr. Molina. If I can add to that, there are several
options. There are many ways to actually address the problem.
And the example I gave from the National Commission on Energy
Policy is one example I think Senator Bingaman is discussing
and considering for action.
It is not enough to do the science. It is not enough to
invest, which is terribly important. And the point is, much can
be done. It does not have to be Kyoto, but definitely much can
be done to start limiting the nations without adverse economic
impacts.
You will hear more perhaps from the second panel on the
details. We, as scientists, simply expose what the enormous
risks might be if we do not do it.
Senator Thomas. Yes. I understand.
Dr. Molina. But we also, as individuals, can, of course,
have strong statements that much can be done that is not being
done. And that is a point without affecting the economy in a
negative way. For example, going beyond voluntary measures to
limit the nations. That can certainly be done.
Senator Thomas. We also have to balance that. I do not want
to argue with you, but the economy--we go through this Kyoto,
and we go through it all the time. It is not a new issue. And
we are trying to find a way to deal with the problem without
putting great limits on the economy. And frankly, you can sit
in your scientific seat, if you want to, and not worry about
the economy, but you cannot do that when you are making the
decisions.
Dr. Molina. That is why I gave the example of--the specific
example of the National----
Senator Thomas. And you talked about nuclear. France is
using nuclear almost entirely. You said maybe we could do it.
Illinois, 40 percent of their electricity is already generated
by nuclear. It is not a brand new idea. Yes, sir. I am taking
too much time.
Dr. Cicerone. I think we all sympathize with the enormous
responsibility that you feel. One of the statements that the
science academies of the G8 nations and the other three just
made was that it is vital that all nations identify cost-
effective steps that they can take now to contribute to
substantial and long-term reduction in that global greenhouse
gas emissions. That statement did not try to make political
choices, recognize the need.
I just jotted down seven quick thoughts on the values of
energy efficiency that I think we would all agree with. From
the United States' point of view, our manufacturing sector uses
50 or 60 percent more energy to produce a widget than, let us
say, our competitors in Japan and Germany do. And when the
energy costs get as high as they are now, that is a significant
fraction of the product cost.
Now if we could help to find ways to manufacture more
efficiently, there would be a win-win there. We have a
strategic reliance on foreign oil that I do not think any
American is comfortable with. If we could increase our energy
efficiency and decrease that strategic reliance on foreign oil.
You have thought about this a lot.
We have local and regional air pollution issues that,
again, arise from the more inefficient burning of fuels for
energy. If we could increase the efficiency, we could decrease
that problem.
We have a balance of trade issue. I just sketched this out.
I could be wrong, but our current usage of foreign oil is
contributing maybe $200 billion a year to our trade deficit. We
could reduce the trade deficit by increasing our energy
efficiency.
We have the climate change issue, where we all want to slow
down the emissions of carbon dioxide. If we could increase our
energy efficiency with all that means from our business and
commercial sector.
We worry about the illicit usages of the money that we are
spending on foreign oil. Where is that money going? You
probably know the answer better than we do. And I am not sure
you have it all either.
And then finally, there is a world market for energy-
efficient devices. If we could somehow create incentives for
our companies to create those energy--so there are seven win-
win-win propositions here.
Senator Craig. And those are very good. As you well know,
we are right now in the middle of our energy policy development
between the House and the Senate, and many of these things are
there. And so we are moving in that direction.
Dr. Cicerone. The win-win ones.
Senator Craig [presiding]. I hope so. Thank you. I
appreciate your specifics.
Senator.
Senator Corzine. Thank you. And thank the panel. This is an
extraordinary presentation that I think should capture the
imagination of not just the U.S. public's eye, but globally.
I want to piggyback on Senator Craig. I will probably be--
might come at it from a different angle, but I would like each
of you to speak to the one or two initiatives that you think,
whether it is through conservations or efficiencies, as Dr.
Cicerone said, or is it through alternative production elements
that you think would fit into the portfolio that we should be
investing in to address this issue on a long-term basis. And
having been someone who is involved in business, it may not be
profitable in the short run, each of those things, but in the
long run, may have huge return profiles.
So I would like you, within the best of your judgment, to
identify those things that have the highest return profile over
some period of time. So it is relatively open ended, but I
would like to know what that portfolio of actions are that
address what you have so ably described as a real problem for
mankind.
Start with Dr. Molina.
Dr. Molina. It is a tough question, because my conclusion
is that we do need to leave open a whole variety of options.
The way I would put it is that what is very important to do is
to--there has to be some government intervention that goes
beyond voluntary measures to have a strong market signal, so
that the market itself chooses what are the best options to
limit the emission of greenhouse gases.
Clearly, as Dr. Cicerone pointed out, increasing energy
efficiency is a very obvious one. Using the energy sources that
do not consume fossil fuels, renewable energy sources----
Senator Corzine. The fact is, though, that energy
efficiencies might not be in the short run 1 year, 2 years, 5
years market viable----
Dr. Molina. That is right.
Senator Corzine [continuing]. Relative to long-term return
profiles.
Dr. Molina. Yes.
Senator Corzine. So are the efficiencies that were spoken
about, do they have return profiles over a period of time, and
where should we be focusing our exploration if we are trying to
have the greatest impact on these issues as we go forward?
Dr. Molina. Well, just to make the point again, that is why
it is very difficult to point any one or two solutions, and you
have to let society choose the best. Energy efficiency alone
will not solve the problem.
Another very important aspect for the long term, which I
consider absolutely essential, is to continue investing in
developing new technologies, and in particular, to work with
the developing world along these lines.
Senator Corzine. Such as?
Dr. Molina. Well, first of all, there are issues with
fossil fuel usage, such as carbon capture. That is in the
works. It will, of course, cost more, but society can certainly
afford it if it is done properly. So proper use of coal and
other fossil fuels without affecting the environment. But then
we mentioned----
Senator Corzine. Mileage standards are efficiency issues
that cost more. There is no question. Most of these things cost
more.
Dr. Molina. If the cost increase is sufficiently slow,
society can certainly adapt. I mean in the long run it will be
cheaper for society if you consider the costs of not taking
these actions.
Senator Corzine. Okay.
Dr. Molina. But I could mention a whole list. There are a
series of important papers which have a list of 20, 30 things
we could do now and things that you have to do later with new
technologies.
Senator Corzine. Okay. Sir, what are your favorite----
Dr. Hurrell. I am going to give--I am not going to waste
your time by trying to guess at that. My hands are full doing
the science. My expertise is in the science. I can just make
the general statement, as I do in my written testimony, that I
feel that there are a large number of technology options, and I
think all nations need to work to identify the most cost-
effective steps that they can take to help contribute to this
problem. I am simply not an expert in this area.
Senator Corzine. Thank you.
Dr. Cicerone. The reason that I am happy with the answer
that we need all of these ideas that you just recommended is we
will end up with a more stable solution. During the first oil
crisis of 1974 and then in 1979, I was disappointed to find out
that there was no magic bullet, no new energy source, or
current one that could be exploited that would be cheap, and
efficient, and self-reliant.
Now I am much more convinced that what we face is a few
percent here and there. By picking up a couple or a few percent
here and there, we can make enormous progress. There are
markets for all of the new technologies and efficiencies, and
we will end up with a more stable, sustainable situation. So
you pick up a few percent from the adoption of solar
photovoltaic energy for electricity, a few percent from wind, a
couple of percent from biomass usage, get started on clean coal
technology, and carbon sequestration. But anybody who thinks we
are going to find a way to sock away 25 million tons of carbon
dioxide per day has not looked at the size of the problem.
Clean coal and carbon sequestration can make a dent, but it
is not going to be the total solution.
Senator Corzine. Nuclear power would fit in----
Dr. Cicerone. Nuclear power. I know of a concept that is
being explored now for a nuclear fusion technique which is
being supported totally by private investors. Mostly by private
investors. A couple of small government grants supporting these
people, because the payoff would be so large even though it may
not be a total solution.
So a combination of new technologies and improving old
ones, inefficiencies, will lead to a dramatic and yet stable
solution. But there is not a single magic bullet.
Senator Corzine. When you say efficiencies, I want to just
make sure, is mileage standards one of those that you--on
automobiles?
Dr. Cicerone. There is a lot of potential there.
Sir Houghton. I think there is a great deal, except--just
to give maybe a view from outside your country, I mean we
believe very much in market mechanisms. Capping and trading is
a very powerful thing. We have high hopes of Kyoto, as far as
that is concerned.
There is efficiency, of course, in buildings, efficiency in
transport. Much, much more efficient transportation. Motorcars
and the like. And those are all possible, that in a way, they
are there. They just have to be built and done.
And the same with buildings. We can cut our--IPCC has said
we can cut by 50 percent or so in buildings without too much
difficulty. And we should get on with doing that. It needs
incentives to do----
Senator Corzine. I am going to have to get on and vote. I
apologize. I would like to----
Sir Houghton. It needs incentives to do that, and we have
to--and then we have to work closely and generously with the
developing countries, particularly China and India, and other
such countries to make sure that we really help them to buildup
their economies in ways which are friendly to this whole
problem of climate change.
And I know the Chinese are very concerned about it, and the
impact on their country of climate change. So are the Indians.
They have some very good climate scientists that are well aware
of this. They desperately need us to work with them on that. As
I say, in Europe, and the European Union is going to work as
closely as it can with these countries to try to help them,
again, in a generous way, to do things, to buildup their
industrial machinery in a way which is, as far as possible,
carbon free. Thank you.
Senator Alexander [presiding]. I will ask a question and
then Senator Murkowski will.
Let me pursue this line a little bit that was begun by
Senator Corzine, but first let me ask, most of our new power
plants in the United States are natural gas plants. Natural gas
produces methane, is that correct?
Sir Houghton. It is methane.
Senator Alexander. So is making electricity from natural
gas contributing to global warming and something we ought to
limit or stop?
Dr. Cicerone. Yes. In two ways. But it is also more
efficient. The electrical production compared to the amount of
carbon used in methane is efficient. We get more efficiency.
The typical coal-powered--coal-fired power plant of the past
generation had like a 30 percent efficiency. We can do much
better than that now, with mixed cycle gas turbines and
capturing waste heat, especially with natural gas.
But if the methane, which is the natural gas, is lost
before being burned, it is a direct greenhouse emission. And,
of course, carbon dioxide is produced in the burning of the
natural gas. So it is not a total solution, but the efficiency
gain is substantial and can be made even better.
Senator Alexander. Well, let me then go back to the
unanimity of your recommendations about why there is--that
there is global warming, and that it is caused in significant
part by human activity, and that it is urgent we do something
about it within a generation. That is a pretty clear message
coming from you.
I would argue that the Senate Energy Bill that Senator
Domenici, and Senator Bingaman, and the rest of us worked on,
without imposing mandates, goes a long way in taking steps to
produce low carbon or carbon-free electricity, focusing on,
first, conservation and efficiency, second, on advanced nuclear
power, third on coal gasification and carbon sequestration, and
fourth, on new supplies of natural gas, which you have just
said is less harmful, because it is more efficient. And then
there is also support for renewable.
But what is surprising and disconcerting to me from the
scientific community is how the scientific community with a
single voice can say this is a terrifically urgent problem, it
is being caused by human activity to a significant extent and
we need to deal with it in a generation.
Yet, when we then say, ``Okay. So then what do we do about
it,'' you are all over the map and say, ``Well, we need a
little here, a little there, a little here, a little there.'' I
do not see it, looking at it that way.
I mean the United States of America uses 25 percent of all
the energy in the world. Now we are not going to put a few
solar panels on or build some windmills and solve the problem
in the United States in a generation. And you have mentioned
carbon sequestration as the most politically attractive
solution. It would be large-scale coal gasification, with
carbon sequestration. That solves 15 problems at once. United
States, and China, and India. It solves the environmental
problems. It is an elegant solution in a scientific term, but
it has--but we are several years away from there.
If we were to begin to--we might produce coal gasification
very quickly, but carbon sequestration is a massive
undertaking. And we do not quite yet know how to do it.
So I am working backward, and if we are talking about the
next generation, I do not see any way in the world for a
country as large as the United States to reduce the effects of
global warming unless we are aggressive on conservation and
efficiency, first, and aggressive on nuclear power, second. I
do not see any way in the world that scientifically there is a
way to limit global warming in the United States unless we do
what France is doing.
Now if that is true, why does not the scientific community
say that? Because what I always see is let us do a little of
this, a little of this, let us build windmills, and put on
solar panels. That might be good for a desert island, but it
will not solve global warming in the United States of America.
And I believe you would be more persuasive in persuading
the Senate and the country that global warming is an urgent
issue if you would also say, as Senator McCain did and Senator
Lieberman did when they amended their legislation this year and
said we want to put mandates on global warming, and we want to
incent nuclear power, because in this generation, it already
produces 70 percent of all the carbon-free electricity in the
United States today. And in this generation, other than
conservation and efficiency, it is the only way to do it. Who
would comment on that?
Dr. Cicerone. I do not think you would find much
disagreement with that, Senator Alexander. I think Dr. Houghton
mentioned earlier his personal concerns about spent fuels and
potential----
Senator Alexander. Of course.
Dr. Cicerone [continuing]. There are those concerns. There
is the----
Senator Alexander. Proliferation and spent fuel are the two
worries.
Dr. Cicerone. And we all worry that in the last 20 or 30
years we and other countries have not had an aggressive set of
activities to make nuclear power more dependable and more safe.
We wish we had. But the numbers are pretty much what you said.
The United States gets almost 20 percent of its electricity
already from nuclear energy. It has enormous potential. People
just want to see it done safely.
Senator Alexander. And yesterday I met for a few minutes
with the head of our naval nuclear operation. I mean he runs
103 reactors.
Dr. Cicerone. Tremendous record of safety.
Senator Alexander. I think he has an unblemished record of
safety since the 1950's in terms of the reactors. And I
jokingly once suggested to him that what we ought to do in the
United States is build 20 stripped down aircraft carriers with
two 500-watt nuclear reactors and just park them around the
coast and plug them into the grid. Because that would be 20
more nuclear reactors than we have built since the 1970's.
At the same time, France is 80 percent nuclear. Japan, who
suffered nuclear tragedies, has gone ahead with it. And we are
loaning $5 billion through the EXIM Bank to help China build
24. And the President is working with India to help them do
that. And I think we should want them to do that, because that
will reduce the demand for energy, reducing prices, and it will
clean the air, and it will help global warming.
So why does not the scientific community say, ``We see the
problems with nuclear power,'' but if you want to deal with
global warming in one generation, other than conservation
efficiency, nuclear power--it is not a little here and a little
there. Nuclear power is the only way----
Dr. Cicerone. The big one.
Senator Alexander [continuing]. To do most of it.
Sir Houghton. Can I just balance that? I mean I do not
disagree with the statement you made, but there are two sorts
of energy we have not mentioned that much about this morning,
which I think in your country can be very important.
One is biomass----
Senator Alexander. But, sir, what percent of our total
energy will biomass--today it is about 1 percent of our total
energy production. And you are the one who said that in a
generation we must deal with this. And what do you think
biomass is going to produce?
Sir Houghton. I have seen the program in your country
called 25 by 25, which is for 25 percent of your total energy
to come from biomass by 2025.
Senator Alexander. Well, sir, if you believe that, then I
do not believe what you said earlier about global warming.
Sir Houghton. Well, I do not necessarily--I am just telling
you----
Senator Alexander. You undercut your entire credibility
when you suggest that 25 percent of our energy will be biomass
by 2025.
Sir Houghton. I am posing to you a proposal which has been
made, which is probably too ambitious. And I understand that.
But I also understand that biomass is important for China, and
India, and other countries. And that is the important part of
the whole portfolio.
We need a portfolio of possibilities, which includes
nuclear, which includes other things, which includes solar as
well. Because you have other places where you could----
Senator Alexander. What percent do you think solar will be,
sir?
Sir Houghton. Pardon?
Senator Alexander. What percent of the United States do you
think solar will be in a generation? You are the one who said
it is urgent to deal with this in a generation. And today,
solar is less than 1 percent, even though we spent billions of
dollars on it.
The Chairman [presiding]. All right. Senator, this is your
last question, please.
Senator Alexander. Well, I have--I am trying to interject
some----
The Chairman. I understand, but, you know----
Senator Alexander [continuing]. Realism----
The Chairman. You were gracious to take over.
[Laughter.]
Sir Houghton. I am aware of proposals which are being made
elsewhere in the world for solar to have a very big part in it.
And I also know the potential in your country for, if you
really want to do something, doing it fast, doing it well, and
doing it efficiently. I am not in the position to say exactly
what you can do. But I do urge you to address a portfolio of
possibilities, to weigh them all together and what you can do,
and come up with a plan for doing it.
And that is what I urge my own government to do in the
U.K., what I urge the European Union to do. And I just wish
this would be done in a more responsible and a more genuine
strategic manner.
The Chairman. Thank you both.
Senator, thank you. I do not mean to cut you off, but I
think even though you are generous to take over when we are not
here, you should not assume that the time consumed by you does
not count.
[Laughter.]
Senator Alexander. I had an opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and
I took it.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. You are practical in all respects.
Senator Alexander. Well done.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Now we are going to ask the Senator from
Alaska.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I kind of
enjoyed that little engagement there.
I have said repeatedly, I do not need to be converted on
whether or not we have climate change under way in this
country. As I said in my very brief statement this morning, I
see it in my home State. I see it with what is happening with
the erosion. I see it with what is happening in our vegetation
that is migrating northward, with the insects that are coming
on, with the temperatures. So I know that something is
happening just from a non-scientific person who lives there
point of view.
So I have been trying to find what are the answers. Help me
with the science. And I have been spending the time that I
think a reasonable person in my State would be doing on this
issue. I want to know the answers, but I want to know with a
certain level of certainty what it is that is causing this. So
I listened with great interest this morning to the conclusion
that all four of you have reached that it is man's emissions
that are causing the changes that I am seeing in my State and
the changes that you have referred to throughout the world.
The scientific modeling out there is amazing. And I have
had an opportunity to see some of it, talk to the scientists
about how it works, and what more we need to do. Why can we not
understand and differentiate then what effect the human
variables, whether it is the solar changes, or the current
changes? What portion can we extract out of this equation and
say this is manmade versus this is what Mother Nature is doing?
And if we cannot, why can't we? And will we ever be able to
make that distinction, that differentiation? Now I am not going
to sit here and tell you from a policy perspective, if you come
back and tell me that 5 percent is man-induced and the other
ninety-five percent is human variable, that we are going to
direct our policy that way.
But are we to the point of understanding from the
scientific perspective how we can isolate this?
Dr. Hurrell?
Dr. Hurrell. I will attempt to answer this question
probably in two parts. The first speaking to where the
technology stands and our ability to differentiate between the
human versus more natural origins of the climate change and
climate variability.
And, of course, one of the main tools that we have for
doing this are the state-of-the-art models of the coupled
climate system. And in recent years, I think very credible
arguments can be made that these models have become very useful
in tackling that specific issue.
If you look at the models now, they are able to replicate,
for instance, the most important characteristics of the
observed changes in global temperature over the last 100 years.
Since they can do that, we can then begin to break down which
forces have contributed to the climate change in terms of the
increases in temperature that we have observed. If you do those
experiments, you find that natural variations and particular
changes in solar luminosity played a key role in contributing
to the warming during the early part of the 20th century.
But the temperature changes that we have seen in the last
several decades, those same simulations with only the so-called
natural forces and climate prescribed, do not produce any
significant change in temperature over the last several
decades.
When you then give the models the information about the
observed buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they
now produce the increase in temperature that has been observed.
So this is very strong evidence, I think, from these very
credible, although not perfect, but very credible models that
much of the climate change over the last several decades is
being driven by the buildup of greenhouse gases, and sulfate
aerosols and the like in the atmosphere.
Senator Murkowski. Can you define ``that much''?
Dr. Hurrell. I would say based on the climate model
simulations that are contributing to the next assessment of the
IPCC that nearly all of the warming is attributable to that in
recent decades.
Senator Murkowski. How do you respond then to those--you
have scientists all over the board, like economists, like
lawyers, like politicians. You ask them all, they are all going
to have their own theory.
I had an opportunity to speak with a climatologist out of
Oregon, who is indicating that in his opinion it is the cyclic
increase in the solar radiation and/or the changes in the North
Atlantic or the Pacific Decadal Oscillations that affect the
currents.
Dr. Hurrell. Yes.
Senator Murkowski. So you are saying all of it and he is
saying----
Dr. Hurrell. No.
Senator Murkowski [continuing]. Hey, it is all--it is the
natural variables.
Dr. Hurrell. Thank you for the opportunity to expand. That
gets to the second point of my question. The first point was
really addressing the very large-scale temperature changes. On
a regional level and a local level you will often hear
scientists say that there is more uncertainty in that. And that
is because one of the outstanding scientific questions is how
will the so-called natural modes of the climate system--you
mentioned the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, or El Nino, the ENSO
events in the tropical Pacific, which have a worldwide impact
on climate and weather.
How will those natural phenomena be affected as a result of
human activities? And there is much less certainty on that
topic. There are very open scientific issues. So when you look
at your State of Alaska, for instance, you have seen warming
there that is very significant.
You have noted that you can observe the changes with your
own eye. And, in fact, a very key player in Alaskan climate is
the so-called Pacific Decadal Oscillation. So there are natural
variations in climate that are occurring, that have always
occurred in the past. But imposed upon that then is the human
influence.
But it becomes much more difficult to attribute at a
regional or a local level. For instance, the warming in the
Arctic in recent decades. Just how much of that is due
specifically in a specific region to the buildup of greenhouse
gases. Because a fundamental scientific question is, how do we
expect the so-called modes of variability of the climate system
to be affected?
Now it is a complicated issue, because in--if I can go on
just one more moment. Sir John was speaking about the Atlantic
climate. And one of the--the key driver of Atlantic climate,
for instance, is something called the North Atlantic
Oscillation. It is in some ways analogous to the impact that
the PDO has on climate in Alaska.
And scientists have known for a long time that this is a
so-called natural mode of climate variability. It is
significant year to year, and maybe even decade to decade
variations. But there is research that indicates that the
amplitude and the phase of this phenomena, which has been
behaving differently in recent decades, can be related to the
warming of the tropical oceans.
When you look at the warming of the tropical oceans, in
particular, for instance, the Indian Ocean, there is very
strong scientific evidence to suggest that a big component of
that warming of the oceans is, indeed, anthropogenically driven
by the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
So you have the warming of the tropical oceans, which are
being driven, in part, by the increased greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere that are affecting the
behavior of this mode of variability in the system thousands of
miles away in the North Atlantic, and are contributing to some
of the unusual behavior of this North Atlantic oscillation.
Senator Murkowski. Just so that I am clear that I
understand your position, you believe that much, if not all, of
what we are seeing that is contributing to climate change,
global warming, is caused by man-induced emissions. We may be
seeing some regional impact that is perhaps not quite in sync
with what we are seeing globally, that is being impacted by the
overall global changes.
Dr. Hurrell. Regional climate, if you will, is affected by
the weather patterns, the jet streams, and the like. And they
are sort of organized in some coherent fashion in the climate
system by these large-scale modes of variability. You mentioned
the Pacific Decadal Oscillation.
The mechanisms for that can be related to natural couplings
in the atmosphere ocean system. Exactly how those couplings are
affected by global warming is still a major research issue. So
that is what I am trying to separate out, that we know that on
a global scale, and we can begin to quantify, I believe, with
global climate models, what the human-induced contribution to
that overall global warming is. On a local and a regional
scale, it is much more difficult to attribute any specific
change to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Senator Murkowski. I think if you could show this panel
here and other policymakers that, in fact, with the statistical
modeling, almost entirely we are seeing global climate change
as it relates to or caused from manmade emissions, I think it
might be easier for us to make a determination in terms of
where we go with policy. But when we get statements like we
believe that much of it is caused by, that makes it tougher. I
think we are looking for a little more certainty.
The one thing that I concluded, sitting down with a group
of scientists that were involved with the Arctic climate impact
assessment report, was that they all agreed something was
happening, but they could not determine exactly where it was
coming from. So your assistance on that would help us.
Mr. Chairman, I could go on all morning, but I know we have
another panel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Did you feel compelled
to say something?
Dr. Hurrell. I was simply going to add that I would be more
than happy to provide the committee with some of the evidence
from the climate model simulations that I am referring to, to
show that in a global mean sense, nearly all of the warming in
recent decades can be attributed to the buildup of greenhouse
gases.
Sir Houghton. May I just add briefly, that is on the global
scale we have this confidence that Dr. Hurrell has been talking
about, but the regional scale, there is a lot of natural
variability. But that natural variability is all being affected
by the global scale, by all the global scale changes due to
human activity.
But because of the degree of that variability, any given
event, we cannot say that event is caused by human-induced
climate change, because we have had lots of the variabilities
so large. There is one event which I mentioned, which is the
heat wave in Europe, which is so far outside. It is five
standard deviations away. So far away from natural variability,
it could not conceivably have come from natural variability.
But it is most other single events--but it is when we see
the way in which the number of events and their average
intensity, we can see the trends. And those trends are now
occurring. We are seeing more floods, and more droughts, and
more storms in general this end of the century that we had in
the middle of the century. And the models can actually predict
reasonably well or project quite well what will happen by the
year 2050, for instance, is what these good models show, that
suggest in Europe we are going to have a risk of flooding which
is five times greater in 2050 than it is now. So the 50-year
flood will become the 10-year flood, and so on.
So we can project into the future, but actually identifying
anything now, because of this great natural variability of
climate, which is part of the climate characteristic, is made
very difficult.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Now I guess you noticed
that I have not participated, and that is very unusual. But I
thought it best to do it the way I did it. I am not sure what
is going to happen for the rest of the day to these wonderful
following witnesses, but I am going to try to put you on and
see what happens. We both have something scheduled, but let us
see what happens.
First, let me start, Dr. Cicerone, you indicated that we
have evidence over a 400,000-year period that carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere had various high and low levels, and you found
that out in a typical way that is now determined to be
accurate.
Just so we will know, where did the pollutant that
contributed then come from? Certainly, it was not what we are
doing now. That was not even a civilization. So where did it
come from?
Dr. Cicerone. In that range that I spoke of, the last
couple of glacial cycles, 400,000 years, the carbon dioxide
amounts went between about 180 and 280 parts per million, and
today we are about 380.
The Chairman. Okay.
Dr. Cicerone. So well outside the natural range. But
nonetheless, those were big changes, as you say.
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Cicerone. The decomposition of organic material in the
soils was going on over geological time scales, and the
exchange of carbon dioxide with the oceans. No one can
completely tell why the carbon dioxide amounts changed. It
looks as if the carbon dioxide changed partly in response to
changing climate and partly leading the change in climate over
the past two ice ages.
The data are about as firm as we are going to get. They are
real measurements from dated ice cores. So it is exchange of
carbon with the organic matter in soils and exchange of carbon
dioxide with the oceans, the stuff moving back and forth, up
and down.
The Chairman. But the fact that it existed then and we did
not have a source of pollutants that we are now trying to
control is not a reason to draw any inferences that the
information about the current pollutants is not right.
Dr. Cicerone. Correct. First of all, we are way outside the
range of natural variability, the 180 to 280. And second, we
have isotopic data that tell us that the carbon dioxide buildup
in today's atmosphere is mostly due to fossil fuel consumption.
Maybe 80 percent.
The Chairman. My second point. It has been stated by one of
you, I think it was you, Sir John, that while China is now and
will become, unless some big changes occur, a more major
contributor to the CO2 that we are worried about,
and something was said that they are looking for us to do
something, it is very interesting, and you should know that we
are in the same boat and we have people tell us, we are not
going to proceed until they do something.
Now you have answered that by saying you are the leaders.
If you lead, they will follow. I want to suggest to you that
that is not an easy nut to sell up here. Okay? So I would
suggest that we be focusing on how are we doing something that
they should recognize that we are doing.
And so I want to tell you something about the energy bill
that we produced. We produced an energy bill that essentially,
for our new policy, could have been called a clean energy bill,
instead of just an energy policy. Because everywhere in the
bill the emphasis is on producing energy that is clean. And not
only clean, but we have literally used the words, greenhouse
gas clean. The whole section on incentives, which is one that
Senator Bingaman and I take most pride in, which is going to
permit the Secretary of Energy to finance, and we hope we will
get it in--the House has not said yes yet. But we are saying we
do not get a bill unless it is in there--actually permits the
funding in the next few years of facilities that are aimed at
reducing greenhouse gases.
And it is going to cost a lot of money, but the way we have
done it, it is not going to cost our treasury so much, because
it is guaranteed loans where the applicant pays the risk. The
risk insurance is paid by them. It may be 10 percent. It may be
5. And that whole section is designed to employ innovative
clean energy, and it is actually said that avoid, or reduce, or
sequester air pollutants or other emissions of greenhouse
gases.
Now if we do that, we pass that law, and we get started on
it, is that not evidence that we are doing something? Or is
that not the kind of evidence that China or anybody else would
be waiting for? Now I just state that--I just throw you that
out. I do not need an answer. It seems to me we are going to do
something.
Now my last observation, or third observation is this. You
heard almost everyone here say with varying degrees that there
is a problem. But I think you also gather that the question
what do we do about it, and how, remains a very live subject.
And while you are not the experts on that, it does appear that
you have to be involved in that, and what do we do about it.
And I submit that the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, Sir
John, was on the right track in talking about practical things.
Real things. Not only achievable things. Achievable things that
do not amount to anything I do not put in the class of being
very relevant.
So when people say we can do this, and we can do that, we
have to ask the question, just what will that amount to. And I
submit to you that the United States will make a giant stride
in nuclear power, and you will see it. I mean it will happen.
There will be a nuclear power plant started in the United
States within the next 3 years, in my opinion. Sounds crazy,
does it not? But I think it will happen. And that is because of
this bill and because of what is already happening.
Now having said that, I just make the point that we need to
come up with a plan that gives us a period of time to pursue
those technologies with vigor, so that we are moving toward
achievement and that at some point, if we do not, we do
something.
Now the reason Senator Bingaman and I have been drawn to
the National Commission on Energy Policy, that they say would
end the energy stalemate. It recommends sort of what I am
saying, that for X number of years we pursue the voluntary
approach, and we want to extend that a little bit to be more
consistent with the President's goals, and then we would
trigger some things. And then I want to urge that you study
that with us, look at it. And I will ask you about it.
The last point is, I do not think the issue is whether we
have a major international problem. I think the question is how
do we solve it. And I think we have too many people talking as
if it is simple. Oh, just cut emissions 10 percent, and come up
with a bill that says we should do that.
Well, I hope you understand that I have heard nothing like
that from your mouths today. And I thank you very much for your
calm expertise here today. And we need more of that, because
this country lives on energy. Whether anybody wants to think we
are hogs or whatever, we live on energy. And we are successful
because of the use of energy. And we cannot put ourselves back
in an era when we say we are not using energy without
devastating something, right? That is pretty simple.
In fact, I was going to say, Dr. Molina, you do not have to
be a Nobel winner to know that, right?
Dr. Molina. Right.
The Chairman. You know a lot more than that. That is very
simple. So I am just going to leave it to you for a couple of
observations from each of you about what I have said. I am
looking for a solution, but I am not going to join the crowd
that thinks it is simple. I am not going to join the crowd that
thinks Kyoto was a solution. I hate to tell you, it is not a
solution. It would not be achieved.
And America, some people think we are being--the President
is being stubborn, but I remind you that the U.S. Senate did
not have one affirmative vote to support Kyoto when we voted on
it. And they keep blaming the President.
Nobody voted to give the President the authority to sign
that treaty. So we have to talk about something else. Everybody
keeps saying what about it. Well, we have to come up with
something else that we can talk about.
Having said that, I am out of time, but usually that means
you can use up some time, because mine does not count against
you. So would any of you like to comment in any respect.
Dr. Molina?
Dr. Molina. Yes. Senator Domenici, as you know I am a
member of the National Commission of Energy Policy, so I very
much endorse what you just have stated. And I repeat once more,
we as scientists, of course, can state what the severity of the
problem is, but we do not have the solution. We have to work
with the rest of society to do that. And that is why it makes
sense to have government intervention, to have a strong signal
that something is to be done. It will not happen spontaneously.
We do need enough resources for technology, including clean
nuclear energy. So I think you are very much on the right
track. We do work with our economist colleagues. And I think
there are very sensible solutions. I agree with you, different
than Kyoto, but the National Commission on Energy Policy
recommendations repeated one very good example that I
understand you are looking at very carefully, which is how to
go about it without having a negative economic influence on the
United States.
Dr. Hurrell. I do not have too much to add. I would
reinforce the comments that Dr. Molina made, and I agree with
what you are saying, Senator Domenici. I am very heartened to
hear from this committee that they feel as though it is not a
question of whether or not this is a problem, but rather how to
go about addressing it. That is not my area of expertise.
But I have been biting my tongue a bit, because my father-
in-law is a nuclear engineer, and I would simply say that I do
think that nuclear energy is a very, very real and viable way
to make a major contribution to this problem.
Dr. Cicerone. Senator Domenici, as you know, the National
Academies of Sciences and Engineering are at your disposal. We
exist to help the Government in performing evaluations and
recommendations. And in this challenge, we will be at your
service.
The Chairman. Sir John.
Sir Houghton. Just to mention, Kyoto finishes in 2012.
Kyoto is not a long-term solution. Kyoto was never meant to be
a long-term solution. Kyoto is a beginning. And Kyoto is a
beginning that brings nations together to do things. It is also
based on market-based techniques and measures. And I notice--
and we hope those will work. And they will have some effect.
But we have to look now, we have to begin to look now at
the longer term. Beyond Kyoto. Whatever happens there, in order
to come up with what you say in your sense of the Senate's
resolution, which you passed, you should enact a comprehensive
and effective national program of mandated market-based limits
and incentives on emissions of greenhouse gases that slow,
stop, and reverse the growth of such emissions at a rate and in
a manner, and so on.
I mean that is a marvelous statement. That is exactly what
we believe should happen. It means that governments, and
industries, and local governments, and everybody should get
together to work out a program, a timed program of how you can
proceed with this. But it is also--it has to encourage
comparable action by other nations, for major trading partners,
and so on, and key contributors to global issues.
And so there is an international part to it, very important
international part to it. And if I might again repeat what I
said at the start, coming as I do from outside your country,
and listening, as I do, to what the rest of the world says, to
a large degree the rest of the world is looking at you in the
United States and saying, ``Please, United States, you are a
big contributor to, of course, the problem of global warming
because of your emissions. You have this enormous industrial
capacity. You have this enormous desire to lead in the world.
And please exercise that leadership, which will enable the rest
of the world to come along with you to help to solve this
problem.''
The Chairman. Well, for myself, I would just say thank you
for the compliment. I wish you would follow in some other
areas, too, but it seems to be that we have difficulty getting
follow-ship in some other areas of endeavors that are important
to us. I am just kidding. Just kidding.
Let us take a look at--do you have anything further,
Senator Bingaman, of these witnesses?
Senator Bingaman. No, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Would you join me in thanking them?
Senator Bingaman. I think the testimony has been excellent,
and I very much appreciate the witnesses and particularly, Sir
John, thank you for coming all this distance.
Sir Houghton. Thank you.
The Chairman. We appreciate it. Thank you all. Thanks for
much. You are excused.
Would the other witnesses join with me and let me talk to
them a minute? You can sit where you are or come up and let us
just chat a bit. Do I understand correctly that each of you,
let us say, Dr. Montgomery, do I understand that you are from
around here, Doctor?
Dr. Montgomery. Yes.
The Chairman. The region. How convenient would it be if we
set you up again?
Dr. Montgomery. We are all open, sir.
The Chairman. Would that be all right, Mr. Grumet?
Mr. Grumet. Around the corner, sir. Can be here any time.
The Chairman. Okay. Dr. Morgenstern?
Dr. Morgenstern. Local.
The Chairman. Guy Caruso? Local? Okay, with the Energy
Information Agency. You have been doing great work, let me say.
We greatly and very much appreciate it.
Here is what we are going to do. Rather than try to package
this in and shove it into a small time, we are going to
reschedule it when we have more time. And you will be first up,
the next panel we have. Is that satisfactory? Maybe in the
meantime, you have heard a little from us. You might----
Panelist: Improve the quality of our testimony.
The Chairman. Yes.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, answer some--you know what we are
thinking about. Yes. Thank you very much. Let me announce that.
Thank you.
All right. What we have decided to do, since these four
witnesses are from the immediate area, they have expressed a
willingness to come back on reasonably short notice, and we
will attempt to set up another hearing where they will be
first. There will be another panel with them that will address
the issues that you have from another vantage point. And with
that, I thank everybody, including the members of the press. We
stand in adjournment.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to be
reconvened on September 20, 2005.]
CLIMATE CHANGE
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V.
Domenici, chairman, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. Hello, everybody. Good morning, witnesses.
Senators, good to be with all of you.
I want to thank all of you for coming here from your busy
schedules. As everybody knows, this is a continuation of the
hearings that the committee held on July 21. Due to the length
of the questions and the answers, and the press of the Senate
business, the committee was unable to hear from you. We heard
only the first panel. For that, we apologize. Glad we were able
to set it up again today.
Today we will hear from four witnesses on the topic of
mandatory carbon controls and the impact of such. Now, there
could be a lot of other questions asked of you, but I think--
and we cannot hold Senators to anything, nor you to your
answers, but that is what we would like to focus on, because
the previous discussion covered the other subject that was
important. So the impact of these controls that we are speaking
of, what that might be on the economy and how effective the
controls might be in reducing carbon emissions that are
generated in the United States.
I should note that the Deputy EIA Administrator, Howard
Gruenspecht, is appearing instead of Administrator Caruso and
Dr. Anne Smith is appearing in place of David Montgomery. That
is just a coincidence of scheduling and we greatly appreciate
your stepping in and we know your testimony will be the
equivalent of whom you replace.
I am pleased that the committee is continuing the
discussion of this serious issue. It is clear that something is
happening with the Earth's climate and I am aware that many in
the scientific community are warning us that something needs to
be done. I am also aware that there are equally-qualified
members of the scientific community who do not share those
views. Nevertheless, I believe that it is prudent to heed the
warnings that we are hearing and begin to find ways of
alleviating the human contribution to this problem that is
being presented to us.
As I said in the July 21 portion of the hearing, what, who,
how and when are the questions that the hearing and subsequent
hearings will help us answer. With this hearing we are
continuing to search for answers on meaningful economically
feasible activities that will produce real reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.
It is clear to me that developing a system of mandatory
controls on carbon emissions could be a daunting task. In fact,
it is. Controls must be effective. They must produce positive
reductions. The cost should have the least possible negative
effect and any burdens must be as equal as possible, spread out
among those affected.
Now, some say that does not matter, and they have said,
when we were arguing on the floor, at least someone did, that
we were too concerned about fairness. But, actually, fairness
is important in itself, it is also important from the
standpoint of Senators and voters and people willing to do
things. Many, including the NCEP, suggest that the answer lies
in a system assigning greenhouse gas emitters emission
allowances that could be sold or traded. The NCEP has also
suggested that a monetary value of the allowances be capped at
$7 a ton of carbon, rising slowly over 10 years. If needed,
emitters could purchase allowances from the government.
Proceeds can be used to finance research and development on new
or low-carbon energy technologies. I hope I have not misstated
the position. I think that is correct.
These are interesting ideas, but designing an effective and
equitable allowance mechanism is likely to be very difficult,
and I think you yourselves, your group, is acknowledging that.
I believe such allocation mechanisms might be constructed, but
I do not think we are there yet. I would be glad to hear from
you on that score. I guess, not to be trite, but I think the
devil is in the details in that regard.
So let us proceed. I yield now to Senator Bingaman. Thank
you so much, Senator Bingaman, for helping me move this along
and for your interest.
[The prepared statements of Senators Akaka and Corzine
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, U.S. Senator From Hawaii
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the economics
of global climate change. First of all, I want to thank ranking member
Jeff Bingaman, and you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in the
Senate's passing the first resolution in support of mandatory control
of carbon dioxide during debate on the Senate's energy bill. Included
in that resolution was the idea that it should be done in a way that
does not hurt the economy. I am very interested in how to do that and I
have some questions for the witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is extremely timely. In the aftermath of
the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina, we must consider the
economics of NOT acting with respect to global climate change.
This is something I have said many times before, but now we have a
tragic case. Estimates to rejuvenate the Gulf Coast and to repair New
Orleans are in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and climbing. The
cost to human life and well-being can never be rectified.
It was known that New Orleans was vulnerable, that it is below sea
level, and that levees could potentially breach. It is also widely
accepted that global warming will bring stronger storms, if not more
frequent.
The recent article in Science, by Dr. Peter Webster, links greater
hurricane intensity with warmer sea surface temperatures. This is like
fueling hurricanes with warmer sea temperatures. This is a devastating
thought for all people in low-lying areas such as the Gulf of Mexico.
Areas around the Mississippi delta in Louisiana are already sinking,
even as world-wide sea levels are on the rise. That makes it a triple
whammy for Louisiana.
My view, with Hawaii's vulnerability in mind, is that our
investment in curtailing the causes of global warming, and our nation's
leadership in convincing other nations such as China to reduce carbon
emission, are critically important for the future. When we discuss
economics of carbon control, I have long said that we must weigh the
costs of inaction as well as the costs of action. Hurricane Katrina is
just the first of these wake-up calls.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the
witnesses.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jon S. Corzine, U.S. Senator From New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for holding this
hearing on the important issue of climate change. Senator Bingaman,
thank you, also, for your leadership and advocacy of smart, effective
climate change policies.
The consensus among the worldwide scientific community is that the
burning of fossil fuels is linked to global warming, and global warming
threatens our environment, our health, and our future. It may even be
linked to the recent increase in hurricane intensity, and the
accompanying dangers.
I strongly supported Senator Bingaman's amendment to the Energy
bill proclaiming that the U.S. Senate should take mandatory action on
climate change, and confirming the Senate's objective to seriously
consider climate change proposals. While this amendment passed the
Senate on a bipartisan basis on June 22 of this year, it is a small
step on a much larger journey that requires a much greater sense of
urgency. Hearings like this one continue to raise awareness of the
dangers of global climate change. It is my hope that the words spoken
today will translate into comprehensive policies that effectively
address global warming, and that we will see action soon.
The overwhelming scientific consensus is that average global
temperatures are rising. Though there are natural fluctuations in
average global temperatures from year to year and even decade to
decade, scientists believe that the rise in temperature we have seen in
the later part of the 20th century is due to human factors. Dr. Ralph
Cicerone, who was recently hired to head the National Academy of
Sciences, asserts that global warming is caused primarily by humans,
stating that, ``nearly all climate scientists agree,'' with this
viewpoint. The NAS was specifically chartered by Congress to advise the
government on scientific matters. It would be foolish to ignore their
findings.
Many scientists believe we are already witnessing the effects of
global climate change in the form of the recent increase in the
intensity and frequency of hurricanes. Dr. Kerry Emanuel, an
atmospheric expert and MIT professor, believes the higher the
temperature of the sea surface, the more intense and greater the
duration of hurricanes. In short, scientists believe that global
climate change creates meteorological factors conducive to the creation
and durability of strong storms. With the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina still fresh in our minds, this consensus should take on an
especially strong meaning. If indeed we can create a unified climate
change policy that would effectively eliminate or mitigate the effects
of rising sea temperatures, we should unhesitatingly do so.
My state of New Jersey, though not as susceptible to hurricanes as
the Gulf coast, still sees its fair share of storms during hurricane
season. When storms approach New Jersey, we pile sandbags, put plywood
up on the windows, and stock up on supplies, much like those in New
Orleans did. Such preparations go a long way in attempting to lessen
the effects of strong storms. If we can do the same in Congress by
passing adequate and meaningful legislation that helps buffer severe
weather, don't we owe it to our constituents to do so?
Global warming threatens our environment, our communities and our
way of life. It can have a severe economic impact on communities and
individuals. We have already seen the devastating economic cost of
Katrina. Not only has a billion dollar tourism industry been decimated,
but rebuilding an entire metropolis will cost tens of billions of
dollars in federal spending. My state, along with all others on the
Atlantic coast, is also susceptible to catastrophic damage caused by
seasonal storms. If our beaches are threatened, and our coastline
damaged, New Jersey will see an economic impact of terrible
proportions. Our second largest industry, tourism, simply will
disappear without the draw of the Jersey shore. As Katrina has shown
all too tragically, every coastal area that we hold dear is at risk of
losing a huge part of their states' economies.
I have long been a proponent of legislation that would counter this
problem and encourage reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. In the
last two Congresses, I secured language in the Senate energy bills
creating a greenhouse gas registry. The greenhouse gas registry would
have been an important first step in confronting climate changes, and I
am committed to continuing to fight for this approach.
And of course, I have been clear about my support for stricter CAFE
standards, which I hope, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, my
colleagues will see as just the start of a comprehensive, thoughtful
policy to effectively address climate change.
Again, I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for allowing this
Committee the chance to hear from these witnesses before us about this
crucial topic. I look forward to their testimonies.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Bingaman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for reconvening this hearing on climate change and global
warming issues. Clearly there are a tremendous number of
important issues competing for attention here in the Congress
at this time in our Nation's history, and I think it is a
tribute to you that you are willing to commit some committee
time to continue to look at this issue and see if there is a
path forward that we can agree upon.
I would just make three very brief points. First, I am
persuaded that there is a broad scientific consensus that links
climate change to manmade emissions. There are clearly
uncertainties about how the climate is going to change, about
what impacts it will have, and various other aspects of the
issue. But I believe it makes sense to begin now to hedge
against the negative risks involved with climate change and I
hope we are able to do that.
Second, I just make the point that in looking at what the
effect of any kind of a system of emissions controls might have
on the economy, we also need to recognize the effect of
inaction on the economy. I do not think that we can ignore the
fact that changes are expected, adverse changes in our economy,
if we pursue a path of inaction. I think that that is an
important issue to have discussed.
The third and final issue is that out of this hearing and
others that you may choose to schedule, I hope we can get some
consensus on a way forward. Obviously, this is an extremely
interesting issue and one that has had an enormous amount of
study. Our contribution, if we are able to make a contribution
to the debate, is going to be in actually getting agreement on
a course of action, and that is what I hope very much this
hearing will help us achieve.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Does any Senator feel like they should speak at this point?
We are going to have plenty of time. Why do we not do this? Any
Senator who would like to can speak for up to 5 minutes.
Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR
FROM WYOMING
Senator Thomas. I am frankly looking forward to your
testimony, and thank you for having this. I just note we know
that we are facing several items here at the same time. We are
looking at energy, how we are going to supply energy. So I hope
that you will kind of orient toward policy directions. We can
get wrapped up in numbers, but how are we going to balance the
things that we need to have energy and to do it in an
environmentally sound way?
So we look forward to hearing from you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. I really want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for having an open mind on this. I think it is really
important. I think the situation is changing rather
dramatically.
I would like to put in the record a release from the
Georgia Institute of Technology and read one quote.* They have
just done a study on hurricanes and, quote: ``What we found was
rather astonishing. In the 1970's there was an average of ten
category 4 and 5 hurricanes per year globally. Since 1990 the
number of category 4 and 5 hurricanes has almost doubled,
averaging 18 per year globally.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The release can be found in the appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So the bottom line is, although there are not more
hurricanes, they are much more intense. I spent a day at the
Scripps Institute of Oceanography a while back and what they
said global warming would do is bring on essentially more
erratic weather patterns, that when it rains the drops would
get bigger and we would be subject to much more forceful
weather conditions. It looks to me as if this is beginning to
happen. So I think the ability of this committee, if it is not
our SUV loophole closer, if it is not McCain-Lieberman, I think
we really do have to come up with some system that will make a
difference in reducing global warming gases in the atmosphere.
So thank you very much.
The Chairman. Anybody else on this side?
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I will say,
you reminded us at the last hearing. You said it is not really
so much the question of whether or not there is a serious
problem, but what do we do about it. That is why we are here
today, to listen to some of those who do have some specifics. I
would agree with Senator Thomas. I would hope we would be able
to get into a discussion as to how we actually could make
something work. So I appreciate you calling this today.
The Chairman. Well, I am compelled, Senator Feinstein, to
respond to your statement. I was very reluctant, in light of
Katrina, to call this meeting because I do not think--I thought
somebody would come up with the idea that could be quoted all
over the world that Katrina was in some way related to global
warming. I have heard one of the best experts in the world on
television saying that that is nuts, and I think it is enough
for the English to be blaming us and saying we deserve Katrina
because we did not sign the Kyoto Agreement, which is also
absurd, than to get that spread across here.
So I have great respect for you and I thank you for what
you said about my calling the meeting, but I do not think--if
we are going to get off on that, we will call a couple of
witnesses in the next few days on hurricanes and I think we
will find that certainly that is not the consensus opinion.
Senator Feinstein. All I did was quote from a study, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. I understand. Well, I could have had a study,
I could have two of them, saying--in fact, I might dig them up
and make sure the press gets them.
Having said that, let us proceed. We will take the Federal
witness first.
STATEMENT OF HOWARD GRUENSPECHT, PH.D., DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
Dr. Gruenspecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Bingaman,
and members of the committee. I guess with all the discussion
of baseball at last week's hearings I would like to start, as
you have indicated, by noting that I am pinch-hitting here for
Guy Caruso, who was in the on-deck circle in July when the
hearing was postponed, but is traveling out of town today. I
know he would have wanted to be here.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Energy Information Administration's recent analysis
of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and energy use.
EIA is the independent statistical and analytical agency in the
Department of Energy. We provide data and analysis to assist
policymakers and inform energy markets, but we do not promote,
formulate, or take positions on policy issues.
At the request of Senator Bingaman, EIA recently analyzed
the impacts on energy markets and the economy that would result
from recommendations contained in the December 2004 report
issued by the National Commission on Energy Policy; they are
represented here and you will hear from them. That analysis and
my testimony today focus on a case that includes all of the
recommendations made by the Commission that EIA was able to
analyze in its modeling system. But we also looked at several
of the recommendations separately, including the proposed cap-
and-trade program, and I will discuss that as well.
We found that three policies--the cap-and-trade program,
which is linked to a target for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions intensity beginning in 2010; tighter fuel economy
standards for cars and light trucks; and new building and
appliance efficiency standards--were projected to have the most
significant impact on energy use and emissions of the
recommendations made by the Commission.
Overall, the policies we modeled were projected to reduce
total energy consumption in 2025 by 5 percent and fossil energy
use in 2025 by 7 percent, both relative to the reference case
in our Annual Energy Outlook 2005. However, even with those
reductions, U.S. consumption of oil, natural gas and coal all
grow from today's levels by 2025.
Turning briefly to the individual fuels, the policies in
the NCEP package are projected to reduce oil demand by 7
percent in 2025, with a slight decrease in import dependence.
As shown in figure 1 of the written testimony, almost all of
the reduction in oil demand results from more stringent fuel
economy standards. The cap-and-trade program alone has only a
small impact.
Second, even though the cap-and-trade program itself would
tend to increase the use of natural gas, the NCEP policies
taken together are projected to reduce natural gas use slightly
by 2025. That is because the NCEP proposals for building
standards and some of the technology programs--incentives in
the programs--lower natural gas use for space heating and
electric generation, and the other programs provide incentives
for renewable, nuclear, coal-fired, and integrated
gasification-combined cycle generation, which tend to shift
generation away from natural gas. Projected coal demand is
reduced from its reference case level by about 10 percent in
2025.
Figure 4 in the written testimony shows that the NCEP
policies are projected to significantly change the mix of
investment in the electric power sector. Again, I mention the
integrated gasification-combined cycle capacity additions,
which more than double compared to the reference case.
Renewable capacity additions increase by nearly 150 percent and
total renewable generation is up by 25 percent over the
reference case. At the same time, additions of conventional
coal-fired generation capacity are less than 25 percent of the
reference case level.
The NCEP policies also affect energy prices. Lower demand
for energy tends to lower the wellhead or minemouth price of
energy, but the cost of emissions permits required under the
cap-and-trade proposal adds to the delivered price of energy.
So the net impact on the delivered price of energy reflects
both of these effects.
So to briefly summarize, the average price of petroleum
products to all users is higher by a little bit more, 1.4
percent in 2025, with the NCEP proposals compared to the
reference case. In the same year, average natural gas and coal
delivered prices are 8 percent and 56 percent higher,
respectively. Electricity prices in 2025 are 6 percent higher,
reflecting the higher cost of fuels.
By 2025, the NCEP policies reduce energy-related carbon
dioxide emissions by 8 percent due to lower energy demand and
the change in the fuel mix. Covered greenhouse gas emissions,
including gases inside and outside the energy sector, are
reduced by 11 percent in 2025.
Figure 5 in the testimony shows the key role of emissions
reductions outside the energy sector, which account for more
than 50 percent of the total reductions in 2015 and 35 percent
of the total reductions in 2025 in the case with all of the
NCEP policies, and an even larger share of total reductions
from the cap-and-trade policy considered alone. The absolute
level of emissions continues to grow in both cases, but at a
slower rate than in the reference case.
Economic impacts are clearly another important indicator.
By 2025 real gross domestic product in the NCEP case is reduced
by .4 percent or $79 billion. That is in real 2000 dollars. As
shown in figure 6, the NCEP cap-and-trade program alone is
shown to have a smaller impact on the economy.
To conclude, I would like to briefly discuss the
relationship of this latest work to earlier analyses that EIA
has done. We have looked at the Climate Stewardship Act, the
McCain-Lieberman bill, which would have capped greenhouse gas
emissions at the 2000 level by 2010 and the 1990 level by 2016.
A subsequent version of that, S. 2028, which we also looked at,
removed the provision to tighten the cap beginning in 2016.
Like the NCEP proposal, the two versions of McCain-
Lieberman have cap-and-trade systems that start in 2010. But
the NCEP cap-and-trade proposal is less stringent because it
targets a reduction in emissions intensity that allows some
growth in the absolute level of emissions and it includes a
safety valve on the price of emission permits. Either version
of the Climate Stewardship Act is projected to result in larger
energy system changes and larger reductions in energy-related
emissions than the NCEP package as a whole or its cap-and-trade
proposal alone. Figure 8 in my written testimony shows
emissions permit prices are significantly higher for those
proposals.
Another observation is that the safety valve feature of the
NCEP cap-and-trade proposal protects against the possibility of
large changes in the energy system and energy prices and of
large economic impacts if reducing emissions is more costly
than expected. However, if the safety valve becomes effective,
emissions will be permitted to rise above the targeted level.
So you have insurance on the cost, but on emissions levels you
have more uncertainty.
So policies with a firm cap on emissions provide emissions
certainty regardless of cost to the energy system and the
economy, and, therefore, when you are looking at that type of
proposal, estimates of energy system and economic costs are
subject to much greater uncertainty.
That concludes my testimony. Thank you and I will be happy
to answer any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gruenspecht follows:]
Prepared Statement of Howard Gruenspecht, Deputy Administrator,
Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Energy
Information Administration's (EIA) recent analyses of greenhouse gas
reduction policies.
EIA is the independent statistical and analytical agency within the
Department of Energy. We are charged with providing objective, timely,
and relevant data, analyses, and projections for the use of Congress,
the Administration, and the public. We do not take positions on policy
issues, but we do produce data, analyses, and forecasts that are meant
to assist policy makers in their energy policy deliberations. Because
we have an element of statutory independence with respect to this work,
our views are strictly those of EIA and should not be construed as
representing those of the Department of Energy, the Administration, or
any other organization.
My testimony today will focus on EIA's recent assessment of the
impacts on energy supply, demand, and the economy that would result
from the recommendations proposed in a December 2004 report entitled
Ending the Energy Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's
Energy Challenges, prepared by the National Commission on Energy Policy
(NCEP), a nongovernmental privately-funded entity. ETA's report,
Impacts of Modeled Recommendations of the National Commission on Energy
Policy, released in April 2005, compares cases incorporating the NCEP
recommendations to the projections of domestic energy consumption,
supply, prices, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions through
2025 in the reference case of the Annual Energy Outlook 2005 (AEO2005).
AEO2005 is based on Federal and State laws and regulations in effect on
October 31, 2004. The potential impacts of pending or proposed
legislation, regulations, and standards--or of sections of legislation
that have been enacted but that require funds or implementing
regulations that have not been provided or specified--are not reflected
in the projections. AEO2005 explicitly includes the impact of the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the Military Construction
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, and the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004. AEO2005 does not include the potential impact of
energy legislation that is now being considered by the Congress or
regulations such as the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Clean
Air Interstate and Clean Air Mercury rules that were promulgated
earlier this year.
The projections in the AEO2005 and our analysis of the impacts of
the NCEP policy recommendations are not meant to be exact predictions
of the future but represent likely energy futures, given technological
and demographic trends, current laws and regulations, and consumer
behavior as derived from known data. EIA recognizes that projections of
energy markets are highly uncertain and subject to many random events
that cannot be foreseen such as weather, political disruptions, and
technological breakthroughs. In addition to these phenomena, long-term
trends in technology development, demographics, economic growth, and
energy resources may move along a different path than expected in the
projections. Both the AEO2005 and our report on the NCEP policy
recommendations include a number of alternative cases intended to
examine these uncertainties.
Since ETA's report has been provided to the committee and is
available to the public on EIA's web site, my testimony presents only a
summary of its key findings. My testimony focuses on the NCEP case in
our report, which includes all of the NCEP recommendations that EIA was
able to model. However, I will also discuss some results for individual
recommendations modeled separately, such as the proposed cap-and-trade
program (CAP-TRADE case) linked to an intensity target for greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, the proposed fuel economy standards (CAFE case),
and the deployment incentives (INCENT case). Then, I will turn to
sensitivity cases that highlight the effect of alternative technology
assumptions on our results. Lastly, I will offer some comparisons to
findings from some previous EIA analyses of policies to limit GHG
emissions.
MAIN RESULTS OF THE EIA ANALYSIS
The December 2004 NCEP report outlined a broad array of policy
measures, not all of which were amenable to analysis using the EIA
model of U.S. energy markets, the National Energy Modeling System
(NEMS). Our analysis focused on the recommendations that could be
modeled and which were thought to have a significant potential to
affect energy consumption supply and prices. Where the NCEP
recommendations required further specification, specific assumptions
were developed in consultation with staff of the requesting committee.
Our results show that the largest projected impacts on emissions,
energy production, consumption, prices, and imports result from three
of the NCEP recommendations: the cap-and-trade program linked to an
intensity target for GHG emissions beginning in 2010, a major increase
in corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for cars and light
trucks, and the new building and appliance efficiency standards. Other
recommended policies generally affect specific fuels or technologies
but do not have large overall market or emissions impacts.
The impacts of the modeled NCEP recommendations, analyzed together
unless otherwise noted, relative to the AEO2005 reference case, are
discussed below.
Energy Consumption
Primary energy consumption is 2.26 quadrillion Btu (1.9 percent)
lower in 2015 and 6.73 quadrillion Btu (5 percent) lower in 2025 as the
combination of efficiency programs and new CAFE standards reduces
energy demand. Fossil fuel energy consumption is 2.5 quadrillion Btu
(2.4 percent) lower in 2015 and 8.1 quadrillion Btu (6.9 percent) lower
in 2025. In absolute terms, the use of all fossil fuels is projected to
grow from 2003 levels through 2025.
Figure 1* illustrates the impacts of the NCEP policies on oil
consumption. Oil consumption in the NCEP case is 0.83 million barrels
per day (3.4 percent) lower in 2015 and 2.1 million barrels per day
(7.4 percent) lower in 2025. The import share of petroleum product
supplied declines from 62.4 percent to 61.3 percent in 2015 and from
68.4 percent to 66.8 percent in 2025. As shown in Figure 1 almost all
of the projected reduction in oil consumption results from the
recommendation to increase fuel economy standards (CAFE case). More
than two-thirds of oil consumption is currently used in the
transportation sector, and the transportation share of total oil use is
projected to grow to 71 percent in 2025 in the reference case. Because
of the GHG permit safety valve, which caps the price of traded permits
at $6.10 per metric ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) in 2010
rising to $8.50 per metric ton in 2025 (2003 dollars), the maximum
direct effect of the cap-and-trade policy on the delivered price of
gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel is roughly 7 cents per gallon (2003
dollars). Taken alone, a 7-cent price increase is not expected to spur
either a switch to alternative fuels or prompt a significant increase
in fuel efficiency (CAP-TRADE case).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figures 1-9 have been retained in committee files.
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Figure 2 illustrates the impacts of the NCEP policies on natural
gas consumption. Natural gas consumption in the NCEP case is slightly
lower (0.45 quadrillion Btu or 1. 6 percent) in 2015 and 1.1
quadrillion Btu (3.6 percent) lower in 2025, due mainly to lower
electricity demand from the building standards recommendation and the
incentives provided for deployment of renewable, coal-fired integrated
gasification combined-cycle (IGCC), and nuclear power plants that
further reduce the size of the market for natural-gas-fired electricity
generation. In contrast, when the cap-and-trade program is considered
alone (CAP-TRADE case), projected natural gas consumption rises above
the reference case level as natural gas replaces coal in electricity
generation.
Figure 3 illustrates the impacts of the NCEP policies on coal
consumption. Coal consumption in the NCEP case is slightly reduced
(0.46 quadrillion Btu or 1.8 percent) in 2015 and more significantly
reduced (3.0 quadrillion Btu or 9.8 percent) in 2025, due mainly to the
lower electricity demand and shifts in the generation fuel mix that are
caused by the cap-and-trade program. The technology incentives and
building standards packages have offsetting effects on coal use, by
encouraging IGCC plants while reducing electricity generation, so the
net effect on coal use of the cap-and-trade program alone (CAP-TRADE
case) is similar to that of the combined NCEP policy case.
Figure 4 shows how the NCEP policies affect projected electric
generation capacity additions over the 2004 to 2025 period. Because of
the early deployment incentives (INCENT case) and the cap-and-trade
proposal, projected IGCC capacity additions more than double, and
renewable generation increases by 23 percent relative to the reference
case. However, the projected capacity additions of conventional coal-
fired technology decline to less than 25 percent of the reference case
level. The shift from conventional coal-fired plants to more efficient
IGCC plants results in an increase in the amount of generation per ton
of coal consumed.
Energy Prices
The NCEP policy recommendations generally reduce the demand for
fossil fuels, which tends to lower wellhead or minemouth prices.
However, the cost of permits required under the cap-and-trade program
tends to increase the delivered price of fossil fuels. When these
effects are taken together, the cost of permits tends to dominate even
with the safety-valve limit on permit prices in place, so the energy
prices paid by end users generally rise.
The average petroleum price to all users (including the price of
emissions permits) is 2.2 percent higher in 2015 and 1.4 percent higher
in 2025 than in the reference case, with the permit prices more than
offsetting the lower crude oil prices resulting from the new CAFE
standard. When the cap-and-trade (CAP-TRADE) program is considered
without new fuel economy standards, the reduction in oil demand is much
smaller, so the expected impact on delivered petroleum prices is
larger.
The average delivered natural gas price in our NCEP case is $0.17
per thousand cubic feet (2.7 percent) lower in 2015, with the wellhead
cost reduction partially offset by the increased GHG permit price, and
$0.52 per thousand cubic feet (7.6 percent) higher in 2025, largely
because of the permit price which is added to the delivered fuel costs.
The 2015 result reflects the impacts of building and appliance
standards, which reduce residential electricity demand, and incentives
for IGCC, which favor coal-fired generation relative to natural gas.
When the costs of emissions permits are included, the average
delivered coal price is $0.54 per million Btu (43 percent) higher in
2015 and $0.74 per million Btu (56 percent) higher in 2025 than in the
reference case because of the high carbon content of coal. The much
higher percentage change in delivered coal prices compared to the other
fossil fuels reflects both its high carbon content per unit of energy
and its relatively low price in the reference case.
The average delivered electricity price is projected to be
unchanged in 2015 but is 0.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (5.8 percent)
higher in 2025 because of the mandatory cap-and-trade program. EIA's
electricity price estimates reflect the assumption that consumers
capture the economic benefits of the allocation of GHG permits to
regulated utilities in areas of the country where electricity rates are
set under cost-of-service regulation.
Emissions
Projected reductions in energy-related CO2 emissions,
which are concentrated in the electric power and transportation
sectors, are 2.8 percent in 2015 and 7.7 percent in 2025. These
reductions are larger than the corresponding reductions in primary
energy use (1.9 and 5.1 percent, respectively for 2015 and 2025), as
the NCEP policy recommendations promote a less CO2-intensive
energy mix.
Covered GHG emissions are 393 million metric tons equivalent (5.2
percent) lower in 2015 and 964 million metric tons CO2
equivalent (11 percent) lower in 2025. Covered GHG emissions intensity
decreases by 5.1 percent in 2015 and by 10.6 percent in 2025. The
absolute level of covered GHG emissions is projected to grow at an
annual average rate of 1.1 percent over the 2003 to 2025 period,
compared to annual average growth of 1.5 percent in the reference case.
As shown in Figure 5, reductions in emissions of non-CO2
GHG emissions, which are not represented in a detailed fashion in NEMS,
account for over 50 percent of the covered GHG emissions reductions in
2015 and 35 percent of the covered GHG emissions reductions in 2025.
Estimates for non-CO2 GHG emissions were developed using
emissions baselines and abatement cost curves based on engineering cost
estimates that were supplied by EPA. Real-world factors affecting the
behavior of decisionmakers and the use of incomplete cost information
may result in an overstatement of the actual level of non-
CO2 abatement achieved at each level of the permit price.
However, as discussed below, due to the safety-valve feature of the
proposed cap-and-trade program, the projected energy sector and
economic impacts of the NCEP policy recommendations would not change
significantly even if the assumptions used regarding the supply of GHG
abatement opportunities were too optimistic.
Because of the safety-valve price mechanism in the cap-and-trade
program for GHGs, the GHG intensity targets specified by the NCEP are
not reached. EIA projects that total emission reductions fall short of
the emission target by 557 million metric tons CO2
equivalent in 2025.
Economic Impacts
Figure 6 shows the projected effect of t1 NCEP policy
recommendations and the cap-and-trade policy considered separately on
the projected level of real gross domestic product (GDP). By 2025, real
GDP in the NCEP and CAP-TRADE cases are, respectively, 0.4 percent ($79
billion dollars) and 0.13 percent ($27 billion dollars) below the
reference case levels. These changes do not materially affect average
economic growth rates for the 2003 to 2025 period. Real consumption is
also reduced over the 2010 to 2025 period relative to the reference
case, with the impact reaching about 0.55 percent in 2025 ($74 billion
in year 2000 dollars).
Cap and trade systems or emissions taxes are generally considered
the most economically efficient approach for reducing emissions, since
they allow reductions to be made where they can be achieved at the
lowest cost. In a pure cap-and-trade program, the price of emissions
permits, which generally rises as the cap is made more stringent, is a
good indicator of economic impacts. However, in a program that combines
a cap-and-trade program with regulatory measures, a lower permit price
does not imply lower economic impacts. Although the regulatory measures
included in the NCEP case result in a lower projected price of
emissions permits than would be expected if the cap-and-trade policy
was implemented alone, the projected economic impacts in the NCEP case
are higher than for the cap-and-trade only case in our analysis.
TECHNOLOGY SENSITIVITIES
While the AEO2005 reference case used as the basis for comparisons
in our analysis incorporates significant improvements in technology
cost and performance over time, it may either overstate or understate
the actual future pace of improvement, since the rate at which the
characteristics of energy-using and producing technologies will change
is highly uncertain. Relative to the reference case, ETA's high
technology case generally assumes earlier availability, lower costs,
and higher efficiencies for end-use technologies and new fossil-fired,
nuclear, and nonhydropower renewable generating technologies.
Although the NCEP recommends increases in the funding for research
and development, EIA, consistent with its established practice in other
recent studies, did not attempt to estimate how increased government
spending might specifically impact technology development. Instead, to
illustrate the importance of technology characteristics in assessing
the impacts of the NCEP recommendations, EIA prepared a set of NCEP
policy cases using its high technology assumptions. Figure 7 shows how
the use of high technology assumptions tends to reduce projected energy
use with or without the recommended NCEP policies. Relative to the
AEO2005 high technology case, the high technology case combined with
the NCEP recommendations reduces fossil fuel use by 1.46 quadrillion
Btu (1.5 percent) in 2015 and 4.48 quadrillion Btu (4.1 percent) in
2025.
Under the high technology assumptions, the NCEP's greenhouse gas
intensity goals are met, reducing covered GHG emissions intensity from
480 to 463 metric tons CO2 equivalent per million dollars of
GDP in 2015 (3.5 percent) and from 405 to 373 metric tons
CO2 equivalent per million dollars in 2025 (7.9 percent).
Attainment of the emissions intensity goal depends heavily on estimated
reductions of non-CO2 GHG emissions, subject to the caveats
above and on the use of banked GHG emissions permits that are exhausted
in 2025, at the end of the forecast horizon for this analysis. Because
energy consumption is already lower in the high technology case than in
the reference case, the NCEP recommendations have a smaller relative
impact to the high technology case. However, due the lower baseline
consumption, the GHG intensity goals are easier to attain.
RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS EIA GREENHOUSE GAS ANALYSES
EIA has completed several other reports on policy proposals to
limit or reduce GHG emissions. EIA's previous analyses of emission
reduction proposals indicate that the economic impacts are largely
determined by the size of the energy market change required to satisfy
the policy and the speed with which the change must occur. In 2003, EIA
considered the original version of the Climate Stewardship Act (S.
139), which would cap GHG emissions at the 2000 level in 2010 and the
1990 level in 2016 and beyond. In 2004, EIA considered an amended
version of that bill (S.A. 2028) that removed a provision for a
tightening of the emissions cap beginning in 2016. The NCEP proposal,
S.A. 2028, and S. 139 all have a 2010 start date for their cap-and-
trade systems. The NCEP proposal is less stringent than the others
because it is expressed in terms of GHG emission intensity, starts from
the 2010 level, and includes a safety valve.
These earlier reports suggest that either version of the Climate
Stewardship Act is projected to provide larger reductions in emissions
from the energy sector than the NCEP policy recommendations. To achieve
this, higher permit prices (Figure 8) and larger energy system changes,
particularly for electricity generation and demand, are required.
That is, S.A. 2028 and S. 139 would require more significant
changes in the U.S. energy system and larger increases in delivered
energy prices than the NCEP recommendations, resulting in larger
estimated economic impacts. As permit prices increase, electricity
prices typically increase and reduce demand while electricity
generation tends to shift away from coal technologies because of the
high carbon content of the fuel and toward low or no-carbon emitting
technologies like renewable, natural gas, and nuclear power generation
(Figure 9).
Finally, while all baseline and policy projections are inherently
uncertain, differences in policy design can affect the impacts on the
energy system and the level of GHG emissions. The safety-valve feature
of the NCEP cap-and-trade proposal would allow GHG emissions to rise
above the level projected in our report in the event that emissions
reduction inside or outside the energy sector proves to be more costly
than we expect, while protecting against the prospect of larger energy
system and economic impacts in these circumstances. In contrast,
policies that impose a ``hard'' cap on emissions without a safety-valve
price for GHG credits, would force the GHG emissions target to be met
through higher GHG prices, regardless of the cost to the economy.
This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Well, I want to thank you very much for your
concise and understandable testimony. We appreciate it.
Dr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF ANNE E. SMITH, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT,
CRA INTERNATIONAL
Dr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for your invitation to participate in today's hearing. My
name is Anne Smith. I am an economist and a vice president at
CRA International. The opinions I will be presenting here are
my own and not those of my company, CRA International.
The role of technology frames the entire climate policy
decision. If we believe the conclusion of climate scientists,
then we must act to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at
some level in order to achieve significant reductions in
climate risk. To accomplish this goal by about mid-century,
this century, all new global energy needs will have to be
satisfied from essentially carbon-free sources. That takes more
than a few percent reductions here and there.
No technologies available today, even as a group, are
capable of providing this much carbon-free energy at an
acceptable cost, and that fact makes the central challenge of
climate policy all about stimulating breakthroughs that will
lead to entirely new technologies that can accomplish this
goal.
None of the emissions limitations or the safety valves or
subsidies proposed in the NCEP or by Senators McCain or
Lieberman or in the amendment proposed by Senator Bingaman
provide adequate incentives for this research and development,
or R&D. Caps on emissions starting in 2010 can only motivate
use of currently available technology and, although an
assurance of high future carbon prices could motivate
investment in the R&D that is required to create these
radically new technologies, unfortunately the safety valve
limits the rate of increase in carbon prices to a level that is
too slow--too low, sorry, to stimulate that R&D.
Now, even choosing a higher rate of escalation in the
safety valve price would not work because it would not provide
a credible private sector incentive for the R&D. The reason for
this is explained more in my testimony, my written statement,
but this is because once new technologies are developed then
the most attractive choice for a future government will be to
allow those allowance prices to fall down to the lowest level
possible to incentivize the uptake of those new technologies.
But that carbon price will never be high enough, that low
carbon price will never be high enough to provide an adequate
reward to the firms, the private sector firms, who invested in
the R&D. This is because there is a fixed cost to R&D and by
the time the technologies are available that fixed cost and
expenditure by the private sector will be sunk and it will not
be necessary for the government to ex post pay them back in
order to get the technologies adopted.
So here is the Catch-22 we face. Any announced future
carbon price that is high enough to induce the breakthrough R&D
would not be credible and any carbon price that is low enough
to be credible as a sustainable policy in the United States
would not be sufficient to induce the R&D breakthrough.
Some people are saying that subsidies are necessary in
combination with the safety valve price to achieve the needed
R&D. In fact, the kinds of subsidies that are proposed in the
Bingaman amendment and the NCEP proposal would only promote
technologies that can be built at near-commercial scale today
or in the very near future.
If anything, this would just help--these subsidies would
just help lock into place the current ways of reducing
emissions, that would become obsolete if the R&D that we need
becomes successful.
The approach of layering subsidies onto a safety valve
actually reveals that the policy, the safety valve policy that
has been proposed with subsidies, would not be as cheap as the
safety valve price would suggest. Consider this. If the safety
valve price is set at a level that is supposed to be the
maximum acceptable cost that our country is willing to spend on
near-term emissions reductions now, then the subsidies
represent an end run around that spending limit. They directly
cause spending on projects that cost more and exceed the price
of the safety valve on a dollars per ton reduction basis.
This is how it happens. The private sector will be willing
to pay up to an amount equal to the safety valve price and then
the Government will use funds that it has collected from the
private sector to pay even more for those same projects. So the
policy will be more expensive than advertised.
Now, that might be justifiable if the policy were to
provide incentives for breakthroughs toward a zero emissions
world, but for reasons I have already explained it will not do
that.
So I want to be clear. Placing an economy-wide price on
carbon emissions before the R&D is accomplished can be
justified as a supplement to a meaningful R&D mission, but we
need to first figure out what the R&D goals and targets are
before we know how to set that price for today.
I also want to be clear, the safety valve is a far better
way to achieve this role of achieving near-term emissions
reductions that are affordable than a hard cap. A low price on
carbon emissions can serve to motivate low-cost emissions
reductions and including a safety valve is important to limit
the damage to the economy that could occur under a hard cap.
But if setting a stable price, a stable and low price on
carbon emissions, is the only near-term objective of the
policy, then the rest of the cap-and-trade system is not needed
and a carbon tax would do just as well.
Some people think that a cap-and-trade system is better
than a carbon tax approach and in part this is because the
carbon cap approach allows the Government to make valuable
allowance allocations to help offset the burden. But they are
mistakenly believing that a carefully devised allocation scheme
could make everybody better off and this is simply not
possible. This I have also explained in detail in my written
statement, the reasons for that.
The possibilities of allocations, allowance allocations,
does not make a cap-and-trade system any more cost-effective
than a tax and yet, as we have seen, it can greatly complicate
the process of getting the policy into place.
Now, the safety valve is neither more nor less than a
carbon tax and it would simple, more simple, more transparent,
to propose a carbon tax than to devise a costly and complex
apparatus of emissions trading to achieve what is a fairly
modest goal of setting a low and stable price on carbon
emissions.
Now, I believe that the focus of the current debate on how
to set a safety valve or a cap is encouraging policymakers to
neglect the much more important and more urgently needed
actions for reducing climate risks. The top priority for
developing a climate change policy should be a greatly expanded
government-funded R&D program, R&D, not subsidy program, along
with concerted efforts to reduce barriers that currently limit
technology transfer to developing countries, where some cheaper
near-term reductions could be achieved now.
Both of these actions present major challenges and both
must really be initiated immediately if they are going to have
their desired effect in time to achieve the long-term emissions
reductions that we want. Yet they are receiving minimal
attention from policymakers, who are transfixed by the
challenges of creating an unnecessarily complex scheme to set a
low price on current carbon emissions even though that
component of the climate policy will provide no reduction in
climate risk.
So thank you for the opportunity, giving me an opportunity
to share my views on this important topic. I would be happy to
answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne E. Smith, Ph.D., Vice President,
CRA International
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for your
invitation to participate in today's hearing. I am Anne Smith, and I am
a Vice President of CRA International. Starting with my Ph.D. thesis in
economics at Stanford University, I have spent the past twenty-five
years assessing the most cost-effective ways to design policies for
managing environmental risks. For the past fifteen years I have focused
my attention on the design of policies to address climate change risks,
with a particular interest in the implications of different ways of
implementing greenhouse (GHG) gas emissions trading programs. I thank
you for the opportunity to share my findings and climate policy design
insights with you. My written and oral testimony today is a statement
of my own research and opinions, and does not represent a position of
my company, CRA International.
I would like to start by summarizing what I think are the most
important and overarching considerations that should be accounted for
in devising a sound and effective policy to mitigate risks of climate
change. I will then provide a basis for these points, present more
extensive detail on the trade-offs in policy design alternatives, and
summarize results of analysis my colleagues and I have done of the
comparative costs and effectiveness of proposals now before the
Congress.
The key points that I have to offer about designing an effective
climate change policy are:
The linkage between near-term domestic GHG reductions and
real reduction of climate change risk is, for all practical
purposes, nonexistent. Near-term domestic controls cannot have
any meaningful impact on global emission levels at any cost
that is currently deemed realistic. Such policies also will not
stimulate the kinds of technological progress necessary to
enable meaningful emissions reductions later on (because one
can expect that carbon prices will be driven to the lowest
level necessary to incentivize adoption of important new
technology--a level that is too low to provide innovators with
a return of their one-time investment cost).
The current debate about how to impose ineffectual near-term
controls is encouraging policy makers to neglect much more
important, more urgently needed actions for reducing climate
change risks. The top priority for climate change policy should
be a greatly expanded government-funded research and
development (R&D) program, along with concerted efforts to
reduce barriers to technology transfer to key developing
countries. Neither of these will be easy to accomplish
effectively, yet they are receiving minimal attention by policy
makers.
Developing new technologies is crucial and it will require
long-run, high-risk, high-cost R&D to produce radically new
GHG-free energy sources. Even with moderately expensive GHG
limits, the private sector will under-invest in this kind of
R&D, and only government can provide the needed R&D investment.
The existing climate policy proposals, including the McCain/
Lieberman (M/L) Bill and the NCEP or Bingaman proposals, focus
on providing subsidies to existing technologies rather than R&D
aimed at developing new technologies. New government efforts to
pick winning technologies and subsidize their deployment would
probably undermine the cost-effectiveness of any emissions
control program, without producing the forward-looking R&D that
we really need.
Although no near-term emissions control program will have
much impact on solving the climate problem, a price on carbon
in the near-term can be justified as a supplement to a
meaningful R&D mission once that mission has clearly defined
targets for success. The near-term control program's role would
be to stimulate emissions reductions that can be achieved now
more cheaply than the present value of future control costs
targeted by the R&D program; the maximum near-term carbon price
could therefore be determined by discounting the R&D program's
defined targets for technology costs and dates of commercial
availability.
The design of such a policy for near-term emissions control
matters tremendously. CRA's modeling work and the economics
literature indicate the relative cost-effectiveness of the
various options for the climate change situation.
a. Hard caps are the most costly and least desirable option.
b. The safety valve approach and carbon taxes are
alternatives to hard caps
that are much less costly, and that are more consistent with
the inherently subsidiary role of any near-term reductions
program. (The contrast between a safety valve and hard cap
approach is especially evident in my comparison below of
results of CRA's modeling of the McCain/Lieberman Bill and the
cap program of the Bingaman Amendment.)
c. One factor highlighted by CRA's work but often slighted in
other analyses is the possibility of using allowances to limit
the costs of controls. Domestic GHG controls will cause small
but not trivial losses of government revenue. Auctioning some
of the allowances and using proceeds to offset other expected
reductions in Federal revenue would noticeably reduce the
program's total cost to society.
d. There are no simple analytical methods for determining
allocations of allowances to individual companies or sectors to
equitably mitigate the financial impacts of the policy.
e. There is no allocation design that can make all affected
parties better off under a cap-and-trade or other carbon
pricing policy.
f. The inherent complexity of a safety valve approach does
not appear to be justified compared to a simpler carbon tax. A
carbon tax would provide identical emissions reduction
incentives at identical costs to those of the safety valve
proposal without the political, institutional, and analytical
complications apparent in today's safety valve proposals.
To provide a foundation supporting the above statements, I will
begin with a review of the basic elements of climate science and
projections of future greenhouse gas emissions that are relevant to
economic questions about the design of climate policies. In section 2,
I will describe the range of potential policy designs, which include
carbon-pricing schemes and technology strategies. Section 3 will focus
on just the carbon-pricing approaches in more detail, and will include
a comparative analysis that my colleagues and I have done of the costs
and effectiveness of proposals now before the Congress. I will address
costs and risks to the economy from different policy designs, the
ability of economically feasible mandatory caps on emissions to
accomplish long-term climate goals, the role of allocations in policy
design, and alternatives to ``mandatory limits on greenhouse gas
emissions.'' In Section 4, I will turn to technology strategies. I will
explain the reasons for my conclusion that the most important first
step for the Congress to take in developing a cost-effective US climate
policy is to provide incentives for R&D into new energy technologies.
In all of the following, I wish to be clear that I use the term R&D
as a distinctly different concept from providing subsidies for the
initial uptake of existing but yet-to-be deployed technologies. By R&D,
I mean investment to create technologies that do not exist today, and
which would require major new scientific breakthroughs before they
could become an option that any private entity might consider proposing
in a competition for actual implementation under a subsidy program. The
R&D may entail basic science as well as work that is identifiably on an
energy technology with low or zero carbon emissions. Subsidies are
aimed at bringing technologies into the market, and by definition, such
technologies must be already reasonably well developed, if not yet
cost-effective to use under current prices without supporting funding.
There may be a sometimes unclear line dividing the two, but it is clear
that we do not yet have enough forms of energy technologies that could,
as a group, provide a carbon-free energy economy at any reasonable
cost. Creating that capability should be the mission of an R&D program.
1. Key Points from Climate Science and Global Emissions Scenarios
The key points from climate science and emissions scenarios that
are critical to the economic analysis of policy options are:
Increases in global average temperatures are related to the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Once
emitted, greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for many
decades, so cumulative emissions over a long period of time
determine changes in greenhouse gas concentrations. As a
result, climate change risk is a function of cumulative
greenhouse gas emissions, not emissions in any given year.
Discussions of long-term objectives for climate policy
usually focus on stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at
some level, so as to limit temperature increases. The
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will
continue to increase as long as there are net additions of
greenhouse gases. To achieve stabilization of concentrations
and temperature at any level will require that average economy-
wide greenhouse gas emissions be reduced to nearly zero.
Given the scale of projected increases in global greenhouse
gas emissions, achieving zero net carbon emissions by the
middle of the next century will require producing at least as
much energy as is now produced from all sources by means of
processes that have near-zero net carbon emissions. It is not
possible to accomplish this with current technologies at
anything close to the current or projected cost of energy
produced from oil, natural gas, and coal.
Within the next decade or two, developing countries will
overtake the industrial world in total greenhouse gas
emissions, so that by 2025 more than half of global annual
emissions of greenhouse gases will be coming from developing
countries. Thus no long-term objective of climate policy can be
achieved without effective actions to reduce emissions from
developing countries. Moreover, comparison of greenhouse gas
intensity between developing and industrial countries suggests
that there is a large potential for near-term emission
reductions in developing countries at costs far lower than
comparable emission reductions in the United States and other
industrial countries.
These features of the climate problem have some very strong
implications for policy design. Since only cumulative emissions over
long time periods matter for climate risk, mandatory caps that place
specific limits on near-term emissions in each year create significant
cost risks without accompanying benefits. Near-term limits on
greenhouse gas emissions require the use of current technology for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and as I will discuss in Section 4,
they provide no credible incentive for research and development aimed
at wholly new and more affordable technologies.
Nearly-zero greenhouse gas emissions cannot be achieved with
current technologies without massive disruption to standards of living.
Once technologies are developed that can make massive emissions cuts
affordable (even if still quite costly) then it will be possible to
``make up for'' reductions that we might not undertake today. Therefore
the only reductions in emissions that make sense economically until
zero-carbon energy becomes affordable as the mainstay of our energy
system are those that are very cheap now.\1\
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\1\ Their cost should be less than the present value of the cost of
``making up'' for them when the zero-carbon economy becomes viable. For
example, if nearly all GHG emissions could be eliminated or offset at
$25/tonne CO equivalent starting in 2050 (i.e., $93/tonne carbon-
equivalent), then the most that it makes economic sense to pay for
emissions reductions in 2010 is about $3.60/tonne CO2-eq.
(or $13/tonne carbon-eq.), using a 5% real discount rate.
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These considerations suggest that the most important long-term
feature of any policy initiative is the impact it will have on
investment in R&D and the development of new technologies to provide
essentially carbon-free energy at an affordable cost. For near-term
emission reductions, the most cost-effective emission reductions
available today are in developing countries, placing a high priority on
near-term control policies to bring about changes in how energy is used
in developing countries.
2. Overview of Range of Available Policy Approaches
Proposed approaches for climate change policies that involve a
commitment by the government to bring about changes in future
greenhouse gas emissions include:
Pure cap-and-trade
Cap-and-trade with a safety valve
Carbon tax
An R&D-focused ``technology strategy''
Market transformation and technology transfer in developing
countries
These policy approaches form a continuum, all of which can be
implemented in a market-based manner. At one end of the scale are
policy designs that impose specific, rigid limits on greenhouse gas
emissions on specified dates. These are the pure cap-and-trade
programs, which place a cap on emissions and allow trading of
allowances between regulated parties to create an incentive for choice
of the most cost-effective mitigation options. Much attention has been
paid to these designs, which have been used successfully in other
environmental areas such as the Acid Rain program (Title IV) of the
Clean Air Act. The McCain/Lieberman amendment to the 2005 Senate Energy
Bill (S. 1151) falls in this category.
The rigidity of emission limits is progressively loosened in
proposals for combining cap-and-trade with a ``safety valve'' or for
simply using a carbon tax to penalize the use of all fossil fuels in
proportion to their carbon content. Both safety valve and carbon tax
approaches avoid the imposition of a rigid cap, and instead rely on the
economic incentive of putting a price on carbon emissions to achieve
changes in emissions levels.
An R&D-focused technology strategy would commit the Federal
government to supporting the research to create new technologies whose
adoption in the future will enable much larger and more cost-effective
emission reductions than are possible today; this also can, and should
be designed in a market-based manner.
Thus, even now, the Congress is looking at a continuum of
proposals, with the most rigid being the M/L Bill with its specific
targets and timetables for near-term reductions, and the least rigid
and potentially most cost-effective being a focus on devising and
implementing a major and comprehensive R&D program to produce
affordable, zero-emitting technology that will be possible to adopt on
a massive scale, throughout our economy and that of the globe.
The pure cap-and-trade approach places the highest priority on
achieving fixed and predictable emission reductions, and accepts
whatever the cost of achieving those emission reductions may be. The
pure carbon tax limits the cost of achieving emission reductions to be
no greater, per unit of carbon removed, than the tax. The emission
reduction achievable from a carbon tax is uncertain, because it depends
on how much emission reduction is possible at a cost equal to or less
than the tax. Thus the carbon tax places the highest priority on cost
containment, while tolerating some uncertainty in the level of emission
reductions to be achieved. The safety valve becomes indistinguishable
from a carbon tax once the price limit on emission allowances is
reached.
Technology policy and policies toward developing countries address
the two features of climate policy that are not addressed by mandatory
limits on near-term emissions. These, I will suggest, offer far more
potential for cost-effective emission reductions in the near and long
term, and are appropriate places for Congress to consider immediate
action.
This Congress has considered proposals in four out of these five
categories. The proposed McCain/Lieberman amendment to the Senate
Energy Bill of 2005 fell in the first category, of mandatory caps.
Proposals by the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) and
Senator Bingaman (S.A. 868) fall into the second, safety valve,
category. An approach to reducing emissions from developing countries
was passed into law as Title XVI of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
along with some of the elements of a technology strategy. Only carbon
taxes per se are not talked about in Washington, but the choice between
carbon caps and carbon taxes is a very important one in the literature
on climate policy.
I do not believe it is appropriate to narrow consideration at this
time to only ``mandatory'' programs in the sense of binding caps on
specific schedules, which if taken literally would include only the
McCain/Lieberman proposal. Although used and justifiable in other
environmental areas, this is not the most suitable policy design for
climate change. Costs of large near-term reductions are high, mandatory
caps create large risks and uncertainty about cost, and even mandatory
caps cannot provide a credible incentive for R&D to develop needed
technologies. Safety valve proposals, which become indistinguishable
from carbon taxes once the safety valve becomes effective, offer
additional flexibility and need not imply greater climate risks.
Therefore, I would encourage you to include in your thinking about
``mandatory'' programs all policies that force households and
businesses to take into account a cost of greenhouse gas emissions.
This would recognize that carbon taxes, as well as the NCEP and Senator
Bingaman's approaches, are all ``mandatory'' approaches to emissions
reductions.
However, none of the mandatory programs aimed at putting limits on
future carbon emissions will provide a credible incentive for R&D or
actions by developing countries. Such mandatory programs are not the
only actions that can be taken today. I have concluded that commitments
to support technology development and bring about change in the rate of
growth of emissions from developing countries are a more effective and
appropriate focus for current action on climate policy. To my mind, it
makes the most economic sense to start where resources committed to
mitigation of climate change can achieve the greatest gains,
considering both near-term and long-term outcomes as a whole.
Therefore, we should start with a clearly articulated and carefully
implemented R&D program for developing affordable zero-carbon emitting
technologies. Neither the technologies nor the necessary R&D program to
create them presently exists.
The first three approaches (pure cap-and-trade, cap-and-trade with
a safety valve, and carbon taxes) all function by placing a direct
price on GHG emissions. In the next section, I will discuss each of the
individually, highlighting their respective strengths and weaknesses. I
will then provide comparisons of the outcomes under a pure cap-and-
trade proposal (i.e., the McCain/Lieberman proposal) to those of a
proposal that directly limits costs rather than emissions (i.e., the
GHG cap program of the Bingaman/NCEP proposal) to highlight how they
tend to differ in their impacts. I complete the next section by
addressing a number of issues related to allocation of allowances that
I feel are greatly misunderstood, yet extremely important if a cap-and-
trade approach is selected instead of a carbon tax approach for
imposing a price on carbon emissions. The following, and last section,
will then turn to an important limitation of all approaches that
directly price emissions in the unique situation of climate change
policy, and the reasons that an R&D-focused technology strategy needs
to be the first and foremost consideration in any policy to address
climate change risks. It is my view that none of the proposed policies
to date properly address this R&D need. In general, they have confused
subsidies with the need for R&D on new technologies, and for the most
part the subsidy programs that have been proposed are also unnecessary
for motivating a least-cost response under a carbon-pricing program.
3. Approaches that Place a Direct Price on Emissions
A. Pure cap-and-trade with rigid emission limits
Emission caps are enforced, under cap-and-trade proposals, by
distributing a set of emission allowances, limited to the quantitative
cap. These emission allowances can be traded, so that emission
reductions will occur where they are most cost-effective given current
technology. The cost of a cap-and-trade program depends on how tightly
the caps are set initially and how they are tightened over time. How
emission allowances are distributed also affects the overall economic
impact of this policy approach.
Near-term caps, such as those proposed by Senators McCain and
Lieberman, can only be met through use of costly measures based on
today's technology. This raises their costs substantially compared to a
policy sequence in which new and more affordable technologies are
developed first, so that much larger emission reductions can be
achieved at much lower cost.
Emission caps, even if never tightened, will become more expensive
over time, because energy needs are always growing as population
increases and the economy expands. Holding greenhouse gas emissions
constant in the face of ever-increasing energy demand requires going to
ever more costly control options. The depth of the cuts required can be
seen by comparing business-as-usual, or current-policy emissions to
emissions under the cap. Based on the current EIA Annual Energy Outlook
forecast for emissions under current policies, the limits proposed by
Senators McCain and Lieberman would require total CO2
emissions from covered sectors to be reduced to 15% below current
policy levels in 2010 and 26% below current policy levels in 2020.
Continuing the McCain/Lieberman cap to 2050 would require a reduction
of emissions to 48% below current policy levels in that year.
Tightening the cap to a level consistent with current proposals for
programs that could stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere would require emissions to be reduced to more than 80% below
what CRA International projects for current policy emissions in 2050.
The imposition of rigid limits creates unnecessary cost risks, even
in the near-term, because rigid limits can become very expensive if
economic growth exceeds expectations or if costs of measures required
to reduce emissions turn out to be higher than assumed. Since climate
risks are not affected by variations in emissions from one year to the
next, but only by cumulative emissions over long time periods, these
cost risks associated with rigid caps are completely unnecessary to
achieving long-term climate goals.
The perception that fixed caps create excessive cost risks is, I
believe, widely shared. The McCain/Lieberman amendment would have
created specific fixed and mandatory caps. Other policy approaches
before Congress are based on a recognition that setting this kind of
mandatory cap is not the only way to take effective action to address
climate change. All the other approaches before the Congress involve
market based incentives, but do not place a rigid cap on emissions.
These approaches are more suitable to the nature of the climate
problem.
B. Cap-and-trade with a safety valve
Combining cap-and-trade with a safety valve has the purpose of
reducing the cost risk associated with the pure cap-and-trade approach.
Senator Bingaman and NCEP's proposals also reflect a concept called an
``intensity-based'' cap, but this only serves to reduce the expected
costs of the policy. The real reason that these proposals have reduced
risk of unexpectedly (and unacceptably) high costs lies wholly in the
safety valve provision.
The original concept of an ``intensity-based'' target is that caps
would only be tightened in relation to economic activity levels. If
economic activity is high, an intensity approach would allow a somewhat
looser cap to accommodate the extra need for energy, rather than to
choke it off by having a rigid cap no matter what the level of economic
activity. However, as implemented in these two current proposals, the
``intensity-based'' cap would, in fact, still be an absolute cap,
computed up to ten years in advance and rigid thereafter. Its primary
novelty is that by computing a cap that is tied to economic growth
rather than historical outcomes, it would more gradually phase in the
cap's apparent stringency. This certainly makes such a cap less costly
than a tighter cap that prevents any further emissions growth at all.
However, as long as the cap is binding at all (which is the intention),
there is still uncertainty on how costly it will actually be to attain,
especially given its rigidity over ten-year periods. (A cap that is
truly flexible from year to year in response to economic activity
outcomes might somewhat mitigate this cost uncertainty, but would
require continual, year-to-year updating of allocations. This updating
would probably be more detrimental than helpful in producing compliance
planning certainty, while still not assuring that costs of control
would remain below some planned level.)
Nevertheless, the Bingaman and NCEP proposals do have much less
cost risk than previous cap-and-trade proposals, entirely due to the
safety valve provision. The safety valve places a ceiling on the price
of carbon allowances under the cap provision. This would be
accomplished by allowing companies to achieve compliance by paying the
safety valve price to the government in lieu of turning in actual
allowances that have been issued. Alternatively, the government could
issue more allowances at the safety valve price, which would then be
turned in along with originally-issued allowances. Either way, the
effect of the safety valve is to make the cap itself flexible rather
than rigid. However, its flexibility is linked to the cost of control
rather than to economic activity per se.
In summary, the safety valve is a very important way of minimizing
cost risk under a carbon emissions control policy, and it does so by
converting the carbon cap into a carbon tax if the cost of control to
meet the cap is higher than the pre-agreed safety valve price. By
design (and also just like a tax), this can alter the amount of
emission reduction that is achieved, thus making emissions reductions
uncertain instead.
C. Carbon taxes
Once the safety valve becomes effective, the environmental outcomes
and control costs under a program based on safety valves become
indistinguishable from a carbon tax. However, a carbon tax policy would
avoid creating the costs and bureaucracy associated with allocating
allowances and administering an emission trading and enforcement
system.
All of these approaches--rigid caps, caps with safety valve, and
carbon taxes--share a common feature of mandatory but market-based
emission limitation. They require an emitter to pay for its legal
emissions, either by purchasing an allowance, foregoing revenues from
the sale of an allowance it was allocated, or paying a tax. Each
creates revenues, and the choice must be made in designing the policy
of who will collect these revenues and how they will be used. This is
the choice between auction and allocation of allowances under a cap-
and-trade system.
The safety valve involves the sale of emission allowances for a
fixed price. It is equivalent to charging a carbon tax on the use of
fossil fuels, with the tax rate set for each fuel based on its carbon
content. Use of a carbon tax would also leave control of how to use the
revenues under the normal budget process. In contrast, revenues from
auctioning allowances or from selling allowances under a safety valve
can be placed outside the budget process, as they are in both the
McCain-Lieberman and Bingaman proposals. Using a free allocation of
carbon allowances to compensate some of those harmed by the imposition
of limits on greenhouse gas emissions is also a use of potential
revenues that could accrue to the government, and removes decisions
about that use of revenues from the normal budget and authorization and
appropriation process. This has a very important influence on overall
economic costs.
The proposed cap-and-trade and safety valve programs are likely to
impose higher costs than a carbon tax. In part, this is true because
they are likely to have greater administrative costs than an explicit
tax. But more importantly, by taking revenues outside the normal budget
process, these policy designs eliminate the possibility of using some
or all of the revenues to replace taxes that would otherwise have to be
raised through other federal tax programs. As I discuss in subsection E
below, not allowing revenues from allowance auctions to be used to
offset impacts of emission limitations on total government revenues
substantially increases the cost of the Bingaman and McCain/Lieberman
approaches.
Otherwise, the effects of cap-and-trade with a safety valve and a
carbon tax are indistinguishable. Consumers of energy will experience
increases in the cost of energy, in one case by the price that energy
producers must pay for carbon allowances and the other by the carbon
tax they must pay. The response of businesses and households to these
altered prices will be identical. Differences will arise only from how
potential revenues from the safety valve or carbon tax are utilized.
D. Analysis of the costs of mandatory caps and safety
valves
In order to quantify the costs and emission impacts of the McCain/
Lieberman and Bingaman amendments, my colleagues and I have used CRA's
Multi-Region National Model of the U.S. economy.\2\ This model has been
used in a variety of studies over the past 10 years, and was used by
the National Commission on Energy Policy in its own analysis of the
economic impacts of its proposals.
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\2\ For documentation of the MRN model, see http://www.crai.com/
pubs/pub_3694.pdf.
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We have analyzed a range of estimates for the impacts of the
McCain/Lieberman proposal (M/L) and of the carbon cap program in the
Bingaman Amendment (BA). For M/L our range was based on assumptions
about the cost at which a carbon free ``backstop'' technology will
become available and how that cost will drop over time; the
availability and cost of ``offsets'' to CO2 emissions in
covered sectors; and the choices that will be made about long-term
emission limits after 2020. For the BA, at the low end of the range, we
assume that regulated non-CO2 GHGs are able to be costlessly
reduced up to the point where the marginal cost of reducing those other
GHGs exceeds the safety valve price, based on marginal abatement cost
curves prepared by MIT. At the high end of the range, we assume that
non-CO2 GHGs are reduced costlessly only up to the point
where they achieve their own share of the intensity targets. Our
baseline or ``current policy'' emissions trajectory was based on the
AEO 2005 reference case forecast of CO2 emissions, and was
not varied, though this would be another source of cost uncertainty,
especially for the M/L rigid caps.
The form of Senator Bingaman's carbon cap proposal that we analyzed
sets a cap on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 2010 onward. The cap
is to be calculated in 2006 so that it will cause greenhouse gas
intensity (GHG emissions divided by GDP) to fall by 2.4% per year from
2010 to 2020, and then to fall by 2.8% per year thereafter. The
required improvements in GHG intensity are converted to fixed caps for
the next decade by multiplying the required GHG intensity times the
level of GDP in each year that is projected as of 2006.
We applied a ``safety valve'' which allows regulated entities to
purchase carbon allowances for a price of $7 per ton of CO2
in 2010, escalating at 5% per year (nominal). Both the safety valve
escalation and the annual improvement in GHG intensity can be revised
by joint resolution. The bill requires the President to report to
Congress on what other countries are doing to reduce GHG emissions as a
basis for recommending such revisions. The proposal includes some, but
not all, emissions of non-CO2 GHGs in the calculation of GHG
intensity and allows banking of allowances for use in future years.
We assumed that under Senator Bingaman's proposal a large fraction
of carbon allowances will be ``allocated'' to businesses that face
disproportionately large negative impacts, and that 5% in 2010, rising
to 10% by 2020, of the allowances will be auctioned to provide funding
for subsidies for the development and deployment of selected energy
technologies.
Sources of economic impacts. Economic impacts arise from four major
sources. Direct costs of complying with emission limitations or of
adjusting energy supply and use in response to a safety valve/carbon
tax are incurred by energy producers and consumers. These costs arise
from the necessity of diverting resources from other productive uses to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The activities involved include
substituting more costly but lower carbon forms of energy for fossil
fuels, making investments and incurring higher costs to improve energy
efficiency, and losing the benefits of foregone energy services.
A second set of costs arises from an increased excess burden of
existing taxes. Both the Bingaman and M/L proposals provide for
allocations of allowances and specify how revenues from allowance
auctions will be utilized. They do not allow proceeds to be used to
reduce other taxes. It is widely accepted among economists who study
the Federal tax system that the current set of income, payroll and
corporate taxes impose a deadweight loss on the U.S. economy. It has
been found in a number of studies that a system of emission limits or
carbon taxes that raises energy costs effectively increases the burden
of existing taxes on the economy.\3\ Using the revenues from sale of
carbon allowances or from a carbon tax to substitute for revenues that
would otherwise be raised through conventional taxes can reduce or
eliminate this distortion. Allocating emission allowances at no cost
removes that ability to reduce the distortions of the tax system and
contributes to higher costs, as does reserving revenues for new
spending programs that are created by the policy.
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\3\ On the issue of how existing tax distortions are magnified by
emission limits, see Larry Goulder, Ian Parry and Dallas Burtraw,
``Revenue-Raising vs. Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The
Critical Significance of Pre-Existing Tax Distortions,'' RAND Journal
of Economics, Winter 1997; and Larry Goulder and Lans Bovenberg,
``Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes:
General Equilibrium Analyses,'' American Economic Review, September,
1996.
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CRA's analyses have revealed a need for governments to use
allowance auctions under a GHG cap to generate a certain amount of new
government revenue to offset likely reductions in existing tax revenues
due to a decline in economic activity from the cost of the policy. If
such offsetting revenues are not tapped from the value of the
allowances, then governments will either have to cut services or else
raise existing tax rates. The latter action would actually exacerbate
the costs of the policy, and thereby create an inefficiency due to tax
distortions even while the carbon allowance market may function in a
perfectly efficient manner in achieving cost-effective emissions
reductions to meet the cap. Neither of the proposals analyzed provides
for any revenues to be used to offset tax base erosion.\4\ Although
there are some revenues from auctions and safety valve sales, these
revenue sources are earmarked for new spending programs rather than to
supplement other, falling sources of government revenues.
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\4\ In very approximate-terms, the share of the allowances that the
government would need to offset tax base erosion and thus avoid
exacerbating policy costs appears to be between 30% and 60%. This is
based on multiple scenarios analyzed by CRA International using its MRN
model, and apparently has been corroborated by analyses by Prof.
Goulder of Stanford University (personal communication).
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A third cost element arises from the transition costs of job search
which are triggered by the changes in real wages and shift in industry
structure causes by emission limits or safety valve/carbon tax
policies. This cost element shows up directly in the results as an
increase in transitional unemployment, and contributes to reduced GDP
and to lower household consumption and welfare.
Finally, since MRN is a fully dynamic computable general
equilibrium model with forward-looking expectations, the prospect of
rising carbon allowance prices and future economic impacts leads
households to change their current saving and investment behavior.
Households reduce their current consumption, in order to save and
provide for higher future income to cover the increasing costs of
tighter emission limits and rising safety valve/carbon taxes. This
anticipatory behavior makes future costs show up in the present. The
banking option included in both M/L and BA also encourages businesses
to undertake emission reductions in early years in excess of those
required by carbon limits, in order to avoid even higher future
mitigation costs due to tightening emission limits or higher safety
valve/carbon taxes. This also contributes to costs in early years.
I provide details of our comparison of the impacts of M/L and BA in
Exhibits 1-4* at the end of this testimony. Generally speaking, our
results suggest that M/L impacts are about 3 to 4 times larger than the
impacts for the BA cap program. Key economic indicators all follow this
pattern:
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* The exhibits have been retained in committee files.
For 2010, the GDP loss under BA would be about $21 billion
to $34 billion, or a 0.1% to 0.2% reduction (compared to 0.3%
to 1.0% for MIL). The GDP loss increases over time, both
because the percent impact of BA increases with time, and
because GDP increases with time.
GDP loss under BA in 2020 is $70 billion to $96 billion.
(This compares to $214 to $517 billion for M/L) It reflects a
0.3% to 0.4% reduction in 2020 GDP (compared to 0.8% to 1.9%
for M/L).
Per household consumption losses under BA are $135 to $147
in 2010 and $147 to $164 in 2020. (Comparable M/L losses are in
the $450 to $800 range.)
Job losses under BA in 2020 are 281,000 to 326,000 (compared
to 793,000 to 1,306,000 under M/L).
Reduction in coal output in 2020 is 8% to 11% (compared to
23% to 42% for M/L).
Reduction in refined oil output in 2020 is 2% (compared to
6%-13% for M/L).
Carbon prices are $13 to $18/tonne C in 2010 and $21 to 29/
tonne C in 2020. (M/L carbon prices are $47-$130 in 2010 and
$75-$209 in 2020.)
Under BA, carbon allowance prices hit the safety valve price
in 2020 in the high case and 2035 in the low case.
The greater cost certainty associated with the safety valve is
apparent in the fact that our M/L cost ranges are much wider than those
we estimated for the BA cap. However, the lower overall costs of the BA
cap simply reflect the fact that it imposes a much less stringent
demand for near-term emissions reductions. Over the period from 2020 to
2050 BA provides emission reductions that total between one-third and
two-fifths (32% to 40%) of those provided by M/L. Since the costs of BA
range from 25% to 33% of M/L, the comparison also illustrates the law
of diminishing returns, in that it costs proportionately more to
achieve the larger emission reductions required by M/L.
E. Issues in allocating allowances
Allocations versus auctions. I understand the committee is very
interested in the issue of allocation of allowances under Senator
Bingaman's proposal. This is a feature of policy design for which there
are several alternatives. Senator Bingaman distinguishes between
auction and allocation. Some allowances would be allocated to parties
that suffer disproportionate harm from emission limits, and some would
be auctioned and provide revenues.
The first question that the Committee might want to consider is who
should control the use of the revenues from any auctioned or safety
valve allowances. If revenues are placed in the general fund, then
Congress will retain the ability to make the decisions about how the
revenues will be utilized. This will allow Congress to consider all
societal needs together, and to balance competing needs as they evolve.
To place the proceeds into a Trust Fund that earmarks them for spending
only related to climate policy is tantamount to deciding now that
climate-related spending needs to be separated from all other
government spending decisions, and given a separate, more elevated
priority than all other societal needs, including future needs that may
not be anticipated at present. Public finance practitioners generally
frown on the idea of earmarking funds from particular revenue sources
to particular purposes, because the amount of money that will be
collected from a particular source is only connected loosely, if at
all, to the amount that it is wise to spend on even a related purpose.
Thus earmarking is likely to produce either too much or too little
funding, and it removes the decision about how much should be spent
from the normal budget, authorization, and appropriation process.
In this regard, I also note that free allocation of allowances is
not the only way to provide for compensation of affected parties. Any
compensation that can be achieved by a free allocation formula could,
in principle, be replicated under a 100% auction--it would only require
that the auction revenues be returned to companies by the same formula
that would have been used for allocations. Funds could be appropriated
to provide compensation for those disproportionately harmed, or
specific tax credits could be enacted. Determining how to make this
compensation using normal budget processes would be no harder than
determining how to allocate allowances under the procedures outlined in
Senator Bingaman's proposal.
While general principles of public finance suggest that separation
of revenues from such a policy into a Trust Fund is probably unwise, my
personal research has found that such an approach also could exacerbate
the total costs of any carbon-pricing policy, and thus would be
inconsistent with principles of minimizing policy costs. Paradoxically,
allocating all of the allowances at no cost to affected parties, and/or
using all of the proceeds from sale of allowances to fund new spending
programs, can lead to far larger costs to the economy than necessary.
This policy cost inflation can be averted by using some allowance or
carbon tax revenues to replace other taxes that would have to be raised
to meet budget targets. By allowing carbon policy revenues to flow to
the general fund, Congress retains its ability to determine how much of
the proceeds from allowance sales or carbon taxes should be used for
replacement of other tax revenues that can be expected to decline under
the carbon policy.
Free allocations cannot compensate all businesses and households.
Impacts on households and industry are not determined by where
regulations are put in place. An upstream system like that in Senator
Bingaman's proposal still imposes costs on households and industries.
Not all the costs are borne by fuel suppliers, even if they are the
point of regulation. All users of energy have higher production costs.
Some will be able to pass some of these costs to their consumers, while
others will have little ability to pass costs through, and the brunt of
the financial impact will be borne by their shareholders. In the end,
households cannot pass the costs on to anybody, and they ultimately
bear the entire cost, as consumers of higher cost of goods and
services, and as shareholders in companies that cannot pass the costs
on.
Conceptually, allocations could be used to help compensate the
companies that bear an exceptional and unfair burden. We have, in other
contexts, estimated the average loss in capital value to owners of
assets in aggregated economic sectors such as the oil, gas, coal and
electricity generation sectors. However, there is no simple formula to
identify exactly which companies these are, or what amount of
allocation would actually provide for an equitable burden sharing
arrangement. Companies within the same economic sector may face diverse
impacts, so that an estimate of the ``average'' loss of profitability
for each sector may bear no correlation to the sum of losses across the
negatively affected companies within each sector. Even if one could
identify reasonable allocations to each sector of the economy,
comparable allocations to each company within a sector would have
little chance of equalizing burdens within the sector. Attempts to
analytically identify company-specific burdens within a sector would be
even more challenging than attempts to identify needs by sector, as the
relevant data are not even publicly available. Thus, the idealized
concept of mitigating the impact of the rule on individual companies
cannot be estimated quantitatively at the level of detail needed to
define company-level allocations, let alone be condensed to a
relatively simple formula.
It is also important to realize that the energy sectors (including
non-regulated entities in the energy sectors) are not the only sectors
that will bear losses of capital value as a result of a carbon pricing
policy. All sectors of the economy will be affected to some degree, as
all are consumers of energy to varying degrees. As more and more of the
needs to be compensated are recognized, the identification of a
``fair'' allocations rule will become exceedingly complex.
More importantly, once it is recognized that needs for compensation
include all individual energy consumers, and not just companies, policy
makers will have to realize that it is not possible to offset losses
for everyone through allocations of allowances. The total cost of a
cap-and-trade system will always exceed the total value of the
allowances in that system:
This is because companies must pay (1) to reduce emissions
down to the level of the cap and also (2) for every ton of
emissions that remains after meeting the cap. The value of the
allowances equals only the second component of total costs. At
most, the government can give that entire value back to the
companies by free allocation of 100% of the allowances, but
that leaves companies still incurring the first cost component,
and without any way to compensate them for that cost--which is
the real net cost to society.
It is true that companies may be able to pass some of these
two cost components on to their customers, and so directly-
regulated companies could be given more compensation than the
cost that their shareholders bear if all of the allowances were
allocated to them alone. However, this only means that a part
of the net cost has been spread to other, non-regulated
parties, including consumers. They, in turn, would require
their share of the allowance allocation to be compensated for
the part of the cost that was passed to them. There is not
enough value in the allowances to cover all costs to regulated
companies if they cannot pass those costs on, and neither can
that value cover all the incurred costs after they are divided
up and spread throughout the entire economy.
Thus, a carbon pricing policy will always impose a real net cost on
the economy that cannot be eliminated through any allocation formula
that may be devised. All that an allocation scheme can do is alter the
companies and individual consumers that end up bearing the burden of
that cost.
These challenges in identifying fair allocations are not a result
of proposing an upstream point of compliance. They would be equally
difficult under any downstream or hybrid form of implementation. They
do, however, present more prominent issues when using a cap-and-trade
approach than under a carbon tax, because the former system does
require that a specific decision be made for how to distribute the
allowances. (At the same time, needs for compensation and burden
sharing would also exist under a carbon tax, and there would also be
equivalent degrees of ability to achieve such compensation under a
carbon tax.)
Administrative costs and bureaucracy for small and distant emission
reductions. I have estimated that under Senator Bingaman's proposal,
the price of carbon allowances would rise above the safety valve level
between 2020 and 2035. EIA puts this somewhat earlier.
This effectively turns the Bingaman proposal into a carbon tax
program, but with the much higher costs of an administrative apparatus
for issuing, enforcing, and trading carbon allowances that doesn't
actually do anything other than impose a pre-determined price on carbon
emissions.
This leads to the question of whether it is desirable to create the
bureaucracy and administrative burden of a comprehensive national
emission trading program for the small reductions that are possible
with a safety valve. The main differences between safety valve
proposals and simply establishing a federal fuels tax based on carbon
content are (1) that the safety valve has a greater administrative
burden, and (2) the safety valve approach allows revenues that would
otherwise go into the normal budget process to be handed out by an
executive agency or quasi-government corporation.
Thus the government cedes the ability to set overall social
priorities for the use of the funds. Further, it sets the stage for
automatically spending whatever is collected on climate-related
technologies, without regard to the need for spending at such a level.
Because it is not tied to an R&D program with clearly specified goals
and a plan for meeting those goals, much of the spending is likely to
result in subsidies on investments that would occur anyway (because
they are cost-effective under the carbon price) or on investments that
are not desirable (because they are only feasible at a cost that is
higher than the safety valve price, which by definition reflects the
maximum that is deemed reasonable to spend on near-term emissions
reductions).\5\ The use of an outside entity does not solve the problem
of creating a good R&D program; but it does mean that Congress loses
the opportunity to make those R&D spending decisions directly and
transparently.
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\5\ Nuclear power presents a different situation. Although the
technology is nearly zero-emitting (there are some emissions associated
with its fuel cycle), available now, and cost-effective under even a
modest carbon pricing scheme, its deployment is hampered by existing
policy. Removal of institutional and political barriers to new nuclear
generation might be the most important way of enabling existing nuclear
generation technology to provide cost-effective emissions reductions
within the next two decades.
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4. The Need for R&D Strategy to Be the Leading Edge of Climate Policy
A. New technology is not encouraged by mandatory limits
Although M/L has much more substantial (and uncertain) costs than
the BA cap proposal, both proposals have substantial costs. But despite
these costs to the economy, neither fixed caps nor safety valve/carbon
tax policy designs can provide an adequate incentive for the critical
piece of the solution--which is creation of radically new technologies.
In my opinion, it would be better now to put resources into developing
new technologies than in forcing the use of existing technology to
achieve relatively small and costly emission reductions. Creating an
effective R&D program will not be cheap, but it ultimately has to
happen if climate risks are to be reduced. The difficult decisions are
how much to spend now, and how to design programs to stimulate R&D that
avoid mistakes of the past.
The subsidies to current technology embodied in BA and M/L are not
likely to bring about that change in the fundamental direction of R&D,
because they are directed at the demonstration and use of current
technology. These subsidies should be carefully distinguished from
funding for R&D. Most subsidies would be unnecessary under a carbon-
pricing program, as the market price of carbon due to the cap provides
the appropriate financial incentives for the optimal use of the control
methods that would then also benefit from the subsidies. A well-
designed policy to address needs for R&D in entirely new technologies
is needed, not subsidies to get existing technologies deployed in the
market place. A very different commitment is needed to create programs
that will change the direction of basic research toward creation of
climate friendly, zero carbon technologies. Subsidies for demonstration
and use of currently available technologies do not create incentives
for creation of entirely new technologies.
In BA, the carbon intensity basis for mandatory caps ensures that
they rise gradually, so that there is little change in emissions for
the next decade. The safety valve, by design, takes over from the
mandatory cap when its costs begin to rise. By design, the safety valve
will not stimulate the desired level of R&D. By attempting to limit
cost to a level deemed tolerable, it eliminates adequate incentives for
R&D on new technology.
Nor will an adequate incentive be provided if the safety valve were
eliminated, now or in the future. This would provide a trajectory of
rising allowance prices and tightening limits. But those future policy
results cannot be a credible incentive for current R&D, as I explain
next.
B. Carbon pricing programs cannot provide credible
incentives for technology development
Whether cap-and-trade or a carbon tax is the policy approach taken,
these mandatory programs cannot achieve the most important need in a
climate program, which is to stimulate development of the kinds of
technologies that alone can make significant mitigation of climate risk
possible in the long run.
Emission caps are not only premature and risky for the economy.
They are not capable of stimulating the kind of technology development
that is an absolute necessity to achieve any of the objectives of
climate policy. Putting a stop to the continued growth of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere requires meeting all of today's
energy needs in a way that produces zero net carbon emissions, and does
so at acceptable cost. That is not possible with the set of
technologies that exist today.
Hoffert et al. argue that ``the most effective way to reduce
CO2 emissions with economic growth and equity is to develop
revolutionary changes in the technology of energy production,
distribution, storage and conversion.''\6\ They go on to identify an
entire portfolio of technologies, suggesting that the solution will lie
in achieving advances in more than one of the following categories of
research:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ M.I. Hoffert et al., ``Advanced Technology Paths to Global
Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet'' Science, Vol. 298,
Nov. 1, 2002, p.981.
wind, solar and biomass
nuclear fission
nuclear fusion
hydrogen fuel cells
energy efficiency
carbon sequestration
Currently available technologies cannot provide sufficient or low
cost reductions to meet the GHG challenge. Developing that supply will
require basic science and fundamental breakthroughs in a number of
disciplines. The magnitude of possible reductions in the next decade or
two achievable with today's technology is dwarfed by the magnitude of
reductions that successful innovation would supply through these
routes.\7\
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\7\ For example, if all of the existing U.S. natural gas-fired
combined cycle generating capacity were to suddenly be fully utilized,
we estimate based on our models of the U.S. power sector that current
annual U.S. CO2 emissions would be reduced by about 80
MMTC--about a 4% reduction in total U.S. GHG emissions--and it would
come at a cost of about $80/tonne C, even if gas prices would not be
inflated by the sudden surge in natural gas demand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emission caps cannot provide adequate incentives. Even combined
with an allowance trading system that puts a price on emissions, fixed
caps cannot provide the incentives for the necessary technological
change to occur. Thus, efforts to address climate change by imposing
costly caps or taxes in the near-term will fail to provide long-term
reductions. Additionally, if the R&D externality is being effectively
addressed, implementation today of a cap or tax that will not become
stringent until a later date will provide little or no further benefit
in the form of an ``announcement effect.'' The only role for near-term
GHG caps or taxes would be to achieve emissions reductions that are
justifiable immediately because their cost per ton removed is less than
the present value of the cost of avoided future emission reductions
that would come from the future technologies, once they become
available. Any other degree of stringency is unwarranted before R&D is
successful, and unnecessary to supplement policies that will address
the fundamental market failures associated with R&D.
Announcements of high future carbon prices to stimulate R&D are not
credible, because those carbon prices would not be necessary once
technologies are developed.\8\ When new technology and new capacity
investments are the issue, the only policy strategies that matter
immediately are those that will increase incentives to invest in R&D,
and direct the R&D toward technologies that will create a much larger
supply of carbon-free energy alternatives at acceptable costs.
Therefore, the only attribute of a cap-and-trade program that will
matter will be the future course of the cap and its implications for
future allowance prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ These points are developed in a more rigorous fashion in W.D.
Montgomery and Anne E. Smith ``Price, Quantity and Technology
Strategies for Climate Change Policy.'' To appear in Human-Induced
Climate Change: An Interdisciplinary Assessment, Cambridge University
Press, forthcoming 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
None of the ``mandatory'' programs under consideration could
stimulate the kind of R&D in new energy technologies that is required.
The ``safety valve'' in the NCEP program and Senator Bingaman's
amendment is designed to provide assurance that the price of emission
allowances will not reach economically unsustainable levels. But that
policy design causes the prices to be set at a level far too low to
provide an adequate incentive for private investors to develop
radically new technologies.
To motivate the large R&D investments required, it would be
necessary for governments to announce policies that will lead to high
enough implicit taxes on carbon emissions to provide an adequate
expected return on R&D investment. This tax will necessarily exceed the
tax needed to induce adoption of the technology once it is developed.
Once affordable technologies are produced, a relatively low carbon tax
price will be enough to motivate companies to adopt the new
technologies. That lower carbon price will not be enough to compensate
the investors who paid for the R&D, but it will be enough to get it
utilized.
Even if laws passed today served to announce a future emissions tax
high enough to create such an incentive, no future Congress or
Administration would keep that commitment once the technology was
developed. As in the case of patents, there is a tradeoff between
efficiency in resource allocation and providing an incentive for R&D. A
carbon price above the level necessary to induce adoption of the new
technology will cause avoidable deadweight losses as all energy supply
and use decisions are distorted. Reducing implicit carbon taxes to the
lowest possible level to get the new technology deployed will always be
beneficial to the economy. Therefore, future governments will face
irresistible pressure to let the implicit tax on carbon emissions fall
back to a level just sufficient to get the R&D utilized, taking away
all the rewards to innovation.
This leads to a fundamental dynamic inconsistency that makes any
effort to set emission caps or announce future carbon prices sufficient
to stimulate R&D not credible. Since private investors can understand
this is the optimal strategy for government--and indeed would likely be
skeptical of the political ability of any government to proceed with
what will look like ``corporate welfare''--they will not be motivated
to invest in R&D by any announcement of future climate policy.
C. Design of technology policy
What this argument demonstrates is that it is not possible to rely
on caps on future emissions, or on announcements of a safety valve or
carbon tax, to motivate R&D to develop the new technologies needed for
long-term reduction of climate risk. This means that there is an
extraordinarily high priority to designing effective programs to
stimulate that R&D through incentives provided today. I would urge
Congress to turn its interest in climate policy toward a subject it
knows well--how to craft a program that will lead to effective use of
private and government funds to carry out the R&D needed to provide the
radically new technologies required to stabilize concentrations of
greenhouse gases and ultimately, global climate.
D. Large opportunities for near-term emission reductions
exist in developing countries
For near-term emission reductions, developing countries offer far
larger and more cost-effective opportunity for emission reduction that
mandatory emission limits on U.S. businesses and consumers. There are a
number of ways in which the U.S. Congress could act to increase
technology transfer and encourage foreign investment in developing
countries, and these actions could lead to near-term reductions in
emission larger than any of the mandatory limits on U.S. emissions
under considerations.
The provisions of the McCain/Lieberman and Bingaman Amendment
proposals dealing with developing countries create no mechanism for
bringing about changes in those countries. A great deal of the
difference in greenhouse gas intensity between developing countries and
industrial countries can be explained by fundamental failures of
markets and institutions in developing countries. Much more cost-
effective emission reductions are possible in the near-term through
programs directed at developing countries by focusing on fundamental
institutional and market reforms to create the property rights and
investment climate required for private foreign direct investment and
technology transfer.\9\ These needs are already a focus of the Climate
Change Title (Title XVI) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which passed
into law after the Bingaman Amendment was released. I believe that
approach of Title XVI should be followed, and further enhanced if
necessary. The more general and less focused provisions expressed in
the Bingaman Amendment proposal are unnecessary additions, and could
distract from implementing the more focused provisions that already
exist as law.
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\9\ Such policies are discussed at greater length in W. David
Montgomery & Sugandha D. Tuladhar, ``Impact Of Economic Liberalization
On GHG Emission Trends In India,'' Climate Policy Center, May, 2005.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, doctor.
Mr. Grumet.
STATEMENT OF JASON S. GRUMET, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY
Mr. Grumet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Jason
Grumet and on behalf of our bipartisan membership of our
Commission I want to thank you. I want to thank Senator
Bingaman and the rest of the committee for the attention you
have given to this issue and our proposal--why do I not start
again.
What you missed, Mr. Chairman, was largely me thanking you,
so I would like to repeat that if I might, which was to thank
you for the attention that you brought to this topic and our
proposal and also for having not only the hearing on climate
science, but this follow-up hearing.
Let me just begin by directly embracing I think the way
that you laid out the criteria for success, because I think we
agree fundamentally that the details are very important, that
this is not easy, that to succeed we must establish a program
that is going to achieve the greatest reduction at the lowest
cost. It must be economically efficient, it must be fair, it
must protect our economic vitality, our economic
competitiveness. It must also instill the desire for a global
and truly effective solution.
These are the criteria, Mr. Chairman, that I think are
clearly expressed in the sense of the Senate resolution. They
are also the criteria which explicitly animated the Energy
Commission's policy approach of trying to combine a modest
carbon price and augment that with the technology incentives
that could bring technologies forward in a timeframe that this
challenge requires.
Now I want to just talk for a moment about our overall
architecture and then move to the costs and benefits of our
proposal. By and large, our goal was to establish a robust
architecture that could evolve over time as our understanding
of science progresses, as actions of other countries progress,
but explicitly to establish a modest initial cost. We achieve
that by suggesting a mandatory economy-wide system of market-
based regulations. The goal there is to maximize efficiency and
also to encourage the private sector to innovate, which of
course we have found is always the ultimate solution to these
kinds of challenges.
Equally important, Mr. Chairman, we propose a very gradual
reduction target and we propose a cost certain, cost cap, to
protect our economy against uncertainties that I think we all
fear.
Finally, we believe that a modest carbon price, of course,
is not in and of itself going to be adequate to bring forth
these technologies and we explicitly propose to augment this
modest market-based system with a continued active effort on
the part of government to advance these technologies.
Finally, we propose that our policy be explicitly linked to
the actions of our key trade partners, China, India, and
developing countries.
Now let me turn, as this is an economically focused
hearing, to the costs and benefits. I would suggest to you that
there is actually surprising agreement on the costs of our
proposal. Dr. Smith and Dr. Montgomery of Charles River
Associates provided the economic modeling that we used in our
report to express our sense of the projected costs and benefits
and caused us to conclude that we thought the benefits were
quite modest. Dr. Gruenspecht and the good people at EIA have
done a follow-up analysis which in many ways has eclipsed our
own.
Just let me try to put this in perspective, because the
economy is a very big place, so very small effects taken out of
context can be somewhat misleading. The EIA suggests that due
to the imposition of our mandatory economy-wide carbon program
gross domestic product in the United States between 2005 and
2025 will grow by 80.6 percent as opposed to 80.8 percent. If I
can pull my favorite quote out of the report--and Dr.
Gruenspecht, they are practiced in not using adjectives, but I
found this quote helpful. It says: ``The overall growth rate of
the economy between 2003 and 2025 in terms of both real and
potential GDP is not materially affected by the commission
proposal.''
Put another way, Mr. Chairman, our Nation will be as
wealthy on January 15, 2025, as we would otherwise be on
January 1, 2025, as a result of the costs of this program.
Now, the numbers I agree are less, I think, instructive
than the overall frame, and simply I would suggest that the
dire suggestions of economic impacts that have framed our Kyoto
debate simply do not obtain here. Coal is not driven from the
economy. Coal use in fact continues to increase, as Dr.
Gruenspecht said, part of the reason why the United Mine
Workers have endorsed this proposal. Natural gas demand does
not skyrocket. In fact, as Dr. Gruenspecht indicated, it
ultimately goes down, and if you focus just on the carbon
program it increases by no more than 1 percent. The economic
dislocations that we have all feared simply do not appear.
I think a lot of that comes to bear on the cost certainty
our program provides. It has gotten us out of this ``my modeler
is smarter than your modeler'' debate that causes this dramatic
gap in people's different projections.
But now let me turn a little bit to benefits, because,
while the costs have clarified, I think there is a growing
disagreement among experts about the benefits and the logic of
combining the market program with an incentive program.
Predictably, the environmental community has concluded that our
$7 a ton initial carbon price is not enough and business and
trade associations have suggested that it is too much. I credit
Dr. Smith with the I think creative argument, if I understand
it, that it is at once not enough and too much, which I think
raises the complexity of the debate quite a bit.
But our Commission by and large avoids extremes and I
think, like democracy itself, it is best useful to compare this
combined approach in the comparison to alternatives. Our
alternatives are quite simple. We can either put the entire
burden on the private sector--a market signal is a good thing,
but I think most agree that Kyoto was too much of a good thing.
By placing the entire burden on the private sector, we have
unacceptable costs, unacceptable dislocations, and we fail to
address the long-term market failures that Dr. Smith addressed
through R&D.
But conversely, placing the entire burden on the public
sector, which I think is a fair description of the status quo,
where we raise tax revenues for big government programs to
choose the right technologies, is simply not the way we have
learned to solve problems in this country. It provides no
incentive for private sector innovation, no incentive to deploy
technologies. Even if the taxpayers support the full cost of
deployment, if the costs of venting a ton of carbon to the
atmosphere there is simply no incentive to bring these
technologies forward.
Finally, I think I am personally leery of Apollo metaphors
that suggest big government spending, absent any particular
strategy to suggest how much money, how it will be spent,
ultimately who is going to raise that money. Fundamentally, it
is the marketplace and not any of us, no matter how well
intentioned or expert, that must ultimately decide how to move
these technologies forward.
So in closing, let me just contrast I think the extremes
with the benefits of a balanced system. The combination of a
modest cost price on carbon and a technology program provides
real near-term reductions. Our proposal is anticipated to
reduce the growth in annual greenhouse gas emissions by two-
thirds over the next decade, allowing us then to move into
ultimately a cap and a reduction.
Early market signals avoid locking in bad investments and,
contrary to Dr. Smith's expectations, it was the CEO's on our
commission, the people who actually make billion dollar long-
term investments, who were strongest of the view that a modest
market signal now would have dramatic long-term impacts on
their ideas and challenges.
It is an equitable approach, Mr. Chairman, because it
shares the burdens. Someone is going to have to pay for this
technology and it shares the burdens between the public sector
and shareholders.
Mr. Chairman, while I think our Commission was a bid
prudish in our interest in not exceeding or spending money that
we do not have, it provides an opportunity to actually generate
revenue so that you can move these technologies forward in a
revenue-neutral way.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it allows us to establish our
international leadership. We all agree that we cannot solve
this problem absent commensurate and real efforts by China and
India. We need to establish our opportunity to work with those
countries more aggressively than we can right now. It is clear
that we cannot in the United States solve this problem absent
participation by those other countries. I think it is equally
true that the rest of the world cannot solve this problem
absent the leadership of the United States.
Thank you for this opportunity and we offer whatever our
Commission can do as you address these difficult issues in the
time ahead.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grumet follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jason S. Grumet, Executive Director,
National Commission on Energy Policy
Good morning, Chairman Domenici and Members of the Committee, and
thank you for holding this hearing to explore the benefits and economic
impacts of approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. I speak to
you today on behalf of the National Commission on Energy Policy, a
diverse and bi-partisan group of energy experts that first came
together in 2002 and last December issued a comprehensive set of
consensus recommendations for future U.S. energy policy.
I would like to begin by commending Chairman Domenici and Senator
Bingaman and many others on this Committee for their leadership in
winning Senate adoption of a landmark resolution recognizing the
importance of the climate problem and, for the first time, putting this
body on record in support of the need for mandatory efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. I believe that in years to come, passage of
this resolution will come to be seen as a pivotal moment in the
evolution of our collective response to the risks posed by climate
change.
The resolution marks a turning point, but it also represents a
logical next step for the Senate on this issue. When the Senate last
expressed its views on climate change--in the Byrd-Hagel resolution of
1997--it set out two basic criteria for future U.S. climate policy that
continue to serve as critical guideposts for our discussions today. The
first criterion is that any efforts to combat climate change must not
compromise the vitality or competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The
second criterion is that all nations, and particularly developing
nations with rapidly growing emissions, must also act to address this
problem. As we heard from the panel of distinguished scientists who
testified before this Committee in July, the scientific consensus about
climate change has steadily strengthened over the last decade. While a
majority of Senators have now agreed that it is time to act, Senators
on this Committee have clearly expressed a shared view that the
solution to this global problem will not come easily. It was also
widely and correctly noted at the previous hearing that mitigating the
risks from global warming will require the deployment of an array of
clean energy technologies, many of which have not been commercialized
or even invented. The challenge before us is to determine the most
effective and efficient means of developing and deploying these new
technologies while satisfying the criteria articulated in both the
Byrd-Hagel and the more recent Bingaman-Domenici resolutions.
Our group, the National Commission on Energy Policy, has developed
an approach that we believe can reduce domestic emissions, spur
technology development and meet the twin tests of economic
responsibility and international equity.
But before outlining key elements of that approach, let me say a
few additional words about the Commission itself. The Commission was
formed in 2002 by the Hewlett Foundation and several other private,
philanthropic foundations. Its ideologically and professionally diverse
16-member board included recognized energy experts from business,
government, academia, and the non-profit sector. Our final
recommendations, which are described in a report that was released on
December 8, 2004, were informed by intense discussions over several
years, by dozens of analyses contained in a 2,800 page Technical
Appendix, and by extensive outreach to over 200 other groups. Those
recommendations, I should stress, deal with a comprehensive set of
energy policy issues including (in addition to climate change) our
nation's dependence on oil and the need for increased investment in new
energy technologies and critical energy infrastructure.
As a group, however, we recognized from the outset that climate
change presented one of the central energy challenges of our time and
so we devoted considerable energy to developing a detailed set of
recommendations for addressing this issue. I would like to begin my
remarks by summarizing the Commission's view that volunteerism and tax-
payer supported incentives alone do not provide an effective or
economically efficient response to this challenge. After explaining our
support for mandatory market-based limits to slow, stop and ultimately
reverse the growth of greenhouse gas emissions, I will focus on the
attributes of a mandatory program that are needed to protect our
economy.
The Imperative of Mandatory Action--Our Commission strongly
supports the need for continued government efforts to accelerate the
development and early deployment of low and non-carbon energy sources.
We applaud the Administration's efforts in this regard. However, in a
competitive market-economy, where companies are encouraged and in some
cases obligated to maximize shareholder value, it is contrary to the
rules of free-market competition to expect companies to invest scarce
resources absent a profit motive. While there are numerous cases where
a combination of good will, good public relations, and positive
ulterior motives (like reduced energy bills), create an adequate basis
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, these cases will remain limited if
the financial value of reducing a ton of GHG emissions remains zero.
It is somewhat ironic that the European Union is actively
implementing market-based regulatory approaches developed here in the
Unites States while we pursue a top-down program of government-
directed, tax-payer funded research and deployment incentives.
Developing and commercializing new technologies will cost money. The
question is who is best positioned to secure and effectively spend
these resources. While there is certainly a role for public funding and
government incentives, the Commission believes. that there must also be
a role for those who emit greenhouse gases to share in the costs of
developing solutions. As we have learned over the last twenty years,
given a rational reason to invest, the private sector is far better
than the government in developing technological solutions. The success
of the acid rain program demonstrates that the most effective way to
engage the ingenuity of the private sector is to place a monetary value
on a ton of reduced emissions thus creating a real economic incentive
to develop cleaner forms of energy. By imposing a modest market signal
to pull private sector technology investment forward in combination
with continued tax-payer supported investment to push longer-term
solutions, the Commission believes we can significantly reduce GHG
emissions without hampering economic growth or prosperity.
Many in the environmental community and some industry analysts have
argued that the modest-market signal proposed by the Commission is
inadequate, in and of itself, to spur the technology innovation needed
to solve the climate problem. The Commission wholeheartedly agrees.
While modeling performed by Charles Rivers Associates under contract to
the Commission and by the Energy Information Administration
demonstrates that a modest carbon price will inspire considerable near-
term reductions, both analyses conclude that.proposed market-signal is
unlikely by itself to make technologies such as carbon sequestration, a
massive deployment of renewable energy generation, or advanced nuclear
facilities cost-competitive over the next two decades. This conclusion
is precisely why the Commission believes that an effective response to
climate change requires both a market signal and significant technology
incentives.
This basis of this conclusion is best revealed by examining the
alternatives. While providing a strong incentive for technology
development, imposing a much higher carbon price on corporations and
share-holders would be economically disruptive and politically
unacceptable. This approach would strand billions of dollars of
existing, long-lived capital stock and cause potentially significant
economic dislocations while new technologies were developed and
deployed. It also fails to address widely accepted market failures that
discourage the investment of private capital in the development of
long-term technologies with uncertain market value. Conversely, the
placing the entire burden on the public sector is equally unacceptable.
By discouraging private investment and innovation, this approach will
ultimately prove ineffective, too costly to the Treasury or both.
Moreover, absent a market signal, there will be little or no incentive
to deploy low carbon technologies even if the tax payer covers the full
cost of their development. In sum, relying entirely upon the private or
public sectors to advance our national interest in technology
advancement, offers a policy prescription that is akin to pushing one-
end of a rope.
The elegance of combining a both market signals and public
incentives is further supported by the opportunity to auction a small
fraction of the emission permits in order support technology innovation
without burdening the general tax base. The Commission proposed to
double U.S. energy R&D, triple international energy R&D partnerships,
and provide significant incentives to accelerate the deployment of coal
gasification and sequestration, bio-fuels, renewable generation,
domestically produced efficient vehicles and advanced nuclear
facilities using the $35 billion in revenue generated by auctioning up
to 10% of the emission permits over a decade.
Overview of Commission Proposal--In addition to advocating for the
combination of a market-based price signal and technology incentives,
the Commission's proposal is explicitly designed to ensure that the
proposed market-based emission reduction requirements do not undermine
economic growth or competitiveness. Specifically, the Commission
recommends that the United States adopt a mandatory, economy-wide,
tradable-permits system for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, with a
safety valve designed to limit costs. This approach is similar to the
successful acid rain program in the United States, but differs in one
very critical respect. Rather than proposing a hard cap on emissions,
we have proposed an absolute cap program costs.
The aim of the Commission's proposal is to slow growth in U.S.
emissions over the 2010-2020 timeframe as a prelude to stopping and
eventually reversing current emissions trends in the 2020s and beyond.
We also explicitly designed our approach to recognize the importance of
participation by major trading partners like China and India. Our
program includes a regular 5-year review of progress which is intended
to assess both the performance of the U.S. program and progress by
other countries. If major U.S. trading partners and competitors
(including China, India, Mexico, and Brazil) fail to implement
comparable emission control programs, further U.S. efforts--including
the gradual increase in stringency built into our program--could be
suspended or adjusted. Conversely, the U.S. program could be
strengthened if international progress, technology advances, or
scientific developments warrant.
International participation and other issues will be the subject of
future hearings, so I want to return now to the main focus of this
panel: economic impacts.
Two key policy choices: 1) a modest reduction target; 2) the cost-
cap or ``safety-valve'' enable the Commission to propose a mandatory,
economy-wide GHG reduction program that according to EIA does not
``materially affect,'' the U.S. economy. I will describe each of these
design features in turn.
Modest Reduction Target--The Commission believes that if we begin
now, there is time to gradually phase-in GHG reductions across the
economy. Like the Administration, we believe that reducing the GHG
intensity of the economy is an effective means of slowing, stopping and
ultimately reducing U.S. GHG emissions. Over the first decade of the
program, we propose to set an economy-wide emission limit based upon a
2.4% decrease in GHG emission intensity. If achieved, this target would
slow annual emissions growth by roughly \2/3\ from business as usual
allowing actual emissions to increase by 0.5% per year instead of by
the currently projected 1.5% annual increase in total emissions. Absent
Congressional intervention to adjust the target, the intensity decline
would increase to 2.8% after a decade effectively stopping emissions
growth. Many have argued that this reduction pathway is too slow and
criticize the Commission plan for explicitly allowing emissions to
increase for a decade after implementation. We acknowledge this
critique, but believe that a modest and low-cost reduction pathway is
critical to achieving the near-term consensus needed for timely action.
The Commission believes that it is critical for the United States to
move forward now to implement a robust regulatory architecture that can
adjust over time as our understanding of climate impacts and the costs
of solutions matures.
Cost-Certainty (the ``Safety-Valve'')--Under a traditional cap and
trade program the reduction target is fixed in statute or regulation
while the costs are ``best guesses'' of what will be necessary to
achieve the fixed targets. While our experience in the acid rain
program suggests that projected costs are more likely to be exaggerated
than understated, there remains a real possibility that costs for
meeting any target will be higher than expected or desired. Under the
safety-valve, regulated entities are allowed to buy additional permits
from the government at a pre-determined price. This feature of the
Commission's proposal ensures that program compliance costs will not
exceed estimates. If technology fails to progress at the projected
rate, the program will reduce less emissions than desired but
compliance costs will not increase.
EIA's analysis and the work of Charles River and others reveal that
expectations of technological progress are by far the most significant
assumptions affecting the costs of achieving a particular emissions
target Under EIA's base-case average technology assumptions achieving
the Commissions modest 2.4% annual intensity reduction will begin to
cost more than the safety-valve price beginning in 2015 causing firms
to avail themselves of safety-valve permits. However, when EIA projects
costs using more optimistic assumptions about technology progress that
seek to capture the Commission's ``recycling'' of auction revenue back
into technology incentives, the target is met throughout the first
decade with the safety-valve never being triggered at all. Under the
more optimistic technology assumptions, a $7/ton incentive results in
nearly double the reductions, but the overall cost of the program is
the same.
The Commission's decision to place a priority on cost-certainty
over emissions certainty reflects our appreciation of strongly held and
fundamentally irresolvable disagreements about technological progress
and the ultimate costs of emission reductions. Rather than spending
several more years paralyzed by differing climate change modeling
assumptions, the safety-valve allows us to begin, albeit cautiously, to
reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions while protecting our economy,
affording time for key industries to adjust and maintaining America's
global competitiveness.
The safety valve also gives businesses the planning certainty they
need to make wise long-run investments that will minimize the costs of
achieving greenhouse gas emissions reductions over time. We chose an
initial safety valve level of $7 per metric ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent because analyses suggest that it roughly reflects the mid-
point in the scientific literature of the expected harm that can
presently be attributed to a ton of GHG emissions given current
scientific understanding. Equally if not more important, the $7 figure
is low enough to ensure that valuable, long-lived energy assets won't
be prematurely retired, yet also high enough to send a meaningful
market signal for future investment in clean, low-carbon energy
alternatives. In our proposal, the safety valve price increases
gradually over time, at a nominal rate of 5 percent per year, to
generate a steadily stronger market signal for reducing emissions.
Overall Economic Impacts--To assure ourselves that we had
successfully addressed potential economic concerns, we subjected our
proposal to detailed economic analysis. The analysis indicated that the
impacts of the program on businesses and households would be modest.
Our own modeling results were subsequently supported by an independent
analysis of our proposal by the Department of Energy's Energy
Information Administration (EIA).
EIA's analysis indicates that the impacts of the program on
businesses and households are likely to be modest. Projected annual GDP
growth would decline by less than .02% against a baseline average
growth or 3.1%. This impact equate to an average annual cost of $78 per
household between program inception and 2025. Assessed cumulatively
between 2005 and 2025, overall, predicted GDP growth would change from
80.8 percent to 80.6 percent, or a difference of 0.2 percent. In the
EIA's own words: ``the overall growth rate of the economy between 2003
and 2025, in terms of both real GDP and potential GDP, is not
materially altered.'' Put another way, the nation would be as wealthy
on January 15, 2025 with the program in place, as it would have been on
January 1, 2025 under business as usual. At the relatively minor cost
of slowing economic growth by two weeks twenty years hence, we can make
a significant start to address global climate change.
Because the models predict that a large share of reductions in the
early years of the program would come from industrial greenhouse gases
such as HFCs, PFCs, and SF6, total energy consumption would be expected
to decline by only 1 percent below forecast levels for 2020, while
still growing 14 percent in absolute terms over the first decade of
program implementation (i.e., 2010-2020). Also noteworthy, natural gas
demand is barely affected by the Commission's climate proposal
increasing by less than 1% over business as usual. When additional
proposals to increase energy efficiency and support coal gasification
are modeled, total natural gas demand actually declines against
business as usual projections. Finally, while coal use grows more
slowly than under BAU, significant growth in coal is projected by both
the Commission and EIA's analysis even when excluding new markets that
will be created by IGCC.
Of course, a very small fraction of a very large economy can still
look like a lot of money if taken out of context. You will undoubtedly
hear from critics that our proposal will cost $313 billion in lost GDP
between 2005 and 2025. What the critics are less likely to mention is
that this is just a tiny fraction of the $323 trillion of cumulative
growth in GDP the economy is expected to generate over the same time
period. Similarly, those who oppose any action on climate change are
likely to point to EIA's estimate of 140,000 lost jobs by 2020 as a
result of the tradable permits program. Again, this number needs to be
viewed in context. EIA's estimate of job losses comes to just 0.4
percent of the 36 million new jobs that the economy is expected to
create between 2005 and 2025.
At Chairman Inhofe's request, EIA also recently examined the
impacts of the program assuming higher natural gas prices and higher
costs for reducing emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gas
emissions. EIA found that the costs of the Commission's proposal would
actually be less if natural gas prices turned out to be higher than
projected. Higher natural gas prices under business-as-usual
assumptions would tend to lower total demand for energy, thus making it
somewhat easier to meet the Commission's proposed emission target.
While more pessimistic assumptions regarding the costs of controlling
non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions would result in lower total
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions, they would not materially
affect program costs. This recent analysis makes clear the value of the
safety-valve both as a substantive protection in case 2005 economic
assumptions are not borne out over time and as a political device to
set aside some of the more contentious and unknowable ``what if''
arguments that have undermined our ability to forge a consensus for
mandatory actions to reduce GHG emissions.
The trade-off for low cost is a program that also achieves
relatively modest emission reduction benefits, at least in its early
stages. We believe that a flexible, gradual, market-based approach that
provides cost certainty is appropriate at a time when uncertainties
remain about the pace of actual warming and about the speed with which
we can develop and commercialize lower-carbon alternatives. While this
program will necessarily need to evolve as other nations join in the
reduction effort and as our understanding of the climate induced
impacts continues to improve. We believe that it is the right approach
to get us started.
In fact, the importance of getting started is exactly what I hope
you will not lose sight of as the inevitable debate about numbers and
dollars and tons and jobs unfolds in the months to come. A war of
numbers too easily leads to paralysis. And right now it matters less
which numbers you choose than that you recognize the essential
principle at the core of our proposal: Strictly voluntary, seemingly
costless approaches will not enable the marketplace to attach a known
value to carbon reductions. Only when reductions have real value--
however small--can companies justify long-term investments in new, low-
carbon energy alternatives and only then will we unleash the ingenuity
and innovation of the private sector in addressing the climate change
problem and in developing the clean technologies that will be in global
demand for decades to come.
Finally, the Commission firmly recognizes that climate change is a
global problem requiring an effective and equitable global solution.
The United States can not meaningfully mitigate the risks of climate
change absent commensurate efforts by the rest of the world. Similarly,
the rest of the world can not solve the climate problem absent
leadership from the United States. The Commission believes that
undertaking mandatory domestic reduction efforts here at home is a
condition precedent to achieving a truly global solution. This
recognition that actions in the developing world will inevitably follow
those of the United States provides further impetus to take action now
so that we can work more effectively to encourage similar actions
overseas.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I speak on behalf of the
entire Commission in offering whatever further support and information
we can provide to assist your deliberations in the months to come.
summary of key features of the national commission on energy policy's
proposal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
Mandatory, economy-wide, tradable permits system would go
into effect in 2010. This would allow U.S. companies adequate
lead time to plan and make needed adjustments or investments.
The program would cover carbon dioxide (CO2) and
other major greenhouse gases (including methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluoro- carbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride).
Environmental target based on annual reductions in emissions
intensity, where intensity is measured in tons of
CO2-equivalent emissions per dollar of GDP. Between
2010 and 2019 the Commission recommends a target emissions
intensity decline of 2.4 percent per year. Based on current GDP
forecasts, achieving this target would reduce projected
emissions growth from a business-as-usual rate of 1.5 percent
per year to 0.5 percent per year. Starting in 2020 and subject
to the Congressional review described below, the Commission
proposes raising the target intensity decline to 2.8 percent
per year (the ``stop phase'' in the figure).
Cost cap is achieved by making additional permits (beyond
the quantity of permits established through the target
intensity decline described above) available for purchase from
the government at a pre-determined price. The Commission
proposes an initial cost cap or ``safety valve'' permit price
of $7 per metric ton of CO2-equivalent. This price
would increase by 5 percent per year in nominal terms.
Permit allocation for a given year would be calculated well
in advance based on available GDP forecasts. For the first
three years of program implementation, the Commission
recommends that 95 percent of initial permits be issued at no
cost to emitting sources. The remaining 5 percent would be
auctioned. Starting in 2013 and every year thereafter, an
additional 0.5 percent of the target allocation would be
auctioned, up to a limit of 10 percent of the total permit
pool.
Congressional review in 2015 and every five years thereafter
to assess the U.S. program and evaluate progress by other
countries. If major U.S. trading partners and competitors
(including China, India, Mexico, and Brazil) fail to implement
comparable emission control programs further U.S. efforts
(including continued escalation of the safety valve price and
permit auction, as well as more aggressive intensity reduction
target in 2020) could be suspended. Conversely, the U.S.
program could be strengthened if international progress,
technology advances, or scientific developments warrant.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Morgenstern.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN, PH.D., ECONOMIST AND
SENIOR FELLOW, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
Dr. Morgenstern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
Senator Bingaman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear here today. I am an economist and senior
fellow at Resources for the Future, a 53-year-old nonpartisan
think tank based here in Washington. The views I present are
strictly my own.
I begin by observing what many press reports have failed to
note, that proposals such as those advanced by the NCEP differ
dramatically from the Kyoto Protocol. Whereas Kyoto sought
significant near-term reductions, NCEP is designed not to avert
climate change over the next 20 years. Rather, its principal
aim is to develop and deploy new technologies to address the
problem in the decades ahead.
Recent EIA analyses, which we have already heard from Dr.
Gruenspecht on, clarify the differences. I have a table in my
testimony that demonstrates this clearly, but looking at
several analyses conducted by EIA over the past several years,
the differences are striking between NCEP and Kyoto. What you
find is that the reductions are only about one-fifth as much as
those proposed under Kyoto in NCEP, allowance prices in 2020
are about eight dollars a ton of CO2, and although
there is a small decline compared to the forecast level, coal
use actually increases 14 percent over the current levels. The
overall economic impacts measured in terms of potential GDP are
about one-eighteenth as much as the Kyoto Protocol.
The NCEP approach relies on market-based policies, in this
case a cap-and-trade mechanism, with a safety valve or price
cap, combined with a set of direct subsidies to new
technologies. The revenues are derived from a sale of a small
portion of the allowances. Thus the NCEP proposal is revenue
neutral.
Market-based mechanisms of this sort have two distinct
effects. On the one hand, they create incentives to reduce
emissions in the near term, thus mitigating environmental
damages associated with those emissions. Second, they alter
incentives for the private sector to develop and adopt new
technologies. In fact, few would disagree that it is the
private sector, not the Government, which has driven innovation
and growth in our society. According to the National Science
Foundation, for example, industry funded about two-thirds of
the research and development in this country in 2003.
While anecdotal evidence on the private sector contribution
is extensive, I would call your attention to a recently
published scholarly paper by David Popp. It documents that
following the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1990, which for
the first time put an incentive on the development of
technologies which would reduce emissions beyond the targeted
level, that the level of patent activity for these particular
types of innovations which increased the effectiveness, the
environmental effectiveness of these technologies, increased.
Heretofore the emphasis in new patents had been focused
principally on only cost-reducing technologies, but it was this
emphasis on environmentally friendly reductions which was
induced as a result of the Clean Air Act.
At the same time, there is an important role for government
clearly in encouraging the development of new technologies,
based largely on the spillovers and externalities associated
with innovations. The existence of these spillovers reduces the
private incentives to pursue innovation as others will mimic
these initial innovations without compensating or fully
compensating the inventors. Patents offer some protection, but
that is limited. Learning by doing creates additional benefits
for society from the early adoption and diffusion of these
technologies.
While the rationale for government support of research and
development and demonstration is quite strong, such programs
cannot do the job completely by themselves. For example,
government-funded technology programs may succeed in bringing
down the cost of promising technologies, like IGCC, so that
they will eventually overtake conventional pulverized coal
technologies.
That said, how can technology programs ever make capture
and sequestration cheap enough so that firms will voluntarily
undertake such efforts? To accomplish sequestration, some form
of mandatory government policy is going to be required. The
real choice is between a command and control approach and a
market-based approach. NCEP has wisely chosen a market-based
approach to encourage this near-term mitigation.
Now, those who oppose a mandatory program fail to recognize
several points. First, the signal that it sends to firms and
households, especially in their investment decisions for long-
lived equipment, like power plants, homes, and many appliances.
Second, the value of cheap near-term reductions in buying time
for further R&D on these new technologies. Third, the
opportunity to encourage a broad set of technologies, not just
the winners picked by the Government program.
Virtually all economists recognize the rationale for some
form of mandatory program. Arguably, there is a disagreement
about the extent of the disincentive for carbon emissions that
should be imposed in the near term. The NCEP recommendation of
$7 a ton of CO2 is quite consistent with the
estimates found in the economics literature on this point.
Let me now turn to a further discussion of the safety
valve. As has been noted by others, it is in effect a type of
insurance designed to protect the economy against unexpected
price increases caused by weather, stronger than predicted
economic growth, technology failures, or other factors. Despite
the success of the cap-and-trade approach without the safety
valve in the acid rain program, problems have arisen in some
other arenas.
For example, during the California energy crisis the price
of NOX permits rose to about $80,000 per ton. More
recently, in the early phase of the European Union trading
system prices have moved around fairly dramatically. Canada,
our neighbor to the north, has included a safety valve in its
recent proposals on climate change.
Now, differences among forecasters have plagued previous
policy proposals. Back in 1997, the Council of Economic
Advisers forecast prices below the equivalent of $8 per ton of
CO2, compared to EIA's estimate of $43 per ton of
CO2. With a safety valve, emissions estimates may
vary, but costs cannot rise above the established price.
Some in opposing the safety valve try to label it as a
disguised tax. In this regard I would make two points. First,
if the price cap is not reached then it is strictly a cap-and-
trade mechanism, just like the acid rain program. However, even
if the price cap is reached, only a very small portion of the
revenues flow to the government, in this case to fund the R&D.
The bulk of the revenues flow directly back to the private
sector. Since a tax is principally defined in terms of the
revenues it generates and since only a small portion of the
revenues ever end up in the hands of government, it clearly is
inaccurate in my judgment to describe it as a tax.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we have come a long way since
the early discussions on the Kyoto Protocol. We are no longer
talking about steep emissions reductions with concurrent risks
to the economy. Rather, the debate has now shifted to the
appropriate mechanism for motivating both the public and
private sectors to pursue technology innovation over the long
term and capturing the low-hanging fruit of cheap emissions
reductions in the short run, all the while protecting us from
unwarranted economic impacts.
That completes my initial remarks and I would be pleased to
answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Morgenstern follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard D. Morgenstern, Ph.D., Economist and
Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before this committee to
comment on the recently adopted Senate resolution calling for a ``. . .
national program of mandatory market-based limits and incentives on
greenhouse gases that (1) will not significantly harm the United States
economy; and (2) will encourage comparable action by other nations that
are major trading partners and key contributors to global emissions.''
To set the context, I will briefly discuss a number of policy
developments since the late 1990s when the Kyoto Protocol was being
negotiated. Then, I will turn to some design issues relevant to the
implementation of the new Senate Resolution, including the mechanisms
that will encourage the development and adoption of new technologies,
and the use of a safety valve or price cap as an integral part of a
cap-and-trade system. Finally, I will comment on possible means of
encouraging comparable mitigation actions by other large emitters.
I speak as an economist who has been involved with the issue of
climate change for almost two decades. Previously a tenured college
professor, I have also had the privilege of serving in senior policy
positions under prior Republican and Democratic administrations.
Currently, I am a senior fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF), a
53-year-old research institution, headquartered here in Washington,
D.C., that specializes in energy, environmental, and natural resource
issues. RFF is both independent and nonpartisan, and shares the results
of its economic and policy analyses with members of both parties, as
well as with environmental and business advocates, academics, members
of the press, and interested citizens. RFF encourages scholars to
express their individual opinions, which may differ from those of other
RFF scholars, officers, and directors. I emphasize that the views I
present today are mine alone.
Let me begin by observing what many recent press reports have
failed to note: recent policy proposals, such as those advanced by the
National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP), differ dramatically from
the Kyoto Protocol. While the details of Kyoto are well known to
members of this committee, the NCEP proposal is novel in a number of
respects, as it combines federal support for innovative technologies
with a program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that involves a cap
on costs. Overall, the NCEP program would have a minimal impact on the
U.S. economy and is revenue neutral with respect to the federal budget.
Whereas the Kyoto Protocol involves fairly steep short-term reductions
and, correspondingly, potentially high costs, the NCEP proposal calls
for relatively modest initial emissions reductions which are, in fact,
quite similar to the voluntary intensity reductions proposed by the
Bush administration. Because of the more modest start, combined with
the safety valve, the costs of the NCEP proposal are much lower.
To see this point more clearly, consider the results of three
separate analyses by the independent Energy Information Administration
(ETA) of the costs of alternative climate proposals conducted over the
past several years. Relying on its standard National Energy Modeling
System, ETA compared the effects of implementing the Kyoto Protocol,
The Climate Stewardship Act introduced by Senators McCain and Lieberman
(S. 139), and the NCEP proposal. Although the EIA studies were
conducted in different years, and involve slightly different baselines,
the results are quite illuminating (see the accompanying table).
EIA's ANALYSIS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, S. 139, AND ENERGY COMMISSION
PROPOSALS: 2020
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kyoto
NCEP S. 139 (+9%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GHG emissions (% domestic reduction)... 4.5 17.8 23.9
GHG emissions (tons CO2 reduced)....... 404 1346 1690
Allowance price ($2003 per ton CO2).... 8 35 43
Coal use (% change from forecast)...... -5.7 -37.4 -72.1
Coal use (% change from 2003).......... 14.5 -23.2 -68.9
Natural gas use (% change from 10.6 4.6 10.3
forecast).............................
Electricity price (% change from 3.4 19.4 44.6
forecast).............................
Potential GDP (% loss)................. 0.02 0.13 0.36
Real GDP (% loss)...................... 0.09 0.22 0.64
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SOURCES.
NCEP: GHG emissions and allowance price is from EIA analysis, Table 118
(May 2005). All other data is from Table 1, ``AEO 2005 Reference
Case'' and ``Greenhouse Gas Policy.'' (EIA, April 2005). This is
available at www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/bingaman/index.html.
McCain Lieberman (S. 139): From Analysis of Senate Amendment 2028, the
Climate Stewardship Act of 2003. Emissions data and allowance price is
from Table B20. GDP is from Table B21. All other data is from Table
B1. (ETA, May 2004). This is available at www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
servicerpt/ml/pdf/sroiaf (2003)02.pdf.
Kyoto Protocol: Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and
Economic Activity. Emissions data is from Table B19. Allowance price
and GDP is from Table ES-2. All other data is from Table B1. (EIA,
October 1998). This is available at www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/pdf/
sroiaf9803.pdf.
For the Kyoto Protocol, EIA forecast greenhouse gas reductions of
23.9 percent in 2020. Under Kyoto, allowance prices were predicted to
reach $43 per ton of carbon dioxide, while coal use was expected to
decline by 68.9 percent below 2003 levels. Real GDP was forecasted to
decline by 0.36 percent. In analyzing the NCEP proposal, EIA foresaw
smaller emissions reductions and, most importantly, quite different
economic impacts. Allowance prices were effectively capped at $7 per
ton of carbon dioxide; coal use was forecast to increase by 14.5
percent above 2003 levels by 2020, and real GDP losses were
considerably smaller (0.09 percent). EIA noted that this policy would
not ``materially'' affect average economic growth rates for the 2003 to
2025 period (p. xi). For McCain Lieberman, EIA forecast impacts that
would fall between Kyoto and NCEP, although they were considerably
closer to Kyoto in terms of both emissions reductions and costs.
The principal reason that NCEP's approach is so much less costly
than Kyoto or S. 139 is that it is not designed to avert climate change
over the next 20 years. Rather, the focus is on developing and
deploying technologies needed to address the problem in the decades
beyond. NCEP does this primarily in two ways: 1) by directly
subsidizing a wide range of new technologies including coal, nuclear,
fuel-efficient vehicles, biofuels and others; and 2) by encouraging
private-sector research and development through incentives for the
deployment of cost-effective carbon saving technologies of all types.
NCEP's cap-and-trade system has the added benefit of generating a
revenue stream to fund the technology subsidies.
It is widely recognized that major progress on climate change will
not be possible without new technologies. It is also widely recognized
that government has an important role to play in spurring the
development and diffusion of these technologies. Without some kind of
additional incentives, the private sector typically will under-invest
in research, development, and demonstration because innovators cannot
reap the full benefits to society of their advances. The existence of
these ``spillovers'' reduces private incentive to pursue innovation, as
others will mimic the innovation without compensating the inventors.
While patents and similar means are used to protect investments in
innovation, that protection is limited. A successful innovator
typically captures substantial rewards, but those gains are sometimes
only a fraction of the total benefits to society arising from the
innovation. This rationale underlies government support of research,
development, and demonstration programs, including the National Science
Foundation, public universities, and others.
Environmental and knowledge externalities have long been at the
center of debates about technology policy. More recently, we have come
to understand some additional market failures that may operate in the
adoption and diffusion of new technologies. For a variety of reasons,
the cost or value of a new technology to one user may depend on how
many other users have adopted the technology. Generally speaking, users
will be better off the more others use that same technology, as this
increases what is known as ``learning by doing'' and ``network''
externalities. Typically, it takes time for potential users to learn of
a new technology, try it, adapt it to their particular circumstances,
and become convinced of its superiority. Consequently, the early
adopter of a new technology creates a positive benefit for others by
generating information about the existence, characteristics, and likely
success of the new technology.
The argument for public support is even stronger in the case of
climate change technologies, where not only do inventors fail to
capture all the gains from their investments but the gains themselves
are not fully translated to the firms' bottom line because there is no
market value associated with emissions reductions. Further, the
prospect of future value--which is driven by policy outcomes--is
uncertain.
Absent government incentives, corporate concern for the environment
may overcome some hurdles. Working against this kind of ``corporate
altruism,'' however, is the need to compete in the marketplace. A
company that puts meaningful effort into reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, rather than reducing costs, may eventually lose out to one
that only seeks to reduce costs.
It is exactly this need to align public and private interests that
underlies the argument for an emissions trading program, or similar
mechanism, alongside technology development and demonstration programs.
While the government seeks technologies to cut carbon emissions, the
private sector seeks technologies to cut costs. Market-based policies
that put a value on emissions reductions encourage firms to conserve
energy, reduce emissions from existing technologies, and adopt new low-
carbon or no-carbon technologies. In contrast, policies that only focus
on technology adoption fail to take advantage of reductions that could
come from existing technologies and conservation.
Market-based policies to reduce emissions have two distinct
effects: they reduce emissions in the near term and they alter the
incentives that firms have for developing and adopting new technologies
for the future. Few would disagree that it is the private sector, not
the government, which has driven innovation and growth in modern
economies. Industry, according to data from the National Science
Foundation, funded 63 percent and performed 68 percent of all research
and development in 2003 (the latest year for which data is
available).\1\ Even as the government tries to encourage greenhouse
gas-reducing technologies, private efforts to improve greenhouse gas-
increasing technologies will likely continue unless firms see some kind
of value associated with emissions reductions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/infbrief/nsf04307/start.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technology programs alone may succeed in bringing down the cost of
integrated gasification and combined cycle (IGCC) coal plants so that
they eventually overtake conventional pulverized coal. That said, how
can technology programs ever make capture and sequestration cheap
enough so that firms will voluntarily capture and sequester emissions?
The real choice is whether capture and sequestration will eventually be
required under a command-and-control style regulation, or whether a
market-based system will be used to flexibly encourage adoption of the
cheapest option. There is growing evidence on the performance of these
alternative approaches, including a volume I recently co-edited which
compares the U.S. and European records of both command-and-control and
market-based mechanisms.\2\ Overall, the analysis finds that market-
based programs are considerably cheaper than command-and-control
alternatives. For example, the U.S. sulfur dioxide program achieved
savings of over 40 percent compared to the command-and-control
alternatives. Additionally, market-based programs have the advantage of
encouraging innovation in a direction that minimizes costs and reduces
emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Harrington, Winston, Richard Morgenstern and Thomas Sterner.
2004. Choosing Environmental Policy: Comparing Instruments and Outcomes
in the United States and Europe Washington D.C.: RFF Press
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another point sometimes overlooked is the opportunity for
relatively inexpensive emissions reductions right now. Emissions
reductions using more conventional technologies may not provide a
complete solution to the climate problem, but by delaying the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, they provide
additional time to develop long-term solutions. Even if a major
technology breakthrough is needed to reach climate stabilization goals,
there are many small-and medium-sized innovations--the type typically
associated with learning by doing--that can yield significant benefits.
Sending a signal about the value of emissions reductions provides the
right information to the private sector about the importance of
undertaking those activities.
Consistent with this logic, the NCEP proposal tries to link the
technology development and the mitigation sides of the problem into a
coherent policy framework. By coupling technology incentives with an
emissions trading program they provide significant incentives--along
with the necessary funding--to develop new technologies that are
essential to the long-term success of any effort to reduce greenhouse
gases.
As a final point on the link between research and development, and
mitigation, I will mention one particular line of thought in
circulation these days that is somewhat at odds with the ideas laid out
here. Because climate change is such a long-term problem, the thinking
goes, it is not appropriate to encourage emissions reductions now--the
policy focus should, instead, be entirely oriented to technology
development. Although there are many complex issues here, the single
point I would make is that even this view supports near-term emissions
reductions as long as the cost is no higher than the expected value of
future mitigation benefits. While one can debate the true magnitude of
these benefits, the economics literature on this issue would certainly
support the $7 per ton of carbon dioxide proposed by NCEP.
I now turn my focus to a discussion of the use of a safety valve or
price cap to avoid unpleasant cost surprises. In the context of a
mandatory cap-and-trade system, a safety valve would specify a maximum
market price at which the government stands ready to sell additional
emissions allowances in order to prevent excessive prices.
At the outset, one must ask a basic question: given the success of
cap-and-trade programs without a safety valve, such as the one for
sulfur dioxide, what is the basis for including a safety valve to
control carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases? The answer is simple
and straightforward: carbon controls are potentially more costly to the
economy than these other programs and, most importantly, there is
greater uncertainty about the true costs. Unforeseen events such as a
warm summer or cold winter, a spurt in economic growth, or a
technological failure of some sort, may drive up control costs
dramatically. One needs only point to the unforeseen events in
California's RECLAIM program that propelled the prices of permits for
nitrogen oxides above $80,000 per ton, or the similar, albeit less
costly, problems that arose in comparable programs on the East Coast.
Because of these concerns a number of nations are considering safety
valves. For example, Canada recently announced it would incorporate
such a mechanism in its domestic program.
As Harvard economist Martin Weitzman pointed out three decades ago,
when higher control costs are of concern but the potential
environmental damages are not particularly sensitive to short-term
emissions fluctuations, it is unnecessary to impose strict quantity-
based controls. Although the experience with sulfur dioxide trading
suggests that the actual costs may be lower than expected, recent
Congressional debates indicate a clear concern that mandatory carbon
mitigation policies may become quite costly--even those involving
modest targets. Part of the cost uncertainty arises from uncertainty
about the level of future baseline emissions that would occur even in
the absence of new policies. There are also uncertainties about the
cost of reducing emissions below baseline, and about the overall
efficiency of the emissions trading system.
One way to address this issue is by using a safety valve that fixes
binding emissions targets as long as costs remain reasonable and allows
the target to rise if costs are unexpectedly high. In practical terms,
the safety valve would involve an initial allocation of permits
followed by the subsequent sale of additional permits that would become
available at a fixed trigger price. Several of my RFF colleagues and I
first proposed applying this mechanism to the control of carbon dioxide
back in 1997.\3\ Recently, NCEP has embraced the idea as part of a
broader package that involves incentives for technology development, as
described previously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Kopp, Raymond J., Richard D. Morgenstern, and William Pizer
1997.''Something for Everyone: A Climate Policy that Both
Environmentalists and Industry Can Live With,'' Weathervane, September
29, available at www.weathervane.rff.org/features/feature015.html.
Kopp, Raymond J., Richard D. Morgenstern, and William Pizer. 2000.
``Limiting Cost, Assuring Effort, and Encouraging Ratification:
Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol,'' Weathervane, June 26, available
at www.weathervane.rff.org/features/parisconf0721/KMP-RFF-CIRED.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In daily life, most individuals like to avoid unpleasant surprises
(hence the popularity of insurance). It is possible to use certain
policy options to avoid unpleasant surprises in the broader economy as
well. Just as the Federal Reserve protects against wide swings in bond
and currency prices, the incorporation of a safety valve in a
greenhouse gas mitigation policy would prevent sharp increases in
energy prices. The ideal climate policy is one that sets an upper limit
on mitigation expenditures. Most consumers are interested in reducing
their out-of-pocket expenditures for energy as well as other goods and
services, and most businesses are interested in maintaining a stable
environment for purposes of planning and investment. The risk of
unexpectedly high compliance costs under a strict permit system would
threaten that stability.
The safety valve approach guarantees that emissions will not exceed
the target as long as the price of the tradable permits does not rise
above the trigger price. It differs in a few important respects from a
well-known provision in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that
establishes a $2,000 per ton penalty (1990$) for violations of the
stipulated sulfur dioxide emissions standards. Since the Clean Air Act
penalty is far above the expected marginal control cost, it has a very
low probability of being invoked. The notion of a safety valve reflects
the society's willingness to pay for carbon mitigation. It is not
intended strictly as a punitive measure. For those who believe that the
costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions are relatively low, permit
prices would never reach the trigger level and emissions would remain
capped.
One thing that has plagued policy proposals in the past is that
different analysts using different models can produce quite disparate
results. For example, in analyzing the Kyoto Protocol, President
Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers forecasted allowance prices
below $7 per ton of carbon dioxide as compared to EIA's $43 estimate.
Interestingly, with the safety valve the emissions estimates may vary
among models but the costs cannot rise above the price cap. Observe
that the EIA estimates of the NCEP proposal, which contains a safety
valve, are extremely close to those of the respected consulting firm,
Charles River Associates, which conducted that macro-economic analysis
for NCEP. Similarly, recent EIA sensitivity analyses of the NCEP
proposal reveal that compliance costs are virtually invariant with
respect to a wide range of assumptions about natural gas supplies, the
availability of non-carbon offsets, and other factors.
A final point about safety valves concerns the claim by some that
such a mechanism is unnecessary as long as banking and offsets are
allowed. Citing the successful sulfur dioxide trading system,
unexpected events of the type that doomed the RECLAIM program in
California are dismissed as the product of a flawed design--namely, the
absence of provision for emissions banking and offsets--rather than as
an inherent problem of applying a fixed quantity trading system to
control emissions. The alternative view, espoused by at least two
former chairmen of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, is
that banking or offset systems cannot reasonably adapt to unexpected
events such as higher energy demand or inadequate technology as
effectively as a safety valve. According to this view, offsets can
reduce the expected cost of a particular goal, but they cannot address
concerns about unexpected events. In fact, if the system becomes
dependent on such offsets, their inclusion can actually increase
uncertainty about program costs if the availability and cost of the
offsets themselves is not certain. In regard to the banking or
borrowing of emissions, the two Council chairmen note that ``. . .
[The] . . . features that . . . provide additional allowances when
shortages arise...are helpful, but only to the extent they can
ameliorate sizeable, immediate and persistent adverse events.'' \4\
That is, offsets or banking systems may reduce the problem, but they
may not be sufficient to address all the uncertainties arising from
unexpected spurts in economic growth, weather variations, or other
events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Hubbard, R. Glenn and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 2003. ``Letter to
Honorable John McCain and Honorable Joseph Lieberman,'' June 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, I will briefly comment on the challenges of bringing
developing countries into an emissions limiting agreement. While this
is clearly a critical need for long-term success of any effort to
address climate change, so far, no proposal has made much headway in
this area. Developing nations are certainly not lining up behind the
idea of binding emissions limits as laid out in the Kyoto Protocol. The
president's proposed use of intensity targets, which takes into account
economic growth when measuring environmental performance, is more
attractive to some developing nations than fixed emissions levels.
However, there is no serious indication that developing nations are
prepared to adopt this approach either. Senators McCain and Lieberman's
Climate Stewardship Act incorporates some limited incentives for
developing nations by allowing up to 15 percent of the total emissions
to come from offsets, including offsets from abroad. Recent proposals
by Senator Bingaman incorporate a similar mechanism, albeit at a lower
(three percent) level. How well such international offsets would
compete against domestic agricultural and forestry projects, or against
domestic non-carbon dioxide sources is an open question. Nonetheless,
this approach clearly has some appeal.
The recent Senate resolution on climate change represents an
important step forward in redefining the initial terms of developing
country participation in greenhouse gas mitigation by opening the door
to potential linkages between climate change and other issues of
international concern. The original Byrd-Hagel language requiring ``new
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions'' by developing countries has been replaced by the
stipulation that U.S. policies ``encourage comparable action by other
nations that are major trading partners and key contributors to global
emissions.'' This new language lowers the bar somewhat for developing
countries and creates a more realistic expectation for participation by
these countries. At the same time, it properly focuses attention on
major trading partners with large emissions.
Consistent with this new Senate language, a proposal advanced by
Senator Bingaman calls for periodic Congressional review of the new
U.S. mandatory program. Under this mechanism Congress would make a
determination every five years to accelerate, decelerate, or leave
unchanged the key program parameters including the emissions target and
the safety valve price. In making this determination, Congress would
review a wide range of factors, including recent technological
advances. Of particular interest would be the mitigation actions of
other nations, both developed and developing, to reduce emissions.
Further, if the United States or other developed nations had
established a program to support clean energy projects in a poor
nation, that too would become part of the review. If one believes, as I
do, that the key to international cooperation on climate change is
linkage on a broad range of issues, including global trade, development
aid, and technology transfer, then such a procedure would potentially
provide Congress an opportunity to influence the actions of both
developing and developed nations as climate policies evolve over the
next few years, all the while avoiding, in EIN's words, ``material''
impacts on the U.S. economy.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we have come a long way since the early
discussions on the Kyoto Protocol. We are no longer talking about steep
near-term emissions reductions with the concurrent dangers for the U.S.
economy. Rather, the debate has now shifted to motivating both the
public and private sectors to pursue technology innovation over the
long term and capturing the low-hanging fruit of cheap emissions
reductions in the near term, all the while protecting the economy from
unwarranted burdens. Such an approach has great potential to encourage
the development and adoption of new technologies that can put the
United States and other nations on a long-term path to address the
climate change issue.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee and
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I think I am going to do what I have usually done and hold
mine for another time. Senator Bingaman, you can start and I
will ask my questions later.
Senator Bingaman. Well, thank you very much. Thank you, all
of you, for your testimony.
Let me just try to take the framework that Dr. Morgenstern
has laid out and ask Mr. Grumet if he thinks it is an accurate
description of what is involved here. First, he talks about the
contrast between a command and control approach to dealing with
greenhouse gas emissions versus a market-based approach, and
characterizes this national commission proposal as a market-
based approach which tries to send a modest signal to the
market that will cause the development and promotion of new
technologies. He says that is the primary objective, as I
understand what he just testified to, that is the primary
objective the commission is trying to achieve with its
recommendations.
Do you agree that is the primary objective?
Mr. Grumet. I think Dr. Morgenstern's characterization is
fundamentally accurate and fair. The ultimate goal, as I think
all the panelists here agree, is to advance technology. The
only solution to climate change requires the significant
advancement of technology. The debate, of course, is how best
to do that. While our Commission had contentious discussions, I
would say equal to those that I have heard take place in the
Senate, one thing that we all agreed about very strongly and
very early was that if we were going to move forward to address
greenhouse gas emissions, as we believed was appropriate, the
marketplace had to be the ultimate arbiter of which
technologies moved forward, how quickly, and in what amount;
that no matter how well intended or educated we all were, no 20
or 40 or 100 people could make the same kinds of decisions
about how best to spend other people's money than 200 million
people could make about how to spend their own.
So fundamentally, yes, we believe it is about sending a
market signal, but also being realistic and not setting a
signal so high that would make it politically irresponsible and
create unacceptable dislocations.
Senator Bingaman. Well, let me just ask. The way you have
chosen, the Commission has chosen, to try to send this market
signal is by designing a cap-and-trade system and putting a
safety valve in it and saying, in order to be in compliance it
cannot cost you more than $7 per ton of carbon that you put
into the atmosphere.
Just to be the devil's advocate here, are there not other
ways that the Government could incentivize the private sector
to promote and develop these new technologies through cost-
sharing, R&D, or various other things that would also get us to
the same place or perhaps get us there in a more direct way?
Mr. Grumet. Senator Bingaman, I think there are certainly a
variety of mechanisms, some of which you have heard described
here today. Incentives sound lovely. We all like incentives.
But fundamentally, somebody has to pay for those incentives,
and in less attractive garb a massive Government program of
incentives of the size which would be necessary to develop and
deploy these technologies would require many tens of billions
of dollars of taxpayer money, and we believe that the
government is simply less efficient at choosing those solutions
than the marketplace.
So it is possible. I am certainly interested in Dr. Smith's
view of how much money it would take to advance the kinds of
technologies at the pace that she believes is appropriate. We
simply thought that it was not prudent, that it ultimately
would be too costly, too inefficient, or some combination of
both. So the marketplace had to be the dominant mechanism, but
that mechanism could be augmented necessarily by raising some
revenue to advance technology.
Senator Bingaman. So as I understand it, your Commission
basically came down with the idea that the Government should do
more to fund R&D of this type, but in addition to that or in
parallel, we should enact some type of cap-and-trade system to
incentivize or encourage or prod the private sector into doing
much more in technology development than they otherwise would?
Mr. Grumet. Senator, that is absolutely right. I think we
all concluded quickly that the private sector, not the
Government, was best capable of making these decisions, but
that the Government needed to play a role, that placing the
entire burden on shareholders was inappropriate and failed to
meet the fairness test that Chairman Domenici addressed at the
outset, that sharing that burden, dramatically finding ways to
engage both the collective spirit and ingenuity of the private
and public sectors, would have a synergistic benefit that we
think is the ultimately coherent policy approach.
Senator Bingaman. Well, let me ask. One of the things that
we sort of got hung up on when we were talking about this in
the context of the energy bill, and very legitimately,
questions were raised about how would--if you had a cap-and-
trade system like the one you have described here, how would
you allocate the credits or emissions credits, whatever, in a
way that would be fair to everyone involved, would not
advantage some sector of the economy over another?
Where are you and where is the Commission in its
deliberations on that? Do you think that can be done? Is it
still to be done in the future? Are you in the process of doing
it?
Mr. Grumet. Senator Bingaman, I think as you and Senator
Domenici both expressed during the closing hours of this
discussion on the energy bill, there are clearly winners and
losers. There are winners and losers if there is a carbon price
of zero, there are winners and losers if there is a carbon
price of $7, $10, or $100.
One way that you can address those fairness issues is
through the allocation of permits. It is important to stress
that who you distribute the permits to in no meaningful way
affects the overall economic costs of the program. Dr.
Gruenspecht and CRA were able to analyze the total costs of our
program with no knowledge of how the allocation would
ultimately be meted out.
But to make the approach ultimately equitable and
politically feasible, these are critically important decisions.
I have to go off book here because our Commission did not try
to specify a particular allocation formula, based on the view
that that was ultimately such a political decision that we
would really not be serving ourselves or the Senate very well
by trying. We have started to host a series of very well
attended workshops to try to bring together the various sectors
of the economy and the interests to imagine different
approaches. I think that it is surely possible to establish an
equitable approach to allocation, just as was done in the acid
rain program, and commend you for committing to consider these
issues further. I think that will become ultimately the
fundamental challenge, probably the last challenge in moving
forward with legislation.
Senator Bingaman. Mr. Chairman, I notice the lights have
not been on during my questioning. I do not mind continuing to
ask questions, but I think I have been doing this for 5 minutes
or more, so I will stop so others can go ahead.
The Chairman. I think you have, but we were going to let
you go on for a little while longer.
I think that we will go on our side now. Senator Martinez
was next, but he did not want to proceed.
Senator Thomas, you are next.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A very complicated issue and I appreciate all the detail
that you have said. Would it be possible for you in two or
three sentences to sum up your recommendation, where should we
go from here, not go into all the details, but say what
basically are you recommending for us to do? Would you each do
that?
Dr. Gruenspecht. I am from the Energy Information
Administration, so I am not recommending any actions.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thomas. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate
that.
Doctor?
Dr. Smith. What I would like to say is that we need to
first and foremost figure out how we are going to get to where
we want to be, what sort of program is needed, how will we
accomplish it, what will its targets be in terms of costs for
reducing emissions----
Senator Thomas. But that is, you are just asking questions.
I want to know your answer. What would you do?
Dr. Smith. I would design an effective R&D program that the
Government could fund and get it started, and using that
mission of the R&D devise some understanding of what sort of
economy-wide emissions price should be placed on the economy
today.
Senator Thomas. I see. Given things like AML funds and so
on, do you think the Government is prepared to handle that
money properly?
Dr. Smith. Sorry? What kind of funds? I did not hear.
Senator Thomas. Well, just some of the funds that have not
gone where they were intended to go when the Government is in
charge.
Dr. Smith. It is clear that funding of R&D needs to be a
partnership of the private sector and the Government. The
Government needs to sort out what amount of funding needs to
flow and then find the means to support that funding.
Senator Thomas. Thank you.
Mr. Grumet, you have talked in detail, but sum up where we
are going.
Mr. Grumet. In a couple of sentences, our Commission
believes that we need to act as soon as possible to establish a
modest long-term market signal that inspires the ingenuity of
the private sector, support those exercises with continued
government funding for longer term R&D, and link that program
to efforts in developing countries so that we make sure that we
ultimately have an effective and equitable global solution.
Senator Thomas. Thank you.
Dr. Morgenstern. I would endorse a balanced approach
involving a cap-and-trade with an R&D system which stimulates
both private and public sector, quite similar to the NCEP, and
that is my one sentence. My second sentence would be that there
is really not that much difference between what Dr. Smith is
proposing and what the NCEP is proposing, in the following way.
Dr. Smith in testimony recognizes that there is an economic
logic to have a cap-and-trade approach. In Dr. Montgomery's
testimony, which was not given today but was scheduled
previously, he actually went so far as to name a number. His
number was $4 a ton of CO2. So we are really talking
about a difference, in a sense, between $4 and $7. I would note
simply for the record that there is a substantial literature
that would support a $7 basis and there is really not a large
difference in truth between the two.
Senator Thomas. I notice you shaking your head.
Dr. Smith. Dr. Montgomery did not suggest $4 per ton. It
was a footnote that was an example of how you could back out
what an appropriate spending would be once you know where you
are headed with the R&D, and it was predicated on an example
where the R&D would produce massive zero-emitting emissions
reductions by 2050, I think, at a cost of $25 a ton.
So it was not a recommendation. It was an example. I
believe I kept it in my testimony.
The other point is I am not recommending a cap-and-trade
program. I am recommending an economy-wide price signal that
would be predicated on the ultimate goal and mission of an R&D
program once that is designed. So I am not debating the needs
for some carbon price signal in the near term, but I am
debating the way that it ought to be introduced and set up as a
policy in the economy.
Senator Thomas. Thank you.
Two comments as I close. One is that this trade thing seems
to me, having been involved in world trade a little bit, what
you are doing is giving away something that people that are not
generating anything, that is not going to make any change
particularly in the world.
The second is I see some of these numbers here in the
reducing of coal, which is our largest fossil fuel resource. So
when you look at energy issues on one side and these issues on
the other, you have to have some balance in the kinds of fuels
that we have available to keep people's lights on. So it is
easy to talk about reducing all those uses, and at the same
time what are you going to substitute it for?
So thank you all for being here.
The Chairman. Senator Salazar, I think I am going to go to
Senator Murkowski, because she was here before you, if you do
not mind.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All of you have keyed in on the focus on technology,
research and development. In the energy bill that was just
passed, and signed by the President, we had a component or a
section in there that related to the technology to provide for
incentives that was, I guess if we had to characterize, our
portion of the energy bill that related to climate change.
There were those of us that looked at the legislation that
Senator Hagel had put together in working with many of us and
said, this is a step in the right direction.
Your comment on that? Is that sufficient? Do we need more?
Dr. Smith, I think you said specifically that you think that
policymakers have paid minimal attention to the R&D, the
technology end of it. Are we going in the right direction with
what we have passed?
Dr. Smith. Are you speaking of title XVI?
Senator Murkowski. I do not know what the title is.
Dr. Smith. The part that passed----
Senator Murkowski. Yes, yes.
Dr. Smith. That is a start in the direction of defining a
technology strategy, but it does not create the vision and
mission of an R&D policies end point. Until we know where we
are going, it is very difficult to organize an effective R&D
program, let alone to determine how much should be spent on it.
So I think it had the right orientation of focusing on the
R&D, but it did not provide and has not yet produced the vision
of what needs to be accomplished in the R&D and then how to
motivate our resources to get there.
I would say also, in the proposed amendment that reflects
the NCEP proposals the subsidies do not reflect an R&D program.
That is not what I mean by a revolutionary change in technology
for providing energy over the next century.
Senator Murkowski. Any other comments on that?
Mr. Grumet. Senator, if I may. I think the energy bill is
absolutely directionally correct. I agree with Dr. Smith on the
need to do more. I also share the concerns of many that we are
going to have a hard time finding all the money to support all
the good things that the energy bill sets forth. So that is why
this combination of market signal and an R&D program made sense
to us.
To Dr. Smith's comments differentiating between
breakthroughs and advances, I guess I am not clear about the
technology. What I am clear about is no democratic process can
determine a 100-year future to enable us then to move 100 years
back and ask the right questions. Climate change is a century-
scale problem. We are going to have to take a first step and
then iterate from there. I believe that the energy bill and our
Commission's support for advanced nuclear designs, for carbon
capture and sequestration, for gasification, for dramatic
increases in biofuels, to encourage the domestic production of
more efficient transportation systems, and down the line are
those gap technologies.
I would encourage the committee to look to the work of Dr.
Sakalow from Princeton, who has identified 15 what he calls
wedge technologies, the technologies I just mentioned and also
efficiency technologies, natural sinks like agriculture and
forestry. I think he makes a compelling case that if you look
at those 15 technological categories, while ultimately the
marketplace must choose among them, it provides a menu that I
actually find quite encouraging.
Over the next 50 years, I think one can see optimism that
both domestically and globally by moving forward with these
technologies we can actually get to the goals that I think Dr.
Smith and I share.
Senator Murkowski. Dr. Gruenspecht.
Dr. Gruenspecht. Thank you. I would say that we in our
analysis did a sensitivity run looking at different energy
technologies--what difference would a different set of
technologies make. It does make a considerable difference to
the results, both with and without additional policies. So
there is no question that technology matters.
We do sometimes have trouble relating changes in
legislative provisions to changes in technology. A lot depends
on what happens with a program. I think one of your colleagues
mentioned earlier that some programs get run well, some
programs do not. There are also issues of what is the amount of
actual appropriations--is it just money moved from one category
to another category--so you close an old program and start a
new program. All those questions come up.
So it is very hard for us to look at the effects of a
particular program, particular legislative language, and say
what difference that makes to technology. But there's no
question that technology makes a difference.
I would also note that the Department of Energy has a
climate change technology program. I think it is also
referenced in the energy bill. They do have a vision and
framework for strategy and planning that is on the web site,
and it is my understanding that they will put out a strategic
plan, a long-term strategic plan for public comment, some time
in the near future, that I think does address some of the--or
may address some of the issues that Dr. Smith raised.
So I think there is an effort to provide a road map, if you
will, that the Department will be coming forth with in the
fairly near future. That might be of interest to you.
Thank you very much.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Salazar, I am going to ask a few
questions since I did not ask any. Then you are next. Is that
acceptable to you?
Senator Salazar. Yes.
The Chairman. Let me talk a minute about the Kyoto since we
get that thrown at us quite often. First, I would like to
reiterate an observation that seems to evade most people that
criticize America, that the decision about Kyoto was not made
solely by a President. The U.S. Senate voted and told the
President of the United States, do not send that treaty up
here, because we would not approve it, and that vote was 98 to
zero. So everybody should know that for every time Europeans
decide to chastise President Bush about it they should add, and
the U.S. Senate decided it would not work.
Now, having said that, what would a reduction of emissions
to 1990 levels do to the U.S. economy, either of the economists
here, or you? It is my understanding that only two members of
the European Union are likely to meet Kyoto commitments. If
mandatory controls are deemed to be the answer to the climate
change problem, why are such controls not working in Europe?
Dr. Gruenspecht. We at the Energy Information
Administration back in the late 1990's did some analysis of the
Kyoto Protocol and those analyses suggested, I think, pretty
significant economic impacts. I should also point out, though,
that various EIA analyses are not directly comparable for
several reasons.
One, the reference case used as a baseline for the analysis
has changed a lot since that earlier work was done. Second, our
Kyoto analysis did not look at non-CO2 greenhouse
gases, which we know from the analysis we did for the NCEP
proposal requested by Senator Bingaman, make a difference.
Third, there is frankly uncertainty in interpreting what the
Kyoto Protocol itself means.
Let me give you an example. There is a period from 2008 to
2012 where there is an emissions limitation under that
agreement, but the question is what do you assume beyond 2012?
Do you assume it stays at the same level? Do you make an
assumption about what the negotiators in that framework will
agree to beyond 2012? So there are lots of open questions.
But I take your point that certainly a large emission
reduction in a short period does tend to produce much larger
economic impacts.
The Chairman. Anybody else want to? I do not want to spend
all my time on Kyoto. It just irks me that it is constantly
referred to by Europeans, even with reference to the
hurricanes. It is just amazing that they are talking about,
since America did not sign the Kyoto agreement, we are reaping
what we are entitled to in hurricanes. I do not know how
anybody can even say such a thing.
Yes, Mr. Economist.
Dr. Morgenstern. Well, the only thing I would add to Dr.
Gruenspecht's point is that the reductions required for the
Europeans are in fact lower than they were for the United
States, so that it is not even fair to make that comparison
about what the impact is on them as opposed to what it is on
us.
The Chairman. A very good point.
The other point, I do not want anybody, including you, Mr.
Grumet, anybody working on this approach, to think that we
ought to look at acid rain. We should, but that is an easy
comparison. You understand that the area of involvement is very
minor in terms of the numbers of participants in the
SOX problem. There are just two major ones, whereas
when you are trying to put together all the players in this
area there are many, many scores of them. So it might be a
similar idea, but it certainly is not a similar problem. Is
that a fair statement?
Mr. Grumet. Mr. Chairman, I think that is exactly right. I
think that the Energy Commission's approach tries to directly
recognize that. I think there was no argument, really
significant argument, that you needed a safety valve on the
SO2 proposal. It was manageable. The technologies
here are greater, I think much greater, and I think the
response needs to be different.
The Chairman. I have got three quick questions. The next
question has to do with an appropriate incentive to move the
technology. I am listening attentively to the difference in
opinions here on how we move the technology. Dr. Smith, I
understand yours, and I understand yours on behalf of your
Commission. But let me ask, in the energy bill we recognized
that it probably would be difficult for the U.S. Government to
appropriate money for the experimental technology, say three or
four major new projects in the gasification, sequestration
area. So we provided an incentive provision that says two ways
to do this. One is appropriate and the other is by a new type
of loan that the Federal Government could make on a 75-25 basis
at reduced interest rates, with insurance being paid by the
applicant so that it is cost-neutral.
Is that an incentive in anyone's opinion for anybody to use
that, or is that not sufficient?
Dr. Smith.
Dr. Smith. That is an incentive to implement a technology
that can be implemented today, that exists at a near-reasonable
but still too high a cost to be justified in the marketplace.
When I speak of R&D, I mean what may involve basic research,
basic scientific research, to make breakthroughs that would
allow technology to come in at maybe half the cost of what can
be done with the current technologies today at some price that
is in the realm of too costly for the marketplace, but may be
subsidizable.
The Chairman. Anybody else have a comment on that?
Mr. Grumet. Mr. Chairman, I think the tax credits are very
thoughtful and appropriate mechanisms. I think those will
encourage IGCC. I just have maybe lower expectations than Dr.
Smith. I think deploying a fleet of carbon-sequestered IGCC
facilities in the next 20 years is an incredible accomplishment
that we should strive toward.
The Chairman. Well, that is why we put it in there. We
thought that. She may be right, though, and we have to have
another thing going on basic. And we do not put enough money in
basic research, so I do not know where we would ever get enough
here, unless it came from the carbon that you are speaking of,
the carbon, the assessment of a carbon tax, which seems to be
anathema.
Dr. Smith, you indicated--you had an observation: For the
near-term emissions reductions, the most cost-effective
emission reduction available today are in the developing
countries. I think you said that. Placing a high priority on
near-term control policies to bring about changes in how energy
is used in developing countries is most important, as you
indicated.
Would you elaborate for us on how we might help get that
done, or is that up to somebody else and it will happen or not
without us?
Dr. Smith. One of the greatest barriers that we have
identified--and my colleague David Montgomery has been working
on this one at some length in the last few years. One of the
greatest barriers to getting the technology into other
countries is simply the basic rule of law, property rights, and
inviolability of contracts and enforceability, general freedom
of markets, and even pricing energy at its cost.
If these things could be changed, then better investments
can be made with today's technology. Even with the efficiency
standards that we have today, those could be better deployed
into these developing countries and achieve much greater
reductions in emissions globally, which is all that we really
care about, than we can achieve in our own country at that
cost.
The Chairman. So those countries would have to do that,
make those stabilizing decisions?
Dr. Smith. It is a challenge. Again, the Hagel-Pryor
amendment that passed into law with the Energy Policy Act has
some provisions to move in that direction. It is a very good
first step. It identifies the right challenges, I think. But it
is still going to be a challenge to implement.
The Chairman. My last question goes to you, Mr. Grumet. You
are busy having task force, or whatever you call them--what do
you call them?
Mr. Grumet. Workshops.
The Chairman. Workshops, trying to address the issues that
Senator Bingaman and I introduced on the floor, that you had a
great idea and we introduced a great bill, but how do you
implement it? Are those workshops aimed at trying to fill in
some gaps as to what might be a fair way to implement?
Mr. Grumet. That is certainly the aspiration, Chairman
Domenici. I should say, though, that I think we are realistic
in the expectations we have for 3 or 4 half-day sessions. We
found that there was a dramatic degree of misunderstanding
about the different options and I think our hope was actually
to bring people together so that we could then fight more
effectively before you in the future.
We are not optimistic or even seeking to bring together a
consensus, but I think that we can elevate the understanding so
that we can have a more effective real debate.
The Chairman. It seems to me those stakeholders who are
participating may be the ones who come up with the answers.
Mr. Grumet. That would certainly be our hope.
The Chairman. Senator Salazar.
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much, Chairman Domenici and
Senator Bingaman, for holding these hearings on this very, very
important issue.
I have two quick questions. The first relates to
agriculture and how the agricultural community might actually
benefit from a cap-and-trade system and the second question has
to do with the EU and their cap-and-trade program and how that
is working. I am going to ask the questions and let you comment
on both of them.
First of all, with respect to my question on agriculture,
it seems to me that farmers in Idaho who are growing potatoes
by the thousands and thousands of acres or farmers in my State
that are growing alfalfa could see significant positive impacts
from being involved in a cap-and-trade system, because they
obviously are consuming large amounts of carbon dioxide in the
growth of their plants.
I am one of the defenders of our energy bill because I
think it did for the first time in our country push forward
renewable energy as a major component of our future energy
policy, and I think that is creating opportunities and will
create opportunities for rural America and for agriculture. But
I also see the issue of how we deal with climate change as
creating an opportunity for farmers who are consuming so much
carbon dioxide in their plants.
I would like you to comment, Mr. Grumet or Dr. Smith, Dr.
Morgenstern, whoever of you wants to comment on that issue of
agricultural opportunities as we deal with the issue of climate
change. Then, second, if you would also comment on how the
European Union cap-and-trade system is in fact working, since
it is up and running.
Mr. Grumet. Maybe I will start with agriculture and then
turn it over to somebody else to talk about the EU. Senator
Salazar, I think your instinct is exactly right that, given a
rational incentive, there is money to be made in agriculture
for lower carbon activities. I think it is also particularly
important to think about this as we see that the commodity
price supports and the Doha Trade Round and others are now
being called into question. We are sensing a growing interest
in the agriculture community, thinking about how in fact
carbon-smart activities could also be a profit center.
I just point to two examples. Obviously, if there is a
value to reducing a ton of emissions that would provide a
significant incentive to sequester carbon through more
intelligent agricultural practices. In addition, farms have a
tremendous opportunity to provide energy and do so in a low-
carbon, low-cost way. I think we were very pleased to
participate in a workshop that Senator Craig held talking about
how to bring cellulosic biomass from wheat straw into the
marketplace. What we find, of course, is that that product,
while desirable, is more costly than gasoline. It is also far
lower in carbon emissions. If there was a value in the
marketplace to lower carbon emissions, it would provide an
additional incentive to those thoughtful types of breakthrough
technologies that I think we all want to see advance.
Senator Salazar. Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to be
in Europe last week to participate in a discussion of the EU
system. I am not an expert on it, but I can report a little bit
about some of the results. It is operating, as you know, in two
phases. There is a warmup phase for the first several years and
then beginning in 2008 is when the larger version goes into
place.
At this point they have over 11,000 sources actually
participating in the program. All 25 countries have actually
set up programs and have approved plans. There have been a fair
number of trades. There has also been a fair amount of price
volatility. The range of prices has ranged from somewhere
around eight euros per ton of CO2 up to almost 30
euros per ton of CO2. Currently it is around 22 or
24 euros.
It is interesting to try to draw some lessons from their
experience for our experience. Of course, everything is still
in the early phases and it will undoubtedly evolve. But I think
there is a couple of points that one can make. First of all,
the price volatility that they have experienced, which in many
ways is tied to changes in weather patterns and fuel market
changes, would probably not be experienced under the NCEP
proposal, simply because the safety valve would undoubtedly
have dampened that. So that is one difference.
Second, there have been some complaints in Europe raised
about potential windfall profits in their system, and in part
that may be tied to the allocation system. Undoubtedly,
Congress would do a fairly detailed--would make fairly detailed
decisions about allocation that I would expect would obviate
that problem.
Senator Salazar. Dr. Morgenstern, what has caused the
volatility in terms of price from $8 to $30?
Dr. Morgenstern. Well, the experts in Europe believe that
it has to do with weather, different expectations about
weather, and frankly fuel volatility. International oil market
prices and other fuel changed have been the largest driving
forces. That is what they have explained to me and I am just
reporting that to you.
But the safety valve, as I say, had it been in place would
have dampened that and would have prevented that from
occurring.
Senator Salazar. In the European cap-and-trade market, what
has been the experience of agriculture with respect to that
market? Are there programs under way that agriculture is
benefiting from because of the cap-and-trade system there?
Dr. Morgenstern. Well, that is a very interesting point.
The design of the system as I understand it does not include
agriculture at this point, and in fact the design of the system
only covers one-half of the total emissions in the economy. So
we could actually--so a sector like agriculture is not able to
participate in the I system. In the NCEP proposal it would be
able to participate.
It is interesting in terms of the EU compliance. Because
they have only about less than half really of their economy,
the emissions, covered by this trading system, it is very
likely that the other half will in fact not make the targets,
and we may have a system where the trading system seems to be
highly successful, but the overall outcome in terms of the EU
meeting its targets may not come to pass. Obviously we do not
know. They may be able to buy tons from Russia or something. I
do not know how that will play out.
But sectors like agriculture or sectors like
transportation, which are not able to participate by design in
their system, are reportedly having the most difficult time
meeting their targets.
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much.
Senator Craig [presiding]. Thank you.
We have a vote under way, I think, now. Is that correct?
Two votes stacked. The chairman has gone to vote and I think
plans to return, so we will move on for a time.
Senator Talent.
Senator Talent. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Grumet, if we adopted NCEP how much would it reduce
global warming? How many degrees reduction would we get?
Mr. Grumet. Senator Talent, I am guessing you know my
answer is that the NCEP proposal in the first 10 years would
have no meaningfully ecologically visible impact on the globe's
warming, nor would Kyoto, nor would McCain-Lieberman or
anything else.
Senator Talent. Maybe after the 10 years, what will we get?
Mr. Grumet. All of these are century-scale efforts. I think
that there is a recognition in the scientific community that if
we allow greenhouse gas concentrations to double or triple we
may find very unfortunate effects that would result from a
three to five degree increase in temperature. The goal is to
mitigate that.
Senator Talent. After 10 years, do we know?
Mr. Grumet. Senator, we will never know. I think that is a
fair----
Senator Talent. Fair enough.
Just to make this brief, because maybe Senator Smith wants
to go before the vote, I think the NCEP concept explicitly
anticipates that after 5 years or 10 years we will consider
another step. Is that correct?
Mr. Grumet. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Talent. Now, here is my concern about how this
might operate on the ground. If you are a company and you are
thinking about investing in a chemical plant or a refinery--and
we certainly need more refinery space--and Congress has passed
NCEP, maybe you can quantify the costs of NCEP. But what you
know is that in passing it, Congress explicitly anticipates
doing something else 5 years or 10 years down the road. You do
not know--as a matter of fact, what is being I think marketed
as a virtue of NCEP is that we do not know, that we will make
some adjustment down the road.
So you are thinking of investing hundreds and hundreds of
millions of dollars in a plant. You are going to have to get a
rate of return on it. You certainly do not want a financial
disaster, and you have this thing hanging out there. Now, do
you not think that under those circumstances you might
consider, you know, we can make a similar investment in China
and we have a pretty good idea what our costs are going to be
there?
Mr. Grumet. Well, Senator, certainty in terms of projecting
atmospheric or global temperatures or business is always a
desire and never an option. The question that our Commission
dealt with in terms of business certainty was, was there more
certainty in the status quo, where people have all kinds of
different proposals, many much more aggressive than ours, many
much less aggressive, and we kind of have a spiritual fight
about are we going to do it all or do none of it.
I think our group came to conclude that setting a path
forward that had a gradual program, that recognized that we had
to slow emissions before we sought to stop and ultimately
reverse them, that obligated the Congress of the United States
to affirmatively engage before those changes were made, that
had a set of dials for an intensity reduction so you would not
have discontinuities and big jumps, I think our group thought
that provided more certainty than rolling the dice and seeing
what happened next.
Senator Talent. When I chaired the Small Business Committee
in the House I had to constantly remind myself, we love small
business because it produces jobs, it hires people, it produces
technological innovation, but nobody ever started a small
business to create jobs. They start a small business or, for
that matter, they make an investment as a big business in order
to get a return on the investment.
I just think we have to be very careful. I understand what
you are doing and I think from our perspective here it seems to
make sense. We talk with all the stakeholders, we have this
initial step. My concern is on the ground it is going to
produce actually more investment precisely because of the
uncertainty, it is going to produce more investment where they
do not care about global warming, and we may end up with more
greenhouse gases and fewer jobs, and that would be the one dumb
thing to do, would be to hurt the economy and get nothing in
favor of it.
I understand what you are doing. I am just concerned that
the uncertainty may have exactly the opposite of what you
intend.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Craig. Thank you very much.
Senator Smith, I got here before you did. I am going to ask
one question. I think we can get both of our questions in.
I wanted to ask this of EIA. Figure 4 in your charts,
doctor. I find it very interesting as you look at the spread of
savings and usage, and figure 4 represents that item,
generating capacity additions by type 2004 through 1925. I have
traveled the world about as much as anybody on the climate
change issue. I do not know how many COPS I have been to, but
it is a fascinating cottage industry to watch. Now, having said
that, I do not mean that as a slam at all. But there is a great
industry that has grown up around climate change itself, for
better or for worse.
But there is a reality out there and the reality is that
there are some technologies, if fully implemented, could have
tremendous effect on emissions. One of them is nuclear. We
worked very hard to incentivize new nuclear in the energy bill
and, while I have not read all of your testimony, I would hope
that you would analyze and make a reasonable argument that if
we fully implemented and fully fund what we have just done as a
country we could move ourselves ahead in a dramatic way, but
most important is that we would also build technologies that
were available to the world to use.
So I am sitting with the Chinese representative in Buenos
Aires. He talks about 100 new nuclear plants, 100. They are
still dominantly coal. They are going to build a lot of coal.
We are now working with India. They could come on line. We have
at least four on the drawing boards in this country now that
could be pouring concrete by 2008, could be on line by 2015.
Yet nothing shows up here in your charts as to increased
generating capacity as it relates to nuclear. Or am I just
missing it?
Dr. Gruenspecht. First let me say, I am a retiree from the
cottage industry that you mentioned having to do with global
warming. So I was quite involved in the early 1990's, less
involved today.
I would say that this is an analysis of the NCEP policy
proposal.
Senator Craig. So I am directing it at the wrong----
Dr. Gruenspecht. No, you are directing it correctly, I
think. The NCEP policy proposal had a modest incentive, I
think, that in our estimation produced one additional nuclear
plant, and there it is in our chart.
This analysis, I will say, was done before the passage of
the energy bill and, as you mentioned, the energy bill has some
very significant incentives for nuclear, including a production
tax credit. That is a very significant incentive for up to
6,000 megawatts. It has the insurance proposal that the
administration advanced. It has title 17. Presumably, the
incentives there, which are very open-ended, could be used for
nuclear.
What I would say is that this chart does not reflect the
energy bill. It reflects the incremental effect of the NCEP
proposal. We will in fact at EIA need to look at the energy
bill in the context of our next annual cycle of long-run
projections, and those are very significant provisions and
those provisions would have an effect. But this analysis and
the testimony was about the NCEP proposal.
Senator Craig. I got you, I got you.
I am a little frustrated that we are still--and we should,
I guess--be hypothesizing where the future is. I do believe
there is a responsibility, though, to suggest, those of you who
are advocates, that what we have just done is a significant
work and we ought to be fully funding it and implementing it,
because there are technologies in there that spread across the
spectrum into the world at large, that are going to be very
beneficial in the long term, while we still debate conceptual
ideas of how to do other things.
Dr. Gruenspecht. Let me just say one more thing. Obviously,
EIA has no crystal ball about what the funding will actually
be. But at least with respect to the production tax credits,
that is not a proposal that requires funding as we understand
it.
Senator Craig. That is correct.
Dr. Gruenspecht. And we will need to deal with that.
Senator Craig. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Let me begin my comments by admitting to our
questioners--thanking you for being here, or our panelists, but
admitting to you that I am suspicious of government-planned
markets. Last week I was one of the few Republicans who voted
against the cap-and-trade system for mercury that was proposed
by the Bush administration. The environmentalists loved my
vote, but now they want me to vote for a cap-and-trade system
as to carbon.
How do you reconcile that?
Mr. Grumet. Senator, I will wade into these delightful
waters. I think that the general conclusion that our Commission
brought to this discussion is that market-based programs are
more efficient and more effective and should be used everywhere
possible, with one exception. That exception is when the use of
the free market creates distributional impacts that concentrate
pollution in one place and not another.
I take no position on the mercury decision, but note that,
mercury being a neurotoxin, there are concerns about market
trading in mercury, which I assume attach to your concerns and
your vote. Carbon being harmless to breathe, it is actually the
perfect pollutant in which a market-based system can provide
you with all the incentives with none of the anxieties about
those distributional impacts.
So I imagine that is the basis of the differentiation.
Senator Smith. I guess my concerns or my suspicions about
the EU's approach and the difficulties they are running into,
my suspicions I guess are further heightened by all of this.
But when it comes to carbon, I live in a State where every
year we burn up tens of millions of acres of trees. 2 years
ago--I think it was 2 years; maybe it is 3 now--we had the
Biscuit Fire. It burned up more land than there is acreage in
the State of Rhode Island. The amount of carbon that that put
out was 40 million tons.
I know you are not foresters. 40 million tons, just that
right there, that is about 10 percent of the emissions of all
the coal plants in America. I guess my question is what is the
best forest policy? When you think of requestration, should we
just leave these carbon moonscapes as they are and let natural
regeneration go? Or would we be better off in terms of global
warming to replant these areas, knowing that that takes half
the time that the other takes?
Dr. Smith. May I comment?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Dr. Smith. First I would like to point out that 40 million
tons is about our estimate of how much the NCEP proposal would
produce in reduction in 2010. So you are right that it is a
very large amount, but it is also a very small amount that we
are saying would occur under the NCEP proposal. Effectively we
are saying it will give us the equivalent of one less forest
fire of that sort.
On the other hand, it certainly makes sense to reforest
where one has burned down if that is the best use of the land.
That will certainly sequester over time some of the emissions
back in.
Senator Smith. So replanting is good for global warming
purposes?
Dr. Smith. Replanting generally is good for reducing carbon
emissions if it makes sense as a land use, too.
Senator Smith. Any other comments on that?
Mr. Grumet. I come from a part of the country that is
largely paved, so I am not going to offer my thoughts about
forestry. I would just note that Dr. Smith chose to identify
the first year of this program, which begins very gradually. In
2025 our modest program is expected to reduce a billion tons of
carbon a year. So 40 million is a big number, but I think in
context it is certainly not fully offsetting what we would
consider a mandatory economy-wide reduction program.
Senator Smith [presiding]. It is interesting you say that.
This is no criticism, but it is the areas that are all paved
over that are telling the areas where forests how to run their
forests.
I think all of my colleagues have left to vote and I need
to do the same as well, because I think it is just about to
end. So let me--I am given instructions that we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIXES
----------
Appendix I
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Responses of James W. Hurrell to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Over the last several decades, anthropogenic emissions
have ``substantially contributed'' to the increase in average global
temperatures. Upon receiving a question from one of the Senators, one
of the panelists suggested that ``80 percent'' of the warming was due
to human activities. Do all the panelists agree? Please provide
information as to how this estimate was derived.
Answer. The strongest evidence to support this statement comes from
numerical experiments performed with state-of-the-art global climate
models. These models encapsulate the current understanding of the
physical processes involved in the climate system, the interactions,
and the performance of the system as a whole. They have been
extensively tested and evaluated using observations. Today's best
climate models are now able to reproduce the climate of the past
century, and simulations of the evolution of global surface temperature
over the past millennium are consistent with paleoclimate
reconstructions.
As a result, climate modelers are able to test the role of various
forcings in producing the observed changes in global temperature.
Forcings imposed on the climate system can be natural in origin, such
as changes in solar luminosity or volcanic eruptions, or human-induced,
such as increases in aerosol and greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere.
Climate model simulations that account for such changes in forcings
have now reliably shown that global surface warming of recent decades
is a response to the increased concentrations of greenhouse gases and
sulfate aerosols in the atmosphere. An example, from a climate model
simulation performed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research
(NCAR), is provided in Figure 1.* When the model is integrated forward
in time over the 20th century with only information on imposed natural
forcings, there is no discernible trend in global surface temperatures
over the last several decades (blue line). When changes in greenhouse
gas and aerosol concentrations are added to these natural forcings,
however, the model not only simulates an increase in global surface
temperature (red line), but it almost exactly reproduces the observed
rate of change (black line). Numerous simulations for each case are
run, and the solid lines represent the mean while the shaded regions
indicate the ``spread'' about the mean. This spread reflects intrinsic
natural climate variations arising from purely internal atmospheric
processes as well as from interactions among the different components
of the climate system, such as those between the atmosphere and oceans
or the atmosphere and land.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figures 1 and 2 have been retained in committee files.
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Such results, which have also been produced by several other
independent modeling groups, increase our confidence in the
observational record and our understanding of how global mean
temperature has changed. They also indicate the time histories of the
important forcings are reasonably known, and the climate processes
being simulated in models are adequate enough to make the models very
valuable tools for investigating the causes and processes of past
climate variations as well future climate change.
Question 2. We received testimony that sought to distinguish
between average global temperature changes causes primarily by
anthropogenic emissions and local/regional temperature changes caused
at times by natural variation. Please explain in greater detail.
Answer. Global average temperature increases in recent decades are
primarily due to changes in anthropogenic forcings (Question 1).
Evidence for a warmer world is also reflected in other independent
measures as well, as documented in my written testimony. Some of these
are regional in character, such as: (1) the rapid melting of glaciers
in non-polar regions around the world; (2) decreases in the areal
coverage and thickness of Arctic sea ice, especially during summer, and
of snow cover over northern continents; and (3) reductions of a few
weeks in the annual duration of northern lake and river ice cover. Yet,
in spite of this and other evidence (e.g., rises in global sea levels)
that gives a collective picture of a warming world, the magnitude of
the anthropogenic influence on regional climate remains uncertain. A
principal reason is because the effects of human activities are
superimposed on the background ``noise'' of natural climate
variability, which can be very large regionally.
Global warming does not mean that temperature increases are
spatially uniform or monotonic: some places warm more than the average
and some places cool. Land regions have warmed the most (0.7 C since
1979), with the greatest warming in the boreal winter and spring months
over the Northern Hemisphere (NH) continents. Regionally, winter
(December through March) temperatures have been 1-2 C warmer than
average over much of North America and from Europe eastward to Asia
over the past two decades, while temperatures over the northern oceans
have not warmed as much (Figure 2). This pattern is strongly related to
decade-long changes in natural patterns (or modes) of the atmospheric
and oceanic circulation. In particular, changes in the behavior of the
El Nino/Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon and the Pacific Decadal
Oscillation (PDO) have contributed substantially to the regional
cooling of the North Pacific Ocean and the warming over western parts
of North America, while changes in the behavior of the North Atlantic
Oscillation (NAO) have driven much of the warming over Europe and Asia.
Changes in anthropogenic forcing may affect these modes, however,
so quantifying the anthropogenic and natural components of the observed
warming on regional scales remains a difficult and critical research
question. For instance, several recent studies have concluded the
temporal behavior of the NAO in recent decades is outside the range of
natural variability, and moreover that this unusual recent behavior is
linked to the (anthropogenic) warming of the tropical oceans.
Similarly, some have argued that the recent behavior of ENSO is
inconsistent with natural variability. Yet, attribution remains
uncertain.
Many global climate models, for instance, project changes in the
statistics of ENSO variability with global warming, specifically of
greater ENSO activity marked by larger interannual variations relative
to the warmer mean state. More El Nino events would increase the
probability of weather regimes that favor the regional patterns in
Figure 2; yet, the details of ENSO are not well enough simulated in
climate models to have full confidence in these projected changes, in
part because the positive atmosphere-ocean feedbacks involved with ENSO
mean that small errors in simulating the relevant processes can be
amplified.
Thus, while it is likely that changes in ENSO, the NAO and other
natural modes of climate variability will occur as a result of
anthropogenic climate change, their nature, how large and rapid they
will be, and their implications for regional climate change around the
world remain uncertain.
Question 3. Please explain the meaning of `scientific consensus'
and comment on the status of the science of climate change in the
scientific and academic community.
Answer. A key aspect to scientific consensus is the building of a
consensus and, thus, the process. In the case of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the process is very open and inclusive.
The mandate of IPCC is to provide policy makers with an objective
assessment of the scientific and technical information available about
climate change, its environmental and socio-economic impacts, and
possible response options. The IPCC reports on the science of global
climate change and the effects of human activities on climate in
particular. Each new IPCC report reviews all the published literature
over the previous 5 years or so, and assesses the state of knowledge,
while trying to reconcile disparate claims, resolve discrepancies and
document uncertainties. For the 2001 Third Assessment Report (TAR),
Working Group I (which deals with how the climate has changed and the
possible causes) consisted of 123 lead authors, 516 contributors, 21
review editors, and over 700 reviewers. The lead authors all have to be
satisfied with the content of the report and the wording. There are
also several independent reviews at various stages, including a full
governmental review, and all comments must be addressed and documented
by the review editors. Final approval is through an intergovernmental
meeting. This means that the report cannot be selective in what it
deals with. It is a very credible document, and very much represents a
consensus.
The TAR concluded that climate is changing in ways that cannot be
accounted for by natural variability and that ``global warming'' is
happening. There are still and will always be climate change skeptics,
but the vast majority of reputable scientists accept and agree with the
major conclusions of the IPCC reports.
Question 4. What is ``abrupt climate change?'' Can you identify any
potential thresholds that might be crossed if insufficient action is
taken to control CO2 emissions? For example, I have heard
that beyond certain temperature increases, large ice sheets could
collapse, leading to huge increases in sea level. Can you comment on
this and other potential thresholds?
Answer. There is an abundance of scientific evidence that shows
major and widespread climate changes have occurred with startling
speed. For example, roughly half of the warming of the North Atlantic
Ocean since the last ice age was achieved in only a decade, and this
warming was accompanied by significant changes in climate across most
of the globe. Research over the past decade has shown that these
abrupt--or nonlinear--climate changes have been especially common when
the climate system was being forced to change most rapidly. Thus, the
rate of buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere may increase the
possibility of large, abrupt and unwelcome regional or global climate
events.
The mechanisms of past abrupt climate changes are not yet fully
understood, and climate models typically underestimate the size, speed
and extent of those changes. Hence, future abrupt changes cannot be
predicted with confidence. Yet, because of greenhouse warming and other
human alterations of the earth system, and the long lifetime of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere, certain thresholds are likely to be crossed
and we will not know we have crossed them until it is too late to alter
the outcome.
So what can we do in the face of such uncertainty? Someone recently
brought to my attention the analogy of buying insurance. One does this
not because it lessens the chance of some terrible event, but because
it smoothes out the financial impacts if a catastrophic event does
occur. In the case of abrupt changes in climate, buying insurance--in
the form of sound climate policy--not only reduces the risk of severe
climate impacts but also smoothes out the risk of having to make abrupt
changes in policy, which we know are costly.
Question 5. Can you tell us something about the time horizon for
stabilizing climate, given how long carbon dioxide remains in the
atmosphere? Do we need to begin to control emissions now or can we
wait?
Answer. Because of the long lifetime of carbon dioxide and the slow
equilibration of the oceans, there is a substantial future commitment
to further global climate change even in the absence of further
emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Several modeling
groups have performed ``commitment'' runs in order to examine the
climate response even if the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere had been stabilized in the year 2000. The exact results
depend upon the model, but they all show a further global warming of
about another 0.5 C, and additional and significant sea level rises
caused by thermal expansion of the oceans by the end of the 21st
century. Further glacial melt is also likely.
There is now also better quantification of the climate system
response to different emission scenarios (stabilization at 550, 690 and
820 ppmv concentrations of carbon dioxide by the year 2100). All global
climate models contributing the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report (due to
be published in 2007), for instance, produce similar warming trends in
global surface temperatures over the next few decades, regardless of
the emissions scenario. Moreover, nearly half of the early 21st century
climate change arises from warming we are already committed to. By mid-
century, the choice of scenario becomes more important for the
magnitude of warming, and by the end of the 21st century there are
clear consequences for which scenario is followed.
Question 6. Given that there is still some uncertainty about the
details of future warming, how should such uncertainty be dealt with in
designing policy responses?
Answer. There is indeed uncertainty in the details of future
warming. Climate models are not perfect, and uncertainties remain. For
instance, the precise nature of aerosol/cloud interactions and how
aerosols interact with the water cycle remains a major uncertainty in
our understanding of climate processes and, thus, their representation
in models. Yet, the ability of these models to simulate the past record
(Figure 1) means that the processes being simulated are adequate enough
to make the models very valuable tools. Moreover, in spite of
uncertainties and differences among models, they produce a number of
consistent results concerning future climate change (see Question 5 as
well as my written testimony).
Based on this and other evidence, I believe there is a clear need
to begin to reduce emissions immediately. While some changes arising
from global warming might be benign or even beneficial, the rate of
change projected exceeds anything seen in nature in the past 10,000
years and is apt to be disruptive in many ways. Economists have
analyzed the costs of various policy responses and they tell us that
the most cost-effective emission trajectories involve starting now to
control emissions. Further delay will be costly.
Question 7. How do we know that emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases are causing Earth's temperature to rise, as
opposed to other factors that we have no control over; such as sun
spots? Some assert that an increase in solar irradiance is the main
cause of the Earth's current warming trend. Therefore, reducing fossil
fuel emissions would not impact the Earth's temperature.
Answer. Although there is little doubt that the sun's radiant
output impacts the Earth's climate on both decadal and centennial time
scales, there is no credible evidence to suggest that an increase in
solar irradiance is the main cause for the recent warming trend. This
is addressed in my response to Question 1.
Question 8a. There are some who question the veracity of the
assertion that the earth has warmed substantially over the last
century. Arguments typically fall into three categories. It would be
useful if you would address each in turn:
Urban Heat Island Effect. This is the claim that the underlying
temperature data is tainted by the proximity of data-generating
thermometers to cities. As urban areas have grown over the last fifty
years, the air temperatures around these cities have increased due to
larger amounts of heat generating substances like rooftops and
roadways. Scientists claim to have corrected for the urban heat island
effect. How was this done, and how can we be sure that it was done
correctly?
Answer. While amplified warming does occur in cities and is an
important local phenomenon, a number of independent and recent studies
have shown that urbanization is a negligible effect as far as
continental-and hemispheric-space averages are concerned. Over land,
temperature data come from fixed weather observing stations with
thermometers housed in special instrument shelters. Records of
temperature from many thousands of such stations exist. Some are in
urban areas. Many are not.
One concern regarding the construction of global temperature
records is the variety of changes that may affect temperature
measurements at an individual station. For example, the thermometer or
instrument shelter might change, the time of day when the thermometers
are read might change, or the station might move. These problems are
addressed through a variety of procedures (for example, checking for
consistency with data from neighboring stations) that have proven to be
very effective. Other, perhaps more subtle influences (e.g.,
urbanization) are addressed either actively in the data processing
stage or through dataset evaluation to ensure as much as possible that
the data are not biased. For instance, several studies have compared
global surface temperature time series made up of only rural stations
with the ``standard'' global temperature time series, only to find out
that there is no significant bias. The IPCC (2001) stated that urban
heat island effects could contribute no more than six percent of the
rising average temperature trends in recent decades, and a National
Academy study of the surface temperature record concluded that the
global surface temperature trend accurately reflects warming.
Question 8b. Satellite and Airborne Balloon Data Contradict Surface
Temperature Readings. Global mean temperature at the earth's surface is
estimated to have risen by about half a degree F over the last two
decades. On the other hand, satellite measurements of radiances and
airborne balloon observations indicate that the temperature of the
lower to mid-troposphere (the atmospheric layer extending from the
earth's surface up to about 8 km) has exhibited almost no change during
this period. Please explain whether this discrepancy is, indeed, real
and how to account for it.
Answer. I argue that there is no contradiction, and the reasons why
are provided in my written testimony. There are several key points:
The satellite and surface data differ in what they measure:
surface thermometers measure the air temperature at the Earth's
surface, while the satellite measurements in question infer
temperatures of different broad layers of the atmosphere which
respond differently to natural climate variations such as ENSO,
greenhouse gases and other factors that influence climate.
A chronic difficulty in obtaining reliable climate records
from satellites has been changes in instruments, platforms,
equator-crossing times, and algorithms. The microwave sounding
unit (MSU) tropospheric temperature record has overcome some of
these problems, but how transitions between different
satellites are dealt with and other biases in the data result
in a range of global trend estimates. Several groups have
analyzed the data, and over 1979-2004 all data versions show
warming; however, the trend estimates range from 0.04 to 0.17
C decade-1. Such differences highlight the issue of
temporal homogeneity in the satellite data.
Because about 15% of the MSU signal for middle tropospheric
temperature actually comes from the lower stratosphere, the
real warming of the middle troposphere is greater than that
indicated by the MSU data sets. This has been confirmed by new
analyses that explicitly remove the stratospheric influence,
which is about -0.08 C decade-1 on middle
tropospheric MSU temperature trends since 1979.
By differencing MSU measurements made at different slant
angles, new data records can be created that are weighted more
toward the lower troposphere. The latest product exhibits a
warming trend that is 0.2 C decade-1 larger in the
tropics (where the largest ``discrepancy'' with surface warming
has been noted) than previous estimates. The result is tropical
warming consistent with that found in surface measurements, and
consistent with the warming produced by climate models.
Radiosonde releases provide the longest record of upper-air
measurements, and these data exhibit similar warming rates to
the surface record since 1958. Unfortunately, vast regions of
the oceans and portions of the landmasses (especially in the
tropics) are not monitored so that there is always a component
of the global or hemispheric mean temperature that is missing.
Moreover, measurement errors and sampling issues affect the
radiosonde record as well. The correction for non-climatic
effects in these records has not received as much attention as
for the surface records, but efforts are increasing. A recent
study, for instance, finds that after accounting for previously
uncorrected errors due to daytime solar heating of the
radiosonde instruments, the tropical troposphere has warmed at
a rate (0.14 C decade-1) consistent with model
simulations and the surface record.
Question 8c. The Hockey Stick. In recent months, there have been
assertions that the statistical method used to analyze global
temperature data for the last several hundred years was biased towards
generating the ``hockey stick'' shaped curve that shows sustained low
and stable temperatures for hundreds of years with an extremely sharp
rise in the last 100 years. Can you comment on whether the observations
depicted in the hockey stick curve are, indeed, legitimate?
Answer. An important point is that the ``hockey stick'' curve does
not serve as the basis for the scientific consensus that the planet is
warming and that this warming is due to human activities. A very large
number of independent studies have led to this conclusion.
That said, the results of the original ``hockey stick'' graph (Mann
et al. 1998; Nature) are legitimate and remain as a valuable estimate
inside the set of available climate reconstructions of past centuries.
Not all reconstructions agree in the details, but their primary
structure is very similar throughout and they agree with our
understanding of possible forcing factors, both natural and
anthropogenic.
Without going into detail, the recent criticisms raised against the
statistical method used in Mann et al. (1998) either refer to very
small effects or they cannot be supported. New investigations into the
summaries of North American tree rings show that, independent of the
exact procedure used in the summary of the individual series, all
methods lead to essentially the same result as the original Mann et al.
(1998) reconstruction. Strongly differing results can only be achieved
if a significant portion of the climatic signal in the original proxy
records is omitted (which, of course, is not desirable). Questions
regarding the potential for a very large bias in the century-scale
climate amplitude of the Mann et al. (1998) reconstruction (von Storch
et al. 2004; Science) cannot be reproduced with a code that is verified
on the real proxy data. Papers addressing these issues and confirming
the validity of the Mann et al. (1998) findings are currently in the
peer-review process.
Question 9. Some say that global warming might be a positive
development? Will agricultural crop productivity improve due to the
greater amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and can we expect
the Arctic and Antarctic regions to become more habitable?
Answer. Modest amounts of warming will have both positive and
negative impacts. The effects of climate change on agricultural
productivity depend on numerous inter-related factors, including rising
temperatures, increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and average
precipitation levels. A modest increase in global temperatures could
increase agricultural productivity in some areas by, for instance,
lengthening the growing season. As stated earlier, however, the rate of
change projected exceeds anything seen in nature in the past 10,000
years and is apt to be disruptive in many ways. For instance, there is
likely to be an amplified change in extremes associated with global
warming. Extreme events, such as heat waves, floods and droughts, are
exceedingly important to both natural systems and human systems and
infrastructure.
Concerning high latitude regions, where the warming is expected to
be greatest, there is already strong evidence to suggest the current
warming is having strong negative impacts. One example is severe
coastal erosion due to retreating sea ice, increasing sea level, and
thawing of coastal permafrost. Others include negative impacts to
buildings, roads, and industry due to thawing of tundra and ice roads.
Increases in insect outbreaks and forest fires also accompany ongoing
warming. So the evidence is strong that the negative impacts are very
likely to outweigh positive ones as rapid warming proceeds.
Question 10. It is my understanding that the assessments of the
progression of global warming through the next century and its impacts
on changing the Earth's climate are largely based on computer modeling.
It goes without saying that the planet's atmospheric, hydrologic, and
meteorological systems are highly complicated. What can you say about
how climate modeling capabilities have advanced since scientists began
evaluating the problem? What is the level confidence that the computer
models are providing useful projections of the future climate?
Answer. The best climate models encapsulate the current
understanding of the physical processes involved in the climate system,
the interactions, and the performance of the system as a whole. They
have been extensively tested and evaluated using observations. They are
exceedingly useful tools for carrying out numerical climate
experiments, but they are not perfect, and some models are better than
others. Uncertainties arise from shortcomings in our understanding of
climate processes operating in the atmosphere, ocean, land and
cryosphere, and how to best represent those processes in models. Yet,
in spite of these uncertainties, today's best climate models are now
able to reproduce the climate of the past century (Figure 1), and
simulations of the evolution of global surface temperature over the
past millennium are consistent with paleoclimate reconstructions. This
gives increased confidence in future projections.
The shortcomings in our understanding of the processes involved in
climate and how they are depicted in models arise from inadequate
observations and theoretical underpinnings associated with the
incredible complexity of dealing with scales from molecules and cloud
droplets to the planetary-scale atmospheric circulation. These issues
are addressed in several steps:
Individual climate processes are dealt with as best as is
possible given the understanding and computational limitations.
The processes are assembled in models and then the model
components are tested with strong constraints. The components
include modules of the atmosphere, the oceans, the land and sea
ice, and the land surface. These modules are coupled together
to mimic the real world.
The climate system model as a whole is then integrated in an
unconstrained mode and thoroughly tested against observations.
One strong test is to simulate the annual cycle of seasonal
variations (the changes in climate from winter to summer). Another is
to simulate observed variability from one year to the next. Yet another
is to simulate past climate (Figure 1), even going back in time
thousands or millions of years tested against records from ice cores,
tree rings, and other ``proxy'' data.
As our knowledge of the different components of the climate system
and their interactions increases, so does the complexity of today's
climate models. Also, many of the most pressing scientific questions
regarding the climate system and its response to natural and
anthropogenic forcings cannot be readily addressed with traditional
models of the physical climate. One of the open issues for near-term
climate change, for example, is the response of terrestrial ecosystems
to increased concentrations of carbon dioxide. Will plants begin
releasing carbon dioxide to the atmosphere in a warmer climate, thereby
acting as a positive feedback, or will vegetation absorb more carbon
dioxide and hence decelerate global warming? Related issues include the
interactions among land use change, deforestation by biomass burning,
emission of greenhouse gases and aerosols, weathering of rocks, carbon
in soils, and marine biogeochemistry.
Exploration of these questions requires a more comprehensive
treatment of the integrative Earth system. In order to address these
emerging issues, physical models are being extended to include the
interactions of climate with biogeochemistry, atmospheric chemistry,
ecosystems, glaciers and ice sheets, and anthropogenic environmental
change. These new ``Earth System Models'', however, will require large
investments in computing infrastructure before they can be fully
utilized.
Question 11. Is the recent rise in global temperature within the
scope of natural variation? For instance, it has been observed that the
world appears to be on a cyclical temperature pattern of rising and
falling into and out of ice ages every several hundred thousand years
or so. What has caused global temperatures to vary naturally by 5 to 7
degrees thousands of years ago before humankind started burning fossil
fuels and releasing large amounts of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases?
Answer. Climate varies naturally. We consider natural variability
as resulting from purely internal atmospheric processes as well as from
interactions among the different components of the climate system, such
as those between the atmosphere and oceans or the atmosphere and land.
However, the most significant forcings with impact on climatic time
scales are generally imposed upon the climate system.
External forcings arise from a wide array of processes covering a
range of spatial and temporal scales. ``Natural'' external forcings
include changes in the global configuration of the continents, the slow
increase of solar luminosity that occur over hundreds of millions of
years, variations in the Earth's orbit, and the injection of aerosols
high into the atmosphere by explosive volcanic eruptions. Human
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, the local
emission and suspension of small (aerosol) particles on timescales of
minutes to days, and changes in land use are some examples of
anthropogenic forcings.
The global temperature variations reflected in ice core records
from the distant past reflect the influence of natural external
forcings on the climate system. However, these reconstructions of past
temperature swings have also demonstrated that the projected rate of
global temperature change exceeds anything seen in nature in the past
10,000 years.
Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere are now higher than
at any time in at least the last 750,000 years. It took at least 10,000
years from the end of the last ice age for levels of carbon dioxide to
increase 100 ppmv to 280 ppmv, but that same increase has occurred over
only the past 150 years to current values of over 370 ppmv. About half
of that increase has occurred over the last 35 years, owing mainly to
combustion of fossil fuels and deforestation. In the absence of
controls, future projections are that the rate of increase in carbon
dioxide amount may accelerate, and concentrations could double from
pre-industrial values within the next 50 to 100 years.
Responses of James W. Hurrell to Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. Would you say that the steps America has taken in the
recent years to improve energy efficiency and produce lower carbon
emissions from power generation are the right first steps in addressing
climate change? Within that construct, given the current U.S.
electricity supply that is more than 50% derived from coal, is
encouraging clean coal technology, IGCC and carbon sequestration the
most important immediate policy action we can take?
Answer. The only way to minimize human-induced climate change is to
reduce emissions or increase removal of greenhouse gases from the
atmosphere. Reducing carbon dioxide emissions from power generation is
thus a very important step in addressing climate change. Improving
energy efficiency is also desirable.
Regarding the second part of your question, I am not an expert in
energy technology, policy or economics. But regarding carbon
sequestration, one of the major advances in climate modeling in recent
years has been the introduction of coupled climate-carbon models.
Climate change is expected to influence the capacities of the land and
oceans to act as repositories for anthropogenic carbon dioxide, and
hence provide a feedback to climate change. These models now allow us
to assess the nature of this feedback.
Results show that carbon sink strengths are inversely related to
the rate of fossil fuel emissions, so that carbon storage capacities of
the land and oceans decrease and climate warming accelerates with
faster carbon dioxide emissions. Furthermore, there is a positive
feedback between the carbon and climate systems, so that further
warming acts to increase the airborne fraction of anthropogenic carbon
dioxide and amplify the climate change.
As a non-expert on energy technology, I can only add that experts
believe a portfolio of technologies now exists to meet the world's
energy needs over the next 50 years and limit the trajectory of
atmospheric carbon dioxide increases. No single element of this
portfolio (e.g., nuclear power, efficient baseload coal plants,
efficient vehicles, etc.) can do the entire job by itself.
Question 2. Scientific research shows that mitigation actions taken
now mainly have benefits 50 years from now. Dr. Hurrell, you said ``it
is vital that all nations identify cost-effective steps that they can
take now.'' Given that viewpoint, do you agree that clean coal
technology, renewable fuels and nuclear power are the most promising
areas the government can spend research dollars?
Answer. I cannot suggest which energy technologies should receive
greatest emphasis in the near-term because I am not an expert in energy
technology or policy. However, as noted above, I believe it is
essential to encourage technological innovation and explore the entire
spectrum of energy generating technologies, including nuclear, clean
coal, and renewable fuels.
Question 3. While you have presented what appears to be a united
scientific front in the form of the statement from the academies of
science from 11 countries, I am concerned by some of the news since the
release of that statement. The Russian Academy of Sciences says it was
misrepresented and that Russian scientists actually believe that the
Kyoto Protocol was scientifically ungrounded. I am also aware that
there was a significant misrepresentation on the science between our
academy and the British representative. Given this background, wouldn't
you say there are still some pretty fundamental disagreements about the
science of climate change among scientists around the world?
Answer. As outlined in my written testimony, I do not believe there
are fundamental disagreements about the science of climate change.
Please also see my response to Question 3 from Senator Bingaman. There
is overwhelming agreement among climate scientists that human
activities are increasing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere and that this is resulting in significant changes to Earth's
climate.
I therefore believe the academies statement accurately represents
the current state of scientific understanding of climate change.
However, I was not involved in the process of generating the statement,
and I respectfully suggest that further concerns are most appropriately
addressed to representatives of the U.S. National Academy.
Question 4. In this international academies statement, you find
that an ``immediate response that will, at a reasonable cost, prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,'' but
continue to say in the following paragraph, ``minimizing the amount of
this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge.'' Could you please elaborate, since any response can't both
be a ``reasonable cost'' and a ``huge challenge'' proposition, how you
resolve the two?
Answer. Again, I respectfully suggest that questions about the
international academies statement are most appropriately addressed to
those who drafted and issued the statement. I would point out that the
challenge of dealing with climate change involves much more than
financial costs. One aspect of this challenge is the very long-term
nature of climate change. The emissions of greenhouse gases that have
already occurred will result in climate changes that play out for
decades, or, in the case of sea-level rise, over centuries. We will
thus need to devise and maintain multi-generational mitigation and
adaptation strategies. I believe that this can be properly
characterized as a huge challenge quite apart from the issue of
financial costs.
Question 5. Several scientists have cited events like the high
temperatures in Europe in the summer of 2003 and increased storminess
in the 1980s and 1990s as evidence of climate change. Don't global
ecosystems go through natural periods similar to these as well?
Answer. Climate varies naturally from both internal processes and
from changes in ``natural'' external forcing (see my response to
Question 11 from Senator Bingaman). However, the critical point is that
the projected rate of global temperature change exceeds anything seen
in nature in the past 10,000 years, and it is unlikely many natural
systems can adapt. An example is the coral reefs, which some scientists
believe are already beyond a point of recovery as a result of ocean
warming. Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere are now higher
than at any time in at least the last 750,000 years, with very rapid
increases in recent decades owing to mainly the combustion of fossil
fuels and deforestation. In the absence of controls, future projections
are that the rate of increase in carbon dioxide amount may accelerate,
and concentrations could double from pre-industrial values within the
next 50 to 100 years. Thus, we will experience climate conditions in
the next 100 years that are very different from any experienced during
the entire development of human society.
Question 6. There are a number of astrophysicists and other
scientists who believe that sunspots are a major contributor to
changing temperatures. A recent survey showed at least 100 such studies
are underway. Why don't scientists put as much emphasis on this
possibility or other aspects of natural climate variability as they do
on emissions from human activity?
Answer. Scientists put a tremendous effort on unraveling the
complexities of the climate system, including the role that changes in
natural external forcings (such as changes in solar luminosity) have
played in producing past variations in global surface temperature. Our
understanding of the physical processes involved in the climate system
is encapsulated in today's climate system models, which are now able to
reproduce the climate of the past century with impressive fidelity (see
Figure 1 and my response to Question 1 from Senator Bingaman). As a
result, climate modelers are able to test the role of various forcings
in producing the observed changes in global temperature. These
simulations clearly indicate that the global surface warming of recent
decades is a response to the increased concentrations of greenhouse
gases and sulfate aerosols in the atmosphere. When the models are run
without these forcing changes, and only include ``natural'' forcings
from changes in solar irradiance and volcanic eruptions, they fail to
capture the almost linear increase in global surface temperatures since
the mid-1970s.
Question 7. Much of the discussion about climate science being
settled is based on the summary chapter of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change of the United Nations. The chapter made specific
predictions about the pace of rising temperatures and the relative
importance of human activities to climate change. And yet, the body of
the report is much more ambiguous and inconclusive about the current
state of the science. Is anything being done to ensure that the summary
of the next IPCC report is more reflective of the overall analysis by
the scientists?
Answer. I assume the question is referring to the Summary for
Policy Makers (SPM), which is approved word-by-word and line-by-line in
an Intergovernmental Meeting in which the U.S. Government fully
participates. This summary involves negotiations about how the
scientific findings are expressed, but it does not change the science
on which it is based. There is also a Technical summary and executive
summaries for each chapter. The report as a whole goes through a very
rigorous review process (see my response to Question 3 from Senator
Bingaman and also my written testimony for more details on the IPCC
process). The openness of the entire process results in a very
credible, consensus document.
Question 8. The natural ``greenhouse effect'' has been known for
nearly two hundred years and is essential to the provision of our
current climate. There is significant research in the literature today
that indicates humans, since the beginning of their existence, have
caused an increase in the greenhouse effect. Some argue that the
development of agriculture 6,000 to 8,000 years ago has helped to
forestall the next ice age. The development of cities, thinning of
forests, population growth, and most recently the burning of fossil
fuels, have all had an impact on climate change. Our ecosystems have
constantly adapted to change, as we as humans have adapted to our
ecosystems as well. Is it possible that the increased presence of
CO2 caused by the 8,000 years of modern human existence may
be something our ecosystems will continue, as they previously have, to
naturally adapt to?
Answer. Ecosystems do not adapt to change. Individual species that
make up ecosystems adapt to changing climate conditions, move, or go
extinct. Ecosystems change as the mixture and characteristics of
species within them change. In some cases, ecosystems disappear and are
replaced by other ecosystems that contain different species and provide
different services.
It is true that a broad range of human activities, including land
use change, thinning or removal of forests, and, more recently, the use
of fossil fuels, have affected the Earth's climate and ecosystems over
the course of human history. But we are witnessing a unique period.
Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere are now higher than
at any time in at least the last 750,000 years. It took at least 10,000
years from the end of the last ice age for levels of carbon dioxide to
increase 100 ppmv to 280 ppmv, but that same increase has occurred over
only the past 150 years to current values of over 370 ppmv. About half
of that increase has occurred over the last 35 years, owing mainly to
combustion of fossil fuels and deforestation. In the absence of
controls, future projections are that the rate of increase in carbon
dioxide amount may accelerate, and concentrations could double from
pre-industrial values within the next 50 to 100 years. The result is
that the rate of change as projected exceeds anything seen in nature in
the past 10,000 years.
The rapid climate change that we are experiencing now is already
affecting some ecosystems. The ranges of migrating birds and some fish
and insect species are changing. Tropical regions are losing animal
species, especially amphibians, to warming and drying, and coral reefs
are dying because of excess ocean warmth. Continued rapid climate
change is expected to result in significant ecosystem impacts over the
next 100 years and beyond. Some plants and animals may be unable to
adapt or migrate in response to such a rapidly changing climate. Rare
ecosystems, like mangrove forests and alpine meadows, could disappear
in some areas.
Responses of James W. Hurrell to Questions From Senator Talent
Question 1. You note that most of the warming since 1979 has
occurred in cold-weather winter and spring months, and that only 0.7
degree Centigrade. Is there any harm in this?
Answer.The warming has occurred in all seasons and over much of the
globe, but not uniformly. Climate models used to project future climate
indicate that the largest temperature increases will occur over land
relative to oceans, with the greatest warming at high latitudes of the
Northern Hemisphere during the winter and spring seasons--much like the
pattern we are observing. Over portions of North America, Europe and
Asia regional increases in average surface temperature since 1979 have
exceeded 1-2 C (see Figure 2 in my response to Senator Bingaman).
Modest warming will have both positive and negative impacts. A
modest increase in global temperatures could increase agricultural
productivity in some areas by, for instance, lengthening the growing
season. But in high latitude regions, where the warming is expected to
be greatest, there is already strong evidence to suggest the current
warming is having strong negative impacts, such as severe coastal
erosion due to retreating sea ice, increasing sea level, and thawing of
coastal permafrost. The thawing of tundra is having negative impacts on
buildings, roads, and industry. Higher global sea levels associated
with warmer ocean temperatures mean that storm surges associated with
hurricanes will be more destructive. Moreover, the rate of future
warming as projected exceeds anything seen in nature in the past 10,000
years.
Question 2. You also note that temperatures from 1861-1920 were
constant, with a 0.3 degree Centigrade warming from 1921-1950, a
cooling of 0.1 degree through the mid 1970s, followed by a warming of
0.55 degree through now. Doesn't this imply temperature fluctuation
more so than the usual argument of a constant increase in temperature?
If nothing else, doesn't it imply that nature causes of temperature
change more than overtake those of human origin (since emissions have
generally been increasing throughout the Industrial Age and didn't drop
off in the 50s, 60s, and 70s)?
Answer. Global average surface temperatures show a linear warming
trend of 0.6 C 0.2 C since the beginning of the 20th century.
Linear trends are a simple way to summarize the change in a time series
over some period of time. In my written testimony, I was noting that
the change in observed global surface temperatures is more complex than
a simple linear trend value would indicate (see Figure 1 in my response
to Senator Bingaman).
You are correct to note that natural variations are evident in the
global surface temperature record. Natural variations result from
purely internal atmospheric processes as well as from interactions
among the different components of the climate system, such as those
between the atmosphere and ocean associated with the El Nino/Southern
Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon in the tropical Pacific. Changes in solar
luminosity and the injection of aerosols high into the atmosphere by
explosive volcanic eruptions are also considered to be ``natural''
external forcings. Many of the large amplitude year-to-year
fluctuations evident in Figure 1 reflect ENSO, volcanic eruptions and
other variations associated with natural variability. Natural
variations also affect temperatures on longer time scales, for instance
associated with multi-decadal variations in the Meridional Overturning
Circulation (MOC) in the ocean.
Climate models, when forced with known changes in natural external
forcings, produce variations in global surface temperatures that mimic
observations; yet, these simulations fail to reproduce the observed
warming over recent decades (Figure 1). The recent warming (which,
incidentally, is well described by a linear trend) can only be captured
when known changes in anthropogenic forcings are added to the models as
well. This result, combined with many other pieces of knowledge
(summarized in my written testimony), led the IPCC to conclude in its
third assessment report that ``most of the warming observed over the
last 50 years is attributable to human activities.'' The best
assessment of global warming remains that the human climate signal
emerged from the noise of background variability in the late 1970s.
Question 3. You add that the National Research Council in 2000
studied the problem and concluded that ``the warming trend in global-
mean surface temperature observations during the past 20 years is
undoubtedly real and is substantially greater than the average rate of
warming during the 20th century. The disparity between surface and
upper air trends in no way invalidates the conclusion that surface
temperature has been rising.'' Please explain the basis for the strong
NRC position in the face of remaining data discrepancies.
Answer. Please see both my written testimony and my answer to
Question 8 from Senator Bingaman for more relevant details. In short,
initial analyses of satellite data that measure the temperature of
broad atmospheric layers indicated that temperatures in the troposphere
showed little or no warming, in stark contrast with surface air
measurements. Climate change skeptics used this result to raise
questions about the reliability of the surface record. The NRC report,
however, did not find this to be the case. It, like the IPCC
assessments and many independent studies in the refereed literature,
concluded that, while the surface record is not perfect, it does depict
large-scale changes in surface temperature to a high level of
certainty.
Independent analyses of global upper-air temperatures derived from
satellites also show warming since 1979, when the satellite record
begins. However, trend estimates range from 0.04 to 0.17 C
decade-1. Such differences highlight the issue of temporal
homogeneity in the satellite data.
Question 4. You note that even if we would have stabilized our
emissions as of 2000, temperatures would still increase by 0.5 degree C
by 2100. What level of emissions reductions would be needed (and when)
in the U.S. and world-wide to accomplish this? If developing nations do
not participate (as we expect they won't) and in fact increase their
emissions (as we expect they will), what greater level of reductions
would the U.S. have to make?
Answer. The first part of your question refers to the so-called
``commitment'' runs performed by several modeling groups around the
world in order to examine the climate response if there are no further
increases in global emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.
So, effectively, no additional reductions are required for this
emission scenario to be realized. However, as you note, further
increases in emissions are likely, especially as countries like China
and India strive to reach a standard of living similar to ours.
The second question is beyond my expertise. I do note, however, the
CO2 emissions reductions necessary to achieve a given target
depend on the quantitative details of the stabilization target, the
emissions judged likely to occur in the absence of a focus on carbon (a
business-as-usual trajectory), and how natural sinks for atmospheric
CO2 will behave (see also my response to Question 1 from
Senator Bunning). For reference, Pacala and Socolow (2004, Science)
note that stabilization at 500 ppmv (the current CO2
concentration is near 375 ppmv) requires that emissions be held near
current levels (7 GtC year-1) for the next 50 years, even
though they are currently on a doubling path. This is because
greenhouse gases have very long atmospheric lifetimes. They build up in
amounts over time, as has been observed.
Question 5. You note that the benefits of actions taken today won't
appear for 50 years or more. Can you even quantify those benefits, or
offer any degree of certainty that they will be realized? Will they
even materialize unless we take the drastic action of reducing
emissions to 2000 levels (or lower)?
Answer. I note in my written testimony that ``it should be
recognized that mitigation actions taken now mainly have benefits 50
years and beyond now.'' Again, this statement refers to the long
lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere and the slow equilibration
of the oceans, so that there is a substantial future commitment to
further global climate change even in the absence of further emissions
of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The consequence of inaction is
that the rate of increase in carbon dioxide amount may accelerate, and
concentrations could double from pre-industrial values within the next
50 to 100 years. The resulting very rapid rate of climate change is apt
to be disruptive in many ways, as summarized by the IPCC and elsewhere.
Question 6. If all the countries that have signed Kyoto stay within
compliance of Kyoto, how much of a reduction in global warming would
this result in?
Answer. If the Kyoto Protocol had gone into effect with the U.S.
included, studies indicate that, under reasonable assumptions, it would
delay the doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere
by about 15 years (from about 2060 to 2075). This result, however,
depends greatly on what is done after 2012. Without U.S. involvement,
the gain is closer to 10 years.
Question 7. Can you confirm that suspended water vapor levels,
cloud cover percentages and direct solar irradiation changes over time
all represent variables in these forecasting models that could have
significant impacts on the conclusions of the results of these models?
Answer. The best climate models encapsulate the current
understanding of the physical processes involved in the climate system,
the interactions, and the performance of the system as a whole. They
have been extensively tested and evaluated using observations. They are
exceedingly useful tools for carrying out numerical climate
experiments, but they are not perfect, and some models are better than
others.
Water vapor, cloud, and solar radiation are all dealt with in
climate models, although there is considerable uncertainty associated
with the depiction of cloud owing to its complexity. In fact, this is a
major source of the uncertainty in future climate projections, and it
is fully expressed in the projections of IPCC. In spite of differences
among models and the uncertainties that exist, however, climate models
produce some consistent results regarding future projections of
climate, as detailed in my written testimony. For instance, regardless
of the emissions scenario, all climate models produce very similar
warming trends over the next few decades.
Question 8. In looking at pre-industrial global temperature
patterns, would you agree that changes in temperatures over time have
occurred that had no anthropogenic basis?
Answer. Yes. And this is true of today's climate as well. Please
see my answer to your Question 2.
Question 9. Do we know what the ``best'' global temperature is to
sustain life?
Answer. It seems to me that the answer to this question will vary
depending on the nature of life, whether biota, insects, mammals, or
humans. The process of evolution guarantees that we are most adapted to
the current or past climate. Life itself depends enormously on
intricate webs and predator-prey relationships, so that if one link in
the chain is upset it can propagate through the whole chain. Examples
abound. These include how earlier springs lead to earlier hatching of
insects but perhaps not birds. So, when the birds hatch, their
traditional food is no longer available and they may be in jeopardy.
This also happens with disruptions like drought. Drought dries up
puddles and lakes and destroys the natural predators for mosquito
larvae, so after a drought there is an expansion of mosquitoes and
greater risk of outbreaks of vector borne disease such as malaria or
Rift Valley fever.
Question 10. What is currently being done to curb emissions from
parts of the world in poverty who are deforesting their environment and
burning biomass for all means of day-to-day living, and are these
emissions continuing to increase in the world?
Answer. I am not a policy expert, and I am not familiar with the
policies of other nations. I cannot answer this question, beyond noting
that deforestation and biomass burning is accelerating in many parts of
the world.
Question 11. Do you believe it is practical to seek emission
controls in parts of the world that are struggling in poverty?
Answer. My personal view it that it is vital that all nations
identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to
substantial and long-term reductions in net global greenhouse gas
emissions. Some countries can do more than others, but it is important
that the science not be ignored while designing policies.
Question 12. What is being done to curb emissions in the developing
countries like China and India?
Answer. Again, I am not a policy expert. I am unfamiliar with what
is being done in countries like China and India to curb emissions, but
I hope they are considering the diverse portfolio of energy
technologies that exists now and can contribute toward stabilization
strategies.
Responses of James W. Hurrell to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Is there any credible scenario for stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions that does not involve the United States and
other major emitters stopping their emissions growth over the next
couple of decades and sharply reversing their emissions growth by 2050?
Answer. The answer depends on the stabilization target as well as
several other factors. Pacala and Socolow (2004, Science) note that
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 500 ppmv
(the current CO2 concentration is near 375 ppmv) requires
that global emissions be held near current levels (7 GtC
year-1) for the next 50 years, even though they are
currently on a doubling path. Holding global emissions near current
levels for the next 50 years would require that emissions growth in any
particular nation or group of nations be matched by emissions
reductions elsewhere. Such an effort requires full consideration of the
diverse portfolio of energy technologies that exists.
Question 2. Would the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal stop and then reverse U.S. greenhouse gas emissions?
Answer. I am not familiar with the proposal you reference. I cannot
comment.
______
Responses of Ralph J. Cicerone to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Over the last several decades, anthropogenic emissions
have ``substantially contributed'' to the increase in average global
temperatures. Upon receiving a question from one of the Senators, one
of the panelists suggested that ``80 percent'' of the warming was due
to human activities. Do all the panelists agree? Please provide
information as to how this estimate was derived.
Answer. I am not sure of the 80 percent number specifically, but I
do agree that it is likely that most of the global mean surface
temperature increase since the late 1970s is due to human activities.
This conclusion is consistent with that reached by Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their 2001 assessment of the
scientific literature and the 2001 report of the NRC Climate Change
Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions.
This conclusion is generally based on studies that compare the
observed climate record from 1860 to today with global mean temperature
simulated in three computational climate model scenarios:
1) Only natural variability (due to solar and volcanic
variability)
2) Only anthropogenic variability (due to greenhouse gases
and aerosols)
3) Both natural and anthropogenic variability
In these studies, the models run with only natural variability are
unable to reproduce the warming observed since the late 1970s,
typically showing no trend over this time period (e.g., Stott et al.,
2000; Meehl et al., 2004). Thus, we conclude that human-caused climate
forcings have disrupted Earth's energy balance, causing an increase in
global mean surface temperatures (NRC, 2005).
Improved understanding of the natural variability of the climate
system supports the conclusion that human activities are mostly
responsible for global temperature increases of the past three decades.
In particular, new studies of solar variability show that there has
been little if any trend in the Sun's brightness over the past 25
years, ruling out solar variability as a major driver of observed
warming (see Response to #7 for more details).
Because of the still uncertain level of natural variability
inherent in the climate record and the uncertainties in the time
histories of the various forcing agents, a causal linkage between the
buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the observed climate
changes during the 20th century cannot be unequivocally established.
The fact that the magnitude of the observed warming is large in
comparison to natural variability as simulated in climate models is
suggestive of such a linkage, but it does not constitute
incontrovertible proof of one because the model simulations could be
deficient in natural variability on the decadal to century time scale.
Question 2. We received testimony that sought to distinguish
between average global temperature changes causes primarily by
anthropogenic emissions and local/regional temperature changes caused
at times by natural variation. Please explain in greater detail.
Answer. As discussed in the response to #1, there is good evidence
that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are responsible for
global mean increases in surface temperature that have been occurring
since the late 1970s. It is more difficult to attribute changes
observed on local and regional scales to anthropogenic causes because
the range of natural climate variability is known to be quite large (in
excess of several degrees Celsius) on these smaller spatial scales and
shorter time scales and because global climate models have more skill
in predicting climate for large regions and long time scales.
Precipitation also can vary widely. For example, there is evidence to
suggest that droughts as severe as the ``dust bowl'' of the 1930s were
much more common in the central United States during the 10th to 14th
centuries than they have been in the more recent record. Mean
temperature variations at local sites have exceeded 10 C (18 F) in
association with the repeated glacial advances and retreats that
occurred over the course of the past million years.
Question 3. Please explain the meaning of `scientific consensus'
and comment on the status of the science of climate change in the
scientific and academic community.
Answer. Scientific understanding is continually undergoing changes
and refinements as hypotheses are tested and experiments are conducted.
At any one time it is possible in various ways to test the degree of
consensus that may exist about the state of scientific knowledge in a
particular area and the degree of uncertainty that may exist. For
example, the National Research Council has developed a process to
produce its ``consensus'' reports regarding current scientific
knowledge. The NRC process begins by selecting a committee of highly-
qualified experts that represents the range of disciplines, expertise,
and perspectives necessary to make an informed and objective assessment
on the topic in question. The committee assembles data from a variety
of sources, including the scientific literature, the testimony of other
experts, and the public. Using these data, its own collective
knowledge, and assessment of the existing scientific evidence, the
committee conducts deliberations and writes a draft report of consensus
findings with supporting arguments. Each committee member must agree to
all of the findings and recommendations in the report, although in rare
cases a committee member can ask that a dissenting opinion be included.
Each report is subjected to rigorous, anonymous review by a group of
independent experts before it is approved in final form and released to
the public. The National Research Council has issued a number of
reports concerning the state of knowledge and uncertainties in climate
change science.
The climate science community has also developed additional
processes for articulating consensus on the state of science, largely
through the preparation of assessment reports. The largest and most
well-known of climate assessment activities is conducted by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which has produced
major assessments on a regular basis over the past 15 years. The most
recent IPCC assessment of the science of climate change was published
in 2001 (IPCC, 2001). An NRC committee examined this assessment and
found that the full IPCC Working Group I report is an admirable summary
of research activities in climate science (NRC, 2001a). IPCC (2001) and
NRC (2001a) both conclude that climate is changing and that the recent
changes are likely due in large part to human activities.
A less formal way of identifying a scientific consensus is by
considering the breadth of the scientific literature and presentations
at scientific conferences. For example, a recent analysis of over 900
papers published in refereed scientific journals between 1993 and 2003
with keywords ``global climate change'' concluded that there is a
strong convergence of views in the scientific community that climate is
changing and that recent warming is largely due to human activities
(Oreskes, 2004).
Question 4. What is ``abrupt climate change''? Can you identify any
potential thresholds that might be crossed if insufficient action is
taken to control CO2 emissions? For example, I have heard
that beyond certain temperature increases, large ice sheets could
collapse, leading to huge increases in sea level. Can you comment on
this and other potential thresholds?
Answer. Abrupt climate change generally refers to a large shift in
climate that takes place so rapidly and unexpectedly that human or
natural systems have difficulty adapting to it. Such a climate shift
can persist for years or longer--such as marked changes in average
temperature, or altered patterns of storms, floods, or droughts--over a
widespread area such as an entire country or continent, In the context
of past abrupt climate change, ``rapidly'' typically means on the order
of a decade (NRC, 2002).
Abrupt climate change can occur when the Earth system gets pushed
across a threshold, whether by some sudden event like a massive
volcanic eruption or by the accumulation of more gradual changes in the
climate system. It is not yet known what the thresholds are or whether
human-induced increases in greenhouse gases will trigger abrupt climate
changes. Scientists are concerned about increasing greenhouse gases
because past abrupt climate changes have been especially common when
the climate system itself was being altered.
A question of great societal relevance is whether the North
Atlantic circulation, including the Gulf Stream, will remain stable
under the global warming that is expected to continue for the next few
centuries. A shutdown of the circulation would not induce a new ice
age, but would cause major changes both in the ocean (major circulation
regimes, upwelling and sinking regions, distribution of seasonal sea
ice, ecological systems, and sea level) and in the atmosphere (land-sea
temperature contrast, and the intensity, frequency, and paths of
storms).
Other potential impacts of a global-warming induced abrupt climate
change could be associated with increased frequency of extreme events
related to land-surface hydrology. Great variability in precipitation
patterns, ranging from heavy rainstorms and flooding to persistent
drought, might become more common. In particular, some models suggest
that greenhouse warming will cause El Nino manifestations to become
stronger and more frequent. It is important to note that not all models
agree on the potential impacts of global warming on abrupt climate
change.
Question 5. Can you tell us something about the time horizon for
stabilizing climate, given how long carbon dioxide remains in the
atmosphere? Do we need to begin to control emissions now or can we
wait?
Answer. Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for many
decades and major parts of the climate system respond slowly to changes
in greenhouse gas concentrations. Although carbon dioxide is the most
significant greenhouse gas perturbed by humans, other anthropogenic
greenhouse gases also have an important impact on climate. These
include (1) methane, for which concentrations have increased by about a
factor of 2.5 since preindustrial times, but have stopped increasing
more recently for unknown reasons; (2) halocarbons such as
chlorofluorocarbons, whose emissions were controlled because they
contribute to ozone depletion in the stratosphere; and (3) nitrous
oxide, which continues to rise.
Even if greenhouse gas levels were stabilized instantly at today's
levels, the climate would still continue to change as it adapts to the
increased emissions of recent decades, as illustrated in Figure 1. For
current models with a midrange climate sensitivity and average
assumptions about the greenhouse effects of atmospheric aerosols,
Wigley (2005) estimates next 400 years, with most of the warming
occurring within the first 100 years (see the center red line in Figure
1*). Thus, even with no greenhouse gas emissions from this point
forward, we would be experiencing the impacts of climate change
throughout the 21st century and beyond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figures 1-3 have been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If it were possible to control emissions such that they stayed at
today's levels into the future, we would not be able to stabilize
climate for at least 400 years, as illustrated in Figure 2. Failure to
implement significant reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions now,
will make the job much harder in the future.
Question 6. Given that there is still some uncertainty about the
details of future warming, how should such uncertainty be dealt with in
designing policy responses?
Answer. Pinpointing the magnitude of future warming is hindered
both by remaining gaps in understanding the science and by the fact
that it is difficult to predict society's future actions, particularly
in the areas of population growth, economic growth, and energy use
practices. However, a lack of full scientific certainty about some
aspects of climate change is not a reason for delaying an immediate
response that will, at a reasonable cost, prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Indeed, relevant
policy actions that affect population growth, economic growth, energy
use practices, and other societal factors will have an impact on future
warming.
Question 7. How do we know that emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases are causing Earth's temperature to rise, as
opposed to other factors that we have no control over; such as sun
spots? Some assert that an increase in solar irradiance is the main
cause of the Earth's current warming trend. Therefore, reducing fossil
fuel emissions would not impact the Earth's temperature.
Answer. Please see the response to #1, which addresses how
scientists attempt to determine the contributions of natural and human
causes to observed climate change.
The extent to which variations in the Sun might contribute to
recent observed warming trends is an area of active research. The Sun's
brightness--its total irradiance--has been measured continuously by a
series of satellite-based instruments for more than two complete 11-
year solar cycles. These multiple solar irradiance datasets have been
combined into a composite time series of daily total solar irradiance
from 1979 to the present. Different assumptions about radiometer
performance lead to different reconstructions for the past two decades.
Recent analyses of these measurements, taking into account instrument
calibration offsets and drifts, argue against any detectable long-term
trend in the observed irradiance to date. Likewise, models of total
solar irradiance variability that account for the influences of solar
activity features--dark sunspots and bright faculae--do not predict a
secular change in the past two decades. Thus, it is difficult to
conclude from either measurements or models that the Sun has been
responsible for the warming observed over the past 25 years, although
this hypothesis was more plausible before the availability of more
recent evidence.
Knowledge of solar irradiance variations prior to the commencement
of continuous space-based irradiance observations in 1979 is
rudimentary. Models of sunspot and facular influences developed from
the contemporary database have been used to extrapolate daily
variations during the 11-year cycle back to about 1950 using
contemporary sunspot and facular proxies, and with less certainty
annually to 1610. Circumstantial evidence from cosmogenic isotope
proxies of solar activity (14C and 10Be) and
plausible variations in Sun-like stars motivated an assumption of long-
term secular irradiance trends, but recent work questions the evidence
from both (Lean et al., 2002). Very recent studies of the long term
evolution and transport of activity features using solar models suggest
that secular solar irradiance variations may be limited in amplitude to
about half the amplitude of the 11-year cycle.
Question 8. There are some who question the veracity of the
assertion that the earth has warmed substantially over the last
century. Arguments typically fall into three categories. It would be
useful if you would address each in turn:
a. Urban Heat Island Effect. This is the claim that the underlying
temperature data is tainted by the proximity of data-generating
thermometers to cities. As urban areas have grown over the last fifty
years, the air temperatures around these cities have increased due to
larger amounts of heat generating substances like rooftops and
roadways. Scientists claim to have corrected for the urban heat island
effect.
b. Satellite and Airborne Balloon Data Contradict Surface
Temperature Readings. Global mean temperature at the earth's surface is
estimated to have risen by about half a degree F over the last two
decades. On the other hand, satellite measurements of radiances and
airborne balloon observations indicate that the temperature of the
lower to mid-troposphere (the atmospheric layer extending from the
earth's surface up to about 8 km) has exhibited almost no change during
this period.
c. The Hockey Stick. In recent months, there have been assertions
that the statistical method used to analyze global temperature data for
the last several hundred years was biased towards generating the
``hockey stick'' shaped curve that shows sustained low and stable
temperatures for hundreds of years with an extremely sharp rise in the
last 100 years.
Question 8a. Urban Heat Island Effect. How was this done, and how
can we be sure that it was done correctly?
Answer. The possibility of extra heating associated with cities
biasing the global mean temperature records is a legitimate concern,
which scientists have researched over the past decade. The conclusion
of this research is that estimates of long-term global land-surface air
temperature trends are relatively little affected by whether or not the
averaging includes urban stations. Urban effects on globally averaged
land surface air temperatures do not exceed about 0.05 C over the
period 1900 to 1990, compared to an overall trend of about 0.7 C. This
conclusion has been reached by comparing the trend at urban stations to
that at rural stations (e.g., Peterson et al., 1999).
Question 8b. Satellite and Airborne Balloon Data Contradict Surface
Temperature Readings. Please explain whether this discrepancy is,
indeed, real and how to account for it.
Answer. A National Academies report released in 2000, Reconciling
Observations of Global Temperature Change, examined different types of
temperature measurements collected from 1979 to 1999 and concluded that
the warming trend in global-average surface temperature observations
during the previous 20 years is undoubtedly real and is substantially
greater than the average rate of warming during the 20th century. The
report concludes that the lower atmosphere actually may have warmed
much less rapidly than the surface from 1979 into the late 1990s, due
both to natural causes (e.g., the sequence of volcanic eruptions that
occurred within this particular 20-year period) and human activities
(e.g., the cooling of the upper part of the troposphere resulting from
ozone depletion in the stratosphere). The report spurred many research
groups to do similar analyses. Satellite observations of middle
troposphere temperatures, after several revisions of the data, now
compare reasonably with observations from surface stations and
radiosondes, although some uncertainties remain.
Question 8c. The Hockey Stick. Can you comment on whether the
observations depicted in the hockey stick curve are, indeed,
legitimate?
Answer. Observations of global mean surface temperature of the past
1000 years do show a rapid increase in the last 100 years, with
particularly significant warming in the last 30 years. This result has
been demonstrated by many different groups of scientists using
different assumptions and methodologies (see Figure 3).
Question 9. Some say that global warming might be a positive
development? Will agricultural crop productivity improve due to the
greater amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and can we expect
the Arctic and Antarctic regions to become more habitable?
Answer. There will be winners and losers from the impacts of
climate change, even within a single region, but globally the losses
are expected to outweigh the benefits. Some impacts include:
Some regions will have increased agricultural productivity
due to longer growing seasons, fertilization by higher levels
of atmospheric CO2, or changing precipitation
patterns, and there may be an overall increase in timber
productivity. However, other areas, particularly arid and semi-
arid regions, will have decreased agricultural productivity due
to likely decrease in available soil moisture.
Temperate and arctic regions will have decreased energy
demands for winter-time heating, although this brings the
negative impact of increased energy demands for summer-time
cooling.
Melting of sea-ice in the Arctic could open up new shipping
lanes and ecotourism opportunities.
Melting of the permafrost in the Arctic will compromise
infrastructure (e.g., roads and buildings) built on those
lands.
There will likely be shifts in plant and animal habitats,
both terrestrial and oceanic, in the Arctic. This could benefit
some aspects of life in the Arctic, but indigenous populations
who have traditional lifestyles will likely have difficulty
adapting quickly to the changes.
The changes in Antarctica are anticipated to take place more
slowly, so it is difficult to say whether the continent will
become more habitable anytime soon.
Question 10. It is my understanding that the assessments of the
progression of global warming through the next century and its impacts
on changing the Earth's climate are largely based on computer modeling.
It goes without saying that the planet's atmospheric, hydrologic, and
meteorological systems are highly complicated. What can you say about
how climate modeling capabilities have advanced since scientists began
evaluating the problem? What is the level confidence that the computer
models are providing useful projections of the future climate?
Answer. Climate system models are an important tool for
interpreting observations and assessing hypothetical futures. They are
mathematical computer-based expressions of the thermodynamics, fluid
motions, chemical reactions, and radiative transfer of Earth climate
that are as comprehensive as allowed by computational feasibility and
by scientific understanding of their formulation. Their purpose is to
calculate the evolving state of the global atmosphere, ocean, land
surface, and sea ice in response to external forcings of both natural
causes (such as solar and volcanic) and human causes (such as emissions
and land uses), given geography and initial material compositions. Such
models have been in use for several decades. They are continually
improved to increase their comprehensiveness with respect to spatial
resolution, temporal duration, biogeochemical complexity, and
representation of important effects of processes that cannot
practically be calculated on the global scale (such as clouds and
turbulent mixing). Formulating, constructing, and using such models and
analyzing, assessing, and interpreting their answers make climate
system models large and expensive enterprises. The rapid increase over
recent decades in available computational speed and power offers
opportunities for more elaborate, more realistic models, but requires
regular upgrading of the basic computers to avoid obsolescence. Their
simulation skill is limited by uncertainties in their formulation, the
limited size of their calculations, and the difficulty of interpreting
their answers that exhibit almost as much complexity as in nature (NRC,
2001b). Even though some scientists might prefer a simpler way to
project future climate, these models are currently the best option
because they are the only tool that can incorporate the relevant
information about the climate system.
The National Academies' report Improving the Effectiveness of U.S.
Climate Modeling (2001b) offers several recommendations for
strengthening climate modeling capabilities, some of which have already
been adopted in the United States. At the time the report was
published, U.S. modeling capabilities were lagging behind some other
countries. The report identified a shortfall in computing facilities
and highly skilled technical workers devoted to climate modeling.
Federal agencies have begun to centralize their support for climate
modeling efforts at the National Center for Atmospheric Research and
the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory. However, the U.S. could
still improve the amount of resources it puts toward climate modeling
as recommended in Planning Climate and Global Change Research (2003).
Question 11. The 2001 NAS review of climate-change science that you
chaired has been interpreted by some as reinforcing the view that
human-caused climate change is a real and urgent problem, while others
say it reinforces the view that the uncertainties are so large that no
action should be taken until they are reduced.
a. Which group is right?
b. If you were rewriting your report today, some four years later,
how would it be different?
Answer. NRC (2001a) describes the state of science on climate
change and does not address policy choices. In the intervening years,
new research has addressed some of the uncertainties identified in NRC
(2001a). In my opinion, if NRC (2001a) were written today, it would
give greater emphasis to at least four new findings:
Longer and more compelling temperature record:
The years 2001-2004 are four of the five hottest since the
late 1880s for global mean surface temperature (1998 was the
hottest).
Better Understanding of Surface and Atmospheric Temperature
Trends
Discrepancies among temperature measurements taken by
instruments on the surface of the Earth, on balloon-borne
radiosondes, and on satellite platforms engendered debate about
the warming trend. In recent years, corrections to each of the
data sets (e.g., Sherwood et al., 2005; Mears and Wentz, 2005)
along with improved understanding of atmospheric dynamics have
made it possible to eliminate the differences or else explain
them based on the physical understanding of the system. All
three data sets now have a significant warming trend at the
surface.
Ocean Heat Content Changes Consistent with Greenhouse
Warming:
The ocean, which represents the largest reservoir of heat in
the climate system, has warmed by about 0.12 F (0.06 C)
averaged over the layer extending from the surface down to 750
feet, since 1993. Recent studies have shown that the observed
heat storage in the oceans is consistent with expected impacts
of a human-enhanced greenhouse effect (Hansen et al., 2005).
Solar Variability too Small to Explain Warming:
One area of debate has been the extent to which variations in
the Sun might contribute to recent observed warming trends. The
Sun's total brightness has been measured by a series of
satellite-based instruments for more than two complete 11-year
solar cycles. Recent analyses of these measurements argue
against any detectable long-term trend in the observed
brightness to date. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the
Sun has been responsible for the warming observed over the past
25 years.
Responses of Ralph J. Cicerone to Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. Would you say that the steps America has taken in the
recent years to improve energy efficiency and produce lower carbon
emissions from power generation are the right first steps in addressing
climate change? Within that construct, given the current U.S.
electricity supply that is more than 50% derived from coal, is
encouraging clean coal technology, IGCC and carbon sequestration the
most important immediate policy action we can take?
Answer. Over the last several years, there have been dramatic
improvements in energy efficiency for most electricity using
technologies. For example, according to the National Academies' study,
Energy Research at DOE: Was It Worth It?, the sales-weighted average
electricity use by refrigerators sold in the United States dropped from
about 1365 kWh/year in 1979 to about 600 kWh/year in 2001.\1\ The
record for other electric appliances and air conditioning has also been
similar. Of course, there has also been a significant growth in the
number of such appliances installed over the same period due primarily
to the growth in the number of households. Coupled with increases in
the average size of a residence and in the number of electricity-using
devices per household, there has been continued growth in the demand
for electricity over the same period. According to the Energy
Information Administration total electricity use in the residential
sector has increased from 683 billion kWh in 1979 to 1203 billion kWh
in 2001. Similar behavior has been observed in the commercial sector
where electricity use has grown from 473 billion kWh in 1979 to 1080
billion kWh in 2001. The rates of growth in each of these sectors,
however, have been substantially less than the period prior to 1979.
Although there are many reasons for this change, it is likely that
increasing energy efficiency played a significant role. Furthermore,
the study mentioned above along with other, ongoing Academy work
suggest that there are a number of research opportunities for
increasing energy efficiency for a broad range of technologies.
Nevertheless, while past and projected energy efficiency can contribute
to at least a slowing of carbon emissions from electricity generation,
by itself, it is not likely to stop the growth in such emissions. A
1999 report by the Congressional Research Service, Global Climate
Change: Carbon Emissions and End-use Energy Demand (RL30036) discusses
this issue in more detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This report presents an analysis of a number of Department of
Energy energy efficiency and fossil fuel combustion technology research
programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research on sequestration of carbon dioxide from the combustion of
coal for electric power production could be a very important step for
halting the growth in carbon emissions. Clean coal technology and IGCC
were initially developed to minimize emissions of air pollutants, such
as sulfur dioxide. These technologies can contribute to carbon emission
reductions only to the extent that they increase the efficiency of coal
combustion and, possibly, make it easier to integrate carbon dioxide
sequestration technology. The latter has significant potential for
reducing carbon emissions, but its success is still uncertain.
Commercial, large-scale carbon sequestration is many years away, at
best, and research to reach this goal is important (Socolow, 2005). A
National Academies' workshop report, Novel Approaches to Carbon
Management: Separation, Capture, Sequestration, and Conversion to
Useful Products, presented a discussion of a number of new research
areas to attack this problem. Until commercial sequestration
technologies are available, however, carbon emission reductions can
probably best be achieved by encouraging the construction of natural-
gas fired generation plants instead of coal. The domestic supply of
natural gas appears to be limited, and production increases may not be
possible much longer. Therefore to continue this path towards
constraining carbon emissions, increasing the importation of natural
gas, generally in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), probably is
essential.
In formulating a national strategy for minimizing CO2
emissions from energy production and use, we should consider a range of
technology options, from improving energy efficiency to carbon
sequestration to nuclear energy. It is important to clearly and
carefully develop reasonable expectations of potential emissions
reductions associated with the full suite of technology options.
Question 2. While you have presented what appears to be a united
scientific front in the form of the statement from the academies of
science from 11 countries, I am concerned by some of the news since the
release of that statement. The Russian Academy of Sciences says it was
misrepresented and that Russian scientists actually believe that the
Kyoto Protocol was scientifically ungrounded. I am also aware that
there was a significant misrepresentation on the science between our
academy and the British representative. Given this background, wouldn't
you say there are still some pretty fundamental disagreements about the
science of climate change among scientists around the world?
Answer. No, disagreements about the underlying science are actually
relatively minor. The statement agreed to by the science academies of
the G8 nations, China, India, and Brazil makes this quite clear. The
full statement can be viewed at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/morenews/20050607.html. Note also that
the statement does not address the relative merits of the Kyoto
Protocol. Disagreements remain between governments in terms of
determining an appropriate policy response.
Question 3. In this international academies statement, you find
that an ``immediate response that will, at a reasonable cost, prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,'' but
continue to say in the following paragraph, ``minimizing the amount of
this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge.'' Could you please elaborate, since any response can't both
be a ``reasonable cost'' and a ``huge challenge'' proposition, how you
resolve the two?
Answer. The question has taken out of context two phrases from the
statement produced by the science academies of the G8 nations, Brazil,
China and India. The two paragraphs in full are as follows:
``Action taken now to reduce significantly the build-up of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will lessen the magnitude
and rate of climate change. As the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognises, a lack of
full scientific certainty about some aspects of climate change
is not a reason for delaying an immediate response that will,
at a reasonable cost, prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.
As nations and economies develop over the next 25 years,
world primary energy demand is estimated to increase by almost
60%. Fossil fuels, which are responsible for the majority of
carbon dioxide emissions produced by human activities, provide
valuable resources for many nations and are projected to
provide 85% of this demand (IEA 2004). Minimising the amount of
this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge. There are many potentially cost-effective
technological options that could contribute to stabilising
greenhouse gas concentrations. These are at various stages of
research and development. However barriers to their broad
deployment still need to be overcome.''
In the first paragraph above, the goal of preventing dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system is identified and
the second paragraph recognizes that this is a challenging goal, for
which potential technological options are becoming available, but not
yet widely deployed. Indeed, the statement of the eleven national
science academies recommends several actions to work towards meeting
the goal:
``Identify cost-effective steps that can be taken now to
contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global
greenhouse gas emissions. Recognise that delayed action will
increase the risk of adverse environmental effects and will
likely incur a greater cost.
Work with developing nations to build a scientific and
technological capacity best suited to their circumstances,
enabling them to develop innovative solutions to mitigate and
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, while
explicitly recognising their legitimate development rights.
Show leadership in developing and deploying clean energy
technologies and approaches to energy efficiency, and share
this knowledge with all other nations.''
Question 4. Several scientists have cited events like the high
temperatures in Europe in the summer of 2003 and increased storminess
in the 1980s and 1990s as evidence of climate change. Don't global
ecosystems go through natural periods similar to these as well?
Answer. Yes, climate variability is known to have occurred
throughout Earth's history, presumably due to natural causes.
Scientists have hypothesized that human-caused global warming will lead
to more frequent and more severe extreme events, including heat waves,
severe storms, and hurricanes. A recent climate modeling study found
that European heat waves in the latter half of the 21st century may be
more intense, more frequent, and longer lasting than those of the late
20th century (Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004). However, it is not possible to
determine definitively whether events such as the 2003 European heat
wave are due to human or natural causes.
Question 5. There are a number of astrophysicists and other
scientists who believe that sunspots are a major contributor to
changing temperatures. A recent survey showed at least 100 such studies
are underway. Why don't scientists put as much emphasis on this
possibility or other aspects of natural climate variability as they do
on emissions from human activity?
Answer. Actually, scientists have conducted significant research on
natural climate variability, including how solar variability,
volcanoes, the biosphere, weathering of rocks, and other natural
processes can affect climate. Research on climate variability also
addresses multiple modes of natural variability in the climate system,
such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the North Atlantic
Oscillation (NAO), and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), and the
extent to which these longer term (multi-year to multi-decadal)
variations might explain recent trends. So far, none of these processes
have been able to explain the increases in global mean temperature
observed since the late 1970s.
The extent to which variations in the Sun might contribute to
recent observed warming trends is an area of active research. The Sun's
brightness--its total irradiance--has been measured continuously by a
series of satellite-based instruments for more than two complete 11-
year solar cycles. These multiple solar irradiance datasets have been
combined into a composite time series of daily total solar irradiance
from 1979 to the present. Different assumptions about radiometer
performance lead to different reconstructions for the past two decades.
Recent analyses of these measurements, taking into account instrument
calibration offsets and drifts, argue against any detectable long-term
trend in the observed irradiance to date. Likewise, models of total
solar irradiance variability that account for the influences of solar
activity features--dark sunspots and bright faculae--do not predict a
secular change in the past two decades. Thus, it is difficult to
conclude from either measurements or models that the Sun has been
responsible for the warming observed over the past 25 years, although
this hypothesis was more plausible before the availability of more
recent evidence.
Knowledge of solar irradiance variations prior to the commencement
of continuous space-based irradiance observations in 1979 is
rudimentary. Models of sunspot and facular influences developed from
the contemporary database have been used to extrapolate daily
variations during the 11-year cycle back to about 1950 using
contemporary sunspot and facular proxies, and with less certainty
annually to 1610. Circumstantial evidence from cosmogenic isotope
proxies of solar activity (14C and 10Be) and
plausible variations in Sun-like stars motivated an assumption of long-
term secular irradiance trends, but recent work questions the evidence
from both (Lean et al., 2002). Very recent studies of the long term
evolution and transport of activity features using solar models suggest
that secular solar irradiance variations may be limited in amplitude to
about half the amplitude of the 11-year cycle.
Question 6. Much of the discussion about climate science being
settled is based on the summary chapter of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change of the United Nations. The chapter made specific
predictions about the pace of rising temperatures and the relative
importance of human activities to climate change. And yet, the body of
the report is much more ambiguous and inconclusive about the current
state of the science. Is anything being done to ensure that the summary
of the next IPCC report is more reflective of the overall analysis by
the scientists?
Answer. Certainly some nuance will be lost when summarizing
hundreds of pages of detailed text in a 59-page Technical Summary or a
17-page Summary for Policymakers, as was the case for the Working Group
I portion of the IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a). Yet, it is
not clear that the summaries represented the state of science
differently than the full text. The 2001 NRC report Climate Change
Science concluded the following:
``The committee finds that the full IPCC Working Group I
(WGI) report is an admirable summary of research activities in
climate science, and the full report is adequately summarized
in the Technical Summary. The full WGI report and its Technical
Summary are not specifically directed at policy. The Summary
for Policymakers reflects less emphasis on communicating the
basis for uncertainty and a stronger emphasis on areas of major
concern associated with human induced climate change. This
change in emphasis appears to be the result of a summary
process in which scientists work with policy makers on the
document.
Written responses from U.S. coordinating and lead scientific
authors to the committee indicate, however, that (a) no changes
were made without the consent of the convening lead authors
(this group represents a fraction of the lead and contributing
authors) and (b) most changes that did occur lacked significant
impact.
It is critical that the IPCC process remain truly
representative of the scientific community. The committee's
concerns focus primarily on whether the process is likely to
become less representative in the future because of the growing
voluntary time commitment required to participate as a lead or
coordinating author and the potential that the scientific
process will be viewed as being too heavily influenced by
governments which have specific postures with regard to
treaties, emission controls, and other policy instruments. The
United States should promote actions that improve the IPCC
process while also ensuring that its strengths are
maintained.'' (NRC, 2001a)
Another IPCC assessment is underway now, with the reports due to be
released in 2007. It is our understanding that similar measures will be
taken to ensure that the summaries accurately reflect the body of the
report. For this Fourth Assessment Report, Working Group I is co-
chaired by Susan Solomon, a highly respected scientist employed by the
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Question 7. The natural ``greenhouse effect'' has been known for
nearly two hundred years and is essential to the provision of our
current climate. There is significant research in the literature today
that indicates humans, since the beginning of their existence, have
caused an increase in the greenhouse effect. Some argue that the
development of agriculture 6,000 to 8,000 years ago has helped to
forestall the next ice age. The development of cities, thinning of
forests, population growth, and most recently the burning of fossil
fuels, have all had an impact on climate change. Our ecosystems have
constantly adapted to change, as we as humans have adapted to our
ecosystems as well. Is it possible that the increased presence of
CO2 caused by the 8,000 years of modern human existence may
be something our ecosystems will continue, as they previously have, to
naturally adapt to?
Answer. Yes, many ecosystems and human systems will likely be able
to adapt to some of the changes associated with global warming. But,
CO2 and other greenhouse gases have increased much more
rapidly in the past century than at any other time for which we have
clear documentation and the levels of these gases are higher than at
anytime in the last 420,000 years (Petit et al., 1999). Thus,
greenhouse warming is happening more rapidly than ecosystems are
accustomed to.
It is not clear how well natural systems will be able to adapt to
this more rapid and significant change. It is likely that there will be
major disruptions to some ecosystems and that terrestrial plant and
animal species will be unable to migrate quickly enough to accommodate
regional climatic changes. Without intervention, it is likely that more
species will become endangered in the coming decades due to climatic
changes in habitat combined with human-caused fragmentation of habitats
and restriction of migration routes. Habitats of marine species are
expected to shift poleward, with an expansion in habitat for warm-water
species and a decrease in habitat for cold-water species. (IPCC, 2001b)
Question 8. Dr. Cicerone, you said that ``Observations and data are
the foundation of climate change science.'' Yet observational data is
available for at best the past 140 years. And reconstructive climate
data for the last 2000 years offers widely divergent conclusions as to
timing of trends, peaks and troughs. Climate change is a phenomenon
most apparent over significantly larger time periods. While the panel
before us presented temperature and CO2 level reconstruction
that paints the 20th century as one-time anomaly, could you summarize
the research that indicates contrary positions? Isn't it true that at
previous times in the earth's history CO2 emissions have
been exponentially higher than current levels?
Answer. Actually, observations of the last 2000 years do not offer
widely divergent conclusions as to the timing of trends, peaks, and
troughs. In fact, all the estimates of global mean observed surface
temperature of the past 1000 years show a rapid increase in the last
100 years, with particularly significant warming in the last 30 years
reaching maximum temperatures in the late 1990s and early 21st century.
This result has been demonstrated by many different groups of
scientists using different assumptions and methodologies (see Figure
1).* It is consistent with direct measurements of the greenhouse gases
CO2 and CH4 extracted from ice cores.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Retained in committee files.
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Global mean temperatures over geological timescales are
hypothesized to have been much warmer (and much colder) at times. Based
on models and inferences about atmospheric composition from geological
data, it is thought that the early Earth (i.e., billions of years ago)
was warmed by a high concentration of greenhouse gases, probably mainly
CO2, perhaps in the range of a few hundred to 1000 times
present atmospheric levels (Kump et al., 2000). To explain such high
levels of atmospheric CO2, most attention has focused on the
dominant process that draws down atmospheric CO2 relative to
production on geological timescales: the chemical weathering of
continental silicate rocks. In a planet with much less exposed land
mass, this removal process for CO2 would be much slower,
allowing CO2 to build up in the atmosphere. It should be
emphasized, however, that this hypothesis is based largely on models
and inference rather than conclusive proxy evidence. Also, the changes
associated with global warming are happening at a much more rapid pace
than those that may have happened on geological timescales.
Geological evidence also suggests that atmospheric CO2
changed dramatically on timescales of a few to tens of millions of
years during much of the Phanerozoic eon (from about 540 million years
ago until 20 million years ago). The record suggests that for at least
two-thirds of the last 400 million years, levels of atmospheric
CO2 were 5-10 times higher than at present. It appears that
these oscillations in atmospheric CO2 were linked to
recurring changes from greenhouse to icehouse climate states (Berner
and Kothavala, 2001; Royer et al., 2004).
Question 9. The panel touched on some energy alternatives such as
biomass, natural gas, and nuclear power, yet there was little mention
of hydrogen power. From a scientific viewpoint, where do you think we
are on being able to really utilize hydrogen power? What is the
potential of hydrogen power?
Answer. Hydrogen, like electricity, is an energy carrier, not a
primary fuel. It must be made from other energy sources. It has the
potential for reducing carbon emissions if it is generated from non-
fossil energy (nuclear or renewables) or if the carbon from fossil fuel
sources is sequestered. The National Academies has recently issued two
major reports on the subject of hydrogen covering the potential of
future technologies for its production, as well as its use in
transportation and stationary applications: The Hydrogen Economy--
Opportunities, Costs, Barriers, and R&D Needs (2004), and Review of the
Research Program of the Freedom CAR and Fuel Partnership (2005).
Transforming the current petroleum-based transportation system, for
example, to a clean, hydrogen-fueled system is extremely challenging
requiring a fundamental transformation of automotive technologies and
the supporting fuel infrastructure. Even if all the technical
challenges are met, transitioning from the current fuel infrastructure
based on gasoline and diesel fuel to one based on hydrogen derived from
a variety of sources (e.g., coal, natural gas, solar, wind, biological
conversion, nuclear) will be a formidable social and economic
challenge. Research and development in support of such a transformation
is justified by the potentially enormous beneficial impact to the
nation.
Much progress has been made in many hydrogen technologies, such as
fuel cells. Nevertheless, many technical barriers exist and need to be
overcome, and fundamental invention is probably needed to achieve
performance and cost levels that will lead to cost competitive hydrogen
and commercially acceptable vehicles. For example, fuel cells face
performance, durability, efficiency and cost issues, and hydrogen
storage for onboard vehicles faces difficult size, weight and cost
barriers. Even assuming that the technical and cost targets for
commercial readiness could be met in the 2015 to 2020 time frame, it
would take many decades for the turnover of the vehicle fleet in order
to have a significant impact on carbon emissions from the
transportation sector. This implies that the conventional internal
combustion engine will be the automotive power plant that consumes most
of the fuel in the vehicle fleet for several decades to come and
improving technology to reduce fuel consumption and emissions from
internal combustion engines is, therefore, critically important as
well.
Question 10. The panel established very clearly that we should
adopt policies that decrease carbon emissions regardless of any other
carbon emissions policies we pursue. We are currently or will shortly
be providing expanded incentives for clean coal, nuclear energy and
renewable fuels. Do you feel this is money well spent? What
technologies do you feel the government should be more involved in
developing?
Answer. Nuclear and renewable energy technologies release very
little carbon. As noted above, clean coal technology and IGCC coupled
with full sequestration can also result in little or not carbon
emissions. All of these technologies, however, have drawbacks. The
economic competitiveness of nuclear energy is still questionable
compared to current fossil technologies under existing regulatory
conditions, and issues of nuclear waste and public acceptance still
remain. Only a few renewable energy technologies are economic at this
time, and then only at particularly favorable sites. Also, as noted,
the successful development of carbon sequestration is uncertain.
Nevertheless, these are our options for carbon-free fuels.
In the transportation sector, it will also be important to
understand the competition that will arise between electricity-based,
liquid-fuel-based (e.g., cellulosic ethanol), and hydrogen-based
transportation technologies. This is particularly important as clean
alternative combustion engines and hybrid vehicles, fuel cells, and
batteries evolve. Understanding which pathway, or combination of
pathways, will provide the best opportunities for reducing CO2
emissions and improving energy security will require a balanced
research and development portfolio and extensive systems analysis.
In all of these cases, continued research and development is
important. There remains, however, the question of how best to pursue
the goal of reducing carbon emissions. A systematic, comprehensive
comparison of the options described in the above three questions has
not been done. Such an analysis would have to account for the complex
array of economic, technical, environmental, regulatory, and public
acceptance issues that affect each of the options. With the results of
this assessment in hand, policy choices that provide effective
incentives for the most promising carbon management options are more
probable.
Responses of Ralph J. Cicerone to Questions From Senator Talent
Question 1. The Academies letter says that it is ``likely'' that
man is the cause of global warming--what exactly do we know, and what
are we inferring from the data we have? How well to the models of today
replicate actual observed climate patterns of recent times? What margin
of error do you attach to the best models we have today?
Answer. It is likely that most of the global mean surface
temperature increase since the late 1970s is due to human activities.
This conclusion is consistent with that reached by Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their 2001 assessment of the
scientific literature and the 2001 report of the NRC Climate Change
Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions.
This conclusion is generally based on studies that compare the
observed climate record from 1860 to today with global mean temperature
simulated in three computational climate model scenarios:
1) Only natural variability (due to solar and volcanic
variability)
2) Only anthropogenic variability (due to greenhouse gases
and aerosols)
3) Both natural and anthropogenic variability
In these studies, the models run with only natural variability are
unable to reproduce the warming observed since the late 1970s,
typically showing no trend over this time period (e.g., Stott et al.,
2000; Meehl et al., 2004). Thus, we conclude that human-caused climate
forcings have disrupted Earth's energy balance, causing an increase in
global mean surface temperatures (NRC, 2005).
Improved understanding of the natural variability of the climate
system supports the conclusion that human activities are mostly
responsible for global temperature increases of the past three decades.
In particular, new studies of solar variability show that there has
been little if any trend in the Sun's brightness over the past 25
years, ruling out solar variability as a major driver of observed
warming (see Response to #2 for more details).
Because of the still uncertain level of natural variability
inherent in the climate record and the uncertainties in the time
histories of the various forcing agents, a causal linkage between the
buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the observed climate
changes during the 20th century cannot be unequivocally established.
The fact that the magnitude of the observed warming is large in
comparison to natural variability as simulated in climate models is
suggestive of such a linkage, but it does not constitute
incontrovertible proof of one because the model simulations could be
deficient in natural variability on the decadal to century time scale.
Question 2. There are a number of astrophysicists and other
scientists who believe that sunspots are a major contributor to
changing temperatures. A recent survey showed at least 100 such studies
are underway. Why don't scientists put as much emphasis on this
possibility or other aspects of natural climate variability as they do
on emissions from human activity?
Answer. Actually, scientists have conducted significant research on
natural climate variability, including how solar variability,
volcanoes, the biosphere, weathering of rocks, and other natural
processes can affect climate. Research on climate variability also
addresses multiple modes of natural variability in the climate system,
such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the North Atlantic
Oscillation (NAO), and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), and the
extent to which these longer term (multi-year to multi-decadal)
variations might explain recent trends. So far, none of these processes
have been able to explain the increases in global mean temperature
observed since the late 1970s.
The extent to which variations in the Sun might contribute to
recent observed warming trends is an area of active research. The Sun's
brightness--its total irradiance--has been measured continuously by a
series of satellite-based instruments for more than two complete 11-
year solar cycles. These multiple solar irradiance datasets have been
combined into a composite time series of daily total solar irradiance
from 1979 to the present. Different assumptions about radiometer
performance lead to different reconstructions for the past two decades.
Recent analyses of these measurements, taking into account instrument
calibration offsets and drifts, argue against any detectable long-term
trend in the observed irradiance to date. Likewise, models of total
solar irradiance variability that account for the influences of solar
activity features--dark sunspots and bright faculae--do not predict a
secular change in the past two decades. Thus, it is difficult to
conclude from either measurements or models that the Sun has been
responsible for the warming observed over the past 25 years, although
this hypothesis was more plausible before the availability of more
recent evidence.
Knowledge of solar irradiance variations prior to the commencement
of continuous space-based irradiance observations in 1979 is
rudimentary. Models of sunspot and facular influences developed from
the contemporary database have been used to extrapolate daily
variations during the 11-year cycle back to about 1950 using
contemporary sunspot and facular proxies, and with less certainty
annually to 1610. Circumstantial evidence from cosmogenic isotope
proxies of solar activity (14C and 10Be) and
plausible variations in Sun-like stars motivated an assumption of long-
term secular irradiance trends, but recent work questions the evidence
from both (Lean et al., 2002). Very recent studies of the long term
evolution and transport of activity features using solar models suggest
that secular solar irradiance variations may be limited in amplitude to
about half the amplitude of the 11-year cycle.
Question 3. Is it true that the Canadian Climate Center study and
the U.K. Hadley Center studies used by the Clinton Administration to
justify Kyoto were the two that predicted the most extreme results? Is
it also true that Dr. Pat Michaels and Tom Karl of NOAA independently
confirmed that these models could not reproduce past U.S. temperature
trends over any averaging period (e.g., 5, 10, or 25 year periods)?
Didn't the Canadian model over-predict warming by 300%?
Answer. To my knowledge, the Clinton Administration never used any
specific models to ``justify Kyoto.'' The U.S. National Assessment of
Potential Climate Change Impacts (NAST, 2000) did use climate scenarios
from both the Canadian Climate Center (CCC) and the U.K. Hadley Center
in its analyses, along with several other models and historical data.
The National Assessment, which fulfills the requirements of the U.S.
Global Change Research Act of 1990, evaluated the potential risk to the
United States from climate impacts if greenhouse gas emissions
continued on a business-as-usual trajectory. It did not consider any
Kyoto-based analyses. The two models were selected by the National
Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST), an independent, non-governmental
committee for several reasons:
1) They were published and part of the international debate
leading to the IPCC reports, also completed in 2001.
2) The model computations covered the period from 1895 to
2100, allowing the National Assessment to (a) compare model
results and historical observations to judge the veracity of
the simulations and (b) examine future climate conditions
projected by the models.
3) They preserved model results on a daily basis (rather than
monthly means, for example), allowing the National Assessment
to include ecosystem impact analysis.
4) They provided access to all the available model results.
5) They bracketed the range of model simulations or, in other
words, they were far from the most extreme results. The CCC
model was one of the warmer models in the IPCC family, whereas
the Hadley Center model was at the lower end of the spectrum,
but somewhat closer to the middle (see NAST, 2001, p. 31-40).
These two models were not the only ones used in the National
Assessment. Some participants also used the National Center for
Atmospheric Research (NCAR) Climate System Model, however it was not
ready until part way through the assessment so not every group included
it. At the time, U.S. modeling capabilities were lagging behind some
other countries, in part because of a shortfall in computing facilities
and highly skilled technical workers devoted to climate modeling (NRC,
2001b). In addition to global models, some participants in the National
Assessment also looked at historical analogues or regional model
simulations.
In regard to the questions about the accuracy of the models, it is
important to note that all global climate models have some flaws. All
the models used in the National Assessment were compared to
observations to judge their ability to simulate the last 100 years. All
the available models suggest a warming range of 0.4 to 0.8 C over the
20th century, which is the same range as the observations. The Hadley
model predicts 0.55 C and the Canadian 0.7 C, well within the
observed range. The Canadian model did not over-predict 20th century
global mean temperature trends by 300%. Most models of this generation
captured the ups and downs of the observed record of the last 100 years
when they included the impacts of solar variability, greenhouse gases,
and aerosols. However, they were not designed in a way to perfectly
reproduce the year-to-year variation for a specific region over any
period of years in the 20th century. Thus, conclusions in the National
Assessment about interannual variation were not based on the global
model results.
Question 4. To what degree can we attribute warming to controllable
GHG emissions, i.e., what portion of the observed warming is due to
human emissions?
Answer. It is likely that most of the global mean surface
temperature increase since the late 1970s is due to human activities.
This conclusion is consistent with that reached by Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in their 2001 assessment of the
scientific literature and the 2001 report of the NRC Climate Change
Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions.
This conclusion is generally based on studies that compare the
observed climate record from 1860 to today with global mean temperature
simulated in three computational climate model scenarios:
1) Only natural variability (due to solar and volcanic
variability)
2) Only anthropogenic variability (due to greenhouse gases
and aerosols)
3) Both natural and anthropogenic variability
In these studies, the models run with only natural variability are
unable to reproduce the warming observed since the late 1970s,
typically showing no trend over this time period (e.g., Stott et al.,
2000; Meehl et al., 2004). Thus, we conclude that human-caused climate
forcings have disrupted Earth's energy balance, causing an increase in
global mean surface temperatures (NRC, 2005).
Question 5. Assuming the technology was available today, what would
be the necessary GHG emissions cuts in the U.S.A to stop the warming
and level out global temperatures? Does this assume no increases in
emissions by developing nations?
Answer. Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for many
decades and major parts of the climate system respond slowly to changes
in greenhouse gas concentrations. Although carbon dioxide is the most
significant greenhouse gas perturbed by humans, other anthropogenic
greenhouse gases also have an important impact on climate. These
include (1) methane, for which concentrations have increased by about a
factor of 2.5 since preindustrial times, but have stopped increasing
more recently for unknown reasons; (2) halocarbons such as
chlorofluorocarbons, whose emissions were controlled because they
contribute to ozone depletion in the stratosphere; and (3) nitrous
oxide, which continues to rise.
Even if greenhouse gas levels were stabilized instantly at today's
levels, the climate would still continue to change as it adapts to the
increased emissions of recent decades, as illustrated in Figure 1. For
current models with a midrange climate sensitivity and average
assumptions about the greenhouse effects of atmospheric aerosols,
Wigley (2005) estimates that global mean surface temperatures will
increase by about 0.4 C over the next 400 years, with most of the
warming occurring within the first 100 years (see the center red line
in Figure 1).* Thus, even with no greenhouse gas emissions from this
point forward, we would be experiencing the impacts of climate change
throughout the 21st century and beyond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because instantly stopping all greenhouse gas emissions is
unrealistic, scientists have considered what steps would be necessary
to stabilize atmospheric CO2 levels at several targets
ranging from 450 ppm to 1000 ppm (compared to today's levels of 380 ppm
and pre-industrial concentrations of 280 ppm). Depending on the target,
a range of emissions cuts are required by developed and developing
countries. For example, Wigley (1997) found that to achieve CO2
stabilization at 550 ppm, developed countries would need to begin
reducing emissions 1% a year by 2010 and developing countries would
need to do so by 2030. Note that stabilizing CO2
concentrations at 550 ppm is estimated to lead to a global mean
temperature increase of about 2.5 C over 1990 levels in 2150 (IPCC,
2001).
Question 6. The statement from the academies of science from 11
countries has turned out to be quite controversial. The Russian Academy
of Sciences says it was misrepresented in the statement and that
Russian scientists actually believe that the Kyoto Protocol was
scientifically ungrounded. Also, the president of the American Academy
has complained that his British counterpart misrepresented the U.S.
view of the science and that there might be an end to future
collaboration between U.S. and British scientists. Aren't there still
some pretty fundamental disagreements about the science of climate
change among scientists around the world?
Answer. No, disagreements about the underlying science are actually
relatively minor. The statement agreed to by the science academies of
the G8 nations, China, India, and Brazil makes this quite clear. The
full statement can be viewed at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/morenews/20050607.html. Note also that
the statement does not address the relative merits of the Kyoto
Protocol. Disagreements remain between governments in terms of
determining an appropriate policy response.
Question 7. The 4th paragraph of the joint science academies'
statement talks about undertaking an ``immediate response that will, at
a reasonable cost, PREVENT dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.'' But the 5th paragraph says, ``minimizing the
amount of this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge.'' Since it can't be both, would you describe the measure you
would endorse as a ``reasonable cost'' proposition or a ``huge
challenge''?
Answer. The question has taken out of context two phrases from the
statement produced by the science academies of the G8 nations, Brazil,
China and India. The two paragraphs in full are as follows:
``Action taken now to reduce significantly the build-up of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will lessen the magnitude
and rate of climate change. As the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognises, a lack of
full scientific certainty about some aspects of climate change
is not a reason for delaying an immediate response that will,
at a reasonable cost, prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.
As nations and economies develop over the next 25 years,
world primary energy demand is estimated to increase by almost
60%. Fossil fuels, which are responsible for the majority of
carbon dioxide emissions produced by human activities, provide
valuable resources for many nations and are projected to
provide 85% of this demand (IEA 2004)3. Minimising the amount
of this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge. There are many potentially cost-effective
technological options that could contribute to stabilising
greenhouse gas concentrations. These are at various stages of
research and development. However barriers to their broad
deployment still need to be overcome.''
In the first paragraph above, the goal of preventing dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system is identified and
the second paragraph recognizes that this is a challenging goal, for
which potential technological options are becoming available, but not
yet widely deployed. Indeed, the statement of the eleven national
science academies recommends several actions to work towards meeting
the goal:
``Identify cost-effective steps that can be taken now to
contribute to substantial and long-term reduction in net global
greenhouse gas emissions. Recognise that delayed action will
increase the risk of adverse environmental effects and will
likely incur a greater cost.
Work with developing nations to build a scientific and
technological capacity best suited to their circumstances,
enabling them to develop innovative solutions to mitigate and
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, while
explicitly recognising their legitimate development rights.
Show leadership in developing and deploying clean energy
technologies and approaches to energy efficiency, and share
this knowledge with all other nations.''
Question 8. If all the countries that have signed Kyoto stay within
compliance of Kyoto, how much of a reduction in global warming would
this result in?
Answer. Estimates for warming between 1990 and 2100 range from 1.4
to 5.8 C (IPCC, 2001). In the analysis of Reilly et al. (1999), if all
nations complied with the Kyoto Protocol, global mean surface
temperatures would be about 0.5 C less than if no intervention is
taken. At the treaty's implementation in February 2005, the agreement
had been ratified by 141 countries representing about 60% of global
emissions. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol as currently being implemented,
might be expected to reduce future warming by about 0.3 C by 2100.
Question 9. Can you confirm that suspended water vapor levels,
cloud cover percentages and direct solar irradiation changes over time
all represent variables in these forecasting models that could have
significant impacts on the conclusions of the results of these models?
Answer. Yes, water vapor, cloud cover, and solar irradiation are
important variables that all climate models incorporate.
Question 10. In looking at pre-industrial global temperature
patterns, would you agree that changes in temperatures over time have
occurred that had no anthropogenic basis?
Answer. Yes, pre-industrial temperature showed natural climate
variability, likely due to solar variability, volcanoes, the biosphere,
weathering of rocks, and other natural processes. There are also
multiple modes of natural variability in the climate system, such as
the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the North Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO), and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), which cause longer
term (multi-year to multi-decadal) variations.
Question 11. Do we know what the ``best'' global temperature is to
sustain life?
Answer. No, but we do know that human systems have developed in a
way to take advantage of current climate conditions. We live and have
built major infrastructure along coastlines, assuming that sea levels
will not change significantly. We have developed agricultural lands in
locations that current climate conditions favor. We have constructed
elaborate systems to distribute fresh water that depend on current snow
pack levels, rainfall amounts, and river flows. These and other major
infrastructural investments are not easily or quickly shifted. Thus,
while humans--especially those who live in richer and more educated
countries--will no doubt be able to adapt, it is unlikely that they
could do so without exacting economic, health, and other tolls.
Question 12. What is currently being done to curb emissions from
parts of the world in poverty who are deforesting their environment and
burning biomass for all means of day-to-day living, and are these
emissions continuing to increase in the world?
Answer. I am not familiar with efforts to control biomass burning
emissions in developing countries. Based on satellite observations of
large fires, Duncan et al. (2003) found no significant trends in
emissions from burning of forests and grasslands over the past two
decades. Their analysis did not consider emissions from burning biofuel
(e.g., wood, agricultural waste) for day-to-day living. Streets et al.
(2001) analyzed greenhouse gas emissions from China over the 1990s and
found a slow decline in emissions from the use of biofuel for cooking
and heating.
Question 13. Do you believe it is practical to seek emission
controls in parts of the world that are struggling in poverty?
Answer. Whether to seek emission controls in impoverished parts of
the world is largely a policy decision, for which science and
technology can inform only part of the answer. Certainly, higher
quality fuels and better developed technology for using those fuels
provide greater energy output and less pollution. So, there are
compelling reasons for curbing emissions in these countries in addition
to addressing global warming.
Question 14. What is being done to curb emissions in the developing
countries like China and India?
Answer. Streets et al. (2001) analyzed greenhouse gas emissions
from China over the 1990s and found that emissions increased
significantly from 1990 until about 1996, when they began decreasing
until 2000. They attribute the decrease to a radical reform of China's
coal and energy industries, as well as the economic downturn in China
associated with the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998. At the time,
the authors predicted that as China's economy recovered from the
economic downturn and completed major reforms, rates of greenhouse gas
emissions would begin to slowly increase. More recently, China has
taken several steps to begin controlling their greenhouse gas
emissions, including:
In October, 2004 China enacted their first fuel efficiency
standards for new passenger cars (see http://www.usatoday.com/
money/world/2004-10-08-china-fuel-efficiency_x.htm ). The first
phase began this summer. The second phase begins in 2008 and
mandates a 10% improvement. Unlike U.S. standards which
regulate corporate averages, the Chinese standards set a
maximum fuel consumption rate for every vehicle sold, with the
rate varying for 32 different car and truck weight classes.
In January 2005, the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) published the China Medium and Long Term
Energy Conservation Plan which targets an average annual
reduction of 2.2% in energy intensity to 2010. The main thrust
of the plan is to give priority to energy conservation over
development of new energy sources.
In March, 2005 China enacted a renewable energy law
requiring an increase in consumption of renewable energy from
current levels of about 3% to 10% by 2020. My understanding is
that renewable energy in the law includes hydroelectricity,
wind power, solar energy, geothermal energy and marine energy.
(See http://www.renewableenergyaccess.com/assets/download/
China_RE_ Law_05.doc)
China's Air Conditioner Energy Efficiency Standards have
recently been tightened by 10-20%
Emissions from India have increased significantly over the past
several decades as the country has become more industrialized. Analyses
by Shukla et al. (e.g., 2003) indicate that a portfolio of strategies--
including increasing efficiency, upgrading transportation systems, and
penetration of renewable and nuclear energy sources--will likely be
necessary to control emissions as India's economy and population expand
in the coming decades. I am not familiar with specific measures to
control emissions in India.
Responses of Ralph J. Cicerone to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Is there any credible scenario for stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions that does not involve the United States and
other major emitters stopping their emissions growth over the next
couple of decades and sharply reversing their emissions growth by 2050?
Answer. Stabilizing CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere
requires CO2 emissions to drop well below current levels.
Although the ocean has the capacity to uptake 70 to 80% of foreseeable
anthropogenic CO2 emissions, this process takes centuries
due to the slow rate of ocean mixing. It is hard to envision any
scenario for stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions and the resultant
concentrations of these gases in the atmosphere that does not involve
significant emissions reductions by major emitters.
Question 2. Would the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal stop and then reverse U.S. greenhouse gas emissions?
Answer. My understanding is that the proposal by the National
Commission on Energy Policy aims to slow, stop, and then reverse growth
in the rate of greenhouse gas emissions. Under the proposal, total
annual emissions would continue to increase until around 2020, then
level out, and eventually start to decrease.
______
Responses of Sir John Houghton to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Over the last several decades, anthropogenic emissions
have ``substantially contributed'' to the increase in average global
temperatures. Upon receiving a question from one of the Senators, one
of the panelists suggested that ``80 percent'' of the warming was due
to human activities. Do all the panelists agree? Please provide
information as to how this estimate was derived.
Answer. I was not the panelist that quoted the 80%. It is, however,
close to the estimate that I have also often quoted quite independently
and arrived at as follows. In answering the question of how much of the
recent warming is due to human activities there are two relevant
considerations: (1) estimates of radiative forcing and (2) estimates of
natural variability. I deal with these in turn.
ESTIMATES OF RADIATIVE FORCING
It is the radiative forcings that are driving change. For the
latest estimates of radiative forcings I refer to the paper by J.
Hansen et al., Earth's Energy Imbalance: Confirmation and Implications,
in Sciencexpress for 2 May 2005--a paper that provides more detail and
updates similar information in Fig 3 in the Summary for Policymakers
(SPM) and in chapter 6 of the IPCC 2001 Report, Climate Change 2001:
the Scientific Basis.
`Natural' forcings are mainly those due to volcanoes (in Hansen's
paper the blue line labelled stratospheric aerosols--because it is dust
in the stratosphere that causes forcings from volcanoes) and changes in
solar irradiance. The estimated solar irradiance change of about 0.2
watts per square metre occurred mostly in the first half of the 20th
century and is believed to be a significant factor in leading to the
warming during that period. Changes in solar radiation in the second
half of the century are small as indicated from measurements from
satellite instruments since the 1970s.
The other forcings are almost entirely anthropogenic (apart from a
small component of black carbon from `natural' forest fires). Note that
greenhouse gases provide by far the largest positive (warming) forcing
and that significant negative (cooling) forcing comes from
anthropogenic aerosols. This latter is sometimes called global dimming
as it tends to offset some of the greenhouse gas warming. Note that by
far the largest contribution to radiative forcing over the last 50
years comes from increases in greenhouse gases and that at least 95% of
the positive (warming) forcing over this period comes from human
activities. Note also that most of the negative forcing is also of
human origin and that this will reduce if, as is expected, sulphur
dioxide (that leads to reflective tropospheric aerosol formation)
pollution controls become more severe during coming decades.
Fig 1B in the Hansen et al. paper compares model simulations of
surface temperature change over the 20th century, that include all the
forcings of Fig 1A, with observations of surface temperature change. It
should be compared with Fig 4 in the SPM of the IPCC 2001 Report. It
deals more comprehensively and accurately with the various forcings
than did the IPCC Report and extends them to the present. It shows a
remarkable degree of agreement between simulations and observations.
ESTIMATES OF NATURAL VARIABILITY
Looking at estimates of anthropogenic radiative forcing enables us
to establish that the observed warming over the last 50 years is
entirely consistent with it being due almost entirely to human
activities. However, it is known that the global average temperature
and hence the climate can also change due to unforced variations that
occur because of variations within the climate system itself. Estimates
of such natural variability come from long climate model simulations
that agree reasonably well with such variability found in observational
studies (as explained in chapters 8 and 12 of the IPCC 2001 Report).
Such studies show that more than about 20% of the rise in global
average temperature since 1950 of about 0.45 C is very unlikely (less
than 10% probability) to come from natural unforced variability.
Taking these two considerations together leads to the conclusion
that it is very likely (greater than 90% probability) that at least 75%
of the warming over the last 50 years in due to human activities.
Question 2. We received testimony that sought to distinguish
between average global temperature changes causes primarily by
anthropogenic emissions and local/regional temperature changes caused
at times by natural variation. Please explain in greater detail.
Answer. The climate shows natural variability (i.e. unforced
variability--see answer to question 1) in all climate characteristics
(temperature, precipitation, humidity, wind speed, etc.) and on all
time and space scales. The shorter the time scale and the smaller the
space scale the larger is this variability. That is why it is easier to
identify trends in climate due to anthropogenic emissions in annual and
global averages of quantities such as temperature rather than in
shorter-term or local climate data.
Climate regimes are patterns of climate behaviour that have been
identified in different regions. They represent an important component
of the description of climate in different parts of the world. Examples
of these regimes are the Pacific North Atlantic Anomaly (PNA), the
North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and the El Nino-Southern Oscillation
(ENSO). The last of these is the best known and the most important; El
Nino events are associated with extreme climate events such as floods
and droughts in Africa, Australia, America and Asia. There seems no
doubt that these regimes are influenced by increases in greenhouse
gases; understanding the detail of these influences is an important
topic of current research.
Question 3. Please explain the meaning of `scientific consensus'
and comment on the status of the science of climate change in the
scientific and academic community.
Answer. Because discussion and debate are essential to the
advancement of science, use of the expression `scientific consensus'
needs to be explained. In the context of the IPCC reports `consensus'
does not mean that agreement has been reached on all matters concerning
climate change. What the IPCC has done in its reports is to distinguish
between what is reasonably well known and understood from those areas
where there is still much uncertainty and debate. What is often
described as the IPCC `consensus' (although the IPCC itself has never
used that term) concerns matters such as the estimates of global
average temperature rise (including its range of uncertainty), the
range of estimates of sea level rise and the descriptions of likely
dominant impacts in terms of precipitation and extremes--all under
stated assumptions regarding future anthropogenic emissions.
The IPCC Reports have been given very strong support by many
scientific bodies including most recently in a statement issued on the
7 June 2005 by the Academies of Science of the leading nations of the
world (the G8 countries plus China, India and Brazil).
The science of climate change has grown very substantially over the
last twenty years--so has the number of scientists working in the
field. It has become an increasingly well established and respected
academic discipline. Climate data has expanded a great deal and climate
models have developed in size (thanks to increased computing power) and
sophistication. Modeling of regional change is now developing rapidly
into a useful and effective tool for the analysis and projection of
regional changes. As the science has advanced, not only have the basic
messages regarding climate change in the IPCC's 1990 and 1995 Reports
been confirmed but the impacts then projected have proved, in general,
to be too conservative.
Question 4. What is ``abrupt climate change?'' Can you identify any
potential thresholds that might be crossed if insufficient action is
taken to control CO2 emissions? For example, I have heard
that beyond certain temperature increases, large ice sheets could
collapse, leading to huge increases in sea level. Can you comment on
this and other potential thresholds?
Answer. The climate system is complex and highly non-linear in
character. `Abrupt climate change' refers to the possibility of unusual
and rapid change occurring due to thresholds being reached or
instabilities occurring. Some examples are:
1) If the average temperature in the vicinity of Greenland
rises by more than about 3 C (5.5 F)--very likely to occur
within the next 50 years--studies indicate that melt down of
the Greenland ice sheet is likely to begin (Climate Change
2001, the Scientific Basis IPCC 2001 Report, chapter 11).
Complete melt down, that could take 1000 years or more, would
lead to 7m (23 ft.) of global sea level rise.
2) There is a lot of current concern regarding the stability
of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. It could lose mass over the
next 1000 years with an associated sea level rise of several
meters but there is incomplete understanding of some of the
underlying processes (Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report,
IPCC 2001, Report Q4).
3) The long term stability of the ocean's Conveyor Belt (a
circulation in the deep ocean coupling the oceans together) is
also of concern. It is partially driven by the Thermohaline
Circulation (THC) whose main source is the sinking of cold,
dense water with high salinity at high latitudes in the
Atlantic ocean. Increased precipitation at these latitudes and
increased ice melt reduces the water's salinity, and hence its
density, making it less likely to sink, so weakening the THC.
All climate models that couple the ocean and atmospheric
circulations show this weakening of the THC and hence also of
the Gulf Stream. It is possible for the THC to be cut off
completely--some models with `business as usual' growth in
CO2 emissions show cut-off occurring within 100-300
years; there is also paleoclimatic evidence of it occurring in
the past. If cut-off were to occur, the effect on the world's
climate, especially in regions surrounding the north Atlantic,
could be profound (Climate Change 2001, the Scientific Basis
IPCC 2001 Report, chapters 7 and 9).
Question 5. Can you tell us something about the time horizon for
stabilizing climate, given how long carbon dioxide remains in the
atmosphere? Do we need to begin to control emissions now or can we
wait?
Answer. There are three main time scales concerned with the
stabilization of climate.
1) The first is the time response of the oceans to change. If
emissions of greenhouse gases were to end immediately, the
global average temperature would continue to rise at a similar
rate as now for 30 to 50 years as the ocean's upper layers warm
and then much more slowly over centuries as the lower layers of
the ocean warm.
2) The second time scale is concerned with the life time of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that is largely determined by
exchange with the ocean. Its life time in the atmosphere is
complex but is typically of the order of decades (for exchange
with the ocean's upper layers) and centuries (for exchange with
the deeper ocean). If anthropogenic input of carbon dioxide to
the atmosphere were to halt, its atmospheric concentration
would only decline slowly.
3) The third time scale of importance is that applying to
changes in anthropogenic emissions. Because of inertia in the
system of energy infrastructure, changes in these emissions
will take the order of decades to be realized.
For reasons associated with all these time scales--reducing the
build up of further commitment to change associated with (1),
recognizing the long time scale for emissions reductions to be
reflected in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration with (2) and
the time scales associated with energy infrastructure in (3)--there is
an urgency to begin seriously to reduce emissions now.
Question 6. Given that there is still some uncertainty about the
details of future warming, how should such uncertainty be dealt with in
designing policy responses?
Answer. The need for appropriate policy responses despite
scientific uncertainty was recognized 13 years ago in 1992 in the
Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed by all nations at the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, signed by President George Bush Senior
for the United States and subsequently ratified unanimously by the U.S.
Senate. In Article 3 it includes an agreement that the Parties to the
Convention should ``take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent
or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.''
Scientific certainty regarding many aspects of climate change has
increased substantially since 1992 so that the need to take action is
even stronger that it was then. A range of responses can be designed.
1) There are responses addressing energy efficiency e.g. in
buildings, appliances, vehicles and in industry. Many of these
will require regulation or incentives for them to be achieved
on the scale required. Most of them are win-win in character,
as most will lead to significant--even large--savings in cost
or materials as well as in carbon emissions. There are numerous
examples, for instance from U.S. industries, showing the value
to the U.S. economy of such measures.
2) There are responses that also enhance energy security that
are also win-win.
3) There are responses to do with adaptation to climate
change, for instance to prepare, especially in the more
vulnerable areas, for the expected increase in the number and
intensity of extreme events (e.g. floods, droughts, heat
waves). There is much evidence to show that more adequate
preparation substantially reduces the damaging impacts of such
events.
4) There are responses that would be much more cost-effective
to take now rather than later, for instance in the design of
power infrastructure with a typical life of 30-50 years. To
have to replace such infrastructure before the end of its
useful life would be costly.
5) There are technologies concerned with carbon-free energy
sources (e.g. solar, biomass, biofuels, hydrogen technologies)
that need to be developed as rapidly as possible to the level
at which they can begin to act as significant alternatives to
conventional fossil fuel energy sources.
Question 7. How do we know that emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases are causing Earth's temperature to rise, as
opposed to other factors that we have no control over; such as sun
spots? Some assert that an increase in solar irradiance is the main
cause of the Earth's current warming trend. Therefore, reducing fossil
fuel emissions would not impact the Earth's temperature.
Answer. Measurements of solar irradiance have been made since 1979
from satellite mounted instruments. Small changes of up to 0.1% occur
associated with the 11 year solar cycle. There is no evidence for
changes greater than about 0.2% occurring in the longer term. Over the
last 50 years, radiative forcing due to changes in solar irradiance is
much smaller than that due to anthropogenic increases in greenhouse
gases (Climate Change 2001, the Scientific Basis IPCC 2001 Report,
chapter 6 and J. Hansen et al., Earth's Energy Imbalance: Confirmation
and Implications, in Sciencexpress for 2 May 2005 doi:1110252).
Question 8a. There are some who question the veracity of the
assertion that the earth has warmed substantially over the last
century. Arguments typically fall into three categories. It would be
useful if you would address each in turn:
Urban Heat Island Effect. This is the claim that the underlying
temperature data is tainted by the proximity of data-generating
thermometers to cities. As urban areas have grown over the last fifty
years, the air temperatures around these cities have increased due to
larger amounts of heat generating substances like rooftops and
roadways. Scientists claim to have corrected for the urban heat island
effect. How was this done, and how can we be sure that it was done
correctly?
Answer. During development of the global surface temperature
compilations, data from each observing station were quality-controlled.
This included comparisons with neighbouring stations. Records showing
complex inconsistencies relative to their neighbours were rejected from
the analysis. This will have removed many urban stations where ongoing
changes in the environment have caused multiple, non-climatic changes
in the record. Where the neighbour-comparisons showed simpler
inconsistencies such as a relative warming trend, the urban records
were retained but were adjusted to be consistent with their rural
neighbours (e.g. Hansen, J. et al., 2001, J. Geophys. Res., 106, D20,
23,947-23,963).
There is substantial evidence that this procedure has been
successful and that the land surface air temperature record used in
assessment of climate change is not greatly influenced by urban
warming. First, global rural temperature trends have been very similar
to those based on the full network of stations (Peterson, T.C. et al.,
1999, Geophys. Res. Lett. 26, 329-332). Secondly, ocean surface
temperatures have risen nearly as much as those over land (Folland,
C.K. & Karl, T.R. et al. 2001, chapter 2 in Climate Change 2001: The
Scientific Basis. IPCC 2001 Report). A somewhat greater warming over
land than over the ocean under increasing greenhouse gases is expected
because of the greater thermal capacity of the oceans. Thirdly,
temperatures on calm nights, when urban heat islands are mainly
evident, show no more warming than temperatures on windy nights at a
worldwide subset of the stations used to monitor global surface air
temperature (Parker, D.E., 2004, Nature, 432, 290).
Uncertainties regarding urbanisation effects are allowed for in the
global average surface temperature curve shown in the IPCC 2001 Report
(Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, Summary for Policymakers,
Figure 1a). These uncertainties play a diminished role because land is
only 30% of the global surface. Even the overall uncertainties, which
include the effects of incomplete coverage and possible residual biases
are much smaller than the global warming signal.
Question 8b. Satellite and Airborne Balloon Data Contradict Surface
Temperature Readings. Global mean temperature at the earth's surface is
estimated to have risen by about half a degree F over the last two
decades. On the other hand, satellite measurements of radiances and
airborne balloon observations indicate that the temperature of the
lower to mid-troposphere (the atmospheric layer extending from the
earth's surface up to about 8 km) has exhibited almost no change during
this period. Please explain whether this discrepancy is, indeed, real
and how to account for it.
Answer. Over the last few years, much careful and detailed study
has been addressed to surface, balloon and satellite temperature
observations taken over the last 25 years and the relationships between
them. I summarize briefly in this answer the conclusions from a number
of key papers that are now available describing this work, some of them
published as recently as this August and two that will be published
over the next two or three months. Because of the number of papers to
which I am referring, for convenience I list all the references at the
end of this answer. The main outcome of this work is that statements
that the lower to mid-troposphere shows no warming trend or has cooled
relative to the surface are no longer tenable. Such statements rely
upon analyses of old radiosonde datasets, which had not adequately
accounted for instrumental and observational biases, and a single
satellite dataset. The first U.S. Climate Change Science Program report
(www.climatescience.gov), which will be published in the late fall, is
on this subject and will provide a far more detailed answer than is
possible here.
Efforts in the last few years have led to significant revisions to
existing upper-air temperature datasets and the production of a number
of new balloon-based (Lanzante et al., 2003a, b, Thorne et al., 2005a)
and satellite-based (Mears et al., 2003, Grody et al., 2004, Mears and
Wentz, 2005) climate datasets under different, seemingly reasonable,
approaches. An alternative approach to removing the stratospheric
influence from the satellite records has also been proposed (Fu et al.,
2004). Therefore the scientific community now have at their disposal a
much larger number of independently derived estimates of tropospheric
temperature change to analyse. Globally, the estimates of the average
temperature trend for the period over which satellite data are
available range from a slight warming to warming greater than that seen
at the surface. It can be concluded therefore that the tropospheric
data are consistent with a temperature trend similar to that at the
surface, although the uncertainties are such that a relative cooling of
the troposphere also cannot be ruled out.
Uncertainty in tropospheric trends is much greater than uncertainty
in surface trends, reflecting the greater technological challenges of
adequately monitoring changes aloft than at the surface. Only with the
advent of recent datasets (see above) has the importance of structural
uncertainty--the effects of methodological choices employed to identify
and remove non-climatic influences from the raw data during dataset
construction upon the climate dataset that results--become apparent
(Thorne et al., 2005b).
Much of our uncertainty in temperature trends aloft arises in the
tropics. Mears and Wentz (2005) have highlighted an error in the
original satellite record of Christy et al. (2003) which led to a
spurious cooling bias in the tropics. Balloon-based records are also
sparsely located in the tropics, and have tended to launch only at
local daytime (rather than twice-daily that is more common elsewhere).
Daytime biases in radiosonde records are more pervasive due to solar-
heating effects, and the lack of day and night launches at these
stations potentially makes identification and removal of any non-
climatic influences much harder (Lanzante et al., 2003a, Sherwood et
al., 2005).
Santer et al., 2005 have recently compared tropical temperature
predictions from 19 climate models run with historical changes in
human-induced and natural forcing factors with four of the current
observational datasets (2 balloon based, 2 satellite based). Within the
tropics our expectations are that surface anomalies will be amplified
aloft because of latent heat release upon condensation under a
convective regime. All the models exhibit this behaviour on all
timescales from monthly variability up to inter-decadal trends
regardless of differences in model physics, resolution, and the
forcings applied. The observations also exhibit amplification aloft on
short timescales, but all except one dataset exhibits damping aloft on
long timescales. Either in the real-world different processes dictate
low-and high-frequency behaviour in the tropics and all the models fail
to capture this, or, more plausibly, most observational datasets retain
significant biases which impact their suitability for long-term trend
analysis. Gaining unambiguous clarification of which is the case and
gaining a cleaner estimate of recent tropospheric temperature changes
in the tropics is seen as a high priority.
Question 8c. The Hockey Stick. In recent months, there have been
assertions that the statistical method used to analyze global
temperature data for the last several hundred years was biased towards
generating the ``hockey stick'' shaped curve that shows sustained low
and stable temperatures for hundreds of years with an extremely sharp
rise in the last 100 years. Can you comment on whether the observations
depicted in the hockey stick curve are, indeed, legitimate?
Answer. I have received a similar question from Senator Talent
(Q6). I provide the same reply to both questions.
This is a fast moving area of research. Very recently the
assertions by McIntyre and McKitrick (2005a, b) (MM), alluded to in the
question (references at end of answer), have been shown by several
papers to be largely false in the context of the actual data used by
Mann and co-workers. Ammann (a palaeontologist at the National Centre
for Atmospheric Research) and Wahl of Alfred University have two
papers, one in review and one in press, that reproduce the original
results published by Mann et al. in Nature in 1998 and Geophysical
Research Letters, 1999 and prominently used in the IPCC Third
Assessment Report. They demonstrate that the results of MM are due to
MM having censored key proxy data from the original Mann et al. (1998)
data set, and to having made errors in their implementation of the Mann
et al. method. They specifically show that 15th century temperatures,
related to the bristlecone pine issue, were not similar to 20th century
temperatures, as was suggested by MM. Amman and Wahl issued a press
release in May 2005 on this finding. Fuller details are at http://
www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2005/ammann.shtml These authors state that
they will make their full computer code available publicly.
A specific claim is made by MM that the ``hockey stick'' shape of
the Mann et al. reconstructions is derived from the way Mann et al.
normalise and centre their principal component pattern data. This has
recently been tested. Rutherford et al. (in press, Journal of Climate)
have shown that essentially the same result as Mann et al. is obtained
using an entirely independent statistical method on similar data. This
eliminates the step of representing regional tree-ring networks by
principal components. The likely reason why Mann et al. were able to
successfully use their particular technique is because the structure of
paleoclimate data is more complex than the temporal ``red noise''
tested by MM.
Other investigators have reconstructed climate over the past 1000
years using very different techniques and different selections of data.
Some of these results are recent, and some were shown in Fig 2.21 of
the IPCC Third Assessment Science Report, Climate Change 2001. These
authors tend to find a greater magnitude of climate variability than
did the Mann et al. ``hockey stick'' results. In particular the
``Little Ice age'' centred around 1700 is generally cooler. Some of the
more recent papers of this type show a Little Ice Age cooler by up to
several tenths of a degree centigrade than any reconstruction shown in
the Third Assessment Report in Fig 2.21, including that of Mann et al.
However, all but one recent papers (Esper et al., 2002, Mann & Jones,
2003, Moberg et al., 2005, Huang, 2004, Jones & Mann, 2004, Bradley et
al., 2003) find that the warmth of the late 20th century is still
exceptional, as their reconstructions of the temperature level relative
to the 20th century in the Medieval warm period are similar to the Mann
et al. results. Soon & Baliunas concluded that the late 20th century
was not unusually warm but their methodology was flawed (Mann and
Jones, 2003) as they equated hydrological influences with temperature
influences and assumed that regional warmth corresponded to hemispheric
warmth.
I am sure that the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report will fully take
all these new findings into account. In the meantime, it is important
to recognise that no evidence has emerged that seriously calls into
question findings regarding the climate of the 20th century and the
influence of human activities as described in the IPCC 2001 Report.
Question 9. Some say that global warming might be a positive
development? Will agricultural crop productivity improve due to the
greater amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and can we expect
the Arctic and Antarctic regions to become more habitable?
Answer.
ON CROP PRODUCTIVITY
Higher concentrations of CO2 can enhance the
productivity of crops that undergo C3 photosynthesis (wheat,
rice and most temperate crops) by fertilizing photosynthesis. In areas
subject to water stress, productivity may also potentially be enhanced
through higher CO2 concentrations increasing the efficiency
of water use. Crops with C4 photosynthesis (maize, sorghum,
millet, sugar cane) will not benefit from increased CO2 in
these ways.
These direct effects of CO2 on crops should be viewed in
the context of indirect effects due to the climate change arising from
increasing CO2. Crops are affected by changes in temperature
and moisture availability. Warming in cold regions is expected to
create generally more favourable conditions for crops, although the
expansion of crop areas would be limited by soil quality and day
length. In regions currently under agriculture, the specific types of
crops which may be grown are expected to change with warming; C4
crops may become more favoured in temperate regions. However, higher
temperatures would be expected to lead to a greater requirement for
irrigation due to increased water loss by evaporation. Warming may also
increase the prevalence of some pests and diseases.
Moreover, changes in precipitation patterns could have major
impacts. Some regions are predicted to become wetter and others drier.
Wetter conditions in general would promote growth although increased
severe heavy rainfall and floods would damage crops. Drier conditions
in general would place greater demands on irrigation which itself would
be subject to decreasing supply and competition from other uses such as
drinking water and industry. Extreme high temperatures and droughts
could have catastrophic impacts. In summary, some regions would expect
net positive impacts whilst other would expect net negative impacts.
Research on cereal yields assessed in the IPCC Third Assessment Report,
which should be regarded as early work in an ongoing field of research,
suggested that the greatest decreases in yield are expected in the
tropics while some temperate and cold regions may see an increase in
yield in the medium term.
It should also be noted that other changes in atmospheric chemistry
related to climate change may affect crop yields. In particular,
increases in ozone concentration are expected to be detrimental.
ON HABITABILITY OF THE ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC
There may be an expansion of cropping regions towards/into the
Arctic, although this would also be limited by other factors as
described above. In general, the problems associated with extreme cold
temperatures would be expected to decrease. New issues would arise with
warming, such as ground subsidence due to permafrost melting.
Antarctica is expected to remain ice covered for the next century and
beyond.
Question 10. It is my understanding that the assessments of the
progression of global warming through the next century and its impacts
on changing the Earth's climate are largely based on computer modeling.
It goes without saying that the planet's atmospheric, hydrologic, and
meteorological systems are highly complicated. What can you say about
how climate modeling capabilities have advanced since scientists began
evaluating the problem?
What is the level confidence that the computer models are providing
useful projections of the future climate?
Answer.
HOW HAVE CLIMATE MODELING CAPABILITIES ADVANCED SINCE SCIENTISTS
FIRST BEGAN EVALUATING THE PROBLEM?
Since the early days of modern climate modeling in the 1970s,
scientists have progressively modeled more of the processes that play a
role in climate. For example, early models represented only the
atmosphere, with a very simple representation of ocean effects. Later
the effects of changing ocean currents and ice were taken into account,
and recently scientists have begun to model the interactions of climate
with the biosphere. At the same time, our developing understanding of
each system (atmosphere, ocean, etc.), together with increasing
computer power, have meant that each component can be represented with
greater realism.
As an example, today we are able to represent the circulations of
the atmosphere and the ocean coupled together with sufficient realism
that models reproduce many of the observed, large scale features of
climate. Ten years ago this was only possible with the use of so-called
`flux adjustments' which corrected for the long term effects of slight
errors in the models' heat distribution. Ten years before that we had
not even begun to include the effects of ocean currents in models.
The ongoing development of models has led to increasing confidence
in the modeling of many climate phenomena such as El Nino, monsoons,
Arctic climate processes and the North Atlantic Oscillation.
Throughout this history of development, the models' prediction of a
substantial global warming in response to increasing greenhouse gases
has been consistent and unambiguous. As models improve we are able to
add more detail and confidence.
WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE COMPUTER MODELS ARE PROVIDING
USEFUL PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE CLIMATE?
Confidence in model projections comes from three sources: the fact
that they are based in fundamental physical principles such as
conservation of energy, the fact that when driven by present day levels
of solar energy input and concentrations of greenhouse gases and other
trace species, they reproduce many observed features of present
climate, and the fact that when driven by historical variations in
those factors, they reproduce observed variations in climate. The
development over the past 20 years of model formulation (discussed
above) has seen a parallel increase in the veracity with which the
models represent observed climate changes and variability.
The success of models in reproducing present and past climate lead
us to believe that they are capturing much of the fundamental physics
of the climate system. Hence the comprehensive climate models provide
the best tool available to assess future climate change. Nonetheless
there are quantitative differences between projections made with
different models, and these differences represent a level of
uncertainty in the modeling. By detailed analysis of the models,
scientists can identify sources of uncertainty--for example the
modeling of clouds continues to be an important issue--and by a
painstaking process of research reduce that uncertainty over time.
Models generally have greatest skill on larger scales, and as a
generalization, the larger the scale (global, continental) the more
robust are the modeling results.
Question 11. It is often asserted, by those who dispute the
strength of the evidence of human-caused climate change, that the IPCC
process has been politicized in a way that has tended to exaggerate the
evidence for the reality of the problem and to understate the
uncertainties. As the Chair of the IPCC's Working Group I on the
science of climate change itself, could you characterize for us any
political pressures you and your Working Group have experienced?
Answer. First, let me say that, as chair of Working Group I, a
crucially important task for me was to ensure that any bias, agendas or
pressures for political or other reasons (for instance personal
agendas) were not allowed to get in the way of accurate, honest and
balanced appraisal of the science.
During my years working with Working Group I, although I was
supported in that task by the U.K. government, I played no part at all
in the formulation or presentation of U.K. policy on climate change.
The U.K. government made it clear that they expected me to avoid and
refuse all political or other improper interference from whatever
quarter in my IPCC work.
The occasions when political pressures were most apparent were the
intergovernmental meetings when the Summaries for Policymakers (SPM)
were discussed and approved. At these meetings, typically about 100
governments were represented and about 40 scientists representing the
lead authors of the chapters were present to ensure the scientific
integrity of the final document. The meetings were also open to
representatives of non-governmental organizations from both the
environmental and industry sides. The purpose of these meetings was to
make sure that the SPMs were accurate and balanced scientifically and
also that their presentations were clear, understandable and policy
relevant.
The political pressures at these meetings that tended to be the
most obvious and persistent came from a small group of oil producing
states assisted by some of the industrial NGOs who worked to weaken or
remove statements expressing the reality of climate change and its
likely impacts. Less persistent pressures to strengthen such statements
tended to come from some of the environmental NGOs and from a few
country delegates. All proposals for change arising from these
pressures were subjected to careful scientific scrutiny. After this
thorough scrutiny (sometimes taking a substantial amount of time) the
final text was accepted by all parties and all scientists without
dissention--with one exception that occurred in 1995 when it became
necessary to add a footnote expressing dissension by two countries, a
footnote that was in fact withdrawn before the document's publication.
The final summary in each case was as accurate, balanced and
unbiased as it was possible to make it. In every case, the SPM was
improved in both accuracy and clarity by the process of the
intergovernmental meeting. I can say categorically that there was no
tendency to exaggerate evidence for the reality of the problem or to
understate the uncertainties. If anything, the tendency was the other
way--to be cautious in our statements and to make sure that we fully
represented the uncertainties. The growth in the confidence expressed
by the IPCC in its statements from the 1990 report through the 1995
report to the 2001 report, I believe, illustrates the IPCC's tendency
to caution.
Question 12. In the 1970s, climate scientists claimed that the
world was cooling and anthropogenic activities might be prematurely
forcing the planet into an ice age. Today we hear that the earth is
warming. What can you say about the scientific debate on cooling
several decades ago and why is today's situation with global warming
different?
Answer. There were some very cold winters in Europe and North
America in the 1960s that led some scientists to speculate that we
might be entering a new ice age. Most climate scientists disagreed with
and indeed opposed that speculation--as I did--pointing out that there
was nothing in the 1960s outside the range of natural variation. Also,
according to the theory that ice ages are triggered by regular
variations in the Earth's orbit that can be predicted precisely from
astronomical data, the current interglacial period has tens of
thousands of years to run before the appropriate conditions for the
next ice age occur.
The current situation with global warming is very different. First,
the basic physics of increasing surface temperature with increasing
greenhouse gases has been known since the early 19th century. Secondly,
the increase in global average temperature during the last 50 years is
very unlikely to be due solely to natural variability. Thirdly, climate
models that include the relevant physics and dynamics of the
atmosphere's and ocean's structure and circulation are unable to
simulate the profile of temperature increase unless the radiative
forcing due to the anthropogenic increase of greenhouse gases is
included in addition to all known natural forcings.
Responses of Sir John Houghton to Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. Would you say that the steps America has taken in the
recent years to improve energy efficiency and produce lower carbon
emissions from power generation are the right first steps in addressing
climate change? Within that construct, given the current U.S.
electricity supply that is more than 50% derived from coal, is
encouraging clean coal technology, IGCC and carbon sequestration the
most important immediate policy action we can take?
Answer. I agree that increasing energy efficiency across the board
(e.g. in buildings, appliances, vehicles and in industry) is an
essential part of action to address climate change. It has the
advantage that most such actions are win-win in character i.e. they
will lead to significant, even large, savings in cost or materials as
well as in carbon emissions. There are numerous examples, for instance
from U.S. industries, of the economic and other benefits of increased
efficiency.
The other main action to address climate change mitigation is for
the generation of energy to move as rapidly as possible to be less
carbon intensive and eventually to be close to carbon free. It is clear
that clean coal technology (IGCC and carbon sequestration) will play an
important role in this future.
Question 2. Sir Houghton, you testified that over two thirds of the
projected increase in emissions from now until 2030 will come from
developing countries. Do you believe it would be responsible for EU
countries and America to adopt an emissions reduction that failed to
include this part of the world?
Answer. Countries who have joined the Kyoto Protocol have adopted
emissions reductions that do not include developing countries. This is
in line with the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) agreed
by all nations in 1992 that states that industrialized nations that
have already received large benefits from fossil fuel energy should be
first to take action on climate change. But I agree that any
international agreements post-Kyoto for emissions reductions need also
to involve developing countries, especially those that are
industrializing rapidly. I say a little more about this in my answer to
Q3.
Question 3. You indicated in your testimony that America needs to
take a global leadership position on climate change. You argued that
developing nations will ``follow, not lead'' on the issue of climate
change and that mandatory agreements with these nations would not be
necessary as they voluntarily adopt emissions standards in the future.
Yet the mandatory cap program recommended by the NCEP specifically
discounts voluntary cap programs in America as unable to achieve
necessary reductions. They have argued that without mandates, the
marketplace will not make the adjustments needed to achieve the very
aggressive goals envisioned. Do you believe it is consistent to
advocate a ``follow, not lead'' voluntary approach with developing
nations while dismissing the same approach in America?
Answer. Let me explain the arguments behind my use of the phrase
`follow, not lead' in respect of developing countries.
As I explained in my written testimony, we in the developed
countries have already benefited over many generations from abundant
and cheap fossil fuel energy--although without realizing the potential
damage to the climate and especially the disproportionate adverse
impacts falling on the poorer nations. The Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC) recognized the particular responsibilities this
placed on developed countries to be the first to take action and to
provide assistance (e.g. through appropriate finance and technology
transfer) to developing countries for them to cope with the impacts and
to develop cost effective sources of energy free of carbon emissions.
This is at the basis of my `follow, not lead' approach.
But it is not my intention to associate this approach only with
voluntary action. Given the fact of first action taken by developed
countries, for instance through the Kyoto Protocol, I agree that
further action with mandatory targets and requirements are necessary
for all countries. That is the urgent challenge of the next stage of
negotiations that is taking place within the FCCC in which all
countries--both developed and developing--must be involved.
Question 4. While you have presented what appears to be a united
scientific front in the form of the statement from the academies of
science from 11 countries, I am concerned by some of the news since the
release of that statement. The Russian Academy of Sciences says it was
misrepresented and that Russian scientists actually believe that the
Kyoto Protocol was scientifically ungrounded. I am also aware that
there was a significant misrepresentation on the science between our
academy and the British representative.
Given this background, wouldn't you say there are still some pretty
fundamental disagreements about the science of climate change among
scientists around the world?
Answer. I have consulted the Royal Society in London about the
questions you have raised about the joint statement from the academies
and they have provided me with the information that follows in the rest
of this answer.
All of the national academies that signed the joint statement on
global climate change remain committed to it, and there is not, nor has
there ever been, any disagreement between the signatories over its
content.
There have been media reports that a member of the Russian Academy
of Sciences, who is well-known for his opposition to the Kyoto
Protocol, has requested that the Academy's President, Professor Yuri
Osipov, should withdraw his signature from the joint statement.
Professor Osipov has not done so.
There has been an exchange of correspondence between Dr. Bruce
Alberts, the President of the National Academy of Sciences, and Lord
May of Oxford, the President of the Royal Society, about a brief
reference in the Society's media release accompanying the launch of the
statement to an earlier report published by the NAS in 1992. The
exchange of correspondence has not been about the content of the joint
statement.
The signatories to the joint statement by the national academies
remain committed to its content and hope that it will help the
governments of the G8 nations to determine their future actions and
policies on climate change.
Question 5. In this international academies statement, you find
that an ``immediate response that will, at a reasonable cost, prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,'' but
continue to say in the following paragraph, ``minimizing the amount of
this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge.'' Could you please elaborate, since any response can't both
be a ``reasonable cost'' and a ``huge challenge'' proposition, how you
resolve the two?
Answer. The next paragraph in the academies statement goes on to
say, `There are many cost-effective technological options that could
contribute to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations. These are at
various stages of research and development. However barriers to their
broad deployment still need to be overcome.' The barriers that exist
are not all economic ones. That this is the case is illustrated by the
fact that it is generally agreed that many energy efficiency measures
exist that could be implemented at no net cost or with significant cost
savings--yet little action is taken about them. Other measures have
been proposed that are described as win-win, implementation of which is
not being pursued.
One of the barriers is the wide campaign of misinformation by
vested interests that has persuaded people and their leaders to deny
the existence of the problem of climate change or that even if the
problem exists, little or no action about it need be taken at the
moment.
An important part of the challenge, therefore, is first to ensure
that governments, industries and the general public receive accurate
and honest information that will give them the confidence to act, and
secondly for governments in particular to set up the framework
(including incentives and other appropriate economic measures) that
will lead to action at reasonable cost. A further challenge in this
process will be to carry out honest assessments of the `reasonableness'
of the costs of mitigation action by comparing them against the costs
of inaction and the costs of adaptation, including so far as possible
`costs' that cannot be expressed in monetary terms.
Question 6. Several scientists have cited events like the high
temperatures in Europe in the summer of 2003 and increased storminess
in the 1980s and 1990s as evidence of climate change. Don't global
ecosystems go through natural periods similar to these as well?
Answer. There is a great deal of variability in the natural climate
system and extreme events occur--and always have occurred--on account
of this natural variability. Because of this variability it is not
possible, in general, to identify any particular extreme event as due
to the increase of greenhouse gases through human activities. However,
in mentioning the heat wave in Europe in 2003, in which over 20,000
people died, you cite the one recent event that is so very far outside
the range of natural variability (the average temperature for the
months of June, July and August in central Switzerland was 5 standard
deviations away from the average since instrumental records began 140
years ago) that analysis shows that most of the risk of that event is
almost certainly due to the increase in greenhouse gases (Stott, P.A.
et al. 2004, Nature 427, 332-6). It therefore does provide evidence
that human induced climate change is occurring.
Regarding the increased storminess of the 1980s and 1990s relative
to the 1950s, this has been studied by insurance companies. They report
an increase during this period in the number of weather of weather
related disasters by a factor of 5 and in the economic cost (adjusted
for inflation) of such disasters of a factor of 10. Although part of
these observed upward trends is related to socio-economic factors
(population growth, increased vulnerability and increased wealth) a
substantial part is also linked to the increased frequency and
intensity of such events (Climate Change 2001: the Synthesis Report,
IPCC 2001).
This increased trend in the frequency and intensity of such events
is what is expected in a world that is warming due to increased
greenhouse gases. As I explained briefly in my written testimony, there
are scientific reasons for this trend and further it appears as a
robust result from climate models.
Question 7. There are a number of astrophysicists and other
scientists who believe that sunspots are a major contributor to
changing temperatures. A recent survey showed at least 100 such studies
are underway. Why don't scientists put as much emphasis on this
possibility or other aspects of natural climate variability as they do
on emissions from human activity?
Answer. The IPCC in its reports has considered all aspects of
natural variability as well as the effect of greenhouse gas emissions
from human activity. A substantial section of chapter 6 of the IPCC
2001 Report, Climate Change: the Scientific Basis is devoted to
possible solar influences on climate and about 50 papers on the subject
are cited. It remains a subject of serious scientific research
interest.
The IPCC's task, however, has been to compare all known natural
influences on climate (including solar influences) with the effects of
increasing greenhouse gases. Measurements of solar irradiance have been
made since 1979 from satellite mounted instruments. Small changes of
about 0.1% occur associated with the 11 year sunspot cycle. There is
some evidence for solar influence on climate over the last few
centuries, for instance during the first few decades of the 20th
century. But the influence is small. Over the last 50 years, radiative
forcing due to changes in solar irradiance is much smaller than that
due to anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases (see also J. Hansen
et al., Earth's Energy Imbalance: Confirmation and Implications, in
Sciencexpress for 2 May 2005, doi:1110252)
Question 8. Much of the discussion about climate science being
settled is based on the summary chapter of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change of the United Nations. The chapter made specific
predictions about the pace of rising temperatures and the relative
importance of human activities to climate change. And yet, the body of
the report is much more ambiguous and inconclusive about the current
state of the science. Is anything being done to ensure that the summary
of the next IPCC report is more reflective of the overall analysis by
the scientists?
Answer. I am aware that statements are often made and quoted
asserting that the Summaries for Policymakers (SPM) of the IPCC reports
do not accurately reflect the science of the underlying chapters. Yet,
to my knowledge, none of those expressing such views have provided
evidence or examples to support them.
It is important to recognize the IPCC's purpose in preparing an SPM
for its reports. As an intergovernmental body, the IPCC is bound to
produce its conclusions succinctly and in a form that is understandable
by policymakers and relevant and helpful to their needs. The SPM
therefore is not a scientific summary of all the science laid out in
the chapters. It does not list, for instance, all the factors or all
the arguments involved in the scientific appraisal of any given area.
Each chapter, in any case, produces its own scientific summary. The SPM
is a summary of conclusions, largely taken from the chapter summaries,
selected for their policy relevance and in the drafting of which lead
authors from the chapters have played a full part.
It is also important, as your question implies, that the SPM
adequately expresses the degree of certainty to be associated with any
conclusion. The IPCC has spent a lot of time debating how this can best
be done and a large proportion of the time in the intergovernmental
meetings that have approved the SPMs (see also my answer to Q11 asked
by Senator Bingaman) has been taken up with ensuring that the final SPM
text accurately reflects the chapters in the degree of confidence
expressed in the conclusions. When this has to be done succinctly, as
the SPM requires, it is helpful for confidence to be expressed
quantitatively. For instance, in all the IPCC scientific reports, so
far as possible, numerical values quoted in the conclusions also
included error bars to express their uncertainty. In addition, in the
2001 IPCC Report, many of the more qualitative statements have been
made quantitative by attaching to them numerical estimates of
probability. For instance, a given conclusion described as likely is
estimated to have a probability of being true in the range 67% to 90%
and as very likely when its probability of being true is estimated as
in the range 90% to 99%, and so on. In this way, uncertainties have
been presented in a manner that can be more easily interpreted and used
by policymakers, especially when the impacts of climate change have to
be folded into the consideration of wider policy issues involving
future energy generation or the provision of security.
Further, in the IPCC 2001 SPM, clearly listed are areas of
importance where there is no evidence of change, for instance in sea
ice cover in the Antarctic or in the average number and intensity of
tropical cyclones over the 20th century.
I have no doubt at all that matters regarding the accuracy and
balance of the SPM and the way uncertainties are represented continue
to be very fully discussed within the IPCC as it prepares the Fourth
Assessment Report.
Question 9. The natural ``greenhouse effect'' has been known for
nearly two hundred years and is essential to the provision of our
current climate. There is significant research in the literature today
that indicates humans, since the beginning of their existence, have
caused an increase in the greenhouse effect. Some argue that the
development of agriculture 6,000 to 8,000 years ago has helped to
forestall the next ice age. The development of cities, thinning of
forests, population growth, and most recently the burning of fossil
fuels, have all had an impact on climate change. Our ecosystems have
constantly adapted to change, as we as humans have adapted to our
ecosystems as well. Is it possible that the increased presence of
CO2 caused by the 8,000 years of modern human existence may
be something our ecosystems will continue, as they previously have, to
naturally adapt to?
Answer. According to data from the Vostok and Taylor Dome ice
cores, atmospheric CO2 concentration rose by 20ppm (from
260ppm to 280ppm) between 8,000 years ago and the start of the
industrial era (circa 1750). Since then, CO2 has risen to
377ppm in the Mauna Loa record. This is higher than at any time in the
440,000 year ice core record and also higher than at any time in the
last 20 million years according to geochemical evidence. There are
therefore no examples in the recent past to which we can refer for
evidence of adaptation to current or projected future CO2
levels.
The amount of the CO2 rise over the last 250 years has
been nearly 5 times that seen over the previous 8,000 years, with the
rate of rise 150 times faster. Ecosystems will already need to be
adapting more rapidly than before. In the six illustrative SRES
scenarios examined in the IPCC Third Assessment Report of 2001, the
CO2 concentration reaches between 540ppm and 970ppm over the
next 100 years. These correspond to rates of rise of 650 to 2300 times
faster than over the 8,000 years pre-industrial. Adapting to the
associated climate change under any of these scenarios will become
increasingly difficult for both ecosystems and humans.
Question 10. The panel touched on some energy alternatives such as
biomass, natural gas, and nuclear power, yet there was little mention
of hydrogen power. From a scientific viewpoint, where do you think we
are on being able to really utilize hydrogen power? What is the
potential of hydrogen power?
Answer. Hydrogen has many advantages as a fuel in that it is very
non-polluting and is ideal for using in fuel cells that are potentially
highly efficient and convenient devices for producing electricity.
Further, providing the hydrogen is produced from a carbon-free source,
it does not add to the greenhouse effect.
Hydrogen power does not, however, exist in isolation from the means
by which the hydrogen is produced. That may be from solar energy or
from the energy alternatives that you have mentioned such as biomass,
natural gas or nuclear sources. Hydrogen essentially provides a
secondary rather than a primary source of energy.
There seems to be general recognition that hydrogen has great
potential and will become an important and probably dominant fuel in
the future. Before this occurs on a very large scale, substantial
further development of fuel cells and of technologies for hydrogen
storage are required especially for use in vehicles.
Question 11. The panel established very clearly that we should
adopt policies that decrease carbon emissions regardless of any other
carbon emissions policies we pursue. We are currently or will shortly
be providing expanded incentives for clean coal, nuclear energy and
renewable fuels. Do you feel this is money well spent? What
technologies do you feel the government should be more involved in
developing?
Answer. I am not an expert on energy policy so can only make a
general comment. It is clear, I believe, that there is no one solution
to the challenge of moving to carbon free energy, so all possibilities
need to be explored and assessed. There are also comparatively new
technologies, especially some in the field of renewables, that will
require considerable government support before they can become
commercially competitive.
Responses of Sir John Houghton to Questions From Senator Talent
Question 1. There has been a fair amount of criticism of the output
of the models used to forecast possible climate conditions in the
future, due in part to the data assumptions made. How responsive has
the IPCC been to external criticism? Has this criticism led to any
modeling or data input revisions, and what was the result of these
revisions?
Answer. In contrast to models of the economy, for example, climate
models are not based on empirical or statistical extrapolation but they
possess a sound theoretical basis in the established laws of physics
and dynamics. These include the laws of conservation of mass, heat,
moisture and momentum and the equation of state. Future projections are
determined through integration of the equations describing these laws
together with Newton's equations of motion. Such models are essential
tools for adding together all the non linear processes involved in the
behaviour of the total climate system. A good description of the
present state of climate modeling can be found in J.F.B.Mitchell, Can
we believe predictions of climate change? Q.J.R.Meteorol.Soc., 130,
2341-2360, 2004.
There has been enormous development in the size, sophistication and
skill of climate models over the last 30 years. The global modeling
community has been closely involved in the IPCC process and contributed
a great deal to it. In particular, for the 2001 IPCC Report, 20 groups
in different institutions and countries running over 30 general
circulation models with full coupling between the atmospheric and ocean
circulations set up elaborate procedures to evaluate and compare
formulations and results between all 30 models. This process has been
highly productive in leading to improvements in model performance,
creating increasing confidence in model results and providing guidance
for model developments.
Many of the criticisms of models commonly voiced concern older
models in some of which adjustments (e.g. flux adjustments at the
atmosphere-ocean boundary) had to be made the validity of which was
questioned. The modeling community has worked to remove such
limitations. For instance, modern models do not require flux
adjustments. The main uncertainties in models that remain arise from
difficulties of adequately dealing with clouds and with the ways in
which small scale motions (too small for discrete model description)
influence motions on the larger scale. Uncertainty about clouds is the
main reason for the range of uncertainty from 1.5 to 4.5 C still
quoted by the IPCC for the climate sensitivity (the increase in
equilibrium surface temperature arising from a doubling of carbon
dioxide).
Question 2. You say in your written testimony (p. 7) that the Kyoto
Protocol is just a ``beginning for the process of reduction'' for
countries that ratified the protocol. What level of cuts are necessary
to reach the goal of Kyoto? If the EU is having trouble meeting the
``beginning'' targets, how will they meet the necessary targets without
wrecking their economies, and how are the rising emissions of
developing countries factored in?
Answer. I have consulted with the U.K. government in providing this
answer. The goal of the Climate Convention is to stabilise greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere at levels which avoid dangerous anthropogenic
climate change. The European Union (EU) has suggested that this would
mean avoiding temperature rises greater than 2 degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels. Recent research indicates that to do so requires
global greenhouse gas emissions to peak within the next two decades,
followed by substantial global reductions relative to 1990. These would
need to be of the order of at least 15% and perhaps as much as 50% by
2050. Developed countries would need to take greater action which
suggests that their emissions will need to fall by between 60 and 80%
of current levels by 2050. Kyoto is thus clearly just a first step as
its goal is to achieve reductions in developed country emissions in the
near term (2008 to 2012). However the Protocol includes built in
mechanisms for considering what actions should be taken by parties in
the period after 2012 and initial discussions on this are due to begin
among Kyoto parties at the 1st meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol, this November in Montreal.
With regard to the EU's Kyoto targets, a recent European Commission
report (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/
com2004_0818en01.pdf) suggests that a combination of existing domestic
policies and measures, additional policies and measures which are
already in an advanced state of planning, and emission credits gained
through the Kyoto Protocol's project-based mechanisms will deliver a
total EU-15 emissions cut of 8.6% by 2010 (the EU-15 target is -8%).
The EU Council of Ministers has set out a range of emission reduction
pathways, as noted above, to consider when discussing the future with
other parties. The U.K. aims to use its Presidency of the EU to launch
the process of developing strategies or pathways to deliver those kinds
of medium and long term targets. The U.K. hopes to introduce in the EU
the same kind of process taken by the U.K. in 2003 when it formulated
its Energy White Paper, undertaking the necessary work to demonstrate
that future targets adopted are achievable and compatible with healthy
economic growth.
Question 3. You note in your written testimony (p. 8) that for the
U.K. to meet its target of 60% reductions by 2050, it would suffer a
loss of 6 months' growth over 50 years, or 1% of the growth over that
time period. How much money in GDP and how many lost jobs does that
represent? Does this result in any reduction in emissions, particularly
in light of the fact, as you note, that China is building the
equivalent of a 1 gigawatt, fossil-fuel powered generating station
every week?
Answer. I have consulted with the U.K. government in providing this
answer. Analysis for the U.K.'s Energy White Paper in 2003 concluded
that the costs of achieving a 60% reduction in CO2 emissions
might be around 0.5-1% of GDP in 2050. This would be broadly equivalent
to a reduction of about 0.01 percentage points a year in the assumed
GDP growth rate of 2.25% a year. The cost to GDP in 2050 is estimated
to be between 10bn and 25bn per annum (in 2000
prices) by 2050 compared with a forecast level of GDP in 2050 of around
2500bn. There are no figures available for the effect on
employment. If the U.K. achieves a 60% reduction in its carbon dioxide
emissions this would mean that the U.K.'s annual emissions had fallen
to around 65 million tonnes of carbon by 2050, about 90 million tonnes
lower than they are currently. To put this in context, a new 1 GW coal-
fired power station might be expected to emit around 1.5 million tonnes
of carbon per year. The Energy White Paper recognises that it won't be
enough for the U.K. to act alone and that others will need to make
comparable efforts to meet the challenge of climate change.
Question 4. The time for greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere
to decay, as predicted by the IGCC model is about 37 months. However,
actual experience based on studies of volcano eruptions suggest a decay
time of half of that (Michaels and Knappenberger, 2000) or less
(Douglass and Knox, Univ. of Rochester, reported in Geophysical
Research Letters), meaning a lower climate sensitivity and lower the
future temperature rise. Have the IGCC numbers been rerun to account
for this actual data, rather than sticking to the modeling assumptions?
Answer. Different greenhouse gases have different lifetimes in the
atmosphere. The fundamentals of their atmospheric cycles and lifetimes
are well understood. I do not recognize to what decay the 37 months
refers. However, I believe the Senator's question is rather about the
transient climate response observed after the Pinatubo volcanic
eruption and how this might be used to constrain our knowledge of
climate sensitivity and ``global warming commitment'' (the extra-
warming in the pipeline once greenhouse gas concentrations have been
stabilized). The climate response to stratospheric aerosols induced by
the Pinatubo eruption has been used in a number of studies to attempt
to provide information about climate sensitivity or the time constant
of climate response to perturbations in radiative forcing such as
occurs with greenhouse gases. The one you cite by Douglass and Knox
essentially employs an extremely simplistic one-dimensional model that
includes no allowance for the ocean and also employs an incorrect
definition of radiative forcing. Other studies have used full three-
dimensional climate models (Kircher et al., Journal of Geophysical
Research, 104, 19039-19055, 1999; Soden et al., Science, 296, 727-730,
2002) and find that moderate to high climate sensitivities (i.e. 3 to
4.5 degrees C for a doubling of CO2 at equilibrium) are
compatible with the observations. However, as pointed out by R.S.
Lindzen and C. Giannitsis (J. Geophys. Res., 103, 5929-5941, 1998) in a
detailed study on the climatic effects of volcanic cooling, the
uncertainties associated with the climate response are such that no
clear conclusions can be drawn regarding either climate sensitivity or
the time scale of climate response from studies on a single volcanic
eruption such as Pinatubo.
Question 5. What has been the pattern of findings as the science
improves--more or less climate sensitivity to carbon concentration in
the atmosphere, greater or lesser projected warming? E.g., I understand
that the large majority of models predict a more modest warming of 2-5
degrees F, as opposed to IGCC's Third Assessment Report which predicts
about 11 degrees F (6 degrees C) by 2100.
Answer. The IPCC's Third Assessment Report in fact gave an
uncertainty range of 1.4 to 5.8 degrees C (2.5 to 10.5 F) for the
projected global average temperature rise in 2100--you just mention the
top end of that range. Included in that range are uncertainties in
projections of how greenhouse gases will increase in the 21st century
(that is dependent on how emissions due to human activities evolve) in
addition to uncertainties in our scientific understanding of the
response of climate to increased greenhouse gases. The range for global
average temperature rise projected for 2100 published in the IPCC 1995
Report of 1.0 to 3.5 C (1.8 to 6.3 F) was less than that in 2001,
largely because of different assumptions about likely emissions of
aerosols due to human activities and also of greenhouse gases, in the
21st century.
The response of climate to increased greenhouse gases is described
by a quantity called the climate sensitivity that is defined as the
amount of global average temperature increase for a doubling of
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration under equilibrium conditions.
This is a quantity determined from the science. Your question, I
believe, is asking how estimates of the climate sensitivity have
changed as our understanding of the science has improved.
In both the First and Second IPCC assessment reports of 1990 and
1995, the range of estimates of climate sensitivity was 1.5 to 4.5 C
(2.7 to 8.1 F). In the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) of 2001, the
conclusion drawn in the summary section of chapter 9 was that ``the
previous estimated range for this quantity, widely cited as +1.5 to
+4.5 C, still encompasses the more recent model sensitivity results''.
However, in Table 9.4 of that chapter, the range of values of climate
sensitivity in the 15 full climate models available to that chapter was
quoted as from 2.0 to 5.1 C (3.6 to 9.2 F) with a mean of 3.5 C
(6.3 F), indicating a tendency for models at that time to show
somewhat higher values of climate sensitivity. Since the publication of
the TAR there have been a number of studies in which models have
produced climate sensitivities in excess of 6 C (11 F) (e.g. Murphy
et al., 2004, Nature, 430, 768-772; Stainforth et al., 2005, Nature,
433, 403-406). In general, the lower end of the uncertainty range for
climate sensitivity has tended to remain at 1.5-2 C (2.7-3.6 F) while
the upper range has increased.
In conclusion, therefore, as the science has developed and
improved, there has been a tendency for an increase in the likelihood
of greater sensitivity and greater warming.
Question 6. What's the status of the review of the Mann ``hockey
stick'' temperature curve? I understand that studies by Stephen
McIntyre and Ross McKitrick suggest that it relied on the statistically
insignificant bristlecone pine. Is the IPCC taking another look at that
work, which forms the basis for much of today's climate change debate?
Answer. I have received a similar question from Senator Bingaman
(Q8c). I provide the same reply to both questions
This is a fast moving area of research. Very recently the
assertions by McIntyre and McKitrick (2005a, b) (MM), alluded to in the
question (references at end of answer), have been shown by several
papers to be largely false in the context of the actual data used by
Mann and co-workers. Ammann (a palaeontologist at the National Centre
for Atmospheric Research) and Wahl of Alfred University have two
papers, one in review and one in press, that reproduce the original
results published by Mann et al. in Nature in 1998 and Geophysical
Research Letters, 1999 and prominently used in the IPCC Third
Assessment Report. They demonstrate that the results of MM are due to
MM having censored key proxy data from the original Mann et al. (1998)
data set, and to having made errors in their implementation of the Mann
et al. method. They specifically show that 15th century temperatures,
related to the bristlecone pine issue, were not similar to 20th century
temperatures, as was suggested by MM. Amman and Wahl issued a press
release in May 2005 on this finding. Fuller details are at http://
www.ucar.edu/news/releases/2005/ammann.shtml. These authors state that
they will make their full computer code available publicly.
A specific claim is made by MM that the ``hockey stick'' shape of
the Mann et al. reconstructions is derived from the way Mann et al.
normalise and centre their principal component pattern data. This has
recently been tested. Rutherford et al. (in press, Journal of Climate)
have shown that essentially the same result as Mann et al. is obtained
using an entirely independent statistical method on similar data. This
eliminates the step of representing regional tree-ring networks by
principal components. The likely reason why Mann et al. were able to
successfully use their particular technique is because the structure of
paleoclimate data is more complex than the temporal ``red noise''
tested by MM.
Other investigators have reconstructed climate over the past 1000
years using very different techniques and different selections of data.
Some of these results are recent, and some were shown in Fig 2.21 of
the IPCC Third Assessment Science Report, Climate Change 2001. These
authors tend to find a greater magnitude of climate variability than
did the Mann et al. ``hockey stick'' results. In particular the
``Little Ice age'' centred around 1700 is generally cooler. Some of the
more recent papers of this type show a Little Ice Age cooler by up to
several tenths of a degree centigrade than any reconstruction shown in
the Third Assessment Report in Fig 2.21, including that of Mann et al.
However, all but one recent papers (Esper et al., 2002, Mann & Jones,
2003, Moberg et al., 2005, Huang, 2004, Jones & Mann, 2004, Bradley et
al., 2003) find that the warmth of the late 20th century is still
exceptional, as their reconstructions of the temperature level relative
to the 20th century in the Medieval warm period are similar to the Mann
et al. results. Soon & Baliunas concluded that the late 20th century
was not unusually warm but their methodology was flawed (Mann and
Jones, 2003) as they equated hydrological influences with temperature
influences and assumed that regional warmth corresponded to hemispheric
warmth.
I am sure that the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report will fully take
all these new findings into account. In the meantime, it is important
to recognise that no evidence has emerged that seriously calls into
question findings regarding the climate of the 20th century and the
influence of human activities as described in the IPCC 2001 Report.
Question 7. If all the countries that have signed Kyoto stay within
compliance of Kyoto, how much of a reduction in global warming would
this result in?
Answer. I have consulted with the U.K. government in providing this
answer. If the developed country parties make the reductions they have
committed to, in the period 2008-2012 the reduction in projected global
emissions will be up to about 2%. This takes account of the fact that
developing country emissions will still rise as they do not have
emission reduction targets, although mechanisms such as the clean
development mechanism, together with technology transfer and capacity
building, will be expected to lead to some reduction in their emissions
growth. The significance of the first commitment period is as a first
step for building broader coalitions and a longer-term engagement aimed
at reducing global emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as the
establishment of essential monitoring and measuring standards and cost-
effective market mechanisms such as international emissions trading.
Question 8. Can you confirm that suspended water vapor levels,
cloud cover percentages and direct solar irradiation changes over time
all represent variables in these forecasting models that could have
significant impacts on the conclusions of the results of these models?
Answer. In the formulation of climate models, estimates of direct
solar radiation changes with time are included, along with estimates of
all other known forcing factors, both natural and anthropogenie. There
are periods such as that from around 1900-1940 when it is believed
solar radiation changes had a significant effect. Any effect of solar
radiation changes over the last 50 years, however, has been small
compared with the effects of increasing anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions Climate Change; the Scientific Basis, the IPCC 2001 Report,
chapter 6).
Water vapor concentration and the coverage of cloud (at different
levels and of different types) are variables within the model equations
that are generated within the model as the model integrations progress
by applying the physical laws on which the model depends. These
variables are not introduced from outside except in the specification
of initial conditions; the influence of the these is soon lost as the
integrations progress. The way in which clouds are treated within the
model equations differs significantly amongst models. The largest
single uncertainty in model results arises from uncertainties regarding
this treatment as is explained in Climate Change; the Scientific Basis,
the IPCC 2001 Report, chapter 8.
Question 9. In looking at pre-industrial global temperature
patterns, would you agree that changes in temperatures over time have
occurred that had no anthropogenic basis?
Answer. Temperature is a climate variable that has large natural
variability over all time scales and space scales. The natural
variability can arise because of external forcing such as changes in
solar radiation or because of variations within the climate system
itself. In addition to this natural variability, changes occur because
of human activities, for instance deforestation, changes in vegetation
or land use and since the industrial revolution because of changes in
atmospheric composition especially most recently emissions into the
atmosphere of growing quantities of greenhouse gases.
The task of the IPCC has been to study thoroughly all reasons for
climate variability and change both natural and anthropogenic and,
through appropriate scientific analysis and the employment of climate
models, to distinguish as far as possible between natural and
anthropogenic effects.
Question 10. Do we know what the ``best'' global temperature is to
sustain life?
Answer. Life of all kinds--human and non human--exists successfully
on earth under a very wide variety of climates. What is important to
realize is that humans and ecosystems have over millennia and centuries
adapted to reasonably stable local climatic conditions. But unusually
large climate changes are beginning to occur on a global scale and at a
rate that is greater than for at least 10,000 years. If the local
climate changes too rapidly, adaptation to new conditions may be
difficult for both ecosystems and humans. The IPCC has concluded,
`Projected climate change will have beneficial and adverse effects on
both environmental and socio-economic systems, but the larger the
changes and rate of change in climate, the more the adverse effects
predominate' (Climate Change 2001, Synthesis Report,
Many ecosystems are sensitive to unusual and sustained changes in
temperature or precipitation. I give two examples. First, many areas of
tropical corals are suffering `bleaching' because of increases in ocean
temperature. Corals are also expected to be seriously affected by the
increased ocean acidity that is occurring because of carbon dioxide
from anthropogenic sources that is emitted into the atmosphere and then
dissolved in ocean waters--an environmental problem that has only
recently been appreciated. (see U.K. Royal Society Report 12/05, Ocean
acidification due to increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide, 30 June
2005, available on ). A second example is of
substantial die back that is occurring in forests at northern high
latitudes because of increased warming outside their normal range of
tolerance.
Over past epochs humans have responded to severe local or regional
climate changes by moving into other more tolerable areas. In our
modern extremely crowded world large population movements are no longer
possible. To some adverse changes, it will be possible for humans to
adapt, although often at significant cost. For instance, adaptation to
changes in average water availability, average temperatures or some sea
level rise might be achieved through alterations to water resource
infrastructure, building design or sea defences. For many low lying
areas, however, such as large populated deltas or many islands,
adaptation to sea level rise is not a practical possibility and many
millions will be displaced. Further, the increases that are likely in
the frequency and intensity of floods and droughts will cause large
problems especially for populations in sub tropical countries that are
particularly vulnerable to such events.
Question 11. What is currently being done to curb emissions from
parts of the world in poverty who are deforesting their environment and
burning biomass for all means of day-to-day living, and are these
emissions continuing to increase in the world?
Answer.
ARE THESE EMISSIONS CONTINUING TO INCREASE
Deforestation releases CO2 to the atmosphere both from
the vegetation directly and also by disturbing the soil. The numbers
quoted below refer to this. Burning biomass as a day-to-day fuel leads
to net CO2 emissions if the biomass is not replaced. If the
biomass is grown explicitly for fuel wood then there are no net
CO2 emissions as the carbon biomass stock on average remains
constant.
CO2 flux from land-use change is increasing at about the
same rate as fossil fuel usage. On a global scale, in 1980 land-use
change accounted for about 23% of total anthropogenic emissions and in
2000 about 24%. Regionally, there are some differences. From 1980 to
2000, land-use carbon fluxes increased by 30% in tropical America--
close to the global average increase. Larger increases occurred in
tropical Asia (56%) and tropical Africa (60%).
(Data taken from: Houghton, R.A., and J.L. Hackler, 2002. Carbon
Flux to the Atmosphere from Land-Use Changes; and Marland, G. et al.,
2005, Global, Regional, and National CO2 Emissions--both in
Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change, Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S.
Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn., U.S.A. Both are available at:
.)
WHAT IS CURRENTLY BEING DONE
My main personal experience of this problem comes through the Shell
Foundation (a large charity set up by the Shell Company mainly to
support sustainable energy provision in the third world) of which I am
a Trustee. The Foundation has a large program aimed at the creation of
local enterprises that build and market simple efficient stoves using
traditional fuels that will substantially the reduce the amount of fuel
that is used and also reduce indoor air pollution with the serious
damage to health that it causes. The Foundation also has programs aimed
at the creation of enterprises to provide sustainable and affordable
energy to poor communities often from the use of readily available
waste material (e.g. rice straw in China, coconut shells in the
Philippines, etc.). The potential for the multiplication of such
projects is very large. An aim of the Foundation is to join with other
bodies and agencies to create mechanisms for the large scale-up of such
programs so that they can become significant on a global scale both in
the provision of energy to poor communities and also in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.
Question 12. Do you believe it is practical to seek emission
controls in parts of the world that are struggling in poverty?
Answer. I believe the top priority is to achieve emissions
reductions in the parts of the world that are making the largest
emissions contributions i.e. the industrialized nations and those
nations that are rapidly industrializing. Regarding nations `struggling
in poverty', as you will see from my answer to Q11, I believe there is
great opportunity for agencies and governments in the developed world
to assist them to move out of poverty in ways that are sustainable and
that reduce rather than increase their greenhouse gas emissions.
Question 13. What is being done to curb emissions in the developing
countries like China and India?
Answer. In reply to Question 3 from Senator Bunning, I emphasized
the importance of developed countries leading by example with regard to
developing countries such as China and India. I also mentioned the
responsibility on developed countries to develop partnerships with
countries that are seeking to industrialize so as to assist them in
whatever ways they can with the development of low carbon or carbon
free energy generation. Further, it is essential that developing
countries are full participants in agreements that need to be reached
regarding targets and mechanisms in the next stage of negotiations that
is taking place within the FCCC.
Responses of Sir John Houghton to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Is there any credible scenario for stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions that does not involve the United States and
other major emitters stopping their emissions growth over the next
couple of decades and sharply reversing their emissions growth by 2050.
Answer. All scenarios of global emissions that stabilize carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere this century slow emissions
growth over the next few decades and reverse that growth severely
during the second half of the century. That applied to global
emissions. The slowing and reversal of emissions for industrialized
countries need to occur more quickly than for global emissions so as to
allow room for growing industrialization in developing countries. I
provide examples of stabilization profiles for both developed and
developing countries in my written testimony to the committee.
Question 2. Would the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal stop and then reverse U.S. greenhouse gas emissions?
Answer. I am not an expert of energy policy and cannot comment in
detail on the proposals of the National Commission on Energy Policy. As
I understand it, their main proposals are limited to stopping the
growth of emissions by 2020 and do not cover the period after that
date, although they recognize in their report the need for the reversal
of emissions growth after 2020.
______
Responses of Dr. Mario Molina to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Over the last several decades, anthropogenic emissions
have ``substantially contributed'' to the increase in average global
temperatures. Upon receiving a question from one of the Senators, one
of the panelists suggested that ``80 percent'' of the warming was due
to human activities. Do all the panelists agree? Please provide
information as to how this estimate was derived.
Answer. Other panelists will need to answer for themselves as to
whether they agree with the 80 percent figure. While I personally
believe that estimate is probably in the right ballpark, I think it's
less important to focus on a particular number than it is to stress the
broader scientific consensus reflected in recent findings of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)--in particular the
IPCC's finding that ``MOST of the warming of the past 50 years is
attributable to human activities.''
As for the techniques used to estimate the extent of human vs.
natural influences on climate, estimates such as the one noted above
are generally based on a careful statistical comparison of the
temperature record over the past century against the timing and
estimated magnitudes of the positive and negative ``forcings'' (warming
and cooling influences respectively) known to have been produced in
this period by both human and natural phenomena. Examples of such
forcings include volcanic eruptions (which are thought to have had a
slight overall cooling influence on surface air temperatures over the
past 50 years), solar changes (which are not thought to have had a
significant effect over this time period but may account for a slight
amount of warming), emissions of sulfates and other aerosols (some of
which would have had a cooling effect), and emissions of carbon
dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases (which would have a strong
warming effect).
A crucial test of our confidence in the proposition that human
activities are having a substantial impact on global climate is that
when the best current climate models are supplied with the estimated
time history of all known forcings--natural and human--as inputs, the
temperature history for the 20th century calculated by the models
matches the observed temperature record. If the ``model'' climate is
driven only by the known natural forcings, the match with observations
is poor; that is, the natural forcings cannot account, by themselves,
for a large part of the changes in temperature that have been observed.
Question 2. We received testimony that sought to distinguish
between average global temperature changes causes primarily by
anthropogenic emissions and local/regional temperature changes caused
at times by natural variation. Please explain in greater detail.
Answer. The surface temperature of the Earth is never uniform. The
average temperature that features in discussions of climate change
represents an average over every place on Earth, including some places
that are warmer than average and some that are cooler. (The average is
also an average over time--over the 24 hours in each day and the 365
days in each year, if one is speaking, say, of the average temperature
for 1850 or 2000 or 2005.) Changes in temperature are likewise not
uniform spatially or temporally, and this is true whether the changes
result from human or natural forces.
For example, volcanic eruptions reduce the average temperature of
the Earth for a time because the fine particles they inject into the
stratosphere reflect sunlight back into space before it reaches Earth's
surface. The cooling they cause is not, however, spatially uniform
because the particles are most concentrated in the latitude band where
the eruption has occurred. (The winds that spread these particles
around blow mostly from west to east moving them quite rapidly along
lines of constant latitude while spreading them only slowly to the
north and south.) In addition, the cooling effect declines over time
because the particles eventually settle back to Earth.
Particles added to the atmosphere by human activities--including
especially agricultural burning, fossil-fuel burning, and human-caused
forest fires--also show the highest concentrations, and therefore the
largest effects, in the latitudes where they are emitted. Some of these
particles tend to cool the Earth below them, like those from volcanic
eruptions, while others (such as black soot from incomplete combustion)
tend to warm the Earth below.
Unlike particles from volcanic eruptions, most of the greenhouse
gases being added to the atmosphere by human activities stay there long
enough to become uniformly mixed through the atmosphere around the
globe. But still, the temperature changes that result from these
greenhouse-gas increases are not uniform over the surface of the Earth,
because the other forces that shape the surface temperature at any
given place can act to either amplify or reduce the impact of altered
greenhouse-gas concentrations on local temperatures. Such forces can
include natural oscillations in the climate system, like the El Nino-
Southern Oscillation and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, that can
modify the global-scale response at a particular location for years or
even decades, making the response to increased greenhouse gas
concentrations larger or smaller. Notably, the global-scale warming
influence of human-made greenhouse gases will not only be superimposed
on top of all these natural cycles, but may also influence their
behavior. At the local to regional scale, additional influences--such
as air pollution, land cover change, and urbanization--can also
contribute to localized warming or cooling.
Indeed, because of the complicated dynamics of changes in the
circulation of the atmosphere and the oceans--changes that can be
caused by the effects of greenhouse gases or by human and natural
forces that are independent of greenhouse-gas increases--it is
perfectly possible, and indeed is often predictable, that some regions
will become cooler on average even as the Earth as a whole grows warmer
on average. And, of course, some regions will warm faster than the
world as a whole is warming, as for example is happening in the Arctic
for reasons that are quite well understood. Based on global-scale
``fingerprint'' studies that compare complex patterns of temperature
and other aspects of climate from observations and climate models, we
generally expect warming to be greater over land areas than over the
oceans (due to differences in heat capacity), greater at mid to high
latitudes than at low latitudes (due to more energy going into
evaporation in lower latitudes), and greater in the winter than in the
summer (again due to more heat going into evaporation during the
summer). These tendencies are based on long-term projections and may or
may not apply in all regions or localities, especially in the early
stages of warming. Nevertheless, it is clear that over the next
century, the human-caused amplification of the greenhouse effect will
exert a dominant influence on average temperatures at sub-continental
to global scales.
Question 3. Please explain the meaning of `scientific consensus'
and comment on the status of the science of climate change in the
scientific and academic community.
Answer. The validity of scientific propositions is not determined
by popular vote or even by a vote among scientists. It is determined by
the replicability of observations, experiments, and analyses and the
demonstrated predictive value of theories based on these, as certified
by peer review. Peer review takes place when papers submitted for
publication in scientific journals are reviewed by ``referees'' chosen
by the editor, as well as when other scientists critique and try to
replicate published results and when bodies such as the National
Academy of Sciences and the IPCC use committees of scientists to review
the state of understanding on specific issues.
At any given time, in any given scientific discipline, there is a
set of understandings of the subject constituting what most competent
specialists in the field consider to have been established. These
understandings relate to what these specialists believe is known with
high confidence, what they believe is probably true but not yet
established with such high confidence, and what they believe the
important questions are that need further investigation before
conclusions can be drawn about them with any confidence at all. This
set of understandings of a topic--the understandings held in common by
most competent specialists in the relevant field--is what is meant by
the term ``scientific consensus''.
The term does not mean some sort of average or common understanding
held by everybody who is a scientist of any kind. Science is divided
into many disciplines and specialties, and specialists in one topic are
not necessarily much better informed about the science of topics
outside their specialties than are laypeople. (Indeed, an intelligent
layperson who has made a serious effort to learn about a particular
scientific topic will probably know more about it than a scientist from
a different specialty who has not made such an effort.) Thus, one would
not try to determine the ``scientific consensus'' on climate change by
polling a random sample of scientists of all specialties. One does it,
as the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the IPCC have done it, by
convening a representative sample of the leading specialists to review
and discuss current understandings and write down what they come up
with in a report, which is then subjected to further review by
additional leading specialists as to its accuracy and clarity.
Like all science, the science of climate change is evolving--a
process in which old understandings are strengthened, modified, or
discarded; earlier questions are wholly or partly answered (or found to
resist answers); and new questions emerge. Disagreement and controversy
are a normal part of this process. Much of the attention of scientists
tends to be focused on questions that are not yet settled, and it is
the healthy habit of some fraction of the scientific community to be
constantly challenging understandings that most others have accepted.
Scientific reputations are made not only by answering questions that no
one was able to answer before, but also by showing that some
understanding that was previously commonly accepted is in fact not
adequate and requires modification.
The possibility of making their reputation by overturning accepted
scientific wisdom motivates the ``heretics'' who are found in every
scientific field. But policy makers and the public need to know that
such reversals of accepted understandings are far rarer than popular
accounts of science often suggest. In any given field at any given
time, the odds are that most of the understandings held in common by
most of the specialists in that field are right or close to right. The
greater the body of accumulated evidence and analysis that supports
those understandings, moreover, the lower is the chance of their being
overturned. And even in the most celebrated scientific ``revolutions'',
such as that produced by Einstein's theory of special relativity, the
``old'' understandings often remain adequate for most purposes.
(Special relativity notwithstanding, the old Newtonian mechanics remain
perfectly adequate for predicting what will happen when you drive your
car at 60 mph into a brick wall.)
The ``scientific consensus'' on climate change--the understandings
of climate science currently held in common by almost all scientists in
this field--is based on a very large body of evidence and analysis from
a wide range of relevant scientific disciplines and approaches,
accumulated by thousands of researchers in universities, research
centers, and field stations all around the world over a period of many
decades. The robustness of the consensus view is based on:
the sheer volume of evidence and analysis (which has
expanded at a greatly increased rate over the past 15-20
years);
the consistency of the picture that results from different
types of observations and different modes of analysis (direct
measurements of greenhouse-gas concentrations and the
temperature of the ground and atmosphere and oceans; inferences
about earlier concentrations and temperatures from glaciers,
tree rings, sediments, and the like; application of fundamental
principles of atmospheric physics; and computer simulations of
past and future climatic change); and
an intensity and rigor of peer review unusual even by the
ordinary standards of science, resulting from the obvious
importance to society of getting this particular science right
and manifested in the extraordinary number and depth of
multiply peer-reviewed reports on the science of climate change
by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the IPCC, and a
number of other national and international scientific bodies.
The scientific consensus view on climate change will continue to
evolve as measurements and analyses continue. It is highly unlikely,
however, that this evolution will change the current core
understandings--namely that the Earth's climate has recently been
changing in a manner that is unusual against the backdrop of normal
variation from natural causes, that increased atmospheric greenhouse-
gas concentrations from human activities are playing a large role in
these changes, and that continuation along the current path will lead
to additional climatic changes that are, on balance, increasingly
harmful to industrialized and developing countries alike--in any
fundamental way. The evolving understandings will, instead, provide
more detailed and reliable information than currently available on the
character, geographic distribution, and timing of future climatic
changes and on the impacts of these changes. It is important for policy
makers to recognize that this more detailed and reliable picture is at
least as likely to be more alarming than the current scientific
consensus, as described by the National Academy of Sciences and the
IPCC, as it is to be less alarming than these current portrayals.
Question 4. What is ``abrupt climate change?'' Can you identify any
potential thresholds that might be crossed if insufficient action is
taken to control CO2 emissions? For example, I have heard
that beyond certain temperature increases, large ice sheets could
collapse, leading to huge increases in sea level. Can you comment on
this and other potential thresholds?
Answer. Improved methods for reconstructing the past climate of the
Earth from ``paleoclimatological'' evidence such as the composition of
gas bubbles trapped in the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have made
plain that the climate has sometimes changed more abruptly in the past
than had previously been supposed--for example, making a transition
from an interglacial to a glacial period, or the reverse, in a matter
of one to a few decades, rather than centuries. The fact that such
rapid changes in outcome have been possible under gradually changing,
natural ``forcings'' of Earth's climate is anything but reassuring in
the context of the relatively rapid changes in ``forcing'' being
generated by human-caused greenhouse gases today. If climate changes
abruptly rather than gradually, the possibilities for adaptation by
means of altered agricultural practices and patterns, construction of
dams and dikes, and so on become much less promising.
To understand the possibility of abrupt or ``non-linear'' climate
change it may be helpful to think about a light switch. If you first
apply only a little bit of force to the switch, it doesn't move and no
light comes on. But if you progressively add more pressure, you will
eventually ``flip the switch'' and the light will come on. The light
produced is not proportional to the pressure applied; that is, you
don't get a little bit of light as you add a little bit more pressure.
The light turns on once you push hard enough to move the switch.
Similarly, the Earth's climate system is likely to contain thresholds
that could conceivably initiate or accelerate abrupt climate change
once the ``forcing'' caused by increased atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases reaches a certain level. One example of such a
threshold might involve sudden shifts in the thermohaline pattern of
ocean circulation. As warming temperatures melt the ice at the poles,
salty ocean waters will be diluted with freshwater. Paleoclimatic
records suggest that it is possible this gradual freshening of the sea,
if it reached a certain level, could ``flip a switch'' and greatly
diminish or even shut down deep ocean currents that are important in
transporting heat and nutrients from the equator to the poles via
global ocean circulation patterns. The result could be significant
changes in regional weather patterns.
Crossing certain temperature thresholds could also trigger the
initiation of rapid and irreversible melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet
or a sudden destabilization of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, either of
which would raise global sea levels by about 20 feet. Another
possibility is that temperatures could increase enough to trigger
large-scale decomposition of methane clathrates (with attendant large
amplification of the greenhouse effect). Unfortunately, knowledge of
these possibilities is not yet sufficient to enable confident
prediction of whether and when they would materialize along the warming
trajectory now being traveled. Knowledge of these possibilities is,
however, sufficient to conclude that we would be wise to slow the rate
at which we are adding pressure to the switch--in this case, by pushing
up atmospheric concentrations of heat trapping gases.
To underscore this point, another analogy may be helpful. We can
think of ourselves as being on a CO2 ``highway'' that is
taking us to a rapidly warming future. By adopting more or less
aggressive measures to curb emissions we can exit this highway at
various places and thereby stabilize atmospheric concentrations of
heat-trapping gases at various levels. At the moment, however, we are
whizzing past exits, and with each one that goes by the risk grows that
we may be passing a threshold. For example, as rising CO2
concentrations both increase global temperatures and acidify the
oceans, coral reefs may already be destined for large-scale
devastation. We may have already passed that point of no return, but we
can't be sure since we don't know exactly which exits mark different
thresholds for drastically changing the way our planet operates.
The problem is that we are not likely to know that we have missed
an exit or crossed such a threshold until it is too late to alter the
outcome. Because CO2 remains in the atmosphere for
centuries, we can't wait and then make quick corrections once we see
the results. Meanwhile, the faster we travel the more difficult it
becomes to safely turn off the highway at any given exit. Thus, slowing
our current emissions trajectory may be our best hope for anticipating
and ultimately avoiding really abrupt and potentially catastrophic
climate changes. By doing so, we can buy time to further develop our
understanding of Earth's climate systems and to develop the new energy
technologies that will be needed to stabilize future atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations.
Question 5. Can you tell us something about the time horizon for
stabilizing climate, given how long carbon dioxide remains in the
atmosphere? Do we need to begin to control emissions now or can we
wait?
Answer. Human additions of CO2 to the atmosphere produce
long-lasting increases in the total quantity of CO2 in the
atmosphere--which boosts the greenhouse effect because, while some
portion of any additional carbon is quickly removed through uptake by
plants and by the surface layer of the oceans, much of the carbon
remains for decades and some of it remains for centuries. Every
increase in the CO2 content of the atmosphere, moreover,
initiates changes in the climate that themselves grow for decades (due
to the inertia of the climate system). The consequences of a given
increase in temperature, moreover, may continue to build for centuries
after the increase occurs. (This is the case for the rise in sea-level
is likely to result from continued warming, for example.)
Thus, even though some effects are immediate, the full effects of
any human additions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the
atmosphere will not be felt for decades and centuries after the
additions occur. Prudence therefore requires controlling emissions long
before the climate-change impacts being experienced have become
intolerable. Given that harmful effects of greenhouse-gas-induced
climate change are already being experienced at a global-average
temperature increase of around 0.8 degrees C (1.4 degrees F) above the
pre-industrial level, and given that the full effect of current
greenhouse-gas concentrations will be a further increase of about 0.6
degrees C (1.1 degrees F) by the time the ocean reaches equilibrium
with the increased greenhouse effect that these concentrations entail,
we would be foolish not to start controlling the offending omissions
immediately.
Question 6. Given that there is still some uncertainty about the
details of future warming, how should such uncertainty be dealt with in
designing policy responses?
Let me begin my answer by once again suggesting an analogy. If you
go to your doctor and he says that if you continue on your present
course, you are at very high risk of having a heart attack, what do you
do? Do you ask exactly what day the heart attack will come and how
severe it will be? Or do you take action right away to diminish your
risk and try to prevent an attack?
Similarly, based on what we know now about the risks associated
with rising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, there is a
clear need to begin reducing emissions right away if we are to improve
our odds of avoiding the potentially severe and dangerous types of
consequences that lie ahead. We know that the risk of ``dangerous
anthropogenic interference'' in the Earth's climate is going to
continue to grow until we address it. Economists have analyzed the
costs of various policy responses and they tell us that there are more
and less cost-effective ways to go about managing this risk. The most
cost-effective emissions trajectories involve starting now to control
emissions, just as it is best to initiate one's retirement savings
early and benefit from the compounding of interest over time. Delay
will be costly, and is likely to require an even greater allocation of
resources in the long run. Doing less (or nothing) to control emissions
now makes it more likely that we will have to do more later--and do it
more abruptly. As the joint statement of the national academies pointed
out, this is likely to be more expensive because it is difficult for
economies to adjust to abrupt policy changes. It is thus not only more
prudent, but more economically efficient to begin taking action now--
preferably by implementing a policy that sends a clear signal to the
market about the cost of emissions. A well-designed policy to
accomplish this can also provide important ancillary benefits by
promoting efficiency, reducing oil imports, improving air quality, and
giving U.S. companies a competitive edge in the development and
deployment of new energy technologies.
Question 7. How do we know that emissions of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases are causing Earth's temperature to rise, as
opposed to other factors that we have no control over; such as sun
spots? Some assert that an increase in solar irradiance is the main
cause of the Earth's current warming trend. Therefore, reducing fossil
fuel emissions would not impact the Earth's temperature.
Answer. The sun's radiant output is one of many factors that affect
the Earth's climate. Scientists have intensively studied these various
factors and how much they have influenced climate over the past
century. ``Fingerprint'' studies analyze patterns of temperature change
in models and in observations to help understand the causes of climate
change. For example, were recent warming trends being caused by an
increase in solar irradiance, one would expect the stratosphere to be
warming also. This is not the case--in fact, the stratosphere is
cooling. Similarly, if sunspots are the main cause of warming, then
warming trends should correlate with sunspot activity. Again, this is
not the case. Instead, global average surface temperatures have
continued to rise with rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases. According to the IPCC, the warming effect due to increased
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere over the past century
is estimated to be more than eight times greater than the effect of
changes in solar irradiance. In fact, observations do not even show an
increase in average solar output over the past 50 years. Numerous peer-
reviewed studies have concluded that natural factors, including solar
output, could not have caused the observed warming of the past half
century.
Question 8a. There are some who question the veracity of the
assertion that the earth has warmed substantially over the last
century. Arguments typically fall into three categories. It would be
useful if you would address each in turn:
Urban Heat Island Effect. This is the claim that the underlying
temperature data is tainted by the proximity of data-generating
thermometers to cities. As urban areas have grown over the last fifty
years, the air temperatures around these cities have increased due to
larger amounts of heat generating substances like rooftops and
roadways. Scientists claim to have corrected for the urban heat island
effect. How was this done, and how can we be sure that it was done
correctly?
Answer. The ``urban heat island effect'' is a spatially nonuniform
warming effect from human activities that some climate-change skeptics
have claimed has distorted the temperature record of the last 100 years
so as to cause an overestimate of the effects of greenhouse gases. Some
(including the author Michael Crichton in his recent novel) have
claimed that much or all of the entire observed global warming is an
artifact resulting from many of the measurement stations being in
cities, which are warmer than the surrounding countryside because of
the heat released in the operation of vehicles, factories, and homes.
While a few disreputable skeptics continue to claim this, the fact is
that their hypothesis has been completely discredited by much-
replicated studies that carefully correct the analysis of temperatures
from the global thermometer network for the effects of urban heat
release.
To correct for the urban heat island effect, for example,
scientists have compared temperature measurements taken in rural vs.
urban areas and in some cases have simply excluded measurements taken
at urban sites. Meanwhile, studies that compare global time series made
up of temperature measurements taken only at rural stations with time
series that also include temperature data from urban stations have
found no difference between the two, suggesting that there is no bias
in the global temperature trend due to urbanization\1\ In another
recent study using different methods, Parker (2004) also found no
effect from urban warming in the global average temperature record.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, for example, Peterson, T.C., K.P. Gallo, J. Lawrimore,
T.W. Owen, A. Huang, and D.A. McKittrick, 1999: Global rural
temperature trends. Geophys. Res. Letts., 26, 329-332 and Peterson,
Thomas C., 2003: Assessment of urban versus rural in situ surface
temperatures in the contiguous U.S.: No difference found. J. Climate,
18, 2941-2959.
\2\ Parker, D.E., 2004: Large-scale warming is not urban, Nature,
432, 290-291, 10.1038/432290b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, it is worth noting that thermometer readings are not the
only evidence of warming. Glaciers on every continent, none of which
are located in urban environments, are retreating. Rising sea levels,
increasing ocean temperatures, thawing permafrost, and movement of
animal and plant species all provide additional evidence of a global
warming trend that cannot be explained by the urban heat island effect.
Question 8b. Satellite and Airborne Balloon Data Contradict Surface
Temperature Readings. Global mean temperature at the earth's surface is
estimated to have risen by about half a degree F over the last two
decades. On the other hand, satellite measurements of radiances and
airborne balloon observations indicate that the temperature of the
lower to mid-troposphere (the atmospheric layer extending from the
earth's surface up to about 8 km) has exhibited almost no change during
this period. Please explain whether this discrepancy is, indeed, real
and how to account for it.
Answer. Recent peer-reviewed studies have shown that the low-and
mid-troposphere have in fact warmed at about the same rate as the
Earth's surface over the past few decades. The earlier notion that the
troposphere had not warmed was based on significant errors in the
adjustment of satellite and balloon data. As these errors have been
corrected, the temperature data for the low-and mid-troposphere have
consistently shown more warming.\3\ Studies to be published this month
(11 August 2005) in Science expose the latest of these errors (see
Sherwood et al., 2005 for balloon data; and Mears and Wentz, 2005 for
satellite data).\4\ In addition, the rate of warming both at the
surface and in the troposphere has increased in the years since initial
analyses of satellite and radiosonde data were undertaken.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See, for example, Mears, C.A., M.C. Schabel, and F.J. Wentz,
2003: A Reanalysis of the MSU channel 2 tropospheric temperature
record. J. Climate, 16, 3650-3664; Vinnikov, K.Y., and N.C. Grody,
2003: Global warming trend of mean tropospheric temperature observed by
satellites. Science, 302, 269-272; Vinnikov, K.Y., A. Robock, N.C.
Grody, and A. Basist, 2004: Analysis of diurnal and seasonal cycles and
trends in climatic records with arbitrary observation times. Geophys.
Res. Lett., 31, L06205, doi:10.1029/2003GL019196, 2004; Lanzante, J.R.,
S.A. Klein, and D.J. Seidel, 2003: Temporal homogenization of monthly
radiosonde temperature data. Part I: Methodology. J. Climate, 16, 224-
240 and Lanzante, J.R., S.A. Klein, and D.J. Seidel, 2003: Temporal
homogenization of monthly radiosonde temperature data. Part II: Trends,
sensitivities, and MSU comparison. J. Climate, 16, 241-262.
\4\ Sherwood, S.C., J.R. Lanzante, C. Meyer, Science, 11 August
2005: Radiosonde daytime biases and late 20th Century warming.
(10.1126/science. 1115640) and Mears, C.A., and F.J. Wentz, Science, 11
Aug. 2005: The effect of diurnal correction on satellite-derived lower
tropospheric temperature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though there are still minor discrepancies between available data
sets due to the different methods that different research teams use to
analyze the data, the bottom line is that both the surface and the
troposphere show significant global warming trends according to all
available data records: those derived from thermometers at the surface,
those derived from sensors on satellites, and those obtained from
weather balloons. These records show no major difference between
surface and tropospheric warming at the global scale over the past
several decades.
Question 8c. The Hockey Stick. In recent months, there have been
assertions that the statistical method used to analyze global
temperature data for the last several hundred years was biased towards
generating the ``hockey stick'' shaped curve that shows sustained low
and stable temperatures for hundreds of years with an extremely sharp
rise in the last 100 years. Can you comment on whether the observations
depicted in the hockey stick curve are, indeed, legitimate?
Answer. The ``hockey stick'' shape of reconstructions of Earth's
temperature over the past 1,000 years, which shows a sharp rise in
temperature over the last 100 years, is a feature that is found in, or
supported by, many different lines of measurement and analysis by many
different investigators. It appears, for example, in studies of the
extent of glaciation in mountain regions, gas bubbles trapped in the
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, tree rings, pollens preserved in
sediments, and borehole measurements of temperatures at various depths
in Earth's crust. The critiques that have been offered of the
statistical techniques that were used to produce one particular version
of the ``hockey stick'' graph--a version that was prominently displayed
in the 2001 climate-science report of the IPCC--would not invalidate
this general conclusion even if the critiques were correct. But it now
seems quite clear, both from the responses offered by the authors of
that graph and from analyses that are becoming available from others,
that these critiques are wrong.
In addition, it should be stressed that the details of the shape of
the 1000-year ``hockey stick'' are not an essential element of the key
understandings in the current scientific consensus about climate
change--namely, that the planet is now warming at an unusual rate and
that this current warming is primarily due to human activities. A very
large number of independent studies have led to this conclusion.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ A thorough analysis of the hockey stick debate can be found at
www.realclimate.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 9. Some say that global warming might be a positive
development? Will agricultural crop productivity improve due to the
greater amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and can we expect
the Arctic and Antarctic regions to become more habitable?
Answer. The effects of climate change on agricultural productivity
depend on numerous inter-related factors, including rising
temperatures, increased CO2 in the atmosphere, average
precipitation levels, incidence and severity of floods and droughts,
and the plant-pest-and-pathogen-promoting effects of a warmer, wetter
world. Early studies that ignore the pest-and-pathogen and flood-
drought issues have suggested that a modest increase in global-average
temperatures would increase agricultural productivity in some areas,
while reducing it in others. Even these limited predicted benefits are
confined to small increases in temperature, however, with
overwhelmingly negative effects setting in when temperatures reach
levels expected in many agricultural regions by the middle of this
century. More recent studies that account for a fuller range of
climate-linked effects on crops suggest that net negative impacts on
world agriculture are likely even sooner.
Modest amounts of global-average warming will have both positive
and negative impacts on other aspects of human health and well-being as
well. In some mid-latitude regions, for example, slightly warmer winter
conditions might have some positive consequences (e.g., lower heating
bills) as well as some negative ones (e.g., diminished mountain
snowpack could further strain already inadequate water supplies in
western parts of the United States). But in these non-agricultural
respects, too, the net impacts are likely to turn strongly negative for
most nations, people, and biological systems above a certain
threshold--both because the rate of climatic change is likely to
require continual adjustment and because negative impacts will begin to
overtake positive ones.
The recent Arctic Climate Impact Assessment presented evidence that
strong negative impacts are already affecting the Arctic and that these
negative impacts are likely to intensify as warming proceeds. Impacts
that are already being registered include severe coastal erosion due to
retreating sea ice, rising sea level, and thawing of coastal permafrost
and attendant damage to buildings, roads, and industry. More severe
insect outbreaks and more frequent forest fires are also likely to
accompany ongoing warming. The warmest regions of the world, meanwhile,
may begin to experience conditions that are virtually unprecedented for
human societies and natural ecosystems. In sum, the evidence is strong
that negative impacts are very likely to outweigh positive ones as
rapid warming proceeds.
Question 10. It is my understanding that the assessments of the
progression of global warming through the next century and its impacts
on changing the Earth's climate are largely based on computer modeling.
It goes without saying that the planet's atmospheric, hydrologic, and
meteorological systems are highly complicated. What can you say about
how climate modeling capabilities have advanced since scientists began
evaluating the problem? What is the level confidence that the computer
models are providing useful projections of the future climate?
Answer. You are correct that we gain most of our insight into what
the future holds by utilizing complex, physically-based computer
models. These models are quantitative and grounded in the fundamental
laws of physics and chemistry and are anchored by a very large number
of scientific measurements. Our confidence in the models is
strengthened by the fact that they can replicate past and present
climates as well as the influences of the most important factors that
affect climate. The models are extensively compared, tested, and
refined, and they provide us with valuable insights. Climate scientists
do not use the models blindly, they analyze and understand them and
check them against everything else that they have learned.
That said, models are not the only tools scientists use to predict
what will happen as greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise.
Records of past climatic conditions derived from ice cores, tree rings,
and other data, and observations from the past century also provide
evidence regarding how climate changes and what the impacts of such
changes are likely to be. There is no past analog to the geophysical
experiment that our species is now undertaking--and is committed to for
some time into the future. Although models may provide only an
indication of what is most likely to occur, they are among the most
important tools we have for anticipating the consequences of a changing
atmosphere rather than simply facing those consequences without
warning.
Question 11. You played a central role as a scientist in the debate
surrounding the stratospheric ozone hole, which led to a resolution
that is widely regarded as one of the most important and successful
international environmental agreements ever. Do you see any key
similarities between the two issues (stratospheric ozone layer and
climate change) and, more importantly, can you comment on any key
lessons that might be applicable to the current debate on whether and
how to address climate change?
Answer. Ozone is a highly reactive, unstable molecule consisting of
three atoms of oxygen. It occurs both near the Earth's surface--where
it is a major constituent of smog, and in the region of the upper
atmosphere, six to thirty miles above the surface. Paradoxically, while
surface ozone is harmful to human health and the environment, the
``other'' ozone--that in the stratosphere--is absolutely necessary for
life.
Research has been key to understanding how stratospheric ozone
blankets the Earth and helps make it a livable planet. Stratospheric
ozone forms an invisible shield protecting us from the hazardous
ultraviolet radiation that streams towards the Earth continuously from
the sun. UV-B radiation can directly harm people. For every 1% increase
in UV-B radiation, there will be about a 2% increase in non-melanoma
skin cancer in light-skinned people. We currently have about 750,000
new cases of skin cancer each year in the United States, of which
between 0.5% and 1% will result in death. Increased exposure to UV-B
radiation can also cause cataracts, which are already the third leading
cause of blindness in the United States. Increased UV-B radiation is
also associated with decreased immune system response in all
populations.
The story of how we reached these international agreements began
twenty years ago when Sherwood Rowland and I hypothesized that
chlorofluorocarbon molecules (CFCs) are stable enough to diffuse to the
stratosphere where the sun's ultraviolet radiation would split off the
chlorine atom, whereupon each chlorine atom would act as a catalyst,
destroying thousands of molecules of ozone.
Back then there was little but laboratory data and numerical models
to support the hypothesis. In fact, all we really knew was that CFC
concentrations in the atmosphere had been rising and that a seemingly
plausible, but unproven, hypothesis existed that chlorine from CFCs
could destroy ozone.
CFCs were invented in the early 1930s as a replacement for
hazardous compounds like ammonia that were then widely used as
refrigerants. CFCs are odorless, extremely stable, relatively non-
toxic, and nonflammable. Not surprisingly their use quickly spread to a
wide range of industrial and consumer applications, from refrigeration
to aerosols propellants to foam products and eventually as solvents in
the electronics industry.
Given the scientific consensus that now exists, it is hard to
imagine the controversy that surrounded this theory two or three short
decades ago. In part, this controversy was driven by the lack of clear
and convincing evidence in support of the hypothesis, but it was also
driven by a concern that CFCs were critical to our quality of life and
no substitutes existed to replace them.
How then did we quickly evolve from a politically charged situation
in the late 1970s to today where 150 nations of the world have agreed
to phase-out CFCs by the end of this year in all developed countries
and soon thereafter in developing countries?
First and foremost, this issue has been driven by major and
definitive advances in our scientific understanding. We have gone well
beyond our rudimentary knowledge in 1974 of the impact of CFCs on ozone
chemistry. While uncertainties remain, laboratory and field
experiments, observations, and more extensive model simulations have
enabled us to become much more confident about the atmospheric
processes that control stratospheric ozone and the role that CFCs and
other chlorinated and brominated compounds have on those processes.
The most striking example of our new understanding concerns the so-
called Antarctic ozone hole. When ground-based and satellite data were
first published showing the existence of this ozone hole, which opens
in the Antarctic spring, the scientific community, not to mention the
public at large, were taken completely by surprise. No models or
theories had predicted any such phenomenon. At first, the scientific
community was at a loss as to explain its cause. Was it due to CFCs,
the result of some meteorological conditions, or was some other unknown
factor at work? Was the condition unique to Antarctica, to polar
conditions in general, or likely to affect global ozone levels?
These were more than interesting questions for the scientific
community to debate. Just about the same time news about the ozone hole
surfaced in the scientific literature, nations were coming together to
discuss what actions they should take to protect the ozone layer. But a
definitive policy decision was dependent on a sound scientific
understanding of the issue.
In what must be considered record time and with broad international
and public and private sector cooperation, two major scientific
campaigns were organized in 1987 and again in 1988 to collect data
concerning the Antarctic ozone hole. Based on extensive field
measurements, lab experiments and modeling, the consensus view emerged
that CFCs cause the depletion of ozone over Antarctica.
This finding brought a sense of urgency to policy makers. As we all
know, ozone is a global issue and requires a global response.
Reductions in the use of CFCs in the United States--even though the
United States was the major source of CFCs--were not going to solve the
problem if other nations continued to expand their own use.
Subsequently, a series of international scientific studies were
conducted. These reviews began in the 1970s and were formally brought
into the Montreal Protocol when it was signed in 1987. They have become
the bedrock foundation upon which policy decisions concerning ozone
depletion are taken.
The original Montreal Protocol called for a 50% reduction in CFCs
by 1998, but also called for periodic review of scientific and
technology issues. The first such review was issued in 1989 and led the
Parties to agree, first, that--on the basis of new scientific
information--even greater reductions were needed to protect the ozone
layer and second, that chemical substitutes had advanced enough to make
practical the full phase-out of CFCs by the end of the century. It is
important to emphasize that extraordinary technological progress by the
industrial sector in developing CFC alternatives permitted a faster
phase-down. A similar process in 1992 led to agreement that CFCs would
be phased out in the developed world by the end of this year.
Let me summarize the evidence that is now very clear and broadly
accepted by experts around the planet:
1. There is no doubt that the major source of stratospheric
chlorine and bromine is from human activities (e.g., CFCs and
halons), not from natural sources such as volcanoes or sea
spray.
2. There is no doubt that downward trends of stratospheric
ozone occurred at all latitudes, except the tropics, during all
seasons. The overwhelming weight of scientific evidence
suggests that the observed mid-latitude downward trends of
ozone were due primarily to anthropogenic chlorine and bromine.
3. There is no doubt based on combining ground, aircraft,
balloon and satellite data, with laboratory data and
theoretical modeling--that the spring-time Antarctic ozone hole
is due to anthropogenic chlorine and bromine.
4. During periods of declining ozone, stations in Antarctica,
Australia and mountainous regions in Europe, have shown that
ground-level UV-B radiation increases, as is expected to occur
with reduced ozone concentrations.
5. The rate of increase of atmospheric chlorine and bromine
in the atmosphere has slowed considerably in the last few
years, demonstrating the effectiveness of actions taken under
the Montreal Protocol and its amendments. Even so, and if
everything goes forward smoothly, the mid-latitude ozone loss
and the hole over Antarctica are not expected to disappear
until the middle of the 21st century.
lessons learned from the montreal protocol
The story I have told about the ozone layer shows science,
technology, and policy moving forward in harmony. Four factors are
important in understanding the sources of the Montreal Protocol:
1. Evolving scientific understanding of the problem did not
hamper development and implementation of mandatory policies,
2. Once mandatory policies were in place, the rate of
technological progress exceeded our most optimistic
expectations,
3. The United States and other industrialized nations were
willing to take a leadership role and move ahead of developing
nations, and
4. The availability of acceptable substitutes for CFCs was an
important ingredient in garnering widespread political support,
particularly from the business community.
In my opinion, these same factors are necessary for progress to
address global climate change effectively.
Responses of Dr. Mario Molina to Questions From Senator Bunning
Question 1. Would you say that the steps America has taken in the
recent years to improve energy efficiency and produce lower carbon
emissions from power generation are the right first steps in addressing
climate change? Within that construct, given the current U.S.
electricity supply that is more than 50% derived from coal, is
encouraging clean coal technology, IGCC and carbon sequestration the
most important immediate policy action we can take?
Answer. Coal is obviously an extremely important part of our
current energy mix and plays an especially significant role in the
generation of electricity. It is also a relatively low-cost fuel and
one that the United States possesses in abundance. For these reasons,
all NCEP members agreed that it was critical to advance technologies--
like IGCC with carbon sequestration--that will allow coal to continue
to play an important role in meeting the nation's and the world's
energy needs over the long run. As we put it in our report: ``cost-
effective technologies that would allow for continued utilization of
coal with substantially lower greenhouse gas emissions could represent
a significant breakthrough--one that would make policy responses to the
risk of climate change compatible with a new era of expansion for the
coal industry.'' Because such technologies would advance a variety of
economic, environmental, and energy security objectives, NCEP strongly
agrees that developing clean coal IGCC technology and carbon
sequestration is an important near-term policy priority. Accordingly,
our report recommends substantially increased federal funding for
research, development, demonstration and early deployment initiatives
in this area. The funding levels we recommended are explicitly designed
to support the early deployment of roughly 10 gigawatts (GW) of
commercial-scale IGCC power plant capacity, together with additional
projects to demonstrate carbon sequestration at a variety of sites
around the country.
While NCEP agrees that promoting coal IGCC with carbon
sequestration is a critical policy priority, we also believe it cannot
be our only policy priority if we are serious about addressing climate
change. There are at least two reasons why technology incentives, by
themselves, do not constitute an adequate response to the threat of
climate change. First, in order for new technologies to succeed it is
always more effective, and indeed often necessary, to pair a policy
``push''--in this case public support for RD&D--with a ``pull'' from
the marketplace. To create a market pull for coal IGCC and other
climate-friendly technologies, markets need to put a value on avoided
carbon emissions, so that utilities have clear incentives to pursue
non-and low carbon alternatives and so that investors can justify
putting money into new and less proven technologies.
The second point is that no one technology, by itself, can
``solve'' the climate problem. On the contrary, most experts believe
that we will need a portfolio of solutions that includes not only coal
IGCC with sequestration but a variety of other options such as
increased energy end-use efficiency, new nuclear technology, more
natural gas technologies, and renewable energy options like wind and
solar power. The importance of promoting a broad array of solutions
rather than putting all our eggs in one technology ``basket'' again
points to the need for a comprehensive policy framework that can create
consistent incentives throughout the economy for avoiding carbon
emissions. A mandatory, market based emissions trading program such as
we have proposed for limiting carbon emissions is necessary to create
those consistent incentives and is the critical complement to all other
policies aimed at advancing a particular technology solution, be it
coal IGCC or another low-carbon alternative.
To sum up, all the efforts that have already been made to improve
efficiency in the electric sector and to reduce carbon emissions from
electricity generation are important and have helped to keep
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide lower than they otherwise
would be. For all the reasons I have described above, however, these
early efforts must now be followed by the crucial next step of
implementing an overarching, mandatory policy for gradually limiting
greenhouse gas emissions in the future. My NCEP colleagues and I
believe that, over time, such a policy will not only prove most
effective at promoting new technologies like coal IGCC with carbon
sequestration, but will also prove the least costly approach for
addressing the risks posed by future climate change.
Question 2. As a member of the NCEP, you described the NCEP
findings as a scientific analysis of why ``business as usual'' can not
continue. Given the major government initiatives, most notably the
Energy Bill we wrote in this committee, wouldn't you agree that America
is no longer operating ``business as usual''?
Answer. The recently passed energy bill contains a number of
provisions that I and other members of the NCEP strongly support,
including new incentives for a variety of technologies that will help
make our nation more energy secure while also reducing our greenhouse
gas emissions. By themselves, however, these measures are unlikely
either to significantly alter our future greenhouse gas emissions
trajectory or to maximize the results achieved through additional
government expenditures on new technologies. In a competitive market-
economy, where companies are encouraged and in some cases obligated to
maximize shareholder value, it is contrary to the rules of free-market
competition to expect companies to invest scarce resources absent a
profit motive. While there are numerous cases where a combination of
good will, good public relations, and positive ulterior motives (like
reduced energy bills), create an adequate basis for taking action,
these cases will remain limited if the financial value of reducing a
ton of greenhouse gas emissions remains zero.
Unfortunately, the energy bill--notwithstanding the progress it
makes in other important areas--does not provide that clear market
signal. It does not directly address climate, nor does it seek to limit
future greenhouse gas emissions. So in that sense, I would argue we are
still operating in a ``business as usual'' framework with regard to
climate change.
Question 3. While you have presented what appears to be a united
scientific front in the form of the statement from the academies of
science from 11 countries, I am concerned by some of the news since the
release of that statement. The Russian Academy of Sciences says it was
misrepresented and that Russian scientists actually believe that the
Kyoto Protocol was scientifically ungrounded. I am also aware that
there was a significant misrepresentation on the science between our
academy and the British representative. Given this background, wouldn't
you say there are still some pretty fundamental disagreements about the
science of climate change among scientists around the world?
Answer. I am not aware of the specific controversy or controversies
to which this question refers and would defer to my fellow witnesses,
notably Ralph Cicerone, for their view of the matter if in fact any
such disagreements exist. I will, however, say that while I was not
involved in drafting the national academies' joint statement on global
warming, I fully endorse it and believe that it accurately reflects the
considered, consensus view of the great majority of climate scientists
around the world. While scientists will always continue to debate
details (because that is the primary way in which science advances), it
is clear to me that mainstream scientists around the world are in
fundamental agreement about the science of climate change.
Question 4. In this international academies statement, you find
that an ``immediate response that will, at a reasonable cost, prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,'' but
continue to say in the following paragraph, ``minimizing the amount of
this carbon dioxide reaching the atmosphere presents a huge
challenge.'' Could you please elaborate, since any response can't both
be a ``reasonable cost'' and a ``huge challenge'' proposition, how you
resolve the two?
Answer. As I noted in my previous response, I wasn't personally
involved in drafting the academies' statement. Nevertheless, I believe
its thrust is quite clear and that it is not, in fact, difficult to
reconcile the two specific sentences juxtaposed in this question.
Simply put, it is often the case that the best and most practical
solution to a very big problem lies in approaching it with relatively
small steps. It may be helpful to return to the analogy of the heart
patient I introduced in response to Senator Bingaman's Question #6. If
the patient does nothing now, but later requires emergency surgery or
even an artificial heart, managing his condition will be expensive and
risky and may require major advances in medical science. But the same
patient can take early steps to reduce his risk of heart attack--such
as changing his diet and exercising more--that are relatively easy and
low cost. Of course, he may eventually still require more drastic
treatment. But, at a minimum he can buy some time and significantly
increase his odds of a healthy outcome over the long run.
I believe the national academies were trying to make a very similar
point. Fundamentally altering our energy systems so that global
greenhouse gas emissions not only stop owing but begin to decline in
absolute terms clearly presents a huge challenge. But taking early
steps to set in motion some of the long-term changes that will
eventually be required can be done at reasonable cost. As in the
analogy of the heart patient, timing is everything. The longer we wait,
the more difficult it becomes to achieve any given stabilization target
without incurring large, wrenching, and probably quite expensive
changes to our existing energy systems. That's why the academies'
statement urges governments to ``recognize that delayed action will
increase the risk of adverse environmental effects and will likely
incur a greater cost.''
The National Commission on Energy Policy shares this view. We too
concluded that a lack of full scientific certainty must not be an
excuse for inaction and that the key thing is to start now by taking
cost-effective steps that will contribute to substantial long-term
emissions reductions. That's why we recommended a very gradual program
for limiting greenhouse gas emissions that explicitly holds costs to a
reasonable level. Our proposal does not solve the climate problem--in
fact, as our critics often point out, it allows U.S. emissions to
continue to rise in the first decade of program implementation. But it
does begin to generate the clear and quantifiable market signals that
will be needed to elicit technological innovation and long-term
investment in lower-carbon alternatives. That's a small step to be
sure, but it may be our best hope for getting started and, by doing so,
for turning climate change from an overwhelming challenge into a
difficult, but manageable one.
Question 5. Several scientists have cited events like the high
temperatures in Europe in the summer of 2003 and increased storminess
in the 1980s and 1990s as evidence of climate change. Don't global
ecosystems go through natural periods similar to these as well?
Answer. While it is true that there are natural climate cycles that
can cause events such as those cited in this question, it is also
true--based on a number of studies--that such events are likely to
occur with far greater frequency as a result of human-caused increases
in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. For example, a study
by researchers at the U.K. Meteorological Office and Oxford University
that used both field measurements and computer models concluded that
the chance of a heat wave as severe as that of 2003 in Europe had at
least doubled and probably quadrupled due to higher levels of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.\6\ The study further found that
summers like 2003 (which would be an extremely rare event under normal
circumstances) are likely to occur every other year by the middle of
this century due to global warming.
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\6\ Stott, Peter, D.A. Stone, M.R. Allen, Nature, 2 December 2004,
Vol. 432, Human contribution to the heatwave of 2003.
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As for severe storms, a recent study by MIT hurricane expert Kerry
Emanuel (2005) shows that the destructive power of hurricanes has
increased markedly over the past 30 years and that this increase is
highly correlated with rising sea surface temperatures due to global
warming.\7\ This increase in destructiveness is due to both longer
storm lifetimes and greater storm intensities. Other studies over
recent years have shown that the incidence of heavy and very heavy
precipitation events (i.e., major downpours) has likewise increased in
recent decades, leading to increased flooding and erosion.\8\ These
trends have been similarly linked to the warming effects caused by
human-induced increases in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse
gases.
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\7\ Emanuel, Kerry, 2005, Nature, 4 August 2005, Vol. 436/4,
Increasing destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years.
\8\ See, for example, Groisman, Pavel, R.W. Knight, T.R. Karl, Feb.
2001, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Heavy
precipitation and high streamflow in the contiguous United States:
trends in the 20th century.
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Question 6. There are a number of astrophysicists and other
scientists who believe that sunspots are a major contributor to
changing temperatures. A recent survey showed at least 100 such studies
are underway. Why don't scientists put as much emphasis on this
possibility or other aspects of natural climate variability as they do
on emissions from human activity?
Answer. Sunspots are a cyclical phenomenon--they increase and
decrease with a period of about 11 years. Such short-cycle ups and
downs do not produce long-term trends in climate. There is evidence
that the output of the sun varies also on longer time scales, and there
is much scientific interest in how this works and how it may have
affected Earth's climate over geologic time. The IPCC's estimate in its
2001 report was that the role of changes in the sun's output in the
climate forcing of the past 250 years is in the range of 10 times
smaller than the role of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. And a wide
variety of studies show that the rapid increase in temperature
experienced in the last part of the 20th century and continuing today
was not due to changes in solar output, which have been very small in
this period.
``Fingerprint'' studies based on complex patterns of temperature
changes over the Earth and in different layers of the atmosphere have
used observations and models to attribute the observed temperature
record of past decades to particular factors that influence climate.
Such studies have been helpful in determining which factors are most
responsible for the observed changes. None of these studies have
concluded that solar influences are a major factor in the observed
trends. There is thus no scientific evidence to support the notion that
sunspots or other natural variables are as important as human-caused
emissions in explaining recent warming trends.
Question 7. Much of the discussion about climate science being
settled is based on the summary chapter of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change of the United Nations. The chapter made specific
predictions about the pace of rising temperatures and the relative
importance of human activities to climate change. And yet, the body of
the report is much more ambiguous and inconclusive about the current
state of the science. Is anything being done to ensure that the summary
of the next IPCC report is more reflective of the overall analysis by
the scientists?
Answer. It is simply not the case that the summary chapter is
inconsistent with the body of the IPCC report. Rather, any differences
in tone most likely reflect the difference between a document oriented
to policy-makers and decision-makers vs. a document oriented to a
scientific audience. The IPCC technical chapter authors conduct their
analyses and communicate their results based on the traditional
decision-making paradigm of the scientific community, namely to have
95% or better confidence that what you say is the correct explanation
AND 95% or better confidence that there is no other alternative
explanation. While this level of certainty is appropriate in the
context of pure scientific inquiry it is rarely, if ever, achievable in
the realm of policy making.
The IPCC Summary for Policymakers thus represents a translation of
the significance of the scientific findings into terms that
policymakers can work with. In making this translation, IPCC authors
agreed on a specific lexicon (i.e., the sequence of words `virtually
certain,' `very likely,' `likely,' etc.) to define relative levels of
likelihood and certainty based on best evidence and considered
scientific judgment. The meaning of these terms is carefully spelled
out in the IPCC report and their use is footnoted throughout the text.
Of course, some scientists are not entirely comfortable with the
results of this translation--after all, it is always possible for a
reader to misunderstand the scientific nuances and to draw incorrect
conclusions from necessarily qualitative terms such as ``very likely''
or ``virtually certain''. In the case of climate change, as with most
other important public policy challenges, however, policy makers simply
do not have the luxury of waiting until all scientific uncertainties
are resolved before some difficult decisions must be made. As a result
it will continue to be necessary to undertake the process of
translation exemplified by the IPCC report's Summary chapter.
In sum, while I'm sure the IPCC will continue to work to improve
its approach to communicating scientific understanding, this does not
mean that the current Summary does not represent a fair and reasonable
characterization of the best available climate science as the IPCC
authors felt it should properly be applied in a policymaking context.
Question 8. The natural ``greenhouse effect'' has been known for
nearly two hundred years and is essential to the provision of our
current climate. There is significant research in the literature today
that indicates humans, since the beginning of their existence, have
caused an increase in the greenhouse effect. Some argue that the
development of agriculture 6,000 to 8,000 years ago has helped to
forestall the next ice age. The development of cities, thinning of
forests, population growth, and most recently the burning of fossil
fuels, have all had an impact on climate change. Our ecosystems have
constantly adapted to change, as we as humans have adapted to our
ecosystems as well. Is it possible that the increased presence of
CO2 caused by the 8,000 years of modern human existence may
be something our ecosystems will continue, as they previously have, to
naturally adapt to?
Answer. The advent of agriculture 6,000 to 8,000 years ago may have
caused changes in the atmosphere which in turn triggered climatic
changes, but those changes occurred within a range that had been
experienced on Earth in the preceding million years. In other words,
ecosystems had to readjust to conditions that had obtained at some
point in the--geologically speaking--relatively recent past, rather
than to an entirely new set of conditions. What is happening now is
that the climate is responding to atmospheric conditions that have not
occurred for at least several million years. Moreover, this change may
be happening with unprecedented rapidity. Within a century, atmospheric
CO2 is projected to be at levels that have not been
experienced on Earth in tens of millions of years. For natural
ecosystems, then, the really key issue may not be how much the climate
is changing, but how fast that change is occurring.
Climatic conditions have, until recently, also been relatively
stable over the history of human civilization. Our present societies
are adapted in many ways to conditions that have obtained for at least
several centuries. Because of our technological prowess, human
societies are likely to be better able to adapt to a rapidly changing
climate than natural ecosystems, which can respond only slowly to
changing conditions. But the pace of change will have important
consequences for human adaptability as well. The more quickly
buildings, infrastructure, agricultural practices, water systems, and
other aspects of society are forced to change, the more costly it will
be to adapt and the higher the toll is likely to be in terms of human
morbidity, mortality, and diminished quality of life. This is
especially true, of course, for impoverished nations that are already
more vulnerable to changing natural conditions and that lack the
resources of more developed societies to adapt effectively.
Finally, it is worth noting that if human activities 6,000 to 8,000
years ago could cause climatic impacts of the magnitude indicated by
the above question, this implies that the far more significant changes
we are now causing in the atmosphere are likely to have commensurately
more dramatic consequences for global climate conditions.
Question 9. NCEP has previously explained that there are
significant uncertainties, both scientific and technological, and that
the best approach is ``the search for a mix of affordable technical and
policy measures.'' Given your support of this proposal, could you
outline how and what measures you would enact?
Answer. This question may be primarily intended for other panelists
who were not, as I was, active participants in the National Commission
on Energy Policy (NCEP). Nevertheless I will say that, in a nutshell,
the NCEP's recommended approach is to combine an initially modest,
economy-wide, market based program for limiting future greenhouse gas
emissions with substantial new public investments in developing and
deploying advanced low-or non-carbon energy alternatives. Our specific
recommendations are outlined in detail in the report we released last
December. A summary of our proposal with respect to a tradable-permits
program for limiting greenhouse gas emissions was provided in written
testimony provided to the Committee by NCEP Executive Director Jason
Grumet. The full report, copies of which have previously been given to
the Committee and which is readily available from NCEP, also included
two illustrative tables summarizing the scope of technology investments
proposed by the Commission and their possible allocation, both as
between (1) basic RD&D vs. early deployment incentives and
international cooperation and (2) as between different technology areas
(e.g., energy efficiency, advanced fossil fuel technologies, nuclear,
renewables, etc.).
Question 10. The panel touched on some energy alternatives such as
biomass, natural gas, and nuclear power, yet there was little mention
of hydrogen power. From a scientific viewpoint, where do you think we
are on being able to really utilize hydrogen power? What is the
potential of hydrogen power?
Answer. The most important point to understand about hydrogen is
that it is not an energy source like coal or nuclear energy or
sunlight, but only an energy carrier (like electricity), which society
can choose to produce from one or more of the available energy sources
in order to improve the convenience, versatility, efficiency, or
environmental characteristics of our energy system. Like electricity,
hydrogen is very clean at the point of end-use (but not necessarily at
the point of its manufacture), and also like electricity, hydrogen uses
more raw energy in its production than the product contains. Society
will choose to pay this energy price for hydrogen production when the
``system'' benefits in terms of the combination of cleanliness,
convenience, and economics warrant it, but until now this has only been
the case for chemical uses of hydrogen (such as in fertilizer
production), not in the energy system.
One powerful motivation for pursuing the use of hydrogen in the
energy system is that stripping hydrogen from hydrocarbon fuels such as
coal, oil, and natural gas would provide a way to ha mess much of the
energy content of these fuels while capturing the carbon for
sequestration away from the atmosphere. This is, in essence, what
happens in an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle power plant with
carbon capture, and what would happen in still more advanced coal power
plants that used fuel cells for converting the hydrogen to electricity
rather than burning the hydrogen in a gas turbine. Avoidance of the
carbon emissions from autos, trucks, and buses would likewise be one of
the main motivations for converting such vehicles to use hydrogen as
fuel, along with the motivation that the hydrogen could be produced
from a wide range of energy sources, not just from the petroleum that
is the only important source of gasoline and diesel fuel for these
vehicles today.
In developing our recommendations, other NCEP members and I gave
considerable emphasis to the development of the coal-gasification and
carbon-capture-and-sequestration technologies that are likely to be the
earliest opportunity to benefit from hydrogen in the energy sector. We
also examined the prospects for the use of hydrogen as a low carbon
alternative to oil-based transportation fuels. We recognized that
hydrogen in this role offered some theoretically impressive
environmental and national security benefits and might have the
potential, at some point in the future, to play an important role in
the transportation fuel mix. We also, however, quickly reached the
conclusion that a number of very significant technological challenges
must be overcome to realize this potential. In fact, because these
near-term technological hurdles are so significant we concluded that
hydrogen in the transport sector offers little to no potential to
improve oil security and reduce climate change risks in the next twenty
years. Accordingly, while we remained supportive of basic research into
hydrogen in portable applications as a potential long-term (i.e.,
roughly mid-century) solution, we also urged that efforts to speed the
deployment of a hydrogen transportation system not displace other
activities that could deliver far more significant results in terms of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and petroleum consumption over the
next twenty years. I will note that the National Academy of Sciences,
in a separate and more comprehensive report on hydrogen that was
released in 2004, came to very similar conclusions.
Question 11. The panel established very clearly that we should
adopt policies that decrease carbon emissions regardless of any other
carbon emissions policies we pursue. We are currently or will shortly
be providing expanded incentives for clean coal, nuclear energy and
renewable fuels. Do you feel this is money well spent? What
technologies do you feel the government should be more involved in
developing?
Answer. As noted in my response to a previous question, the
recently passed Energy Bill includes a number of provisions, including
several important provisions related to technology incentives, that I
and other members of NCEP support. As I have also previously stated,
however, the effectiveness of these incentives is likely to be
substantially undermined by the fact that they are not accompanied by a
mandatory program that would place a firm financial value on avoided
greenhouse gas emissions.
It is somewhat ironic that a number of European nations are
implementing market-based regulatory approaches developed here in the
Unites States while we pursue a top-down program of government-
directed, tax payer funded research and deployment incentives.
Developing and commercializing new technologies will cost money. The
question is who is best positioned to secure and effectively spend
these resources. While there is certainly a role for public funding and
government incentives, the Commission believes that there must also be
a role for those who emit greenhouse gases to share in the costs of
developing solutions. As we have learned over the last twenty years,
given a rational reason to invest, the private sector is far better
than the government in developing technological solutions. The success
of the acid rain program demonstrates that the most effective way to
engage the ingenuity of the private sector is to place a monetary value
on a ton of reduced emissions thus creating a real economic incentive
to develop cleaner forms of energy.
Responses of Dr. Mario Molina to Questions From Senator Talent
Question 1. In your testimony, you state that ``the climate system
is very complicated and science does not have all of the answers.''
Also, ``There is of course much we do not fully understand about the
timing, geographic distribution, and severity of the changes in climate
. . . that will result if heat-forcing emissions continue.'' Finally,
you add that ``not knowing with certainty how the climate system will
respond should not be an excuse for inaction.'' To me, your statements
say that we should proceed with caution and not mandate anything until
we know that the mandated action will, in fact, solve a problem in a
cost-effective manner. Are you suggesting that the Administration's
proposal for continued study and incentives for voluntary adoption of
technology both here and abroad are an insufficient response given the
certainty of the data both with respect to the quantification of the
problem and the solution?
Answer. It is important to recognize that U.S. climate policy for
more than a decade now has consisted of continued study, technology
incentives, and voluntary programs. Progress has been achieved during
that decade, to be sure: individual companies made efforts to reduce
their emissions, promising new technologies like hybrid vehicles and
coal IGCC emerged, and we reached a much better understanding of
climate science and of the dynamics underlying potential responses to
human-induced changes in the composition of the atmosphere. But the
more than 10 years that have passed since the first Bush Administration
signed the original International Framework Convention on Climate
Change have also demonstrated the limits of voluntarism. Overall,
energy-related U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have increased by
approximately 12% between 1993 and 2003, the fuel economy of our
vehicle fleet has actually declined, and our near-exclusive dependence
on fossil fuels in all aspects of our energy system remains as
entrenched as ever. Meanwhile, the risks of continuing on our present
course have come more clearly into focus than ever before.
In this context, I believe it's important to think carefully about
the meaning of caution. Confronted with ever stronger evidence of a
potential risk, are we really being cautious to continue increasing our
exposure to that risk? Or is it time to do more, albeit cautiously, to
reduce this exposure? I would argue that it is indeed time to do more--
and by more I mean moving beyond a policy of pure voluntarism.
Certainly, the Administration's proposals to promote advanced
technologies here and abroad can help. I couldn't agree more strongly
that technology investment and increased cooperation with other
countries, especially developing countries, are critical components of
a sound climate policy. But by themselves they are not enough. For
reasons articulated in my responses to several previous questions, it
is critical to begin harnessing the power of the marketplace. Simply
put, companies need to be able to attach a hard value to avoided carbon
emissions if we are going to expect them to make long-term investments
in climate-friendly technologies. In a competitive world they will
never be able to do that absent a mandatory policy.
NCEP has recommended one approach to implementing such a policy.
Moreover, we believe our proposal for a tradable permits system for
greenhouse gases is extremely cautious in the sense that it is cost-
capped, flexible, gradual, and includes multiple opportunities for
review and adjustment. It is so cautious, in fact, that our own
analysis and that of the Energy Information Administration indicate it
will have no material effect on the U.S. economy over the next decade
or more. The specifics of our proposal can certainly be debated; the
need for something like it, in my view, cannot. So by all means, let us
proceed cautiously. But let us not misunderstand caution to imply that
we should merely continue doing what we have been doing, even if that
means increasing our exposure to potentially significant climate risks.
Question 2. You suggest that a 5 degree F temperature increase
could lead to a whole host of disasters from agriculture losses to
drought to melting glaciers and changes in ocean circulations. Do you
have evidence of any of this occurring with a 5 degree F increase in
temperature, or is this merely speculative? How much of a possible 5
degree F increase in temperature would be attributable to GHGs that are
at least nominally under our control? How much of any emission cuts
that the U.S. might have to make would simply be overtaken by increases
in emissions by developing nations such as China and India?
Answer. While global average temperatures have increased by about
1.5 degrees F since pre-industrial times, the warming that has already
occurred over the past few decades in Alaska and the rest of the Arctic
is considerably more dramatic (on the order of 3 degrees F). Not
surprisingly, Alaska and other northern regions are also providing some
of the strongest observable evidence to date of the kinds of impacts
that could be associated with warming of this magnitude. As noted in
response to a previous question, these impacts include severe coastal
erosion due to retreating sea ice, rising sea level, and thawing of
coastal permafrost and attendant damage to buildings, roads, and
industry. In sum, the proposition that a 5 degree F increase in global
average temperatures--which would amount to a three-fold increase in
the amount of warming that has already occurred--could cause serious
consequences, can hardly be characterized, at this point in time, as
``merely speculative.''
On the contrary, further warming of this magnitude is likely to
greatly amplify many of the negative impacts we are already seeing in
Alaska and elsewhere. Temperature changes in the high northern
latitudes, which are likely to continue to be more dramatic than the
global average, could initiate the rapid deterioration of the Greenland
Ice Sheet (which would likely raise the rate of sea level rise to well
over 3 feet per century) and cause much further disruption of natural
ecosystems, wildlife, and forests. Other consequences in the United
States alone could include a significant diminution of spring snowpack
in mountain regions, which would greatly exacerbate the chronic water
shortages that already exist in the western United States, an increased
incidence of serious fires in western forests as well as of extreme
weather events, like heavy downpours and heat waves, and declining
agricultural productivity in some regions. Meanwhile, impacts in other
parts of the world would likely be even worse.
Turning to the issue of international participation, it is of
course undeniably true that climate change is a global problem and that
efforts to address it will only be successful if every major emitting
nation, including developing countries like China and India, takes
part. It is, however, equally true that such international
cooperation--and particularly the participation of countries like China
and India--is unlikely to be forthcoming absent U.S. leadership. As the
country with the world's highest emissions, in both absolute and per
capita terms, and as the country that is responsible for by far the
largest share of the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations that has already occurred (and hence for a
disproportionate share of the warming to which the planet is already
committed), the United States cannot expect other countries to be
sympathetic to the argument that it should not act because any domestic
emissions reductions it implements might be offset by emissions
increases elsewhere. Instead, the United States should set an example
and demonstrate its own commitment to addressing the climate problem in
a meaningful way, while at the same time making vigorous efforts to
engage other nations.
NCEP recommended just such an approach precisely because we felt it
was most likely to produce the kind of international participation that
will ultimately be vital to mounting an effective global response to
the problem of climate change. Given the interest that countries like
China and India have in pursuing a more sustainable energy policy--in
some cases as much from the standpoint of energy security as out of
concern about climate change or environmental quality--we believe there
is every reason to be optimistic that a proactive response from the
United States would inspire further action to limit emissions by other
countries.
Question 3. What if the science showed only a 2-4 degree F increase
in temperature by 2100? Would you still advocate mandatory emissions
reductions at this time? If so, is the technology available today to
accomplish those cuts without raising energy costs?
Answer. Even if the magnitude of predicted warming were somewhat
lower than current estimates (e.g., 2-4 degrees F as opposed to 5
degrees F by 2100), the possibility that the actual warming itself and/
or its impacts could be more severe than expected--especially if the
global climate system responds in non-linear ways as a result of some
of the potential feedback mechanisms discussed previously--together
with the near certainty that temperatures would continue to rise well
into the 22nd century absent some action during the coming decades to
reduce emissions, would still, in my opinion, argue for mandatory near-
term steps aimed at slowing, then stopping, and eventually reversing
current emissions trajectories. The significant impacts that are now
being experienced in some places due to the 1.5 degree F increase we
have already sustained argue that another 2-4 degrees F would
constitute dangerous interference with the climate system, something we
have pledged to avoid under the Framework Convention on Climate Change
signed by George W.H. Bush.
Given the current status of technology, the Commission believes
there is no entirely costless way to achieve this objective: any market
signal that attaches a positive value to avoiding greenhouse gas
emissions will necessarily produce an increase in the cost of using
carbon-producing fossil fuels. It is, however, possible to limit the
impact on energy costs to a reasonable and, in our view, politically
and socially acceptable level. Specifically, the approach we have
proposed (which involves a tradable-permits system for limiting
greenhouse gas emissions combined with a safety-valve mechanism that
explicitly caps program costs) is estimated to have only a small impact
(less than 7% for gasoline, natural gas, and electricity) on predicted
energy prices over the next 15 to 20 years. Over time, we believe this
market signal will help prompt the innovation and technology investment
needed to make further emissions reductions feasible while holding
costs and overall energy price impacts to a minimum.
Question 4. In your policy formation statement, you indicate that
we should search for a mix of affordable technical and policy measures
that will be able to reduce emissions and adapt to the degree of
climate change that cannot be avoided without incurring ``unreasonable
costs.'' Please define what you mean by unreasonable costs. Do these
costs factor in the transfer of industry and jobs to such developing
countries as China and India and, if so, do the emission cuts by the
U.S. plus the increases by China and India result in a net increase or
decrease in emissions?
Answer. The Commission made no attempt to define ``unreasonable
costs'', but we did agree that the explicit cost cap included in our
proposal for a mandatory greenhouse gas tradable permits program met
the test of reasonableness. Because of the safety valve mechanism in
our proposal, we know with certainty that impacts on energy prices for
consumers and businesses would be relatively modest (less than 7% for
gasoline, natural gas, and electricity). As I have already noted, the
Energy Information Administration has concluded that our proposal would
have no ``material impact'' on the nation's economic growth or
prosperity between now and 2025. This result rules out the possibility
that our proposal could cause any significant transfer of industry and
jobs to other countries.
While we are confident that implementing the kind of policy we have
recommended will not cause any offsetting emissions increases in China
and India, we of course recognize that rapidly growing emissions in
these countries must also be addressed if there is to be a meaningful
global response to the climate issue. Just as domestic efforts to
address climate change will not be successful in the long run absent
global participation, however, efforts to engage major developing
countries like China and India are unlikely to be successful absent
U.S. leadership. The best way to re-establish that leadership, in our
view, is for the United States to take an initial step domestically
with the understanding that further emissions reduction efforts will be
contingent on comparable efforts by other major emitting nations.
Accordingly, our proposal is explicitly phased and calls for periodic
reviews to assess international as well as domestic progress. Depending
on the results of these reviews, the United States could opt to make a
variety of adjustments to the tradable permits program, including
suspending further increases in the safety valve price. In addition, to
encourage emissions mitigation efforts by nations like China and India,
the Commission recommends that the United States continue and expand
current bilateral negotiations and provide incentives to promote
technology transfer and to encourage U.S. companies and organizations
to form international partnerships for implementing clean energy
projects in developing countries.
Question 5. What is the impact of the U.S. adopting Bingaman/NCEP
and China and India not doing so? When the industry and jobs move to
China and India, don't global emissions actually go up, as even today,
the U.S. has and will continue to have better environmental controls
than developing nations? Wouldn't we be better served transferring the
technology that we know works to developing nations as they grow in
their industry and electricity generation?
Answer. For the reasons described in the previous response, we do
not believe that implementation of the Bingaman/NCEP proposal will
cause industry and jobs to move to China and India. Moreover, if China
and India do not act, we would expect Congress to halt further
increases in the safety valve price, thereby allowing the effective
stringency of the U.S. program to diminish over time. We think it far
more likely, however, that China, India, and other major emitting
nations will respond positively if the United States adopts a
meaningful, mandatory policy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In
fact, some of these countries have already begun reducing their
emissions below forecast levels as they pursue improved energy
security, energy efficiency, conventional pollution control, and market
reform. All of these efforts will be enhanced by continued technology
transfer from the United States to developing nations which we strongly
support as a complement to, rather than substitute for, domestic
action.
Question 6. What do you make of the fact that while NOAA concluded
that 2004 was the fourth warmest year on record and that some of the
warming was human-induced, that satellite instruments (which indirectly
measure the average temperature of the atmosphere in a deep column
above the surface) are hard pressed to demonstrate any positive trends
over the past 20 years?
Answer. This question refers to outdated information about the
satellite data based on initial analyses by J. Christy and R. Spenser
that have since been corrected. In addition, the rate of warming both
at the surface and in the troposphere has increased in the years since
that initial analysis.
Recent peer-reviewed analyses of the satellite data have shown that
the low and mid troposphere have in fact warmed at about the same rate
as the surface over the past several decades (see e.g., Mears et al.,
2003; Vinnokov and Grody, 2003; Vinnikov et al., 2004).\9\ The earlier
notion that the troposphere had not warmed was based on significant
errors in adjustments to the satellite data. As each error was
corrected, the data showed more warming. Studies published this month
(11 August 2005) in Science expose the most recently discovered of
these errors.\10\
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\9\ See, for example, Mears, C.A., M.C. Schabel, and F.J. Wentz,
2003: A Reanalysis of he MSU channel 2 tropospheric temperature record.
J. Climate, 16, 3650-3664; Vinnikov, K.Y., and N.C. Grody, 2003: Global
warming trend of mean tropospheric temperature observed by satellites.
Science, 302, 269-272; and Vinnikov, K.Y., A. Robock, N.C. Grody, and
A. Basist, 2004: Analysis of diurnal and seasonal cycles and trends in
climatic records with arbitrary observation times. Geophys. Res. Lett.,
31, L06205, doi:10.1029/2003GL019196, 2004.
\10\ Mears, C.A., and F.J. Wentz, Science, 2005: The effect of
diurnal correction on satellite-derived lower tropospheric temperature.
11 Aug 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though there are minor discrepancies between data sets due to the
different methods that research teams use to analyze the data, the
bottom line is that both the surface and the troposphere show
significant warming trends according to all the data records: those
derived from thermometers at the surface, those derived from sensors on
satellites, and those obtained from weather balloons. There is no major
difference between surface and tropospheric warming at the global scale
over the past 50 years.
Question 7. If all the countries that have signed Kyoto stay within
compliance of Kyoto, how much of a reduction in global warming would
this result in?
Answer. The Kyoto Protocol never represented more than a first step
toward addressing the climate problem at a global level--indeed it
sought to define only relatively near-term (2008-2012) emissions
targets. As such, it was not designed to, by itself, achieve the
sustained, overall emissions reductions that would be necessary to
prevent or substantially mitigate expected changes to the Earth's
climate as a result of increased atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases. Rather, the argument for ratifying Kyoto (which has
now been done by nearly all of the United States' major industrialized
trading partners) always rested on the proposition that it was
important for the developed countries to lead the way in starting to
curb future emissions, even if it was understood that these early
efforts would have little effect in and of themselves unless they were
followed up in the post Kyoto era by a more comprehensive global
effort.
I and other members of NCEP essentially share the conviction that
near-term, mandatory action and leadership by developed nations like
the United States are necessary to begin making progress on the climate
issue. We also believe, however, that we have crafted an approach that
is preferable to Kyoto insofar as it convincingly addresses the cost,
equity, and competitiveness concerns that have been raised in
connection with Kyoto. In any case, all sides in the ongoing domestic
and international debate over future climate policy should be able to
agree that the time for debating the merits of the Kyoto Protocol is
past. That debate is now largely moot and prolonging it only serves
those whose interests lie in continued policy paralysis and delay.
Question 8. Can you confirm that suspended water vapor levels,
cloud cover percentages and direct solar irradiation changes over time
all represent variables in these forecasting models that could have
significant impacts on the conclusions of the results of these models?
Answer. Certainly all of these variables have a significant impact
on the Earth's climate system and on the predictions generated by
existing climate models. Accordingly, our ability to accurately
incorporate these (and many other) variables in our models is
constantly being refined and compared to actual observations. While
uncertainties remain in specific areas, however, our overall confidence
in existing climate models is bolstered by several factors. First, as
noted in my response to a previous question, current models can
replicate past and present climates as well as the influences of the
most important factors that affect climate. Second, a variety of
models, all of which have been extensively compared, tested, and
refined, provide essentially coherent and consistent results concerning
the likely impacts of anticipated changes in the composition of the
Earth's atmosphere. Thus while different models may treat individual
variables such as those identified above somewhat differently, the fact
that they nevertheless come to substantially similar conclusions
suggests that we can have a high degree of confidence in their overall
results.
Question 9. In looking at pre-industrial global temperature
patterns, would you agree that changes in temperatures over time have
occurred that had no anthropogenic basis?
Answer. It is of course true that changes in global temperatures
occurred before human activities had any significant impact. Scientists
who study past climates have been able to identify the likely causes of
most of those changes and have determined that the warming trend
observed in global average temperatures over the last 50 years is
strikingly different from past changes and can only be explained by
including human influences in the calculus. In fact, the IPCC has
concluded that human activities not only play a role, but are primarily
responsible for this trend. Two points are relevant here. The first is
that as noted repeatedly in response to previous questions--it is the
pace of anticipated climate change, as much as the potential magnitude
of this change, that we should be worried about. Compared to past
climate changes that occurred as a result of purely natural influences,
human-induced climate change appears to be progressing at a rate that
is simply unmatched in recent geological time. Second, the fact that
climate change can also occur absent human influence does not lead
logically to a justification for complacency. One might as well argue
that because wildfires can also be caused by lightning, people should
feel free to toss lit matches into the forest.
Question 10. Do we know what the ``best'' global temperature is to
sustain life?
Answer. The most general answer to this question is that there is
no single ``best'' temperature for sustaining life on Earth. At any
given temperature, different organisms and ecosystems will evolve
toward a different equilibrium than they would at any other temperature
and it is fundamentally impossible to single out any one of these
states as definitively ``better'' than any other. More than any
particular temperature, however, it is possible to say that climatic
stability is important to sustaining life. Dramatic and rapid changes
in climate are almost always detrimental, both to individual organisms
and to the larger ecosystems they inhabit.
To attempt a more specific answer to this question, one would have
to start by specifying what type of life one is interested in
sustaining. Insects and weeds, for example, tend to do very well in a
warmer world (as evidenced by the recent massive increase in spruce
bark beetle outbreaks and the observed doubling of ragweed pollen
production). On the other hand, some species, like the golden toad that
used to inhabit the cloud forest of Costa Rica, have already been
driven to extinction by the warming that has already occurred over the
past 50 years. Other species, like the polar bear and ice-dependent
seals, are increasingly stressed and may find it more and more
difficult to survive in the wild as continued warming further shrinks
the summer sea ice on which they depend. Coral reef ecosystems, the
nursery for many marine species, are also at risk of succumbing to
warmer temperatures and the changing chemistry of ocean water due to
rising atmospheric CO2 levels. Many other life forms that
cannot adapt or relocate quickly are similarly threatened by rapid,
human-induced climate change.
Assuming that the priority for most policymakers would be to
preserve optimal conditions for human life, it remains difficult to
identify a single ``ideal'' temperature. Here again, however, the more
relevant point is that human societies and infrastructure the world
over have developed in climatic conditions that have been remarkably
stable for 10,000 years. As a result, the assumption that these
conditions will continue is ``built into'' most aspects of our
existence, whether we live in highly industrialized societies or in
societies that are more directly dependent on natural systems for
shelter and sustenance. A rapidly changing climate could therefore
impinge on human existence and quality of life in a wide variety of
ways. At best, the consequences will frequently be costly and
inconvenient; at worst they could cause significant loss of life and
higher rates of injury and disease.
To give just one example, many of the world's coastlines have
become heavily populated under the implicit assumption that sea level
would be relatively stable. But global warming is already causing sea
levels to rise and is likely resulting in higher storm surges, more
coastal erosion, and a marked increase in the destructive power of
hurricanes.\11\ If these trends continue, the consequences in wealthier
countries like the United States could include substantial property
losses and high costs to move housing and infrastructure as populations
are forced to relocate further inland. In poorer and more vulnerable
low-lying countries like Bangladesh, the results would likely be more
dire and could include significant loss of life, increased incidence of
disease, and massive population displacements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For example, Emanuel (2005) has documented a marked increase
in the destructive power of hurricanes over the past 30 years as these
storms have become, on average, more intense and of longer duration
(Emanuel, Kerry, 2005, Nature, 4 August 2005, Vol. 436/4, Increasing
destructiveness of tropical cyclones over the past 30 years.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 11. What is currently being done to curb emissions from
parts of the world in poverty who are deforesting their environment and
burning biomass for all means of day-to-day living, and are these
emissions continuing to increase in the world?
Answer. Developing nations have as much reason as developed nations
to be concerned about climate change and as much incentive to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions, given that they are likely to be
especially vulnerable to the negative impacts of future warming. What
they lack, in many cases, are the economic and institutional resources
to implement policies for reducing emissions, as well as access to the
technologies that would make it possible to pursue their legitimate
aspirations for development in a more environmentally sustainable
manner. This situation speaks to the need for a continued emphasis on
technology transfer and assistance from developed countries to the
developing world to overcome these obstacles. At the same time, it must
be emphasized that many developing countries are already making
concerted efforts to address environmental and public health concerns
in ways that will also yield ancillary benefits in terms of reduced
greenhouse gas emissions. Examples include efforts to reduce methane
emissions from sewage and garbage (these emissions can be comparatively
large in many developing countries), to address a major public health
concern by reducing soot emissions from inefficient cooking stoves and
2-stroke engines, and to limit deforestation and restore vegetation
cover as means of controlling erosion and improving water quality. In
some cases, developing countries have even moved ahead of developed
countries with respect to adopting progressive environmental or energy
policies. China, for instance, recently moved to implement tougher
automobile fuel economy requirements than currently exist in the United
States.
Question 12. Do you believe it is practical to seek emission
controls in parts of the world that are struggling in poverty?
Answer. With assistance and access to improved technologies, it is
not only practical but essential for many poor nations to pursue a
development path that is cleaner, more sustainable, and less carbon-
intensive than the development path traveled by already wealthy,
industrialized nations. I believe it is the responsibility of developed
nations to help make this possible.
Question 13. What is being done to curb emissions in the developing
countries like China and India?
Answer. See question 11 above.
Responses of Dr. Mario Molina to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Is there any credible scenario for stabilizing
greenhouse gas emissions that does not involve the United States and
other major emitters stopping their emissions growth over the next
couple of decades and sharply reversing their emissions growth by 2050?
Answer. No. To stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations
during this century, total global emissions--including emissions from
the United States and all other major emitting nations--must begin to
decline at some point in the coming decades. The steepness of this
decline or--as you put it the sharpness of the reversal, depends on the
stabilization target being pursued and on when the decline commences.
For example, one estimate published by Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds in
1996 indicates that global emissions must begin to turn down beginning
in 2035 in order to achieve the goal of stabilizing atmospheric
CO2 concentrations at 550 ppm by the end of the century. By
the same token, slowing the rate of emissions growth in the near term
will allow the eventual decline needed to achieve a given stabilization
target to be more gradual and/or to commence at a later point in time.
Question 2. Would the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal stop and then reverse U.S. greenhouse gas emissions?
Answer. The NCEP proposal lays out a specific approach for
achieving the slow and stop phases of a program to reduce U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions. The slow phase covers the first decade of
program implementation (from 2010 through 2019); the stop phase is
initiated starting in 2020. Put another way, the NCEP recommendations
take us to the year 2020 on the below graphic and not beyond. We
consciously chose not to detail the terms of the ``reverse'' phase,
recognizing that it would be presumptuous and probably meaningless to
presuppose the likely evolution of an intentionally flexible and
contingent program more than two decades into the future. That said, it
is important to point out that the architecture of our proposed policy
would readily support the implementation of a reverse phase designed to
steadily reduce U.S. emissions.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The accompanying graphic has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As our report states, the NCEP proposal `` should be understood as
an initial domestic step in the long-term global effort to first slow,
then stop and ultimately reverse current emission trends. In its
structure and stringency, the Commission's proposal is designed to
encourage the timely initiation of what will necessarily be a phased
process. The Commission believes that this approach is more pragmatic
and ultimately more effective than years of further legislative
stalemate in pursuit of a more aggressive initial goal.''
Put simply, we believe that the accumulated emissions resulting
from additional years of inaction are almost sure to be greater than
the possible benefits that would result from postponing more aggressive
action to a point in the more distant future. Once a market signal is
in place, we expect that solutions will flourish, anxieties will abate,
and Congress will be better able to predict and then adopt more
stringent iterative emissions reduction requirements.
______
Responses of Richard D. Morgenstern to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Questions have been raised about the uncertainties for
potential investors in new refineries or other energy facilities that
could be created by the provision in the Bingaman amendment that calls
for Congress to review emissions goals, price caps, and other features
every five years. Could you comment on this?
Answer. My understanding is that this provision gives Congress an
opportunity to evaluate new information such as the actions of other
nations or new scientific, technological, or economic developments that
might affect future emissions goals, price caps, or other design
elements of the program. It seems quite consistent with the routine
Congressional reviews conducted in other policy areas. The
uncertainties inherent in future energy markets, climate science, and
prospect of future climate policies of one kind or another--with or
without adoption of the Bingaman amendment--are likely to dominate any
economic or financial assessment of refineries or other energy
facilities.
Question 2. Do I correctly understand that the so-called safety
valve or cost cap provisions in the National Commission on Energy
Policy proposal and Bingaman legislation provide for economic
certainty, but not environmental certainty. Can you explain how that
works?
Answer. The safety valve or price cap is, in effect, a type of
insurance policy designed to protect the economy against unexpected
price increases caused by weather, stronger than predicted economic
growth, technology failures, or other factors. Despite the success of
the cap and trade provision in the acid rain program, which lacks a
safety valve, problems have arisen in other programs. For example,
during the California energy crisis the price of nitrogen oxide
(NOX) permits rose to $80,000 and, more recently, in the
early phase of the EU trading system, prices have fluctuated between 8-
30 Euros for carbon dioxide (CO2) permits.
Differences among forecasters have plagued previous policy
proposals to reduce GHGs. President Clinton's Council of Economic
Advisers forecasted allowance prices below $8/ton of CO2
compared to the Energy Information Administration's (EIA) estimate of
$43. With a safety valve, emissions estimates may vary but costs cannot
rise above the established price cap. Recent EIA sensitivity analyses
confirm this point, as they found compliance costs to be virtually
invariant with respect to a wide range of assumptions about natural gas
supplies, the availability of non-carbon offsets, and other factors.
The safety valve differs in a few important respects from a well-
known provision in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that establishes a
$2,000-per-ton penalty (1990$) for violations of the stipulated sulphur
dioxide (SO2) emissions standards. Since the Clean Air Act
penalty is far above the expected marginal control cost, it has a very
low probability of being invoked. In contrast, the proposed safety
valve price reflects the society's willingness to pay for carbon
mitigation and is not intended strictly as a punitive measure. For
those who believe that the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
are relatively low, permit prices would never reach the trigger level
and emissions would remain capped.
Question 3. Emission trading programs have been highly successful
in phasing out leaded gasoline and CFCs, and most notably in reducing
emissions of S02 and NOX through the Acid Rain trading
program. Is emission trading a good policy instrument for addressing
climate change? Why or why not?
Answer. I believe that a market mechanism like emissions trading is
an excellent policy tool for addressing climate change. Introduction of
an emissions trading program would have two distinct effects. It would
create incentives to reduce emissions in the near term, thus mitigating
environmental damages associated with those emissions. And, at the same
time, it would alter incentives for the private sector to develop and
adopt new technologies. While these same effects would occur under a
carbon tax regime as well, an emissions trading system does not oblige
the private sector to make payments directly to the government and,
correspondingly, obviates the need of the government to make decisions
about how best to recycle the funds. As noted in the response to
question two, inclusion of a safety valve would protect the economy
against unexpected price increases caused by weather, stronger-than-
predicted economic growth, technology failures, or other factors.
Question 4. The United States spends a significant amount of money
on R&D into non-carbon and low-carbon technologies. How does this
amount compare to our overall economy, our total spending on energy,
and our total greenhouse gas emissions? Are other countries spending
comparable amounts based on their size and emission levels?
Answer. Various U.S. and foreign government agencies report
information relevant to this question. In the following paragraphs, I
have summarized the most relevant and recent information and also
provided references for future follow-up.
For each of the past three years, the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) has issued a report to Congress entitled Federal Climate
Change Expenditures, which details federal spending on programs and tax
proposals related to climate change. Table 1 provides a summary of
spending for these programs from 2002 through 2006. The proposed 2006
budget indicates that approximately $4.7 billion will be spent on R&D
(this number was calculated by adding the total budgets for the Climate
Change Science and Technology Programs. Table 1 also shows that over
the past few years total spending on the Climate Change Science Program
has decreased slightly. In addition for the 2006 fiscal year, there is
a small reduction in spending is proposed in the Climate Change
Technology Program, relative to the enacted 2005 budget. Overall,
federal climate change expenditures have increased, but this is largely
due to the increase in spending on energy tax incentive proposals (For
further information about the breakdown of climate change spending, by
department, see Appendix B of OMB 2005).
Table 1.--SUMMARY OF FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE EXPENDITURES ON PROGRAMS AND TAX PROPOSALS RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, FY 2006 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
[Discretionary budget authority and tax proposals in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 $ Change
Actual Enacted Actual Enacted Proposed 2006-2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Climate Change Science Program (CCSP)
U.S. Global Change Research Program............... 1,667 1,722 1,803 1,700 1,711 11
Climate Change Research Initiative................ 42 173 217 181 -36
-------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--CCSP\1\............................. 1,667 1,764 1,976 1,918 1,892 -26
Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP)
Department of Agriculture......................... 3 39 45 48 35 -13
Department of Commerce............................ 28 30 7 -22
Department of Defense............................. 51 75 60 -15
Department of Energy.............................. 1,519 1,583 2,390 2,505 2,506 1
Department of the Interior........................ 1 2 2 0
Department of Transportation...................... 5 1 2 1
Environmental Protection Agency................... 115 106 110 109 113 4
National Aeronautics and Space Administration..... 227 208 128 -80
National Science Foundation....................... 11 11 11 1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal--CCTP\1\............................. 1,637 1,728 2,868 2,989 2,865 -124
International Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development......... 174 214 195 189 162 -27
Department of State............................... 7 6 5 6 11 5
Department of the Treasury\2\..................... 43 56 52 45 25 -20
-------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal International Assistance............. 224 276 252 240 198 -42
Energy Tax Incentive Proposals That Reduce 0 0 0 83 524 441
Greenhouse Gases\3\..............................
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total\1\ \4\.............................. 3,522 3,762 5,090 5,223 5,473 250
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Subtotals and table total may not add due to rounding. Subtotals and totals supersede numbers released with
the President's 2006 Budget. Discrepancies resulted from rounding and improved estimates.
\2\ The FY 2004 and FY 2005 enacted level for the Tropical Forestry Conservation Act (TFCA) is $20 million each
year. In FY 2006, the Administration has requested a total of $99.8 million for debt restructuring programs to
be available for: bilateral Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and poorest country debt reduction,
contributions to the HIPC Trust Fund, and TFCA debt reduction. The Budget provides the Treasury Department
flexibility in determining the amount for each program. The FY 2006 funding level for TFCA has not been
determined yet.
\3\ The cost of the four energy tax incentives related to climate change included in the President's FY 2006
Budget is $3.6 billion over five years (2006-2010).
\4\ The International Assistance subtotal contains funds that are also counted in the Climate Change Science
Program subtotal. Table total line excludes this double-count.
Source: Adapted from OMB 2003, and 2005.
In its Annual Energy Review EIA provides information on energy
consumption, energy expenditure, and emissions in relation to GDP. The
most recent EIA calculations on energy expenditures show that in 2001
the United States spent $693.6 billion on energy (nominal dollars, EIA
2004). This amount was 6.8 percent of the GDP that year (ETA 2004). In
2002, OMB reports that $3.3 billion was spent on the Climate Change
Science and Technology programs, which is 0.03 percent of the 2002 GDP
(ETA 2004; OMB 2003).
Greenhouse gas emissions were estimated to be 6,828.9 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents in 2001 and 6,862.0 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents in 2002, an increase of 0.5
percent (EIA 2003). EIA also provides estimates of greenhouse gas
emissions relative to GDP. In 2001, greenhouse gas emissions were 691
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per million (2000 chained)
dollars (EIA 2004). In 2002, this number decreased to 684 metric tons
of carbon dioxide equivalent per million (2000 chained) dollars (EIA
2004).
While I am more familiar with U.S. spending and greenhouse gas
data, I was able to find some information on foreign spending on
climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. The European Environment
Agency (EEA) reported that the EU-15 emitted 4,180 million metric tons
of CO2 equivalents in 2003 (EEA 2005). Table 2 provides the
breakdown of emissions by country. EEA also reported that it spent
831,000 Euros, or $ 934,758 (converted using OECD's Purchasing Power
Parity for 2004) on ``tackling climate change'' in 2004 (EEA 2004).
Britain's Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
reports that the government funded an #11.5 million research program in
2000-2001 in order ``to improve . . . understanding of the science and
impacts of climate change, to quantify the UK's emissions of greenhouse
gases, and to inform policies on reducing emissions'' (DEFRA 2001).
This amount is equal to approximately $18.5 million (2001 dollars,
converted using Purchasing Power Parity).
A list of sources is presented below:
DEFRA. 2001. Climate Change UK Programme. Available at http://
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/cm4913/4913html/index.htm.
Last accessed Oct. 2005.
EEA. 2004. Annual Report 2004. Available at http://
reports.eea.eu.int/report_2004_0622_154840/en/Annual-report-
FINAL_web.pdf. Last accessed Oct. 2005.
EEA. 2005. European Community Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends.
Available at http://reports.eea.eu.int/technical_report_2005_4/en/
EC_GHG_Inventory_report_2005.pdf. Last accessed Oct. 2005.
EIA. 2003. Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2002.
Report #: DOE/EIA-0573(2002/ES). Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/1605/gg03rpt/summary/index.html. Last accessed Oct. 2005.
EIA. 2004. Annual Energy Review 2004, Report No. DOE/EIA-
0384(2004). Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/contents.html.
Last accessed Oct. 2005. (Table available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/aer/txt/ptb0105.html)
OECD. 2005. Purchasing Power Parities. Available at www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/61/54/18598754.pdf. Last accessed Oct. 2005.
OMB. 2003. Federal Climate Change Expenditures, Report to Congress.
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/
fy04_climate_chg_rpt.pdf. Last accessed Oct. 2005
OMB. 2005. Federal Climate Change Expenditures, Report to Congress.
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/
fy06_climate_change_rpt.pdf. Last accessed Oct. 2005
Table 2.--OVERVIEW OF MEMBER STATES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO EC GHG EMISSIONS EXCLUDING LUCF FROM 1990 TO 2003 IN CO2 EQUIVALENTS (TG)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Member State 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Austria................................. 79 83 76 76 77 80 83 83 83 80 81 85 86 92
Belgium................................. 146 149 147 146 151 152 157 148 153 146 148 147 145 148
Cyprus.................................. 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 8 9 9
Czech Republic.......................... 192 178 164 158 152 153 155 159 149 140 148 148 143 145
Denmark................................. 69 80 74 76 80 77 90 80 76 73 68 70 69 74
Estonia................................. 43 41 30 23 24 22 23 24 22 20 20 19 20 21
Finland................................. 70 69 67 68 74 71 77 76 73 72 70 76 77 86
France.................................. 568 593 585 559 555 563 578 572 584 566 560 564 554 557
Germany................................. 1,244 1,191 1,142 1,126 1,108 1,103 1,121 1,084 1,057 1,021 1,017 1,028 1,015 1,018
Greece.................................. 109 109 110 110 113 114 118 123 128 127 132 134 134 138
Hungary................................. 103 95 85 85 85 84 86 84 84 84 81 84 81 83
Ireland................................. 54 55 56 56 57 58 60 63 65 67 69 71 69 68
Italy................................... 511 513 509 505 496 528 519 525 535 544 551 556 555 570
Latvia.................................. 25 24 19 16 15 12 12 12 11 10 10 11 11 11
Lithuania............................... 51 45 42 38 35 31 28 24 22 21 21 20 20 17
Luxembourg.............................. 13 13 13 13 13 10 10 9 8 9 10 10 11 11
Malta................................... 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Netherlands............................. 212 216 215 221 221 224 233 225 227 215 214 216 213 215
Poland.................................. 460 438 440 430 440 417 437 427 404 402 386 383 370 384
Portugal................................ 59 61 65 64 65 70 67 70 75 83 80 81 86 81
Slovakia................................ 72 63 59 55 52 53 54 54 52 51 48 53 52 52
Slovenia................................ 19 17 17 18 18 19 19 20 20 19 19 20 20 20
Spain................................... 284 290 299 287 303 315 307 328 337 365 380 379 399 402
Sweden.................................. 72 72 72 72 75 73 77 73 73 70 67 68 69 71
United Kingdom.......................... 748 752 729 710 700 691 714 691 686 652 652 663 644 651
EU-25................................... 5,212 5,156 5,023 4,919 4,917 4,931 5,036 4,964 4,935 4,849 4,844 4,894 4,852 4,925
EU-15................................... 4,238 4,246 4,159 4,087 4,088 4,129 4,211 4,150 4,160 4,091 4,100 4,146 4,126 4,180
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: EEA 2005
Question 5. You seem to agree that the most important long-term
feature of any climate policy is the impact it will have on investment
in R&D and the development of new, carbon-free technologies in both the
private and public sectors. What do you believe are the best policies
for pursuing needed R&D? Should these R&D initiatives be primarily
taxpayer funded, government R&D programs, or should we pursue policies
to provide incentives for private-sector R&D?
Answer. Few would disagree that the private sector, not the
government, has driven innovation and growth in the modern economy. For
example, according to the National Science Foundation, in 2003 industry
(not government) funded almost two-thirds of all R&D in the United
States.
It is also widely recognized that government has an important role
to play in spurring the development and diffusion of these
technologies. Without some kind of additional incentives, the private
sector typically will under-invest in research, development, and
demonstration because innovators cannot reap the full benefits to
society of their advances. The existence of these ``spillovers''
reduces private incentive to pursue innovation, as others will mimic
the innovation without compensating the inventors. While patents and
similar means are used to protect investments in innovation, that
protection is limited. A successful innovator typically captures
substantial rewards, but those gains are sometimes only a fraction of
the total benefits to society arising from the innovation. This
rationale underlies government support of research, development, and
demonstration programs, including the National Science Foundation,
public universities, and other research institutions.
Environmental and knowledge externalities have long been at the
center of debates about technology policy. More recently, we have come
to understand some additional market failures that may operate in the
adoption and diffusion of new technologies. For a variety of reasons,
the cost or value of a new technology to one user may depend on how
many other users have adopted the technology. Generally speaking, users
will be better off the more others use that same technology, as this
increases what is known as ``learning by doing'' and ``network''
externalities. Typically, it takes time for potential users to learn of
a new technology, try it, adapt it to their particular circumstances,
and become convinced of its superiority. Consequently, the early
adopter of a new technology creates a positive benefit for others by
generating information about the existence, characteristics, and likely
success of the new technology.
The argument for public support is even stronger in the case of
climate change technologies, where not only do inventors fail to
capture all the gains from their investments but the gains themselves
are not fully translated to the firms' bottom line because there is no
market value associated with emissions reductions. Further, the
prospect of future value--which is driven by policy outcomes--is
uncertain.
Absent government incentives, corporate concern for the environment
may overcome some hurdles. Working against this kind of ``corporate
altruism,'' however, is the need to compete in the marketplace. A
company that puts meaningful effort into reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, rather than reducing costs, may eventually lose out to one
that only seeks to reduce costs.
It is exactly this need to align public and private interests that
underlies the argument for an emissions trading program, or similar
mechanism, alongside technology development and demonstration programs.
While the government seeks technologies to cut carbon emissions, the
private sector seeks technologies to cut costs. Market-based policies
that put a value on emissions reductions encourage firms to conserve
energy, reduce emissions from existing technologies, and adopt new low-
carbon or no-carbon technologies. In contrast, policies that only focus
on technology adoption fail to take advantage of reductions that could
come from existing technologies and conservation.
Question 6. Roughly how large an R&D investment do you believe is
needed at this time, given that radically new technologies will be
required in the future to address climate change? Are current energy
R&D funding levels adequate, or do you think additional resources are
required?
Answer. It is difficult to judge the ``optimal'' funding level for
R&D. As noted in the response to question number 4, OMB reports
proposed 2006 budgets for climate change science and climate change
technology of $1,892 and $2,865, respectively. The NCEP proposal would
approximately double the spending levels on the climate change
technology program over a 10-year period. While still higher levels may
be justified, an equally important issue concerns the mechanism used to
fund the R&D. Recognizing that funding of R&D has a somewhat checkered
past, due partly to a large (and growing) degree of congressional
earmarking and annual funding fluctuations, it is important that the
designated funds be subject to an independent, multiyear, integrated
planning process. Ideally, an independent group or commission assembled
for this purpose would have, as its goal, the best allocation of R&D
funds for long-term, cost-effective climate mitigation and would
include experts from government, private industry, and academia.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For further discussion of how this process might work, see
Kopp, Raymond J., Richard D. Morgenstern, Richard G. Newell and William
A. Pizer, ``Stimulating Technology to Slow Climate Change,'' in New
Approaches on Energy and the Environment, (Morgenstern and Portney,
editors), RFF Press, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using
intensity-based emission targets?
Emissions intensity targets focus on emissions per dollar of real
GDP, rather than on the absolute level of emissions. In my view, a key
advantage of intensity-based targets is that they help shift the debate
away from measuring progress strictly in terms of zero or negative
growth in emissions as a near-term goal, which is an unrealistic
objective for a growing economy like that of the United States. In
contrast, emissions-intensity frameworks start out with the more
achievable goal of slowing the rate of emissions growth. Especially as
nations are just beginning to implement mandatory emission reduction
programs, such a formulation is more pragmatic. Another advantage of
intensity targets is that they promote an emphasis on progress rather
than simply on the absolute status of one nation versus another, which
could help ease some of the concerns about equity among nations. A
further advantage of intensity-based targets is that developing nations
often appear favorably in such calculations as they are reaping the
natural declines arising from modernization. This could facilitate the
entry of developing nations into meaningful initial commitments.
That said, intensity targets also have a number of disadvantages.
First, they are harder to convey to the public than a simple emission
cap. Second, the main advantage of intensity targets--that they do not
draw attention to zero growth as a benchmark for progress--will be seen
as a disadvantage by advocates who seek such a benchmark.
A final observation is that intensity targets are not a useful way
to deal with economic shocks that make the cost of any emission limit
uncertain. Other mechanisms, such as safety valves, can better address
this problem, as discussed in the response to question 3. A fuller
discussion of intensity targets can be found in a recent paper by my
RFF colleague, William Pizer.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Pizer, William 2000. ``The Case for Intensity Targets,''
Discussion Paper 05-02, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
(forthcoming in Climate Policy).
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Question 8. What are your views on setting up a trust fund with the
proceeds from a cap and trade program and using the revenue to fund
investment in low-emission energy technologies?
Answer. While trust funds are sometimes pilloried as ``lock boxes''
that distort national spending priorities, the requirements of science
and technology programs for long-term, stable funding mitigates against
such concerns. The fact that the revenues for the trust fund would be
derived from hitherto-untapped sources closely tied to the goals of the
R&D programs also addresses these concerns. On balance, I think there
is a good case for setting up a trust fund with the proceeds from a cap
and trade program and using the revenue to fund investment in low-
emission energy technologies.
Question 9. Please comment on your view of success of EU program
and what we can learn as we move forward in the United States.
Answer. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) is a
major environmental policy, representing the world's first large-scale
greenhouse gas trading program. It covers more than 11,000 facilities
in 25 countries and 6 major industrial sectors. The first stage of the
program is now in operation, covering CO2 emissions only.
National allocation plans have been approved in all nations, although
registries in all nations are not yet fully operational. Protocols have
been established for uniform monitoring of emissions. Allowances equal
to monitored emissions must be surrendered on an annual basis,
beginning at the end of this year. Beginning in 2008, the system will
be expanded to include additional sectors and additional greenhouse
gases. Significant trading volumes are already occurring, mostly in the
power sector, and the system seems poised to deliver real but modest
reductions compared to a business-as-usual scenario. Possible lessons
for the United States can be drawn from the early experiences of the
EU-ETS:
The price of allowances has fluctuated considerably (8-29
Euros) since the beginning of the program in January 2005. Some
of the fluctuations are clearly associated with weather and
fuel-price dynamics. Many observers believe that over the
longer term prices will decline as the early growing pains of
the program are resolved and, particularly, as more eastern
European nations establish registries and enter the market more
actively. Had the EU-ETS adopted a safety valve at a level
consistent with the long-term price expectation, as has been
widely discussed in the United States, some of the extreme
price fluctuations would have been avoided.
The EU-ETS covers less than 50 percent of the total EU
emissions; consequently, the success of the trading program
does not imply that the EU will meet its overall emissions
targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Rather, achievement of the
Kyoto target depends partly on the success of various
regulatory and voluntary programs in place in other sectors of
the economy, plus the success of governments in purchasing
allowances from Russia or other Annex B nations, or through the
Clean Development Mechanism. Recent discussions in the United
States have focused on economy-wide or near economy-wide
systems that, by definition, would not have the same type of
problems.
Because the EU-ETS is based on the operation of a series of
national-based institutions throughout the EU, problems in
individual nations can affect the prices and availability of
allowances elsewhere. The fact that the registries in some
nations are not yet operational, particularly in Eastern Europe
where net selling is expected, means that the market remains
thin and sensitive to single trades. The same problems are not
likely to occur in the United States, where discussions have
focused on a market entirely organized at the national level.
Question 10. It is sometime said that using a safety valve is the
same as adopting a carbon tax. Please explain why you agree or
disagree.
Answer. Some, in opposing a safety valve try to smear it by calling
it a disguised tax. In this regard, I would make two points: first, if
the price cap level is not reached, then it is strictly a cap-and-trade
mechanism, just like the acid rain program and not at all like a tax.
Second, even if the price cap level is reached, only a small portion of
the revenues would accrue to the government, in this case to fund
research and development. The bulk of the revenues would flow directly
back to the private sector. Because a tax is principally defined in
terms of the revenues it generates, and since only a small portion of
the revenues ever end up in the hands of the government, it is not
accurate to describe the safety valve as a tax.
______
Responses of Richard D. Morgenstern to Questions From Senator Akaka
Question 1. I have some questions about the carbon-trading program
in the European Union.
We know that Europe has started a carbon-trading program.
Can you please describe the basics of what is happening there?
How is the carbon traded, capital generated, and who receives
the benefits?
Second, what is the outlook for success in this trading
program?
Finally, what are the lessons for the U.S. from Europe's
experience? Has there been widespread unemployment or lack of
economic growth?
Answer. Please see the answers to Senator Bingaman's question
number 9.
Question 2. From your testimony, it sounds like the National
Commission on Energy Policy proposal would have a very small impact on
the U.S. economy overall. Further, it will not ``avert'' climate change
over the next 20 years. However, you apparently believe that it is very
important to undertake something like the NCEP proposal. Can you
explain a little more why it is so important if we aren't having an
effect on climate change?
Answer. The principal reason that NCEP's approach would have a much
smaller impact on the U.S. economy than the Kyoto Protocol or S. 139 is
that, fundamentally it is not designed to avert climate change over the
next 20 years. Rather, the focus is on developing and deploying
technologies needed to address the problem in the decades beyond. The
NCEP proposal does this primarily in two ways: 1) by directly
subsidizing a wide range of new technologies including coal, nuclear,
fuel-efficient vehicles, biofuels, and others; and 2) by encouraging
private-sector research and development through incentives for the
deployment of cost-effective carbon saving technologies of all types.
NCEP's cap-and-trade system has the added benefit of generating a
revenue stream to fund the technology subsidies.
The NCEP strategy recognizes that large-scale emission reductions
in the near term are not a prerequisite to long-term success of the
overall mitigation strategy. Unlike SO2, lead, or other
pollutants with short-term health impacts, the damages associated with
climate change are primarily long term in nature. The mitigation
strategy used to address the issue needs to reflect that understanding
of the problem.
Responses of Richard D. Morgenstern to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Under the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal, what happens when a covered entity uses the safety valve
rather than lowering emissions? What is done to ensure that emissions
are actually reduced?
Answer. An economic-based measure such as a cap-and-trade system
provides incentives for industry, consumers, and governments to reduce
their emissions. Such incentives have been proven successful in the
SO2 trading program and elsewhere in the United States and
abroad. A safety valve is designed to protect the economy against
unexpected price increases caused by weather, stronger than predicted
economic growth, technology failures, or other factors.
If the goal is to reduce emissions in the near term without regard
for the economic consequences, then a safety valve is not necessary.
However, if the goal is to address the long-term build up of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere without imposing undue economic harm, then the
safety valve is an appropriate mechanism.
Question 2. Under the Commission's proposal, a company could pay
the $7/ton fee instead of reducing the greenhouse gases. So, in the
end, is there really a firm cap on emissions?
Answer. The $7/ton charge creates incentives for all sources to
undertake emission reductions up to the point where mitigation costs
reach that level. With such a scheme in place, more expensive
mitigation activities would not likely be undertaken.
Question 3. What policy solutions do you recommend to correct for
this so we can still make environmental progress?
Answer. The answer depends in large part on how one defines
``progress.'' In my view, the creation of incentives to develop and
deploy new technologies, combined with incentives to undertake low-cost
emission reductions in the near term, would represent real progress on
the climate change issue. I believe that zero or negative emissions
growth in the near term is not a realistic definition of progress for a
growing economy like that of the United States.
Question 4. Has anyone looked at the cost of inaction--in other
words, what the impact will be to the economy to not curb emissions?
I'm thinking specifically of costs related to:
health care due to dirtier air,
insurance costs due to more intense storms,
government emergency relief services,
the costs of alternative sources of water in the west as the
snowpack decreases,
the costs of protecting homes, businesses and highways from
rising sea levels,
farm payments due to decreased agriculture output, and
what the potential impact all of those increased costs will
have on economic growth.
Answer. There is a large and growing literature on the impacts of
climate change. I would refer you to the extensive studies published by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as well as those
published by the U.S. EPA.
Response of Richard D. Morgenstern to Question From Senator Corzine
Question 1. A cap-and-trade policy is widely acknowledged as a
mechanism that encourages industry to find the most cost-effective
opportunities to meet a specific policy goal. It gives companies the
flexibility to decide what types of actions and technologies work best
for them. It is also widely acknowledged that improvements in other
areas such as fuel efficiency would also have a significant impact on
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reducing air pollution, and
increasing our energy independence. Wouldn't the reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions be that much greater if we coupled a cap-and-
trade policy with stricter CAFE standards?
Answer. It is true that short of very strict limits on emissions
which, in turn, would lead to sharp increases in the price of gasoline
and other carbon-based fuels, the emission reductions from automobiles
under a cap and trade program of the type proposed by the NCEP are
likely to be quite modest. Non-price measures clearly have a role to
play in this sector. As currently designed, however, CAFE standards
have some well-documented problems. Other program designs might be more
effective in achieving mobile-source emission reductions with fewer
unintended side effects.
______
Responses of Anne E. Smith to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Do you believe that climate change is linked to
anthropogenic emissions?
Answer. I think there is enough evidence to warrant climate change
risk management. My testimony outlined my thoughts on the key elements
of such risk management.
Question 2. In your written testimony, you state that ``a price on
carbon in the near-term can be justified as a supplement to a
meaningful R&D mission once that mission has clearly defined targets
for success.'' and that ``only government can provide the needed R&D
investment.''
Question 2a. What are your thoughts on how those long-term targets
should be developed and, based on the targets, (i) what near-term
carbon price would you suggest is reasonable and (ii) what level of
funding would support a ``meaningful'' R&D program that would support
these goals?
Answer. The nation needs to engage in a direct discussion of how to
create an effective R&D program and what that program should strive to
accomplish. The latter is what I mean by ``targets for success.'' I,
myself am just beginning to think about how one might put this
together, but here are some initial thoughts that might help start a
discussion. One important question is ``What would the nation be
willing to pay to achieve a zero-emissions energy system?'' The current
cost of a global zero-emission system is patently not acceptable. It
also appears that lithe added cost of achieving a zero net GHG world
were only a few percent of our current costs of energy, the nation
might be willing to accept this cost to reduce climate change risk.
Unfortunately, the latter situation is not a real choice at present,
and no set of technology forecasts suggests that this will be possible
even over the next 30 years. However, there might be some higher cost
that we still would accept at some point in the future if, from that
point on, it were to provide meaningful reductions in GHG emissions.
The important question is whether this acceptable cost has any overlap
with the costs that might be technologically achievable in the coming
century with a concerted and focused R&D program.
The acceptable cost could be seen as a ``stretch goal `` for the
R&D program. Setting such a goal is fundamentally a political process
as it requires that uncertain risks of climate change be balanced
against the more certain costs to our economy of using such future
technologies on a scale that could actually stabilize atmospheric
emissions. Economics might help inform a rational trade-off, but the
stakes and associated uncertainties are so pronounced that the final
choice for a cost goal depends on much broader social considerations.
Once the stretch goal for the R&D program has been articulated,
then one can start to estimate reasonable levels of spending on near-
term emissions reductions and the magnitude of the R&D task.
(i) A reasonable near-term carbon price would be the present value
of the stretch goal for the future cost that we determine we are
willing to accept for a zero-emissions economy. Calculating that
present value is simple if one knows the future ``acceptable'' cost-
per-ton that is the R&D goal, and the associated date of availability.
Footnote 1 of my written testimony provided an illustrative example of
such a calculation. It was illustrative because we currently lack both
a national view of an ``acceptable cost `` for achieving zero net
emissions, and an R&D program that offers a plan and target time period
for deployment.
(ii) The level of funding for the R&D program would be determined
by a process of identing the types of breakthroughs necessary to
achieve the stretch goal. Once these R&D milestones have been
identified, it will be more possible to discuss an appropriate scale
and form for the R&D program, which in turn will identify the
appropriate spending, and ramp-up rates for such spending.
Question 2b. How much do you expect this to cost the government?
Answer. See my reply to 2a(ii) above.
Question 2c. How much do you think the government would actually
spend?
Answer. If an R&D program were to be developed that has a clearly
articulated vision of what its targeted outcomes are, is founded on a
political consensus that such outcomes would enable a national response
to reduce emissions on a scale sufficient to meaningfully reduce risks
of climate change, and with a coherent plan for how to make progress
towards its defined goal, then it is likely that the government could
agree on the spending necessary to fulfill the plan.
Question 2d. You said in your testimony that the difficult
decisions are how much to spend now, and how to design programs to
stimulate R&D that avoid mistakes of the past. Can you share your
recommendations?
Answer. Designing a truly effective R&D program is clearly a major
challenge yet it has not received even a modest amount of attention
among climate policy analysts. My recommendation is that the community
of environmental policy analysts immediately strive to shift their
attention away from their traditional focus on devising efficient
regulatory structures and focus it on the challenge of devising
effective R&D programs. An intellectual cross-fertilization is needed
between environmental economists and economists who have studied R&D
processes. I am not saying that R&D should be solely a job for
government. As I stated in my testimony, the objective should be to
design a set of incentives that can shift private sector R&D in the
direction of producing the needed advances for climate technology.
Question 3. You say that we need to develop ``breakthrough''
technologies, and that once they are developed we can make massive
emissions cuts. You seem to acknowledge that this may still be ``quite
costly''.
Question 3a. How many greenhouse gas emissions do you expect will
be released between now and when these ``breakthrough'' technologies
are developed and then deployed?
Answer. The quantity of GHG emissions that will be released over
the next several decades will depend, at the margin, on the costliness
of policies that are enacted around the world, and also on whether
developing nations become engaged in any effort. However, under any
scenario, we can expect that atmospheric concentrations will continue
to rise until zero-emissions technologies start to be deployed on a
global scale.
Question 3b. How certain are you that these ``breakthrough''
technologies will be created?
Answer. The likelihood of success depends on national and
international efforts to identify the necessary component
breakthroughs, and to create the programs that will help make them
possible. Lack of such efforts reduces the likelihood that they will be
created.
Question 3c. What if we fail to develop them?
Answer. If lower-cost zero-emissions technologies are not
developed, then the world's economies will probably continue to emit
GHGs at a rate that causes atmospheric concentrations to continue to
grow.
Question 3d. Would you expect massive emission cuts by deploying
the ``breakthrough'' technologies to lead to massive fuel switching
from coal and other resources?
Answer. I have no idea.
Question 4. In your analysis of the NCEP proposal, how much money
did you determine would be generated by the sale of allowances due to
the auction and safety valve?
Answer. My testimony reported our analysis of the cap-and-trade
portion of the Bingaman Amendment. We estimated a range of prices and
emissions outcomes. Our estimates of revenues from the auction plus the
safety valve sales (in 2005 constant dollars) are:
2010--$1 to 2 billion
2015--$2 to 3 billion
2020--$4 to 7 billion
2025--$5 to 12 billion
2030--$7 to 17 billion
The lower bound reflects just auction revenues, because our low
case does not trigger any safety valve sales through 2030. Most of the
difference between the lower bound and upper bound for 2020-2030
reflects revenues from safety valve sales.
Our analysis did not include the impact of the CAFE provisions. The
CAFE standard would reduce the government revenue estimates, especially
at the upper end of the range, while increasing the overall social
costs of the program.
Question 5. According to NCEP recommendations, these revenues would
then get redirected back into near term low carbon technology
deployment programs (such as advanced nuclear, biomass, and coal with
sequestration) as well as doubling basic energy R&D funds for the long
term. In such a scheme, as the difficulty of the goals increased with
the rise in the safety valve price, the funds going into technology
innovation would also likewise increase. In your testimony, you
indicate that the NCEP/Bingaman Amendment energy innovation funds are
inadequate for the task at hand. How much more public money do you
suggest be dedicated to energy research and development? How should
these activities be funded?
Answer. My testimony related to the Bingaman Amendment as written,
and did not relate to any provisions or recommendations in the NCEP
proposal that were not reflected in the Bingaman Amendment. I did wish
to suggest that current R&D spending was inadequate for the task at
hand; rather, I argued that the nation is lacking a clearly targeted
and carefully planned R&D program to develop much lower cost options
for a zero-emissions economy, and that the Bingaman Amendment would not
help fill this gap. I argued that subsidies increased the cost that we
will spend on near-term technologies to a level above that implied by
the safety valve, which is inappropriate if the safety valve represents
the maximum that we should be spending today on near-term reductions. I
also argued that spending on subsidies did not constitute spending on
R&D.
See my reply to question 2a(ii) regarding my thoughts on how to
determine how much public money should be dedicated to energy R&D. Once
appropriate funding levels have been determined, I feel that it is up
to the Congress to determine how to raise the funds. I stated in my
testimony that I do not think that the funds should come solely from a
carbon tax allowance auction, or safety valve sales. Such revenue
sources might generate either too little revenue or too much revenue to
serve a well-targeted and well planned R&D program, and so they should
not be formally linked to each other. Additionally, I do not recommend
that a carbon tax rate or safety valve price be chosen based on R&D
spending needs; the appropriate level should be based on considerations
such as I outlined in my reply to question 2a(i).
Question 6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using
intensity-based emission targets?
Answer. I see no particular advantages or disadvantages of basing a
cap-and-trade program on intensity-based emission targets. The only
merit of the concept is that it has enabled the nation to recognize
that a ``cap'' might allow for emissions to increase from where they
are today, yet still impose a real cost on the economy, and require
concerted effort to achieve. However, as implemented in the NCEP
proposal and the Bingaman Amendment, it is still a cap, with attending
concerns about cost uncertainty and variability. More importantly, the
cap in these two proposals, whether intensity-based or not, is rendered
almost completely irrelevant by the safety valve provision, which
converts the ``cap'' into an effective tax.
Question 7. What are your views on setting up a trust fund with the
proceeds from a cap and trade program and using the revenue to fund
investment in low emission energy technologies?
Answer. See the second paragraph of my reply to question 5.
Question 8. As you know, we are operating under huge budget
deficits and, therefore, massive appropriations for R&D are unlikely.
Given this context, if the Bingaman proposal was modified to fund
``Long-run, high-risk R&D to produce radically new GHG-free energy
sources,'' rather than subsidies for existing technologies, could you
support it?
Answer. My replies under questions 2 and 5 above sum up my view of
an appropriate set of actions and policies to mitigate climate change
risk. That approach is fundamentally different from the Bingaman
proposal, and it would not be achieved by merely changing the
earmarking of funds for subsidies to earmarking of funds for R&D.
First, and foremost, specific national goals for an R&D program must be
articulated and that important gap would not be filled by simply
altering what the revenues are earmarked to be used for. Spending on
R&D without first determining what would constitute ``success `` and
ident0ing how to maximize chances of success would probably just be a
waste of money.
My testimony also emphasized that a carbon tax is a simpler and
more transparent way of achieving a goal of placing a near-term price
on GHG emissions. I have also concluded that using CAFE standards,
which currently are in the Bingaman proposal, is less cost-effective
than using a price signal to drivers of current automobile technology
combined with a program for the long-run development of a future, zero-
emitting form of personal transportation.
Question 9. Under what conditions could you support a carbon tax?
Answer. See my reply to question 2a(i).
Question 10. You state that ``the `safety valve' in the NCEP
program and Senator Bingaman's amendment is designed to provide
assurance that the price of emission allowances will not reach
economically unsustainable levels. But that policy design causes the
prices to be set at a level far too low to provide an adequate
incentive for private investors to develop radically new
technologies.'' Yet earlier you note that only a low price would be
justified. What price does your analysis suggest would be appropriate
to encourage private investors to develop radically new technologies
(a) on their own, and (b) in conjunction with an appropriate R&D
program?
Answer. I conclude that no price signal created by government
legislation or regulation can provide the incentives necessary for
private investors to develop radically new technologies. This is
because of a dynamic inconsistency of incentives that is the subject of
my recent paper with Dr. David Montgomery, and which is described in my
written testimony on pp. 17-19. Price signals are useful for motivating
the private sector to deploy technologies that currently exist but
which would be more costly than higher-emitting technologies but for a
carbon price that we are willing to impose and pay for now. Such price
signals might also motivate private entities to make some evolutionary
improvements on existing technologies that could quickly bring them
into the cost-effective range defined by a credible and sustainable
near-term carbon price. My thoughts on what that near-term carbon price
level might be are described in my response to question 2a(i) above.
Motivation to develop revolutionary technologies, requiring the
coordination of a set of many separate scientific breakthroughs, must
come from other forms of policy than a carbon price signal. Their
eventual deployment can be motivated by a carbon price signal once the
technology has reached the deployment stage, which occurs after the R&D
stage.
Responses of Anne E. Smith to Questions From Senator Akaka
Question 1. From what you and Dr. Morgenstern state in your
testimonies, there is virtually no way that the U.S. can do anything
that will reverse global warming. Even reductions to zero carbon
emissions right now will hardly stabilize temperature.
Answer. Even if the U.S. were to reduce its emissions to zero right
now, emissions in developing countries would continue unabated and so
atmospheric concentrations would continue to increase too. Atmospheric
stabilization can only be achieved if the entire globe moves to zero
carbon emissions. This is why it is so important for a US policy
response to directly address the need for reducing developing country
emissions and not just focus on reducing US contributions to emissions.
Question 2. Your testimony emphasizes the importance of investing
in R&D for technology, particularly ``radically different''
technologies for limiting carbon emissions. If the nation were to
embark on one of the three options in your testimony (cap & trade,
cost-based, or carbon tax), how do you see economic growth distributed
in the technology community or the U.S. in general? Which types of
business would be the winners--where would you expect to see economic
investment, jobs, and growth? Would it be large coal technologies, for
example, or small electronics firms or carbon material firms?
Answer. The ``winners'' will depend on the focus of the R&D program
that I have argued should be developed as a first step. I do not know
what that focus would be. However, I am confident that a sound program
will require a diversified approach and that will imply opportunities
to contribute to the program will be available in many sectors of the
economy.
Responses of Anne E. Smith to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Under the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal, what happens when a covered entity uses the safety valve
rather than lowering emissions? What is done to ensure that emissions
are actually reduced?
Answer. When a covered entity ``uses'' the safety valve, it pays
money to the government equal to the safety valve price in that year
times the amount by which its actual emissions exceed its holdings of
allowances (both allocated allowances and those purchased after the
allocation). The safety valve therefore does not require that emissions
are actually reduced; it does however ensure that covered entities have
a real financial incentive to achieve all the emissions reductions that
they can find at a cost per ton reduced that is cheaper than the safety
valve price.
Question 2. Under the Commission's proposal, a company could pay
the $7/ton fee instead of reducing the greenhouse gases. So, in the
end, is there really a firm cap on emissions?
Answer. No, there is not a firm cap on emissions.
Question 3. What policy solutions do you recommend to correct for
this so we can still make environmental progress?
Answer. My written and oral testimonies have consistently
recommended that the nation develop and implement an effective, long-
term R&D program to enable us to achieve an affordable, zero net
emissions energy system within the century--hopefully starting within
the next 30 years. For near-term actions, I have recommended that we
focus (1) on achieving transfer of current state-of-the-art
technologies to developing countries that still investment in less
efficient technologies even as they grow, and (2) on creating a price
signal on domestic emissions that will incentivize the reductions that
are cheaper now than the present value of making those reductions later
with more advance and cheaper technologies.
Question 4. Has anyone looked at the cost of inaction--in other
words, what the impact will be to the economy to not curb emissions?
I'm thinking specifically of costs related to:
health care due to dirtier air,
insurance costs due to more intense storms,
government emergency relief services,
the costs of alternative sources of water in the west as the
snowpack decreases,
the costs of protecting homes, businesses and highways from
rising sea levels,
farm payments due to decreased agriculture output,
and what the potential impact all of those increased costs
will have on economic growth.
Answer. There is no firm scientific basis currently linking the
above consequences to increasing atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases. There is a general consensus among climate modelers
that it is currently impossible to calculate the effects of atmospheric
concentrations at a sufficient level of regional detail to predict even
the direction of change in these potential consequences. However,
various analysts have attempted to make ``what-if'' calculations of
benefits that assume a particular relationship. Even so, their general
conclusions have been that very high cost near-term emissions
reductions (e.g., costs of the level that economists project would
occur under a hard cap such as McCain-Lieberman's or the Kyoto
Protocol) are not justifiable. This is largely because these costly
near-term actions will have no meaningful impact to reduce the risks of
any of the possible outcomes you have listed above.
Risks to health of air pollutants are already managed under the
Clean Air Act, and there are far less costly methods for reducing these
pollutants than a carbon emissions cap.
Question 5. Your testimony includes a number of comments regarding
the allocation of allowances under a greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-
trade programs. This is a critical issue in putting together such
legislation. What is your recommendation regarding how the allowances
should be allocated?
Answer. Allocation schemes mainly alter the burden sharing under a
cap-and-trade program, and so the decision on allocation of allowances
is an inherently political process driven by multiple social
objectives. Analysis methods may be useful to help politicians and
affected parties understand the sharing of the burden associated with
different allocation schemes, but they cannot provide enough certainty
and specificity to positively identify appropriate or ``fair''
allocations even if the normative goals were to be specified. It is
particularly important to recognize that there is no allocation scheme
under a cap-and-trade program that can make everyone whole: even the
most cost-effective program will have a net cost, and someone (some
groups) will ultimately have to bear that cost burden.
As noted in my testimony, some attributes of an allocation scheme
can actually exacerbate a cap program's cost, and politicians should
avoid those situations when attempting to devise a politically
acceptable set of allocations. These include (a) failing to recognize
the need to replace government revenues that may decline due to the
economic impact of the cap, and (b) allocation rules that update what a
company will receive in future years on the basis of their future
business outcomes.
Response of Anne E. Smith to Question From Senator Corzine
Question 1. Are you convinced that global climate change is linked
to anthropogenic emissions?
Answer. I think there is enough evidence to warrant climate change
risk management. My testimony outlined my thoughts on the key elements
of such risk management.
______
Responses of Jason S. Grumet to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. Emission trading programs have been highly successful
in phasing out leaded gasoline and CFCs, and most notably in reducing
emissions of SO2 and NOX through the Acid Rain
trading program. Is emission trading a good policy instrument for
addressing climate change? Why or why not?
Answer. Emission trading has proved to be a highly effective policy
instrument for addressing a variety of environmental problems.
Moreover, this approach is likely to be especially well-suited to
reducing emissions of the chief greenhouse gases implicated in human-
induced climate change.
The generic advantage of an emission trading approach is that it
can achieve maximum environmental benefit at minimum cost by allowing
individual sources to exploit the lowest cost emission-reduction
opportunities available to them. This means that sources in a position
to cheaply cut emissions can implement more than their share of
reductions and sell excess permits or allowances to other sources that
face higher costs. As such, a trading program is far more flexible and
cheaper than a command-and-control approach, where strict control
requirements typically apply to each individual source. The proposal
put forward by the National Commission on Energy Policy goes even
further to ensure that costs are known--and ``capped''--in advance by
including a safety-valve mechanism that allows sources to buy an
unlimited quantity of additional permits from the government at a pre-
determined price.
Emission trading programs work best where the following conditions
obtain:
The underlying environmental problem occurs over a large
area, rather than being highly localized.
A large number of sources are responsible for the problem.
The cost of reducing emissions varies from source to source.
Emissions can be consistently and accurately measured.
All of these criteria are met in the case of climate change. First,
the underlying problem occurs over the largest possible area--the
entire planet. From the standpoint of warming impacts there is no local
component to greenhouse gas emissions--their effects on the atmosphere
are the same wherever they occur. Second, emissions of greenhouse gases
from different sources vary widely, as do the opportunities and costs
for reducing those emissions. Finally, it is not difficult to
accurately track and report the vast majority of emissions of carbon
dioxide, the most important anthropogenic pollutant implicated in
global warming. Carbon dioxide emissions accounted for nearly 85
percent of the overall U.S. greenhouse gas emissions inventory in 2003;
of these emissions, nearly all (98 percent) were energy related--that
is, they resulted from the combustion of fossil fuels like coal, oil,
and natural gas. Unlike other energy-related pollutant emissions, which
can vary widely depending on combustion conditions, the type of
pollution control equipment in place (if any), and a host of other
parameters, carbon dioxide emissions are a straightforward function of
the carbon content inherent in the fuel being consumed and can be
calculated simply and precisely long before combustion actually occurs.
This feature means that the requirement to hold emissions permits
(otherwise known as ``point-of-regulation'') can occur anywhere along
the fuel production, distribution, and consumption supply chain. It
also means that the great majority of regulated entities do not need to
install new emissions monitoring equipment, they need simply keep track
of the type and amount of fuel for which they are responsible within
the emission trading program.\1\
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\1\ Emissions of other greenhouse gases, notably methane, nitrous
oxide, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6, can be more difficult to track and
document, but these emissions account for a much smaller share of the
overall inventory. In the case of methane and nitrous oxide, the next
most important greenhouse gases in the United States, methodologies for
estimating emissions from a variety of sources have been developed and
refined over several years and can be used where direct measurement of
emissions may not be feasible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. You seem to agree that the most important long-term
feature of any climate policy is the impact it will have on investment
in R&D and the development of new, carbon-free technologies in both the
private and public sectors. What do you believe are the best policies
for pursuing needed R&D? Should these R&D initiatives be primarily tax-
payer funded, government R&D programs, or should we pursue policies to
provide incentives for private sector R&D?
Answer. As I stressed in my testimony, the National Commission on
Energy Policy strongly believes that a combination of public and
private sector R&D is crucial to develop the new technologies that will
be needed to effectively reduce not just U.S., but global, greenhouse
gas emissions over the coming decades. We further believe that the best
and most effective means for stimulating technology investment is to
combine a market signal for reducing emissions with increased public
funding and performance-oriented government incentives aimed at
developing and commercializing low-and non-carbon energy alternatives.
In our proposal, a cost-capped emission trading program provides the
crucial market signal by creating real economic incentives for the
private sector to avoid emissions and invest in climate-friendly
technologies. This market signal is complemented by increased funding
for both government and private-sector efforts to develop longer-term
technologies, such as carbon sequestration, large-scale renewables, or
advanced nuclear, that would otherwise remain uneconomic in the face of
the relatively modest carbon price implicit in our emissions trading
proposal.
As to the question of whether public funding should be primarily
directed toward government R&D versus private-sector R&D, the
Commission believes that both sectors have important assets and
expertise and that both must play a significant role in advancing new
technologies. The final chapter of our report contains a detailed
discussion of the specific stages of energy-technology innovation and
of the different and complementary roles of the public and private
sectors in moving new technologies through these stages, which include
applied research, development, demonstration, early deployment, and
widespread deployment. Typically, government institutions play a larger
role in the early stages of that progression (fundamental and applied
research), while private-sector actors play an increasingly dominant
role in the latter stages (that is, from development and demonstration
through deployment). The following paragraph from our report captures
our basic view of how best to leverage a combination of private and
public sector R&D efforts:
``Complementarity of public-sector investments and incentives
with the private sector's efforts means that the publicly
supported efforts should be focused precisely on those
ingredients of a societally optimal energy research,
development, demonstration, and early deployment
(ERD3) portfolio that industry would not be
supporting on its own--avoiding the error of paying industry
with public funds to do what it would otherwise be doing with
its own money. Complementarity also means exploiting the
complementary technology-innovation capacities of industry and
publicly funded national laboratories and academic research
centers. In many cases this should entail actual partnerships,
in which industry's role will naturally increase as the
innovation process in any particular case proceeds . . .
specifically, as a technology moves from applied research
through development, demonstration, and early deployment, the
insights about commercial products and the marketplace that are
industry's fort become increasingly indispensable to success.''
(National Commission on Energy Policy, Ending the Energy
Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's Energy
Challenges, December 2004, p. 100)
Question 3. Roughly how large an R&D investment do you believe is
needed at this time, given that radically new technologies will be
required in the future to address climate change? Are current energy
R&D funding levels adequate, or do you think additional resources are
required?
Answer. Among the Commission's most important findings was the
finding that current energy-related R&D investment by both the public
and private sectors falls far short of what is needed to successfully
address climate change and meet the other critical energy challenges we
face in the next century. In fact, energy is by far the least R&D
intensive high-technology sector in the U.S. economy at present. Even
as total energy sales in the United States rose from $500 billion per
year in 1990 to about $700 billion per year today, private-sector
investment in energy R&D investment fell by roughly half, from about $4
billion per year in 1990 to about $2 billion per year at present.
Federal investment in energy R&D, meanwhile, has averaged well under $3
billion per year since the late 1980s--it rebounded slightly in the
early 2000s after reaching a low of less than $2 billion per year in
1998, but remains (in constant 2000 dollars) far below the nearly $6.4
billion level of investment reached in the late 1970s. Moreover, the
portion of overall federal appropriations devoted to applied energy-
technology RD&D in the FY2004 budget came to only about $1.8 billion
(compared to $6.08 billion in FY1978). Overall, combined private-sector
and federal funding for energy R&D amounts to less than 1 percent of
energy sales, a level of investment that is far below the average for
other high-technology industries.
Deciding how much energy R&D investment is ``enough'' is, of
course, difficult, since the answer depends not only on the level of
expenditure being considered, but on the difficulty of the challenges
being addressed and the effectiveness of the R&D efforts being mounted
to address those challenges. Nevertheless, as we point out in our
report, every study in recent years that has attempted to look
comprehensively at this question has concluded that current efforts in
both the public and private sectors are not commensurate in scope,
scale or direction with the challenges, the opportunities, and the
stakes at hand. To remedy this shortfall, the Commission recommended
roughly doubling annual direct federal expenditures on energy research,
development, and demonstration. Specifically, our recommendations
included:
Revising the energy-relevant provisions of the tax code to
substantially increase private-sector incentives to invest in
energy research, development, demonstration, and early
deployment (ERD3).
Doubling annual direct federal expenditures on energy
research, development, and demonstration over the period from
2005-2010 (corrected for inflation)--with increases emphasizing
public-private partnerships, international cooperation, and
energy technologies offering high potential leverage against
multiple challenges.
Creating a serious and systematic ``early deployment''
component to complement the increased research, development,
and demonstration activity with effective, accountable, and
performance-oriented approaches to accelerating the attainment
of market competitiveness by the most promising technologies
that successfully pass the demonstration phase.
Expanding by at least three-fold, within the above-
recommended increases in federal ERD3 efforts, the
government's activities promoting and participating in
international cooperation in this domain.
Strengthening the organization and management of the federal
governments ERD3 activities through continuation and
expansion of the efforts already underway in the Department of
Energy (DOE) to improve communication, coordination, portfolio
analysis, and peer review in DOE's ERD3 programs and
pursuing increased coherence and self-restraint in the
Congressional ``earmarking'' process for ERD3
appropriations.
A further point, which I also stressed in my testimony, is that the
Commission felt it very important to ensure that additional public
spending on energy R&D would not add to the current burden on the U.S.
Treasury or compound our mounting national debt. Accordingly, we
recommend that any new public investments in energy R&D be funded
through the new revenues raised by auctioning a small portion (maximum
of 10 percent) of the emissions permits allocated under our recommended
greenhouse gas trading program and through sales of additional permits
under that program via the safety valve mechanism. Further details and
discussion concerning the Commission's energy-technology incentive and
R&D recommendations can be found in our full report.
Question 4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using
intensity-based emission targets?
Answer. The chief advantage of an intensity-based approach is that
it creates an environmental target that is flexible and responsive to
economic conditions. As such, the very formulation of the target makes
explicit the notion that our goal in the first decade of program
implementation is only to slow, not stop, current growth in national
greenhouse gas emissions and to improve the efficiency of the American
economy by reducing its energy intensity: This is a goal that is
broadly supported by both political parties and by the American public
(it is worth noting that the Bush Administration's voluntary greenhouse
gas reduction target is also expressed in intensity terms). By
contrast, setting a fixed emissions target tends to arouse concerns
that a policy to limit greenhouse gas emissions will necessarily limit
future economic growth. The choice of an intensity-based target,
together with a safety-valve mechanism to limit the economic cost of
implementing overall reductions, results in a policy that, according to
an independent analysis by the federal Energy Information
Administration, would have no material effect on ``the overall growth
rate of the economy between 2003 and 2025, in terms of both real GDP
and potential GDP.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ As noted in my testimony, the LIA analysis specifically found
that the cumulative effect of the Commission's recommended greenhouse
gas emission trading program would be to reduce overall predicted GDP
growth between 2005 and 2025 from 80.8 percent to 80.6 percent, or a
difference of 0.2 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another key advantage of an intensity-based approach is that it is
more amenable to developing country participation. Developing countries
are especially sensitive to the concern that limiting greenhouse gas
emissions will limit growth. By supporting the use of intensity metrics
in greenhouse gas management regimes that naturally accommodate
emissions growth, the United States would be designing a framework that
is more likely to encourage developing country participation.
Finally, a related advantage of an intensity-based approach is
where it sets the bar for future policy debate. A fixed target is
inflexible by design, politically contentious to iterate, and prone to
over-determined conclusions about the success or failure of the
policies used to achieve it. In contrast, negotiations based on
intensity goals are about the rate of decline and offer greater
opportunities for fine-tuning and adjustment. As such, this approach
may prove more robust and resilient than the alternative approach of
setting absolute goals based on historic emissions levels.
However, it should be noted that, the very attributes that make an
intensity approach well suited for the initial decades a carbon
management program may eventually need to be reconsidered if a global
scientific and political consensus forms around a desired absolute
emissions target. As the global effort to address climate change
matures, it may eventually become reasonable to place less emphasis on
providing economic certainty (through mechanisms such as the safety
valve and the intensity target) while placing more emphasis on
achieving and maintaining a fixed environmental outcome. For just this
reason and because it is inherently impossible to prejudge developments
that might affect policy deliberations decades into the future, the
Commission has not attempted to articulate detailed recommendations for
how its proposed policy would evolve beyond the 2020-2025 timeframe. In
the meantime, however, we believe that our proposed approach achieves
an appropriate balancing of the need for economic versus environmental
certainty and that the advantages of setting emissions targets on an
intensity basis outweigh the disadvantages of using this approach.
Question 5. What are your views on setting up a trust fund with the
proceeds from a cap and trade program and using the revenue to fund
investment in low emission energy technologies?
Answer. As noted above and in my earlier testimony, the Commission
strongly recommends that additional public investment in low-and non-
carbon energy technologies should be funded by the auction of a portion
of permits or allowances under its proposed emission trading program,
together with revenues generated by the sale of additional permits or
allowances through the safety valve mechanism. Because significant
global reductions in greenhouse gases will eventually require the
development and large-scale deployment of new technologies, these
investments are absolutely critical if we are to achieve long-term
success in dealing with climate change while simultaneously ensuring
continued access to reliable and affordable energy supplies. The
Commission considered the relative merits of ``on-budget'' and ``off-
budget'' funding strategies. In light of Congress' historic reluctance
to support ``off-budget'' funding mechanisms and the challenges
inherent in creating a new institution, the Commission focused its
recommendations on opportunities to build upon recent successful
efforts to improve the effectiveness of existing government technology
programs. While recognizing that Congress alone is responsible for
appropriations, the Commission believes that the practice of non-
competitive earmarks has in some cases undermined the effectiveness of
public funds spent on energy technology innovation and believes that
greater efforts are needed to ensure that earmarks are consistent with
the strategic objectives of the programs affected.
Responses of Jason S. Grumet to Questions From Senator Akaka
Question 1. My question has to do with sequestration of carbon. Did
your Commission look at various ways to enhance sequestration of
carbon--that is, taking carbon out of the earth's biosphere by a number
of means including storing it in oceans and increasing plant biomass?
Did the Commission see this as a viable means to reduce carbon? How did
the Commission see it as participating in the overall market?
Answer. The Commission believes that geologic sequestration is a
promising strategy for reducing the climate impacts associated with
future use of traditional energy resources, most notably coal. In
particular, we looked at geologic carbon sequestration in combination
with the development and deployment of advanced integrated gasification
and combined cycle (IGCC) coal-fired electricity production. Potential
repositories for geologic carbon sequestration include depleted oil and
gas fields, unmineable deep coal seams, or deep saline formations. In
general, we are optimistic about the potential role for geologic carbon
sequestration as part of an array of strategies for mitigating climate
change risks in the future. This optimism is based on the size of
potential geologic repositories in the United States, which, according
to current estimates, could theoretically hold hundreds of years worth
of current U.S. emissions and on the fact that all aspects of the
technology required for carbon capture and sequestration are developed
and in use today, primarily to support the use of carbon dioxide
injection for oil recovery. Further investment is required, however, to
reduce costs and to demonstrate and deploy these technologies on the
scale needed for meaningful capture and sequestration in the context of
a larger greenhouse gas management strategy. The Commission's
recommendations therefore include $3 billion in public support over ten
years for the commercial-scale demonstration of geologic carbon storage
at a variety of sites around the country, both in conjunction with coal
IGCC plants and as stand-alone sites.
While our analysis focuses primarily upon geologic sequestration,
the Commission recognizes the important role that biological
sequestration must also play in long-term carbon management strategies
and believes that there are a variety of opportunities for agriculture
and forestry industries to profit as the sellers of reduction credits
under a market-based emissions trading program. One biological
sequestration strategy that the Commission devoted considerable
attention to is the opportunity to accelerate commercial scale
production of ethanol from cellulosic biomass. We believe that this
technology is particularly attractive due to the combined benefits
cellulosic ethanol offers for climate change mitigation and improved
oil security. The Commission did not look closely at deep-ocean
sequestration strategies.
Question 2. Clearly the participation of developing countries in a
global carbon reduction effort is necessary to make a difference on
global greenhouse gases. How does the Commission see that link or
challenge working--between developed nations that have adopted carbon
controls, and either leading or pushing countries such as China and
India to adopt similar emissions controls? What does the Commission see
as the best way to ensure those changes?
Answer. The Commission wholeheartedly agrees that the problem of
climate change requires a global response and cannot be meaningfully
addressed on a long-term basis without full participation by all major
emitting nations, including developing nations such as China, India,
and Brazil. We believe the best way to elicit an equitable and
effective global response is for the United States to return to a
position of international leadership on this issue by taking an initial
step domestically, while designing that initial step so that it
explicitly links future U.S. action to limit greenhouse gas emissions
to comparable efforts by other developed and developing nations to
achieve their own emissions reductions. Thus, our proposal for a
mandatory, economy-wide U.S. greenhouse gas emissions trading program
is intentionally phased and carefully designed to protect our economy
from competitive disadvantage if other nations fail to limit their
emissions. It also contains an important provision for periodic five-
year reviews of the U.S. program which would enable Congress to assess
progress by other countries as part of a determination of how domestic
efforts should evolve. Specifically, the Commission recommends that if:
``other countries with significant emissions and/or trade
with the United States do not take comparable action to limit
emissions by 2015, five years from the commencement of the U.S.
program, further increases in the safety valve price should be
immediately suspended. Depending on international progress, the
United States could also opt not to introduce a more ambitious
target rate of emissions intensity improvement in 2020 and make
other adjustments to its domestic program; conversely it could
decide to move forward more aggressively in the second decade
of program implementation than the Commission is proposing.''
(National Commission on Energy Policy, Ending the Energy
Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's Energy
Challenges, December 2004, p. 25)
By explicitly linking future U.S. actions to international
progress, the Commission hopes to create a ``push'' for developing
country involvement in climate mitigation efforts. That push should be
combined with positive incentives aimed at ``leading'' other countries
toward participation. Accordingly, we recommend that the United States
continue and expand its current bilateral negotiations with nations
such as China, India, and Brazil while also providing incentives to
promote technology transfer and to encourage U.S. companies and
organizations to form international partnerships for implementing clean
energy projects in developing nations.
Finally, it is important to recognize that a number of countries
are already taking steps to limit greenhouse gas emissions. This
includes not only our major trading partners in the developed world,
many of whom (including the European Union, Japan, and Canada) have
adopted the Kyoto Protocol and begun efforts to implement their
obligations under Kyoto, but also several key developing nations that
have begun reducing their emissions below forecast levels as they
pursue enhanced energy security, energy efficiency, conventional
pollution control, and market reform. These developments are
encouraging and provide grounds for optimism U.S. efforts to address
our own contribution to the climate problem would prompt an
international response more likely to exceed our expectations than to
disappoint them.
Responses of Jason S. Grumet to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Under the National Commission on Energy Policy's
proposal, what happens when a covered entity uses the safety valve
rather than lowering emissions? What is done to ensure that emissions
are actually reduced?
Answer. Differing opinions about the pace of technological progress
make it impossible to confidently predict both the costs and benefits
of mandatory greenhouse gas reduction efforts. Through inclusion of a
``safety-valve'' mechanism to cap program costs, the Commission is
expressing a preference for cost-certainty over emissions certainty in
the initial stages of a carbon management regime. Ultimately,
addressing the threat of climate change will require global agreement
about an ecologically sustainable emission limit and an equitable
sharing of reduction burdens. Achieving the long-term environmental
objective will likely require that fixed emission limits eventually
replace cost-based policies. However, the Commission strongly believes
that reducing uncertainty about near-term economic impacts is crucial
to creating a consensus for timely action.
A cap and trade program with a safety valve will function exactly
like a traditional cap and trade regime until and unless technology
fails to progress as desired. Under a traditional cap approach, slower
than desired technological progress results in higher than anticipated
program costs. Through inclusion of the safety-valve compliance
mechanism, a failure of technology to progress as the desired rate will
cause firms to purchase additional emission permits from the government
at a set price leading to lower than anticipated emission benefits. The
Commission and the Energy Information Administration have each analyzed
the projected impacts of the Commission's climate program under a range
of technology assumptions. Both conclude that under relatively
optimistic technology assumptions, the safety-valve will not be
triggered and full program benefits will be achieved. Conversely, under
more pessimistic technology assumptions, firms will take advantage of
the safety valve compliance option resulting in roughly half of the
emission benefits. Advocates for mandatory climate action generally
tend toward technology optimism arguing that main economic models fail
to capture a range of cost-effective compliance options. If correct,
the safety-valve will simply have served to allay the anxieties and
speeded adoption of a meaningful reduction program. If incorrect, the
safety-valve will serve its intended purpose of achieving all available
emissions reductions up to, but not beyond, the point where overall
costs to the economy are deemed acceptable by policymakers.
The Commission has proposed a price--starting at $7 per metric ton
of carbon-dioxide-equivalent in 2010 and escalating in nominal terms by
5 percent per year thereafter--that is high enough, in our judgment, to
achieve substantial emissions reductions and generate a meaningful
market signal for encouraging investment in low-and non-carbon
alternatives, but not so high as to materially impact the U.S. economy
or undermine the competitiveness of U.S. firms in international
markets.
Question 2. Under the Commission's proposal, a company could pay
the $7/ton fee instead of reducing the greenhouse gases. So, in the
end, is there really a firm cap on emissions?
Answer. There is no firm cap on emissions in the Commission
proposal.
There is no debate over the fact that a carbon program with a $7
per ton CO2 cost cap sends a weaker market signal than a
program in which limits must be achieved regardless of economic impact.
However, it is worth noting that most greenhouse gas cap-and-trade
proposals to date have included a variety of so-called ``flexibility
mechanisms'' that would, in practice, also allow domestic emissions to
rise above the stated cap. Since the costs associated with achieving a
fixed level of emissions reduction cannot be known in advance, cost
arguments are impossible to adjudicate to the satisfaction of all
stakeholders and will likely continue to stymie efforts to reach
political consensus. Hence our Commission believes that the more
meaningful comparison may be between the timely adoption of a cost-
capped mandatory program and the continuation of business as usual in
which domestic carbon emissions can be vented into the atmosphere at no
cost. From ecological, economic and political perspectives the
Commission believes that speeding the adoption of a robust policy
architecture to address the long-term challenge of climate change is
more important than achieving a precise level of near-term emission
reductions.
Question 3. What policy solutions do you recommend to correct for
this so we can still make environmental progress?
Answer. We regard the safety valve feature as a key virtue of our
proposal and do not believe it requires ``correction.'' Proposals,
which may set strict caps and look more aggressive on paper, won't
result in progress if they never succeed in garnering the political
support needed to implement them. Congress has repeatedly gone on
record in support of action on climate only if such action does not
damage the U.S. economy or undermine U.S. competitiveness. We believe
our proposal meets that test, while still achieving substantial
reductions below the emissions trajectory projected absent policy
intervention. Specifically, modeling analyses conducted using
conservative assumptions about technology innovation indicate that our
proposal will produce 540 million metric tons of carbon-dioxide-
equivalent greenhouse gas reductions in 2020, a 6 percent reduction
below business-as-usual projections. Under more optimistic technology
assumptions, estimated reductions in 2020 could roughly double to
approximately 1 billion metric tons.
While our proposal certainly achieves progress in slowing emissions
growth over the first decade of program implementation, its more
important contribution over the long run is likely to reside in the
market signal it creates for avoiding future emissions. Only when
greenhouse gas reductions have a concrete value will the tremendous
ingenuity and investment potential of the American economy be brought
to bear in developing and deploying the new technologies needed to
achieve more substantial emissions reductions in the future--not only
in the United States, but worldwide.
The initial market signal created by the Commission's proposal--at
$7 per metric ton of carbon dioxide--is admittedly modest. As I noted
in my testimony, we selected this figure because our analysis of the
available literature suggested it roughly corresponds to the mid-point
of current estimates of the expected harm that can be attributed, based
on present scientific understanding, to a ton of greenhouse gas
emissions. Perhaps more importantly, at $7 per ton the safety valve
price was sufficiently low as to minimize the immediate burden on
consumers and business and avoid forcing the premature retirement of
long-lived capital assets (such as power plants) that were constructed
before climate concerns figured in the investment decisions of most
energy companies, while still creating a meaningful market signal for
avoiding future emissions. Certainly a stronger initial signal would
produce a stronger initial response, but it would also be more costly
to the economy. Finally, it is important to emphasize that the market
signal under the Commission's proposal grows steadily stronger over
time as the nominal safety valve price increases by 5 percent per year.
This gradual but measurable progression in the stringency of the
program gives businesses the planning certainty they need to make wise
long-run investments that will minimize the costs of achieving
greenhouse gas emissions reductions over time.
In sum, as I noted in the previous response, the decision about
where to set the safety valve price is ultimately a political one.
Ultimately it is probably less important what specific price is chosen
than that we get started. The Commission believes its proposal--by
removing cost uncertainty as a basis for inaction--offers the best
chance we have right now to do just that.
Question 4. Has anyone looked at the cost of inaction--in other
words, what the impact will be to the economy to not curb emissions?
I'm thinking specifically of costs related to:
health care due to dirtier air,
insurance costs due to more intense storms,
government emergency relief services,
the costs of alternative sources of water in the west as the
snowpack decreases,
the costs of protecting homes, businesses and highways from
rising sea levels,
farm payments due to decreased agriculture output,
and what the potential impact all of those increased costs
will have on economic growth.
Answer. In the early stages of its deliberations, the Commission
reviewed the available literature on potential costs associated with
future climate change, including costs associated with many of the
categories of possible impact listed in the question. Some of this
material is available in a separate compendium of research that the
Commission compiled as part of its final report and that we would be
happy to make available to the Committee. The short answer to the
question is that inaction will almost certainly impose costs on our
economy and there is good reason to believe that these costs could be
quite large. The difficulty, of course, is in quantifying these costs
given the numerous uncertainties that are involved; the complexity of
various feedback mechanisms, not only within the climate system but in
the natural and human systems that are intimately affected by climate;
and the inherent difficulty of assigning a specific value to things
like species diversity and ecosystem preservation. Not surprisingly,
analyses that have attempted to derive cost estimates for the likely
impacts of climate change have therefore produced a wide range of
results.
In fact, as is often the case with important environmental issues,
it is even harder to agree on the cost of inaction than it is to agree
on the cost of taking steps to mitigate the problem. For this reason,
Commission members agreed that it would be unproductive to become
bogged down in either side of the cost debate. A much simpler
conclusion: that the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence points
to the risk, if not the certainty, of potentially significant adverse
harms and that cautious steps are warranted at this time to begin
reducing that risk, provided an adequate basis for consensus within our
own very diverse group and should, in our view, provide an adequate
basis for action by Congress. In fact, we believe a modest and gradual
approach such as we have proposed, because it is inherently flexible
and can be fine-tuned as better information becomes available, is
precisely the best response in a situation where uncertainties abound
on both sides of the impact versus mitigation cost-debate. The key is
to start now, because by doing so we effectively buy time to make
adjustments if climate change and the consequences it unleashes turn
out to be worse than expected. By contrast, each additional year of
political stalemate and inaction simply limits our options and
increases the risk that we'll eventually realize we should have done
more, but realize it only when it is already too late.
Responses of Jason S. Grumet to Questions From Senator Salazar
Question 1. Mr. Grumet, thank you for your participation today and
for your work on the National Commission on Energy Policy. The NCEP
proposal would have a very modest effect on the economy. Furthermore,
your climate change proposal takes great pains to ensure no one source
of energy is put in an unfavorable position compared to others.
Now, this is very important to me, because as you know coal is a
large part of the Colorado economy, and in fact it is a large part of
America's energy future.
Can you explain how the NCEP climate change proposal will prevent
coal from being adversely affected?
Answer. Commission members recognize the extremely important role
that coal plays in the nation's and the world's energy mix and took
care to develop policy recommendations that offer, in our view, the
best odds of ensuring a continued and significant role for coal in the
future. Our approach is two-fold. On the one hand, the near-term policy
we have proposed for slowing growth in U.S. greenhouse emissions is
designed--both in terms of the target it sets, the cost certainty it
provides, and the very gradual way in which it progresses--to minimize
adverse impacts on coal and give the industry an opportunity to adjust
successfully to emerging climate constraints. As a second, critical
policy complement to this program, our recommendations provide for
substantial public investment in helping the coal industry to develop
and deploy a next generation of technologies that are compatible with
the need to limit greenhouse gas emissions and address a number of
other coal-related environmental concerns.
With respect to the Commission's climate change proposal, we looked
specifically at the impacts of our greenhouse gas trading program on
the coal industry. As one would expect, the effects of the proposal on
coal use and coal prices would be somewhat more significant than the
effects on other, less carbon-intensive fossil fuels like natural gas
and oil. Nevertheless, under our proposal projected coal consumption in
2020 is reduced by only 9 percent relative to the business-as-usual
forecast and overall coal use still rises by 16 percent compared to
current (2004) consumption. In fact, modeling indicates that our
proposal will cause the additional retirement of just 700 megawatts of
existing coal-fired generating capacity (approximately equivalent to
one medium-large power plant)--again relative to base-case
projections--between now and 2020.
While early efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions need not and,
in the Commission's view, should not create undue hardship for the coal
industry, it is clear that the industry will need to evolve to improve
its competitiveness in an increasingly carbon-constrained world. The
key is to develop coal technologies that are compatible with the need
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and that also address other public
health and environmental concerns currently associated with
conventional pulverized coal plants. The Commission sees great promise
for achieving these objectives through integrated gasification and
combined cycle (IGCC) coal technology, which--besides having lower
pollutant emissions of all kinds--can open the door to economic carbon
capture and storage. In fact, we believe the future of coal and the
long-term success of future greenhouse gas mitigation efforts may hinge
to a large extent on whether IGCC technology can be successfully
commercialized and deployed over the next twenty years. Our complete
report includes a detailed description of the potential of this
technology, including its potential as a means for someday producing
clean low-carbon liquid fuels suitable for use in the transportation
sector, as well as a discussion of the financial and technological
challenges that must be overcome to give coal IGCC a chance to prove
itself in the marketplace. To help overcome these obstacles we propose
a substantial increase in federal support for IGCC and other promising
advanced coal technologies. Specifically, the Commission recommends
that the federal government:
Provide up to $4 billion over ten years to support the early
deployment of roughly 10 gigawatts of sequestration-ready IGCC
plants.
Provide support for the commercial-scale demonstration of
geologic carbon storage at a variety of sites with an
investment of $3 billion over ten years.
In sum, the Commission firmly believes that the best future for
coal lies not in continued paralysis on the issue of climate change,
but in carefully designed policies that both effectively reduce climate
risks and do so in a manner that helps the industry adapt and even
thrive. That the United Mine Workers of America, an organization which
we consulted frequently and extensively throughout our deliberations,
has expressed support for the Commission's report and recommendations
provides considerable grounds for optimism that it is possible to do
both.
Question 2. Why is the NCEP proposal so modest?
Answer. As I noted in my testimony and in several of the foregoing
responses, the Commission recognized from the outset that progress on
climate change was not going to be possible in this country unless
Congress and the public could be convinced of two things: first, that
reducing greenhouse gas emissions could be achieved without harming the
U.S. economy or putting U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage
and second, that all countries with major emissions would soon join the
United States in doing their fair share to implement reductions. The
modesty of our proposal reflects an appreciation for the importance of
these constraints. It also reflects an appreciation of the extent to
which significant uncertainty on all sides of the climate debate, but
most notably with respect to the consequences of current emissions
trends and the costs and benefits of mitigation, argues for a gradual
and flexible approach. Commission members are well aware that the
emissions reductions required on a worldwide basis to stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases far exceed the level of
reduction that would be achieved by the policies we have proposed for
implementation over the next 10 to 20 years. As such we have never
advertised our recommendations as a ``solution'' for climate change.
Our goal, rather, was to design an approach that would allow the United
States to take an initial step domestically while simultaneously
establishing a robust policy architecture that could evolve over time
to reflect changes in scientific understanding, technology development,
and prospects for collaboration with other nations. Or as we put it in
our report:
``[T]his proposal should be understood as an initial domestic
step in the long-term effort to first slow, then stop, and
ultimately reverse current emission trends. In its structure
and stringency, the Commission's proposal is designed to
encourage the timely initiation of what will necessarily be a
phased process. The Commission believes that this approach is
more pragmatic and ultimately more effective than years of
further legislative stalemate in pursuit of a more aggressive
initial goal.'' (National Commission on Energy Policy, Ending
the Energy Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's
Energy Challenges, December 2004, p. 19)
------
Responses of Howard Gruenspecht to Questions From Senator Bingaman
Question 1. The U.S. spends a significant amount of money
on R&D into non-carbon and low-carbon technologies. How does
this amount compare to our overall economy, our total spending
on energy, and our total greenhouse gas emissions? Are other
countries spending comparable amounts based on their size and
emission levels?
Answer. The most recent year for which data are available
for all of the domestic parameters requested above is 2003. For
fiscal year 2003, Federal spending for programs in the Climate
Change Technology Program was $2,555 million. For calendar year
2003, U.S. gross domestic product was $11,004 billion, energy
expenditures were $751.7 billion, and total net greenhouse gas
emissions were 6,072.2 million metric tons CO2
equivalent. Therefore, Federal spending on climate-change
technologies was 0.023 cents per dollar of GDP, 0.34 cents per
dollar of energy expenditure, and 42.1 cents per ton of
CO2 Eq. Reliable data on government expenditures for
climate change-related technologies are not readily available
for other countries.
Question 2. Roughly how large an R&D investment do you
believe is needed at this time, given that radically new
technologies will be required in the future to address climate
change? Are current energy R&D funding levels adequate, or do
you think additional resources are required?
Answer. In 2005, the Federal Government plans to invest
nearly $2 billion in climate change science and nearly $3
billion in climate change technology research, development, and
deployment, including voluntary partnerships. Funding for these
activities is adequate.
Question 3. In the EIA's analysis of the NCEP climate
change proposal, was it important to know where in the energy
system the point of regulation would be located? How was the
point of regulation handled for the purposes of your analysis?
Please describe what impact the point of regulation has on
overall program effectiveness and discuss what bearing it has
on your analysis.
Answer. The cost and effectiveness of any regulations
depend partially on how they are implemented. ETA's analysis
does not include the implementation costs (i.e., monitoring,
verification, and management costs) of the NCEP cap-and-trade
proposal for either the public or private sector, primarily
because the implementation processes to be used are generally
unspecified in the NCEP report. The actual costs of the NCEP
proposal could be higher if the implementation process hinders
the development of a fully functioning and efficient market for
permits.
The NCEP climate proposal, a cap-and-trade system with a
safety-valve price on GHG permits, is loosely modeled after the
power plant SO2 cap-and-trade program created in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This program generally has
very low transactions costs. However, the NCEP proposal is more
complex and difficult to manage because of the larger number of
entities potentially affected. In EIA's analysis, a permit fee,
based on the carbon content of the fuel, is reflected in the
fuel cost at the point of consumption and all affected
consumers are assumed to directly participate in the permit
transactions. From an implementation perspective, however, it
is impractical to expect many of the residential, commercial,
and small industrial end-users to actually trade in permits. It
is far more likely that the permit purchases and transactions
would be regulated, managed and monitored at major emitters and
major distribution points (marketers and distributors) in the
energy market.
Question 4. In the ETA's analysis of the NCEP climate
change proposal, was it important to know whether, how, and to
what extent emission allowances would be allocated? How was
allowance allocation handled for the purposes of your analysis?
Please describe what impact the allowance allocation scheme has
on overall program effectiveness and discuss what bearing it
has on your analysis.
Answer. EIA's analysis assumed that the tradable permits
allocated to the Federal Government (5 percent of the total
between 2010 and 2012, then rising to 10 percent in 2022 and
thereafter as specified in the NCEP recommendations) were
publicly auctioned. The government also receives the safety
value price for all permits that are purchased in excess of the
emissions target for the cap-and-trade program. All other
permits are allocated to emitters in proportion to their
historical emissions.
EIA calculates that the projected cumulative discounted
Federal revenue equals the cumulative discounted expenditures
in 2022. Beyond 2022 any excess revenues collected are assumed
to flow to the U.S. Treasury. Although EIA did not consider
alternative allocation schemes, if the percent of tradable
permits allocated to the Federal Government were higher, more
revenues would flow to the U.S. Treasury and the point of
``fiscal neutrality'' would occur sooner.
ETA's analysis assumes that emission permits that are
allocated to emitters are ``grandfathered'' based on historical
utilization. A different allocation of permits would generally
not affect the efficiency of the program, but it would change
it's distributional impacts.
Question 5. Please reflect on the recent analysis you
conducted for Senator Inhofe on the impacts of higher natural
gas prices--among other things--on the NCEP's climate change
proposal. Was the safety valve effective in keeping overall
program costs down when confronted with the higher costs in
this sensitivity case?
Answer. Senator Inhofe requested that EIA prepare
sensitivity runs based on the full National Commission on
Energy Policy (NCEP), Cap-Trade (with safety valve), and No-
Safety (greenhouse gas cap and trade policy without safety
valve) cases from our report using the natural gas price and
availability assumptions in the Annual Energy Outlook 2005
(AEO2005) ``restricted natural gas supply'' case, and assuming
25 and 50 percent fewer non-carbon dioxide emission reductions
were available for purchase at a given greenhouse gas permit
price.
We prepared three groups of four model simulations. Each
group includes the comparable case from the earlier analysis of
the NCEP proposals done at the request of Senator Bingaman,
along with three sensitivity cases as stipulated by Senator
Inhofe above.
We found that the alternative assumptions about natural gas
supplies and the availability of non-CO2 greenhouse
gas emissions reductions have fairly small effects on the
estimated incremental impacts of the NCEP's recommendations.
The higher natural gas prices that result from the AEO2005
restricted natural gas supply assumptions tend to lower overall
energy demand and make non-fossil fuels like renewables and
nuclear more attractive, even without the NCEP's recommended
appliance and building efficiency standards, technology
incentives, and greenhouse gas cap and trade programs. As a
result, the incremental costs of complying with the NCEP
recommendations are generally lower with these alternative
assumptions even though the absolute level of economic
performance, both with and without the cap-and-trade program,
is adversely impacted by the reduced availability of natural
gas in the restricted supply scenarios.
The assumptions about the availability of reductions in the
emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases are only
important when the NCEP's recommended greenhouse allowance
price safety valve is not in effect. When the safety valve is
in effect, the emissions reductions coming from non-
CO2 gases are lower with the alternative
availability assumptions, but there is little impact on energy
markets because the greenhouse gas allowance price is capped,
limiting the impact of the NCEP's cap-andtrade proposal.
Responses of Howard Gruenspecht to Questions From Senator Corzine
Question 1. I understand that your estimate of the economic
impact of the NCEP proposal is that it would change our GDP in
2020 by a very minimal amount.
Answer. In 2000 dollars, real GDP in the NCEP case is
expected to be $10 billion lower (0.1 percent) in 2010 and $35
billion lower (0.2 percent) in 2020 relative to the reference
case. Consumption of goods and services per household falls by
approximately $66 (0.1 percent) in 2010 and $273 (0.3 percent)
in 2020. The consumer price index (CPI) rises by 0.2 percent in
2010 and by 0.4 percent in 2020. The inflation rate, as
measured by the growth rate of CPI, increases by about 0.2
percent point in 2010 and by less than 0.1 percent point in
2020. The implementation of higher CAFE standards raises the
average price of new light-duty vehicles by approximately four
percent, with a decrease in sales of approximately four
percent.
If only the cap-and-trade system is put in place (the Cap-
Trade case), real GDP is expected to be $9 billion lower (0.1
percent) in 2010 and $17 billion lower (0.1 percent) in 2020
relative to the reference case. Consumption of goods and
services per household falls by approximately $45 (0.1 percent)
in 2010 and $78 (0.1 percent) in 2020. The consumer price index
(CPI) rises by 0.2 percent in 2010 and by 0.5 percent in 2020.
The inflation rate, as measured by the growth rate of CPI,
increases by about 0.2 percent point in 2010 and by less than
0.1 percent point in 2020.
The relative size of these estimated impacts is, of course,
in the eye of the beholder.
Question 2. Given the urgency of the global warming
problem, what more can we do, beyond the NCEP proposal without,
in the words of the Sense of the Senate resolution that we
adopted last month, ``significantly harming'' the U.S. economy?
Answer. The Energy Information Administration (EIA),
consistent with its statutory mission, does not develop or
advocate any particular energy policy or environmental
policies. One key way to minimize the impact on the economy of
policies Congress or the Administration might wish to implement
is to provide sufficient lead time to allow the various parts
of the economy--consumers, business, and government--to change
practices on a gradual steady basis rather than abruptly.
Prospects for a smooth adjustment to policy changes are also
enhanced when affected parties have the expectation that the
newly implemented policies will be long-lived in order to have
a lasting effect on behavior.
Response of Howard Gruenspecht to Question From Senator Salazar
Question 1. Dr. Gruenspecht, in April 2005, the Energy
Information Administration (ETA) released a report analyzing
the policy recommendations contained within the 2004 National
Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) report entitled, ``Ending
the Energy Stalemate: A Bipartisan Strategy to Meet America's
Energy Challenges.'' Since this analysis was published, the
U.S. Senate passed a ``Sense of the Senate'' resolution calling
for mandatory limits and incentives to slow, stop, and reverse
the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in a manner and at a
pace that will not significantly harm the economy and will
encourage comparable actions by other countries.
In order to evaluate the full range of potential policies
that would be compatible with the resolution, I request that
the EIA build on its analysis to date by running a number of
additional intensity target and safety valve scenarios. I note
that EIA has been able to respond quickly to other Senators'
analytical requests following the April report, and I request a
similarly prompt response to this letter.
The analysis in the April 2005 report included a greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions intensity reduction program with a GHG
intensity improvement of 2.4 percent per year between 2010 and
2019 and 2.8 percent per year between 2020 and 2025, and with a
safety-valve permit price starting at $7 per metric ton
CO2 equivalent in 2010 nominal dollars and
increasing by 5 percent annually up to $14.55 in 2025.
I request an additional analysis that evaluates a range of
intensity improvements and safety-valve combinations. This
analysis should include additional intensityimprovement/safety-
valve combinations with intensity improvements ranging from 2.6
to 4.0 percent per year and safety valve values ranging from
$10 to $35 (in 2010 nominal dollars, rising five percent per
year). The purpose of this analysis would be to draw out the
impacts of alternative policies. The different combinations run
should allow policy makers to evaluate the impact of changing
the safety valve price through this range given the base case
intensity improvement (2.4 percent through 2020 and 2.8 percent
thereafter), and to evaluate the impact of increasing the
intensity improvement through this range in combination with
various safety valve prices. Each of these combinations should
be analyzed under both the base case and high technology
assumptions.
This report should include estimates of the same
environmental and economic indicators from the previous report,
including but not limited to supply estimates (by fuel), GHG
emissions, GDP and employment.
I request that you complete these analyses and report them
to me and other members of this Committee by December 1, 2005.
Answer. EIA has met with Dr. John Plumb of your staff to
discuss an approach to addressing this request.
Response of Howard Gruenspecht to Question From Senator Akaka
Question 1. The EIA analysis shows that three of the
National Commission on Energy Policy's proposals will have the
greatest effect on energy demand, use, and consumption in the
U.S.--the cap and trade program, the increase in automobile
fuel efficiency standards, and the new building and appliance
efficiency standards. As far as economic impacts go, your
testimony indicates that although costly, the changes will not
affect average economic growth rates for the 2003 to 2025 time
frame.
It appears from your analysis that fuel economy standards
for transportation are essential for the rest of the cap-and-
trade policy. They drive down demand and offset the cost of
permits for the cap-and-trade system. Would you agree that to
be successful, the carbon emissions from the transportation
sector must be included in any cap-and-trade control policy?
Answer. It is generally true that the least costly approach
to meeting any national greenhouse gas emissions intensity
target is to include as many of the energy consuming sectors as
possible in the cap-and-trade system, including the
transportation sector. For any specific emissions target, the
more expansive the market to which a GHG cap-and-trade policy
applies, the less costly such a policy is to implement.
Transportation fuel consumption produces approximately one
third of all combustion-related carbon dioxide emissions. In
that sense, the transportation market is an important sector to
incorporate in any carbon dioxide emission control strategy.
There are three ways to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the
transportation sector: (a) through a capand-trade system which
adds to the cost of using fossil fuels based on the carbon
dioxide emitted, (b) through the use of standards (i.e.,
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)), or (c) a combination of
standards and a cap-and-trade system.
EIA studies have shown that carbon dioxide permit prices
that are comparable to those under the NCEP cap-and-trade
program would have negligible impacts on transportation fuel
consumption. The result suggests that the transportation sector
is not expected to be a major source of low cost GHG
reductions. The NCEP permit price cap of $8.50 per ton carbon
dioxide translates into an increase of about $0.08 per gallon
in the delivered gasoline price. Carbon dioxide permit prices
would need to rise to much higher levels to significantly
affect consumer choices for light duty vehicles and fuel
consumption. Light duty vehicle purchase patterns have only
recently begun to shift in response to the increase in fuel
prices. It is useful to note that an increase of 1 dollar per
gallon of gasoline corresponds to a carbon dioxide permit fee
of over $110 per ton carbon dioxide or $400 per ton carbon.
Fuel economy standards are a more direct way to limit
petroleum fuel use, a goal that is related to, but distinct
from, the goal of GHG reduction. However, consumer purchase
patterns have shown that at prices under $2 per gallon,
consumers value horsepower, safety and size more than
efficiency. Fuel economy standards that override consumer
preferences could engender a significant welfare cost.
Responses of Howard Gruenspecht to Questions From Senator Feinstein
Question 1. Could you explain the correlation between the
level of emissions and the ``safety valve'' in the National
Commission on Energy Policy's proposal? Specifically, how would
the emissions level change over time at various levels of the
price cap?
Does the price cap of $7 per ton lead to a stopping and
reversal of emissions growth? Did you analyze alternative
safety valve prices?
For example, what happens if we increase the price to $15,
which is the level of the Canadian price cap?
What happens if we increase it to $30, roughly the level
that emissions allowances are trading for in the European Union
this week?
Answer. The greenhouse gas intensity target proposed by the
NCEP implies an annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target
into the future. All energy users bear the cost of holding
emissions permits equal to their greenhouse gas emissions in
each year. Using a cap-andtrade system, a market-clearing
emissions permit price is developed at which the energy market
would take sufficient action to limit emissions to meet the
desired GHG target. Since banking of permits is permitted in
the NCEP proposal, some energy consumers may ``over-comply'' in
earlier periods when cost is relatively low so that they can
use the allowances later or sell them to others with a higher
implicit compliance cost. As it does, the permit price rises
until it reaches the safety valve price. When the permit price
exceeds the safety valve price, some buyers will purchase
permits from the Government at the safety-valve price rather
than undertake costlier actions to reduce emissions. ETA's
analysis projects that the NCEP cap-and-trade proposal would
slow but not stop the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. ETA
projects that a safety valve price of $7 per ton would not stop
or reverse emissions growth in the United States for the 2010
to 2025 period.
EIA analyzed one additional case as a sensitivity to
determine what allowance prices would be necessary to reach the
GHG emissions targets through 2025 as prescribed by the NCEP
report. The allowance price required to reach the NCEP
emissions target, which itself allows for some growth in
emissions even without consideration of the ``safety value''
feature, was about $15 per metric ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent in 2015 and $35 per ton in 2025. The necessary
permit prices to reach the NCEP emissions targets are generally
higher when the cap-and-trade program is implemented without
the other NCEP policies or if reductions in non-energy-related
GHG emissions prove to be more costly than suggested by the
EPA-provided abatement curves used in ETA's study.
Question 2. Under the National Commission on Energy
Policy's proposal, what happens when a covered entity uses the
safety valve rather than lowering emissions? What is done to
ensure that emissions are actually reduced?
Answer. When a covered entity purchases permits from the
Federal Government instead of making changes to its use of
energy, the actual emission levels will exceed the NCEP
targets. Implicitly, the target is being relaxed in order to
avoid the need for higher-cost abatement actions.
Question 3. Under the Commission's proposal, a company
could pay the $7/ton fee instead of reducing the greenhouse
gases. So, in the end, is there really a firm cap on emissions?
Answer. Under the safety valve provision specified in the
NCEP cap-and-trade proposal, there is no absolute cap on
greenhouse gas emissions. However, when the permit price rises
to the safety valve level, fossil fuel users and other GHG
emitters continue to receive a price signal to reduce their
emissions relative to the level of economic activity.
Question 4. What policy options do you recommend to correct
this [safety valve issue] so we can still make environmental
progress?
Answer. Because the Administration does not support the
NCEP proposal, DOE is not in a position to offer policy
recommendations for improving it.
Question 5. Has anyone looked at the cost of inaction--in other
words, what the impact will be to the economy to not curb emissions?
I'm thinking specifically of costs related to:
health care due to dirtier air,
insurance costs due to more intense storms,
government emergency relief services,
the costs of alternative sources of water in the west as the
snow pack decreases,
the costs of protecting homes, businesses and highways from
rising sea levels,
farm payments due to decreased agriculture output,
and what the potential impact all of those increased costs
will have on economic growth.
Answer. Consistent with its statutory mission and expertise, EIA
provides only estimates of the economic and energy sector impacts of
imposing energy-related environmental policies, such as those
considered in the NCEP proposal, an analysis is requested by Congress
or the Administration. Some of the issues raised in your question have
been addressed in the scientific literature and in various assessment
reports.
Appendix II
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
----------
University of Ottawa,
Faculty of Science,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, July 18, 2005.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I respectfully request that the attached
articles be entered into the committee record.* I conduct research on
past climates in the Arctic, and feel the results of my group's work is
of relevance to your hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The enclosed research publication documents our discovery of new
evidence for past warm periods in the Arctic. The material we use is a
newly discovered mineral deposit found in permafrost regions, and which
grew some 10,000 years ago. It is similar to cave deposits that have
been extensively used to reconstruct past temperatures in continental
settings. However, this material is formed by bacterial colonies that
grow under conditions of climatic improvement. It shows that the
average summertime temperature at that time was several degrees warmer
than today.
The relevance of this work, as well as other studies that document
a warm early Holocene climate in the Arctic, is that it emphasizes that
climate change is both natural and dramatic. Further, the fauna and
flora of the Arctic survived these very warm periods, and will
certainly survive the natural climate warming that we have observed
over the past century.
I am fully in favor of decreased emissions in order to improve air
quality and to reduce energy demands. However, Kyoto and any similar
treaty that would target CO2 on the basis of curtailing
global warming is fundamentally flawed. CO2 is a very, very
minor greenhouse gas that has never been shown to have an impact on
climate. Energy and emissions policies to be adopted by the U.S.A and
other countries must be based on factual science. We are not affecting
climate, nor can we control climate. It is driven by solar activity,
and amplified by water vapor. CO2 is a nutrient for plants.
I hope that this may help with your committee's good work,
Sincerely,
Ian Clark,
Professor, Isotope Hydrology and Paleoclimatology.
[Enclosures.]
______
University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, VA July 19, 2005.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Domenici: Along with this letter, I am sending you an
article from the refereed scientific literature entitled ``Revised 21st
Century Temperature Projections,'' authored by myself and three
colleagues at the University of Virginia.*
The article demonstrates that likely temperature changes in this
century are going to be near the low end of projections made by the
United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This
substantially reduces the prospect of disastrous climate change and
increases the time horizon for development of new energy technologies.
The IPCC projections are largely warmer because of unrealistic
assumptions about carbon dioxide increases, and their assumption that
the mathematical form of the large family of climate models, which
represents scientific consensus, is wrong. These models share a common
characteristic: warming, once initiated by human activity, tends to
take place at a constant rate.
I ask that you place this letter and the following article in the
record as material relevant to the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee hearing on July 21, 2005.
Sincerely,
Patrick J. Michaels,
Professor of Environmental Sciences.
[Enclosure.]
______
Oregon State University,
Corvallis, Oregon, July 19, 2005.
Hon. Pete V. Domenici,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Domenici: I would like to submit the two attached
articles for inclusion in the public record for the hearing on Arctic
climate on Thursday, July 21. One article is a review of the recent
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and the second an overview on trends
in Arctic sea ice.
By way of introduction, please allow me to state that I have been
active in meteorology and climatology since 1971 and have been
recognized by the American Meteorological Society as a Certified
Consulting Meteorologist. Since 1989 I have served as State
Climatologist for Oregon, and I was a two-term President of the
American Association of State Climatologists. My qualifications to
comment on climate studies are very strong.
The views expressed in the attached articles are my own and do not
necessarily represent the policy of the State of Oregon nor my
employer, Oregon State University.
Sincerely,
George H. Taylor,
Certfiied Consulting Meteorologist.
[Enclosures.]
______
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment--Does it Represent a Significant
Breakthrough in our Understanding of the Arctic?
Recently the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) report was
released by the Arctic Council. The report documents significant
ecosystem response to surface temperature warming trends that occurred
in some areas since the mid-19th century and in the last thirty years.
Among the conclusions of the report are:
Annual average temperature in the Arctic has increased at
almost twice the rate of the rest of the world.
Winter temperatures in Alaska and western Canada have
increased about 3-4 deg C over the past half century, with
larger increase projected in the next 100 years.
There has been widespread melting of sea ice and glaciers.
The average extent of sea-ice cover has declined by 15-20% over
the past 30 years.
There has been increased precipitation, shorter and warmer
winters, and decreases in snow cover.
The area of the Greenland Ice Sheet that experiences some
melting has increased about 16% since 1979.
These are just a few of dozens of conclusions, some of which
involve effects plant and animal populations, others which describe
consequences to humans (some beneficial, but most detrimental). Because
the ACIA is so lengthy, I have not yet had a chance to thoroughly
examine it. But based on a review of the Executive Summary (26 pages in
length) and Conclusions (29 pages), I have been able to compare the
ACIA statements with the conclusions of scientists studying the Arctic,
from peer-reviewed journal publications. One of these days I'll get
through the much longer Overview Report and perhaps update this
analysis.
Is the ACIA a breakthrough climate assessment? Does it faithfully
capture the essence of climate change in the Arctic? Or is it just
another doom-and-gloom report from the international climate community?
Following is an examination of climate behavior in the Arctic over the
last couple centuries (and earlier).
ARCTIC AIR TEMPERATURES
Naurzbaev, et al. (2002) created a proxy temperature data set
spanning nearly 2,500 years for the Taimyr Peninsula of northern
Russia, all of which is poleward of 70N. The authors studied tree
rings-widths of living and deceased larch trees. They reported that
``the warmest periods over the last two millennia in this region were
clearly in the third, tenth to twelfth and during the twentieth
centuries.'' The first two, they claim, were warmer than those of the
last century. Twentieth century temperatures appeared to peak around
1940.
Chylek, et al. (2004) analyzed Greenland air temperatures over the
last 100 years. At coastal stations, ``summer temperatures, which are
most relevant to Greenland ice sheet melting rates, do not show any
persistent increase during the last fifty years.'' The peak coastal
temperatures occurred in the 1930s, followed by significant cooling,
followed by warming; but current temperatures ``are about 1 C below
their 1940 values.'' In the highest elevations of Greenland's ice
sheet, ``the summer average temperature has decreased at the rate of
2.2 C per decade since the beginning of the measurements in 1987.''
The warm period in the first half of the 20th century, prior to the
big increases in greenhouse gases, saw very rapid warming--even though
CO2, reputed by many to be the most significant driver of
temperature change, rose very little. In fact, during the decade of the
1920s at the coastal stations, ``average annual temperature rose
between 2 and 4 C [and by as much as 6 C in the winter] in less than
ten years.'' The authors conclude that conclude that ``since there was
no significant increase in the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration
during that time, the Greenland warming of the 1920s demonstrates that
a large and rapid temperature increase can occur over Greenland, and
perhaps in other regions of the Arctic, due to internal climate
variability such as the NAMINAO [Northern Annular Mode/North Atlantic
Oscillation], without a significant anthropogenic influence.'' Further,
``the NAO may play a crucial role in determining local Greenland
climate during the 21st century, resulting in a local climate that may
defy the global climate change.'' Contrary to the ACIA statements,
CO2 increases would seem to have little or no effect on
Greenland climate.
The instrumental record demonstrates a consistent trend as well.
Polyakov, et al. (2002, 2003b) studied a large area in the Arctic and
created a history of temperature from 1875. They report that
temperature peaked in the late 1930s, with 1937 the warmest single
year. Since that time, there was a cooling, then a recent warming, but
current temperatures have yet to reach the levels observed 65 years
ago.
I decided to create some temperature plots myself. Using data from
the Global Historical Climate Network (GHCN) data base, I created
graphs displaying annual average temperatures for all stations north of
70N. Figure 1* shows trends from 1970 through 2003, a period with
significant warming--about 1.5 C in 33 years, the equivalent of 4.5 C
per century, which fits right in with the ACIA's projections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Figures 1-4 have been retained in committee files.
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Now take a look at Figure 2, showing the trend from 1934 to 2003.
Significant cooling occurred through about 1964, followed by a leveling
off and then a slow rise, but temperatures remain cooler than they were
in the 1930s.
Finally, in Figure 3 we see the entire period, back to 1880.
Overall, there is about a 2 C warming, but this is because the record
starts with a very cold period and ends on a warm one.
Fitting a linear trend (as shown) to such an oscillatory time
series strikes one as highly inappropriate!
These results are nearly the same as those of Polyakov, et al.
(2002).
Conclusion: while temperatures appear to have warmed in the last 40
years, a longer viewpoint shows much warmer temperatures in the 1930s
and 1940s, apparently even warmer than those today.
SEA ICE IN THE ARCTIC
Grumet et al. (2001) created a record of sea ice conditions in the
Baffin Bay region of the Canadian Arctic going back 1,000 years. They
concluded that the 11th through 14th centuries saw reduced sea ice, but
that ice extent was greater over the next six centuries. The last
century has shown that ``sea-ice conditions in the Baffin Bay/Labrador
Sea region, at least during the last 50 years, are within `Little Ice
Age' variability,'' despite several periods of warmer temperatures. The
authors added an interesting statement, as well, stating that the sea
ice cover history of the Arctic ``can be viewed out of context because
their brevity does not account for interdecadal variability, nor are
the records sufficiently long to clearly establish a climate trend.''
For an area in the Greenland Sea, Comiso et al. (2001), used
satellite images to assess the size and character of the Odden ice
tongue, a 1,300 km long feature, from 1979 to 1998. They were also able
to infer its character back to the early 1920s using temperature
measurements. The authors stated that there has been no statistically
significant change in any of the parameters studied over the past 20
years. However, the proxy record several decades further into the past
reveals that the ice tongue was ``a relatively smaller feature several
decades ago,'' apparently as a result of warmer temperatures.
Omstedt and Chen (2001) identified a proxy record of the annual
maximum coverage of Baltic sea from 1720 through 1997. They stated that
there was a sharp decline in sea ice in about 1877. There was also
greater variability in sea ice extent in the first 150 years of the
record, which was colder, than in the warmer period of the last 100
years.
Jevrejeva (2001) reported on a longer Baltic sea ice data set from
1529 to 1990 for the port of Riga, Latvia. The time series included
four climate eras: (1) 1530-1640, with warming accompanied by earlier
ice break-up (by 9 days/century); (2) 1640-1770, a cooler period with
later ice break-up (5 days/century); (3) 1770-1920, with warming and a
tendency toward earlier ice break-up (15 days/century); and (4) 1920-
1990, a cooling period with later ice breakup (by 12 days/century).
Conclusion: Arctic sea ice has undergone significant changes in the
last 1,000 years, even before the mid-20th century ``greenhouse
enhancement.'' Current conditions appear to be well within historical
variability.
OCEAN CONDITIONS
Polyakov, et al. (2003a) were anxious to assess reports of
``extraordinary change in the Arctic Ocean observed in recent decades''
made by various parties. To investigate these claims, they used
temperature and salinity measurements in made winter in the central
Arctic Ocean near Russia in 1973-79. They also employed 40 years of
summer and winter observations in the Laptev Sea.
The authors concluded that earlier reports of rapid Arctic warming
``considerably underestimates variability.'' Their new analyses ``place
strong constraints on our ability to define long-term means, and hence
the magnitudes of [air and sea temperature] anomalies computed using
synoptic measurements from the 1990s referenced to means from [earlier]
climatologies.''
Conclusion: ocean temperature histories, like those of air
temperature and sea ice, display marked variability. We are in danger
of oversimplifying the historical trends and misrepresenting the future
if we simply assume ``the Arctic Ocean is warming up and will continue
to do so.''
DISCUSSION
Oddly, the ACIA does a very poor job of documenting its sources of
information. For such an ambitious document (it is hundreds of pages
long, with stunning graphics and a very professional appearance) its
science consists primarily of blanket statements without any sort of
reference or citation. Were any of the references listed above
considered by the ACIA team. It appears doubtful.
The ACIA appears to be guilty of selective use of data. Many of the
trends described in the document begin in the 1960s or 1970s--cool
decades in much of the world--and end in the warmer 1990s or early
2000s. So, for example, temperatures have warmed in the last 40 years,
and the implication, ``if present trends continue,'' is that massive
warming will occur in the next century. Yet data are readily available
for the 1930s and early 1940s, when temperatures were comparable to
(and probably higher than) those observed today. It would appear
prudent to use the longest reliable record for assessing trends.
It is also inadvisable to employ the use of linear trends to
represent time series which are cyclical in nature. The character of a
trend line in a data set like the one shown in Figure 3 is largely a
function of the starting and ending points selected.
CONCLUSIONS
Recently National Geographic devoted an issue to ``Global
Warming.'' Reading the ACIA brought back memories of the NG
publication, and brought to mind the overall comment I made upon
reviewing it: slick and beautiful but very one-sided. That pretty much
sums up my feelings about the ACIA, based on what I have seen so far:
nice graphics but bad science.
______
Trends in Arctic Sea Ice
According to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, published in
2004 and 2005, there has been widespread melting of sea ice and
glaciers in the Arctic in recent decades; the average extent of sea-ice
cover has declined by 15-20% over the past 30 years.
According to Environmental News Service (February 1, 2005),
``Global warming will hit the Arctic harder and faster than the rest of
the world and could cause the extinction of polar bears and other
Arctic wildlife within 20 years, conservationists warn. `If we don't
act immediately the Arctic will soon become unrecognizable,' said Tonje
Folkestad, climate change officer with WWF's International Arctic
Program.''
Many scientists, and a large number of journalists, have made
similar claims. Below is an overview of Arctic climate science, based
on reviews of scientific journal publications, which shows a very
different picture.
SEA ICE IN THE SUB-ARCTIC
Grumet et al. (2001) created a record of sea ice conditions in the
Baffin Bay region of the Canadian Arctic going back 1,000 years. They
concluded that the 11th through 14th centuries saw reduced sea ice, but
that ice extent was greater over the next six centuries. The last
century has shown that ``sea-ice conditions in the Baffin Bay/Labrador
Sea region, at least during the last 50 years, are within `Little Ice
Age' variability,'' despite several periods of warmer temperatures. The
authors added an interesting statement, as well, stating that the sea
ice cover history of the Arctic ``can be viewed out of context because
their brevity does not account for interdecadal variability, nor are
the records sufficiently long to clearly establish a climate trend.''
For an area in the Greenland Sea, Comiso et al. (2001), used
satellite images to assess the size and character of the Odden ice
tongue, a 1,300 km long feature, from 1979 to 1998. They were also able
to infer its character back to the early 1920s using temperature
measurements. The authors stated that there has been no statistically
significant change in any of the parameters studied over the past 20
years. However, the proxy record several decades further into the past
reveals that the ice tongue was ``a relatively smaller feature several
decades ago,'' apparently as a result of warmer temperatures.
Omstedt and Chen (2001) identified a proxy record of the annual
maximum coverage of Baltic sea from 1720 through 1997. They stated that
there was a sharp decline in sea ice in about 1877. There was also
greater variability in sea ice extent in the first 150 years of the
record, which was colder, than in the warmer period of the last 100
years.
Jevrejeva (2001) reported on a longer Baltic sea ice data set from
1529 to 1990 for the port of Riga, Latvia. The time series included
four climate eras: (1) 1530-1640, with warming accompanied by earlier
ice break-up (by 9 days/century); (2) 1640-1770, a cooler period with
later ice break-up (5 days/century); (3) 1770-1920, with warming and a
tendency toward earlier ice break-up (15 days/century); and (4) 1920-
1990, a cooling period with later ice breakup (by 12 days/century).
MOVING POLEWARD
Laxon, et al. (2003) were motivated by a ``mismatch between the
observed variability and that predicted by models.'' Unfortunately, the
``sparseness of sea ice thickness observations'' in the Arctic means
that the ``regional and interannual variability of sea ice thickness is
entirely based on models of the Arctic.'' They found high-frequency
interannual variability which runs counter to what the models say. In
conclusion, ``Until models properly reproduce the observed high-
frequency, and thermodynamically driven, variability in sea ice
thickness, simulations of both recent, and future, changes in Arctic
ice cover will be open to question.''
Polyakov, et al. (2002) studied sea ice cover over the Kara,
Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi Seas north of Russia. Sea ice cover
trends were ``smaller than expected'' and ``do not support the
hypothesized polar amplification of global warming.'' In a later
report, Polyakov et al. (2003b) stated that ``long-term ice thickness
and extent trends are small and generally not statistically
significant''; in fact, ``over the entire Siberian marginal-ice zone
the century-long trend is only 0.5% per decade,'' or 5% per century.''
A number of researchers have suggested that inflows of Atlantic
water into the Arctic profoundly affect temperatures and sea ice trends
in the latter ocean. Polyakov, et al. (2004) are among these. The first
sentence of their paper states ``Exchanges between the Arctic and North
Atlantic Ocean have a profound influence on the circulation and
thermodynamics of each basin.'' The authors attributed most of the
variability to multidecadal variations on time scales of 50-80 years,
with warm periods in the 1930s-40s and in recent decades, and cool
periods in the 1960s-70s and early in the 20th century. These are
associated with changes in ice extent and thickness (as well as air and
sea temperature and ocean salinity). The most likely causative factor
involves changes in atmospheric circulation, including but not limited
to the Arctic Oscillation.
It is tempting to employ satellite data to estimate sea ice trends
(see, for example, Parkinson, et al., 1999; and Parkinson, 2000).
Granted, satellites are marvelous tools for such surveys, but their
data sets are limited to only the last several decades. According to
Schmith and Hansen (2003), trend studies of Arctic sea ice conditions
``should be regarded with some care'' since the period of satellite
observations coincided with but one phase of a clear multidecadal
oscillation. Studying observations for the period 1820-2000, the
researchers used ice observations to estimate ice export in waters off
Greenland. One parameter which shows multidecadal variability is the
correlation between ice export and the North Atlantic Oscillation
(NAO); see trends below. In recent decades there has been a strong
correlation between the two, as there was in the 1930s-40s. During the
1960s-70s and from about 1870-1920 there were much lower correlations.
This ``casts doubt on the hypothesis of enhanced greenhouse effect
being the cause'' for recent NAO-sea ice correlations, according to
Schmith and Hansen (2003).*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* All graphs have been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rigor, et al. (2002) suggest that the Arctic Oscillation (AO)
affects surface air temperatures and sea ice thickness over the Arctic
in a profound way. Ice thickness responds primarily to surface winds
changes caused by the AO, whose long-term trends are shown below.
Parkinson (2000) seems to have identified decadal or longer trends
as well. The analysis described in that paper divided the Arctic into
nine regions. In seven of the nine the sign of the trend ``reversed
from the 1979-1990 period to the 1990-1999 period,'' which is another
reason to be cautious when evaluating relatively short data sets.
Holloway and Sou (2002) used data from ``the atmosphere, rivers and
ocean along with dynamics expressed in an ocean-ice-snow model.'' The
authors warn against using any linear trend longer than 50 years due to
multidecadal variability, which included ``increasing volume to the
mid-1960s, decadal variability without significant trend from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s, then a loss of volume from the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s. They also suggest that changes in wind patterns play a large
role in ice thickness changes and that ``Arctic sea ice volume has
decreased more slowly than was hitherto reported.'' In fact, ``the
volume estimated in 2000 is close to the volume estimated in 1950.''
INTERDECADAL VARIABILITY
Again and again we see terms ``decadal,'' interdecadal'' or
``multi-decadal'' in describing Arctic sea ice conditions. You have
seen the similarity of the NAO and AO and can view the long-term
variability. Note that in the NAO and AO charts that 1970 (a starting
point for many of the time series being mentioned) occurred at a time
of minimum NAO and AO value.
Now consider a data set from the WARM part of the world, the
Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Below annual values of the PDO. In
the following chart I have plotted the NAO, AO and PDO together, with
19-year smoothing to show long-term trends. The final chart shows
surface air temperature in the Arctic, from Polyakov, et al. (2002),
showing striking multidecadal variations.
WHAT THIS TELLS US
If we want to understand variability of Arctic sea ice (and, for
that matter, sea and air temperature) we should take our eyes off
greenhouse gases, at least for a moment, and study multidecadal
phenomena. We should also avoid the temptation of taking the last 20-30
years of data, computing a trend, and assuming that that trend will
continue for 50-100 years. History tells us that long-term linear
trends will not occur. In the words of Santayana, ``Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.'' Or make bad forecasts.
__________
Statement of Glenn Kelly, Executive Director, Alliance for Climate
Strategies, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the Alliance for Climate
Strategies (ACS) appreciates the opportunity to submit the following
statement for the record regarding the actions our member industries
are taking to address climate and emissions issues.
alliance for climate strategies description
ACS is a broad-based advocacy coalition of industry sectors created
to:
Exemplify the principle that voluntary actions are an
effective means of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Demonstrate that the ingenuity and technological expertise
of American industry can achieve meaningful reductions in GHG
emissions.
Membership in the Alliance includes the following eight trade
associations:
American Chemistry Council.
American Forest & Paper Association.
American Petroleum Institute.
American Road & Transportation Builders Association.
Edison Electric Institute.
Nuclear Energy Institute.
National Mining Association.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
ACS members believe that a ``do nothing'' option clearly seems
imprudent, especially when common-sense, cost-effective strategies are
available that will support technology development and deployment while
creating jobs and sustaining economic growth. Members of ACS also
believe that the costs and consequences of a mandatory cap-and-trade
program will severely impact every state and congressional district in
the nation by raising household consumer costs and reducing job
opportunities while doing little if anything to address the global
nature of the climate issue.
Our statement will address the following four topics:
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Trends (U.S. and Abroad).
GHG Measuring and Reporting.
Ongoing Voluntary Initiatives and Investment.
Technology Research, Development & Deployment.
There often is a misperception that due to the general opposition
to mandatory GHG emissions reduction caps, industry is doing nothing on
the issue. Nothing could be farther from the truth. U.S. industries, in
fact, have a well established and successful record of voluntary GHG
management initiatives that is strong today and continues to grow.
Government strategies and policies that provide investment stimulus to
develop and deploy existing and new low-carbon and zero-carbon
technologies will help to continue and expand this successful record of
voluntary initiatives.
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS TRENDS (U.S. AND ABROAD)
The Energy Information Administration (ETA) reports that carbon
dioxide (CO2) accounts for approximately 85 percent of U.S.
GHG emissions. The remainder includes the GHGs methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. While all
of these are important, it is easy to see why the focus is on
CO2; on a global warming potential basis it accounts for
almost 85 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions. Because more than 95
percent of the CO2 emissions come from energy, energy
quickly becomes the focus for many people.
Looking at energy-related CO2 emissions in round
numbers, about one-third comes from transportation, a little less than
one-third comes from industry, and a little more than one-third comes
from residential and commercial sectors combined. These sector numbers
include allocated electricity emissions. Roughly three-fourths of
residential and commercial emissions are associated with electricity,
while in the industrial sector, less than 40 percent is associated with
electricity.
Looking at trends over 1990-2003 (see chart* above), U.S. GDP grew
about 3 percent per year, but overall energy-related CO2
emissions grew only 1.1 percent per year. CO2 emissions from
the residential and commercial sectors grew about 2 percent per year,
while transportation grew less than 1.5 percent per year. But the big
message here is that industrial CO2 emissions from energy
actually declined--that is, without mandatory GHG programs, industrial
sector emissions were lower in 2003 than they were in 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* All charts have been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Turning to global trends, a couple of key realities are evident.
First, following a substantial drop in Eastern Europe/Former Soviet
Union emissions with the collapse of the former Soviet Union just after
1990, emissions trends are now clearly upward in those countries.
Second, developing country emissions were about 40 percent below those
of industrialized countries in 1990 but by 2020 are projected to be
more than 10 percent above developed country emissions. Third, driven
largely by efforts by China and India to improve their citizens'
standard of living, between 2000 and 2020 developing country
CO2 emissions are projected to increase by 71 percent, but
developed country emissions increase by only 23 percent. Addressing
global GHG emissions without involving the developing countries is
really an exercise in futility.
Looking more closely at the E.U. major 15 countries, the chart
below illustrates the report of the European Environmental Agency (EEA)
evaluating whether the E.U.-15 countries are on track to meet their
Kyoto Protocol commitments for 2008-2012. In the chart, the green-
colored bars are positive and the red-colored bars are negative. Only
the U.K. and Sweden are ``green,'' and the remainder of this graphic is
``red,'' meaning the EEA concludes that these countries are not on
track to meet their burden-sharing targets.
Clearly, many of the E.U.-15 countries are way above the emission
trends required to meet their targets. Additionally, the E.U. Emissions
Trading System went into operation on January 1, 2005--even though some
of the basic plans were yet to be completed--to say nothing of the
institutions needed to administer the trading system. The message here
is capping and actually reducing GHG emissions is a serious and
difficult challenge in any country. Western Europe is having difficulty
meeting its Kyoto Protocol commitments, and actions that have been too
difficult to adopt thus far may well be required. And circumstances in
the U.S. are far different from those in Europe. EIA projects West
European population growth to amount to less than 10 million over 2000-
2020. Contrast that with the U.S.--where population is projected to
increase by about 60 million people by 2020--and one can quickly see
the challenges that lie before us.
Based on data from ETA's International Energy Outlook 2004, the
U.S. is making strong progress on reducing the carbon intensity of
economic activity. Intensity reductions in Germany and the U.K. exceed
those in the U.S., but Germany benefited from shutting down highly
inefficient East German factories with reunification, and the U.K. had
massive reductions in coal use by switching to natural gas. But U.S.
reductions in the ratio of carbon (from energy) to GDP exceed those of
the other Western European countries as well as Japan and Canada--all
of whom have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. (See chart below.)
While the Europeans are struggling with their Kyoto Protocol
requirements, some in the U.S. advocate GHG emissions caps. Proposals
from Senators McCain and Lieberman and from Senator Bingaman are two
such examples. One issue often overlooked is the sheer size of some of
these cap and trade proposals.
Some invoke the success of the sulfur dioxide (SO2 or
acid rain) program as an argument for using GHG emission allowances.
However, there are huge differences between the SO2 program
and the programs envisioned under current cap and trade proposals.
First, there are commercially available end-of-the-stack control
technologies for SO2, but not for CO2--at least
until carbon capture and geologic storage becomes cost effective.
Second, the SO2 program covers only a single industry, while
GHG cap and trade proposals would impact the entire U.S. economy.
Third, the SO2 program has about 9 million tons of
allowances, while the McCain-Lieberman bill, as one example, has almost
6 billion tons of allowances, plus a complicated and uncertain number
of ``offsets.'' Fourth, the acid rain program had a market value of
allowances of about $1.5 billion in 2003. But in 2010, ``issued
allowances'' under the McCain-Lieberman bill would have a market value
of $80-$115 billion, according to the EIA. By 2025, such a program
would have a market value of $245-$278 billion. The magnitude of a
McCain-Lieberman proposal is not often appreciated. A comparison of the
acid rain program is noted in the following chart:
That is a quick overview of global GHG emission trends, what
industry has accomplished over the past decade, and the real-world
difficulties posed by mandatory programs. We would like to turn now to
a discussion of voluntary reporting and measurement.
GHG MEASURING AND REPORTING
We would like to make it clear that U.S. industry is taking
significant steps to measure and report emissions voluntarily, and we
would like to highlight to the Committee some of the activities that
ACS members are undertaking as participants in the Climate VISION
program of the Department of Energy (DOE) (see below).
The first step in addressing emissions is learning to measure
emissions accurately. Industrial processes are highly varied--ranging
from complex systems to single units--and they use different types of
fuels in different ways. Converting fuel usage to emissions requires
careful collection and organization of data and selection of correct
conversion factors. Industry is aggressively working to address these
issues.
The first step in calculating emissions is adoption of a protocol.
This is a plan or general outline of what type of data will be
collected and how it will be combined. The second step--and probably
the most important--requires developing methods that are specific to
each industry. This involves identifying operations, establishing
accounting boundaries, collecting data, and finding emissions factors.
For diverse industries with varying operations, each of these steps is
critical and must be carefully tested to assure that the method is
accurate and that data collection is feasible. Once the method is
established, spreadsheets can be created to facilitate the actual
calculation.
We call the Committee's attention to an example from the oil and
gas industry that shows how critical the methodology is in calculating
emissions (see chart below).
This chart shows the variation that can occur in estimating
emissions. Looking from left to right across the graph, API compared
the methane emissions from an on-shore oil production facility using
its Compendium and methods developed by Latin American Oil and Gas
Industry (ARPEL), the Environmental Protection Agency (EIIP), the
European exploration and production industry (E&P Forum), the Canadian
industry (CAAP), and the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC).
The results show that the various methods produced estimates of
methane emissions that vary by more than fivefold. This clearly shows
the variability in calculating emissions, especially emissions from
non-combustion sources (the solid area on the bar chart). API is
working to get its Compendium adopted as a single, comprehensive and
consistent method for estimating GHG emissions from oil and gas
facilities worldwide.
The forest products industry represents a different operating
situation. At pulp and paper mills more than 90 percent of emissions
come from stationary combustion of fossil fuels; thus, the emission
factors proposed by the IPCC were a good starting point. In early 2001,
the pulp and paper industry, working with its international
counterparts, began a project to develop a global methodology for
estimating GHG emissions. The resulting industry-specific calculation
tools were based on protocols developed by World Resource Institute
(WRI) and World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and
were subsequently peer reviewed and adopted as the WRI/WBCSD pulp and
paper mill module. The complete tools include a step-by-step
description of the process and a spreadsheet to make the calculation
process easy. The forest products industry also developed a similar
tool for wood products facilities. This tool is also undergoing the
WRI/WBCSD review process. Other industries--cement, aluminum, iron and
steel, and mining--are creating similar modules based on the WRI/WBCSD
protocol.
Finally, utilities currently report virtually all of their GHG
emissions to the EPA under the Clean Air Act. Utilities that purchase
fuel to generate electricity use a fairly consistent process. Thus,
``continuous emissions monitors'' applied to the stacks and estimated
fuel-use data can be used to calculate CO2 emissions. Using
this approach, it is estimated that utilities are reporting 99.9
percent or more of their emissions to EPA. This information is
published annually at the sector level by the EPA.
Starting in 1994, the power sector was one of the first to begin
reporting of voluntary efforts under the Energy Policy Act of 1992
section 1605(b) program to the EIA. In 2003, the sector had reported
about 261 million tons of CO2-equivalent emission reductions
from direct emission reductions, avoided emissions and sequestration.
The level of reported reductions by utilities has increased almost
every year since the program began. Power sector members plan to
continue reporting their GHG emission reduction activities under the
1605(b) program. Other industries will be reporting emission reductions
as part of their Climate VISION commitment.
ONGOING VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES & INVESTMENT
We would also like to highlight the voluntary programs and
initiatives that member associations of ACS are undertaking as part of
the Climate VISION program.
In 2002, President Bush challenged the nation to reduce its GHG
emissions intensity 18 percent by 2012 through voluntary actions. As
part of the President's strategy, he created the Climate VISION
(Voluntary Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now) program,
housed at DOE. Under the program, industries--working with various
federal agencies--commit to voluntarily reduce their GHG emission
intensities. To date, 14 industry associations, representing more than
90 percent of U.S. industrial GHG emissions, have announced voluntary
pledges and programs.
One of the most important tools for achieving the intensity
reduction goal will be company activities. Some of these activities
will occur through individual company initiatives, such as those under
the EPA Climate Leaders program, and others through industry-wide
initiatives, such as PowerTree Carbon Company. PowerTree Carbon Company
is an initiative sponsored by 25 U.S. power companies--including
investor-owned utilities and cooperatives--to plant trees in critical
habitats in the Lower Mississippi River Valley to manage
CO2.
Yet another element of company activities will be the use of
numeric goals to drive internal actions. The Climate Leaders website
contains a partial listing of such actions.
Late last year, the power sector signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with DOE to achieve the equivalent of a 3-5 percent
reduction in its carbon intensity by 2012. Actions under a work plan
will include achieving credible, verifiable reductions in carbon
intensity or offsets of GHGs through a range of individual company
actions, industry-wide initiatives and cross-sector efforts. EEI
members, for example, will work with their counterparts in the other
power sector trade associations to help achieve this voluntary numeric
goal.
In addition, NRECA and the Department of Agriculture earlier signed
an MOU to identify and advance technologies that will help achieve the
national goal. Initially NRECA is working with its members and the
Agriculture Department to eliminate technical and market barriers to
the use of low-emission renewable energy, such as agricultural waste-
to-electricity, through the use of systems approaches and the
development of decision-support tools.
Other ACS members have similar agreements, such as:
American Forest & Paper Association
AF&PA members plan to reduce their emissions intensity by 12
percent by 2012 through:
Developing new, energy-efficient technologies that use
renewables and biomass energy and that, if fully
commercialized, could make the forest products industry energy-
self sufficient.
Increasing paper recovery for recycling, which avoids GHG
emissions by keeping paper out of landfills.
Enhancing carbon storage in forests, which remove
CO2 from the atmosphere and store it for long
periods of time.
Enhancing carbon storage in wood and paper products, which
continue the process of withholding carbon from the atmosphere.
American Petroleum Institute
100 percent participation in Natural Gas Star and combined
heat and power programs.
10 percent improvement in aggregate refinery energy
efficiency over 2002-2012.
Develop GHG management plans.
National Mining Association
Reductions through research under DOE-NMA Industry of the
Future program.
Calculate industry efforts to sequester carbon on reclaimed
mine lands.
Develop voluntary reporting methodology.
Additional reductions from coal mine methane recovery where
feasible.
Industry has responded to the Climate VISION challenge. ACS members
are taking actions that will result in real and substantial GHG
reductions now, not in the future--and without the need for mandatory
actions. Furthermore, industry is taking significant steps to measure
and report emissions voluntarily, and we wanted to take this
opportunity to tell you about some of the things that we, as members of
Climate VISION, are doing.
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT & DEPLOYMENT
All energy resources along with efficiency and conservation will be
needed to meet our nation's growing demand for energy and electricity.
It is important that we develop and put into commercial operation
technologies that will allow us to use these resources with as low an
emissions profile as possible.
One way that will allow our economy to grow with lower emissions is
to continue to develop ways to use energy more efficiently. In the last
20 years, we have reduced the amount of energy we need for each dollar
of GDP by 40 percent. This trend will continue on a nationwide basis,
but to be more specific:
Many of the industries that are associated with ACS are working
with DOE in a program called Industries of the Future, in which they
are jointly funding research to make their operations more efficient.
These projects are short term--they will have an impact in the next few
years.
Cogeneration--a process where the waste heat that is produced when
making electricity is captured and used--is a relatively new example of
efficiency in action. And that is just the tip of the iceberg. It is
only good business to produce more with less energy, and all industry
is working toward that goal.
Some technologies, such as nuclear power and renewable
technologies, have no carbon emissions, and it is important that public
policies support, not constrain, their increased use.
Wind, solar and biomass are the most promising of the renewable
technologies, and technological advancements are lowering the cost of
these every year. The amount of electricity generated from wind power,
although still small, has doubled since 2000. The use of solar and
biomass is also increasing.
Now just a few words about nuclear power--our largest source of
non-carbon-emitting electricity generation. The U.S. has 103 operating
nuclear plants producing close to 20 percent of our electricity. In the
absence of nuclear power, U.S. electric sector carbon emissions would
be almost 30 percent higher, according to calculations by the Nuclear
Energy Institute (based on data from EIA). Given the volume of carbon
emissions prevented by nuclear power plants, it is clear that the U.S.
cannot have a plausible long-term climate program without a growing
contribution from nuclear power.
The electric power industry is moving forward with a program that
will lead to construction of new nuclear plants in the U.S., and there
is significant progress on that score. The licensing process has been
overhauled, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is reviewing several
new standardized designs. Three companies have submitted applications
for early site permits, and two consortia are preparing applications
for construction and operating licenses. And the Tennessee Valley
Authority is leading a third consortium, evaluating the feasibility of
building new nuclear plants at its Bellefonte site in Alabama. If all
goes well, the nuclear industry will have units under construction by
2010 with significant numbers of new nuclear plants built during the
next decade.
But, as mentioned previously, we need all forms of energy to meet
future demands, and this means that we will continue to use all fossil
fuels--coal, oil and natural gas--well into the future. Although we are
working to minimize emissions from fossil fuel use, we also have to
look at ways to capture and permanently store--or sequester--
CO2 emissions. In some instances, this can be done directly
as the energy is used. In other cases, where CO2 cannot be
directly captured, we have to look at ways to offset emissions, for
example, through the capture of CO2 from the air and then
storage of this CO2 in forests, plants or grasses. This is
terrestrial sequestration; in the short term, this is probably the best
way to capture and store CO2. Many of our companies have
terrestrial sequestration programs that are on the ground and working
now. The forest products industry is working to increase research on
forest sequestration and has established the Forest Carbon Consortium
to promote research on the potential of managed forests to store carbon
and produce energy.
Storage of carbon in plant life is not the only way to go. Carbon
can be stored in geologic formations on land and in the ocean. A number
of companies in the industries represented by ACS members are part of
the joint industry-government Regional Carbon Sequestration
Partnerships that were started about two years ago with the goal of
determining the most suitable technologies, regulations and
infrastructure for carbon capture, storage and sequestration in each
region of the country.
Internationally, our government formed the Carbon Sequestration
Leadership Forum, which brings governments and industry from all over
the world to share information and conduct joint research in order to
find ways to sequester carbon more efficiently and cost effectively.
ACS members are involved in this initiative.
Finally, DOE has initiated a joint government-industry research
program to find safe ways to store carbon in geologic repositories. The
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)--a research arm of the
electric utility industry--has a pilot-scale test center for
CO2 capture and containment. EPRI has developed site-
selection criteria for CO2 sequestration, and is in the
process of selecting a site to test long-term underground
CO2 storage.
We are also working on projects that will result in lower emissions
when we use fossil fuels--in particular, coal and petroleum products.
These projects are both short and long term. The Clean Coal Technology
Industry-DOE partnership is well established--it started in 1986 to
address SO2 and nitrogen oxide issues. Over time, the
program has evolved, and technologies, such as integrated gasification
combined cycle (IGCC), have been developed to use our vast coal
resource more cleanly--with lower emissions and more efficiency. This
means lower CO2 emissions for each unit of electricity
produced. Many of these are new or very near-term technologies. These
are important, as coal provides more than 50 percent of the electricity
used in our country now and is expected to maintain this share in the
future.
Industry is also working on research that will have benefits in the
long term. For example, a number of coal and utility companies are
involved with DOE in a project called FutureGen, which is an initiative
to build the world's first zero-emissions coal-fired power plant. This
will be a commercial scale IGCC plant that produces electricity and
hydrogen. The CO2 will be captured and sequestered. This is
an important part of the Administration's effort to move our economy--
over the long term--to a hydrogen-based economy. Hydrogen will be made
from many fuels, including coal and natural gas.
There are a number of transportation initiatives that will result
in reduced emissions over time. In the short term, the CO2
diesel project that is just beginning will test the capability of using
biofuels in large-scale mining operations in Nevada and Indiana.
Utilities are working with DOE to develop and test a commercial hybrid
work truck that will mean lower CO2 emissions, and the
automobile industry is an active participant in the Freedom Car
project.
These examples are illustrative of the many research projects that
are ongoing to develop technologies that will result in lower emissions
in both the short and long term.
CONCLUSIONS
The often-stated claim that the U.S. industrial sector is not
responsive to concerns about GHG emissions and climate change is
unfounded. Indeed, the U.S. industrial sector, largely represented by
ACS, is working to address emissions concerns through a variety of
means--voluntary initiatives, government partnerships, and technology
research, development and deployment. ACS members are proud of the
achievements to date that are outlined above and look forward to more
positive progress. No other sector of the U.S. economy can claim this
level of progress.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to submit this statement. ACS and member companies stand
ready to assist your efforts to address this important policy issue.
__________
Statement of the Georgia Institute of Technology
hurricanes are getting stronger, study says
Atlanta (September 15, 2005)--The number of Category 4 and 5
hurricanes worldwide has nearly doubled over the past 35 years, even
though the total number of hurricanes has dropped since the 1990s,
according to a study by researchers at the Georgia Institute of
Technology and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). The
shift occurred as global sea surface temperatures have increased over
the same period. The research will appear in the September 16 issue of
the journal Science, published by the AAAS, the science society, the
world's largest general scientific organization.
Peter Webster, professor at Georgia Tech's School of Earth and
Atmospheric Sciences, along with NCAR's Greg Holland and Tech's Judith
Curry and Hai-Ru Chang, studied the number, duration and intensity of
hurricanes (also known as typhoons or tropical cyclones) that have
occurred worldwide from 1970 to 2004. The study was supported by the
National Science Foundation (NSF).
``What we found was rather astonishing,'' said Webster. ``In the
1970's, there was an average of about 10 Category 4 and 5 hurricanes
per year globally. Since 1990, the number of Category 4 and 5
hurricanes has almost doubled, averaging 18 per year globally.''
Category 4 hurricanes have sustained winds from 131 to 155 miles
per hour; Category 5 systems, such as Hurricane Katrina at its peak
over the Gulf of Mexico, feature winds of 156 mph or more.
``This long period of sustained intensity change provides an
excellent basis for further work to understand and predict the
potential responses of tropical cyclones to changing environmental
conditions'', said NCAR's Holland.
``Category 4 and 5 storms are also making up a larger share of the
total number of hurricanes,'' said Curry, chair of the School of Earth
and Atmospheric Sciences at Georgia Tech and co-author of the study.
``Category 4 and 5 hurricanes made up about 20 percent of all
hurricanes in the 1970's, but over the last decade they account for
about 35 percent of these storms.''
The largest increases in the number of intense hurricanes occurred
in the North Pacific, Southwest Pacific and the North and South Indian
Oceans, with slightly smaller increases in the North Atlantic Ocean.
All this is happening as sea-surface temperatures are rising across
the globe-anywhere from around one-half to one degree Fahrenheit,
depending on the region, for hurricane seasons since the 1970's.
Research suggests that rising sea surface temperatures could mean
more storms of the same intensity of Hurricane Katrina.
``Our work is consistent with the concept that there is a
relationship between increasing sea surface temperature and hurricane
intensity,'' said Webster. ``However, it's not a simple relationship.
In fact, it's difficult to explain why the total number of hurricanes
and their longevity has decreased during the last decade, when sea
surface temperatures have risen the most.''
``NCAR is now embarking on a focused series of computer experiments
capable of resolving thunderstorms and the details of tropical
cyclones,'' said Holland. ``The results will help explain the observed
intensity changes and extend them to realistic climate change
scenarios.''
The only region that is experiencing more hurricanes overall is the
North Atlantic, where they have become more numerous and longer-
lasting, especially since 1995. The North Atlantic has averaged eight
to nine hurricanes per year in the last decade, compared to the six to
seven per year before the increase. Category 4 and 5 hurricanes in the
North Atlantic have increased at an even faster clip: from 16 in the
period of 1975-89 to 25 in the period of 1990-2004, a rise of 56
percent.
A study published in July in the journal Nature came to a similar
conclusion. Focusing on North Atlantic and North Pacific hurricanes,
Kerry Emanuel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) found an increase
in their duration and power, although it used a different measurement
to determine a storm's power.
But whether all of this is due to human-induced global warming is
still uncertain, said Webster. ``We need a longer data record of
hurricane statistics, and we need to understand more about the role
hurricanes play in regulating the heat balance and circulation in the
atmosphere and oceans.''
``Basic physical reasoning and climate model simulations and
projections motivated this study,'' said Jay Fein, director of NSF's
climate and large scale dynamics program, which funded the research.
``These results will stimulate further research into the complex
natural and anthropogenic processes influencing these tropical cyclone
trends and characteristics.''
Webster is currently attempting to determine the basic role of
hurricanes in the climate of the planet. ``The thing they do more than
anything is cool the oceans by evaporating the water and then
redistributing the oceans' tropical heat to higher latitudes,'' he
said.
``But we don't know a lot about how evaporation from the oceans'
surface works when the winds get up to around 100 miles per hour, as
they do in hurricanes,'' said Webster, who adds that this physical
understanding will be crucial to connecting trends in hurricane
intensity to overall climate change.
``If we can understand why the world sees about 85 named storms a
year and not, for example, 200 or 25, then we might be able to say that
what we're seeing is consistent with what we'd expect in a global
warming scenario. Without this understanding, a forecast of the number
and intensity of tropical storms in a future warmer world would be
merely statistical extrapolation.''