[Senate Hearing 109-153]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-153
TSUNAMI RESPONSE: LESSONS LEARNED
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Allen, BG John, U.S. Marine Corps................................ 59
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware........... 15
Frist, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Tenessee..................... 18
Larson, Hon. Alan, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC...... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Lugar...................................................... 123
Lindborg, Nancy, president, Mercy Corps, Washington, DC.......... 96
Prepared statement........................................... 99
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Committee tsunami trip reports:
Blank, Jonah, professional staff member.................. 2
Rubin, Nilmini, professional staff member................ 7
McClymont, Mary, president and CEO, Interaction, Washington, DC.. 81
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Natsios, Hon. Andrew S., Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 35
Slides presented............................................. 40
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Lugar...................................................... 128
Toole, Daniel, Director, Office of Emergency Programs, UNICEF,
New York, NY................................................... 88
Prepared statement........................................... 91
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 29
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Lugar...................................................... 123
Additional Prepared Statements and Other Material Submitted for the
Record
Human Rights First, prepared statement........................... 108
Indian Ocean--Earthquake and Tsunamis............................ 129
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Briefing to Staff
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee...................... 117
Siddharth, Veena, Washington director, Human Rights Watch/Asia,
prepared statement............................................. 116
Yuan, Nancy, vice president, director, the Asia Foundation,
Washington, DC, prepared statement............................. 120
(iii)
TSUNAMI RESPONSE: LESSONS LEARNED
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 9:32 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the
committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Coleman, Murkowski, Biden,
Sarbanes, Feingold, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today the committee meets to discuss our Nation's response
to the tsunami that struck on December 26, 2004, causing death
and destruction in at least 12 countries. The tsunami created a
humanitarian tragedy of incredible proportions. According to
the U.S. Agency for International Development, more than
160,000 people are confirmed dead; 140,000 people are still
missing; and countless people were injured. More than 1 million
people remain homeless.
Beyond the comprehensive casualty figures, the tsunami has
left deep scars on the societies of the Indian Ocean region.
For example, the Government of Indonesia estimates that 700 to
1,100 of its schools were destroyed and that 1,750 primary
school teachers are dead or missing. Nearly 180,000 students
have no schools to attend.
The United Nations International Labor Office estimates
that the tsunami wiped out jobs for 600,000 people in Indonesia
alone, and more than 400,000 in Sri Lanka. An additional
100,000 are thought to be out of work in Thailand. Many of the
people who lost their jobs were fishermen, farmers,
shopkeepers, or workers in the tourism industry. The tsunami
destroyed fishing boats and nets, and wiped out acres of
farmland, leaving behind high concentrations of sea salt that
must be washed out before crops can grow again.
Statistics, however, cannot quantify the psychological
impact of the disaster. They cannot convey the grief of the
fisherman who has lost his family and his livelihood. They
cannot explain the defeat of an elderly woman who has lost
everything she has worked her whole life to earn. They cannot
capture the fear and disorientation of children who experienced
this disaster.
On behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate,
I want to express our deepest sympathy to the victims of this
tragedy. While financial and in-kind assistance cannot
compensate for the huge loss of life that countries in the
region have suffered, the contributions of the United States
and many other nations can help stabilize the region and assist
survivors in rebuilding their lives. As the world leader in
international disaster assistance, the United States is working
closely with the international community to implement the most
effective response possible in the coming months. In addition,
American citizens, businesses, and organizations have donated
an estimated $700 million directly to international relief
efforts.
Beyond the compelling humanitarian reasons for swift
action, a stable and prosperous Asia is essential to the global
effort on a range of shared challenges, including weapons
proliferation, terrorism, narcotics, and contagious diseases.
The economic and political consequences of this natural
disaster could be even more severe unless we commit ourselves
to advancing a strong recovery in the region.
President Bush has requested $950 million in tsunami
disaster relief. I am confident that Congress will come to an
agreement on this aid package. We also must ensure that the
United States contribution to tsunami relief does not come at
the expense of our other international commitments, including
those related to poverty-stricken Africa.
The Foreign Relations Committee has been working with the
executive branch to develop legislative initiatives that will
assist in the tsunami recovery. Committee staff members have
traveled to Indonesia and Sri Lanka to observe the United
States and international relief response firsthand. Their
reports will be included in this hearing record.
[The committee travel reports follow:]
Tsunami Trip Report Submitted by Jonah Blank, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Professional Staff Member
The following is a brief summary of activities during my recent
StaffDel to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. More detailed findings
have been presented to the ranking member, and staff members of both
minority and majority sides.
SUMMARY OF TRIP
From August 2-16, 2005, I conducted a fact-finding trip to
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. The primary focus was post-tsunami
reconstruction efforts, with secondary focus on political issues
including Aceh peace accords (Indonesia) and counterterrorism (all
three countries). During a brief stopover in London (August 16), I
consulted with British Foreign Office officials on counterterrorism
issues, particularly focused on alleged linkages between the July 7
Underground bombings and the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba.
KEY FINDINGS
INDONESIA
Tsunami reconstruction: In meetings in Medan (base for much of the
post-tsunami reconstruction effort for Aceh, as well as nearly all
reconstruction effort in Nias), local NGO workers, government
officials, journalists, and civil society representatives made broadly
congruent points:
The U.S. naval assets and other military personnel deployed
to the region had a tremendously positive impact on local
sentiment regarding America. U.S. military personnel were
described as very efficient, very effective, and excellent
good-will ambassadors. The efforts of the U.S. military had a
ripple effect, in that they prompted the Indonesian military
(TNI) to become more effective in order to avoid being shamed
by comparison. Moreover, the human touch brought by U.S.
military personnel helped put a new face on the image of
America generally presented to the Indonesian public by news
from Iraq and elsewhere: Pictures of servicemen and
servicewomen playing with children, helping rescue elderly
people, digging wells, etc., provided better public diplomacy
than any effort currently underway.
In general, however, reconstruction efforts are not
proceeding quickly enough to satisfy the hundreds of thousands
of displaced citizens. Acehnese interlocutors said that as of
August, only 10 percent of the post-tsunami promises regarding
reconstruction projects had been kept; they warned that a
failure to meet the expectations of the populace could cause
the agreement between the government and GAM (the Acehnese
rebel group), signed August 15, to fall apart. Journalists
agreed that popular dissatisfaction with the pace of
reconstruction was growing. There was also concern about
possible relocation of fishing communities to inland sites,
where they would be forced to live on handouts rather than
being able to earn a living. According to several
interlocutors, the Multidonor Trust Fund (MDTF) had significant
amounts of money available for projects, but access was delayed
by Ministry of Finance redtape, and by poor coordination
between the various ministries, donor countries, and NGOs. The
BRR (government coordinating branch) is well-intentioned, but
hasn't yet done sufficient coordination. More local government
input and local autonomy was advocated.
Religious issues were raised regarding certain foreign NGOs,
with some Christian groups accused of proselytization or
attempts to place Muslim orphans with Christian families
abroad. Some 300 orphans were reportedly flown to a Christian-
run orphanage in Jakarta during the early days of the crisis,
leading to a new federal instruction that all orphans be given
to the charge only of Muslim groups. The hardline Islamist
Islamic Defenders Front (FDI) was working in Aceh and Medan
with the Islamist political party PKS, but extremist groups
like Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujaheddin are said to failed in
their efforts to establish a foothold in Aceh. Despite concerns
about the motives of certain Christian NGOs, foreign NGOs in
general were seen in a more favorable light than local groups.
``Local NGOs want to enrich themselves,'' said one
interlocutor. Among the foreign NGOs and other organizations
cited as being most widely appreciated were IOM, the United
Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, Oxfam, Mercy Corps, and
Save the Children.
Site visits in and around Banda Aceh
Over the course of 3 days (Friday, August 5-Sunday, August 7) I
visited various sites within the city of Banda Aceh, and at several
villages in the vicinity. The purpose was to see a representative
sample of the devestation wreaked by the tsunami, and the
reconstruction efforts underway. My hosts were the personnel of the
USAID mission, accompanied by implementing partners from the NGO
subcontractors.
Village of Gurah: This prosperous seaside community was
almost entirely obliterated by the first wave. The cupola of a
mosque was carried approximately 2 kilometers inland by the
water, and deposited (intact) in the middle of a rice paddy.
The village had about 650 inhabitants before the tsunami, of
whom only 155 survived. The economy of the village was based on
rice farming and fishing.
Bazaar around Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh: This site, the
economic and religious center of Aceh's capital, had been a
scene of devastation broadcast around the world in December and
January. Now, the sight was far more benign. The mosque itself
sustained little major damage, with the most enduring damage
limited to a freestanding minaret. The debris that had
blanketed the mosque grounds and all surrounding streets after
the tsunami has been largely cleared away. The bazaar, located
very close to the masjid, has been moved from a two-storey
building into a set of stalls directly abutting the mosque. The
site of the old bazaar remains ruined: The lower level is still
full of waterlogged debris, while the upper level is filled
with incinerated waste (trash on the upper level dried out and
could be incinerated, but there was no easy way of disposing of
the waste at ground-level). Throughout the city of Banda Aceh,
much of the worst-afflicted buildings have been destroyed or
rebuilt. Many, however, remain unrepaired: Often this is due to
legal challenges regarding ownership (owners deceased, or
documents establishing ownership destroyed and courts unable to
render quick judgements among various claimants).
Village of UI Lee Lee: More than 7 months after the tsunami,
this (like many villages) remains virtually a wasteland.
According to USAID staff, 85 percent of population here were
killed, and 80 percent of houses destroyed.
Village of Lapunk: According to USAID staff, this village
suffered devestation similar to that of UI Lee Lee. About 80
percent of the houses were destroyed, and about 855 inhabitants
were killed. The local mosque was left standing--giving rise to
varying interpretations (either supernatural causes, or
superior building materials).
Meetings in Jakarta
My meetings with Indonesian legislators focused on a recently
passed House bill, requesting a State Department report on legality of
Indonesian control of West Papua. This issue caused considerable
concern among Indonesian parliamentarians of all political parties. My
discussions and statements backed up the message being put forward by
the U.S. Embassy and other administration officials.
I also had meetings with U.S. Government personnel on a variety of
topics. Appropriately cleared staff are encouraged to seek a detailed
debrief.
SRI LANKA
Tsunami reconstruction site visits
On a 2-day trip outside the capital, I visited sites in the region
around Galle, Mathura, and Dondra. USAID and NGO staff emphasized that
these southern sites had not been as badly affected as sites in the
north and northeast, which suffered from the direct tsunami wave rather
than the washback.
CHF transitional housing site. Houses here have concrete
foundation and wall-base, with metal frame and plywood walls
covered by USAID plastic sheeting, topped by an aluminum roof.
Houses are laid out at angles, rather than like rows of
barracks or trailer parks: This provides more privacy (not
staring right into neighbor's house), and also avoids the
stigma of resembling barracks set up for plantation workers
during colonial times. This last point is of great cultural
significance, since the local Sinhalese population maintains
significant cultural taboos regarding association with the
Tamil plantation workers. In the days immediately after the
tsunami, a local political party (the JVP) set up barracks-type
housing, and it was shunned as soon as the inhabitants were
able to find alternate places to camp.
Transitional housing built by Irish NGO GOAL. Here the
structures were similar to those of CHF, but with wooden frame
substituted for metal ones, and sited in rows rather than at
angles. Locations were sometimes problematic: One camp was
located so far from the ocean that the residents (members of a
fishing community) would have to take a bus to reach their
fishing boats every morning.
Saw, but did not visit, transitional housing built by
WorldVision (between Colombo and Galle). According to local
interlocutors, these structures were not well designed: The
combination of small size and corrugated tin walls made them
into ``convection ovens.'' Moreover, WorldVision's evangelical
outlook (and policy of mandating staff attendance at daily
prayer meetings) was cited as an irritant with the local
(predominantly Buddhist) population. Catholic Relief Service,
by contrast, was described as a good model of a religiously
affiliated organization that managed to keep its doctrinal
identity strictly segregated from its humanitarian mission.
In discussions with NGO workers at these sites, several common
threads of comment emerged:
Where to put the displaced people? Land is scarce, and
almost all of it is already occupied by other families. Fishing
communities can't be relocated inland.
Government-mandated setbacks are problematic. On the
southern coasts, no new construction is permitted within 100
meters of the high-water mark. In the north and northeast, the
setback is 200 meters. These restrictions puts an enormous
amount of scarce land off limits. It also raises equity issues,
and the suspicion that the government is favoring Sinhalese
(who predominate the southern areas) over Tamils and Muslims
(who predominate in the north and northeastern areas). There is
also suspicion that the setback ordinance is a ploy, in order
to clear fishing communities from prime seafront land in order
to clear the way for development of tourist resorts.
Equity issues with other poor people. IDPs from the long-
running civil war have been displaced for years, even decades--
yet they get leapfrogged by tsunami IDPs. And ordinary poor
people, who are often equally destitute, get nothing at all
from the new aid influx.
Unneeded material aid is a burden. Well-meaning, but
unprofessional, donors have sent vast amounts of material to
Sri Lanka--everything from tinned food to children's toys to
clothing. Much of this material is culturally or climatically
inappropriate (even ski parkas have been received by this
tropical nation). Uncoordinated donations of goods and services
by a raft of miscellaneous groups often does more harm than
good: The professional NGOs not only must spend significant
time sorting out the useful from the useless donations, but it
finds the planning and carrying out of reconstruction projects
impeded by ad-hoc efforts of amateurs. When an amateur group
slaps up a dangerously substandard housing or well project (for
example), this causes popular resentment against professionals
who must work more slowly, and who may have to tear down a
poorly built structure in order to rebuild it correctly.
Meeting in Colombo with Foreign Minister Lakhsman
Kadirgamar
On Thursday, August 11, I met (together with Charge d'Affaires
James Entwhistle) with Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakhsman Kadirgamar.
We had a productive discussion on a variety of topics, including
tsunami reconstruction, government-LTTE ceasefire, and other political
issues. When I asked the Foreign Minister what he considered the most
important message he would like me to take back to Washington, he cited
the importance of keeping the LTTE on the FTO list, and of pressuring
our European, Asian, and Canadian allies to join in cutting off foreign
sources of LTTE support. He noted that his own residence had been
aggressively surveilled by LTTE cadres, apparently bent on
assassination.
On Friday, August 12, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was shot and
killed while swimming at his personal residence. The sniper (according
to public accounts) had carried out the operation with great
professionalism, staking out the residence for a long period from a
neighboring building, and targeting the Foreign Minister with a barrage
of 7.62mm bullets fired from an automatic rifle equipped with a custom-
built tripod, a silencer, and a night-vision scope. Sri Lankan and
international observers have attributed the action to the LTTE.
MALDIVES
Program in the Maldives centered around two issues: Tsunami
reconstruction, and the threat of Islamist extremism.
Tsunami reconstruction
Site visit to tsunami-hit island, Kaf Guraidhoo. At the
height of the tsunami, approximately 80 percent of the nation
of the Maldives was submerged. Some islands were hit worse than
others, and many of the worst-affected are located too far from
the international airport on Male to be reached in a visit as
brief as the one I was able to make. Kaf Guraidhoo was chosen
as a site visit not for the intensity of its damage so much as
for the logistics: It could be visited from Male by speedboat,
rather than chartering an expensive seaplane.
On Kaf Guraidhoo, a very small community, 43 houses were
destroyed, four people were killed, and 400 individuals were
(and still are) displaced. The housing is being rebuilt by the
UNDP, but progress is going slowly. During our visit, the
frustration of the inhabitants was readily visible: We
witnessed an angry tirade by the village headman, directed at
the Maldives Government officials who accompanied us. He
demanded to know why, 7 months on, the community members still
were living in tents that provide little shelter from the
sweltering heat and monsoon rain.
Traditional building material on the atolls is coral, and
the older buildings still use this as their wall material. It
has the advantage of being light, airy, and free--but has been
banned by the government in an attempt to preserve the nation's
one irreplaceable natural resource (without vibrant coral
reefs, the Maldives would lose its vital tourist revenue).
Logistical challenges of getting substitute material (concrete
for cinderblocks) out to the remote, far-flung atolls, however,
are not insubstantial.
A UNDP team was visiting Kaf Guraidhoo during our site
visit, and we consulted with them about the difficulties they
faced. They were well aware of the popular discontent at the
pace of reconstruction, but noted that this was only one among
an enormous number of sites to be rebuilt. During the tsunami,
this entire island had been submerged, up to the level of a
person's knees. The primary UNDP effort was the building of a
community center. In the meantime, inhabitants took what
shelter they could beneath the plastic sheeting bearing the
symbol of USAID--and of the Saudi relief agency.
Flooding was not limited to the smaller islands. According
to government interlocutors, the capital city of Male was
entirely flooded as soon as the wave hit at about 9:20 a.m.
Impact of Islamist ideology
The Maldives is an overwhelmingly (indeed, constitutionally) Muslim
nation, but has traditionally been socially and religiously moderate.
Several official interlocutors expressed concern at the rise of
Islamist ideology, and worried about the impact this might have upon
the nation's fledgling move toward democratization.
Minister of Atolls Development Mohamed Waheed Deen
(essentially the Minister of Interior for islands beyond Male)
noted that many wealthy gulf residents came to Maldives on
holiday. While this provides jobs and income, it also fuels
resentment at the disparities of wealth evident between the
local inhabitants and their neighbors from the Middle East.
Minister of Defense and National Security Ismail Shafeeu
noted the problem of drugs, which was closely tied to the rapid
opening of the Maldives to visitors from South Asia and the
Middle East. Unprocessed heroin is a major threat, he noted,
with the adult addict population estimated by some studies as
high as 200,000-500,000 (about 10 percent of overall
population). Due to the Maldives' open economy, it is easy to
launder money here: ``We're in a bad spiral now, fighting it,
but not making headway.'' This issue is linked with the
extremist threat, since various groups have used criminal
enterprises to raise money for terrorism in other parts of the
world. During the 1980s and 1990s, many Maldivian boys went to
Pakistani madrasas, often sponsored and funded by Saudi
charities. Many have now come back home, and retained the
ideology of their ``sponsoring agencies.'' This is a potential
threat for the future, he said.
UNITED KINGDOM
On August 16, en route from Sri Lanka back to Washington, I had
discussions in London with officials from the British Foreign Office
who specialize on South Asia and counterterrorism issues. The focus of
these discussions was putative linkage between the July 7 bombings in
the London Underground and the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e
Taiba.
These discussions were informative and useful. Due to the sensitive
nature of the topic, appropriately cleared staff are encouraged to seek
a detailed debrief from me in an appropriately secure setting.
itinerary
August 2............................ Depart Washington.
August 4............................ Arrive Medan, Indonesia.
Meeting at U.S. consulate, on
logistics of tsunami/earthquake
aid provision via Medan and other
parts of Sumatra.
Participants: R. Simanjuntak, Abo
Mutalib Lugus.
Meeting at U.S. Consulate:
Acehnese elders.
August 5............................ Meeting with journalists and NGO
workers.
Afternoon: Transit to Banda Aceh.
August 6............................ Aceh: Site tours of USAID projects
and NGO sites in Banda Aceh and
environs. Visit to village of
Gurah.
Meeting with subcontractor
Muhammad Najib.
Meeting with Asia foundation's
Human Hamid.
August 7............................ Site tours in Banda Aceh and
villages:
Village of UI Lee Lee,
Village of Lapunk,
Transit to Jakarta.
August 8............................ Jakarta: Embassy brief, meeting
with Amb Pascoe, and meetings
with Indonesian Government
officials (Sudjadnan
Parnohadiningrat and others).
August 9............................ Transit to Sri Lanka.
August 10........................... Site visits between Colombo and
Mathura (CHF and GOAL).
August 11........................... Site visits between Galle and
Colombo (Mercy Corps and others).
Meeting with Foreign Minister
Lakshman Kadirgamar.
August 12........................... Transit to Maldives.
Meeting with Atolls Minister
Mohamed Waheed Deen and other
Maldivian officials.
August 13........................... Site visit to tsunami-hit Kaf
Guraidhoo.
August 14........................... Meetings with Maldives Government
officials, including Minister of
Defense and National Security
Ismail Shafeeu.
Transit to Sri Lanka.
August 15........................... Depart Sri Lanka. Transit to U.K.
August 16........................... Meetings at British Foreign
Office. Transit to Washington.
End Mission
______
Tsunami Trip Report Submitted by Nilmini Rubin, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Professional Staff Member
From January 8-17, 2005, SFRC staffer Nilmini Rubin traveled to Sri
Lanka to observe the impact of the December 26, 2004, tsunami and the
effectiveness of the relief and aid response. As part of Congressman
Leach's delegation \1\ for 2 days, I traveled to the south of the
island and participated in official meetings. Afterward, I traveled to
the mid-eastern part of Sri Lanka with CARE USA President Peter Bell to
observe relief operations and then joined USAID staff to look at
recovery in the southeast part of the island. I made a point to observe
the impact on affected people in Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher
towns and neighborhoods.
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\1\ Congressman Leach's delegation included Senators Brownback and
Corzine, Representatives Blumenauer, Faleomavaega, Ferguson, Flake,
Garrett, Gilchrest, Shays, Smith, Watson, Pallone, as well as staffers
Jamie McCormick, Doug Anderson, Landon Fulmer, and Evan Gottesman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tsunami affected most of Sri Lanka's coastline, killing more
than 30,000 people and destroying more than 100,000 homes leaving
nearly 600,000 displaced.\2\ This disaster hit 2 years after the
ceasefire between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the
Sri Lankan Government which stopped the violence, mainly in the north
and east, that had resulted in more than 64,000 deaths since 1983.\3\
In addition, the country was recovering from the loss of between 25,000
and 50,000 people as a result of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP) insurrection in the south in the 1970s and 1980s.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sri Lanka and Maldives Tsunami Disaster Action Response Plan:
USAID/OFDA: Bringing Hope to People.
\3\ Bruce Vaughn, ``Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations,''
Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2004.
\4\ Europa World Year Book, page 3934.
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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Special Envoy. The creation of a Special Envoy could
maintain pressure on both sides to wage peace.
Financial Controls. Insistence that all World Bank-proposed
financial controls are accepted by the Sri Lankan Government
and that the central Sri Lankan Government set up a system to
consult with the district governments on spending could thwart
corruption.
Housing and land titling. Permanent housing should become
the main development focus as it was in terrible need. Land
issues are very difficult and Sri Lanka is a very densely
populated country with serious titling problems.
Early Warning System. An early warning system for tsunamis
and other types of danger should be established. It would have
saved lives in Sri Lanka. As the destruction was in a ring less
than a mile wide around the island, even a 15-minute warning
would have allowed people to move to a safe area.
IMPRESSIONS
I learned that there are three levels of response to this and other
disasters: Immediate relief; intermediate rehabilitation; and long-term
recovery. While there has been a tremendous focus on immediate relief,
the major challenge will be long-term recovery. One aid worker stated
``we need to do more than restore people to their impoverished state.''
He asserted that economic development is, in part, disaster mitigation
as the poor tend to be inordinately affected by natural disasters. Most
observers agreed that the tsunami hit the poorest.
There are a number of complexities in Sri Lanka. Housing and land
for internally displaced people from the ongoing ethnic conflict is
still pending--many of them have been living for years in shacks. Also,
many of the villages near the affected areas are very poor and there
are concerns about the fairness of helping the tsunami victims and not
their poor neighbors.
The Sri Lankan Government and Sri Lankan civil society were the
first responders to the tsunami disaster before the international
community was in place. While many acknowledged that the Sri Lankan
Government was doing the best it could to respond to the tsunami
disaster, there was concern that Sri Lanka was taxing aid provided to
the victims. According to Tara de Mel, National Operations Coordinator,
the Government of Sri Lanka continues to impose duties (averaging 18
percent) on private donations that are sent directly to Sri Lanka,
rather than going through international NGOs or governments.
Reportedly, U.N. agencies held a meeting 2 hours after the tsunami
hit Sri Lanka. The United Nations helped with information gathering
mechanisms and helped the government establish the National Operations
Center. UNICEF had already been working in many of the affected areas
to address the impact of the civil conflict.
NGOS
I found international NGOs like Save the Children partnering with
local NGOs to provide assistance. Similarly, CARE, which has been in
Sri Lanka since 1956, used its relationships with the communities to
provide assistance. I met a number of new international NGOs to Sri
Lanka that were trying to help but have no sense of the political
situation which makes them vulnerable and could result in unintended
consequences. Established NGOs referred to the new international NGOs
as ``parachuters.''
U.S. GOVERNMENT
Shortly after the tsunami, USAID/OFDA provided more than $23.3
million to support emergency relief supplies, health, water and
sanitation, cash-for-work, transitional shelters, psycho-social
support, and child protection activities.\5\
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\5\ Sri Lanka and Maldives Tsunami Disaster Action Response Plan:
USAID/OFDA: Bringing Hope to People.
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USAID has a base of operations in Ampara, where more than 10,000
died as a result of the tsunami. Along those lines, USAID was one of
the few official donors with offices outside of Colombo (in Trincomalee
and Ampara) and it has allowed USAID to become a nerve center,
providing information to the new groups. USAID had previously worked
with fishing communities, so reaching back out to replace boats will be
quite easy for them. I saw USAID boats being used to ferrying people in
an area where a bridge had been washed out. On the other side of the
bridge was a badly affected community.
In Ampara, USAID gave grants in kind and did not distribute any
cash so as to impede the misuse of funds. I was very impressed with the
USAID staff and the local hires. They were an important resource for
other NGOs, had a good understanding of the sensitivities in Sri Lanka
and were highly professional.
I also saw U.S. Marines assisting in the recovery, clearing
destroyed buildings in preparation for rebuilding.
POLITICIZATION OF THE RECOVERY
According to Peter Harrold of the World Bank, two-thirds of the
damage from the tsunami was in the northeast provinces where many Tamil
people live. So, the nature of collaboration between the government and
the LTTE adds a complicating factor that has to be addressed with care.
The World Bank official added that the disaster occurred when the peace
process was at its lowest ebb since the ceasefire in October 2002. At
first, many were optimistic that the disaster would lead to renewed
interest, by both sides, in peace; but worry was setting in.
The politicization of the recovery was clear. The government seemed
to be consolidating power--rather than devolving--in the wake of this
crisis. I saw internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps that were funded
by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (allegedly linked to the LTTE)
and by the JVP (a socialist nationalist political party). The JVP and
the TRO were separately setting up their own camps. The JVP was driving
around passing out rice, lentils, spices, and pumpkins for people to
cook. They were cleaning up debris as well.
There was concern about the relief reaching all affected people in
Sri Lanka--both in the government-held areas and the LTTE controlled
areas. In the East, the Sinhalese (majority) tend to live more inland
and the Tamils and Muslims live closer to the coast. Some felt that it
was possible that the inflow of tsunami relief would inflame ethnic
tensions because some--who may be very poor regardless of their impact
by the tsunami--would be left out.
Ampara was the part of Sri Lanka most destroyed by the tsunami--
more than 10,000 have died here. However, it was the area where I saw
the least help. It takes about 10 hours from Colombo to get to some of
the villages that I visited in Ampara. There was a minimal
international presence there. Temporary shelter consisted of plastic
sheeting on sticks. There was food and water. There was serious and
obvious depression--many were afraid to move back to where they lived.
The sanitary facilities were poor.
RESPONSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANKS
The most critical financing issue to watch was that of the
multilateral development banks (MDBs) as the MDBs make up a significant
portion of the government's budget. The World Bank and Asian
Development Bank are currently conducting needs assessments in Sri
Lanka. The World Bank has announced it will provide $100 million in
initial financial support to Sri Lanka with additional funding for
longer term reconstruction efforts.\6\ The Asian Development Bank
announced that between $100 million and $150 million in new operations
could be processed in the short to medium term, devoted to the
reconstruction effort in Sri Lanka.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ World Bank website: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
NEWS/0,,contentMDK:
20318541 menuPK:34463 pagePK:64003015 piPK:64003012 theSitePK:4607,00.ht
ml.
\7\ Asian Development Bank website: http://www.adb.org/Media/
Articles/2005/6619_tsunami_ impact_Sri_Lanka/default.asp.
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The World Bank Representative, Peter Harrold, explained that the
World Bank was pushing for accountability structures for the tsunami
relief money. He said the World Bank has asked the Sri Lankan
Government to (1) create a web-based system so it is easy to track the
money; (2) continue to follow procurement rules and competitive
procedures even in the disaster environment; (3) require an
international audit; and (4) have citizen accounting system so the
people can say if the money has translated into impacts on the ground.
The Sri Lankan Government has not yet agreed to this system, Mr.
Harrold added.
One accountability structure not mentioned, specifically, by the
World Bank in our meeting that was very important according to Nilan
Fernando of the Asia Foundation, was the consultation and involvement
of local and provincial governments. Some others report that the
government was trying to secure direct budget support with minimal
controls.
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP) CAMPS
I visited a number of camps, with varying design, for people
displaced by the tsunami. Many IDPs were in schools and temples where
the bathroom facilities are not adequate. I saw one of their camps in a
Buddhist temple with more than 800 people and 2 toilets. They were
planning to dig more latrines but were inundated with needs.
Most women I spoke to felt safe--the Sri Lankan military has posted
officers at some of the camps. Yet still, domestic violence was a
problem in the camps. Even though most villages were kept together,
domestic violence continues. Statistics do not exist, but CARE
responded to 4 domestic violence complaints on the one day that I was
traveling with them.
SHELTER
Most of the affected people that I spoke to said that they lost
everything they owned. They invested all of their money into the
building of their homes. The women purchased gold jewelry as a store of
value. I did not meet anyone who had insurance to cover their loss.
Each affected person that I talked to said that they wanted a new
home and land. They did not know where the land would come from. Land
in Sri Lanka, an island the size of West Virginia, is scarce and the
affected area has a concentrated population. Another major problem in
Sri Lanka is titling. Many affected people did not have legal title to
their homes and some of those who did lost their deeds in the wave.
A significant complication was that many of the people who lost
their homes were ``fisherfolk'' who need to be near the coast. The
government's revised regulation on how close to the coast structures
could be rebuilt was in dispute during my visit.
HEALTH
Disease incidence was lower than initially expected because of high
immunization rates and successful cholera prevention programs in Sri
Lanka according to the World Health Organization representative.
During my 1-week stay in Sri Lanka, I did not observe any public
information on HIV/AIDS. I discussed AIDS with a number of Sri Lankans
who, despite their ethnic and class differences, all asserted that AIDS
was not a problem in Sri Lanka as it was in other countries. Given risk
factors in Sri Lanka such as conflict, displacement, tourism, and
prostitution, I would be surprised if this assertion was true.
ELDERLY
I did not see any tsunami-relief programs targeted to the needs of
the elderly nor did I meet anyone who knew of any programs for the
elderly. My concern was that the elderly who are unable to work and
have lost family members may fall through the cracks.
During my trip, I was deeply moved by my conversations with elderly
people. In Batticaloa, I met an elderly lady named Padida Ismael who
asked me what she should do. For years, she had maintained a small
corner shop. It was lost in the tsunami, as was her home and all her
possessions, including all of her clothes. Mrs. Isamael was wearing a
donated sari. She said that ``it is too late for me. My whole life's
work is gone.'' Then, she cried.
I met two elderly ladies in Ampara who sat by the rubble that was
once their home. They mourned the loss of their community and said they
had ``no place to go.'' One woman said that her children are now
homeless, too, so she could not depend on them. The other woman said
that she lost her son and had no other means of support. They were in
profound grief.
Microenterprise and other employment generation mechanisms don't
help the infirm--who may worked their whole lives for the little they
had. I was deeply touched by the elderly women that I met. Many of them
shared a story--she doesn't know what she can do, she is too old to
work, and she has no one left to take care of her.
WOMEN AND CHILDREN
In Batticaloa, I saw Muslim, Tamil, and Burgher villages erased by
the wave. Women repeatedly approached me to tell me their stories. They
often sobbed. They clearly wanted to be heard and to get help.
The National Child Protection Authority was in the process of
determining the number of children that are orphaned. They will try to
trace family members, then will turn to fostering, adoption, and
orphanages according to the UNICEF representative. According to the
UNICEF representative, since the tsunami hit on a Sunday, most families
were together. According to Tammie Wilcuts of Save the Children, more
parents are missing children than children are orphaned.
SCHOOLS
As I visited villages in Ampara with staff from USAID's Office of
Transition Initiatives, I could see that a significant percentage of
the coastal schools were damaged completely or partially. Some schools
can be salvaged but others cannot.
UNICEF was helping some set up temporary schools. UNICEF provides
the plastic sheeting for the roof and the parents are scrounging for
wood to make frames. UNICEF also provides school kits--a box with a
blackboard, notebooks, pencils, etc.--almost everything you need to
start classes. However, these temporary schools will be wholly
inadequate in the rain. And everyone thinks the temporary schools will
be in place for at least 6 months. The Canadian Disaster Assistance
Response Team was looking at how they can provide engineering expertise
to rebuild some of the schools, USAID was coordinating masons and
providing tools for volunteers.
ENVIRONMENT AND FISHING
Many argued that the destruction from the tsunami was aggravated by
the destruction of coral and mangroves in Sri Lanka.
Reportedly, more than half of the 28,000 vessels in Sri Lanka were
damaged or lost in the tsunami. As most of the fishing boats on Sri
Lanka are made of fiberglass, repairs are costly. Fishing is an
important industry on the island. Not only does it provide the economic
base to coastal villages, the industry provides the main source of
protein in the common Sri Lankan's diet. The economic ripple effect of
the loss of so many seacraft was very evident at camps around the
country. Resurrecting this important industry is vital to the interests
of the nation's coastal areas.
One problem in Sri Lanka before the tsunami was overfishing--
especially near the coast because people here had (and will have again)
small boats (40 ft.) that don't allow them to go out far. The FAO was
working with people to get them to pool to buy bigger boats that can go
out farther and mitigate the coastal problem. The Sri Lankan Prime
Minster asserted that fishermen from other countries fish in Sri Lankan
waters.
The following persons met with me in Sri Lanka:
U.S. Embassy
Jeffrey Lunstead, Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives
David Willams, Vice Consul
Dean Thompson, Foreign Service Officer
Patricia Mahoney, Foreign Service Officer
Prasad Gajaweera, Political Specialist, U.S. Embassy
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
Carol Becker, Mission Director
Bill Berger, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
Justin Sherman, Country Representative, Office of Transition
Initiatives
Benjamin Kauffeld, Health & Humanitarian Assistance Program Manager
Solita Muthukrishna, Project Management Assistant
Lionel Jayaratne
Wayne Brook, Regional Program Manager (Ampara) for Office of Transition
Initiatives
Vani Nalayanee, Grants Specialist for Office of Transition Initiatives
Al Sadath, Office of Transition Initiatives
Other U.S. Government
Brigadier General Panter, U.S. Marine Corps
Sri Lankan Government
Prime Minister Rajapakse
Tara de Mel, National Operations Center Coordinator
U.L. Hashim, Director of Education, Zonal Education
Commanding Officer Wickrameratne, Air Force Squadron Leader
M.K. Pathmanathan, Minister of Parliament
International Organizations
Peter Harrold, Country Director, World Bank
Jeremy Carter, Senior Resident Representative, IMF
Miguel Bermeo, Resident Representative, UNDP
Wallaya Pura, Acting Representative, U.N. High Commission for Refugees
Edward Chaiban, Head of Mission/Representative, UNICEF
Dr. Denham Paul, Consultant, World Health Organization
Jeff Taft-Dick, Country Director, World Food Program
Mazlan Jusoh, Representative, Food and Agricultural Organization
Non-Governmental Organizations
Kushil Gunasekera, Unconditional Compassion
Peter Bell, President, CARE USA
Scott Faiia, Country Director, CARE Sri Lanka
Robert Go, Media Adviser, CARE Sri Lanka
Vasuki Jayashankar, Project Director, Prevention of Gender-based
Violence, CARE Sri Lanka
Jose Ravano, Emergency Coordinator, CARE Sri Lanka
Nilan Fernando, Representative in Sri Lanka, The Asia Foundation
Tammie Wilcuts, Save the Children
Matthew Parry, Regional Associate, International Disaster Response
Unit, American Red Cross
Lynne Robinson, Mercy Corps
Sri Lankans affected by the Tsunami
P.H. Punayasiri
Sedhu Segeruma
Megeni Avama
Rosalyn Peralya
M.H. Susilawathie
K. Punyawathie
K. Somawathie
L. Neel Samantha Silva
R.E. Ganatilaka
Manel Galage
D.P. Upasiri
Alageiedh Sarasinamam
Padidah Ismael
Palliani
Other Sri Lankans
P. Perera, KPMG
A. de Silva, volunteer coordinator of Taiwanese doctors
S. de Silva, tourist industry
M. Mahendrajah, retired
S. Weerasinghe, retired
D. Weerasinghe, homemaker
Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team
Bill Wyman, coordinates Canadian Military with NGOs
Mr. Gilbert, volunteer coordinator
Mr. Yergeau, field engineer
Mr. D'arcangelo, water and sanitation
Mr. Bettis, construction
My Trip Schedule
1/8 Departed D.C.
1/9 En route to Colombo, Sri Lanka.
1/10 Arrived in Colombo, met with
Ambassador Lunstead and USAID
Mission Director Carol Becker.
1/11 Toured tsunami-affected areas in
Galle, Hikkaduwa, and Seenigama,
witnessed U.S. Marines clearing
rubble at a school, a cleanup
project with local volunteers, the
distribution of aid at a relief
center for displaced persons, and a
damaged tourist hotel. Observed
National Operations Center.
1/12 Met with international organizations
including the World Bank, UNICEF,
U.N. Development Program, the World
Health Organization, and the World
Food Program.
1/13 Toured tsunami-affected areas in
Batticaloa, Kattankudy,
Kurukkalmadam, Dutch Bar, and
Navalady, met with CARE staff,
observed a relief distribution in
affected community.
1/14 Toured tsunami-affected areas in
southern Ampara including Oluvil,
Palamanai, Akkarapatu, Tirrukkovil,
Komari, and Pottuvil. Observed
damaged public schools and saw
temporary schools supported in part
by UNICEF. Visited IDP camps.
1/15 Toured tsunami-affected areas in
northern Ampara including Kalmunai,
Karaitivu, and Nitavur. Saw
political groups providing relief.
1/16 Meetings with individuals and
organizations in Colombo.
1/17 Returned to D.C.
Background on Sri Lanka \8\
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (formerly known as
Ceylon) is an island in the Indian Ocean with a population of about 19
million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Drawn mainly from State Department http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
ei/bgn/5249.htm.
Sinhalese make up 74 percent of the population and are
concentrated in the densely populated southwest.
Ceylon Tamils, citizens whose South Indian ancestors have
lived on the island for centuries, total about 12 percent and
live predominantly in the north and east.
Indian Tamils, a distinct ethnic group, represent about 5
percent of the population. The British brought them to Sri
Lanka in the 19th century as tea and rubber plantation workers,
and they remain concentrated in the ``tea country'' of south-
central Sri Lanka.
Other minorities include:
Muslims, about 7 percent of the population;
Burghers, who are descendants of European colonists,
principally from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
(U.K.); and
Aboriginal Veddahs.
Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu. The
majority of Sri Lanka's Muslims practice Sunni Islam. Sizable
minorities of both Sinhalese and Tamils are Christians, most of
whom are Roman Catholic.
The Chairman. This disaster has taken an incredible toll on
children. The United Nations Children's Fund estimates that
children comprise more than one-third of all deaths. Tens of
thousands of children have lost family members and friends and
are coping with unspeakable trauma. Nearly 35,000 children have
been orphaned, and many more have been separated from their
families. In addition to facing the risks of disease, hunger,
and exposure, these children are vulnerable to being trafficked
for sexual exploitation, forced labor, conscription, and other
purposes.
I would like to highlight three initiatives undertaken by
this committee that deal specifically with the problems faced
by children and other vulnerable populations.
First, today I am introducing a resolution urging the
United States to ratify ``The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children,'' and the underlying ``U.N. Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime.'' U.S. ratification of these
agreements would improve our ability to coordinate law
enforcement efforts designed to protect children and vulnerable
populations. We also must encourage other nations to ratify
these agreements, which require parties to criminalize
trafficking in persons and to cooperate with international law
enforcement responses to trafficking.
Second, today I will reintroduce ``The Assistance for
Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries
Act of 2005.'' I originally introduced this bill in 2004. It
would help address the consequences of the catastrophic growth
in the number of children orphaned by AIDS and other causes. In
sub-Saharan Africa alone, an estimated 14 million children have
been orphaned by AIDS, and this number is projected to soar to
more than 25 million by 2010. The bill would support community-
based organizations assisting these children, reaffirm our
commitment to the international school lunch program, and
develop ways to reduce school fees so that orphans are not
forced to leave school because of cost, and promote the
establishment and enforcement of inheritance rights for women
and children. Although the bill is aimed at the AIDS orphan
crisis, it would be applicable to the orphans who lost their
families in the tsunami disaster.
I want to thank the five cosponsors of this bill: Senators
Boxer, Chafee, Coleman, Feingold, and Smith. They have been
active in the bill's development and they have demonstrated an
unwavering commitment to achieving bipartisan success on this
important bill.
Third, Senator Biden and I are working on a bipartisan
legislative effort targeted at providing greater protection to
women, children, and other vulnerable populations in the
context of war or disaster. This is an issue of longstanding
interest to Senator Biden, and he introduced the original
``Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act'' during the
last Congress. We are consulting closely on how to craft a bill
that would gain broad support within the Senate so it could be
passed in this session.
The tsunami disaster has provided a tragic model of what
can happen to women, children, the elderly, and the disabled in
the aftermath of disaster or conflict. These vulnerable
populations face extreme risks during periods of instability or
upheaval. In addition to threats from trafficking, abuse, and
other predatory activities, vulnerable populations are
sometimes blocked from assistance flowing to disaster areas by
stronger or more politically connected groups. Our staffs
witnessed this problem while traveling in the Indian Ocean
region.
And I appreciate Senator Biden's steadfast leadership on
this issue and his commitment to getting this bill passed. I am
hopeful that our hearing today will provide additional insights
that can be applied to perfecting this legislation.
Today we are joined by three distinguished panels. They
will discuss the United States and international responses to
the tsunami.
On the first panel, we welcome our friend, the
distinguished Senator, Majority Leader Bill Frist, who has
traveled to the Indian Ocean region to personally review relief
efforts.
On the second panel, we welcome Alan Larson, Under
Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural
Affairs; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and
Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development. We look forward to the insights of
these three friends of the committee and to hearing how their
respective agencies are contributing to the relief effort.
On our third panel, we welcome Daniel Toole, Director of
the Office of Emergency Programs at UNICEF; Mary McClymont,
President and CEO of InterAction; and Nancy Lindborg, President
of Mercy Corps. They will provide us with perspectives on the
role of the United Nations and the NGO community.
We thank all of these witnesses for joining us today and
for sharing their thoughts on what has been done in response to
the disaster and what can be done better in the future.
I recognize now our distinguished ranking member, Senator
Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
You listed the witnesses we are about to have. One of the
witnesses we are going to hear today is a man who has been
before this committee many times and a man whose judgment we
relied on over the years in both Republican and Democratic
administrations, Alan Larson. He is going to be leaving
Government service shortly, and I just want to publicly
acknowledge what an incredibly fine job he has done, how well
he has served the committee when he has been here, how well he
has served the country. He is a model of the professionalism
that exists in many places in our Government. I want to
publicly acknowledge that at this time.
I also want to explain at the outset, Mr. Chairman, at
10:15 I will have to leave. I am also a member of the Judiciary
Committee. It is hard to believe, but 8 years ago I helped
draft a bankruptcy bill that I think is rational. We have
passed it repeatedly with overwhelming majorities: 89 and 87
and 91 votes, and it is still not in play. It is being marked
up again today. So I apologize to the witnesses that because of
my long, long investment in this piece of legislation, which I
am blamed for having written and I must take part of the blame
for, I will be leaving.
The third point I would like to make, before I read my
brief statement, is that I have taken out of the statement any
of the references that you made about the humanitarian
disaster. I do it not to deemphasize how startling and of what
biblical proportions this disaster was, but just in the
interest of time.
Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by commending you not only
for calling this hearing but for your continued leadership. The
list of legislation that you have listed today is a testament
to how seriously you take your oversight responsibility and how
clearly you understand what the core remaining problems are.
The idea that we are going to have millions of homeless
children in Africa, that we have the devastation and the
homelessness of the young children in this region of South Asia
has not only humanitarian impact, it has phenomenal
consequences for the development of those countries and
phenomenal consequences, quite frankly, for our ultimate
security. So I compliment you.
Six weeks ago, to state the obvious, the people of
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and at least a half a
dozen other countries were struck by a disaster, as I said, of
biblical proportions. The scale of the devastation was
literally beyond comprehension. I recall when the first reports
came by that, maybe, there were 30,000 dead and how absolutely
shocked we were and the world was. But, my Lord, we are now
talking about something between 160,000 and 180,000, maybe as
many as above 200,000 dead. These numbers are mind-numbing, but
every single one of these numbers is an individual that
represents a dreadful, unique loss for their families and for
humanity.
Americans, like people all over the globe, were
heartbroken, and like people around the world, we responded
with generosity and dedication. The outpouring of private
charitable contributions was something wonderful to behold, a
sense of commitment that will, I hope--I always hope when these
things happen--carry over to other humanitarian crises
elsewhere in the world and maybe begin to change our attitudes
slightly about how we look at one another.
But I want to just take a moment to comment on our
military, the sailors and marines, along with a number of other
services, who have earned the deep gratitude not only of the
people of the tsunami-hit nations, but all of the world. The
deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group and the
military assets demonstrated a point that is of tremendous
value: America's military might enables us to be a formidable
enemy but also a very, very, very powerful friend. This is a
point that, I think, is too often unrecognized. We have shown
from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans that our fighting men
and women are second to none. We do not always have the
opportunity to demonstrate the other side of the coin: Our
military's enormous capacity for saving and serving human
lives.
I came to this body, not unlike you, Mr. Chairman, a long
time ago, a product of the Vietnam generation and not
particularly enamored with our military when I arrived in 1972.
But I must tell you, in my travels around the world--and I have
made it a point, as many of you have, including our first
witness, of going to every place of conflict that we have men
and women in war, in battle, risking their lives, since I have
been a Senator. And without fail, the single most competent
people at restoring life--at restoring life--not just taking
life, restoring life--have been our military.
I was giving Mr. Natsios a little bit of grief earlier
today, in a private meeting here, about why we have not been
able to disseminate more of the aid that we voted for for Iraq,
the $18.4 billion. He accurately pointed out AID has done their
job well. And I said, what about Fallujah? I said I go over
there and talk to the military guys and they say, give me some
money, we can help get this done. He said it is being done. We
are working with them.
But it is astounding. I just think it is important that our
people know that our military--they are the same kids, the
second lieutenant who stands there in Brcko in northern Bosnia,
that as you see a group of 25 people carrying axes and sickles,
literally walking down a street of a neighborhood about to
reclaim a home that was theirs, that was a Bosniak home, from a
Serb who may be living there. And it is a young second
lieutenant standing in the middle of the street, going whoa,
wait a minute, fellows, and peacefully taking care of it.
Or the second cavalry in Sadr City, led by Corelli, a
general who can shoot straight and kill if he has to, but who
stands there and he says, give me PVC pipe and let me run it
out of the back of these homes into the Tigris so the sewage
does not pile up in their front streets, and when he does it,
the incidents of conflict diminish.
So it is not a mere afterthought, that I point out today,
that our military is involved in saving lives, as well as
defending us and necessarily sometimes taking lives of bad
guys.
As a two-star admiral, in command of the USS Abraham
Lincoln carrier group, told a visiting congressional
delegation--and I am paraphrasing because I was not on that
delegation. Someone apparently asked him, was this a
distraction from all the strains on the military in terms of
fighting the wars we have to fight today. And he said, I am
told the quote was, this is not a distraction from our job, it
is our job.
In humanitarian terms, there is simply no other institution
in the world that could have delivered the assets and
capabilities of the U.S. military. From helicopters to water
desalinization plants, the Navy had it all and they got it on
the scene within 1 week of an initial call.
In political terms--and it may not be politically correct
to raise this--this represents an example of supremely
effective and cost effective public diplomacy in the extreme.
It demonstrated a simple, yet often-overlooked point: Good
deeds breed good will.
I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, as I try to shorten this
statement, that some of the questions that we should explore
include--yesterday the administration announced it will
increase our pledge for relief and reconstruction to $950
million, in other words, an additional $600 million over the
$350 million already committed and basically spent. I applaud
the President for that. But the questions I have are: What can
we do to ensure full transparency for our pledge so Americans
and the world know that we are spending this money wisely?
What can we do to assure equal transparency on the part of
the governments with whom we are working? To be blunt, some of
the governments in the affected countries have a history of
endemic corruption, and some of their militaries have a poor
record with respect to human rights.
What can we do to ensure that our money gets to the
affected people themselves long after news cameras have
decamped from four other sites?
And what can we do to ensure that our funding does not help
fuel civil conflicts rather than resolve them?
Mr. Chairman, this tragedy is a challenge to the United
States, a challenge to demonstrate to the world just how
generous and open-hearted the American people are and the
American Government can be; a challenge to engage in
cooperation with the world community, to show the world, and
particularly the Muslim world, just what sort of powerful
friend we can be. We must meet this challenge, and I believe
the administration should be complimented for the way in which
they have approached this challenge.
I want to make it clear about accountability. Given the
option between taking a risk on not having sufficient
accountability but potentially saving thousands of lives or
altering the circumstance of the people in the region, I am
willing to take that risk. But nonetheless, we still should
have transparency, as best we can, as it relates to the use of
these moneys by the governments to whom we are providing the
money.
Again, I thank you for your leadership. I apologize for
delaying the majority leader who has a busy schedule. As I used
to tell his predecessor, the job is not worth the car, but I am
glad he has it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, I thank the distinguished ranking
member. I compliment him on his conscientious attendance over
in Judiciary for his important work, even as he does the Lord's
work here in this committee.
It is a real privilege to welcome my friend and our
distinguished Republican leader, Bill Frist, a gifted physician
who has, in fact, throughout his public career, been on the
scene to minister to people. Once again, he has done so in this
case. We look forward to your testimony. Thank you for coming.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be back in this room with you and your members. I will be
brief. You have an outstanding series of panels to follow, but
I do appreciate the opportunity to share some experiences that
I had when I and Senator Mary Landrieu went to South Asia
several days after the tsunami struck.
Right up front, from that first day that we set foot in Sri
Lanka, it was apparent that the United States was leading in
terms of providing relief, assisting with recovery, and the
rebuilding of that part of the world. We must all be thankful
for and commend our Government agencies, especially the
military personnel who Senator Biden so appropriately commented
on, and the American people, and all who responded in a timely
and immediate way. It was apparent on the ground that the
United States was leading that effort.
The death and destruction is not exactly as you see on
television and have read about, but actually much worse. The
human face of this tragedy is terrible: Over 35,000 orphans;
the fact that more than a third of the people who died were
children; the fact that the more than 1 million people who have
lost their homes are still homeless, now a month and a half
later.
I do want to stress the compassion that we saw on the
ground: The aid workers, the military men and women, the
doctors that came in, the engineers that arrived from the
United States to clear the roads and, indeed, from all over the
world. Our friends around the world, as we saw, also
contributed generously.
I know you will be talking a lot about the sum of money
that the administration has requested, and that I encourage us
all to be strongly supportive of. For every dollar that has
been requested, there has been a dollar matched by our private
charities, by charitable giving in this country. It is totally
different when we compare our private sector aid and giving to
official assistance from around the world; the degree of
generosity and compassion expressed by individual citizens--
that outpouring--is somewhere between $800 million and $900
million thus far.
Mr. Chairman, I want to take the opportunity to focus on
one element that we responded to well, and introduces the
success of the short-term response, but what I would encourage
this committee to focus on in the future. It involves the
absence of clean water and access to clean water and
sanitation.
In the tsunami area, lack of clean water emerges as one of
the most pressing problems. As the tsunami came in, the salt
water contaminated, immediately, the wells along the coast, and
water containers that had been held in the homes all along the
coast. You would fly for hundreds of miles along this coast
with this unending destruction. But water containers were
washed away and, of course, shelter and homes were washed away
as well.
We visited the refugee camps. Many of them were local
schools that were taken over, and clearly not equipped from a
sanitation standpoint, or a water supply standpoint, to provide
for the people.
Our military response was superb; over 400,000 gallons of
fresh water were shipped in. Senator Landrieu and I
participated in the delivery of USAID supplies, which focused
on water availability, whether it was chlorine or whether it
was private sector sachets to clean water, or whether it was
infant solution called Pedialyte, where an immediate response
of nutrition and water could be provided.
As you flew over the beaches in Sri Lanka, water would come
in and large pools would collect--a real potential breeding
ground for mosquito-borne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, and
the like. An immediate response to prevent disease would be to
dredge and remove those pools of water so that we did not have
these water-borne illnesses: cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever,
and the like. We did not see outbreaks, however, because of the
immediacy of that response in a number of other areas.
Now, I bring this issue to the attention of this committee
in part to applaud this coming together, almost symphonic
approach by our military, by our USAID personnel, by the
private sector in those first couple of weeks because it
prevented what could have been the No. 1 killer after the
tsunami itself. I bring to this committee the real challenge--
that we have to look at long-term solutions that were
highlighted by the tsunami crisis regarding access to clean
water. The facts are this.
One million, six hundred thousand children die every year
because of lack of access to clean water; 1.6 million children.
Lack of clean water is the No. 1 killer of children in the
world because of water-borne diseases.
One billion, two hundred million people in the world do not
have access to clean water, and this refers back to the bills
that the chairman talked about introducing in terms of our
focus on relief, and a much broader response to global poverty
and overall development.
Two billion, four hundred thousand people in the world do
not have access to basic sanitation. Worldwide, in the next 15
years, 135 million people likely will die--135 million people
will die in the next 15 years--because of water-borne
illnesses.
Now, there are three points I want to make. First, clean
water should become a major priority in our development
programs. Today, it is not a focus. It is not a major priority.
Right now the United States spends about $600 million a year on
clean water programs. That is only about 3 percent of our $20
billion international aid budget. That proportion is simply not
enough as we look at the impact of what prevention can do in
terms of limiting water-borne illnesses, the No. 1 killer of
children in the world today.
I will be continuing to work with members on this committee
and their staff to introduce legislation that will make access
to clean water one of our major foreign aid objectives. The
legislation will coordinate and focus our clean water efforts.
It will establish partnerships with a wide variety of
governmental agencies, NGOs, and international bodies. It will
require our aid and development agencies to develop an annual
strategy to meet specific goals.
Second, I believe that we should leverage private dollars
to develop water infrastructure around the world. We know that
it would have an impact. Ultimately it is going to be the
private companies, not state entities, who will do the hard
work in developing infrastructure to deliver clean and abundant
water. We saw it in the tsunami ravaged regions. It is the
private sector that is coming in, building on the immediate
response of the government sector, that ultimately will address
long-term issues like housing and, in this case, clean water.
The third point and the last point that I will make, Mr.
Chairman, is an issue that really plays out in the three bills
that you mentioned, and I commend you for all three of those
bills. And it also reflects on the comments of Senator Biden.
That is, as we look at diplomacy, issues of health and public
health and medicine can be used as a currency of peace. I am
absolutely convinced of this. That is why I bring up this issue
of water because for the investment up front, the outcome, the
influence on peace, I am absolutely convinced there is great
promise.
Several things can be done that really center on this
personal contact of addressing public health, of addressing
medicine as a currency of peace. One would be a piece of
legislation that I am working on, again with members on this
committee, and that is to establish a global health corps. A
global health corps that can be mobilized very quickly to go
into areas like the tsunami region; that can be on the ground
within hours, but also a global health corps that can take
advantage of the compassion, the outpouring of support by my
colleagues today who, as physicians, do want to be able to
participate on an ongoing basis. Public diplomacy, I believe,
can greatly be improved and heightened by focusing on providing
public health services abroad.
This global health corps concept is one that I hope to be
introducing shortly. An element of that would be having a Peace
Corps-like global health corps available for immediate
response, like in the tsunami, but on an ongoing basis.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I do believe that increasing the
number of people with access to clean water will take time and
commitment. The long-term goals are bold. It can be approached
with incremental steps, and I would encourage this committee to
do just that. The demographic, social, and environmental trends
are grim. Over 130 million people will die because of lack of
access to clean water. It is totally preventable. It offers a
currency of peace that we are all looking for.
So, for the benefit of humanity and for the peace of the
world, I think we need to take this challenge head on over the
coming weeks and coming months. I do ask my colleagues to
support these proposals, to embrace them, to build on them, and
to make them work. By doing so, we can save millions of lives
and give millions more the opportunity to live healthier, more
fulfilling lives.
Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to
participate in this very important hearing, and I commend you
for the legislation that you and the ranking member are
introducing to further these causes.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Frist, for
these very important ideas and for your pledge to work on
legislation. I know you will find many supporters in this
committee. We look forward to working with you and our
colleagues on the health corps idea and likewise on the need to
provide water that is clean and sanitary to millions of people.
We thank you for using this forum to outline these ideas today.
The chair now calls upon a distinguished panel that will be
composed of the Honorable Alan Larson, Under Secretary for
Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs of the Department
of State; the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Defense; the Honorable Andrew Natsios,
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development.
Gentlemen, we welcome you once again as friends of the
committee and thank you for coming to offer testimony today in
this important hearing.
Let me suggest that you try to bring your comments into a
10-minute framework. The chair will not be excessively rigorous
about this, but to the extent that we start in that framework,
there will be ample time for questions from members.
I will call upon you in the way that I introduced you to
begin with, and that will be, first of all, Secretary Larson,
then Secretary Wolfowitz, and then Administrator Natsios. Would
you please proceed.
Let me compliment you, along with our distinguished ranking
member, for your distinguished service. We hope this will not
be your last testimony before our committee, but we thank you
for your particular contributions in this current office that
you now hold.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC,
BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Larson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank Senator Biden and all the distinguished members of this
committee for your leadership and for holding this hearing.
I appreciate very much the opportunity to brief you on the
administration's response to the devastating Indian Ocean
tsunami, but also and more importantly, I would like to sketch
out some of the actions and issues that we must face in the
future. With your permission, I would summarize my longer
written statement which I would like to see submitted.
The Chairman. It will be made a part of the record in full.
Mr. Larson. Wonderful.
In our written testimonies, my colleagues and I have
outlined how the United States, our military, our foreign
assistance officials, and our ambassadors and diplomats worked
together quickly, collaboratively, and effectively to save
lives and to begin the process of rebuilding.
The President's request for a $950 million supplemental
appropriation will not only replenish the costs incurred to
date, but it will also position the United States to continue
to play a leading role in rebuilding infrastructure and in
helping the victims of this disaster restore their livelihoods.
It will also enable the United States to lead in international
efforts to create an expanded and improved early warning system
for natural disasters and to participate in any debt deferrals,
as may be appropriate. We do ask for the support of the
Congress in quickly approving the President's request.
Going forward, the State Department will work very closely
with all agencies, and particularly with USAID, to establish
policy on tsunami relief and recovery funding, and the United
States will work closely with host governments, with the United
Nations, and with other donors to make sure that our funding is
part of a well-coordinated and effective effort.
From the very first hours, our embassies in the field were
working with local officials to identify needs, to disburse
emergency assistance, to obtain overflight clearances, and
otherwise facilitate the work of our military and USAID
colleagues.
Here in Washington, the State Department stood up an
interagency policy task force, and my colleague, Under
Secretary Marc Grossman, called together an ad hoc
international core group to coordinate the first essential
stages of the international response.
At the same time, the State Department's consular affairs
officials immediately began responding to over 30,000 requests
about the welfare and whereabouts of Americans who could
possibly have been affected by the tsunami. We have now
narrowed down to 12 the number of unresolved cases. At the
moment there are 18 Americans confirmed dead and 15 presumed
dead.
If I were to draw, Mr. Chairman, some preliminary lessons
today that we have learned and that we want to apply going
forward, they would include the following. The ability of all
of us--but I will speak specifically of the State Department,
our embassies and our consular affairs officials--to respond
strongly and effectively was greatly enhanced by our diplomatic
readiness program that increased our surge capacity. We thank
the Congress for its support of this diplomatic readiness
program and want to work with you to be able to maintain it in
the future.
Second, quick, ad hoc, informal, collaborative
coordination, both within the U.S. Government and between the
U.S. Government and other international players, is crucial at
the early stage of a complex emergency.
Third, military-to-military cooperation is critical. For
example, our cooperation with the Indonesian military was
excellent, but former Secretary Powell commented that it could
have been even better if there had been more opportunities for
training, interaction, and cooperation through military-to-
military cooperative programs.
Fourth, the United Nations organizations, including the
Emergency Relief Coordinator, the World Food Program, UNICEF,
the World Health Organization, and others, played a crucial
role in the international response. We do not see a need for a
new international disaster assistance body separate from the
Emergency Relief Coordinator. We do believe, however, that the
lines of authority and communication within the U.N. system
could be strengthened.
Fifth, in an era where Americans travel throughout the
world, we are going to need to clarify to the authorities that
we need to extend forensic identification and mortuary services
to countries that experience natural disasters.
Sixth, as has been commented already, the outpouring of
over $800 million of private contributions has demonstrated the
compassion of the American people, and the capabilities that
the private sector has, to contributing to disaster relief and
to longer term development. And we are going to need to work
somewhat more systematically with the private sector through
organizations like the Chamber of Commerce to put in place the
mechanisms to ensure that this assistance is well channeled and
well targeted.
Seventh, perhaps the most important step we can take going
forward, is to work with other countries to improve their
capacity to respond to natural and manmade disasters. This
includes sharing best practices, training first responders,
sharing technology. In fact, that is exactly what we are going
to be doing as we work to expand and strengthen the
international early warning systems for natural disasters such
as tsunamis.
In 1993, the General Accounting Office, looking at the
United States noted that--and I am quoting here--``fewer
Federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic
disaster if State and local governments are integral parts of
an effective national disaster response system.'' That ends the
quote.
I think looking internationally and looking into the
future, a critical challenge is to improve the capacity of
other nations to be effective and integral parts of an
international disaster response system. We need to think
carefully about how to stimulate these improved capacities,
working through networks such as the G-8, APEC, ASEAN, and the
various regional organizations.
I think this may be similar in some respects to the lessons
we learned after 9/11/2001 about cross-border terrorism. One of
those lessons was that we needed to strengthen political will,
and the capacity of other national governments around the
world, to combat terrorism, to curtail the flow of financing to
terrorist organizations, and to keep their own transportation
systems safe and secure. And since then, we have worked very
hard with partners around the world on new initiatives to
strengthen awareness, political will, and the capacity to deal
with these problems.
The final lesson I would draw, Mr. Chairman, is simple;
that is, when danger approaches or disaster strikes, there is
no substitute for active American leadership and engagement.
The American response to the Indian Ocean tsunami has given the
world fresh insight to the character of America. We need to
build on this foundation, and to do that, the President's
supplemental request is of critical importance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alan Larson, Under Secretary for Economic,
Business and Agricultural Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC
Six weeks have passed since a deadly earthquake and tsunamis struck
countries in Asia and Africa. The countries and people struck by this
disaster are now beginning to turn from the immediate task of saving
the lives of family and friends, to the long-term and even more
difficult work of rebuilding homes, livelihoods and communities. The
best estimates by affected country governments and the United Nations
report more than 161,000 dead in seven countries over two continents,
and another 139,000 still missing. Over 1.1 million people are
displaced.
The U.S. Government, in partnership with the affected countries,
the international community, and the United Nations, will continue to
provide food, shelter, water and sanitation to those in need. As
President Bush said, ``The government of the United States is committed
to helping the people who suffer. We're committed today and we will be
committed tomorrow.'' Americans have great sympathy and respect for the
people of devastated communities, who have come together to search for
the living, bury the dead, care for those who have lost families and
livelihoods and rebuild their lives.
National and local governments in the countries hit by the tsunami,
the multilateral development banks and bilateral donors, including the
United States, are working together to assess medium- and long-term
damage and needs. Even in the worst hit areas, such as Aceh and the
coastline of Sri Lanka, rehabilitation and reconstruction have begun.
Preliminary assessments produced jointly by the tsunami-affected
governments, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, USAID and
other partners place damage and loss costs at $4.5 billion in Indonesia
and $1.3 billion in Sri Lanka. While Maldives assessment has not yet
been completed, Maldives' own assessment is that $1.3 billion will be
required for tsunami reconstruction. We expect refinements of these
studies to be produced in the coming weeks.
To help meet these needs, the Administration is seeking $950
million to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas
devastated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and to cover the costs of the
U.S. Government's relief efforts to date. As President Bush said when
announcing this request: ``From our own experiences, we know that
nothing can take away the grief of those affected by tragedy. We also
know that Americans have a history of rising to meet great humanitarian
challenges and of providing hope to suffering peoples. As men and women
across the devastated region begin to rebuild, we offer our sustained
compassion and our generosity, and our assurance that America will be
there to help.'' The President and this Administration look forward to
working with Congress to provide these funds quickly.
We recognize that the Committee seeks in this hearing to have a
preliminary assessment of ``lessons learned.'' The transition period
now from relief to reconstruction and recovery provides a useful
juncture at which to assess the effectiveness of the immediate response
to the tsunami disaster by the U.S. Government, as well as other
actors. We appreciate this opportunity to share with the Committee some
preliminary thoughts. The assessments and recommendations that follow
result from informal interagency discussions, information from the
State Department's embassies and USAID's missions.
In any disaster, the United States must be coordinated internally,
as well as with other responders; these include government officials
and non-governmental groups in impacted countries and regions, the U.N.
system, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other
responding nations. The sheer magnitude of the tsunami presented many
challenges to all those who sought to provide assistance--many of these
difficulties were met with remarkable speed and effectiveness. This is
a success story, but as in any complex situation, there is also room to
assess how things might have been done even better and how they can be
improved in the future.
The United States is uniquely equipped and willing to contribute
our resources to employ the many tools at our disposal in responding to
international crises. The following series of simultaneous actions
undertaken by the United States--often in conjunction with other
actors--illustrate our process for responding to the tsunami crisis:
(1) Taking care of American citizens; (2) coordinating government-wide
mechanisms; (3) engaging the international community; and (4) engaging
affected countries.
Taking Care of American Citizens: The Bureau of Consular Affairs
(CA) established within 24 hours of the disaster a consular task force
to handle inquiries from American citizens. Over the course of the
first week, the Department received over 30,000 inquiries from all over
the country and around the world about missing Americans. Of those tens
of thousands of initial inquiries, we worked 15,112 inquiries on
specific individuals who might have been in harm's way, and nearly all
of these cases are resolved. The number of American confirmed dead is
currently 18 and the number of presumed deaths is 15. We are hopeful
this number will not rise any higher.
This remarkable response was facilitated by CA's standing practice
of keeping ``fly-away'' teams on standby for crisis response. In the
tsunami case, given the distance from Washington to the impact zone, CA
initially deployed personnel to affected areas from neighboring Asian
countries. We then sent in personnel from Washington as well as some
from elsewhere who had specific language fluency. As in many crises,
consular personnel were frequently assisted by locally resident
American citizens who volunteer their services to help fellow citizens
through the ``warden'' program. In this instance, the volunteer wardens
were most helpful in getting messages to other Americans to phone home
and reassure loved ones that they were okay.
Consular Affairs and embassies report good cooperation overall with
local authorities and across Washington agencies to identify Americans
who may have been harmed by the disaster. Three groups of issues have
emerged that could improve the U.S. Government's ability to assist
Americans overseas when a disaster strikes:
Technology: Web-based tools, such as on-line inquiry forms,
can help supplement telephone queries about missing Americans
and improve our ability to rapidly process and cross check
information (e.g., with flight manifests) from a variety of
sources. CA will be expanding its use of technology along these
lines, and sees no statutory impediment to such action in the
context of the Privacy Act.
Surge Capacity: While CA was able to respond quickly with
fly-away teams, it is worth noting this capacity depends on the
overall diplomatic readiness of the Department. We welcome the
opportunity to work with Congress to maintain this capacity.
International Coordination: CA maintains regular contact
with key allies on crisis management objectives. We all
recognize that our most important objective is to have a
prompt, effective means of communicating with each other rather
than fixed plans. During a crisis, it is essential that we
share information on fast-breaking developments and available
resources. Our experience during the tsunami reinforced our
belief that this type of regular communication leads to
effective coordination.
Coordinating Government-wide Mechanisms: Within the first day after
the tsunami struck, U.S. Ambassadors and Embassy staff, including USAID
missions, were on the ground working with national and regional
governments to disburse emergency funds, identify relief needs, and
provide rapid assistance. When the need for transport became apparent
in Indonesia, the U.S. Ambassador was on the phone to Washington
urgently requesting helicopters and the first sign of relief that
victims saw in many regions was the helicopters of the United States
Navy, bringing water, food and medicine to those in need. Within 72
hours after the tsunamis struck, the USS Bonhomme Richard and the 15th
Marine Expeditionary Unit had been turned around from their previous
mission and sent steaming toward the Indian Ocean.
The State Department played a key role in laying the groundwork for
our military and USAID's rapid response, including:
On December 27 the State Department stood up a policy task
force, established simultaneously with counterpart task forces
at USAID/Response Management Team, the Department of Defense
(DOD) and Pacific Command;
Immediately after the tsunami struck, my colleague, Under
Secretary Marc Grossman, called together and led an
international ``Core Group'' that included Australia, Japan,
India, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Nations to
coordinate the first stages of the international response. This
Core Group ensured one country did not duplicate the efforts of
others, identified and filled gaps in the first days and broke
logistical bottlenecks. As the United Nations mobilized and
took on a central role in the relief response, the core group
passed its coordinating functions to the United Nations;
State worked quickly with DOD on contacting host governments
to secure status of forces agreements, permission for our
military to use foreign airspace and territorial waters to
conduct relief operations;
Embassies worked with local customs authorities to smooth
entry of relief goods;
The State Department task force processed the voluminous
tsunami-related information pouring into Washington from the
media and from embassies overseas, summarizing and distributing
that information to the interagency via twice-daily situation
reports; and
The State task force also compiled and monitored the
extensive USG emergency assistance in each affected country and
the USG resources available to bring to bear.
The U.S. military and the U.S. Agency for International Development
moved quickly and effectively to help those in need. I especially want
to acknowledge the outstanding contributions of the U.S. Pacific
Command. My colleagues on the panel will supply you with more details
on the remarkable things they accomplished to establish the logistical
backbone for the entire relief operation and to facilitate the work of
the United Nations, NGOs and other donors.
The coordination effort required for dealing with the tsunami was
one of the most complex ever attempted by a State Department task force
or by the U.S. Government. The process worked extremely well especially
in light of the magnitude of the tragedy. The task force provided vital
insight and guidance that helped to shape the overall U.S. response and
ensure coordination of U.S. and international relief efforts.
An initial review of our experience in responding to this disaster
also suggested areas where the Administration and Congress can work
together to ensure the United States has the resources and flexibility
needed to speed help to those in need. For example:
Mass Casualty Disasters: This disaster required the United
States to respond to a mass casualty incident (other than
terrorist-related) involving a large number of victims, both
American and foreign, in several foreign countries. Although
identifying the dead is not a foreign assistance issue,
President Bush is seeking to replenish in the supplemental a
special State Department account to fund efforts to identify
the remains of Americans killed in a natural disaster overseas.
Private Donations: The outpouring of donations from private
U.S. individuals and companies to help in a disaster overseas
posed new challenges in matching those who can contribute with
those in need and coordinating private efforts with national
governments and bilateral and multilateral donors.
There was close interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries
during the crisis, and foreign militaries played a vital role in
providing relief to the people of the region. In that light, it is
worth reviewing U.S. capacity to interact with military forces in
response to a humanitarian crisis, and to explore ways the United
States can increase our training and capacity building assistance to
foreign militaries for such operations.
The foreign military that was faced with the most extreme tsunami-
related challenges was the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). As my DOD
colleagues can attest, the cooperation between the TNI and the U.S.
military was very good. But we believe it could have been better, and I
would therefore like to briefly address the present legislative
restriction on IMET for Indonesia.
The Department fully supports justice and accountability for the
egregious acts of violence committed against our American citizens in
Timika, Indonesia in 2002. The Department considers the protection of
Americans abroad one of its most important responsibilities. We will
continue to emphasize to the Indonesian Government that resolving this
case and ensuring the safety of Americans in general are crucial to our
overall relationship.
Our concern is not with the intended purpose of the legislative
condition, but with the limitation on flexibility that it represents.
The United States has many priorities in Indonesia, including
strengthening democracy, promoting military reform and enhancing
security cooperation, especially against terrorism. IMET is an
extremely valuable tool that Congress provides to accomplish these
objectives. For that reason Secretary Rice is examining these issues
with a view toward working together with Congress to achieve our many
critical interests in Indonesia.
Engaging the International Community: The Core Group model
discussed above provides several good lessons going forward. First,
coordinating donor response in the early stages of a crisis smoothes
interactions with authorities in affected regions, maximizing needed
assistance while not overwhelming local capacity. Related to this, a
clear channel of interaction with the recipient government gives
affected regions the opportunity to guide support according to their
priorities, which is essential for assistance to be delivered
effectively.
Second, including affected countries with extra capacity to help
other victims builds regional cooperation and a sense of ``ownership''
of the relief effort and facilitates good relations with local
authorities. For example, the inclusion of India in the core group
smoothed the way for excellent military cooperation with India
throughout the crisis. India's participation was also seen, properly,
as an acknowledgement by the United States of India's growing
international stature, and recognition of its transformation from being
an aid recipient to a strong regional donor.
Finally, a flexible framework is important to responding quickly
and effectively to a disaster situation. The State Department was able
to rapidly pull together this group, which never had a physical meeting
and established no bureaucracy in addressing critical issues. The
composition of the Core Group was the right formulation to respond to
the tsunami crisis. Core Group members were able to reach out quickly
without the structural impediments that any kind of permanent structure
might have imposed.
In addition to bilateral outreach, the State Department, along with
USAID and DOD, coordinate closely on the ground and at the policy level
with a range of U.N. agencies engaged in disaster relief. The U.N.
system directs its policy-level and on-the-ground disaster response
primarily through the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC
has a number of U.N. offices it can utilize to coordinate overall
response, in particular the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA). On the ground, OCHA sets up Humanitarian Information
Centers (HICs) to coordinate among U.N. agencies and with the affected
countries, bilateral donors, military units and NGOs.
At the same time, independent U.N. agencies, such as the World Food
Program (WFP), the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health
Organization (WHO), take on specific coordination and response leads
related to their mandates. For example:
The International Organization for Migration was there in
the first days, and with USAID funding, provided the major
share of truck transport and logistics for the crucial first
few weeks;
To combat measles is Aceh, where vaccination coverage was
less than 50 percent before the tsunami, UNICEF began a measles
campaign to vaccinate approximately 575,000 children;
WHO established health sector meetings and, along with USAID
and the U.S. Navy, initiated a series of assessments along
Aceh's western coast to determine the health profile and relief
needs among the affected population; and
WFP set up a logistic pipeline for rice and food commodities
to Aceh and Meulaboh, and began a system of sea transport to
reach areas not accessible by road.
At the policy level, the ERC participated in daily coordination
calls of the Core Group. In addition, on the day of the Indian Ocean
earthquake, the ERC dispatched teams of experts to help Sri Lanka and
the Maldives assess the extent of the crisis. Once the multinational
forward hub was established at Utapao, Thailand, the United Nations
also positioned liaison officers there from WFP and the U.N. Joint
Logistics Center (JLC). They worked alongside liaison officers from
Thailand and bilateral agencies, including USAID. The HIC was set up
quickly to establish coordinating meetings between all actors in the
relief operation.
The United States experienced good coordination with the United
Nations during the crisis, and the U.N. role was essential to the
success of the overall international response. At the same time, it
would have been helpful if the United Nations had deployed staff more
quickly to the region and set up a more robust command and control
operation to meet logistic and coordination requirements. The somewhat
decentralized system wherein OCHA coordinates some aspects of the
U.N.'s operations, while independent U.N. agencies simultaneously
coordinate specific sectors, can lead to bottlenecks and delays.
The Administration does not believe it is necessary to establish a
new disaster body separate from the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator
and the offices it commands. In our preliminary analysis, however, it
would be worthwhile to re-examine how the United Nations conducts
disaster planning and response. Some specific ideas might include:
Lines of Authority: Strengthening the ERC's lines of
authority would better empower the ERC to manage the U.N.
agencies with disaster relief as part of their mandate.
Communication: Encouraging better communication between U.N.
agencies and offices; institutionalizing mechanisms for
coordination in the wake of a disaster that requires an
immediate humanitarian response.
Streamlining: Bringing some existing programs, which
currently reside in various U.N. entities, under one existing
office or agency instead of a new body. This could save money
and improve effectiveness through streamlining, especially if
the authority of the ERC were enhanced.
Addressing such reform is currently on the minds of some donors,
such as the United Kingdom, which has raised these issues in context of
their Presidency of the G-8.
Engaging Affected Countries: The people caught in a disaster are
frequently also those who respond most quickly to the immediate needs
of those around them. Governments and local authorities in the affected
areas also set the priorities and goals for reconstruction and
development as rebuilding begins. Thus, one of the most important ways
to bolster disaster response capacity is to strengthen the capacity of
local and national authorities to prepare for and coordinate their
response to disasters.
Across the region hit by the earthquake and tsunamis, neighbors
saved lives, brought medical assistance to the injured, and helped each
other in heroic fashion. Many local and national governments responded
amazingly well, especially given the magnitude of the disaster. For
example:
The governments of India, Malaysia, and Thailand marshaled
resources quickly to help their own people and reached out
quickly to other affected nations. India, in particular, has
benefited from years of USAID funded training and support in
emergency and disaster management which has greatly improved
their ability to manage disasters on their own;
The Sri Lankan Air Force, with its limited fleet, flew long
hours on relief operations and supported numerous VIP visit
requests and aid coordination requests. The Sri Lankan Air
Force provided immediate evacuation services to foreign injured
in remote parts of the country;
Many Americans caught in the tsunami, who often showed up at
the embassy with only their bathing suits left, were taken in
immediately by Sri Lankan families and fed, housed, provided
with some basic clothing, and, in some cases, given enough
money to get back to Colombo.
A group of Indonesian students from Java, with no relatives
in Aceh, managed to get on a C-130 bound for Aceh to offer
their help. Relief organizations quickly utilized them moving
supplies.
Thailand allowed the United States, the United Nations and
the international community to use Utapao Air Base in northeast
Thailand as a regional hub for humanitarian assistance to the
affected areas.
As the United States considers how international capability to
respond to disasters can be improved, we need to look first at how to
build local disaster response capacity. Our own domestic disaster
response model can serve as a reference point. When evaluating U.S.
internal disaster response capability, the U.S. General Accounting
Office concluded in 1993: ``Fewer federal resources are needed to
respond to a catastrophic disaster if state and local governments'
response capabilities are greater . . . we emphasized that state and
local governments are integral parts of an effective national disaster
response system. The success or failure of any changes in the federal
role in that system will always be heavily affected by the efforts of
state and local responders.''
Other countries can apply this same concept to augment their own
domestic disaster mitigation and emergency response capacities. Within
our current resources, the United States can continue to use such
mechanisms as:
Encouraging countries to review and exercise their disaster
response systems: This will help them to discover ahead of time
and prepare for possible problems like bottlenecks in the
distribution network.
Sharing best practices: For example, Florida Governor Jeb
Bush is discussing with Thailand ways to share Florida's
experiences in dealing with the hurricanes that struck Florida
last year.
Enhancing training for first responders: In the wake of the
Gujarat earthquake that struck India, the United States
launched and continues to provide first responder training. In
Bangladesh, following the typhoon, we helped the country
install storm shelters and initiate first responder training.
The United States can also look to other areas where we have
provided extensive training. For example, by the end of 2004,
the United States had provided, through the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) program, counterterrorism training to almost
41,000 law enforcement personnel in 148 countries.
Sharing technology: We are working with United Nations
agencies and other donor nations to develop an early warning
system for natural disasters in the Indian Ocean, and the
President's supplemental budget request supports this need. We
might also consider compiling and exercising internet-based
networks and databases to facilitate coordination in responding
to disasters.
The U.S. response to the tsunami shows the value of prompt and
effective American action, combined with multilateral support for
disaster victims. There are a number of areas international disaster
response can be improved by streamlining existing mechanisms and, above
all, improving the capacity of local authorities to respond to crises.
Every disaster presents a unique set of challenges, but by
disseminating best response practices, providing training for first
responders and ensuring clear lines of communication, the United States
and the international community can most effectively deliver its vast
quantity of existing support.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Larson.
I would like to call now upon Secretary Wolfowitz.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC, ACCOMPANIED BY BG JOHN ALLEN, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and thanks for your
leadership and that of the U.S. Congress in helping to lead
this international effort in providing relief for what is one
of the largest humanitarian disasters in living memory.
As you know, yesterday the President announced a very large
request for supplemental funding to help see us not only
through this emergency relief effort, which by our account, I
think, will cost roughly almost $350 million, but an additional
$600 million on top of that to support the long-term recovery.
You have my statement. I would just like to make a few
summary points.
The Chairman. It will be made complete in the record.
Mr. Wolfowitz. First of all, just to observe the sheer
scale of this disaster. It is commonly said that quantity has a
quality all its own, and, I think that is worth thinking about
in this circumstance. It hit me first, even before going out to
the region, when I met with an Indonesian from Aceh, who works
in Washington, who lost his entire family, except for an aunt
and uncle who live here, in this disaster. I asked him how many
people he lost. He said 200. In other words, it is not just his
immediate family, it is his entire extended family. When you
think about that and you think about the situation of an orphan
in that setting who has not only lost his parents, but probably
lost the entire community that in normal circumstances he could
look to for support, I think you have a sense of how the scale
of this disaster has created qualitatively different problems.
Another illustration--and it bears very much on this
request for funding--is the scale of the recovery operation,
which is something that I did not fully appreciate until I went
out there, and neither did Admiral Fargo, our commander of
Pacific forces. Even though we had been extensively briefed on
the extent of the damage and we had had detailed briefings in
Thailand about the damage to the bridges along the road on the
coast, the two impressions that Admiral Fargo and I took away
overwhelmingly was, one, how this destruction just goes on for
mile after mile after mile. And second, we looked at the 36
bridges and realized that if you repaired all 36 of them, there
is still no road in between them. The ground in many places has
subsided 2 or 3 feet and there is a question as to whether the
road should be rebuilt in the same place at all.
The recovery effort here is going to be huge and no country
could undertake that scale of recovery on its own. No
developing country certainly.
Second, to say a word about the U.S. military contribution.
You have heard a lot about it. I am going to repeat things you
have heard already, but I do not think we can say enough good
things about what our incredible men and women have been doing.
Thanks also to the American taxpayer who has put a huge
investment in the ships and aircraft that made this possible.
We did a rough count of the 26 ships, 58 helicopters, and 43
fixed-wing aircraft that have engaged in this operation. They
represent $28 billion of American taxpayer investment in our
military, just the equipment alone, not to mention the people
who are, in many ways, a bigger investment. Without that, even
with this supplemental funding, we would not have been able to
deliver that emergency assistance. But with that, we were able
to deliver 10 million pounds of food and medicine, 400,000
gallons of fresh water. We have been able to treat 2,500
patients and we are still treating some on board the hospital
ship Mercy.
There is no way to count them, Mr. Chairman, but judging
just from the fact that there were 750,000 or more displaced
persons and in western Indonesia, those people were in
locations that were inaccessible by any other means than
helicopter, I think one can safely assume that tens of
thousands of lives were saved by that effort. And the kind of
medical disaster that we all feared did not happen, probably in
no small measure because people were kept healthy.
Third, to emphasize the importance of this recovery effort.
As impressive as the emergency relief operation has been and as
much as we can compliment our military for their contribution,
indeed, the entire international community for coming so
quickly to the rescue, it would be like a relay race where the
baton is dropped by the next runner if we do not continue what
is going to be a huge effort on the recovery side. We have, in
my view, very important reasons to make sure that that baton is
not dropped, not only because we owe it to the orphans who are
trying to face life without their families, without their
communities as a purely humanitarian matter, but also having
made this large investment in the emergency effort, speaking,
at least, for the Department of Defense, we would hate to see
people say, well, it was a nice start but the finish was
terrible.
But finally--and this would be my last point. I would like
to go into some detail--the fact that the largest single
disaster area happens to be in Indonesia, I think gives it
especial importance. As you know, I was Ambassador to Indonesia
for 3 years, but I am not speaking here as a former Ambassador
to Indonesia. I am speaking as someone who is very concerned
about the larger strategic situation we are in, in the world
today, who believes in what the President spoke about, about
the importance of freedom and democracy in combating extremism,
and the fact, which is often known but insufficiently
appreciated, that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population
of any country in the world and it combines that with a long
tradition of religious tolerance. In fact, Indonesia recognizes
not only Islam but Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism as
officials religions of the country.
Most importantly, starting about 7 years ago, Indonesia has
emerged as one of the more successful developing democracies in
the third world. It started in 1997 with what was commonly
called an economic tsunami that engulfed not only Indonesia but
many other countries of South Asia and East Asia which led,
more or less directly, to the fall of the Suharto dictatorship
in the spring of 1998. That was followed, to summarize a lot in
two sentences, by two free and fair Presidential elections, the
first in 1999 and the second one completed just last September,
as remarkable, I think in its own way, as the elections in
Afghanistan and the Palestinian Authority and Iraq that have
gotten more international attention.
One of the things that was impressive about that election
is that it brought into office a President, Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, who ran on a platform promising effective
government, promising to combat corruption, promising to
maintain the religious tolerance and inclusiveness of the
country. And he earned an overwhelming popular mandate. It
speaks to his leadership and it speaks, I think, to the
Indonesian voters.
But that government with its new mandate is now put to the
test, and clearly meeting that test in responding to the
recovery efforts in Aceh, if they can do it successfully, will
strengthen democratic institutions in Indonesia and reinforce
that country's tradition of tolerance. But it is a huge test
and it is a test made all the more difficult because of the
specific circumstances of Aceh.
If you will indulge me for just a minute. Aceh is a small
province, its people with their own language, a very
distinctive culture, a very distinctive and independent history
for a long time. The Dutch only began colonizing Aceh, in fact,
in the late 19th century.
In recent years, there has been a bitter war because an
armed movement, seeking independence in that province, has been
fighting the Indonesian military. I believe the United States
and all the countries of the Asia Pacific region have an
interest in preserving the unity of Indonesia and that the best
way to do that is through a peaceful resolution of this ongoing
struggle. That is going to be a factor in the recovery efforts.
If those tensions between the Government of Indonesia for the
Indonesian military on the one hand and the local population on
the other are not managed properly, they will interfere with
the recovery effort. On the other hand, I am more hopeful that
the common interest of all parties in achieving the goal of
successful recovery should inspire people to overcome those
tensions, and doing so, I think might provide a platform for
what would be in its own region a very important contribution
to peaceful diplomacy.
So, I believe, there is a huge stake here. The President
obviously believes there is a huge stake, and that is why he is
asking the Congress for so much additional support for tsunami
recovery.
But while our military role is coming to an end next week,
the suffering of the victims of this tragedy will not have
ended. This is not a time for short attention spans or donor
fatigue. The whole international community, I believe, has an
interest in helping to get the tools that these people need to
rebuild their shattered lives and we look forward to getting
support from the Congress.
If I might, I would like to introduce Brigadier General,
U.S. Marine Corps, John Allen, who has played the leading role
for us in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in
coordinating support for this relief effort, and I would like
to say the reason you see--not only the reason you see, but the
team that you see here, symbolizes the fact that this has been,
in my experience, a model of interagency cooperation and
collaboration, and I look forward to continuing it.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Wolfowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary, Department
of Defense, Washington, DC
THE EARTHQUAKE/TSUNAMI DISASTER
As you know, this was a double-headed disaster. First was a massive
earthquake that registered at 9.0 on the Richter scale, making it one
of the 4 or 5 largest earthquakes of the past century. It lifted the
ocean floor overlying the thrust fault between the Indian tectonic
plate and the overlying Burma plate by up to 10 feet. The earthquake
was followed almost immediately, in the case of the northwest shore of
the island of Sumatra by a succession of tsunami waves. The region of
destruction was extensive, ranging laterally 2,000 miles from east to
west, and from north to south nearly 500 miles, or two-thirds the width
of the United States and nearly half the distance from the north of the
United States to the south. The tsunami waves created great destruction
and disruption in lives and property leaving over 160,000 dead and over
140,000 missing in its wake, over 1 million people displaced, and
billions of dollars in reconstruction costs. To put a human face on
this disaster, shortly before I went to the region to survey the damage
and review our military relief effort, I met with an Acehnese who
resides here in Washington. This one individual lost 200 members of his
immediate family in the tsunami. An aunt and an uncle who live here are
his only surviving relatives in the world. The rest of his family was
swept away in an instant.
I visited the region 3 weeks ago, just after the calamity. By that
time, however, Thailand was already in the recovery stage. Sri Lanka
was still conducting some emergency relief, but it was soon to turn the
corner and the U.S. military effort was starting to shift elsewhere. In
Indonesia they were still reeling from the enormity of this disaster.
As terrible as it was throughout the region, the devastation in
Indonesia was incomparably greater. Under any other circumstances the
toll of over 8,000 dead or missing in Thailand alone would be
devastating. Yet in Sri Lanka the losses of over 35,000 dead or missing
is more than four times higher than for Thailand. But in Aceh, one
small province in Indonesia, whose population at about 4.2 million is
about a fifth of Sri Lanka's (20 million), the toll of over 114,000
dead and over 127,000 missing was seven times greater than in Sri Lanka
(thirty-one times greater than Thailand).
THE U.S. RESPONSE
Despite the devastation, there was an encouraging amount of good
news--the resilience of the people, the willingness of governments to
cooperate to help their people and the readiness of the international
community to offer assistance. One of the good news stories concerned
the interagency coordination and cooperation within the U.S. Government
in Washington straight out to the ground level where the execution was
occurring. The success in this cooperation and coordination was almost
unprecedented, and it benefited directly from lessons learned in
previous crises.
However, there is always room for improvement and we are looking
closely at our response effort through an after action review. We have
already identified, along with USAID/OFDA, the need to establish some
common operating procedures and mechanisms to help smooth our
coordinated response to future crises.
The ability of the Department of Defense to respond so quickly
would not have been possible without the relationships developed over
many years with the militaries of countries in the region, particularly
with Thailand. An unexpected consequence of the relief operation was
the opportunity to work closely and effectively with the Indian
military, with whom we are expanding ties, as well as the Indonesian
military (TNI), with whom we have had difficult relations in the past,
but with whom we have worked well in this crisis.
Thanks to the Department of State, in cases where we required over
flight clearances or status of forces agreements we were able to obtain
them in a timely manner. This disaster, and our response to it, has
demonstrated the importance of having standing agreements like these
where possible, as well as bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreements (ACSAs) to enable us to cooperatively respond to
humanitarian disasters. The restrictions that many people feared we
might encounter from the Indonesian military and bureaucracy were
overcome by the decisive leadership of newly-elected President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono and his Administration.
Our early relief efforts in Indonesia would have been somewhat more
effective if we had more experience working with the Indonesian
military (TNI) and if the TNI had better English language capabilities
and more modern equipment, but the real point to emphasize is that the
Indonesian government recognized immediately the need for help and
welcomed all who came forward.
This disaster has no doubt focused the minds of other nations on
creating some sort of disaster response capability. The countries in
the regional core group were selected to a large extent because they
possessed the ability to respond quickly. It is in our interest to
expand that capability and the number of our partners in the region who
possess it. USPACOM has a program known as the Multinational Planning
Augmentation Team (MPAT) to create not a standing response force, but a
cadre of individuals who are accustomed to working together on a
multinational basis to respond to crises. MPAT experience was put to
good use in the response to the tsunami crisis.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE
At the height of the Department of Defense (DOD) effort there were
nearly 16,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, 26 ships
(including one USCG cutter), 58 helicopters of all kinds, and 43 fixed
wing aircraft (mostly transport). The capital investment that the
American taxpayers have made in the equipment that made this effort
possible reached nearly $30B. With these state of the art resources our
extraordinarily capable men and women delivered over 10 million
(10,124,059) pounds of food and supplies and provided over 400,000
(422,324) gallons of fresh water for the people whose lives were
endangered by the specter of starvation and disease. As well, our
military medical system provided care to over 2,500 patients, and the
U.S. hospital ship Mercy remains off the coast of Sumatra rendering
vital medical assistance.
But the real impact can best be measured in the lives saved and
assistance provided to the host nations as they tried to come to grips
with a disaster of such scope and extent. It can also be measured by
the good will it has generated. Conservatively, the U.S. response to
this natural disaster saved thousands, and probably tens of thousands
of lives, particularly in Indonesia, and provided desperately needed
hope to hundreds of thousands of others.
A little more than 3 weeks ago, as we flew above the northwest
coast of Sumatra surveying the damage, the sheer scale of the
devastation was overwhelming. The Indonesians were still finding as
many as 3,000 human remains a day in the rubble . . . where there was
rubble. At the airfield at Banda Aceh, in the heat and humidity, we saw
a human chain of magnificent young American men and women loading the
helicopters with supplies, food and water. All of them had volunteered
to come ashore from the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and make a
difference however they could. In those lines were officers and
sailors, Chiefs and fighter pilots, aid workers and Indonesian military
(TNI) working side by side to get the food and water on those
helicopters and out to the people of Aceh.
As a result of this effort, in Aceh the USS Abraham Lincoln and her
helicopters have already passed into local legend as the Grey Angels. I
had a chance to visit with the crew of the Lincoln during my visit and
to share in their zeal for the relief effort. They were quite proud of
what they were accomplishing. As one fighter pilot told me--and I
should say this is quite an admission coming from a fighter pilot--``we
are all helicopter pilots now.''
In Galle, Sri Lanka, we visited a school that had been undermined
and rendered unsafe by the waves of the tsunami. In 100-degree heat,
Marines and Navy Seabees, working alongside the Sri Lankan Army,
operated heavy equipment and bent their backs into clearing the site
for a new school. When we asked the teachers what they thought of the
Marines and Seabees they burst into smiles and rapid-fire comments of
approval.
On the runway at Utapao, Thailand, the young Air Force men and
women of the airlift control elements were pressing themselves to the
outer edge of their endurance controlling the flow of relief supplies
to airfields from Utapao through to Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The
efforts of our service men and women have not only saved lives but also
generated unbelievable goodwill throughout the region.
As we pass the baton to the affected governments and international
relief organizations, we have an interest in staying engaged. This
crisis was humanitarian. It has been said that the Chinese character
for crisis represents both danger and opportunity. Here then is a
danger that failure to properly address the reconstruction needs,
particularly in Indonesia, could harm the affected governments. But
here too is also opportunity. If reconstruction is done the right way
in Aceh, it could bolster the credentials of the Indonesian government.
This is also an opportunity for the Indonesian government to show the
people of Aceh the good things that Jakarta can do for them and to use
the attention of the world to help achieve a political settlement to
the longstanding separatist problem. Similarly, another country
affected by this disaster, Sri Lanka, is facing a separatist problem.
We hope that the opportunity that has been presented to the people of
Sri Lanka can contribute to the long-term settlement of its divisions
as well.
Any government would be challenged by this crisis and the burden of
recovery. Indonesia in particular finds itself--as an emerging
democracy--at the time of the tsunami not yet 100 days into the
Administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The 1997 economic
crisis in Southeast Asia was referred to as an ``economic tsunami'' and
it contributed to the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship. This real
tsunami presents an enormous challenge to the still developing
democratic government in Indonesia. However, by meeting the challenge
successfully there is an opportunity to greatly strengthen democratic
government and free institutions in the country that has the largest
Muslim-majority population in the world.
We need to support the wave of democracy as it spreads across the
Muslim world. The elections held in Indonesia last year, the second
democratic elections in the country and the first direct election of a
President, are as significant as the elections this year in
Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. While the new democracy in Indonesia
is proving more capable than many thought possible, it must still be
nurtured.
President Yudhoyono holds a great deal of promise in terms of
increasing good governance, rooting out corruption, and continuing the
already significant reforms of the TNI. President Yudhoyono is, by the
way, a retired general and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College through the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program.
We have a strong interest in helping this democracy succeed. One of
the first ways we can do this is by ensuring that the job of bringing
relief and reconstruction to the people of Aceh is accomplished.
We can also support democracy by strengthening the civilian
government's capacity to manage defense and security matters and by
supporting the process of reform in the Indonesian military (TNI).
We all recognize why the U.S. Congress and the Administration have
put restrictions on military-to-military relations with the TNI. At the
same time, I believe we must take a broad approach to relations with a
country as important as Indonesia.
Legal restrictions on assistance we can provide to the TNI have
contributed to some unfamiliarity and suspicions between our military
forces. These restrictions did not overly limit our ability to respond
to most of the tsunami-related requirements of the TNI. For example, we
had the necessary authorities to provide spare parts for Indonesian C-
130 aircraft.
Nevertheless, I believe that many of the restrictions on our
defense relations with Indonesia have outlived their usefulness. We
need to look forward. The Indonesia of today is simply a different
country, and the TNI a significantly different military, from the one
that perpetrated the depredations of East Timor.
During my visit to Jakarta, the new civilian Minister of Defense,
Juwono Sudarsono, recognized the need for improved defense relations.
He specifically asked for more assistance from the United States to
assist his efforts to continue TNI reform. We should assist him in this
effort.
CONCLUSION
Through the hard work of the tsunami victims themselves, the
affected nations, as well as the United States and the rest of the
international community, the situation has evolved to the point at
which current assistance needs can now be met by the military and
civilian officials from the affected countries in coordination with the
U.N. and relief organizations.
The redeployment of U.S. military assets does not signal the
departure of U.S. assistance, but rather is a direct result of host
nation, U.S. Government agencies, international agencies, U.N. and
other NGOs assessments that U.S. military assets and capabilities are
no longer required. This is done is close coordination with the host
governments and reflects the transition from direct support to recovery
and reconstruction.
The lasting result of U.S. efforts should be that we did the right
thing, for the right reasons--regardless of the nationality, race, or
religion of those afflicted. That when needed, the United States was
there to aid in this enormous humanitarian disaster relief effort and
we remained only as long as we were needed and could be effective.
Although our military role is coming to an end this week, there is
no conclusion to the suffering of the victims of this disaster in South
and Southeast Asia. This is no time for short attention spans or donor
fatigue. The entire international community has an interest in helping
get the tools that they need to rebuild shattered lives. We thank the
Congress, and this Committee, for your strong support for this effort.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Secretary
Wolfowitz. We applaud the point you have made of the
interagency cooperation. We are very pleased that General Allen
could accompany you and share the very strong work of your
colleagues at the Department of Defense.
I would like to call now upon Administrator Andrew Natsios
for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Natsios. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
committee for this opportunity to testify.
We have this in front of you and there is a PowerPoint
presentation I am going to walk through. It looks like this for
those of you who want to follow along with the document. We
have written testimony that I would like to submit, but let me
just go through this.
The Chairman. It will be made complete in the record.
Mr. Natsios. Thank you very much.
I think we think of this as a tsunami. It was actually two
events, an earthquake and then a tsunami. The earthquake is the
fourth worst in recorded history. So, if there had been no
tsunami, we still would have had widespread damage to the
infrastructure in Aceh. In fact, 70 percent of the bridges in
the interior of the island that were unaffected by the tsunami
were destroyed by the earthquake. As Paul Wolfowitz just said,
some of the roads have subsided 2 or 3 feet. That was not from
the tsunami. That is from the earthquake, but to have both of
these simultaneously within an hour of each other was simply
unprecedented in its magnitude.
[Note.--All slides presented by Hon. Natsios can be found
at the end of his statement.]
There is a map here, in the presentation, as to where the
areas are that were affected, and the red line are the coast
lines of the area affected. This actually even affected Somalia
and Kenya. There were people killed. Fishermen were killed in
Somalia and Kenya by this tsunami that moved at 500 miles an
hour. Most waves travel at 30 to 40 miles an hour. It was not
the wave itself that killed people. It was the power of the
wave, the force of it at 500 miles an hour that actually killed
people.
The next slide indicates the way in which the international
humanitarian disaster response system of the U.S. Government
operates. Under Federal law of the Foreign Assistance Act, the
President names an international coordinator of disaster
response. I was named by President Bush, as AID Administrators
have for the last 40 years, to take that role. There is a
mechanism in Federal regulation that is a State Department AID
rule and it says the Ambassador has to declare a disaster
before we can mobilize our resources. Those declarations of
disaster were done on Sunday, the day of the event itself.
And we mobilized the disaster assistance response team,
which is sort of a military-like unit in AID that goes out to
the field. It is sort of like a company is, or a battalion is,
and it does the response for the U.S. Government. It is
composed of people from many Federal agencies but led by USAID.
We focus on four things in all disaster responses, whether
they are natural disasters or wars or famines, food, water and
sanitation, health, and shelter, because these are the things
that kill people in an emergency. This is the emergency
response phase.
Then we move into rehabilitation and reconstruction. We
used to do these things sequentially, but in the last decade,
we have realized these things are all done simultaneously. We
will provide humanitarian relief to people 6 months from now,
very vulnerable populations like orphans, for example. And we
will move into the reconstruction phase. We are already doing
reconstruction even a month after the emergency. So these are
not sequential. They are simultaneous.
The next slide, No. 4, indicates one thing we did the first
week. We began cash-for-work programs with small amounts of
money, $4 or $5 a day, particularly in Sri Lanka and in India
and in Indonesia, to get people moving again. This is both a
therapy for people, many of whom are in psychological shock.
Their entire neighborhood has been wiped out. Their families
have been wiped out. Their businesses are gone. Their jobs are
gone. They have no income. Their houses are gone. So we want to
get the people back working, doing something constructive,
because for psychological reasons, it is very important.
Second, we want to get the economy moving by getting money
moving. Most of these people do not have jobs because the
businesses were destroyed by the tsunami or by the earthquake.
So we did this very rapidly. There were thousands of jobs
literally created by our partner organizations with funding
from the U.S. Government within the first week.
The next slide. We also moved very rapidly into
microfinance. There were some microfinance institutions, one of
which in Indonesia that we started many years ago. We stopped
funding it years ago. It has 56,000 chapters to it. This is an
AID project from 20 years ago. It is one of the largest
microfinance networks in the world spectacularly successful.
There were 14 offices in Aceh of this organization, chapters
just in the capital city; 13 of them were destroyed. They were
small banks basically. They were destroyed. All the staff was
killed. All the money is gone and the buildings are all gone.
So only one of the offices was left, but we are using the
microfinance networks that were established many years ago as a
development intervention in Indonesia to begin to recapitalize
businesses to get the markets moving and to get money moving
through people's families so that the business community can
reestablish itself. It is very important.
Senator Frist talked about the importance of water.
President Bush has proposed, and we have implemented, the safe
water for the poor program, which is a Federal U.S. Government
initiative administered by AID, funded by the Congress, which
we appreciate very much, to create safe water around the world.
It is to purify water not at the source, which is the
traditional means, but at the consumption level, because lots
of bad things happen to water between a water purification
plant and when it gets to people's homes in many developing
countries.
We have a plant that produces a little bottle. This little
packet is what we use in Latin America. I gave away my last
bottle to a media reporter who was interested. It is a little
bottle. It costs 50 cents to produce it. That bottle, one
capful chlorinates 10 liters of water, which is enough for a
family for a day. And we produce 7,000 of those a day, at a
factory in Indonesia, for use among the poor who have dirty
water that they normally would have to drink around Indonesia.
We diverted the production from that plant for Banda Aceh. We
moved 70,000 bottles of this and packets of this stuff to Banda
Aceh within the first week. We simply took the existing
production, moved it in there, using U.S. military transport
planes. This is very useful. This is another instance of
integration of USAID and the use of military logistics
capacity.
What we did was, we did a mass distribution. So 75 percent
of the families had these available to them within a few days.
It was the NGO community and the U.N. agencies and the IOM, the
International Organization for Migration, and our partner
organization, DAI, that distributed this, on the retail level,
to people in the communities that were displaced.
The next slide shows the relief effort where there is a
U.S. Government helicopter, U.S. military helicopter, and AID
relief supplies. We have four warehouses around the world, the
closest of which to this region is in Dubai, where we moved
stuff within a few days into that region. Then the distribution
of this into the area was done by the U.S. military. We
established a system of validation where AID officers were
placed in all of the major military units, and before a
logistics task was undertaken by them, we validated it that it
conformed to international humanitarian relief protocols
because the military said we do not know the protocols. We
really want you to help us. We do not know which NGO or which
is more important than one other NGO. There are partner
organizations that have been trained in this and know how to do
this, and we wanted to order these tasks of the U.S. military
based on these protocols that would save the most lives in the
shortest amount of time. That is the principle. How do you save
the most lives in the shortest period of time? And we did that
in a very collaborative, integrated way with the military.
I might add we have never done this with this level of
integration before. This was not an individual agency response.
This was a U.S. Government response with the State Department,
AID, and the U.S. military all functioning as an integrated
team, which does not always happen, even though we would like
it to. It really did happen in this case. And our offices are
reporting to me we need to build this into doctrine so we can
do this again the same way.
The budget that President Bush announced yesterday in the
supplemental is, we think--we are checking this now--the most
generous in the history of the United States for a natural
disaster, a single event. Nine hundred and fifty million
dollars has been proposed, and I would like to break down for
you how on the reconstruction side of this and rehabilitation
side of this will be spent.
Three hundred and thirty-nine million dollars will be spent
out of this $950 million for infrastructure reconstruction,
roads, schools, water distribution systems, bridges. We are now
working with the ministries of the countries that were most
severely damaged because they are in charge of their own
reconstruction. We need to emphasize this. It is not
international agencies. It is not AID agencies. It is not NGOs
in charge. It is the government in charge. These are all
democratically elected governments. This is not Darfur. This is
not Rwanda after the genocide. This is not a post-conflict
situation, even though there have been insurgencies in both
countries. These are parliamentary democracies. We need to
respect their leadership and follow their lead and work with
them on what is appropriate, what is not appropriate from our
own perspective. We were doing that very cooperatively and very
collaboratively.
One hundred and sixty-eight million dollars of this budget
will be spent for the transition of victims and survivors back
to their communities in the form of food aid, shelter, housing
reconstruction, education, and programs that help people get
back to work and establish businesses. I just mentioned some of
those.
There is $35 million for disaster early warning systems. I
might add the biggest risk in the Indian Ocean is not tsunamis.
It is typhoons; 400,000 people died in the great typhoon of
1974, in Bangladesh alone, in 1 hour. We established an early
warning system with the U.S. Weather Service and the Bangladesh
Government after that emergency that set up an alarm system
from our weather satellites. We did the same thing at the
request of the Government of Vietnam and all of the South
Pacific islands, which are at risk from typhoons. Those systems
have saved millions of lives over the years.
What we should do, I think, is to look at a natural
disaster vulnerability system, not just tsunamis, but also
typhoons, which is a greater risk in this region, so that we
have an alarm and early warning system for both simultaneously
in the same system.
There are $62 million to provide technical assistance for
planning reconstruction activities. If we are going to spend
this much money, we have to ensure that the ministries in the
governments we are working with have the logistical capacity,
the planning capacity, and the accountability systems and the
financial management systems to make sure this works properly.
And finally, there are $346 million to replenish costs
incurred by USAID and DOD in the provision of immediate relief
so that none of our programs in other regions of the world will
be adversely affected.
We have already begun housing reconstruction for temporary
shelters that will house people until the larger reconstruction
program is in full gear, and we are beginning to do that. We
hope this budget goes through quickly.
The next slide indicates the work we are doing with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to do assessments. We are doing
these jointly with AID staff and the U.S. Army Corps about what
the condition is of different elements of the road system in
Aceh. That will help us to design, with the Indonesian
Government, the infrastructure.
The next slide indicates just a picture of what is left of
the major highway in the area of Aceh that was most affected by
the earthquake.
We are beginning to focus our attention on the fishing
fleets now. Of course, these are coastal areas primarily and
they were badly affected by the tsunami and there is a lot of
destruction to the boats you see here on the left. But we are
bringing new boats in now so they can begin to fish again.
Finally, we have the elements of an early warning system.
This will all be done in a coordinated fashion in the
international system. We do not do this alone. The governments
will have to run the early warning systems. So we have got to
make sure that everybody is trained properly and the sensor
devices are in place and the sensors have a communication
system to the national disaster aid agencies in those countries
and then that the communities get a very rapid response and
then people know what to do after they hear the alarm. The
Japanese have just hosted two conferences on this. We are
working with them. They have a lot of expertise in this, and
UNESCO at the United Nations is also expert in this. So we are
working with all of them in an integrated fashion.
So that is a general summary of what the planning is on how
we will spend the $950 million to deal with this terrible
tragedy.
[The slides that were presented and prepared statement of
Mr. Natsios follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Andrew Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC
Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, and members of the Committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify today about U.S. strategies for
relief and reconstruction assistance in response to the recent
devastating tsunami.
The U.S. Government (USG) is authorized under section 491 of the
Foreign Assistance Act to carry out and coordinate international
disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance. As
USAID Administrator, I am the President's Special Coordinator for
International Disaster Assistance. In this role, I can direct all of
the Agency's resources, as well as call upon the assistance of other
USG departments and offices.
I have delegated the operational coordination for foreign disaster
assistance down through the USAID structure to the Director, Office of
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). USAID/OFDA plays a critical
role in the international disaster response framework, working at all
levels to ensure that an appropriate, effective, and efficient response
is provided to those who are suffering. Because the USG provides over
40 percent of all humanitarian assistance funds worldwide from all
donor governments, our role in disaster assistance has been long-
standing, extensive, and marked by deep involvement.
USAID has developed systems for immediate response to disasters,
including rapidly-deployable Disaster Assistance Response Teams
(DARTs), and Washington, DC-based Response Management Teams to support
the field operations. In order to respond quickly and effectively,
USAID/OFDA has refined the Incident Command System (ICS), which was
developed by the U.S. Forest Service to fight forest fires. ICS is a
command and control tool in a disaster response. It provides a means to
coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the
common goal of saving lives, property, and the environment.
This system has since been adopted by many response organizations,
both domestically and internationally. Through these mechanisms and
over forty years of experience in responding to international
disasters, USAID is able to incorporate a wide variety of skills and
resources in its response. Clearly, the system works.
USAID consistently has received favorable reviews on its disaster
relief operations from the General Accounting Office (GAO) and has
helped untold millions of people affected by disasters worldwide.
Organizational reforms at USAID, improved interagency coordination,
and flexibility have marked our response to the unprecedented
devastation of the Tsunami disaster. The United States responded
rapidly and as a team--across USG agency boundaries as well as in
partnership with non-government organizations (NGOs), corporations,
governments, and other relief agencies. This enabled us to mobilize the
people and resources that were crucial to saving lives and alleviating
suffering. Let me elaborate on these points.
Coordination
The very day the earthquake hit, USAID mobilized Disaster
Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) and USAID Mission staff within hours
after the disaster hit. Approximately 50 DART members and more than 100
USAID Mission staff in Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand were
involved in the overall coordination of relief and reconstruction
activities, reviewed NGO, U.N. and host government funding requests,
and recommended appropriate USG relief efforts. A round-the-clock
Response Management Team (RMT) was established in Washington as a
backstop to the field staff and point of contact for information,
assistance, and coordination.
In disasters of this magnitude, it is absolutely essential to
coordinate civilian response activities with those of the U.S.
military. Let me take this opportunity to personally thank the
President and the military for rapidly committing the assets that were
needed to the region. Without their strong logistical support and the
staff and equipment they made available, our response would not have
been as effective as it was.
Natural disasters and critical military operations have seen
cooperation between USAID and the Department of Defense expand
dramatically over the last several years. Key to this cooperation has
been the creation of effective coordination mechanisms--from the
tactical field level all the way up to the strategic headquarters
level--that has involved USAID staff at critical points in the
decisionmaking process. What we have witnessed over the past several
weeks is substantial progress toward the seamless cooperation of both
organizations and is the result of hard work long before the earthquake
and tsunamis hit. The efforts of both DOD and USAID to build
relationships that bring the capabilities and expertise of each into an
effective partnership have proven their worth in this disaster, and we
will continue this approach of active engagement and planning with DOD.
Let me explain how the relationship is working by citing what took
place in Thailand. Thailand generously offered the use of Utapao
airbase as the humanitarian assistance hub for Tsunami relief. There,
the DART established a Military Liaison Cell to validate and prioritize
requests for assistance. This helped ensure that U.S. and other
coalition military resources were put to use in the most effective and
efficient manner, according to accepted humanitarian relief protocols,
as opposed to a ``first come, first served'' basis. Liaison officers
from the affected countries' militaries as well as from militaries of
other donor nations and the United Nations also participated in the
coordination process. The military's willingness to follow USAID
guidance on the best use of their assets to support local governments
and NGOs was a milestone in our relationship. I am convinced that this
coordination was key to saving lives, feeding people, and relieving
great suffering. USAID also placed staff at the Pacific Command
Headquarters in Hawaii, where much of the planning for the U.S.
military's role in the relief effort originated under Admiral Tom
Fargo's leadership.
As we move from relief to reconstruction, USAID and DOD are already
working to ensure a seamless and smooth transition from reliance on
military assets to those of civilian agencies. Towards this end,
USAID's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, Mark
Ward, just returned from a trip with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to the
region where they discussed concrete steps to ensure that civilian
agencies are in position to assume the functions initially provided by
the U.S. military.
One of the more remarkable examples of cooperation involved a USAID
Food for Peace Officer, Herbie Smith, and the USS Abraham Lincoln. The
Abraham Lincoln, offshore at Banda Aceh, could produce tens of
thousands of gallons of potable water. The only problem was that there
was no way to get it to people on shore. Herbie immediately went out
and bought a huge number of water jugs from local markets throughout
Indonesia and arranged with the military to get the jugs transported to
the Abraham Lincoln. Military personnel then filled the jugs with clean
water, and helicopters distributed the water in Aceh. This is but one
example of how USAID's experienced staff, working hand-in-hand with the
military, moved assistance to needy people.
Organizational Reforms at USAID Ensure Integrated Response
USAID's relief effort in response to the Tsunami was based on the
significant procedural and policy changes that govern how the Agency
responds to overseas disasters. We have both revamped our
organizational approach and accelerated the time perspective under
which we conduct relief operations. These changes have been in the
works for the last several years. They are based largely on our
experiences with Hurricane Mitch, as well as applying the lessons we
learned in Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Until recently, a compartmentalized approach was used in responding
to disasters overseas. USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) would
handle emergency food needs, while USAID's OFDA would respond to
immediate non-food necessities. If the disaster struck in a ``country
in transition,'' USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) would
also be called to respond. After immediate life-saving assistance was
provided, USAID's respective regional bureau would step in to work on
reconstruction and rehabilitation. This approach was very segmented,
both chronologically and organizationally. It resulted in lost
opportunities in the use of relief initiatives that could have been
used more strategically to accelerate reconstruction, encourage
community participation, and build a foundation for development. In
contrast to the past, USAID now takes a more holistic approach
organizationally and a longer term view operationally.
USAID is now in the position to draw immediately from wide-ranging
expertise found throughout the Agency and in the rest of the USG. In
effectively spearheading the USG's disaster response, our activities
are no longer stove-piped into different offices and bureaus within the
Agency. In the Tsunami relief effort, USAID's DART and RMT included
staff not only from OFDA, but also from several other USAID offices and
bureaus, including FFP, OTI, the Office of Democracy and Governance,
the Bureau for Global Health, the Bureau for Asia and the Near East as
well as USAID Missions in the affected area and the Bureau for
Legislative and Public Affairs. Staff from USAID Missions in Jakarta,
Colombo, New Delhi, and Bangkok were embedded into the DART structure
from the beginning. In this regard, it is important to note the value
of having a preexisting USAID mission in the region. We have also
recruited staff for the DART and RMT from other federal agencies, such
as DOD, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health and
Human Services, including the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry, the Department of Agriculture, including the U.S. Forest
Service, and the Bureau for Land Management. The DART and RMT also used
staff from outside the federal government, including the Fairfax and
Los Angeles Search and Rescue teams, the University of Texas, and the
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance.
Quick Response
USAID has drawn upon its long experience in humanitarian relief to
establish the relationships and agreements necessary to quickly
mobilize all available assets when a disaster strikes. The Agency
worked in partnership with the global civilian humanitarian relief
community--NGOs and international organizations--and used its pre-
positioned food stocks in Dubai to rapidly mobilize relief operations
in affected countries. Bringing together the NGO experience, technical
skills, and resources adds tremendous value to our response efforts. In
the Tsunami disaster, you have seen the fruits of that labor.
The great size and complexity of the response put flexibility and
ingenuity at a premium. This was in evidence in actions that USAID
undertook in conjunction with two of its partners, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and Development Alternatives (DAI).
Prior to the earthquake, humanitarian organizations were not permitted
into Aceh province without express permission by the Government of
Indonesia. As it turns out, a network of staff from IOM and DAI did
manage to retain a strong relationship with provincial officials in
spite of this restriction. USAID and other donors capitalized on the
influence of IOM and DAI by providing them with funding to help move
relief commodities into Aceh from Medan. This was done with the help of
80 trucks contracted by USAID/Indonesia.
The Cuny Principle
USAID's policy of consolidating and coordinating relief efforts
within the Agency and across the USG is only part of our new approach.
Another is our focus on incorporating development objectives for
economic and social change into relief efforts from the very beginning
of a response. Our policy is to plan and carry out relief,
rehabilitation, and reconstruction simultaneously.
More than two decades ago the late, legendary disaster expert, Fred
Cuny, published a groundbreaking book, ``Disasters and Development''
which laid out his long experience in working with the victims of
natural disasters around the world. His vision was revolutionary, yet
breathtakingly simple. In a nutshell: The talent and resilience of
people struck by disaster are the most powerful forces for the
rehabilitation and reconstruction of societies struck by disaster. The
people in their communities are the first responders. Moreover, they
embody strengths that exist in no other group--strengths that
absolutely must be harnessed if we are to build positive change in the
affected society.
Natural disasters--earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, tsunamis--
hurt people and cripple economies. They kill; they maim; and they
destroy. But victims are never helpless. These people know their
environment. They know their society. They are very likely to have
coped with other disasters in their lives. They, more than anyone, want
to recover. And, as the shock of the disaster subsides, new
opportunities emerge that can be exploited to build a more sustainable,
more equitable, and, in many cases, a less violent society. Disaster
survivors are often among the strongest voices for change.
External assistance must capitalize on these opportunities.
Immediate physical needs have to be met: Clean water and sanitation,
health care, food, and shelter. But the best way for outsiders to
assist is to provide help that is part of a long-term solution defined
by local actors, rather than just a hand-out. In practice, this means
that relief assistance efforts should focus on recovery and renewal
from the very beginning. While providing life-saving assistance, we
need to get markets functioning again through activities such as cash
for work that creates a demand for goods and services. In short, a
return to normalcy depends on reviving the local economy, and that
means restoring local markets.
Relief assistance should help reestablish local government and
civil authorities by responding to their priorities in vital relief
efforts. Our interventions should aim at restarting social services at
the local level--schools, primary health care clinics, water treatment
facilities, and so on. And it is vital, early on, that we assist
stricken families with the help they need to rehabilitate destroyed
housing and restore ruined livelihoods. Again, the assistance effort
should focus on development even as it provides short-term relief.
Fred was killed in Chechnya in 1995, almost ten years ago. Yet the
Indian Ocean tsunami shows that his vision is as relevant as ever. In
brief, we must work to see that something good can emerge out of
destruction.
This approach to relief and development assistance forms the
cornerstone of USAID's programming strategy. It applies operating
principles that I recently codified as USAID's ``Nine Principles of
Development and Reconstruction Assistance.'' For example, the Principle
of Ownership states that the affected people themselves own their
relief and recovery process. The Principle of Capacity-Building
requires that USAID interventions strengthen local institutions. The
Principle of Sustainability says that program impact must endure after
assistance ends. I am attaching a summary of these principles to this
testimony.
Relief Efforts Also Address Trauma and the Increased Risk of Human
Trafficking
USAID's programs are helping survivors to deal with trauma and
providing for a return to a sense of normalcy and stability in their
communities. The family is the cornerstone of psychological well-being
and the focus of many of our efforts. USAID is supporting programs that
unite dislocated children with extended family members. We are also
funding initiatives that restore a sense of security and stability for
children by providing them with a structured environment. In such
places, children can be supervised while adult family members engage in
rebuilding efforts or income-generating activities.
USAID worked with our partners to initiate public awareness
campaigns on the added risks that women and children face and their
vulnerability to falling victims to traffickers. These risks increase
when people are displaced, when children are separated from their
families, when livelihoods are ruined, and when infrastructure is
destroyed. While so far there is no evidence to suggest that
trafficking has increased, we are redoubling our efforts to educate
women and children and relief workers to these risks, and to help
government organizations in affected countries address issues of
protection and abuse among affected populations. In Sri Lanka, for
example, USAID has funded UNICEF and Save the Children/UK to establish
a registry of orphans. We are also funding the Solidarity Center to
provide training for relief workers and to strengthen collaborative
efforts on the part of government and civil society to protect
children. In Indonesia, similar public awareness campaigns are being
targeted to the displaced and training provided for relief workers who
come in contact with these populations.
Helping Countries Rebuild: The U.S. Tsunami Relief, Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction Program and USAID's Role
The USG Tsunami Reconstruction Program will support efforts on the
part of national governments and local communities to rebuild quickly,
restart their economic engines, and harness the unprecedented resources
and support that is coming from around the world. The goals are to save
lives, support reconstruction. priorities of affected countries and
regions and to advance a wide range of development needs and foreign
policy interests. The United States will continue to work closely with
affected countries and other donors as we assess needs and undertake
reconstruction activities.
President Bush is seeking $950 million as part of the supplemental
appropriations request to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction
of areas devastated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and to cover the costs
of the USG's relief efforts to date. This is the most generous USG
response to a foreign natural disaster in American history.
Our reconstruction program is built around five themes:
--One, using relief to foster reconstruction, self-sufficiency and
build a foundation for future development. Cash-for-work, micro-finance
and livelihood programs are helping to get markets working, building
individual and community self-sufficiency.
--Two, providing technical assistance to affected governments with
immediate survey and planning work to help them make the best decisions
about utilizing the considerable contributions from the world
community. This assistance will include support to assist local
authorities, communities and local civil society organizations and
ensure their full participation in planning, prioritizing and
undertaking reconstruction programs. Proper emphasis is being placed on
inclusion, transparency, and accountability in all such efforts.
--Three, financial and technical support to rebuild and improve
infrastructure, including important, high visibility transportation and
public utilities projects such as schools, roads, bridges, and water
treatment plants, which will serve as major USG interventions. A local
communities grants program will support small scale infrastructure
reconstruction including clinics, schools, markets and other community-
level infrastructure identified by communities.
--Four, helping individuals to rejoin the workforce and return to
their communities by helping individuals rebuild their homes, replace
lost assets, and get back to work. Grants, small loans, and cash-for-
work programs will pump much needed money directly into the hardest hit
communities. This will allow disaster victims to take control of their
own lives and start rebuilding their businesses and communities. The
success of our efforts requires us to expand and build upon ongoing
partnerships with U.S. and local NGOs in creating these jobs and income
opportunities.
--And, five, building the capacity within the affected governments
to prepare for and respond to future disasters. This will include U.S.
support for a regional tsunami early warning system being designed
collaboratively by other countries and donors. We will also support
efforts in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India to strengthen the
communications that alert communities to imminent threats, as well as a
community-based outreach and training program so that people know what
to do when they hear an alarm. We will also aid governments put in
place measures to help national, provincial and local government guide
reconstruction that will be environmentally-sound and infrastructure
that is more resilient to likely natural disasters.
Accountability
As USAID continues to make major improvements in its approach and
operations, we have not forgotten one of our fundamental obligations--
ensuring the proper and effective use of U.S. Government funding. USAID
takes its responsibility as steward of taxpayer money very seriously.
For this purpose, USAID meets regularly with host governments and
contractors and grantees to ensure that all USAID-funded activities are
well coordinated and complement other programs on the ground. USAID
staff members make regular field visits to observe the progress of
USAID-funded programs. Our missions are also working with civil society
organizations in the countries, such as the Forum on Aceh Recovery, to
assist efforts of local organizations to track and monitor relief and
recovery budgets.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been present from the
inception of our response to ensure high levels of accountability for
public funds and to help guard against possible waste, fraud, and
corruption. As with USAID projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, the OIG has
been asked to conduct ``concurrent financial and performance audits.''
These audits are conducted as reconstruction or other activities unfold
rather than after they are largely complete so that any accountability
or program effectiveness issues can be identified and corrected at an
early stage. For example, USAlD/Indonesia has already requested that
OIG Regional Inspector General Office in Manila perform concurrent
audits of work being performed by the contractors and grantees in Aceh
and Northern Sumatra. Once supplemental moneys for our efforts there
are received, auditors will be engaged at all levels of programming for
these concurrent audits, from the development of statements of work to
implementation of the contracts.
Partnering to Meet the Challenges Ahead
The President, and former Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush,
have asked people to reach deep into their pockets to help those
affected by this disaster. And the response of the American people--
individuals, as well as civic associations, churches, and
corporations--has been overwhelming. Americans have donated more than
$800 million to humanitarian agencies--a total amount second only to 9/
11. As one gauge of public response, it is interesting to note that
USAID has had more than a million visitors to our Tsunami website. Some
days early on in the crisis registered more than 80,000.
The Agency is also actively working with the community of private
voluntary organizations, as well as large corporate partners, to build
public-private alliances in support of medium to long-term
reconstruction efforts in the region. For example, USAID has already
initiated a partnership with Mars, Incorporated, which has generously
committed $1 million to assist vulnerable children in the affected
area. Their generosity will be met by a matching grant from USAID. The
USAID and Mars partnership to fund will focus on meeting the needs of
vulnerable children in the tsunami-affected areas of Indonesia and
India. Funds will be channeled to international and local relief
organizations that are working in the affected areas. This is a great
example of the USG helping channel the generosity of the private sector
to help vulnerable children during this crisis.
I would like to thank President Bush, and the two former Presidents
as well, for mobilizing this remarkable display of public support. And
I would like to thank the American people--for showing the world once
again what a compassionate people we truly are.
The compassion of Americans is at the very core of what USAID
stands for. By giving the citizens of emerging nations a helping hand
as they work to improve their societies and economies, we show the
world the best of the United States. As the President said, ``Well
after the immediate danger passes, USAID is still going to be in the
hard-hit areas . . . helping the people improve their schools and
develop health services and mitigate conflict and reinvigorate local
economies, and help build institutions of democracy, so people can live
in peace and freedom.''
The policy changes that I have described here today, the results of
which you have seen in the remarkable relief efforts underway in South
Asia, are all part of living up to the trust that the American people
have placed in us. The world is a complex place, and interventions have
to be designed accordingly. We have to stay flexible, keep our eye on
the long-term objectives, and work together. This is the only way
forward. And this is the new USAID. All Americans can be proud of its
performance.
Thank you.
______
Principles of Development and Reconstruction Assistance
The following nine principles are the key tenets of USAID's work.
The principles are not a checklist. They are a summary of the
characteristics of successful assistance programs. They cannot be
applied the same way in each situation but should serve as a reference
for development practitioners as they design and implement programs.
PRINCIPLE OF OWNERSHIP
Recognize that a country and its people own, and participate in,
their social and economic development.
PRINCIPLE OF CAPACITY-BUILDING
Strengthen local institutions and promote appropriate policies
essential to economic growth and good governance. Recognize that there
are limits to a country's and its institutions' ability to absorb large
amounts of assistance.
PRINCIPLE OF PARTNERSHIP
Achieve common development objectives through close collaboration
with governments, communities, donors, NGOs, international
organizations, universities, and the private sector.
PRINCIPLE OF SELECTIVITY
Allocate resources to countries and programs based on need, policy
performance and foreign policy interests.
PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY
Design programs in a way that ensures their impact endures after
assistance ends.
PRINCIPLE OF AGILITY
Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities and
minimize the cost of delivering assistance.
PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Assign individual responsibility for managing tax-payer funds, and
apply transparent systems for tracking funds and monitoring progress
toward objectives.
PRINCIPLE OF ASSESSMENT
Tailor programs based on careful research and understanding of
local conditions and best practices in international development
assistance.
PRINCIPLE OF RESULTS
Focus resources through programs of sufficient size and scale to
achieve clearly defined and measurable objectives critical to a
country's needs. Maximize cost efficiency and timely delivery of
services while ensuring objectives are met.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Natsios.
We will now have questions.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Just before questions, could I ask General
Allen to say a word on behalf of our wonderful men and women in
uniform? He is the one on this panel best positioned to say
something on that score.
The Chairman. Very well. General Allen.
STATEMENT OF BG JOHN ALLEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity today to speak on behalf of the men and women.
I have been in the service over 30 years at this point, and
I have to tell you, sir, I was unprepared for the extent of the
devastation that we encountered on the ground in the countries
to whom we brought aid. No verbal picture can ever adequately
describe it. No camera can ever capture the image of desperate
suffering that the populations in this region encountered.
But to this region came the American military, the U.S. men
and women of our country. I have spoken to many of these men
and women who served in Operation Unified Assistance, and not
one was unmoved by the scope and the magnitude of this
disaster. Every person, with whom I spoke, was deeply honored
to have been a part of this relief effort, but also, at the
same time deeply humbled, humbled at the opportunity to
contribute and at the courage and the dignity and the gratitude
of the victims and the countries themselves.
America's sons and daughters serving in these distant
regions embodied all of the finest traditions and the highest
values of the United States of America. They came quickly. They
served quietly, and they departed without fanfare, seeking no
recognition for themselves, deriving pleasure and reward only
in the saving of lives and the easing of suffering.
We had the chance to meet with members of all of the
services on the ground. Our first day, as we landed from a
helicopter, in Banda Aceh, out from the tree line came very
quickly, a crowd of about 100 sailors who had come from the
Abraham Lincoln whose silhouette you could see off the beach.
It has now become known as the Gray Angel. Those hundred
sailors had all volunteered to come ashore, and there were 100
each day coming ashore to volunteer to do nothing less than to
carry food or to carry water, to load the aircraft, to do all
that they could. Whether they were otherwise employed on the
nuclear power plant of that aircraft carrier or repairing
highly sophisticated equipment, they just wanted to help. They
did that every day for the entire operation.
We went to Sri Lanka to a school in a town called Galle
that had been undermined by the waves and had largely
collapsed. And there in the 100-degree heat were marines and
seabees working to knock down that school to begin to build a
new one. We had the opportunity to speak with the teachers at
that school, and we asked them what they thought of those
seabees, those young sailors and those young marines. And
instantaneously there were spontaneous smiles and words of
congratulations and thanks.
On the runway at the Thai naval air base of Uttapal, United
States C-130s were parked wing tip to wing tip being loaded and
offloaded constantly by young Air Force men and women, who were
working in high humidity and high heat around the clock, to
push those supplies forward as fast as they possibly could,
working to the outer edge of their endurance.
And finally, probably one of the most perfect examples came
when I had the opportunity to stand in a tent along the runway
of the airstrip at Banda Aceh. That runway at Banda Aceh was
clearly the single point where all of the aid was coming in to
northern Sumatra and coming in and being distributed. It was a
true hub. Airplanes were coming in constantly 24 hours a day.
Helicopter activity was going on as the distribution to the
further points was conducted. And all of that was being
orchestrated by young Air Force men and women from the tanker
airlift control element, about 20 of them, young airmen. And if
that could be called a symphony or an orchestra, they were all
the maestros in moving those airplanes along the ground and
loading and unloading that cargo. And standing in that tent
with a young Air Force major who commanded that group, I
observed, largely in tribute, that if those 20 young men and
women went away tomorrow, that would be a single point of
failure, and this would all grind to a halt.
Now, it had been words of tribute. I think he took it a
little differently. He took one step toward me in the half-
light of the tent, looked me in the eye, and said, ``we will
not fail.'' Those words were emblematic of the can-do attitude
of every man and woman in uniform that served in Operation
Unified Assistance. Those were courageous words and words that
described heroic acts.
Let me close, sir, by offering my sincere thanks first to
those who served in this contingency and who are at this very
moment, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, still continuing to save
lives and to restore hope to a shattered population.
It is also important to note that we could not have been as
effective as we were in this operation had it not been for the
immediate cooperation of Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia who
selflessly, generously, and unhesitatingly made their
facilities available for the rescue and the relief operations.
Our longstanding and cordial relations with these countries
converted quickly into access to airfields and port facilities
and made all the difference in the emergency of the early
response and our continued efforts today.
Finally, sir, I would be remiss if I did not publicly
recognize the role of this committee and the U.S. Congress in
supporting the U.S. military in general and Operation Unified
Assistance in particular. I can say unequivocally no other
country in the world could have responded as did the United
States of America. In the earliest moments of this crisis,
desperate voices were raised in that region, and there was a
cry that went out, who will help us? Who will come? The
response was from the United States. It was clear and it was
immediate. America will help you. We are coming.
As our military role in this crisis draws to a close,
American units are departing the region, even as I speak, some
for home and for families and loved ones, and others to
continue on with other missions. The fact that we could help,
the fact that we could get there so quickly, and the kinds of
capabilities we brought to this crisis is a direct result of
the support of the U.S. Congress for our U.S. military. I am
not only proud of our services, I am proud of that support,
sir, and I am deeply grateful for it.
Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee and
thank you for your leadership, sir.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, General Allen. Our
hearing is timely because our military forces are still there.
We have an opportunity to express appreciation to them, and we
appreciate so much your very thoughtful and compelling
testimony about their contributions. We have an opportunity to
pay tribute today, likewise, to those in our State Department,
those in USAID, in NGOs, and others who will be continuing on.
One of the reasons for the hearing is to recognize the
extraordinary leadership that in an interagency way, as
Secretary Wolfowitz said, has been exemplified, but also to
indicate, as the $950 million the President has asked for, that
this is a long trail ahead. So often these emergency situations
are overtaken by other emergencies and other compelling needs.
This one will not go away. The enormity you have been
describing is very clear, and the graphics you have presented
to us and to the press and to the public are very important.
Let me suggest that we will have an 8-minute round of
questions. If there are more questions after that, we will have
another round. We will have another panel following this. So I
think members are mindful of that.
Let me start the questioning by asking you, Secretary
Larson. You have outlined at least seven task forces that have
been in operation at the Federal level. Who is ultimately
responsible for coordination of all of these efforts that have
been described by the witnesses today?
Mr. Larson. Now, as we move into a process that, while it
continues to have relief elements, is more focused on
reconstruction, the structure that we have set up is one where
the State Department will be bringing together the agencies
that are involved in this and trying to work with everyone to
establish policy and priorities for the funding the President
is requesting. Obviously, USAID is our principal implementing
agency on the ground and is the one that is doing the work
going forward.
We have established, within the Economic Bureau of the
State Department, a very small task force with a handful of
additional people that can help provide the impetus and the
ongoing energy that, I think, you and other members of the
committee have suggested has to be there for this to be a
sustained effort.
The Chairman. Secretary Wolfowitz, you have mentioned, as
we talked about the $950 million supplemental appropriation,
that this does not include all of the operation costs already
incurred by the Department of Defense for tsunami-related
operations. How will those costs be covered?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I believe, actually, they will be covered
out of this supplemental, but the original request only covered
the specific things that applied from what we call, I guess,
ODACA, which is the specific humanitarian relief. But out of
this $950 million, $346 million, we estimate, will cover
already incurred expenses of DOD and USAID. General Allen, do
you have the exact numbers? I think it is about a two-thirds/
one-third split.
The Chairman. Well, that really answered my question
because essentially we know that the other relief expenditures
are being covered. So, the point is that other obligations,
other activities our country has elsewhere will not suffer.
Essentially this appropriation is going to cover the
expenditures, and that would be true of our military
operations.
Mr. Wolfowitz. That is right, with $600 million for
reconstruction.
It is worth emphasizing too, Mr. Chairman, we are from the
Government, but the private sector is doing amazing things. As
you know, former Presidents Bush and Clinton have led a
fundraising effort, which I am told--I do not mean that effort
alone, but the American people in their various voluntary ways
have already pledged something like $700 million of private
assistance. I think that also deserves a special mention.
The Chairman. It certainly does. Dr. Frist mentioned that
the meter is still running. It may be moving toward the $800
million or the $900 million figure.
Secretary Wolfowitz, the seeds of democracy have been
implanted and have been taking hold in Indonesia for some time.
As you mentioned, you served as our distinguished Ambassador to
the country, and it was my privilege to visit with you during
that period of time.
But now, one of the consequences of this transition is a
new role for the Indonesian military, the TNI. Now, please
provide the committee, today, with your assessment of TNI's
changing role. In addition, would it be helpful to have a level
of cooperation with our authorities in connection with the
ongoing Timika investigation, as well as the cooperation that
we are hopeful that we will have, as our military leaves, as
our civilians are still there? The complications of all of this
are enormous and beyond this hearing today. But give us some
impression of what our goals ought to be with regard to both
democracy and the military, including an increased level of our
participation or cooperation with both.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me take a stab at it. As you know, it is
a big and complicated question, and I know Secretary Rice is
engaged currently and, I think, over the coming week or two in
consultation with Members of the Congress about this issue,
which is a sensitive issue. Both the executive branch and the
Congress have imposed a number of restrictions in the past on
our cooperation with the Indonesian military, largely in
reaction to some pretty significant human rights abuses and
most significantly the atrocities that were committed in East
Timor in 1998.
I am not about to sit here and tell you that everything is
fine now by any means, but I would say two important points of
progress that really need to be noted. No. 1, most importantly,
it is a different government there now, and it is a government
that is democratically elected that I believe is deeply
committed to the goals of democratic reform and civilian
control of the military. They have, for only the second time in
their history, a civilian Defense Minister, and he happens to
be the same one who was the first civilian Defense Minister,
someone I know from my time in Jakarta, who is very committed
to the idea of civilian control and has a big job in front of
him. It is a government, I think, that wants us to develop a
better relationship with the Indonesian military and deserves
our support.
Second, while the record is far from perfect, it is
certainly worth noting that the Indonesian military has stayed
in the background, as it should have, but as some people might
have been surprised, Indonesia transformed to a country that
had once been largely run by the military to one that is now
run by democratically elected government, and, in fact, the 100
seats that they used to have assigned to military in the
Indonesian Parliament have been taken away. There is a lot of
change, in short, and, I think, as important as it is to work
for an accounting of things that were done in the past, I do
think this is a new era and the challenges of responding to the
tsunami just underscore the importance of making sure that we
have the right tools going forward.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Do you have a comment? Yes, Secretary Larson.
Mr. Larson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a couple
of brief comments to what Secretary Wolfowitz said. Clearly, we
want to continue to work hard to ensure accountability and
ensure a strong human rights performance and to make sure there
is accountability for the past abuses. We do feel that the
cooperation on the Timika investigations has been constructive
and we welcome that. We do feel that the experience with the
tsunami has indicated areas in which having had more contact
cooperation with the Indonesian military could have had some
advantages. No decisions have been made, but as Secretary
Wolfowitz said, the Secretary of State is examining this issue
and will be interested, I know, in continuing to consult the
Congress on it.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,
I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I think it is
an extremely important hearing.
On Tuesday, we had a meeting of the Maryland delegation
with some of the NGOs. Some of the leading NGOs are
headquartered in our State and are very much involved in the
tsunami relief. We met with them and heard what they are doing,
the efforts they are making, the problems they foresee, and so
forth.
I might say to you, General Allen, that they were quite
complimentary about the role that our military had played and
the essential logistics support the military had provided. They
even pointed out while we did not need the military to build
the school, it was a nice touch that they went in there and did
that, and it made quite an impression on the populace. So I
just want to state that up front.
I am concerned, though, that the well-deserved attention on
the tsunami and the tremendous response may end up diverting
funds and attention away from other humanitarian needs, and
particularly from development efforts, which have been worked
out carefully with local agents on the ground. It takes quite
an effort just to get the confidence of people to enter into
these development plans. And then, if money is not forthcoming
to carry through on that, we lose the momentum that has been
built up and sometimes it is very difficult to reconstruct it.
So I am seeking an assurance that the supplemental request
will completely reimburse USAID for all tsunami-related
expenses so that we will not have a short-changing of other
ongoing programs. Now, where do we stand on that? I commend the
administration's statement, just yesterday, about increasing
the U.S. contribution.
Of course, we have had a tremendous outpouring from the
private sector, a truly staggering response. I think that
reflects something very good about the American people.
But I want to ensure that these other efforts will
continue. Where are we on reimbursements for the tsunami-
related expenses?
Mr. Natsios. Senator, we worked with the OMB and with the
White House on that and provided them the detailed accounting
of what we spent, which is $123 million to date. I was very
concerned myself about this, but the President made very early
on a public statement that all of the money AID has spent on
this will be reimbursed. He did not say in a supplemental, but
as we know, yesterday he announced the supplemental. If this
budget is passed, we will be whole.
I would say something, though, just in terms of timing. For
reasons that may be well understandable, if this part of the
budget does not pass until the third quarter, we will have
severe stress on our humanitarian budget, and then it will
affect our operations elsewhere. But if this budget passes in a
reasonably smooth way, then we will be fine. All the money we
have spent will be reimbursed and it will not affect any
operations anywhere else in the world.
Senator Sarbanes. Has it up to this point affected those
operations to some extent?
Mr. Natsios. We are in the beginning of the second quarter
of the fiscal year, and so our humanitarian relief budget has a
lot more money in it, that we can spend this quarter, for other
efforts elsewhere in the world. However, our budget is under
severe stress not because of the tsunami but because of Darfur,
but because there is a major food emergency in east Africa
right now in Ethiopia. And we are working on it, and we are
working with OMB. There is money in the budget for Sudan, $150
million for food for Darfur in southern Sudan. So money is in
this for other emergencies that is not in our regular budget,
and I would commend that to you. There is also $100 million for
the reconstruction of southern Sudan, in addition to what is
already in the budget.
So there is also money in the budget for Afghanistan and
Iraq. Much of that will go to us. So it is not just the tsunami
we are interested in, in this budget. It is all the other
accounts that also fund many of our programs around the world.
Senator Sarbanes. Let me give you a specific example that I
am concerned about with respect to long-term development
programs. Since emergency food aid needs were greater than
anticipated last year, you reduced the amount of food aid used
to support long-term development. The budget that was just
released cut food aid by another $300 million and transferred
it over to disaster relief. But that, again, raises the
question of cutting sustainable development programs. How are
we going to address that problem?
Mr. Natsios. Well, Senator, the budget was not cut $300
million. It was transferred into an account to do something
very innovative and new, which many of us have been lobbying
for when I was in the NGO community in the nineties for many
years. The President has taken a bold move to change the whole
structure of the food aid account. I will give you an example.
In Afghanistan, we invested United States Government money
that you appropriated in an agricultural development program
that produced a surplus wheat crop 2 years ago, the greatest in
the history of Afghanistan. Prices collapsed as a result of
that and we imported U.S. Government food under title II bought
in the United States, shipped it in, 200,000 tons, when we
could have, if we had the money, purchased the local food and
kept the price at an average level. What happened is that many
of those farmers who were growing wheat said, I am losing
money, I am going to grow poppy now. That is what they did
because we could not use our food account to do local purchase
of food.
The President has proposed of the $1.2 billion budget for
food aid, that $300 million of it be used to allow us to do
local purchase of food in development situations, but mostly
emergency situations to help stimulate agricultural production
in many countries.
There has been no cut in the food aid budget. The food aid
budget, in fact, will be able to buy more food because 30 to 40
percent of our food aid budget is for transportation. It costs
a lot of money to move food from the United States into rural
Afghanistan. If the food is next door, produced locally, there
is very little transportation cost. So this is an innovation.
It is not a cut in the food aid budget. If anything, we will be
able to buy more food if the budget goes through the way it is.
In addition, though, we do recognize there is a problem
with total food because of an emergency. So, in the President's
budget, there is $150 million for additional food aid for Sudan
because there is a food emergency in Sudan, not just in Darfur.
There was a 60-percent crop loss because of a drought in
eastern Sudan, the south, and even in Kordofan Province which
is not in the middle of a conflict. So that is in this budget;
the supplemental budget.
Senator Sarbanes. All too often in emergencies, women and
children have found themselves doubly victimized. They flee
conflict or disaster, end up in camps where they are vulnerable
to physical and sexual abuse, as well as, sometimes,
discrimination in the distribution of food and medical
supplies. What steps are we taking to provide specific
protection for women and children in the wake of this crisis?
Mr. Natsios. Senator, that is a very good question because
that is a serious problem. When we do drops of food--and that
is the last alternative. We have no other way of doing it--we
will air drop food into emergencies, and typically the people
who are strongest get it. So our doctrine over the years has
been to ensure that there is a competent NGO on the ground that
knows how to do this or a U.N. agency like the World Food
Program that receives the food and ensures the most vulnerable
get it. We typically target female heads of household in
emergencies because they are the most vulnerable in terms of
income and also because of protection issues. Human traffickers
will go after women whose spouses are not around to protect
them, and they will particularly go after orphaned children or
children who have been separated from their families.
We have been giving money, $2 million, to UNICEF, to
Catholic Relief Services, and to a number of NGOs to set up a
protection system and a registration system for unaccompanied
children or children who have lost their parents in Banda Aceh
and in Sri Lanka because of this problem. In many countries in
the developing world, there is no birth recording system to
record births, and so there is no record that any of these
children exist except for the parents saying, well, I had six
kids and these are the kids' names. The parents are dead and
the kid is 2 years old. How do we know who the kid belongs to?
The kid cannot even talk yet.
So what is happening now, the NGOs on the ground, with
funding from the U.S. Government to set up such a registration
system in the areas where there has been the largest loss of
life to ensure that we know who the kids are. We do not allow
traffickers to go in and prey on these children.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I also
want to commend you for having this very, very timely hearing.
It is important as the mission is not over. There is a lot more
to be done.
I also want to commend Senator Sarbanes, my colleague, for
the question that he asked. It was a very, very important
question. I am glad that he brought our attention to it.
General, you talked about the fact that we could provide
help and get there so quickly and how critical that was. It was
either yourself or Secretary Wolfowitz.
I had a chance to be in the area with the Senate majority
leader. He was in Sri Lanka. Then we were together in India. We
talked about the Indian response, which was really tremendous.
Even though they suffered great casualties, they had a
tremendous military presence. And there were two observations I
had, and then I will get to my question.
One is that the perception of American military might was,
in many ways, kind of transformed in the region. People saw it
as a tremendous positive. They understood the importance of
that military might and the way it can be used in a
humanitarian capacity.
The second observation--and I got a sense of this when I
had a chance to visit with the Secretary General of NATO at the
end of our trip, after we were in India, Pakistan, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and then, ultimately, in Brussels. He was talking
about the European response or perhaps lack of military
response, lack of ability to move there so quickly, and
indicated that that was cause for reflection on the part of
NATO of its capacity.
What does NATO need to do? It is one, obviously, about
ensuring peace. It is also about being able to respond to
humanitarian situations.
I would be interested in your reflection of the impact of
our response, what it is having in NATO, what it is having upon
our European allies in terms of the way they configure their
forces, in terms of the kind of equipment that they may be
looking at, the kind of training that they may be doing. Do you
see any kind of long-term impact on our allies in terms of
their ability to be able to respond, as they viewed what we
were able to do and what, in fact, the Indians were able to do?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I wish I could say I have seen an impact,
but I think we are dealing with the problem with our NATO
allies that their defense budgets just keep declining, and very
few of them now have the capacity to do even things that they
have been trying to do already. I do not want to diminish it.
We have got a significant NATO contribution in Afghanistan, but
they still fall short of what they would like to be doing
there. Maybe this will be an extra impetus.
I am going to be going to the Wehrkunde conference in
Germany this weekend. You make a very good point that there is
no reason why our European allies--and they did contribute. The
French had an aircraft carrier off the Indonesian coast, but, I
think, it was 3 or 4 weeks after we got there. The
Singaporeans, to pick a different ally, demonstrated even small
countries can make a big difference if they put their minds to
it.
I guess it is worth commenting. We thank the Congress and
the American taxpayer for their support. We thank the American
people for their generosity. It has been noticed, I have to
tell you, in Indonesia, that there has been very little
generosity so far from parts of the Muslim world that are big
on talking about jihad and other things, but when 200,000
people, all of them Muslims in the case of Indonesia, die in
this catastrophe, there is not much help forthcoming. I hope
those people might think a little bit about what they have done
and what they have not done also.
Senator Coleman. I really do hope that there is an
opportunity here to look at what we were able to do, look at
the nature of our forces, look at the type of equipment that we
have. I got a sense, in talking to Secretary General de Hoop
Scheffer from NATO that there is some reflection going on about
whether they could have responded quicker; what type of
equipment do they need to be able to do that. Again, the
history has been one of not making the commitment in terms of
the budget, but perhaps the public might be raising their voice
to say, you know, there is a purpose for having forces that can
respond quickly.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, and I think the point is worth making.
It is not just a matter of the size of the budget, it is a
matter of where you direct it. We are finding, even with an
enormous effort on transforming our forces, a lot of things
that we do that are kind of legacies from the cold war and do
not make a lot of sense anymore. The chairman is familiar with
the debates about whether NATO would go out of area or out of
business. And it is worth commenting, no one at the time ever
dreamed that NATO would be deploying forces to Afghanistan.
So, even though the budgets are declining, there is a
greater sense of a worldwide mission for the alliance. I think,
maybe, if we say, OK, we do think more resources should go to
NATO defense budgets, but within the resources you have let us
allocate them in a way that can allow you to respond in
situations that, during the cold war, we would never have
dreamed of having a NATO response in Afghanistan, much less in
Southeast Asia. But it is a different world, and, I think,
there is room for progress on that front.
Senator Coleman. I am hopeful that this terrible tragedy
provides an opportunity for an awakening or a reflection on the
type of force that can be effective today, again not just in
fighting wars, but in meeting humanitarian needs.
There was very brief mention of the impact of this disaster
on east Africa. I represent a community that has a very
significant Somalian population. I am not sure if this is for
Administrator Natsios or Secretary Larson. But with the very
difficult political situation in Somalia, can you tell me what
kind of presence there we have, if any? Have we been able to
assess the damage? What kind of response have we been able to
offer?
Mr. Natsios. We have given grants to an NGO and to the
World Food Program and I believe--let me just look here. I
think it is $1 million to Somalia. We do know there was damage,
but it is certainly not on the scale of what happened in Sri
Lanka or Aceh. I have the grants right here. I can read them to
you.
Senator Coleman. My hope is it is on the radar screen.
Mr. Natsios. We have given money to UNICEF, UN OCHA, World
Concern, and the World Food Program, and the UNHCR, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, $1,034,000 for the
response in Somalia.
Somalia has a regular AID program in it, but we run it out
of Nairobi because there are still serious security problems.
It is a modest humanitarian program with some development parts
to it, but we cannot send our officers in because the situation
is not secure. But we work through partner organizations, the
NGO community, and U.N. agencies.
Mr. Larson. Going forward, of course, we will be informed
by the needs assessments that are currently underway, led by
the World Bank, in which we are participating. That will help
us make judgments about the division of our funding across
countries, as well as across sectors.
Senator Coleman. One last question to you, Secretary
Larson. The impact of relief in terms of dealing with some of
these areas where there has been conflict, Greece/Turkey, 1999,
the earthquake, and there seemed to be some positive impact
from that great tragedy. Sri Lanka, Aceh, Somalia. Do you get
any sense that the humanitarian response is having some impact
on lessening some of the civil discord?
Mr. Larson. There is an opportunity. It has been very
notable in Sri Lanka that the government and the Tamil Tigers
have essentially had a cease-fire and that there has been
cooperation in getting relief flowing to where it needs to go.
Similarly, in Aceh, the Indonesian Government has opened up
Aceh. It has cooperated with all of the groups, governments,
and NGOs that are trying to provide humanitarian relief. There
have been some continuing difficulties, but we do believe that
it is a moment of opportunity we have to seize to try to work
toward developing a peace process in these countries that will
resolve these longstanding conflicts, even as we go about the
task of rebuilding the damaged areas with them.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Natsios. I would just add, Senator, that the peace
agreement that was just signed between north and south Sudan--
Secretary Powell and I were at the signing ceremony in Nairobi
3 weeks ago, coming back from the tsunami region. That whole
peace process started after a humanitarian cease-fire was
declared in the Nuba Mountains, which the State Department and
AID helped negotiate, just to bring humanitarian relief in
because it was the worst affected area of the entire country in
terms of people dying. But that led to an improvement in the
trust that people had to sit down and talk and then things
improved from there, and it led to this peace agreement. So it
can, in fact, have a profound effect, but you have to take the
opportunity when it is in front of you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one comment?
I mentioned the French, but it is worth noting Canada, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, as well as France, have made
contributions in different forms in this effort, and I will
give you the details for the record. Most importantly, the
countries of the region have really stepped up, and India has
taken a real lead not only in dealing on its own with its own
problems, but providing contributions and help to others. It
has been outstanding.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
I do not think we can say, obviously, too often how
profoundly saddened the American people were by the loss that
so many communities experienced in the tsunami. I want to
commend both the domestic and international response efforts to
date, and I want to say to my colleagues that I will certainly
remain committed to working on this with them.
I want to especially commend our troops. Brigadier General
Allen, I really appreciated your comments, and let me just
extend my thanks for their heroic work on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, the phrase that is probably being used the
most here is ``window of opportunity,'' and, I think, there are
very positive windows of opportunity connected with this issue,
but I think we also have to be careful to be absolutely sure
that there are not inappropriate or perhaps unripe windows of
opportunity that come out of this. I remember this was an issue
a little bit in the confirmation of Secretary Rice. We have to
be careful how we speak about this disaster in terms of it
being a window of opportunity.
So I had not planned on discussing the issue of our
military relationship with Indonesia at this hearing, but it
was raised by Secretary Wolfowitz in his testimony. The
chairman raised it as a question, and in light of that, I feel
compelled to make a few remarks.
I applaud the tremendous effort that the Indonesian
authorities, including the military authorities, have made to
address the horrible tsunami tragedy. Again, I want to commend
the U.S. military efforts to assist in that response.
Mr. Chairman, this does not mean that there is not an
ongoing, urgent need for military reform in Indonesia. We have
not seen progress, in my view, on accountability for some very
grave human rights abuses. We have not seen a real effort to
rein in the many murky financial and business relationships in
which the military engages. I do not think this mission is even
close to being accomplished. And that is why, actually,
Secretary Wolfowitz, I strongly support the E-IMET training
that Indonesia currently gets because it builds capacity to
address these critical issues.
I noticed, Mr. Secretary, that you mentioned the
President's statement in his inaugural. I will tell you one of
the things that I thought of, as I sat there, was the
repressive tactics that the military in Indonesia has used in
the past not only with regard to East Timor, which you and I
have discussed over the years, but also within its own borders,
including in particular in Aceh. I think the President's words
should have a meaning with regard to the problem that has
existed with regard to the Indonesian military.
So, Secretary Wolfowitz, I appreciated your testimony and
obviously appreciate your commitment to Indonesia. I want to
reiterate that because I do think that this topic is
essentially a separate discussion about whether the existing
restrictions overly limit our ability to respond to this
crisis. And you were candid enough to indicate that certain
things were able to be done under the current rules, but you
seem to be concerned about the restrictions that led to what
you called a climate of unfamiliarity and suspicion when our
forces arrived to work with the Indonesians.
As you well know, though, the Indonesian military is the
largest beneficiary of the counterterrorism fellowship program.
Indonesia's military participates with ours in scores of PAYCOM
theater security cooperation program activities. In fact, more
than 132 such activities involving Indonesia are programmed for
fiscal year 2005. And Indonesia currently is eligible for and
receives, as I have indicated, expanded IMET training. So, I
think, we have ample opportunity now to overcome unfamiliarity.
I do think that is a good thing.
So, as you and I discussed before, we hope this will lead
to a constructive discussion about where our military
relationship with Indonesia goes, but I think that is something
that we should pursue in the future.
I do want to say a word about one other aspect of this,
which is the Timika incident. I am glad that we finally have an
indictment in the Timika case. I believe that the evidence
suggests that Indonesian cooperation did improve significantly
after Congress took action to link this issue to IMET. I want
to thank the chairman for his willingness to allow me time and
various opportunities to make that case here.
But it seems to me that the indictment in this case is only
a first step. The FBI considers this an ongoing investigation,
and the FBI has not exonerated anyone. A number of questions
remain unanswered, and clearly other conspirators were
involved. Most importantly, I believe the resolution of this
case means that efforts are made to hold those responsible for
the ambush accountable for their actions in a court of law. But
even the one individual indicted by the United States remains
at large and has been neither indicted nor arrested by
Indonesian authorities. So, in my view on this particular
matter, apart from the other issues, more remains undone than
has been accomplished, and I certainly do not consider that to
be something that has been resolved.
Finally, on this point, Secretary Wolfowitz, I heard your
comments about language and how English training is so
important. My understanding is that there is a difference of
opinion or interpretation between those who created the
authorities for E-IMET in the Congress and the way the
administration interprets those authorities with respect to
English language training. I think you will find, as we talk
constructively in the future, that there is a great deal of
willingness, here in Congress, to ensure that English language
training is available to the Indonesian military, even among
those who, like me, believe it would be a mistake, at this
point, to abandon all conditions and create an anything-goes
signal to the TNI, particularly when we still have ongoing
investigations into the murder of Americans in Timika to deal
with.
So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your willingness to allow me
to get into that subject a bit.
I want to commend Senator Coleman for his reference to
Somalia and Africa with regard to this matter, and I thank you
for that response and want to express my ongoing interest and
interest of the members of this committee in the African aspect
of this disaster.
Now, I would like to ask Mr. Larson and Mr. Natsios what
mechanisms are in place, not simply to ensure that there is
transparency in the use of relief and reconstruction funds, but
also to ensure that the people in affected countries and
communities actually have some kind of access to this
information. For example, information that is apparent to those
of us in Washington, who can read English language documents on
line, may not be so accessible or useful to people from the
affected villages. Could each of you respond to that? Mr.
Natsios.
Mr. Natsios. Certainly, Senator. In terms of
accountability, the business model that AID went to, perhaps a
decade and a half ago, is to go through, what I would call,
civil society organizations, NGOs, international organizations,
contractors, labor unions, faith-based groups, farmers'
cooperatives. We put very little money--I think there are only
four or five countries which are geostrategically important to
the United States in the Muslim world where we actually
transfer our money into the coffers of any government. We work
with the governments. We put technical specialists in
government ministries. We plan with them, but we do not move
money through their accounts. We did that for 30 years, and we
had some bad problems. So the accountability level of our money
is not dependent on problems of corruption in any of these
countries.
In fact, the Government of Indonesia knows they have a
problem. They have announced they are considering setting up an
independent separate account just for money that will go from
some donor governments and international agencies through their
ministries so that they can account for it properly. So I want
to commend the efforts of the Indonesian Government to
recognize they have a problem and deal with it through this
accounting system. But our money will go through the
traditional mechanisms of partner organizations that we use.
The third thing that we have done, in terms of
accountability, is I asked the Inspector General to move in, at
the same time the relief teams do, to do concurrent audits of
everything we were doing, and if they saw something wrong in
terms of process or recordkeeping, they were to inform us
immediately on the spot and not wait till after everything was
all over to tell us we made a mistake. So the Inspector General
has played an integrated role as a member of our team to ensure
there were high levels of management and accountability.
Finally, Price Waterhouse offered, as a gift to UN OCHA,
the coordination unit of the United Nations Secretariat, an
accounting system to account not only for all donor government
contributions, but all private contributions to the tsunami
response. So we have an integrated system for accountability.
Now, this is untested. It is a new system, but I want to
commend the United Nations and Price Waterhouse for the
contribution of that system because that, in fact, could
improve the whole accountability of the entire system over the
longer term.
The last question you asked, Senator, I forgot.
Senator Feingold. People's ability to access this
information given the fact that it is usually in English.
Mr. Natsios. The partner organizations we work through and
our own staffs speak the local languages or we would not send
them there. So, the NGO staffs, the AID staffs speak the local
languages in the countries that we are working in and they talk
with them. They deal with people.
There is actually a public information campaign effort,
that we go through at the community level, to inform people of
how this system works and to work with them on planning what is
done with the money. We do not just go into a village and say,
oh, we are going to rebuild something for you. We have to ask
them. Do you want this building rebuilt? Where do you want it
rebuilt, and how do you want it? Are you going to participate
in this with us? We are not going to do this for you. You have
to do this with us. It is a community-based approach. It is the
most successful approach because then, if there is a problem,
they know they own the problem along with us. It is a much
better approach. So we work with them in a very integrated
fashion at the local level to do any reconstruction, not just
here but anywhere else in the world as well.
Mr. Larson. Just a few quick followups, if I could.
Indonesia's separate account that Mr. Natsios mentioned--they
imagine having the World Bank play a key role in running that
and basically providing the fiduciary role. So that is going to
be very helpful.
Both Thailand and Indonesia have come to us and asked for
help in management of the ongoing reconstruction process,
advice that we have gained or experience we have gained from
responding to natural disasters in the United States, and we
are pursuing that sort of advice with them.
In Sri Lanka, where the Millennium Challenge Corporation is
also acting, we have a requirement for a very full process of
outreach to the communities so it is a sort of community-
informed set of priorities.
And finally, beyond the immediate efforts of our assistance
workers, we are working very hard to get the message out to the
broader communities about what the United States is doing. So
we put messages from the President, from our Ambassadors into
local language media to explain what we are doing. We are going
to continue to make the case about the American response
through our public diplomacy strategy.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the
panel, thank you. I am sorry that I missed your earlier
testimony. I have had an opportunity to read through most of
your testimonies. I, too, want to take the time to thank you
and your agencies and all that you are doing on behalf of the
victims, the families, and all the efforts that have been made
to date.
If I ask questions that have already been answered, I
apologize in advance, but it helps me to have the opportunity
at this point in time.
Even with the President's announcement yesterday that the
United States has pledged the $950 million in assistance, we
recognize that this probably is not the full picture. I guess
this is a question directed to you, Mr. Wolfowitz. In terms of
anticipated final costs--and I know we are asking you to look
into the crystal ball, but insofar as the military relief
operations in Indonesia and the other nations, can you give me
any sense as to the military end of it and the costs
associated?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I will ask General Allen to correct me, but
I believe we have incurred about $121 million to date and
anticipate about $244 million--have I got the numbers right--
before this operation is finished. So it is well within the
$900 million. In fact, our costs, plus AID's cost together, are
estimated to be $346 million for the emergency relief
operations. So, basically, the supplemental will cover those
costs and provide an additional $600 million for the
reconstruction effort.
Senator Murkowski. And you think that that is realistic
then for the duration as we move into the reconstruction.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think it is realistic as a U.S. Government
contribution, recognizing that there are many other countries
that are contributing, more that probably should contribute,
and the American private sector has been spectacularly generous
with $700 million and still collecting. Administrator Natsios
is probably the best one to estimate what the total
requirements will be, but it should not be the United States
that bears the total share of it either.
Andy, do you want to comment?
Mr. Natsios. The assessments are now being conducted. They
are joint assessments with the ministries of the governments
that are involved because they have the lead, with the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the donor governments.
For example, the European Commission and AID have officers with
the State Department on these teams to do assessments in
different categories like infrastructure, community
reconstruction at the local level, housing reconstruction,
economic interventions to get the business community
recapitalized and markets started, that sort of thing. Those
are not all out.
I think we have got some initial assessments in, and my
memory is in Aceh--Alan, was it $4 billion or $5 billion?
Mr. Larson. I think the initial estimate in Indonesia is on
the order of $4.5 billion as the estimated total cost of
reconstruction over a number of years.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
The Pacific watch center that alerted the authorities in
Diego Garcia--I am assuming that that is a similar type of a
system as we have up north that gives us our tsunami alert,
recognizing that we have got to get those buoys fixed. We are
working on that. But the question is: If we were able to notify
those in Diego Garcia, why was it not communicated beyond that,
or was it?
Mr. Natsios. The first thing is you can communicate to
people, but what do they do? If you turn an alarm on, they do
not even know what the alarm is for. There was no system in
place to communicate with people at the village level to tell
them not only is a tsunami coming, but this is where you have
to go to escape it. If you do not have that system in place,
people could go to a more dangerous place.
There are three elements to an early warning system. One is
the sensor devices, the scientific equipment, that our
scientists, Japanese scientists are particularly expert in
because we have had a history of natural disasters. The second
part is the communications system to get the information to the
community, and the third and the most important part of this,
when you think about it, is educating the community on what the
alarm system means and how you respond to it. Those systems did
not exist.
Diego Garcia was spared not because of the alarm system,
but because, as I understand it, the coral reef stopped the
tsunami. Where would you go in Diego Garcia? It is 3 feet above
sea level. I mean, if the coral reefs had not stopped that
tsunami, no alarm system is going to help you out.
Senator Murkowski. Yes. So, really, it is not just having
the system, it is the education that goes with the system.
Mr. Natsios. Absolutely. That is part of the system.
Mr. Wolfowitz. My understanding, Senator, is they got an
earthquake alert. They knew there was a big earthquake. They
had no warning there was a tsunami. And as Mr. Natsios said,
the highest place to go, someone said, is the diving board at
the swimming pool. There was no tsunami in Diego Garcia. That
is why nothing happened.
Mr. Larson. Recognizing there are two parts of the problem;
the detection and then getting the right kind of notice to
people who need to be warned, there is an issue going forward
about making sure that the detection system that we have in the
Pacific and that helps protect Alaska can be expanded and
improved. There are a series of active meetings underway. Mr.
Natsios has mentioned some in Japan. There will be a meeting
next week in Brussels where the scientists and the expert
officials who know how these systems work can help develop a
coordinated international approach to make sure that all of the
information about earthquake events and about the movement of
tidal waves over the water can be systematically collected and
made available so that it could be used to warn populations in
the Indian Ocean area, which was not the case before. Those
buoys were not there and the system was not present.
As Mr. Natsios has said, there is another challenge too and
that is making sure that there is right type of civil defense
and warning systems in place in these countries.
The President's supplemental request will allow us to be
lead participants in the development of both of those types of
systems.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Natsios, in the report that you have
included in your package here, you make reference to the
psychological impact of the tsunami and make reference to some
preliminary results from a Save the Children study of parents
and caretakers. You indicate that it suggests there is not a
mental health crisis. As a result of the tsunami, children
displayed common reactions to a traumatic event.
In the testimony that we are going to hear in the next
panel--and this will be a question that I will ask the
individuals on that panel--there is considerable reference to
the psychological effects on the survivors, and particularly
the children, suggesting that there is perhaps more of a
problem. Can you speak to that?
Mr. Natsios. The Save the Children study is very useful but
it is for a discrete population. It is not a comprehensive
study of all of the survivors. We do know from research that
has been done in past natural disasters and manmade disasters
that particularly children but even adults who have lost a
large number of members of their family--Paul Wolfowitz just
mentioned on Sri Lankan was it?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Indonesian.
Mr. Natsios. Indonesian who lost 200 members of their
extended family. The notion that has no effect on a person--I
mean, it has an effect. If they also were someone who survived
but whose home was destroyed, business was destroyed, their
school and their neighborhoods were destroyed, it does have an
effect.
We do know, in some cases, that people will sort of go into
a state of withdrawal. They will simply sit and stare. I have
seen this in displaced camps. We do not see any of this
happening on a large scale here. But I have been to camps where
suicide rates are high. People will commit suicide because they
become so desperate and so despondent over what has happened to
them.
We need to monitor this. We need to watch this very
carefully. We put some money into the NGO community to begin to
look at this because we do not want this developing.
I do know a friend of mine, who is a Foreign Minister in
East Timor, was telling me, even though East Timor was not
affected, that there were rumors every day in the capital for
several weeks afterward that there was a tsunami coming, and
people would leave the capital city because of the fear. So
they do not have any trauma in East Timor, but the event in the
media did have an effect on people's behavior in terms of
panic.
There was another earthquake yesterday. I do not know if
you noticed that in Banda Aceh. These tectonic plates do not
just stop once. This is not one event. There are going to be
several events potentially. This, fortunately, did not cause
any damage and it did not cause a tsunami. It was not quite
large enough an earthquake to cause a tsunami. But there is
still fear of repetition of this.
So we need to watch this; monitor it. We are not facing a
crisis at this point, but we do not want problems later on.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
members of the committee. This has been a very informative and
timely hearing.
A couple of comments, I guess, I would make before I asked
questions. I am encouraged by the testimony indicating that the
supplemental should ensure that existing development efforts
are sustained and held harmless essentially. I think Senator
Sarbanes raised a very important point which is, our
credibility oftentimes is on the line, and once we get a
project started, to divert it would be a mistake.
A corollary to that is the fact that as significant as this
tragedy was--and I am very mindful of it. I, like Secretary
Wolfowitz, spent a lot of time in Indonesia. I spent time there
as a child. My sister is half Indonesian. So nobody is more
sympathetic than I am to the situation.
I think it is important to note that there are a lot of
silent crises taking place all over the globe that do not
generate the same amount of attention and, as a consequence, do
not generate the sort of private giving that we have seen in
this circumstance. A lot more people, unfortunately, are dying
in Darfur than will have died no matter what the eventual
outcome of the tsunami ends up being. I think it is important
for all of you, who are in positions to help shape U.S. foreign
policy and foreign aid, to think about how do we highlight
these other tragedies as they are unfolding and make sure that
our response is equally adequate and that we have the same
sense of urgency about them. That is a difficult thing to do,
but it is one that I think is very important.
Let me just pick up on a couple of questions that have
already been raised to see if I can, maybe, put a little more
flesh to the bone.
I am very interested in the idea of training military in
other countries to respond to these crises, and I am encouraged
by that notion that we are going to be trying to do some
institution building there with respect to best practices,
first responder training and so forth. I do not know if you
want to select, maybe, an example of Indonesia or Sri Lanka or
a couple of other countries where you think that has already
proceeded and what the barriers to that are and what the
opportunities are as well, but I would be interested in hearing
a little bit more about how that might proceed. Maybe I will
start with you, Secretary Larson.
Mr. Larson. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for
your remarks about the importance of staying the course on our
commitment to development worldwide. I think Mr. Natsios, and I
in particular, have worked hard to launch initiatives like
ending the cycle of famine in the Horn of Africa, having
effective and increased levels of development assistance. So we
are very committed to that.
In terms of expanding capacity in these countries, we have
had a very nascent effort in APEC that has begun to discuss
this. The Australians have been leaders of this. It seems clear
to us that the first responders are always the local people and
the local communities and governments. It is going to be
important to have the capabilities there that are necessary to
respond to natural disasters. We think that the experience of
FEMA could be very important for them, and we think we should
be looking at ways to translate some of that experience.
The Ambassador of Thailand came to me and he said, you
know, we are not asking for international financial assistance,
but we know we have a big task of reconstruction and we want to
think with you about how to do that. We know that Florida had a
very difficult year in responding to the hurricanes. So we have
arranged some informal contact between officials in the State
of Florida and the Thai Government to think through
systematically how you respond.
In other areas of policy, we have been able not only to set
up best practices but to begin to set up audit type systems
where countries voluntarily say, why do you not come in and
help us assess whether we have put in place the things that we
need to have to really be effective. Those are among the ideas
that we are exploring now generically.
Moving forward, in Indonesia, just to pick up that example,
the Indonesians have been very appreciative of the role our
military has played. They recognize that they have a very big
task ahead of them in coordinating effectively the
reconstruction effort, and they have come to talk to us not
only about specific projects and specific ideas but how,
working with USAID and others, can they make sure that they are
managing the entire process of reconstruction in an open,
transparent, and effective way. That is just a few examples of
the types of things we have in mind.
Mr. Natsios. Senator, if I could just mention Darfur. We
have been engaged as the first donor in Darfur before any news
media was there, I might add. In fact, I had a press conference
in Nairobi after my first trip to Darfur 2 years ago when the
conflict was just starting, and the only reporters to report
what was happening were African reporters. I could not get
western media to focus on it. We had press conferences here and
the media would not focus on it. They all of a sudden did and
many have done an excellent job since then. But we were there
long before the American media knew how you spelled Darfur. I
am not trying to be insulting here.
But we do not base our humanitarian responses on media
coverage. If we did, the most remote places in the world like
eastern Congo, for example, is among the worst deaths in an
emergency in history, 3.8 million people, according to the
International Rescue Committee and other competent NGO studies
that indicate a huge loss of life. A huge loss of life. It is
not in the media at all, even now.
I have been personally to Darfur four times in the last 2
years, more than any other place in the world, as a matter of
fact. And we have spent $350 million and most of the food going
into Darfur is from the United States Government. So we have
been out in the forefront. We have led the charge. It is a much
more difficult situation because it is not a natural disaster.
It is a manmade disaster and there are malicious people
involved committing horrendous atrocities. We believe, working
with the State Department, we have an international and
diplomatic strategy to deal with what is happening, but it is a
highly complex political situation not just a matter of
logistically moving things around to help people in a natural
disaster.
Senator Obama. General, do you have something to add?
General Allen: Yes, Senator, if I may add. All of our
warfighting commanders who are major regional commanders have a
plan called a theater security cooperation plan. It is a
reflection of the guidance given to them by the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
The particular plan in this case that covered this region
is implemented by the Pacific Commander, ADM Tom Fargo. His
plan has been extraordinarily active with regard to having
extensive bilateral and multilateral relations with the
militaries of the region. So it starts with his own personal
relationship with his counterparts, but we exercise frequently
with all of these militaries. We do it bilaterally and we have
annual major multilateral exercises that benefit from the
contribution of forces but liaison officers and observers as
well.
So there were habits of functional cooperation, habits of
command and control which we had been developing for years
which paid off huge dividends early in this crisis. In
particular, I will tell you we have an entity known as the
multinational planning augmentation team, which is a
multinational organization that exists in Pacific Command which
can come together, very quickly, to assist a commander in doing
the planning necessary to execute whether in a combat situation
or, in this case, a horrific natural disaster.
When we had the chance to visit with the commander of the
U.S. forces, LTG Rusty Blackman, Marine Corps, at Uttapal, he
gave the Secretary and me a briefing, and along the back wall
of the briefing room were the liaison officers from 10
different countries. They had come quickly. We knew each other
well. We had been exercising well. There was an excellent
exchange both at a cultural and a language level, and we think
that this was a very, very important early ability of the
militaries of the region to stem the potential death toll here.
One other point that I would make is that we are going to
continue this kind of a relationship. We are very active in
something called the ASEAN Regional Forum, which is an
extension of ASEAN. A subject which has come up more frequently
of late--and we are going to continue to try to offer our very
best advice in this regard--is the dimension of consequence
management. We raised this at the last meeting. We will be
going to Berlin which will be hosting the next intercessional
group of the ASEAN Regional Forum where we are going to
continue to talk about the employment of military forces for
disaster relief and consequence management.
So we think there has been a very rich experience in terms
of expertised experience, and we are going to take advantage of
that and capitalize on it in the future.
Senator Obama. That is very encouraging, and I very much
commend, obviously, our troops and your office and others that
are doing an excellent job on this.
I know that I am out of time. I am going to, if you do not
mind, Mr. Chairman, just lob another question out there since I
have been fairly patient and it is related. I will just stop
there.
I am interested, No. 1, in terms of reconstruction. I know
this is difficult to do in poor countries, but are we able to
think about structural engineering or changes in the
reconstruction process that anticipate natural disasters and
lessen their impact? Again, obviously, this is difficult to
carry out where resources are wanting, but I am wondering
whether that is something that we are giving some consideration
to.
The final question I will just have is, Secretary
Wolfowitz, maybe, if you can just flesh out a little bit more
the opportunities and challenges we face as we are working with
the Indonesian military with respect to the Aceh conflict and
whether there are things that we can do to lessen the human-
driven dimensions of a disaster in that area.
Mr. Natsios. In terms of whether we build disaster
mitigation measures into our reconstruction, that is standard
AID policy and has been for decades. In the Gugarat earthquake
of India which took place several years ago, if you will
recall, with a large loss of life, we ensured that in the
reconstruction we did, that the housing that was rebuilt was
built according to international earthquake standards. We
worked with the U.S. Geological Survey. In fact, there have
been scientists from the U.S. Geological Survey in the disaster
assistance office of AID for a couple decades now. They are
normal transfer of personnel. We use our scientists from other
Federal agencies to help us not just in earthquakes but also in
storm construction.
A lot of the housing codes in Latin America and in the
Caribbean were designed through AID mechanisms, working with
some universities in Virginia that have expertise at this. Fred
Krimgold is one of the leading earthquake architects and storm
architects in the country. He is a professor at the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute. We use him. We helped work with these
countries to design building codes that meet these standards.
Unfortunately, building codes, even in the United States,
are not always followed and in developing countries they are
frequently not followed. So we have also complemented that with
training of contractors in the private sector and of banks and
insurance companies to get into private markets and the private
system disaster mitigation, particularly with respect to
construction standards so that the private sector uses them
even if the public sector does not always follow the building
codes. So when we do the reconstruction in the countries in
this area, we will be following those standards.
Last, I got a call from my good friend, the Sri Lankan
Ambassador to the United States, who asked that we send a land-
use planning expert from AID because they are now rewriting
their land-use planning legislation or statute in Sri Lanka to
move people back from the coast. Now, that is more sensitive
than it sounds because people are having to give up very
valuable land where they had their businesses or their fishing
fleet or their homes. So we are helping them technically. I
think the guy is about to go out to help them design the
statute and to work with the communities, so this is accepted
because it is not just a matter of construction. It is also a
matter of land-use regulation that can contribute to better
disaster mitigation in the future.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, three points. First of all, on your
earlier question about military training, I think it is an
interesting question, which I am going to look into when we get
back, as to whether our IMET programs, military education
training programs, sufficiently focus on the possibility of
training in this specific area, that is to say, disaster
assistance. As General Allen said, we get enormous side
benefits just from general military cooperation, but there are
lessons to be learned here about whether, maybe, specific
programs focused on that function would be valuable.
Second, your question about building local capacity. It was
striking to me when I spoke with the Indonesian Minister of
Planning, who is in charge of basically economic development,
who is in charge of their reconstruction efforts. She is a very
impressive economist, very thoughtful. She said one of their
biggest challenges is how to develop local capacity in Aceh so
that they do not end up with everything going through a Jakarta
bureaucracy, and I think that is a commendable goal.
Finally, most importantly, on the question you asked about
the role of TNI, the Indonesian military, in this whole thing,
they can be part of the problem or they can be part of the
solution. Senator Feingold earlier suggested, I think, that I
had used the word ``window of opportunity,'' and I do not think
one should use those words in connection with something this
horrible.
But I did say it is a crisis and crises have elements of
danger and opportunity. As you look at the role of the
Indonesian military in Aceh, they can continue on the record of
the past 10 years, which is a pretty bad one. It is a difficult
circumstance, admittedly, fighting an armed insurgency, but
there has been a great deal of abuse of the local population.
From what I can tell, those practices have largely been set
aside, if not entirely set aside, in this immediate crisis. And
they have to be set aside if we are going to succeed in this
large-scale reconstruction effort. And that is the danger, but
the opportunity is if they are set aside, if 6 months, a year
from now both the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Army,
and the people of Aceh can say, well, we got together, we dealt
with something far more important than these issues we have
been fighting over, maybe there is a way to resolve those
issues. I think it is a real opportunity.
As I said, I think before you came here, Secretary Rice is
consulting with the Congress, currently, about what to do about
IMET restrictions. I do not think we are talking about turning
a blind eye on crimes of the past. I certainly would not. And I
do not think we are talking about anything goes. But I do
think, both in terms of the conditions the Congress set already
with respect to Timika--we can argue about whether more
cooperation is required or not required, but I was stunned,
myself, at the level of cooperation the FBI got and the results
that they produced. A lot of that is law enforcement-sensitive
and cannot be discussed here in open session, but I think they
clearly responded to what we asked for. And there is a little
bit of a feeling, well, every time we do what you ask for you,
you ask for something else. That is, in my view, not a good way
to get people to cooperate.
One final observation, if I could. A friend of mine, who is
a journalist in Indonesia, who has taken considerable personal
risks over his career fighting for human rights and democracy
in his country, said democracy in Indonesia would be much
stronger today if there were 10,000 Indonesian officers who had
been through American training.
I am not saying that our training is perfect or that no one
who goes through our training ever commits abuses, but I think
it is a pretty consistent record that exposure to our military,
exposure to our system has a positive effect from the point of
view of decorum and progress in promoting democracy and
freedom. I hope it is in that spirit that these consultations
can take place and we can come up with a way forward that
supports the objectives that I believe are widely shared on
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
We thank all Senators and thank especially our witnesses
for a very comprehensive hearing and excellent responses.
We will now call upon an additional panel composed of Ms.
Mary McClymont, President and CEO of InterAction; Mr. Daniel
Toole, Director of the Office of Emergency Programs of UNICEF;
and Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps.
We thank the witnesses for joining us this morning. I would
ask, as I suggested to the earlier panel, that if possible, you
summarize your comments to within a 10-minute framework. Your
full statements will be made a part of the record and questions
will follow.
I am going to yield the chair fairly shortly to my
distinguished colleague, Senator Murkowski. She is the chairman
of our Subcommittee for East Asia and the Pacific. She will
continue to conduct the hearing in my absence.
First of all, I would like to call upon the witnesses in
the order that I introduced them. That would be Ms. McClymont,
then Mr. Toole, and Ms. Lindborg. Ms. McClymont.
STATEMENT OF MARY McCLYMONT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERACTION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. McClymont. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity to testify before this committee to share some
initial thoughts about lessons we have learned in responding to
the tsunami to date, as well from other major emergencies.
These might be helpful for the longer term recovery phase of
the tsunami and for future crises.
The committee is to be commended for launching this
reflection so promptly. We also want to commend the President,
Members of Congress, and other administration leaders for their
public statements of concern and commitment of resources, along
with the American people for their generous donations.
Seventy-two of InterAction's one hundred and sixty member
groups are engaged in some way in nine of the crisis-affected
countries, working directly on the ground and through local
partners, or shipping commodities to the region for
distribution. Most are engaged in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and
India, and I base my remarks largely on their experiences.
Many InterAction members have been established for decades
in the region, and this is probably what allowed them to
respond so quickly to immediate needs with hundreds of their
local staff and partners on the ground by providing clean
water, food, temporary shelter, and medical care.
Let me first address three aspects of the crisis on the
ground.
First, in every natural disaster, there are impediments to
overcome in delivering assistance. It was the very magnitude of
the crisis itself in the worst hit countries that compounded
these problems. As you know, local officials and service
providers were killed, injured, or missing. With transportation
and communications infrastructures destroyed, access was
impossible in some areas. Our members and other aid workers
were ready to help, but they faced major logistical problems.
With its helicopters, personnel, and commodities, the United
States military was able to extend the reach of the
humanitarian effort into remote parts of Aceh and Sri Lanka.
Their superb performance is a reminder that our Armed Forces
have unrivaled logistical assets unique to these situations. As
the transition from military to unaided civilian services is
now rightly underway, their effort is a fine example of an
appropriate kind of role our Armed Forces can play in such
settings.
Second, ongoing civil strife in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
posed potential challenges for relief delivery. International
aid workers had been banned for over a year in Aceh, leaving
little NGO capacity. Apprehension that the Indonesian military
would ban or impose tight controls on the programs of foreign
relief organizations proved unfounded. We hope and trust this
will remain the case going forward.
As to relief coordination, it works for us at many levels
in all the disasters we operate in through established
mechanisms among our own InterAction members with USAID and
with relevant U.N. agencies and other NGO consortia. That is
what happened here. On the ground, the governments of India and
Sri Lanka immediately assumed this responsibility on their own
territory and are playing a strong role. The Indonesian
authorities sought U.N. help in managing the international
relief effort.
Although understandably difficult in the first days, we
believe the coordination of relief efforts is becoming more
effective each day. In Aceh, for example, Indonesian and U.N.
officials are sharing responsibility and working together
increasingly well, while NGOs, U.N., and government
representatives come together to identify issues, conduct
sectoral assessments, and rationally allocate resources.
The most serious impediment to good coordination appears to
be the large number of inexperienced groups and individuals
that have arrived in some of the affected countries. Although
apparently well-intentioned, they are unaccustomed to the way
the United Nations, Red Cross movement, and established
international NGOs and local partners work together so
frequently in these kinds of settings. We anticipate that this
problem will diminish over the coming weeks as the initial
relief phase winds down.
Despite the fact that the humanitarian effort has,
fortunately, prevented a second tidal wave of lethal disease
among survivors in the region, hundreds of thousands are
displaced, vulnerable to infectious disease and profound
psychological problems and dependent on donors for basic needs.
As we look forward, I highlight, now, four relevant
reminders we could bear in mind during the recovery period.
First, accountability by relief providers. The past 6 weeks
have underscored to us the extraordinary generosity of the
American people. Sixty InterAction members report today they
have received in the aggregate an unprecedented $765 million in
contributions from private donors, most of it from individuals.
This provides a sharp reminder of the need for NGO
accountability to the public for the careful, transparent, and
effective use of these funds. For the past decade, our members
have abided by a set of program, financial, and fundraising
standards guiding their work and helping assure donors that
funds are being well spent. We will work to assure the public
has available timely, detailed information on the use of the
funds entrusted to us. By the same token, we, and other
humanitarian responders on the ground, must be accountable for
our actions to those we are seeking to assist by
conscientiously applying the internationally accepted sphere
standards that guide disaster response.
Second, long-term commitment. Experience with myriad
natural disasters has taught us that full recovery and
rehabilitation from such devastation takes between 5 and 10
years. We are encouraged that leadership roles for the planning
process have been assumed within the United Nations and the
international financial institutions.
It will be important that NGOs participate fully in the
upcoming donor conferences given the resources we will bring to
the table and our long engagement and partnerships with local
communities and organizations. Although financial pledges made
by the international community have been extraordinary, it is
no secret that many commitments go unfulfilled.
We are gratified by the President's announcement yesterday;
he will seek $950 million for relief and longer term
reconstruction needs in the tsunami countries. We urge that
governmental funding be provided on a multiyear basis and on
flexible terms before attention shifts elsewhere.
In addition, it will be critical that national governments
and donors fully consult and coordinate with local communities,
authorities, and civil society on the ground. Our job is to
respect their needs and provide the capacity building support
necessary to help them restore their own lives.
Third, forgotten crises. As has been mentioned at this
hearing, sadly this disaster reminds us of all the equally
tragic crises in the world that are not receiving as much
attention, such as Sudan's Darfur region, northern Uganda, and
the Congo. Some crises are silent like the 1.2 billion people
living in extreme poverty in the developing world. We hope that
our leaders, including Members of Congress, as well as the
media, will now seize the moment and take the opportunity to
help us further educate and sensitize the American public to
these ongoing humanitarian crises and extreme poverty in the
world.
Finally, funding needs. With these concerns in mind, we are
gratified of the President's announcement and that it will, in
part, replenish the USAID development and disaster accounts
from which funds were drawn for the initial tsunami response in
a timely way, as was underscored by Mr. Natsios. We have also
urged that additional funds be provided for humanitarian needs
that otherwise go unmet in Sudan, Congo, Uganda, as well as
funds to address the major global shortfalls in emergency food
aid, to which Senator Sarbanes referred.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McClymont follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary E. McClymont, President and CEO,
InterAction, Washington, DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before this
Committee on the ``Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned.'' I also want to
acknowledge the leadership and support that you, Senator Biden, and
many others on this Committee have provided on issues of importance to
those of us in the humanitarian and development community. I am
grateful for this opportunity to present some of the views and
perspectives of InterAction members on the response to the Tsunami
crisis.
InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international
development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Our 160
members operate in every developing country and have decades of
experience on the ground in working to overcome poverty, exclusion and
suffering by advancing social justice and basic dignity for all. While
many of our members have a long and successful history of partnership
with U.S. Government agencies, collectively, the members receive $3
billion in annual contributions from private donors, including direct
contributions from the American people. Both faith-based and secular,
InterAction members are headquartered in 25 states and have branch
offices and/or constituencies in every state in the country.
Furthermore, when one looks at the donors, sponsors, and supporters of
our member organizations, InterAction reaches millions of Americans who
care about and support in some form our foreign assistance programs.
The world has not seen in recent memory any natural disaster equal
to the magnitude of the Tsunami crisis in sheer geographic scope, level
of destruction, unprecedented private giving, and extensive
international response. These factors make it all the more important to
consider the response and lessons learned to date, as well as those we
know from previous experience. We can apply them in our current relief
activities, in the long-term recovery and rehabilitation phase in which
we will be engaged for years to come, and in the major natural
disasters inevitable in the future. The Committee is to be commended
for launching this reflection so promptly.
I also wish to commend the President, former Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Members of the Congress, and USAID Administrator, Andrew
Natsios, for the personal concern for those affected by the crisis they
have demonstrated by their public statements and commitment of
resources. The personal visits to the region undertaken by many
prominent American leaders, including members of the Senate and this
Committee, have underlined the depth of American compassion for those
now trying to rebuild their lives and American commitment to assist
them. Furthermore, the response of the U.S. military, in collaboration
with the civilian agencies, was critical in getting relief to
vulnerable populations and saving lives in the initial phase of the
crisis response. And finally, I want to thank the American people for
their generous donations to help the victims in this crisis.
Reviewing the Humanitarian Response to Date
Seventy-two InterAction organizations, or almost half of our 160
members, are engaged in some way in this crisis, either by responding
directly on the ground operationally, working with local or
international partners who are operational, shipping commodities for
the use of partners in the region, or undertaking advocacy. Although
our members are working in nine of the affected countries, most are
engaged in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India, which were the worst hit. I
therefore will focus my remarks based largely on their experience in
these three nations.
Many of our members had a long-established presence in each of
these countries when the Tsunami struck. In Indonesia and Sri Lanka,
for example, many have been engaged in humanitarian assistance as well
as development for more than a decade, helping to deal with the
consequences of the civil strife each of these nations has long
endured. With hundreds of local staff working at the village level in
these three countries, they were able to respond quickly to immediate
needs for clean water and food, to help reunite family members, and to
assist survivors in finding temporary shelter. Medical personnel
arrived from abroad within days of the Tsunami and began to treat
physical injuries. Assessments were initiated of water and sanitation,
as well as health needs. Survivors were assisted in digging latrines,
collecting the bodies of the deceased, and removing debris from
roadways.
In every natural disaster there are impediments to overcome in
delivering humanitarian assistance. The magnitude of the crisis in the
worst hit countries made some of these obstacles daunting, such as the
immediate creation of coordination mechanisms. Many local officials,
health and social service providers and educators were among those
killed, injured, or missing. In Indonesia's Aceh Province alone, it has
been reported that 70 percent of the health care providers and 1,500
teachers were killed, missing, or fled the area. Roads were washed
away, bridges collapsed, vehicles were sucked into the sea,
communications systems were destroyed and fuel supplies quickly were
exhausted. Access to some areas became impossible, except by
helicopter. Some airports close to severely affected areas became
congested due to staffing, offloading, and storage capacity shortages.
Finally, the ongoing civil strife in Indonesia and Sri Lanka posed
potential challenges to the delivery of relief. In Aceh Province, for
example, international aid workers had been banned for over a year.
There was little NGO capacity already in place and a concern that those
from elsewhere in Indonesia, as well as those arriving from abroad,
might be denied permission to enter the region. It was not clear if the
ongoing conflicts there and in Sri Lanka would put survivors at
increased risk and imperil relief workers.
While our members were mobilizing staff in the region and assigning
personnel from around the world to respond to the emergency,
InterAction formed a working group to facilitate the exchange of
information and coordination between the members responding to the
crisis. Our regular meetings almost immediately were supplemented with
weekly meetings hosted by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA) in which NGOs and USAID officials shared information and
concerns. As a member of the InterAgency Standing Committee, the body
established by the United Nations General Assembly more than a decade
earlier to coordinate responses to emergencies, InterAction began
sharing information and engaging regularly with the U.N. agencies
responding to the crisis, as well as with the Red Cross movement and
our NGO colleagues in Europe.
We initiated several actions to facilitate our work and respond to
the overwhelming public interest in assisting those affected by the
Tsunami. Within 48 hours after the onset of the crisis, we published
the initial list of our members accepting contributions with
descriptions of their activities. We posted on our website information
on appropriate ways to give, and distributed to the media video and
radio news releases we had prepared earlier on the same topic. Our
consistent message in such disasters is that cash is best. We also
posted on our web site guidance for the American public on
considerations in selecting a relief agency to which to contribute. We
responded to myriad press inquiries about our members' responses, the
situation on the ground and how concerned citizens could help.
In the region, the governments of India and Sri Lanka immediately
assumed responsibility for coordination of disaster response activities
on their territory. The Indonesian authorities asked the United Nations
to assist in managing the international effort even as it directed the
domestic reply. Disaster Response Teams from OFDA arrived in the
affected countries within days, as the U.N.'s Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs sent assessment teams and
personnel to assist U.N. officials assigned in the affected countries.
U.S. military helicopters, personnel, and commodities from the Abraham
Lincoln and its escorts extended the reach of the humanitarian
community into parts of Aceh cut off by road and addressed other
logistic constraints to effective delivery of assistance. U.S. Navy
personnel provided similar assistance in Sri Lanka. In each country
participants in the civil conflicts seemed to welcome relief
activities. Although skirmishes between belligerents have occurred in
Aceh, these incidents did not impair the delivery of humanitarian
relief. Apprehension that the Indonesian military would ban or impose
tight controls on the programs of foreign relief organizations have
proved unfounded. We hope and trust that this will continue to be the
case as the relief phase moves to recovery.
Today, an estimated 2 million people throughout the affected region
are receiving some form of assistance from their own governments and
the 4,000 humanitarian personnel who have come from abroad to help
them. With over 275,000 known dead or missing, the casualty toll is
indeed catastrophic. But the good sanitation practices of local
populations, several timely immunization programs, generally adequate
nutrition, and good fortune have so far prevented a second tidal wave
of lethal disease among survivors, many of whom nevertheless remain
vulnerable to cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, measles, malaria, and
other contagious illnesses.
The devastating disaster has had major psychological effects on
survivors as well, especially children. While the resumption of normal
work and living conditions will help survivors to regain their mental
and emotional equilibrium, many will need longer-term psychosocial
support to deal with the profound trauma, loss and other repercussions
of the disaster. The crisis has amplified the psychosocial needs and
heightened protection risks to children, such as separation,
trafficking, and sexual exploitation. Early fears of trafficking in
children, however, have been allayed by measures taken by the extended
families of children whose parents were lost and by government bans on
travel by children without accompanying family members. But given the
prevalence of trafficking in some affected countries this and other
protection concerns bear watching in the months ahead, in addition to
the ongoing psychosocial needs.
Hundreds of thousands of survivors remain displaced, an estimated
400,000 in Aceh alone. Many have sought refuge in spontaneous
settlements. The Indonesian government has plans for moving many of
these persons to 24 relocation camps. This may be an appropriate
interim solution but past experience suggests that camps are not always
the best answer to the needs of displaced populations. They may be
particularly inappropriate in Aceh, where local people have been moved
into camps in the past for political reasons. Camps should be created
only in consultation with the survivors and movement to them should be
voluntary.
Although some cash for work programs have been initiated by NGOs,
most survivors remain unemployed. As you have read, thousands of
fishing boats have been destroyed, and the fields of many farmers have
been washed away or damaged by salt water. It will be some time before
these people will again be self-sufficient. Meanwhile they will remain
dependent on their governments and the donor community for food and
other basic necessities.
Coordination of relief efforts is becoming more effective each day,
particularly among agencies working in specific sectors. The
governments of Sri Lanka and of India are playing strong roles. In
Aceh, for example, Indonesian and U.N. officials are sharing
responsibility and working together increasingly well. The United
Nations has established two offices in Aceh and expects to open two
others soon. Regular meetings of humanitarian personnel, including our
member groups, around various sectors of concern--primarily water and
sanitation, health, shelter--are being hosted increasingly under the
joint auspices of the Indonesian government and the United Nations in
Aceh. The transition from military to civilian services in key areas
such as transportation is going smoothly.
The most serious impediment to good coordination appears to be the
large number of inexperienced organizations and individuals that have
arrived in some of the affected countries. There are an estimated 400
NGOs now present in the region, 150 in Aceh alone. While U.N.
organizations, the Red Cross movement, and established international
NGOs and their local partners have been working together on sectoral
assessments and a rational allocation of resources, some of the
agencies, unaccustomed to these environments in which they are working
and the kind of coordination used, have not been as constructive. We
hope and anticipate that this problem will diminish over the coming
weeks as the initial relief phase winds down. The more experienced
international NGOs are making efforts to reach out to those willing to
collaborate and to help them benefit from participation in coordination
mechanisms.
Learning and Applying Lessons
As we look ahead during the recovery and rehabilitation phases of
the Tsunami crisis and as we anticipate other emergencies that surely
lie ahead, I highlight below several of the lessons from our experience
in responding to this crisis to date, as well as those we know from
prior experience and should bear in mind going forward.
Accountability. The past six weeks have reminded us of the
extraordinary compassion and generosity of the American people. As of
February 7, 60 InterAction members report they have received in the
aggregate over $765 million in contributions from private donors, most
of it from individuals. We established the InterAction ``Tsunami
Barometer'' on our website to track these donations. Our members
recognize that we are accountable to the public for the careful and
effective use of these funds. Members subscribe to a set of standards
adopted by the InterAction alliance over a decade ago. They address
performance, fundraising, governance, program and financial management.
Conformance to these standards guides our members' work and helps
assure donors that funds are being spent in an accountable and
effective way. Members are obliged to ``full, honest, and accurate
disclosure of relevant information concerning their goals, programs,
finances and governance.'' We are working with our members to remain
true to these important principles, and to provide timely, detailed
information on the use of all funds entrusted to them.
Appropriate Giving. In their public comments InterAction and its
members promote the theme that cash is the most appropriate
contribution a private citizen can make, a message that appears to have
been largely accepted by the American people. It certainly helps
enormously when that message is delivered from the White House by the
President, as it was on several occasions after December 26. In
contrast to the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, when warehouses in Gulf
ports were crammed with used clothing and other commodities not
urgently needed in Central America, our fellow citizens used their
checkbooks, credit cards and wallets to make their contributions this
time.
Military Response. The superb performance of the U.S. military
personnel assigned to assist the relief effort is a reminder that our
armed forces have capabilities that are indeed unique in situations of
natural disasters of this magnitude. While the armed forces of over 20
countries responded to this crisis, the reach of our navy and the
transport, water purification, and logistic assets it brought to bear
are indeed unrivaled. One indicator of how well the humanitarian and
military responders worked together is the U.N.'s report that the
military forces on the scene replied affirmatively to 97 percent of the
specific requests from humanitarians for transportation and other
services. Now that the NGOs and the United Nations. have had time to
lease civilian helicopters, ship in trucks and obtain more water
purification equipment, the military will no longer be needed and
civilian professionals can carry out relief and reconstruction work
unaided. The U.S. military's role in Tsunami relief serves as a good
example of an appropriate role for our armed forces in providing
assistance in such settings.
Essential Services. An initial assessment of the response in Aceh,
and our recent experiences in the Bam earthquake and in Darfur,
indicate the international relief community can provide adequate
emergency medical services but is not as well resourced in dealing with
sanitation and provision of clean water. U.N. Emergency Response
Coordinator Jan Egeland initiated a systematic inventory of the
community's capacities several months before the Tsunami. When the
results are available later this year, IASC members and donors will
have to consider whether a reallocation of resources and capacities to
cover shortfalls in the essential services would be appropriate.
Applying Humanitarian Standards. The humanitarian response to the
crisis is far from over. As I already have indicated, hundreds of
thousands of those who survived the Tsunami remain displaced, without
employment, and still vulnerable to disease. As relief activities
continue, NGOs and other humanitarian responders must be careful to
maintain a level of care equal to the internationally accepted ``Sphere
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.''
Incorporated into our InterAction standards, these are recognized by
the U.S. Government and throughout most of the international
humanitarian community as appropriate guidelines for relief work.
Long-Term Commitment. Experience with myriad natural disasters has
taught us that full recovery and rehabilitation from such devastation
takes between 5 and 10 years. There is understandable pressure to show
quick results, and, as I have indicated, relief activities to date have
preserved hundreds of thousands of lives. But the task of rebuilding
livelihoods and restoring communities requires planning, strategizing,
and realistic timeframes. We are encouraged that leadership roles
within the United Nations and the international financial institutions
have been identified to consolidate assessments and start
reconstruction planning. We hope the Administration and Congress stay
the course on what will surely be a lengthy reconstruction effort,
building on the goodwill we have generated through our relief efforts.
NGO Participation in Reconstruction Planning. We also must remember
that within the InterAction alliance, different agencies perform
different functions. Some respond only in the initial short-term relief
phase, providing basic clinical and public health services, water and
food, temporary shelter, etc. Others remain for the extended recovery
and reconstruction phase, helping to rebuild the communities that have
been destroyed, either where they were or in more secure locations.
Many of the 70 InterAction member agencies responding to the Tsunami
are planning to be engaged over the longer-term. Thanks to the
generosity of the American public quite a few of our members are at or
well on their way to meeting their funding targets, which will enable
them to do this. We underscore the importance of NGO participation in
the donor conferences expected to be convened later this year. We
believe that the resources we will bring to the reconstruction phase,
our long engagement with the local communities, and the partnerships we
have with local organizations will enable us to play an important role
in the deliberations on reconstruction planning.
Respecting Local Communities and Capacities in the Recovery
Process. As we plan for the future we believe it important to remember,
in the words of my colleague Peter Bell, President of CARE, USA, that
``the largest contribution to the reconstruction effort will come from
the hard work, ingenuity and capacity of citizens in affected
countries.'' It will be important that national governments and donors
include in their planning processes consultation and coordination with
civil society and local authorities. The role of local communities in
their own development and rehabilitation is critical, with a focus on
helping them rebuild their capacities. Special attention should be paid
to vulnerable groups such as women-headed households, low caste
individuals, children, and others who are traditionally outside the
formal decisionmaking structures of their communities. Likewise, and
particularly in those countries beset by civil wars, recovery programs
must be designed and implemented in a manner that is perceived as fair
and equitable, so that they do not compound mistrust and existing
grievances, especially in conflict areas.
Meeting Pledges. Mr. Chairman, the financial commitments made by
the international community to relief and recovery have been
extraordinary. But it is no secret that many pledges go unfulfilled and
that it sometimes is hard to tell how much funding is ``new money.'' At
this early stage we also have only preliminary estimates of the full
cost of recovery and rehabilitation. Judging by what we have heard from
Members of Congress, we are gratified by what appears to be broad
support for a generous American government contribution to the
financing of long-term programs. Furthermore, my colleagues and I are
persuaded that governmental funding to assist those affected by this
disaster must be provided on a multi-year basis and on flexible terms
while memories of the devastation and suffering are fresh. We have been
pleased to hear the President and members of the Congress emphasize the
need for a long-term approach.
Forgotten Crises. Sadly, this crisis reminds us of all the equally
tragic crises in the world that are not receiving as much attention,
such as Sudan's Darfur region, northern Uganda, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In just these three countries many millions of
lives have been lost and millions of innocent people continue to suffer
the deadly consequences of conflict and violence. Some crises are
silent, like the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty in the
developing world. It is our hope that our leaders, including members of
Congress, will take the opportunity to further educate and sensitize
the American public to these ongoing humanitarian crises and extreme
poverty. We will do our best to keep the spotlight on all of these
crises. The President was helpful on this front when he underscored to
Americans that the funds provided for relief and reconstruction to
those affected by the Tsunami should be seen as ``extra help'' and not
as a replacement for donations for other important needs.
Funding Needs. With these concerns in mind, we have recommended
that the Congress provide $2 billion in emergency supplemental funding
to meet needs not only in the Tsunami-affected countries but also those
elsewhere. We have urged that $500-$600 million be used for non-
military relief and reconstruction assistance to Tsunami-affected
countries, including the replenishment of USAID development and
disaster accounts from which funds were drawn for the initial Tsunami
response. An additional $400-$500 million is needed for other
humanitarian needs in Sudan, Congo, Uganda and elsewhere that otherwise
would go unmet. Finally, $1 billion should also be available for
addressing the global shortfalls in emergency food aid, some of which
is needed in Tsunami affected countries.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your comments and
to responding to your questions.
Senator Murkowski [presiding]. Mr. Toole.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL TOOLE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
PROGRAMS, UNICEF, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. Toole. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, members of
the committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to
discuss what UNICEF has been doing for the tsunami disaster, as
well as the United Nations as a whole.
I guess I would first take an opportunity, as others before
me, to thank the American Government, this administration,
President Bush himself, for the extraordinary response to the
tsunami crisis. As an American citizen--and it is not so common
in the U.N. system--I take real pride in the tremendous efforts
of the United States to alleviate the suffering of the tsunami
victims. Americans have opened their hearts, as well as their
pocketbook, as has been mentioned many times today. UNICEF has
already raised over $300 million for the crisis and over $60
million of that has come from the American population itself,
in addition to funds from the American Government. I know I
speak for the entire humanitarian population and the community
of aid workers saying thank you. We are very, very grateful for
the steadfast support.
I would add to that the incredible logistics and transport
support from the American military that UNICEF has also
benefited from, without which we would not have been able to
deliver the assistance, as well as technical assistance from
the CDC.
I would also thank the committee for its leadership in
organizing the hearing and hope you will continue your
discussions.
Madam Chair, the events of about 6 weeks, as others have
said, were truly cataclysmic. I have traveled to the region
twice. I came back just on Sunday from my second trip. No
words, no photo, no amateur video can possibly show or
demonstrate what has happened. Others have mentioned that
before me. I will not repeat it. But communities have suffered
enormously and every picture that you see, every video that you
see, every scene of destruction that you have seen are lives of
people. There are pieces of clothing. There is a CD. There is a
photo album or a diploma that you find on the ground. These are
people's lives that were disrupted. These are people's jobs
that have been ruined. These are children who are, indeed,
traumatized.
More than a third of the victims were indeed children. In
some communities, UNICEF has found that the number may be as
many as half. Those children who have suffered and who are left
are vulnerable because of their loss of homes, parents, family.
They are hungry. They are liable for disease. They are
traumatized and they are at a threat of exploitation and abuse.
Perhaps the saddest portion of the scenes that one sees is
that, indeed, there are more parents without children than
children without parents. Many, many children lost their lives.
Together with our U.N. and nongovernmental partners, UNICEF
is doing everything possible to eliminate the health and other
risks to survivors. That is our first job; to keep children
alive. We have assumed the lead coordination role in education,
child protection, and water and sanitation, as mentioned by
others before me. Water and sanitation is one of the most
important strategies that we need to pursue in the long term.
Indeed, although the sheer scale of the disaster and the
numbers of countries affected has presented enormous logistical
problems, coordination of relief efforts has actually been
better than in the past. It is better than in Darfur. It is
better than it has been in Afghanistan. UNICEF has already
delivered more than 8 million dollars' worth of supplies and we
have $45 million of supplies in the pipeline to arrive in the
next few weeks.
I will not go into detail, Madam Chair, but I do have a
long statement which I am happy to share with you and I am
happy to answer questions, should you have any.
Early interventions by aid agencies and the swift response
of the international community, as a whole, have given cause
for hope. Thanks to the committed response of the international
community, media attention, and the strong leadership of the
affected governments themselves, early fears of massive deaths
after the tsunami have not materialized. For example, though
early media reports of trafficking and abuse proved largely
unsubstantiated, they nevertheless galvanized a powerful
response that may have not emerged as quickly without such
attention. Early measures to protect children, many of them
taken by the affected governments, doubtless went a long way
toward preventing further victimization. This underlies the
need to strengthen and accelerate our collective protection
response so that it can become more predictable and ultimately
more effective. There is a clear need for automatic and
prevention-oriented protection responses in times of emergency.
Some of the other lessons that we have seen already. There
is a clear message that we need to invest in national capacity
to respond, and speakers before me have mentioned that. The
strength of the national response in Thailand and India in
particular stand testament to what can be achieved when
governments have the proper tools in place. Here again
preparedness should be the watch word. We know that our
assistance cannot stop once these early interventions are over,
once the threat of disease subsides, once the first day of
school has passed.
In UNICEF we often say we work in countries before, during,
and after an emergency. We also work on both sides of crises
and conflict, adhering to the universal humanitarian principles
of neutrality and impartiality. That is why, if you travel to
Sri Lanka or Aceh a year or two from now, you will still find
our staff and other NGOs working to help government and civil
society to support the long-term rehabilitation and recovery of
all the region, whatever their political allegiance may be.
Too often in the past, the international community has
allowed its attention to wander; wander away too soon,
depleting political will and resources before the job is truly
over. Others before me have said that we must not let that
happen. I echo that theme. We must invest for the long term. We
must invest in a flexible and long-term support to tsunami
victims.
One of the most important outcomes that could arise from
the disaster would be peace-building, as has been mentioned.
Madam Chair, it is clear that despite recent setbacks, an
opportunity does exist to pursue negotiated settlements in both
Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I urge this committee to use the
tremendous political capital at its disposal to bring
conflicting parties together in both of these stricken
countries. Indeed, the continued leadership and support of the
U.S. Government is vital in every respect. The long-term
commitment of the international community, as a whole, is
essential to helping tsunami-stricken communities move from
relief to recovery. I hope the U.S. Senate will remain engaged
in this issue, and for my part, I would be happy to return
later to testify and provide an update on what has actually
been accomplished.
Madam Chair, UNICEF has always worked in emergencies, both
natural and manmade. Originally we were called the United
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It has always
been a part of our business. It comes out of the shattered past
of the Second World War. Much has changed since then, but our
fundamental purpose has not. Emergencies today represent 40
percent of our activities. In health, nutrition, water,
sanitation, protection, education, as well as the protection
against HIV/AIDS our core commitments to children in
emergencies are more than a mission statement. They are a
humanitarian imperative.
Therefore, even as we continue our work in tsunami-affected
countries, we must help focus public and government attention
to other forgotten countries. Sudan with a recent peace
agreement gives some cause for hope but also creates the need
for rapid, positive change to build confidence and better
social services in Liberia, where we must consolidate the
initial steps toward peace and normalcy, and in other countries
as far afield as Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, or even the
Central African Republic.
Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you on behalf
of UNICEF. Thank you on behalf of the United Nations for your
continued and strong support. Together we can improve the lives
of millions of children in emergencies across the globe by
starting with this response in the tsunami.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Toole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dan Toole, Director, Office of Emergency
Operations, UNICEF, New York, NY
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss UNICEF's response to aid victims of the tsunami.
Before I begin, however, I would like to take this opportunity on
behalf of UNICEF to extend our deepest appreciation for the support and
leadership of this Administration, and of President Bush, in responding
to the tsunami crisis. As a citizen of this country, I take real pride
in the tremendous efforts of the United States to alleviate the
suffering of tsunami victims. Americans have opened their hearts--and
their pocketbooks--in an unprecedented way; the American public alone
has donated over $60 million to UNICEF in support of the tsunami. I
know I speak for the entire humanitarian community when I say that we
are all truly grateful for the tremendous support of the United States.
The U.S. military has offered key logistical support, particularly
in the Aceh region of Indonesia. The inter-agency health assessment on
the West Coast of Indonesia would not have been possible without the
USS Lincoln. The USNS Mercy has now moved into Indonesian coastal
waters, and has already begun to assist UNICEF in our efforts to
provide primary health care to affected populations there. The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention has seconded a number of staff to
UNICEF Indonesia, offering technical expertise in malaria prevention,
diarrheal diseases, and measles.
In this, as in any emergency, UNICEF does not work alone. I would
like to thank our partners in the NGO community and our sister U.N.
agencies, as well as our government partners around the world for their
invaluable support and assistance. Finally, I would also like to
commend this Committee for its leadership in remaining focused on this
issue, and for holding this hearing today.
Mr. Chairman, the events of 6 weeks ago can only be described as
cataclysmic. I have travelled the region twice since the tsunami
struck, and I can tell you that no words, no photo, no amateur video
could ever capture the devastation I saw there. Indeed, despite more
than 20 years of working in development and humanitarian assistance, I
have never seen this sort of destruction before.
No doubt you have all heard the figure: Over 5 million people have
been affected by this calamity. But even a number like this falls short
of describing the enormity of the situation. People have lost family,
friends, homes, and livelihoods. They have also lost doctors and
teachers, roads and bridges, schools and hospitals. The very lifeblood
of their communities has been washed away. In some parts of Aceh, the
destruction goes nearly 5 miles inland--scarcely a tree or a building
remains. Nor were these ``little peasant shacks'' or huts on the
beach--these were houses made of reinforced concrete, two and three
stories high. Now all that remains of these neighborhoods are ragged
walls of perhaps a foot high.
The photos you have seen show miles of rubble, and that is what is
left. But remember, the rubble is people's lives. There are bits of
clothing--a CD, a photo album, a diploma, an intact bottle of chili
sauce and a half case of soda--random bits of thousands of lives now
gone.
I flew down the coast to Meulaboh in a helicopter, and--thanks to
the U.S. military--returned that way as well. The scene was one of
nightmarish destruction. Near Banda Aceh, where the coastline is one of
rugged cliffs, a band of white salt marks where the swelling sea
reached the height of a four-story building. Where there are
depressions and bays, as in Banda Aceh itself, the rushing water
destroyed everything in its path. Imagine four waves, each 40 feet high
or more, carrying cement, chairs, cars. I could describe for you a
litany of surreal images: A bulldozer carried 4 miles inland and
discarded in the middle of a withered rice paddy; a huge petroleum
barge hurled into someone's home a mile and a half from the coast; palm
trees flattened in a row like the tines of a comb.
And this is to say nothing of the damage caused by the earthquake
itself. Nine point zero on the Richter scale--it is difficult to
imagine. The aftershocks alone, measuring 6.5, tore through Aceh with
the same force as the earthquake that devastated Kobe, Japan in 1995.
We are only now beginning to assess the damage caused before the waves
hit.
But of course it is not the toll upon brick and mortar that is so
devastating to see. It is the human stories that tear your heart out,
and they are seemingly endless. Despite my many years cultivating a
``steely exterior'' in emergencies, it was still a tremendous effort
not to break up in the face of these tragedies. A woman in Mulativo Sri
Lanka, lost two of her children and her husband in an instant. She
managed to get one daughter on a roof and scurry up a tree with her 8-
month old, only to have the baby ripped from her arms. Two weeks later,
she sobs inconsolably, her face the epitome of horror and despair. What
can we say? Another woman lost 34 people in her family--three
generations. She is left with a grandson who was away visiting an
uncle, and a daughter whose home she was visiting when the waves hit.
Story after story, person after person. Random destruction, random
horror that has burrowed deep into the mind. People who just stare at
the sea or at a roof and who won't speak. It will take a long time to
heal; some may never get there.
More than a third of the victims of the tsunami were children. In
some communities, UNICEF has found that the number is much higher--as
many as half. Those children who survived are left vulnerable by the
loss of homes, parents and family. For them, the threat has not yet
passed. Hunger, disease, trauma and the threat of exploitation still
pose serious risks.
Together with our U.N. and non-governmental partners, UNICEF is
doing everything possible to eliminate these risks. We have helped
ensure that there is clean water in Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka,
India, Thailand, and even as far away as Somalia. Latrines have been
established for the tens of thousands of displaced living in camps or
with local communities. We have distributed health kits and basic
supplies like clothing and plastic tarps to provide temporary shelter,
ensure good nutrition, and guard against disease. We have supported the
affected governments and our NGO partners to set up protective
environments for children, including those who have lost their parents.
And we have undertaken vaccination campaigns against deadly illnesses
such as measles. To date, UNICEF has shipped over 2,000 metric tons of
relief supplies in response to this emergency, at a total value of over
$8 million. In all, some $45 million worth of supplies have been
ordered.
These early interventions, and the swift response of the
international community as a whole, have given cause for hope. No doubt
we all remember the early fears that disease might double the number of
casualties, and the alarming media reports of trafficking of children.
Thanks to the committed response of the international community and the
strong leadership of the affected governments themselves, these fears
have largely failed to materialize.
This is thanks in large measure to the unprecedented degree of
coordination among humanitarian actors. The sheer scale of this
disaster and the number of countries affected has presented an enormous
logistical challenge. Even so, however, coordination of relief efforts
among U.N. actors--and between the United Nations, NGOs and
governments--has shown a vast improvement over previous emergencies.
Under OCHA's overall leadership, humanitarian actors have engaged in
regular, systematized information-sharing and planning to map out
response, helping to ensure that every need is covered without
unnecessary duplication. In spite of the large number of agencies
operating in the field, we are working well together.
Under this overall umbrella, UNICEF has assumed the leading
coordination role in certain key sectors--namely, education, child
protection, and water and sanitation. In nutrition, we share a
leadership role with our partners in the World Food Program, and in
health, we are collaborating with the World Health Organization.
With respect to the latter, vaccination campaigns throughout the
affected areas were one of our earliest priorities. In India, measles
and vitamin A drives began within days of the disaster, and by January
7th these campaigns had already wrapped up on the mainland. The remote
Andaman and Nicobar Islands took longer to reach, but thanks to the
cooperation of the Indian government, immunization of children is now
well underway.
In the Aceh region of Indonesia, where over 75 percent of health
care professionals are still unaccounted for, we are working in close
collaboration with key partners including: The World Health
Organization, Medecins sans Frontieres, IFRC, Care, and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to provide measles vaccines and vitamin
A supplements to over half a million children between the ages of 6
months and 15 years. We are also providing basic drugs and supplies for
health facilities to cover 1.2 million people, including 1 million
sachets of oral re-hydration salts, malaria treatment for 3.2 million
people, 2,700,000 iron tablets, 68,000 syringes, and 11,500 safety
boxes.
UNICEF also participated in the recent inter-agency health
assessment on the west coast of Indonesia. This 24-person assessment
team, consisting of U.N. agencies and NGOs, was only possible as a
result of logistical support from the United States. It covered
numerous sites previously unassessed on the West Coast, using four
teams operating simultaneously and supported by U.S. helicopters for
drop-off and pick-up. The assessment took 6 days in total, hosted on
the USS Lincoln.
As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, our deepest gratitude goes to
the U.S. military for this and other crucial assistance. U.S. military
support continues to prove invaluable in Indonesia, and I would
especially like to highlight the USNS Mercy, a floating hospital of
exceptional resources. UNICEF and the crew of the Mercy have already
begun technical-level discussions to assess the many ways in which the
Mercy can support key areas of public health such as water quality,
malaria prevention and control, emergency obstetrical care and safe
motherhood, measles vaccination programs, and psychosocial support.
Needless to say, however, the threat of disease remains. Clean
water and proper sanitation are a critical and growing problem,
especially for the hundreds of thousands of tsunami survivors living in
temporary camps. The risk of water-borne diseases such as cholera and
diarrhea is high, especially for children.
The sanitation situation is particularly worrying in Indonesia,
where in some areas of Aceh Province, only one in 1,000 people has
access to a toilet. This shortage has been exacerbated by heavy rains,
which have flooded many toilets in low-lying camps, forcing displaced
people to relocate to higher ground. Heavy rains have worsened the
situation in Sri Lanka as well, where only 35 percent of people in
camps have access to safe sanitation. And in the Maldives, water and
sanitation has proven to be the greatest challenge. The extremely low
altitude of these islands rendered them especially vulnerable to damage
and contamination of water supplies and sewage systems. As early as
December 28, UNICEF estimated that one in five islands in the Maldives
was without safe drinking water. Compounding the problem, virtually
every household on the affected islands reported blocked or damaged
sewage systems.
In response, we are working with governments to coordinate aid
agency relief efforts across the tsunami-affected countries to restore
access to safe water and sanitation. In the Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar
Districts of Indonesia, UNICEF is pumping and chlorinating 1,500 wells
to benefit 15,000 people, and supplying mobile water treatment units at
six locations along both East and West Coasts to benefit 25,000 people.
Construction of emergency latrines is ongoing, and we are also
providing bathing and washing facilities for 43,000 people in
settlements for the displaced.
In Sri Lanka, UNICEF has distributed hundreds of tons of water and
sanitation supplies, including bottled drinking water, water
purification tablets, water tanks, pumps, jerry cans, and family water
kits, to name but a few. We have constructed more than 1,500 temporary
latrines, and are supporting the establishment of women's bathing
facilities at relocation sites for the displaced.
And in the Maldives, we have distributed Basic Family Water Kits,
containing collapsible buckets, bars of soap and purification tablets,
including instructions on their use in the local language. We are
helping the government to construct latrines, and have supplied
hundreds of wheelbarrows, shovels, rakes, disinfectant, and other
cleaning equipment to address the problem of garbage disposal. Across
the Maldives, UNICEF and its partners are assisting 69 islands with
over 13,000 households.
These and other UNICEF water and sanitation projects will be
supported by the Tsunami Water and Sanitation Fund, created last month
in partnership with the Clinton Foundation as part of President Bush's
campaign for private sector support to the tsunami crisis. The new fund
will support a robust series of programs designed not only to restore
safe water and sanitation for affected countries, but to improve upon
what existed before. And of course, former President Clinton will now
support the tsunami effort more broadly as Secretary General Kofi
Annan's Special Envoy for Tsunami-affected Countries.
Turning to the issue of protection, UNICEF and other child
protection agencies have been deeply concerned over reports of children
being exploited or trafficked. For the most part, however, these
reports have thankfully remained unsubstantiated. This is in part
because the number of separated children--those no longer in the care
of their parents--and unaccompanied children--those no longer in the
care of an adult--is relatively small. Though it varies among
countries, the devastation of the tsunami was such that many children
simply did not survive; as a result, there are few children at all in
some of the worst hit areas, unaccompanied or otherwise.
In addition, the affected communities generally have a strong
tradition of caring for children who have lost parents, and as a result
we can say confidently that the number of children requiring full-time
care from child protection agencies is very small.
In Indonesia, UNICEF and its partners have registered 440 separated
and 31 unaccompanied children. In Sri Lanka, there are 1,500 separated
children living with family, and fewer than 50 children are
unaccompanied; 4,000 Sri Lankan children have lost at least one parent.
In neighboring India, we have identified 361 children who have lost
both parents, and over 1,800 who lost one. Approximately 500 children
in Thailand have lost one parent or guardian, and 73 lost both parents.
Considering the magnitude of this emergency, the number of
unaccompanied children is relatively small; however, it is still
crucial to ensure that these children are protected from those who
would prey upon their vulnerability. In this regard, UNICEF commends
the swift and decisive leadership of the affected governments. Through
the imposition of moratoria on international adoptions, the tightening
of port and border security and other measures, affected governments
have helped ensure that their children are not victimized yet again by
the tsunami. In addition, I would like to offer our sincere thanks for
the statement issued by the U.S. Government in the early days of the
crisis underlining the essential role of extended family and community
placement for children who had lost their parents. It was a helpful
initiative prompting national governments to strengthen their own
measures to protect children from illicit adoption or trafficking.
UNICEF and its partners have also taken protective measures for
unaccompanied children. In part through generous support from USAID,
child centers have been established throughout the affected areas to
register unaccompanied and separated children, and to set up family
tracing mechanisms to help locate loved ones. Children who are no
longer in the care of their families will be protected and supported
through these centers so that they are not abandoned or left to fend
for themselves, but have the opportunity to go to school, eat well and
play. We are distributing Family Kits to support households who are
caring for separated children, and monitoring mechanisms have been put
into place to ensure that children living with foster families are
being cared for responsibly.
But it is not just separated and unaccompanied children that need
our protection. Thousands of children living in displacement camps are
vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and in some cases recruitment
into local fighting groups. And virtually every child in the affected
areas is experiencing some form of psychological distress arising from
the disaster. For these children, it is crucial to re-establish some
sense of normalcy, and ensure that there are safe places for them to
learn, play, and interact.
Throughout the affected regions, UNICEF has been supporting local
governments in their efforts to get children back to school--or, where
this is not possible, ``back to learning.'' We have shipped literally
tons of educational materials, including thousands of school tents,
school-in-a-box kits, and recreation kits including sports and games.
We are supporting teacher training, including training in psychosocial
support, and are assisting the Government of Indonesia to recruit
teachers to replace the 2,000 education professionals who were killed
in the tsunami.
Even once schools have re-opened, however, the psychological impact
on ``the tsunami generation'' is likely to be deep and long term, and
will require sustained psychosocial care. Throughout the affected
areas, we are supporting community- and school-based psychosocial
responses to help children cope with the enduring impacts of this
tragedy.
In Sri Lanka, for example, UNICEF is training non-governmental
partners, teachers and local authorities in psychosocial response,
including developing projects where children can help each other. In
the districts of Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Kirinda, UNICEF and its
partners have established spaces in displacement camps where children
can learn and play safely, where they can interact with each other in a
stable environment. Thousands of play kits, including toys, puzzles and
sports equipment, are being distributed. Through play, drawing and
structured recreation activities, children in Sri Lanka and elsewhere
are coming to terms with the terrible losses they have suffered.
Thus far, there have been only scattered reports of abuse and
trafficking, and those generally unconfirmed. Nevertheless, UNICEF Is
taking precautionary measures, including extensive awareness-raising
campaigns and the training of military and police officers in child
protection issues.
Mr. Chairman, one of the most important lessons we can draw from
these figures is that, as the old adage goes, an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure. Though early media reports of trafficking and
abuse proved largely unsubstantiated, they nevertheless galvanized a
powerful response that may not have emerged as quickly otherwise. Just
as swift vaccination campaigns, Vitamin A distribution and the
provision of clean water helped stave off disease, early measures to
protect children--many of them taken by the affected governments
themselves--most likely went a long way toward preventing the further
victimization of children.
This points to a need which has been increasingly apparent to child
protection agencies of late: The need to mainstream our collective
protection response so that it becomes more predictable and,
ultimately, more efficient. Just as we know from experience to
distribute oral re-hydration salts and water purification tablets in
times of flood, so too should we have automatic, preventive protection
responses in times of emergency.
But our assistance does not stop once these early interventions are
over--once the threat of diseases subsides and the first day of school
has passed. In UNICEF, we often say we work in a country before, during
and after an emergency. We also work on both sides of a conflict,
adhering to the universal humanitarian principles of neutrality and
impartiality. That is why, if you travel to Sri Lanka or Aceh in a year
or two, you will see our staff helping governments and civil society to
reconstruct school buildings and health clinics, and to support the
long-term rehabilitation and recovery of all regions, whatever their
political allegiance. Too often in the past, the international
community has allowed its attention to wander away too soon, depleting
political will and resources before the job is truly over. We must not
allow that to happen here.
Another lesson we can take away from this tragedy is the importance
of investing in national capacity to respond to disasters. The strength
of the national response in Thailand and India stand testament to what
can be achieved when governments have the proper tools in place. The
international community will always respond when disaster strikes, but
national capacity is critical. Here again, preparedness is the
watchword.
And it is not only governments who need to be prepared. The
international humanitarian community also has a responsibility in this
regard. So what about us? Were we at UNICEF ready for such a massive
emergency? Of course not. No one could have planned for a calamity of
this scale. However, the lessons of Darfur, Afghanistan and Liberia
have helped us to respond faster and more efficiently. They have also
shown all of us in the United Nations the vital importance of
coordination. Now we need to carry these lessons forward to other
emergencies.
Mr. Chairman, UNICEF has always worked in emergencies, both natural
and man-made. Originally called the United Nations International
Children's Emergency Fund, the organization was created to provide
humanitarian assistance to children living in a world shattered by the
Second World War. Much has changed since then, but our fundamental
purpose has not. Emergencies still account for 40 percent of our
activities. In health and nutrition, water and sanitation, protection,
education and HIV/AIDS, our Core Commitments for Children in
Emergencies are more than a mission statement--they are a humanitarian
imperative.
Therefore, even as we continue our work in tsunami-affected
countries, we must help focus public and government attention to other,
forgotten countries: Sudan, where the recent peace agreement gives some
cause for hope, but also creates a need for rapid and positive change
to build confidence and better social services; in Liberia where we
must consolidate our initial steps toward peace and normalcy; in
Afghanistan where massive support is still necessary to build peace;
and in other countries such as Cote d'lvoire, Haiti and the Central
African Republic.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you on behalf of
UNICEF for your continued strong support. Together, we can improve the
lives of millions of children in emergencies across the globe, building
better opportunities, better futures, for every child.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Toole.
Ms. Lindborg.
STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you, Madam Chair, Senator Biden. We
appreciate your leadership on this and so many issues and, at
this point, your stamina. We appreciate your inviting us to
share our early reflections on how the international community
has responded to the devastation of the tsunami.
A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity to travel to Sri
Lanka and Indonesia and I stood with our team in the village of
Miruk Lam Reudeup, which is just outside Banda Aceh in
Indonesia. I think it is fair to describe that area as Ground
Zero. It suffered from both the earthquake and the devastation
of the tsunami. As you have heard throughout the morning, it is
a scene of some devastation, the churned debris that covers
what used to be homes and villages.
While I was there, we began working with villagers, who had
come from nearby displaced camps, in a cash-for-work program
that paid the villagers to do the projects that they had deemed
the highest priority. In that instance, it was to clear the
roads so they could reenter their villages to see what was left
and, on a more gruesome note, to enable the Indonesian military
to come in and retrieve the bodies that were still under the
debris. It was a pretty sobering and pretty desolate sight.
But, just yesterday, I received an e-mail from a member of
our team on the ground, and he writes that since my visit, the
recovery has really been remarkable. You would not believe this
place, if you saw it, he writes. The village has a new well, a
generator that runs the water pump, lights that extend the
workday well into night. All the roads are cleared. People are
returning home and beginning to rebuild. Small businesses that
service the reconstruction effort are popping up. Jobs are
being generated. Markets are open. The people in the village,
he writes, are several steps ahead of the government and the
international NGOs.
I wanted to share that reflection with you because it
captures a really important point that I would like to make,
and that is, relief and recovery works best when it is planned
and executed in close partnership with the communities affected
by a disaster. Many of these community members, despite the
considerable trauma that we have heard quite a bit about today
and the enormous loss caused by this disaster, are at this
point survivors, and many of them have the will and the know-
how to help shape the best response to the disaster.
I was asked to reflect a little bit on where I thought the
NGOs were most effective in this response. I would like to just
hit three points.
The first is that, because of the long-term investments in
development that many of us have made, in partnership with the
U.S. Government, in so many of these countries, we were able to
respond quickly through our partnerships with local communities
and local governments, with our own staff members who were
poised and ready to go in, and with local knowledge, networks,
and suppliers. A quick example is that Mercy Corps has worked
in Sumatra for several years with a U.S. Department of
Agriculture program. Because of our nearby location to Aceh, we
were able to be at the border quickly with a seasoned team,
with assets, trucks, motorcycles, and office supplies ready to
go as the border opened. That is the result of long-term
development investments.
Second, I think we have done our best work when we are able
to leverage the energy and the ingenuity of the local
communities. I cited the cash-for-work example in Aceh. This
means being able to see the best ways to support the community
as they move forward in their own recovery. It means investing
in their efforts. For example, seeing that there is a brick
factory that, with a capital investment, can get back up and
running, supply bricks for the effort, employ individuals, and
give them the capacity to earn income and make their own
decisions about how to move forward.
In Meulaboh, for example, we very quickly helped local
community members move, within the first 10 days, 28 boats back
down to the ocean, repair them, and get them back out to sea.
As one fisherman told me, I am still afraid to go too far out,
but it feels good to get back into some routine.
Third, as has been noted, there has been an unprecedented
response by private donors throughout the world, and Americans
have been extraordinarily generous. That incredible pipeline of
flexible, fast money has enabled the NGOs to mobilize quickly.
From the very first day, we were able to move in with resources
and were able to undertake immediate distributions. It has
enabled us to be so flexible that as the situation, which is
extraordinarily dynamic, has changed, we have been able to
adjust our programs to support recovery efforts as quickly as
is needed. It has proven to be a remarkable asset, if we ever
have had any doubt, in enabling that response.
I would like to comment briefly on two challenges that
remain, although, I think we have made great progress on both
in this particular response. The first is the challenge of
material aid. We have seen this in many emergencies stemming
from extreme good will and wonderful motivation. Well-meaning
people want to respond by providing things, medicines, clothes
and items that, although well-intentioned, end up clogging up
our logistical pipelines and are often not appropriate for the
environment. For example, I met with a Sri Lankan village
leader who was a bit perplexed at a shipment of ties and
miniskirts that he had just received. There are many very
important uses of material aid, but it has to be demand-driven,
well-targeted, appropriate, and prioritized.
The good news is we have made enormous progress with this
response. We have seen messages in mainstream publications to
please donate cash instead of goods. Great credit is due to
Presidents Bush and Clinton for their carrying that message so
effectively as well.
Second, we have talked a lot through the morning about
coordination, and I think that we were challenged to coordinate
because of the enormity of the response. So, many groups and
individuals who have not previously worked in emergency
environments, through the best of intentions, showed up. But
the good news is that the experienced actors, the U.N. and the
NGO community, they were able to quickly, on the ground,
reconstitute the international architecture that does exist.
Just to give you a sense of what that looks like on the
ground: In Indonesia, when I was there, every morning at 7
o'clock, there was a meeting between U.N. representatives and
NGOs to talk about the key issues for a half-hour, followed by
sectoral and regional meetings that appropriate NGO
representatives then attended through the day. There is also a
humanitarian information center established by the United
Nations. So, if you are new to the scene, you can plug in, see
who is doing what, who has which resources and where.
Just a quick example; a very small example of how that
works. In Meulaboh, Mercy Corps was able to bring in several
shipments of dried fish. We learned that Catholic Relief
Services was distributing a food basket that lacked protein but
they had the networks in the displaced camps. We were able to
add our fish to their food basket so that there was a complete
food basket distributed to those families. Those kinds of
examples occur every day in many, many ways.
One way in which all of this coordination becomes very
helpful is that it gives us a mechanism to deal with the
sensitive issues, one of which is shelter. The whole question
of shelter is quite complicated in Aceh where there are 450,000
displaced people. The United Nations, the NGOs, and the
Indonesian Government have been able to form an integrated task
force to look at how to ensure the best setting for the
proposed barracks. So, some of the early concerns have not
materialized, although it is an issue that we will all be
looking at closely, but with good dialog and good coordination
among all the various actors there.
Finally, I would like to end with just two recommendations
as we look forward. The first is to really urge that we look
again at how to establish funding mechanisms that distribute
money much more quickly and effectively over longer time
periods. We had a great advantage because of the private
resources that were available for the tsunami. We do not
always, in fact, we rarely have that advantage. We see what a
great benefit that is for ensuring a very fast and effective
response that can move to meet changing needs as quickly as the
situation demands.
Second--and this is pertinent as you look at both the
supplemental request and the FY 2006 budget--it is critical to
maintain our solid investments in development. As important as
these emergency responses are, it is critical that we do not
forget the value of long-term development programming, the
value that it played in this response, and also in meeting the
many silent tsunamis around the world.
I will not say more because I was very heartened to hear
the concern among many of the Senators on this committee that
we not forget either of those important areas.
As we reflect on this first period of response, I think
there is much to commend. I think that the international
community drew together and we were able to avert some of the
biggest fears that we had. We were able to access some of these
very difficult areas and meet the immediate needs. Kids are
back at school in Aceh and the risk of widespread disease has
been averted.
I will say, however, that now is when the hard work begins.
These are extraordinarily complex situations and there will be
rebuilding efforts that will take us through the next 5 to 8
years. It is important that we not lose that focus. I would
urge you all to consider holding a hearing in another 6 to 12
months to check in how that longer term effort is going. In the
meantime, we will continue to take our cue from the enormous
courage of all the survivors with whom we are working.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy Lindborg, President, Mercy Corps,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting me to share my thoughts on the humanitarian response to the
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. The tsunami delivered a historic
and devastating punch through a region that spanned 11 nations,
requiring a fast and comprehensive response. This disaster severely
tested the international relief infrastructure, and I believe we can
draw from this experience valuable lessons that will inform our
planning and response to future emergencies. I applaud the committee
for taking the time to explore these issues, appreciate as always the
leadership of Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, and look forward to
working with you to improve our capacity to respond to future
disasters.
A few weeks ago, I traveled to Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I stood
with our field staff in the utterly devastated village of Miruk Lam
Reudeup in the Aceh Province of Indonesia. I think it's fair to
describe that area as Ground Zero for the disaster, as it was affected
both by the earthquake and the massive tsunami that followed. Most of
us have seen the images of churned debris and devastated landscapes.
While I was there, Mercy Corps began working with the villagers in a
cash-for-work program that paid them to do projects they identified as
most important. They began by clearing the road into their village, so
they could pick through the remains of their houses, and most
importantly, the Indonesia military could gain access to recover the
many bodies under the wreckage. It was a desolate scene, with villagers
wearing face masks and laboriously clearing the way to their former
homes.
But just yesterday, I got an e-mail from Dan Curran, a member of
the Mercy Corps team in Aceh. He writes that since my visit there, the
recovery has moved quickly. ``You would not believe this place if you
saw it,'' he wrote. The village has a new well, a generator that runs
the water pump, and enough lights to extend the work day well into the
night. The roads have been cleared. People are returning home and re-
building with whatever materials they can salvage. Small businesses
that service the reconstruction effort are popping up around town,
providing much needed jobs and building supplies. ``The people in this
village,'' Dan wrote, ``are several steps ahead of the government and
the international NGOs.''
Dan's observation captures well one of my key points today: Relief
and recovery works best when planned and executed in close partnership
with the communities affected by a disaster, whether natural or man-
made. Many of these communities have the will and the know-how to shape
the best response to the situation--the international community needs
to fully use and support these local assets.
In responding to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the international NGO
community was most effective when it leveraged the energy and ingenuity
of the affected communities, when we have made long-term investments in
building local capabilities, and when we have the resources and
flexibility to support local initiatives.
We have passed the critical first month of response. As we reflect
on the response to date, there is much to commend. The world has
responded with incredible generosity. Many nations were able to work
together to access difficult areas and provide essential services.
Schools have reopened in Aceh. Conflicts have abated. Major disease
outbreaks have been averted. I think we can be proud of the response.
And now the really hard work begins.
I would like to offer a few comments from the perspective of an
NGO, about the NGO response to this tragedy:
1. Ongoing Investments in Longer Term Development Enabled a Fast,
Effective Response
First, many of us had a fast and substantial immediate response to
the emergency. Because many of us have been working on the ground in
India, Sri Lanka, Sumatra and elsewhere, we were in a position to
deploy the right people and resources on very short notice. We were
able to do so because we have existing networks of local teams, local
partners and suppliers. In those critical first hours after the
emergency, it is the people on the ground who are able to reach those
affected most quickly.
For example, Mercy Corps teams were waiting at the Aceh border as
government officials opened that border for the first time in a year
and able to cross into Aceh with a seasoned team, an office set-up and
supplies. We are able to do so thanks largely to the fact we have
several ongoing development focused USDA programs in Sumatra. Through
these programs, Mercy Corps distributes soy milk to more than 100,000
schoolchildren and supports local NGOs in microfinance, water and
sanitation, capacity building and relief activities. Due to these USDA
programs, Mercy Corps was able to quickly redeploy staff, equipment,
and resources to Aceh and provide immediate food, temporary shelter,
and water to thousands of survivors. Our familiarity with Sumatra and
working with the local NGO sector have also proved helpful in our
effort to move quickly into community recovery activities, a process
that will continue to rely on partnerships with local NGOs and
community groups. Within the week, we were distributing food to more
than 60,000 individuals using World Food Programme resources.
2. Early Developmental Relief Focus Supported Local Capacity
Second, Mercy Corps, like some other NGOs, sought and implemented
innovations that moved the response quickly into recovery programs. As
always, Mercy Corps made an effort to be flexible and entrepreneurial.
We looked for gaps in the response and moved immediately to fill them.
Mercy Corps participated fully in the effort to meet urgent needs--
distribution of food, health and hygiene supplies, household kits and
other essentials--but we also immediately started working with local
communities to determine the necessary next steps for recovery. The
cleanup and income needs in affected areas were tremendous, but so were
the supply of labor and enthusiasm among local workers.
As I noted earlier, Mercy Corps started a cash-for-work program
that paid locals to clear roads, rebuild schools, and maintain IDP
camps. We employed more than 1,600 people in Banda Aceh alone, giving
families the income to buy much-needed staples and making communities
livable again. The NGO community was able to work with communities, to
assist kids to return to school, help fisherman repair their boats and
support a return to their homes.
3. Ability to Mobilize Private Resources Enabled a Fast and Innovative
Response
Third, we benefited from an unprecedented amount of private
resources. If we ever had any doubt, this crisis proved the enduring
value of fast, flexible resource pipelines. Without having to wait for
institutional donors, many NGOs were able to move quickly into the
affected areas and begin delivering vital assistance. We are
essentially the arms and legs of the international response, and this
time around, we were resourced so we could mobilize fully and quickly.
All too often, we are scraping for funding early on in a crisis while
institutional funding sources get underway.
As importantly, as the situation changed, we were able to identify
innovative solutions and work with communities to devise assistance
options that most met their needs. For example, Mercy Corps was able to
begin cash-for-work programs as soon as community members identified
their desire to get back to work. We were then able to begin investing
in small entrepreneurial efforts designed to jumpstart the local
economies, providing income and jobs. Once these efforts demonstrated
an effective approach, we could scale them up. A cash-for-work program
that began with 100 villagers in Miruk Lam Reudeup is now employing
more than 2,000 workers throughout Aceh, with support from OFDA, OTI
and UNDP.
Unfortunately, we can't count on this level of public support,
especially for the more complicated and hidden emergencies we typically
address.
4. Challenges of Material Aid Remain
One of the chronic problems we face in highly publicized
humanitarian efforts is too much material aid. Generous and well-
meaning people--though schools, workplaces, places of worship--want to
contribute to the relief effort and send clothes, food, and other
supplies. Unfortunately, those donated items tend to clog up our finite
transportation and logistics systems with goods that may not always be
a top priority. While in Sri Lanka, I spoke with one village leader who
noted a supply of neckties and miniskirts he recently received.
Although much can be done responsibly with material aid, it must be
demand-driven, well-targeted, appropriate and prioritized.
The good news is that we've made significant progress on this
issue. Our collective public reminders that cash donations are most
effective in such emergencies seem to be getting through. Mainstream
publications carried this message as did Presidents Bush and Clinton.
But we need to continue driving home that message because the wrong
donated goods continue to gum up the works.
5. Coordination Systems Worked
Despite the appearance of chaos, there is an effective
international infrastructure for coordinating these responses. It
occurs at many levels: Internationally between donors, at a country
level, and in each region. Experienced responders know how to
constitute this system in each new emergency.
In India and Sri Lanka, the governments managed the coordination,
while NGOs worked in sector and regional working groups to share
information and resources. In Indonesia, the government designated its
military leadership to coordinate with the many international
militaries that responded, while asking the United Nations to
coordinate the international NGOs and other international
organizations.
So what does this look like on the ground? In Indonesia for
example, there are regular--at first daily--morning meetings with the
key U.N. agencies and NGO representatives to identify top issues of the
day. There are then a series of sector specific and regional meetings
that appropriate U.N., NGO and government representatives attend. The
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has set up a
Humanitarian Information Center to facilitate information exchange.
Finally, there is a group of NGOs that meets each week to identify
critical issues as well.
In practice this means that in Meulaboh, for example, Mercy Corps
was able to procure several shipments of dried fish. Catholic Relief
Services was distributing a food basket from the World Food Programme,
and although they had established the distribution network, they lacked
any protein component. Aware of this gap, we gave them the fish for
their teams to distribute so villagers would receive a complete food
basket.
It also means that as difficult and complex issues such as shelter
are addressed, there are mechanisms for working together. With nearly
450,000 displaced people in Aceh, the question of shelter is enormous.
The majority of those people are living with host families, in a
remarkable tribute to the Indonesian concept of ``Pella Gandong'' or
taking care of each other. But even so, there is a need to identify
temporary options for nearly 150,000 of the homeless. The Indonesia
government, U.N. and NGO community have set up a joint process for an
integrated planning approach with the intention to ensure the best site
selection, design and operation of the barracks now proposed in 24
sites.
6. Collective Commitment to Accountability and Standards in Place
NGOs have collaborated extensively with one another and with the
U.N. community over the past 8 years to develop increased levels of
accountability and effectiveness in our relief operations. The results
are evident in the standards agreed by InterAction, an association of
160 U.S.-based relief and development organizations, and in the Sphere
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Mercy
Corps field staff in Aceh report that the level of understanding and
adherence to the Sphere standards among the established NGOs has been
unprecedented, which has brought a greater degree of accountability and
uniformity to the effort.
Two critical challenges stem from the inevitable ranks of highly
motivated often brand-new organizations and individuals that are
compelled to respond. As is often the case, they flocked to the
tsunami-affected areas, swelled the ranks and made coordination more
difficult. This is not a new phenomenon and usually quiets down after
the first few weeks, but it does increase an impression of chaos that
can be misleading.
In addition, many new or less experienced organizations that don't
meet key standards undermine the effectiveness of our collective
response and divert valuable resources from the collective effort.
To conclude, I would offer the following recommendations as we
assess our performance in the Indian Ocean region and explore ways to
plan and execute better humanitarian responses in the future:
1. Establish a mechanism for rapid disbursement of U.S. Government
relief funds. As I mentioned above, this extraordinary tragedy brought
about extraordinary generosity from individual donors; as a result,
private funds financed our initial response and allowed us to be
unusually nimble in our programming. In many of the most severe crises
though, governments provide the vast majority of the funds. We need to
streamline the mechanism for distributing fast, long-term and flexible
response funds from the government.
2. Make solid investments in developing countries. Local
communities and governments were key to the sound responses in
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. When we invest in long-term
development--building stronger governance structures, expanding
educational opportunities, enhancing the health infrastructure--we
improve livelihoods and better equip beneficiary communities to deal
with disasters.
Furthermore, these investments allow NGOs like Mercy Corps to
establish the kind of presence--a forward position, if you will--that
enables us to quickly deploy knowledgeable local and international
staff to the crisis area. Country experience among NGO staff was
especially important in this crisis, since both Sri Lanka and the Aceh
Province of Indonesia have longstanding internal conflict dynamics that
affect response strategies and implementation.
For these reasons, development assistance needs to be a top
priority for the U.S. Government. As the discussion gets underway on
the President's FY2006 budget request, please consider the need to
ensure that core development accounts are maintained or improved.
3. Focus immediately on development relief and restoring
livelihoods. Delivering food aid and non-food emergency supplies will
remain the immediate priority in humanitarian crises. But as Mercy
Corps learned on the ground in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, we must
simultaneously work to get people back on the job: Farmers to their
fields, fishermen to their boats, merchants to their shops, teachers
and students to their classrooms. Instead of focusing on a false
distinction between ``relief'' and ``recovery'' phases, we need to
manage the two in parallel.
4. Prioritize local resources and community partnerships. In
procuring relief supplies and staffing our missions, we should use
local suppliers and talent whenever possible. That ensures the most
locally appropriate goods and services and pumps much-needed money into
the local economies. Most NGOs do their very best to develop local
talent, which is especially important in the two hardest hit areas in
the tsunami-affected regions: Because of the dynamics of local
conflicts, governments are unlikely to permit international staff to
stay indefinitely and we will need to rely heavily on local staff to
accomplish recovery goals over the longer term.
Partnerships with local groups and leaders help guarantee that our
efforts are meeting the greatest community needs. Mercy Corps worked
closely with survivors in the devastated Indonesian town of Meulaboh to
determine how we could contribute. The town's profitable fishing fleet
was all but demolished by the tsunami, so we worked with leaders to
organize the fisherman and pay them to move and repair boats that could
be salvaged. Within weeks, fishermen were back on the water generating
income for their families.
Challenges Ahead
As I noted earlier, the serious, complex and long-term effort of
rebuilding these communities lies ahead. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia,
there are tangled conflicts that remain just barely below the surface.
These countries will have to grapple with the many complicated issues
related to rebuilding an entire human and physical infrastructure. They
will have to painstakingly restore whole cadres of government workers
killed or wounded by the tsunami.
The role that we as international NGOs can continue to play is a
supportive one. We take our cue from the many people who have survived
and now lead the way with their determination to rebuild their lives.
We can and will continue to help people plug as quickly as possible
back into a life in which they can begin the long process of healing,
make a living and rebuild both their houses and their community.
______
Summary of Mercy Corps Tsunami Response Operations
Mercy Corps is concentrating its relief and recovery efforts in
three nations: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India. At present, our tsunami
response operations are assisting more than 250,000 people throughout
the region, including over 130,000 in Sri Lanka, over 75,000 in
Indonesia, and over 50,000 in India. More than 150 Mercy Corps staff
members are engaged in these activities, which focus primarily on
economic and livelihood recovery and, where necessary, ongoing
emergency relief assistance. Mercy Corps is also exploring recovery
needs in northern Somalia with an eye toward providing assistance to
tsunami affected communities in that country.
The emphasis during the initial phase of our response has been to
meet the most urgent emergency needs through the provision of clean
water and repair of sanitation facilities, as well as the provision of
sanitation supplies, food, blankets, and other non-food items, shelter
materials, tools, and medicines. In addition, we are assisting with
psychosocial services, cleanup, and access to other basic services.
From the start, we have worked to tie emergency relief with longer term
development activities. Cash for work programs are repairing damaged
infrastructure, while providing participants with an opportunity to
earn income and regain a sense of normalcy. As always, we are working
in coordination with other aid agencies, supporting local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the disaster, and
moving as quickly as possible to address the significant economic and
livelihood challenges faced by these coastal communities.
Following is a brief summary of Mercy Corps operations in the
region:
INDONESIA
A Mercy Corps team was among the first humanitarian workers to gain
entry into Banda Aceh, an area of Indonesia that's been closed off to
the world for years due to civil war. In addition to helping meet
immediate food, water, and shelter needs, Mercy Corps has been making
special efforts to address the long-term needs of children, the most
vulnerable of those affected by the tsunami. On January 26--
1 month after the tsunami--Mercy Corps helped students in Banda Aceh
return to 15 local schools. This ``back to school'' success was made
possible by community mobilization and the hard work of local citizens
employed in cash for work programs.
Mercy Corps' cash for work programs pay local workers a fair daily
wage to help clean up debris and repair critical infrastructure. This
approach is helping accelerate economic recovery among Indonesian
families, as well as providing a valuable service in rebuilding
tsunami-damaged areas. Within 3 months, Mercy Corps plans to employ
6,000 people in cash-for-work programs that will continue to clean up
and restore communities. We are also working to facilitate the stable
return of at least 1,000 displaced families to several villages by
providing shelter materials and ensuring a clean water supply.
In the coming months, Mercy Corps will increasingly focus its
efforts on programs that stimulate local business and help communities
rebuild. Programs already underway included business activities, such
as pallet building and loans for brick enterprises, as well as the
recapitalization of local businesses to expand employment. Along these
lines, Mercy Corps aims to support at least 100 enterprises in 20
villages in the coming months. Finally, we are supporting the return of
at least 1,000 families in several villages, facilitating ``go-and-
see'' visits, distributing family kits for communities in their area of
return, providing basic shelter materials, and conducting basic well
water chlorination.
SRI LANKA
Mercy Corps staff members are partnering with local organizations
to ensure a rapid, efficient response in the areas where assistance is
most needed, especially the hard hit Ampara District on the eastern
coast of Sri Lanka. Currently, Mercy Corps has eight international aid
workers in the country and offices in Colombo, Pottuvil and
Trincomalee. Senior Mercy Corps staff members have years of experience
in Sri Lanka, and Mercy Corps completed an assessment visit to Sri
Lanka in mid-December, less than 2 weeks before the disaster. This
presence and expertise allows us to build on a broad and deep
foundation of local contacts.
Mercy Corps has provided school materials to children, and
supported children's recreation programs in the camps that many on Sri
Lanka's eastern coast temporarily inhabit. Mercy Corps is also helping
to rehabilitate the severely damaged local maritime economy, by
supporting the repair of fishing boats. Mercy Corps has provided
materials for cleanup, distributed shelter supplies, initiated a public
health information campaign and is implementing cash for work programs
in a number of communities throughout the country. Much of Mercy Corps'
emergency relief support has been provided in partnership with local
non-governmental organizations responding to the disaster.
INDIA
Working with local Indian organizations, Mercy Corps is assisting
tens of thousands of people in Tamil Nadu, India. Mercy Corps has
partnered with the DHAN Foundation to launch relief and recovery
efforts in 20 of 73 villages in Tamil Nadu's Nagappattinam district
(population 196,000). Efforts include distribution of temporary shelter
and relief supplies, construction of community activity centers, and
cash-for-work programs to help improve and reclaim agricultural land
and livelihoods and improve local water sources. Working with the
national humanitarian organization DMI (Disaster Mitigation Institute),
Mercy Corps has completed construction of roughly 350 temporary
shelters, with construction of a further 100 now underway. Mercy Corps
has also distributed household kits and food to almost 800 tsunami-
affected families.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg. I think your
suggestion about a followup hearing in the not too distant
future is a very important one. We do need to continue with the
monitoring, knowing what is happening and knowing what else we
could be doing better.
Ms. Lindborg, both you and Ms. McClymont mentioned the
issue of very good intentions, those who want to come to help
but that the inexperience, perhaps some of the newer
organizations or just individuals that want to assist can be,
in fact, an impediment or get in the way of the operations. I
actually had a conversation 2 weeks ago with some friends of
the family. He is a dentist in Alaska, and they are looking to
go to Indonesia over their son's spring break in March to do
what they can to help. What I am gathering from this hearing is
they should probably look for another opportunity during that
spring break to do what they can to help unless they have
already made advance arrangements to assist.
How do you get the message out? We have been talking about
coordination, collaboration, just educating people on what is
needed to help. Instead you get ties and miniskirts. I read the
article about the down jackets going, and they improvised and
used them for diapers for some of the infants. How do we deal
with this? Is it getting better as we are getting further from
the actual tragedy itself? What is the message that needs to go
out now?
Ms. McClymont. Well, let me just begin, Senator, by
appreciating your concern about this issue because it is a
major one, as Nancy Lindborg has suggested. InterAction has on
its website, for starters, a guide to appropriate giving. To
the extent people are able to know about our website and come
there and understand it better, that is a start.
Second, we have produced a video news release and a radio
news release that we have distributed to media outlets to try
to get the word out on this. I think what, as Nancy suggested,
was so critical this time around--many of us were speaking to
the media about this concern. I know Members of Congress spoke
to the public about this concern, and as Nancy suggested, it
was the powerful voice of the President saying, cash is best.
Please rely on the reliable NGOs that are out there doing the
work.
Again, I would hope that we could get the word out that, on
our website are the list of our member organizations where they
describe all they are doing overseas in this disaster and many
others with great particularity. I think if people could find
their way to these very reliable, sound organizations, at least
that comprise our membership, they would find that they would
be able to provide funding for certain activities those NGOs
might be undertaking that, as your colleagues, they might find
a volunteer opportunity. There is a particular website which
gives guidance on those individuals who do wish to volunteer,
but certainly they can come to our website to observe which of
our member organizations might want to use their help.
Admittedly, that is infrequent. You need to be trained. You
need to be experienced to go out and work in these difficult
situations.
But I think the more we can use your help, the Members of
Congress, and the President, to lay out these messages along
with us, I think we have just got to keep at it. It certainly,
as Nancy suggested, was better this time than it has been in
other disaster incidents.
Senator Murkowski. And I appreciate your comments, Ms.
Lindborg, about relying on the local communities, relying on
the locals first rather than us assuming that we know what to
do, but to take that brick factory that is there, get it up,
and get it integrated.
You mentioned that you had morning meetings, I guess
meetings between the U.N. agencies and the NGO representatives
to identify top issues of the day. How did the local community
play into that type of a meeting format? Were they involved?
Ms. Lindborg. They were not involved in that meeting. The
government was involved by virtue of the United Nations holding
meetings every evening with the government, and they then
brought that message forward to the NGOs. The NGOs would bring
the community concerns from our meetings with community leaders
and religious leaders throughout the course of our work.
It is important to note, however, that one of the really
devastating losses in Aceh was of so many of the leaders that
comprised the government and community and religious leadership
throughout the province. So they are trying to rebuild that,
along with the physical infrastructure. But that morning
meeting was an opportunity to bring those strands together and
share what were the critical concerns and issues to focus on.
Senator Murkowski. So they really were integrated, which is
so important.
You also spoke about some kind of a mechanism to get the
funding out fast, and the fact that you had flexibility. With
all of the private moneys that were coming in, it enabled you
to move rapidly. But you believe you would not have had that
flexibility had that private funding not been available,
recognizing that we might not have it for the next event. How
do you recommend that we provide for the flexibility while
still having a level of accountability that, of course, we must
have?
Ms. Lindborg. I think that USAID, through the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance, has moved this forward immensely
in recent years, but there is still a lag time before the funds
are actually flowing. During that lag time, the NGOs really
rely on the private funds that we are able to raise, and we are
not always able to do so if the conflict is not well known by
the American public. Darfur presents a very instructive
comparison to the tsunami.
This is a conversation that we have had for a number of
years, and we would appreciate the opportunity to continue the
dialog about how we might structure some sort of prequalified
mechanism that would have a fund that accountable partners with
agreed-upon measures could draw down from and not just for the
3 months that is often the case because it chews up a lot of
time to have to resubmit proposals.
What we found we could do with this emergency was, in a
very entrepreneurial way, spot the needs, come up with creative
solutions, test them, and then bring them to scale. That is not
always possible with more restricted funding.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. Toole.
Mr. Toole. If I could just add to that. I think it is
something that we have also lived through. I actually called
our national committee here in Washington, as well as in London
and Berlin, on the 27th and said, basically, I need cash now,
and those national committees pull funds from the public
sector, the individuals who give, my mother, aunts, et cetera.
So I think we cannot underestimate the value of that public
commitment.
I would also, however, raise that for each of us and in our
case, UNICEF, the U.S. contribution to our regular resources,
so the regular budget contributions, are also what allow us to
respond quickly. The United States is the largest governmental
donor to UNICEF, and the fact that you give to the regular
budget means that we have those funds ready to react quickly.
So, yes, I agree that we need some sort of standby accounting
facility where we can quickly mobilize funds either from the
public sector or from governments, but also do not
underestimate the value of your regular contributions to some
of these organizations, and the fact that that gives us the
flexibility we need.
Thank you.
Senator Murkowski. And, Mr. Toole, you had mentioned in
your comments that UNICEF has been in these countries before
the tragedy, during, and they will be there after. I think that
that sets you up certainly to evaluate what we do in between
the crises. You have mentioned just one very simple example of
making sure that the fundraising is ongoing so that when there
is a tragedy, when there is a crisis, you have some
flexibility.
What else can we do in these in-between times to make sure
that we can, to the extent possible, be prepared? This is not
only as it relates to how we deal with the natural disaster,
but how we deal with the vulnerable populations, such as our
children. It is kind of a big question. I do not know if there
are easy answers.
Mr. Toole. There are certainly not easy answers, but I will
try anyway.
I think, first, I would come back to your dentist. The one
thing we should not do, in trying to reorient some of the
enthusiasm, is squelch that enthusiasm. What we actually need
is greater commitment to long-term issues. It is extraordinary
to me that, for example, for the tsunami UNICEF requested $144
million for the relief phase. We have raised $300 million in
about a month. For Sudan, which is a longstanding difficult
crisis, we asked for $288 million back in November. So far we
have raised $20 million. So there is a very different level of
commitment. So I think, on the one hand, we need to keep that
enthusiasm and help to channel it toward issues that are
perhaps more difficult to understand but still can help us.
Second, I would focus on the preparedness. We talked about
the early warning mechanisms that are possible for natural
disasters. We in the United Nations, but I know also some of
the NGOs, are working on similar early warning features for
conflict, for changes in political situations and we track the
world through our operation centers, et cetera, to do that.
Could we have foreseen the tsunami? No. It is not possible,
nor would it even be desirable to plan on a disaster at that
scale, but I think we can look at the early warning systems for
natural disasters. We can look and track the world for the
kinds of changes that start to happen with markets, with
children going to school, et cetera, to watch the world and
make sure that we can respond quickly.
Senator Murkowski. One of the things that you know you can
count on in a natural disaster, whether it is an earthquake in
Alaska or whether it is a tsunami in Indonesia, typhoons, you
are always worried about your water source. You are always
worried about the safety of your water. I am curious to know
about UNICEF's efforts. And I really appreciated the leader's
spotlight on how we deal with the water situation and really
putting a focus on that for our developing countries.
I am going to sit down with him and remind him that I still
have some issues in my State where we do not have safe water
and still are carrying our water. We have got to deal with
that.
But are we getting closer to that point where we have
portable water systems that can move in and respond when we
have these natural disasters, when we have these tragedies?
That seems to be the one area that we just have not kind of got
it right, and it leaves us vulnerable to disease, to infection,
and to all kinds of horribles. Are we getting any better?
Mr. Toole. Senator, I think we are. Are we there yet? No. I
think what was good to see in this particular crisis, whether
it was in the Maldives or in Aceh in Indonesia or in Sri Lanka,
was that we did actually get water to people pretty quickly.
Was it perfect water? No. For example, in Sri Lanka there has
not been a single death from a preventable disease since the
tsunami. That is extraordinary.
Where we are doing less well is in the complex emergencies.
So, for example, in Darfur we, with our partners, have drilled
wells and provided water to 800,000 people. As director of
emergencies, normally I would be thrilled. That is half the
population that we are trying to reach. So we have got a very
long way to go. So, I think, in natural disasters, particularly
because of some of the military assets, because of the capacity
to move in quite quickly, we are responding better than we are
in some of the complex emergencies where we need to drill
wells, we need to refit springs, have filters or
desalinization. It becomes more complicated in those contexts.
Ms. McClymont. Senator, if I may, just to add to what Mr.
Toole said. I know that the United Nations, through the Office
of Humanitarian Coordination that is headed by Jon Eglund, has
been looking at this question of our capacity, our
international response capacity with respect to the
fundamentals of international response, water and medical care
and so forth. They have determined through their inventory
recently that there is a concern about the lack of water and
sanitation capacity and resources. Medical care seems to be
reasonable in terms of the capacity of the community to
respond. But I know he will be following up and we, who work
with the United Nations on this matter, will be following up
and probably coming back to the Congress to discuss that
further.
I also just wanted to underscore that we, too, were
encouraged by the leader's comments about the worry over clean
water. We would simply suggest that even as we go forward and
try to find more resources and capacity to do that, we cannot
forget the accompanying pieces of the puzzle, the whole set of
development and disaster response concerns, education, and
health care and the like.
I think in response to the question you posed just before,
what do we do between crises; I think that it is so much about
what Ms. Lindborg said and what we, as the InterAction
community have been pushing for, that is to say, to have a very
sustainable and adequate level of funding for longer term
development assistance so that the members of InterAction and
other NGOs that are out there can keep building their local
partners on the ground. It is really through that local
capacity that those on the ground can respond, and we work very
closely with them.
So I wanted to just underscore the point of the need for
our attention to this longer term development assistance. We
were concerned to see that in the fiscal year 2006 request,
there was a cut in the development assistance accounts, part of
which is about clean water. So we would want to draw attention
to that and see if we can keep pushing ahead and doing better
on that score too.
Senator Murkowski. Good points.
I appreciate the comments from the three of you. I
appreciate your participation here in the hearing this morning.
I think it has been informative for all of us, and I think I
certainly will follow up with your suggestion, Ms. Lindborg,
and will recommend to the chairman that we do a followup to
just kind of check and see how things are going. Hopefully, we
will have good reports and we will be able to say that we,
indeed, have learned a great deal from this tsunami and how to
better respond in the future.
So I thank you for your time, and with that, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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Additional Prepared Statements and Other Material Submitted for the
Record
Prepared Statement of Human Rights First
Human Rights First would like to thank Chairman Lugar and Senator
Biden for the opportunity to place this testimony on relief and
reconstruction efforts in Aceh into the committee record. In this
testimony we will address a fear in policy circles that raising human
rights concerns will jeopardize the humanitarian mission. Our belief is
that although this is a sensitive issue in Indonesia, as in many
countries, such fear underestimates the positive impact of an informed,
coordinated approach to human rights issues at an early stage and
throughout the reconstruction process.
Human Rights First recognizes that both the committee members and
witnesses for this hearing have shown a willingness to publicly address
human rights issues while tackling core development challenges in the
tsunami-affected region. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has noted the need
to support military reform, and Administrator Andrew S. Natsios is
among the many participants who have addressed the need for
accountability in the aid process. We would like to take this
opportunity to add to these lessons by focusing on the role of civil
society in Aceh both before and after the tsunami.
Graffiti on a surviving shard of wall in Banda Aceh serves as a
record of the disaster: ``The earthquake began at 7:55. The ocean rose
at 8:30. Only the ruins remain.'' In Aceh, the tsunami seemingly came
out of nowhere. But the relief and reconstruction that follows is
taking place in a context of low-level conflict, military control, and
weak respect for human rights that long predates December 26, 2004.
This context provides lessons from the recent past, but also warning
signs in the current environment and a few indications of what the next
phase may bring.
Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization.
Since 1978, it has worked to protect and promote fundamental human
rights, holding all governments accountable to upholding the standards
set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and other
international human rights instruments. Our Human Rights Defenders
program works to support the efforts of human rights activists around
the world through advocacy campaigns on behalf of persecuted human
rights activists, and activities designed to expand the practical
realization of the right to promote and protect human rights.
the persistence of the past
The Indonesian Government in Jakarta deserves credit for opening
Aceh to foreign assistance in the days after the tsunami hit. The
Indonesian military has also played an important role in relief
activities to date, including food distribution and the recovery of
bodies. The arrival of an astounding collection of aid workers and
foreign militaries, including American troops, to a province largely
closed to outsiders for nearly two years has been accompanied by major
changes. These visitors have saved many lives and helped foster a level
of openness, in those areas in which the international community is
present, that one local activist could only sum up in the word
``unbelievable.''
But while many Americans first heard of Aceh in the aftermath of
the tsunami, for those who follow human rights in Asia the name was all
too familiar. While Aceh had been the site of anticolonial resistance
and regional rebellions for much of the 20th century, the current
conflict began with a declaration of independence in 1976 and the
creation of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM).
Counterinsurgency operations peaked in the 1990s and then again when
martial law was declared in May 2003.
The continuing impact of abuses committed during this separatist
conflict will have important ramifications for the planning and
execution of recovery plans. For example, any agency seeking working to
address trauma, displacement, or lost livelihoods will find that these
problems did not begin on December 26. Three decades of
counterinsurgency operations, capped by two years of martial law and
civil emergency, provide several important lessons for those working in
Aceh today:
The politicization of displacement and attacks on humanitarian
workers: Throughout the years of war the Acehnese have acquired long
experience with displacement. Even before martial law, villagers often
fled the fighting to seek refuge at mosques or soccer fields in nearby
towns. Civil society organizations, including women's organizations and
student groups, played an important role in providing food and medical
care and monitoring the situations in these temporary camps. The camps
were viewed by the military as potential bases of support for GAM.
Fearing that the guerrillas were using the camps to recruit members,
obtain supplies, or maintain a presence in the towns, the military
viewed the displaced population with suspicion and targeted those who
sought to assist them. Members of student groups and local humanitarian
organizations were harassed, beaten, and threatened with death by
security forces and their civilian allies. In December 2000 three
volunteers with Rehabilitation Action against Torture in Aceh (RATA)
were killed together with the torture victim they were assisting, and
staff members of the international aid organization Oxfam UK were
tortured in August 2000.
For its part, GAM forced many non-Acehnese migrants to seek safety
outside the province, where many remain in cramped camps. GAM also
reportedly used the IDP population for its own strategic and public
relations ends, discouraging some from returning to their homes.
The displaced civilian population was caught between the GAM rebels
and the security forces. With as many as 100,000 displaced Acehnese
scheduled to be moved to semipermanent relocation camps beginning next
week, there is reason to fear that this vulnerable population will
again be used as pawns. While access to affected populations has not
been problematic to date, if the environment changes due to renewed
conflict or tightened security, local organizations assisting or
monitoring the relocation sites may be singled out for official
harassment.
Undermining civilian government and civil society: There is a
common impression that the large military role in Aceh is due to the
tsunami's destruction of the civilian bureaucracy and civil society
organizations. The disaster did indeed cause major losses: Nearly 1,000
civil servants are dead or missing at the provincial level alone, and
54 of the 241 subdistrict governments are said to be nonfunctioning.
More than 40 NGO activists, including several leading human rights
defenders, are missing or dead, as well as journalists, teachers,
religious leaders, and other community leaders. Several prominent human
rights organizations have lost their offices and their records.
But the military's dominance is also the legacy of years of
military operations followed by martial law. Even before martial law
the army's territorial command structure, reinforced by a series of
military operations, created a parallel structure down to the village
level that overshadowed the weak civilian bureaucracy. Even as military
commanders took control of the economic and political life of the
province, many civil servants fled their posts due to fear of GAM
attacks. The court system outside of Banda Aceh had largely ceased to
function long before the tsunami struck.
Under martial law subdistrict heads in contested areas were
replaced with retired military officers. Martial law also had a
``humanitarian component'' that gave the Indonesian military a central
role in assistance to IDPs and severely restricted NGO access. Local
organizations were shut out of IDP camps they had worked in previously.
Martial law was downgraded to civil emergency status in May 2004,
but access by international organizations and journalists was still
severely limited at the time of the tsunami. Under civil emergency the
power was formally vested in civilian authorities (a governor later
jailed on corruption charges), but troop strength and military
operations were not necessarily scaled back. A respected Jakarta NGO
has identified 84 civilian deaths and 47 disappearances in the first
six months of civil emergency ending November 2004. What's more,
authorities are still empowered to summarily restrict freedom of
expression and assembly, carry out arbitrary searches, and restrict
freedom of movement.
A 6-month extension of civil emergency will end on May 19, the
second anniversary of the declaration of martial law. The presidential
decree that extended the status calls for a monthly evaluation, but the
government has not used this feature to withdraw emergency status.
PRESENT WARNING SIGNS
The dominant role of the Indonesian military
The Indonesian military has played an often welcome role in relief
operations. Such a role was required immediately after the tsunami by
the lack of alternatives in many areas and the need to reach people in
need quickly. But especially as the emergency phase shifts to
reconstruction, military participation in the context of Aceh raises
serious questions.
At the provincial level, the former commander of operations under
martial law, Major General Bambang Darmono (a former martial law
commander), serves as head of humanitarian operations for the army,
distinct from the security operations. But in Meulaboh, the second
biggest hub of humanitarian activity, one colonel has performed both
functions. This meant he has run the nightly relief coordination
meetings at the base while simultaneously bearing responsibility for
ensuring that GAM was defeated militarily. While there is not yet
evidence of discrimination impacting suspected GAM sympathizers, this
dual role raises fears that food aid or relocation programs could be
subordinated to military aims.
In addition there have been several credible reports that local
military commanders have required that aid be handed over in whole or
in part to be distributed by the armed forces, citing fears that the
aid would otherwise end up in guerrilla hands. But this practice could
also lead to discrimination, bottlenecks in aid, and corruption.
As the government begins massive relocation into semipermanent
barracks, the possibility of an army role is also troubling. Although
government officials stated there would be no army role beyond
``securing'' the barracks, military documents and the military role in
aid distribution, management, and security in existing camps raise
concerns.
Signs of hostility to humanitarian workers
Given the long track record of hostility toward IDPs and those
working to help them, intimidation or other forms of restriction are a
particular point of concern. Local and international NGOs have not
reported that restrictions have significantly hampered their ability to
operate. At the same time, however, there are signs that some in the
military are uneasy with the role played by NGOs, especially local
ones.
It has been widely reported that the military has formally
restricted access by foreign aid workers beyond the two cities of Banda
Aceh and Meulaboh, ostensibly as protection from attack. International
NGOs are expected to clear their travel in advance and accept a
military escort if required. However, these rules are not strictly
enforced, and so far appear to be a form of monitoring rather than
control. It is important that these rules are not used to restrict
access beyond that required by genuine security concerns. GAM has
stated it will not attack foreign aid workers, a pledge that is
consistent with its vested interest in a continued international
presence in Aceh.
Travel around some west coast towns such as Lamno is especially
circumscribed. Indonesian volunteers and one international NGO were
prevented from traveling in this region, although this problem was
later remedied.
Human Rights First has also learned of isolated, but nevertheless
worrisome, efforts to intimidate local NGOs.
According to press reports on January 10 in the Mata Ie
section of Banda Aceh, a volunteer was beaten by soldiers and
needed stitches.
Several local NGOs have been visited by security officers
demanding information on their aid distribution activities. Two
of the most active NGOs in Banda Aceh were visited within half
an hour on the night of January 22, one by police and one by
members of the provincial military command in plainclothes.
Students carrying out a health assessment in Bireuen were
approached at an IDP camp by several soldiers. The officers
later came to their office and took them to the military post
where they were questioned for several hours about their
activities before being released.
The head of the watchdog organization Government Watch,
Farid Faqih, was detained on January 27 in Meulaboh, accused of
stealing supplies donated by army wives. He was badly beaten by
soldiers including an army captain. While his role in the
disappearance of the supplies is still unclear, his
mistreatment is a worrying sign.
Lack of local participation
Acehnese have a saying that ``Buya krueng teudong-dong, buya tamong
meuraseuki.'' This translates roughly as ``the crocodile in the river
only watches while other crocodiles eat his food.'' Failure to
participate in the benefit of Aceh's natural resources has long been
one of the grievances driving separatism in Aceh. The influx of NGOs
and businesses from other parts of Indonesia and around the world has
raised fears that the main beneficiaries of the billions of dollars
pledged for reconstruction will once again not be the Acehnese. Their
exclusion from planning their own future led one Acehnese to tell me in
frustration: ``Sometimes I think it would be better if the wave had
just wiped us out, so these people could come and build whatever they
want.''
The provincial government has signaled its willingness to involve
Acehnese society in the development of a ``blueprint'' for
reconstruction. But participation is not just a matter of good
development practice; in the Acehnese context it is also dependent on
respect for fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression and
assembly.
Civil society organizations, including NGOs, academics, and
religious organizations, should be given a central role in the design,
delivery, and monitoring of aid efforts. The local nonprofit community
is reeling from the destruction, and the loss of several of its leading
members. But Aceh's development and human rights organizations have
survived years of war, abuse, and martial law. If conditions allow they
will continue to play an important role.
FUTURE ISSUES
The Indonesian government is still developing a master plan for
Aceh's reconstruction, and the international community has engaged
government agencies in a dialog on internationally accepted principles
and standards. However several issues have already been identified as
important and potentially problematic. The role of human rights
defenders and other NGO monitors will be critical to efforts to achieve
transparency and accountability.
Limits to access: Access in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar district, and
Meulaboh remains quite good. But even in those areas the fact that
civil emergency status and restrictions on access remain officially in
place, coupled with signs of suspicion of humanitarian workers, lead
many to fear that the current levels of openness will not be sustained.
Land rights: Land rights are contentious in Indonesia under the
best of conditions. But the loss of documents by landowners and the
destruction of offices of the regional land board further compounds the
problem. An additional source of conflict and uncertainty is the
proposed creation of a buffer zone of up to two kilometers from the
shoreline, with limited construction along the coast. The displaced
population has not received any clear information about this plan. If
this situation leads to conflict, the military role in relief and
reconstruction may become more problematic.
Human rights defenders play a critical role in allowing people to
defend their rights in the face of the state, the military, and a
private sector that often relies on links to powerful state elites.
Military-linked businesses: Due to a long history of economic
exploitation of Aceh's resources by the military, there is widespread
concern that army-controlled business and foundations will seek to play
a role in reconstruction. Such a role could cause problems especially
where reconstruction plans run into opposition from local communities.
As early as January 11, the Artha Graha conglomerate, partly owned by
the military, arranged an invitation by the local government to provide
a blueprint for the reconstruction of the city of Meulaboh, although
the offer was later rescinded in deference to the provincial master
plan now under development.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The chair of Artha Graha's relief effort, the retired general
Kiki Syahakri, was martial law administrator in East Timor during the
worst of the violence and has been indicted for crimes against humanity
by the United Nations Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military involvement in underground activities such as illegal
logging will also be relevant in the construction boom to come.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the face of these significant concerns, we would offer the
following recommendations for all future assistance to Aceh:
1. Support an environment conducive to the participation of Acehnese
civil society
The Indonesian Government should revoke civil emergency status and
it's restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly. Donors, such
as the World Bank, USAID, and United Nations agencies, should include
protections for human rights defenders in their dialog with Indonesia
on Aceh's reconstruction as a necessary mechanism for transparency and
accountability.
2. Ensure access by humanitarian and human rights organizations to all
regions of Aceh
The fear that GAM's civilian supporters or even active members are
among those seeking aid should not be used as an excuse to unreasonably
restrict aid or to intimidate aid workers, whether foreign or domestic.
For its part, GAM must not put the camps' civilian populations at risk
by using them to operate in any way. Indonesian authorities should
continue to give local and international humanitarian assistance groups
and also human rights organizations full and free access to all IDP
camps to help safeguard the rights of the displaced and ensure that new
violations are not allowed to occur.
Access is about more than the distribution of supplies. It is also
important that information flows freely in both directions. Displaced
people must be aware of their rights and their choices. Human rights
defenders need to be able to obtain and provide information about
conditions for IDPs and other vulnerable groups throughout Aceh. The
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states that everyone has the
right ``freely to publish, impart or disseminate to others views,
information and knowledge on all human rights and fundamental
freedoms.''
3. Minimize the role of the Indonesian military in humanitarian
operations
A central question for the international community is whether it
will reinforce the dominance of the military or seek to empower civil
society and the civilian government through its policies on aid and
reconstruction. Any efforts to improve conditions in Aceh, whether in
the area of human rights, development, or conflict-resolution, must
attempt to reverse the marginalization of civil society.
This debate reaches beyond Aceh. At the national level, a major
obstacle to respect for human rights in Indonesia has been the
resistance to military reform. And the biggest sign of military's
failure to reform has been its role in Aceh since the declaration of
martial law.
Aid agencies and bilateral donors should require clear statements
on the nature and extent of the military participation in
reconstruction, including through military-linked businesses.
______
Prepared Statement by Raymond C. Offenheiser, President, Oxfam America
Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity for Oxfam America to submit written testimony
for the record. We appreciate your interest in gathering a variety of
perspectives on the important issues of the tsunami response and
lessons learned when providing relief in the wake of the terrible
tsunami tragedy.
Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency
committed to developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and
social justice. We are part of a confederation of 12 Oxfam
organizations working together in more than 100 countries around the
globe with an annual budget over $400 million dollars.
OXFAM'S RESPONSE
In response to the tsunami, Oxfam has assisted over 300,000 people
across the disaster zone. In Indonesia we are working with the
Government of Indonesia and UNICEF to oversee the development and
management of water and sanitation projects. Nearly 50 percent of the
water pipe network was damaged in Meulaboh and 70 percent in Banda
Aceh. In India we are working with local partners distributing
thousands of hygiene kits, repairing water sources and funding a health
institute to train volunteers in psychosocial counseling. In Sri Lanka
we are rehabilitating water sources and constructing temporary
shelters. We also have programs and are providing assistance in
Thailand, Maldives and Somalia.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The United States Government, local charities, and the American
public have responded to the tsunami with unprecedented promises of aid
and donations demonstrating our country's compassion and generosity.
It is now over a month after the tsunami and more than 1 million
people living in the Indian Ocean region remain displaced. The death
toll is over 200,000 and could still increase unless the humanitarian
response continues to reach all those in need with appropriate and
effective life-saving assistance.
It is important to remember that beyond the immediate threats to
life nearly two million people may face the threat of living in poverty
unless the massive reconstruction effort of the next few months and
years specifically aims to reduce poverty.
QUALITY OF AID NOT QUANITY MATTERS MOST
Aid groups for the most part have done an admirable job in saving
as many lives as possible, and providing survivors with the basic
necessities--food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Quick
action has so far prevented major outbreaks of waterborne disease that
could have doubled the death toll from the disaster.
But the sheer scale and complexity of the humanitarian response
have also caused problems that threaten to overwhelm fragile economies
and civil society organizations in the affected countries, exacerbate
religious and ethnic tensions, and lead to bitterness and
recriminations among survivors and their neighboring communities.
Oxfam is working to ensure a more successful outcome. But it will
be impossible to mitigate these threats unless steps are taken to
ensure that aid programs are designed and implemented as effectively as
possible.
First, tsunami survivors must be full participants in planning the
rebuilding of their communities. While the emergency phase of relief
delivery is mostly a top-down process, the rehabilitation and
reconstruction programs now under way must be designed with input from
the people whom they are intended to benefit. Too often, their wishes
are an afterthought at planning meetings.
Better coordination by the U.N. and government agencies is also
essential. The hundreds of aid organizations that flocked to southern
Asia vary widely in their experience levels, skills, missions, and
operating styles. Without better guidance in coordinating their
activities, aid will be distributed unevenly, leading to resentments
among beneficiaries. To be successful, aid agencies need comprehensive
information about the needs in each affected community to help guide
plans for the rebuilding phase and make sure that no community is
passed over because of politics or confusion.
National governments, with support from the United Nations, should
implement a system to accredit international humanitarian
organizations, to ensure that their experience qualifies them for the
scope and duration of the work they propose to do. Not every group that
shows up at a disaster scene is qualified to help out, and their well-
meaning efforts can end up hampering relief.
Aid groups, for their part, should stick to doing what they know
best. Faced with myriad urgent needs and fueled by a donation bonanza,
some organizations have been tempted to expand their programs into
areas where they have little experience and less expertise. With a
surfeit of groups on the ground, they should focus on their core
competencies, leaving other tasks to those with the capacity to do them
well.
Best practices in humanitarian response have changed a lot in the
past couple of decades, with the creation of internationally recognized
standards set by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
Sphere Project, among others. Yet many aid groups still don't comply
with--or even know about--such benchmarks. Thus we continue to see aid
distributed without the benefit of proper assessment of needs and
resources. Too many groups are simply throwing items out of the back of
a truck to an assembled crowd, without any systematic attempt to ensure
that they benefit the neediest people.
Finally, too much money reaching an impoverished area can be almost
as debilitating as too little. International aid organizations must be
careful not to overtax a fragile system of domestic NGOs that lack the
capacity to absorb large grants. Nor should they hire away key staff
members from domestic groups, but instead should consider recruiting
highly trained expatriates to return to their country to help manage
rebuilding projects for a specific term. We've already seen how a flood
of U.S. dollars in developing economies has caused a steep appreciation
of local currencies like the rupee and bhat against the dollar. If not
managed closely, that trend could lead to rapid inflation that could
cause further economic calamity on par with the tsunami itself.
The large volume of aid available should enable countries affected
by the tsunami not only to recover but to put their people on a path
toward sustainable long-term development. To merely return survivors to
the marginal lives of poverty many of them led before the waves came
would be unthinkable, leaving them just as vulnerable as they were on
that terrible day.
Each successive major disaster offers the humanitarian aid
community lessons in how we can improve our work. But unless those
lessons are implemented by the scores of aid groups flocking to
southern Asia, our collective ``best practices'' will be submerged in
an anarchy of altruism. That would be a discouraging return indeed on
the world's massive investment in rebuilding the lives and communities
devastated by the tsunami.
LESSONS LEARNED
It is already possible to draw some lessons from the tsunami,
albeit provisional. Oxfam and many others will want to revise these in
the coming months, but these six lessons are already clear and should
not be ignored.
1. The survivors need appropriate aid, not any aid. Some of the aid
provided has not been appropriate. The two fundamental things that must
be remembered are the need to ask people what they want--and to meet
the internationally accepted ``Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum
Standards for Disaster Relief.'' This is not happening as widely as it
should and levels of consultation with beneficiaries must be increased.
2. The aid effort must do more to apply the lessons from previous
crises. International humanitarian agencies have learned more from the
inconsistent humanitarian response to the crises in central Africa in
the mid 1990s, than most other emergencies. In order to maintain a
consistent response humanitarian guidelines and principles should be
followed. As well as the Sphere technical standards for relief, the
Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief sets out acceptable principles for
relief, the People in Aid program outlines acceptable care of aid
workers, and the U.N.'s Guidelines for Internally Displaced People
highlights the rights of internally displaced people under
international law. All of these are deeply relevant to the post-tsunami
response and should be consistently upheld by agencies.
3. The collapse in international attention does not bode well for
sustained aid. It may take 5 years--the planning period for Oxfam's
Aceh program--or more to rebuild the affected areas. But we have
already seen a gap between what is promised and delivered. On paper, 93
percent of the U.N.'s humanitarian appeal has been funded. In reality,
governments have donated only about half the total amount needed.
Though more than $4 billion has been promised for reconstruction, will
these promises mean more than massive promises of aid after previous
disasters in Iran, Mozambique and Central America?
4. The need is just as much to find durable solutions for the
displaced survivors as for better early warning to mitigate future
disasters. An early warning system may be ready within 18 months. This
is vital. But it is easy to ignore the needs of those rebuilding their
lives after the tsunami. For example, the 600,000 people displaced in
Aceh need more than temporary aid or the temporary camps that are
planned. They must be given a genuine choice in the short, medium and
long term to overcome poverty. The Indonesian Government and all
warring parties should ensure the end to violence, and commit to
negotiating a long-term settlement to Aceh's conflict. In Sri Lanka,
those that have been displaced need their leaders, on all sides, to
show the same commitment to ensure that life after the tsunami will not
be the same as before. Many survivors of the tsunami remain extremely
vulnerable to abuse. They need to be protected as well as given
immediate aid.
5. Reconstruction plans should look at the needs of women, men and
children differently. In Sri Lanka many women who were on beaches or in
markets lost their lives. There appears to be large numbers of
households in which the father is suddenly a single parent--or the
woman a new single mother. So far, there has been insufficient
attention placed on the specific needs of these men, women and
children, facing surviving the tsunami under very new circumstances.
6. Aid is only the first kind of international support that the
survivors of disasters need. To a certain extent this was recognized
rather quickly. The Paris Club of creditors welcomed initiatives on
debt relief and the access to the EU of tsunami-affected countries'
exports. These steps have not yet gone far or wide enough but they show
a very positive awareness that a wide range of international policies
should be used to help countries recover after catastrophic crises.
This could be followed more widely in future crises--after conflicts as
well as natural disasters.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE USG
Stay the course. Oxfam commends President Bush's commitment
to public efforts to mobilize funding and long-term
reconstruction in the tsunami affected region. However, we have
already seen a gap between what has been promised by donors and
what has been delivered. On paper 93 percent of the U.N.'s
tsunami Flash Appeal has been funded. In reality, governments
have donated only about half the total amount needed. The USG
still has a critical role to play as a generous funder for
relief and long-term rehabilitation.
Don't forget about other emergencies. The death toll in
Darfur has reached 200,000 with close to 2 million people
displaced. While we must respond to the tsunami, we can't
forget about the millions of people caught up in the midst of
other crises. The U.N. global consolidated appeal of $1.7
billion for the world's 14 other major humanitarian crises has
only been 26 percent funded.
Confirm that all tsunami-related aid will not be taken from
current aid budgets underfunding other emergencies. Oxfam is
asking for the President's tsunami supplemental to Congress to
include a minimum of $1 billion in emergency assistance to meet
the needs of tsunami victims as well as others affected by
crises. This would include $500 million for the relief and
reconstruction efforts surrounding the tsunami and $500 million
for other emergencies such as Sudan and Ethiopia.
Trade and Debt Relief. Reconstruct livelihoods not poverty
by providing debt relief to affected countries in addition to
money for relief and reconstruction and reduce textile and
apparel tariffs:
Debt relief. The Paris Club of creditors offered to freeze
debt repayments from tsunami-affected countries but should
go beyond this and cancel debts above a sustainable level,
so long as the proceeds are spent on reconstruction and to
reduce poverty. For example, Indonesia spends ten times
more on debt repayment than health. Debt relief could
potentially release billions of dollars for reconstruction.
Trade. In order to ensure that the people in the countries
that were affected by the tsunami can begin the process of
reconstructing their lives and economies, the United States
should reduce textile and apparel tariffs for those
countries. Oxfam is supporting S.191--the ``Tariff Relief
Assistance for Developing Economies Act of 2005''
introduced by Senators Smith, Feinstein, Baucus and
Santorum that will provide tariff relief to some of the
tsunami-affected countries.
CONCLUSION
In the face of this terrible tragedy we commend the United States
for its leadership and hope that you will consider these thoughts to
ensure a comprehensive and effective response for the millions of
people who are victims of this catastrophe as well as other disasters
where people are suffering. Thank you again for this chance to share
Oxfam's perspectives.
______
Prepared Statement of Veena Siddharth, Washington Director, Human
Rights Watch/Asia
I would like to thank Chairman Wolf, Chairman Lantos and the
members of the House Human Rights Caucus for the opportunity to share
information we have collected on human rights in Aceh since the
tsunami. Human Rights Watch appreciates your recognition of the links
between human rights and post-tsunami reconstruction. Prior to the
tsunami, Human Rights Watch had documented a range of abuses in Aceh,
including the systematic use of torture against detainees by Indonesian
security forces. Because of pre-tsunami prohibitions on access to Aceh,
our reports may have underplayed the scale of human rights abuses. Aceh
will not successfully rebuild unless there is recognition of the human
rights abuses and steps taken to prevent them in the future.
I will briefly list six issues that we are monitoring in this
reconstruction phase:
1. Access
2. The role of the military
3. Lack of choice in registration and relocation
4. Land Rights
5. Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
6. Need for coordination and transparency of aid
1. ACCESS
Although there has been access to tsunami-affected areas, it is
limited.
--The Indonesian military continues to designate most of the province
as insecure for foreign access and is strictly enforcing a no-
travel policy to those areas.
--We cannot verify if there are tsunami IDPs in any of these no-
travel areas. The general consensus from agencies on the ground
was that there are not, but given the difficulties of access,
Human Rights Watch cannot confirm this.
2. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
We remain concerned by the continued involvement of the military in
camp management, coordination and distribution of aid. As a party to
the conflict their involvement cannot be viewed as impartial.
--In Banda Aceh a facade of civilian control is apparent but on the
west coast all coordination is still done through the military.
--In Meulaboh the United Nations has its office located directly
inside the local military battalion compound, and continues to
have daily coordination meetings with the local military
commander, Col. Gerhan Lentara, despite the presence of a local
civilian head of district. Colonel Lentara was infamously
involved in the East Timor Santa Cruz massacre of 1991.
--At the moment, several international NGOs regularly accept
``military security escorts'' when visiting IDPs.
--While much of the civilian infrastructure was decimated on the west
coast, there continues to be an overreliance on the military
for logistical support, even when there are alternatives. There
are real concerns that if the aid community pushes too hard on
access they will lose their position altogether. This may
explain why there has not been strong opposition to the
military's assertion that there are no IDPs, tsunami or
otherwise, in the no travel zones.
3. REGISTRATION AND RELOCATION OF IDPS: LACK OF INFORMED CHOICE
We are concerned about the manner in which the registration is
being carried out, by whom, and the method in which the relocation will
be implemented.
--IDPs lack information. According to credible sources on the ground,
IDPs are often not aware that the tsunami had affected other
countries, let alone the plans for relocation or what their
options were.
--Other issues facing IDPs include criteria for site selection,
impact on livelihoods, protection mechanisms, sensitivity of
the data and fear of military involvement in relocation and
camp management.
4. LAND RIGHTS: COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
--Disputes over land rights could affect long-term stability in Aceh.
This is an area ripe for corruption and arbitrary
decisionmaking.
--Compensation: There is still no articulated policy on how
compensation will be decided, to whom, and under what criteria.
It seems most likely that compensation will be provided on a
sliding scale depending on the destruction of property; but
this is not clear.
5. PROTECTION OF IDPS
Despite the amount of money, agencies, and others in Aceh, up to a
month after the tsunami many IDPs still had not received supplementary
food or nonfood items. Protein and staples are lacking.
--There has been no effort at all to consider protection of IDPs in
the current spontaneous camps.
--With regards to the relocation barracks, we are concerned that IDPs
have already been moved by the government before donors have
sorted out minimum standards.
--Barracks are ill designed, crowded, and without child friendly or
community spaces. Aside from a UNICEF initiative there are no
reporting mechanisms for the protection of women and children
in camps. While there appear to be no problems at the moment it
is expected that IDPs will be in these crowded facilities for
up to 2 years, in conditions that are ripe for abuse.
--All distribution of aid is being conducted through heads of
communities and through heads of households. Both are
traditionally male held positions. This process has the
potential to exclude women, unaccompanied children, and other
vulnerable groups. Very little aid is being distributed
directly to IDPs.
6. AID: DELIVERY, COORDINATION AND TRANSPARENCY
Accountability and transparency of the $4.5 billion that has been
pledged for tsunami relief will be essential. While we appreciate that
the military has permitted access to Aceh for tsunami relief, we are
concerned about their long-term presence and involvement in aid
coordination, given their history in the province.
--Given the history of corruption in Aceh, there are concerns that
most of the reconstruction contracts will be given to military
or government owned businesses.
--There are credible reports of looting by the police and the
military.
--While there is still no road access on the west coast (something
like 87 bridges out on that road alone), it seems that slow and
ineffective coordination is the main reason for the delay in
delivery of aid.
RECOMMENDATIONS
While the tsunami has certainly resulted in unprecedented access to
some parts of Aceh it does not change the underlying causes and reasons
for the ongoing conflict. The TNI continue to wage their war against
GAM. While the reported 200 killings since the tsunami is undoubtedly
an exaggeration, civilians are still being killed. We call on the U.S.
Government to:
Call for access to all parts of Aceh to ensure that pre-
tsunami IDPs receive assistance and that there is a monitoring
of potential abuses on either side of the conflict;
Call for a phase-out of the military's role in camp
management, coordination and distribution of aid;
Ensure that U.S. and multilateral assistance incorporates
steps for protection of and equitable treatment of IDPs,
including pre-tsunami IDPs;
Ensure that there is a clear and fair policy on compensation
for those who have lost land and property;
Work with other donors to build in transparency and
anticorruption mechanisms into the reconstruction package with
genuine involvement of Acehenese civil society in monitoring
and shaping the reconstruction process.
Aceh has gone through a tremendous catastrophe with unimaginable
loss and devastation. Indonesia's long-term stability rests on
confidence by the Acehenese people in the reconstruction process.
______
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Briefing to Staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
1. Introduction to IOM
Intergovernmental organization, HQ in Geneva
Created in 1951--outside of the U.N. system--more
responsive, flexible
2005 budget is app. US$800 million of which 92 percent is
earmarked for operational activities and funded by voluntary
contributions
Service-oriented: working with migrants of all sorts--
displaced persons, refugees, asylum-seekers; economic or labor
migrants, trafficked migrants
Primarily operational, logistical--we see migration as a
positive force which can benefit both migrants and societies
2. IOM Activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
Transport and logistics
Indonesia--The total number of IOM trucks operating between
Jakarta-Medan-Banda Aceh and Medan-Meulaboh currently stands at
350. Since the first deployment of trucks on 30 December 2004,
IOM has moved and distributed some 10,324 Metric Tons (MT) of
relief items from Medan in north Sumatra to Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam Province. Of that total, IOM has transported 1,670
MT of relief goods to Meulaboh in convoys which began operating
on 8 January. IOM relief good delivery routes also include
Medan-Biruen, Medan-Nias and Medan-Lhokseumwe. IOM Banda Aceh's
truck fleet currently comprises 21 trucks which are used to
distribute relief goods in and around Banda Aceh for IOM, U.N.
agencies and international and national NGOs. IOM Banda Aceh
has distributed humanitarian relief items to more than 20 IDP
camps and communities hosting Tsunami affected populations
throughout the Districts of Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya
and Pidie.
Sri Lanka--IOM continues to provide free emergency transport
assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka, IOs, NGOs and
donors. For this purpose 10M currently leases a vehicle fleet
of 45 trucks, each with cargo capacity of 10 Metric Tons.
Specialized trucks for container shipments, passenger buses,
trailers and vans can be supplied on request. To date, IOM has
operated 820 round trips for transportation of bottled water,
food items, water purification equipment, fishing boats,
medical supplies and various other relief items to numerous
locations throughout the country. Vans/four-wheel-drive
vehicles have been provided 64 times, 20ft container trucks/
trailers have been arranged on 7 occasions and 19 passenger
buses, transporting a minimum of 435 relief workers have been
dispatched.
Shelter
In both Sri Lanka and Indonesia, IOM has been asked by the
respective Governments to coordinate and implement shelter activities:
IN SRI LANKA
Batticaloa district:
IOM has committed to provide temporary shelter for 327
families in Onthachimadam, Kaluwanchikudy DS division.
Construction of temporary shelters for 20 families in the
division has been completed. Development of other sites is in
the initial stages with land leveling and site preparation
taking place. Identification of additional land suitable for
shelter construction is ongoing.
Ampara district:
The construction of 100 temporary family shelters (for 100
families) is progressing in Ullai, Pottuvil DS division. A
further total of 45 temporary shelters, each consisting of four
family units (to house 180 families) are currently under
construction on various other sites/divisions in the district.
Construction of five temporary schools is progressing in
Pottuvil, Thambiluvil, Thampattai and Akkaraipattu DS
divisions.
Trincomalee district:
Development of a temporary shelter site for 180 families is
in the final stages in Mutur DS division. The site holds 45
temporary shelters, each consisting of four family units. All
shelters are completed and ready for occupation while
construction of a community centre and additional toilets is
still in progress.
Kalutara district:
IOM agreed to construct temporary shelters for 168 families
in Katukurunda and Paiyagala south and north. The families all
have land within the 100m ``no building zone'' so 43 shelters,
each consisting of four family units will be built on
government allocated land further from the sea. IOM is
currently discussing/identifying suitable shelter sites.
Transitional shelters:
IOM is examining three different designs of transitional
shelters in terms of suitability, cost and availability of
materials. The designs will be presented at an agencies shelter
coordination meeting at TAFOR (Task Force for Relief) tomorrow.
IOM is currently committed to constructing 5,608
transitional shelters in Trincomalee (1,200), Batticaloa
(1,539), Ampara (2,200) and Kalutara (769) districts.
IN INDONESIA
The first IOM model temporary shelter unit arrived by truck
from Jakarta on 5 February. Assembly was completed by 7
February. The model temporary shelter unit is now on display at
the IOM office in Banda Aceh.
The Ministry of Public Works has proposed to IOM five
temporary shelter sites. IOM's shelter experts are currently
assessing the viability of the sites. IOM's shelter experts are
also traveling to Meulaboh to map sites for the shelter
program.
Health
To date, IOM's medical team has provided immunizations and
Vitamin A supplements to a total of 3,442 children. (Banda Aceh
1,792; Teunom, 1,559 and Lamno 91.) Figures on children
immunized in Calang by the IOM medical team will be available
shortly.
At this point in time there are three IOM immunization teams
fielded: (1) Ministry of Health, UNICEF, IOM and GOAL. This
team targets schools in a sweeping operation to follow up on
missed cases. (2) The second team comprises Ministry of Health,
IOM, Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) which is focused on
Teunom. (3) The third team comprising IOM and GOAL is currently
in Panga, on the west coast close to Teunom, on an assessment
mission. The vaccination campaign in Panga is due to begin this
week.
A six month pilot project entitled ``Aceh Mental Health
Capacity Building Project,'' has been funded by IOM and
approved by the Indonesian Ministry of Health/Directorate for
Mental Health Services. This three-tier training course on
basic counseling and early detection of mental health disorder
skills is aimed at raising awareness and building competency
amongst mental health care personnel, public health caregivers
and community leaders. IOM's psychiatrist attended a WHO/
Ministry workshop entitled: ``Psycho Social and Mental Health
Agenda on Aceh'' in Jakarta on 7 February.
IOM's health care specialist continues to liaise and
coordinate IOM's proposed rehabilitation of five health care
centers and training of staff and administrators with the
Government of Indonesia and potential partners.
3. Observations on Protection for Vulnerable Persons
With respect to IDPs--Ensuring the voluntariness of
relocations of IDPs from public buildings into temporary or
transitional shelter is an important area of concern. IOM works
closely with the displaced individuals and the Government
authorities to assure that all needs are met.
Documentation to replace lost IDs is a paramount need to
ensure everyone is restored their proper identity--and so are
able to register their property and livelihood losses,
especially as regards land rights.
Important to use the media better, and assure that they are
educated on the issues; if media is more informed, then media
coverage would be of assistance, rather than letting them focus
on nonissues or trying to get new angles on a story.
In Sri Lanka, early reports of child abductions, and sexual
exploitation and abuse of children that were carried widely in
the media have not been verified by either the National Child
Protection Authority or the police. Sexual and gender-based
harassment and violence has been reported from many camps and
hospitals, but only two formal complaints (by adult women) have
so far been made to police.
With respect to trafficking, IOM is implementing a rapid
response trafficking awareness raising project in two of the
tsunami-affected countries, i.e., Indonesia and Sri Lanka, with
a primary focus on the over one million internally displaced.
Utilizing its long-term countertrafficking experiences and its
efficient emergency logistics networks already existing in the
two countries, IOM will aim to reduce vulnerability and
incidences of trafficking of vulnerable populations,
particularly women and orphaned children, from and within the
tsunami-affected areas, through multilevel mass information
campaigns tailored to country-specific post-tsunami realities,
in close coordination with national governments, U.N. agencies
and NGOs.
4. Lessons Gathered
IOM Director General was just in Sri Lanka and Indonesia and offers
his experienced voice with a few key points:
The international players must not neglect close
coordination with host governments at all levels. This sounds
obvious, but there are many instances where agencies went
blithely ahead without checking and got themselves in trouble.
Both Sri Lanka and Indonesia have real governments that will
not be brushed aside. One key to IOM's successful response is
precisely our careful attention to working with the host
government, at all levels.
Using national staff in implementing activities can give an
agency a big boost. IOM has benefited enormously from having
large numbers of Indonesian, Acehnese, and Sri Lankan employees
in our ranks.
From the Sri Lanka experience: what is needed is for the
country to establish a response capacity to future sudden
natural disasters. But this capacity should be built not only
at the national level, but at all levels--even to the level of
ordinary people as well so they can depend on their own
resources.
The existence of civil conflict in both Sri Lanka and Aceh
is another complication, requiring deft handling by relief
agencies. Of course not all agencies can be ``old pros'' in a
particular disaster-struck nation, but it sure helps to have
been there and to know some people in advance.
Coordination of donor responses: Donors often insist that
agencies assure proper coordination so as to avoid duplication;
they need to learn to practice what they preach and be sure to
avoid duplication of contributions in some areas, with other
areas experiencing huge gaps. In Sri Lanka, for example, UNICEF
and WFP have been overfunded while other agencies have not
received enough funds.
______
Prepared Statement of Nancy Yuan, Vice President, Director, the Asia
Foundation, Washington, DC
The international response to the earthquake and tsunami that hit
South and Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004, has been unprecedented.
The efforts to date have, of course, largely focused on immediate and
basic food, water, and shelter needs, and maintaining public health.
While these priorities continue, many agencies and governments are also
turning to the challenges of the medium and long term.
Over the past 6 weeks, the Asia Foundation has focused on medium
and long-term reconstruction in the tsunami affected areas of
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India. Some relief activities have
been supported through its affiliate organization, Give2Asia.\1\
Notably, the Foundation has also been contacted by a few of the larger
international NGOs focused on relief as a potential grantee for medium-
and long-term programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Give2Asia, a U.S. nonprofit organization established by the
Asia Foundation, facilitates private giving to charitable causes
throughout the Asia region. Give2Asia has raised $1.2 million to date
for the Tsunami Recovery Fund. See www.Give2Asia.org for more
information.
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In each affected region, the Foundation has chosen to work with
local organizations, as is its usual practice, in order to reach the
largest number of people possible and to rebuild the capacity of local
institutions. The Foundation is also working to encourage local
involvement in planning, by establishing a meaningful dialog with local
and central government officials reviewing reconstruction strategies
and developing a mechanism for community participation. In some cases,
it also means building the capacity of local governments through
technical assistance given the number of local government officials
lost in the tsunami. Finally, the Foundation is providing technical
assistance for disaster preparedness and management to improve the
planning and training capacity of disaster management. Since 1995, the
Foundation has operated a disaster preparedness training program in the
Pacific Islands with the goal of building self-reliance in disaster
management.
INDONESIA
In Indonesia, the Asia Foundation is channeling most of its Aceh
relief program through Muhammadiyah, one of its long-term local
partners. Muhammadiyah is Indonesia's second largest mass-based Muslim
organization, with a membership of approximately 25 million. Its main
function is to deliver social services at the community level--health
and education as well as its religious services. In their nationwide
programs, Muhammadiyah has consistently shown their commitment to
democratic values of pluralism and tolerance. They are effective in
actively promoting these values as they have credibility as well as
access to their mass-based extensive network.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For example Muhammadiyah produced more than 6,000,000 leaflets
focusing on the issue of tolerance and pluralism (e.g. Accepting
Differences: Deliberation and Democracy) and distributed through their
network of mosques. Muhammadiyah has also been successful in their
nonviolence campaigns among the youth--a perennial problem among urban
youths, particularly in Jakarta. In Aceh, for nearly five years,
Muhammadiyah has trained activists to identify and report on human
rights violations in the province's conflict-ridden areas. Likewise, in
various partnerships with the Foundation, Muhammadiyah has been on the
forefront of nonreligious issues such as sound elections, good
governance, nonviolence, and civic education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Aceh context, the Foundation's decision to work with and
through Muhammadiyah is based on our understanding of two important
factors: (1) Aceh is and was the site of a serious conflict between the
Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) prior to the
disaster; (2) Islam plays a heightened role in Aceh, and is the primary
social and cultural force there. Muhammadiyah is one of the most
credible and trusted Islamic groups in Indonesia and, crucially, is
accepted on both sides of Aceh's conflict. Such community trust and
confidence is and will be crucial to the success of relief efforts.
Aside from the government and the military, Muslim-based
organizations such as Muhammadiyah are among the very few organizations
with an extensive network throughout Aceh. One of the three major
universities in Aceh is a Muhammadiyah University, and Muhammadiyah
runs almost 60 schools and eight boarding schools for the poor in the
province. Because it is a nationwide organization, the Aceh branch of
Muhammadiyah has strong backup support from the central board of
Muhammadiyah. Precisely because of the nationwide support and extensive
activities in pre-tsunami Aceh, Muhammadiyah was one of the first local
organizations to mobilize an effective response to the disaster. Its
four-level University building, which was not damaged by the disaster,
has been transformed into a vital base camp for Muhammadiyah relief
operations--including a temporary clinic, a radio station, and a
volunteer center.
As part of its near-term response in Aceh, the Foundation provided
funding for 150 skilled volunteers--doctors, nurses, forensic
specialists, paramedics, child care experts--drawn from Muhammadiyah
institutions nationwide for the first month after the disaster. During
this time, for example, eight paramedics served over 12,000 people in
the IDP camps and assisted IOM with logistics in Banda Aceh.
Communication networks in the affected regions of Indonesia have
been devastated by the tsunami, creating a massive obstacle to recovery
and relief efforts. With private funding, the Foundation has already
been able to help reestablish communications networks through support
for Radio 68H, which has established radio communications in 50 IDP
camps in Banda Aceh, broadcasting public service announcements about
aid distribution, emergency relief coordination, and a missing persons
service. A program in Meulaboh has also been established.
Coordination among both local and international organizations
responding to the crisis has often been lacking in Aceh. To help
address this problem, the Foundation has been leading a collaboration
with Save the Children, Oxfam, Hivos and Mercy Corps, to support a
website, www.indotsunamirelief.com. The website, dedicated to
coordination among funding agencies and civil society organizations
working in Aceh, is up and running, though the official launch will be
on February 16 in Banda Aceh.
Another concern raised in the field has been how to ensure that
there is active participation by Acehnese in the reconstruction and
planning phase. The Asia Foundation has also been working with the
major organizations active in Aceh, (CARE, Save the Children, PCI, CRS,
Oxfam), in the development of a document outlining Common Operating
Principles and Guidelines for Tsunami Reconstruction in Aceh. We expect
that other organizations, including bilateral donors, will also sign on
in the coming weeks.
SRI LANKA
In Sri Lanka, the Foundation has provided assistance through faith-
based and private voluntary organizations, including Buddhist, Hindu
and Christian groups, along with the Rotary and Lions Clubs. These
efforts have included the provision of basic relief supplies and
transport in the East and South, and relocation of people from
churches, temples and schools which served as refugee camps, to homes
and other temporary housing. These organizations will also help to
rebuild homes and schools, and purchase fishing boats.
With USAID funding, the Foundation has supported the Legal Aid
Commission in Sri Lanka to assist survivors with lost documents and
pressing legal issues. Special help desks have been established and LAC
lawyers are providing assistance to local government officials and
volunteers from local NGOs to help victims obtain documents, and solve
legal issues related to property, adoption, insurance, banking, and
other matters.
With OTI funding through the Asia Foundation, psychosocial services
are being provided through the Psychosocial Support Programme and
Psychosocial Forum. These organizations are providing a range of
services, including training, counseling materials for local and
international CSOs, translations of materials from Singhalese into
Tamil, a website for district level services, a Missing Persons Desk,
and a database within the Psychosocial desk at the Center of National
Operations.
In Sri Lanka, we have also been in discussions with donors about
operational principles for Tsunami reconstruction, which have been
incorporated into a World Bank/ADB/JBIC needs assessment. These
principles focus on conflict sensitivity, local elected government
involvement in planning, demand driven response, communication and
transparency, and coordination between stakeholders.
THAILAND
In Thailand, the Foundation's programs have focused largely on
legal aid for tsunami survivors, and involve a range of legal NGOs,
Shariah law experts, universities and government officials. A handbook
will be developed to detail a variety of government programs available
to victims. The Foundation plans to support a one-stop legal aid
service center, a call center, and website to provide pro bono service
to victims. The Foundation is also working specifically on issues
related to the protection of women and children through needs
assessments conducted by the Ministry of Social Development and
prominent women's groups, such as the Women and the Constitution
Network and the Children and Family Affairs Committee of the Islamic
Center of Thailand.
INDIA
In India, through private funding raised through Give2Asia, the
Foundation has supported CAF India, a local nongovernmental
organization, to provide relief supplies, purchase fishing boats and
nets, and help local governments to review land use for reconstruction
projects such as schools, hospitals, and microenterprise.
As the U.S. Government, in concert with other international donors,
national and local governments in the affected regions, and private
organizations like the Asia Foundation, work to address the medium- and
long-term needs of those areas devastated by the tsunami, it is
important to keep a number of important points in mind.
First, recovery will require large-scale reconstruction that
addresses the massive destruction of physical infrastructure and the
loss of valuable human resources. National governments and local
communities have some resources, but the majority of the resources for
reconstruction will come through two channels--international donor
assistance and private investment, both foreign and domestic. Given the
scale of the disaster and the magnitude of the anticipated resource
flows, coordinating donor assistance and attracting and accommodating
investors will be an enormous challenge, and requires substantial and
thoughtful planning.
Second, effective and responsive government will be essential if
successful, accelerated reconstruction is to take place. Central
governments will play a key role, but local governments in coastal
areas will also have major responsibilities. Local government,
particularly at the municipal, district, and provincial levels, was
weak in many of the affected regions prior to the crisis, and in many
areas, capacity has been diminished, or destroyed, by the loss of local
government staff. Governing institutions, particularly at the local
level, will need substantial and timely assistance if they are to
undertake critical large-scale planning and management roles that will
be required of them over the next few years.
Third, local credibility and trust will be vital, particularly
regarding longer term efforts in areas that have been wracked by
conflict in recent years. The Foundation's efforts (both short-term
tsunami relief and other long-term program areas) in Aceh, have been
successful to date in large part due to the local trust conferred on
its local partner, Muhammadiyah.
Finally, consistent and substantial local input must be an
essential element of long-term recovery efforts. To further this goal,
building the capacity of civil society organizations will also be
critical, as such groups can play an important role in launching
ongoing public-private dialog for reconstruction and recovery, helping
to encourage local ownership, coordination, and effective action at all
levels.
In responding to the tsunami tragedy, both in terms of short-term
relief efforts and longer term planning, the Asia Foundation has drawn
on its years of experience in the region and lessons learned from
programs such as enhancing interfaith dialog in Indonesia; managing
conflict in Sri Lanka; and promoting legal aid and rights in Thailand.
Utilizing the valuable experiences, insights, and credibility of local
networks of partner organizations and individuals has been a core
element of the Foundation's long-term effectiveness--and likewise such
experience can greatly enhance the efficiency and efficacy of long-term
recovery efforts on the part of the United States and the entire
international community.
Thank you.
______
Responses of Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to Questions from
Senator Lugar
Question. In coordinating the military relief efforts, has the U.S.
strategy of ``places not bases'' in Southeast Asia proven itself
valuable? How have the facilities and bases in Thailand and Singapore
affected relief operations?
Answer. We have close military relationships with many Southeast
Asian nations. These relationships are important to us in many respects
and help us to achieve many of our objectives in the region. In the
case of Operation Unified Assistance, the tsunami relief operation, our
longstanding relationships and habits of cooperation in the region were
critical to our ability to quickly set up an international coordination
center in Utapao and create other staging areas within the region from
which we were able to direct the relief operations. Without the close
relationship with Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and others in the
region, our relief efforts would have certainly been slower and far
less effective. Our efforts likely would have been further enhanced if
we had similar ties with other nations in the region, most notably
Indonesia.
I should point out as well that this relief operation was a prime
demonstration of the validity of our concept of ``seabasing'' where
U.S. forces can be stationed on board U.S. naval vessels offshore while
still projecting our capabilities ashore. In this case, seabasing
allowed the U.S. military to effectively provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief without creating a large, intrusive, and
vulnerable footprint ashore in the affected regions.
Question. Please provide the committee with your impressions of the
changing role of TNI during this phase of the transition to democracy
in Indonesia. Also, what is your assessment of the level of cooperation
being provided to the U.S. authorities reviewing the Timika murder case
by Indonesia military authorities?
Answer. The Indonesian military (TNI) continues to wrestle with
defining its new role since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime
in 1998, as do all the other parts of the Government of Indonesia and
most parts of Indonesian society.
This is clearly still a work in progress, but important and
sustained reforms have been made by the TNI. The TNI has remained a
neutral player throughout two electoral processes and political crises.
TNI active duty officers can no longer hold government offices and
there are no longer any TNI officers sitting in the Parliament as
appointed military representatives. In addition, we have seen important
and significant steps taken toward accountability for Suharto-era
abuses and an increased emphasis on respect for human rights and
professionalism. The TNI's reform is by no means complete, but I
believe that progress has been and will continue to be made. Indonesian
Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono has specifically requested U.S.
assistance in supporting reform through the provision of International
Military Education and Training (IMET). We should support him in
helping the process of reform, just as the United States is doing for
other institutions within the central and local governments in
Indonesia.
I would refer you to the FBI for a full assessment of the level of
cooperation being provided to the U.S. authorities by the Government of
Indonesia and the TNI. Secretary of State Rice on February 25, 2005,
made the assessment in a certification to Congress that the Indonesian
Government and armed forces are cooperating with the FBI investigation
into the August 31, 2002, murders of two American citizens and one
Indonesian citizen in Timika, Indonesia.
______
Responses of Under Secretary Alan Larson to Questions From Senator
Lugar
Question. In identifying the remains of victims from dozens of
countries through DNA testing, the Thai authorities face a challenge
similar to the United States following the 9/11 attacks. Are there
lessons to be learned from these two experiences that would better
prepare us for disaster responses in the future?
Answer. The December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean Tsunami destroyed major
tourist areas in southern Thailand and left over 5,000 people dead and
3,000 missing, including 10 confirmed American citizen deaths and 14
Americans who are presumed dead. More than 30 countries provided
assistance to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to establish the Thailand
Tsunami Victims Identification (TTVI) center in Phuket, Thailand, to
handle the enormous task of identifying the remains of the victims. The
United States has assisted in this international effort by deploying
forensics experts from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), the
FBI and the medical examiner's office in Onondaga County, New York.
In order to better prepare the United States to respond to a future
mass casualty event, consideration should be given to clearly
identifying and assigning to a USG agency, with the know-how and
personnel, the authorization to provide immediate victim identification
services to affected areas overseas. While FEMA possesses many of the
capabilities for mass casualty and mass fatality response, its
authority for providing assistance is limited to domestic disasters.
Currently no USG agency has clear authority or funding to provide
mortuary and forensic identification services and assistance to foreign
countries in need.
Question. From information we have collected throughout the federal
government, it appears at least seven task forces (and perhaps more),
have been in operation at the federal level of our government connected
to earthquake/tsunami relief. These various task forces have been
operating out of USAID, Pacific Command (PACOM), the National Security
Council, and the State Department, among others.
Please outline for the committee the total number of U.S. federal
task forces which were or are still operating in connection with the
earthquake/tsunami disaster and advise as to whom (what person) in the
U.S. Federal Government is ultimately responsible to assure proper
coordination of these various task forces.
Answer. The U.S. Government mounted a rapid and comprehensive
response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and resultant tsunamis. In the
immediate aftermath of the disaster, seven agencies and departments
stood up task forces to offer direct assistance in accordance with
their mandates and expertise, and to communicate with the international
community and multilateral institutions. As affected countries moved
from the relief phase to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the United
States responded in parallel, standing up a coordination system to
assist tsunami victims with rebuilding their shattered lives. The
attached diagrams visually display the relationship between the task
forces established in the immediate aftermath of the disaster (Diagram
A), as well as the structure for the relief and reconstruction phase
(Diagram B).
Immediate Aftermath
The following agencies stood up task forces. All of these entities
have stood down:
Department of State (DOS): DOS stood up 3 task forces within
24 hours of the disaster.
Task Force 1: The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) assisted
American citizens to locate the welfare and whereabouts of
loved ones. CA received over 30,000 calls, which generated
over 15,000 cases that required action. Over the course of
8 weeks, CA narrowed the unaccounted for to four cases.
Task Force 2: The East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Bureau
headed a task force that facilitated interaction between
the U.S. military and host governments, accelerated the
entry of relief goods into affected countries and acted as
the main clearinghouse for information from embassies,
other government agencies, and the media.
Under Secretary Marc Grossman established the senior level
international Core Group (Australia, Japan, India, Canada,
the Netherlands, and the United Nations).
On 6 January 2005, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) created the Tsunami Humanitarian Sharing (THIS)
Interagency Working Group to facilitate the management of
interagency geospatial information and to coordinate
support for field needs related to tsunami relief efforts.
USAID: USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance stood
up a Response Management Team (RMT) as per standard procedure
in a natural disaster scenario. The RMT is activated to provide
full support to a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The
DART provides a presence on the ground capable of carrying out
sustained response activities. The RMT provides the necessary
support to a DART from USAID headquarters and manages USAID
response activities and coordinates interagency cooperation in
the initial response phase. USAID also stood up an Agency
Tsunami Task Force which is responsible for setting overall
USAID policy in response to the disaster in Asia, providing
operational guidance of program activities, and recommending
resource allocations for all programs.
Pacific Command (PACOM): PACOM activated the Combined
Support Force (CSF) 536, headquartered in Utapao, Thailand as
part of the DOD's Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. CSF-536 was the
on-scene military headquarters responsible for U.S. forces
involved in relief operations. Additionally, PACOM stood up
three Combined Support Groups--in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and
Thailand--to transport relief supplies via ground and air to
distribution points and remote locations in support of relief
agencies and the host governments.
Department of Defense (DOD): The DOD response was in support
of the larger U.S. Government response led by the USAID Office
of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and in cooperation with
the Department of State and the National Security Council. DOD
provided support to indigenous efforts in areas where unique
military capabilities could be of use, for example: logistics,
air and sea borne transportation, search and rescue, water
purification capabilities, and medical support/supplies. In
addition, this multifaceted response also involved the host
nations, U.N. organizations, partner states, other military
forces, and nongovernmental organizations.
National Security Council (NSC): Beginning December 27 and
continuing daily through the first weeks of the crisis, NSC
chaired a working level humanitarian response coordination
meeting that addressed needs from the field and ensured
interagency issues regarding the humanitarian response were
addressed. Participants met via secure video teleconference and
included all the operational agencies (USAID, Department of
Defense, Pacific Command, State, Department of Homeland
Security and Department of Health and Human Services). The NSC
group was disbanded February 8, 2005, as response coordination
no longer required senior level attention.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): HHS created a
small headquarters working group on tsunami relief efforts. The
working group was led by the Office of Global Health Affairs in
the Secretary's Office. Its efforts were coordinated by the NSC
as part of the interagency group.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS): DHS stood up a small
workgroup to support the needs expressed by the Department of
State and the Department of Defense in their humanitarian
relief efforts. For example, in the immediate aftermath, the
U.S. Coast Guard deployed air assets in support of the DOD
mission to deliver water and food to the impacted region. USCG
also provided medical personnel to serve aboard the Mercy.
Relief and Reconstruction
The State Department, in close coordination with USAID, is
responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government's response in the
relief and reconstruction phase. Specifically, Ambassador Doug
Hartwick, based in State's Economic Bureau (EB) has been designated as
the Tsunami Coordinator. State and NSC convened January 7 the first of
a now weekly interagency working group (IAWG) meeting on tsunami
reconstruction.
The State Department is working across the U.S Government to set
U.S. reconstruction priorities, coordinating especially closely with
USAID's tsunami task force, which is responsible for setting USAID
policy in response to the disaster in Asia, providing operational
guidance of program activities, and recommending resource allocations
for all programs in the affected countries. As necessary, smaller
interagency working groups on thematic issues (e.g., early warning
systems) are convened and report to Ambassador Hartwick. Externally,
DOS and USAID will work with other bilateral donors, the United
Nations, the multilateral development banks and the international
financial institutions to help tsunami victims rebuild their
communities and livelihoods. Affected countries and regions have the
lead in reconstruction, and the United States will work to respond to
the needs and priorities as identified by these national and local
authorities.
[Diagrams A and B follow:]
Response of USAID Administrator Andrew S. Natsios to Question From
Senator Lugar
Question. Is humanitarian aid reaching all affected areas in Sri
Lanka sufficiently, including those areas that have majority Tamil and/
or Muslim populations in the North and East of the country?
Answer. The USAID/DART has deployed teams to all nine tsunami-
affected districts. These teams have met with the Government of Sri
Lanka (GOSL) officials, implementing partners and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in camps. By and large, all affected people are
receiving assistance from one organization or another.
USAID/DART assessments have shown that emergency needs for food,
shelter, water, and clothing are being met, although with difficulty in
some areas. Given the disaffection between ethnic communities in Sri
Lanka, it would be hard to imagine any major operation by the GOSL
going uncriticized. For example, a February 7 World Food Program report
noted that, ``On Friday 4 February a large number of tsunami affected
Muslims, mainly fisherman, protested simultaneously in several towns of
Ampara district. They claimed that after 41 days since the tsunami
struck they had not received adequate relief supplies. They also asked
that in the east, Muslims be permitted to handle the distribution of
relief supplies as well as the LTTE.'' The USAID/DART has not
encountered any documented cases of malfeasance. USAID does not feel
that any community will go without support given the tremendous
response to this disaster by the international community.
The infrastructure and agriculture assets of the country are
intact, with damage restricted to a narrow band of between 100 meters
and 1 km inland from the coast. Therefore, the same support resources
are available now that were available prior to the tsunami. That said,
the USAID mission in conjunction with the USAID/DART will continue to
monitor the situation and report on any developments.
______
Indian Ocean--Earthquake and Tsunamis
USAID Fact Sheet No. 32, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, February 8, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indonesia............ 114,000 dead,\1\ 413,000 displaced \2\
126,000 missing
\1\.
Sri Lanka............ 30,974 dead, 553,287 displaced \3\
4,698 missing
\3\.
India................ 10,749 dead, 112,558 displaced \4\
5,640 missing
\4\.
Maldives............. 82 dead, 26 12,698 displaced \6\
missing \5\.
Thailand............. 5,393 dead, N/A
3,062 missing
\7\.
Malaysia............. 68 dead, 6 8,000 displaced \8\
missing \8\.
Somalia.............. 150 dead \8\.... 5,000 displaced,\8\ 54,000
affected \9\
Seychelles........... 3 dead \8\...... 40 households displaced \10\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source Legend:
\1\ Government of Indonesia, 2/7/05.
\2\ Government of Indonesia, 2/7/05.
\3\ Government of Sri Lanka, Center for National Operations, 2/1/05.
\4\ Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1/18/05.
\5\ Maldives National Disaster Management Center, 1/23/05.
\6\ Maldives National Disaster Management Center, 1/23/05.
\7\ Government of Thailand, 2/4/05.
\8\ U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1/
18/05.
\9\ U.N. Consolidated Appeal, 1/6/05.
\10\ U.N./Seychelles and USAID, 1/12/05.
Total USG Humanitarian and Recovery Assistance Pledged......$350,000,000
Total USAID/OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed............82,970,096
Total USG Humanitarian Assistance Committed \1\..............123,009,940
\1\ This figure includes assistance from USAID (including USAID/OFDA),
the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The value of assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Defense is
not included in total USG assistance committed.
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CURRENT SITUATION
Indonesia Update
According to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), the
Government of Indonesia (GOI) declared on February 4 that the
first phase of the emergency relief operation in Aceh Province
was over and reconstruction and recovery activities will begin
after the planning phase is completed.
WFP reported on February 4 that the GOI will register all
displaced persons and catalogue their skills in order to
facilitate temporary job placements during the reconstruction
period. In addition, the GOI indicated that a number of
relocation barracks will be built throughout affected areas of
Aceh Province for internally displaced persons (IDPs).
International media report that the GOI plans to build 754
barracks in 39 locations with 401 barracks scheduled for
completion by the end of February. As of February 8, the USAID/
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) reports that 13
barracks have been constructed.
According to the USAID/DART, no comprehensive psychological
and social assessment of the affected populations has been
undertaken to date. However, preliminary results from a Save
the Children study of parents and caretakers in the worst
affected areas of Banda Aceh and Pidie suggest that there is
not a mental health crisis as result of the tsunami. According
to focus groups in the study, parents were aware of how their
children's attitudes and behaviors have changed. In addition,
the study found very few serious cases of impairment or
dysfunction among children. Instead, children displayed common
reactions to a traumatic event, such as the fear that something
bad will happen again and that they will not be with their
parents when it does.
On February 5 and 6, USAID/DART members visited a USAID/
OFDA-funded community health clinic and mobile health services
in Darussalam, and Rumah Sakit Umum Hospital, the primary
referral hospital for Aceh Province. Although international
medical personnel continue to provide emergency services to
tsunami-affected populations, USAID/OFDA's implementing
partners are making a concerted effort to increase local
capacity and transition activities to local health providers.
On February 4, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta announced the
departure of the USS Abraham Lincoln, the aircraft carrier that
dispatched the first helicopters to provide assistance to Aceh
after the tsunami. Since the U.S. military began providing
tsunami relief assistance, U.S. military personnel have flown
more than 2,800 relief missions, provided medical treatment to
more than 2,200 people, and delivered 4,000 tons of supplies.
Sri Lanka Update
In late January, the Ministry of Urban Development and Water
Supply issued a public notice stipulating guidelines for
development in coastal areas in government-controlled areas in
Sri Lanka. According to the guidelines, residential and
commercial construction along the western and southern coastal
zones from Point Pedro to Dondra must be 100 meters inland from
the coast. In the eastern and northern coastal zones, no
construction is allowed within 200 meters of the coast.
According to the Center for National Operations, the difference
in buffer zones between the east and west coasts is due to the
high population density in western coastal areas. According to
local media reports, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) has established a buffer zone of between 300 to 500
meters for construction in LTTE-controlled areas.
India Update
The Supreme Court of India has relaxed an order banning the
removal of timber from protected forests in the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands for a period of six months in order to meet the
immediate requirement for reconstruction/
repair of houses. Local officials have stated that temporary
housing will be ready for displaced populations by April, the
start of the monsoon season in the islands. The local
administration reports that 40,962 persons remain in camps in
the islands as of February 6.
Maldives
According to the U.N. country team, multi-sectoral relief
activities are underway throughout the islands. The Government
of Maldives (GOM) indicates that transport and logistical
coordination remain priority concerns given the dispersion of
the affected areas and difficult conditions for aid deliveries.
Humanitarian assistance must be delivered to each of the 200
islands individually and can only be provided through the use
of small boats or other light transport. As a result, the U.N.
Resident Coordinator's Office has requested the deployment of
U.N. Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) staff to support logistic
coordination between the GOM and U.N. agencies in Maldives.
USG ASSISTANCE
USAID Regional Response
The USAID/DART and the U.S. military continue to conduct
needs assessments and provide supplies and essential logistic
support for the relief efforts in affected countries.
Indonesia
To date, the USG has provided more than $41.1 million in
emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and
sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and
social support, logistics and coordination, and rehabilitation
activities for affected communities in Indonesia.
On February 7, USAID/OFDA committed nearly $4.1 million for
activities in Aceh: $1.3 million to Mercy Corps for community
infrastructure rehabilitation (cash-for-work), micro-finance,
and livelihood recovery projects; approximately $1.3 million to
Project Concern International for health, water and sanitation,
and livelihood recovery programs; and nearly $1.5 million to
International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD) for water and
sanitation, micro-finance, and livelihood recovery projects.
Sri Lanka
To date, the USG has provided more than $62.0 million in
emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and
sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and
social support, protection and anti-trafficking, logistics and
coordination, and cleanup and rehabilitation activities for
affected communities in Sri Lanka. USAID/OFDA-funded cash-for-
work and micro-finance programs are fully operational. The
USAID/DART in Sri Lanka is now focusing on program monitoring
and evaluation and ongoing situational assessments.
India
On January 31, the USAID/DART in India closed out more than
four weeks of operations, after providing approximately $4.1
million for shelter, water and sanitation, cleanup and
rehabilitation, education, and cash for work activities for
tsunami-affected residents. During the transition to the
recovery phase, USAID/India will oversee USAID/OFDA-funded
programs, and USAID/OFDA and USAID/India will share
responsibility for monitoring.
Maldives
On January 28, the USAID/DART Field Officer posted to Male'
closed out operations in Maldives. USAID staff and military
personnel were stationed on the ground in Maldives since
January 10, conducting assessments and coordinating and
consulting with government officials. During that time, USAID/
OFDA provided more than $1.3 million for health, nutrition,
water and sanitation, and emergency relief supplies.
Department of Defense (DOD) Humanitarian Assistance
As of February 8, 3,594 U.S. military personnel are involved
in delivering more than 24.0 million pounds of relief supplies
and equipment to the affected region. Of the 688 military
personnel currently on the ground, 675 are in Thailand, 8 in
Sri Lanka, and 5 in Indonesia. With 8 ships and 25 aircraft,
the U.S. military has delivered a total of 9,259,209 pounds of
relief supplies to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and other affected nations in the last 24 hours.
BACKGROUND
A magnitude 9.0 earthquake on December 26, off the west
coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered massive
tsunamis that affected several countries throughout South and
Southeast Asia, as well as Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, and the
Seychelles in East Africa. Aftershocks from the December 26
earthquake continue to occur in the region.
Based on initial findings of USG assessment teams and on the
recommendation of Secretary of State Powell and USAID
Administrator Natsios, on December 31, President Bush committed
$350 million toward earthquake and tsunami relief and recovery
efforts. Dollar amounts in this Fact Sheet are part of the
total pledge of $350 million and refer to specific funding
actions that have been committed and programmed.
USAID REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ASIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IFRC............... Response to Regionwide........ $4,000,000
emergency appeal.
U.S. Embassy/JTF... Emergency relief Regionwide........ 196,631
supplies (In-kind
contribution).
AirServ............ Aerial assessment, Regionwide........ 2,436,681
transport of
relief personnel
and light cargo.
WFP................ Logistics, air Regionwide........ 5,000,000
support and
coordination.
Multiple........... Transport of Regionwide........ 523,260
relief supplies.
Administrative.... .................. 468,460
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to region................ 12,625,032
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to region............................. $12,625,032
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACF/France......... Water and Aceh Province..... $400,000
sanitation and
emergency
household kits.
CARE............... Water purification Aceh, North 256,276
Sumatra.
Christian Child protection Aceh Province..... 396,728
Children's Fund and psychological
(CCF). and social
support.
Church World Psychological and Aceh Province..... 221,375
Service. social support
for children.
DAI................ Immediate relief Aceh Province..... 5,000,000
and
rehabilitation
interventions
through local and
international
NGOs.
$62,688--Muhammadi
yah for school
clean-up and cash-
for-work in Banda
Aceh.
$15,000--SATORLAK
for disaster
management
training in Aceh
Province.
$74,725--Yayasan
Rumpun Bambu for
cash-for-work and
rehabilitation in
Aceh Province.
$750,000--Mercy
Corps for cash-
for-work
activities in
Banda Aceh and
Meulaboh.
$13,900--LPPM for
clean-up in
Campus Darussalam
Complex.
$237,000--Project
Concern
International
(PCI) for cash-
for-work in West
Aceh Province.
$132,000--Panglima
Laot for cash-for-
work in Aceh
Jaya.
$79,465--BEM Sya
Kuala for cash-
for-work in Banda
Aceh.
$47,802--IOM for
airport
rehabilitation in
Banda Aceh
Airport.
IFRC/Indonesian Red Emergency relief Aceh, North 2,200,000
Cross. supplies. Sumatra.
Indonesian Red Emergency relief Aceh, North 99,050
Cross. supplies (In-kind Sumatra.
contribution).
IMC................ Health............ Banda Aceh........ 292,129
IMC................ Mobile health Aceh and North 2,000,000
units, Sumatra.
rehabilitation of
local health
clinics, malaria
control, and
psychological and
social activities.
IOM................ Provision of Aceh, North 1,000,000
emergency relief Sumatra.
supplies,
shelter, food,
water, and
medicine.
IRC................ Water and Aceh Province..... 2,564,729
sanitation,
mobile health
clinics, support
for public health
networks, and
psychological and
social activities.
IRC/IOM............ Emergency relief Aceh, North 523,260
supplies (In-kind Sumatra.
contribution).
IRD................ Water and Aceh, North 285,428
sanitation. Sumatra.
IRD................ Water and Aceh Province..... 1,499,769
sanitation, micro-
finance, and
livelihoods
recovery.
Johns Hopkins/ Maternal and child Aceh, North 254,023
JHPIEGO. health. Sumatra.
Mercy Corps........ Emergency response Aceh, North 292,060
activities. Sumatra.
Mercy Corps........ Community Aceh Province..... 1,321,771
infrastructure
rehabilitation
(cash-for-work),
micro-finance,
and livelihoods
recovery.
PCI................ Mobile health Aceh, North 236,929
clinics. Sumatra.
PCI................ Health, water and Aceh Province..... 1,327,321
sanitation, and
livelihoods
recovery.
SC/US.............. Emergency health, .................. 288,533
sanitation,
shelter, and
protection.
SC/US.............. Emergency relief Aceh Province..... 901,239
activities.
USAID/Indonesia**.. Emergency grants Aceh, North 136,766
for water and Sumatra.
sanitation,
health, and
shelter.
UNICEF............. Child protection Aceh Province..... 1,500,000
and psychological
and social
activities.
UNHCR.............. Shelter........... Aceh, North 2,000,000
Sumatra.
WHO................ Health Aceh, North 291,500
surveillance. Sumatra.
WVI................ Shelter and Aceh, North 249,985
household kits. Sumatra.
Multiple........... Transport of Aceh, North 256,002
relief supplies. Sumatra.
Administrative.... .................. 114,500
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Indonesia............. 25,909,373
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WFP................ 3,000 MT of P.L. Sumatra........... 2,438,560
480 Title II
emergency food
assistance.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/FFP assistance to Indonesia.............. 2,438,560
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/INDONESIA ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CARDI.............. Emergency response Aceh Province..... 99,960
teams.
CARE............... Water and Aceh Province..... 98,889
sanitation.
ICMC............... Targeting/ Aceh Province..... 100,000
monitoring of
emergency relief
supplies.
IOM................ Logistics......... Aceh Province..... 208,452
I0M................ Emergency relief Aceh Province..... 1,650,000
activities.
IRD................ Emergency food Aceh Province..... 99,974
assistance.
Mercy Corps........ Shelter, health, Aceh Province..... 250,000
water, and trauma
counseling.
Naval Medical Procurement and Banda Aceh........ 579,000
Research Unit. staffing of
reference
laboratory.
Nurani Dunia....... Emergency relief Aceh Province..... 99,669
supplies.
SC/US.............. Emergency relief Aceh Province..... 100,000
supplies and
health.
Multiple***........ Emergency relief Aceh Province..... 2,087,000
activities.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/Indonesia assistance to Indonesia........ 5,372,944
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WFP................ 9,417 MT of P.L. Sumatra........... 7,533,600
416(b) Title I
emergency food
assistance.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USDA assistance to Indonesia................... 7,533,600
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE/PRM ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IOM................ Anti-Trafficking Aceh and Medan.... 200,000
Initiatives.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total State/PRM assistance to Indonesia.............. 200,000
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Indonesia.......................... $41,454,477
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
** USAID/OFDA funding, provided to USAID/Indonesia, will be allocated to
implementing partners based on assessments.
*** USAID/Indonesia is using existing funds earmarked for activities in
Aceh Province to support grants in response to the earthquake and
tsunami.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SRI LANKA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACF/France......... Emergency relief Trincomalee, $403,763
supplies and Mulaitiva, Jaffna.
water and
sanitation.
American Center for Psychological and All Affected 350,000
International social support Districts.
Labor. including
antitrafficking.
The Asia Foundation Child protection All Affected 199,408
and psychological Districts.
and social
activities.
CARE............... Emergency relief Ampara............ 1,941,787
supplies, water
system
rehabilitation.
CCF................ Cash-for-work and Ampara, Matara, 2,310,294
community Hambantola,
rehabilitation. Trincomalee,
Galle.
CHF International.. Cash-for-work, Kalutara, Galle, 3,000,000
debris clean-up, Matara.
repair of schools
and public
buildings,
latrine
construction, and
water and
sanatation.
CRS................ Transitional Batticaloa, Ampara 3,048,000
shelter, home
repair, latrine
construction.
USAID/OTI.......... Relief and Affected areas.... 2,500,000
recovery projects
through existing
DAI contract with
USAID/OTI.
GOAL............... Shelter, water and Ampara, 3,280,423
sanitation, and Hambantota,
cash-for-work Matara.
activities.
IFRC............... Emergency relief Affected areas.... 750,699
supplies (In-kind
contribution).
IOM................ Provision of Northern, Eastern, 500,000
emergency relief and Southern
supplies, coastal areas.
shelter, food,
water, and
medicine.
Mercy Corps........ Cash-for-work and Trincomolee, 1,509,447
community Batticaloe,
rehabilitation. Ampara,
Hambantota,
Matara.
Nathan Associates.. Community Affected areas.... 10,000,000
rehabilitation,
livelihoods, and
microfinance
projects.
SARVODAYA.......... Cash-for-work, Galle, Hambantota, 1,748,120
debris clean-up, Ampara.
repair of
buildings, and
water and
sanitation.
SC/UK.............. Shelter, water and Trincomalee, 630,620
sanitation, and Matara, Galle.
emergency relief
supplies.
Shelter for Life... Transitional Trincomalee....... 1,026,185
shelter and
latrine
construction.
Sri Lanka Red Cross Emergency relief Ampara, Mulaitiva. 356,655
supplies, health,
and cash-for-work
activities.
UNICEF............. Water and All Affected 1,000,000
sanitation and Districts.
emergency school
kits.
UNICEF............. Child protection Affected areas.... 500,000
and psychological
and social
activities.
UNHCR.............. Shelter........... Affected areas.... 1,000,000
USAID/Sri Lanka.... Emergency relief Affected areas.... 100,000
activities.
USAID/Sri Lanka**.. Emergency relief Affected areas.... 95,449
activities.
US Navy............ Emergency relief Affected areas.... 5,225
supplies (In-kind
contribution).
WVI................ Emergency relief Trincomalee, 499,849
supplies and Ampara.
shelter.
Multiple........... Transport of Affected areas.... 657,553
relief supplies.
Administrative.... .................. 76,512
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Sri Lanka............. 37,489,989
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WFP................ 18,220 MT of P.L. Affected areas.... 20,028,340
480 Title II
emergency food
assistance.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/FFP Assistance to Sri Lanka.............. 20,028,340
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WFP................ 5,583 MT of P.L. Countrywide....... 4,466,400
416(b) Title I
emergency food
assistance.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USDA assistance to Sri Lanka................... 4,466,400
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Sri Lanka.......................... $61,984,729
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
** USAID/OFDA funding, provided to USAID/Sri Lanka, is being allocated
to implementing partners based on assessments.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prime Minister's Emergency relief Countrywide....... $50,000
Relief Fund. activities.
IFRC/Implemented by Emergency relief Countrywide....... 50,000
Indian Red Cross. activities.
ACTED.............. Livelihoods....... Tamil Nadu........ 297,934
CARE............... Water and Tamil Nadu and 686,759
sanitation, cash- Andhra Pradesh.
for-work, and
livelihoods.
CRS................ Water and Tamil Nadu and 1,069,566
sanitation, Andhra Pradesh.
psychological and
social support.
EXNORA............. Cash-for-work and Tamil Nadu........ 115,195
water and
sanitation.
FHI................ Livelihoods and Tamil Nadu........ 280,147
debris removal.
GOAL............... Cash-for-work and Tamil Nadu........ 250,112
rehabilitation of
agricultural land.
PCI................ Shelter, Tamil Nadu........ 440,295
livelihoods, and
training.
WVI................ Shelter and cash- Tamil Nadu........ 859,992
for-work.
Administrative.... .................. 33,000
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to India................. 4,133,000
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to India.............................. $4,133,000
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE MALDIVES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNICEF............. Emergency relief Countrywide....... $94,600
supplies (In-kind
contribution).
UNICEF............. Health, nutrition, Countrywide....... 1,200,000
water and
sanitation.
Multiple........... Transport of Countrywide....... 68,400
relief supplies.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Maldives.............. 1,363,000
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Maldives........................... $1,363,000
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thai Red Cross..... Procurement and Countrywide....... $100,000
distribution of
relief items.
Administrative.... .................. 215,371
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Thailand.............. 315,371
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Tailand............................ $315,371
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO MALAYSIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Malaysia Red Procurement/ Northwest Malaysia $50,000
Crescent National distribution of
Disaster relief items and
Management and shelter materials.
Relief Committee.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Malaysia.............. 50,000
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Malaysia........................... $50,000
========================================================================
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SEYCHELLES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seychelles Red Emergency relief Countrywide....... $50,000
Cross. activities.
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Seychelles............ 50,000
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Seychelles......................... $50,000
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing
partner Activity Location Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNICEF............. Health............ Puntland.......... $50,000
UNICEF............. Health............ .................. 250,000
OCHA............... Coordination...... Countrywide....... 141,369
World Concern...... Emergency Relief .................. 392,962
Activities.
UNHCR.............. Shelter........... Puntland.......... 200,000
------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Somalia............... 1,034,331
========================================================================
Total USG assistance to Somalia............................ $1,034,331
========================================================================
* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as
of February 8, 2005.
further information on usg response
More detailed information on USG assistance already provided,
including DOD resources, in response to the disaster may be found in
previous USAID/OFDA
Fact Sheets: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/
disaster_
assistance/countries/indian_ocean/et_index.html.
public donation information
Making a Donation to Relief Efforts
The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is
by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that
are conducting relief operations.
For a list of humanitarian organizations accepting donations
for South Asia relief operations, please see ``Tsunami Relief''
at www.usaid.gov or www.usafreedomcorps.gov. Or call the Center
for International Disaster Information at (703) 276-1914.
USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid
professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the
affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such
as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse space, etc.);
can be transferred very quickly and without transportation
costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and
ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate
assistance.
Additional Information
Information on making effective donations can be found on
the following websites:
USAID: www.usaid.gov, Keyword: Donations
The Center for International Disaster Information:
www.cidi.org
InterAction: ``Guide to Appropriate Giving'' at
www.interaction.org
Information on choosing a charity to support can be found on
the following websites:
Better Business Bureau: www.give.org
GuideStar (A National Database of Nonprofit
Organizations): www.guidestar.org
The American Institute of Philanthropy:
www.charitywatch.org
Charity Navigator: www.charitynavigator.org
Information on relief activities of the humanitarian
community can be found at www.reliefweb.int.