    [Senate Hearing 109-93]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hrg. 109-93

     U.S. TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM AND S. 50, ``THE TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS ACT
                                   OF 2005''

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 2, 2005

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

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    22-845                 WASHINGTON : 2005
    _________________________________________________________________
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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                         TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
    CONRAD BURNS, Montana                    Chairman
    TRENT LOTT, Mississippi              JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
    KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas              Virginia
    OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
    GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BARBARA BOXER, California
    GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               BILL NELSON, Florida
    JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
    JIM DeMint, South Carolina           FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
    DAVID VITTER, Louisiana              E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
                                         MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
                 Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
            Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
                    David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
       Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
       Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
                                    Counsel
                 Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on February 2, 2005.................................     1
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    53
        Prepared statement...........................................    56
    Statement of Senator DeMint......................................    51
    Statement of Senator Inouye......................................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     2
    Statement of Senator E. Benjamin Nelson..........................    46
    Statement of Senator Smith.......................................    49
        Prepared statement...........................................    51
    Statement of Senator Stevens.....................................     1
        Letter, dated February 1, 2005 to Hon. Ted Stevens from Jane
          T. Dana, Acting General Counsel, Department of Commerce....    13

                                   Witnesses

    Bement, Jr., Dr. Arden L., Director, National Science Foundation.    21
        Prepared statement...........................................    22
    Cox, Dr. Daniel, Director, O.H. Hinsdale Wave Research
      Laboratory, Oregon State University............................    58
        Prepared statement...........................................    59
    Frist, Hon. Bill, Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate............     2
    Groat, Charles G., Director, U.S. Geological Survey..............    31
        Prepared statement...........................................    32
    Hansen, Roger A., Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks;
      Director, Alaska Earthquake Information Center.................    69
        Prepared statement...........................................    71
    Kelly, Brigadier General John J., U.S. Air Force (Retired),
      Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere,
      National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).........    14
        Prepared statement of Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr...    16
    Landrieu, Hon. Mary L., U.S. Senator from Louisiana..............     5
    Marburger, III, Dr. John H., Director, Office of Science and
      Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President...........     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    10
    Shea, Eileen L., Project Coordinator, East-West Center, Honolulu,
      Hawaii.........................................................    63
        Prepared statement...........................................    65
        Letter with Attachments, dated February 9, 2005 to Senators
          Stevens and Inouye.........................................    77

                                    Appendix

    Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, prepared
      statement......................................................    83
    Carlson, Doug, Honolulu, Hawaii, prepared statement..............    83
    Response to letter dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens
      and Co-Chairman Inouye to:
        Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr......................................   107
        U.S. Geological Survey.......................................   111
        Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr......................    94
    Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Arden L. Bement,
      Jr., by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   109
        Hon. Mark Pryor..............................................   110
    Response to written question submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
      Roger A. Hansen................................................   118
    Response to written questions submitted to Charles G. Groat by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   121
        Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................   127
        Hon. Mark Pryor..............................................   128
    Response to written questions submitted to Brigadier General John
      J. Kelly by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................    88
        Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................    85
        Hon. Mark Pryor..............................................    91
    Response to written questions submitted to Dr. John H. Marburger,
      III by:
        Hon. Maria Cantwell..........................................   101
        Hon. John McCain.............................................    99
        Hon. Mark Pryor..............................................   103

     U.S. TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM AND S. 50, ``THE TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS ACT
                                   OF 2005''

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2005

                                           U.S. Senate,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
    SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        The Chairman. Welcome to our first hearing. We're honored
    to have Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and, soon, Senator
    Mary Landrieu here to testify on their recent trip to the
    countries impacted by the Indian Ocean tsunami. We do thank
    them for their willingness to come.
        In 1994, Senator Inouye and I, along with Senator Hatfield
    of Oregon, directed NOAA to develop the National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program. We had had a tsunami in 1968, after the
    earthquake. But this was in response to a small tsunami that
    impacted the West Coast. It reflected the concern we all shared
    about the frequency of tsunamis in the Pacific. This bill is
    intended to build on the current tsunami warning network that
    we have in the Pacific.
        I thank the witnesses for being here today.
        Let me yield to Senator Inouye, our Co-Chairman.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

        Senator Inouye. I'd like to join our Chairman in welcoming
    our distinguished panel of witnesses, especially the Leader, as
    they testify on a catastrophe that has left the world in shock,
    and governments scrambling to react.
        We all saw the devastation, the incredible human suffering,
    and the obliteration of entire communities. The destruction hit
    everyone and everything in its path, without regard to national
    or ethnic identity, level of economic development, or
    technological sophistication.
        Our response, as a global community, must, similarly, cut
    across superficial distinctions among nations and people. Our
    response, however, must not be a disorderly surge of activity
    and investment dictated by emotions.
        Mr. Chairman, may I request that the rest of my statement
    be made part of the record?
        [The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
        I would like to join our Chairman in welcoming our distinguished
    panel of witnesses today. As they testify on a catastrophe that has
    left the world in shock, and governments scrambling to react. The
    tsunami that struck the coasts of the Indian Ocean struck without
    regard to national or ethnic identity, level of economic development,
    or technological sophistication. I believe that our response as a
    global community must similarly cut across superficial distinctions
    among nations and peoples.
        That response, however, must not be a disorderly surge of activity
    and investment dictated by emotions. Rather, we must study carefully
    the nature of the threat of tsunami, assess our capacity for detecting
    and forecasting these natural disasters, and make a plan that both
    makes sense, and is sustainable over time.
        Protecting human life and property from natural disaster requires
    the ability to reliably detect and forecast, the capacity to broadcast
    warnings in a timely and informative manner, and the knowledge in
    communities of how to respond and evacuate to safety. Above all,
    however, it requires the willingness to invest resources to prepare for
    a threat that is largely unseen and unpredictable--until the last
    moment, when a monstrous wave actually strikes.
        As we came to understand the broader threat that tsunami posed, Ted
    Stevens and I worked together in 1994 to direct the National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop a Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program. We are pleased to report that this program has laid
    the foundation for tsunami preparedness in the Pacific. The National
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has taken the lead in this
    effort with support from other federal partners, such as the U.S.
    Geological Survey, and the National Science Foundation. We look forward
    to hearing reports and testimony from these agencies as they describe
    where their work has brought us today.
        The appalling scope of the Indian Ocean tragedy illustrates the
    importance and necessity of our work of the past 10 years, and with
    stark clarity, we can see that despite our best efforts, much remains
    to be done. Now, as before, Senator Stevens and I have come together to
    lead the charge toward national and international tsunami preparedness
    by introducing our bill, S. 50, the Tsunami Preparedness Act, which
    many of our colleagues here in this room have chosen to cosponsor.
        I hope that today's testimony will shed additional light on how we
    may further improve our bill and come to grips with national and global
    tsunami preparedness. In particular, I look forward to the testimony of
    Ms. Eileen Shea, an authority on risk management in the Pacific. Her
    report on how the Pacific community has come together to form a
    family--or ``ohana''--in order to pool resources for disaster
    preparedness will be most informative. I welcome her perspectives on
    how our risk management ohana can integrate tsunami preparedness into
    an overall portfolio of planning and preparation.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Unless there's objection, we'll have Senators make their
    statements after the Leader and Senator Landrieu make their
    statements.
        Welcome. Dr. Frist, we welcome your statement.

      STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER, U.S.
                                 SENATE

        Senator Frist. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman and Senator Inouye, Members of the Committee,
    it is a real honor for the two of us to present to you, and to
    share some of our findings on a trip that we made, very early,
    to the tsunami region. We had a wonderful opportunity to see
    the very best of compassion and caring expressed and, at the
    same time, witness the devastation, destruction, sorrow, and
    the pain that we all know characterized this tsunami. Thanks
    for holding this hearing as we look at ways to prevent, as well
    as to respond to, disasters such as the tsunami. This is a very
    important hearing.
        Senator Landrieu and I, on the spur of the moment, did
    leave the United States to witness this destruction,
    predominantly in Sri Lanka. As mentioned, 150,000 people, at
    least, have died, over five million homes destroyed, thousands
    remain missing. A real focus on children, will be reflected in
    both of our comments.
        Many of the nations' first responders came to help. But I
    have to say, right up front, it gives us a great deal of pride
    to watch our Marines, very early on, as part of the 12,000 to
    15,000 military personnel who responded quickly with usable
    forces. It was very impressive to see them coming, moving
    debris, working with USAID, working in a very cohesive fashion.
        The destruction is exactly as described. I have a slide up.
    It's a little bit shaded, because it's taken through the window
    of an airplane, but the coast is there. You can see, for those
    several hundred meters, there's total destruction. What was
    amazing is, when you flew in a helicopter, there's no end to
    it. It goes for miles--10 miles, 20 miles, 50 miles, 100 miles,
    1,000 miles.
        Much remains to be done. Much has been done already. We
    have psychological trauma that is going to take years to deal
    with. We have shelter needs that will take years to deal with.
    The immediate recovery and response, indeed, was quite
    impressive.
        Amidst all the tragedy, what was clear to me is that, in
    terms of the response, it was not the absence of food, because
    food was provided fairly quickly, and not the absence of
    hospitals, although they were overcrowded, but it was the
    access to something as basic as water, that we all take for
    granted. What happened with the tsunami, the wells that people
    had were filled with saltwater, which is not potable water. You
    had water buckets that were washed away totally; therefore,
    people, however they got their water initially, were not able
    to do that.
        We had a focus on water. I have a slide up right now that
    shows the aid that's delivered really typifies everybody coming
    together, with USAID written on the side of that package. You
    see Sri Lankan physicians from the Sri Lankan Red Cross there,
    aid delivered from around the country in the background there,
    the types of quarters in refugee camps, schools that were taken
    over to house many people.
        Quick action was taken; and, therefore, we didn't see
    epidemics of malaria or pooling of water that might have
    resulted. Dredging took place. So as water came in and washed
    in, early dredging prevented those pools of water from which
    malaria could have arisen, from which typhoid fever could have
    arisen, a breeding ground for mosquitoes.
        Now we need to look at long-term solutions, which is part
    of what this hearing is today.
        One area that I want to focus on is this area of public
    health, particularly as it does relate to water. The conditions
    that we witnessed in the tsunami's aftermath are common
    conditions around the world. There's about 1.2 billion people
    who don't have access to potable water today. That will result,
    probably, in about 135 million deaths over the next 15 to 20
    years, all because of this lack of access to clean water.
        Three proposals that I'd like to mention:
        First, clean water should be, ought to be, a major priority
    in our development programs, the U.S. development programs. And
    they're not. Today, we spend about 3 percent of our
    international development and humanitarian assistance budget on
    water. That's only about $600 million of $20 billion. We must
    work to improve the water quality, not only in the areas that
    were tsunami-damaged, but, indeed, throughout the world. I
    mentioned 1.2 billion people, today, don't have access to clean
    water; 2.4 billion people don't have access to basic
    sanitation. It applies to children, specifically, because there
    are 4 billion cases, diarrheal cases a year, and that results
    in 1.8 million deaths of children under the age of 5 each and
    every year, something that absolutely can be prevented.
        I show this slide because what is in my hand are these
    little packets that we had the opportunity to deliver. This
    little packet, which costs about 7 cents to make, if we had put
    in any kind of water, addresses both bacteria and parasites.
    And this little packet costs 7 cents to make, and will give
    about 45 days of clean water, which is pretty amazing. This
    shows that there are inexpensive solutions that we need to be
    both mobilized up to develop, which we have--this is just 1 of
    about 4 types of packets like this--but also to be able to
    distribute very, very quickly, and that was one of the things
    that Senator Landrieu and I had the opportunity to do.
        No. 2, we, I believe, need to use medical assistance and
    public health as a currency for peace as we engage others
    around the world. We've missed it in the past, but I believe
    medicine and public health can be used as a vital tool for
    international diplomacy as we look ahead and decide how to
    spend our resources.
        The assistance that we give other nations has its greatest
    impact when it is on the ground, when it touches individuals in
    very intimate and in very personal ways, at the community
    level.
        I throw this slide in here, because this is a hospital that
    we visited, and this is one of the victims from the tsunami who
    had come in. You see the Sri Lankan physicians, in the past we
    met Scandinavian physicians, they all make a difference,
    directly impacting people's lives, with their expertise, but
    also by reaching out and touching people in a very intimate
    way. And we have missed it. We don't have any national or
    international programs now that focus on what I will come back
    to, and that is a global health corps.
        I do intend to promote a new version of the type of Peace
    Corps that we reach out very directly as a global health corps.
    It would bring together medical professionals, it would bring
    together people in this country who want to donate a period of
    time. It might be a month, it might be 6 months, it might be a
    year, in terms of technology and expertise in public health and
    medicine, and it also would allow them to come back to this
    country and help educate us and the American people. When you
    look at the big, big killers that are out there today, it is
    still infectious disease. It is HIV/AIDS. It is malaria. It is
    tuberculosis. So it is a win-win for everyone. This global
    health corps, I'll be talking more about in the future, but at
    least wanted to introduce the concept.
        So, No. 1, water should be injected into our development
    policy in foreign aid. And, No. 2, let's begin to think of
    using medicine and public health as a currency for peace, part
    of our diplomacy. And a good way to start that is a global
    health corps.
        Third, and last, we should leverage private dollars to
    develop water infrastructure around the world. We've done it
    pretty well in the United States of America, but we have not
    done it elsewhere around the world. We are the Nation who can
    do that. Private companies, not state entities, will ultimately
    do the hard work of providing clean, potable water.
        In the tsunami-ravaged areas, we saw private businesses,
    big and small, respond and assist in everything from water
    purification, through packets like this, to logistics. And what
    we can do, and should do, is leverage those private dollars
    into the field, looking for ways to develop, and ways we can do
    it, and certain models to develop, private/public partnership
    to inject this capital and help people with their water
    projects.
        In closing, I'll just show this one slide. Again, this was
    from our trip, because it was one of the clinics that we
    visited. And there are two children there, because, as Senator
    Landrieu will say, this tsunami had a huge impact on children.
    It reminds me of the medical response. These two kids were
    sleeping in the same bed, because the infrastructure is not
    fully developed. And as we reinvest in these parts of the
    world, I hope that we can inject both water infrastructure, as
    well as public-health infrastructure.
        We have much to do. We've got to be bold. I think this
    hearing is a great start to look both at prevention and
    appropriate response. The first steps, indeed, can be quite
    modest. I do hope that my colleagues will support these
    proposals in responding with water as a major priority in
    development assistance; No. 2, a global health corps; and, No.
    3, policy which will leverage private and public dollars to the
    benefit of kids like this that are sitting with me in the
    hospital.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Landrieu?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. MARY L. LANDRIEU,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA

        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure
    for me to join Senator Frist today and give very brief
    comments, because he's covered so much of what we realized on
    the trip.
        Let me begin just by thanking you, acknowledging a new
    Member of this Committee, Senator David Vitter, who I'm sure
    will be joining us shortly. His willingness to tackle complex
    problems will, no doubt, continue the impressive work of
    Senator John Breaux, who served for many years, and most
    admirably, on this Committee.
        I want to just ditto, if I could, the points made by
    Senator Frist, but add a few new points, if I could.
        Jokingly, I told him I'd be happy to accompany him on this
    trip, if he did not require me to go in any operating room,
    which, I'm pleased to report, he lived up to his end of the
    bargain.
        Senator Frist. But we got close.
        Senator Landrieu. Well, we got close, but he--I was
    successful in staying out of the operating rooms.
        But I want to thank you for your introduction of the
    Tsunami Warning System bill, which we're here to testify on
    today, our need to invest in coastal communities, and the
    immediate and long-term impact of this tragedy on children and
    families.
        First, I would like to say that it's hard to describe the
    destruction in words. Truly. Not just the intensity of it, but
    the expanse of the coastline affected. In an instant, Mr.
    Chairman, thousands of people and structures on miles of
    coastline were simply eliminated, swallowed up, washed away by
    a massive surge of water. The only warning that millions of
    people had was the ominous and awe-inspiring retreat of the
    ocean's waters, revealing hundreds of feet of sand and beach.
    Then, in a rush of water, the magnitude of this force wiped out
    3,000 miles of shoreline, and carried with it the homes and
    lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
        To give those in our country a better understanding of the
    magnitude, this chart would be helpful. I've tried to explain
    this. It would be as if you took an eraser, started at
    Galveston, Texas, and just erased the coastline all the way up
    to Bar Harbor, Maine, back as long as a football field, in some
    instances, or a fourth of a mile to a mile in other instances,
    eliminated.
        The most amazing thing that we saw was actually the fact
    that the palm trees survived. I've been through many hurricanes
    in my life, as many of you all have--and, Mr. Chairman,
    yourself, you've witnessed a lot of the weather's ferociousness
    in Alaska--but Senator Frist and I commented, as we flew over
    this coastline, mile and mile, that the palm trees managed to
    just bend with the wave, and after the wave receded, came back
    up. But there were no homes or people or structures underneath
    the palm trees, themselves.
        It reminds me to testify, this morning, that we should
    think of our coastal communities like palm trees, and build
    them in a way that they can weather these inevitable natural
    disasters, whether they be tsunamis or hurricanes or the surge
    of saltwater intrusion. With adequate and improved warning,
    better planning, and more robust investments in the right kind
    of infrastructure, our coastal communities here in America and
    around the world will continue to grow and thrive decade after
    decade.
        Above all, these astonishing images. While the death toll
    was staggering--it could be over 150,000, 226,000, it's going
    to be hard to actually get an accurate estimate, of course; in
    many of these countries the census is not as sophisticated as
    ours--and over 500,000 were injured. But while the death toll
    is staggering, it is also extremely disturbing to realize that
    many of these people could have been saved, even with minimal
    time involved. People could have simply walked to safety.
    Experts say that oceans may give people as much as 5-minute
    warnings to escape to higher ground. Five minutes could have
    saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Mr. Chairman, even the
    smallest of toddlers and the most frail of seniors can walk the
    length of a football field, out of the reach of this wave.
        So I'm pleased to lend my support and eye-witness accounts
    to the Tsunami Preparedness Act. This legislation will improve
    methods of detecting and warning coastal residents about
    tsunamis, establish important mitigation programs, enhance our
    research, and assist our friends abroad, as Senator Frist said,
    and build peace.
        But warning, Mr. Chairman, is not enough. We must also
    invest and reinvest in our natural barriers, and constantly
    review our evacuation routes. This giant wave, not only killed
    a quarter of a million people, it also, as I said, obliterated
    the natural coastal barriers in the region. The United Nations
    Environmental Program estimates the damage to the environment
    could topple 675 million in loss of natural habitat, an
    important ecosystem function. This number could not only--
    should not only concern environmentalists that seek the worthy
    goal of preserving nature's wonders, it should also concern
    those whose safety and economic livelihood depend on these
    barriers being intact. We know something about that in
    Louisiana, and so do you in Alaska. Restoring the reefs and
    barrier islands and shorelines of these areas will help long-
    term disaster risk reduction. Without the barriers that act as
    nature's own line of defense against flooding, storm surges,
    waves, hurricanes, and even tsunamis, human lives are at risk.
        Mr. Chairman, as I told you, from Louisiana, I know how
    vulnerable coastal communities are. 122 million people in
    America, 53 percent, live in coastal counties or parishes. The
    most common threat to these communities is the rapid rise of
    the water tables, hurricanes, saltwater intrusion.
        I'd like to show the next chart, briefly, and then end with
    just one or two comments.
        In the same area that I showed, the areas in red are
    basically areas in our southern part of the country that are
    below sea level. And I'm sorry I did not have the charts for
    the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts. But just the Gulf Coast
    region will show you, in red, it is 1.5 meters below sea level.
        I ask this Committee, as we pass this legislation, what
    have we done if we warn people of danger, but don't help them
    escape it? In the hurricanes that ravaged Florida and the Gulf
    Coast region last year, people left their homes, only to get
    stuck in gridlock on highways trying to escape the 150-200
    mile-and-hour winds that were projected along the Gulf Coast.
        So I ask, as you all look forward, not only to this piece
    of legislation, but in the Oceans Act or oceans legislation
    that is emerging from the recent study, to think carefully
    about that. While our work here today will focus on warning, we
    must also focus on what this disaster means, or disasters like
    this could mean, to our own communities in Louisiana.
        And, finally, one sentence, Mr. Chairman, about the
    families. Nations are, in fact, built on roads and
    infrastructure and railroads. But nations are primarily built
    on families, strong families, united, protective of one
    another, and focused on building and protecting their
    communities. Everything we do, in this Committee or the Foreign
    Ops Committee or in any other Committee in this Congress,
    should be focused on rebuilding these 11 nations, family by
    family, picking the one child that was left, uniting them with
    the one aunt that was left, finding the one grandfather that
    may still have a fishing boat intact, and trying to put them
    together to help rebuild these nations, and, in doing so,
    remind ourselves that building families in America is the best
    way we can assure our future.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Well, thank you both very much.
        Leader, last year in the Foreign Operations appropriations
    bill, we put $100 million in there as an add-on to start a
    program for clean water throughout the world, fashioned after
    the system that we started in Alaska to deal with the 240-odd
    villages in Alaska that, until recently, did not have clean
    water and sewer. We figure that the cost is about $2,000 a
    well. As we go into places like African villages, it's much
    less than what's in our state. But I do believe we should
    followup on your idea with regard to try and find a way to deal
    with this access-to-clean-water problem. And it's--I don't know
    how much of it's within the jurisdiction of this Committee, but
    we're going to take a look and try to work with you on that
    aspect.
        Does anyone have any comment or a statement to make to the
    Senators?
        [No response.]
        The Chairman. We thank you both very much.
        Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. We look forward to working with you----
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman.--on this legislation.
        Senator Frist. I do appreciate that focus in
    appropriations, just real quickly, because I think every
    Committee needs to go back and look, because we've had this
    lack of coordination, and we absolutely know that that well,
    for $2,000, going back to what Senator Landrieu closed on, has
    an economic impact, has an impact on family. It is a huge
    women's issue throughout Africa. We traveled throughout
    Mozambique, had a large bipartisan group, last year, and,
    indeed, when you talk to women who are walking 3 to 4 hours a
    day, each day, for water, and you look at their children, you
    see the huge economic, social, and family impact that a simple
    well, $2,000, can have on a community.
        So thank you for your leadership there.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much. Appreciate you both
    being here.
        Our second panel of witnesses are Jack Marburger, the
    Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; John
    Kelly, the Deputy Under Secretary for Commerce for Oceans and
    Atmospheres; Dr. Arden Bement, Director of the National Science
    Foundation; and Dr. Charles Groat, the Director of the U.S.
    Geological Survey.
        We do thank you for being here today, and would urge you to
    take your positions.
        I must state to Members and to the audience that Admiral
    Lautenbacher, sadly, is seriously ill and cannot be with us. We
    will schedule another time for him to appear. But we do send
    our best wishes to him.
        May we proceed in the way that I presented your names,
    gentlemen? Your statements will be printed, in full, in the
    record, and we ask you to summarize them as concisely as you
    are able to do so. It's a highly technical subject, so we do
    not want to shut you off or limit you unnecessarily.
        Mr. Marburger?

          STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR,
     OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
                             THE PRESIDENT

        Dr. Marburger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
    Committee. Thank you for inviting me today to discuss the
    Administration's plans for the U.S. Tsunami Warning System.
        I'll keep my oral remarks short. Thank you for including my
    written testimony in the record.
        I, too, have just returned from the tsunami-devastated
    area. And I, too, was sobered by the extent by the extensive
    damage I saw there.
        I attended a ministerial meeting on regional cooperation on
    tsunami early warning arrangements in Phuket, Thailand. Science
    ministers from approximately 46 countries were invited,
    including all the countries affected by the December 26th
    earthquake and tsunami.
        The greatest tragedy of this colossal natural disaster is
    that many of the deaths, as Senator Frist indicated, could have
    been prevented, if only a warning system had been in place to
    alert people in harm's way. Preventing deaths in future similar
    catastrophes will require a high degree of international
    cooperation, and I will mention, later, steps the
    Administration has taken, and plans to take in the future, for
    securing international cooperation and developing a global
    tsunami warning system as part of the Global Earth Observation
    System of Systems, or GEOSS.
        Mr. Chairman, about 85 percent of tsunamis worldwide occur
    in the Pacific Ocean, where life-threatening ones appear about
    once per decade. Because of this risk, the U.S. has led in the
    development of tsunami detection and monitoring technologies,
    and has cooperated since 1968 in the International Coordination
    Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, which
    currently has 26 member countries. This system operates under
    the auspices of UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic
    Commission, or the IOC.
        The world's most advanced tsunami-detection systems, NOAA's
    Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami buoys--they're
    called ``DART buoys''--are deployed as part of the U.S. Pacific
    Tsunami Warning System. The Administration's plan includes
    enhancing the existing Pacific Warning System to provide more
    comprehensive coverage and faster alerts to broader
    populations.
        Tsunamis occur less frequently in the Atlantic Ocean, the
    Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean, but, obviously, they are still
    a threat. Their potential impact is increasing because of the
    global migration of populations to coastal areas. By 2025, for
    example, approximately 75 percent of the U.S. population will
    live in coastal communities.
        The current risk, measured by the frequency of occurrence
    times the consequences, justifies the investment in expanded
    detection warning and disaster-reduction systems. The
    Administration's plan, which you will hear more about in other
    testimony, will expand our detection and warning capabilities
    to the Atlantic and Caribbean, permitting very effective
    detection capability in the event of a U.S. coastal tsunami.
        Of course, some of the components of a tsunami detection
    warning and disaster reduction system are unique to the tsunami
    hazard, such as the sensors for deep-ocean detection of tsunami
    waves, but much of such a system has value for other hazards,
    as well. The communications infrastructure, the emergency
    evacuation and response plans, damage-assessment tools, public
    education programs, and many other components are relevant, in
    general, for disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response.
        Many federal agencies cooperate to provide technical
    support for tsunami readiness. Those represented here today:
    NOAA, USGS, and the National Science Foundation lead the
    effort, but agencies like the Department of Homeland Security,
    with the Disaster Warning System, and NASA's Satellite Remote
    Sensing, also contribute to tsunami detection and warning, as
    well as to post-incident damage assessment and response. Such
    interagency science and technology activities are coordinated
    through the National Science and Technology Council, managed by
    my office, to ensure optimal use of public funds.
        The U.S. and the international community are well prepared
    to create a global tsunami warning system. Catalyzed by the
    U.S., the Intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations----
        The Chairman. I'm constrained to tell you, we would
    appreciate it if you would summarize, that we have another
    panel.
        Dr. Marburger. this is actually an abbreviated version of
    the whole statement.
        Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you for this opportunity.
    I'd just indicate that we are cooperating with other nations in
    an effective organization. We're ready to carry out the intent
    of a bill that is introduced, and Administration plans which
    are consistent with that bill.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of
        Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
        The recent tragic earthquake and resulting tsunami in the Indian
    Ocean was a natural disaster of almost unimaginable proportion. The
    U.S. and the world have responded generously with aid to those who have
    been hurt and with resources to assist in assessing and responding to
    the damage. What made this event even more tragic is that many of the
    deaths were preventable--if only an effective warning system had been
    in place to alert the communities that were in harm's way. The
    Administration is committed to helping ensure that warning and response
    systems are put in place--domestically and internationally--that will
    substantially reduce loss of life and property in the future.
    The Tsunami Threat
        A tsunami is a series of very long, fast-moving waves that can
    travel long distances across the open ocean at speeds up to 500 mph. As
    the tsunami approaches shore, the successive waves may slow to speeds
    of 20-30 mph and grow substantially in height, with the first wave
    commonly not the largest or most destructive. Tsunamis are generated by
    any rapid, large scale sea disturbance. Approximately 90 percent are
    generated by undersea earthquakes, but not all undersea earthquakes
    generate tsunamis. They may also be caused by events such as volcanic
    eruptions or major landslides.
        Approximately 85 percent of tsunamis occur in the Pacific Ocean
    because of this ocean's encircling major seismic zones that are
    associated with the volcanoes of the ``Pacific Ring of Fire.'' Since
    1946, five Pacific Ocean tsunamis have cost the U.S. more than 300
    lives and hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage. Because
    of the much greater frequency of Pacific Ocean tsunamis, prior U.S. and
    global efforts to develop tsunami warning systems have focused on this
    region. Since 1968, the U.S. and other Pacific region nations have
    cooperated in the International Coordination Group for the Tsunami
    Warning System in the Pacific (ICG/ITSU), which currently has 26 member
    states. This system operates under the auspices of UNESCO's
    Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). Currently, the
    world's most advanced tsunami detection systems, NOAA's Deep Ocean
    Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) systems, are deployed in the
    U.S. Pacific Tsunami Warning System.
        Although less likely, tsunamis have some potential of occurring in
    the rest of the world's oceans, including the Indian Ocean, Caribbean,
    and Atlantic Ocean. Even though the probability is small, the potential
    for tsunami-related loss of life and property is increasing because of
    population migrations to coastal areas. The United Nations reports that
    already two-thirds of the world's population crowd near the coastline,
    and within three decades, if trends continue, 75 percent of humanity
    will reside in coastal areas. By 2025 nearly 75 percent of all
    Americans are expected to live in coastal counties, many of whom will
    be in tsunami risk areas. Given a tsunami's great destructive power,
    expanding tsunami protection for U.S. coastal communities and
    developing global early detection and warning systems are justified.
        While plans to expand the world's tsunami detection and warning
    capabilities for global coverage were already in development when the
    December 26 tsunami struck, this event has focused international
    attention on the need for tsunami detection and warning and has created
    opportunities for enhanced international cooperation in developing and
    deploying such systems.
    Disaster Warning and Reduction Systems
        Some of the components of a tsunami detection, warning and disaster
    reduction system are unique to the tsunami hazard, such as the sensors
    for deep ocean detection of tsunami waves. But, I would like to
    emphasize that a great deal of the investment is not confined to
    tsunamis alone. The communications infrastructure, emergency evacuation
    and response plans, damage assessment tools, public education programs,
    and other components are relevant to many types of disasters.
        I would like to outline the generic components for a successful
    disaster detection, warning, and reduction system, including how these
    components relate specifically to the tsunami hazard. A complete system
    includes:

       Risk assessment, which is enabled by the detailed modeling
            of coastline communities and by increased scientific
            understanding of the formation and propagation of tsunamis;

       Detection, to reliably indicate whether a tsunami has
            occurred, avoiding costly false alarms and the associated
            erosion of public confidence;

       Warning, including the initial issuance; transmission to
            affected countries, regions, and communities; and communication
            to the affected population;

       Activation of a response plan, already in place in the local
            communities;

       A ``ready public,'' able to respond in an efficient and
            timely manner through preparedness education;

       Situational awareness, with monitoring of the incident until
            an ``all clear'' has been sounded;

       Resilient infrastructure, protective shelters, reliable
            supply routes, food and water, medical supplies and medical
            evacuation procedures; and ultimately

       Lessons learned; a post-incident evaluation with feedback to
            enable future improvements.

    Science and Technology for Tsunami Readiness
        Mobilizing federal science and technology to support tsunami
    readiness requires the contributions from a number of federal agencies,
    and also requires a coordinated approach. The agencies represented here
    today, NOAA, USGS, and NSF, lead our tsunami readiness effort, but the
    contributions of other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland
    Security in disaster warning systems and NASA in satellite remote
    sensing, contribute in a variety of ways to tsunami detection and
    warning, as well as to post-incident damage assessment and response.
    Federal science and technology challenges that draw on the strengths of
    more than one agency are coordinated through the National Science and
    Technology Council (NSTC). In particular, coordination through the
    Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction and the Interagency Working Group on
    Earth Observations has been critical in assuring the best use of our
    collective capabilities.
        Although we are focused here today on what it will take to deploy a
    system that will allow faster and more accurate tsunami detection and
    warning, I would like to point out some of our other significant
    contributions to tsunami warning and disaster reduction:

       Our ability to do accurate risk assessment and prediction is
            supported by basic research on seismic and tsunami processes as
            well as by advances in numerical modeling and simulations of
            these processes and of their impact on coastal communities.

       Enhanced community warning systems and improved disaster
            response capabilities are being developed by FEMA and other
            agencies, capitalizing on an ``all hazards'' approach to
            disaster-resilience.

       Research findings from the social and behavioral sciences
            are being employed to improve emergency response planning.

       Advanced satellite communications technologies and data
            relay allow real-time monitoring of the situation, and
            satellite remote sensing images and products are being used by
            relief agencies to assess the extent of the damage and
            determine where relief efforts are most critical and how best
            to carry them out. Satellite images from the December 26
            tsunami also provided the first large-scale, open ocean data of
            a major tsunami event.

       And, tsunami education programs are being developed and used
            with at-risk populations, such as NOAA's National Weather
            Service TsunamiReady Program that provides public education and
            preparedness measures for vulnerable U.S. coastal communities.

        Tsunami detection begins with seismic monitoring. The Global
    Seismographic Network, which is managed jointly by the USGS and NSF
    with international partners, currently has a network of 137 seismic
    stations that have been installed around the world in a variety of
    configurations. The seismographs detect earthquakes and, judging from
    the location, type and magnitude of the earthquake, can indicate the
    possible generation of a tsunami. In many areas of the globe, the
    presence of a tsunami can only be confirmed as the tsunami nears shore
    and is detected by tidal gauges. However, in the Pacific Ocean NOAA has
    deployed six Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART)
    systems consisting of a seafloor pressure sensor that can detect a
    tsunami as it passes and relay the information to a moored surface buoy
    for communication via satellite to Tsunami Warning Centers. DART
    systems provide earlier and more accurate tsunami detection and
    significantly reduce costly false alarms.
        U.S. plans for improved initial tsunami detection and warning hinge
    on deploying more DART systems to cover at-risk areas of the world's
    oceans, and on improving the Global Seismographic Network to provide
    enhanced coverage as well as improved analysis and communications of
    earthquake activity. Additional research into seismic and tsunami
    processes, and public education and preparedness programs, are also
    essential. The Administration has outlined detailed plans for an
    enhanced U.S. system that will provide nearly 100 percent detection
    capability for the U.S. coasts, and we have proposed to commit $37.5
    million over the next two years to build and deploy this system. You
    will hear the details of this proposal from the other members of this
    panel.
    International Coordination for Tsunami Readiness
        Tsunamis and many other naturally occurring phenomena are global in
    scale and require international cooperation in response. The
    Administration is committed to working with our international partners
    on the process of developing a global tsunami detection, warning and
    response capability.
        In the aftermath of December 26, a number of countries have called
    for expanded tsunami warning systems both in the Indian Ocean and
    globally. Australia, Germany, Japan, India, China and other countries
    quickly announced proposals for establishing early warning systems for
    tsunamis or, in the case of China, for all natural disasters. A number
    of countries and organizations have also proposed special international
    meetings on these topics. We are endorsing and promoting coordination
    of efforts among likely key contributors as well as incorporation of
    these efforts into existing mechanisms for global cooperation on
    disaster warning and reduction.
        We propose that coordination be carried out through the
    Intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (GEO). Enhanced Earth
    observation was a core element of the 2003 G-8 Evian Action Plan on
    Science and Technology for Sustainable Development. The World Summit on
    Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 also called for greater
    integration of Earth observation systems. Responding to this priority,
    the U.S. hosted the first Earth Observation Summit in Washington, DC in
    July 2003. As a result of this meeting, the GEO was established to
    organize the development of a comprehensive, coordinated, and sustained
    Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). 56 countries are
    currently GEOSS partners, including India, Indonesia and Thailand. All
    nations are invited and encouraged to join. GEO has developed a ten-
    year plan that is focused on nine societal benefits, including ``reduce
    loss of life and property from disasters'' and ``protect and monitor
    our ocean resources.'' Once implemented, this plan could not only
    revolutionize our understanding of the Earth and how it works, but how
    countries cooperate.
        It is important to note that UNESCO's Intergovernmental Ocean
    Commission (IOC) is a GEO member and the coordinating body of the
    existing Tsunami Early Warning System in the Pacific. Efforts to
    establish a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean can
    benefit from the experience and expertise of the IOC, not only in
    coordinating the Pacific Early Warning System, but also in addressing
    the full range of ocean and coastal problems through the sharing of
    knowledge, information and technology among countries.
        At the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, January 18-22, in
    Kobe Japan, the U.S. delegation affirmed U.S. commitment to working
    with our international partners on a global tsunami warning system. I
    have just returned from the Ministerial Meeting on Regional Cooperation
    on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in Phuket, Thailand, at which we
    considered a Thai proposal for developing a regional tsunami early
    warning system for the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. The U.S. has
    proposed that the development of any regional or global tsunami warning
    system--particularly in the Indian Ocean--be coordinated through GEO
    and be a top, near-term priority for GEOSS. This discussion will
    continue when the Group meets in Brussels, February 14-16 and formally
    adopts the GEOSS 10-year implementation plan. After the implementation
    plan is ratified by the GEOSS partners in February, specific country
    commitments and steps forward will be important topics for the G-8
    summit in July 2005.
        As part of the strategic planning for this international ``system
    of systems,'' the U.S. has developed its own Strategic Plan for the
    U.S. Integrated Earth Observation System which, like the international
    plan, focuses on the nine societal benefit areas. This strategic plan
    was developed by the NSTC Interagency Working Group on Earth
    Observations, and provides the essential framework for the U.S.
    contribution to the GEOSS implementation plan. The expansion of the
    U.S. tsunami warning system will be implemented in the context of this
    U.S. Integrated Earth Observation System and as a U.S. contribution to
    GEOSS.
        I should also mention that Admiral Lautenbacher is the U.S. Co-
    Chair of GEO, along with Japan, the European Commission, and South
    Africa, and that Dr. Groat is the U.S. representative to GEO. They will
    also speak in more detail about the development of GEOSS and the U.S.
    contributions to this important international project.
    Conclusion
        In closing, I would like to quote David Broder of the Washington
    Post on this topic: ``Just as the world has managed to put aside
    political, religious, and ethnic rivalries to help the victims of this
    disaster, so the scientists and environmentalists meeting in Brussels
    will have an opportunity to show their foresight in making such
    calamities less likely. The United States leadership in this
    international effort is a source of pride for the nation.''

        The Chairman. We thank you very much. I apologize for the
    interruption.
        General Kelly, we're pleased to have your statement.
        Before your statement, I would place in the record the
    letter we received from the General Counsel of your Department
    which advises us that the Administration does support this
    bill.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                               February 1, 2005
    Hon. Ted Stevens,
    Chairman,
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
    Washington, DC.

        Dear Mr. Chairman:

        This letter provides you with the Department of Commerce's views on
    S. 50, the ``Tsunami Preparedness Act''. The recent catastrophic event
    in the Indian Ocean highlights the threat tsunamis pose to many coastal
    communities, and the need to defend American communities against future
    tsunamis. The Department supports the Committee's efforts to strengthen
    the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) tsunami
    detection, forecast, warning, mitigation and education and outreach
    programs. In light of this event, as well as this past hurricane
    season, the Department believes that we should take this opportunity to
    strengthen and clarify NOAA's responsibilities for protecting lives and
    property from the broad spectrum of natural hazards the nation faces.
    We would like to work with the Committee this year to pass the
    Administration's NOAA Organic Act, which provides the necessary
    authorities and flexibility for NOAA to effectively and efficiently
    carry out its mission, including tsunami warnings.
        While the Department supports the Committee's legislative intent to
    address tsunamis through the authorization process, we are concerned
    that the specificity in the proposed bill could unintentionally limit
    NOAA's ability to effectively manage these programs. Our major concerns
    are with sections 3(b), which could restrict NOAA's ability to apply
    new technologies and techniques, and 3(d)(4), 3(e), 4(c)(6), 6(a)(1),
    6(b) and 7(c), which seek to restrict the authority of NOAA and the
    Administrator, and which would impair NOAA's ability to manage its own
    resources and priorities. Further, we are concerned that S. 50 does not
    vest authorities in the Secretary of Commerce, who is responsible for
    all Department of Commerce programs.
        Finally, the Department requests that all funding authorized for
    this purpose be consistent with the amounts contained in the
    Administration's proposal for strengthening the U.S. Tsunami Warning
    System, which was released on January 14, 2005. The Department of
    Commerce appreciates the opportunity to present views on S. 50 and
    looks forward to working with you to ensure NOAA has the necessary
    authorities to respond effectively to all natural hazards, including
    tsunamis.
        The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no
    objection to the transmittal of these views from the standpoint of the
    Administration's program.
            Sincerely,
                                                  Jane T. Dana,
                                                 Acting General Counsel

     STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN J. KELLY, U.S. AIR FORCE
                 (RETIRED), DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
       COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
                   ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA)

        General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you for those kind
    remarks about my boss. I'll pass them to him, and hopefully
    that will help speed his recovery. I know he really wanted to
    be here today to talk about this subject, because he keenly
    cares about it.
        The Chairman. Well, he is a great friend, and we visited
    with him when he visited the Hawaii Tsunami Center, just
    recently. So we do send our best wishes.
        General Kelly. Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, Members of
    the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify about
    NOAA's activities with tsunamis, and I appreciate you
    submitting my written remarks and including them in the record.
        What I'll briefly focus on this morning is the U.S. Tsunami
    Warning Program, how the U.S. can help the world better prepare
    for tsunamis, and NOAA's role in the Tsunami Warning Program.
        NOAA and its predecessor agencies have provided tsunami
    warning services to this nation since 1949. In 1996, as you
    mentioned, the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program was
    established, and it is a NOAA-led effort, to forge partnerships
    with federal and state entities to detect and, most
    importantly, prepare for, and respond to, tsunamis.
        Your continued support for that program has helped prepare
    this nation for the next tsunami in three ways. One, creation
    of tsunami flooding and inundation maps; the use of these maps
    to establish TsunamiReady committees; and improvements in
    tsunami warning services through research, better use of
    seismic and deep-ocean tsunami data, and the development of
    forecast models. NOAA is proud of the collective
    accomplishments that both we, on the federal side, and with our
    partners in the states have accomplished, and believe your
    investments and NOAA's efforts have already paid big dividends.
    Yet the tragedy in the Indian Ocean shows that we need to do
    more to accelerate and expand our tsunami preparedness in this
    country.
        The current Tsunami Warning System consists of two warning
    centers, the Richard H. Hagemayer Center, in Hawaii, and the
    West Coast Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, in Palmer, Alaska.
    These centers are responsible for issuing all tsunami warning/
    watch advisory and information messages.
        As Dr. Marburger mentioned, NOAA research activities
    developed the Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis,
    or DART, buoys to measure tsunamis in the deep ocean, and to
    transmit this information back to the warning centers. These
    instruments accurately characterize the size of a tsunami by
    measuring the pressure wave from the deep-ocean floor as it
    passes. Tsunamis as small as half a centimeter have been
    measured.
        In November of 2003, the DART buoys demonstrated their
    effectiveness. A large earthquake occurred in the Aleutian
    Islands and generated a tsunami. The two warning centers
    evaluated the tsunami, based on data from the DART buoy, and
    confirmed only a small wave. This accurate prediction of the
    non-destructive tsunami is estimated to save the government of
    Hawaii about $68 million in preparation costs. We also have
    about 100 water gauges used by the Tsunami Warning Center to
    provide information on the magnitude of the tsunami.
        The NOAA Hagemayer Warning Center also serves as the
    operational center for the International Tsunami Warning Center
    of the Pacific, which is comprised of 26 nations. The center's
    primary responsibility is to issue tsunami warnings in the
    Pacific Basin for tsunamis that may cause damage far away from
    their source; however, it is the responsibility of the member
    nation to issue local warnings.
        On Sunday the 26th of December, within 7 minutes of
    notification, and within 15 minutes of the Indonesian
    earthquake, both centers issued tsunami information bulletins.
    However, an effective tsunami warning system requires many
    components: one, an assessment of the hazard; two, near-
    realtime data; three, highspeed data-analysis capabilities;
    four, a highspeed tsunami warning communications system; and,
    last, but probably most important, an effective local
    communications infrastructure for the timely and effective
    dissemination of warning and evacuation requirements.
    Unfortunately, such a system does not exist in the Indian
    Ocean.
        With global attention on this important matter, we have a
    great opportunity to better prepare the world for tsunamis
    through the development of a Global Earth Observation System of
    Systems. The United States has been leading this effort for the
    past 2 years. Next month, in Brussels, 54 nations of the world,
    and the European Union, will gather together to reach an
    agreement that will begin the development of GEOSS.
        Vice Admiral Lautenbacher is the co-chair of that effort,
    and we are going to work to ensure that the GEOSS's first order
    of priority is to develop a global tsunami warning system. It
    is my hope that positive changes in technology, education, and
    cooperation will emerge from what happened in the Indian Ocean.
        The Bush Administration recently announced that we are
    committed to completing the current U.S. Tsunami Warning System
    by mid-2007. NOAA's contribution to that system includes
    modernizing and expanding the existing DART buoy network. We
    plan on installing 32 new operational DART buoys--25 in the
    Pacific, 7 in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. And, as you well
    know, Mr. Chairman, the weather in the Aleutians is a real
    challenge, and it complicates our ability to repair the DART
    buoys when they malfunction; and so, we are going to place, in
    the Aleutian area, in the water, three backup buoys, so if a
    primary one goes down, we'll automatically have an ability to
    continue to get that data.
        We will also procure and install 38 new sea-level
    monitoring and tide gauge stations, and expand the operation of
    the Alaska and Hawaii Tsunami Warning Centers to 24 hours a
    day, 7 days a week. NOAA forecasters will then be better able
    to protect the United States, and will be able to alert
    communities within minutes of a tsunami-producing effect.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Commerce
    does support Senate Bill 50, the Tsunami Preparedness Act, and
    you do have the letter of support from the Department.
        In closing, I appreciate your efforts to help better
    prepare this country for the next tsunami, because it's not a
    question of if there will be one, it is when it will be and
    where it will be.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher
    follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr., U.S. Navy
       (Retired), Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere;
         Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the
    opportunity to testify before you regarding the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administrations (NOAA) activities with tsunamis. I am Vice
    Admiral (retired) Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr., Undersecretary of Commerce
    for Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator.
        As the world and our Nation mourn the loss of life from the Indian
    Ocean tsunami tragedy, we recognize the very real threat of tsunamis
    and ask, ``Could it happen here? '' We need to be able to answer that
    question with a high degree of confidence.
        We know a tsunami can affect any community along the coast of the
    United States. This is particularly true for the Pacific coast, where
    tsunamis have been more frequent. The recent event in Southeast Asia
    and Africa highlights the need to identify steps we can take to
    mitigate the potential impact of such an event here at home.
        NOAA and its predecessor agencies have provided tsunami warning
    services for our Nation since 1949. Following the 1992 Northern
    California earthquake/tsunami, Congress asked NOAA to examine tsunami
    preparedness of the U.S. West Coast and the National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program (NTHMP) was born. The NTHMP is a NOAA led effort to
    forge federal/state partnerships to detect, prepare and respond to
    tsunamis. Your continued support for this program has prepared our
    country for the next U.S. tsunami in three main ways: (1) Creation of
    tsunami flooding/inundation maps using advanced numerical models; (2)
    Use of these maps to develop evacuation procedures, road signs to guide
    evacuation, educational programs to raise tsunami awareness, and the
    establishment of TsunamiReady communities; and (3) Improvements in
    tsunami warning services through the use of better seismic and deep
    ocean tsunami data and the development of tsunami forecast models. NOAA
    is proud of the collective accomplishments of federal partners (USGS,
    NSF, and FEMA) along with our state partners (Alaska, California,
    Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington). Over the past 8 years we have
    identified what needs to be done, but so far there are inundation maps
    for only 30 percent of the Pacific states coastline, local communities
    are in need of warning dissemination systems, and the NOAA tsunami
    warning system needs more deep ocean tsunami detectors to improve
    warning services. Your investments and NOAA's efforts to date have paid
    large dividends, yet, in the face of the Sumatra tsunami, we believe
    our Nation should accelerate and expand our tsunami preparedness
    efforts.
        In this testimony, I will describe our existing tsunami warning
    program, including a brief overview of our work with the International
    community; specific actions NOAA took during the recent tsunami; and
    then briefly outline the Administration's plan for developing a global
    tsunami warning system.
        Tsunamis are natural disasters that can form in all of the world's
    oceans and inland seas, and in any large body of water near seismic
    activity. Each region of the world appears to have its own cycle of
    frequency and pattern for generating tsunamis that range in size from
    small events (no hazards) to the large and highly destructive events.
    Eighty-five percent of tsunamis occur in the Pacific Ocean and its
    marginal seas. This is not surprising as the Pacific Basin covers more
    than one-third of the earth's surface and is surrounded by a series of
    mountain chains, deep-ocean trenches and island arcs called the ``ring
    of fire.''
        Most seismic activity occurs in this ring of fire where the main
    tectonic plates forming the floor of the Pacific collide against one
    another or against the continental plates that surround the ocean
    basin, forming subduction zones. While tsunamis can be generated by any
    sudden pressure source in the water, such as a meteor, landslide, etc.,
    most are generated from earthquakes. Large earthquakes can create
    tsunamis that may be locally devastating, their energy decays rapidly
    with distance. Usually they are not destructive more than a few hundred
    kilometers away from their sources. That is not the case with tsunamis
    generated by great earthquakes in the North Pacific or along the
    Pacific coast of South America. On the average of six times per
    century, a tsunami caused by an earthquake in one of these regions
    sweeps across the entire Pacific Ocean, is reflected from distant
    shores, and sets the entire ocean in motion for days. Although not as
    frequent, destructive tsunamis have also been generated in the Atlantic
    and the Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea and even within smaller
    bodies of water, such as the Sea of Marmara, in Turkey. There have also
    been tsunamis in the Caribbean, but the lack of any recent tsunami in
    that area has lowered the level of interest and hindered establishing a
    warning program in that area.
        According to NOAA's National historical tsunami databases, during
    the 105-year period from 1900 to 2004:

       923 tsunamis were observed or recorded in the Pacific Ocean.

       120 tsunamis caused casualties and damage, most near the
            source. Of these, at least 10 caused widespread destruction
            throughout the Pacific.

       The greatest number of tsunamis during any one year was 23
            in 1938. While most were minor, one event did result in 17
            deaths.

       There was no single year during this period that was free of
            tsunamis.

       19 percent of all tsunamis were generated in or near Japan;
            9 percent were generated off Alaska and the west coasts of
            Canada and the United States; and 3 percent were generated near
            Hawaii.

        The U.S. Tsunami Warning System consists of two warning centers:
    the Richard H. Hagemeyer Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Ewa
    Beach, Hawaii; and the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/
    ATWC) in Palmer, Alaska. NOAA conducts research on tsunamis, operates
    essential ocean buoys and tide gauges to detect tsunamis, and works
    with other federal, state, local government agencies and universities
    as our partners in the tsunami warning mission.
        The Richard H. Hagemeyer Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii
    was established in 1949 in response to the unpredicted 1946 Aleutian
    tsunami, which killed 165 people on the Hawaiian Islands. In 1967, the
    West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, was created
    as a result of the 1964 Great Alaska earthquake and tsunami. These
    centers are responsible for issuing all tsunami warning, watch,
    advisory, and information messages to emergency management officials
    and the public throughout their respective areas of responsibility. The
    Pacific Center covers United States interests and territories
    throughout the Pacific, including Hawaii, while the West Coast/Alaska
    Center covers Alaska, and the west coast of North America from British
    Columbia, Canada through California.
        About 100 water level gauges are used by the Tsunami Warning
    Centers and are operated by the United States and our international
    partners. These gauges are along the coasts of islands or continents
    around the Pacific Rim. NOAA operates many of these stations, including
    33 from NOAA's National Water Level Observation Network in the Pacific
    Ocean basin, which are equipped with software to support the Tsunami
    Warning System. Water levels from these gauges can be sent directly to
    NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers and others who want the information. NOAA
    is working to upgrade the nationwide network with a real-time
    capability to provide a continuous (minute-by-minute) stream of water
    level data for integration with tsunami warning systems and research
    applications. NOAA also helps support many coastal gauges located in
    other countries around the Pacific.
        NOAA operates six Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
    (DART) buoys. NOAA research activities developed these buoys to measure
    tsunamis in the deep ocean and to transmit the information back to the
    Warning Centers in near real time. These instruments accurately
    calculate the size of the tsunami by measuring the pressure it exerts
    on the deep ocean floor as the wave passes over. Tsunamis as small as
    0.5 cm have been measured. NOAA began placing DART buoys in the Pacific
    Ocean in 2002 and plans to have a complete coverage of potential
    Pacific tsunami source zones over the next few years.
        In November 2003, the buoys demonstrated their effectiveness. A
    large earthquake occurred in the Aleutian Islands and generated a
    tsunami. The two Tsunami Warning Centers evaluated the tsunami using
    coastal gauge data but did not ``stand down'' until a reading arrived
    from the nearest DART buoy confirming only a small tsunami. During post
    analysis of the event, DART data were used for a model simulation and
    the output from the simulation accurately predicted the 2 cm tsunami
    recorded at Hilo, Hawaii. This NOAA model is still being developed, but
    an initial version will be transferred to the warning centers for test
    operations this year. DART data and the forecast model show much
    promise to help accurately predict tsunami impacts. In the history of
    the Pacific Warning Center, 75 percent of its warnings to Hawaii have
    been for non-destructive tsunamis. The DART data combined with forecast
    models promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates as well as
    provide a better measure of the severity of destructive tsunamis for
    Hawaii and all other parts of the Pacific. The accurate forecasting of
    a non-destructive tsunami in November 2003 saved Hawaii an estimated
    $68M in projected evacuation costs.
        The Pacific Center also serves as the operational center for the
    International Tsunami Warning System of the Pacific, which is comprised
    of 26 member nations of the Pacific Rim. These members share seismic
    and water level information with the Pacific Center so the Center can
    determine whether a tsunami was generated in the Pacific Basin and
    assess its strength. The Pacific Center's primary responsibility is to
    issue tsunami warnings for Pacific Basin teletsunamis--tsunamis that
    can cause damage far away from their source. It is not the Center's
    responsibility to issue local tsunami warnings from seismic events
    outside of the United States. For example, if an earthquake occurs off
    the coast of Japan and a local tsunami is generated, it is Japan's
    responsibility to issue a local tsunami warning. However, it is the
    Pacific Center's responsibility to warn all participating Nations in
    the Pacific Basin if the Japanese tsunami will cause damage far from
    its source.
        Only Australia and Indonesia have coastlines bordering both the
    Pacific and Indian Ocean coasts. None of the other countries impacted
    by the Indian Ocean tsunami have coasts bordering the Pacific Ocean and
    therefore they do not receive tsunami bulletins via the automated
    dissemination network.
        Thailand and Indonesia are member states within the International
    Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (ITSU), but their participation
    has been limited. Thailand has no coast along the Pacific, and
    Indonesia's tsunami threat is primarily outside the Pacific Basin. As a
    member of the International Coordination Group (ICG) for ITSU, the U.S.
    has actively encouraged non-member States to become ICG/ITSU members.
    Under the IGC/ITSU, the U.S. has actively supported the need for global
    tsunami mitigation actions and will continue to provide support through
    the development of a Global Earth Observation System of Systems
    (GEOSS), an effort in which the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic
    Commission, the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
    (ISDR), and a number of other UN agencies and programs participate.
        NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no authority or responsibility to
    issue tsunami warnings for the Indian Ocean basin. However, knowing the
    concern Pacific countries might have about the potential devastating
    impact a large earthquake and resulting tsunami can inflict, on Sunday,
    December 26, 2004, at 8:14 p.m. EST, within 15 minutes of the
    Indonesian earthquake, both centers issued Tsunami Information
    Bulletins. These bulletins included location and initial magnitude
    (8.0) information and an assessment that there was no tsunami threat in
    the Pacific. As the Indian Ocean is outside the NOAA tsunami area of
    responsibility, NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no procedures in
    place to issue a warning for this region. An hour and 5 minutes after
    the earthquake, as additional information came in from seismic
    monitoring stations around the world, another bulletin was issued by
    both Centers revising the magnitude of the earthquake to 8.5. This time
    the bulletin contained a statement that the potential existed for a
    tsunami near the epicenter. Unfortunately, there was no sea-level data
    or other information available to substantiate or evaluate a tsunami
    until 3\1/2\ hours after the earthquake when news reports began coming
    indicating casualties in Sri Lanka and Thailand. At about the same
    time, data from the one sea-level gauge in the Indian Ocean (Cocos I;
    west of Australia) was received indicating a 45cm peak-to-trough non-
    destructive tsunami.
        Sea-level gauges are essential elements of the current Tsunami
    Warning System in the Pacific. When strategically located, they are
    used to quickly confirm the existence or non-existence of tsunami waves
    following an earthquake, to monitor the tsunami's progress, and to help
    estimate the severity of the hazard. There was no data available from
    the Indian Ocean to help the warning centers know what was occurring.
        An effective tsunami warning system requires (1) an assessment of
    the tsunami hazard, (2) near real-time seismic and oceanographic (sea-
    level change) data; (3) high-speed data analysis capabilities; (4) a
    high-speed tsunami warning communication system; and (5) an established
    local communications infrastructure for timely and effective
    dissemination of the warning and evacuation requirements. It is also
    critical that coastal populations are educated and prepared to respond
    appropriately to tsunami warnings and calls for evacuations. For the
    Pacific Basin, these tsunami warning requirements are well known.
    Unfortunately, for the Indian Ocean basin, they were basically non-
    existent.
        There are currently 6 DART buoys in the Pacific operated by NOAA--3
    off the coast of Alaska, 2 off the coast of the western U.S., and one
    in the eastern Pacific. These first buoys of the currently envisioned
    29 buoy array are an example of a successful transition of buoys from
    research and development into an operational system. Presently, three
    of the deployed DART buoys are non-operational due to failure of the
    sea floor pressure unit (buoys 46401 and 46402; Aleutian Islands) and
    communication module inside the surface buoy (buoy 46404; Pacific
    Northwest/Washington). The Washington buoy has been out of service for
    15 months for various reasons. Initially there was a power failure, but
    when the buoy was retrieved an explosion occurred. Service to all buoys
    was stopped while a safety stand-down was held to determine the cause
    of the explosion and while a redesigned buoy compartment was
    implemented in all buoys. Upon service, the Washington buoy's sea floor
    unit failed, indicating a problem with undersea cabling. A technical
    stand-down led to further refinement of the cables. Weather conditions
    further delayed our attempts to bring this buoy back online; the sea
    floor unit was repaired during a service visit in January.
    Unfortunately, subsequent to that visit the buoy experienced failure of
    the communications module. A service visit to repair the Washington
    buoy is expected in mid-February. Of the two buoys in the Aleutian
    Islands, one has been out of service for 6 months and the other for 1
    month. As many of you are aware, particularly you Mr. Chairman, the
    seas are particularly rough in this region during the winter months. We
    are currently waiting for a safe weather window, and will service the
    buoys as soon as that window of opportunity presents itself.
        The government of Chile purchased one DART buoy from NOAA, and that
    buoy is now operating off the northwest coast of Chile; another buoy is
    in the process of being purchased by Chile at this time. Japan also
    operates a few cabled deep ocean sensors off its Pacific coasts. The
    NOAA buoys represent the only current deep ocean capability available
    to the Tsunami Warning Centers to detect tsunamis. In July of last
    year, staff from the Pacific Center had discussions with Japanese
    representatives about the possibility of allowing PTWC access to data
    from the Japanese cabled buoys.
        While technical equipment is required for detection and
    communication, equally important are continued research and
    development, and education and outreach to mitigate potential impacts
    from tsunamis. People must have the knowledge and information to act
    during potentially life threatening events. Outreach and education
    efforts, such as NOAA's own StormReady and TsunamiReady programs, are
    key components of the U.S. National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
    (NTHMP). These programs foster interaction between emergency managers
    and their citizens, provide robust communications systems, and
    establish planning efforts before certification. NOAA also developed
    multi-hazard risk and vulnerability assessment training and decision
    support tools using GIS mapping technology to highlight populations,
    infrastructure and critical facilities at risk for coastal hazards.
    These tools and other support are critical to land use planning, pre-
    disaster planning, mitigation efforts, and targeted dissemination of
    outreach, education and information about high-risk areas.
        The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) was
    launched by the General Assembly of the United Nations to provide a
    global framework for action to reduce human, social, economic, and
    environmental losses due to natural and man-made hazards. The ISDR aims
    at building disaster-resilient communities, highlighting the importance
    of disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable
    development. ISDR is the focal point within the United Nations system
    for coordination of strategies and programs for disaster reduction and
    to ensure synergy between disaster reduction activities and those in
    the socioeconomic and humanitarian fields. One particularly important
    role of ISDR is to encourage both policy and awareness activities by
    promoting national committees dedicated to disaster reduction and by
    working in close association with regional initiatives. As part of this
    effort, tsunami hazard maps have been produced for over 300 coastal
    communities in over 11 countries, including 130 communities throughout
    the United States.
        The United Nation's Education, Scientific, and Cultural
    Organization's (UNESCO) Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
    (IOC) has developed products to help countries implement tsunami
    response plans. Road signs and other mitigation products are available
    through the NTHMP (http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami-hazard). In
    summary, Tsunami Response Plans are probably the most cost-effective
    way to create a tsunami resilient community. To be successful,
    communities must remain committed to a continuous, long-term education
    program. Tsunamis are infrequent events and it is important to ensure
    future generations understand tsunami safety.
        Protecting near-shore ecosystems, like coral reefs, is equally
    important for maintaining disaster-resilient communities. The
    international media and South Asian officials reported less destruction
    in locations protected by wave-absorbing healthy coral reefs. NOAA and
    our federal, state, territorial, and international partners work to
    protect and preserve coral reef ecosystems.
        The United States will continue working closely with the
    international community to help implement recommended tsunami detection
    and warning measures for the Indian Ocean Basin and other regions of
    the world currently without adequate tsunami warning capability. A
    comprehensive global tsunami warning program requires deploying DART
    buoys along each of the world's major subduction zones; adding real-
    time sea-level monitoring/tide gauge stations; establishing Regional
    Centers for Disaster Reduction, assessing hazards, promoting education
    and outreach efforts; and conducting research and development.
        As recently announced, the Bush Administration has a plan to
    upgrade the current U.S. Tsunami Warning System. NOAA's contribution to
    this plan includes procuring and installing 32 new DART buoys,
    including 25 new buoys in the Pacific and 7 new buoys for the Atlantic
    and Caribbean. We expect to have the complete network of DART buoys
    installed and operational by mid-2007; 20 buoys should be operational
    in FY06, with the final 12 in place in FY07. In addition to the DART
    buoys, NOAA will procure and install 38 new sea level monitoring/tide
    gauge stations. The Administration has allocated $24M, over the next
    two years, to NOAA for this effort, including $18.1M for the Pacific
    Basin and $5.9M for Atlantic/Caribbean/Gulf.
        There were many lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami. A
    key point to make is that, for all coastal communities, the question is
    not ``if '' a tsunami will occur, but ``when.'' We know what causes a
    tsunami to develop, and we know a great deal about how to track them
    and forecast their path. With expansion of the U.S. Tsunami Warning
    System, NOAA forecasters will be able to detect nearly 100 percent of
    tsunamis affecting the United States and will be able to respond and
    alert communities within minutes of a tsunami-producing event. With
    expanded education and outreach via NOAA's TsunamiReady program and
    other efforts, we can rest assured that our coastal communities have
    the opportunity to learn how to respond to a tsunami event and that we
    have minimized the threat to American lives.
        With global attention on this important matter, we have a great
    opportunity to help the world better prepare for tsunamis through the
    development of a Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).
    This system would include a real-time global seismic monitoring
    network, a real-time DART network, and a near real-time sea level
    monitoring network. I will be a member of the U.S. delegation at the
    Third Earth Observation Summit (February 16, 2005; Brussels, Belgium)
    and will work to ensure that the development of a global tsunami
    warning system is a high priority for the larger Global Earth
    Observation System of Systems and the Integrated Ocean Observing
    System.
        In closing, I would like to thank Members of this Committee for
    their work in developing S. 50, the Tsunami Preparedness Act. The
    catastrophic event in the Indian Ocean highlights the threat tsunamis
    pose to all coastal communities, and the need to defend American
    communities against future tsunamis. The Department of Commerce
    supports the purposes of this legislation to authorize and strengthen
    the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's tsunami
    detection, forecast, warning, mitigation and education and outreach
    programs. As you know, the Department believes that in addition to
    improving the ability to detect and forecast tsunamis, it is equally
    important to educate citizens on what actions to take when they receive
    a tsunami alert. The Department supports and appreciates the language
    that calls for strengthening the TsunamiReady program, an
    administrative initiative to educate and prepare communities for
    survival before and during a tsunami.
        We look forward to working with Congress and other Nations around
    the world to help take the pulse of the planet and make our world a
    safer place. Attached to this written testimony submitted for the
    record is an article published in the International Tsunami Information
    Center Tsunami Newsletter, which provides detailed information about
    NOAA's Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. Much more information about
    tsunamis can be found at http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov, http://
    www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/, http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/, and http://
    www.ngdc.noaa.gov/spotlight/tsunami/tsunami.html.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Bement, the National Science Foundation Director,
    please?

       STATEMENT OF DR. ARDEN L. BEMENT, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
                           SCIENCE FOUNDATION

        Dr. Bement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inouye,
    and Members of the Committee. Thank you very much for the
    opportunity to present testimony on the National Science
    Foundation's role in providing greater----
        The Chairman. Could you pull that microphone up closer,
    please?
        Dr. Bement. Is this better?
        So, again, I thank you for the opportunity to present
    testimony on the National Science Foundation's role in
    providing greater understanding and education of tsunami events
    through science and engineering research.
        Because the National Science Foundation has the mission to
    build the nation's scientific and engineering knowledge
    capacity and capability, NSF and the communities we support
    have a responsibility to undertake relevant research in the
    context of these events.
        Through rapid-response reconnaissance teams supported by
    the National Science Foundation, we have moved quickly to focus
    the U.S. research community's efforts to understand the nature
    of this event, identify relevant lessons for future disasters,
    and build on the research that we have funded in the past.
        Our rapid-response research teams include problem-focused
    interdisciplinary collaborations. In these collaborations, NSF
    is working with international partners and countries directly
    affected, or neighboring the disaster, to improve
    communications, collaboration, and priority-setting as the
    immediate and longer-term research efforts get underway.
        This disaster has raised awareness of, and attention to,
    earthquakes and tsunamis and their predictability. NSF has long
    funded the research and instrumentation aimed at detecting and
    understanding the impacts of these phenomena.
        Prominent examples include the realtime Global
    Seismographic Network, or GSN, the data from which forged the
    critical core of the early warning of this event.
        From the figures accompanying my written testimony, we see
    the power of this warning system. Figure 1, on the easel, with
    the globe in the center, depicts the location of the GSN
    stations in relation to the epicenter of the quake, which is in
    the center of the diagram. Figure 2 illustrates the collected
    seismic measurements from these stations made as the wave front
    traveled around the world. These charts illustrate the power of
    this network, which is operated by the Incorporated Research
    Institutions for Seismology.
        The GSN is funded, in partnership, by NSF and the United
    States Geologic Survey, and it is a primary international
    source of data for earthquake location and also tsunami
    warning.
        NSF also funds research designated to support damage and
    loss prediction and avoidance. These efforts include the
    effects of earthquakes and tsunamis on buildings, bridges, and
    critical infrastructure systems. Additionally, research efforts
    center on estimating economic consequences, human and societal
    impacts, and emergency response and warning capabilities. For
    example, engineers and scientists at the Earthquake Engineering
    Research Centers and the Southern California Earthquake Center
    are working to establish the nature, attenuation, and impacts
    of subduction-type earthquake ground-shaking. These centers are
    developing hazard assessments that can be applied to critical
    infrastructure design in areas threatened by earthquake and
    tsunami hazards.
        Mr. Chairman, more than 75 million Americans in 39 states
    live in areas at risk for earthquakes. The NSF has recently
    established the George E. Brown, Jr., Network for Earthquake
    Engineering Simulation, or NEES, as we refer to it. This is a
    major national infrastructure project that is revolutionizing
    earthquake engineering research. It allows NSF-funded
    researchers to create physical and computational simulations in
    order to study how earthquakes and tsunamis affect our critical
    infrastructure. The NEES Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State
    University is the world's most comprehensive facility for
    studying tsunamis and storm waves.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for the opportunity to
    testify on a topic of great importance to the science and
    engineering communities. I hope that I have conveyed to you the
    NSF's serious approach to generate new knowledge about the
    natural phenomena that lead to tsunami events, also the design
    of safer coastal structures, the development of early warning
    and response systems, and effective steps for disaster
    recovery.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Bement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director, National
                               Science Foundation
        Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inouye, and Members of
    the Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to present
    testimony on the National Science Foundation's role in providing
    greater science and research to understanding tsunami events.
        The events surrounding the December 26, 2004, Sumatra-Andaman
    Island earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami constitute disasters for the
    natural, social, and constructed environments in the region. Because
    the National Science Foundation (NSF) has the mission to build the
    nation's scientific and engineering knowledge capacity and capability,
    NSF and the communities we support have a responsibility to undertake
    relevant research in the context of the events.
        NSF has moved quickly to focus the U.S. research community to
    address the disaster, response, and relevant lessons for future
    disasters, building on the research related to these topics that we
    have funded in the past. Later in my testimony, I will detail the ways
    our previous research has contributed to the ability of the United
    States and others to understand and respond to the disaster, and
    information on the NSF's role in supporting the U.S. research
    community's immediate response to the tragedy.
        This disaster has revealed several areas in which understanding--as
    well as infrastructure--were insufficient to deal with the crisis, and
    where NSF's research communities can bring basic knowledge and relevant
    infrastructure to bear. The U.S. communities include problem-focused,
    interdisciplinary research teams, often with international partners in
    mutually beneficial and sustainable collaborations. NSF is working with
    counterpart organizations in countries directly affected by the
    disaster, as well as other countries in the region, to improve
    communications, collaboration, and priority setting as the immediate
    and longer-term research efforts get underway.
        This disaster has raised awareness of and attention to the
    phenomena of earthquakes and tsunamis, and their predictability. NSF
    has long funded scientific and engineering research infrastructure
    aimed at detecting and understanding the impacts of these phenomena.
    Prominent examples include the real-time Global Seismographic Network
    (GSN), the data from which forged the critical core of the early
    warning of the December 26, 2004, earthquake. This Network, operated by
    the Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, is funded in
    partnership by NSF and the United States Geological Survey, and is the
    primary international source of data for earthquake location and
    tsunami warning.
        We also fund research designed to support damage and loss
    prediction and avoidance for the United States and elsewhere, including
    earthquake and tsunami effects on buildings, bridges, and critical
    infrastructure systems, and estimates of economic consequences, human
    and societal impacts, and emergency response. For example, engineers
    and scientists at the Earthquake Engineering Research Centers and the
    Southern California Earthquake Center are working to establish the
    nature and attenuation of subduction-type earthquake ground shaking,
    and to develop probabilistic hazard assessments that can be applied to
    critical infrastructure design in areas threatened by earthquake and
    tsunami hazards. NSF has recently established the George E. Brown, Jr.
    Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES), a major national
    infrastructure project to create a complete system of test facilities.
    The project is revolutionizing earthquake-engineering research. NSF-
    funded researchers create physical and computational simulations in
    order to study how earthquakes and tsunamis affect buildings, bridges,
    ports, and other critical infrastructure. The NEES Tsunami Wave Basin
    at Oregon State University is the world's most comprehensive facility
    for studying tsunamis and storm waves.
        These globally historic earthquake and tsunami events have
    heightened awareness in the engineering and science research
    communities of the huge responsibilities to create new knowledge about
    our human and organizational environments, natural biologic systems,
    constructed environments, and about our vulnerabilities in the face of
    damaging forces. It is important that the work includes all aspects of
    environmental damage, mitigation, response, and recovery.
    The National Science Foundation Research Portfolio
        The tremendous loss of lives and destruction of the natural and
    built environments resulting from the December 26 events brought to the
    forefront questions about disaster preparation, mitigation, response,
    and recovery. NSF's research investments have developed a knowledge and
    human resource base over broad areas relevant to these questions.
    Current and past pertinent research activities include:
        Earthquakes: The Sumatra earthquake occurred along a subduction
    zone where tectonic plates collide. These subduction quakes are the
    largest and most destructive type of earthquake, and cause most of the
    world's tsunamis. NSF researchers have been making exciting
    advancements in subduction zone research including new techniques and
    facilities that define the structure, chemistry and dynamics of active
    subduction zones. A prime example is the findings about the Cascadia
    subduction zone in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. This fault structure
    generated a 9.0Mw earthquake on January 26, 1700, with a tsunami that
    destroyed whole forests on the largely uninhabited Oregon coast,
    toppled buildings on Vancouver Island, and killed coastal dwellers in
    Japan.
        Tsunami Generation: NSF research includes field studies using
    research vessels and other platforms and facilities, including the
    Integrated Ocean Drilling Program's (IODP) drill ship the Joides
    Resolution. NSF research aims to understand the processes by which
    earthquakes, large slumps, and other landslips generate tsunami waves,
    and to model how tsunamis interact with the shore zone, including the
    nature of present and past sediment deposits left by tsunamis.
        Rapid Response Reconnaissance: NSF supports the Earthquake
    Engineering Research Institute (EERI) and its Learning from Earthquakes
    (LFE) project that trains and deploys rapid-response teams of civil
    engineers, geoengineers, and social scientists to earthquakes that
    occur around the world. These teams identify information resources,
    research needs, and provide ground truthing for remotely sensed
    observations. NSF also funds the Natural Hazards Research and
    Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at
    Boulder, which supports rapid-response research by social science
    researchers, and leads the world as a clearinghouse for
    multidisciplinary and social science studies of hazards and disasters.
        Remote Sensing: Remote-sensing technologies quantify damage over
    large geographic areas and provide reconnaissance information where
    access to impacted areas is difficult. For the first time, high-
    resolutions sensors (Quickbird and Ikonos), moderate-resolution sensors
    (SPOT, LandSat, and IRS), and low-resolution sensors (MODIS, Aster) are
    recording the Indian Ocean events in near real-time. With this
    information it will be possible to identify and quantify damage and
    impacts to critical infrastructure systems (including electric power
    systems, water supply, sewage, transportation, safe shelter buildings,
    ports, and harbors). Such assessments can then be verified by on-the-
    ground inspections.
        Physical and Computational Simulation: Tsunami disasters are
    dominated by coastal damage and loss of life. Scientists and engineers
    need to predict site-specific wave run-up patterns and determine
    tsunami-induced forces and scour effects to enable better design of
    waterfront structures and help guide decision-making processes
    including vulnerability assessment. NSF research has developed scenario
    simulations for tsunami hazard mitigation, including tsunami
    generation, hydrodynamics, warning transmission, evacuation, human
    behavior, and social and environmental impacts. The NEES Tsunami Wave
    Basin is being used to construct and test large-scale, realistic models
    of infrastructure--such as shorelines, underwater pipelines, port
    facilities, and coastal communities.
        Sensor Networks: NSF research investigates new uses for and new
    kinds of sensors and networks for health monitoring and damage
    assessment of the civil infrastructure, both physical and cyber.
    Flexible and scalable software architectures and frameworks are being
    developed to integrate real-time heterogeneous sensor data, database
    and archiving systems, computer vision, data analysis and
    interpretation, numerical simulation of complex structural systems,
    visualization, probabilistic risk analysis, and rational statistical
    decision making procedures. NSF has also funded research on socio-
    technical arrangements for bringing information to policymakers.
        Risk Assessment: Risk assessment and decisions about preparing for
    risks are immediately relevant topics that NSF-funded scientists have
    researched in depth. Basic science and engineering research provides
    the in-depth understanding needed to design effective detection,
    warning, mitigation, response, and recovery programs. Research on risk
    communication and decision-making regarding low-probability, high-
    consequence events is being applied to many types of disasters. Key for
    application of engineering knowledge is to establish the basis for
    performance-based design to be applied to all critical infrastructure
    systems and facilities of the constructed environment.
        Warning Systems and Evacuation: NSF has supported extensive and
    long-term research on warning systems and evacuation, with clear
    implications for managing tsunami events. NSF research includes basic
    work on integrated warning systems for rapid-onset extreme events,
    including detection, modeling, and communications technologies, and
    also the social and organizational components needed for effective
    warnings: societal and community public education and preparedness,
    appropriate authorities and resources for organizational and
    governmental entities responsible for warning and evacuation processes,
    appropriate messages and means of dissemination to at-risk populations,
    and the management and maintenance of warning systems over time. One
    specific focus for research has been sensor networks that must
    ``funnel'' a sudden impulse of data that is generated due to an
    anomalous event such as an earthquake, terrorist attack, flood, or
    fire. The objective is to understand how to design sensor networks to
    adequately handle these impulses of data and to feed the information
    into public warning systems.
        Behavioral Responses: Emotional and cognitive responses to stress
    as well as vulnerability and resiliency in the face of threat and
    terror are the focus on current research in social psychology. Research
    in geography and regional science examines patterns of settlement that
    lead to social vulnerability and the differential impact of hazards,
    including earthquake hazards, on different groups. An earlier study
    exploring the restoration of assumptions of safety and control
    following the 2001 terror attacks has direct implications for
    understanding the restoration of human wellbeing following these
    devastating events.
        Human and Socio-technological Response: Behavioral and social
    science research funded by NSF provides insights about how people
    respond to disasters and identifies the short- and long-term effects.
    Scientists have documented and analyzed social phenomena in the
    immediate wake of disasters, such as altruism, volunteerism,
    convergence, and improvisation. These phenomena vary by country and
    culture. NSF researchers are developing distributed, reliable, and
    secure information systems that can evolve and adapt to radical changes
    in their environment. Such systems would deliver critically important
    services for emergency communication and management through networked
    information services and up-to-date sensor data over ad-hoc flexible,
    fault-tolerant networks that adapt to the people and organizations that
    need them. Such technology facilitates access to the right information,
    for the right individuals and organizations, at the right time. This is
    necessary to provide security, to serve our dynamic virtual response
    organizations, and to support the changing social and cultural aspects
    of information-sharing among organizations and individuals.
        Emergency Response Research: The complex problems associated with
    earthquake and tsunami hazard mitigation and response strategies
    necessitate interdisciplinary and international research efforts,
    including modeling and computational simulation, large-scale laboratory
    modeling, geographical information and communication systems, and
    social sciences and planning. NSF supports research on social,
    political, and managerial aspects of emergency response activities and
    aid provision, including need-based distribution of assistance within
    diverse societies.
        Ecology: Research on the ecology of infectious disease contributes
    to understanding the dynamics of epidemics and change, particularly in
    the context of ecological changes such as those following natural
    disasters. Disturbance ecology examines how biological populations,
    communities and ecosystems respond to extreme natural and human events,
    including hurricanes and tsunamis. Long-term ecological research is
    critical to understanding the base line conditions, without which the
    changes resulting from catastrophic events such as earthquakes and
    tsunamis cannot be understood.
        Microbial Genome Sequencing: NSF funded research on microbial
    genome sequencing provides key information that enables identification
    and understanding of the life functions and ecology of microbes that
    play critical roles in the environment, agriculture, food and water
    safety, and may cause disease in humans, animals, and plants. Genome
    sequence information can be utilized to develop tools to detect
    disease-causing organisms and develop countermeasures such as
    antimicrobial chemicals and vaccines.
        Education and Human Resources: NSF has dozens of active projects
    funded that target or include Earth science education and understanding
    of natural hazards. For example, the NSF National Science, Mathematics,
    Engineering, and Technology Education (SMETE) Digital Library program
    is supporting a multi-year project to develop a data-oriented digital
    library collection on education in plate tectonics, the central Earth
    science paradigm governing earthquakes and resultant tsunamis. Such a
    collection works to ``bridge the gap'' between science data archives
    and libraries, and improves access to the historic and modern marine
    geological and geophysical data. Further, the project is enhancing the
    professional development of teachers through interactions with a local
    school district and with teachers nationwide. Also, NSF has supported
    the incorporation of advanced technologies in K-12 learning materials
    in Earth science, including visualizations and working with images from
    space, real-time data, and experimentation with models and simulations
    (techniques used in earthquake events to generate model predictions of
    tsunamis). This work was utilized to update and improve one of the most
    widely used high-school Earth science textbooks.
    NSF Investments in Research Infrastructure
        The natural disaster raised awareness of and attention to the
    phenomena of earthquakes and tsunamis, and their predictability. NSF
    has long funded scientific and engineering research infrastructure
    aimed at detecting and understanding the impacts of these phenomena.
    Prominent examples include:

       IRIS, GSN--Real-time Global Seismographic Network (GSN) data
            forged the critical core of the early warning of the December
            26, 2004, Sumatran Earthquake. The GSN, operated by IRIS
            (Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology) and funded
            in partnership by NSF and the United States Geological Survey,
            is the primary international source of data for earthquake
            location and tsunami warning.

       Engineers and scientists at the Earthquake Engineering
            Research Centers \1\ (EERCs) and the Southern California
            Earthquake Center (SCEC at the University of Southern
            California) are working to establish the nature and attenuation
            of subduction-type earthquake ground shaking, and to develop
            probabilistic hazard maps and shaking levels due to subduction
            earthquakes in all oceans. This information will support damage
            prediction for the U.S. and elsewhere, including earthquake and
            tsunami effects on buildings, bridges and other lifelines, and
            estimates of economic, safety, and emergency response
            consequences.

        \1\ MAE (Mid America Earthquake Center at the University of
    Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for
    Earthquake Engineering Research at the University of Buffalo) and PEER
    (Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center at the University of
    California, Berkeley).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       NSF has completed construction of the George E. Brown, Jr.
            Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES), a major
            national infrastructure project to create a complete system of
            test facilities that is revolutionizing earthquake engineering
            research. NSF-funded researchers create physical and numerical
            simulations in order to study how earthquakes and tsunamis
            affect buildings, bridges, ports, and other critical
            infrastructure. The NEES Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State
            University is the world's most comprehensive facility for
            studying tsunamis and storm waves.

    The National Science Foundation's Immediate Response
        For more than three decades, NSF has supported quick-response
    disaster studies that dispatch scientists and engineers to the
    aftermath of crises ranging from hurricanes and earthquakes to the
    terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Researchers were in the field
    within days after the South Asian tsunami to gather critical data
    before it was lost to nature and reconstruction. The ephemeral
    information, including assessments of physical damage to both the built
    and natural environments, as well as social science research that will
    help emergency teams and local leaders better direct future rescue
    efforts, is vital for scientists and engineers to understand and
    prepare for future disasters.
        A variety of mechanisms are available to support quick-response
    research, including the following: (1) Small Grants for Exploratory
    Research (SGER), which may be awarded in order to gather data that is
    likely to disappear over time after the impact of disasters; (2)
    supplements to existing awards to fund data collection; (3) specific
    continuing grants that support quick-response field reconnaissance and
    research across a variety of disciplines; and (4) flexibility inherent
    in existing awards that allows for the support of post-disaster
    investigations. NSF has already utilized all of these types of support
    in responding to the December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami in the
    Indian Ocean.
        Several programs and projects have established funding to send
    rapid response teams to disaster sites:
        NSF Earthquake Engineering Research Centers are undertaking work on
    damage assessment. The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
    Engineering Research (MCEER) sent a team of researchers to Thailand in
    partnership with the Asian Institute of Technology and the Earthquake
    Disaster Mitigation Research Center from Japan. Shubharoop Ghosh from
    ImageCat will join a team led by Prof. Yamazaki of Chiba University.
    The team is examining impacts of the earthquake and tsunami upon
    buildings and critical infrastructure. Research is also being supported
    by the earthquake centers on validating the potential of remote sensing
    data to accurately assess damage and impacts.
        Multidisciplinary research has been undertaken through the NSF-
    funded Learning From Earthquakes (LFE) Program that is managed by the
    Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), a non-profit
    institution in Oakland, California. LFE is sending two teams to Sri
    Lanka, Thailand, the Maldive Islands, and India. The teams will gather
    data on estimated wave heights, extent of inundation, geological
    scouring, and other perishable information related to the physical
    aspects of tsunamis. They will coordinate their work with teams from
    Japan and Australia.
        In addition, other EERI activities will collect data. Jose Borrero,
    University of Southern California, was one of the first U.S.
    researchers to gain access to one of the hardest-hit area of Sumatra. A
    13-member team of engineers led by EERI member Sudhir Jain, Indian
    Institute of Technology, Kanpur, is investigating the structural damage
    and impacts on port facilities along the eastern coast of India, as
    well as on the Adaman and Nicobar Islands.
        These initial EERI teams include geotechnical, structural, and
    coastal engineers; geologists; geophysicists; and experts in fluid
    mechanics. In subsequent efforts, a joint EERI/ASCE team of engineers
    will travel to the area along with social scientists from the Disaster
    Research Center at the University of Delaware. They will focus on
    damage to lifelines, including highways, bridges, ports and harbors,
    water delivery systems, sewage facilities, and other utilities. They
    will also begin to document the resulting impacts on communities and
    the entire region. These impacts include search and rescue operations,
    medical response, multinational relief, organizational response,
    effects on children and families, shelter and housing, and social and
    economic impacts. Members of EERI and other earthquake engineering
    experts who reside in the affected countries will also contribute the
    results of their independent investigations. These reports will be
    compiled on the EERI website, published by EERI as part of the LFE
    program, and made available internationally.
        NSF's Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) is a
    major source of information about tsunamis. The O.H. Hinsdale Wave
    Research Laboratory at Oregon State University, home to the largest
    tsunami research facility in the world, was sought out as a source of
    answers to the pressing questions in the wake of the disaster. The lab
    hosted local news teams as well as CNN, NBC's `` Today Show,'' the
    Discovery Channel, and Spiegel TV from Germany.
        The Directorate for Geosciences is offering SGERs and award
    supplements to study physical processes in the earthquake-tsunami zone.
    For example, NSF-funded investigators from the California Institute of
    Technology who were already studying uplift or subsidence of atolls in
    the earthquake zone returned to Sumatra immediately after the event to
    measure earthquake-related vertical displacements. Additionally,
    scientists from the University of California-San Diego plan to resurvey
    a network of approximately fifty geodetic monuments in North Sumatra,
    the Mentawai Islands, and Banda Aceh to determine coseismic and
    postseismic deformation caused by the Sumatra earthquake. These new
    data will provide critical geodetic constraints for the seismographic
    inversion of the earthquake source to constrain models of the
    subsequent devastating tsunamis and to contribute to the study of the
    great earthquake cycle in that region. The NSF-funded geodetic
    consortium UNAVCO Inc. is coordinating efforts by the scientific
    community to measure the post-earthquake distortion in the region of
    the earthquake. The NSF-funded seismology consortium IRIS (Incorporated
    Research Institutions for Seismology) is leading efforts to develop
    real-time, finite-fault modeling techniques so that information on the
    actual characterization of the earthquake source can be updated
    continuously as real-time seismic data are received.
        The oceanographic communities are actively mapping the earthquake
    rupture zone, studying aftershock events, and venting of natural fluids
    using ocean bottom seismometers, ships, remotely operated vehicles, and
    potentially autonomous undersea vehicles. In addition, the NSF's
    Division of Ocean Sciences will sponsor a series of free, on-line
    workshops for K-12 teachers that will provide them with lesson plans,
    teaching materials, and access to scientists so that they can present
    the latest scientific tsunami information to their students. These
    workshops will reach several thousand teachers this month alone, with
    additional workshops possible dependent upon demand. A major challenge
    for these oceanographic studies is gaining permission from the
    Indonesian government to conduct research in its territorial waters.
        The Directorate for Computer and Information Science and
    Engineering will be offering SGERs and award supplements to extend
    projects on sensor networks for damage identification, information
    about the location of survivors, emergency response infrastructure
    technology, and the ability of organizations to respond to man-made and
    natural disasters. The San Diego Supercomputer Center at the University
    of California, San Diego has offered computational and data integration
    and data backup resources to local universities, facilities, or
    government agencies that might need them.
        The Human and Social Dynamics (HSD) priority area has allocated $1
    million to support SGERs for multidisciplinary research, including such
    issues as warning systems, disaster epidemiology, crisis decision-
    making, emergency response, and short-term and long-term recovery and
    mitigation. These awards will be established by the end of February
    2005. Additional funding will be available from the NEES program to
    archive data collected under these SGERs in the central data repository
    operated by NEES Consortium, Inc. The Directorate for Social,
    Behavioral, and Economic Sciences has also made special funds available
    for SGERs pertinent to learning from this event.
    Conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, as you well know NSF has as its mission the promotion
    of the progress of science, the advancement of the national health,
    prosperity and welfare, and the securing of the national defense. Since
    science is truly global in nature, NSF engages in these activities in
    collaboration with international partners. As such, NSF will continue
    to respond to disasters such as the earthquake and tsunami events in
    partnership with others in the global science and engineering
    communities.
        The South Asian tsunami disaster is representative of an entire
    class of catastrophic disasters: events that are low probability yet
    have high consequences. With the right information, communities and
    nations can characterize such risks and determine how to allocate
    resources for detection, warning, and preparedness.
        Research into decision-making provides insights and tools for
    characterizing such risks and for addressing future questions about
    allocating resources to detection and warning. NSF, in cooperation with
    the world research community, including the scientists, engineers, and
    students from the affected countries, will continue to generate new
    knowledge about the natural phenomena of these events, the design of
    better coastal structures, the development of early warning and
    response systems that can mitigate loss of life, and recovery from such
    disasters. These new bodies of knowledge need to be transferable to all
    regions of the world that can benefit from these efforts. With NSF
    support, scientists will continue to study societal vulnerability to
    natural hazards with a view to building resilience through increased
    knowledge and preparedness, improved natural resource management, and
    other policy strategies so that we may help stem the loss of life and
    property in future events.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify on a
    topic of great importance to the world community. I hope that I have
    conveyed the serious approach that NSF has taken to help generate new
    knowledge about the natural phenomena that lead to tsunami events, the
    design of safer coastal structures, the development of early warning
    and response systems, and effective steps for disaster recovery.
        I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Groat, from the U.S. Geological Survey?

    STATEMENT OF CHARLES G. GROAT, DIRECTOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

        Dr. Groat. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
        Senators Frist and Landrieu gave you a good sense of the
    dramatic impact that this dramatic event had. Let me give you a
    sense, in beginning, of the forces of the earth that caused it.
        The December 26, 2004, a magnitude-nine earthquake was
    initiated 20 miles below the sea floor off the western coast of
    Sumatra. It was the fourth-largest earthquake to strike the
    planet since 1900, and the largest since a magnitude-9.2 struck
    your state, Alaska, Senator Stevens, in 1964. As with other
    giant earthquakes, this one took place along the subduction
    zone, where the tectonic plates that make up the earth's rigid
    outer layer are thrust beneath one another. This thrusting
    resulted in a rupture that propagated northward along the plate
    boundary fault for over 750 miles. Along the length of that
    fault, the sea floor was jolted upward as much as 15 feet,
    lifting trillions of gallons of water into the air, and
    resulting in the forces that provided the tsunami.
        While not all tsunamis are caused by earthquakes, most of
    them are. So, therefore, the earthquake monitoring system that
    Director Bement referred to is critical in providing
    information about where tsunamis are likely to occur. And so,
    the network is extremely important, and it has to be up to the
    task of providing information about the earthquakes in a very
    sophisticated and very timely manner. The GSN that he referred
    to is the key part, on a global scale, of doing that. And with
    128 globally distributed seismic sensors that are all very
    modern, we have the infrastructure in place to provide the core
    part of the knowledge that is necessary to interpret whether
    earthquakes will generate tsunamis or not, if they occur in
    ocean basins.
        A little closer to home, in the United States, the USGS
    operates an advanced national seismic system which provides
    seismic data to NOAA's Tsunami Warning Centers. That system
    includes a 63-station backbone network that is, itself, very
    modern, and provides information supported by 17 regional
    seismic networks that ensure that the United States has
    adequate and detailed coverage for providing this kind of
    information.
        As a result of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the President
    announced and asked the Departments of Commerce and Interior to
    determine whether our systems were adequate. As a result of
    that, the United States Geological Survey has put together a
    plan to upgrade our seismic system capabilities and our
    interpretive capabilities, both to provide NOAA with the
    information it needs as to whether these earthquakes that occur
    on plate boundaries will generate tsunamis, and also to provide
    information locally to the United States coastal communities,
    as they need it.
        So let me close by just indicating what it is we're doing.
        We're implementing 24-by-7 operations at our National
    Earthquake Information Center, where the information is
    gathered and sent out.
        We're upgrading the hardware and software there to make
    sure that we have the sophisticated processing that's necessary
    to give the interpretive information, both on the global sense
    and in the U.S. sense.
        We're also improving the detection response time of the
    Global Seismographic Network by making data from all stations
    realtime. In other words, we get the information when it's
    received by the stations, not with any delays. Only 80 percent
    of that network is realtime right now.
        We're also increasing the maintenance schedules for all of
    the stations so that we have data available as continuously as
    possible.
        We're also providing some new software that was generated
    by the California Integrated Seismic Network, which is a USGS
    university and state partnership, to speed USGS-generated
    earthquake information directly to local emergency managers.
    And this is extremely important in coastal communities, because
    earthquakes that generate tsunamis close to shore have to be
    responded to very quickly. There isn't the time, nor the
    instrumentation, between those and the shore to provide the
    warnings. So the earthquake is a key part of what coastal
    communities need to have in which to base their warning
    systems. So we're upgrading our ability to do that.
        And, finally, we're also increasing the geologic studies
    that occur around the margins of the United States and in the
    Caribbean to understand the past frequency of tsunamis, which
    gives us some sense of when and where they occur, and the
    magnitude of those.
        The Sumatra Earthquake, which contributed significantly to
    the loss of lives and property, also continues us to forward
    our comprehensive concern about earthquakes, themselves,
    because they do occur more frequently, and they do destroy
    lives and property on a more regular basis, and in a very
    destructive basis. And through the National Earthquake Hazards
    Reduction Program, in which we partner with the National
    Science Foundation with NIST and with FEMA, we will also work
    with other agencies and universities to improve tsunami hazard
    assessments and warnings, and to expand our knowledge of
    tsunami generation and the impacts, and to evaluate the
    research and operational requirements for effective hazards
    planning, warning, and response systems.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Groat follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Dr. Charles G. Groat, Director, U.S. Geological
                                     Survey
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to discuss the recent tragedy in South Asia and what can be
    done to reduce the threat that tsunamis and earthquakes pose to coastal
    communities in the United States and around the globe. Events such as
    this serve as a tragic reminder of our vulnerability to natural
    hazards. While the United States is not as vulnerable to tsunamis as
    other regions of the world, we do face significant risk.
        On December 29, the President asked the Departments of the Interior
    and Commerce to determine whether our systems are adequately prepared
    for a tsunami on our coasts. As a result, the Administration announced
    its commitment to implement an improved domestic tsunami detection and
    warning system. As part of the President's plan, the U.S. Geological
    Survey (USGS) will strengthen its ability to detect global earthquakes
    both through improvements in the Global Seismographic Network (GSN),
    which we support jointly with the National Science Foundation (NSF),
    and through around-the-clock analysis of earthquake events. The changes
    that are proposed for USGS clearly have a dual purpose, improving our
    capacity to respond to earthquakes as well as supporting the tsunami
    warning program of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    (NOAA).
        In addition to earthquake monitoring and reporting, the USGS
    conducts a number of activities aimed at improving tsunami hazard
    assessments, education, and warnings, including geologic investigations
    into the history of and potential for tsunami occurrence, coastal and
    marine mapping, and modeling tsunami generation. Although most tsunamis
    are caused by earthquakes, they can also be caused by volcanic
    eruptions, submarine landslides, and onshore landslides that cause
    large volumes of rock to fall into the water. All of these tsunami-
    generating hazards can impact the United States. Consequently, a broad
    range of USGS work in earthquake, volcano and landslide hazards, and
    coastal and marine geology, contribute to better understanding of
    tsunami impacts and occurrences.
        Additionally, USGS is playing a role in relief efforts for nations
    impacted by the December 26 disaster by providing relief organizations
    worldwide with pre- and post-tsunami satellite images and image-derived
    products that incorporate information on population density, elevation,
    and other relevant topics. These images and products are being used by
    relief organizations to determine where relief efforts are most
    critical and how best to carry out those relief operations. In our
    efforts to assist and improve relief efforts, we work closely with
    partners at NOAA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, other
    federal agencies, and in academia. For example, USGS scientists are
    part of international teams conducting post-tsunami investigations in
    Sri Lanka and Indonesia with the goal of applying the knowledge
    developed to other vulnerable areas in the United States and around the
    globe.
        USGS is also working with NOAA and other domestic and global
    partners through the Global Earth Observing System of Systems (GEOSS)
    and other mechanisms. Through GEOSS, improved monitoring capabilities
    must be firmly linked into all-hazards warning systems and, the most
    important link in the chain, public education and mitigation programs.
    As we move forward, we must bear in mind that this was an earthquake
    disaster as well as a tsunami disaster, and we must learn from both.
    This is not just a scientific endeavor; it is a matter of public
    safety.
    Earthquake and Tsunami of December 26, 2004
        This was the second year in a row in which a deadly earthquake
    occurred near the end of the year. In 2003, a magnitude 6.6 quake
    struck Iran's ancient city of Bam, killing over 30,000 people. In 2004,
    the deadly quake was a magnitude 9 earthquake that initiated 20 miles
    below the seafloor off the western coast of Sumatra, the fourth largest
    earthquake to strike the planet since 1900 and the largest since a
    magnitude 9.2 earthquake struck Alaska in 1964. The earthquake and
    resulting tsunami killed more than 150,000 people around the Indian
    Ocean, two-thirds of them in northern Sumatra, whose inhabitants
    experienced not only the severe shaking from the earthquake but also
    the tsunami's full force.
        As with other giant earthquakes, this one took place along a
    subduction zone, where one of the tectonic plates that make up the
    Earth's rigid outer layer is being thrust beneath another (see Figure
    1). The Sunda trench is the seafloor expression of such a plate
    boundary where the Indian plate is thrusting under the overriding Burma
    plate. The size of an earthquake is directly related to the area of the
    fault that is ruptured. This rupture propagated northward along the
    plate boundary fault for over 750 miles beneath the Nicobar and Andaman
    Islands almost to Burma with a width of over 100 miles and slip along
    the fault averaging several tens of feet.
        It is difficult to comprehend the scope of a magnitude 9
    earthquake. When we hear the term earthquake magnitude, we think of the
    Richter scale, which was the first of several scales developed to
    measure the earthquake size from the seismic waves they generate. These
    scales are logarithmic such that each whole number represents an order
    of magnitude larger in the seismic waves generated. So a magnitude 7
    earthquake is 10 times larger than a magnitude 6 and 100 times larger
    than a magnitude 5. However, the amount of energy released goes up much
    faster. This magnitude 9 earthquake released 32 times more energy than
    a magnitude 8 earthquake and 1000 times more energy than a magnitude 7
    earthquake such as the one that struck the San Francisco Bay area in
    1989. The energy released by the Sumatra earthquake is roughly equal to
    that released by all the earthquakes, of every size, everywhere in the
    world since the mid-1990s. It's important to remember that our own
    coasts, Alaska in 1964 and the Pacific Northwest in 1700, were the site
    of earthquakes as large as the Sumatra earthquake.
        A great deal of that energy was transferred to the Indian Ocean's
    waters and ultimately to its surrounding shores. Along the length of
    the fault rupture, the seafloor was jolted upward by as much as 15
    feet, lifting trillions of gallons of sea water--a volume more than 30
    times that of the Great Salt Lake--and generating the tsunami that
    swept both east, inundating the coast of Sumatra, Thailand and Burma,
    and west, crossing the open ocean at hundreds of miles per hour on its
    way to the coasts of India, Sri Lanka, and eventually eastern Africa.
        Tsunamis strike the Indian Ocean less frequently than the Pacific
    Ocean, which is ringed by subduction zones, but there have been at
    least a half dozen Indian Ocean tsunamis caused by earthquakes in the
    past 200 years. What had been the deadliest tsunami in the region was
    not caused by an earthquake but by the explosion of Krakatau volcano in
    1883. The tsunami generated by the collapse of that volcano killed
    36,000 people on Java, Sumatra and neighboring islands.
        It is important to emphasize that not all large subsea earthquakes
    generate tsunamis. For example, four days before the Sumatra
    earthquake, a magnitude 8.1 earthquake struck the seafloor south of New
    Zealand near the Macquarie Islands. Instead of generating a thrusting
    motion as in a subduction zone, this earthquake occurred on a strike-
    slip fault, moving side to side like the San Andreas Fault, a motion
    much less efficient at creating a tsunami. No tsunami was generated.
    Even earthquakes generated in subduction zones may not produce tsunami,
    depending on whether the fault rupture reaches the seafloor, the amount
    of displacement on the fault and other factors. One of the key roles of
    a tsunami detection system is to avoid false warnings that cause costly
    and unnecessary evacuations that can undermine people's willingness to
    heed warnings in the future. In addition to buoys and tide gauges,
    seismic data may be able to provide an additional check, and research
    in this area could improve our ability to recognize tsunami-causing
    events in minutes.
    U.S. Earthquake Monitoring Networks and Their Role in Tsunami Warning
            Center Operations
        To monitor earthquakes in the United States, the USGS has begun to
    install and operate the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS), which
    was established by the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program
    (NEHRP) in 2000 (Pub. L. 106-503). The system includes a 63-station
    ANSS Backbone Network, which is capable of locating most felt
    earthquakes nationwide and provides data in near-real-time to USGS.
    Extending our capability in high-hazard areas of the country are 17
    regional seismic networks that provide detailed coverage and rapid
    response, local expertise in event analysis and interpretation, and
    data. Our ANSS partnerships--which include universities, state
    government agencies and NSF--greatly leverage USGS seismic monitoring
    capabilities. The key products of the system are rapid and accurate
    earthquake locations and magnitudes, delivered directly to users for
    emergency response.
        In several of the highest-risk urban areas in the United States,
    dense arrays of seismic sensors designed to record strong ground motion
    have been deployed under ANSS. These areas include the Los Angeles, San
    Francisco, Seattle, Anchorage and Salt Lake City metropolitan regions.
    When triggered by an earthquake, data from these sensors are
    automatically processed into detailed maps of ground shaking
    (``ShakeMaps''), which in turn feed loss estimation and emergency
    response. Also, because earthquake losses are closely tied to the
    vulnerability of buildings and other structures, USGS monitors
    earthquake shaking in structures in support of engineering research,
    performance-based design, and rapid post-earthquake damage evaluations.
    If placed in certain critical facilities, these sensors can contribute
    to critical post-earthquake response decisions.
        USGS has set a minimum performance goal of determining automated
    locations and seismic magnitudes within 4 minutes or less in the U.S.
    This is exceeded in many ANSS regions; for example, the magnitude 6.5
    San Simeon, California, earthquake of December, 2003, was automatically
    located within 30 seconds. Earthquake data, including locations,
    magnitudes, other characterizations and, where requested, the actual
    seismograms, are automatically transmitted from USGS and regional
    centers to federal response departments and agencies such as the NOAA
    tsunami warning centers, the Department of Homeland Security, including
    the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state governments,
    local emergency managers, utility operators, several private sector
    entities, and the public and media. USGS does not currently have 24
     7 earthquake analysis, but analysts are on-call in the event
    of a large earthquake worldwide. The Administration has recently
    proposed 24  7 operations as a key needed improvement in
    response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster.
        To monitor seismic events worldwide, the Global Seismographic
    Network (GSN) maintains a constellation of 128 globally distributed,
    modern seismic sensors. USGS operates about two-thirds of this network,
    and the University of California, San Diego, operates the other third
    with NSF support. NSF also funds the IRIS (Incorporated Research
    Institutions for Seismology) Consortium to handle data management and
    long-term archiving. Two GSN stations were the first to detect the
    December 26, 2004, Sumatra earthquake, and automated analysis of these
    data generated the ``alerts'' of strong recorded amplitudes sent to
    NOAA and USGS. At the present time, about 80 percent of GSN stations
    transmit real-time data that can be used for rapid earthquake analysis
    and tsunami warning. The Administration is requesting funding to extend
    the GSN's real-time data communications, as well as to improve station
    uptime through more frequent maintenance. These changes will result in
    improved tsunami warning in the United States and globally.
        Through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, the USGS,
    NOAA, FEMA, and five western States (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon
    and Washington) have worked to enhance the quality and quantity of
    seismic data provided to the NOAA tsunami warning centers and how this
    data is used at the state and local level. This program has funded USGS
    to upgrade seismic equipment for regional seismic networks in Northern
    California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii. The seismic data
    recorded by the USGS nationally and globally are relayed to the NOAA
    tsunami warning centers. USGS and NOAA also exchange earthquake
    locations and magnitude estimates, with USGS providing the final
    authoritative magnitudes of events. USGS is also working with emergency
    managers in the Pacific Northwest to support public warning systems in
    coastal communities there.
        Improving earthquake monitoring in the United States--with
    consequent improvements to public safety and the reduction of
    earthquake losses--can be achieved through the modernization and
    expansion of the ANSS, including expansion of seismic sensor networks
    nationwide, the upgrading of the associated data processing and
    analysis facilities, and the development of new earthquake products.
    Funding over the past three years has focused on installation of over
    500 new seismic sensors in high-risk urban areas. The FY05
    appropriation for ANSS is $5.12 million. The President's proposed
    increase in funding to USGS in response to the tsunami disaster would
    allow USGS to make critically needed improvements to performance in one
    key element of ANSS, providing 24  7 operations capacity and
    completing software and hardware upgrades to speed processing times.
    These improvements will enhance USGS support of NOAA's tsunami warning
    responsibility.
    The Threat From Tsunamis and Great Earthquakes in the Pacific
        The concentration of U.S. tsunami warning efforts in the Pacific
    reflects the greater frequency of destructive tsunami in that ocean.
    Approximately 85 percent of the world's tsunamis occur in the Pacific.
    This is due to many subduction zones ringing the Pacific basin--the
    source of submarine earthquakes of large enough magnitude (greater than
     cents7) to produce tsunami. While Hawaii's position in the middle of
    the Pacific makes it uniquely vulnerable to ocean-wide tsunami, this
    chain of volcanic islands also faces a hazard from locally generated
    tsunami due to local earthquakes or submarine landslides. In 1975, a
    magnitude 7.2 earthquake just offshore the island of Hawaii caused a
    tsunami that killed 2 with maximum runup height (elevation reached by
    tsunami as they move inland from the shoreline) of 47 feet.
        U.S. Insular Areas in the Pacific also face a threat both from
    ocean-wide tsunami as well as ones generated locally. The volcano
    Anatahan in the Northern Marianas, which began actively erupting on
    January 5, 2005, serves as a reminder that inhabitants and U.S.
    military interests in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
    and the Territory of Guam are threatened by nine islands with active
    volcanoes that have the potential to generate hazardous ash plumes as
    well as tsunamis through eruption-induced collapse. The risks from
    tsunamis to the inhabited islands are poorly understood, and tsunami
    inundation modeling is needed to assess the threat represented by such
    an event.
        Our knowledge of what may be the greatest risk to the United States
    does not come from our tsunami experiences of the last half century,
    but rather to the detective work of USGS and other scientists in the
    Pacific Northwest. In contrast to the San Andreas Fault, where the
    Pacific and North American plates are sliding past one another, a
    subduction zone known as Cascadia lies offshore further north, its size
    nearly identical to that of the rupture zone of the Sumatra earthquake
    (see Figure 2). On January 26, 1700, the Cascadia subduction zone broke
    in a great earthquake, probably from northernmost California to the
    middle of Vancouver Island. Along the Pacific coast in Oregon,
    Washington, California, and British Columbia, this huge event of the
    same general size of the Sumatra earthquake, caused coastal marshes to
    suddenly drop down several feet. This change in land elevation was
    recorded by the vegetation living in and around the coastal marshes.
    For example, along the Copalis River in Washington State, Western Red
    Cedar trees that have lifespans of over 1000 years were suddenly
    submerged in salt water. Over the next few months, those trees died. By
    comparing tree rings of the still standing dead trees with nearby trees
    that were not submerged, paleoseismologists established that the trees
    were killed during the winter of 1699-1700.
        Digging through river bank deposits along the Copalis and other
    rivers in Cascadia, paleoseismologists found a pervasive, black sand
    sheet left by the tsunami. Because the sands deposited by the tsunami
    are transported by the tsunami waves, paleoseismologists can combine
    the location of tsunami sands with the change in marsh elevation to get
    an approximate idea of the length of the rupture for the 1700
    earthquake. Tsunami sands have been found from Vancouver Island to
    Humboldt Bay in California.
        Once paleoseismologists found evidence of the 1700 event, they
    combed written records in Japan to see if evidence existed of an
    unknown tsunami wave. Several villages recorded damage in Japan on
    January 27, 1700, from a wave that people living along the coast could
    not associate with strong ground shaking. The coast of Japan had been
    hit, not unlike Sri Lanka and Somalia, by a distant tsunami, but this
    tsunami came from the west coast of North America. By modeling the
    travel time across the Pacific, paleoseismologists were able to
    establish the exact date of the last Cascadia subduction zone event.
        Based on estimates of the return interval, USGS scientists and
    others have estimated that there is a 10-14 percent chance of a repeat
    of the Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake and tsunami event in the next 50
    years. Since that initial discovery in the early 1980s, many of the
    elements of the seismic systems for the Pacific Northwest described
    above have been put in place along with improved building codes to
    address the higher expected ground shaking and increased public
    education through the efforts of state and local emergency managers.
        The December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami together cause us to
    focus on the similar threat from the Cascadia subduction zone that
    faces the Pacific Northwest as well as our long Alaskan coastline. Here
    I cannot emphasize enough the critical role played by our partners in
    state and local government, especially the state emergency managers.
    Largely through the efforts of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
    Program partnership, much has been accomplished. Seismic systems have
    been improved, allowing NOAA's West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning
    Center to issue warnings within minutes of a significant offshore
    earthquake. Inundation maps, graphic representations of estimates of
    how far inland future tsunami waves are likely to reach, are available
    for most major communities in northern California, Oregon, and
    Washington. Working with FEMA, public education has been stressed, and
    emergency managers have begun installing all-hazard warning systems.
    USGS is co-funding a $540,000 pilot project in Seaside, Oregon with
    FEMA and NOAA to develop risk identification products that will help
    communities understand their actual level of risk from tsunami in a way
    that could be conveyed on existing flood maps. The goal of the project
    is to develop techniques that can be used to determine the probability
    and magnitude of tsunami in other communities along the west coast of
    the United States.
    Tsunami Threats in the Atlantic
        With respect to tsunami hazard risk to the U.S. East coast, it
    should be noted that subduction zones are scarce in the Atlantic Ocean.
    But the Atlantic Ocean is not immune to tsunami. A tsunami following
    the great 1755 Lisbon earthquake, generated by collision of the African
    and Eurasian tectonic plates, devastated coasts of Portugal and
    Morocco, reached the British Isles, and crested as much as 20 feet high
    in the Caribbean.
        In 1929, the magnitude 7.2 Grand Banks earthquake triggered a
    submarine landslide and tsunami that struck Newfoundland's sparsely
    settled coast, where it killed 27 people with waves as high as 20 feet.
    An event like this, involving a submarine landslide, may be the most
    likely scenario for the Atlantic coast. Scars of past large submarine
    landslides abound on the continental slope off the U.S. Atlantic coast.
    As in the 1929 Grand Banks event, some of the slides probably resulted
    from large earthquakes. If earthquakes are the primary initiator of the
    observed landslide features, the hazard to the Atlantic coast is
    limited as large earthquakes rarely occur in the vicinity of the U.S.
    and Canada Atlantic coast--perhaps once a century, on average (Boston
    area, 1755; Charleston, 1866; Newfoundland, 1929). Additionally, this
    type of tsunami would affect a much smaller geographical area than one
    generated by a subduction zone, and its flooding effect and inundation
    distance would be limited. Much work is needed, however, to more fully
    understand the triggering of submarine landslides and the extent of
    that threat in the Atlantic.
        Another tsunami scenario for the Atlantic coast that has been
    widely publicized is a landslide involving collapse of part of the
    Cumbre Vieja volcano in the Canary Islands into the sea. While this
    collapse would be dramatic and might indeed induce a transatlantic
    tsunami, such a collapse may occur only once every hundred thousand
    years. Furthermore, unlike the West Coast with the abundant record of
    past ocean-wide tsunami deposits, no such regionally extensive deposits
    have been found to date along the Atlantic coast.
    Tsunami Threats in the Caribbean
        The Caribbean is subject to a broad range of geologic processes
    that have the potential to generate tsunami. Indeed, the Caribbean
    tectonic plate has almost all of the tsunami-generating sources within
    a small geographical area. Subduction zone earthquakes of the type that
    generated the Indian Ocean tsunami are found along the Lesser Antilles
    and the Hispaniola and Puerto Rico trenches. Other moderately large
    earthquakes due to more local tectonic activity take place probably
    once a century, such as in Mona Passage (1918 tsunami) and in the
    Virgin Islands basin (1867 tsunami). Moderate earthquakes occur that
    may trigger undersea landslides and thus generate tsunami. An active
    underwater volcano (Kick'em Jenny near Grenada) where sea floor maps
    show previous episodes of flank collapse also poses a tsunami hazard.
    Above-water volcanic activity occurs, wherein the Lesser Antilles
    periodically generate landslides that enter the sea to cause tsunami.
    And finally, the possibility exists of tele-tsunami from the African-
    Eurasian plate boundary, such as the great Lisbon earthquake of 1755
    described above.
        In 1867, an 18-foot high tsunami wave entered St. Thomas' Charlotte
    Amalie at the same time that a 27-foot wave entered St. Croix's
    Christiansted Harbor. Were that to occur again today, the 10-fold
    increase in population density, the cruise ships, petroleum carriers,
    harbor infrastructure, hotels and beach goers, nearby power plants,
    petrochemical complexes, marinas, condominiums, and schools, would all
    be at risk.
        On October 11, 1918, the island of Puerto Rico was struck by a
    magnitude 7.5 earthquake, centered approximately 15 kilometers off the
    island's northwestern coast, in the Mona Passage. In addition to
    causing widespread destruction across Puerto Rico, the quake generated
    a medium sized tsunami that produced runup as high as 18 feet along the
    western coast of the island and killed 40 people, in addition to the 76
    people killed by the earthquake. More than 1,600 people were reportedly
    killed along the northern coast of the Dominican Republic in 1946 by a
    tsunami triggered by a magnitude 8.1 earthquake.
        In contrast to the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico has low tsunami
    risk. The region is seismically quiet and protected from tsunami
    generated in either the Atlantic or the Caribbean by Florida, Cuba, and
    broad continental shelves. Although there have been hurricane-generated
    subsea landslides as recently as this fall, there is no evidence that
    they have generated significant tsunami.
    Lessons Learned: What the United States Can Do to Better Prepare Itself
            and the World
        Natural hazard events such as the one that struck Sumatra and the
    countries around the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, are
    geologically inevitable, but their consequences are not. The tsunami is
    a potent reminder that while the nations surrounding the Pacific Ocean
    face the highest tsunami hazard, countries around other ocean basins
    lacking basic tsunami warning systems and mitigation strategies face
    considerable risk. Reducing that risk requires a broad, comprehensive
    system including rapid global earthquake and tsunami detection systems,
    transmission of warnings in standardized formats to emergency officials
    who already know which coastal areas are vulnerable through inundation
    mapping and tsunami hazard assessment, and broadcast capabilities to
    reach a public already educated in the dangers and how to respond. For
    tsunami crossing an ocean basin, an adequate system of earthquake
    sensors, Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoys,
    and tide gauges should allow for timely warnings if the rest of the
    system is in place. For tsunami generated near the coastline, time is
    considerably more critical. For tsunami warnings to be effective, they
    must be generated and transmitted to the affected coastline within a
    few minutes of detection, local emergency responders must be prepared,
    the population must be informed, and the entire system must be executed
    without delay.
        The Sumatra earthquake and its devastating effects will encourage
    us to continue forward on the comprehensive NEHRP approach to
    earthquake loss reduction. USGS is committed to do so in partnership
    with FEMA, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and NSF
    to translate research into results through such initiatives as ANSS,
    the George E. Brown, Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation,
    the plan to accelerate the use of new earthquake risk mitigation
    technologies, and development of improved seismic provisions in
    building codes.
        As part of the President's plan to improve tsunami detection and
    warning systems, the USGS will:

       Implement 24  7 operations at the National
            Earthquake Information Center and upgrade hardware and software
            systems in order to improve the timeliness of alerts for global
            earthquakes. As part of the upgrade, USGS will fully develop
            what is now a prototype system to estimate the number of people
            affected by strong ground shaking after an earthquake using our
            ShakeMap model and databases of global population. Known as
            Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER),
            this system can provide aid agencies and others with a quick
            estimate of how significant the casualties might be well in
            advance of reports from affected areas where communications may
            be down.

       Support research to develop more rapid methods for
            characterizing earthquakes and discriminating likely
            tsunamigenic sources.

       Improve the detection response time of the Global
            Seismographic Network by making data from all stations
            available in real time via satellite telemetry and improving
            station up-time through increased maintenance schedules.
            Improved coverage in the Caribbean region will be achieved
            through the addition of stations and upgrades of existing
            stations through international partnerships and cooperation.

       Further the use of software developed by the California
            Integrated Seismic Network (a USGS, university and state
            partnership) to speed USGS-generated earthquake information
            directly to local emergency managers with a dual use capability
            to also provide NOAA tsunami warnings.

       Enhance existing USGS geologic and elevation mapping for
            coastal areas in the Caribbean. Such mapping is critical to
            development of improved tsunami hazards assessments for Puerto
            Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

        The USGS will also continue its ongoing efforts to improve tsunami
    hazard assessment and warnings through geologic investigations into the
    history of and potential for tsunami occurrence; coastal and marine
    mapping; modeling tsunami generation, source characterization, and
    propagation; and development of assessment methods and products such as
    inundation maps with NOAA, FEMA, and other partners. USGS will also
    continue strong partnerships with state tsunami and earthquake hazard
    mitigation groups and contribute to public awareness efforts. An
    example of the latter is the 2001 publication, USGS Circular 1187,
    Surviving a Tsunami: Lessons Learned from Chile, Hawaii and Japan,
    which was prepared in cooperation with the Universidad Austral de
    Chile, University of Tokyo, University of Washington, Geological Survey
    of Japan, and the Pacific Tsunami Museum. Continuing investigations of
    the Indian Ocean tsunami provide a critical opportunity to expand our
    knowledge of tsunami generation and impacts and to evaluate the
    research and operational requirements for effective hazard planning,
    warning, and response systems.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
    Committee and would be happy to answer any questions now or for the
    record.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        We have just created a new Subcommittee on Disaster
    Prevention and Prediction. We hope that that Subcommittee will
    keep your two agencies pretty busy, because we think we have to
    find some way to make this a more robust system.
        Let me ask you, Dr. Marburger, what's the timeline for the
    Administration's improved Tsunami Detection and Warning System?
    Can you tell us the timeline, how soon are you going to move
    into it? As I understand it, we're going to finish the one
    we've already got going, but there's a tremendous expansion of
    it. How long is it going to take us to do that?
        Dr. Marburger. That's correct. The agencies indicate to us
    that they ought to be able to have substantial improvement of
    the existing system within 2 years, at the end of 2 years, if
    I'm not mistaken. Fortunately, all the technology is available.
    The systems are up and running, and it's improvements and--
    improved maintenance and additional deployment of things like
    these new buoys that's required. So it should be doable in a
    relatively short period of time. Mid-2007 are the dates that
    I've heard. They can be confirmed by others.
        The Chairman. As I understand it, General Kelly, several of
    these buoys are not working right now. The DART is on the
    surface of the ocean. They're connected to a detector at the
    bottom. Tell us what is leading to the malfunction of these
    warning devices now?
        General Kelly. Many things.
        The Chairman. I can't hear you, I'm sorry.
        General Kelly. Many things. And you are correct, there are
    six DART buoys sited in the water today. Three of the six are
    not operational. One has not been operational since October of
    2003. There are two complicating factors. One is the weather,
    the weather in the Aleutians, there's a narrow window when we
    can get boats in there, or ships in there, to repair them, and
    then, two, a number of components have failed, different
    components have failed at different times. And so, part of our
    plan is, in fact, to put a better buoy in place of the existing
    ones, and then expand the network.
        The Chairman. Could you put that chart up again, showing
    where these new buoys are going to be----
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman.--and where the existing ones are? As I
    understand it, half of the buoys we've detected--we've deployed
    right now are not functioning?
        General Kelly. That is correct.
        The Chairman. Which ones?
        General Kelly. (Indicating.) The red ones.
        The Chairman. Tell us, for the record.
        General Kelly. Three along the Aleutians.
        The Chairman. Three along the Aleutian chain.
        General Kelly. Yes. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. And what's the plan for replacing those?
        General Kelly. Within the last--within the last several
    weeks, we--or last month--we attempted to repair one, got it in
    the water, and then a component malfunctioned. And we are ready
    now, as soon as we get a break in the weather--we have forward-
    deployed the parts into Alaska--as soon as we get a break in
    the weather--and we need about 7 days of good weather--we'll
    get a ship out there and replace the buoys.
        The Chairman. Whose job is it to maintain and assure that
    they are functioning?
        General Kelly. NOAA's.
        The Chairman. Which part of NOAA?
        General Kelly. The National Weather Service.
        The Chairman. Do they have the equipment to do that?
        General Kelly. Well, they certainly don't own the ships to
    do it, and they use the NOAA Corps to do that, or we contract
    out. But they have--we have a National Data Buoy Center in Bay
    St. Louis, which has the capability----
        The Chairman. Where do you have it?
        General Kelly. Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. And----
        The Chairman. The center's in Mississippi, and all the
    buoys are in the Pacific?
        General Kelly. Well, no, sir, we have other kinds of buoys
    along the Gulf Coast and along the United--and along the----
        The Chairman. We're talking about tsunami warning now.
        General Kelly. Well, yes, sir, but we're also talking about
    buoy technology. And they have engineers and they have
    scientists, and they work closely with the Pacific Marine
    Environmental Lab. So our operational and maintenance repair
    facility is in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.
        The Chairman. How long have they been down, those three?
        General Kelly. One has been down since October 2003, one
    was down in--one went down in December 2004, and another went
    down in August 2004.
        The Chairman. Is there a specific program looking at the
    reliability of these buoys we're going to deploy?
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Who's in charge of that?
        General Kelly. We're working jointly with the Pacific
    Marine Environmental Lab and our experts at the National Data
    Buoy Center.
        The Chairman. All right. That worries me a great deal. If
    we're going to spend money expanding the system we're going to
    put out there--the buoys have been failing at this rate, it,
    sort of, looks to me like the taxpayer may be just financing a
    facade.
        General Kelly. It is not our intent to put a one-for-one
    replacement of the buoys that are out there as we expand this
    network. We need to put out buoys that are more robust and
    survive longer. And, in fact, given the challenges that we've
    had in--as I mentioned earlier, including--included in the plan
    will be three buoys that I will call ``in-water backups,'' so,
    in case one does malfunction, we will still have something
    providing us data.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Groat, the problem of these earthquakes and prediction
    and tying them into this system, can you tell us, we have these
    buoys deployed, but you're not relying on those buoys for your
    predictions and detection of earthquakes, are you?
        Dr. Groat. No, sir. We rely on the Global Seismic Network,
    local networks that are subsidiary to it, to understand the
    earthquakes and the potential for generating a tsunami. Many
    earthquakes are very large, but don't generate tsunamis, even
    those that occur in the ocean. The key is getting that
    earthquake interpretation to NOAA in a timely fashion so that
    if it's likely to have generated a tsunami, then they can be
    prepared to use that information.
        The Chairman. Is there a way to tie together what you've
    got and the other systems here to make a prediction telling us
    if an earthquake occurs at any particular place, there will or
    not be a tsunami? We seem to only get tsunamis as a reaction to
    the earthquakes, mainly in the Pacific, right?
        Dr. Groat. Correct.
        The Chairman. So are we tied together--can we say, if
    there's an earthquake at such-and-such a place on the Aleutian
    chain, there probably would be a tsunami that would go any
    particular direction?
        Dr. Groat. With the upgrades that we've talked about in our
    seismic monitoring system and the data processing, we will do a
    better job of predicting whether the earthquake was of a type
    that would generate a tsunami. There are many large
    displacements that go this way, and they don't generate
    anything.
        The Chairman. OK. But if you can predict there's going to
    be a tsunami, can you predict where it's going to go?
        Dr. Groat. Well, they go--it's, sort of, like dropping a
    rock in a pond, the waves go in all directions. So once we know
    where it is, then we can watch where the waves will go. And we
    can predict that pretty well.
        The Chairman. Thank you. That's what I was looking for. I
    watched the Discovery channel the other night. You all did a
    very good job on that, and I did not know that until then, that
    it is like dropping a stone in a pond. There will be tsunamis
    everywhere if it's located, say, around Senator Inouye's
    country, it's possible it could affect the whole Pacific,
    right?
        Dr. Groat. Very much so.
        The Chairman. Senator Inouye?
        Senator Inouye. Like most of my colleagues, I'm concerned
    about the six DART buoys. Three have been out of commission for
    about 15 months. And if it weren't for the tragedy of biblical
    proportions, the likelihood is that this Congress would not
    have been notified. Am I correct?
        General Kelly. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inouye. We would not have known that three were out
    of commission.
        General Kelly. You're correct. But I would point out that
    the DART buoys, while important, are not the only components in
    the network.
        Senator Inouye. I realize that there are many circumstances
    that would cause problems, such as weather and the budget. Why
    was it impossible for NOAA to notify the Congress that three of
    the six were out of business?
        General Kelly. Senator, within NOAA, there are a number of
    observing systems out there. And, as a matter of practice, we
    routinely don't notify the Congress when a given sensor, or a
    series of sensors, goes out.
        Senator Inouye. You don't know whether the system is
    working or not?
        General Kelly. Well, no. We know, but we don't routinely
    notify the Congress. We sometimes have problems with
    satellites, with a given sensor on a satellite, and, at least
    in my experience, we have not routinely provided an update to
    the Congress of a problem with a satellite sensor. We try to
    work through it, and, in most cases, get it resolved.
        The Chairman. Would the Senator yield just there?
        Senator Inouye. Sure.
        The Chairman. Who do you notify when a buoy goes down?
        General Kelly. When a buoy goes down, the head of the
    National Weather Service gets notified, the two Tsunami Warning
    Center directors get notified, and it is the responsibility of
    the head of the National Weather Service to get those buoys
    repaired.
        The Chairman. So they don't tell your Governor, or mine.
        Senator Inouye. These buoys are obviously very important.
    They not only prevent the loss of lives, they prevent the
    unnecessary expenditure of funds. I'm just thinking to myself,
    if that disaster that we experienced in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
    had occurred in Washington or Oregon or Alaska, and we weren't
    warned because the three buoys were not operational, the
    atmosphere in this room would be, I think, much more heated.
        General Kelly. I agree with you, Senator Inouye, but I
    believe that, while the three buoys are important, we still
    have the capability to warn. And even if that earthquake had
    occurred somewhere in the Pacific, warnings would have gone
    out. Because even with the three buoys being down, the Pacific
    Tsunami Warning Center did issue a--what we call an information
    advisory that a tsunami had, in fact, been generated. So, while
    the three are down, and that's regrettable, and we're working
    to get them repaired, we are not totally defenseless because
    those three are down. And I am not trying to condone the fact
    that they are down, or they've been down as long as they have,
    but I think it is important that we don't leave here thinking
    that we are totally defenseless in providing information and
    warnings. And you are correct that one of the great benefits of
    those DART buoys are, it gives confirmation as to the
    characterization and the magnitude of the tsunami, and, in
    fact, helps reduce the number of what we call false alarms, and
    then saves the local governments money, in terms of responding.
    And, frankly, most importantly, a whole string of false-alarm
    tsunami warnings will cause the citizens not to pay attention
    to it, and that is a critical thing we need to work against.
        Senator Inouye. By indicating your position, you're not
    suggesting we don't need any more DART buoys.
        General Kelly. No, sir, I am not indicating we don't need
    any more DART buoys. They will improve the system. I am trying
    to get the message across that we are not totally defenseless
    with the existing systems, and the citizens of Hawaii and the
    citizens of Alaska and the West Coast of the United States
    ought not to get unduly alarmed.
        Senator Inouye. I have just one more question, to any one
    of you. Within 24 hours after the disaster in Southeast Asia,
    major stations, such as CNN and all of the networks began
    criticizing, and suggesting that they should have been notified
    so that they could have used their offices and facilities to
    warn the people. Is that a valid criticism? Could that have
    been done?
        Dr. Marburger. Well, it certainly could have been done. I
    do not know what the protocol is for notifications, but the
    National Weather Service is notified instantly, and usually
    their information is shared immediately with the media.
        General Kelly. Senator Inouye, it is my belief that many of
    those news organizations did, in fact, get the tsunami bulletin
    that was sent out from the Hagemayer Warning Center in Hawaii.
    I think what they were asking for was some type of protocol
    being established wherein the watch officer might make a
    telephone call to them or somehow take an explicit step to get
    the information to them.
        Senator Inouye. Is that a valid request?
        General Kelly. I think we have to do some analysis of it
    and what we are talking about. Now, let's take the National
    Hurricane Center. When hurricanes are coming, there is a large
    press presence in the Hurricane Center. Fortunately, with
    hurricanes, we have a bit more time to start alerting the
    public. With tsunamis--and while this earthquake, as Dr. Groat
    said, was one of the more massive in the century, I mean, we
    had time to watch the tsunami perpetuate across the Pacific.
    Frequently, in Alaska and Hawaii you only have minutes, and I'm
    just not sure, given one watch officer trying to issue
    bulletins, clarify the bulletins, that there's sufficient time
    for him to be talking to the press. There may be other
    arrangements that can be made with the press for them to get
    the information differently.
        The Chairman. There was another criticism, in that we did
    notify the countries involved, but the receiving facility was
    not operational. Is that a valid one?
        General Kelly. When you're talking about the ``receiving,''
    you're talking about the receiving system in the in-country?
        Senator Inouye. Yes.
        General Kelly. As I said in my testimony, we have an
    agreement with 26 countries in the Pacific Rim to provide
    information to them, and then they have the responsibility of
    developing their local warnings and distributing them to their
    country. No such system exists in the Pacific Ocean, so I--I'm
    sorry, in the Indian Ocean--and so, that is--there's some truth
    in that, that countries were not prepared to deal with it.
        As I said in my testimony, tsunami preparedness has a
    number of variables in it. To my mind, the most important one
    is, when you get the warning, have you got a way, internally,
    to get it out to your citizens, and have you educated them and
    worked with them so that they know what to do? Thanks to both
    of your help with the Tsunami Mitigation Program legislation in
    1996, we've been able to do a fair amount of that work on the
    West Coast and in Hawaii.
        Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Gentlemen, if necessary, Senator Inouye and I
    will send you a letter, to each of your agencies, for this
    request. We would ask that you report back to us, in 2 weeks,
    what it would take to establish a system to notify the entities
    who have been mentioned--specifically, 911, the Weather
    Channel, the emergency disaster systems that exist in the 50
    states.
        The Chairman. We're concerned primarily with this country
    because of our Committee's jurisdiction. I'm sure others will
    be asking the question about the international aspects of the
    system to come. But, right now, we thought we had a system, and
    we found, when this occurred, that it was--half of it was
    dormant, was not working. And we think we ought to have a
    system that not only--we're notified if something's gone wrong,
    but we also have adequate apparatus to detect the problem and
    get at it now.
        And, beyond that, though, I think that the news media have
    a legitimate cause to object. There's no reason why we can't
    have an interconnection with 911 or with the Weather Channel or
    with the disaster system or with FEMA. That can--we also handle
    communications, gentlemen, and that can be done automatically.
    Once you press the button, it can be very ubiquitous and go
    throughout the country, if it's set up right.
        So we'd like to know, What will it take to do that? And if
    you need money, the appropriations bills are coming up, we'll
    see to it you'll get it.
        General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I may have misunderstood your
    question. I thought, when you were talking about the press, you
    were talking about internationally. We work--we, in NOAA, work
    very, very closely with the Weather Channel. We work very, very
    closely with FEMA. We will provide the information you
    requested. I will be surprised, in fact, if those organizations
    you talked about did not have information about this tsunami.
    The fact was, though, that the tsunami was not going to impact
    the United States, and, therefore, some of their interest may
    not have been as great on it. But internationally--dealing with
    the international press, I'm not sure what the arrangements
    are.
        The Chairman. Well, of course, we're talking here about
    when it might be coming our way, and those buoys are supposed
    to tell us that.
        General Kelly. Well, that's what I'm telling you. I believe
    the system is in place if this one would have affected the
    United States.
        The Chairman. Yeah. I'm sorry to take your time.
        Senator Nelson?

                 STATEMENT OF HON. E. BENJAMIN NELSON,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    gentlemen, for helping us understand what is involved in
    detecting and--tsunamis and communicating the information.
        As it relates to a globalization for a warning system so
    that it's not only--we're not only capable of communicating the
    information to affected locations, what would be involved in
    making sure that the receiving end of the information is
    capable of, not only receiving, but acting on this information?
    If the information goes out, and there's no reaction to it,
    obviously, then, it's not terribly helpful. We will have
    committed our--we will have fulfilled our responsibility, but
    we're certainly not going to get the result we're looking for.
    And if $350 million of aid is going from the United States,
    given the fact that there's also private aid that will go, what
    would be involved in making sure that we have receivers at the
    other end so that there could be action taken on it? And, also,
    what barriers might we encounter? And some idea of the cost. I
    suspect that if we're looking at this in terms of dollars and
    cents, there may be a way to quantify it. There is no way to
    quantify or qualify the untold misery and loss of life and the
    disruption to entire areas around the world.
        Dr. Marburger?
        Dr. Marburger. Yes, let me take a crack at that.
        First, the most important part of the receiving nation's
    capability must be communications and education systems,
    country by country, in the affected countries. And it is
    necessary for some of those countries in the Indian Ocean
    periphery to build from scratch. There's a great deal of
    unevenness in the state of development in those countries, as
    you well know. The most capable countries are already on their
    way toward building systems like ours in their countries.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Were they in the process of doing that
    before this, or is this subsequent to the event?
        Dr. Marburger. I believe that some of those countries were,
    countries like India and Australia and Indonesia, Thailand all
    have important capabilities. And as a result of the meeting
    that I attended last weekend in Thailand, it became clear to me
    that those countries are likely to be the centers. Just as the
    U.S. and Japan and some other countries around the Pacific have
    strong systems, I believe those systems will begin to emerge in
    the Asian nations around the Indian Ocean.
        The U.S. will participate in advising and helping those
    nations to develop strong programs, which include more than
    just the sensing systems. We have a great deal of experience.
    We work closely with the UNESCO IOC, and they are on the scene
    and helping to advise those countries, as well. I believe that
    aid will be required, and that aid will be delivered through
    the normal channels, but, at this time, I can't make an
    estimate of how much might be necessary.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Could somebody else help us? Yes?
        Dr. Bement. I think education and preparation is vitally
    important, especially in being able to do risk and
    vulnerability assessment. It's critically important that there
    be lifelines that are robust and can function under this type
    of a disaster. And I think our field surveys will inform that
    process.
        We're discovering that there are many bridges that were not
    pinned to their support structures, that were washed away. That
    affected, not only food and water supply, but also medical
    evacuation. There are many structures on the coastal regions
    that were not built to earthquake codes. We're still sorting
    out what was earthquake-related and what was tsunami-related.
    Unfortunately, they both reinforced one another.
        But detection is one thing. Casting that detection into a
    suitable warning system based on risk and vulnerability
    assessment that's done before-the-fact, so you can at least
    have an understanding of how much damage can be done and what
    prior preparation would help mitigate the event, I think, is
    critical----
        Senator Ben Nelson. So----
        Dr. Bement.--in this particular instance.
        Senator Ben Nelson.--our ability to detect, without the
    capability to followup, is inadequate in order for these
    countries to be able to respond, even though we may. And I
    suspect that those three buoys will be corrected rather quickly
    in the Alaskan area. I sense the Chairman's----
        Dr. Bement. I think Dr. Marburger, in his----
        Senator Ben Nelson.--interest in doing that, yes.
        Dr. Bement.--Dr. Marburger, in his written testimony, I
    think spelled out all the elements that are needed for a robust
    system, and it involves, not only detection and warning, it
    requires a good response plan, a good recovery plan, and it
    also requires an infrastructure that has lifelines that will
    survive the event.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Now----
        Dr. Groat. Senator, could I--oh, excuse me.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Sure. Yes, Dr. Groat?
        Dr. Groat. Just one particularly challenging aspect of
    this, not only internationally, but domestically, that we all
    have to worry about is the fact that if the rock drops in the
    pond, and the waves come from some great distance, we have
    plenty of time--literally hours, in some cases. And if there is
    a structure in place to get warnings to citizens--news media,
    weather--whatever it happens to be--were in decent shape,
    particularly in the United States. The challenge comes if this
    subduction-zone-caused earthquake-generated tsunami is just a
    few miles off the coast, as it was in the case of Sumatra,
    where we have very little time, then the challenge of getting
    that information, that it is likely to have generated a
    tsunami, into the hands of the response agencies, even when
    they're sophisticated, as they generally are in the United
    States, and then eliciting the proper response from the
    citizens, is a super challenge for all of us. And that's where
    these communication links and education links and programs,
    such as the program that NOAA supports, are so important, and
    the engagement of local governments and regional governments
    and all of the preparedness agencies is so critical.
        So literally you have little time, other than to say
    there's a likely tsunami, the tide gauges and others indicate
    that it may be coming is to--the run-for-your-life business has
    to be communicated very quickly and very effectively. And
    that's a challenge even in our country, where we could probably
    do it pretty well, but in the countries that we were just
    talking about, it's a whole other order of magnitude to do
    that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is it possible for us to improve from
    ``pretty well'' to ``very well''?
        Dr. Groat. I think we can. I think the Subcommittee you
    described as having created is going to create a much broader
    awareness of the array of natural hazards that we have.
    Tsunamis are certainly one, but earthquakes, landslides,
    hurricanes, all of those things that affect populations very
    quickly, need to be paid attention to, not only from how-they-
    occur, when-they-occur warnings systems, but creating that
    education process that puts our populations-at-risk at less
    risk. And I think this Subcommittee can go a long way in
    helping that happen.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you for your comments.
        If the information we're getting from some people about
    global climate change is correct, we may be in for a lot more
    of these than we anticipate right now, so I think it's
    essential that we take this action. That's why we created that
    Subcommittee.
        Senator Smith?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

        Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if I can
    ask that my longer opening statement be included in the record.
        The Chairman. Sure. It will be.
        Senator Smith. Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for
    considering our implications of S. 50, which is the subject of
    this hearing.
        As a Senator from a coastal state, I'm very mindful that 85
    percent of tsunamis occur in the Pacific. I'm also mindful that
    Oregon is right in the middle of a Cascadia Subduction Zone.
    Apparently, according to your written testimony, Dr. Groat,
    about every few hundred years there's a major shift in this
    zone. And the last time it shifted was in 1700, and that that
    produced a tsunami on the Oregon coast the equivalent of what
    occurred in Southeast Asia. And I understand you're saying that
    there is a 10 to 15 percent chance that that will occur in the
    next 50 years.
        Dr. Groat. That's correct.
        Senator Smith. I guess, on the basis of that, that we're at
    the end of that likely millennial period where we could suffer
    another. I'm wondering if S. 50, and the changes that are
    proposed in that bill, are sufficient to give Oregonians,
    Washingtonians, Californians, and Alaskans the warning time
    that they would need to avoid the kind of devastation we saw in
    Southeast Asia.
        I say that, because I understand that this plate is close
    enough to the coast of Oregon that it would only give coastal
    residents somewhere between 10 to 30 minutes to retreat. Are
    the systems in place to save their lives?
        Dr. Groat. Let me first comment, Senator, from the role
    that the USGS plays in this--and that is that if the upgrades
    that we're talking about in the seismic systems, and the
    ability to interpret the information that would occur from an
    earthquake in the zone you just described, were processed and
    communicated in the way--I think, in a technical sense, the
    bill does recognize the role that we would play in providing
    that information to the appropriate places and to the
    appropriate agencies. I would have to rely on others to comment
    as to whether--once that got communicated, whether there was a
    system in place that would, in fact, warn Oregonians quickly
    enough to respond in the way that I just described.
        Senator Smith. I'm mindful, having come from my state
    legislature, that we have done a great deal of work on this
    issue, but I wonder if you're aware, Are other states on the
    Pacific Coast--are they making sufficient preparations for
    warning systems? I mean----
        General Kelly. Senator, let me address it from the National
    Weather Service point of view. Within the National Weather
    Service, we have a program called TsunamiReady. It is not a
    very complicated program. It is--you ask the coastal community
    to have some point where the warning information could come.
    You ask that that be manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. You
    ask that they have developed a communications system to get
    that warning out to the citizens in that community, and that
    they have thought through where we would evacuate the citizens
    to in the event that warning came, and they have some scheme or
    practice schedule to practice evacuations.
        And if they have that, we, in the Weather Service,
    designate them as TsunamiReady. They get a number of big
    placards that go on the state highways and the roadways coming
    in. There's little notes at the bottom of them which says
    things like, ``If you feel the ground shake, get away from the
    waterfront.'' That's applicable in your State of Oregon. We
    work in the state of Washington. It's in the State of Hawaii.
    It's in the state of Alaska. The local forecast offices up and
    down the West Coast work with the local emergency managers.
        I would love to tell you that 99 percent of the local
    communities are enrolled in that TsunamiReady program, but I
    would be misleading you. I think up and down the West Coast
    there may be a combination of 15 cities, slash, counties that
    are in the program.
        So what we need to do is redouble our efforts to start
    working with the local areas, because, in the final analysis,
    the local communities have to be where the action will take to
    get the citizens ready to move out of the way of this event.
        Senator Smith. Are you gentlemen, in your positions, are
    you familiar with the Hinsdale Wave Research Center at Oregon
    State University?
        Dr. Bement. Well, the National Science Foundation supports
    that center, so we're very familiar with it.
        Senator Smith. I had the privilege of touring that with Dr.
    Cox, who will be on the next panel. I hope you make good use of
    it. It is a spectacular facility that certainly taught me a lot
    about tsunamis, long before this one occurred in Southeast
    Asia. And it's a remarkable asset that we have to spread
    information about what we're facing if you live on the coast.
        And I'm wondering about inundation mapping. Can that help
    ensure that coastal residents immediately know when to go and
    what to do? How----
        Dr. Bement. I think that's part of the prevention and
    education. Some of our reconnaissance teams now are trying to
    infer wave heights based on water lines and inundation surveys
    that they're currently doing, because one of the weak points in
    our predictive models are the runup part of the event, where it
    hits the shore. And enclosed bays, estuaries, and the beach
    gradient can have a big effect on how large that wave will be
    when it hits. And those are areas where we need to refine our
    current models.
        Senator Smith. Not only refining the models, but my
    question is, because of what happened in Asia, Do you have
    sufficient funding to complete these inundation mappings?
    Because I think that that--if not, we need to get you the
    money, because people need to know where they can go, in their
    geography, to avoid the wave.
        Dr. Bement. Well, we do need to respond to that in our
    future-year budgets. Currently, we're planning workshops this
    spring and summer to assimilate and understand the data coming
    back from the survey teams. And based on those reports, we will
    be developing longer-range research activities, and we'll
    probably have to incorporate that in our budget for next year.
        Senator Smith. I would strongly urge you to do that.
    Senator Stevens has a lot of sway on the Appropriations
    Committee. And I just think if you need funding for inundation
    mapping----
        Dr. Bement. Well, I did shift some funding for next fiscal-
    year request to help address some of that, but it may not be
    adequate.
        Senator Smith. Anything that it needs--you need to make it
    adequate, on behalf of the people of Oregon, please do it.
        Dr. Bement. Thank you.
        Senator Smith. Thanks.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon H. Smith, U.S. Senator from Oregon
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing and for
    including on today's witness list Dr. Daniel Cox from the O.H. Hinsdale
    Wave Research Center at Oregon State University (OSU). I had the
    opportunity to tour OSU's research facilities with Dr. Cox last year. I
    look forward to hearing from him as well as the other panelists. I want
    to thank each of today's witnesses for being here.
        As a Senator from a coastal state, I have a very obvious interest
    in today's proceedings. Eighty-five percent of tsunamis occur in the
    Pacific Ocean. While in the United States we have been fortunate not to
    have experienced destruction on the scale currently seen in southeast
    Asia, the recent tragedy reminds how important it is that our
    communities are prepared in the event that a major tsunami strikes our
    coast.
        Running along the Pacific Northwest--stretching from northern
    California to British Columbia--lies the Cascadia Subduction Zone.
    Research has shown that the Cascadia Subduction Zone has unleashed
    massive earthquakes off the coast of the Pacific Northwest every few
    hundred years. The last such quake occurred in January 1700. This event
    was similar in magnitude to the Sumatra earthquake and sent huge tidal
    waves barreling into the shores of the Pacific Northwest.
        In testimony prepared for today, Dr. Groat writes that ``there is a
    10-14 percent chance of a repeat of the Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake
    and tsunami event in the next 50 years.'' Scientists estimate that
    given the proximity of the subduction zone to the coast--approximately
    70 miles off shore--it would take a tsunami roughly 10 to 30 minutes
    from the time the fault line ruptured to strike the Oregon coast.
        Warning and detection systems are important, but alone they are not
    enough to protect our coastal communities. Our coastal residents must
    know where to go and what to do when the ground begins to shake. To
    protect the safety of our coastal residents, we must continue to work
    with our state and local partners to accelerate tsunami inundation zone
    mapping and ensure contingency plans are in place for rapid evacuation
    of vulnerable low-lying communities.
        I was pleased to join Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and a number
    of my other Senate colleagues last week in introducing the Tsunami
    Preparedness Act of 2005. By improving tsunami detection and warning
    systems, as well as inundation mapping and community outreach and
    education, I am hopeful that this legislation will go along way toward
    helping our coast be better prepared should a tsunami strike.
    Thankfully, these events are rare and the cost of preparing for them is
    miniscule compared to the loss of life and property that could result
    if we are caught ill-equipped.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this hearing and for
    the opportunity to speak. I look forward to learning more from today's
    panelists. I also ask unanimous consent that the testimony of the
    Oregon Coastal Zone Management Association be entered into the
    Committee record.

        The Chairman. Senator DeMint?

                     STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMint,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

        Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm from South Carolina, so I'm on the Atlantic side, and I
    think what you're suggesting, we're not at nearly as much risk,
    is that what I understand from the panel? Although there may be
    some applications that we need on the East Coast.
        Just a quick question, I guess, to anyone on the panel, in
    the--is, I appreciate the information that you've shared. I
    certainly don't pretend to be anywhere near an expert on what
    you're talking about after a few minutes, but, based on what
    you've told me, I have a--somewhat of a concern that we might
    be quickly expanding antiquated technology in order to cover
    our bases as quickly as we can. The failure rate of these buoys
    is apparently a concern to everyone who's heard that, and it
    doesn't sound like a quick fix or a few new parts is going to
    solve the service problem of these. And my question is simply,
    Has there been a coordinated attempt to look at all the
    technology that's available to see if water-based is really the
    way to go? Are there land-based water-level measurements that
    could go out several hundred miles that could give,
    particularly states like Oregon that expect a very short
    notice, a quicker way to respond than something that's floating
    around in the ocean that may not be working? That would be my
    only question. I think everyone is going to be interested in
    funding whatever works. But from what I've heard today, I'm a
    little concerned that what we may be funding might not be the
    most reliable way to go.
        General?
        General Kelly. Senator, on the observation side, there are
    two components to it. One, there is--there are the DART buoys.
    Larger in number are the tide gauges I mentioned. We're going
    to put some 38 new ones in. There are a number of tide gauges
    up and down the United States coasts today. They serve multiple
    purposes, not just for tsunamis.
        The utility of the DART buoy is, with it being out in the
    deep water, you get an earlier confirmation as to whether a
    tsunami has or has not occurred. On the side that it has not
    occurred, that prevents the number of false alarms from being
    too high. On the fact that it did occur, then you can give more
    positive statements to the citizens that something not very
    nice is coming their way.
        Yes, we have challenges with the DART buoys. We've had
    trouble maintaining them. I would point out that we know of no
    other country in the world that has developed a technology like
    this. The Germans contend they have a system. But the best I
    can determine, no one has ever gotten any data from the system
    and been able ever to see--to operate.
        So I don't want to minimize the technical accomplishments
    that the researchers that have developed these DART buoys have
    made in doing it. And, yes, indeed, we do have some reliability
    problems with them, but when you're dealing with high-tech
    equipment--and I'm not trying to minimize that--that's not an
    unusual thing. It is not our intention to, with all the new
    DART buoys that are going out there, to replicate old
    technology that has given us maintenance problems. We are going
    to try to make it more robust.
        But we believe the data from the DART buoys is an essential
    element of the observing network. It is not the only element,
    as I tried to say earlier. It's regrettable that three of the
    six are down. We still have some capability. We would like to
    have more capability. But we do believe that the DARTs are an
    important part, and we are going to try to make them more
    reliable.
        Senator DeMint. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Cantwell?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my
    statement be inserted in the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
    for holding this hearing on the Tsunami Preparedness Act of
    2005. I had an opportunity, in the last 10 days, to visit the
    Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in Seattle that is part
    of the NOAA operations. And, first and foremost, I want to
    thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for their diligence
    on this issue.
        When a crisis happens, you go back and look and see how
    prepared we are to date, and one thing that is very clear to me
    is that Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye, because of
    incidents that have happened in their states, have put a lot of
    energy into focusing on this issue and getting us where we are
    to date.
        I had the chance to see the current DART buoy, and to
    understand the information system that connects to it and how
    it relays information. And I also got a chance to see the next-
    generation buoys, which will be much easier to deploy. So I
    have a good sense of where we're heading with the technology,
    which, for taxpayers and security reasons, will be much more
    cost-efficient and reliable. Instead of spending hundreds of
    thousands of dollars on a research vessel trying to go out
    hundreds of thousands of miles to deploy this, we might even be
    able to push them out of an airplane or off of any kind of
    vessel. So we're making good progress.
        That doesn't mean that we, in the Northwest, don't want to
    know when the current buoys are going to be fixed. And I know
    my colleagues have raised these questions already, so I won't
    say anything other than we're very concerned, and we'd like
    them to be, obviously, operational as quickly as possible.
        The one thing that is clear when you see the technology at
    the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory is that this act is
    really about the preparedness element. It is about mapping. It
    is, in the sense of what happened in Indonesia, understanding
    that the effects of such devastation basically wipe out roads
    and bridges and they hinder not just evacuation, but also
    support in the future.
        So my question to General Kelly or to Dr. Groat is just,
    How far can--how fast can we get this mapping done? As you
    know, the last time we had a major earthquake was in the year
    1700. A 30-foot-high tsunami smashed into our coastline, and
    the USGS estimates that there is a 10 to 14 percent chance that
    another major Cascadia quake could happen in the next 50 years.
    We're very interested in how soon the mapping could happen. And
    exactly, then, what does the mapping provide us, in the sense
    of local law enforcement and others, regarding the certainty of
    our preparedness efforts?
        Dr. Bement. Senator Cantwell, the field data that's coming
    back will help inform the mapping process. But we currently
    have remote sensors--high resolution, medium resolution, low
    resolution sensors that are actually gathering data in real
    time of the affected regions in this latest disaster. Once we
    assimilate that data, we will be able to accelerate, I think,
    the mapping effort. And by learning through our predictive
    models we can infer what the damage zones would be if such an
    earthquake were to happen, for example, at the Cascadia fault
    line, which is about as large as the fault line in the Indian
    Ocean. The extent. It's almost a similar event.
        As far as timelines are concerned, I'm not at the position
    to really lay that out in any great detail, but I think we're
    going to be much better informed about how to go about doing
    that.
        Dr. Groat. If I could comment, Senator Cantwell, you've hit
    upon a very sensitive point, I think, with both U.S. Geological
    Survey and NOAA. There are several kinds of maps that are
    useful in this process. Inundation maps clearly are important.
    Accurate maps upon which models can be built are important. But
    they depend on, in our case, the topographic maps that show the
    details of the topography on the onshore areas, and, in the
    case of NOAA's responsibilities, the bathymetric maps that are
    offshore. Having the most modern, current information about
    what the land looks like and what the sea bottom looks like is
    really critical to providing the information for inundation
    maps and for providing information to response agencies about
    surges in areas that might be affected.
        I know in our case--and I can't speak for General Kelly--
    getting that information as current as it needs to be--many of
    our maps are 27 years old--so that it reflects the coast as it
    is today, and the infrastructure as it is today, is a real
    challenge for us. And if we're talking about funding challenges
    to provide information needed for those efforts, this is one,
    in our case, where the topography--the mapping of the
    topography needs to be modern, needs to be current, needs to be
    digital, so that it can go into the models and into the
    inundation mapping. And I know General Kelly has similar
    concerns.
        General Kelly. I'll just second what Dr. Groat said. It is
    a challenge to get current surveys of the undersea and what the
    shoreline and the surface--sea surface is.
        Senator Cantwell. So are we talking years?
        Dr. Groat. I think the capabilities are there now, with
    LIDAR and some of the technologies that provide information
    about the landscape in digital form, to turn those into digital
    map products, that we don't have to be talking about very many
    years in critical coastal areas. In other words, we're not
    talking about decade-long programs. I think in a matter of a
    few years, with the funding, we could have current, update
    digital information about the areas of the coast that are
    likely to be impacted by this sort of event.
        Dr. Bement. I can say that, if you look at just the area--
    the terrain that's above the water level, the inland terrain,
    there are geodetic surveys that are currently underway, some
    involving Caltech, other universities that are involved. And
    that's part of the survey work that's currently going on at the
    present time. Now, how all that geodetic information will be
    factored back into topological maps and update the maps, that's
    outside the science area. That's more than the----
        Dr. Groat. We do have a framework for that, called the
    National Map, and it's an attempt to bring information from the
    sources that Dr. Bement described, and others who are gathering
    relevant digital information about the landscape, into one
    framework so that it is the same around the coast, so we have a
    product that has set standards, set approaches to providing
    this information that everyone can use in a standardized
    fashion.
        So we do have the framework, we do have a lot of
    organizations gathering it. What we don't have is sufficient
    support to gather that information as quickly as we would like
    to have it.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I think that was the point I was
    trying to draw out. It's not a next-week project, but it isn't,
    also, a 10-year time-frame before we'll have the results we
    need.
        Dr. Groat. Exactly.
        Senator Cantwell. And the sooner that we can get to the
    mapping, the better preparedness plans we'll be able to
    develop.
        I see my time is almost up, Mr. Chairman, but if I could
    just ask another question about inland waterways.
        I think a lot of people think of this tsunami threat as
    unique to coastal regions, but Puget Sound, with its population
    base, cities of Seattle and Tacoma and up the coastline of
    Puget Sound, Bellingham and others, may be as susceptible to a
    tsunami threat as the outer coasts. How do you see the
    inundation mapping efforts helping to prepare large communities
    with, in terms of not just evacuating communities but also
    protecting infrastructure?
        Dr. Groat. I think the mapping is, as you're pointing out
    very accurately, needs to extend into those inland bodies,
    those sounds, those estuaries, those bays, that are accessible
    to the sea, where waves can come in--as they have in all cases
    with these tsunamis, if there is an inlet, they'll come through
    them--and that the infrastructure, as well as the people in
    there, needs to be accurately represented so--on these maps.
    And that's part of the National Map, is to include not just the
    terrain, but the infrastructure that's there--houses,
    buildings, bridges, so forth. And that needs to be as much in
    place for areas facing--you know, areas on these inland bodies
    connected to the sea as it is on the raw coast. And that is
    part of the structure that we're talking about.
        Senator Cantwell. I see. And if I could just throw this
    in--if we had this mapping done prior to December 26, 2004, and
    we knew what was going to happen in Indonesia--which, in fact,
    I know the minute the earthquake happened, people ran to the
    lab at the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in Seattle
    and started trying to model scenarios, but by the time they got
    information, the tsunami was actually hitting--but say we had
    gotten all this mapping done 3 or 5 years ago. What would we
    have done differently in preparing that community?
        Dr. Marburger. Let me say, the main problem in the Indian
    Ocean countries was not the technical warning. The main problem
    was the absence of local public education and local
    communications systems. That was the biggest thing that was
    there. There were warnings available, based on seismic data
    alone, that were transmitted to some spots in the Indian Ocean
    that could receive them and knew what to do, but the biggest
    challenge that we have is to provide infrastructure in those
    nations so that they can educate their people and communicate
    with them when they get the information.
        So while simulations and additional instrumentation in the
    Indian Ocean are important, nevertheless, the most important
    thing is the public education and the identification of the
    critical infrastructure long before the tsunami hits.
        Dr. Bement. One thing that's going to be a major unknown is
    what really changed as a result of the tsunami and the
    earthquakes with regard to the relationship between groundwater
    and surface water and what damage was done to the aquifers that
    may not be reversible. Had that information been baselined, we
    might be able to detect or determine what changes took place.
    Now, that's one thing we can yet do in our own coastal regions,
    is to develop that baseline data, so that we would be better
    informed what possible damage might be done to aquifers and
    other sources of fresh water.
        General Kelly. Senator Cantwell, you put your finger on the
    real challenge. And while the death--the number of deaths pale
    in comparison to what happened in the Indian Ocean, it was a
    very active hurricane season last year. They were, overall,
    very well forecast. The Government of Haiti was provided good
    forecasts and good information on what was likely to happen
    with the hurricane, and they still lost 3,000 of their citizens
    due to flooding. And it's my belief, in large measure, that
    that's tied to the infrastructure challenge that that
    particular government faced. And so, it cuts across all natural
    disasters, and it is a big challenge.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        I'll just drop a little pebble in this small bowl up here.
    Do you ever think what would happen if the Madrid fault slipped
    again? I mean, I heard that bells rang in the churches in
    Boston and the Mississippi changed its course. So, I mean, we
    still have problems all over this country. It's not necessarily
    coastline.
        And, second, back years ago, the Navy was building up Adak,
    and we finally ended up with about five different naval bases
    on that little island. We built a tsunami-proof shelter. We
    didn't build any more, because of the cost of that one. But
    there are things we must think about, and that is, can we get a
    tsunami-proof shelter in the areas where they might be needed?
    I would--I hope that our Subcommittee that we're going to
    create will go into things like that.
        And we look forward to working with you, but we're very
    serious about this coordination thing, now, and I hope you will
    help us by giving us your ideas of, what could we do to assure
    that there would be proper notification to all the public
    sources that would help disseminate news.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator from Washington
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for holding this hearing and for championing this
    critical bill. Your leadership and foresight--along with that of
    Senator Inouye--created the existing tsunami warning system, and I look
    forward to working with you to further upgrade and modernize this
    essential service.
        Mr. Chairman, the loss of life and infrastructure incurred as a
    result of the recent tsunami in the Indian Ocean provides a jarring
    reminder of the need to evaluate the risk of tsunamis to our own
    coastal populations.
        That's why this well thought out bill, developed in cooperation
    with the Administration, is so important. I am pleased to be a
    cosponsor of it.
        I recently visited the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in
    Seattle, which provides research support for all aspects of the U.S.
    tsunami program. While I was greatly impressed with their work, I also
    learned that we can and must do more.
        Whether it is developing more reliable monitoring buoys, or
    improving our nation's vulnerability assessments, more resources are
    needed.
        I also learned more about the massive Cascadia fault that lies off
    the coasts of Washington, Oregon, and Northern California and the fact
    that it is similar in size and geologic character to the fault that
    produced the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami.
        A major Cascadia earthquake--the last which occurred in the year
    1700 and led to a 30-foot high tsunami smashing into Washington's
    coastline--could happen at any time. The U.S. Geological Survey
    estimates there is a 10 to 14 percent chance of another major Cascadia
    quake within the next 50 years.
        Since a Cascadia-generated tsunami would allow for only 10 to 20
    minutes of warning, I am pleased that this legislation includes
    community-based tsunami hazard mitigation program and an acceleration
    of critical vulnerability assessments and inundation maps. This
    information is critical for coastal communities to plan for future
    tsunami events.
        I'd also like to thank Senator Inouye and Stevens for accomodating
    my request and including language in this bill that requires an
    assessment of tsunami risks in vulnerable inland bodies of water.
    Earthquakes within the Puget Sound have historically produced
    significant tsunamis, which today would cause significant flooding
    along the waterfront of Seattle and other inner coastal communities.
        So again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I fully
    support the Tsunami Preparedness Act and believe it is essential if we
    are to prevent the devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami from
    one day becoming realty on our coasts as well.

        Senator Inouye?
        Senator Inouye. I just wanted to clarify the record. In
    November of 2003, one of the DART buoys issued data and
    suggested that a massive tsunami was on its way to Hawaii. But
    thanks to the efficiency of NOAA, they immediately clarified
    the data and suggested it was not hitting us. And we've
    calculated that it saved the State of Hawaii about $70 million;
    otherwise, we would have spent all that money. So I want to
    thank you very much.
        And, Mr. Chairman, may I submit written questions?
        The Chairman. Yes. *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * Written questions and responses are printed in the Appendix.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Chairman. I'd appreciate it if you would respond to
    questions that will be submitted by the individual Senators.
    And, again, we thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. We
    consider this to be a very important first hearing.
        We'll now turn to the second panel--or maybe the third
    panel, Dr. Roger Hansen, Professor of the University of Alaska
    in Fairbanks, the Director of the Tsunami Warning and
    Environmental System for Alaska; second, Ms. Eileen Shea,
    Project Coordinator of the East West Center, of Honolulu,
    Hawaii; and, third, Dr. Daniel Cox, the Director of the
    Hinsdale Wave Research Laboratory at Oregon State University.
        Senator Smith has a conflict, so, as a matter of courtesy,
    Dr. Cox, we're going to call on you first.
        We do hope that you all will give us a summary of your
    statements, or at least shorten them somewhat, but all of your
    statements will be printed in the record as though read.
        Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman?
        The Chairman. Senator Smith?
        Senator Smith. May I thank you for that courtesy and also
    welcome Dr. Cox. He has taken the redeye to be here. Senator
    Cantwell and I know that flight very well. Welcome.
        The Chairman. Dr. Cox, I welcome you. I left Oregon State
    College to go to war, some 50-odd years ago. Nice to see you
    here.

       STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL COX, DIRECTOR, O.H. HINSDALE WAVE
              RESEARCH LABORATORY, OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Cox. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of
    the Committee, for this opportunity to discuss the research
    that we're doing at Oregon State in the Hinsdale Wave Research
    Laboratory. I'm the director of that laboratory, and also
    associate professor in civil engineering.
        We are home to the world's largest facility specifically
    constructed for tsunami research, and I'd like to give you,
    just, sort of briefly, the history of it, just to show you that
    this has been many, many years in the making, planning long
    before I got there. I've only been there for about 2\1/2\
    years.
        And I'd also like to tell you just, sort of, how the
    tsunami community has come together, a little bit about what
    we're learning about today's--the recent events, and then how
    we're trying to improve the nation's ability to respond to
    tsunami disasters, emergency planning, and so on.
        In the 1990s, there was a series of NSF workshops to decide
    what are the nation's needs for tsunami research. And, as a
    result of these workshops, there was a proposal to come up with
    a very large wave basin. This is a large rectangular concrete
    basin that can very accurately repeat a tsunami-like wave. It's
    called a soliton. And the main purpose of this facility is to
    provide proof that the numerical models are working well. We've
    heard a lot of testimony today talking about inundation mapping
    and the reliance on these maps for telling people where to go,
    directing them, deciding what kind of infrastructure will be in
    place after the tsunami event happens, and so on. But all of
    these computer models have to be tested very carefully before
    we rely on them.
        And we use, to some degree, the fieldwork that's been done,
    trying to piece together the clues from the site reconnaissance
    surveys. But they don't have enough information. They don't
    give you the wave height, the wave direction in all locations.
    And so, we can very accurately make physical models with very
    carefully controlled conditions, and then compare the results
    of the physical models with what the numerical models predict.
    And that's how we use our facility.
        We also use it as a sort of a center for the research
    community. It's a great place where people gather and share
    ideas, exchange information. We had two of our professors going
    to Madras, to India, to look at the survey, the damage, and
    then they'll come back, share their results, hold a series of
    seminars, and so on. So it's also provided a great focal point
    for the research community.
        There was also a report published by the National Research
    Council for the NEES program. And, in that report, it outlines
    very specifically what are the challenges for the research in
    our areas--and that includes better understanding of the
    tsunami inundation that we heard about earlier today--and also
    the tsunami impact, what happens when that wave hits buildings
    and bridges and other critical lifelines that would be
    necessary in an evacuation.
        The long-term goal is really to develop a comprehensive
    numerical model that includes not only the hydrodynamics of the
    wave and the wave impact and the debris flow, but also includes
    human factors--how people will respond in a crisis--and this
    will greatly improve our ability to plan for tsunami attacks--
    tsunami disasters.
        So I just--I'd like to finish here and just say that I
    think we have an extremely unique tool here for the Nation to
    use. It's a shared-use facility. It's hosted at Oregon State,
    but it's really designed with a number of researchers in mind.
    We bring them here, we do the--the research--the tsunami
    research is supported by the National Science Foundation. So if
    their proposals are accepted, then their work is supported in
    our lab for free, or by the National Science Foundation.
        And, yeah, with that, I'd be happy to answer any questions
    that you might have.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Cox follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Cox, Director, O.H. Hinsdale Wave
                  Research Laboratory, Oregon State University
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for the
    opportunity to discuss how research will continue to improve our
    nation's ability to deal with tsunami risks. I am Daniel Cox, Director
    of the O.H. Hinsdale Wave Research Laboratory at the Oregon State
    University College of Engineering, home to the world's largest and
    most-wired facility specifically designed for tsunami research.
        Today, I would like to provide some information on how this new
    Tsunami Wave Basin facility is helping this country better prepare for
    the next tsunami scenario, including development of more effective
    tsunami warning systems, safer evacuation routes and procedures, and
    better building and bridge design.
        As mentioned in previous testimony and elsewhere, advanced
    numerical models are essential for tsunami mitigation and evacuation
    procedures. These simulation tools have been developed at research
    universities like Oregon State over the past several decades. The
    guidance and validation of these models, especially the inundation
    process of the tsunami wave impacting the coast and flowing over the
    land, has been achieved through careful comparison with laboratory
    studies. It is important that we continue to use the latest numerical
    techniques to improve their predictive capability and systematically
    test their accuracy with benchmark data before we rely on them for
    emergency planning, zoning, and construction guidelines.
    Background on the Development of the Next-Generation, Shared-Use
            Facility for Remote Tsunami Research
        In the 1990s a series of NSF-supported workshops were convened by
    the tsunami research community to determine the needs for supporting
    the further development of tsunami research and numerical models. These
    workshops led to a document that outlined the requirements of a large
    wave basin, capable of generating solitons (or solitary waves which
    have tsunami-like behavior). In addition to the physical requirements
    and instrumentation of the new facility, the workshops stressed
    collaboration and a close integration of physical experiments and
    computer simulations through data sharing and research guidance based
    on field work and practical applications. Many of the researchers who
    participated in these early workshops were also actively involved in
    post-tsunami surveys, for example in Nicaragua, Indonesia, and Papua
    New Guinea. Their graduate students have gone on to successful careers
    at places like the NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory to
    work on tsunami inundation mapping.
        In the late 1990s, the need for a tsunami wave basin was recognized
    at the NSF, and funding for up to two facilities was included in the
    initial call for proposals in the first solicitation of the George E.
    Brown Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (or NEES)
    program. Through a competitive proposal process, Oregon State
    University was awarded a $4.8M grant, which was augmented by
    approximately $1.2M from the Oregon State University College of
    Engineering. One of the first steps was to establish an advisory board
    of tsunami experts, coastal engineers, and computer scientists from
    universities such as Cal Tech, Cornell, USC, and Delaware, as well as
    government agencies including NOAA. A second step was to actively
    engage the tsunami and coastal research community for input on the
    design of the new facility, instrumentation, and data sharing
    requirements. In parallel with this, the Principle Investigators of the
    tsunami project at Oregon State continued to work with the entire NEES
    consortium. The NSF funding also helped the OSU College of Engineering
    attract a world-class team of tsunami experts, computer scientists, and
    ocean engineers who appeared in many national media reports following
    the Asian tsunami last December. Construction of the new facility was
    completed ahead of schedule and commissioned during a ceremony on
    September 13, 2003. The Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State University
    was selected as one of four out of 15 NEES sites showcased in the NSF's
    live demonstration of the NEES program in November, 2004.
        The Tsunami Wave Basin facility itself (Figure 1) is a large,
    rectangular basin, measuring 160 ft. long by 87 ft. wide by 7 ft. deep
    (48.8 m x 26.5 m x 2.1 m) with a wavemaker consisting of a series of
    programmable wave boards at one end. These paddle-like wave boards can
    be programmed to move in a carefully prescribed motion that generates a
    soliton (or solitary wave), which is a simplified form of a tsunami. At
    the end of the basin opposite of the wavemaker, researchers install
    contoured terrain characteristic of coastal features, such as bays or
    points of land. On this terrain, researchers can place models of
    coastal infrastructure such as bridges and buildings, for example,
    instrumented with sensors to measure the impact of the wave or debris.
    It is important to note that although the soliton is a simplified
    representation of the tsunami, it is complex enough to provide a strict
    test for numerical models. In other words, if a numerical simulation
    can not reproduce the simplified conditions of the laboratory, it will
    have little use as a decision-making tool. In addition to the
    construction of the physical basin, the NSF grant provided for the
    development of cutting-edge information technology (IT) infrastructure.
    This IT infrastructure assists in experimental planning, archiving, and
    sharing of data. It also enables researchers anywhere in the nation to
    remotely participate in experiments in real-time, saving travel costs
    and speeding research.
    Grand Challenges for the Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation
            (NEES) and Tsunamis
        A National Research Council report published in 2003 outlines the
    challenges in earthquake engineering as well as a research agenda for
    the NEES program, including tsunamis. The report provides the
    historical perspective of tsunami research, critical knowledge gaps,
    and outlines short-term and long-term research goals.
        The report recommends that:

            ``A complete numerical simulation of tsunami generation,
            propagation, and coastal effects should be developed to provide
            a real-time description of tsunamis at the coastline for use
            with warning, evacuation, engineering, and mitigation
            strategies.''

        The short-term goals outlined in this report include:

            1. Better understanding of tsunami inundation--how the wave
            travels over dry land.

            2. Better understanding of sediment transport under tsunamis.

            3. Quantify the impact forces of the tsunami wave and debris on
            structures.

            4. Determine the effects on buildings and groups of buildings.

            5. Work with the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
            (NTHMP) to refine research needs to best support NOAA's
            mission.

        Medium-term goals include:

            1. Verify and validate numerical models for defining runup
            limits.
            2. Work with the geotechnical community to study the mechanics
            of landslide generated tsunamis.

        The long-term goal is summarized as:

            Develop comprehensive, interactive scenario simulations that
            integrate the physical aspects (generation, propagation,
            inundation) with societal issues such as transmission of
            warnings to the public, evacuation, environmental impacts,
            rescue tactics, and short-term and long-term recovery
            strategies.

    What is the Role of the Tsunami Wave Basin for Future Tsunami
            Disasters?
        The intended purpose of the Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State
    University is to provide the research community with a controlled
    environment for the systematic study of primarily tsunami inundation
    and tsunami generation from landslides.
        Post-tsunami (reconnaissance) surveys provide new insights and
    valuable lessons learned about the real effects of the actual events.
    However, it is impossible to collect sufficient and accurate data from
    surveys to improve numerical models because the data/information are
    ephemeral and difficult to obtain. There is no way to make advance
    preparations to obtain data since it would be a formidable task to
    install a sufficient number of sensors in the field prior to a very
    unpredictable and rare tsunami event. For example, the speed of the
    wave is an important variable when considering evacuation or the safe
    design of buildings or bridges, but this data are rarely available.
    Wave height and direction are also extremely important but elusive
    quantities.
        All numerical models require known boundary conditions and initial
    (or starting) conditions. Because we have almost no quantitative
    information about the real tsunami as it approaches the shore, we can
    not properly prescribe the initial condition, and therefore we can not
    easily compare the damage at the site to the damage predicted in the
    model. The laboratory, however, provides us with a tool that can
    provide boundary and initial conditions as well as the resultant force
    of the tsunami as it impacts the coast. We can prescribe the same
    initial condition to the numerical simulation and then through
    comparisons with laboratory data, we can verify (or refute) the
    accuracy of the simulations. The increasing computational speed of
    numerical simulations has shown that we can simulate large geographical
    regions with complex shapes. The remaining questions are the accuracy
    of these simulations and inclusion of realistic features such as wave-
    impacts and debris flows.
    Development of Collaborative Tools for Natural Hazards Mitigation
        We have been developing three separate but closely related research
    programs on integration of hazard mitigation tools and information: (1)
    tsunami scenario simulations, (2) computational portal, and (3) tsunami
    digital library. These activities heavily rely on the advanced
    information technologies, and have direct impacts on hazard mitigation
    practice.
    Scenario simulations:
        An alternative to a full-scale field investigation is to perform
    repeatable and precisely controlled ``scenario'' simulations. A
    scenario simulation means a case study, either in a real or
    hypothetical background setup. Tsunami phenomena and effects are
    simulated for given geographical, seismological, geological, and
    societal conditions. Simulations must be comprehensive and integrated
    not only in tsunami generation, propagation, runup motion (flow
    velocities and inundation) and flow-structure interactions, but also
    other types of simulations such as warning transmission to the public,
    evacuation, environmental impacts, rescue tactics, and short-term and
    long-term recovery strategies. The simulation exercises should include
    physical models, numerical models, informatics, human behavior,
    communication simulations, and other exercises that will integrate the
    tsunami source with its eventual effects on communities and the
    environment. This activity is by nature a multi-university, multi-
    community, and multi-disciplinary effort. The goal is to provide damage
    estimates based on best available information, ultimately leading to
    earthquake related risk analysis/assignment for an urban region and to
    provide a rich problem-solving environment for the education of
    students. A tsunami simulation scenario must actually expand this
    concept to include the modeling of human behavior, since a primary
    emphasis of tsunami hazard mitigation is not only minimization of
    structural damage but also the saving of lives through evacuation. It
    is emphasized that this type of work must be collaborative. The
    collaboration with only a few researchers is insufficient; the entire
    community involvement is essential for the success.
    Tsunami digital library:
        In recent years, the Internet has become the primary source of
    information and data. Before the Internet, the challenge was limited
    access to information and data. Now the problem is locating information
    relevant to their discipline and validating the quality of such
    information. Existing web search technologies are insufficient to
    retrieve information that is relevant to a particular scientist's
    context and guaranteed to have some level of quality assurance. New
    technology for information search that addresses both quality and
    context will substantially increase the effectiveness of scientists
    studying natural hazards and their mitigation, enabling greater
    understanding of hazards and more effective preparedness and response.
        Such information and data are highly diverse, and serve a very
    diverse community. The unique information challenges presented by
    tsunamis, the history of research collaboration among the tsunami
    scientific community, and increasing public awareness of the danger to
    life posed by natural hazards combine to make tsunamis an obvious focus
    for the first digital library of natural hazard information. The
    software components to be developed as part of this project will be
    used to develop digital libraries for other natural hazard domains.
    Computational portal:
        Numerical modeling is an essential tool for advancing our
    understanding of natural hazards, allowing us to study hazard
    characteristics, impacts, and prediction. At the same time, highly
    sophisticated models impose complex requirements for data,
    computational resources, and knowledgeable interpretation. Typically,
    it is individual researchers and mitigation personnel who must grapple
    with these problems. We are developing a coordinated, Web-based
    environment for sharing knowledge about tsunami prediction and
    mitigation. It will provide points-of-entry through which users can
    access computational models without the difficulties usually involved
    in managing data, computing resources, and other operational
    requirements.
    Summary
        The Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State University provides tsunami
    researchers with a unique tool to develop and test the next-generation
    of numerical models for tsunami simulations. The basin is designed as a
    shared-use laboratory, meaning that is researchers from around the
    country can access it through the Network for Earthquake Engineering
    Simulation program supported by the National Science Foundation through
    2014.
        I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator do you have any questions? I'd be pleased to yield
    to you.
        Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Dr. Cox, thank you for being here. I very much enjoyed the
    tour that you gave me. Having listened to today's testimony--
    and yours, as well--I'm curious as to your thoughts, if you've
    had a chance to review S. 50 and the Administration's proposal
    from an academic perspective. Do you see these proposals as
    adequate, in terms of research, mapping, and education? Do you
    think--is this a sufficient step forward?
        Dr. Cox. I think it's a step in the right direction, and I
    think the points that are outlined today, the importance of
    education--once you have a warning system, and you tell
    people--you've got to tell them what to do, and they have to
    know how to respond. There's no time to educate them during the
    time of crisis. So I think these are all steps in the right
    direction.
        We've talked about inundation mapping. The future of
    inundation mapping is really trying to start to measure the--or
    map the intensity of the event, not just where the last water
    line is. And the intensity is really related to whether or not
    a building is going to withstand the attack or not. So there's,
    I think, a lot more work that we need to do to better prepare
    ourselves for the inevitable tsunami.
        Senator Smith. Thank you, Dr. Cox, for being here, and, Mr.
    Chairman, for your courtesy. I appreciate that.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
        May we proceed, then? Ms. Shea?

      STATEMENT OF EILEEN L. SHEA, PROJECT COORDINATOR, EAST-WEST
                        CENTER, HONOLULU, HAWAII

        Ms. Shea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, Members
    of the Committee. It's my honor to be here today, and thank you
    for the invitation to talk about S. 50, the U.S. Tsunami
    Preparedness Act, as well as your general interest in building
    disaster-resilient coastal communities.
        I first sat in this hearing room over 30 years ago, as a
    NOAA employee, in Congressional Affairs, and I believe that S.
    50 represents just another step in your long legacy in this
    Committee of commitment to the coastal communities, the coastal
    resources, and the coastal businesses of this nation. And,
    therefore, it is an honor to be here.
        I'd actually like to just touch on three things, in
    particular, and they have all come up, in one form or another,
    today.
        The first is, I want to commend the Committee for taking a
    multi-hazard perspective on this bill and on building our
    resilience to tsunamis and other natural hazards. The same
    coastal communities in Southeast Asia and along the United
    States that are subject to tsunamis are also subject to other
    natural disasters--coastal flooding, typhoons, hurricanes, high
    wind and wave events. All of those events have the potential to
    threaten life and property, and all of those events are things
    that we need to address if we're going to build what I like to
    call an effective risk-management information system.
        I believe that S. 50 and much of the discussion in the
    testimony today is headed in the direction of building that
    kind of risk-management information system, but I'd like to
    pick up on something that, Senator Inouye, you mentioned in
    your opening remarks, Senator Cantwell has, Senator Nelson has,
    others have mentioned, the idea of focusing on the receivers of
    these informations. It really doesn't matter how accurate and
    how efficient the arm of a quarterback is. If there isn't a
    person at the other end waiting to receive it, and a team of
    people--NGOs, the media, the civil-society community leaders,
    the governments, at a local level--a team of people who can
    help get that individual down the field and in the end zone.
        It is essential, if we are to pursue building disaster-
    resilient coastal communities, that we do focus on those
    receivers of this information. An effective warning system,
    like we've heard discussed by many of the panelists today, is a
    part of that information system, but we really must invest in
    that education program.
        And TsunamiReady communities is a good example of helping
    to reach out to communities and prepare them, but it's only
    part of the picture. And we've heard several witnesses today,
    as well as several of the Members, talk about the broader
    education effort, formal and informal education, technical
    training, and also leadership training, building the next
    generation of leaders of these institutions that will be
    responsible for warning and response.
        The second element of a--for me--of an effective risk-
    management system is this concept of a better understanding of
    vulnerability and our choices for adaptation, our choices for
    building resilience. We've heard much talk today about these
    inundation maps. These are parts of tools for understanding how
    exposed we are to a risk. How sensitive are we to a risk? The
    other part of the equation is, how prepared are we to deal with
    that? How resilient are we? How much like those palm trees that
    Senator Landrieu mentioned are we, are our businesses, our
    infrastructure, our key economic sectors, and the people in our
    communities who call the coastal zone ``home''? Building that
    partnership, building those--that understanding of
    vulnerability, and our ability to adapt is an essential part of
    what we're about.
        I think that it's important to remember that building this
    understanding of vulnerability is not just a matter of funding
    a few socioeconomic studies. It's about establishing a new way
    to doing science. It's about participatory research in which
    the decisionmakers and the community leaders and the scientists
    and the technical experts work together in a process of shared
    learning and joint problem-solving.
        It's also important to remember that this is probably best
    done at a regional level. One size does not fit all when it
    comes to education programs, warning systems, or adaptation.
    It's really important, I think, as we consider the next steps,
    that we consider the regional effect.
        And, finally, it's important to build critical
    partnerships. I don't have to add much to the discussion today
    about the international partnerships involved in the tsunami,
    but I will mention that--and thinking about those receivers
    again--that one institution that wasn't mentioned in the
    tsunami arena is the International Tsunami Information Center
    in Honolulu, which is the focus of the receiving-education--
    reaching out, education and training both in the U.S. and
    abroad.
        Finally, I would like to touch on a regional activity.
    There is, in the Pacific now, something called the Pacific Risk
    Management Ohana. ``Ohana'' means family. ``Ohana'' means
    working together. Three years ago, under the leadership of the
    NOAA Pacific Services Center, all of the federal agencies in
    the Pacific Islands region who work in disaster management sat
    around a table together to talk about better coordinating the
    work that they do. As a result of that initial meeting, the
    scientific institutions active in risk management in the
    Pacific, the Federal agencies active in risk management in the
    Pacific, and state and local entities and organizations are all
    now acting together in the context of PRiMO, a coordinated
    effort on the part of all of those interested institutions to
    work together.
        In one way, it's an example of the kind of coordination
    that you're calling for in S. 50. In other, it's a reflection
    of how important it is to do this at the regional level,
    because it is at the regional level where we can work together,
    touch each other in ways that the Majority Leader mentioned
    today. It's about understanding the people, the resources, and
    the businesses in these communities. And I think we're on our
    way.
        Thank you for the opportunity. I'll be happy to answer any
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Shea follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Eileen L. Shea, Project Coordinator, East-West
                            Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, Honorable Members, ladies and
    gentlemen, ALOHA and thank you for the opportunity to share some
    thoughts on the U.S. tsunami warning system and enhancing our efforts
    to build disaster-resilient coastal communities in the wake of the
    December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Your initiative and leadership in
    this endeavor is crucial and is an important next step in this
    Committee's longstanding legacy of commitment to the communities,
    businesses and natural resources that call the coastal zones of the
    world home. According to the Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and
    Islands, coastal areas (within 60 km of the shoreline) are home to 50
    percent of the world's populations and two-thirds of the world's
    largest cities are located on coasts. The final report of the U.S.
    Commission on Ocean Policy notes that approximately 52 percent of the
    U.S. population resides in coastal counties which constitute 25 percent
    of the U.S. land area and include economic activities that contribute
    approximately $4.5 trillion (roughly half) of the Nation's annual GDP.
    I am honored by your invitation to contribute to your deliberations. My
    thoughts today are based largely on my work in climate vulnerability
    assessment and risk management in the Pacific, including the use of
    climate forecast information to support decision-making.
        The tragic loss of life and property associated with the December
    2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami highlights the complex and
    close relationship between achieving national development goals and the
    ability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural
    disasters. Increasingly, international and regional development bodies
    like the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank and the
    Asian Development Bank are recognizing that effectively managing the
    risks associated with natural disasters such as tropical cyclones,
    coastal inundation from storm surge, droughts, floods and geologic
    hazards such as earthquakes and tsunamis, is an essential component of
    an effective, long-term development strategy.
        It is important to remember that the same nations that suffered the
    greatest impacts from the December 2004 tsunami are also highly
    vulnerable to other natural disasters. Typhoons, floods, and high wind
    and wave events are frequent visitors to the same coastal communities
    affected by the recent tsunami. As we take steps to reduce the
    vulnerability of coastal communities to high-impact, low-frequency
    events such as future tsunamis, we should also be strengthening their
    resilience in the face of other, more frequent and often devastating
    natural disasters including weather and climate-related extreme events
    such as hurricanes and typhoons, floods, landslides, drought and high
    wind and wave events. In other words, a comprehensive, multi-hazard
    approach is needed that establishes the social (human, institutional
    and political) as well as scientific and technical infrastructure
    necessary to anticipate and manage risks. If we focus only on the
    tsunami hazard itself, I fear that we will be like the proverbial
    general planning for the past war.
        In the 2004 World Disasters Report: Focus on Community Resilience,
    the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
    advocates a stronger emphasis on proactive, people-centered approaches
    to building resilience--rather than simply understanding and describing
    a community's vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters. In this
    context, the 2004 report highlights the importance of ``understanding
    the ability of individuals, communities or businesses not only to cope
    with but also to adapt to adverse conditions and to focus interventions
    at building on those strengths'' with an emphasis on risk reduction and
    development work. I commend your Committee for emphasizing a
    comprehensive, longer-term approach in your initial planning for an
    effective U.S. response to the December 2004 tsunami. In this context
    and in light of other testimony, let me highlight the particularly
    important elements of such a program. These elements include:

            First, building information systems that support pro-active,
            comprehensive risk management;

            Second, improving understanding of vulnerability and effective
            adaptation strategies; and

            Third, establishing and sustaining the critical partnerships
            required to develop disaster-resilient coastal communities.

    Comprehensive Risk Management Information Systems
        Following the December 2004 disaster, we all focused on what could
    have been done to prevent such an awful loss of lives. Immediate
    attention was, appropriately, given to the technical systems that can
    provide the basis for more effective advance warning of future
    tsunamis. The expansion of seismic and ocean monitoring programs, the
    establishment of warning centers and the improvement of communications
    infrastructure to disseminate warnings and alerts are all critical and
    should be pursued aggressively. In this context, I would like to
    reinforce the importance of providing warnings and forecasts in
    language and formats that are accessible, understandable, useful and
    usable. In many parts of the U.S. and the world, this will involve
    translation into local languages and the use of relatively simple forms
    of communication such as radio, phone, facsimile and visual and
    auditory cues (such as warning flags and sirens) as well as the
    involvement of trusted, local knowledge brokers such as NGOs,
    religious, civic and, in the case of indigenous populations,
    traditional leaders and teachers. As we saw with the Indian Ocean
    tsunami, many of the most vulnerable populations lived in remote
    communities without access to the communications infrastructure of
    large urban centers. Reaching these communities remains perhaps the
    biggest challenge for disaster warning systems. Meeting that challenge
    should be of the highest priority as we move toward a pro-active risk
    management information system since the system will only be effective
    if it reaches those in danger.
        Decades of natural hazards research, responding to weather extremes
    as well as my own experience in exploring adaptation to climate-related
    extreme events in the Pacific suggests, however, that good
    international and local warning systems are only one part of an
    effective risk management information system. As a colleague of mine
    pointed out recently, a successful pass in the NFL requires not only a
    skilled quarterback but a skilled receiver who not only knows where on
    the field to be to catch the ball but also what he's expected to do
    once he has the ball. In addition to knowing that more effective
    warnings are produced and disseminated, we should also be concerned
    with enhancing the knowledge, skills and capabilities of the receivers
    of those warnings including disaster management agencies and other
    national and local government officials, community and business
    leaders, NGOs and other key elements of civil society such as women's
    and youth groups and, ultimately, the public.
        The concept of enhancing public awareness is, of course, not new in
    the disaster management world. There is a strong foundation of ongoing
    disaster preparedness education programs underway funded by a number of
    U.S. Government agencies (e.g., NOAA, FEMA, USGS), other national and
    local governments; scientific and educational institutions as well as
    regional and international organizations and technical institutions.
    NOAA's Tsunami Ready Communities program is a good example of this
    existing foundation. I hope that our response to the Indian Ocean
    tsunami will provide us with an opportunity to strengthen those
    programs and expand their focus beyond warning and immediate response
    to include a broader public awareness of the social, institutional and
    political challenges associated with building more disaster-resilient
    coastal communities.
        In this context, warning and communications system improvements
    should be accompanied by a broad education program designed to enhance
    the cadre of individuals and institutions in the region capable of
    assessing vulnerability, communicating warnings and managing risks
    associated with natural disasters. Such a program should include:

       Targeted technical training to increase awareness of recent
            scientific developments in key hazard areas (e.g., tsunamis,
            weather extremes, climate variability and change) and make new
            tools and technologies in vulnerability assessment risk
            management decision support available to a wider Asia-Pacific
            community;

       Leadership training programs in risk assessment and
            management for representatives of government agencies,
            businesses, universities, NGO's, and coastal communities; and

       Formal and informal education programs and materials to
            broaden public awareness and understanding of disaster risk
            reduction challenges and opportunities by introducing them to
            the multi-disciplinary suite of issues involved in development
            and implementation of risk reduction strategies. Such a program
            would recognize the importance of knowledge of local
            communities and cultures as well as the technical aspects of
            risk assessment and management including: environmental science
            and technology, land use planning, health, civil society, and
            cultural aspects of leadership, problem solving and decision-
            making.

        As we move forward, we also need to more effectively engage the
    media as a critical component of an effective, comprehensive risk
    management information system.
    Understanding Vulnerability and Promoting Enhanced Resilience
        An effective risk management information system also requires a
    better understanding of the multi-hazard vulnerability of coastal
    communities with an emphasis on strengthening the resilience of
    critical infrastructure, key economic sectors, valuable natural
    resources and, most importantly, the people who call those communities
    home. As some of today's witnesses have suggested, the provision of
    high-resolution imagery, geospatial (GIS) technology, risk and
    vulnerability maps and model-based decision support tools are important
    elements of work in this arena. I encourage the Committee to complement
    these traditional vulnerability assessment tools with an integrated
    program of research and dialogue focused on building disaster-resilient
    coastal communities that would draw on the broad multi-disciplinary
    expertise of and technical capabilities of partners in government,
    academia, business and civil society. Such a program would recognize
    the connections among social, economic and environmental goals to
    reduce significant risks and build sustainable communities. In our
    internal deliberations following the tsunami, my own organization, the
    East-West Center, has decided that the multi-hazard approach to
    building resilience in coastal communities is the framework in which we
    will organize our post-tsunami program.
        Emphasizing a multi-hazard approach to comprehensive risk
    management such a program might include:

       Targeted research to improve our understanding of the links
            between disaster risk reduction and sustainable development;
            assess vulnerabilities for key sectors, resources and
            populations; identify and explore opportunities to minimize the
            economic and social impacts of disasters; support the
            integration of traditional and local knowledge and practices
            with new scientific insights and technology to enhance risk
            management and adaptation; and explore local, national and
            regional governance options for effective risk management;

       Enhanced risk reduction information services including the
            provision of high-resolution imagery, geospatial (GIS)
            technology and model-based decision support tools as well as
            support for local, regional and international discussions to
            support the emergence of an effective, multi-hazard warning and
            disaster risk management systems at local, national, regional
            and international levels; and

       Dialogue on local, national, regional and international
            governance options for effective risk management--exploring how
            to better coordinate the roles of government, civil society and
            local communities in disaster warning, response and risk
            reduction.

        This last item reflects the importance of using a collaborative,
    participatory approach that effectively engages the scientific
    community and decision-makers in a process of shared learning to
    understand vulnerability and enhance resilience. Returning to my
    earlier football analogy--as we all know, that successful long pass
    requires more than just the quarterback and his receiver; it requires a
    team of individual players and coaches each contributing their special
    talents and unique expertise as part of a coordinated team effort
    informed by history, a shared understanding of individual roles and
    expectations and months or years of practice in working together toward
    a common goal. In thinking about building and sustaining disaster-
    resilient coastal communities, we'll want to build a powerhouse team of
    international, regional and international institutions, government
    officials, businesses, resource managers, scientists, engineers,
    educators, NGOs, the media and community leaders--each bringing their
    own insights and expertise to the table in a combined effort focused on
    the future.
    Building and Sustaining Critical Partnerships
        Building these partnerships will be a critical factor in our
    success. As the overwhelming response to the December 2004 Indian Ocean
    tsunami demonstrates, there are a large and diverse number of players
    on a risk management team ranging from individual community volunteers
    to international organizations like the United Nations. Many of the
    witnesses today have emphasized the importance of setting the
    international elements of a U.S. tsunami response program in the
    context of existing multi-national programs and institutions such as
    the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
    (ISDR); the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
    Organization (UNESCO); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
    the World Bank and regional development banks; and the planned Global
    Earth Observing System of Systems (GEOSS) among others. Earlier I
    referred to the importance of integrating local and cultural knowledge
    to enhance the effectiveness of technology and, in this context, we
    will also want to capitalize on the expertise and networks of a number
    of regional organizations and institutions. In the Pacific, for
    example, development of an effective multi-hazard, risk management
    system will likely involve technical, government leaders; disaster
    management and development agencies from all Pacific Rim nations,
    including the United States; the UNESCO International Tsunami
    Information Center; the South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission
    (SOPAC), the Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
    (SPREP), scientific, technical and educational institutions throughout
    the region. Hawaii alone, for example, is home to a number of technical
    and educational institutions that stand ready to contribute to the
    emergence of an effective, multi-hazard risk management system in the
    Asia-Pacific region including the East-West Center, the Pacific
    Disaster Center, the University of Hawaii, and the Center of Excellence
    for Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance as well as the regional
    programs of a number of U.S. Government agencies such as NOAA, USGS,
    FEMA and others. As we consider the more local components of a
    comprehensive risk management system, of course, the team will expand
    to include state and local agencies, communities and NGOs. Coordinating
    the work of these diverse partners is a challenge but meeting that
    challenge is essential to fulfilling our shared obligation to this and
    future generations.
        I'd like to take a moment to highlight an ongoing partnership in
    the Pacific that is already beginning to demonstrate the value of
    innovative collaboration and cooperation in the area of risk
    management. About three years ago, the NOAA Pacific Services Center
    convened a roundtable discussion among the various federal, state and
    local agencies, scientific and educational institutions and regional
    organizations active in disaster management in the American Flag and
    U.S. Affiliated Pacific Islands. Those individual players are now
    working together as part of a Pacific Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO).
    The Hawaiian word Ohana means family and, as the name suggests, the
    various agencies and organizations active in PRiMO are identifying
    opportunities to work together in creative new ways to advance critical
    elements of an effective local and regional multi-hazard risk
    management system including: coastal and ocean observing systems; data
    management; decision support tools; communications infrastructure and
    information dissemination; post-disaster evaluation and performance
    indicators; education, outreach and training; and traditional knowledge
    and practices. The enhanced level of collaboration represented by PRiMO
    helps put the Pacific in a strong position to take advantage of new
    technological capabilities and support the emergence of a comprehensive
    risk management information system in the region. An enhanced program
    of risk assessment and adaptation in the Pacific could contribute
    significantly to enhancing the resilience of the communities,
    businesses and natural resources of the region and, I believe, provide
    a demonstration of the value of not only new technologies but also of
    innovative institutional partnerships focused on comprehensive risk
    management.
    Concluding Remarks
        The overwhelming magnitude of the disaster generated by the
    December 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami will, I suspect, keep
    the images of suffering and devastation in our minds for some time.
    With those vivid images has come a remarkable level of energy,
    generosity and commitment to assist those in need. I fear, however,
    that if history is precedent, that commitment--like the images from the
    newspapers and television--will begin to fade in the collective memory
    of those not immediately affected by the tragedy. The testimony of
    today's witnesses and this Committee's leadership in developing an
    effective, long-term response, however, suggests that this tragedy can
    lead to a new level of collaboration and commitment that will last far
    into the future. From the devastation of a single event in the Indian
    Ocean, I believe that we can work together to build disaster-resilient
    coastal communities in the United States and around the world. Perhaps
    the ultimate legacy of this recent disaster will be the emergence of a
    comprehensive risk management program that will protect the people,
    communities, economies and natural resources who call this planet home.
        Mahalo nui loa--thank you very much--for the opportunity to share
    these thoughts with you and Godspeed in your deliberations. I would be
    happy to answer any questions you may have.

        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Hansen?

     STATEMENT OF ROGER A. HANSEN, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA
       FAIRBANKS; DIRECTOR, ALASKA EARTHQUAKE INFORMATION CENTER

        Dr. Hansen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
    Committee, for inviting me today.
        I am the----
        The Chairman. Pull that mike toward you.
        Dr. Hansen. I'm the state seismologist for Alaska, and a
    research professor at the Geophysical Institute at the
    University of Alaska Fairbanks. I've been invited today to give
    testimony on the tsunami warning system in Alaska.
        Today, tsunami safety in Alaska comes from a strong
    partnership between several state and federal agencies as a
    result of the participation in the National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program, which has been----
        The Chairman. I'm sorry to tell you again. I can see people
    back there straining to hear you, Doctor. Pull that mike right
    up to you, please.
        Dr. Hansen. Is this better? OK.
        Today, tsunami safety in Alaska comes from a strong
    partnership between several state and federal agencies as a
    result of the participation in the National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program, which has been aided in Alaska by expanded
    roles for the University of Alaska, the State Geological
    Survey, the State Emergency Management Agency, and the West
    Coast and Alaska's Tsunami Warning Center, run by NOAA. This
    program consists of hazard assessment of our coastal
    communities through tsunami forecasting, monitoring and warning
    guidance, and education and mitigation at the local levels. I
    will speak briefly on each of these topics.
        On March 27th, 1964, a magnitude 9.2 earthquake ripped
    through the Prince William Sound in Southern Alaska, generating
    a devastating tsunami. Though the death toll in 1964 is
    minuscule compared to the Indian Ocean disaster, Alaska today
    still faces difficult challenges for warning its at-risk
    communities of the occurrence of tsunamis.
        These challenges come, in part, from the nature of our
    remote location, our irregular coastlines with complex
    bathymetry and topography, the vast size of our state, where
    our coastlines extend from equivalent distance of California to
    the tips of Florida, that we live in one of the most
    seismically active regions of the world, and the lack of
    infrastructure throughout the area for both operations and
    maintenance of monitoring systems, and for consistent and
    timely communication of warning messages.
        Warning guidance. First and foremost, we must be able to
    detect events that can trigger tsunamis. And this is done with
    the use of seismology and seismic networks as the primary
    method to detect earthquakes that may cause tsunamis. Sea-level
    data, both tide gauges and deep-ocean buoys, are also monitored
    to verify the existence of, and the danger posed by, tsunamis.
    But our primary hazard comes from the local tsunami generated
    by nearby large earthquakes in or near the coast of Alaska.
        The deep-ocean buoys, while a part of the larger warning
    system designed for the Pacific-wide tsunamis, are secondary
    indicators for local Alaska warnings. This is because a locally
    generated tsunami wave will likely hit most of Alaska's coast
    long before it reaches the deep-ocean buoys. Therefore, we must
    rely on the rapid warnings that can be issued from the
    detection of large earthquakes by a seismic network.
        Modern seismic recordings can provide rapid information on
    earthquake location, size, and the distribution of sea-floor
    deformation that generates tsunamis. However, since much of the
    seismic network in Alaska has been in operation since the
    1960's, many stations are in need of modernizations to achieve
    this goal.
        Over the past few years, the Alaska Earthquake Information
    Center, the state's seismic network operator, was tasked,
    through the National Hazard Program, to develop 18 of these
    modern stations for Alaska and ensure the timely delivery of
    this data to the warning centers. The university program has
    now increased the number of modern stations that we can provide
    to augment this sparse improvement, and, through applied
    research efforts, provides some enhanced information on the
    local earthquakes. However, even with the funding of both the
    national program and the university program, nearly 75 percent
    of Alaska's seismic network still relies on outdated equipment.
    This leaves vast areas of Alaska, and, in particular, the very
    seismically active Aleutian Islands, still underpopulated with
    modern seismic stations.
        Mitigation. It is important to recognize that a tsunami
    warning system must go beyond just the ability to detect a
    tsunami and send a warning message. The most important aspect
    of tsunami warning systems is the existence of a mechanism for
    disseminating warning information to the people on the
    shorelines and for the recipient of the warning messages to
    understand how to react.
        Tsunami hazard mitigation requires a long-term sustained
    effort of continuing public education and responsible planning
    decisions in coastal communities. The power of education is
    clear.
        The state of Alaska partners are well aware of our
    difficulties in reaching our more than 80 communities at risk
    to tsunamis. Improving the warning communication and outreach
    infrastructure at the state and local level for both emergency
    managers and the public represents the most important
    improvement to be made in Alaska for saving lives.
        Hazard assessment. Tsunami warning and safety procedures
    require an understanding of hazards and risks associated with
    tsunamis. In Alaska, led by researchers at the University of
    Alaska Fairbanks, we are evaluating the risk by constructing
    inundation maps for all the at-risk communities through our
    super-computer modeling of tsunami water waves from scenario
    earthquakes and landslides.
        Reliable modeling results, however, require that we have
    accurate bathymetry. And, in fact, we need this bathymetry to a
    resolution that is not available in Alaska today.
        Much of the sea floor along the shallow waters off the
    coast of Alaska have not been mapped in many years. Some areas
    not since before the 1964 Prince William Sound magnitude 9.2
    earthquake. And note that large earthquakes can change
    bathymetry in local areas of the sea floor by tens of meters.
        Collection of improved bathymetry along Alaska's coastal
    communities should be a top priority for enhanced funding of
    any tsunami program. In addition, it is important to stabilize
    the funding necessary to create the numerical models and
    inundation maps.
        In summary, Alaska has in place a partnership to address
    the threat from tsunamis, yet we still have continuing needs
    for improved monitoring with seismic and tide-gauge networks,
    scientific infrastructure for numerical forecasting of
    tsunamis, and the civil infrastructure to educate and warn
    people.
        Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman and the Members of the
    Committee. I'm happy to answer any questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Hansen follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Roger A. Hansen, Professor, University of Alaska
           Fairbanks; Director, Alaska Earthquake Information Center
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you very much for
    inviting me to testify. My joint appointment as the State Seismologist
    for Alaska and as a Research Professor at the Geophysical Institute of
    the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) places me in a unique and
    advantageous position to partner in a tsunami hazard mitigation program
    for Alaska bringing together operational monitoring, education, and
    research activities. I have been involved in the National Tsunami
    Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) since its inception as a co-author of
    the Implementation Plan nearly 10 years ago, and continuing to this day
    as a strong facilitator and member of the NTHMP Steering committee
    representing Alaska. My unique position also serves to manage the
    Alaska Earthquake Information Center which operates and maintains the
    over 400 station Alaska Seismic Network for regional monitoring of
    earthquakes and volcanos in Alaska. Our decades long collaboration and
    partnership with the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center for seismic data
    exchange has been recently strengthened by our involvement in the NTHMP
    and the related Tsunami Warning and Environmental Observatory for
    Alaska (TWEAK) programs. TWEAK has funded the creation of a virtual
    center at UAF, called the Alaska Tsunami Center and Observatory, that
    combines the strengths of the Geophysical Institute, the Institute of
    Marine Sciences, and the Alaska Regional Supercomputer Center into one
    organization in partnership with our federal and state agencies.
        Tsunami Safety in Alaska comes from a strong partnership between
    several state and federal agencies. The NTHMP was created with the
    understanding that the best way to address the hazards posed by
    tsunamis was through a state/federal partnership that leveraged an
    improved ``coordination and exchange of information to better utilize
    existing resources.'' Through participation in the NOAA National
    Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), this partnership provides
    improved levels of warning guidance, hazard assessment, and mitigation;
    allowing an integrated response in Alaska to a potentially tsunamigenic
    earthquake.
        It is important to recognize that tsunami warning systems require a
    sophisticated infrastructure that goes well beyond just the ability to
    detect a tsunami and send a warning message. This infrastructure must
    include a continuing partnership between the state and federal agencies
    and the local communities at risk to assess the hazard and provide
    levels of mitigation to minimize the risk to life and property. Nowhere
    in the U.S. is such a partnership more important than in Alaska. Much
    of Alaska is remote, with little built infrastructure for
    communications, harsh winters, and communities that are located in one
    of the most seismically active regions of the world. Our primary hazard
    comes from the ``local'' tsunami generated by nearby large earthquakes
    in or near the coast of Alaska, rather than from the ``distant''
    tsunami that travels across the open ocean. In this case, the deep
    ocean buoys, or ``tsunameters'', while a part of the larger warning
    system designed for U.S. Pacific-wide tsunamis, are secondary
    indicators for Alaska warnings, because a locally generated tsunami
    wave will hit the Alaska coast long before it reaches the deep ocean
    buoys. We must rely on the rapid warnings issued from the detection of
    the earthquake; and even more so on education, hazard assessment, and
    mitigation as to how to respond to the potential of a tsunami.
        The U.S. Tsunami Warning System consists of two warning centers:
    the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Ewa Beach, Hawaii and
    (important to Alaska) the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/
    ATWC) in Palmer, Alaska. These centers work in cooperation with other
    NOAA units to perform their mission. In Alaska, state agencies such as
    the Alaska Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
    (ADHS&EM) and the Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys
    (ADGGS), and the Alaska Tsunami Center and Observatory at the
    University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), are strong partners in the
    tsunami warning mission.
    Warning Guidance
        First and foremost, we must be able to detect events that can
    trigger tsunamis. The current tsunami warning systems are triggered by
    information from earthquake seismic networks. Typically, earthquake
    magnitudes above certain levels cause tsunami warnings to be issued. In
    Alaska the WC/ATWC has the responsibility for issuing all tsunami
    warning, watch, advisory, and information messages to emergency
    management officials. As earthquakes trigger most tsunamis, the WC/ATWC
    monitors data from seismic networks throughout Alaska and worldwide.
    While the WC/ATWC maintains a backbone network of 11 seismic stations
    in Alaska, in order to monitor for large coastal earthquakes they
    receive a subset of about 40 stations from the 400-station combined
    seismic network of the Alaska Earthquake Information Center (AEIC) and
    Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO). The data are processed in near-real-
    time and initial warnings for tsunamis from large earthquakes are based
    solely on seismic data. This is the reason that it is so critical to
    have modern instrumentation for application to modern techniques for
    rapid determination of earthquake magnitude. Sea level data (both tide
    gauges and deep ocean buoys) are also monitored to verify the existence
    of and danger posed by tsunamis. Bulletins are issued through standard
    NWS channels, such as the NOAA Weather Radio and the NOAA Weather Wire
    as well as the FAA NADIN2 system, FEMA's National Warning System, State
    Emergency channels, and other means. (All Alaska earthquakes are then
    re-processed by AEIC utilizing the entire combined Alaska Seismic
    Network and included in the authoritative catalog at AEIC). The NTHMP
    funded upgrades to  cents55 seismic stations in regional networks
    throughout the western U.S. This leveraged NTHMP resources with the
    already substantial investments in seismic networks in order to provide
    high quality data to the tsunami warning centers. AEIC was tasked
    through NTHMP to develop 18 of these stations for Alaska for delivery
    to the warning centers. At the request of ATWC, the TWEAK program has
    now substantially increased the number of modern stations AEIC can
    provide to augment this sparse improvement. Yet many vast areas of
    Alaska (and in particular the Aleutian Islands) still remain
    underpopulated with modern seismic stations.
    Hazard Assessment
        Well recognized in the NTHMP, a second part of the tsunami warning
    and safety procedure requires an understanding of hazards and risks
    associated with tsunamis in Alaska. Without a clear understanding of
    what areas are at risk and which areas are unlikely to be flooded, it
    is impossible to develop effective emergency response plans and
    education programs. To ensure reliable tsunami early detection and
    hazard assessment capabilities, it is essential to create a numerical
    model to forecast future tsunami impact and flooding limits in specific
    coastal areas. The NTHMP made it a priority to develop the expertise
    within each state for providing tsunami flood maps for the states
    communities at risk. In Alaska we are evaluating the risk by
    constructing inundation maps for at-risk communities through modelling
    of the tsunami water waves from scenario earthquakes and landslides.
    This effort for Alaska is being led by the UAF Alaska Tsunami Center
    and Observatory in close collaboration with ADHS&EM, ADGGS, the UAF
    SuperComputer Center, and other state and federal partners. As
    inundation maps for communities are completed, they are presented to
    both state and local emergency managers who then use the information
    for planning and exercising evacuation routes and safe zones for the
    communities visitors, tourists, and local residents. Maps for several
    communities on Kodiak Island, Homer, Seldovia, and Seward have been or
    are nearly completed, and we now wait for needed information on
    bathymetry for the many other at-risk communities for which maps will
    be made. The earlier example of the remoteness of Alaska again affects
    our productivity in map generation. Many regions along the shallow
    waters off the coast of Alaska have not been mapped in many years. Some
    areas not since before the 1964 Prince William Sound M9.2 earthquake.
    Reliable modelling results require that we have accurate bathymetry to
    a resolution that is not generally available except in the lower 48
    states, and at a very few communities in Alaska. Collection of improved
    bathymetry should be a top priority for enhanced funding of any tsunami
    program. In addition, it is important to stabilize the infrastructure
    necessary to create the numerical models within Alaska.
    Mitigation and Response
        Arguably the most important aspect of tsunami warning systems is
    the existence of a mechanism for disseminating warning information to
    the people and businesses on the shorelines. It has been recognized
    that tsunami hazard mitigation requires a long-term sustained effort.
    Tsunami mitigation needs to be an institutionalized part of continuing
    public education, emergency management and responsible planning
    decisions in Alaska's coastal communities. Tsunami education materials,
    inundation maps, community evacuation maps and signs, warning sirens,
    and numerous other mitigation-related products are being developed as
    part of the NTHMP program. These materials are brought to communities
    by a team of scientists and statewide emergency planners on a routine
    schedule to establish the infrastructure for education and outreach
    with respect to tsunami hazards and warnings. This infrastructure of
    communication between UAF, WC/ATWC, emergency management officials,
    ADGGS, and local communities is what allows warnings to be disseminated
    and acted upon in an efficient manner throughout the Alaska
    Communities. The TWEAK program is assisting this through an active
    education and outreach program, as well as partnering with ATWC and
    ADHS&EM to purchase and install tsunami warning sirens in at risk
    communities. Discussions with the emergency management community and
    the Director of the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center both concluded that
    the most useful improvement to be made to the warning system in Alaska
    is to improve the warning and communication infrastructure at the local
    level for both emergency managers and the public. Again, increased
    funding for tsunami programs for Alaska should also include as a top
    priority resources for expanding the warning dissemination
    infrastructure and mitigation activities.
    What is Needed for the Future
        While Alaska has created an infrastructure for efficient tsunami
    warning and safety procedures, our efforts are only beginning. As
    mentioned earlier, the weak link of information and communication must
    include not only improvements to infrastructure and data collection and
    processing, but also include a continuing state/federal partnership for
    education and outreach.
        Important to tsunami safety for Alaska, the TWEAK program between
    UAF and the Alaska regional level of the NOAA Weather Service, is a
    program in support of the NTHMP that provides direct assistance to the
    issues most critical to tsunami safety in Alaska. The TWEAK program has
    brought the federal, state, and university partners within Alaska into
    a mature organization of tsunami activities described above. A virtual
    center, called the Alaska Tsunami Center and Observatory, has combined
    the strengths of the Geophysical Institute, the Institute of Marine
    Sciences, and the Alaska Regional SuperComputer Center in one
    organization in partnership with our federal and state agencies. This
    Center will continue to support the goals of the National Tsunami
    Hazard Mitigation Program that are unique to the difficult setting of
    Alaska through improvements and enhancements in monitoring, modeling,
    and education and outreach.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Hansen. Sorry to be
    reading a memo that just came in from my office. I'm told that
    you just made a little history, Doctor, you just lectured your
    graduate students at the University of Alaska who are tuned in
    and watching this on a live broadcast through our Webcast. So
    thank you for coming here. And your students, I'm sure, will
    appreciate the fact that you're here and they're there.
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Hansen. They got a free breakfast.
        [Laughter.]
        The Chairman. I think we ought to thank them. You realize
    what time they had to get up to watch you?
        Dr. Hansen. Yes.
        The Chairman. It's 4 hours earlier than we are.
        But, anyway, I want to ask you, first, Dr. Cox, Am I
    correct, in reading your testimony, that you think you could
    test things like buildings?
        Dr. Cox. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Could you test a model of a tsunami survival
    hut, if we could devise one?
        Dr. Cox. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Could you devise one?
        Dr. Cox. We're working on it. And I think, also----
        The Chairman. Are you thinking something that's big enough
    for a lot of people, or just a little one for individual
    islands?
        Dr. Cox. It--I'm at a loss for words. But the--what we're
    looking at is really, Can the computer--let's say, Could a
    numerical simulation correctly predict the impact force on the
    building, however that building is constructed. And so, what we
    measure in our laboratory is the actual force of that wave on a
    building.
        But we're--and then, let's say, for example, how--let's
    say, if you were to design breakaway walls, for example, if--
    let's say, in a hotel, a modern hotel, if you had two strong
    walls and two weak walls, at what point would the weak walls
    break away, for example?
        The Chairman. But I'm going at it a different way. When we
    did the----
        Dr. Cox. Sure.
        The Chairman.--the building in Adak, we looked at what
    could survive a wave going over it and coming back over it. OK?
        Dr. Cox. Yes.
        The Chairman. In terms of a lot of people. Can you look at
    that for the purpose of determining, could we start a program
    of some sort of fairly inexpensive shelters designed in a
    fashion that could resist a wave, force it to go over it and
    come back over it?
        Dr. Cox. Yes, sir. And in addition to the design of one
    particular building, what we're finding out from the field
    surveys is that it's often the arrangement of the buildings
    that can either increase or decrease the forces. So that's
    something else we'll be testing in the laboratory, is, how does
    the arrangement of particular buildings improve our ability to
    withstand the tsunami.
        The Chairman. Well, we devised wings that were capable of
    standing up at greater than the speed of sound, so I think you
    ought to be able to find a way. But the question is, can you do
    it so we can produce them and really help the world to provide
    some shelters for these people, like in areas just--what we
    just witnessed out there.
        Dr. Cox. Yes, sir, that's one of the goals at the
    laboratory. Sure.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Shea, you--how do you interface with the concept of,
    you know, warning to people in the outer islands?
        Ms. Shea. It's a very big challenge. Part of it is a
    communications challenge, actually, not just the physical
    technological systems, but also language, and communicating in
    language that is understandable. But the other is actually
    building local networks of people who are skilled in
    understanding what's coming through as a warning and then can
    communicate locally, in local languages and in local context.
    So----
        The Chairman. Do you use commercial media?
        Ms. Shea. Absolutely. And, in fact, the role of the media
    is important, but it's also important to remember that many of
    the communities, those remote fishing communities, for example,
    that were--whose structures were completely wiped away, didn't
    have access to some of the media. In the United States, we can
    rely on the media the way the Weather Service has done for
    years. And I think it's really important that we consider the
    role of the media in warnings in the United States, as well as
    internationally. But I also think we have to build that local
    community network, those community leaders entrusted--those
    trusted information brokers in a community who can help.
        The Chairman. A lot of them didn't have a public media----
        Ms. Shea. That's right.
        The Chairman.--wireless media.
        Ms. Shea. That's right. And----
        The Chairman. My feeling is, maybe we should assist them to
    get wireless media so it will be there. It would be maintained
    by the local people. You put up some warning system, someone's
    going to forget to turn it on.
        Ms. Shea. Yeah.
        The Chairman. It's really providing a continuous service,
    in terms of some sort of weather service or whatever it might
    be. I should think, on a wireless basis, they would have gotten
    the information much better out there.
        Ms. Shea. I think that's true. And I think there are also
    some fairly low-tech solutions that include Hi-Fi radio, HF
    radio, and satellite downlinks in a wireless way from warning
    centers that then can be rebroadcast by HF radio. That's
    relatively inexpensive. The other is, then, combining that
    wireless link, the information that comes from the wireless
    link, with low-tech capabilities like warning flags or siren
    systems. Those two can be used without having to rely on that
    infrastructure that you so rightly point out is not available
    in many of these communities.
        The Chairman. Dr. Hansen, how about using those graduate
    students out there--I assume they're still watching--why don't
    you review our proposal to have this new Subcommittee of
    Disaster Prediction and Prevention, and ask them what they
    think we ought to go into. What should we ask the Subcommittee
    to start out on? What's the most important areas that we could
    look at to see where there are deficiencies in prediction and
    prevention? Could you do that for us?
        Dr. Hansen. Yes.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Hansen. I will.
        The Chairman. Senator Inouye?
        Senator Inouye. As we have demonstrated, it usually
    requires a disaster of biblical proportions to get all of us
    acting. For example, it took the tsunami disaster in Southeast
    Asia to bring about the creation of the Disaster Prevention and
    Prediction Subcommittee.
        I don't know if you have the expertise to respond, but do
    you believe that the bill that we are proposing, S. 50, would
    do what you believe is necessary?
        Ms. Shea. Yes. I think it's a really good start. I think
    that if I were looking at S. 50, I might suggest broadening the
    education components of S. 50, and I also might suggest that we
    look at ways of broadening that vulnerability and adaptation
    research component. And, in particular, leveraging ongoing
    activities. These same communities that are subject to tsunamis
    are also, as several people have mentioned today, subject to
    other coastal threats. There are other coastal warning systems
    out there. There are climate forecast systems out there, in the
    United States and around the world. And if we can leverage
    those, find those partnerships, we can make a significant
    advance in the receiver end of this problem without an
    investment of a significant amount of new resources. It's
    really about bringing those partnerships.
        Senator Inouye. Would you favor this Committee with the
    memos carrying out those proposals?
        Ms. Shea. Absolutely. Be happy to, Senator. Happy to.
        Senator Inouye. It would be very helpful.
        Ms. Shea. Great.
        [The information follows:]

                                               East-West Center
                                         Honolulu, HI, February 9, 2005
    Hon. Ted Stevens,
    Chairman,
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
    Washington, DC

    Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
    Ranking Minority Member,
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
    Washington, DC

        Dear Sirs:

        Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify last week on S. 50
    and the evolution of an effective U.S. tsunami warning and preparedness
    program. As I mentioned at the hearing, I am honored to be able to
    contribute in some small way to your efforts to build more disaster-
    resilient coastal communities in the U.S. and around the world. During
    the hearing, you asked me to provide you with some written suggestions
    to strengthen S. 50, including an outline of the elements of regional
    pilot projects focused on building the resilience of coastal
    communities. By way of this letter, I am pleased to respond to that
    request for additional information.
        First, I would like to reinforce the importance of setting tsunami
    warning and preparedness programs in a multi-hazard, risk management
    context as mentioned in Section 2(a)(10) of S. 50. As we discussed
    during the hearing, many of the elements of a program designed to
    improve warnings and enhance resilience in the face of low-frequency,
    high impact events such as tsunamis will also make important
    contributions to enhancing the resilience of coastal communities in the
    face of other natural hazards such as extreme weather events (floods,
    hurricanes, high wind and wave events) as well as the consequences of
    climate variability and change. I would encourage the Committee to
    respond to Section 2(a)(10) with a new title/section authorizing NOAA
    to work with other federal partners, state governments, academia, the
    extramural research community, and the private sector to implement a
    Disaster-Resilient Coastal Communities Vulnerability and Adaptation
    Program. Such a program would complement and build on the tsunami-
    specific hazard mitigation program called for in Section 4 of S. 50 but
    would provide a broader context in which to support various activities
    that can help coastal communities respond to a variety of hazards/
    threats. Pursuant to your request, I have included a description of the
    key components of such an integrated program as Appendix A to this
    letter.
        As we discussed briefly last week, this kind of integrated
    vulnerability assessment and adaptation program is perhaps best
    implemented on a regional scale since one size does not fit all when it
    comes to understanding vulnerability, providing useful and usable risk
    assessment information or developing effective risk management
    strategies. I would like to strongly endorse the idea of initiating
    this program through one or more regional pilot projects that would
    both demonstrate the value of the integrated programmatic approach
    described above and move quickly to reduce the vulnerability--enhance
    the resilience--of coastal communities particularly at risk to tsunamis
    and other natural hazards such as weather and climate-related extreme
    events.
        As I mentioned last week, I believe that the Pacific might be one
    such region based on its vulnerability to tsunamis, a dependence on
    climate-sensitive resources and sectors such as fisheries, tourism and
    agriculture; ongoing work in tsunami, weather and climate forecasting
    and assessment; and the institutional partnerships reflected in the
    Pacific Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO). Based on the testimony of my
    colleague from the University of Alaska, I believe that Alaska would be
    another high-priority candidate for a regional pilot program for many
    of the same reasons. I might suggest that a third regional program
    might be considered for the Atlantic seaboard with its vulnerability to
    coastal flooding and hurricanes. I would encourage consideration of at
    least three years for a regional pilot project along the lines
    described above with an eye toward sustaining the partnerships
    established during the pilot phase.
        My review of S. 50 identified a few additional specific suggestions
    for strengthening the bill. I have included those suggestions in
    Appendix B to this letter.
        Mahalo nui loa for the opportunity to provide this additional
    information as you continue your deliberations on S. 50.
            Aloha pumehana,
                                                Eileen L. Shea,
                                                       East-West Center
                                   Appendix A
    Key Components of a Disaster-Resilient Coastal Communities
            Vulnerability and Adaptation Program
        Such a program would complement and build on the tsunami-specific
    hazard mitigation program called for in Section 4 of S. 50 but would
    provide a broader context in which to support various activities that
    can help coastal communities respond to a variety of hazards/threats.
    Such an integrated program might include:

       The development of multi-hazard vulnerability maps that help
            governments, businesses and communities characterize and assess
            their current risks in the face of a variety of natural hazards
            and provide a baseline for assessing future risks;

       Multi-disciplinary vulnerability assessment research and
            dialogue to improve understanding of a coastal community's
            exposure and sensitivity to hazards as well as providing
            insights into adaptation options (policies, engineering,
            resource management) that would either reduce exposure and
            sensitivity or enhance resilience. The ultimate focus of this
            component of the program would be the integration of risk
            management considerations in the context of economic
            development and community development planning and policies. As
            I mentioned last week, this will involve more than a few,
            isolated studies of the socioeconomic impacts of hazards/
            natural disasters. Such a program will be most effective when
            it incorporates a collaborative, participatory approach that
            effectively engages scientific and technical experts as well as
            policy officials and decision-makers in government, businesses,
            academia, NGOs and community leaders in a process of shared
            learning and joint problem solving.

       Risk management education programs, including: (a) technical
            training on recent scientific developments in key hazard areas
            (e.g., tsunamis, weather extremes, climate variability and
            change) and new technologies; (b) leadership training to
            enhance the cadre of individuals and institutions responsible
            for risk assessment and risk management programs; and (c)
            formal and informal education programs and materials including
            public awareness brochures and campaigns as well as curriculum
            development;

       Risk assessment technology development including (but not
            limited to) developing practical applications of the insights
            gained from risk perception and risk communication research as
            well as the provision and application of new tools and
            technologies such as high resolution imagery and modeling,
            remote sensing and in situ observations and imagery, geospatial
            (GIS) technology, innovative uses of current and planned
            observing systems and model-based decision support tools;

       Risk management data and information services including: (a)
            access to observational data and derived products from relevant
            observing systems including, but not limited to the tsunami
            observing system of buoys and tide gauges authorized in S. 50
            as well as the weather, climate and hazard/risk management
            components of regional and global observing systems (e.g., the
            Integrated Ocean Observing System, the Global Climate Observing
            System and the Global Environmental Observations System of
            Systems); (b) developing and maintaining multi-disciplinary
            data sets on the nature and consequences of key hazards; and
            (c) development and provision of new, integrated data products
            that support risk assessment and risk management programs; and

       Risk communication systems that build on existing warning
            and forecast systems such as the expanded tsunami warning
            system called for in S. 50 as well as ongoing weather, climate
            and ocean monitoring and forecasting systems. This component of
            the program would also provide a focus for exploring the
            applicability of a variety of communications tools and
            technologies as well as the development of the social network
            of individuals and institutions involved in risk/hazard
            warning, response and recovery.

        This kind of integrated vulnerability assessment and adaptation
    program is perhaps best implemented on a regional scale since one size
    does not fit all when it comes to understanding vulnerability,
    providing useful and usable risk assessment information or developing
    effective risk management strategies. Criteria for identifying
    appropriate regional pilot projects in the context of S. 50 might
    include:

       Vulnerability to tsunamis as well as weather, climate and
            other coastal hazards;

       Dependence on economic sectors and natural resources that
            are particularly sensitive to coastal hazards such as coastal
            inundation as well as weather and climate-related extreme
            events such as hurricanes, floods, and high wave events;

       Opportunities to link to and leverage related ongoing
            regional risk observation, research, forecasting, assessment,
            education and risk management programs such as: the Pacific
            Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO) and/or the Alaska Tsunami
            Preparedness Program discussed during the February 2 hearing;
            NOAA's Regional Integrated Science and Assessment (RISA)
            program which focuses on climate-related risk management;
            regional coastal ocean observing system programs in support of
            the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS); and state
            coastal zone management programs with strong hazards/risk
            reduction components;

       Evidence of strong, interagency collaboration in the area of
            risk management; and

       Access to NOAA and other federal agency programs, facilities
            and infrastructure in tsunami and other coastal hazards
            monitoring, warning, forecasting, research, assessment and data
            management.

        I would encourage the Committee to consider funding such regional
    pilot programs for a three-to-five year period with annual funding
    levels reaching approximately $1M.
                                   Appendix B
    Additional Specific Suggestions to Strengthen S. 50
        The following specific suggestions to further strengthen S. 50 are
    also offered for your consideration:

       Add to the end of Section 2(a)(l0) ``and a sustained program
            of education and risk assessment to support the development of
            effective response strategies;

       In Section 7, Global Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Network,
            explicitly identify and authorize expanded support for the
            International Tsunami Information Center which NOAA hosts as
            part of the UNESCO/IOC tsunami program;

       Also in Section 7, I would encourage you to authorize NOAA
            to contribute to international tsunami education and
            vulnerability and adaptation programs as well as the detection
            equipment and technical advice already included in S. 50;

       Consider combining the discussion of ``Transfer of
            Technology, Maintenance and Upgrades'' that currently comprises
            Section 3(d) with the ``Tsunami System Upgrade and
            Modernization'' provisions of Section 6 under Section 3;

       More explicitly call out the importance of engaging state
            coastal zone management programs in the implementation of S.
            50; and

       Include a section on data management to authorize expanded
            support for efforts by NOAA to support the data management
            requirements associated with the expanded observing system
            called for in S. 50.

        In the context of this latter item, I might suggest inclusion of a
    new subsection--possibly under Section 3, Tsunami Detection and Warning
    Systems--that would authorize and direct NOAA to support the data
    management requirements associated with the Tsunami Detection and
    Warning System called for in S. 50. From my perspective, these
    requirements would include:

       Quality control and quality assurance for the ocean
            observation and geophysical data from the tsunami detection and
            monitoring system;

       Archiving and maintaining ocean observation data from the
            tsunami detection and monitoring system;

       Supporting the integration of ocean observations from the
            tsunami detection and monitoring system with other national and
            international water level measurements such as the Global Sea
            Level Monitoring System (GLOSS);

       Supporting the integration of ocean observations from the
            tsunami detection and monitoring system with other elements of
            the global and coastal components of the Integrated Ocean
            Observing System (IOOS) and the Global Environmental Observing
            System of Systems (GEOSS); and

       Supporting the development of and access to data sets and
            integrated data products designed to support multi-hazard
            regional vulnerability assessment and adaptation programs such
            as those called for in Title__.

        In addition to national data centers such as NODC, NGDC and NCDC,
    NOAA should look to regional data centers like the NOAA Integrated
    Environmental Applications and Information Center (NIEAIC) in Honolulu,
    HI to fulfill the requirements described in this section.

        Senator Inouye. Dr. Cox, this Committee has heard that
    Japan has already developed buildings, in place and
    operational, for tsunami purposes. Have you heard about them?
        Dr. Cox. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inouye. Are they working?
        Dr. Cox. To my knowledge, they're working. But I think
    that--if I could just continue that--I think the--how many
    people you could put into the building versus, you know,
    getting people to higher ground, I--I mean, I can't speak for
    the United States, but I think we have to consider whether or
    not we have a--sort of, a high concentration of people in a
    particular area, let's say at a resort community or something
    like that, then I think such a building might make sense. I
    think other times we have to consider just evacuating everybody
    to higher ground. I think we heard earlier that we can't have,
    sort of, a one-size-fits-all policy, but I think sometimes it
    may make sense to build tsunami-resistant structures in high-
    density places like a resort community.
        Senator Inouye. Dr. Hansen, I think statistics indicate
    that the State of Alaska is more prone than any other state to
    earthquakes and tsunamis. Are you satisfied that the warning
    system we have today is sufficient?
        Dr. Hansen. No, I'm not. I believe that it's insufficient
    in ways of getting the information out to the local
    communities. We're----
        Senator Inouye. How would you----
        Dr. Hansen.--in need of improving that.
        Senator Inouye.--improve that?
        Dr. Hansen. Right now, we're trying to establish--we're
    trying to exercise our established partnership to get out
    education and outreach programs. We visit communities. We've
    put together videos to help educate the populations of Alaska
    about the tsunami in our state. In addition, we're trying to
    work with leveraged moneys from the National Hazard Program and
    the university program to get sirens put out that have been
    developed under this--the National Program. Sirens then need to
    be triggered somehow, and so, we're working with the NOAA
    Tsunami Warning Center to put together the infrastructure we'll
    need to get out to communities where, say, NOAA Weather Wire
    doesn't work, or it doesn't work very well, and improve that
    infrastructure to get information out beyond just the local
    manager, but to the people that are in danger.
        Senator Inouye. Ever since the end of World War II, the
    State of Hawaii has maintained an air-raid siren system, and it
    blows off once a month, and some of the tourists go berserk,
    not knowing whether it's a bombing attack or tsunami, but it
    serves a little purpose.
        Ms. Shea, do you think it works?
        Ms. Shea. Oh, absolutely. I think that for low-frequency
    events, like tsunamis, I think we tend to forget--the
    population tends to forget, in the long period of time. But I
    think it's useful in the sense that when we hear it, in Hawaii,
    and we know that what it means is, if it's the first Monday of
    the month, we know it's a test. And if it's not the first
    Monday of the month, then we know there's something to be
    concerned about, and then we do turn to the television, the
    radio, call the local agencies, call the State Civil Defense.
    So it absolutely does work. Those low-technology but high-
    impact systems are really quite effective.
        Senator Inouye. Oftentimes, when we venture into something
    that's complex and new, we set up pilot programs. Do you think
    a pilot program would work in this situation?
        Ms. Shea. I think it would. I think pilot programs would
    be, in fact, very useful. And I think--again, look for those
    opportunities where you have areas at high risk--Alaska, the
    Pacific comes to mind in the case of tsunami--and also those
    areas where you're built--where these partnerships of other--of
    agencies working together already exist. And I think--so I
    think that--I think we've heard enough testimony today to
    suggest that there are probably a couple of places, at least,
    where a pilot project could demonstrate that partnership,
    demonstrate the different kinds of technology, and demonstrate
    the value of building this comprehensive risk-management
    information system.
        Senator Inouye. See, we have no idea what the costs will
    be, and a pilot program might be helpful.
        Ms. Shea. Yes.
        Senator Inouye. Can members of the panel provide us with
    your ideas of what, if any, the pilot program should look like?
        Ms. Shea. Absolutely.
        Senator Inouye. I would appreciate that.
        Dr. Cox. Yes, thank you.
        Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        And, Dr. Hansen, I think I'm indebted to you for this, a
    copy of ``Ocean Fury: Tsunamis in Alaska.'' Let me read to the
    Senator, what this says. It says, ``Future tsunamis will hit
    Alaska. Taking its cue from the survivors of 1964, this program
    explains how scientists, local officials, and emergency
    responders are working together to reduce the loss of life and
    property when tsunamis assault Alaska's coast again. With the
    aid of 3D computer graphics, scientists describe how different
    kinds of tsunamis form, how they can travel at jetliner speeds,
    sometimes striking shorelines with little or no time to escape.
    More important, this program describes what you should do to
    improve your chances of surviving the next tsunami.''
        I hope, Dr. Hansen, you've provided a copy of this to every
    school in the state.
        Dr. Hansen. The emergency management group is doing that
    kind of thing, that's exactly right.
        The Chairman. That should be a program that all young
    people should look at so they can understand there's something
    out there to prepare for.
        We thank you very much. You demonstrate that this a issue
    of substantial concern to where we come from, the two of us,
    and we appreciate you--have you got another copy? I'll give
    that to Senator Inouye.
        Dr. Hansen. I don't with me, but I can get you one.
        The Chairman. One of those graduate students will mail me
    one.
        [Laughter.]
        The Chairman. We do thank you very much for taking the time
    to come here. It's very important. This is our first hearing.
    The two of us, as Co-Chairmen of this Commerce Committee, we
    wanted everyone to understand this is going to be one of our
    number-one targets, to really deal with prevention and
    detection of disasters.
        Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. The
    December 26th Indian Ocean Tsunami was a terrible tragedy.
        The sheer devastation inflicted by the tsunami reminds us all how
    vulnerable our coastlines are to widespread damage. In California, this
    is a serious threat because we are home to miles of beautiful coastal
    communities, well within reach of potential damage caused by tsunamis.
        Californians have confronted tsunamis in the past. On March 28,
    1964, a tsunami originating from an earthquake near Alaska hit the
    Northern California community of Crescent City, killing 10 people, and
    damaging 91 homes and 197 businesses. The power of this tsunami was so
    intense, large buildings in Crescent City were uplifted by the force of
    the waves.
        The Cape Mendocino earthquake in 1992 created a tsunami that
    wreaked havoc along California's northern coastline. Thankfully, there
    were no deaths, but the 1992 tsunami highlights the need for
    notification of a tsunami as well as public outreach efforts.
        One of the many lessons learned from the 1964 and 1992 tsunamis was
    that proper warning and evacuation truly saves lives. First, we need to
    ensure there are enough buoys to protect the California coast from
    tsunamis. Currently, only three out of the six buoys deployed in the
    Pacific Ocean are functional.
        Second, coastal communities need adequate funding so that they can
    become tsunami ready. Since the time of the 1964 tsunami, Crescent City
    has made tremendous strides to protect its residents by implementing
    tsunami emergency plans, installing warning sirens, and creating a
    tsunami education program. As a result, Crescent City has been honored
    by NOAA as a TsunamiReady community.
        However, much more is needed to make sure all of our coastal
    communities are as well prepared as Crescent City is today.
        After consulting with the California Office of Emergency Services
    (OES), my staff has been informed that California is in dire need of
    more funding that will help map potential inundation zones, and that
    will help educate the public.
        According to OES, only $88,000 in federal funding is given annually
    for tsunami evaluation and preparation in California's 15 coastal
    communities, and only two are TsunamiReady by NOAA standards. Tsunami
    taskforces in California have said they need more money to erect
    warning signs on county beaches, plan evacuation routes, and conduct
    public outreach efforts.
        Mr. Chairman, we must do more to ensure that our citizens living
    near the coast are well-educated and better prepared to deal with a
    tsunami, and our emergency officials have the necessary funding to
    achieve this goal.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                                     ______

              Prepared Statement of Doug Carlson, Honolulu, Hawaii
        Mr. Chairman, it is highly probable that tens of thousands of
    people died around the Indian Ocean rim on December 26, 2004 because an
    agency of the United States Government was unprepared to issue an
    effective tsunami warning to the region's population. This inference
    can be made with great certainty based on the public record and the
    statements of numerous Federal Government employees.
        The warning failure occurred even though Pacific Tsunami Warning
    Center (PTWC) scientists first suspected the existence of the tsunami
    as much as two-thirds of an hour before the first waves struck Sri
    Lanka, India and Thailand. That is clearly established in the tsunami
    timeline by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (Ref:
    http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2004/s2358.htm)
        It's true that scientists did not initially know that a 9.0
    magnitude earthquake had struck near Indonesia. They first calculated
    the magnitude at 8.0, which they felt would have triggered only a
    localized tsunami or no tsunami at all.
        Others may wish to investigate the too-low estimate of the
    earthquake's strength with a goal of improving early forecasting
    techniques. The intent of my testimony, however, is to demonstrate that
    the communications protocols that existed on December 26 were
    inadequate to issue an effective warning and that U.S. officials may
    not have been sufficiently trained or sensitized to the importance of
    calling on the news media for assistance.
        We know from numerous media interviews with the scientists that
    about an hour after the earthquake they felt a need to alert people in
    the Indian Ocean region about a possible tsunami. We also know that
    they felt handicapped by the absence of a high-tech tsunami detection
    and alert-dissemination system in the region. Nothing around the Indian
    Ocean approximates the sophistication of the Pacific Rim tsunami
    warning network.
        To their credit, the Center's personnel wanted to take some kind of
    action to alert the region. According to the Center's director, as
    quoted in The International Herald Tribune: ``We wanted to try to do
    something, but without a plan in place then, it was not an effective
    way to issue a warning, or to have it acted upon.'' (Ref: http://
    www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/28/news/warning.html)
        Without a notification plan, the scientists resorted to telephoning
    their colleagues in south Asia, with virtually no success. What they
    did not do was telephone the major international news media, such as
    the Associated Press, CNN, the BBC, Reuters or any other news
    organization with world-wide communications capabilities.
        In other words, in the 41 minutes between issuing a bulletin that
    mentioned a possible tsunami and when the first waves are now thought
    to have reached Sri Lanka, the scientists used the telephone to call
    one person at a time rather than call the mass media to help issue a
    warning through their broadcast and cable networks.
        A NOAA spokesperson later gave what may be the most telling comment
    about the PTWC's crisis communications preparedness: ``Not only was the
    center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list
    of media contacts.'' (Ref:
    http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050107-050909-7208r.htm)
        Would alerting the news media in those first critical minutes have
    made a difference in how many people died in south Asia? With proper
    planning and coordination of media protocols, I'm certain lives could
    have been saved.
        And I'm not alone. Many others around the world have questioned the
    lack of an effective warning. A woman in Sri Lanka who lost her father,
    sister and niece was interviewed by National Public Radio: ``Why didn't
    we receive warning? We had two hours after Indonesian quake, and at
    least five minutes warning would have helped. Five minutes would have
    saved my father's life.'' (Ref: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
    story.php?storyId=4277/95)
        On January 11, the day NOAA's administrator visited the PTWC and
    met with the Honolulu news media, I posted questions on my web log site
    that I felt might well be directed to him. They are still relevant
    today:

       Will NOAA release the PTWC's crisis communications plan? (If
            not, why not?)

       What liaison did NOAA accomplish with the major media
            (Associated Press, CNN, BBC, etc.) before 12/26 to ensure
            emergency phone calls to these media would produce timely
            warnings to their audiences?

       Are PTWC scientists trained to telephone the media to issue
            life-saving warnings?

       Is the PTWC too high-tech oriented? Do you think low-tech
            telephone calls have a place in your pre-crisis planning and
            emergency warning protocols?

       Have you ordered changes in the PTWC warning protocols since
            the tsunami?

       Does NOAA accept responsibility for an internal procedural
            failure that might have cost the lives of tens of thousands of
            people in South Asia?

       What is NOAA telling south Asia nations about its
            performance on 12/26?

       What are your personal feelings about NOAA's performance on
            12/26?

        The administrator did answer many media questions that day,
    including a variation of the last one. According to the Honolulu Star-
    Bulletin, he called the PTWC staff's actions ``excellent'' and faithful
    to the warning procedures in place. ``This is a group that believes in
    saving lives and protecting property at all costs,'' he said. (Ref:
    http://starbulletin.com/2005/01/12/news/index1.html)
        The sad fact is the ``warning procedures in place'' on December 26
    saved no lives and protected no property. Nothing PTWC scientists knew
    or did that day helped people in the tsunami danger zone.
        I respectfully submit to this Committee that the PTWC's apparent
    inability to issue effective warnings is unacceptable. I have proposed
    a five-point program that would help NOAA shift its thinking and its
    culture to include meaningful media notification after future tsunami-
    generating earthquakes:

       NOAA should accept constructive criticism--rather than
            deny--that actions it could have undertaken likely would have
            saved lives in south Asia.

       NOAA should resolve to change its communications culture to
            include reevaluating the scope of its information-disseminating
            mission--i.e., whether its mission extends beyond the Pacific
            Rim.

       NOAA should rewrite its communications protocols to include
            early telephone calls to news organizations that have the
            capability of sending worldwide tsunami warnings.

       NOAA should accomplish high-level coordination with the
            management of these news agencies to ensure proper execution of
            the alerts when received by the media.

       NOAA should train its personnel to respond to suspected
            tsunamis by making direct person-to-person contact with major
            news outlets based on prior planning.

        The media can be an efficient way to send warnings to threatened
    populations when time is of the essence, and NOAA would do well to
    integrate them into its crisis communications planning. Thank you for
    the opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on this important
    matter.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
                        Brigadier General John J. Kelly
    Failure of DART Buoys and Long Term Tsunami Funding Needs
        General Kelly, in your testimony, you noted the failure of three of
    the six Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) buoys
    used to detect tsunami in the event of an earthquake. As you know,
    these buoys are extremely important to our coastal communities, both in
    detecting tsunami that pose a threat to these communities, and in
    preventing expensive evacuations by detecting false alarms. I am
    concerned that these problems have existed for over 15 months and
    Congress is just now learning of this situation.
        Had there been a devastating tsunami in the Pacific this December,
    instead of in the Indian Ocean, and we found out 3 of the DART buoys
    were down, this hearing would have a very different tone. We would like
    to avoid ever having such a situation arise.
        Question 1. What are NOAA's plans for instituting better oversight
    procedures to ensure that contractors are meeting the specifications of
    the system?
        Answer. NOAA has existing procedures in place to ensure contractor
    performance meets the specifications of the DART station. The quality
    of work by the contractors is not a reason for buoy failure. Buoys can
    fail for a variety of reasons related to technology, mechanical or
    mooring systems.

        Question 1a. When can we expect all six DART buoys to be
    operational again?
        Answer. One of the three buoys is now operational, and once the
    weather permits, NOAA is ready to repair the other two. We expect all 6
    DART stations to be operational by summer 2005, and we will follow our
    maintenance schedule to ensure they remain functional. While it is not
    possible to guarantee that these prototype stations will be operational
    100 percent of the time, NOAA is focused on making the DART network
    more robust.

        Question 1b. Will you notify Congress in a timely fashion if other
    failures occur?
        Answer. For any outages of longer than 60 days, NOAA will notify
    the Committee of the status of the network. Additionally, the Committee
    can visit the National Data Buoy Center website for up-to-date
    information on the status of the DART buoys (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/
    dart.shtml).

        Question 1c. How will you ensure these buoys--and the new buoys--
    are serviced regularly and stay in operational condition?
        Answer. NOAA will ensure all DART stations are serviced regularly
    to ensure operational condition to the greatest extent possible. NOAA
    plans for the network to meet operational requirements, even with
    occasional DART station outages. NOAA will develop capabilities to
    address network coverage and redundancy to ensure, as best we can, that
    single DART station failures will not impact the integrity of the
    entire network. Planned redundancy and hardening of the infrastructure,
    combined with the addition of a two-way communication capability, will
    mitigate risk from system-wide failures. In addition to these measures,
    NOAA is also procuring three redundant DART buoys for the Alaska DART
    buoy array and will acquire 10 spare DART buoys as part of expansion of
    the tsunami warning system in FY 2005 and FY 2006. These spare buoys
    will ensure that NOAA can rapidly respond to buoy failure. As the
    expanded network is transitioned from a prototype to a fully
    operational network, NOAA will inform Congress of any outages impacting
    the integrity of the network as a whole.

        Question 2. Funding. The President has committed $37.5 million over
    the next two years (through the end of Fiscal Year 2006) to expand the
    tsunami warning system. Of that funding, how much will go towards (1)
    inundation mapping for all coastal communities; (2) continued
    technology research and development for next generation equipment and
    forecasting; and (3) public education to ensure our communities are
    prepared?
        Answer. Of the $24M scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $4.75M
    will be spent on inundation mapping and modeling, as well as education
    and outreach (e.g., community preparedness activities including
    TsunamiReady). Of this $4.75M, approximately $2.25M will be spent on
    inundation mapping and modeling and $2.5M will go towards public
    education activities. Following the current plan, inundation mapping
    for the major population centers will be complete in 2015. Of the $24M
    scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $1.0M will be directed to support
    Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoy research
    and development activities.

        Question 2a. What are the out-year costs (beyond Fiscal Year 2006)
    of maintaining in working order the entire expanded detection system,
    and the associated tsunami programs?
        Answer. By the middle of calendar year 2007, NOAA expects to fully
    deploy the new suite of DART stations, to continue accelerated
    inundation mapping and modeling activities, and to continue accelerated
    community preparedness activities. NOAA anticipates additional
    operation and maintenance (O&M) costs to maintain the expanded
    detection network in working order, as well as continued costs for
    efforts in tsunami inundation mapping and education/outreach programs.
    The level of funding required beyond FY 2006 will be determined through
    the budget process.

    Agency Participation in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
        Question 3. Both you and Ms. Shea have provided testimony about the
    importance of interagency cooperation in the National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program, specifically cooperation among the National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Geological
    Survey (USGS), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I have some questions about FEMA's
    role in the program.
        In 1996, the Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Federal/State Working Group
    presented its Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Implementation Plan to the
    Senate Appropriations Committee. In this plan, FEMA was given
    responsibilities to produce inundation and evacuation maps, and to
    implement state and local tsunami mitigation programs. The
    Implementation Plan called for over $2.2 million in funding from FEMA
    to carry out these responsibilities--including mapping and mitigation.
        How much funding or in-kind work has FEMA contributed to this
    interagency program since 1996? How does this compare with the other
    federal and state agency contributions?
        Answer. Under the original National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
    Program (NTHMP), FEMA responsibilities were limited to the mitigation
    and implementation of the mapping. While the original plan may have
    called for FEMA funding, under the NTHMP there was no funding made
    available for FEMA.
        Up until last year, FEMA contribution to the NTHMP has primarily
    been in-kind support. This includes the support of two FEMA Regional
    staff members who have been members of the NTHMP Mitigation committee
    since its inception. At least one regional staff person has spent 25
    percent of her time on the tsunami hazard over a 10-year period. A
    rough estimate of staff time and travel over this time is approximately
    $200,000. In addition, one FEMA Headquarters scientist has also been
    involved in this committee as a technical liaison for several years.
        As described in further detail in question 3b, for the first three
    years of the NTHMP, FEMA was the distribution agency for the NOAA state
    grant funding. This was done since NOAA did not have a mechanism to
    transfer funds to the states, while FEMA did. While the actual funds
    came from NOAA, this activity did require significant staff resources
    on the part of FEMA.
        Also described in further detail in question 3a, FEMA jointly co-
    funded a $400,000 project with NOAA to study and develop tsunami
    shelter design guidance. This project builds on a first phase, which
    involved a five-state engineer concept feasibility workshop funded by
    NOAA and led by the State of Washington and the identification of
    existing guidance material. The project will work with the engineering
    community and the states to research and produce the construction
    design guidance for a tsunami shelter structure capable of withstanding
    both the severe ground shaking expected during a design earthquake and
    specific velocities and water pressure that a tsunami will bring to
    bear on structures. The product will be especially useful to low-lying
    communities that lack evacuation access to high ground following a
    local great earthquake and that may have to rely on vertical evacuation
    in existing buildings.
        FEMA has also jointly funded 66 percent of a $412,000 pilot project
    through its National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) with NOAA and the
    USGS to develop risk identification products that will help communities
    understand their actual level of risk from tsunami in a way that could
    be conveyed on FEMA's existing flood hazard maps. The goal of the
    project is to develop techniques that can be used to determine the
    probability and magnitude of tsunami in other communities along the
    west coast of the United States. The location of the pilot project is
    Seaside, Oregon. FEMA's NFIP is involved because FEMA is responsible
    for mapping areas subject to flooding in order to properly rate flood
    insurance policies and provide risk assessment information to states
    and local communities.
        In addition, it should be noted that FEMA's NFIP has considered
    tsunami wave heights during the development of its Flood Insurance Rate
    Maps since the late 1970's for areas of Hawaii and the West Coast where
    tsunami was considered a significantly probable flood threat. The NFIP
    flood maps still reflect tsunami wave heights for areas such as Hawaii
    where inundation heights from that hazard are considered that most
    probable form of flooding.
        Other federal agencies that participate in the National Tsunami
    Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) include NOAA, which has contributed
    approximately $27M, and USGS. The five states participating in the
    NTHMP (Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, and California) have
    contributed a total of $5.0M in in-kind contributions since FY 1997.

        Question 3a. Has NOAA transferred funds to FEMA in order for the
    agency to perform any work for the program? Please explain.
        Answer. There are two instances of NOAA transferring funds to FEMA
    to perform work under the program. First, as mentioned above, was that
    for the first three years NOAA transferred the state grant funds to
    FEMA, who then distributed those funds through our existing State
    Emergency Management Preparedness Grant program. FEMA did not receive
    any compensation for managing this activity. NOAA subsequently took
    over this function and has been distributing the state grants directly.
        Second, also mentioned above, FEMA and NOAA jointly funded a
    project to determine if it is possible to design and build a structure
    to withstand specific tsunami loads and, if so, to develop technical
    design and construction guidance for special shelter facilities that
    would allow for vertical evacuation. Funding for this two-year $400,000
    effort is equally divided between FEMA, through the National Earthquake
    Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), and NOAA, through the NTHMP. The
    project will produce construction design guidance for a tsunami shelter
    structure capable of withstanding both the severe ground shaking
    expected during a design earthquake and specific velocities and water
    pressure from a tsunami that would impact structures. This is a
    significant challenge since current design practice takes into account
    earthquake or coastal storm surge but does not address stronger forces
    that a tsunami would generate. The project, which is being done under
    contract, was initiated last fall and is just getting underway.
        A potential future phase of this project may include developing
    information for states and local communities on how this tsunami
    shelter design guidance can be utilized. This information would
    especially be critical for low-lying communities that lack evacuation
    access to high ground following a local earthquake and that may have to
    rely on vertical evacuation. Future funding would be equally divided
    between NOAA and FEMA.

        Question 3b. Given that FEMA's priorities have shifted from natural
    disaster mitigation to preparing and responding to terror attacks, how
    much funding and effort can FEMA reasonably be expected to contribute
    in the post-9/11 environment?
        Answer. Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
    focused on terrorism and protecting the homeland, it is also committed
    to an all-hazards approach of preparedness for, response to, recovery
    from, and mitigation against all events, including natural disasters.
    Recent efforts to improve response to and recovery from a terrorism
    event does not diminish FEMA's commitment to dealing with the
    destruction of a natural disaster--just the opposite. FEMA has enjoyed
    a long history of focusing on an all-hazards approach, and being part
    of DHS has strengthened that approach. FEMA has successfully continued
    to respond to and recover from a multitude of natural disasters in the
    past year. At the same time, these efforts provide FEMA with
    opportunities not only to better prepare for terrorism events, but also
    for catastrophic events, whether they are natural or caused by
    terrorism.

        Question 3c. What financial burden does this place on NOAA, as the
    primary federal partner, as well as on the states?
        Answer. FEMA's participation has not placed any financial burdens
    on NOAA. NOAA is not in a position to comment on financial burden
    placed on the states.
    Tsunami and Earthquake Program Compatability
        Question 4. As you may know, Congress recently enacted this
    Committee's reauthorization of the multi-agency National Earthquake
    Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), which is aimed at both improving
    earthquake detection and community resilience to earthquakes--including
    building construction and planning guidelines. Similarly, S. 50, would
    authorize NOAA's National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP),
    another multi-agency program involving many of the witnesses here
    today.
        Looking at these two programs together, are the activities of the
    Earthquake program consistent with the goals of the Tsunami program?
    For instance, is a building designed to be earthquake resilient also
    designed to be resilient against tsunami?
        Answer. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)
    activities, under the leadership of the National Institute of Standards
    and Technology (NIST), are consistent with those of the National
    Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. NEHRP operates the Global
    Seismographic Network and the National Earthquake Information Center,
    which provide data essential to the tsunami warning system. Currently,
    buildings designed to be earthquake resilient are not also designed to
    be resilient against tsunamis. NEHRP has a nascent effort to develop
    tsunami hazard maps and design criteria for shelters and critical
    facilities in cooperation with the Tsunami program. While it would not
    be economically feasible to build a typical structure to withstand a
    tsunami, NEHRP believes that structures could be designed to withstand
    at least some specific level of tsunami without collapse. This is
    especially important for buildings such as community shelters or
    critical facilities (e.g., hospitals).

        Question 4a. Does the Earthquake Program have any programs or
    approaches that should be adopted by the Tsunami program? For example,
    should we expand programs regarding construction and planning?
        Answer. The Administration has recently proposed significant
    expansion of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. The
    primary goal of this proposed expansion is to develop and maintain a
    fully operational tsunami warning system. While construction practices
    may be of interest, our efforts are currently focused on improving our
    Nation's tsunami warning capabilities.

        Question 4b. Has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
    participated meaningfully or financially in either program? Are there
    limitations that we should know about?
        Answer. FEMA has the opportunity to play an important role as a
    participant in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP).
    The NTHMP receives strong regional level support from FEMA Region X,
    whose staff attends all NTHMP meetings. FEMA Region X also supports
    including tsunamis as part of the FEMA National Flood Insurance
    Program, and has funded a pilot project being conducted by NOAA to
    evaluate this inclusion. NOAA does not participate in the National
    Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP), and therefore cannot speak
    to FEMA's contributions to that program. Our federal partners, such as
    NSF, NIST, and USGS, are better suited to address FEMA's participation
    in the NEHRP.

        Question 4c. How can we improve coordination and better define
    agency roles in our legislation?
        Answer. An effective National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
    requires active participation of key federal and state partners. NOAA
    believes this can be accomplished within the existing NTHMP.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                        Brigadier General John J. Kelly
        Question 1. I recently visited the Pacific Marine Environmental
    Laboratory (PMEL) in Seattle, which, as you know, provides research
    support for all aspects of the U.S. tsunami program. I was extremely
    impressed by their work and dedication and I thank you for your support
    of this critical facility. As I'm sure you know, PMEL developed the
    DART buoys, which are, and will be, a critical component of our
    Nation's tsunami warning system. These technologies have greatly
    reduced the number of false tsunami alerts, which helps people take
    real alarms seriously. However, I was troubled to learn that three out
    of the six buoys in the Pacific Ocean, including the one off
    Washington's coastline, are currently not functioning properly. An
    emergency repair last month only lasted four days, and then a few days
    ago the buoy started working again. What this situation illustrates, I
    believe, is the need for more reliable buoys and a more redundant
    system. When I visited PMEL, I learned they were working on developing
    a new generation of buoys that would be more reliable, have a longer
    working life, have improved two-way communications, and hopefully be
    less expensive to produce than the older models. Can you please explain
    how you feel passage of this legislation will accelerate the timeline
    for completion of these buoys? Will the buoys deployed under the
    Administration's plan be more reliable?
        Answer. NOAA agrees that we need a reliable and redundant tsunami-
    warning system, and we have accounted for some redundancy in our plan.
    It is important to note that the current DART network (DART I) is a
    research system that was only recently (October 2003) transitioned into
    operations. As you mentioned, the DART stations are being redesigned to
    include redundant features so that they will better withstand the harsh
    conditions in the northern Pacific. The redundant capabilities built
    into the stations will increase the life span of the DART systems, as
    will routine maintenance of the stations. NOAA will also maintain three
    redundant in-water backup stations in the Gulf of Alaska, where sea
    conditions are particularly harsh and servicing buoys can be difficult.
        The Administration's plan was developed in response to the Indian
    Ocean Tsunami, and is designed to improve and expand coverage for the
    United States. This plan represents an accelerated version of NOAA's
    current efforts through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
    (NTHMP), and has accelerated the timeline for completion of the full
    network of DART stations. The U.S. Tsunami Warning System, as described
    in the Administration's plan, will use the funds over the next two
    years to expand U.S. tsunami detection and monitoring capabilities. The
    complete network of 39 DART stations is planned to be fully operational
    by mid-2007. These measures will provide the United States with nearly
    100 percent detection capability for a U.S. coastal tsunami, allowing
    response within minutes.
        The buoys that will be deployed in the Administration's plan are
    those you describe--capable of two way communications and we expect
    this next generation DART system, DART II, to be more reliable. As
    there is always room for improvement, the Administration's 2-year plan
    also provides $1M for research and development for future innovation of
    the DART network.

        Question 2. I understand the next major tsunami to hit the
    Washington coast could originate from an earthquake along the Cascadia
    plate rather than a deep ocean earthquake. However, the buoy-based
    warning system would be largely useless detecting a near-shore tsunami.
    Are there ways to make our current tsunami warning system more
    effective for mitigating near-shore hazards? For example, the NSF's
    NEPTUNE program to wire the Juan de Fuca plate with fiber optic lines
    seems to be supportive of these efforts. Do you feel that there are
    other technologies or approaches Congress should consider funding that
    might produce more timely warning for near-shore generated tsunamis?
        Answer. Near-shore generated tsunamis present a difficult
    challenge. NOAA and federal, state and local emergency managers have
    ensured warning dissemination capabilities are in place for people to
    receive tsunami warnings. With response time for these events measured
    in ``minutes'' rather than ``hours,'' education and outreach are
    critical, as with tornadoes, to enable people to understand their
    vulnerabilities and take appropriate action immediately. The
    Administration's plan includes $2.5M for education and outreach
    efforts, including NOAA's TsunamiReady program.

        Question 3. On my recent visit to PMEL, I learned that Washington
    State is vulnerable not only to tsunamis generated by distant
    earthquakes in the North Pacific Ocean or the closer Cascadia
    subduction zone, but also from faults within the Puget Sound. In fact,
    there is a fault line that goes right across Puget Sound and downtown
    Seattle. While the last major earthquake event happened in the year
    1100, scientists believe another event could happen at any time.
    Although a Puget Sound generated tsunami would provide almost no time
    to effectively evacuate citizens to higher ground, the vulnerability
    assessments and inundation mapping authorized by this bill is critical
    to inform city planners on future siting and permitting considerations.
    Can you tell me the current plans to analyze the tsunami risk for
    inland bodies of water like the Puget Sound?
        Answer. The impact of tsunamis on inland bodies of water, such as
    the Puget Sound, is being researched by NOAA through inundation mapping
    and computer modeling efforts. The analysis of risks to areas such as
    these is included in NOAA's inundation mapping efforts.

        Question 4. Considering the short warning time for earthquake-
    derived tsunamis within the Puget Sound, are there other technologies
    that you think could provide more timely warning to these inland areas?
        Answer. Issuing improved local tsunami warnings due to near-shore
    earthquakes requires enhanced earthquake detection capabilities. The
    U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which operates the Advanced National
    Seismic System to detect domestic earthquakes and jointly operates the
    Global Seismographic Network (GSN) with the National Science
    Foundation, is best suited to answer this question. However, the
    Administration's plan includes funding for upgraded seismometers used
    to improve tsunami detection and includes funding for improvements to
    the GSN. Most tsunamis are triggered by seismic events, and
    improvements to the GSN are critical to (1) quickly determine the
    precise location of the seismic event (2) its precise magnitude and (3)
    quickly disseminate this information to the USGS National Earthquake
    Information Center and the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers. Prior planning
    and rapid response are the most effective means of minimizing
    casualties in any local tsunami event. People must be educated to move
    to higher ground if they are in tsunami threatened area and can feel a
    strong ground shaking. Until we are able to forecast earthquakes, we
    are limited in how well we can forecast local tsunami events.

        Question 5. I am grateful for NOAA's work through the TsunamiReady
    program preparing coastal communities for tsunami hazards. However, you
    yourself noted in your testimony that very few coastal communities
    currently meet NOAA's standards of tsunami preparedness. In fact, only
    three Washington State communities qualify as ``tsunami ready'' under
    NOAA's program. How do you plan to work with communities and local
    emergency response agencies to improve and develop emergency response
    strategies?
        Answer. NOAA is committed to accelerating and expanding its
    TsunamiReady community program to all at-risk communities. The
    Administration's plan provides $2.5M to NOAA over two years to support
    public education activities, including community preparedness
    activities such as the TsunamiReady Program. While NOAA recognizes
    achieving TsunamiReady status requires significant state and local
    support, NOAA will continue working with local communities to leverage
    existing assets and community warning preparedness programs, which
    provide the foundation for allowing a community to become
    ``TsunamiReady.'' NOAA will also continue to work with communities and
    local emergency response agencies interested in developing or improving
    emergency response strategies, through our participation in the
    National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP).

        Question 6. Although I am very concerned about the threat of a
    tsunami to a coastal or Puget Sound community, I would also like to
    state for the record that I remain concerned about all hazards.
    Therefore, it is important to me that related threats be considered
    when investing resources in tsunami preparedness. Do you see ways in
    which earthquake preparedness can be combined with tsunami preparedness
    with the passage of this bill? Please explain if you see opportunities
    to maximize hazard preparedness by preparing for both earthquake and
    tsunami threats.
        Answer. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)
    activities, under the leadership of the National Institute of Standards
    and Technology (NIST) and other experts, are consistent with those of
    the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program.

        Question 7. Like Senator Stevens, I am concerned about coordination
    of agency efforts to ensure effective use of resources and efficient
    warning systems. I understand that the National Earthquake Information
    Center of the USGS is the recognized worldwide authority for rapid
    earthquake detection and location and already has most of the
    technological resources to provide earthquake information rapidly to
    anyone globally. I would like to know specifically how the NOAA tsunami
    warning centers and the USGS NEIC can coordinate to make sure that we
    create the best warning system possible without duplication of effort.
        Answer. NOAA and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) National
    Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) currently coordinate to make sure
    that we have the best, and most efficient, tsunami warning system
    possible. The USGS operates the Advanced National Seismic System
    domestically and jointly operates the Global Seismographic Network
    (GSN) with the National Science Foundation. These networks provide data
    in real time to NOAA's tsunami warning centers through the USGS NEIC.
    The NEIC has a direct link into the NOAA dissemination network, which
    immediately transmits earthquake information to the NOAA tsunami
    warning centers. NOAA, USGS, and FEMA are members of the NTHMP and as
    such, have worked together to ensure coordination. Installation of the
    Consolidated Reporting of Earthquakes and Tsunamis (CREST) system is an
    example of coordination between NOAA and USGS to strengthen the ability
    to rapidly detect tsunamigenic earthquakes.

        Question 8. I understand that the conditions in which the DART
    buoys operate can be dangerous and that a certain rate of equipment
    failure may be unavoidable. However, I'm concerned that 3 of 6 DART
    buoys are currently unreliable, including the buoy off the Washington
    coast. In your estimation, what is the failure rate of these buoys and
    the new buoys that might succeed the current generation of DART buoys?
    Given that failure rate, what is your estimation of the average
    effectiveness of this system?
        Answer. While it is true that, at the time of the hearing, 2 of the
    6 DART stations were offline, this does not indicate that these buoys
    are unreliable in general. The reliability of the DART stations, since
    October 2003, the time when they were transitioned from a research
    program of NOAA Research to an operational program of NOAA's National
    Weather Service, has been 72 percent. This percentage represents the
    combined number of hours the stations have been operational, and
    indicates that the DART station array is a highly effective system
    overall. Our goal is to have a fully capable network of 29 DART
    stations in the Pacific, with 3 additional in-water backups on the Gulf
    of Alaska. While it is not possible to guarantee that these prototype
    stations will be operational 100 percent of the time, NOAA is focused
    making the DART I network more robust and deploying a DART II network
    with reliability built into the design. NOAA plans for the network to
    meet operational requirements, even with occasional DART station
    outages. NOAA will develop capabilities to address network coverage and
    redundancy to ensure, as best we can, that single DART station failures
    will not impact the integrity of the entire network. Planned redundancy
    and hardening of the infrastructure, combined with the addition of a
    two-way communication capability, will mitigate risk from system-wide
    failures.

        Question 9. Confronted with a fresh reminder of the potential
    devastation of an off-shore, tsunami-causing earthquake, I share
    Senator Stevens' concern about ensuring sufficient warning systems are
    in place so that loss of human life can be minimized. Senator Stevens
    requested an estimation of what it would take to establish a
    comprehensive tsunami notification system. I am very interested in your
    response and ask that you please forward me a copy of your answer to
    Senator Stevens' question.
        Answer. A copy of the NOAA response to Senators Stevens and Inouye
    (as well as the incoming letter from the Senators) was faxed to your
    staff (Amit Ronen) on Thursday, March 3, 2005.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
                        Brigadier General John J. Kelly
    Voice Sirens for Effective, Reliable Tsunami Warning
        Question 1. Effective tsunami warning should rely on a variety of
    redundant modes of communication. While there are several technologies
    for communicating tsunami warnings highlighted in the Tsunami
    Preparedness Act of 2005 (S. 50), it is a concern that voice capable
    sirens are not among the technologies mentioned. Emergency managers
    have long depended on sirens to warn the public of emergency and civil
    defense situations including tsunamis, tornados, floods, hurricanes,
    hazardous material accidents, and of a potential nuclear attack.
        Sirens have a number of significant advantages: they insure that
    all residents and visitors to a particular area can be informed without
    regard to the cell phone or pager technology platform or provider they
    may have, when equipped with backup power supplies they will work even
    when the electricity or phone lines are out; when equipped with live
    public address or pre-recorded messages they can be used BEFORE and
    AFTER the incident to communicate important public safety information.
        Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part of a
    preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
    other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
    criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
    of tsunami?
        Answer. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
    works with the emergency management community to ensure warnings are
    received by the public in as many ways as possible--including cell
    phones, pagers, Internet, NOAA Weather Radio All-Hazards, television,
    radio, and sirens. All of these methods are effective, and emergency
    managers must decide how to best warn the public. NOAA's dissemination
    systems are available for the emergency management community to use in
    broadcasting emergency messages. NOAA will continue working with
    federal, state and local emergency managers to ensure warnings are as
    widely distributed as possible. Some National Weather Service Offices
    also issue tsunami warnings via High Frequency (HF) and Very High
    Frequency (VHF) marine radio as well, as do other federal agencies.
    There are no unique criteria for determining which warning systems are
    reliable for tsunamis.

        Question 1a. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
    for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
    inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
        Answer. A comprehensive preparedness plan must address how to get
    messages to people, whenever they need it, wherever they are. NOAA
    Weather Radio All-Hazards is an effective way to reach fishing boats
    near the coast. There are other alternatives available as well,
    including satellite based communications links (Internet and cell
    phone). We employ all possible methods of delivering warnings to those
    at risk.
    Improving Tsunami Prediction and Preparedness
        Question 2. NOAA's National Weather Service has been able to mark
    its progress in severe weather prediction and forecasting with a number
    of useful metrics. For example, they have substantially increased
    warning times for hurricanes and tornadoes, while at the same time
    increasing accuracy of forecasts. Unlike these events, tsunamis are
    caused by largely unpredictable tectonic events that can strike without
    warning, which makes improving prediction a bit harder. However, it is
    important that we use the same approach to improving out tsunami
    prediction and warnings. One way we have started to characterize our
    success is a 75 percent reduction in false alarms since 1996. This is
    indeed an accomplishment. But we also want to make sure that when a
    deadly tsunami is headed for our coasts, we have the best information
    possible for our communities on time, place and severity.
        What kind of progress have we made in accuracy of forecasting and
    prediction since 1996? What is a good measure of such progress?
        Answer. Tsunamis often result from unpredictable seismic events
    that strike without warning. It is a challenge to improving the
    prediction of tsunami-genesis. With each tornado or hurricane, NOAA
    collects a tremendous amount of data. We are able to learn new things
    about these natural disasters with every event; this information aids
    us in our efforts to improve prediction. Fortunately, tsunamis are
    relatively infrequent. That means we record fewer events and have much
    we can learn when it comes to tsunami generation and propagation.
    Understanding how these natural disasters develop is key to determining
    how we can predict these destructive events.
        The Administration's plan calls for NOAA to have a network of 39
    advanced-technology Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
    (DART) buoys for a fully operational enhanced tsunami warning system by
    mid-2007. With a complete network of DART stations, we will have the
    opportunity to detect more tsunami events, and we have the opportunity
    to learn from each one. In November 2003, a large earthquake occurred
    in the Aleutian Islands and generated a tsunami. The DART stations
    recorded this event, confirming only a small tsunami. During post
    analysis of the event, DART data were used for a model simulation and
    the output from the simulation accurately predicted the 2 cm tsunami
    recorded at Hilo, Hawaii. With each tsunami-event recorded by the DART
    stations, we have the opportunity to fine-tune our models used to
    predict tsunami impacts. The DART data combined with forecast models
    promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates as well as provide a
    better measure of the severity of destructive tsunamis for Hawaii and
    all other parts of the Pacific. The accurate forecasting of a non-
    destructive tsunami in November 2003 saved Hawaii an estimated $68M in
    projected evacuation costs. With the additional DART stations, we
    expect to substantially reduce false alarm rate for distant tsunamis
    from 75 percent to less than 25 percent over the next 4 years. Little
    change is expected in reducing false alarms for local tsunamis (those
    generated from near-shore causes). A reduction in the rate of false
    alarms, and the associated cost-savings for our states and territories,
    is an appropriate measure of our progress in tsunami detection.

        Question 2a. What other metrics will be important to pay attention
    to? For example, only 30 percent of our communities at risk have
    inundation maps--shouldn't this percentage improve? How much will this
    metric improve with the funds proposed under the President's plan?
        Answer. NOAA agrees that the percentage of at-risk communities with
    complete inundation maps is an important metric, and we are working to
    increase the number of areas covered by inundation maps. Another
    important metric is the number of at-risk communities that are
    ``TsunamiReady.'' NOAA's TsunamiReady program promotes tsunami hazard
    preparedness as an active collaboration among federal, state and local
    emergency management agencies, the public, and the National Weather
    Service tsunami warning system. The Administration's plan provides
    funding to allow NOAA to increase the number of mapped and TsunamiReady
    communities. Of the $24M scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $4.75M
    will be spent on inundation mapping and modeling, as well as education
    and outreach (e.g., community preparedness activities, including
    TsunamiReady). Of this $4.75M, approximately $2.25M will be spent on
    inundation mapping and modeling and $2.5M will go towards public
    education activities. Following the current plan, inundation mapping
    for the major population centers will be complete in 2015.

        Question 2b. Since we have experienced a 50 percent decline in buoy
    service in the past 2 years, wouldn't this be another metric to focus
    on? What will be your goal?
        Answer. It is not accurate to say that we have experienced a 50
    percent decline in buoy service in the past 2 years. We believe you are
    referring to technical malfunctions of 3 of the 6 DART buoys in the
    weeks preceding the hearing. While it is true that at the time of the
    hearing, 2 of the 6 DART stations were offline, this does not indicate
    a 50 percent decline in performance over the last 2 years. The
    reliability of the DART stations since October 2003, the time when they
    were transitioned from a research program of the Office of Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Research to an operational program of the National Weather
    Service, has been 72 percent. This percentage represents the combined
    number of hours the stations have been operational, and is an
    appropriate metric to use in evaluating the reliability of the DART
    system. Further, this percentage indicates that the DART station array
    is a highly effective system overall.
        Our goal is to have a fully capable network of 29 DART stations in
    the Pacific, with 3 additional in-water backups in the Gulf of Alaska,
    where sea conditions are particularly harsh. While it is not possible
    to guarantee that these stations will be operational 100 percent of the
    time given the demanding environmental conditions in which these
    stations operate, NOAA is focused on making the current DART network
    (DART I) more robust and deploying a next generation DART network (DART
    II) with reliability built into the design. NOAA plans for the network
    to meet operational requirements, even with occasional DART station
    outages. NOAA will develop capabilities to address network coverage and
    redundancy to ensure, as best we can, that single DART station failures
    will not impact the integrity of the entire network. Planned redundancy
    and hardening of the infrastructure, combined with the addition of a
    two-way communication capability, will mitigate risk from system-wide
    failures.
    Funding for Tsunami Mitigation and Response
        Question 3. The Administration recently released its plan to expand
    and modernize its tsunami detection and warning system. This plan
    includes the expansion of the system into areas such as the Atlantic
    Ocean, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico. I applaud the Administration's
    timely response, however, I am concerned that while the plan addresses
    the issue of tsunami detection, it does not completely address the
    issue of response to tsunami, as well as community preparation.
        Which agency will be taking the lead for mitigation, mapping, and
    response?
        Answer. NOAA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and
    the United States Geologic Survey (USGS), through the National Tsunami
    Hazard Mitigation Program, coordinate inundation mapping efforts with
    state and local emergency management officials. FEMA is the lead agency
    for mitigation and response, with NOAA assisting any way possible.
    NOAA's role is to assist in identifying the tsunami hazard (required
    inundation mapping), providing tsunami warning guidance (including
    site-specific tsunami forecast models) and providing tsunami mitigation
    program support through community-based preparedness programs and
    education outreach--including the TsunamiReady Program.

        Question 3a. Does the funding proposed by the Administration
    include funding for tsunami response? How much?
        Answer. The two-year plan proposed by the Administration includes
    funding for NOAA and USGS for an improved tsunami detection and warning
    system. FEMA is the lead federal agency in the response area and is
    best suited to answer questions regarding response funding.

        Question 3b. Will these amounts be adequate given the plans for
    expanded areas of coverage for the tsunami program?
        Answer. The new NOAA funding for mitigation includes $2.5M for
    education and outreach and $2.25M for inundation mapping. This is a
    significant increase from the base funding levels managed through the
    National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. FEMA is the lead federal
    agency in the response area and is best suited to answer questions
    regarding response funding.
                                     ______

      Response to Letter Dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens and
         Co-Chairman Inouye to Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
        In response to a letter, dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Ted
    Stevens and Co-Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, asking to:
        Please explain what information or resources your agency requires
    before it can issue a public warning notification of a natural hazard
    or disaster. In addition, we would like to know which entities or
    organizations receive warnings from, or through, your agency, such as
    the appropriate federal and local disaster response entities, first
    responders/911, and local and national media outlets. To the extent
    possible, your report should also demonstrate which communications
    technologies are currently used to deliver these public warnings, such
    as automatic alert televisions and radios, telephones, wireless and
    satellite technology, including cellular telephones, pagers, personal
    digital assistants (PDAs), and the internet. If such communications
    technologies are not being used, we would like to know what the
    impediments are, and the status of any discussions to expand the
    warning system's capability to do so.
        Your report should also specify a process by which your agency,
    either on its own, or in conjunction with other relevant agencies, can
    maximize effective dissemination of public warning notifications.
    Lastly, we would be interested to know how your agency interacts with
    the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency), the Federal Communications Commission, the
    Department of Commerce, or other relevant agencies with respect to
    warning systems.
    Response
        Thank you for your letter regarding General John J. Kelly's
    testimony at the February 2, 2005, hearing of the Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science and Transportation on the U.S. tsunami warning system
    and the Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005. At the hearing, you asked us
    to tell the Committee how the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration (NOAA) could improve public notification of impending
    natural hazards and disasters.
        NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS) is acknowledged as the
    premier agency in government for disseminating warning information. We
    are efficient at disseminating weather and natural hazard information
    through our vast communication network. We currently provide public
    notification of weather warnings as well as other natural hazards and
    disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and civil emergency messages,
    e.g., hazardous materials spills. These warnings can be received and
    transmitted by a myriad of other users providing access to virtually
    all of the people across the Nation. We can provide access, but we
    cannot ensure the message is received.
        While our system is effective, we can still make improvements. We
    can make our systems more reliable and improve public education. We can
    work with the private sector to utilize new technology to make warnings
    available, and develop other methods to increase accessibility of
    warnings.
        NOAA Weather, Alert, and Readiness Network (NOAA WARN), includes
    all NOAA's National Weather Service warning dissemination systems (see
    attachment). This includes the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR)
    program, which consists of over 900 radio transmitters covering nearly
    97 percent of the nation's population. The President's FY06 Budget
    request includes funds to modernize 64 of 400 remaining vintage 1970's
    NWR transmitters. These improvements will make them more robust by
    including backup power supply, and make them easier to maintain. Backup
    power is critical during major weather events, such as hurricanes, when
    commercial power is out.
        Our assessment and decision-making equipment, the Advanced Weather
    Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), is the initial generation point
    for all NWS disseminated warnings. We are working to ensure AWIPS has
    appropriate software capabilities, capable of disseminating new
    information technology standard formats, to effectively support the new
    technologies such as Geophysical Information Systems (GIS) and Personal
    Digital Assistants (PDAs).
        Issuing weather and water related warnings (including tsunamis) are
    the culmination of a complex process, beginning with observations,
    analysis, and interpretation, and culminating with disseminating the
    warning. NOAA's NWS maintains a complex infrastructure of people and
    technology to create, and then issue those warnings. It is our mission.
    It is what we do.
        Issuing civil emergency warnings or earthquake warnings has a
    different process. NWS serves as a dissemination service for these
    warnings. We rely on communication processing, which is automated for
    earthquake warnings, and is being automated for federal, state and
    local civil emergency messages. For these civil emergency messages to
    be disseminated, we need to ensure agreements are in place to allow
    access to NOAA dissemination systems. In June 2004, the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and NOAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement
    allowing DHS to use the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards network to
    disseminate civil emergency messages.
        Once warnings are in NOAA WARN, they are automatically transmitted
    to the Emergency Alert System (EAS; for wide distribution in real and
    near-real time), the NWS dissemination network, and through other
    private and public dissemination systems. NOAA WARN systems include
    NWR, NOAA Weather Wire, NOAAPort, Emergency Managers Weather
    Information Network (EMWIN), and the Internet. Most local and all
    national media outlets have links to NOAA's NWS dissemination network
    to receive warning information.
        Warning messages from NOAA's NWS activate the EAS and also reach
    the private sector, which rebroadcast the emergency information via
    television, radio, internet (e.g., e-mail warnings), pagers, and in
    some cases PDAs and cell phones. Through this warning system, all
    appropriate federal and local emergency officials have access to the
    warning information and can receive warnings.
        Newer technology (e.g., cell phones, reverse 911, PDA's, pagers)
    can receive warning information, but most are set up to do so only when
    requested by the user or as a subscription service. There is no
    federal, state or local policy in place to mandate redistribution of
    warning information. While there are some technical challenges to
    alert, for example, every cell phone within a certain area, it is
    possible. The difficulty with broadcast cell phone warnings is there
    are no national standards. NOAA will continue to work with appropriate
    public and private entities to ensure warning information is available
    in industry standard formats for ease of interoperability.
        NOAA and DHS have ongoing discussions with satellite communications
    operators, such as XM Satellite Radio, who already have a channel
    devoted to emergency messages. This method to deliver warnings shows
    promise, with the only reservation at this point the limited number of
    users.
        Effective dissemination of public warning notification requires
    using existing systems and infrastructure where possible and public
    education and outreach to recommend what actions to take once the
    warnings are issued. For example, USGS uses the NWS infrastructure to
    disseminate earthquake messages and, as stated above, DHS also has
    access to NWR to disseminate warnings. This is an efficient use of
    government infrastructure. All federal agencies involved in warning the
    public need to continue to work together to leverage available assets.
    NOAA has been working with DHS, the Federal Communications Commission
    (FCC), and other agencies within the Department of Commerce to help
    coordinate the federal effort on a consolidated warning system to
    ensure the public is able to receive emergency messages. This dialogue
    will continue.
        For example, NWS is working with the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA) on a system to streamline the ability of pre-approved and
    authenticated officials at federal, state, and local levels to submit
    messages for broadcast over NWS systems. The NWS received funds in the
    FY 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act to streamline and automate the
    current manual creation, authentication, and collection of all types of
    non-weather emergency messages in a quick and secure fashion for
    subsequent alert, warning, and notification purposes. HazCollect, as
    the new system is known, will function through FEMA's Disaster
    Management Interoperability Service (DMIS). All weather and non-weather
    emergency messages will be available on the DMIS backbone network for
    national, state and local dissemination through myriad public and
    private sector systems.
        Essential to any effective warning system is education and
    outreach. NOAA's NWS has two programs to help ensure local communities
    can receive warning information they need--StormReady and TsunamiReady.
    These programs focus on preparedness and education activities to make
    sure local communities can take appropriate steps once the warning
    information is received. One of the criteria for a community to be
    certified as StormReady is to have in place alternate and redundant
    ways to receive warnings. For example, an emergency operations center
    may have Internet notification as well as NWR as their methods to
    receive warnings. Receiving warnings through multiple systems reduces
    the possibility of missing critical information.
        NOAA is working with DHS and other federal, state and local
    agencies to increase usage of NWR and expand the use of new and
    emerging technology to deliver warnings. Timeliness is always a factor,
    but existing NWS dissemination systems transmit warnings usually within
    seconds. Redistribution through EAS is also quick. However, the Nation
    needs a federal lead agency for a nationwide warning system, using a
    common message standard. We believe DHS/FEMA is the appropriate agency
    to lead such an effort, and must build on existing warning systems,
    such as NOAA WARN, to create a warning ``system of systems.''
        American territories, such as American Samoa, do not have an
    extensive communications infrastructure. NOAA is working with these
    communities and our international partners to ensure warning
    information is communicated to government officials. Much communication
    is done through the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
    (EMWIN) and Radio and Internet (RANET) systems.
        Enclosed is a brief summary of existing NOAA/NWS and related
    federal dissemination systems. We would be pleased to meet with you and
    your staff to provide more detailed information about NOAA warning
    dissemination methods and processes.
        An Integrated Public Alert and Warning System is an important
    element to help keep the people of this Nation safe. Public safety is a
    fundamental responsibility of federal, state and local governments.
    Public alert and warning systems save lives by informing, reducing
    fear, and assisting emergency managers. NOAA will continue to work with
    DHS, FCC and other government agencies to continue to integrate these
    systems.
                                   Enclosure
    NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards
        NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR) is a nationwide network of
    transmitters broadcasting continuous weather information directly from
    a National Weather Service office. NWR broadcasts National Weather
    Service warnings, watches, forecasts, and other hazard information 24-
    hours per day. Known as the ``voice of NOAA's National Weather
    Service,'' NWR is provided as a public service by the Department of
    Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NWR
    includes more than 925 transmitters, covering more than 97 percent of
    the United States, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the U.S.
    Pacific Territories. NWR requires a special radio receiver or scanner
    capable of picking up the signal. Broadcasts are found in the public
    service band on seven frequencies.
        Currently, about 17 percent of the U.S. population owns a NOAA
    Weather Radio, though the actual percentage of the population reached
    may be greater due to the promulgation of receivers in public places
    such as schools, hospitals, fire stations, and malls. NOAA Weather
    Radio receivers can be purchased at many retail stores selling
    electronic merchandise. Some televisions are now equipped with
    AlertGuardTM, which is essentially an embedded NWR receiver
    with alert capability. NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards receivers are
    often sold in boat and marine accessory businesses, as they are popular
    in the marine community. These are just some of the places NOAA Weather
    Radio receivers can be purchased.
        A survey on Weather Radio Interests and Awareness conducted in
    August 2002 by eBrain Market Research (a service of the Consumer
    Electronics Association) identified the following key points:

       The most common type of the NOAA Weather Radio owned is a
            hand-held model (50 percent). Additionally, 32 percent of
            owners possess a desktop weather radio, 19 percent own a marine
            weather radio that picks up NOAA Weather Radio, 11 percent have
            a clock-radio equipped to receive NOAA alerts, and 10 percent
            can pick up NOAA announcements on their CB.

       Given the right product offerings and marketing campaigns to
            promote awareness of weather radios, it is possible
            manufacturers can sell 7.4 million weather radios over the next
            year.

    Emergency Alert System
        The Emergency Alert System serves two functions:

       It provides a last resort method for the President to
            address the Nation in times of national attack or major crisis
            (National Alert).

       When not in use by the President, it can be used to issue
            warning messages of imminent or ongoing hazards at the state
            and local levels by radio, television, and cable systems in
            selected regions. (NOAA Weather Alert, State and Local Alerts).
            \1\

        \1\ Plan for the Operation of the Emergency Alert System (EAS)
    during a National Emergency (FEMA EAS OPLAN), dated September 1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        During a national alert, all radio and television stations and
    cable television systems must either broadcast Presidential alerts
    immediately or cease transmission during the message. Broadcasting of
    state and local alerts is not mandatory, and stations/systems can
    postpone broadcasting a given warning or alert still in force until
    there is a programming pause. National alerts are issued through the
    Primary Entry Point (PEP) system via dialup telephone lines (with High
    Frequency (HF) radio backups) to 34 continental U.S. and territorial
    radio stations. For national alert and warning, the 34 PEP stations
    would then serve as relay points for the Presidential message to
    automatically seize the broadcasts of all U.S. radio and TV and cable
    stations monitoring the PEP stations. The direct PEP radio station
    broadcasts cover approximately 95 percent of the continental U.S. and
    Hawaii and the seized broadcast would cover well over 95 percent of the
    American public.
        State and local alerts generally originate in the State Emergency
    Operations Center or other similar official location. Because there is
    no standard in the country for EAS plans, some states have more robust
    systems than others. For example, Florida and Pennsylvania use
    satellite technology to get out emergency messages from the Governor
    reaching the entire state. Most other states rely on the cascade system
    used for typical EAS messages where stations monitor ``up stream''
    stations for a signal until the entire state is covered. ``Amber
    Alerts'' are also sent out over the system; these may originate from a
    law enforcement agency within the state. The only thing states using
    the system have in common is that they all must enter the system at
    some point from an authorized official.
        All non-PEP broadcast stations and cable systems are required to
    follow their state EAS plans. \2\ Integral to all state plans is they
    must specify monitoring assignments for all broadcast stations and
    cable systems in the state. All broadcast stations and cable systems
    are required to monitor at least two EAS sources according to their
    state EAS plan. At least one PEP station should be monitored by a
    state's EAS network so national level EAS messages can be distributed
    in the state. In an effort to bring order to the system, all broadcast
    stations and cable systems have EAS designations. PEP stations have an
    EAS designation of National Primary (NP), since they are the source of
    national level messages. State level sources have designations of State
    Primary (SP) and State Relay (SR) and local sources are designated
    Local Primary (LP).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ There is no requirement from the FCC for states to have an EAS
    plan, but regulations require states choosing to develop an EAS plan to
    have it reviewed by the FCC.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There is also one national network, National Public Radio (NPR),
    which has voluntarily agreed to distribute national level messages to
    its affiliates via satellite. The NPR directly monitors a PEP/NP
    station and will relay a national level EAS message as soon as it is
    received.
        The National Weather Service (NWS) originates about 90 percent of
    all EAS alerts. Many participating EAS entities voluntarily monitor the
    National Weather Service's NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) transmitting
    alerts. NWR supplies local EAS encoded alerts to broadcast and cable
    entry points as described in each approved state and local EAS plan. In
    many localities, emergency managers can originate EAS alerts through
    NWS, through a broadcaster or cable operator, or through their own
    equipment if they have made prior arrangements documented in EAS plans.
    Proper operation of the EAS depends on those state and local plans
    specifying how stations are linked together in monitoring webs; how
    State Primary (SP), State Relay (SR) and Local Primary (LP) EAS sources
    get EAS warnings; how EAS testing is accomplished; and which EAS
    messages may be relayed.
    National Warning System
        FEMA maintains and operates the National Warning System (NAWAS),
    which was developed and installed during the 1950s, as the primary
    national emergency communication system among federal, state, and local
    emergency operations centers. NAWAS is a dedicated, 24-hour,
    specialized party telephone line with 1,850 terminals at state and
    local emergency operations centers, 911 centers, and police and fire
    stations to all be activated at the same time. The system is used to
    relay national and local information within states. It also has direct
    links to the command center at the North American Aerospace Defense
    Command. Every NWS forecast office has connectivity to NAWAS.
    NOAA Weather Wire System
        The NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS) also plays a role in getting
    weather warnings to the public. NWWS is a satellite data collection and
    dissemination system. NWWS broadcasts can be received anywhere in the
    United States and Puerto Rico. NWWS disseminates warnings in less than
    10 seconds. The warnings have embedded digital information identifying
    specific threats and specific geographic areas at risk. Satellite
    receivers are commercially available. At least one emergency management
    or law enforcement agency in each state has NWWS. These agencies
    rebroadcast the information to other state and local emergency managers
    and also provide local hazard information to the NWS for broadcast,
    when appropriate.
        Negotiations are underway to add the National Law Enforcement
    Telecommunications System to NWWS. This would permit several thousand
    law enforcement agencies around the country to exchange all-hazard
    warnings.
    Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
        The Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (EMWIN)
    transmits real time weather and emergency information. The EMWIN signal
    is available anywhere within the NOAA's Geostationary Operational
    Environmental Satellites (GOES) footprint, which covers most of the
    western hemisphere as well as the central and eastern Pacific Ocean.
    The National Weather Service gathers real time weather and emergency
    information from sources across the globe and broadcasts the
    information via EMWIN. Emergency management groups and municipal
    agencies receive EMWIN data from the satellite and retransmit it on
    local radio frequencies. State and local agencies select the
    information to fit their specific area. The EMWIN datastream is
    rebroadcast by the University of Hawaii over the PEACESAT satellite
    covering much of the Pacific Ocean including remote Pacific islands. In
    some small island countries, it is the most reliable way to get
    forecasts and warnings and information. Commercial software is
    available to allow local computers to be configured to trigger alarms
    for specific hazards.
    RANET
        Advancement of communication and dissemination capacities in
    developing countries for purposes of tsunami and other hazards warning
    is being addressed in part through the NOAA and USAID Office of Foreign
    Disaster Assistance supported Radio and Internet (RANET) program. RANET
    works to develop dissemination capacities for distribution of critical
    weather and climate information to rural and remote populations in
    developing countries. This program is active throughout Africa and the
    Pacific, and activities are expected to begin in late spring and early
    summer in Asia. The RANET program utilizes WorldSpace digital satellite
    broadcast capacity, provided through the not-for-profit First Voice
    International, to deliver a variety of graphic and text based
    information to national weather services and remote field offices
    anywhere in Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the
    Pacific. The broadcast on the AsiaStar and AfriStar WorldSpace
    satellites is a comprehensive suite of weather forecasts, observations,
    bulletins, and related information. RANET ties this broadcast capacity
    to traditional FM and HF radio broadcasts, as well as other networks.
    In response to the December 26, 2004, tsunami disaster, RANET is
    working with the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center to develop a `global'
    cell phone based SMS/text messaging service. Technical development of
    the system was completed on February 14, 2005, and it is now undergoing
    a series of tests before being formally announced. The service will
    provide notification to foreign government officials and those
    appointed by a country point-of-contact when bulletins from the Pacific
    Tsunami Warning Center and other centers are released. Similarly, RANET
    is developing a web-based alert notification system. While receiving
    activity support and coordination, RANET is not currently provided
    operational resources.
    Dissemination of Tsunami Warning Information to the Public
        The NOAA National Weather Service (NWS) Richard H. Hagemeyer
    Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) disseminates bulletins by a
    variety of methods to (1) eliminate single points of failure, and (2)
    to reach all of its clients. PTWC relies heavily on the established
    communications infrastructure used by the weather side of the NWS.
    Bulletins are sent via a dedicated circuit to the NWS
    Telecommunications Gateway (NWSTG) in Silver Springs, Maryland, and
    from there they are forwarded into the Advanced Weather Information
    Processing System and delivered to NWS Forecast Offices. From NWS
    Forecast Offices tsunami information is relayed into the NOAA Weather
    Radio (NWR) and Emergency Alert System (EAS) when necessary. Bulletins
    are also forwarded from the National Weather Service Telecommunications
    Gateway (NWSTG) into the World Meteorological Organization's Global
    Telecommunications System for delivery to weather offices worldwide.
    Bulletins are also forwarded from the NWSTG into the Emergency Managers
    Weather Information Network (EMWIN) for delivery over the GOES and
    PEACESAT satellites to many places including remote Pacific islands.
    PTWC bulletins are also sent to the NWSTG over the NOAA Weather Wire
    System (NWWS), a satellite based system with a 2-way dish at PTWC. In
    addition to providing a redundant path from PTWC to the NWSTG, the NWWS
    provides NWS products including tsunami bulletins to a variety of
    customers, including the media, via an NWS program called the Family of
    Services (FOS). Television stations in Hawaii, for example, subscribe
    to an Associated Press (AP) feed over which they receive PTWC
    bulletins. The AP receives its weather information from multiple NWS
    forecast and warning dissemination systems to help ensure high
    reliability. PTWC sends tsunami information to the U.S. Armed Forces
    via a legacy dial-out GateGuard terminal delivering the bulletins via
    the AUTODIN system to approximately 200 commands. PTWC also informs the
    Pacific Command of U.S. Forces and the Navy Command Center for the
    Hawaii Region by telephone. PTWC also sends its bulletins to
    approximately 30 airfields and other locations in the Pacific over the
    Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network. In addition, bulletins
    are sent via e-mail to about 100 addresses and via fax to about 20
    offices.
        The procedure PTWC has always operated under is it only provides
    tsunami warning guidance to national and local authorities. This is no
    different than for other natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods,
    etc. NWS provides the information to decision-makers. Those authorities
    are then responsible for making decisions about whether or not to issue
    an evacuation order, and for disseminating such orders to the public.
    In some cases, such as an urgent local tsunami warning in Hawaii, the
    issuance of evacuation orders with sirens sounding and an activation of
    the EAS and NWR (by the NWS Honolulu Forecast Office in response to a
    PTWC bulletin) is pre-approved by State Civil Defense (SCD) in the
    interest of time when minutes and seconds count. But in other cases
    such as a distant tsunami approaching Hawaii, SCD may consult with its
    own tsunami advisors and control the issuance and timing of any
    evacuation. Local authority for evacuations is critical since PTWC
    warnings to various parts of the Pacific, being based initially on only
    the seismic data, have a high false alarm rate. It could be very
    confusing to the public if PTWC issued evacuation guidance to a region,
    but local authorities in that region had decided not to evacuate.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
                           Dr. John H. Marburger, III
        Question. What actions are being taken by the U.S. in response to
    the health threats that continue to exist in the affected countries?
        Answer. My office, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, is
    not coordinating the U.S. response to health threats in the affected
    countries. However, I have asked the U.S. Agency for International
    Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the
    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to provide detailed
    information on their response to health threats, which are described
    below. In addition, I have asked NASA to summarize its less direct, but
    nevertheless important, contributions through satellite imaging.
    USAID
        USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has
    provided over $30 million to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
    international organizations to provide assistance in health, water/
    sanitation, and psychological and social activities. OFDA has provided
    $8 million to NGOs and international organizations for health sector
    programs (excluding psychological and social activities, and water/
    sanitation). OFDA funded partners have provided mobile health clinics
    and field hospitals, rehabilitated primary health care clinics and
    hospitals, and provided medicines and emergency health care supplies.
    In addition, OFDA-funded international organizations are tracking
    patterns of life-threatening diseases, and assisting in the control of
    communicable diseases through surveillance and early warning systems,
    immunization, distribution of hygiene kits, and health/hygiene
    education.
        USAID/OFDA has provided $17 million to organizations for water and
    sanitation activities to ensure sanitary conditions and access to
    potable drinking water for affected populations. Partner activities
    include construction of latrines, provision of containers for
    transportation of water and water storage bladders, disinfection of
    water sources, water purification and treatment, hygiene education, and
    distribution of hygiene kits.
        In addition to the traditional emergency health activities, OFDA is
    supporting organizations that are carrying out interventions to
    mitigate the psychological trauma of the tsunami. OFDA is providing
    funding in India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia for programs that provide
    psychological and social support for survivors of the tsunami. Total
    support for these activities totals approximately $5.2 million. We have
    given particular attention to the needs of children and are supporting
    several organizations that are facilitating structured activities for
    children and adolescents, often through child-centered spaces. These
    activities are being implemented in internally displaced persons (IDP)
    program settlements and tsunami-affected communities alike.
        OFDA is currently funding the following organizations to implement
    Health, Psychological and Social, and Water/Sanitation programs
    benefiting tsunami-affected populations:

            Action Contre la Faim
            American Center for International Labor
            The Asia Foundation
            CARE
            Catholic Relief Services
            Christian Children's Fund
            Church World Services
            Cooperative Housing Foundation International
            GOAL
            International Medical Corps
            International Organization for Migration
            International Rescue Committee
            International Relief and Development
            Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology
            and Obstetrics
            Project Concern International
            Sarvodaya
            Save the Children/US
            Save the Children/UK
            Shelter for Life
            Sri Lanka Red Cross
            United Nations Children's Fund
            World Health Organization

        USAID is also considering proposals from NGOs and others and
    working to respond to the needs assessments being developed for the
    region. For additional details, see the INDIAN OCEAN--Earthquake and
    Tsunamis Fact Sheet, available on the USAID website (http://
    www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/tsunami).
    DoD
        The Defense Department has dispatched the medical ship USNS Mercy
    off the coast of Banda Aceh Indonesia. This medical ship is staffed by
    a unique combination of military personnel and American volunteers from
    the medical community coordinated by the NGO Project HOPE. In
    coordination with the Government of Indonesia, the military staff and
    volunteers are providing state of the art medical services to those
    patients that cannot be treated by the hospitals on shore. They are
    also providing consultation services, limited training, and
    bioengineering repair services in hospitals on shore.
    HHS
        HHS has deployed 54 employees to the region, including four people
    assigned to the U.S. Disaster Assistance Response Teams, as well as
    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) epidemiologists and
    field staff in Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. They are assisting
    with activities related to vaccine-preventable diseases, childhood
    injuries and trauma, malaria control, health and nutrition, mental
    health, rapid needs assessment, and response coordination. Among the
    diseases that are being monitored are cholera, dysentery, malaria and
    typhoid fever. In addition, HHS staff are assisting the Department of
    Defense aboard the USNS Mercy.
        Since late December, CDC staff in Thailand and India, where HHS has
    ongoing programs, have been assisting local health and other officials,
    under the direction of the respective U.S. embassies. Their activities
    include assessing health needs, monitoring for diseases, and
    documenting the dead and missing. HHS scientists are assisting teams
    led by Department of Defense, the State Department and international
    organizations. HHS officials in the United States are in daily contact
    with American, international and local officials involved in the
    tsunami response.
        HHS is working with other agencies of the U.S. government planning
    for the recovery and reconstruction phase of the tsunami response.
    NASA
        NASA satellite observations and predictions of Earth processes are
    being used to support human health aid programs in the tsunami affected
    regions and elsewhere in the world. Health factors that are measurable
    from NASA research instruments include, air and water contaminants,
    ambient temperature extremes, ultra-violet radiation and a myriad of
    other factors that contribute to our knowledge of public health
    challenges. NASA collaborates to expand the use of Earth observing
    instruments, advanced communication technology, high speed computing
    capabilities, data products, and predictive models associated with the
    occurrence of disease to assist partners in enhancing their
    surveillance systems.
        For example, NASA's Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center
    (SEDAC) is working with the Geographic Information Support Team (GIST),
    which includes representatives from the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster
    Assistance (OFDA), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
    Affairs (OCHA), the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), the UK
    Department for International Development (DFID), the World Health
    Organization (WHO), and others. This group is providing access to key
    geospatial data needed by working teams in the field.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                           Dr. John H. Marburger, III
        Question. Dr. Marburger, confronted with a fresh reminder of the
    potential devastation of an off-shore, tsunami-causing earthquake, I
    share Senator Stevens' concern about ensuring sufficient warning
    systems are in place so that loss of human life can be minimized. Thank
    you for the outline you provided in your written testimony of the
    generic components for a successful disaster detection, warning, and
    reduction system. Senator Stevens requested an estimation of what it
    would take to establish a comprehensive tsunami notification system,
    such as the one you outlined in your testimony. I am very interested in
    your response and ask that you please forward me a copy of your answer
    to Senator Stevens' question.
        Answer. I share your concern that the citizens of the U.S. have
    sufficient warning of any tsunami event on our shores. In fact, tsunami
    warnings are a part of a larger effort to provide warnings for all
    natural and human-caused disasters within the U.S.
        The responses to Senator Stevens' question come mostly from the
    agencies charged with the development of a comprehensive tsunami
    notification system. The U.S. already has significant warning
    capabilities for a variety of severe weather events and other
    emergencies. For example, I have attached an extended excerpt from a
    letter submitted by NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher in response to
    questions by Senators Stevens and Inouye in which the current warning
    capabilities of the U.S. are summarized nicely. We believe that the
    efforts of the Department of Commerce (NOAA), the U.S. Geological
    Survey (USGS), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the
    Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) are effective and should
    continue their development. The next steps in this process are outlined
    in the fact sheet that the Office of Science and Technology Policy
    released (copy attached) describing the Administration's immediate
    steps to strengthen the U.S. tsunami detection and warning capabilities
    in the Pacific Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, and Caribbean Sea. Furthermore we
    have assembled an interagency working group under the National Science
    and Technology Council to provide the detailed planning and
    identification of responsibilities to implement these improvements.
    This group will issue a detailed plan by mid-summer.
        In addition, the evolving emergency notification situations
    following the events of September 11, 2001 have motivated us to create
    an interagency effort to coordinate the activities with the Federal
    Government that deal with emergency warnings. This new group is now
    being formed under the National Science and Technology Council and will
    be called the Task Force on Effective Warnings. This Task Force will be
    charged with examining both natural disaster warnings and homeland
    security warnings, and to will examine and make recommendations about
    disaster warning/communication systems, networks or facilities to
    provide effective disaster warning systems for the Nation. We believe
    that the integration of warning systems for natural hazards should be
    combined with warning associated with homeland security into a single
    ``all hazards'' warning system for the people of the U.S.
    Excerpt from letter to Senators Stevens and Inouye from Vice Admiral
            Conrad C. Lautenbacher on February 22, 2005:
        NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS) is acknowledged as the
    premier agency in government for disseminating warning information. We
    are efficient at disseminating weather and natural hazard information
    through our vast communication network. We currently provide public
    notification of weather warnings as well as other natural hazards and
    disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and civil emergency messages,
    e.g., hazardous materials spills. These warnings can be received and
    transmitted by a myriad of other users providing access to virtually
    all of the people across the Nation. We can provide access, but we
    cannot ensure the message is received.
        While our system is effective, we can still make improvements. We
    can make our systems more reliable and improve public education. We can
    work with the private sector to utilize new technology to make warnings
    available, and develop other methods to increase accessibility of
    warnings.
        NOAA Weather, Alert, and Readiness Network (NOAA WARN), includes
    all NOAA's National Weather Service warning dissemination systems (see
    attachment). This includes the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR)
    program, which consists of over 900 radio transmitters covering nearly
    97 percent of the nation's population. The President's FY06 Budget
    request includes funds to modernize 64 of 400 remaining vintage 1970's
    NWR transmitters. These improvements will make them more robust by
    including backup power supply, and make them easier to maintain. Backup
    power is critical during major weather events, such as hurricanes, when
    commercial power is out.
        Our assessment and decision-making equipment, the Advanced Weather
    Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), is the initial generation point
    for all NWS disseminated warnings. We are working to ensure AWIPS has
    appropriate software capabilities, capable of disseminating new
    information technology standard formats, to effectively support the new
    technologies such as Geophysical Information Systems (GIS) and Personal
    Digital Assistants (PDAs).
        Issuing weather and water related warnings (including tsunamis) are
    the culmination of a complex process, beginning with observations,
    analysis, and interpretation, and culminating with disseminating the
    warning. NOAA's NWS maintains a complex infrastructure of people and
    technology to create, and then issue those warnings. It is our mission.
    It is what we do.
        Issuing civil emergency warnings or earthquake warnings has a
    different process. NWS serves as a dissemination service for these
    warnings. We rely on communication processing, which is automated for
    earthquake warnings, and is being automated for federal, state and
    local civil emergency messages. For these civil emergency messages to
    be disseminated, we need to ensure agreements are in place to allow
    access to NOAA dissemination systems. In June 2004, the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and NOAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement
    allowing DHS to use the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards network to
    disseminate civil emergency messages.
        Once warnings are in NOAA WARN, they are automatically transmitted
    to the Emergency Alert System (EAS; for wide distribution in real and
    near-real time), the NWS dissemination network, and through other
    private and public dissemination systems. NOAA WARN systems include
    NWR, NOAA Weather Wire, NOAAPort, Emergency Managers Weather
    Information Network (EMWIN), and the Internet. Most local and all
    national media outlets have links to NOAA's NWS dissemination network
    to receive warning information.
        Warning messages from NOAA's NWS activate the EAS and also reach
    the private sector, which rebroadcast the emergency information via
    television, radio, internet (e.g., email warnings), pagers, and in some
    cases PDAs and cell phones. Through this warning system, all
    appropriate federal and local emergency officials have access to the
    warning information and can receive warnings.
        Newer technology (e.g., cell phones, reverse 911, PDA's, pagers)
    can receive warning information, but most are set up to do so only when
    requested by the user or as a subscription service. There is no
    federal, state or local policy in place to mandate redistribution of
    warning information. While there are some technical challenges to
    alert, for example, every cell phone within a certain area, it is
    possible. The difficulty with broadcast cell phone warnings is there
    are no national standards. NOAA will continue to work with appropriate
    public and private entities to ensure warning information is available
    in industry standard formats for ease of interoperability.
        NOAA and DHS have ongoing discussions with satellite communications
    operators, such as XM Satellite Radio, who already have a channel
    devoted to emergency messages. This method to deliver warnings shows
    promise, with the only reservation at this point the limited number of
    users.
        Effective dissemination of public warning notification requires
    using existing systems and infrastructure where possible and public
    education and outreach to recommend what actions to take once the
    warnings are issued. For example, USGS uses the NWS infrastructure to
    disseminate earthquake messages and, as stated above, DHS also has
    access to NWR to disseminate warnings. This is an efficient use of
    government infrastructure. All federal agencies involved in warning the
    public need to continue to work together to leverage available assets.
    NOAA has been working with DHS, the Federal Communications Commission
    (FCC), and other agencies within the Department of Commerce to help
    coordinate the federal effort on a consolidated warning system to
    ensure the public is able to receive emergency messages. This dialogue
    will continue.
        For example, NWS is working with the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency (FEMA) on a system to streamline the ability of pre-approved and
    authenticated officials at federal, state, and local levels to submit
    messages for broadcast over NWS systems. The NWS received funds in the
    FY 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act to streamline and automate the
    current manual creation, authentication, and collection of all types of
    non-weather emergency messages in a quick and secure fashion for
    subsequent alert, warning, and notification purposes. HazCollect, as
    the new system is known, will function through FEMA's Disaster
    Management Interoperability Service (DMIS). All weather and non-weather
    emergency messages will be available on the DMIS backbone network for
    national, state and local dissemination through myriad public and
    private sector systems.
        Essential to any effective warning system is education and
    outreach. NOAA's NWS has two programs to help ensure local communities
    can receive warning information they need--StormReady and TsunamiReady.
    These programs focus on preparedness and education activities to make
    sure local communities can take appropriate steps once the warning
    information is received. One of the criteria for a community to be
    certified as Storm Ready is to have in place alternate and redundant
    ways to receive warnings. For example, an emergency operations center
    may have Internet notification as well as NWR as their methods to
    receive warnings. Receiving warnings through multiple systems reduces
    the possibility of missing critical information.
        NOAA is working with DHS and other federal, state and local
    agencies to increase usage of NWR and expand the use of new and
    emerging technology to deliver warnings. Timeliness is always a factor,
    but existing NWS dissemination systems transmit warnings usually within
    seconds. Redistribution through EAS is also quick. However, the Nation
    needs a federal lead agency for a nationwide warning system, using a
    common message standard. We believe DHS/FEMA is the appropriate agency
    to lead such an effort, and must build on existing warning systems,
    such as NOAA WARN, to create a warning ``system of systems.''
        American territories, such as American Samoa, do not have an
    extensive communications infrastructure. NOAA is working with these
    communities and our international partners to ensure warning
    information is communicated to government officials. Much communication
    is done through the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
    (EMWIN) and Radio and Internet (RANET) systems.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
                           Dr. John H. Marburger, III
        The questions voiced by Senator Pryor reflect concern and interest
    in the success and effectiveness of existing warning mechanisms and the
    likelihood that these systems will get better in the future. I share
    those concerns and have assembled an interagency working group under
    the National Science and Technology Council to gather together the
    agencies working on tsunami warning systems to provide the detailed
    planning and identification of responsibilities to implement these
    improvements. This group will issue a detailed plan by mid-summer and
    we will follow up with the agencies to ensure effective implementation.
        The specific questions submitted by Senator Pryor are identical to
    the questions submitted to NOAA. Since NOAA is the agency responsible
    for managing the TsunamiReady Program and is primarily responsible for
    instituting any needed changes in the U.S. tsunami warning system, I
    will defer to NOAA's detailed responses to these questions, listed
    here.
    Voice Sirens for Effective, Reliable Tsunami Warning
        Question 1. Effective tsunami warning should rely on a variety of
    redundant modes of communication. While there are several technologies
    for communicating tsunami warnings highlighted in the Tsunami
    Preparedness Act of 2005 (S. 50), it is a concern that voice capable
    sirens are not among the technologies mentioned. Emergency managers
    have long depended on sirens to warn the public of emergency and civil
    defense situations including tsunamis, tornados, floods, hurricanes,
    hazardous material accidents, and of a potential nuclear attack.
        Sirens have a number of significant advantages: they insure that
    all residents and visitors to a particular area can be informed without
    regard to the cell phone or pager technology platform or provider they
    may have, when equipped with backup power supplies they will work even
    when the electricity or phone lines are out; when equipped with live
    public address or pre-recorded messages they can be used BEFORE and
    AFTER the incident to communicate important public safety information.
        Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part of a
    preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
    other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
    criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
    of tsunami?
        Answer. NOAA works with the emergency management community to
    ensure warnings are received by the public in as many ways as
    possible--including cell phones, pagers, Internet, NOAA Weather Radio
    All-Hazards, television, radio, and sirens. All of these methods are
    effective, and emergency managers must decide how to best warn the
    public. NOAA's dissemination systems are available for the emergency
    management community to use in broadcasting emergency messages. NOAA
    will continue working with federal, state and local emergency managers
    to ensure warnings are as widely distributed as possible. Some National
    Weather Service Offices also issue tsunami warnings via High Frequency
    (HF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) marine radio as well, as do other
    federal agencies. There are no unique criteria for determining which
    warning systems are reliable for tsunamis.

        Question 1a. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
    for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
    inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
        Answer. A comprehensive preparedness plan must address how to get
    messages to people, whenever they need it, wherever they are. NOAA
    Weather Radio All-Hazards is an effective way to reach fishing boats
    near the coast. There are other alternatives available as well,
    including satellite based communications links (Internet and cell
    phone). We employ all possible methods of delivering warnings to those
    at risk.
    Improving Tsunami Prediction and Preparedness
        Question 2. NOAA's National Weather Service has been able to mark
    its progress in severe weather prediction and forecasting with a number
    of useful metrics. For example, they have substantially increased
    warning times for hurricanes and tornadoes, while at the same time
    increasing accuracy of forecasts. Unlike these events, tsunamis are
    caused by largely unpredictable tectonic events that can strike without
    warning, which makes improving prediction a bit harder. However, it is
    important that we use the same approach to improving out tsunami
    prediction and warnings. One way we have started to characterize our
    success is a 75 percent reduction in false alarms since 1996. This is
    indeed an accomplishment. But we also want to make sure that when a
    deadly tsunami is headed for our coasts, we have the best information
    possible for our communities on time, place and severity.
        What kind of progress have we made in accuracy of forecasting and
    prediction since 1996? What is a good measure of such progress?
        Answer. Tsunamis often result from unpredictable seismic events
    that strike without warning. It is a challenge to improving the
    prediction of tsunami-genesis. With each tornado or hurricane, the
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) collects a
    tremendous amount of data. We are able to learn new things about these
    natural disasters with every event; this information aids us in our
    efforts to improve prediction. Fortunately, tsunamis are relatively
    infrequent. That means we record fewer events and have much we can
    learn when it comes to tsunami generation and propagation.
    Understanding how these natural disasters develop is key to determining
    how we can predict these destructive events.
        The Administration's plan calls for NOAA to have a network of 39
    advanced-technology Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
    (DART) buoys for a fully operational enhanced tsunami warning system by
    mid-2007. With a complete network of DART stations, we will have the
    opportunity to detect more tsunami events, and we have the opportunity
    to learn from each one. In November 2003, a large earthquake occurred
    in the Aleutian Islands and generated a tsunami. The DART stations
    recorded this event, confirming only a small tsunami. During post
    analysis of the event, DART data were used for a model simulation and
    the output from the simulation accurately predicted the 2 cm tsunami
    recorded at Hilo, Hawaii. With each tsunami-event recorded by the DART
    stations, we have the opportunity to fine-tune our models used to
    predict tsunami impacts. The DART data combined with forecast models
    promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates as well as provide a
    better measure of the severity of destructive tsunamis for Hawaii and
    all other parts of the Pacific. The accurate forecasting of a non-
    destructive tsunami in November 2003 saved Hawaii an estimated $68M in
    projected evacuation costs. With the additional DART stations, we
    expect to substantially reduce false alarm rate for distant tsunamis
    from 75 percent to less than 25 percent over the next 4 years. Little
    change is expected in reducing false alarms for local tsunamis (those
    generated from near-shore causes). A reduction in the rate of false
    alarms, and the associated cost-savings for our states and territories,
    is an appropriate measure of our progress in tsunami detection.

        Question 2a. What other metrics will be important to pay attention
    to? For example, only 30 percent of our communities at risk have
    inundation maps--shouldn't this percentage improve? How much will this
    metric improve with the funds proposed under the President's plan?
        Answer. NOAA agrees that the percentage of at-risk communities with
    complete inundation maps is an important metric, and we are working to
    increase the number of areas covered by inundation maps. Another
    important metric is the number of at-risk communities that are
    ``TsunamiReady.'' NOAA's TsunamiReady program promotes tsunami hazard
    preparedness as an active collaboration among federal, state and local
    emergency management agencies, the public, and NOAA's National Weather
    Service tsunami warning system. The Administration's plan provides
    funding to allow NOAA to increase the number of mapped and TsunamiReady
    communities. Of the $24M scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $4.75M
    will be spent on inundation mapping and modeling, as well as education
    and outreach (e.g., community preparedness activities, including
    TsunamiReady). Of this $4.75M, approximately $2.25M will be spent on
    inundation mapping and modeling and $2.5M will go towards public
    education activities. Following the current plan, inundation mapping
    for the major population centers will be complete in 2015.

        Question 2b. Since we have experienced a 50 percent decline in buoy
    service in the past 2 years, wouldn't this be another metric to focus
    on? What will be your goal?
        Answer. It is not accurate to say that we have experienced a 50
    percent decline in buoy service in the past 2 years. We believe you are
    referring to technical malfunctions of 3 of the 6 DART buoys in the
    weeks preceding the hearing. While it is true that at the time of the
    hearing, 2 of the 6 DART stations were offline, this does not indicate
    a 50 percent decline in performance over the last 2 years. The
    reliability of the DART stations, since October 2003, the time when
    they were transitioned from being operated by NOAA Research to NOAA's
    National Weather Service, has been 72 percent. This percentage
    represents the combined number of hours the stations have been
    operational, and is an appropriate metric to use in evaluating the
    reliability of the DART system. Further, this percentage indicates that
    the DART station array is a highly effective system overall.
        Our goal is to have a fully capable network of 29 DART stations in
    the Pacific, with 3 additional in-water backups in the Gulf of Alaska,
    where sea conditions are particularly harsh. While it is not possible
    to guarantee that these prototype stations will be operational 100
    percent of the time given the demanding environmental conditions in
    which these stations operate, NOAA is focused making the DART I network
    more robust and deploying a DART II network with reliability built into
    the design. NOAA plans for the network to meet operational
    requirements, even with occasional DART station outages. NOAA will
    develop capabilities to address network coverage and redundancy to
    ensure, as best we can, that single DART station failures will not
    impact the integrity of the entire network. Planned redundancy and
    hardening of the infrastructure, combined with the addition of a two-
    way communication capability, will mitigate risk from system-wide
    failures.
    Funding for Tsunami Mitigation and Response
        Question 3. The Administration recently released its plan to expand
    and modernize its tsunami detection and warning system. This plan
    includes the expansion of the system into areas such as the Atlantic
    Ocean, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico. I applaud the Administration's
    timely response, however, I am concerned that while the plan addresses
    the issue of tsunami detection, it does not completely address the
    issue of response to tsunami, as well as community preparation.
        Which agency will be taking the lead for mitigation, mapping, and
    response?
        Answer. NOAA, FEMA and USGS, through the National Tsunami Hazard
    Mitigation Program, coordinate inundation mapping efforts with state
    and local emergency management officials. FEMA is the lead agency for
    mitigation and response, with NOAA assisting any way possible. NOAA's
    role is to assist in identifying the tsunami hazard (required
    inundation mapping), providing tsunami warning guidance (including
    site-specific tsunami forecast models) and providing tsunami mitigation
    program support though community-based preparedness programs and
    education outreach--including the TsunamiReady Program.

        Question 3a. Does the funding proposed by the Administration
    include funding for tsunami response? How much?
        Answer. FEMA is the lead federal agency in the response area and is
    best suited to answer this question.

        Question 3b. Will these amounts be adequate given the plans for
    expanded areas of coverage for the tsunami program?
        Answer. NOAA funding for mitigation includes $2.5 million for
    education and outreach and $2.25M for inundation mapping. This is a
    significant increase from prior year funding levels managed through the
    National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. FEMA is the primary federal
    agency in the response area and is best suited to answer that portion
    of this question.

                                     ______

      Response to Letter Dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens and
                 Co-Chairman Inouye to Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr.
        In response to a letter, dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Ted
    Stevens and Co-Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, asking to:
        Please explain what information or resources your agency requires
    before it can issue a public warning notification of a natural hazard
    or disaster. In addition, we would like to know which entities or
    organizations receive warnings from, or through, your agency, such as
    the appropriate federal and local disaster response entities, first
    responders/911, and local and national media outlets. To the extent
    possible, your report should also demonstrate which communications
    technologies are currently used to deliver these public warnings, such
    as automatic alert televisions and radios, telephones, wireless and
    satellite technology, including cellular telephones, pagers, personal
    digital assistants (PDAs), and the internet. If such communications
    technologies are not being used, we would like to know what the
    impediments are, and the status of any discussions to expand the
    warning system's capability to do so.
        Your report should also specify a process by which your agency,
    either on its own, or in conjunction with other relevant agencies, can
    maximize effective dissemination of public warning notifications.
    Lastly, we would be interested to know how your agency interacts with
    the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency), the Federal Communications Commission, the
    Department of Commerce, or other relevant agencies with respect to
    warning systems.
        Potential Enhancements to the Global Seismographic Network (GSN)
    Background
        Over the past 20 years, the National Science Foundation (NSF),
    through funding to the Incorporated Research Institutions for
    Seismology (IRIS) Consortium, has established the 137-station Global
    Seismographic Network (GSN). This network serves as the primary
    international source of data for earthquake location and tsunami
    warning. Although the establishment of the GSN is an NSF-supported
    function and the acquisition of GSN equipment is solely supported
    through the NSF, the GSN-station operation is shared with the U.S.
    Geological Survey (USGS), which supports the maintenance of
    approximately 2/3 of the network. The GSN infrastructure includes not
    only the in situ observing stations, but also global telemetry, and
    data collection and distribution through the IRIS Data Management
    System. The Data Management System, in addition to being the primary
    world repository for seismic data, analysis tools, and visualization
    software, provides an essential quality-control function for the GSN
    hardware and communication links that are so vital to real-time hazard
    warning functions related to earthquakes.
        Real-time GSN data formed the critical core of the early warning of
    the December 26, 2004 Sumatran Earthquake. Within 8 minutes of the
    initial rupture of the M=9.0 earthquake, GSN data flashed
    electronically via satellite and the Internet to the GSN Data
    Collection Center and then to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC/
    NOAA) and the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC/USGS). GSN
    seismometers recorded with full-fidelity the ultra-long period energy
    radiated by the earthquake's 1000 km long rupture. The unique long-
    period response of the GSN is the key factor in providing an accurate
    measure of the size, character, and tsunami-potential of such mega-
    events.
    Potential Enhancements
        Although the GSN system is working very well, there is much that
    can be improved. Some of the enhancements that might be possible with
    the appropriate resources, over the next five years are:
    (1) Telemetry and Information Technology--Expansion and Reliability
        The rapid collection of GSN data and distribution of earthquake
    information is at the heart of an earthquake/tsunami warning system.
    Over 80 percent of the GSN now has real-time telemetry links. However,
    the means of telemetry are very heterogeneous. These include local
    Internet and telemetry links supported by local host organizations;
    Internet infrastructure supported by IRIS and USGS; satellite telemetry
    links supported by IRIS, USGS, National Weather Service, and NSF; and
    global satellite infrastructure shared by the Comprehensive Nuclear
    Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). To complete GSN telemetry to 100
    percent coverage and to enhance low-bandwidth links, 40 telemetry links
    need to be established and maintained.
    (2) Expanding Coverage--International and National Cooperation
        Under NSF supervision, the GSN and the IRIS Data Management System
    are prepared to work with the international community (in particular
    Australia, Japan, France, India, and China) and U.S. agencies, such as
    NOAA and USGS, to enhance the GSN capabilities. This includes the
    installation of much-needed stations on the ocean floor to augment and
    complement the land-based GSN. As new seismic stations are proposed and
    installed in the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere, arrangements need
    to be made to ensure that these stations will contribute to the GSN
    system. IRIS successfully worked with international organizations and
    governments to establish similar networks in Kyrghizstan and Africa.
    The GSN's success is predicated on its close relationship with the many
    local organizations that host the seismic stations. The international
    Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks (FDSN) and the Global Earth
    Observing System of Systems (GEOSS) provide appropriate pathways for
    international collaboration. Needs include data and information
    exchange, shared telemetry, joint stations, coordination of
    infrastructure and the development of local capacity for seismological
    observations and research. Portable seismic systems provided through
    IRIS offer a basis for collaborative research projects between U.S.
    Earth scientists and specialists in South Asia on the structure,
    dynamics, and seismic hazard of the region.
    (3) Long-term Viability of the GSN--Operation and Maintenance
        The Sumatran earthquake once again points to the importance of
    diligence in maintaining a highly reliable and fully operational system
    at all times. Relationships must be nurtured to improve local help for
    GSN maintenance and interagency support by the NSF and the USGS must be
    provided on an ongoing basis.
        With the resources at its disposal, the GSN currently operates at
    about 90 percent data availability. About 10 percent of the network
    (14 stations) is down at any given time, awaiting repair. Increasing
    station uptime requires more field engineer FTE's and travel support.
    The GSN equipment is currently spared and refreshed at a yearly rate
    equal to 5 percent of the total installed equipment base. Increasing
    station uptime will deplete spares more rapidly, requiring an increased
    rate of equipment sparing.
    (4) Sensor Development--Next Generation Ultra-long Period Seismometers
        The Streckeisen STS-1, the premier seismometer used by the GSN for
    recording ultra-long period Earth motions, is no longer manufactured or
    available. The information provided by this unique sensor is the single
    key component in determining the size, and tsunami potential, of great
    earthquakes. As these sensors age and fail, the prospect of a decline
    in network quality looms very real. That there is no comparable
    replacement for the STS-1 is an internationally recognized problem.
    Given the small market (<1000) for such exquisite seismic sensors,
    there is no financial motivation for the private sector to undertake
    such a development. This a potential area for collaboration among
    groups at NSF involved in sensor design. The United States has an
    opportunity to take the lead in developing the next generation ultra-
    long period sensor, which serves both tsunami warning and scientific
    purposes.
        The NSF Division of Earth Sciences has an ongoing Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU) with the USGS regarding joint operation and
    maintenance of the Global Seismographic Network, joint support of the
    Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC), and participation of the
    USGS in the EarthScope project. The NSF also participates in the
    National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) with the USGS,
    FEMA, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
    NEHRP fosters cooperative activities with respect to the nation's
    vulnerability to earthquake hazards, and fosters knowledge transfer
    efforts related to earthquake hazards. It should be noted that in
    addition to earthquake/tsunami research, the NSF also maintains a broad
    research portfolio relevant to potential hazards from volcanic
    eruptions, landslides, and hydrological hazards such as floods,
    droughts, and ground-water contamination. We look forward to continuing
    these interagency activities. It is certainly in the public interest
    that efforts in ameliorating the effects of natural hazards are
    improved by our activities in fundamental research.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                            Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr.
        Question 1. Please describe how you expect the Ocean Observatories
    Initiative to cooperate with other seismic research projects within the
    Foundation and other agencies.
        Answer. The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports basic subsea
    research to understand fundamental earth processes, including those
    that generate earthquakes with tsunami potential. The Ocean Observatory
    Initiative (OOI) will add to understanding and monitoring of large
    submarine fault zones. Sites constructed through the OOI will
    contribute to the seismometer arrays of the Ocean Seismic Network
    (OSN), as well as provide other research tools such as undersea
    pressure sensors. Both these efforts will enable the research and
    technological advancements that will enhance the warning system for
    earthquakes and tsunamis.
        NSF is committed to cooperation and coordination between all
    environmental observing networks, including those that are part of the
    tsunami warning system. Program managers from each of the NSF observing
    systems and geophysical facilities (e.g., EarthScope, OOI, Incorporated
    Research Institutions for Seismology--IRIS, Network for Earthquake
    Engineering Simulation Research (NEES), and UNAVCO) promote
    interactions and synergies between the observing systems and work
    together to respond to common needs for measurement tools, data
    management and cyberinfrastructure, as well as to develop novel
    approaches to interactions across disciplines. For example, studies by
    the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) drill ship Joides
    Resolution include instrumented subsea boreholes linked to seafloor
    observatory networks. These are similar to those proposed for the OOI
    and provide excellent prototype information for the future OOI system.
        Further coordination and cooperation between the OOI and other
    seismic research projects within the Foundation and other agencies also
    occurs through shared facility support as well as use of common data
    management systems such as that funded by NSF through the IRIS
    consortium. Program officers for the NSF, USGS, NASA, and NOAA work
    together to coordinate scientific projects and share support for
    geophysical facilities. This ensures the full capacity and cost
    effective use of these facilities.

        Question 2. Could you please detail how you anticipate OOI, and
    particularly the NEPTUNE project, could contribute to the science that
    will lead to a better understanding of tsunami?
        Answer. The Regional Cabled Observatory (NEPTUNE) that is part of
    NSF's Ocean Observatories Initiative will be constructed off the
    Washington and Oregon coasts. This ocean observing network will be
    equipped with an array of seismic and acoustic sensors that will
    provide data that will complement the Deep-ocean Assessment and
    Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoy array for effective warning of
    tsunami generation and will also enable researchers to investigate
    processes leading to creation of large tsunamis. Information collected
    by NEPTUNE will flow instantly to shore where it will be relayed via
    the Internet to the Tsunami Warning Center, researchers, educational
    institutions, science centers and the public.
        The oceanic region off the coasts of Washington and Oregon is an
    ideal location to create an undersea laboratory to investigate the
    processes leading to tsunami generation. This area is home to a variety
    of active environments each of which will be instrumented with seismic
    and pressure sensors. This will enable researchers to better understand
    how differences in tectonic regimes can lead to variations in the
    amplitude and direction of tsunamis. In addition, this region has areas
    of gas hydrate generation that will be instrumented and their evolution
    studied as part of the NEPTUNE array. Therefore, the effects of gas
    hydrate release on submarine slides and their influence on tsunami
    generation can be studied in detail. Another significant benefit will
    be the ability to investigate all of the processes leading to tsunami
    generation in one location at the scales at which these processes occur
    so that the outcomes of these combined influences can be quantified.

        Question 3. Senator Stevens requested an estimation of what it
    would take to establish a comprehensive tsunami notification system. I
    am very interested in your response and ask that you please forward a
    copy of your answer to Senator Stevens' question.
        Answer. We have attached a discussion of ``Potential Enhancements
    to the Global Seismic Network'' (GSN). This paper describes NSF's role
    in the GSN, a system that provides real-time information on location
    and tsunami potential of great earthquakes, and also suggests some
    improvements to the system that could be made over the next few years.
    NSF has supported acquisition of equipment for the GSN, and shares
    operation of the GSN with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Immediate
    notification of significant earthquake events is made to the National
    Earthquake Information Center (NEIC), operated by the USGS.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
                            Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr.
        Question 1. Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part
    of a preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
    other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
    criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
    of tsunami?
        Question 1a. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
    for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
    inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
        Answer. We have attached a discussion of ``Potential Enhancements
    to the Global Seismic Network''(GSN). This paper describes NSF's role
    in the GSN, a system that provides real-time information on location
    and tsunami potential of great earthquakes. NSF has supported
    acquisition of equipment for the GSN, and shares operation of the GSN
    with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Immediate notification of
    significant earthquake events is made to the National Earthquake
    Information Center (NEIC), operated by the USGS. Although NSF
    participates in the interagency National Earthquake Hazard Reduction
    Program (NEHRP), agencies other than NSF have primary responsibility
    for issuing public disaster warnings and NSF defers to them to provide
    detailed responses concerning warning mechanisms.
                                     ______

      Response to Letter Dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens and
                  Co-Chairman Inouye to U.S. Geological Survey
        In response to a letter, dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Ted
    Stevens and Co-Chairman Daniel K. Inouye:
    Explain what information or resources your agency requires before it
            can issue a public warning notification of a natural hazard or
            disaster.
        The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has responsibility under the
    Stafford Act to issue forecasts and warnings for earthquakes,
    volcanoes, and landslides. For tsunamis, wildfire, flood and hurricane
    hazards, USGS provides critical support to the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and other agencies tasked with
    warning responsibility. In order to carry out these mandates, USGS
    requires a monitoring infrastructure that includes local, national and
    global networks; reliable and redundant telecommunications; modem
    computing centers for data analysis and dissemination; and a skilled
    staff of analysts, technicians, scientists, and network support people.
    To ensure that publicly funded monitoring networks and education
    programs are targeted to regions at highest risk, USGS performs
    assessments of the distribution and extent of each natural hazard
    listed above at various scales--from national to, in high-hazard urban
    areas, local. To improve the accuracy and timeliness of warnings and to
    minimize false alarms, we perform (and fund university and State
    partners to perform) targeted research to understand the underlying
    processes and their predictability. To maximize the extent to which
    hazard information is received and acted upon by appropriate
    individuals when disasters strike, we actively pursue and foster links
    with local governments, emergency management agencies and the media.
    The USGS targets these capabilities to areas with the highest hazard
    and the greatest risk.
    Volcanoes
        Impending volcanic eruptions can be forecast and warnings issued in
    time for communities to take preparatory actions. Eruption forecasts
    and warnings depend on telemetered, real-time data streams from diverse
    suites of monitoring instruments on volcanoes, including reliable data
    streams transmitted by other agencies (e.g., GOES satellite data from
    NOAA, seismic data from key university cooperators). Observatory-based
    scientists are necessary to interpret monitoring data, as eruptions are
    too complex for the fully automatic generation of alerts directly from
    machine signals. Automatic warnings of large volcanic debris flows
    (lahars) based on signals from acoustic-flow-monitor arrays may be the
    exception. These capabilities are currently deployed at the highest-
    priority volcanoes. The USGS has closely monitored the eruption of
    Mount St. Helens since September 2004, correctly forecasting the style
    of eruption, and remaining in daily communication with the Washington
    State Emergency Management Division and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS)
    who rely on USGS information to restrict public access to potentially
    threatened areas surrounding the volcano.
    Landslides
        Landslides, whether induced by rainfall or earthquakes, involve
    complicated physical processes that are not sufficiently well
    understood to permit reliable predictions, but the capability to
    provide advanced warning of increased landslide danger now exists.
    Doing so requires accurate landslide thresholds to monitor the hazard
    and travel distances to gauge possible impact. The first step is a
    detailed study of susceptible geographic regions having the requisite
    geology and topography. Probable landslide paths and travel distances
    are analyzed to identify possible landslide hazards, for example, by
    specifying areas where landslides have a high probability of impacting
    roads and buildings. Within different regions, the timing of landslides
    needs to be observed during storms and correlated with the rainfall
    intensity and duration in order to develop the criteria of rainfall
    thresholds for triggering landslides. Advanced weather forecasts can be
    combined with the threshold models to evaluate whether landslides are
    likely to occur within regions susceptible to landsliding. Real-time
    monitoring of rainfall and site measurements of rising groundwater and
    initial slope movements near landslide sources can provide critical
    information for issuing immediate public warning of landslide hazards.
    Numerous rainstorms in southern California this winter have resulted in
    serious landslides and debris flows. USGS scientists have issued
    advisories of potential landslides to the National Weather Service,
    California Office of Emergency Services (OES), other state and federal
    agencies, and the public--as recently as February 15, 2005. The San
    Bernardino County Sun and other local newspapers have used these
    advisories in crafting news articles alerting their readers to the
    possibility of landslide occurrence and instructing their readers on
    ways to protect themselves.
        The USGS and NOAA recently signed an MOA to develop a joint watch/
    warning system for rainfall-generated landslides (debris flows). The
    MOA calls for NOAA-generated precipitation observations and forecasts
    to be forwarded to the USGS, where they will be compared with the
    threshold models. When a watch/warning is warranted, the USGS will
    forward the pertinent information to NOAA for NOAA to disseminate a
    joint message using its standard watch/warning communication
    procedures. The prototype of this system will be fielded by September
    2005 in the area of operation of NOAA's Weather Forecasting Offices of
    Oxnard (CA) and San Diego (CA), and will cover a number of counties,
    including San Bernardino and Ventura counties.
    Earthquakes
        For earthquakes, it is not yet possible to predict the time and
    location of damaging events, but it is possible to predict their
    impacts and deliver rapid post-event information to emergency
    responders. First, USGS delivers long-term forecasts of earthquake
    shaking in the form of hazard maps that underlie most building codes
    used in the United States. Second, within minutes after a domestic
    earthquake, USGS and its regional network partners issue an alert with
    location and magnitude. In five urban areas where dense arrays of
    strong-motion instruments have been deployed through the Advanced
    National Seismic System (ANSS), Internet-distributed ShakeMaps showing
    the intensity of ground shaking are available to prioritize response
    efforts. Following the December 22, 2003, magnitude 6.5 San Simeon
    earthquake, the California OES was automatically notified within five
    minutes, and the first ShakeMap was pushed to OES and other users in
    less than nine minutes. Third, in the time scale of hours to days
    following large earthquakes, USGS provides short-term predictions for
    the likelihood of aftershocks in California.
    Which entities or organizations receive warnings from, or through, your
            agency (such as federal and local disaster response entities,
            first
            responders/911, and local and national media outlets).
    Earthquakes
        The USGS provides hazard alerts to a broad suite of federal, state
    and local government agencies, and private-sector entities, including
    the media. The scope of the USGS notification process depends on the
    severity, extent, location, and possible impact of the hazard at hand.
    For damaging domestic earthquakes, USGS notifies by telephone, fax, e-
    mail and/or pager:

            White House, The Situation Room
            Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
            Department of the Interior (DOI) Watch office
            Dam and power plant operators (including U.S. Army Corps of
            Engineers (USACE, Bureau of Reclamation, Nuclear Regulatory
            Commission and some public and private utilities)
            Pipeline operators
            Railroads
            Insurance companies
            Department of Defense (DoD) offices with domestic civil defense
            responsibilities
            State and local offices of emergency services
            State geological surveys
            Veterans Administration
            Department of Agriculture
            Department of Transportation including the Federal Aviation
            Administration (FAA)
            Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Transportation Security
            Administration
            NOAA
            The Weather Channel
            National Science Foundation (NSF)
            National Institute of Standards and Technology

        For both domestic and international damaging earthquakes, USGS also
    e-mails earthquake notifications to over 40,000 subscribers including
    many print and broadcast media companies. For public and news media,
    notices are automatically posted to the Web. In the first few days
    after the Sumatra disaster, USGS earthquake Web sites received over 120
    million hits. The ANSS regional networks also have e-mail/pager
    notification lists that reach further into affected States and
    communities. Depending on the location and severity of the earthquake,
    targeted distribution also proceeds to key users that can include the
    Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Environmental Protection
    Agency, NOAA Pacific and Alaska/West Coast Tsunami Warning Centers,
    state and local emergency managers, and 200 foreign agencies.
        For damaging international earthquakes, USGS notifies by telephone,
    fax, e-mail and/or pager:

            White House, The Situation Room
            Department of State
            U.S. Embassies and consulates in affected countries
            U.S. Agency for International Development
            United Nations Office of Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
            Department of Defense
            Federal Aviation Administration
            Federal Emergency Management Agency
            Earthquake Engineering Research Institute
            Humanitarian groups (Red Cross, Red Crescent)
            International Atomic Energy Commission
            Private sector and government search-and-rescue groups

    Volcanoes
        For volcanic alerts, each of the five U.S. volcano observatories
    has developed communication protocols tailored to the appropriate
    hazard and region. For notifications of explosive eruptions that can
    send volcanic particles (``ash'') into the atmosphere, USGS eruption
    alerts are sent to

            FAA air traffic control centers
            NOAA meteorological watch offices and Volcanic Ash Advisory
            Centers Air Force Weather Agency
            U.S. Coast Guard
            Military bases
            Airports

        For volcanic ground hazards (such as lava flows and debris flows),
    USGS relies on the interagency incident command system (ICS), operated
    either by state emergency or federal land managers (like the one
    established by the U.S. Forest Service in 2004 for the eruption of Mt.
    St. Helens). In the absence of an operating ICS, the protocol for
    ground hazards is to alert State emergency and land managers (e.g.,
    National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service, and Washington Emergency
    Management Department), who in turn alert county emergency managers and
    other federal agencies. When an eruption is expected or underway, USGS
    also makes ash fall forecast graphics and sends them to appropriate
    FEMA regional offices and may have a FEMA representative on-site at an
    observatory. To communicate with the local and national media--before,
    during, and after an eruption or episode of unrest--each observatory
    commits experienced staff to talk directly with media representatives.
    Landslides
        Landslide advisories and warnings are sent to the appropriate State
    Offices of Emergency Management and the National Weather Service.
    Notice is also provided (through the DOI Watch Office) to the White
    House, DOI land management agencies, DHS (including FEMA), and Military
    Commands. To communicate with local and national media prior to,
    during, and after landslide events, Landslide Hazard Program scientists
    are available to respond to media inquiries. The Landslide Hazard
    Program also posts detailed information and maps on its Web site, which
    is available to the media, public officials, and the public.
    Demonstrate which communications technologies are currently used to
            deliver these public warnings, such as automatic alert TVs and
            radios, telephones, digital assistants (PDAs), and the
            Internet. If such
            communications technologies are not being used, we would like
            to know what the impediments are, and the status of any
            discussions to expand the warning system's capability to do so.
        The USGS uses a broad range of technologies to distribute alerts
    and notifications, including the public Internet, private/government
    Internet, text messaging, pager, phone, fax, NOAA Weather Wire, and
    briefings to local and national media. Currently, over 40,000 e-mails
    will be sent following a large earthquake. Users have the choice of a
    full message by e-mail or a shorter message suitable for a cell phone
    or PDA. Several improved distribution programs are in development under
    the ANSS, including a replacement for the current e-mail notification
    system that will allow users to customize which earthquake sizes and
    locations will generate alerts. In the Pacific Northwest, the National
    Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program--a partnership that includes NOAA,
    FEMA, NSF, USGS and five Pacific States--is deploying all-hazards
    warning system technology to coastal communities in that region,
    providing tsunami, earthquake and mudflow warnings. The pole-mounted
    All Hazard Alert Broadcast system has a blue warning light to cut
    through fog, a siren warning, and a voice warning that is keyed by NOAA
    Weather Radio or local emergency managers. Washington Emergency
    Management is developing this warning system as part of the National
    Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. This Program is a model for how
    federal agencies and their State partners can work together to reduce
    risk.
        The USGS relies on FAA and NOAA communications systems to relay
    notifications of volcanic activity to enroute aircraft and airline
    dispatchers. For other groups, USGS primarily uses brief phone calls,
    followed by fax and e-mail, to provide more detailed information.
    During both the premonitory and eruptive phases of a volcanic crisis,
    PDAs and text messaging are used to notify off-duty scientists
    automatically of changes in monitoring parameters.
    Specify a process by which your agency, either on its own, or in
            conjunction with other relevant agencies, can maximize
            effective dissemination of public warning notifications.
        The USGS hazard/disaster notification process relies on a
    ``notification tree'' or infrastructure, in which federal and state
    agencies alerted by USGS take responsibility for disseminating USGS
    information to emergency responders and other critical users. This
    system contributes to an all-hazards approach to public warning. This
    process is supplemented regionally and locally by direct (and in many
    cases automated) alerting to critical users (e.g., earthquake ShakeMap
    delivery to utilities, state transportation departments, homeland
    security command centers, and regional pager/text-messaging to
    emergency managers). We believe this is an effective strategy for USGS,
    and it is appropriate to our mission. The USGS is continually honing
    its disaster response strategy.
        As part of the President's plan for an improved tsunami warning
    system, USGS proposes to deploy software developed by the California
    Integrated Seismic Network (a USGS, university and State partnership)
    to speed USGS-generated earthquake information directly to local
    emergency managers with a dual use capability to also provide NOAA
    tsunami warnings.
        Tsunamis are not solely produced by earthquakes. Approximately five
    percent of tsunamis in the past 250 years were produced by volcanoes,
    and some of these are among the most destructive tsunami events known.
    Volcano induced tsunamis are generated in various ways; the largest,
    most destructive tsunamis have been caused by large explosive eruptions
    and flank collapse events on island and coastal volcanoes. There is a
    demonstrated volcanic tsunami hazard in Alaska and Hawaii and a likely
    one in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Improved
    volcano monitoring systems and response planning at volcanoes that have
    a potential tsunami hazard would help provide better mitigation
    concerning an important natural hazard.
        The USGS will continue its broad-based public awareness activities,
    which are integral to effective use of warnings and other hazards
    information by the public and civil defense authorities. For example,
    USGS is working with the FAA, NOAA and others, to formulate a National
    Interagency Operational Plan for Volcanic Ash Episodes, and we continue
    to develop other inter-agency response plans for ground hazards. Such a
    plan is necessary for USGS to meet the aviation sector's stated need
    for notification of explosive ash-producing eruptions by a volcano
    observatory to the appropriate FAA air-traffic control center within 5
    minutes of the event. The USGS offices in California and Washington
    provide training programs for local emergency managers and media on how
    to use ShakeMap and other earthquake notification and assessment
    products generated by the regional and national networks. The USGS is
    working with the American Planning Association to develop a best-
    practices manual on landslides that will become available to thousands
    of planners this spring.
        The USGS is working with the National Weather Service to develop a
    protocol for issuing landslide warnings over NOAA Weather Radio All
    Hazards network. State and county emergency managers--the agencies most
    responsible for issuing instructions to citizens--rely on this
    communication network for timely warnings. Part of the protocol will
    allow real-time transmittal of current weather conditions to USGS
    landslide experts to better pinpoint the areas of greatest danger.
        For improved delivery of flood warnings, USGS currently partners
    with other federal agencies, including the National Weather Service,
    Army Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of Reclamation. This includes
    efforts to raise public awareness about appropriate responses to flood
    watches and warnings. In addition, there are a number of proof-of-
    concept experiments underway to improve the timeliness and quality of
    USGS information used by public and private entities to reduce flood
    damages and loss of life.
        To aid wildland fire suppression, USGS manages and hosts the
    Geospatial Multi-Agency Coordination Group or GeoMAC, an Internet-based
    tool that permits fire managers to access online maps of current fire
    locations and perimeters in the conterminous 48 States and Alaska using
    a standard Web browser. GeoMAC is a multi-agency group with technical
    and subject matter experts from the Department of the Interior's fire
    management agencies--the Bureau of Land Management, National Park
    Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian
    Affairs, and the United States Forest Service of the Department of
    Agriculture, as well as numerous other agencies and firms.
        The USGS is working with the National Interagency Fire Center and
    the University of Alaska Fairbanks, specifically the Geographic
    Information Network of Alaska (GINA) to develop a process for analyzing
    satellite information to obtain daily updates of vegetation condition
    for Alaska to improve the sensitivity to fire weather conditions. A
    cooperative project called LANDFIRE is conducted by USGS and the Forest
    Service to provide regional and local scale geospatial data of
    vegetation, fuel, and fire regime. The project will enhance prediction
    of fire danger and understanding of fire behavior for incident
    commanders and a broad range of other users.
    Specify how your agency interacts with the Department of Homeland
            Security (including FEMA), the Federal Communications
            Commission, the Department of Commerce, or other relevant
            agencies with respect to warning systems.
        The USGS interacts with DHS, Department of Commerce, DoD and many
    other Federal agencies on matters related to hazard mitigation,
    preparedness and disaster alerting. Key among these are FEMA, National
    Weather Service and, for volcanic hazards, FAA. Notifications are
    either direct to the responding agency or coordinated through the
    Department of the Interior Watch Office, which operates around the
    clock to compile and disseminate information relevant to law
    enforcement, homeland security, and natural disasters impacting the
    Department's responsibilities across the United States. For
    earthquakes, USGS National Earthquake Information Center has a direct
    phone line to the DHS/FEMA operations center in Washington. The USGS
    and FEMA are partners in the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction
    Program and have developed and tested a coordinated earthquake response
    plan. For tsunami coordination, USGS exchanges telephone, e-mail, data,
    and Web products with the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers (and with
    tsunami warning centers in Japan, Chile and Russia). The USGS also
    provides earthquake alerting through the NOAA Weather Wire, as
    previously noted.
        For volcanic hazards, USGS works with FAA, NOAA, and DoD to
    disseminate notifications of explosive eruptions and associated ash
    clouds to the aviation sector (both military and commercial). For
    ground volcanic hazards, USGS relies on the interagency Incident
    Command System (ICS), operated either by state emergency or federal
    land managers (like the one established by USFS in 2004 for the
    eruption of Mt. St. Helens). In the absence of an operating ICS, the
    protocol for ground hazards is to alert state emergency and land
    managers (e.g., NPS, USFS), who in turn alert county emergency managers
    and other federal agencies. The USGS sends ash fall forecast graphics
    to appropriate FEMA regional offices.
        To improve the effectiveness of flood warnings, USGS collaborates
    with many federal, state and local government agencies and the private
    sector. The FEMA, and state and local officials monitor flood watches
    and warnings and use USGS Internet sites to ascertain flood conditions
    for those rivers not serviced by the National Weather Service river
    forecast system.
    Explain how your agency could improve public notification of impending
            natural hazards and disasters.
        The USGS could improve public hazard notification and warning of
    natural hazards in three basic areas: (1) Modernization and expansion
    of monitoring networks; (2) increased robustness and redundancy of
    communication links; and, (3) accelerated development and deployment of
    capabilities to take full advantage of new data streams, research
    findings and communication technologies to improve the accuracy and
    timeliness of information we provide for emergency management.
    (1) Modernization and expansion of monitoring networks
        The President's proposal for improving tsunami warning systems
    would replace legacy hardware and software systems at the USGS National
    Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) and establish 247
    operations, actions that will improve response time, benefiting both
    earthquake notification and tsunami warning. The proposal also includes
    support to improve station up-time in the Global Seismographic Network
    (GSN)--a partnership of USGS, the National Science Foundation, the
    Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, and the University
    of California--and to install additional stations in the Caribbean
    region. The NEIC modernization is a key component of the Advanced
    National Seismic System (ANSS). As described in USGS Circular 1188, the
    ANSS plan includes both notification and early warning of earthquakes
    as fundamental goals.
        Impending volcanic eruptions can be forecast and warnings issued in
    time for communities to take preparatory actions. To improve this
    warning capability, USGS is developing a plan for a National Volcano
    Early Warning System (NVEWS). This plan will outline priorities for
    monitoring instrumentation at our most threatening volcanoes, along
    with development of a new generation of information technology tools
    for sharing of data.
        Fire danger information and specific information on fire fuels
    assessment depend on reliable timely satellite observations. It is
    important that USGS continue to provide remote sensing technology to
    the fire management agencies. It is, therefore, important to support
    the ongoing development of the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
    and the companion National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS), a satellite system used to monitor global
    environmental conditions, and collect and disseminate data related to:
    weather, atmosphere, oceans, land and near-space environment.
    (2) Robust telemetry and communication links
        For rapid-onset events like earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
    eruptions and landslides, only realtime systems can provide data in
    sufficient time to issue actionable notifications and warnings. The
    funding in the Emergency Supplemental for improved tsunami detection
    and warning system for the United States, along with the funding in the
    2006 budget for the same purpose, will expand and improve telemetry
    connections to monitoring stations, so that the seismic stations in the
    Global Seismographic Network provide real-time data. This will
    contribute to decreasing the reporting time for global earthquakes from
    over one hour to about twenty minutes.
        USGS data and products often travel across a web of communications
    links from the monitoring network to the public, typically involving
    satellite uplinks and downlinks, the Internet, and radio or television
    bands. Although some USGS systems employ redundant links (e.g.,
    satellite, phone lines, and/or Internet communications), in many cases
    the communications channels are vulnerable to a single point of
    failure. Hardening of these telecommunication links is essential to
    ensure a reliable warning system is available with the appropriate
    level of redundancy.
        As part of the NEIC upgrade, the President's proposal calls for
    247 network operations and robust Internet serving of seismic
    data. It would also increase the number of USGS-operated GSN stations
    that provide real-time data to NEIC and the NOAA tsunami warning
    centers. Currently, only 80 percent of GSN stations have digital
    telemetry links that allow for real-time communication. Both for the
    GSN and the ANSS, a fully telemetered system with redundant
    communications links will improve response time for damaging
    earthquakes. For volcano hazards, establishing a local Internet portal
    in Alaska would strengthen the robustness and reliability of warnings.
    (3) New capabilities
        The USGS is testing dedicated ground-based Doppler radar at
    volcanoes in order to improve its ability to provide notification of
    explosive ash-producing eruption to the appropriate FAA air traffic
    control center within 5 minutes of the event, a need identified by the
    aviation sector. By adding such radar units to the suite of monitoring
    instruments in place at restless or erupting volcanoes, rapid detection
    and confirmation of eruptive ash plumes at night and in bad weather is
    greatly improved.
        Increased use of new remote-sensing technologies such as airborne
    LiDAR and satellite-based InSAR would allow USGS to provide more
    accurate information for a number of hazards. In the case of
    landslides, LiDAR delivers highly detailed topography, which is
    critical for landslide susceptibility characterization and
    identification of past landslide scars. InSAR allows monitoring of
    large slow-moving landslides. These technologies have proven valuable
    for early detection of volcano re-activation as well as providing
    important insights on earthquake fault rupture characteristics.
        Forecasting coastal hazards associated with hurricanes and other
    major storms is critically-dependent on the availability of accurate
    and up-to-date information on nearshore and coastal elevations. In
    cooperation with NASA, NOAA, and the USACE, USGS is developing a
    comprehensive national assessment of coastal hazards based on high-
    resolution LiDAR surveys of coastal and nearshore elevation. Data
    developed within this program have supported the development of models
    relating coastal response to storm surge and wave run-up and nearshore,
    beach, and dune elevations. Forecasts of coastal vulnerability to
    impending storm landfall are developed prior to landfall and made
    available to state and federal agencies to guide pre-storm evacuation
    and post-storm recovery planning. At present, forecasts rely on
    historic or ``model'' storm characteristics and USGS and NOAA are
    working collaboratively to develop vulnerability products that
    incorporate hurricane forecasts issued by the National Hurricane
    Center.
        The USGS routinely acquires and distributes global satellite image
    data from its Landsat satellite system; receives and distributes data
    from several NASA earth-observing satellites; and obtains and
    redistributes data from U.S. commercial and international satellite
    systems. In support of tsunami disaster-response, USGS is distributing
    many types of tsunami-related satellite imagery, maps, and other
    geospatial data and working with commercial satellite data providers to
    support the needs of Federal Government agencies. For disaster
    situations such as these, where hundreds of thousands of digital files
    have already been distributed, USGS posts digital data on a server and
    users electronically ``pull'' what they need over the Internet. The
    President's budget request for USGS includes funds to ensure the
    continued operation of Landsat 7, along with NASA and NOAA, and to
    begin work on an upgraded ground-processing system to acquire, process,
    archive and distribute data from a new generation of satellite-based
    land image sensors. This Landsat Data Continuity Mission is expected to
    begin operations in 2009.
        The President's proposal for upgrading NEIC will accelerate
    development of several rapid-response products, including the Prompt
    Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system, which
    uses information about an earthquake's source, combined with
    information regarding population and infrastructure in the affected
    region to estimate potential damage and loss of life in a major
    earthquake. The PAGER system is ideal for both domestic and
    international areas where a dense seismic network is not available, but
    where a rapid assessment is critical for estimating impact.
        In several metropolitan areas, the ANSS ShakeMap System supports
    direct links to critical users. In California for example, ShakeMap is
    automatically sent by Internet to:

            California Department of Transportation (DOT)
            California Office of Emergency Services (OES)
            Utilities (Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas & Electric,
            Southern California Gas, the Los Angeles Department of Water
            and Power, East Bay Municipal Utility District)
            Bay Area Rapid Transit system
            National media outlets
            Communications companies
            California Earthquake Authority
            Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Services
            Local media outlets
            FEMA regional offices

        Outside of California, ShakeMap is in various stages of development
    and integration. ShakeMap requires dense instrumentation. ShakeMap has
    been deployed in Salt Lake City, Utah, Anchorage, Alaska, and Seattle,
    Washington. In those cities, ShakeMap has been integrated into their
    emergency management and response procedures. The ShakeCast software,
    now under development at a pilot level, is designed to help users
    overcome Internet security barriers and effectively integrate USGS
    earthquake notifications into emergency procedures.
        The USGS is exploring the feasibility of earthquake early warning,
    in which rapid computer analysis and communication links are used to
    provide seconds of warning before earthquake waves arrive. Such warning
    systems are in place in Japan, Mexico and Taiwan. The 2000 re-
    authorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
    (NEHRP) called for development of a U.S. early warning system for
    earthquakes. The USGS currently sponsors modest research and
    development in this area, including research on earthquake early
    warning feasibility and efforts to improve the numbers of seismic
    stations reporting in real time and the speed and reliability of
    earthquake reporting.
        Building on current capabilities for issuing aftershock
    probabilities, USGS and its partners in the California Integrated
    Seismic Network will be releasing a public Web site this spring with
    the probability of strong earthquake shaking in the next 24 hours,
    based upon a background probability from our understanding of geology,
    modified by the probability that earthquakes that have just occurred
    will trigger other activity. In southern California, USGS is
    investigating what information from structural instrumentation can be
    used to provide rapid estimates of structural damage following
    earthquakes or explosions. An experimental instrumentation package is
    being installed in two buildings in the Los Angeles area and we are
    developing tools to analyze the structural health of the buildings from
    those data streams.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                Roger A. Hansen
        Question. Dr. Hansen, thank you for your work to improve local
    communication systems for tsunami warnings in Alaska. Because of his
    strong interest in protecting coastal communities, Senator Stevens
    requested a written suggestion of what a pilot project for improving
    and expanding local tsunami warning systems would look like in your
    estimation. Because of Washington State's high risk for a tsunami
    disaster in the next 50 years, I'm very interested in your vision of a
    possible pilot project and request that you please also send me your
    suggestions.

        Answer.
              Pilot Project for Improving Tsunami Safety in Alaska
    The Problem
        The December 26, 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami illustrated a
    fundamental failure: The inability to communicate a warning message to
    remote areas. This failure existed (both nationally and
    internationally) at all levels of observation, information
    dissemination, and local education and outreach.

       Lack of warning system contributed to deaths of 10s or 100s
            of thousands of people.

       All links in chain missing.
              Scientists--National Authorities--Local Authorities--Populace

        A Secondary failure (scientific) comes from the inability to obtain
    a rapid and robust estimate of an earthquake magnitude using current
    instrumentation.

       The Magnitude of the earthquake was dramatically
            underestimated in real time.

       But we can do something about it. The combination of strong
            motion seismic stations and GPS data in the near regional area
            of a large earthquake can be shown to estimate magnitude
            rapidly within 0.1-0.2 magnitude units of the final estimate.

        Forty years earlier on March 27, 1964 a magnitude 9.2 earthquake
    ripped through the Prince William Sound in southern Alaska, generating
    a devastating tsunami. Though the death toll in the 1964 Good Friday
    quake is miniscule compared to the Indian Ocean disaster, Alaska today
    is vastly different but still faces difficult challenges with warning
    its at-risk communities of the occurrence of tsunamis. These challenges
    come in part from the nature of our remote location, irregular
    coastlines with complex bathymetry and topography; the vast size of the
    state that we live in, one of the most seismically active regions of
    the world; the lack of infrastructure throughout the area for both
    operations and maintenance of monitoring systems; and consistent and
    timely communication of warning messages.
    The Solution
        As presented in my testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
    Science, and Transportation, I will concentrate on addressing some of
    the needs for improving tsunami safety in Alaska by focusing this pilot
    project on combining warning guidance, hazard assessment, and
    mitigation in the very seismically active Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian
    Islands region.
        The pilot project area has been recognized as the most seismically
    active area in the United States. The area generates large tsunamis
    that can affect not only the coastlines of Alaska, but also the rest of
    the Pacific Ocean. The goals of this project will be accomplished by
    engaging the partnerships that already exist in Alaska for addressing
    tsunami safety. This team of professionals from the University of
    Alaska, and state and federal agencies are already operating as a
    partnership within the Tsunami Warning and Environmental Observatory
    for Alaska (TWEAK) program coordinated out of the University of Alaska.
    Warning Guidance
        The region of Southern Alaska extending into the Aleutian Islands
    is severely lacking in modern earthquake instrumentation even though
    there have been more large earthquakes in the past 50 years than
    anywhere else in the United States.
        First and foremost, we must be able to detect events that can
    trigger tsunamis. The primary method of event detection is accomplished
    using seismology and seismic networks. Sea level data (both tide gauges
    and deep ocean buoys) are also monitored to verify the existence of and
    danger posed by tsunamis. Our primary hazard (like that in Sumatra)
    comes from a ``local'' tsunami generated by nearby large earthquakes in
    or near the coast of Alaska. Therefore, we must rely on the rapid
    warnings that can be issued from the detection of large earthquakes by
    the seismic network.
        Modern seismic recordings combined with GPS data can provide rapid
    information on earthquake location, size, and distribution of sea floor
    deformation that generates tsunamis. However, since much of the seismic
    network in Alaska has been in operation since the late 1960s, many
    stations are in need of modernization.
        Over the past few years, AEIC was tasked through the National
    Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to develop 18 of these modern
    stations for Alaska and to ensure timely delivery of this data to the
    warning centers. The University program has now increased the number of
    modern stations AEIC can provide to augment this sparse improvement,
    and provides enhanced information on local earthquakes through applied
    research efforts. However, even with the funding of both the NTHMP and
    the University TWEAK program, nearly 75 percent of the Alaska seismic
    network still relies on outdated equipment, leaving vast areas of
    Alaska (and in particular the very seismically active Aleutian Islands)
    still under-populated with modern seismic stations.
        To improve this situation we propose to augment the network with:

       20 Modern broad band seismic stations with high dynamic
            range and frequency bandwidth.

       20 Modern strong motion seismic sensors that will stay on
            scale for even the large magnitude 9+ earthquakes that can
            occur in the region.

       20 continuously reporting GPS sensors that can directly
            measure permanent deformation and robust earthquake size.

       Modern tide gauges.

       Modern satellite telemetry to record seismic and deformation
            signals in real time at the Alaska Earthquake Information
            Center and the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center.

       Near real time processing of the combined signals to rapidly
            estimate the earthquake size, and distribution of deformation.
            This gives direct and rapid estimates of tsunami potential.

       A prototype multi-observing deep ocean buoy system
            consisting of at least an ocean bottom pressure sensor and an
            ocean bottom seismometer giving lateral constraint to the land
            based seismic network.

        Unique to this effort is the co-location of modern seismic and GPS
    instrumentation. The combined observations give rich information for
    the rapid determination of earthquake location, size, and distribution
    of sea floor deformation that generates tsunamis.
    Hazard Assessment
        Tsunami warning and safety procedures require an understanding of
    hazards and risks associated with tsunamis. Alaska researchers at UAF
    are evaluating the risk by constructing inundation maps for at-risk
    communities through super computer modeling of the tsunami water waves
    from scenario earthquakes and landslides. Reliable modeling results,
    however, require that we have accurate bathymetry to a resolution that
    is not generally available in Alaska. Much of the sea floor along the
    shallow waters off the coast of Alaska have not been mapped in many
    years. Some areas have not been mapped since before the 1964 Prince
    William Sound M9.2 earthquake (Note that large earthquakes can change
    bathymetry in local regions of the sea floor by tens of meters.).
    Collection of improved bathymetry is necessary along Alaska's coastal
    communities and should be a top priority for our pilot project area.
        High resolution modeling and mapping is needed to identify
    potential areas for evacuation and lifeline infrastructure at risk. As
    a part of the pilot project at least one community at risk should be
    selected for acquisition of very high resolution bathymetry. This data
    will enable the construction of very detailed flooding maps for the
    community. Benefits of this process include the enhanced understanding
    of the local risk, construction of evacuation routes for the community,
    and an evaluation of the capabilities (and potential errors) of
    numerical modeling and forecasting of tsunamis with the highest quality
    data available. The models would then be hosted for evaluation by the
    research community as part of the Alaska Region Super Computer Center
    tsunami portal system developed as part of the TWEAK program. A
    candidate community for this evaluation is Akutan. Akutan has one of
    the largest communities in the Aleutian Islands, which supports the
    largest fishing industry in the United States. Other candidate
    communities could include Sand Point, Adak, Dutch Harbor, and a host of
    others among Alaska's 76 coastal communities.
    Mitigation
        Last, but not least, to tie together all the components of tsunami
    identification and warning with the hazard assessment, the pilot
    community needs a comprehensive public education program. It is
    important to recognize that tsunami warning systems must go beyond just
    the ability to detect a tsunami and send a warning message. The most
    important aspect of tsunami warning systems is the existence of a
    mechanism for disseminating warning information to the people on the
    shorelines, and for the recipient of the warning message to understand
    how to react. Tsunami hazard mitigation requires a long-term sustained
    effort of continuing public education, and responsible planning
    decisions in coastal communities.
        The power of education is clear.
        The State of Alaska partners' are well aware of our difficulties in
    reaching our 76 communities at risk to tsunamis. Enhancing the warning
    communication and outreach infrastructure at the state and local level
    for both emergency managers and the public represents the most
    important improvement to be made in Alaska for saving lives.
        Among the pilot project community enhancements to be made include:

       Tsunami training for schools at all grade levels--Adult
            public education through media, community workshops, and other
            means.

       Exercises and drills for elected officials, schools, and the
            general public.

       Focus groups for mitigation, contingency and continuity
            planning workshops for essential services and tsunami-at-risk
            businesses.

       (Note that Public education could have saved thousands of
            lives around the Indian Ocean.)

        Tied to this effort will be an enhanced technical communication
    infrastructure package that can ensure tsunami warnings are broadcast
    to people along the coastlines or in their homes, businesses, and
    boats. Within the pilot community, we will explore all possible
    communication possibilities, including but not limited to:

       Local alert and notification communication equipment such as
            the Emergency Management Weather Information Network, NOAA
            Weather Radios for indoor use, and All Hazard Alert
            Broadcasting (AHAB) Siren and Radio for outdoor use.

       Support from Alaska Division of Homeland Security and
            Emergency Management professionals for disseminating existing
            alert notification, and other enhanced communication protocols,
            to ensure tsunami warning and evacuation messages can be
            received by the public rapidly and effectively.

        The key to success is developing a strong communications link from
    the Tsunami Warning Center to a hazard control center or emergency
    contact point that can be assured of receiving and relaying the
    warnings to the local people through the above considerations.

    Summary
        In summary, Alaska has partnerships in place to address the threat
    from tsunamis. Yet we still have continuing needs for improved
    monitoring with seismic and tide gauge networks, scientific
    infrastructure for numerical forecasting of tsunamis, and the civil
    infrastructure to educate and warn people.
        This pilot will demonstrate the techniques and procedures necessary
    to enhance the delivery of hazard warnings to very remote areas of the
    world. It will focus on an integrated approach of improved monitoring,
    coupled with extensive hazard and risk assessment and quantification,
    tied together with a strong approach for education and outreach, and
    reliable information delivery. In addition, the enhanced monitoring
    with world class multi-use sensing stations will allow for rapid
    evaluation of earthquake size and characteristics, estimates of the
    deformation of the sea floor, and more accurate forecasting of tele-
    tsunamis that would potentially impact Hawaii, the west coast of the
    United States, and other coastlines of the Pacific Ocean.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
                                Charles G. Groat
        Question 1. Dr. Groat, I understand that the Cascadia Subduction
    zone off the coast of Washington state is similar to the fault that
    produced the Indian Ocean tsunami. The last major Cascadia quake on
    January 26, 1700 caused 30-foot high tsunamis that inundated the
    Washington coastline. In your testimony, you stated that USGS
    scientists and others have estimated that there is a 10-14 percent
    chance of a repeat of the Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake and tsunami
    event in the next 50 years. What is the basis for this estimate?
        Answer. The 10-14 percent probability of having a magnitude-9
    earthquake on the Cascadia subduction zone in the next 50 years was
    derived from the average recurrence time of these great earthquakes
    observed in studies of coastal subsidence. For example, at Willapa Bay,
    WA there are wetland soils that were buried during coastal subsidence
    that occurred during great Cascadia earthquakes. These buried soils are
    evidence that seven great earthquakes occurred along the Cascadia
    subduction zone during the past 3500 years. The dates of when these
    soils were buried are consistent with the dates of subsidence events
    found at other locations along the Pacific Northwest coast, further
    supporting the concept that these buried soils record the occurrence of
    great earthquakes along the coast. The ages of these buried soils
    indicate an average recurrence time of about 500 years for great
    Cascadia earthquakes. The USGS used this average recurrence time to get
    two probability estimates for the next 50 years: the 10 percent
    estimate is derived from a model that does not consider the time from
    the last earthquake and the 14 percent estimate is derived from a model
    that considers the time since the last great Cascadia earthquake (in
    1700 A.D.) and the variability in the recurrence time of past great
    earthquakes as seen in the record of buried soils.

        Question 1a. Please explain what makes this fault especially prone
    to generating a tsunami-causing earthquake.
        Answer. Nearly all of the world's major tsunamis occur in
    subduction zones. The geometry between two adjacent tectonic plates in
    subduction zones gives rise to the possibility of tsunami generation in
    areas like Cascadia, where the offshore Juan de Fuca plate is moving
    landward about 1.5 inches per year. Because the rocks in the Juan de
    Fuca plate are more dense than the rocks in the North American plate,
    the Juan de Fuca plate begins to dip slightly into the earth just off
    the Pacific Coast. The contact between the two plates is the Cascadia
    fault. Unlike the San Andreas fault, which is nearly vertical, the
    Cascadia fault is nearly horizontal. This shallow, dipping, geometry
    establishes a very wide contact area--perhaps as much as 60-80 miles--
    between the two plates. The wide contact area combines with the 600-
    mile length of Cascadia to give a huge earthquake fault area. When an
    earthquake occurs on the Cascadia fault, there is as much as 30-60 feet
    of displacement of one plate against the other, and that motion can
    cause rapid changes in the level of the sea floor, resulting in
    tsunamis.
        Not all subduction-zone earthquakes generate damaging tsunamis. If
    the fault displacement does not cause significant movement on the ocean
    floor, then only small waves are generated. In some cases, the initial
    earthquake ground shaking may generate huge underwater landslides that
    can either produce their own tsunamis or complicate a tsunami generated
    by displacement of the ocean floor. Although most tsunamis are
    generated in the world's active subduction zones such as Cascadia,
    occasionally large gravity-driven slumps have occurred elsewhere that
    produced significant waves.
        One issue that needs more study in Cascadia is the effectiveness of
    existing warning systems in the event that only a portion of the
    subduction zone ruptures. In the case where the entire subduction zone
    from Vancouver Island to northern California ruptures, the immediate
    response of coastal residents must be keyed on the strong ground
    shaking. However, the geologic record shows that earthquakes are more
    frequent in the northern California-southern Oregon portion of Cascadia
    than off the Washington coast. If only a portion of the subduction zone
    breaks during an earthquake, then warning systems could be used to help
    guide initial response on the portion of the coast adjacent to the
    immediate earthquake area. The June 14, 2005, magnitude-7.1 earthquake
    off northern California highlighted the need for strengthening seismic
    warning systems to provide better guidance to state officials in the
    event of the next Cascadia earthquake rupturing along only a portion of
    the coast.

        Question 2. Dr. Groat, I understand that a tsunami generated by an
    earthquake along the Cascadia fault could reach the coast of Washington
    state within 10-20 minutes. I'm concerned because only three Washington
    towns are considered prepared under the TsunamiReady program, meaning
    that many, many coastal residents would not have adequate time to
    escape a tsunami. Would the USGS earthquake notification system be able
    to notify coastal communities in time to allow for an orderly
    evacuation?
        Answer. It is important to distinguish the roles of the USGS and
    NOAA with regard to notifying the public about tsunamis. The USGS
    supplies earthquake data to the NOAA West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning
    Center (WC/ATWC) in Palmer, AK, which is responsible for issuing
    warnings to coastal Washington. While the WC/ATWC receives USGS
    earthquake data within seconds, it takes their seismologists a few
    minutes to process the data and obtain a reliable earthquake location
    and magnitude and for the duty seismologist to execute the response
    procedures. Under optimal conditions the WC/ATWC can issue warnings as
    rapidly as two minutes after the earthquake.
        The USGS is also supporting the development of software like
    California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN) Display that enable
    emergency managers to receive notification about earthquakes and
    tsunami warnings quickly as they are distributed by USGS and NOAA. This
    technology eliminates any delays in information distribution and
    portrays the earthquake data on maps that can be customized with local
    highways, hospital locations, and other geographic features. The
    President's tsunami warning initiative provides funding to enhance CISN
    Display and provide it to coastal emergency managers.
        Even though the goal of the USGS is to put automated earthquake
    information into the hands of the emergency management community and
    the public within seconds, and likewise the WC/ATWC strives to issue
    tsunami warnings within a few minutes, it will be difficult, if not
    impossible, for many communities to successfully evacuate all citizens
    in inundation zones within 20 minutes. For that reason, education about
    tsunami hazards and proper evacuation procedures, land-use planning,
    and construction of structures that enable vertical evacuation will all
    be necessary to reduce the loss of life from a tsunami generated by a
    repeat of the 1700 Cascadia earthquake.
        In an effort to further coordinate U.S. national response to the
    threat from tsunamis, USGS and NOAA co-led two separate task groups
    organized by the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee
    on Disaster Reduction and U.S. Group on Earth Observations: ``Tsunami
    Lessons Learned Interim Report'' provides a first look at what lessons
    can be taken from the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami, and
    ``Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for
    Action'' provides a national plan to reduce future losses. These
    reports are expected to be released shortly.

        Question 3. Dr. Groat, I understand that the goal of USGS's
    National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) is to rapidly determine
    location and size of all destructive earthquakes and immediately
    disseminate that information to the public. I understand this to be
    critical because a person on the ground can't tell if the earthquake
    they just felt was a little one under their feet, or a huge one off the
    coast that may be followed by a tsunami. However, I understand that in
    previous instances, such as the Nisqually Earthquake that gave Seattle
    quite a shake in 2001, NEIC notification came in too late to inform and
    improve emergency response efforts. For this reason, I'm pleased to see
    that under the Administration's proposal, the NEIC would upgrade their
    operations and be able to provide 24 hour, 7 day a week notification.
    It is my understanding that a Cascadia fault generated earthquake would
    give Washington state coastal communities only 10 to 20 minutes of time
    to evacuate. Is it possible to reach a two minute performance standard
    for issuing tsunami warnings?
        Answer. The speed at which seismic networks can report about an
    earthquake is governed by the number of seismic stations in the
    vicinity of the earthquake and the speed at which seismic monitoring
    systems can calculate earthquake location and magnitudes. For example,
    the coastal region of Washington is monitored by seismic stations of
    the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN), operated by the
    University of Washington with funding from USGS. Data from the PNSN is
    continually transmitted to the WC/ATWC within seconds as a result of
    system upgrades funded by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
    Program. As a result of this cooperative effort and because NOAA staff
    were on duty at the time of the earthquake, the WC/ATWC released the
    Nisqually earthquake location and magnitude within 2 minutes. It should
    be noted that the PNSN, like other U.S. seismic networks participating
    in the ANSS, typically releases automated earthquake information within
    3-5 minutes.
        Despite improvements in the speed in which USGS or NOAA systems can
    compute location and magnitude and rapid human response, the goal of
    reaching a two minute performance standard for issuing tsunami warnings
    is only possible if there are sufficient seismic stations in the
    epicentral area. For quakes that occur in remote areas of the planet
    where the nearest seismic stations are many hundreds of miles away, it
    can take 10 minutes for sufficient data to be available for a seismic
    network to release a reliable location and magnitude. Although 10
    minutes may seem like a long time to locate a distant earthquake, the
    transit times for distant tsunamis to reach U.S. shores are on the
    order of hours.
        Just as the PNSN provides seismic data to the ATWC , the NEIC also
    provides continuous transmission of data from seismic stations around
    the globe to the WC/ATWC in order for them to be able to issue tsunami
    warnings as fast as possible. With the planned upgrades for the NEIC
    with funding from the President's tsunami warning initiative, the NEIC
    is standing up 247 operations and upgrading their software and
    hardware systems. Like the WC/ATWC, it will then be possible for the
    ANSS to release authoritative and reviewed earthquake information at
    the same speed at which the WC/ATWC releases earthquake information.
        We again want to emphasize that it is unlikely that a 2-minute
    performance standard would be sufficient to guarantee successful
    evacuation of all citizens in inundation zones. However, quick,
    reliable earthquake locations can be used to ``turn off'' initial
    activities that began with felt ground shaking. As noted above, the
    USGS is working to distribute these locations through such systems as
    CISN Display. The USGS is also working to provide a more complete
    description of the earthquake within minutes by automatically
    delivering ShakeMaps to emergency responders so that they can see the
    extent of strong shaking in their region. ShakeMaps also serve as input
    to the HAZUS program for rapidly calculating the expected losses from
    an earthquake.

        Question 4. Dr. Groat, I've heard that coordination and cooperation
    between NOAA, NSF, and USGS is very poor leading to lots of
    inefficiencies. Given the possibility of only 10 to 20 minutes warning,
    it is very important to me that both USGS and NOAA work together to
    disseminate information as fast as possible. Please explain how current
    procedures could be improved to ensure communication and dissemination
    of critical information.
        Answer. Since 1997, the USGS and NOAA have successfully partnered
    on tsunami warning efforts under the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
    Program (NTHMP) in cooperation with FEMA and the five Pacific states.
    The USGS installed dedicated data circuits connecting the two NOAA
    Tsunami Warning Centers to the ANSS to ensure reliable data exchange.
    USGS installed 53 new seismic stations in Alaska, California, Hawaii,
    Oregon and Washington to support improved earthquake detection for
    tsunami warnings and collaborated with NOAA staff in the installation
    of USGS seismological software in the Tsunami Warning Centers. As
    described above, the WC/ATWC also submits their calculations of
    earthquake location and magnitude into the ANSS earthquake information
    distribution system. The USGS and NOAA meet regularly under the
    auspices of the NTHMP to discuss how we could improve cooperation and
    coordination, and the level of cooperation between the ANSS operations
    and Tsunami Warning Center operations is excellent.
        In addition, USGS scientists often are active collaborators with
    NOAA scientists in performing tsunami inundation modeling. USGS
    scientists are tasked with specifying the ``source characteristics''
    (e.g., the dimensions, orientation, and the amount of fault movement)
    of anticipated earthquakes for the models. The USGS has an active
    research program to investigate the geologic evidence from historic
    tsunamis to gain a better understanding of the amount of wave run-up
    and frequency of occurrence. These studies guide the inundation
    modeling of NOAA scientists and form the basis for mitigation planning.
        The USGS, NOAA, and FEMA all belong to the State-Local Tsunami
    Working group convened quarterly by Washington Emergency Management.
    The working group seeks to implement directions and programs developed
    by the NTHMP and provide guidance back to the national program. These
    meetings involve local emergency managers from all Washington coastal
    counties and outside experts as required by the items being discussed
    (e.g., a structural engineer, business continuity planner, etc.).
        The key to coordination among agencies in the NTHMP is the twice-
    yearly meeting of the Steering Committee, made up of representatives
    from the three federal agencies and the five Pacific States. The NTHMP
    has used the steering committee structure to develop the priorities for
    the entire program, ensure a uniform message in tsunami-prone areas,
    and initiate new efforts such as the guidelines for construction in
    inundation zones. Washington State has been particularly aggressive in
    taking full advantage of this coordination by calling routinely on the
    federal partners to help improve public safety efforts in the state.
        As a research granting agency, the National Science Foundation is
    not directly involved with NTHMP or tsunami response. However, USGS and
    NSF collaborate extensively on research activities that contribute to
    an improved understanding of Earth processes that lead to earthquake
    generation. An important aspect of that collaboration is NSF's
    EarthScope initiative, which is establishing a dense array of geodetic
    stations along the western boundary of the North American tectonic
    plate to better understand plate interactions. EarthScope also includes
    a drilling project into the San Andreas fault, and a moving array of
    seismic stations to image the crust and deep structure of the
    continent. In all three projects, USGS scientists are closely
    collaborating with their NSF and university counterparts. NSF and USGS
    are partners in the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (along
    with FEMA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology).
    NEHRP is focused on translating research into on-the-ground earthquake
    loss reduction.

        Question 5. Dr. Groat, on my recent visit to PMEL, I learned that
    Washington State is vulnerable not only to tsunamis generated by
    distant earthquakes in the North Pacific Ocean or the closer Cascadia
    subduction zone, but also from faults within the Puget Sound. In fact,
    there is a fault line that goes right across Puget Sound and downtown
    Seattle. Can you tell me the current plans to analyze the earthquake
    risk for this fault? Are there other technologies that could provide
    more timely warning to these inland areas?
        Answer. Pacific Northwest earthquakes occur in three source zones:
    along the Cascadia subduction zone boundary, within the subducting Juan
    de Fuca plate and within the crust of the overlying North American
    plate. Earthquakes from all three zones threaten the Puget Sound and
    western Washington, but a large crustal earthquake would have very
    severe consequences in Seattle and other cities.
        Crustal zone earthquakes, typically of small magnitudes and usually
    not felt, are the most common earthquakes in western Washington.
    Crustal earthquakes have been as large as magnitude 5.5 in the last 40
    years but have produced little damage. The initiation points
    (hypocenters) of earthquakes located beneath Puget Sound form a dense
    cloud of locations in the crust and do not define linear fault zones as
    seen in California. For many years, the lack of clear trends in the
    located earthquakes, coupled with a lack of known surface evidence in
    the form of fault scarps, contributed to the uncertainty as to how best
    to account for the possibility of crustal earthquakes in hazard
    assessments.
        There are three major fault zones--the Seattle, the Tacoma, and the
    Southern Whidbey Island--that cut through the heavily urbanized regions
    of central Puget Sound. Of these, the Seattle fault is the best studied
    and because of its proximity to so many people and infrastructure, is
    the most critical feature of regional hazard assessments. Although
    known for many years based on regional geology and geophysics, until
    1992 there was no evidence that the Seattle fault was active. In that
    year, paleoseismologists showed that large changes in the elevation of
    prehistoric beaches, in some cases as much as 22 feet, occurred during
    a very large earthquake on the Seattle fault about a thousand years
    ago. This large displacement is consistent with an earthquake of about
    magnitude 7. However, even with these large vertical motions, the exact
    location of the Seattle fault was still poorly known. The portion of
    the fault thought to be responsible for the elevation changes has yet
    to be found.
        Nevertheless, the discovery of the vertical land elevation changes
    sparked considerable research on the fault. In 1994 a basic model was
    developed linking the Seattle fault to the Seattle basin; the Seattle
    basin is a deep (5 miles in places) structural feature roughly centered
    beneath downtown Seattle and Bellevue. A regional aeromagnetic
    experiment suggested the location of three strands of the Seattle
    fault. These strands curve from southern Bainbridge Island through
    south Seattle before bending more northeastward and crossing Lake
    Washington to the greater Bellevue area.
        The introduction of LIDAR flights--Lidar stands for light detecting
    and ranging similar to radar, which stands for radio detecting and
    ranging-- over the Seattle fault on Bainbridge Island in 1998 allowed
    geologists to find the fault in the field for the first time. With a
    precision of about 20 centimeters, LIDAR can map very subtle changes in
    the surface topography, and allows scientists to organize features of
    the landscape. In particular, short linear features that might be
    missed with conventional topography are easily highlighted with LIDAR
    data. Field trenching very rapidly discovered several earthquakes on
    the Seattle fault on and near Bainbridge Island. USGS Geologists also
    found evidence for an active scarp near Vasa Park in southeastern
    Bellevue.
        USGS has used LIDAR since 1998 to document at least eight faults
    from the southeastern Olympic Peninsula to Whidbey Island that have had
    large earthquakes of magnitude 6.5 or greater during the last few
    thousand years, and there are many additional faults that have now been
    identified that need thorough study. Ground motions from crustal
    earthquakes of moderate size, magnitude 6-6.7, produce strong shaking
    on hard rock that can have major effects on buildings and lifelines.
        Fieldwork on various strands of the Seattle fault documents three
    or more large earthquakes in the last few thousand years. By modeling
    the expected ground motions from these earthquakes, seismologists can
    show that the ground and buildings will shake very hard when they next
    strike. The scientific and engineering understanding of the large
    crustal earthquakes on the Seattle fault is now well accepted and the
    USGS joined seven other agencies and organizations to develop a
    detailed scenario of the consequences of a major earthquake on the
    Seattle fault. The scenario, published in June 2005 by the Earthquake
    Engineering Research Institute and Washington Emergency Management, is
    being used to help the region develop a more aggressive strategy to
    lower losses from future events.
        Unfortunately, for crustal earthquakes in urban areas, there is
    little prospect of providing warning of possible tsunamis, because the
    travel time of the first arriving wave will be a few minutes at most.
    Thus, as with the offshore Cascadia events, sustained public education
    is the best way to lower losses and save lives in the event of strong
    shaking in Puget Sound. It is also why the region puts such a high
    premium on completing a full inventory of possible active faults using
    LIDAR data. Without LIDAR, possible crustal faults that could be
    tsunami sources in northern Puget Sound will be almost impossible to
    evaluate.
        Investigating the possibility of tsunamis in Puget Sound is a good
    example of USGS-NOAA cooperation. Under the NTHMP, Washington State
    asked USGS and NOAA to consider this issue. The USGS and NOAA jointly
    convened a panel of experts to discuss shallow earthquake faults in the
    inland waters and consider their potential to generate tsunamis.
    Washington State's request was built on the Seattle fault geologic
    history, which generated a tsunami about 1100 years ago. That tsunami
    overtopped the site of the current West Point Wastewater Treatment
    plant in Seattle and has been traced as far north as Whidbey Island.
        The expert panel developed reasonable fault parameters for several
    major crustal faults that cross the inland waters. NOAA has completed
    modeling a worst-case scenario for the Seattle fault and is now
    beginning modeling on the Tacoma fault. Future modeling will likely
    include the Southern Whidbey Island fault and the Devils Mountain-
    Darrington fault. Modeling of the last fault is hindered by a lack of
    high-resolution topographic data from LIDAR along much of the fault
    trace.
        Much of Seattle and the surrounding area is underlain by poorly
    consolidated glacial materials that may be prone to landslides during
    earthquakes in areas of steep slopes. In addition, the inland waters of
    Washington are subject to landslides that sometimes cause local
    tsunamis. Although not nearly as widespread as other types of tsunamis,
    landslide driven tsunamis may have very high local run-up. Again, at
    the request of Washington State, USGS and NOAA held a meeting to assess
    possible landslide tsunami sources in the inland waters. Using a series
    of maps showing steep, geologically unstable slopes and deep waters,
    the panel designated sections of the inland waters as more likely than
    others to generate tsunamis. NOAA is now studying the best way to use
    the source areas in developing models of possible tsunami inundation
    areas from landslides.

        Question 6. Dr. Groat, I understand that it is most likely that a
    tsunami hitting the Washington coast would originate from an earthquake
    along the Cascadia plate rather than a deep ocean earthquake. I also
    understand that there may be several ways to make our current tsunami
    warning system more effective for mitigating hazards. For example, the
    NSF's NEPTUNE program to wire the Juan de Fuca plate with fiber optic
    lines seems to be supportive of these efforts. Do you feel that there
    are other technologies or approaches Congress should consider funding
    that might produce more timely warning for near shore generated
    tsunamis?
        Answer. There are certainly many reasons to take advantage of
    collaborative opportunities in the region. Already, USGS and the
    University of Washington are collaborating with the NSF-sponsored
    Earthscope initiative that will improve deformation monitoring and
    seismic capabilities in the region. With respect to NEPTUNE, there have
    been discussions between the university departments responsible for
    NEPTUNE and the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network about studying
    possible deployment of offshore seismometers.
        The greatest benefit of offshore seismometers would be more
    reliable earthquake locations for events occurring there. Some offshore
    seismometers might help resolve the forces producing the occasional
    offshore earthquake west of Oregon and Washington, and that would give
    seismologists a better understanding of these events. However, improved
    locations would still be within the time constraints discussed in the
    above questions, meaning that ongoing, consistent education would
    remain their best hope for people on the beach of surviving a
    devastating Cascadia earthquake and tsunami.

        Question 7. Dr. Groat, confronted with a fresh reminder of the
    potential devastation of an off-shore, tsunami-causing earthquake, I
    share Senator Stevens' concern about ensuring sufficient warning
    systems are in place so that loss of human life can be minimized.
    Senator Stevens requested an estimation of what it would take to
    establish a comprehensive tsunami notification system. I am very
    interested in your response and ask that you please forward me a copy
    of your answer to Senator Stevens' question.
        Answer. Sen. Stevens and Sen. Inouye jointly asked USGS to explain
    how we could improve public notification of impending natural hazards
    and disasters. The components of the USGS answer related to earthquakes
    and tsunamis follow:
        The USGS could improve public hazard notification and warning of
    natural hazards in three basic areas: (1) modernization and expansion
    of seismic monitoring networks; (2) increased robustness and redundancy
    of electronic communication links; and, (3) accelerated development and
    deployment of capabilities to take full advantage of new data streams,
    research findings and communication technologies to improve the
    accuracy and timeliness of information we provide for emergency
    response and management.
    (1) Modernization and expansion of monitoring networks
        The President's proposal for improving tsunami warning systems
    would replace legacy hardware and software systems at the USGS National
    Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) and establish 247
    operations, actions that will improve response time, benefiting both
    earthquake notification and tsunami warning. The proposal also includes
    support to improve station up-time in the Global Seismographic Network
    (GSN)--a partnership of USGS, the National Science Foundation, the
    Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, and the University
    of California--and to install additional stations in the Caribbean
    region. The NEIC modernization is a key component of the Advanced
    National Seismic System (ANSS). As described in USGS Circular 1188, the
    ANSS plan includes both notification and early warning of earthquakes
    as fundamental goals.
    (2) Robust telemetry and communication links
        For rapid-onset events like earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
    eruptions and landslides, only real-time systems can provide data in
    sufficient time to issue actionable notifications and warnings. The
    funding in the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental for improved tsunami
    detection and warning system for the United States, along with the
    funding in the 2006 budget for the same purpose, will expand and
    improve telemetry connections to monitoring stations, so that the
    seismic stations in the Global Seismographic Network provide real-time
    data. This will contribute to decreasing the reporting time for global
    earthquakes from over one hour to about twenty minutes.
        USGS data and products often travel across a web of communications
    links from the monitoring network to the public, typically involving
    satellite uplinks and downlinks, the Internet, and radio or television
    bands. Although some USGS systems employ redundant links (e.g.,
    satellite, phone lines, and/or Internet communications), in many cases
    the communications channels are vulnerable to a single point of
    failure. Hardening of these telecommunication links is essential to
    ensure a reliable warning system is available with the appropriate
    level of redundancy.
        As part of the NEIC upgrade, the President's proposal calls for
    247 network operations and robust Internet serving of seismic
    data. It would also increase the number of USGS-operated GSN stations
    that provide real-time data to NEIC and the NOAA tsunami warning
    centers. Currently, only 80% of GSN stations have digital telemetry
    links that allow for real-time communication. Both for the GSN and the
    ANSS, a fully telemetered system with redundant communications links
    will improve response time for damaging earthquakes.
    (3) New capabilities
        The President's proposal for upgrading NEIC will accelerate
    development of several rapid-response products, including the Prompt
    Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system, which
    uses information about an earthquake's source, combined with
    information regarding population and infrastructure in the affected
    region to estimate potential damage and loss of life in a major
    earthquake. The PAGER system is ideal for both domestic and
    international areas where a dense seismic network is not available, but
    where a rapid assessment is critical for estimating impact.
        The USGS is exploring the feasibility of earthquake detection and
    early warning, in which rapid computer analysis and communication links
    are used to provide seconds of warning before earthquake waves arrive.
    Such warning systems are in place in Japan, Mexico and Taiwan. The 2000
    reauthorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
    (NEHRP) called for development of a U.S. early warning system for
    earthquakes. The USGS currently sponsors modest research and
    development in this area, including research on earthquake early
    warning feasibility and efforts to improve the numbers of seismic
    stations reporting in real time and the speed and reliability of
    earthquake reporting.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
                                Charles G. Groat
        Tsunami and Earthquake Program Compatibility. As you may know,
    Congress recently enacted this Committee's reauthorization of the
    multi-agency National Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Program (NEHRP),
    which is aimed at both improving earthquake detection and community
    resilience to earthquakes--including building construction and planning
    guidelines. Similarly, S. 50, would authorize NOAA's National Tsunami
    Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), another multi-agency program
    involving many of the witnesses here today.

        Question 1. Looking at these two programs together, are the
    activities of the Earthquake Program consistent with the goals of the
    Tsunami program? For instance, is a building designed to be earthquake
    resilient also designed to be resilient against tsunami?
        Answer. Because earthquakes are the triggering mechanism for most
    tsunamis, NEHRP activities aimed at improving seismic monitoring
    capabilities are directly relevant to improved tsunami warnings. The
    2000 reauthorization of NEHRP authorized the development of the
    Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS). The data from ANSS stations is
    provided to the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers. In addition, NSF's George
    E. Brown Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES)
    facility, authorized as part of NEHRP legislation, includes a tsunami-
    wave tank at Oregon State University that is making significant
    contribution to our understanding of tsunami phenomena.
        With respect to the second part of this question, the forces
    generated by a tsunami wave are different from those generated by
    strong seismic shaking, and the building design for the earthquakes
    does not necessarily address the hydrodynamic forces generated by
    tsunamis. USGS is not directly involved in the issuance of model
    building codes, although USGS data provides a critical input to the
    process. This question would be best directed to our NEHRP partner
    agencies, NIST and FEMA. FEMA is in the process of developing model
    tsunami inundation zone vertical evacuation shelter construction
    guidance for coastal areas, a project that was initiated before the
    Sumatra earthquake and tsunami brought this issue to the forefront.

        Question 2. Does the Earthquake Program have any programs or
    approaches that should be adopted by the Tsunami program? For example,
    should we expand programs regarding construction and planning?
        Answer. The USGS operates seismic networks in order to record data
    from large earthquakes. We conduct extensive research on this data to
    document the amount of shaking that earthquakes can generate and to
    predict the probability of strong shaking for the entire nation. This
    information is utilized by engineers to make improvements to the
    International Building Code so that structures can withstand the
    shaking from strong earthquakes.
        This collaboration between engineering seismologists in the USGS
    Earthquake Hazards Program and the engineers who are responsible for
    modifications of the building code serves as a model for developing
    structures that could withstand the forces of a tsunami.
    Hydrodynamicists can study and model these forces for input to
    engineers developing building codes for inundation areas.

        Question 3. Has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
    participated meaningfully or financially in either program? Are there
    limitations that we should know about?
        Answer. FEMA plays a crucial role in both programs, ensuring that
    fundamental and applied research activities are implemented into loss-
    reduction practice. FEMA's role in the NTHMP flexes according to the
    needs of the five Pacific states. During the first formative years of
    the program, the mitigation budget was divided between the five states
    and FEMA, with FEMA running a multi-state project. However, rather than
    transfer funds to FEMA for a multi-state project, a few years ago the
    Steering Committee decided to support these projects through a grant
    directly to one of the states. Currently, the NTHMP is funding the
    Guidelines for Construction in Tsunami Inundation Zones, a multi-state
    program effort, through Washington State. FEMA Headquarters has
    contributed about $250K to match the funding from NTHMP for this
    effort.

        Question 4. How can we improve coordination and better define
    agency roles in our legislation?
        Answer. The NTHMP program has provided the impetus for interagency
    coordination and cooperation. Under guidance of a federal-state
    steering committee, the need for reducing the hazard of future tsunamis
    has been foremost in guiding cooperative efforts by NOAA, FEMA, and
    USGS. Continued support for this program, with a strong interagency
    steering committee and active interaction at the working level, is in
    the best interest of furthering this work. No single federal agency has
    the resources or mission to address this complex hazard.
         Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
                                Charles G. Groat
    Voice Sirens for Effective, Reliable Tsunami Warning
        Effective tsunami warning should rely on a variety of redundant
    modes of communication. While there are several technologies for
    communicating tsunami warnings highlighted in the Tsunami Preparedness
    Act of 2005 (S. 50), it is a concern that voice capable sirens are not
    among the technologies mentioned. Emergency managers have long depended
    on sirens to warn the public of emergency and civil defense situations
    including tsunamis, tornados, floods, hurricanes, hazardous material
    accidents, and of a potential nuclear attack.
        Sirens have a number of significant advantages: they insure that
    all residents and visitors to a particular area can be informed without
    regard to the cell phone or pager technology platform or provider they
    may have, when equipped with backup power supplies they will work even
    when the electricity or phone lines are out; when equipped with live
    public address or pre-recorded messages they can be used BEFORE and
    AFTER the incident to communicate important public safety information.
        Question 1. Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part
    of a preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
    other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
    criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
    of tsunami?

        Question 2. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
    for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
    inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
        Answer. USGS will defer to NOAA's responses to these questions.