[Senate Hearing 109-457]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-457
TO REVIEW BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS AGROTERRORISM
THREATS
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE,
NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.agriculture.senate.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana TOM HARKIN, Iowa
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky KENT CONRAD, North Dakota
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MAX BAUCUS, Montana
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming DEBBIE A. STABENOW, Michigan
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
MICHEAL D. CRAPO, Idaho KEN SALAZAR, Colorado
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
Martha Scott Poindexter, Majority Staff Director
David L. Johnson, Majority Chief Counsel
Steven Meeks, Majority Legislative Director
Robert E. Sturm, Chief Clerk
Mark Halverson, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing(s):
To Review Biosecurity Preparedness and Efforts to Address
Agroterrorism Threats.......................................... 01
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Wednesday July 20, 2005
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY SENATORS
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, a U.S. Senator from Georgia, Chairman,
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.............. 01
Roberts, Hon. Pat, a U.S. Senator from Kansas.................... 03
Salazar, Hon. Ken, a U.S. Senator from Colorado.................. 23
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WITNESSES
Panel I
Conner, Hon. Charles, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Washington, DC.................................... 05
Brackett, Robert, Ph.D., Director, Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition Food & Drug Administration, Rockville, MD.... 10
Lewis, John E., Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC....... 08
McCarthy, Maureen, Ph.D., Director, Office of Research and
Development Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC.... 06
Panel II
Cheviron, Mark J., Corporate Vice President and Director of
Corporate Security and Services Archers Daniels Midlane
Company, Decatur, IL........................................... 35
Lane, James, Ford County Undersheriff, Dodge City, Kansas........ 39
Roth, James A., DVM, Ph.D., Director, The Center for Food
Security and Public Health Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa... 31
Sherwood, James, Ph.D., Head, Department of Plant Pathology
University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia......................... 29
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APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Conner, Hon. Charles......................................... 44
Salazar, Hon. Ken............................................ 93
Brackett, Robert, Ph.D....................................... 71
Cheviron, Mark J............................................. 114
Lane, James.................................................. 105
Lewis, John E................................................ 67
McCarthy, Maureen, Ph.D...................................... 58
Roth, James A................................................ 101
Sherwood, James, Ph.D........................................ 96
Document(s) Submitted for the Record:
Harkin, Hon. Tom............................................. 118
Cochran, Hon. Thad........................................... 119
Statement of Mary Upchurch Kruger, Director, Office of
Homeland Security Office of the Administrator.............. 121
Statement of Edwin Quattlebaum, Ph.D., Chairman, President,
and Chief Executive Officer MetaMorphix, Inc............... 126
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Chambliss, Hon. Saxby........................................ 134
Harkin, Hon. Tom............................................. 137
Cochran, Hon. Thad........................................... 148
Grassley, Hon. Charles....................................... 150
McConnell, Hon. Mitch........................................ 153
Roberts, Hon. Pat............................................ 154
Salazar, Hon. Ken............................................ 161
TO REVIEW BIOSECURITY PREPAREDNESS AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS AGROTERRORISM
THREATS
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SR-328a, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Saxby
Chambliss, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present or submitting a statement: Senators Chambliss,
Roberts, Thomas, Dayton, Cochran, and Salazar.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA,
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
The Chairman. Good morning. I welcome you this morning to
this hearing to review the efforts by public and private
entities to increase biosecurity and agroterrorism
preparedness. I appreciate our witnesses and members of the
public being here to review this very important topic as well
as those who are listening through our web site. Agriculture is
a significant sector within the U.S. economy, accounting for 13
percent of the U.S. gross domestic product and 18 percent of
domestic employment. A deliberate attack on the U.S. food
supply and agriculture operations would cause severe economic
loss from farm to plate.
As we have seen with naturally occurring plant and animal
disease, these losses could be particularly severe where States
where animal and crop production is connected and largely
responsible for the majority of economic activity. For example,
three states, Arkansas, Alabama, and my home State of Georgia
account for 31 percent of the chickens produced in the United
States. North Carolina, Iowa, and Minnesota account for 53
percent of hog production; and five others, Nebraska, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Texas, and California produce 35 percent of the
cattle. Four States, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, and Minnesota
produce 54 percent of the corn; and three of those, Illinois,
Iowa and Minnesota, produce 39 percent of all soybeans.
Current Federal efforts to prevent and respond to a
terrorist attack are governed by two main Presidential
directives. We will hear testimony from representatives of the
Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security, and
the Food and Drug Administration outlining existing efforts and
capabilities and what we must do to deter, detect, and respond
effectively to an attack. I am particularly interested in
hearing a status report on the implementation of Homeland
Security Presidential Directives 7 and 9 and what, if any,
additional authorities are necessary to prevent and deter a
terrorist attack on the food supply.
While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 increased biosecurity efforts, it is
clear that more needs to be done. This hearing will serve as a
useful dialog as this committee works with Senators Burr and
Enzi and members of the Health Committee in drafting follow-up
legislation to the Project Bioshield Act passed and signed by
the President last year.
And while we are talking about that, I want to take a
minute to commend the leadership of Senator Burr in this
respect. He was a colleague and friend of my mine in the House.
He was a leader during his House days, and now he has brought
that same leadership and that knowledge and experience to the
Senate and is providing real positive direction on this issue.
As we will hear, the responsibility to counter an
agroterrorist attack spans the various agencies with different
regulatory functions; however, a new partner and often
overlooked component in any response is the integration of
national and local law enforcement agencies. A recent symposium
on agroterrorism hosted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
highlighted the need for our nation to respond quickly and to
ensure local producers and first responders are a part of any
national response plan. I welcome our colleagues from the law
enforcement community to the Agriculture Committee and look
forward to your testimony.
As anyone in agriculture knows, farmers, ranchers,
extension agents, and many others are an integral part of
detecting and responding to any disease outbreak, whether
naturally occurring or deliberate. The second panel highlights
this important partnership between public and private sectors,
and we will hear what is being done to increase our
preparedness at the local level in coordination with farmers
and ranchers, the scientific community, and industry. No effort
to prepare for an attack can be successful without a healthy
and strong public-private partnership.
This will be the third hearing in the Senate since 1999
devoted to biosecurity and agroterrorism. My friend and
colleague, Senator Roberts, who is with us this morning, held
the first hearing in 1999. I think it is fair to say that he
recognized early on the need to address the issue and, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has
continued to highlight the need for direction relative to this
issue.
The events of September 11, 2001, propelled the Government
into action and forced the Federal agencies to re-think the
threats facing agriculture and the need to take steps to
prevent agroterrorist attacks. Later, Senator Talent, also a
member of this committee, highlighted the importance of the
topic at a hearing before the Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee chaired by Senator Collins almost 2 years
ago. I look forward to working with members of this committee
to make sure that this aspect of homeland security receives the
attention and the resources it deserves. To do otherwise would
place a critical sector of the economy at risk.
Before we proceed, I would like to request unanimous
consent to insert testimony submitted by the Environmental
Protection Agency for the record, and without objection, that
will be done.
[The EPA statement follows:]
The Chairman. I would ask my colleagues, Senator Thomas,
Senator Roberts, if you would like to make any opening
statement at this point.
Senator Thomas. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this.
This is an important issue. I have no statement. I am anxious
to hear the testimony.
The Chairman. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I also would like
to hear from the witnesses, but I do have an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Roberts. Let me just say thank you for your very
kind remarks and for holding this hearing. This is one of the
most important issues that we face in agriculture, and it is
true back in 1999, as Chairman of the Armed Services
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, we held it so important that
it we held it in the Armed Services Committee. That was the
first hearing on the topic, and at that time, our president of
Kansas State University testified on the real need and urgency
to really try to accelerate the research and response to
efforts in this area. I argued at the time that this was a
topic we couldn't ignore because it was simply too easy a
target and would create absolute havoc and chaos in our food
supply and our ag markets if it were to occur.
You know, at first, quite a few people wanted to ignore the
issue or at least they didn't want me to talk about the issue.
I know on one visit to western Kansas, I had a farmer come up
to me and say, Pat, you have got to quit talking about all this
agroterrorism stuff; you are scaring the dickens out of people
here and you are hurting the markets. Actually, he put it a
little more colorfully than that, but I think you get the
picture. That was the reaction I got until the tragic events of
9-11. Obviously, we started to pay a lot more attention after
that.
We have since learned that several of the 9-11 hijackers
had agriculture training. I think four of them--no six, and we
know that they had an interest in crop dusters. It is my belief
those crop dusters may have never been intended for people, but
possibly could be used on agriculture. The threat is real. We
know the former USSR had worked to try and simply weaponize
many agriculture diseases, including foot and mouth disease and
glanders and wheat rush, just to name a few. In many instances,
these stockpiles still remain in loosely guarded facilities.
That is what the non-limiter program is all about, and we don't
know whose hands some of it may have ended up in.
We traveled to Ordzhonikidze in Russia to take a look. That
was one of the centers where if you looked at what they were
making, it gave a real true picture, I think, of what President
Ronald Reagan said in terms of the evil empire in terms of what
they were making in terms of stockpiles. By the way, you didn't
open up any refrigerator doors and take a good look or take a
breath. Then they invited you for lunch, which made you think a
little bit.
I sit here today as Chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, and I can tell you that while we have no details of
a specific threat against the food and agriculture sectors, as
my colleague who sits in and is a valued member of that
committee knows, but an attack is certainly possible, if not
probable. It is so easy to do. In many instances, in the case
of foot and mouth disease, it takes little, if any, scientific
training. You just put a handkerchief under a diseased animal
in Afghanistan, put it in a zip-lock bag, put it in your
suitcase, come to the United States and drop it in any one of
our feed lots, and we are in a lot of trouble.
[Telephone interruption.]
The Chairman. That is the Kansas State fight song, in case
anybody missed that.
Senator Roberts. Actually, I tried to put the Marine Corps
hymn on there, but I haven't got it done yet. And my wife is
not going to be pleased that I just cut her off. She is, in
fact, the speaker of my house.
I am pleased since 9-11 we have made major strides in this
area. We have created new diagnostic networks. We have
increased research. Most importantly, our intelligence agencies
and also our relevant food and agriculture agencies are talking
to each other and sharing information. We have come a long way.
A terrorist attack on the ag sector, as you know, Mr.
Chairman, need not be large in scale to have a devastating
impact on our markets. Simply put, we cannot allow that to
happen, and that is why I thank you again for holding this
hearing today. So thank you and I look forward to the testimony
of our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. We are now joined by
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton, do you have any opening comments you wish
to make?
Senator Dayton. I wish I could slim down the way this table
did. Other than that, no, but you fooled me.
The Chairman. Thank you. We are glad you are here.
Our first panel this morning consists of the following
individuals: The Honorable Charles Conner, Deputy Secretary of
the United States Department of Agriculture.
Chuck, I am glad we got you confirmed because you have been
a busy guy and you have spent a lot of time over here with us,
which we appreciate and we are glad to have your expertise and
your knowledge here this morning.
Maureen McCarthy, Director, Office of Research and
Development from the Department of Homeland Security. Dr.
McCarthy, welcome.
Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Lewis,
welcome.
Dr. Robert Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition from the Food and Drug Administration. Dr.
Brackett, we certainly welcome you here this morning.
We will certainly insert your full statement in the record,
but we will turn to each of you now. We will start with Chuck
and move down this way. Any opening comments you wish to make,
we look forward to hearing from you.
Chuck.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES CONNER, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Conner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to
be here today. I appreciate the invitation and the opportunity
to represent the Department of Agriculture on this very timely
hearing.
Today, the committee raises an important issue, food and
agricultural security. It is an issue that the U.S. Department
of Agriculture considers essential to our mission. We seek to
provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and
related issues based on sound public policy, the best available
science, and efficient management. In light of the recent
global events and the growing focus on the security of our food
and agricultural systems, we appreciate the opportunity to
provide you with an update on USDA's homeland security-related
efforts.
I have summarized at your request, Mr. Chairman, my
testimony to 5 minutes, but I would ask unanimous consent that
my entire testimony be included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Conner. This year, agriculture exports, as you know,
are projected to reach approximately $59 billion, thereby
making 2005 the third largest export sales year in our history.
Our nation's food system contributes almost $1.24 trillion or
over 12 percent to our gross domestic product, and it employs
approximately 17 to 18 percent of our entire workforce, as you
have noted, Mr. Chairman. With such a large stake in our
nation's economy, agriculture and the security of our
agricultural sector is our No. 1 concern.
As a department, we face many challenges in protecting this
important infrastructure. The food and agriculture sector is
particularly vulnerable to threats because agribusiness is not
constrained by political boundaries and, as we all know,
diseases and pathogens do not acknowledge State or national
borders. The collective nature of the global food system is our
strength, but it is also a disadvantage in the event of an
attack or natural disease outbreak. Additionally, one of the
agricultural sector's greatest contributions to the quality of
life is the fact that our products flow quickly and easily via
interstate commerce. Contaminated products, whether
intentionally contaminated or unintentionally contaminated,
could spread a pest, disease, or other agent very quickly and
have a devastating effect on our economy.
Since September 11, 2001, USDA has made great progress to
focus and expand our mission to include security for the first
time. What has not changed is our conviction that the threat to
agriculture is very real. We believe that the department is
playing a critical role in protecting the nation's food supply.
Chairman Chambliss, our intention is to be proactive in
maintaining a safe food supply and excellent detection
mechanisms for animal and plant diseases and to be on the
forefront of research and development to identify, contain, and
eradicate animal and plant threats before they are able to have
a major impact on our agricultural systems or our nation's
economy.
USDA remains committed to sustaining the strong
relationships we have established with our partners on the
Federal level as well as with the State and local governments.
Our work with the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and other agencies is
absolutely paramount. Additionally, we have taken broad
measures to educate producers, processors, and consumers on the
importance of identifying and preventing security threats. We
realize that protecting America's food supply is a momentous
task, and that is why we value the opportunity to work in
partnership with other agencies, governments, including this
committee, suppliers and consumers on maintaining a secure food
supply.
My submitted testimony will also highlight the advances
that the department is making to implement both Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 as well as 9 from our focus
on surveillance and monitoring diseases and outbreaks to
response and recovery following an incident. USDA is thoroughly
implementing the HSPD directives. We will continue to work
closely with other agencies to ensure that we have the safest
agriculture and food supply in the world.
The Chairman. I thank you for holding, again, such a timely
hearing, and after my colleagues' testimony, I would be happy
to respond to questions the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Conner can be found in the
appendix on page 44.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Conner.
Dr. McCarthy.
STATEMENT OF MAUREEN McCARTHY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. McCarthy. Good morning, Chairman Chambliss, Senator
Harkin, and distinguished members of the committee. I am very
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the progress the
Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security is making in close cooperation with our other
agency partners to increase the Nation's ability to prevent,
protect, against, and respond to acts of bioterrorism against
our agriculture and food supply.
Last week, Secretary Chertoff announced a six-point agenda
to enhance the department's ability to manage risks, prioritize
policy, share information, and conduct operations with a strong
focus on preparedness. We must accomplish our mission with a
continued sense of urgency. Our enemies constantly change and
adapt. So we as a department must be nimble and decisive. We
are adopting a risk management approach which integrates
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to prioritize our
actions and assess our performance.
A major initiative of the department is the integration of
activities that increase the Nation's preparedness against
present and future threats. Protecting the Nation's agriculture
and food supply is a critical element of these efforts. Our
work must be guided by the understanding that effective
security is built upon a network of systems that spans all
levels of government and the private sector. DHS does not own
or control all of these systems. We must set a clear national
strategy and design an architecture in which separate roles and
responsibilities for security are fully integrated amongst the
public and private stakeholders.
We must draw on the strength of our considerable network of
assets, functioning as seamlessly as possible with other
Federal agencies, State and local leadership, law enforcement,
emergency management personnel, first responders, the private
sector, our international partners, and the general public.
Building effective partnerships must be at the core of every
mission of the department.
The Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for a
broad range of agrodefense, research, development, test
evaluation, and facility operations. These include accelerating
the development of new veterinary countermeasures, establishing
new university centers of excellence for agriculture and food
security, and developing in close coordination with USDA a plan
to provide facilities for farm animal disease and zoonotic
defense, diagnostics, forensics, training, and countermeasure
develop.
The S and T Directorate in partnership with USDA has
developed a joint strategy and program for farm animal disease
defense with an initial focus and emphasis on the development
of veterinary countermeasures for foot and mouth disease.
Within this strategy, ARS from USDA leads the basic research
and early development of diagnostics, vaccines and
immunomodulators. Promising countermeasure candidates are then
transferred to DHS for targeted advance development in
cooperation with industry. The overall goal of this work is to
expedite the transition of new validated diagnostic tools to
the national animal health laboratory network and new vaccines
and immunomodulators to the national veterinary stockpile.
A significant achievement of our agricultural security
preparedness program was the establishment of two new
university homeland security centers of excellence. Through
these homeland security centers and their extensive networks,
we are engaging both the research and education capabilities of
the Nation's academic community to protect our agricultural
security and food infrastructure.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center is a unique and
critical facility for the Nation's foreign animal disease
defense. To facilitate overall coordination of the programs and
operations of Plum Island, a board of directors has been
established which is chaired by DHS and has the administrators
of both ARS and APHIS as members. In 2004, Plum Island
celebrates its fiftieth anniversary. The facility is now well
beyond its originally planned life span and is in need of
recapitalization. This year , we are conducting a conceptual
design study for the next generation of a biological and agro
facility. This process involving gathering requirements and
developing options for the state-of-the-art facility that will
support the Nation's critical mission to protect our
agriculture infrastructure well into the twenty-first century.
The study is being done in collaboration with USDA and HHS.
The Secretary is committed to enhancing our preparedness
and protecting the critical agriculture infrastructure. This is
a high-priority mission for the department and one we conduct
in strategic partnerships with our colleagues from USDA, other
government agencies, and the private sector.
This concludes my prepared statement, and with the
committee's permission, I request my formal statement be
submitted to the record. Mr. Chairman, and all the members of
the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you and would be happy to take any of the questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McCarthy can be found in the
appendix on page 58.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. McCarthy. Your statement will
be put into the record.
We now turn to Mr. Lewis.
STATEMENT OF JOHN E. LEWIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Lewis. Good morning, Chairman Chambliss, Senators.
Thank you for the invitation to come today and discuss with you
this topic of agroterrorism.
Since the tragedy of 9-11, the FBI has necessarily
sharpened its focus on unconventional methods of future
terrorist attacks, including a potential for some manner of
terrorist event aimed at our food or ag sector, but mainly the
previous and much publicized terrorist events including the
Oklahoma City bombing, 9-11, Madrid, and now just recently
London. We must make it our business not to let these series of
events create for us something of a pattern that might preclude
the type of proactive activity needed to prevent the next
event.
Most people do not equate terrorist attacks on people,
public transportation, and buildings with attacks on plants and
animals. We understand this threat to be real and we know the
impact can be could be devastating. Our gathering here this
morning is important. It sheds light on an area of our work
that, frankly, is not all that often the leading topic around
the terrorism discussion table.
The absence of any direct attack on our food supply does
not minimize the possibility that such an event could occur. We
know from the body of intelligence collected to date that al
Qaeda is aware of our agriculture industry along with other
potential targets. To counter this particular terrorism threat,
whether from an international or domestic terrorist, we are
actively engaged and growing more so with our counterparts, not
only across government, but across industry to share
information, technology, and resources. Let me touch on some of
these areas.
One of the ways we are collaborating is through an entity
known as the Agricultural Intelligence Working Group. Members
of this group from across the U.S. intelligence community and
beyond meet regularly to exchange information and ideas about
food security and how best to maximize our combined skills,
technology, and resources. The FBI is also a member of the
National Bioforensic Analysis Center. This center is one of
four components of the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasure Center. We are working with multiple Federal
partners in the area of case attribution, that is identifying
and exploiting any signatures or characteristics of a
biological agent.
The second group identified is a scientific working group
on microbioforensics led by our laboratory division down in
Quantico. It is engaged, again, with our Federal partners in
multiple areas of research, the results of which all can be
used 1 day to improve the tool set we rely upon to carry out
our counterterrorism mission.
In addition to partnerships that begin here inside the
beltway, we are expanding our partnerships to include those in
industry. We are reaching out to farmers, cattle ranchers, food
producers, and distributors, among others. In the
Counterterrorism Division here at FBI headquarters, we are
directing the formation of a program called Agri-Guard as well
as the formation of agroterrorism working groups nationwide.
The Agri-Guard program will be modelled after our existing
Infraguard initiative. The Infraguard initiative was started
back in 1996 and today serves as a virtual and secure link with
a vetting national membership of approximately 12,000
representatives of companies throughout the U.S., representing
not only the computer industry for which this was started, but
beyond.
Using the Infraguard technology backbone, we are moving
forward today to create this very same informational exchange
within the food and ag sector. We have the money and resources
now dedicated to this task, and we are working with our Federal
partners to maximize the degree of coordination that both the
States and industry expect from us.
Beyond this initiative, just in the past several year
weeks, I communicated with our 56 field offices and directed
each to establish formal agroterrorism working groups within
their respective territories. This directive will lead to a
more formal and recurring meeting of key figures from the food
and ag sector in each of the 56 field office territories.
Although some of this is already in place in certain areas of
the United States, my intention is to strengthen and to a
degree standardize our partnerships across the country. We are
working with our Federal partners and looking forward to
recognizable progress in this area by bringing together on a
regular basis for the purposes of prevention, awareness,
intelligence, investigative response, and crisis management,
State-level groups whose membership will include the State
Secretary of Agriculture , for instance, the State's chief
veterinarian, leading law enforcement figures, public health
officials, and pertinent representatives of the food and ag
sector.
If I may depart just for a moment, I can tell you that from
the State of Georgia as well as from your State, Senator
Roberts, we have outstanding participation from across the food
and ag sector, and, frankly, we could use those as models to
push out to the rest of the country for how to bring these
groups together.
On another front, the FBI has partnered with DHS, USDA,
FDA, and private industry to conduct site surveys of specific
and significant food and ag sites throughout the United States.
I call this program the Strategic Partnership Program. The aim
of this initiative conducted closely with our industry
counterparts is to bring together subject matter experts whose
analysis of a specific site can lead to the identification of
potential vulnerabilities that could represent the opening a
terrorist might exploit to plan for and carry out some sort of
attack. This project is also intended to educate and raise a
level of awareness of area law enforcement, lead to the
development of intelligence collection strategies around these
sites and/or vulnerabilities, and to facilitate discussions and
planning to develop mitigation strategies for early detection,
deterrence, disruption, interdiction, and prevention. The sites
will include the entire production cycle from farm to fork.
Finally, the FBI today operates 105 joint terrorism task
forces geographically dispersed throughout the United States.
As you probably know, each of these are comprised of municipal,
county, State, and Federal law enforcement personnel. These
JTTFs are the focal point for counterterrorism efforts here in
the United States and respond to all manner of threats.
The JTTFs in each field office are aided by highly trained
WMD coordinators, weapons of mass destruction coordinators.
Each of these WMD coordinators maintain their own liaison
network within law enforcement and public safety personnel and
in their respective territories, and it is through this network
that all manner of information passes. The WMD coordinators
are, in turn, closely connected to our headquarters-based WMD
domestic terrorism section where substantive multi-discipline
scientific guidance and expertise is available 24-7. If we
don't have the scientific guidance resident at FBI
Headquarters, our WMD team maintains an excellent array of
partnerships across the community, including those folks seated
here today that we can get answers from.
We also operate the hazardous materials response unit and
27 strategically located hazardous materials response teams
throughout the United States. These response capabilities
significantly enhance our ability to collect samples and
effectively support threat assessments when needed.
Farmers, ranchers, food distributors and producers are as
much a first line of defense as our efforts need to be. If a
rancher sees unusual symptoms of illness in a herd, if a food
distributor notes suspicious activity in one of their
distribution centers, we must be able to rely upon rapid and
effective coordination so that all of us, including those here
at the table who may be potentially involved, have the head
start we need. All of us here are working to improve that.
Our goal is to impress upon those in the food and ag
sector, and, frankly, those of us who need to work closely with
them, of the need for increased cooperation, increased
awareness, and the recognition that given the prevailing threat
conditions, we need to chart in a more collaborative course. We
have been met with excellent cooperation from all areas of the
food and ag sector where we have been recently. I am very
optimistic that as we work here to improve our own positions,
the food and ag sector is ready, willing, and able to fully
cooperate with us and where needed improve theirs.
Thank you, sir. I would be happy to respond to any
questions when they come.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis can be found in the
appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Lewis.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT BRACKETT, Ph.D, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FOOD
SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND
Dr. Brackett. Good morning, Chairman Chambliss and members
of the committee. I am pleased to be here today with my
colleagues from the United States Department of Agriculture,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. FDA appreciates the opportunity to discuss our
food counterterrorism activities.
A great deal has been done in the last few years to enhance
the safety of our food supply. FDA has worked with food safety
agencies as well as law enforcement, intelligence gathering
agencies, and the private industry to significantly strengthen
the Nation's food safety system across the entire distribution
chain from farm to table to better protect our food supply
against deliberate and accidental threats. This cooperation has
resulted in greater awareness of vulnerabilities, the creation
of more effective production programs, new surveillance
systems, and faster outbreak response capabilities.
FDA is the Federal agency that regulates everything we eat
except meat, poultry, and processed egg products, which are
regulated by our partners at USDA. FDA's responsibility often
extends to live food animals and animal feed, and FDA is also
responsible for ensuring that human drugs, human biological
products, medical devices, and radiological products, as well
as veterinary drugs are safe and effective and that cosmetics
are safe.
In our food safety and defense efforts, FDA has many
partners: Federal, State, local agencies, academia and
industry. We are working closely with our Federal partners such
as USDA, DHS, Homeland Security, Counsel to the White House,
Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
FBI, but I want to especially emphasize our close working
relationship with our sister public health agency, CDC, Customs
and Border Protection at DHS, and USDA's Food Safety Inspection
Service. FDA is working closely with DHS and other Federal
agencies to implement the President's Homeland Security
Presidential Directives, HSPDs. The President has issued HSPD-
7,-8, and-9 which identify critical infrastructures, improve
response planning, and establish a national policy to defend
the agriculture and food systems against terrorist attacks,
major disasters, and other emergencies.
The HHS and USDA Secretaries or their designees exercise
key responsibilities as sector-specific agencies. DHS serves as
the coordinator of the food and agricultural sector with HHS
and USDA as co-leads for the food sector, and the USDA is the
lead for the agriculture sector. This collaborative effort
combines expertise from several Federal agencies as well as
that of State and local officials and the private sector.
Over the last past 3 years, FDA has been busy implementing
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Protection Act of 2002. The Bioterrorism Act provided the
Secretary of Health and Human Services with significant new
authorities to protect the Nation's food supply against the
threat of intentional contamination and other food-related
emergencies. These authorities improve our ability to act
quickly in responding to a threatened or actual terrorist
attack as well as well as other food-related emergencies.
I would like to mention just a few of the provisions of the
Bioterrorism Act. Section 305 of the Bioterrorism Act requires
registration of foreign and domestic food facilities that
manufacture, process, pack, or hold food for consumption by
humans or animals in the U.S. Thanks to this provision, FDA for
the first time has a roster of foreign and domestic food
facilities that provide food for American consumers. In the
event of an emergency, the registration information will help
FDA quickly identify, locate, and notify the facilities that
may be affected.
Section 307 requires the submission to FDA of prior notice
of food, including animal feed, that is offered for import into
the United States. This advance information enables FDA,
working closely with CBP, to more effectively target
inspections at the border to ensure the safety of imported
foods before they move into the U.S.
Section 306 authorizes FDA to access certain records when
the agency has a reasonable belief than an article of food is
adulterated and presents a threat of serious adverse health
consequences or death to humans or animals. This enhances FDA's
ability to track and contain foods that pose a threat to
American consumers from accidental or deliberate contamination
of food.
I would like also like to briefly mention a few of our
other programs. FDA has issued guidance on the security
measures the food industry may take to minimize the risk of
food that would be subject to tampering or other malicious
criminal or terrorist activities or actions. To increase
laboratory surge capacity, FDA has worked in close
collaboration with the Food Safety Inspection Service to
establish the food emergency response network to include a
substantial number of laboratories capable of analyzing food
for agents of concern. To enhance coverage of imported food
shipments, FDA has expanded FDA's presence at ports of entry,
increased surveillance of imported food, increased domestic
inspection, and enhanced our laboratory analysis capacity. We
have conducted extensive scientific vulnerability assessments
of different categories of foods, determining the most serious
risks of intentional contamination with different biological
and chemical agents during the various stages of food
production and distribution.
FDA has established an Office of Crisis Management to
coordinate the preparedness and emergency response activities
within FDA and with our Federal, State, and local counterparts.
We have embarked on an ambitious research agenda throughout FDA
to address potential terrorist threats.
In conclusion, due to the enhancements being made by FDA
and other agencies and due to the close coordination between
the Federal food safety, public health, law enforcement, and
intelligence-gathering agencies, the United States food supply
and the defense system is stronger than ever before; however,
we are continuously working to improve our ability to prevent,
detect, and respond to terrorist threats.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss FDA's
counterterrorism activities to protect the food supply. I would
be happy to respond to any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brackett can be found in the
appendix on page 71.]
The Chairman. Thanks to each of you for those opening
comments.
The Government Accounting Office released a report in March
reviewing efforts to protect agriculture from terrorist
attacks. While the report acknowledges the efforts and progress
currently underway at USDA and DHS, it cites certain
shortcomings that need to be addressed. Can each witness
address what your respective agencies are doing to address the
conclusions and recommendations in the GAO report, what
corrective actions are being taken in regard to the conclusions
of the report?
Dr. McCarthy, I am particularly concerned about the
dramatic drop in the number of agriculture inspections
following the transfer of inspectors from APHIS to DHS. Has DHS
determined the reason or reasons for the decline in
inspections, and what is being done to correct the problem?
Mr. Conner, the report also notes the inability of the
national veterinary stock pile to respond to a threat like foot
and mouth disease within 24 hours. What are the limits to the
development of the stockpile and what is needed to address
animal disease issues to ensure an outbreak does not spread
across a large geographic area and cause catastrophic economic
loss?
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, sir, and we will certainly give
you a more detailed description of the corrective action plans
to the response to GAO for the record, because I would like to
get those facts straight for you, and we have taken that report
very seriously and have many actions that are undergoing across
the department to respond to that.
In particular on your question of inspections, and I will
get back, again, the more specific details for you on the
record, the approach that the Department of Homeland Security
is taking on the inspections, though, is a risk-based approach.
So we have increased the inspections on what we consider to be
high-risk cargo coming into the country, and that has resulted
in potentially less inspections on what we consider to be lower
risk things coming into the country. The specifics on the
number of inspections that are done at any place, I will
certainly get back to you on the record, but I can tell you
that the department as a whole has taken the issue of risk
management at its core for everything that we do, and that is
part of what is driving the changes in the inspection protocols
at the borders.
Thank you.
Mr. Conner. Mr. Chairman, we take the report and the
recommendations of the GAO very, very seriously. I think one of
the issues they identified for the Department of Agriculture
was our stockpile of vaccines, and the issue that we have there
is that the department acknowledges that we do not have large
stockpiles of the user-ready vaccines, particularly for issues
like foot and mouth disease. What we do have, though, are
significant stockpiles of the products that are necessary to
develop the particular vaccines that will be used in the event
that we would have an outbreak.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the department is confident
that we have contracts with manufacturers where in the event
that we have a particular strain of hoof and mouth disease
outbreak in a particular region, we are prepared to analyze
that strain very, very quickly and determine the precise
vaccine that would be necessary to manufacture that vaccine. We
believe our contract specifies that within two or 3 days, you
know, we have the ability then to receive the production of the
vaccine tailored to that particular event, which can vary. Not
all vaccines are applicable to every particular outbreak, and
so we have the parent material. We have the contracts in place
for the production of the vaccine that become necessary, but
then let me also stress that the vaccine part of the control of
this outbreak is an important aspect, but it is not the only
aspect, and obviously the department continues to rely upon our
traditional methods of quarantine and depopulation as the first
line of defense in the event that we have a particular
outbreak, be it hoof and mouth disease or some other incident.
The Chairman. Mr. Lewis, Dr. Brackett, do you have a
comment on the GAO report?
Mr. Lewis. Mine is going to be very brief, sir. I am not
familiar with this report, but I am going to get a hold of it,
and if there is any corrective action required at DOJ or FBI, I
will certainly get back to you on that and do so promptly.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Brackett. Mr. Chairman, although the report dealt
primarily with agriculture issues, we looked very closely to
find out what parts that we can take lessons from. Several
things, one of which is that we do participate on the steering
committee on the national veterinary stockpile and although it
is primarily being concerned with biologics and vaccines at
this time, our Center for Veterinary Medicine, which has
oversight over drugs and devices that might be used with animal
diseases, is looking to see how that might fit in the future.
Also an important part has to do with communicating what we
have learned from the many exercises that we have done over the
years, including such things as Top-Off-3, and we are in the
process of writing up our lessons learned and contributing that
to the DHS web site so that the other agencies can see what our
perspective has been on that particular issue.
The Chairman. OK. Dr. McCarthy, you made mention of the
work at Plum Island, which I think we would all agree with you
are very much outdated, particularly with respect to the new
types of potential biological agents that we need to make sure
that we protect our food system from.
Mr. Conner, I will have to tell you there is some
apprehension. I have a feeling that Senator Dayton is going to
ask you about why we were not able to determine the BSE issue
more quickly than we were able to in recent weeks or, actually,
recent months, and I am a little bit concerned about the fact
that since September 11th, we have spent billions and billions
of dollars on the issue of homeland security, but yet we don't
have a lab in the United States of America that is capable of
making an instantaneous decision on BSE, which is a fairly
common disease in livestock. So I am a little bit concerned
about where we are going relative to updating Plum Island,
building a new lab, or whatever the answer may be to this
issue.
And I would appreciate it, Dr. McCarthy, you and Mr.
Conner, addressing that a little more in detail.
Mr. Conner. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will go first. On the
issue of Plum Island, I will defer to Dr. McCarthy on that, but
I will just simply note that since the transfer of that
facility from APHIS over to the Department of Homeland Security
in 2003, we have had excellent cooperation with DHS on this.
They consult with us. We still have mission areas occurring
within the Plum Island facility and the relationship and
working together has been a great, and I will let her more
specifically address future plans they may have for Plum
Island.
On the issue of anticipating Senator Dayton's concern, Mr.
Chairman, I will just say the decision to go to Waybridge for
the verification, the tests that were completed there, I
believe we have the facilities within our laboratory system in
this country to conduct the same tests that were conducted in
Waybridge, England. In terms of a final call, if you will, in
this situation where just for review of the committee, we did
have the IHC test, which was negative, and the Western Bott
test on the same animal showing positive some months later. We
felt in this particular case given the experience that
Waybridge has had in this issue because of all of the BSE
situations in Europe and in England, which are many times the
magnitude of the problems that we have seen here in North
America, that we felt it would be best for them to be sort of
the referree in the case of this situation where we had two
conflicting results.
But I don't believe there was actually any testing done by
Waybridge that could not have been conducted in the U.S. if we
would have chosen that option, but we felt it was best to go to
the one institution that has probably had more experience with
this than any place else, and I am thankful that our
institutions here do not have a lot of experience in this
situation as Waybridge has had.
The Chairman. HSPD-9 established national policy to protect
against terrorist attacks on agriculture and food systems.
Specifically, the directive calls for both FDA and USDA to
develop vulnerability assessments for agriculture and food
sectors. What is the status of these respective assessments and
how are the conclusions reached in them helping your agencies
develop technology intervention and countermeasures to
potential threats? Mr. Conner? Dr. McCarthy?
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will touch on the
response to HSPD-9 in the context of the previous question on
Plum Island as well, because one of the recommendations out of
HSPD-9 was to assess the Nation's facility capability to
respond to not only our current agricultural mission
responsibility, but what we may see as future emerging needs,
particularly with agroterrorism.
We at the Department of Homeland Security in close
partnership with USDA have taken the issue of ensuring that the
Nation maintains the critical national assets that it has in
order to be able to be responsive to both the research, the
diagnostics, and the operations that are necessary to protect
the agriculture of this country. As a result of the studies
that we have undertaken in the past and the assessment that we
have undergone with state of the facility at Plum Island, we
have underway right now internally a study that will conduct--a
feasibility study that will be conducted to assess the
requirements the Nation has for agriculture security and in
particular the merging of those requirements from agricultural
protection and into zoonotic diseases.
We are working right now, we are working with the
conceptual study, gathering the requirements in partnership not
only with USDA, but also with our colleagues from HHS to
determine what is needed in this nation in order ensure that we
have that base for the future, the next 50 years. Plum Island
has served us well, don't get me wrong, but the facility itself
is not really what this is about. It is understanding the
capability the Nation needs.
In that respect, we have taken the recommendations of HSPD-
9 very seriously and have worked on that particular one in very
close partnership with our colleagues from USDA and HHS. We
were also tasked in HSPD-9 to reach out to the academic
community, and to that end, we have created two university
centers of excellence focused on agricultural security. The
National Center for Foreign Animal Disease and Zoonotic Defense
is led by Texas A & M and is very engaged with our work on
developing agricultural countermeasures for not only foot and
mouth disease, but Rift Valley Fever, avian influenza, and
brucellosis.
We also created the National Center for Food Protection and
Defense which is led by the University of Minnesota, and they
are very engaged in assessing the vulnerabilities of our food
supply and developing mechanisms for modeling and also
understanding protection of the nodes in our food supply. We
have been engaged extensively with USDA in our joint research
and development strategy to enhance the ability of the research
community to respond to the emerging needs that we have in
agricultural terrorism.
Thank you.
Mr. Conner. Mr. Chairman, I think I would just echo what my
colleague has said, but to put a fine point on it from the
Department of Agriculture's standpoint, I am advised we have
completed seven assessments through our Food Safety and
Inspection Service. I believe four assessments have been
completed by APHIS, and I think we are working cooperatively on
some others with FDA, obviously for the purpose of then sharing
the results of these assessments across not only mission areas
within USDA, but the various agencies that are involved in
this.
The Chairman. Senator Thomas and to my colleagues, with
just three of us here, we will be a little liberal with the 5-
minute rules, unless somebody has a time crunch.
So Senator Thomas.
Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I have not been involved in this as closely as many
have, but we have always had drug inspections to make sure that
they are safe. We have had food inspections always. We have
always checked things that are imported. Foot and mouth disease
is not anything that is new. So I guess I am saying what are
the most vulnerable areas? What is new? What are you doing
differently? This is on bioterrorism. It has been awfully
general, as you said, things that we have been doing forever.
What are the highest priorities now that are different than
what you did five to 10 years ago?
Mr. Conner. Well, I will start out.
Senator Thomas. You have reacted a little bit to what is
being done differently because apparently we are in a different
time, but you said a lot of it is not new.
Mr. Conner. Well, I will start and then turn it over to my
colleagues, Senator Thomas. I will speak only from the
Department of Agriculture's perspective. What we are doing at
the Department of Agriculture is, indeed, new. It is not a same
ole-same ole that has been dressed up in now a homeland
security package, if you will. The work that we are putting
into these assessments, particularly working with the private
sector in terms of making these assessments and providing
recommendations on how they can help us in protecting the
safety of the food supply, I mean the government is not----
Senator Thomas. You have been doing that for years.
Mr. Conner. Well, we have been involved in the safety of
food in terms of inspection for pathogens, those kinds of
situations. What we haven't been involved in is assessing the
vulnerabilities of these particular institutions involved in
food production, and I can give you a couple of props here, Mr.
Thomas, just in terms of activities that would not have been
part of anything the Department of Agriculture was doing
before.
For example, we have recently published, and I believe
shared through the American Trucking Association, guides to
security practices for transporting agricultural and food
commodities. This is not about safety in the traditional sense
of is there e. coli on the meat or something like that. This is
about making sure that once those products are put on your
truck, that there is no chance of someone or something somehow
contaminating those products. This was not done before. This
was not a traditional role of the Department of Agriculture.
Through our web site, we have done a number of things. I
just brought, again as a prop, brochure, the Threat to the
American Livestock Industry that we are publishing. That,
again, is not about the traditional methods of contamination,
but about how you can make sure that the product that you are
sending from farm to table is secure and that there is not an
opportunity for those kinds of contaminations, be it
intentional but possibly unintentional as well. That type of
communication out to the local level has just not been a
traditional role of the Department of Agriculture as well.
So certainly, yes, we have always had communication with
local people, but it has not been focused upon these threat
matrixes as we now have, and this is all new activity for us. I
point to the amount of money that has been spent at Ames, Iowa
in that facility for upgrading so that we are on the cutting
edge in terms of rapid detections of these. I point to the
networking that we have among all of our laboratories to share
information so that if something is detected in Ames, Iowa,
that almost instantaneously a laboratory in North Carolina is
aware of that so that they know what to be looking for. All of
that kind of instantaneous type of communication and
coordination was not present before. So it is new from our
standpoint.
Ms. McCarthy. Sir, I think you make a very good point,
which is the fact that we are leveraging off of a huge base
that this country has invested in for many, many years to
protect the agriculture of the Nation, no question about it. I
think what has happened in particular from the Department of
Homeland Security's perspective, is we come with the sense of
urgency of what must be done faster, what things must be
accelerated and why.
In particular, let me touch on one point, and that is the
issue of understanding the difference between a potential
natural outbreak and an intentional introduction, for instance
the possible intentional introduction of foot and mouth disease
into this country. If it is intentionally introduced in
multiple places around the country, the potential economic
impact could be much greater. Our responses could be
overwhelmed much more quickly. So we need to be able to
understand whether or not there are different types of
responses. We need to be able to apply our tools in ways that
haven't been done before because of the sense of urgency.
It is also the matter that it may hop over borders. So the
fact that we have FMD-free borders surrounding us may be not
the paradigm we are working with now. If the material can,
indeed, be put in a plastic bag and carried over from a foreign
country and introduced, then our protection strategies may not
be as robust.
So we come with a sense of urgency. We come with the notion
that we need to accelerate alternative response mechanisms. We
also come with the notion that we merge in intelligence, and
that is new. We hadn't been in that business in the
agricultural business quite as much, and we work very closely
now with our partners particularly in the law enforcement
community.
We have established for the first time an agricultural
forensics capability. That is different from just diagnostics.
That is the ability to do forensics in such a way that our law
enforcement colleagues could use that information in a court of
a law in a prosecution so that we could actually understand
quickly who possibly perpetrated an event if it was
intentional. That is an additional set of capabilities that we
have brought to bear since the sense of urgency came into place
with agroterrorism.
Thank you.
Mr. Conner. Senator Thomas, if I could just add one
additional comment to my earlier statement as well, I was
reminded that we have worked with FSIS-regulated industries to
develop model food security plans for those individual plants,
and I believe as of early May of this year, our Agricultural
Marketing Service agency that is involved in the substantial
procurement of those commodities for various uses within the
Department of Agriculture is only procuring commodities from
those plants that actually have the security plans in place.
Again that is a relatively recent change for us.
Senator Thomas. Thank you. I guess we need to make it a
little more clear to everyone that if this is a different
situation, we need to be doing something a little unique and a
little different than we have been doing in the past and not
simply talk about doing the investigation of drugs and food and
everything we have always done. That doesn't seem to show that
need for change.
I appreciate it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is to Chuck. Chuck, welcome home.
Mr. Conner. Thank you, sir. Thank you.
Senator Roberts. It is good to see you and we appreciate
you here for the first time since your confirmation and your
swearing in. My first question to you is who is in charge of
the food security policy down at the department? I know that
Mr. Stump is the head of your homeland security activities at
the staff level. Jim Moseley has gone off to Afghanistan and is
doing good work over there. I know Secretary Johanns is very
interested in this. Is it you? Who is the lead dog?
Mr. Conner. I will just tell you that the Secretary of
Agriculture is closely involved in this effort, Senator
Roberts, and I think that that is reflected in the time that he
took to go to Kansas City this past May for the International
Symposium an Agroterrorism. He was out there with you
participating in that, and the Secretary is certainly in charge
of this. We have an important team where I play a role in that
as well, Jeremy Stump, and we have----
Senator Roberts. So you are sort of a troika?
Mr. Conner. Well, it is a big task, Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. OK. Are you, the Secretary, and others
receiving intelligence briefings that you need, and if so, how
often do you receive these briefings?
Mr. Conner. I believe we are. I think the briefings are
available to us weekly, and if we need more than that, that is
available as well. So I certainly have no complaints at this
point.
Senator Roberts. Dr. McCarthy, your testimony today
mentioned several of the divisions within the Department of
Homeland Security that are involved with food and agricultural
security. I am going to ask you the same question. Who is the
head of the policy over there at DHS? Is it the Secretary?
Deputy Secretary? Under Secretary You? Who do we talk to?
Ms. McCarthy. Yes, sir. Well, as you may have noticed in
the Secretary's plan for reorganization, he has culled out
specifically a policy office, which he is in the process of
establishing right now. The Secretary, though, I can tell you
personally takes the issue of agricultural security very
seriously, and that is one of the major sectors of protection
that we have deemed as a high-priority sector that needs to be
protected.
Our information analysis, currently our information
analysis an infrastructure protection division of the
department is responsible for coordinating the agricultural
security interface that we have with the public and private
sectors through the government and sector coordinating
councils. They coordinate all the dialog that we have. We in
the Science and Technology Directorate support them and support
the Secretary through our ability to do research and
development and through our operations of the facilities, and
obviously in the border protection, the inspection work is done
in the borders, but we work very closely with our colleagues in
NIAIP because they have the lead in communicating and
coordinating the activities, not only inside of the Government,
but with the public and private sectors.
Senator Roberts. I don't want to call an acronym. I want to
call somebody. Is that you?
Ms. McCarthy. Sir, you would have to call--I would
recommend you call the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Senator Roberts. He is a pretty busy fellow.
Back in 2002, I joined an exercise held by the department
called Crimson Sky. That was sort of a misnomer because it
followed the experience of Great Britain in regards to their
problems with their livestock herds. They used that method in
regards in incinerating the animals, which is probably the
worst thing you could have done, as we found out.
There wasn't anybody else in town, so I played the role of
President in this exercise, and it simulated the intentional
introduction of foot and mouth disease in five different
locations. By the way, the person who did that was from Iraq,
at least in the exercise. The impact was incredible. In 6 days,
if you do not detect the disease, that is when this or the
effects of the disease first become obvious, and then it is too
late. All of our exports stop. People in the cities discovered
that their food doesn't come from grocery stores, and panic set
in. The markets went crazy.
Basically, we had States calling out the National Guard.
That is when we had the National Guard in the States, not over
in Iraq and in Afghanistan and everywhere else, setting up all
sorts of border situations so livestock in Texas couldn't go to
Oklahoma; Oklahoma couldn't go to Kansas; Kansas couldn't go to
Nebraska; etc., etc. It got pretty rough except everybody
finally realized that all of the States were involved and we
had to do something.
As President, I stopped the movement of all livestock. The
Secretary of Commerce said you couldn't do that. So I fired
him, and it felt very good. But it was absolute chaos and not
only for 1 year and not only for livestock, but every crop. So
if you talk about a real problem, that was a real problem.
So, Chuck, can you tell me are you still conducting these
kind of exercises? You probably don't want to have me play
President, but at any rate, are we doing the exercises that we
need to do in conjunction with your compatriots up there on the
panel, and has that impacted the way you do business?
Mr. Conner. President Roberts----
Senator Roberts. No. That is Brownback. That is not me.
Go ahead.
Mr. Conner. First of all, we did appreciate the role that
you played in that. I think that was a very important
simulation for us and we learned a great deal from that. I
would just harken back to some of the experiences and, again,
what we learned from that just in terms of the importance of
quarantine and the role that that plays in an event like this,
and I think others mentioned earlier the GAO report, this focus
upon the vaccines. I think one of the problems you have with
relying upon the vaccines to control situations like this is
the fact that it does not do much for you in terms of
international.
Senator Roberts. We had to terminate almost every herd in
America. I mean that was the end result. It was an incredible
experience when you really finally got down to the final answer
to stop what was going on. We had to call out the National
Guard and call out the military. Quite frankly, we ran out of
ammunition. It was a mess, and then you had PETA on television,
and I can't describe the utter chaos that happened.
Mr. Conner. I was there, if you recall, sir.
Senator Roberts. It was something that I had quite not
expected all of the ramifications to happen. If we have that,
we don't have the vaccines to do that.
Mr. Conner. No.
Senator Roberts. We had to dig ditches miles long out of
the water supply to get rid of the animals, and it was just
absolutely devastating, which really gets back to the
intelligence factor and are we getting enough intelligence.
Your prepared testimony discusses the Food and Agricultural
Government Coordinating Council as the Department of Homeland
Security, USDA, and HHS, along with Federal, State, and local
officials, and I know that the DHS is the lead agency. How
often do you meet?
Ms. McCarthy. Well, sir, there is actually a meeting with
the full coordinating council next week.
Senator Roberts. Good.
Ms. McCarthy. And the subgroups meet regularly. There are
lots of discussions that go out across the community both
internal to the Federal Government and also across into the
private sector.
Senator Roberts. Chuck, your prepared testimony talks about
rapid test kits, and there is a lot of that in some
legislation. I know Senator Cochran has been very interested in
this. Can you tell me do we have the rapid test kits? I am
talking about livestock here. Have they been distributed to the
States? Are they located at the State labs? At the
universities? At law enforcement, so on and so forth? Is there
training? Where are we with that?
Mr. Conner. Well, I think the rapid test kits are an
important part of that, Senator Roberts, and I may need to
supplement and get some APHIS people to give you the precise
answer just in terms of their development, but let me just say
the simulation, Crimson Sky situation that we had, underscored
for us the importance of that rapid communication and knowing
that if you get a positive hit somewhere in America, that
information needs to be out there and distributed to our
laboratory network very, very quickly so that we can get those
containment measures in place before it does what happened in
the simulation and gets too far away from us.
That has been a big part of what we have done with the
additional resources that have been given us, is to improve
this rapid communication and coordination among our labs so
that we know almost instantaneously when something like this
happens and then provide the appropriate notification to our
colleagues at Homeland Security. FBI has been tasked to work
with our I.G. so that they are involved in the event if it is a
law enforcement-type issue.
Senator Roberts. That is after he reads the GAO report?
Right?
Mr. Conner. That is right.
Senator Roberts. All right. We have heard a lot lately. We
even had a vote on the Senate floor regarding the distribution
of homeland security funding, high threat versus lower threat
areas, city versus rule. That is what it was about.
So, Dr. McCarthy, what priority is given to threats that
are related to food and agriculture security when making these
designations? Do you weigh in on that?
Ms. McCarthy. Yes, sir, we do, and I can tell you the
risked-based approach that we are taking right now looks at the
integration of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. We
are concentrating heavily, though, on things that we think can
have a catastrophic impact to the country, a national scale
impact. So threats to the agriculture are things that we take
very seriously. Actually, many of those wind up falling in the
catastrophic category. Catastrophic doesn't include not only
casualties to humans, but it includes potential economic impact
or societal disruption.
So right now, the department has embarked on integrating a
very solid rigorous risk-based approach to looking at those
things that fall into the most catastrophic category, and those
are the highest priority items that we are looking at, and
there are all elements of the agricultural sector that are very
important. Obviously, our big concern with foot and mouth
disease reflects that.
Senator Roberts. I am glad to hear that.
On the Intelligence Committee, we are reminded daily in the
national press that the al Qaeda is seriously looking at soft
targets, and when we do the analyzing, first the collection and
then the analyzing, we usually weigh intent and capability in
trying to determine where best to focus our counterterrorism
resources. Dr. McCarthy, do you believe we have enough
information to determine the true threat?
You mentioned the Agriculture Intelligence Working Group.
Can you tell me how often that group meets?
Ms. McCarthy. Sir, I would defer to my colleagues from the
FBI to answer the issues specifically on intelligence.
Senator Roberts. OK.
Mr. Lewis. It is a once-a-month meeting, sir.
Senator Roberts. All right. I will push for twice.
The last question that I have, and I am very happy that the
Chairman has returned, tomorrow the Intelligence Committee is
going to hold a confirmation hearing for Vice Admiral Redd to
be the first confirmed Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, and this is going to be--already is--
the primary entity in the U.S. Government responsible for both
the strategic operational planning on counterterrorism and fund
food security. Obviously, this is a very critical issue, as you
have all have indicated.
Do you, and you meaning the USDA and FDA, currently have
representatives assigned to the National Counterterrorism
Center, and if so, are there plans to expand your agency's
presence there?
Ms. McCarthy. Sir, yes, we do, and we work very closely
with them on a regular basis, and we will more engaged with
them, obviously, with the implementation of the WMD commission
reports and the stand-up at DNI.
Senator Roberts. I thank you for your response.
And I have gone on for about 8 minutes, doing a soft shoe
while you went to wherever you went, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Would you like a blow by blow?
Senator Roberts. I think that is classified, sir, if you
will remember.
The Chairman. Senator Dayton has left us.
Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
organizing the hearing. I am here to thank the witnesses for
their witness efforts to help us identify the threat that could
be posed to our agricultural resources by bioterrorism and to
emphasize the importance of research in figuring out ways to
better protect the food security of our country.
I compliment all of you for your efforts to work across
department jurisdictions and include the private sector as well
as public sector agencies in this national effort. We
appreciate the work that you are doing and we hope that through
this hearing, we will learn more about how we can more helpful
in supporting your efforts. If it means passing new authorizing
legislation, then I am sure the chairman will call us together
and put that challenge before the committee. If we are talking
about appropriating funds that are necessary for new research
facilities or for the empowerment of universities or other
research capabilities in our country to do a better job in this
effort, we would like to have the benefit of your advice and
counsel in that way as well.
Mr. Chairman, I have some specific questions which I will
simply ask that we submit for the record. One thing I will ask,
though, and that is about the facilities at Plum Island. I know
that the capabilities there are limited, and what is your
assessment of this facility in terms of its capacity to meet
our national needs in regards to these potential threats?
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, sir, and we certainly are grateful
for all the support that your committees have given us as well.
As I stated earlier in my statements, we have assessed,
obviously, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, which is a
facility whose lifetime, it has exceeded its useful lifetime as
a facility. The Nation needs that critical capability. It needs
the ability to have both the research, the diagnostics, the
forensics, the training, and all the capabilities we need out
50 years in order to provide the Nation with a base to be
responsive to the agricultural missions and the agriculture
security mission that we are all in.
We have undertaken this year a feasibility study that will
look at the requirements potentially for a new facility,
merging those requirements with the requirements for mission
responsibility from the DHS, from our colleagues at USDA, and
from our colleagues at HHS, and we are building facility
options from that set of requirements. So we take this very
seriously and we take it as a national responsibility that the
Nation needs to assess what it needs. We need to be able to
provide the base that allows us to not only do the missions
that we have done historically for the last 50 years, but also
the missions that we have into the future.
Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Salazar.
STATEMENT OF HON. KEN SALAZAR, A U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much, Chairman Chambliss
and, in his absence, Ranking Member Harkin. Thank you for
holding this hearing on the issue of bioterrorism, because it
is very much an important part of providing homeland security
as well as making sure that we are protecting agricultural and
rural America.
I recognize the huge contribution that agriculture makes to
our economy in this country and in my own State of Colorado,
and I know that without agriculture, much of what I call the
forgotten America would go by the wayside. So I appreciate you
putting a focus on the issue of agroterrorism.
And picking up on the comment from outgoing HHS Secretary
Tommy Thompson, last year he said that we were extremely
vulnerable to an agroterrorism attack, and in his statement
about the threat, he said that it worried him, quote, every
single night. I believe that he was right to worry.
I have an opening statement that is much longer, and I will
submit that for the record, Mr. Chairman, if there is no
objection, and I have a couple of questions that I would like
to ask.
The Chairman. Your statement will be inserted without
objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Salazar can be found in
the appendix on page 93.]
Senator Salazar. This is a question for Deputy Secretary
Conner and for Dr. McCarthy, and that is a question on how we
are coming together in the integration of DHS and the
agriculture inspection services. I am trying to work my way
through reviewing Secretary Chertoff's analysis on how the DHS
organization is going and the recommendations that he has on
how we ought to move forward with that. I recognize that
whenever there was a major overhaul of government in the way
that we have overhauled our government to deal with the
challenge of homeland security, that there are very, very
significant management challenges that we need face.
Here on this particular issue, my understanding is we had
some 3200 inspector positions that we had at USDA, that those
inspector positions have been moved over to DHS, and my
question is how is that integration going with respect to what
these inspectors are currently doing? A question that is part
of that as well is I believe there was an authorization to hire
an additional 500 inspectors, and I would like a report on
where we are, on the status of the hiring of those inspectors,
all coming down, basically, to the question do we have enough
horsepower within DHS, men and women power, to be able to deal
with the inspections at our ports and making sure that we have
the readiness to be able to have those inspections done on a
timely basis.
Ms. McCarthy. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.
I do hope that the reorganization plan that the Secretary
presented last week helps clarify some things, because it
should give you insight into the importance he is putting on
very specific functional areas, less so on the management
structure, how the department is managed, but more so on the
fact that there is an attention and a high priority put on
given functional areas, and one of those functional areas is
border protection. So you will see the department align itself
so that all of us who participate in things that have to do
with border protection are working together in a more seamless
fashion. So it doesn't matter whether it is somebody out of my
office that is doing research and development or it is somebody
out of the intelligence unit or somebody out of Customs and
Border Patrol or one of the other organizations. We will be
working on teams that are focused on those functional areas.
The border protection integration took place within the
Customs and Border Patrol part of the department, and in the
new organization, that has stayed together. So each port is
responsible for doing that integration, and it is coming along,
and I will certainly take back for you the question for the
record of where we are on the hiring of inspectors. I can tell
you it has been a challenging job internally for DHS across the
board to recruit and retain the qualified people that we need
to do in many of the jobs, but I can tell you that we have
taken the integration of border security as a topmost priority
in the department, and the Secretary is very committed to
pooling the resources not only from the traditional elements
that came into the department initially, but merging additional
capabilities against those mission responsibilities into the
future.
Senator Salazar. If I may, Dr. McCarthy, a follow-up
question in terms of the qualifications of the individuals that
you are hiring or who are already on board to provide this kind
of security, what kind of people are you looking for when you
are trying to provide us the kind of border security that we
want from the potential entry of some agroterrorist material
that would come across our borders?
Ms. McCarthy. That is a very fair question, sir, and I will
take back the question for the record on the specifics of the
qualifications because I am not in that business, but I do know
that they have held a very high standard of bringing people in
and making sure that they were properly qualified and properly
vetted for the positions that are involved, and I will be happy
to respond to you in writing on the specifics of the
qualifications for those inspectors, sir.
Senator Salazar. Just a follow-up, Mr. Conner, for you in
terms of the USDA, to lose 3200 employees from this agency that
has significant responsibility of making sure that we are
protecting our consumers and our agricultural products, what
kind of impact has that had to the historical pre-9-11 function
within USDA?
Mr. Conner. Well, it has not removed, if you will, Senator
Salazar, our role in this process within this matrix. We
continue to have jurisdiction on meat, poultry, and egg
inspection. We have a significant role in that process for
imported product, and that extends way beyond just simply at
the point of entry into the United States. Our Food Safety and
Inspection Service personnel are located in the foreign
countries that are shipping the product to us before it even is
destined for the U.S. There has to be a certification that the
standards used in that production are equivalent or as strong
as what they are in the U.S. We certify that equivalency and
then audit at the point of processing in the foreign country.
So our role begins and, as well, our FSIS inspectors are
present. Every container of these products that does enter the
country, you know, is visually inspected to make sure that it
shows no signs of tampering or anything at that point. I
believe we have just added 26 new people at our ports of entry
for that specific purpose.
So it has by no means eliminated our role, and we take this
whole issue of equivalency and assurance of the meat, poultry,
and egg product coming into this country quite seriously.
Ms. McCarthy. With respect, sir, if I might add one thing,
I would encourage you to view Homeland Security as the steward
of the homeland security mission. The fact that people move
between one agency and another does not negate the fact that we
have a national mission, and we are the stewards of a national
mission, and our responsibility is to provide the Nation with
the best capability and we work closely in partnership in a
different way than this government has ever done with our
partners in the Federal Government and also the State and local
and private sector.
Mr. Conner. If I could add, Senator Salazar, as well,
actually, I believe in the legislation APHIS continues to set
the policy for the employees that are under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Homeland Security as well. So it is a strong
cooperative relationship.
Senator Salazar. Thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman,
just one concluding comment, and that is for those of us who
come from rural States, and all us who sit on this committee I
think have a special place in our heart for the rural
communities. When I travel in my own State of Colorado and I go
to the small communities and see the water tanks and the grain
elevators and the potato warehouses, and I see those all over
my native valley in the southern part of Colorado, I think it
is just important for us to continue to look at the challenges
that we face in homeland security, because it will be one of
our major challenges for this twenty-first century and making
sure that we are putting the right kind of resources and the
right kind of attention out in those wide expanses of America.
So I think this hearing dealing with agroterrorism is
particularly important in addressing at least a part of that
issue. So I appreciate you holding this hearing very much.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator, for your keen
insight and your interest in this issue, and I think in
Chairman's Cochran's Appropriations Committee, we appropriately
dealt with the exact issue you are talking about, and that is
where to put the resources. We simply can't forget rural
America, and I think we did that in the homeland security bill
last week.
Mr. Lewis, I want to kind of switch gears a little bit
here. I know you testified before the Environment and Public
Works Committee recently relative to ecoterrorism, and it is my
recollection that over the last several years, we have had some
incidents relative to ecoterrorism such as the physical
destruction of some facilities in the western part of the
country as well as some environmental groups who are really
extremist-type groups who have done things such as putting
blades in trees and not allowing our loggers out there to
harvest trees and whatnot. I know that we have identified those
groups. I assume we are continuing to monitor those folks. Have
the number of these instances decreased in the last several
years?
Mr. Lewis. Ecoterrorism, sir, is the No. 1 priority of the
domestic terrorism portion of our counterterrorism division. It
is so because when you look at the last 10 years of activity
from the ecoterrorists, what they have run up in terms of
numbers of incidents and dollars worth of destruction far
exceeds anything else going on in this country in terms of
domestic terrorism or domestic base.
With respect to this issue here today, we have seen very
limited incidents, two I think in the last five or 6 years, not
of any substance at all. They are much more oriented today
toward things like housing developments, condominium
developments, animal releases. SUVs, of all things, are on
their scope. Because we characterize this back at headquarters
as part of the domestic terrorist program, it sits on the JTTFs
just like international terrorism matters do all across the
country. It gets the same push in my every single field office
as does international terrorism matters. I think that is
important. It is on the radar all across the country.
Let me also tell you that up here, not only with the
committee that you have mentioned, but the Senate Judiciary
which I have testified before and most recently talked to
staffers on, there is an interest, and I hope it continues, in
amending legislation that I think we need to strengthen the
toolbox that we use to take to these people. At the present
time, I would consider the threat of agroterrorism from this
side of the domestic terrorism problem to be minimal, based on
what we know today. There is an awful lot going on in this
country in this area from an investigation intelligence
collection standpoint. I can't go into that, obviously, during
this type of hearing, but we have a very good lens, I think,
through which we look to see what is going on around the United
States, what they are interested in, and what we see as their
planned activity over the next several months.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Dr. Brackett, we can't let you leave
without a question. You mentioned in your testimony you have
issued some specific guidelines, security guidelines, for the
milk industry. I want to know what kind of response you have
received from the industry and how well they are working with
you to address your concern. I think there has been a little
push-back on behalf of the producers.
Mr. Brackett. Well, Senator Roberts, actually we have been
working very close with that particular industry at their
request, I might add, to help them in several different ways,
first of all, to the develop the guidance documents that you
refer to, but also to share with them what we know about what
their potential vulnerabilities might be and how they might
take actions to avoid that. What we are hearing is that, for
the most part, the industry, processing industry, is adopting
much of the guidance. It is a process. It is in process. On the
production side, I think that that is coming as well, and I do
know that the associations that represent the dairy farmers are
working with them to try to assist them in adopting some of the
guidance documents that we provided on specific issues or
specific parts of the guidance documents that are relevant to
them.
Senator Roberts. So it is a good news situation?
Mr. Brackett. It is. There is always room for improvement,
and we are working with the industries and with the
associations to help do that, but we have gotten good response
from them, we think.
Senator Roberts. We talk about the livestock industry. If
you really want to look at something where we talk about a soft
target or whatever kind of target it is, you know, obviously
milk would really be one that somebody could choose.
Chuck, I have one final question. A lot of people are
concerned in the world health and agriculture arena that we
have not received any complete information from China in
regards to the true scope of the avian influenza outbreak in
that country. So on the issue of this nature that could have a
major consequence for both animal health and also human health,
who is the lead agency? Is that you or the Department of
Homeland Security? FBI? Or is it, again, a concerted effort,
working closely together, of course?
Mr. Conner. DHS would be the lead on this, working with us
is my understanding, Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Well, I have a suggestion. Back in 2002,
you used some of your supplemental funding provided by Senator
Cochran to establish what is called plant disease and animal
health monitoring networks, and there are labs located at
several universities, and I want to give you kudos, because it
is my understanding that this network was used to quickly
diagnose the discovery of the soybean rust last week in the
U.S., and you alerted all the producers and they knew about it
and they watched for it and they could treat it if, in fact, it
happened. We really limited what could have been a real tough
problem.
So my plea to you is take a look at these labs and these
networks, more especially with something like this avian
influenza, which according to some could be absolutely a very
serious outbreak not only for this country, but for around the
world.
And I thank you for your efforts in that regard and I thank
the panel.
The Chairman. Let me also thank you for being here this
morning and providing great insight and educating the members
of the committee on this issue. Some of you have already been
told that you have written questions that will be coming to
you. There may be others as well. The record will be held open.
I would ask that you get us your responses as quickly as
possible. Again, thank you for your service to our country.
The Chairman. We will now move to our next panel. The next
panel consists of Dr. John Sherwood, head of the Department of
Plant Pathology at the University of Georgia in Athens; Dr.
James A. Roth, Director of the Center for Food Security and
Public Health at Iowa State University; Mr. James Lane, Ford
County Undersheriff, Dodge City, Kansas; Mr. Mark J Cheviron,
Corporate Vice President and Director of Corporate Security and
Services at Archer Daniels Midland Company in Decatur,
Illinois.
Mr. Roberts, I understand you have an introduction.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot today
from our Federal officials on this topic. As you know, one of
the most important topics in this fight is that to deter and to
detect one of prevention. An important player in this role
would be our farmers, our ranchers, our agribusinesses, our
veterinaries, and law enforcement at the local level.
We had a hearing before 9-11. The Intelligence Committee,
the Armed Services Committee, and we have even had
appropriators there. It was that important. We asked 41
agencies in the Federal Government who is in charge, are you
ready in regards to international security and any kind of a
terrorist attack. Of course, everybody said they were in charge
and they were ready. The last person to testify was in charge
of the Sheriffs Association, and he was from Arapaho County,
Colorado, and he said, Well, boys, all these feds are here
already, but it is going to take you 72 hours to get out to
Arapaho County, and I just want to tell you one thing: Until
you all get there, I am in charge.
So I think that is an important point to make, and I am
proud to say that one of the most significant undertakings in
this area has been undertaken by the Ford County, Kansas
Sheriff's Office and the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and
also Kansas State University, and they have been led by the
Ford County undersheriff, James Lane.
The chairman just asked me, James, if we have an
oversheriff as well as an undersheriff. You can speak to that.
James is with us today. His efforts have led to a
substantive research report funded by the National Institute of
Justice. This report has just been completed. I believe it
includes many recommendations that will be a blueprint for
other law enforcement folks around the country.
I am not going to steal James's thunder, so I will not go
into all the details of their efforts, but I say that group has
done just remarkable work. I am very proud of the effort of
James and my home county, and, more importantly, I am very
proud to say that he comes from Dodge City America, and I thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I'll tell you, Mr. Sheriff, any secrets you
want to share with the committee about the Chairman of the
Intelligence Committee while you are here will be welcomed.
Senator Roberts. James, you know that is all classified.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being
here to dialog with us on this very critical issue, and, Dr.
Sherwood, I won't go into a formal introduction of you, but
obviously you probably noticed my hand over my heart when I
said you were from the University of Georgia. We are very
pleased to have you here, and we will start with you and come
right down the row.
All of your statements will be submitted for the record,
but we would appreciate and look forward to any opening
comments you have. Dr. Sherwood.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SHERWOOD, PH.D., HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF PLANT
PATHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, ATHENS, GEORGIA
Mr. Sherwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
inviting me here today to comment on biosecurity preparedness
and efforts to address agroterrorism threats posed by plant
diseases that impact the food, feed, and fiber of our nation.
My name is John L. Sherwood, and I am professor and head of
the Department of Plant Pathology at the University of Georgia.
I am also representing the American Phytopathological Society,
or APS, the premier organization of scientific leaders who work
to keep plants heathy. Our member scientists are employed in
universities, private industry, and agencies within the State
and Federal Governments.
The U.S. has been blessed with vast tracks of productive
land, but at times plant diseases have had significant economic
and social impact. Today, plant pathologists are facing soybean
rust and sudden oak death among other diseases that affect the
vitality of our fields and forests. As with the diseases
affecting animals and humans, new diseases of plants are
regularly encountered here and abroad.
Positive steps to protect U.S. crops have been taken.
Examples are the National Plant Diagnostic Network, the
regulatory activities toward mitigating exotic pathogens by
APHIS and State Departments of Agriculture. The EPA approval of
Section 18 requests to provide expanded management tools to
minimize the potential impact and damage caused by soybean
rust, and the establishment and revitalization of crop
biosecurity panels or centers within various government
agencies.
Four key components of an effective approach to mitigate
acts of crop terrorism and maintain safe and productive crop
systems are strategic anticipation of potential threats,
prevention of a bioterrorist attack, preparedness to respond to
an attack, and coordination of these strategies. The foundation
of security is identifying potential threats through strategic
anticipation. Each year, plant pathologists in the public and
private sector prepare to thwart diseases that may affect our
nation's plant production systems. Fundamental to any aspect of
plant biosecurity is understanding the biology of how plants
get sick. This is why support of basic and applied research in
a competitive grants process is essential for the security of
our nation's feed, food, and fiber production system.
Prevention efforts must be directed toward securing the
Nation against pathogens not yet in the U.S. Currently, much
effort is spent on regulating pathogens that are widespread and
endemic in the U.S. These pathogens pose no more threat in
regard to biosecurity than they annually cause in naturally
occurring epidemics. Such natural epidemics may be devastating
in a given locale during any growing season, but extensive
regulation of such endemic pathogens limits the ability of the
scientific community to investigate and develop appropriate
management strategies and results in squandered resources.
Effective communication between Federal agencies and
scientific societies such as the APS will provide a solid
foundation to prioritize these needs. As 100 percent prevention
is impossible, we must be prepared for the introduction of
pathogens. The recent establishment by the USDA CSREES of the
National Plant Diagnostic Network that is dispersed among the
land grant universities is working to establish coordinated
efforts in APHIS, State Departments of Agriculture, and private
seed companies to minimize the impact of plant diseases.
The elements for an effective national response plan and
crop biosecurity are coming into place across State and Federal
Governments. While the greatest consideration must be given to
threats that directly impact human and animal health, we
emphasize that long-term human and animal health is dependant
on sustainable agriculture production systems in the U.S.
As I indicated, there are many activities underway. What
appears still to be lacking today as a scientist from outside
the Government, and the biggest void to assuring success in all
our efforts is effective communication, coordination, and
strategic planning among the many entities that are charged to
protecting plant health. Following 2 years of planning and
solicitation of stakeholder input, in the fall of 2004 the APS
released its proposal for the establishment of the National
Center for Plant Biosecurity (NCPB) within the USDA as a
Federal coordinating office staffed by Federal employees and
administrated at the level of Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture to coordinate efforts in crop biosecurity. The NCPB
will function as a visionary strategic planning and
coordinating entity, link Federal agencies and staff
responsible for plant biosecurity, and not duplicate efforts
underway.
This proposal has received wide support and endorsed by
many scientific societies. The NCPB will provide a strong
framework and leadership for anticipating, protecting,
responding to, managing, and recovering from disease outbreaks
as mandated in Presidential Directive HSPB-9.
In conclusion, the geographical expanse and economic
importance of the U.S. agriculture enterprise creates a
vulnerability for the intentional or unintentional introduction
of plant pathogens that could directly affect crop yield and
the viability of our crop production systems in our fragile
rural economies. New investments in infrastructure and
resources necessary to protect and maintain plant health will
have significant social and economic impact both in the
immediate future and for generations to come.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sherwood can be found in the
appendix on page 96.]
The Chairman. Dr. Roth.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. ROTH, DVM, Ph.D, DIRECTOR, THE CENTER FOR
FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY, AMES,
IOWA
Dr. Roth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, and thank you for holding this important hearing
today and for the opportunity to testify before you.
I am the Director of the Center for Food Security and
Public Health in the College of Veterinary Medicine at Iowa
State University. Our center's mission is to increase national
preparedness for accidental or intentional introduction of
disease agents which threaten food security or public health. I
would like to thank Senator Harkin for his vision in providing
funding to establish the center so that we can work to carry
out this important mission.
U.S. agriculture is highly vulnerable to the accidental or
intentional introduction of foreign animal diseases. Many of
the foreign animal diseases are zoonotic, meaning that they
also infect people, and can cause serious public health
problems. Agents against animals have been considered as a
component of nearly every nation-sponsored offensive biowarfare
program.
Significant progress has been made in recent years to
better prepare U.S. agriculture and public health. The national
animal I.D. system is being developed. Expert working groups
have been convened to establish research and vaccine
development priorities. A number of States have organized or
are working to organize animal emergency response teams.
Veterinary diagnostic laboratories are networking to enhance
national capacity and to better share information, and Congress
has nearly completed funding for the modernization of the
National Center for Animal Health in Ames, Iowa. These
activities need to continue.
Despite the progress, the U.S. continues to have inadequate
infrastructure for prevention, detection, response, and
recovery from foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. The
national academies are finalizing two reports that detail
current needs for prevention, detection, and diagnosis of
animal diseases and for veterinary research facilities and
training. The significant challenges that I will focus the rest
of my testimony on are the vulnerabilities and needs I consider
the most important for protecting public health, animal health,
and U.S. agriculture from disease threats. These priorities
include the rapid development of vaccines and anti-virals for
high-priority foreign and zoonotic diseases, correcting major
deficiencies in the laboratory capacity for animal health
research and disease diagnosis in the U.S., and strengthening
the human resources needed to prevent, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from a devastating foreign animal or zoonotic
disease.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 calls for the
creation of a national veterinary stockpile. Rift Valley Fever,
Nipah Virus, and avian influenza are especially significant
threats because of their contagious nature and the fact that
they can cause serious illness and death in humans. A
relatively modest investment could result in the development
and production of vaccines for these three diseases for the
national veterinary stockpile. Animal vaccines can be developed
for a small fraction of the cost of developing human vaccines
and can be approved for use much quicker and with less risk
than human vaccines.
Project Bioshield calls for $5.6 billion over a 10-year
period for the development of vaccines and therapeutics for use
in humans. A portion of that funding should be designated to
develop vaccines and other preventatives for zoonotic diseases
in animals. This will effectively reduce exposure of humans to
these diseases, provide protection much sooner than is possible
through the development of human vaccines, and reduce the need
to vaccinate humans.
The second area I want to address is the deficiency in
laboratory capacity for foreign animal and zoonotic disease
defense. As has already been discussed today, the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center does not have adequate capacity for the
foreign animal disease research and diagnostic needs of the
Nation. Planning should begin immediately for replacement of
Plum Island animal disease center facilities, including
biosafety level four facilities, and funding for new facilities
should be appropriated as soon as soon as possible. I was very
pleased to hear earlier today that that planning is beginning.
There are no biosafety level four facilities for livestock
disease research in the U.S. I am currently coordinating a
project to develop a vaccine for the Nipah Virus, a biosafely
level four pathogen which causes serious illness and death in
pigs and in people. Our collaborators in Canada are using their
biosafety level four facility to test the vaccine in pigs
because the U.S. does not have facilities for this research in
food animal species.
The third major deficiency is a shortage of personnel
trained in veterinary medicine. There is a serious and acute
shortage of veterinarians in rural agricultural areas, in
Federal Government agencies, and in disciplines such as public
health and food safety. There is also a critical shortage of
DVM-Ph.D research scientists and teachers to train future
scientists, especially in high-priority areas of veterinary
infectious diseases. Funding of a National Veterinary Medical
Services Act, which was signed by the President in 2003, but
not funded, and the Veterinary Workforce Expansion Act of 2005
is critical to developing the human resources needed for
foreign animal and zoonotic diseases defense.
Thank you for your commitment to protecting U.S. animal
agriculture, and I will be happy to attempt to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roth can be found in the
appendix on page 101.]
Senator Roberts. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JAMES LANE, FORD COUNTY UNDERSHERIFF, DODGE CITY,
KANSAS
Mr. Lane. Senator Roberts, I am honored to provide
testimony concerning the threats of agroterrorism and ongoing
effort to protect American agriculture. Thank you for this
opportunity and also thank you for your earlier comments.
My remarks today will be from the local law enforcement
perspective. I will offer the committee an overview of the
agroterrorism preparedness activities that are occurring at the
local level in the State of Kansas. Further, I will speak
briefly about our experiences, interaction, and initiatives
with State and Federal officials, and I want to emphasize that
we are never satisfied with our current level of preparedness
as this is a continuing process.
The threat of agroterrorism is real. From recent events, we
know there are forces that are seeking to harm America in any
possible manner and that our agriculture is particularly
vulnerable. We know that those who seek to harm us constantly
change their tactics. We cannot overlook the threats to
agriculture and our food supply.
In 2002, a group of local committed agriculture leaders
volunteered to join our community's first responders to develop
a comprehensive plan in response to threats of terrorism. This
group of leaders recognized the importance of preventing an
attack on our base. This coalition continues to assess any
animal and public health issues that pose a threat to our
community. The Ford County Sheriffs Office, Kansas Bureau of
Investigation, and the National Agriculture Biosecurity Center
at Kansas State recently completed a 2-year research project
that was sponsored by the NIJ. Senator Roberts referred to this
project a little earlier.
Previous writings and research identified the dire
consequences of agroterrorism, but information related to law
enforcement's roles and responsibilities were virtually non-
existent. This project establishes a baseline for law
enforcement to better understand the livestock industry and
define its role in working together in the common cause of
prevention. Further research is required to answer many of the
unanswered questions related to this topic.
During the research project, several proactive initiatives
were developed for law enforcement to specifically protect
agriculture from criminal threats, including acts of terrorism.
Local, State, and Federal agencies, including USDA and FBI, and
industry participated in the research activities. The overall
conclusion of this research project centered on the fact that
terrorism, regardless of its former origin, is a local crime
and preventive issues should be developed by local law
enforcement in partnership with the livestock industry.
Recently, a consortium of State and local animal health law
enforcement emergency management and academia officials met in
Kansas City to discuss strategies and prevention and emergency
response issues related to agroterrorism. Representatives from
South and North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri,
Colorado, and Iowa were present for this important planning
session with the overall goal of sharing information and
developing strategies that will work beyond State boundaries.
Our Agri-Guard program is the community policing strategy
with the goal of bringing sheriffs and industry leaders
together to encourage reporting of and education for front-line
industry personnel in suspicious activity. Because of the
interdependence of the industry, this program reaches across
all facets of ag from pre-harvest to post-harvest stakeholders.
Many States have shown interest in this concept developed by
front-line industry personnel and local law enforcement.
You made mention of the ISA conference held in Kansas City,
the International Symposium on Agroterrorism, and I think that
offers a step toward the global initiative on preventing and
responding to agroterrorism with that endeavor.
Across-the-country planning activities such as field
exercises, other training, and communication is occurring.
These food chain homeland security efforts must continue with a
high degree of urgency. Further, because of the potential
consequences associated with an interruption of the food
supply, we cannot become complacent. Most importantly, all
communities must understand that they are not immune from such
an event.
Local first response agencies are far better equipped to
respond to a WMD event because of funding from the Office of
Domestic Preparedness. Agencies who just a few years ago could
not offer their personnel protective equipment can now do so.
In my perspective, the importance of intelligence information
being thwarted from the ground up and the from the top down is
critical. The local deputy sheriff responding to a report of
suspicious activity thwarted by an alert industry professional
is equally likely to identify and prevent agroterrorism as is
the development of intelligence information at the national or
international level. Lacking too, the industry must realize the
importance of reporting such activity and being an equal
partner in protecting itself.
In closing, I testified before a congressional field
hearing at Abilene, Kansas in 2002. Significant process has
been made since that hearing, but there are many threats and
challenges that have yet to be addressed. In my opinion, the
costs of response are far too high and our focus must be on
prevention. From the most simplistic initiatives of
preventative policing to the most complex of disease
surveillance and food safety technology , the need for
prevention cannot be overstated. Federal grants and homeland
security funding must be available to promote local
preventative initiatives, research, and technology to protect
against acts of agroterrorism. To eliminate confusion,
miscommunication, and redundancy, it is essential that a
national homeland security strategy addressing the threats of
agroterrorism be developed and coordinated.
It has been an honor for me to represent local law
enforcement in presenting this testimony. Thank you, and I will
answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lane can be found in the
appendix on page 105.]
Senator Roberts. Mark, it is ADM's time.
STATEMENT OF MARK J. CHEVIRON, CORPORATE VICE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE SECURITY AND SERVICES, ARCHERS DANIELS
MIDLAND COMPANY, DECATUR,
ILLINOIS
Mr. Cheviron. Good morning, Senator Roberts. I would like
to thank you and the other honorable members of this committee
for inviting me to address this issue.
I am Mark Cheviron, Corporate Vice President and Director
of Corporate Security for the Archer Daniels Midland Company.
Archer Daniels Midland, or ADM, is an integrated agricultural
processor. We buy farm products, corn, soybeans, wheat, oats,
cocoa, and produce food ingredients like edible vegetable oils,
flour, animal feeds, and renewable fuels along with other
industrial products. In order to produce and sell more than $36
billion worth of products each year, we rely on over 250
processing plants, more than 500 grain elevators, and a
workforce of 26,000 employees worldwide.
Keeping our facilities secure and our people safe is my
job. I have held this position for over 25 years. The threats I
confront have changed over this period. While I used to worry
primarily about threats of theft, fraud, vandalism, and
workplace violence, I must now also be concerned about
bioterrorism, and I am glad that you share that concern.
America has made progress in hardening our defenses of
traditional terrorist targets, military bases, government
facilities, and commercial air travel. Only recently has our
country turned its attention to better protecting crops,
livestock, and the other products that flow from the farm
communities.
As President Bush has said, ``agriculture ranks among the
most crucial of our Nation's industry, yet its reliability and
productivity are often taken for granted.'' Protecting ADM from
agroterrorism is my responsibility, but one that I cannot do
alone. Business and government must work in partnership, and
with each day, this partnership strengthens. We are grateful
for the assistance we have received through the collaboration
with organizations represented on today's first panel as well
as with our local authorities. We are moving in the right
direction, but more can be done.
Let me outline four areas in which I see room for
improvement. No. 1, agroterrorism is an international problem,
infinitely more comprehensive than any one company or industry.
In order to be better prepared, the private sector needs better
access to counterterrorism units of the Federal Government
which has the means and the expertise to identify emerging
threats. I may know the most effective way to mitigate these
risks for ADM, but I can only address these if I know the
risks. Federal counterterrorism experts can help the private
sector understand potential threats which will guide our
development of effective and efficient countermeasures based on
those risks. We can enhance our overall level of preparedness
by working together and maximizing our collective strengths.
Number two, a bioterrorist attack on our food supply can
have a significant effect even when the amount of contaminant
is small. The best response discovers and isolates a
contaminant before it permeates and travels throughout the food
chain. Today, the technology for detecting these threats is
inadequate.
Number three, certain food security regulations which are
knee-jerk, theoretical, uncoordinated, and counterproductive.
Everybody agrees that agroterrorism is a complex problem, but
regulatory approaches that proscribe across the board
infrastructure changes or one size fits all procedural
requirements are doomed to fail.
Number four, in order to win this war on terrorism, we need
to enhance the exchange of information and expertise between
the public and private sectors. This is harder than it sounds.
We need to think through what restrictions are absolutely
necessary to protect business and to protect sensitive
government information and then devise a system that works for
all interested parties. Information sharing is the key. It
seems obvious, but in reality it means that timely and accurate
information must flow both ways unimpeded and without
hesitation.
Finally, we would welcome the designation of a single point
of contact in the government for reporting suspicious activity.
No time should be lost trying to determine who should be called
when suspicions are raised.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and honorable members of this
committee, for allowing me to speak to you today. Agricultural
processing is ADM's business. Ensuring the reliability and
safety of our nation's food supply is everyone's business. We
are proud to be your partner in the war against terrorism.
This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may give me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheviron can be found in the
appendix on page 114.]
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much.
Dr. Sherwood, let me start with you. As you know, USDA is
developing a national plant disease recovery system that will
implement control measures and Develop resistant seed
varieties; however, you propose the establishment of a national
center for plant biosecurity in the secretary's office. Do you
see the two proposals as complementary, or are they
duplicative? Would it be more efficient to have one agency like
ARS or APHIS handle all plant biosecurity rather than establish
a new entity? And what does last year's detection of soybean
rust tell us in terms of our preparedness to respond to a
sudden outbreak of plant disease?
Mr. Sherwood. Why don't we start with soybean rust, because
that leads to a good reason why APS and myself support the
establishment of a National Center for Plant Biosecurity. Last
year at this time, we were working toward finding that person
that Senator Roberts has repeatedly asked for, who do I call,
and it was very difficult to find within USDA who was the
person who we were supposed to call that was responsible for
coordinating everything in regards to soybean rust.
I think currently, the present structure for the National
Plant Disease Recovery Act being embedded within an agency is
that essentially here you have another example of an add-on to
an agency. Many of these agencies already have very directed
missions. Certainly within APHIS, it is a regulatory mission.
Within ARS, it is a research mission. Within the Department of
Homeland Security, it deals with areas of security.
What I think is we need an office above the agencies,
particularly within USDA, that would be able to coordinate
these efforts, and so it would be that office one could call
when there is potentially an outbreak of another plant disease
such as soybean rust.
The Chairman. All right. Dr. Roth, you heard me talk or
quiz the previous panel relative to the facilities in this
country from an infrastructure standpoint that can respond
quickly to an outbreak of any sort. In your testimony, you cite
the need for biosafety level three and biosafety level four
facilities as well as the need to replace the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center. As you well know, the swift detection
and diagnosis of disease is critical to preventing and/or
limiting its spread, and this lack of research capacity greatly
diminishes our efforts to detect, diagnose, and prevent disease
outbreaks. Given the great exposure of these facilities, how
would you prioritize our physical infrastructure needs in
research and development?
Dr. Roth. I would agree with the other panel members that
replacing Plum Island is a very high priority. The new National
Centers for Animal Health Facilities in Ames, Iowa will have
extensive biosafety level three capabilities. It is not allowed
to be used for certain foreign animal diseases that need to be
done currently on Plum Island. We have no biosafety level four
facilities that are adequate or any that will house large
animals in this country, and I would put that as an extremely
high priority. It takes a fair amount of time to design and
build those facilities. So we need begin that very soon.
The Chairman. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Roth, I wish Senator Thomas could have been here to
hear your testimony. I think it was very helpful, because I
think I am struck on how you very clearly articulated the
danger in regards to some animal diseases that also represent a
threat to humans, and I thank you for your testimony. I don't
wish you any luck with the Cyclones this year, but that is
another subject entirely.
You talked about Plum Island and the resulting impact that
it has on research and the diagnostic capabilities. The
chairman had stressed this and the need to upgrade or replace
this lab along with the need for additional BL-4 labs
throughout the country to conduct this kind of animal research.
Do you have an estimate of how many BL-4 labs you think we need
to in the U.S. to conduct this research?
Dr. Roth. Currently, there are none that can house food
animals, cattle.
Senator Roberts. I know that. That is why I am asking.
Dr. Roth. I think one very good one would be sufficient.
Canada does have in the Canadian Food Inspection Agency in
Winnipeg a biosafety level four facility. They have one room
that will hold food animals. That is the only one in this
hemisphere that I am aware of.
Senator Roberts. Depending on the research being conducted
and the public reaction to that, are there areas where these
labs should not be constructed or are the security and control
features such at that location that it is not an issue?
Dr. Roth. The security and control features on the
biosafety level three and four labs have to operate the way
they are designed, and this is entirely possible. We have a
number of biosafety level four labs with dangerous human
pathogens in the middle of large cities, and we haven't had a
serious accident that I am aware of.
Senator Roberts. But that was my point.
Dr. Roth. Yes, and I agree. These labs are designed to
operate safely and contain the pathagens. We have foot and
mouth disease in the lab in Winnipeg in Canada just north of
the border. As was pointed out earlier, the border is not that
much of a protection from animal diseases.
Senator Roberts. I hope we can work this out.
James, your testimony has discussed the Agri-Guard program
you established as part of the National Institute of Justice
grant, and you described it or I described it as something of a
neighborhood watch program for agriculture. You know what has
happened over the past several years when I would go out to
Dodge and talk to producers and they would tell me to hush
about agroterrorism, and I have literally been amazed by the
breadth and the depth of the participation in the program in
Ford County from the farm level to the processors. How did you
get that to work so fast and so well? Could you give us some
practical examples? You keep talking about processors and
private industry and local law enforcement or whatever, but,
you know, I complained about it. You turned it around. How did
you do that?
Mr. Lane. I don't know that I have the whole answer to
that, but on the surface, I think I can tell you that our
community enjoys a great working relationship between all
levels of government, and I guess maybe what motivated us to
work together was the fact that after the response is over and
everybody that comes in to take care of it leaves, we have to
live in that community. So I think what it does is it motivates
the industry. It motivates us as first responders to reach out.
One thing that I am constantly amazed at is that with the
politics in the industry, that we can put people from different
facets of the industry in the same room together and they don't
brawl. They work toward the common good.
I think what we did, and this is not to pat myself on the
back, but I think what we did was we kept going to the door and
banging on it and saying, you know, we want to work with you
however we can, and I think that gave the industry the trust in
the first response agencies that we did want to work for a
common good. That is the only way I can answer that, sir.
Senator Roberts. Well, I think you have developed a model
that could be used throughout the United States. I don't say
that you are the only model, by any means, but what can we do
to help you implement these programs on a national level?
Although I guess that would be the Department of Justice and
the previous panel. So I will let that go.
Your prepared testimony mentions the need for a national
data base that could be connected to the Federal Terrorist
Tracking System. So based on what you heard from our Federal
officials today, do you think we are moving in the right
direction in that regard?
Mr. Lane. I hope so. I think we have to stress the
importance of intelligence information being forwarded from the
ground level up and vice versa, but what is more important, I
think, is that the people looking at that intelligence
information understands what it means. Without a significant ag
background or understanding of ag, that intelligence
information may not mean anything and we may miss something.
Senator Roberts. I really appreciate that insight.
Mr. Cheviron, you said the private sector needs better
access to the counterterrorism units of the Federal Government
to which has the expertise to identify emerging threats, and
you go on and say I know the most effective way to mitigate
these risks for ADM, but I can only address those risks of
which I am aware. Would you care to amplify on that in sync
with the question I just asked James in regards to the fact are
you aware?
Mr. Cheviron. Sir, we are aware of a lot of problems, but
again, it is more on a parochial level as opposed to a Federal
level. I think that the cooperation we have with the government
now, the fact that we are meeting with so many different
entities that are working so well together, is helping us
understand emerging trends not only in terrorism, but in
regular criminal activity. I think that is being shared much
better now with the private sector.
Senator Roberts. I am glad to hear that. You, on No. 3,
said certain food security regulations which are knee-jerk,
theoretical, uncoordinated, counterproductive. You must be
talking about the Congress. Everybody agrees that agroterrorism
is a complex problem, but some will be required to spend
needlessly to meet the mandates that neither efficiently nor
effectively mitigate the real risks they face. Give me an
example.
Mr. Cheviron. An example would be having a mandate to put a
security officer on a dock in Ama, Louisiana to make sure that
products going out of the country were safe and having a
company pay for that.
Senator Roberts. Why is that unnecessary?
Mr. Cheviron. Well, I think our first priority should be
what is coming into the country as opposed to what is going
out.
Senator Roberts. I expected that you would say that. All
right. So it is not so much what we are shipping out; it is the
risk of what is coming in, and I don't think we have paid
enough attention to that, Mr. Chairman, and I know that you
have been very concerned about it as well.
Finally, let me make a suggestion. In the intelligence
community, we are moving away from the concept of information
sharing. Information sharing basically states that somebody
owns it and they will share with you, but they have to push
that button. You have to pull it from them. You may not even be
aware that it is there even though you have a mission or a
problem that directly affects you. Information access, however,
means that you all work together and if you have the same
mission, the same objective, the same problem, the same
challenge that Dr. Roth is talking about that you do have
access. My only suggestion would be that we need to be talking
not only in the intelligence community, but also in regards to
private business, information access; and, James, that is what
you have been talking about as well. So that is just a
suggestion.
You say we have no easy avenue of recovery when this
information is released inappropriately that causes hesitation.
Senator Chambliss and I oversee 15 different intelligence
agencies, not to mention the Department of Defense. That is
like a wheel barrel with cats in regards to trying to get them
to have access to information and see if we can't pull that
out. The thought all of a sudden occurred to me that you have
the same challenge in regards to private sector-wide with
regards to your trade secrets or your information that is very
special you. Do you have any comment?
Mr. Cheviron. No, sir. I think you have wrapped it up
pretty well in what you just said. I think that there is some
hesitation on private industry, not only with ADM, but the
private sector in general, and that is because they want to
protect proprietary information that they have developed and
they don't want to really share that. They want to make sure
that if they do share that information with the government, it
is protected.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that very much.
Thank you very, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for an
excellent panel.
The Chairman. Mr. Cheviron, following up on that a little
bit, when I put my intelligence hat on, information sharing is
the top of my list. We talk a lot within the intelligence
community about sharing information among Federal agencies,
particularly law enforcement agencies, but what about in the
private sector? Is the level of information sharing between the
public sector and the private sector where it needs to be? Are
we moving in the right direction or are you stone-walled there
from the public side?
Mr. Cheviron. No, sir. I think we are moving in the right
direction. I think that there have been improvements, of
course, the real basis for sharing information is trust. It has
to do with people knowing each other, knowing what they can
share and what they can't, and I think that the Government and
the private sector are working their way toward sharing
information for the common good. I don't think it has to do
anything like it used to be with turf, with protecting the
information and knowing something someone else doesn't know. I
have really seen a change in that in the last three or 4 years.
The Chairman. All right. Well, gentlemen, thank you very
much for your participation in this hearing and being here
today and helping educate the committee. The record is going to
be left open for 5 days. There may be additional written
questions that will be submitted to you, and I would ask that
you get responses to those questions back to us as soon as
possible.
Thank you very much, and this hearing is concluded.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
JULY 21, 2005
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
JULY 21, 2005
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
JULY 21, 2005
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