[Senate Hearing 109-160]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-160
ACCESS DELAYED: FIXING THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Trina D. Tyrer, Chief Clerk
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota CARL LEVIN, Michigan
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Andrew Richardson, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director
Nanci E. Langley, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Tara E. Baird, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Voinovich............................................ 1
Senator Akaka................................................ 9
Senator Carper............................................... 22
Prepared statement:
Senator Lautenberg........................................... 27
WITNESSES
Tuesday, June 28, 2005
Derek B. Stewart, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 4
Kathy L. Dillaman, Deputy Associate Director for Human Resource
Products and Services, Center for Federal Investigative
Services, U.S. Office of Personnel Management.................. 5
Heather Anderson, Director, Strategic Integration, Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Counterintelligence and
Security, and Acting Director, Defense Security Service, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 7
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Anderson, Heather:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 55
Dillaman, Kathy L.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Stewart, Derek B.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Appendix
Questions and Responses from:
Mr. Stewart.................................................. 64
Ms. Dillaman................................................. 67
Ms. Anderson................................................. 69
ACCESS DELAYED: FIXING THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
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TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce and the District of Columbia Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room 562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. George V.
Voinovich, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Voinovich, Akaka, and Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. Good morning. I want to thank you all
for coming, and I suspect that the Ranking Member of this
Subcommittee will be coming in just a short while. We started a
vote at 10 o'clock, so people are tied up with that.
Today, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia
continues its investigation into the Government Accountability
Office's high-risk list of Federal programs that are
susceptible to waste and mismanagement. Today's hearing is
entitled, ``Access Delayed: Fixing the Security Clearance
Process.'' We are going to explore the security clearance
backlog and discuss what actions need to be taken to reduce it.
We will also examine the transfer of investigative
responsibilities from the Department of Defense (DOD) to the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), including the impact that
the shift will have on the ability to investigate and
adjudicate security clearances in a thorough and expeditious
manner.
In order to improve the workflow of any process, we must
first understand the root causes of the problem. In the case of
the security clearance backlog, there appear to be several
barriers to a streamlined process, including (1) the sheer size
of the backlog, which in this case we don't know; (2) an influx
of new requests since September 11, 2001; (3) an inadequate
number of investigator and adjudicator employees; and (4) the
overall lack of a strategic plan for managing the process.
In fact, according to GAO, the clearance process is so
disjointed that DOD has not calculated the size of the backlog
since 2000, meaning that we do not have an exact number of
investigations pending. However, in a February 2004 report, GAO
estimated that the DOD clearance backlog is roughly 270,000
investigations and 90,000 adjudications.
Unfortunately, the implications of a broken security
clearance process send shockwaves throughout the Federal
Government's national security workforce. The bottom line is
that the security clearance process is a major national
security and human capital challenge that needs to be resolved
immediately. The cumbersome and lengthy process can stall the
hiring of both Federal employees and contractors for classified
positions, such as terrorism and intelligence analysts, which
can adversely impact our national security.
During the lengthy security clearance process, prospective
government employees are often in a state of limbo because they
are unable to start their new job until they receive proper
clearances. I can think of nothing more frustrating for a
bright, ambitious, and qualified individual who wants to serve
our Nation, but is told by agencies, such as the FBI and CIA,
they must sit idly for months on end because their security
clearance is being slowly processed.
This scenario is all too real for the private sector, as
well, as GAO found that obtaining a clearance can take over one
year. For example, in fiscal year 2003, GAO reported it was
taking DOD an average of 375 days to process clearances for
private sector contracting positions. Whether they are computer
technology consultants, network engineers, or intelligence
analysts, contractors play a vital role in securing our Nation.
Therefore, it is imperative that we improve this process,
because in today's job market, it is unrealistic to assume that
the best and brightest applicants are going to wait over one
year to receive a government clearance so they can begin their
jobs.
With all these factors, it is no surprise that the security
clearance process has been designated as high risk by GAO.
However, this is one area where I believe that we can make
significant progress in the near future.
A number of simultaneous actions are occurring to
streamline the security clearance process. First, as outlined
in the 2004 Defense authorization bill, DOD transferred its
security clearance investigation workforce to OPM. With this
event occurring on February 22, 2005, I am interested in the
assessment from our witnesses regarding the transition,
including the short- and long-term impact this will have on the
entire security clearance investigation and adjudication
process. I would also like to know if we have enough employees
trained to process the growing security clearance demands of
our post-September 11 Federal Government.
Second, last year, I offered an amendment to the
intelligence reform legislation in Committee to enhance and
consolidate the Federal Government's security clearance
process. My amendment, which was included in the final bill,
directs the President to select a single Executive Branch
department to develop and implement policies and procedures for
security clearance investigations and adjudications.
The law also requires the President to select a single
Executive Branch agency to conduct security clearance
investigations. Additionally, it requires reciprocity of
security clearances in order to streamline the process of
transferring employees from one agency to another, and that has
always been a problem. Too often employees receive a security
clearance from one agency only to find that another agency
won't recognize it, so they have to start the entire process
over again. I think that we need to understand that once you
get a clearance for a certain level, like ``top secret,'' that
the clearance should be transferrable from one agency to
another without starting the process all over again.
I understand that President Bush issued an Executive Order
late yesterday that provides the necessary framework for
implementing the Intelligence Reform Act. I cannot help but
wonder if it is a coincidence that the Executive Order was
issued on the eve of this hearing today.
Under the Executive Order, OPM is the primary Federal
agency responsible for investigating security clearance
applications--congratulations, OPM--while the Office of
Management and Budget is accountable for setting and
implementing the government's security clearance policies.
Although the Executive Order is not the focus of today's
discussion, the timing is important, as I plan to hold another
hearing to examine its implementation later this year.
Senator Akaka and I share a passion for improving the
performance of the high-risk areas. I look forward to working
with the Administration and GAO to make sure that the security
clearance process is removed from the list as expeditiously as
possible.
And I would like to make clear to everyone here today that
I am going to be on this like a junkyard dog. Since this issue
is on the high-risk list, I am going to make sure, as a Member
of the U.S. Senate and the Chairman of this Subcommittee, that
measurable performance improvements are made. We are going to
get this off the high-risk list. Does everybody understand me?
This Subcommittee will hold a hearing on the Executive
Order in 3 months, but quarterly, I am going to be meeting with
Ms. Dillaman, on this issue, and we are going to make
improvements. If you are having any problems with personnel,
with budget, or anything, I want to know about it, because this
is very important. I am interested in human capital and making
sure Federal agencies have the right people with the right
skills and knowledge at the right place to get the job done.
Unfortunately the security clearance process is hurting our
government's ability to function properly, particularly at a
time when we are at risk.
Intelligence is very important, and it is just ridiculous
that you have a backlog of 275,000 cases. It is just something
that needs to be taken care of. It has gone on too long, and we
are all going to work together and we are going to get it taken
care of, OK?
I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation
this morning and I look forward to their testimony.
Since Senator Akaka is not here, we will go forward with
your testimony, and then when he comes or other Members come,
we will get their opening statements. If you will rise and
please raise your hand, it is a tradition of this Subcommittee
to swear in witnesses.
Do you swear the testimony you are about to give to this
Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Stewart. I do.
Ms. Dillaman. I do.
Ms. Anderson. I do.
Senator Voinovich. Let the record show that the witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
Our witnesses this morning include Derek Stewart, who is
the Director of Military and Civilian Personnel Issues at the
Government Accountability Office.
Kathy Dillaman is the Deputy Associate Director of the
Center for Investigative Services at the Office of Personnel
Management. Ms. Dillaman, thank you for making the trip from
Boyers, Pennsylvania, to be here today with us.
Heather Anderson is the Director of the Strategic
Integration at the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, Counterintelligence and Security, and is also the
Acting Director of the Defense Security Service.
Again, I thank you for being here today, and Mr. Stewart,
if you will begin the testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DEREK B. STEWART,\1\ DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased to be
here today to discuss this program that we have spent over two
decades reporting on various aspects of.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Stewart appears in the Apprendix
on page 28.
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Senator Voinovich. Two decades?
Mr. Stewart. Over two decades, sir. DOD has approximately
two million active security clearances and is responsible for
clearances to contractors in 22 other Federal departments and
agencies. So for these and other reasons, it is imperative that
there be an effective and efficient security clearance program.
We view this as a matter of national security.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, after two decades of looking
at this program, we concluded that not only was the program not
effective and efficient, but this was a program in trouble.
This led us to declare the program high risk in January of this
year. Today, I would like to briefly touch on some of the major
conditions we found that led to the high-risk designation and
then offer our observations on steps being taken to address
some of these conditions.
There were four major program conditions that led to the
high-risk designation. First, longstanding, persistent delays
in completing clearance investigations. Second, no single
performance standard for timeliness in completing
investigations. Third, an undetermined backlog of overdue
investigations. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, DOD has not
estimated the size of its backlog since January 2000. And last,
no effective method for estimating the program's total workload
requirement, and this was especially so for the thousands of
clearances needing reinvestigation.
Shortly after we designated the program high risk in
January of this year, DOD transferred its investigative
function and personnel to OPM. However, the problems I just
enumerated did not go away with the transfer to OPM.
For example, DOD's inability to estimate the program's
total workload is still a critical problem. However, I am
pleased to report that DOD is taking a number of steps to
improve the ability to forecast the number of military,
civilian, and contractor positions requiring clearances and the
level of clearance needed. While these are steps in the right
direction, DOD has not set a target completion date for these
efforts. Until DOD can accurately project its total workload,
it will be difficult to determine with certainty the resources
and staff needed to process investigations and adjudications in
a timely, high-quality manner and ultimately eliminate the
longstanding backlog.
Another problem that did not go away with the transfer is
the backlog of overdue investigations. Earlier this year, OPM
reported a government-wide backlog of almost 186,000
investigations, which included some DOD investigations. To
address the backlog and improve timeliness in completing
investigations, OPM reportedly has hired the full-time
equivalent of 3,800 investigative staff. We believe that this
is a positive step forward, but adding thousands of new staff
could result in quality and timeliness concerns until the staff
gains experience. This situation bears close scrutiny.
Mr. Chairman, the one point I would like to emphasize in
closing is that the transfer of this program's investigative
functions to OPM was not a panacea that fixed all the problems.
Much remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions to
this high-risk area. Your hearing today will go far in focusing
the kind of attention that is needed on this critical matter of
national security.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to
respond to questions. Thank you.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you. Ms. Dillaman.
TESTIMONY OF KATHY L. DILLAMAN,\1\ DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, CENTER FOR FEDERAL
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
Ms. Dillaman. Mr. Chairman, I do have a complete statement
that I ask be made part of the record.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Dillaman appears in the Apprendix
on page 49.
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Senator Voinovich. Without objection.
Ms. Dillaman. Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka, it is my
privilege to testify today on behalf of the Office of Personnel
Management concerning this critical issue and to update you on
OPM's efforts to expedite and consolidate elements of the
personnel security investigations program.
There are four steps in the clearance process. First,
agencies determine what level of clearance or access their
employees, applicants, or contractors need. They then confirm
if the person has an active clearance or if a background
investigation is required. To support this, in 2003, OPM
implemented the Clearance Verification System, which provides
online access to current clearance and investigations
information. This system, linked to the Department of Defense
Joint Personnel Adjudication System, contains the clearance
records of over 90 percent of all cleared individuals.
Under the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, OPM is required to establish, operate,
and maintain an integrated, secure, consolidated database of
security clearances with information on granting, denial, and
revocation of clearance actions on military, civilian, or
government contractor personnel. OPM's CVS system will serve as
the foundation for this and has ample capacity to expand the
content of the information maintained and provide access for
authorized users. We are now determining what additional
information should be recorded in this system and the most
effective ways for keeping this information up to date while
ensuring the privacy and security of the information
maintained.
When a background investigation is required, the subject
and the agency provide the data and forms necessary to conduct
the investigation. To support this requirement, in 2004, OPM
implemented eQIP, a web-based data collection system used to
obtain a subject's background information. Today, 27 agencies
use this online system, and we are now working with the
Department of Defense to implement its use for all military,
civilian, and contractor personnel.
The second step of the process is conducting the background
investigation itself, and that is ours. This year, we expect to
receive over 550,000 requests for initial or reinvestigations
to support security clearance determinations. Approximately
80,000 will be investigations for initial top secret
clearances. We also expect to conduct almost 900,000
investigations to determine the trustworthiness or suitability
of individuals in public trust or nonsensitive positions or for
regulatory purposes. Beginning next fiscal year, we are also
planning for a new workload with the implementation of the
Personal Identity Verification Project under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 12.
OPM is working to ensure that adequate staff is available
to deal with our high-volume workloads. Since 1999, the overall
demand has risen sharply, reaching unprecedented levels in the
aftermath of September 11. OPM and DOD both face the challenge
of dramatically increasing staff levels to keep pace with the
demand.
In 2001, the decision to consolidate OPM's and DOD's
investigations programs was made, and I am pleased to report
that the DOD personnel security investigations program workload
and staff were successfully transferred to OPM on February 20.
At that time, 1,578 personnel and over 146,000 investigations
transferred from DOD to OPM.
OPM is also working to increase the size of our contractor
base. We estimate that a total of 8,000 employees and
contractors combined are needed to handle peak workloads. Last
year, we awarded contracts to five new companies, and today,
the six companies under contract have over 6,000 staff that
supplements our Federal staff. Over the next 6 months, we will
see significant performance improvement as the staff becomes
fully productive and the number of contractors continues to
grow.
Senator Voinovich. You said 8,000 people, and then you
mentioned 6,000 others.
Ms. Dillaman. Eight-thousand total, sir. Today, we have
6,000 contractors, 1,578 transferred DSS staff, and the core
Federal staff we had to begin with. We are now over 8,000.
Senator Voinovich. So it is 8,000 altogether, including the
private contractors?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Ms. Dillaman. We are also focusing on delays in obtaining
information from national, State, and local agencies. Many of
these were unprepared for the substantial increases in demands
for their services, resulting in substantial backlogs. We are
working with them closely to identify the problem areas and to
streamline or automate the processes whenever possible.
We are also continuing to look at the use of information
technology in other areas to improve the overall content or
timely processing of investigations or strengthen the
protection of the sensitive information maintained in OPM's
record systems.
The third step of the clearance process is the agency
adjudication of the completed investigation. To minimize
handling, OPM is converting completed investigations to image
files, which will allow for electronic transfer.
When the adjudication action is complete, the fourth and
final step of the process is recording the clearance action in
either OPM's or DOD's record system. This provides OPM a
mechanism for monitoring agency adjudication timeliness.
Through these efforts, we are beginning to see progress in
restoring acceptable processing time. By October 1, 2005, our
goal is to average 35 calendar days or less on approximately 10
percent of the initial investigations that are targeted for
priority processing. For all others, our goal is to complete 80
percent or more within 120 days. We are confident that we will
be able to meet these goals, barring any substantial or
unexpected changes in our workloads.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks and I would be
happy to answer any questions you have.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you very much. Ms. Anderson.
TESTIMONY OF HEATHER ANDERSON,\1\ DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, AND ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
SECURITY SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Anderson. Chairman Voinovich and Senator Akaka, Members
of the Subcommittee, I am Heather Anderson representing the
Department of Defense. I am pleased to testify today and update
you on the personnel security clearance process.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Anderson appears in the Apprendix
on page 55.
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DOD requests personnel security investigations to ensure
that only trustworthy and reliable individuals are granted
access to classified information or placed in sensitive
positions. As prescribed by Executive Order 12968, the
investigative process includes an initial investigation that
provides assurance a person has not demonstrated behavior that
could be of security concern, to be followed by a
reinvestigation that is conducted at specified time intervals
to determine if an individual's clearance should be continued.
There are approximately 3.2 million cleared individuals
within the Federal Government, of which almost 2.5 million, or
80 percent, are cleared DOD affiliates--civilians, military, or
industry personnel, which would include industry individuals
who are processed for clearances by DOD on behalf of 22 other
Federal agencies and under the auspices of the National
Industrial Security Program.
DOD has been partnering with the Office of Personnel
Management for the past 5 years, obtaining their assistance in
the conduct of investigations and collaborating on initiatives
to improve and modernize the investigations process. As Kathy
mentioned, on February 20 of this year, DOD completed the
transfer of the PSI function to OPM, an initiative that began
approximately 2.5 years ago and which has effectively
consolidated management and personnel security investigative
resources within a single agency of the Federal Government.
Prior to the transfer of function, Defense Security Service
succeeded in closing nearly all of their pending investigative
work received on their legacy database.
Our success in completing these investigations was
accomplished in part by redesigning the PSI organization to
reduce infrastructure costs and realigning resources to improve
productivity. By training the entire workforce on OPM's case
management system prior to the transfer, DOD investigative
personnel were able to begin using the system and obtain the
benefit of its operating efficiencies for 7 months before the
transfer. Furthermore, the training enabled a seamless transfer
of function with minimum production downtime.
For the past several years, DOD has also planned for and
has championed a number of initiatives to improve the end-to-
end PSI process and eliminate the systemic weaknesses
identified in past reports. Quite simply, our strategy is to
streamline the process through automation initiatives while
simultaneously transforming the PSI process into a risk-managed
and proactive program with priority given to the most critical
investigations.
Some of these initiatives are: DOD pioneered the two-phased
approach to the top secret reinvestigations, which maximizes
efficiency by using field investigative resources only when
needed. This approach is now the national standard.
A second is the Automated Continuous Evaluation System,
known as ACES, which will identify information of potential
security concern about cleared personnel on a continuous basis
using government and commercial data sources. Our beta testing
results and lessons learned are being incorporated into an
initial operating capability of ACES to be in place later this
year.
A third is that DOD, as mentioned earlier, is in the
process of transitioning to eQIP. As an adjunct to that
implementation, DOD will establish various locations throughout
the United States where requestors can electronically submit
fingerprint cards and release forms that are required as part
of the eQIP request package.
Fourth, DOD and OPM will soon implement the electronic
report for adjudication that will provide for electronic
dissemination of investigative results from OPM to the
appropriate DOD adjudicative entity.
And fifth, the Joint Personnel Adjudication System allows
DOD security managers, including those in industry, to
immediately grant access upon verification of eligibility and
perform certain other clearance actions. This system has been
connected to OPM's Security Suitability Investigations Index
since December 2002. This connection enables DOD and other
Federal Government offices to share information.
Through these initiatives, we believe that the prolonged
processing times and backlogs of prior years will be
eliminated. We are confident that OPM can achieve these initial
goals, in part from the additional investigative capacity OPM
has brought online and through process improvements already
underway.
The DOD's central adjudication facilities are also well
positioned for the timely adjudication of all incoming
investigations expected from OPM. As noted in the GAO report,
DOD has taken positive steps to hire and train additional
adjudicative staff. Our goal is to complete 90 percent of
adjudications within 30 days, not including the time needed for
due process.
DOD will continue to work with OPM and the rest of the
community to identify additional process improvements and to
ensure that processing of clearances meets or exceeds the
requirements mandated by the intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
Subcommittee today. I am happy to answer your questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Ms. Anderson.
Senator Akaka, I understand that you have another hearing
at 11 o'clock. I think before we start asking the questions, I
would appreciate your opening statement, if you care to make
one.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to join you today, Mr. Chairman, and I am hopeful that
our hearing will bring into focus the problems facing the
issuance of security clearances. I look forward to working with
all of you to get security clearances off the high-risk list as
soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman, our national security strategy depends more
than ever on ensuring that security clearances for military
personnel, Federal workers, and government contractors are
investigated and adjudicated without unnecessary delays.
And Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, I regret that I will
have to leave to serve as the Ranking Member of an important
Veterans' Affairs hearing called last Friday after the
Department of Veterans' Affairs acknowledged $1 billion of
shortfall for VA health care.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for being here today
and to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this morning's
hearing. I ask that my full statement be included in the
record.
Senator Voinovich. Without objection.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Thank you, Chairman Voinovich, I am pleased to join you today for
our third hearing in the 109th Congress concerning programs on the
GAO's high-risk list. This morning we will review personnel security
clearances which was added to the list 6 months ago. We agree that we
cannot allow it to stay on the list long, and I am pleased to work with
you, Chairman Voinovich, to get security clearances off the list as
soon as possible.
As Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, as well as the Armed
Services Readiness Subcommittee, I understand the many challenges
facing the Department of Defense (DOD). Between these two
subcommittees, we are providing much needed additional oversight of
DOD.
In November 2003, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to
transfer the DOD personnel security investigative function from DOD's
Defense Security Service (DSS) to the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM).
This decision was prompted by long-standing problems at DSS in
conducting and adjudicating clearances, coupled with a dramatic
increase of employees needing clearances after September 11.
After some delay, approximately 1,600 DSS employees, including
field investigators, support staff, and first-line supervisors were
transferred to OPM's Center for Federal Investigative Services (CFIS)
in February 2005. OPM field investigators, along with OPM's contract
investigative workforce, are now responsible for nearly all personnel
security investigations for DOD military, civilian, and industry
personnel.
Today, we will examine the impact this transfer has had on DOD's
long-standing backlog and whether the transfer to OPM has had the
expected result.
This hearing is important because of its impact on national
security. We understand that our national security strategy depends on
making sure skilled job applicants do not wait months or even years for
security clearances. However, it is not only Federal applicants who
face this problem; it impacts the defense industry as well. For
contractors, it becomes a difficult business decision because well-
qualified job applicants are quickly lost to a competitor.
Once hired, the employee becomes just an overhead expense until the
clearance is granted. Small businesses, which are vital to the U.S.
economy, are especially hard hit by inefficiencies in this program.
There are more immediate national security concerns relating to
personnel security clearances. To allow needed employees to carry out
their jobs, temporary or interim clearances maybe granted pending the
outcome of the investigation and adjudication. Failure to properly
manage the interim clearance process, however, can put classified
information at risk. Also, security clearances must be periodically
updated through reinvestigations. In 2000, GAO found that DOD had over
500,000 overdue reinvestigations. That was one in five of all security
clearances at DOD, putting classified information at serious risk.
As we examine the transfer of functions from DSS to OPM, I am also
interested in hearing about improvements in the transparency of the
clearance process. We have heard complaints from industry
representatives that they are still required to work through DSS, even
though DSS is no longer in a position to provide assistance.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and Mr. Chairman,
I look forward to continuing our work. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. I do have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Dillaman, the Federal Government faces a critical
shortage of foreign linguists. One of the best ways to improve
foreign language proficiency is through immersion programs and
spending time abroad. However, spending time abroad frequently
results in delays in the clearance process as foreign
activities must be verified by investigators.
In the past, DOD's military services have conducted most of
the overseas leads for DSS. However, DOD terminated this
mission following the transfer of investigative function from
DOD to OPM. My question to you is, what is OPM doing to
facilitate the security clearance process for linguists and
others who have spent time overseas?
Ms. Dillaman. Senator, obtaining international coverage has
plagued this process for decades. Until the point of transfer,
OPM relied on both the State Department and the Department of
Defense network of resources to obtain the required overseas
coverage. Prior to transfer, DOD was in the process of
converting this to have their investigative resources obtain
the required international coverage and are now working with
OPM to facilitate sending OPM Federal agents abroad. We expect
to begin deployment of our own agents internationally in August
of this year.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Stewart, much of the
discussion has focused on the number of quantitative personnel
security investigations that OPM is able to conduct. What can
OPM do to improve the quality of these investigations?
Mr. Stewart. We have a number of concerns about the quality
of OPM investigations. One of the major concerns is the number
of new investigators that have been added. According to our
calculation, when we completed our work and issued our report
in February of 2004, DOD and OPM combined had about 4,200
investigators. You have heard today that OPM has 8,000 or more
investigators. That is the addition of several thousand new
investigators.
We would like, and we think it is critical, that there be
uniformity in training, that all of the investigators are
trained on the same standards with the same instructions to
make sure that the investigations are carried out in a high-
quality manner.
The other issue in terms of quality is that before the
program was transferred, OPM handled some of DOD's business.
For example, in fiscal year 2002, OPM closed about 280,000 DOD
cases, but over 28,000 of those cases were closed pending
cases. That is, all of the information was not included in the
investigation. When it was turned over to the DOD adjudicators.
That is not a quality investigation, and 28,000 closed pending
cases in 1 year seems to us to be a fairly large number. So
that is a quality issue that I think DOD and OPM needs to get a
handle on.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Dillaman, would you care to respond to
that?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir. First, on the training issue, we
have developed a very robust training program for both our
Federal and our contractor resources. We have succeeded in
developing one standard handbook that is used by all resources,
contractor and Federal, and our reports of investigation are
all in one common reporting format, making it virtually
invisible to the adjudicator who produced the investigation. So
I think we are well on our way to meeting the training
requirements that Mr. Stewart spelled out.
As far as the closed pending process, it is absolutely true
that in conducting the investigation, there are literally
dozens of different data points or sources that you are
contacting and collecting that make up a complete
investigation. OPM closes an investigation pending, and that is
a term of art for investigations, when a third-party record
source is not available in a timely manner. That means if I
can't lay my hands on a 30-year-old defense file quickly, but I
have substantially completed the investigation otherwise, I
will advance that information to the adjudicating agency and
allow them to decide whether or not there is substantial
information that would support a clearance action or whether
the outstanding piece would pose a risk and should be waited
for. It is an advance process only. The investigation is
completed and sent in its entirety to the adjudicating office.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you
again for holding this hearing, and focusing attention to this
process. Of course, all of you know that the Chairman and this
Subcommittee is really looking to resolving this seemingly
large problem, and I want to commend the Chairman for doing
this. We will certainly do all we can to try to help resolve
this. I thank you for your responses. Mr. Chairman, thank you
very much for allowing me to ask questions.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Mr. Stewart, in the mid-1990's, OPM created an Employee
Stock Ownership Program for its security investigation
workforce. This action moved Federal employees to a privately-
owned company known as U.S. Investigative Services. For almost
10 years now, OPM did not have Federal employees conducting
security clearance investigations. With the transfer of the DOD
employees to OPM, the agency has a hybrid of Federal
individuals and also the private sector. Do you think this is
an appropriate blend of employees?
Mr. Stewart. We haven't really assessed that situation, Mr.
Chairman. It does give us pause because the contractor
employees, we understand, may not be working in the same
fashion as the former DOD employees. The process may be a
little bit different. With training, though, we think that
everybody can be brought up to the same place. But we haven't
really assessed that situation to determine whether there are
any tangible problems with that.
Senator Voinovich. Well, you have got one group working for
the OPM, the former DOD employees, and then you have the
private contractors, five or six of them. I really would be
interested in knowing what GAO thinks about this mixture of
employees.
Ms. Dillaman, how do you decide which group gets assigned
certain cases?
Ms. Dillaman. Mr. Chairman, I really believe this is an
ideal configuration, having a backbone of Federal agents
nationwide that are supported by a broad base of contractors. I
have four contractors to every Federal agent, approximately.
That allows the Federal agents to facilitate access for the
contractors to sources, because it is quite true that Federal
agents sometimes have easier access to State and local law
enforcement systems and other records systems and other
sources.
In addition, I believe there is some work that would be
better conducted by the Federal resources, such as clearing the
contractors themselves.
Today, with the transfer, the Federal resources are still
devoted to DOD's highest-priority cases. Beginning in October,
however, we are going to reconfigure this and redivide what
work the Federal agents do, moving the clearance of contractors
to the Federal workforce as well as troubleshooting all the
contract management issues for the contractors that are placed
throughout the country to the Federal side and giving the more
routine work to the contractors to complete.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Anderson, since the DOD sent
employees over to OPM, please provide your assessment on the
transfer.
Ms. Anderson. I know Kathy and I both recall the town halls
that we did a number of years ago when we first initiated this
whole process, and in speaking with the Federal investigators,
they recognized that the Department of Homeland Security, and
other Federal agencies had the same PSI requirements as DOD and
they really take it as a national security mission. So I
understand through the grapevine that they are welcoming the
new challenges.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Dillaman.
Ms. Dillaman. I would agree. I just completed 5 weeks of
training in the field with all of our new staff, our
transferred staff, and I believe they are a highly motivated,
energized workforce and that they are quite comfortable with
the new role they are going to play.
Senator Voinovich. Since September 11, have jobs that did
not need a clearance been added to the clearance list?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir, they have. The number of clearance
investigations has increased substantially since September 11.
Senator Voinovich. Has anyone reviewed the increases in
security clearances to determine whether they are really
necessary? In other words, after September 11, one of the
things that is troubling to me is that we have really changed
the way we do things. We are almost going to the extreme to
accomplish certain tasks. At the same time, we are adding
enormous sums of money to cover the costs of the added
workload.
Sometimes I think that Osama Bin Laden has to be the
happiest person in the world. Because of September 11, he has
been responsible for enormous change in the United States of
America and, frankly, a very large expenditure of funds being
expended because of the fear of terrorist activities.
Have you examined whether certain clearances are really
necessary?
Ms. Dillaman. Sir, OPM isn't in a position to challenge an
agency's request when they ask for an investigation to support
a clearance, but we do maintain data, specific data by agency,
on those types of trends that can be used to monitor shifts
such as what you just described.
Mr. Stewart. Mr. Chairman, we looked at this issue when we
were doing our work for the February 2004 report. In addition
to the increase in the number of requests for clearances, we
also noticed that there was an increase in the level of
clearance.
For example, in 1995 for contractor personnel, about 17
percent of all requests were for top secret. In 2003, it was 27
percent. So we have seen not only----
Senator Voinovich. Repeat that again.
Mr. Stewart. In 1995, for contractor personnel, 17 percent
of the requests for clearances for contractor personnel was for
the top secret level clearance. In 2003, a couple of years
after September 11, that figure was 27 percent. It requires a
lot more resources to investigate somebody for a top secret
than for a ``secret'' or a ``confidential.'' So we have noticed
that trend.
Mr. Chairman, this is why it is so important for DOD to get
a handle on exactly what its workload requirements are, who
needs a clearance and at what level they need the clearance.
DOD has undertaken this effort, but our concern is that there
is no target completion date for this. We maintain that until
DOD knows how many service members, how many civilian employees
of their 700,000 Federal civilian employees, and how many
contractor personnel actually needs a clearance, what positions
need a clearance, at what level the clearance is needed, there
is no way that DOD can have an efficient and an effective
security clearance process.
Senator Voinovich. Is the agency then the one that deter-
mines----
Mr. Stewart. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Who needs a security clear-
ance----
Mr. Stewart. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. And at what level of
clearance that should be given. Now, Ms. Anderson, you have
heard what Mr. Stewart has to say. What is the Department of
Defense doing to look at those that need a clearance and the
level of clearance? It would be interesting for you to go back
and look at the 17 percent number that he is talking about and
how it is up to----
Ms. Anderson. We have. We actually helped provide those
numbers.
Senator Voinovich. Well, the question is, are the
additional clearances really needed?
Ms. Anderson. If I might start with, we really need to make
a distinction between the need for an investigation and the
need for a security clearance. We do an increasing proportion
of our investigations for access to IT systems that require a
vetting process. We actually think we should know who the
people who are administering our networks are. So there is a
distinction between the need for access to classified
information and the need for an investigation.
We have a DOD regulation that clearly specifies who needs
an investigation for a clearance and who needs an investigation
for a trustworthiness determination. So that mixes the numbers
a little bit.
Senator Voinovich. So the point is that there are some
people that you want to investigate, but not necessarily for a
level of security clearance, is that right? Just generally, you
would like to have an investigation about the background----
Ms. Anderson. A trustworthiness investigation for positions
of trust.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So that is one level----
Ms. Anderson. That is one level of the distinction here.
Senator Voinovich. How do you coordinate your requirements
with Ms. Dillaman's team at OPM?
Ms. Anderson. We have a tendency to harmonize the types of
investigations into the products Ms. Dillaman's organization
serves. So she has a number of categories of investigations of
increasing investment and we use that scale and those defined
investigation types for what we request. We will request a
single-scope background investigation for somebody who needs an
initial top secret clearance. We may also request that same
type of investigation for a system administrator of a mission-
critical network. They don't need access to the classified
information necessarily, but they will have the same scope of
background investigations.
We have tried to harmonize the system in that way. Then it
actually is very useful for us, because if that system
administrator actually needs access to classified later down
the road, we can use that same investigation. So to the
greatest extent possible, we have harmonized the two standards
into one.
But getting back to your original question about the change
in mix, it is very interesting to note that the Department of
Defense did have a significant increase over the last 10 years,
but to some degree, we are seeing it stabilize in the last 3 to
5 years. So we don't think that there is an ever-increasing
number of investigations that will be required. We are working
very hard with the services and agencies to absolutely scrub
their requirements and make sure that we are consistent across
the Department.
We have also provided fairly decent projections to Ms.
Dillaman that allows her to do adequate planning. I think that
there was a structural shift post-September 11 that everyone
has talked about in terms of how we use people and who needs to
be vetted, and I think that we are seeing that structural shift
and we are somewhat hopeful that we will see it stabilize.
Senator Voinovich. So the Department of Defense is
cognizant of the problem. Has there been any recent review of
who should get these investigations and at what level?
Ms. Anderson. Yes. We work with the services and agencies
to actually have them review their programs. The Army did a
very extensive and very well done scrub most recently. The
services have been continuously fine-tuning it.
Now, with the change in mission requirements, we have a
tendency when we call up Reservists and National Guard members
that we have to make sure that their investigations are
current, as well. And so the world environment being what it is
today, I think that the number of clearances that have been
requested and the number of investigations that have been
requested is consistent with the mission requirements.
Senator Voinovich. Now, Ms. Dillaman, I suspect that you
conduct security clearances for the Department of Homeland
Security? How many Federal agencies do you conduct security
clearances for?
Ms. Dillaman. For security clearances, sir, over 50, but in
total, we deal with over 100 Federal agencies. There are
several thousand offices that request investigations from OPM
for either national security purposes, public trust,
nonsensitive or regulatory purposes.
Senator Voinovich. So if OMB, under the Presidential
Executive Order, is in charge of policy, they should look at
this from a management and budget perspective and examine to
ascertain whether those agencies do, indeed, need the
clearances for their employees and contractors.
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Let me start with that. That kind of
defines the customer base----
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir, and as I stated before, we have
solid data on each and every one of those agencies, including
trends for the past 15 years of submissions.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Mr. Stewart, could you comment on
this testimony? How does it relate to what you are saying, how
can the DOD and OPM match their budget and workload
requirements in order to get the job done. Can you comment on
that?
Mr. Stewart. DOD and OPM need to know the number and level
of required clearances in order to efficiently determine the
staffing, the resources, and the budgets. In order for OPM to
plan properly, it has to know the workload coming from DOD.
Senator Voinovich. And you are saying to me today that from
your perspective, we don't know what the workload is coming
from DOD?
Mr. Stewart. Exactly, Mr. Chairman. I am saying that the
DOD has an initiative underway to determine which military,
civilian, and contractor positions need clearances and at what
level. But I am also telling you, DOD is not done with that
initiative. There is no target completion date set for that,
and until that is done, DOD is not going to have an efficient
and effective program.
Let me just give you an example. DOD started contracting
with OPM to handle some of their cases in 1999. In 2001, DOD
overestimated the number of cases by 150,000 investigations.
They were off by 150,000 investigations. In 2002, they
underestimated the number of investigations by 135,000--not
10,000, not 50,000, not 80,000, 135,000 underestimated. In
2003, DOD underestimated its investigations workload by almost
90,000 investigations.
If you are missing your target by 100,000 investigations,
that wreaks havoc on the budgets and numbers of staff you need
to carry out the work. There is no way you can plan for that.
Now, there is a second piece to this, Mr. Chairman, that we
are also concerned about. It is reinvestigations. These are
people who already have clearances and who come up periodically
for reinvestigation. For top secret clearances, it is every 5
years. For secret clearances, it is every 10 years. DOD in the
past has not had a real good handle on what its reinvestigation
workload is. That is, if they are notified that an individual
needs a reinvestigation, they have that piece of information.
The problem occurs when DOD isn't notified. It is when an
organization doesn't submit a request on time that DOD doesn't
know whether the individuals need a reinvestigation or not.
DOD estimated in 2000 that there were approximately 500,000
overdue reinvestigations that had not been submitted to DOD for
reinvestigation. That is a huge workload. And I am here to tell
you today that I don't think the Department has a good handle
on that part of their workload, which OPM would investigate.
So if I am OPM, I would be scared to death of this program,
to be perfectly honest with you. I don't know how OPM can be
comfortable with estimates in workload requirements coming from
DOD given what we know about DOD's ability to estimate its
workload requirements. They have missed by 100,000 in 2000,
150,000 in 2001, 135,000 in 2002, 100,000 in 2003.
But there is an initiative to try to get a better handle on
that. I don't know what is happening on the reinvestigations
piece. There is a system, the Joint Personnel Adjudication
System, that should give them a better handle on the
reinvestigation piece. I think it's close to being fully
implemented. This is not a good picture at this point, sir.
Senator Voinovich. The lion's share of the requests for
these security clearances come from the Department of Defense?
What is the percentage?
Ms. Dillaman. Eighty percent or better.
Senator Voinovich. Eighty percent. So the other 20 percent
is from other agencies. So the Department of Defense creates
the most work. I would like to have the ranking of the
percentages. It seems to me that the OMB folks ought to know
that, also, to begin to get into that issue.
What is your response to this, Ms. Anderson? It sounds to
me like things aren't going very well at DOD.
Ms. Anderson. Sir, you will notice that GAO has not been
out to visit us quite recently. The numbers that are quoted are
from 2000 through 2003. As I cited in my testimony, we have
been working very hard for the last 5 years and we have a
number of initiative that are beginning to pay off that we
started over 2 years ago.
Specifically, let us start with the issue about backlog.
There is a lot of confusion about the term backlog. Ms.
Dillaman and I talk about work in process. Backlog seems to
have varying definitions. There are 329,000 DOD cases in
process today. Even when the investigations are run in 90 days,
we will still have over 150,000 cases in process on any day.
Going back to the conversation about how we could miss our
estimate by 100,000, and I must say I am not familiar with
those particular deltas, but in fiscal year 2001, the
Department of Defense submitted 916,598 cases. We might have
been off by 10 percent. That would be the better part of
100,000 cases. We might have been off by 15 percent. A lot of
the caseload management issues really focused around the
difference between the need, the requirement, and the ability
to fulfill that requirement.
And speaking to Mr. Stewart's comment about why we don't
have a close date for our improvements to validation of the
requirements and projections, we will never have a close date.
You can never be better enough at this to really make it
perfect. We know that what we have today seems to be working
for Ms. Dillaman. She has the benefit of all the information
that gets submitted to her and we keep her up to date on policy
changes and on trends. We talk constantly about where the
numbers are.
If we are going to have a significant change in policy that
will affect her workload, we let her know and we work out
estimates. But there are a number of things you cannot predict.
Senator Voinovich. Over or underestimating the workload by
100,000 is a lot of clearances.
Ms. Anderson. Well, given it is 100,000 out of 900,000, at
least it puts it in context. I am not saying it is perfect. But
this year, we have actually been running relatively close to
our projections. It is also, with regard to predicting of
periodic reinvestigations, it is somewhat problematic to
predict it out much more than 12 or 15 months.
Senator Voinovich. Do you have a report on this that I can
see? We are going to get into dotting the ``i''s and crossing
the ``t''s on this, OK?
Ms. Dillaman. Looking forward to it, sir.
Senator Voinovich. I am going to look at this like guys who
were working for me when I was governor, OK? [Laughter.]
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. And we have to get OMB involved in this.
I am going to contact Clay Johnson and Josh Bolten, because
they have to pay attention to this issue. If they are going to
set the policy, they ought to have a few people that really
know this issue backwards and forwards. So I will be sending a
letter off to OMB and find out what they are doing. I will also
have a follow-up hearing this fall, to make sure they are
prepared and are aware of what responsibility they really have
in regard to this whole area.
I think you need to have some good metrics, too. It is
important that we are all operating under the same data points
because the only way we can really make progress is to
understand what these numbers mean.
Mr. Stewart, I have one question about the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The law requires
80 percent of the investigations on security clearance
applications be completed within 90 days by December 17, 2006.
That is the end of next year. It also requires 80 percent of
the adjudications to be completed within 30 days. Given all
that you know about the backlog and time frames to investigate
and adjudicate security clearances, do you think that DOD and
OPM can meet these timelines?
Mr. Stewart. Based on what I----
Senator Voinovich. Is this realistic? Sometimes Congress
sets deadlines and has no understanding in so many instances
that they are not realistic. For example, we said March 15 was
when the President was supposed to sign the Executive Order on
security clearances. Well, what is today, June 28? It was
finished June 27, 3 months late. We have to be realistic about
what we ask agencies, because if we are not, then they really
say Congress doesn't really understand. What do you think?
Mr. Stewart. Well, based on what I understand about OPM's
current time standards, it is 120 days for initial
investigations and 180 days for investigations. If that is
true, then they may not meet the standards of 90 days in the
new legislation.
Personally, I think that the 120 days and the 180 days are
probably more realistic given the transition of this program
and the number of new staff that have been added. OPM can
probably speak better to this than can I. But given the
thousands of new staff that have been added and the training
that is required to get those folks up and ready to process
investigations, the 90 days specified in the legislation is
probably not realistic.
Currently, OPM's time limits are 120 days for initial
investigations, whether it is top secret or secret, and 180
days for reinvestigations, regardless of the level. So that
does not meet the 90-day requirement. But I don't believe the
90 days is currently doable.
Senator Voinovich. We need to establish rules and baseline
measures for tracking progress. I would be interested in GAO's
opinion about what a realistic timeline would be.
The other thing I am interested in is what process, Ms.
Dillaman and Ms. Anderson, use, to elicit how things can be
improved? Do you hire consultants? How do you determine how you
can improve the respective clearances in your organizations?
Ms. Dillaman. Mr. Chairman, we involve our stakeholders. We
regularly convene a panel of the agencies we serve, including
the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, etc.,
to talk about process, different process elements, and that has
taken us to where we are today, in how we not only move work
internally, but how we move work from the submitting agency and
then back to the adjudicating facility. So there is continuous
change and improvement in the investigative process. You
wouldn't recognize it from 10 years ago. And I think that is
going to be an ongoing effort for us, because you can always
improve.
Senator Voinovich. Ms. Anderson.
Ms. Anderson. Thank you. We work very closely with Kathy
and her team, because they really are our strategic supplier
with regard to investigations. We have taken a hard look at all
the variety of processes and personnel security within the
Department and we have been doing this for a little over 2\1/2\
years, and so we are starting to put pieces in place to bring
it all together. So we have solicited input from all levels of
this process, to include our stakeholders, which would include
industry and our MOU members who are part of the National
Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee
(NISPPAC), and we have received a lot of solicited and
unsolicited feedback along the way, not only from consultants,
but from other interested parties, to include House and Senate
members. So we will take input from anyone. We are looking for
things that make the process better, more robust, and reduce
risk.
Senator Voinovich. Do you employ quality management
techniques? For example, through Total Quality Management
employees are empowered and recommend how they think they can
do their job better and be more efficient, and ultimately
streamline the process.
Ms. Anderson. We have embraced that. One of the real
benefits of our Joint Personnel Adjudication System is that it
allows flexibility. We have a number of very different
organizations within the Department. We have large
organizations, like the services, and then you have smaller
agencies. You have specialized agencies, intelligence agencies,
and defense logistics agencies.
So we have built a set of tools that allow us consistent
measures, consistent quality control, but allows flexibility in
how these sub-organizations organize their processes to best
meet their piece of the mission. So we have empowered them and
given them the tools that allow them some flexibility within
their process so that they can tailor these processes to their
specific needs without engendering any dislocation to
reciprocity and other pieces of the process that are important
to preserve.
Senator Voinovich. Do you have any continuous improvement
teams?
Ms. Anderson. We do not have a standing set of continuous
improvement teams. We have pockets of them in different areas,
to include our automated continuing evaluation system. We have
a whole process improvement team associated with that. Our
adjudicators have a collaborative forum and we are trying to
get a little more structure in that, as well, to actually make
sure that they are leveraging best practices across those
organizations.
Senator Voinovich. I would really like to know what process
you use to involve your employees on developing recommendations
on how things can be improved.
Ms. Dillaman, what about you?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir. We also have users' groups, not
only with our own Federal staff, but we are including the
contractor staff, as well. Each of our contractors sends
representatives to the specific users' groups to talk about
process and tools. Our automation system, which is the heart of
the control of these investigations, has been constantly
renovated through those types of users' groups activities.
Senator Voinovich. OK. I have a little problem with that,
because GAO determined that the private sector contractors were
your external customers, but I think they are your internal
customers. It takes 375 days for contractor clearances. In
other words, private sector employees wait an average of 375
days to receive their clearances. And the question is, have you
sat down to ask contractors how they think improvements to the
security process could be made?
I am concerned that the cost to private contractors
continues to go up the longer the process takes. First of all,
if you want to hire somebody that is good but then they can't
do their work until they get a clearance and you put them on
the payroll, they sit there and can't do their work they are
supposed to do because of the fact that they don't have a
clearance. So the private company keeps losing money.
I know OPM and DOD held a news conference with contractors,
but I want to know how much time have you really spent with
them getting their ideas on how they think you can improve the
system? This is part of quality management, reaching out and
asking their opinions can really make a difference.
I know when I was governor, we had a forum for stakeholders
to fill out. Ninety-five percent of the forms came back with
problems because the form was just not relevant to the
customer. So we spent 6 months with the customer and we reduced
the size of the form and the questions. The end result reduced
errors to close to 5 percent. It was good for our employees
because they were having difficulty working in an efficient
manner since there were high error rates. Customers would
submit their forms and State employees would notify them that
the forms were incomplete, so the customer would have to go
through the process again. It just took a lot of time and
money.
I will never forget, one of the employees said he used to
come to work in the morning, and the closer he got to the
office, the more stressed he became. Just by getting involved
with the customers and coming up with a new form, it just
really relieved all of that tension and made things so much
more efficient.
And the question is, how much time do you spend with your
private sector customers?
Ms. Dillaman. Sir, personally, I spend a good deal of time
with our customers, with the Federal agencies that are
customers. In fact, I have a team here in Washington that is
dedicated to that. In fact, each agency is assigned a customer
service representative for OPM.
When it comes to industry, industry feedback is channeled
through the Department of Defense. I have partnered with DOD
and presented at several conferences and meetings to industry
issues about the process, including taking suggestions on how
we can improve it. But I would defer to my colleague in DOD in
terms of how industry----
Senator Voinovich. I want to know how much--when was the
last time you sat down with the private industry people that
you are hiring to get their feedback on this clearance process
and----
Ms. Anderson. I, myself, briefed them on this issue and
solicited feedback in May--I can probably tell you the exact
date--at the AIA and NDIA forum in Arizona. We have a tendency
to hit about one industry organization meeting for exactly that
purpose a month, if not myself, then someone who directly
reports to me. And we do actually incorporate all of industry's
comments in our DOD position to OPM. To talk about revising the
form, we have provided significant comments which includes the
industry input to OPM with regard to the revision of the SF-86
form.
So we have a number of forums that we provide industry, and
it is normally through the industry associations, although we
are always open and I do very frequently take briefings and
requests from individual industry participants. So we do
everything we can to make sure that we are incorporating all of
the ideas. We are entirely endorsing the need for change.
Senator Voinovich. OK. The question is, my staff met with
some private sector representatives. The real issue is, if OPM
is taking over the investigations, why doesn't OPM meet with
the private sector?
Ms. Dillaman. And again, sir, the request for
investigations on industry come from the Department of Defense.
We are more than happy to meet with industry groups with DOD,
partnering with DOD, but the industry is channeled through DOD.
Senator Voinovich. But the fact of the matter is that in
terms of improving the process, now that OPM is conducting the
investigation, it seems to me that it would be very worthwhile
for you to meet with the private sector stakholders.
Ms. Anderson. Sir, the other piece of this that is very
important to remember, and the reason that Ms. Dillaman and I
team up to meet with industry is invariably when we are talking
about this process, we are talking about the clearance process
and it includes not only the investigation but the
adjudication. So we have worked as kind of a tag team to make
sure if there is a question about something, our organization
reviews the SF-86, the self-disclosed information that is
provided by all of our applicants, and 80 percent of the time
for secret clearances, we can provide an interim clearance in a
week. That will put those industry people to work at the
interim secret level. We do not have that luxury in most cases
at some of the higher level of clearances. That is why we make
sure that we prioritize with OPM those investigations.
But when we have conversations with any of our
constituencies, we have found it beneficial for us to go
together because it is invariably a discussion not only about
the investigation, but what else can be done to have those
people work effectively while it is going on. So we have a
piece of this at the front end with regard to taking some risk
with interim clearances, and we have a piece of this on the
back end, which is the final piece and the decision on
eligibility and, ultimately, access.
Senator Voinovich. Well, we have got this shifting. It
seems to me there is a different perspective from your point of
view since you are the one that is going to have to do the
investigation.
Senator Carper is here. Thank you very much for coming
here. He is very interested in this, because he is also a
former governor. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. But you know something else? I used to be
an intelligence officer in the Navy.
Senator Voinovich. I am looking forward to your questions.
Senator Carper. I probably won't show much intelligence,
but we'll give it our best. [Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, good morning, and to our witnesses, thanks
for coming this morning.
I guess my first question is of you, Mr. Stewart. My
understanding is that GAO has placed a security clearance
process on its high-risk list, and the process, as I understand
it, has been turned over from DOD to OPM and the new Department
of Homeland Security. I know you have already talked about
this, but let me just start with a basic question. How is it
going?
Mr. Stewart. I think it depends on who you ask. If you are
asking me----
Senator Carper. Well, I wanted to ask you first, so----
Mr. Stewart. We have not looked at the transfer itself and
how things are working today. Our concerns are more basic. As I
mentioned earlier, one of the biggest concerns is for the
Department to be able to project its workload requirements.
Until the Department can do that, we at GAO don't believe that
there will be an efficient and effective security clearance
program regardless of who is doing the investigations. So we
have some fundamental problems with the way things are working
overall. The actual transfer, we haven't looked at that to see
how things are working today.
Senator Carper. Let me ask you, Ms. Dillaman and Ms.
Anderson, would you just comment in what Mr. Stewart has just
said.
Ms. Anderson. It is interesting to note, and I had
mentioned it previously, that a lot of these problems have been
longstanding and we have made significant improvement in the
last 2 years. Our ability to project our requirements is very
much improved, and I believe Ms. Dillaman will attest to that,
and that we have not left her high and dry as far as her
ability to project workload needs.
Additionally, as we look forward, every program has room
for improvement, this one more than most. We will continue to
improve and refine those projection models to ensure that we
have taken into account every active variable and can give Ms.
Dillaman the most accurate projection moving forward.
With regard to the transfer, I would say that everyone got
paid, work continued to flow, and no one died, so I would say
it is a success.
Senator Carper. Mr. Stewart.
Mr. Stewart. Senator Carper, let me just tell you one of
the things that we are concerned about, even though we haven't
looked at the transfer. DOD and OPM announced in February 2003
that this transfer was going to take place, over 2 years ago.
There is a system, the eQIP system which OPM has, that DOD
still can't use to submit all of its requests through this
electronic system. So there is a time lag where DOD has to
reformat information in order to get it into the system.
This transfer has been 2 years in the making and this is
just an example of where it doesn't seem that everybody is
talking to each other and there is a strategic plan--DOD needs
an overall plan to make this thing work efficiently and
effectively.
Senator Voinovich, have talked about the need for a Chief
Management Officer at DOD. This is, I think, a program that
should fall under the CMO's jurisdiction. With all due respect
to Ms. Anderson and folks at that level, if you don't have
somebody at the senior-most levels of the organization looking
at this program and making sure that things are happening and
come together in a strategic fashion, I don't know that we will
ever have a successful program there.
Senator Carper. Let me follow up on what you said. I was
struck by Ms. Anderson's comment. It sort of reminded me, I
often say, everything I do, I can do better, and clearly, that
is probably true with most of us who are being honest with
themselves.
I want to come back to the point that Mr. Stewart made. I
think he used the word eQIP, and that is probably an acronym. I
don't know what it stands for. But let me just ask, how are DOD
and OPM using technology to transfer investigations to OPM and
to work through the application process and how successful have
those technologies been?
Ms. Dillaman. I will take it. Senator Carper, OPM in 2004
developed and implemented an online information submission
process. That is eQIP. It would be Electronic Questionnaire for
Investigations Processing. This is web-based technology that
allows the applicant to complete his or her questionnaire
online, store the information in an automated vault, and submit
it electronically along with either imaged or hard-copy
attachments, like the fingerprint chart in the release form.
There was a conscious decision made between OPM and DOD to
customize that, to allow the submissions through JPAS, a system
that DOD was in the process of deploying, that in the long haul
will minimize the amount of resources that it takes to maintain
both systems. That was a very complicated, complex development,
but I am thrilled that we are close to implementation. I expect
over the next 2 to 3 months, we will have a full rollover so
that all submissions from DOD will come in electronically.
Senator Carper. And how long have we been working on this?
Ms. Dillaman. The customized version, over a year, heading
toward two.
Senator Carper. OK. And do you think we are a couple of
months out?
Ms. Anderson. We have already begun using it, but as with
an organization the size of the Department of Defense, you
don't cut it over all in one day. So we are in the process of
matriculating more users every day. As a matter of fact,
earlier this month, we allowed all industry users full access
to it. So the entire cleared industry population is now free to
use it and we are easing their transition, and this is similar
to the services and agencies, is we give them a grace period
that they can use the old EPSQ, our old online questionnaire,
for a little while longer while they are transitioning to how
the new one works. But our expectation is by the end of this
year, everyone in the Department will be on it exclusively.
Senator Carper. Mr. Stewart, should we be encouraged by
this?
Mr. Stewart. Again, it just seems a little curious to us
that this transfer was announced over 2 years ago, and this
clearance-request submission process is a critical part of the
program. It is pretty basic to be able to submit requests, and
we still don't have a fully operational system to make that
happen. So I am not encouraged, quite frankly.
Senator Carper. Are you from Missouri? [Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Show me? Well, in a couple months, I hope
you can show us a fully operational system.
Ms. Anderson. Sir, if I might add that when we talked about
the transfer of the investigations function, the e-Government,
e-Clearance initiative--there are a lot of ``e''s--and the eQIP
software that Ms. Dillaman deployed is separate from that
functional transfer. So while it happened in parallel, it was
not necessarily a condition for that transfer. It was separate.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks for all those ``e''s.
Governor, always a pleasure.
Senator Voinovich. I just would get back to the same
question I had, that DOD had the Case Control Management System
that was used to manage the security clearance databases, is
that right?
Ms. Anderson. It was an investigations case management
system, yes.
Senator Voinovich. And OPM uses the Personnel
Investigations Processing System. I want to make sure--the PIPS
system.
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Now, are we talking about the fact
that you are in the process of transferring the information
from the Case Control Management System to the PIPS system?
Ms. Anderson. No, sir.
Senator Voinovich. You are not?
Ms. Dillaman. We made the decision when we started on the
discussion about the transfer of function. We did the analysis
and determined it made no sense from either economic or
engineering standpoint to move cases in process from DSS's
legacy system, the CCMS, to OPM's PIPS-based system. So as part
of our progression, we adopted the new business process in the
beginning of fiscal year 2004 which had all new work
matriculating on OPM's PIPS system. We then used the balance of
2004 and, quite frankly, a little bit of 2005 to clean up, that
is complete, all the work on the Case Control Management
System.
The investigative data for investigations that were begun
on Case Control Management System were completed on that
system. So there are no more cases on the Case Control
Management System. We are in the process of archiving those
resulting investigations, so we are moving them all to an
electronic format so that they will be available to
organizations like OPM as prior investigations, but they remain
with the Department and we will use an electronic archive to
actually maintain them for the 25-year period.
Senator Voinovich. So the relevant material that you need
has been transferred to the PIPS system?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes. The software with regard to the
submission process and whether or not you use the old DOD EPSQ
or the new eQIP form, actually has nothing to do with the Case
Control Management System.
Senator Voinovich. OK. Ms. Dillaman, in February 2004, GAO
reported that a lack of investigative staff contributed to the
delays in the security clearance investigative process, and
since the transfer, OPM indicated they will need 8,000 full-
time investigators to manage the investigative workload, and
you are talking about almost 8,000, from what your testimony
was this morning.
In 2004, GAO noted that OPM's primary contractor was hiring
around 100 investigators a month, and at the same time was
losing around 70 employees a month. Is your contractor still
experiencing this high turnover rate?
Ms. Dillaman. No, sir. Our primary contractor's attrition
rate now is down to 18 percent.
Senator Voinovich. OK. So that they have reduced the
turnover rate?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir. In fact----
Senator Voinovich. Were you concerned about the turnover
rate that they had?
Ms. Dillaman. Absolutely, sir. There is a large turnover in
this business, and that is historically true, that people start
and for a number of the street agents, that doesn't turn out to
be a long-term. But 15 percent attrition would be about right.
In 2004, our prime contractor sold the business and it had
been an ESOP prior to that, and so there were some windfalls
from that and that accounted for some of the large attrition,
where a number of people left after the sale. But that has
stabilized and our contractor is bringing that down every
month.
Senator Voinovich. The U.S. Investigative Services, which
was an ESOP that was created to preserve the jobs initially of
the people that worked for the OPM was sold to somebody else?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Is it still known as the USIS?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. They kept the name, but there is new
ownership?
Ms. Dillaman. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. And as a result of that new ownership,
you are saying that they are a more efficient operation than
they were prior to the change in ownership?
Ms. Dillaman. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Stewart, are you familiar with that
change?
Mr. Stewart. I am familiar with the change. We haven't
looked at it, but I am familiar with the fact that the ESOP was
sold to another party. I think you are asking a very good
question. Some investigations contractors depend on a large
number of part-time individuals and our understanding is that a
lot of these individuals are retired. They are not looking to
work full-time. We also understand that they could work for
more than one contractor. So they could work for one contractor
this month and not the other contractor the next month.
I think it is great that 3,800 full-time equivalent
investigative staff have been added, but I think it is a
situation that bears watching because of the high turnover rate
that was experienced when we were doing our earlier work and
the fact that many investigators are part-time.
Senator Voinovich. OK. I appreciate your testimony here
this morning. What I want to do next is to set a baseline about
where we are today. I am going to have my staff work on it and
we will contact the Office of Management and Budget to talk to
them about it also. But I want to know, where are we today, and
I want to decide on some metrics so that when we get together 3
months from now, 6 months from now, we can determine whether or
not we are making any progress.
So that is what I want to do. As I said, Ms. Dillaman, you
have got a big job. I think in the Department of Defense, this
challenge, which has been around a long time is unfortunately
typical Department of Defense. One of the things that this
Subcommittee is doing is taking on the fact that the Department
of Defense has many items on the list that need to be corrected
and here is another example of it. You are 80 percent of the
action here. This is high-risk and so it is, again, part of the
Department of Defense.
I agree with you, Mr. Stewart, that if we are going to
really see a transformation of the Defense Department, we do
need a Chief Management Officer that is going to stay with
these things over a long period of time. Secretary Rumsfeld
came in and was really going to improve the Department's
management. In fact, one day before September 11, he said that
if they could improve the efficiency by 5 percent of the
Department, they could save $22 to $24 billion per year. Then
our Nation went to war and that doesn't mean you are not
working on process improvements. I appreciate the fact that the
Department is trying to improve things.
But the fact is that management improvements can get lost.
When I was governor, I had a Chief of Staff, but I also had a
Chief Management Officer that every day got up early in the
morning, went to bed late at night, and when all these
firestorms occurred, that didn't bother that individual because
every day, they were just working on management. And that is
the way we got things done.
This stuff is not going to get done in a short period of
time, and that is why I think it is really important that you
look at these numbers on a realistic basis. If we tell you to
do something and you say, ``Those people are nuts, it will
never happen,'' but if you come back--maybe what we should do
is why don't you sit down and figure out how long it will take
you. What is a reasonable time frame? Maybe we need to change
the law to give you more time. But I think we have got to be
real about this, and I think if we are, I think we can
certainly see some progress made.
I know, Ms. Dillaman, you want to see improvements. Ms.
Anderson, you have been working with us a long time and you
want to see it. I just want to thank you very much. I didn't
bring you here to give you a hard time, but I want to get to
some of the real issues here so we can get them taken care of.
Thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing and giving us the
opportunity to learn more about the security clearance process. This
process is obviously vital to our national security. Before an
individual is given access to sensitive information, we must be
absolutely certain that they are trustworthy. But it is also in our
Nation's interest to see that those with a legitimate need for
information have access to the facts that will help them make good
decisions.
So our security clearance process must not only be thorough . . .
it should also be timely.
Today there is a severe backlog of investigations for security
clearances. It is such a problem that back in January, the Government
Accountability Office designated the security clearance process as a
``high risk'' area within the Department of Defense.
I understand that some of this backlog might stem from the transfer
of investigative responsibilities from DOD to the Office of Personnel
Management. At the current time, DOD has approximately two million
active security clearances issued to military personnel, civilian
workers and defense contractors. These clearances allow individuals to
gain access to classified information that they need to perform their
jobs. Last year the GAO estimated that there was a backlog of roughly
270,000 applications for security clearances that needed to be
investigated, and 90,000 that needed adjudication.
GAO has pointed out four barriers that slowed DOD's ability to
eliminate this backlog, including:
(1) the sheer size of the backlog;
(2) an influx of new requests since September 11, 2001, adding
to the existing backlog;
(3) an inadequate number of investigators and adjudicators,
and;
(4) a lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in
gaining access to state, local, and overseas information.
The 9/11 Commission recommended action on this issue, and raised
concerns that the backlog could make it difficult to expedite key
national security appointments. The Commission recommended that a
single Federal agency be responsible for providing and maintaining
security clearances. This has not yet happened.
Mr. Chairman, this is more than a matter of convenience.
The fact is, if we can't do a background check in a reasonable
amount of time, it raises questions about our ability to do it
thoroughly, as well.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
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