    [Senate Hearing 109-22]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                      S. Hrg. 109-22, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2006

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1042

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                           MARCH 16, APRIL 4, 7, 2005

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            BILL NELSON, Florida
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota

                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                        JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            BILL NELSON, Florida
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                  National Security Space Policy and Programs
                                 march 16, 2005

                                                                       Page

    Teets, Hon. Peter B., Acting Secretary of the Air Force..........     7
    Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Commander, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................    16
    Lord, Gen. Lance W., USAF, Commander, United States Air Force
      Space Command..................................................    33
    Dodgen, LTG Larry J., USA, Commander, United States Army Space
      and Missile Defense Command....................................    37

                  Strategic Forces and Nuclear Weapons Issues
                                 april 4, 2005

    Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Commander, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................    85
    Brooks, Hon. Linton F., Administrator, National Nuclear Security
      Administration, and Under Secretary of Energy..................    95

                       Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
                                 april 7, 2005

    Wynne, Hon. Michael W., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
      Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.........................   133
    Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Commander, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................   137
    Duma, David W., Acting Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
      Department of Defense..........................................   144
    Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense
      Agency.........................................................   150

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2006

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2005

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                  NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE POLICY AND PROGRAMS

        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:04 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Inhofe, and
    Bill Nelson.
        Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
    and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: William C. Greenwalt,
    professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
    member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
        Minority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Catherine
    E. Sendak.
        Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe; Bob Taylor and Matt Zabel,
    assistants to Senator Thune; and William K. Sutey, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, you may take your seats. The
    hearing will come to order.
        We meet today to receive testimony on military space
    programs and policies of the Department of Defense (DOD). I'm--
    Senator Nelson has not joined us yet. I expect him to join us.
    He'd be the ranking member on this subcommittee. I'm somewhat
    new to space issues. He has had a long-time interest in that,
    and he'll be an excellent participant in these discussions.
        I'm pleased to welcome today's witnesses, who,
    collectively, represent the views of the DOD on military space,
    policy, and programs.
        Our first witness, the Honorable Peter B. Teets, Acting
    Secretary of the Air Force, holds a number of other job titles
    relevant to today's hearing--a number, really--Under Secretary
    of the Air Force, Director of the National Reconnaissance
    Office (NRO), and the DOD Executive Agent for Space. Mr.
    Secretary, I understand you may be leaving us before too long,
    and I want to take this moment to express my appreciation, and
    that of this Senate and this committee, for your tremendous
    service to America, your commitment to this country. You've won
    respect across the aisle, you've won the respect of people
    throughout the DOD who care about these important issues.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Teets. I thank you very much, Senator. That's
    very kind of you to say, and I have enjoyed my association with
    this committee and with Congress. Thank you very much, sir.
        Senator Sessions. You've put America first, and you've
    always tried to do it the right way, and I believe you've
    achieved tremendous success at that.
        Our other witnesses include General James E. Cartwright,
    Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)--General
    Cartwright, good to to have you with us; General Lance Lord,
    Commander of Air Force Space Command; Lieutenant General Larry
    Dodgen, Commander of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command; and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare
    Requirements and Programs, Admiral Joseph Sestak, Jr. We're
    delighted to have you here.
        I thank all of you for your service to our Nation in this
    important area of our Nation's defense and for the commitment
    you've given to making our Nation unsurpassed in issues
    relating to space.
        It goes without saying that U.S. military space
    capabilities are, today, second to none. A lot of hard work,
    ingenuity, and national treasure has gone into obtaining this
    capability, and it has paid dividends in recent military
    conflicts. It is also fair to say that potential adversaries
    have come to realize the importance of space for the United
    States military and many of its allies. It is not unreasonable
    for us to assume that they will try to exploit our
    vulnerabilities in this area.
        During last year's space hearing, this Subcommittee, under
    the leadership of Senator Allard, emphasized space acquisition
    and management issues. It was noted that the present generation
    of military space systems are being modernized in virtually
    every mission area: strategic missile warning, assured
    communications, navigation, and intelligence and surveillance.
    Unfortunately, virtually every modernization program has
    suffered substantial problems with regard to cost, schedule,
    and technical performance, so we want to hear from the
    witnesses whether these programs are back on track, how we can
    get them back on track, where the deficiencies exist, and what
    we need to do, collectively, to move forward using the
    resources at hand.
        Beyond a review of individual programs, I've asked the
    witnesses to address recent and emerging presidential guidance
    on a number of important space policy issues. Within the last
    couple of years, the White House has promulgated policies on
    space transportation, commercial remote sensing, space-based
    positioning, navigation and timing, and, as I understand, is
    about to issue an overarching national space policy document to
    update the 1996 guidance on U.S. military and civilian space
    programs.
        In addition, the DOD has issued several directives on
    military space policy, and the Air Force has recently published
    the Doctrine for Counterspace Operations. This rich trove of
    policy documentation serves as a backdrop for our examination
    of important policy issues that could potentially shape the
    acquisition of future military space systems and capabilities.
    I'd like to highlight a couple of such issues.
        The first and foremost policy question concerns the means
    by which the U.S. achieves and maintains freedom of action in
    space while denying such freedom of action to our potential
    adversaries. This question becomes more pressing as U.S.
    dependence on space assets continues to grow, while the
    potential vulnerability of these assets to attack increases due
    to the counterspace capabilities of potential adversaries. As
    Secretary Teets previously stated, the mission of space control
    has not been at the forefront of military thinking, because our
    people haven't yet been put at risk by an adversary using space
    capabilities. That will change. It is these sorts of events
    that the Space Commission members had in mind when they warned
    about the possibilities of a space Pearl Harbor. I believe we
    not only need to think about the mission and implications of
    space control, it is fundamentally irresponsible for us not to
    do so. I think you're right, Secretary Teets, in that regard.
        I remember, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked about space and
    the militarization of space, perhaps at his first hearing, and
    he said, ``Senator, we've had war on land, we've had war on the
    water, we've had war in the air, and we will have war in
    space.'' I think that was a true statement. We wish it weren't
    so, but that's the nature of warfare over the centuries, and I
    think he was correct and honest in that assessment.
        So, I think we can't be squeamish about discussing the
    importance of space to our Nation's defense, and the importance
    that that capability not be placed in jeopardy.
        A second policy issue concerns the way we think about
    military space and warfare. During the Cold War, space systems
    were used primarily to help maintain strategic stability,
    balance of power, and mutually-assured destruction between the
    two superpowers. Today, space supports the warfighter in this
    new paradigm, as we are all aware of the infusion of space
    capabilities into virtually all aspects of U.S. military
    operations. It would be useful, therefore, to ask whether
    current approaches to providing space support to the warfighter
    are working, using Afghanistan and Iraq as examples, or whether
    there are ways space assets can be made more responsive to the
    operational needs of the warfighter. I think Lieutenant General
    Dodgen might have some thoughts on this, and General
    Cartwright, and others.
        Well, those are some of the thoughts that I would have for
    us today. There are a lot of things that I look forward to
    acquainting myself with.
        I am, as I said, before you arrived, Senator Nelson, glad
    to have you as our ranking member. I know you've had long
    association with these issues, and have much insight into them.
        I'm also delighted to be joined by Senator Jim Inhofe, who
    has, for many years, fully understood the importance of these
    issues, and has been a champion for them.
        Senator Nelson?

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        There are many issues to be discussed, and not much time,
    so I will truncate my comments. Let's talk about the Space-
    Based Infrared Radar System (SBIRS), let's talk about the
    Evolved Expendable Lauch Vehicles (EELVs), and let's talk about
    advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) and Transformational
    Satellites (TSATs). I'd also like to hear about a vision for
    space.
        In conclusion, I just want to thank Secretary Teets for his
    long, distinguished, public-service, both in the private
    sector, as well as the public sector.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Teets. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, sort of to follow up on that; in your
    prepared statement, you noted that it is a policy--I'll tell
    you what----
        Senator Inhofe. I really do, and I just would be very
    brief.
        Senator Sessions. Yes, go ahead. Jim would like some
    opening comments.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, one of the reasons I came down----
        Senator Sessions. If you would want to take my time----
        Senator Inhofe. That's very nice of you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions.--in terms of----
        Senator Inhofe. No.
        Senator Sessions.--asking questions, please do that, too.
        Senator Inhofe. I didn't know whether they were going to
    have opening statements or not.
        I only would hope that we could address some things--I've
    long felt that the future is in controlling space. We have,
    historically, controlled space, but not to the degree that--to
    a greater degree than we do today, because we have so many
    others that are getting in on this. It was--you quoted, Mr.
    Chairman, the Space Commission's report, and specifically they
    said, ``An attack on elements of the U.S. space system during a
    crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable
    act.''
        Now, you stop and think about that statement. That's pretty
    strong, and these people know what they're talking about. They
    say the types of attacks could include, but not be limited to,
    jamming of the signal links between satellites and ground
    stations; permanently/temporarily degrading satellites with
    lasers; degrading or destroying satellites or ground systems
    with electromagnetic pulse attacks; conducting cyber attacks to
    disrupt computer systems; and to control satellite functions;
    and to collect, analyze, and distribute information. They came
    out with a lot of other specific things.
        I guess, General Lord and Secretary Teets, what are we
    doing to counter these advances--I mean, these concerns that I
    have right now, and to ensure that we are going to be able to
    maintain the space capability, relative to other nations right
    now? Where do you see that we are?
        Secretary Teets. Sir, I think, at this point in time, we
    have taken some strong action to make certain that we, indeed,
    can have freedom of action in space. We know more today than we
    have ever about what else is up in orbit around us. We have
    started to implement some change that would allow us to provide
    some defense against attack, although we are still very
    vulnerable. If I had one strong worry to relay to this
    committee, it would be exactly that, that we do have
    significant vulnerability.
        Now, I know this is an open hearing, and I don't want to go
    into the details of our vulnerabilities, because--for obvious
    reasons.
        But we have an aggressive research and development program
    underway. We recognize the fact that there may come a point in
    time, in the not too far distant future, when it's going to be
    necessary for us to deny an adversary their use of space. As a
    result, I think we are moving in the right direction, but we
    have a ways to go in this whole arena of space control.
        Senator Inhofe. Should we be doing more than we're
    currently doing, or are you satisfied--and you, too, General
    Lord--with what the budget is providing, in terms of
    counterspace operations?
        Secretary Teets. I think that--and then I'll let General
    Lord take it--but my own view is that we are moving ahead at a
    proper pace. We are doing research and development. I think
    we'll see an increase in the amount of resource applied to
    space control over the course of the next few years.
        General Lord. Senator, let me add to that. I think Mr.
    Teets is accurate. As we put together forces to present to
    General Cartwright to meet his global responsibilities with
    space, we're focusing in the space-control area, particularly
    on space surveillance, which is really being able, as you said,
    to understand the environment of space, who's out there, who's
    operating, and our mixture of our ground-based, our optical,
    and radar sensors to be able to discriminate effects in space.
    Because what we have to be able to do is decide, is this an
    enemy action, perhaps, or is this something that may naturally
    occur in the phenomenon of space? We have to be able to
    discriminate that. So we're pushing hard on that--in that area,
    with space situational awareness.
        We're taking actions in what we call defensive
    counterspace, which is to harden our links and nodes to make
    sure we understand what's--the links that go from--for Global
    Positioning System (GPS), for example, as we talk from the
    ground station to the satellite and back, to make sure those
    are protected, et cetera. So we have a tactical view of that
    with our troops who work in 14th Air Force in Vandenberg and
    work at Schriever Air Force Base, to really do what we have--we
    call a defensive counterspace mindset to kind of think about
    this all the time. If we do have an upset in a computer, we
    don't assume, right from the beginning, that this is something
    that naturally occurred, we kind of take a more defensive look
    at that, rule out all the possibilities, and then solve the
    problem and move on. So we're generating, not only our system
    capabilities, but our human and professional development so
    that we have people that really understand the medium we're
    operating in.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, and one more thing, Mr. Chairman, I'm
    trying to find a hole in the schedule this week to give my
    third 1-hour China speech. In that speech, I'll read a little
    bit about, in here, what I'm going to say.
        China is not only looking to build blue-water navy to
    control the sea lanes, but also develop undersea mines and
    missile capabilities to deter the potential disruption of its
    energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S.
    Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan. The
    weapons China is investing in include cruise missiles,
    submarines, long-range target-acquisition systems--
    specifically, cutting-edge satellites, unmanned aerial
    vehicles, and advanced Su-30s and Su-35s, which, according to a
    very heroic statement that was made in 1998 by the now-Chief of
    the Air Force, is really better than our best strike vehicles.
    This is--the logical progression of this is to try to reach for
    space superiority.
        Is there anything that you can say specifically about your
    concern over what China is doing that can be said in an open
    session? For anyone who wants to respond.
        Secretary Teets. I'd be happy to take a first stab at that,
    if you'd like. I think that you are ringing the right bell with
    the statements that you have made there. I do have a concern
    about the push that China has on space technology.
        Now, of particular concern to me is this issue of the
    European Union starting to forget about any kind of
    International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and just move
    forward to transfer technology to--European space technology to
    China. I think it's a huge concern. I think the administration
    is dealing with it as strongly as they can, in a diplomatic
    way. But I heartily encourage that, because I think transfer of
    European space technology to China will give them a significant
    jump in their capability.
        Senator Inhofe. I think that's right. That's another part
    of my speech, the attitudinal change of the European Union in
    terms of what they're willing to share with China.
        Any other comments on that?
        General Cartwright. I would just add that, as we look, and
    given the forum that we're in, to the capabilities that we have
    in space, the capabilities we plan to put in space, that we
    make sure we understand what the critical nodes are, and that
    we start to design in, at the front end, the survivability and
    the assuredness of those nodes. That can be a layered approach,
    much as we've done with, say, missile defense or something like
    that but look at that and architect it in at the front end.
    That's a lot of the work that we're trying to sit down, between
    STRATCOM and Air Force Space Command, to take a look at this at
    the front end; don't try to engineer it in at the back end.
        Senator Inhofe. That's a good point. A good point.
        Senator Sessions. Jim----
        Senator Inhofe. All right, thank you very much----
        Senator Sessions.--thank you.
        Senator Inhofe.--Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to jump in
    there.
        Senator Sessions. I'm glad you had that opportunity, and I
    know you care about this deeply.
        I forgot to give our panelists an opportunity to make a
    opening statement.
        Secretary Teets, if you or any other members of the panel
    would like to share some thoughts with us, I think it would be
    appropriate that you do so and kind of lay any--give us any
    perspectives that you feel we should be aware of.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PETER B. TEETS, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE AIR
                                 FORCE

        Secretary Teets. Thank you, sir. I'd be happy to take a few
    moments, if I may.
        Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson, let me say that, as you
    made your opening statements, you mentioned that I have spent
    about 3\1/2\ years now with multiple hats on. I have been the
    Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the NRO
    and DOD's Executive Agent for Space, and I feel really strongly
    that these positions should continue to be vested in a single
    individual, because it gives an opportunity, really, to have
    some singular management of national security space programs
    that can provide the continuity while maximizing the
    cooperation between military and Intelligence Community space.
        Just as an example of what I mean, I would just relate to
    you that recently we decided to relocate the Space Radar
    Program Office to the Washington, DC, area, and establish it as
    a joint office. This'll ensure both the Intelligence Community
    and the warfighting community that their needs will be met as
    we move toward fielding this kind of a vital capability. The
    role consolidation is vital to creating the daily executive-
    level focus needed to tackle the complex national security
    space issues, and I urge that this tri-hatted position be
    maintained.
        Now, from that perspective, I want to also thank this
    committee and, frankly, the entire Congress, for your support
    of national security space. I've had the opportunity to testify
    before this subcommittee on several occasions now, and we
    really do appreciate the strong push that you're giving to
    national security space.
        Quickly, going through a few of our priorities, I would
    like to mention that our first priority is mission success,
    both in operations and in acquisition. I would be forthright
    with you and tell you that we have not yet solved all of our
    acquisition problems, and we have recently announced another
    difficulty with the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High
    program. We expect a Nunn-McCurdy notification, for sure. I've
    written to the appropriate people in that regard. I think it's
    possible that we'll have a Nunn-McCurdy breach; that is to say,
    a 25-percent exceedance of the annual production--or, excuse
    me, the average unit production cost for the three production
    geostationary satellites.
        Now, SBIRS-High is a troubled program. It's been troubled
    from the outset. It was a program created in the 1990s, and it
    was not well formed. I would simply say to you that we have,
    subsequent to that time, changed our space policy, acquisition
    policy, and we have found ways to improve that situation. But
    we are, at this point in time, still suffering from the effects
    of a program that was not funded properly, it was not scoped
    properly, it was not set up with proper incentives to the
    contractor, and we continue to bear the legacy of that initial
    formation.
        At the National Reconnaissance Office, I'll just say we're
    in a similar kind of a situation with a major program there
    known as the Future Imagery Architecture. I'll leave it at that
    for the sake of this hearing.
        Now, we will, in fact, be able to bring space power to bear
    in warfighting and intelligence-gathering. By doing so, we will
    maximize the leverage that we can get from joint operations.
    The Space Radar Program that I mentioned earlier will be formed
    well. It will be founded upon the acquisition principles that
    we have learned over these last few years.
        But mission success in space does begin with mission
    success in space lift. I would point out that the last two
    Titan IV launch vehicles are scheduled to launch this year,
    marking the end of an era.
        Another era ended in February, when the last Atlas III
    placed an NRO payload into orbit, the 75th consecutive
    successful Atlas launch.
        Our EELV, the Atlas V, and the Delta IV carry on our proud
    space-launch tradition and ensure our access to space. As we
    continue our transition away from legacy launch systems, our
    strategy is to maximize mission success by maintaining two
    families of launch vehicles. They are the best ever, but we
    cannot afford to risk grounding critical national security
    payloads because we relied on a single rocket fleet with a
    single design.
        Once our space systems are on orbit, space professionals
    use them to provide situational awareness, continuous
    communication, and other critical services to combatant
    commanders, senior leaders, and front-line troops. Our nation's
    warriors and intelligence professionals make extensive use of
    space capabilities.
        Now, last year, Congress directed us to address the
    technology and affordability challenges of this space-based
    radar system that I mentioned earlier, and also look at the
    transformational communications satellite programs in a
    meaningful way. We have restructured both programs to address
    your concerns.
        As I mentioned earlier, we fundamentally restructured the
    space-based radar program, now called Space Radar. We are
    developing a space demonstration that will address technical
    and operational risks, validate costs and technology maturity,
    and exercise the concept of operations that would be employed
    in the operational vehicle. This demonstration would take place
    in fiscal year 2008.
        We're also moving ahead on modernizing military satellite
    communications systems through incremental acquisition of our
    planned transformational communications architecture. Our first
    step will be fielding the Wideband Gapfiller system to be
    launched inside of a year from now, followed by the Mobile User
    Objective System, currently being developed by the Navy, AEHF
    Satellites being produced by the Air Force, and then TSAT.
        The first TSAT launch was purposely delayed in the fiscal
    year 2006 cycle to allow time for laser communications
    technology to mature and for us to further develop the front-
    end processor necessary for making this truly an Internet in
    the sky. We remain on a path to deliver a transformational
    communication capability to the warfighter as soon as
    technology readiness levels and our budget permit.
        Another of our top priorities, and the one that will enable
    success in all the other priorities, is to strengthen our team
    of space professionals--government, civilian, military, and
    industry professionals from across the DOD and the Intelligence
    Community. Space professionals around the world apply space
    power for our Nation. We are working with the Services and the
    national agencies to synchronize their respective space-cadre
    strategies and to implement our space human-capital resources
    strategy.
        The next top national security space priority is to
    continue to integrate space capabilities for national
    intelligence, warfighting, and homeland security. We expanded
    this priority from the 2004 version to emphasize our homeland
    security contributions. Space systems assist in tracking
    illicit material and hazardous cargo, contribute to border
    security, and have the potential to do even more.
        With respect to this type of integration, I believe a
    single individual holding all three space leadership roles is
    the right organizational construct to ensure our national and
    military space systems complement one another to improve our
    total security. Fully integrated national security space
    capabilities enhance decisionmaking and warfighting
    capabilities at all levels.
        The next priority is to produce innovative solutions for
    the most challenging national security problems. We must
    sustain a solid foundation of science and technology to create
    innovative solutions. To that end, we've put together a science
    and technology council, consisting of Air Force Research
    Laboratory participation, Naval Research Laboratory, NRO,
    Advanced Systems and Technology--and in a forum of that nature,
    we invite National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
    in to participate with us, as well, so that we can properly
    leverage each others technology developments as we go forward.
        My final top priority is to ensure freedom of action in
    space. America's dependence on space is well known, and any
    enemy will try to negate our advantage. We're pursuing improved
    space situational awareness to accurately characterize the
    space environment, distinguish malfunctions from attacks, and
    prevent collisions in space. In addition, we are developing the
    ability to protect our satellites and the capabilities they
    provide. This is a military and economic imperative for our
    Nation.
        Because we rely so heavily on space capabilities, we must
    be prepared, when directed, to confront adversaries on the high
    ground of space. Our intent is to use diplomatic or other
    nonlethal means to preclude hostile use of space. But if these
    measures fail, we reserve the right, under international law,
    to take defensive action against an adversary's space
    capability.
        For example, the Air Force's counter-communications system
    will achieve initial operating capability this year. It is a
    ground-based, transportable asset intended to disrupt an
    adversary's satellite communications, but its effects are
    temporary and reversible.
        I'm proud of our national security space accomplishments.
    We improved our space-system capabilities on and off the
    battlefield, and we are modernizing every major space program
    while sustaining existing constellations. I'm highly optimistic
    about national-security space's future.
        I sincerely do appreciate your commitment to helping us
    deliver these vital capabilities. With your ongoing support,
    we'll continue to develop, produce, launch, and operate
    critical space systems for this great nation.
        Thank you, again, for your support.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Teets follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter B. Teets
                                  introduction
        It is my distinct honor to appear before the committee today to
    discuss our National Security Space activities as Under Secretary of
    the Air Force, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
    and Department of Defense (DOD) Executive Agent for Space. I am further
    honored to be joined by the Service leads of our National Security
    Space activities: General James Cartwright, Commander of United States
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM); General Lance Lord, Commander of Air
    Force Space Command (AFSPC); Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen,
    Commanding General, Army Space and Missile Defense Command; and Vice
    Admiral Joseph Sestak, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfare
    Requirements and Programs (N6/N7). Our appearance here, together,
    underscores the importance of unity of effort in our National Security
    Space endeavors.
        I began these remarks by listing my three titles because the
    consolidation of responsibilities across National Security Space in one
    person has been a hallmark of my tenure. As you recall, the 2001
    Commission to Assess the United States National Security Space
    Management and Organization (Space Commission) strongly recommended
    such a consolidation to create daily, senior focus that is needed to
    tackle the complex issues facing our National Security Space efforts. I
    believe the Space Commission got it right, and we should continue on
    this path.
        One of the advantages I have enjoyed over the past 3-plus years has
    been the ability to manage programs across both the open and classified
    space portfolios. I feel strongly that these positions should continue
    to be consolidated under a single individual. There are a number of
    reasons why. First, a single manager across all of the National
    Security Space programs provides a continuity and focus to the overall
    National Security Space program that could not exist otherwise. Second,
    a single manager provides for the best coordinated, most cost-effective
    and efficiently managed program, maximizing the leverage between both
    military and Intelligence Community (IC) space. Third, a single office
    simplifies the chain of command, harmonizing both the IC and the DOD
    efforts in space under a single, accountable authority, ensuring the
    needed cooperation and coordination occurs. This is especially
    important as we consider the need to improve planning, development,
    acquisition, and management of our space capabilities, including the
    industrial base, as our space capabilities also have a tremendous
    economic and social impact.
        Another advantage has been the ability to focus the efforts of the
    broad space team. As in previous years, I have worked with leaders from
    organizations across the National Security Space community to review
    and revise our priorities. As we studied where we are and where we are
    headed in National Security Space, we found that the 2004 priorities
    were still sound, so with a few refinements we carried the same
    priorities into 2005. Our 2005 priorities are: (1) achieving mission
    success in operations and acquisition; (2) developing and maintaining a
    team of space professionals; (3) integrating space capabilities for
    national intelligence, warfighting, and homeland security; (4)
    producing innovative solutions for the most challenging national
    security problems; and (5) ensuring freedom of action in space. These
    five equal priorities are supported in the fiscal year 2006 budget for
    our defense and intelligence space programs, and I will now discuss
    each of these priorities in detail.
             achieve mission success in operations and acquisition
        My first priority is mission success in operations and acquisition.
    Our success in space operations enables the American way of war. We
    have brought space to bear in warfighting and intelligence gathering
    and our Nation cannot do without it.
        Space systems provide global access unhindered by geographic or
    political boundaries, unrestricted by surface or air defenses. When
    integrated with airborne and surface sensors, or when acting alone, our
    systems provide critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) information to national decisionmakers and combatant commanders.
    They monitor the global environment and produce weather forecasting
    data for battle planners; carry global communications to and from
    theater; warn our national leaders and deployed forces of incoming
    missiles; and send precise navigation and timing signals to troops on
    the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in flight, and weapons en route to
    targets. These space capabilities facilitated the tremendous successes
    our joint warfighters achieved during major combat operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, remain critical components of the joint team
    around the world, and will enable continued success in the global war
    on terrorism and future conflicts.
        As recognized in the Space Transportation Policy recently signed by
    the President, mission success in space begins with mission success in
    spacelift. We have a string of successes with 40 successful National
    Security Space launches in a row.
        Within the last few months I visited space professionals at Cape
    Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
    California to kick off the processing of the last Titan-IV launch
    vehicles in our fleet. These Titan IVs are scheduled to launch this
    year, marking the end of an era. Another era ended this past February,
    when the last Atlas-III placed an NRO payload in orbit--the 75th
    consecutive successful launch for an Atlas launch vehicle.
        We now have our Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs), the
    Atlas-V and Delta-IV, to carry on our proud space launch tradition and
    ensure our access to space. Eight launches have now been flown, four
    from each provider, with a ninth launch planned in early March for a
    commercial satellite. Building on our initial successful EELV launches,
    we continue our transition from heritage launch systems to two
    modernized families of vehicles that cover the range of our National
    Security Space needs. Our strategy is to ensure mission success by
    maintaining two families of rockets, at least through this decade.
    These launch vehicles are the best ever, but we cannot now afford to
    risk grounding critical national security payloads because we relied on
    a single rocket fleet with a single design.
        In December 2004, we conducted a demonstration flight of the first
    Delta-IV Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV). The flight met its primary
    demonstration objectives; however, an early shutdown of the first stage
    common booster cores left one of its payloads at a lower-than-planned
    orbit. We are thoroughly examining the cause of the shutdown and will
    make the changes necessary to ensure mission success in the vital heavy
    lift regime.
        Through the remainder of this fiscal year we plan to launch six
    more payloads. A new Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIR-M
    satellite will sustain the GPS constellation and increase the number of
    military code capable satellites. Four NRO launches will strengthen our
    space-based reconnaissance capabilities. Our last Defense Support
    Program satellite will sustain our strategic missile warning
    capabilities.
    Support to Global War on Terrorism and Other Operations
        Our space systems and space professionals provide innovative and
    unique support to U.S. and coalition military and intelligence
    operations worldwide. They provide situation awareness, continuous
    communication, and other critical services to combatant commanders,
    senior-level decisionmakers, and fielded forces.
        Our warriors make extensive use of our space capabilities. As an
    example, just before a special operations mission in Iraq, we received
    a request for critical space support. We used multiple systems to
    complete time-sensitive collections against the target area.
    Immediately upon the final collection, we passed the last crucial bit
    of data to the mission planners. They used the updated target area
    characteristics for planning safe entry and exit routes around
    significant obstacles. The special operation succeeded with zero loss
    of life.
        Fielded forces rely on the precision navigation standard from GPS,
    but space professionals also provide GPS-enhanced theater support
    (GETS) that improves signal quality and accuracy. GETS allows combatant
    commanders to make the best use of high quality targeting data.
        In addition to warfighting applications, space systems provided key
    geospatial information to support civil authorities responding to the
    Florida hurricanes, wildfires in California and Alaska, and oil spills
    along the east coast of the United States. Humanitarian missions
    responding to the Indian Ocean tsunami also benefited from space
    systems.
    Space Acquisition Programs
        We are equally committed to mission success in acquisitions, and
    are taking positive steps to improve our acquisition processes. Late
    last year, we updated our space acquisition policies for both the DOD
    and NRO, bringing them into close alignment. The policies codify best
    practices such as Independent Technology Readiness Assessments and
    Independent Cost Assessments. We are committed to fully funding our
    programs as they enter their preliminary design phase (Key Decision
    Point B), and to demonstrating technology maturity in a relevant
    environment before we settle on a complete design (Key Decision Point
    C).
        In addition to strengthening our acquisition policies, we completed
    a follow-up to our comprehensive, independent study of space
    acquisition. Headed by Tom Young, the Young Panel reported good
    progress in our reforms, and urged us to continue our hard work. The
    panel recommended we continue our efforts to provide program managers
    an adequate management reserve. A sufficient reserve gives a program
    manager the flexibility to address problems in a timely manner; in
    contrast, lack of a reserve may drive the need to restructure the
    program--and often to reprogram funds. A delay of 8 to 10 months
    typically accompanies a formal reprogramming action, during which we
    suffer additional schedule erosion and increased costs. The Young Panel
    found that the cost of resolving a problem could grow by 300 percent as
    a result of this delay. Adequate margin under the program manager's
    control would address these issues and save time and money. We
    recognize the difficulty of budgeting for a reserve, but I believe the
    benefits of flexibility and ability to mitigate cost growth argue in
    favor of adequate reserves.
        Last year, Congress reduced our SBR and TSAT budget requests,
    directing us to spend more time addressing the technology and
    affordability challenges facing both programs. Our message to Congress
    this year: we heard you and we have restructured both programs in a way
    that addresses your concerns.
        We fundamentally restructured the Space-Based Radar program, which
    we now simply call the ``Space Radar'' program. Space Radar will be the
    single space radar effort for the Nation, and provide the deep look,
    all-weather, day and night surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
    required by both the IC and joint warfighters. As part of an integrated
    ISR network, Space Radar will provide critical information with an
    affordable architecture by leveraging horizontal integration and
    advanced technology. To address our current technological and
    operational risks, we are developing a space demonstration that will
    work with other ground and air radar programs. With the demonstration,
    we will validate Space Radar costs and technology maturity as well as
    demonstrate the Concept of Operations and user utility. This will
    culminate in an operational Space Radar initial launch in 2015.
        We are also moving ahead on acquisition of military satellite
    communication systems through an incremental acquisition of our planned
    Transformational Communications Architecture. Our first step will be to
    field the Wideband Gapfiller System--the first of which is scheduled to
    launch later this year. We will follow this with the Mobile User
    Objective System (MUOS), Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
    satellites, and TSAT.
        MUOS and the AEHF system are both high priorities for the joint
    force; for example, the Navy looks forward to these systems'
    contributions to their ForceNet. MUOS, the new DOD narrowband tactical
    communications program, continues within budget and on schedule for
    initial operational capability in 2010. It is the common denominator
    for command and control providing the capability to communicate from
    tactical to theater levels, to allies and coalition partners, and
    between DOD and non-DOD agencies. The AEHF program will provide
    survivable, protected satellite communications for strategic and
    tactical users. We added about $1 billion in fiscal year 2006 through
    fiscal year 2009, and are working closely with the National Security
    Agency to resolve problems surrounding government-furnished
    cryptographic equipment. We are proceeding with a three-satellite AEHF
    constellation, and we retain the option for a fourth spacecraft.
        The first launch of TSAT was delayed from fiscal year 2012 to
    fiscal year 2013, giving us more time to bring the laser communication
    technology to maturity. TSAT remains as important as ever to every
    Service and all combatant commanders, as ultimately their requirements
    (higher capacity communications, Communications ``On-The-Move,'' and
    ISR platform integration) will not be satisfied by the currently
    planned WGS, MUOS, and AEHF constellations. For example, as the Army
    implements modularity and dispersed operations, effective command and
    control of ground forces becomes increasingly reliant on beyond line-
    of-sight systems. TSAT will provide the ability to communicate while on
    the move, with the coverage and capacity needed to implement net-
    centric warfare concepts across geographically separated areas. We
    remain on a path to deliver a transformational communication capability
    to the warfighter as soon as technology maturity and our budget permit.
        We continue to come to grips with the Space-Based Infrared System
    (SBIRS). We delivered our first Highly Elliptical Orbit payload in
    August 2004, and are on track for delivering our second payload in June
    of this year. Also, our Signal Processing Assembly and Single Board
    Computer problems have been resolved. A more rigorous management
    approach has been instituted, with increased government oversight. We
    added more testing at earlier integration levels to allow us to quickly
    address any new technical problems. When fielded, SBIRS will provide
    unprecedented missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence,
    and battlespace characterization to the warfighter. We continue to give
    SBIRS our highest attention.
        GPS modernization continues to be a priority, not just for DOD but
    for civil users of GPS as well. The Air Force is planning to launch
    eight of the modernized GPS IIR-M satellites. Each of these satellites
    offers greater protection against jamming threats, along with new
    signals for our military and civil users. We continue procuring the
    next generation of GPS satellites, GPS-IIF, and remain committed to
    developing and fielding GPS-III and its advanced anti-jamming
    capabilities.
               develop and maintain a team of space professionals
        My second priority is to develop and maintain a team of Space
    Professionals. We have great people in the space business and I am
    dedicated to providing them the tools and training they need to
    succeed. Our space professionals achieve and maintain our advantage as
    the world's leading space faring nation. Comprising a unique mix of
    government civilian, military, and industry professionals from across
    the DOD and IC, they are space power's most crucial element. We are
    developing well-educated, motivated, and competent people who are
    skilled in the unique demands of the space medium. Today they are
    deployed with our forces around the world and in place in the U.S.,
    employing their skills, and advancing space power for our Nation.
        We are working with the Services and National Agencies to
    synchronize their respective space cadre strategies. Additionally, we
    continue implementing our Space Human Capital Resources Strategy. On
    December 15, 2004, we delivered to the Senate and House of
    Representatives Armed Services Committees an implementation plan for
    this strategy. This plan includes specific goals and metrics, and a
    schedule for achieving those goals. Implementing our strategy will
    foster a challenging and productive work environment; encourage and
    support individual career development; and build a system that
    attracts, develops, and retains a talented and diverse team of
    professionals able to meet future space challenges.
        Over the last year, the Air Force established the National Security
    Space Institute (NSSI) to develop space professionals' ability to
    harness space systems for warfighting effects and combat support. NSSI
    courses cover military space systems, space warfare concepts, space
    tactics and space acquisition. In 2004, the NSSI taught more than 2,500
    in-residence students from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and national
    agencies, including Active Duty, Reserves, National Guard, and
    Government civilians.
     integrate space capabilities for national intelligence, warfighting,
                             and homeland security
        My third priority is to continue to integrate space capabilities
    for national intelligence, warfighting, and homeland security. We
    expanded this priority from the 2004 version, to emphasize our
    contributions to homeland security. For example, space systems assist
    in tracking illicit material and hazardous cargoes, and contribute to
    border security. But our Nation's security begins overseas, including
    areas where we do not have forces on the ground. In those areas, space
    systems can provide our eyes and ears. We are committed to bringing all
    our space systems to bear in support of warfighting and intelligence
    needs at home and abroad. Fully integrated National Security Space
    capabilities will enhance decisionmaking and warfighting capabilities
    at all levels.
        The integration of our space forces is being done across the DOD
    and IC. For example, USSTRATCOM has established a Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space and Global Strike, which will improve
    integration of space capabilities. In fiscal year 2004, the NRO trained
    over 4,600 personnel, more than one-third of whom were deployed or
    deploying U.S. military personnel, on the latest techniques to fully
    exploit space systems and capabilities to support combat operations.
        Our ongoing activities in support of the global war on terrorism
    highlight the fact that space capabilities have become increasingly
    integrated in our national intelligence and warfighting operations. As
    mentioned, we are pursuing additional integration by addressing
    intelligence and warfighter needs in the Nation's next-generation Space
    Radar program. We have forged an agreement between the Secretary of
    Defense (SECDEF) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to
    ensure the multi-mission needs, requirements, and capabilities will be
    satisfied for both communities. In response to this agreement, I have
    restructured the Space Radar Program Office and relocated it to the
    Washington, DC, area to improve stakeholder interaction and
    collaboration.
    produce innovative solutions for the most challenging national security
                                    problems
        My fourth priority is to produce innovative solutions for the most
    challenging national security problems. To counter proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), detect emerging terrorist
    organizations, secure our economic institutions, and defend our
    homeland, we are fielding space capabilities targeted against a variety
    of threats. We are working specifically on three needs: Detection, to
    locate and investigate WMD activity, terrorist threats, missile
    launches, and so forth; Communication, to deliver actionable
    information to those in harm's way and those who need to make timely
    decisions; and Action, to prevent adversaries from harming us here or
    abroad. We must sustain a solid foundation of science and technology
    (S&T) to create innovative solutions.
        We recently published the DOD Space S&T Strategy, and at our Fall
    summit we focused on our four S&T vectors: (a) Next Generation Launch
    Capability; (b) Operationally responsive, low-cost 500 kg or less
    satellites and launch capability to support warfighter and intelligence
    needs; (c) Assured freedom of action in space; and (d) Integrated
    Persistent ISR. We will use these operational vectors to help align
    programs, focus the Department's space S&T investment, and adjust S&T
    portfolio priorities as needed. We will continue to refine and review
    these vectors, and ensure our DOD and IC efforts are synchronized.
        We explore many new ideas through Joint Experimentation, which also
    provides a venue for rapid prototyping of emerging technologies. In
    August 2004, emerging space capabilities were integrated into the Air
    Force's Joint Expeditionary Forces Experiment. This experiment focused
    on Battle Management Command and Control improvements, to advance
    network-centric operations. In this experiment, the Satellite
    Interference Response System (SIRS) demonstrated the potential for a
    deployable defensive counterspace capability to detect, characterize,
    and roughly geolocate interference or jamming of satellite
    communications links. The information was reported to the Combined Air
    and Space Operations Center (CAOC), where planners developed options to
    mitigate the interference. SIRS gave the CAOC the capability to rapidly
    react to potential satellite jamming to protect critical space
    capabilities.
        In another recent example of rapid prototyping, NRO engineers
    developed a tool that enables U.S. personnel deployed to Iraq and
    Afghanistan to access intelligence information computers in the
    theater. This tool provided our forces efficient and rapid availability
    to mission critical information. While the Tactical Satellite (TACSAT)
    program is more traditional, we are also using it to explore small
    satellite technologies and assess their military applications. The
    Naval Research Lab hopes to launch TACSAT-1 this summer, and Air Force
    Research Lab (AFRL) will continue to develop the technology with annual
    TACSAT launches.
        A promising area of innovation is our work to develop Operationally
    Responsive Space (ORS) to increase the responsiveness, flexibility, and
    affordability of our space capabilities. The joint Air Force/Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Falcon program remains
    focused on providing low-cost ($5 million per launch vehicle excluding
    payload and payload integration) responsive space launch for small
    payloads (<1,000 lbs. to low earth orbit) with a first demonstration
    scheduled this year. AFSPC and AFRL are also working on the Affordable
    Responsive Spacelift Sub-Scale Demonstrator (ARES), which will develop
    a quarter-scale demonstration of a hybrid vehicle with a reusable first
    stage and an expendable second stage. The goal of ARES is to reduce
    medium lift costs by three to six times and enable turn-around times of
    24-48 hours between launches.
        Ultimately, how we employ both rapid launch and small satellites
    falls under a concept we call Joint Warfighting Space (JWS). JWS is
    focused on providing dedicated, responsive space capabilities and
    effects to the Joint Force Commander in support of national security
    objectives. The DOD Office of Force Transformation, DARPA, and the Air
    Force are enthusiastic about the potential of JWS. The combined efforts
    of these initiatives--operationally responsive launch vehicle and
    satellite development--will transform the delivery of space-based
    capabilities.
        One of the most innovative initiatives we are pursuing calls for
    exploiting a region we refer to as ``Near Space,'' which includes
    altitudes from about 65,000 to 325,000 feet. Using platforms somewhat
    similar to weather balloons or blimps, we can realize many of the same
    benefits space provides--persistence, large field of regard and
    relative immunity from threat--while enjoying the relative ease of
    access and lower costs typically associated with aircraft. ``Near
    Space'' platforms are not intended to replace air or space, but will
    provide additional capability--such as over the horizon communication
    and ISR--fully integrated with air and space platforms. AFSPC has
    conducted a series of ``Near Space'' demonstrations and the results are
    extremely encouraging.
        What we want National Security Space to provide to our national
    leaders and combatant commanders is simple to state, hard to achieve,
    and has not changed from last year. We call it ``transparency''--the
    ability to see everything and know everything, while simultaneously
    denying our adversaries both the ability to do the same and the
    knowledge that such capabilities are being used against them. We are
    constantly working to ensure our S&T efforts result in our ability to
    always be one step, or more, ahead of our adversaries--to see first,
    understand first, and act first.
                       ensure freedom of action in space
        My final priority is to ensure freedom of action in space.
    America's dependence on space capabilities continues to grow. Our
    reliance on space has not gone unnoticed by our adversaries. We have
    been and will continue to be challenged in space and we must be ready
    to protect our capabilities. Our adversary's attempted denial of our
    Global Positioning System through jamming during Operation Iraqi
    Freedom is an indication of our need to protect our space capabilities
    in the future. To answer this and other emerging threats we will
    maintain robust capabilities for assured launch, since freedom of
    action in space begins with the ability to get into orbit. In addition,
    we will develop the ability to protect our space assets and, if
    necessary, prevent potential adversaries from using space in a manner
    hostile to our national interests. Protecting our satellites and the
    capabilities they provide is both a military and economic imperative
    for the well being of our Nation.
    Improved space situation awareness
        The first step in protecting our space capabilities is improving
    our Space Situation Awareness (SSA). With SSA we can accurately
    characterize the space environment, distinguish a malfunction from an
    attack, and reliably prevent collisions in space. We are implementing a
    three-phased approach to improve space situation awareness, involving
    sensors, data fusion, and operating concepts. We are also sustaining
    and upgrading sensors to keep the Space Surveillance Network healthy,
    and developing and fielding new ground and space based sensors.
    Wargames such as Schriever III, conducted this February, emphasized the
    importance of a robust and fully integrated SSA architecture. We
    continue to develop the Rapid Attack Identification, Detection, and
    Reporting System (Spiral 1)--with the potential to provide radio
    frequency interference detection and geolocation for satellite
    communications, and detection and characterization tools for
    interference at our ground sites--and the Single Integrated Space
    Picture (SISP) to provide visibility of theater MILSATCOM support.
    Development of space control systems
        Because we rely so heavily on space capabilities, we must be
    prepared, when directed, to confront our adversaries on the ``high
    ground'' of space. We continue to develop a range of capabilities to
    meet current and future potential threats. Our intent is to preclude
    hostile use of space through diplomatic or other non-lethal means, and
    if such measures fail, we reserve the right under international law to
    take military action against an adversary's space capability in self-
    defense. To that end we have fielded the ground-based Counter
    Communications System (CCS), scheduled to achieve full operational
    capability this year. CCS is ground-based, transportable, and intended
    to disrupt adversary satellite-based communications in a temporary and
    reversible manner.
                                   conclusion
        I am proud of the accomplishments we have made in National Security
    Space through my tenure over these past 3-plus years. We took several
    disparate organizations and integrated them in a way that better serves
    our Nation. At the same time, we demonstrated and improved the
    capabilities our space systems provide on and off the battlefield.
        National Security Space remains a work in progress. We are
    modernizing every major space system and providing new or enhanced
    capabilities, while sustaining existing constellations that provide
    critical capabilities to joint warfighters. The complex technologies
    involved with all of our space systems, the small quantities of
    critical satellites, and the inability to repair them on-orbit requires
    significant upfront investment and attention to practices that are more
    demanding than in other acquisitions. As long as we continue to expect
    our space systems to provide asymmetric advantages, even after years
    on-orbit, then we must build systems that are on the leading edge of
    technology. We are working to minimize difficulties; but as we continue
    to push the technological envelope, challenging situations will always
    be part of the equation. I remain highly optimistic about National
    Security Space's future.
        As stated by the Space Commission and last year's National
    Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
    Commission), our capabilities--in this case our National Security Space
    capabilities--must be viewed as an integrated whole. Because the
    military and intelligence elements in space comprise a national
    security capability, we should keep the functions that oversee them
    integrated. That is why I strongly recommend that a single individual
    continue to hold the dual positions of Under Secretary of the Air Force
    and Director of the NRO, as well as the responsibility as DOD Executive
    Agent for Space.
        I appreciate the continued support Congress and this committee have
    given to help deliver these vital capabilities, and I look forward to
    working with you as we continue to develop, produce, launch, and
    operate critical space systems that deliver vital capabilities to this
    great Nation.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Teets. That's a good
    overall view of where we are. Thank you for your work in
    helping us be in the strong position we are today.
        General Cartwright, did you or any of the others want to
    make an opening statement? We'd be glad to do that.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Cartwright. Mr. Chairman, I've submitted my
    statement for the record. I think, given the time and the
    challenges we have today, I'll stand ready for your questions.
        [The prepared statements of General Cartwright and General
    Lord follow:]
              Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: This is my first
    opportunity to appear before you as Commander of the United States
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Thank you for the time you've given me
    to discuss the missions assigned to us as we continue to prosecute the
    global war on terror and take on the challenge of combating weapons of
    mass destruction.
        My prepared remarks cover USSTRATCOM's role in the challenging 21st
    century environment and plans for addressing those challenges with
    capabilities to serve our Nation's needs in war and in peace.
                      the 21st century global environment
        Global interdependence--economic, political, and social--combined
    with near instantaneous global connectivity, is a trademark of the new
    century. It also heightens the importance of strong links between U.S.
    strategic objectives and regional operations. U.S. strategic objectives
    have profound influence on individuals, regions, nations, and non-state
    actors and networks. The tight linkage between U.S. strategic
    objectives and the conduct of regional operations is evident in our
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more recently in Asia in the
    aftermath of the tsunami. In Afghanistan, the strategic objective to
    combat global terrorism guided, as well as constrained, our regional
    decisions. The regional operations in Iraq are clearly influencing
    cultural, economic, and security considerations around the globe.
        Our adversaries are using asymmetric approaches; exploiting social,
    political, and economic vulnerabilities to avoid confronting superior
    U.S. forces head on. We continue to see increases in the speed and
    deceptive scale of proliferation of potential weapons of mass
    destruction, including delivery and concealment capabilities. We see
    adversaries who would use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
    suicide bombs against their own people and infrastructure, as well as
    against deployed multinational forces. These adversaries have easy
    access to the same global technology base we do, and can exploit the
    same communication and information resources as the American public.
    They have proven they are an intelligent and adaptable enemy.
        All operations, while regional in execution, have global
    consequence and therefore require a global perspective. Regional
    combatant commanders, who are responsible and accountable for
    conducting combat and peacekeeping operations in their areas of
    responsibility (AORs), have long depended upon support provided from
    outside their AORs. Much of that support, which in the past was
    provided on an ad hoc basis, has now been codified in the Unified
    Command Plan as a USSTRATCOM global responsibility. We are positioning
    USSTRATCOM to advance a distinctly global and strategic perspective on
    current and emerging capabilities necessary to deter threats to our way
    of life, particularly those threats involving weapons of mass
    destruction. USSTRATCOM will enable combatant commanders regional
    operations through realization of a comprehensive set of global mission
    capabilities, soundly integrated to achieve more effective and
    efficient execution.
        We look upon this responsibility as both an exciting challenge and
    a solemn obligation to the regional combatant commanders, the American
    men and women who serve in their AORs, and to the American people.
                                global enablers
        21st century operations are fundamentally different from those of
    the last century. Combat operations are being conducted in rapidly
    changing circumstances, shifting from humanitarian operations to
    intense firefights within a few hundred yards of each other with little
    or no warning. This dynamic nature is matched by a varying composition
    of assisting partners. We must be ready to conduct integrated,
    distributed operations using global and regional military forces. In
    many situations, these forces will be augmented by other U.S.
    Government personnel, coalition and commercial partners, and possibly,
    nongovernmental organizations. To plan and effectively execute these
    types of distributed, agile, and integrated operations, the regional
    combatant commands increasingly rely on multiple capabilities the
    global commands must support or provide.
        The Unified Command Plan expands USSTRATCOM responsibilities
    through the assignment of global mission areas that span levels of
    authority, cross regional boundaries, and intersect with various
    national and international agencies. USSTRATCOM's missions are:

             Global deterrence;
             Global support from space-based operations;
             Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
             Global strike;
             Global information and network operations;
             Global command and control;
             Global integrated missile defense coordination; and
             Globally combating weapons of mass destruction.

        Achieving the full potential of these missions is contingent upon
    identifying the right capabilities mix and sustaining our global reach
    through space. However, without the context of advanced situational
    awareness and the power of collaboration, even the best tools may be
    insufficient to deter and defeat a determined adversary. We are placing
    an emphasis on the following global enablers:
    The New Triad
        USSTRATCOM supports The New Triad concept; a strategic way ahead in
    pursuit of a more diverse set of offensive and defensive warfighting
    capabilities. We are active participants in all three legs of The New
    Triad: offensive nuclear and non-nuclear strike (including nonkinetic),
    passive and active defenses, and a defense infrastructure capable of
    building and sustaining all offensive and defensive elements, including
    the critical support areas of command, control, and intelligence.
        Coupled with improved collaboration and shared global awareness,
    The New Triad concept will enable more precisely tailored global strike
    operations. With a full spectrum of nuclear, conventional, and
    nonkinetic options available, regional combatant commanders will be
    enabled to achieve specific local effects against high value targets in
    the context of the strategic objective.
        While we are confident in our ability to support effective global
    strike operations today, we must continue to evolve that capability to
    meet the demands of an uncertain tomorrow. For example, I intend to
    conduct experiments to better understand the value of weapon accuracy
    within a range of stressing environments. If modeling and testing
    confirm the value of such capability, this may lead to new thoughts on
    the balance between nuclear and conventional strike alternatives.
        The new responsibilities assigned to USSTRATCOM have required the
    command to broaden its Cold War focus from deterring nuclear or large-
    scale conventional aggression to becoming a major contributor to the
    much broader defense strategy. Nuclear weapons, however, continue to be
    important, particularly for assuring allies and friends of U.S.
    security commitments, dissuading arms competition, deterring hostile
    leaders who are willing to accept great risk and cost, and for holding
    at risk those targets that cannot be addressed by other means. As
    steward of the Nation's strategic nuclear deterrent, we have two
    specific areas of focus--rationalizing our nuclear forces, and
    providing for a relevant nuclear stockpile in the context of The New
    Triad. USSTRATCOM's first priority will continue to be the maintenance
    of the absolute security, safety, and surety of the stockpile. At the
    same time we will continue to evaluate and provide a range of options,
    both nuclear and non-nuclear, relevant to the threat and military
    operations.
        The New Triad concept presents an opportunity to reduce our
    reliance on nuclear weapons through the evaluation of alternative
    weapons, defensive capabilities, and associated risk. It is our intent
    to have the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review address nuclear issues
    and the associated infrastructure to determine transformation
    requirements for our nuclear capabilities in the 21st century. We will
    look at rationalizing our nuclear forces as an element of the overall
    force structure and the proper tailoring of nuclear effects as part of
    the broad spectrum of national power. These assessments will be
    important to future operational planning as well as future budget
    plans.
        Finally, The New Triad concept provides a framework in which to
    establish a new dialogue on the future role for nuclear weapons in our
    national strategy. The challenging security and threat environment of
    the 21st century signals the need for an informed national level
    discussion to hear the voices of government leaders, military,
    academia, and the public if we are to effectively establish a long-term
    nuclear investment plan.
    Space
        The importance of the space mission to our national security cannot
    be overstated. The U.S. economy, our quality of life, and our Nation's
    defense are all linked to our freedom of action in space. For example,
    satellites are at the heart of routine financial activities such as
    simple automatic teller machine operations or complicated international
    currency and stock market transactions. The telecommunication industry
    is heavily vested in space. Commercial airliners, container ships,
    trains, trucks, police, fire departments, and ambulances have also
    become highly dependent upon space-based global positioning systems to
    enhance their ability to safely deliver people, goods, and services.
    The fact is, our dependency on space increases every day--a fact not
    lost on our adversaries. This growing national dependence on space-
    based and space-enabled capabilities establishes a true imperative to
    protect our space assets and our ability to operate freely in and from
    space.
        We currently enjoy an asymmetric advantage in space, but our
    adversaries are gaining on us. Our space support infrastructure is
    aging and, in some instances, on the verge of becoming obsolete. We
    will continue to face additional challenges as other nations exploit
    new technologies and capabilities in attempts to bridge the gap between
    them and us.
        The space environment itself is also rapidly changing. For example,
    the number of objects-in-orbit increases every month, while the size of
    those objects decreases. This is challenging our space surveillance
    technology, developed in the latter half of the 20th century, because
    it was not designed to detect or track the current magnitude of new,
    smaller objects, including micro-satellites. This increases the chances
    of collisions, which threatens our manned spaceflight program; opens
    the door for unwarned action against U.S. satellites by adversaries;
    and limits our ability to protect our space assets.
        We must do a better job of leveraging the capabilities of our space
    assets--in DOD, national, and commercial systems. We must also maintain
    the ability to protect our own space assets and capabilities, both
    actively and passively, while denying our adversaries the military use
    of space--at the time and place of our choosing.
        In order to bring these elements of space control together, our
    near-term plan is to work with the various space programs to identify
    potential gaps and make sure existing information and applications are
    available and provided to authorized users on a global network. This
    plan will serve as the basis for a concept of operations to exploit
    information from our space assets, providing space situational
    awareness to the regional combatant commands.
    Distributed Operations
        For distributed, integrated operations, dominant situational
    awareness is an imperative--globally, regionally, and locally. It must
    exist across the full breadth and depth of operations, from planning
    and combat through post-conflict reconstruction and ultimately,
    peacetime.
        For our forces to effectively employ collaborative capabilities and
    capitalize upon situational awareness, we must enable them to create
    pictures of the battlespace tailored to their specific needs--what we
    refer to as User Defined Operating Pictures. It is USSTRATCOM's job to
    provide the global capabilities to enhance situational awareness,
    facilitate collaborative planning, and provide a basic User Defined
    Operating Picture capability for all of the combatant commands.
        Many of the capabilities required for agile, distributed operations
    will be facilitated by space and enabled by a global information
    environment with ubiquitous, assured access to information, when and
    where any combatant commander needs it. To achieve this vision, the old
    mantra to provide information on a ``need to know'' basis, must be
    replaced by a ``need to share.'' Critical information that the
    warfighter didn't know existed, and the owner of the information didn't
    know was important, must be made available within a global information
    environment easily accessible to commanders at all levels.
    Interdependent Capabilities
        Our action plan for global command and control focuses on ensuring
    the all-source information needed for effective operations is available
    to all theaters. For the global Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) mission, that also means developing integrated and
    persistent systems capable of supporting precision targeting.
    USSTRATCOM has the lead for coordinating global ISR capabilities and
    will be working closely with the regional combatant commanders, Joint
    Forces Command, and the Services to develop the associated strategy.
        The Department's net-centric global information services, currently
    in development, are essential to our global missions. These services
    will connect global and regional applications and improve both
    horizontal and vertical information integration.
        We are developing a prioritized plan for transitioning away from
    stove-piped legacy systems to capabilities that support broader
    information and applications access. Included in this plan are actions
    focused on leveraging existing legacy applications and data by making
    them more broadly accessible. Each user will be allowed the flexibility
    to select from any available data source, anywhere on the network,
    those objects most useful to them at any particular time. Additionally,
    any new data source will be available the moment it comes onto the
    network, rather than requiring a modification to existing systems, as
    is the case today.
        USSTRATCOM is an advocate for net-centricity. Our focus is on:

             Capability to enable our ``internet-like'' environment
            and access to information;
             Realization of a high-bandwidth, ubiquitous
            communications backbone to deliver information with high
            assurance and low latency; and
             Robust information assurance required to defend our
            networks and our information.

        Creating a collaborative structure is more than just designing and
    disseminating tools--it is also about changing human behavior. Our
    objective is a global, persistent, 24/7 collaborative environment--
    comprising people, systems, and tools. Our future structure must
    support real time command and control at both the global and local
    levels as well as enable dynamic, adaptive planning and execution in
    which USSTRATCOM, the regional combatant commanders, and other
    geographically dispersed commanders can plan and execute operations
    together. Our collaborative environment must also provide the
    capability to ``connect all the dots''--enemy dots, friendly dots,
    neutral dots, contextual dots--all the dots that matter--as they
    appear, rather than wait for a post-event analysis when all of the
    different data stores can be opened. With improved collaboration and
    shared awareness, we can more effectively conduct operations using the
    full spectrum of capabilities to achieve desired, focused effects
    against high-value targets.
        In that regard, we are actively assessing the currently available
    collaborative environment and processes and investigating potential
    pilot programs to encourage organizational information sharing to build
    trust in shared information. Fundamental to this issue is the
    establishment of data tagging standards and associated information
    assurance policies.
        With regard to sharing information, we are in some respects
    navigating uncharted waters. While the value of sharing information
    with allies, coalition partners, and other Federal departments and
    agencies is well understood, sharing information with industry or other
    private sources presents proprietary, intellectual property and privacy
    concerns which are not well understood. Such information has the
    potential to be of great value to USSTRATCOM and the regional combatant
    commanders in accomplishing our missions. We will be attentive to the
    actions currently being taken throughout the Federal Government in
    response to Executive Order 13356, ``Strengthening the Sharing of
    Terrorism Information To Protect Americans,'' which may provide us
    valuable insight and guidance in this sensitive area.
                        building an asymmetric advantage
        In addition to our role as steward of the Nation's nuclear
    stockpile and guardian of global deterrence, USSTRATCOM now has the
    responsibility for working across regional boundaries to address
    threats in a global perspective. To achieve the asymmetric advantage we
    desire requires us to build the interdependent, collaborative,
    operational environment we've envisioned. It is our responsibility to
    provide global services and global context to the regional combatant
    commands and their deployed forces so we are collectively a more
    effective force--for warfighting, peace, and all possible combinations
    of both.
    New Command Structure
        As the latest step in maturing our approach to fulfilling
    USSTRATCOM's global mission responsibilities we are implementing a new
    command structure. This structure is critical to the asymmetric
    advantage we seek, leveraging essential competencies of associated
    components and key supporting agencies through a distributed,
    collaborative environment.
        Rather than creating additional organizational layers, we are
    bringing existing commands and agencies under our global mission
    umbrella through the establishment of Joint Functional Component
    Commands. These interdependent Joint Functional Component Commands will
    have responsibility for the day-to-day planning and execution of our
    primary mission areas: space and global strike, ISR, network warfare,
    integrated missile defense, and combating weapons of mass destruction.
        USSTRATCOM headquarters retains responsibility for nuclear command
    and control. Additionally, headquarters will provide strategic
    guidance, exercise global command and control, and conduct strategic
    level integrated and synchronized planning to ensure full-spectrum
    mission accomplishment. USSTRATCOM will also advocate for the
    capabilities necessary to accomplish these missions.
        This construct will allow us to leverage key, in-place expertise
    from across the Department of Defense (DOD) and make it readily
    available to all regional combatant commanders. Our vision is for the
    combatant commanders to view any Joint Functional Component Command as
    a means by which to access all of the capabilities resident in the
    USSTRATCOM global mission set. Anytime a combatant commander queries
    one of our component commands, they will establish strategic visibility
    across our entire structure through our collaborative environment. The
    fully integrated response USSTRATCOM provides should offer the
    combatant commander greater situational awareness and more options than
    originally thought available. Specific Joint Functional Component
    Command responsibilities include:

             Space and Global Strike. The Commander STRATAF (8th
            Air Force) will serve as the Joint Functional Component
            Commander for Space and Global Strike. This component will
            integrate all elements of military power to conduct, plan, and
            present global strike effects and also direct the deliberate
            planning and execution of assigned space operation missions.
            For plans not aligned with a specific mission set, the Joint
            Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike is
            tasked to work in close coordination with USSTRATCOM
            headquarters as the lead component responsible for the
            integration and coordination of capabilities provided by all
            other Joint Functional Component Commands.
             ISR. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
            will be dual-hatted to lead the ISR Joint Functional Component
            Command. This component is responsible for coordinating global
            intelligence collection to address DOD worldwide operations and
            national intelligence requirements. It will serve as the
            epicenter for planning, execution, and assessment of the
            military's global intelligence, surveillance, and
            reconnaissance operations; a key enabler to achieving global
            situational awareness.
             Network Warfare. The Director, National Security
            Agency (NSA) will also be dual-hatted to lead the Network
            Warfare Joint Functional Component Command. This component will
            facilitate cooperative engagement with other national entities
            in computer network defensive and offensive information warfare
            as part of our global information operations.
              Our coordinated approach to information operations involves
            two other important supporting commands. The Director, Defense
            Information Systems Agency also heads the Joint Task Force for
            Global Network Operations. This organization is responsible for
            operating and defending our worldwide information networks, a
            function closely aligned with the efforts of the Joint
            Functional Component Command for Network Warfare. Additionally,
            the Commander, Joint Information Operations Center coordinates
            the non-network related pillars of information operations:
            psychological operations, electronic warfare, operations
            security, and military deception. Both the Joint Task Force for
            Global Network Operations and the Commander, Joint Information
            Operations Center will be full members of the USSTRATCOM
            distributed, collaborative environment.
             Integrated Missile Defense. The Commander, Army,
            Space, and Missile Defense Command will head the Integrated
            Missile Defense Joint Functional Component Command. This
            component will be responsible for ensuring we meet USSTRATCOM's
            Unified Command Plan responsibilities for planning,
            integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations
            and support. It will conduct the day-to-day operations of
            assigned forces; coordinating activities with associated
            combatant commands, other STRATCOM Joint Functional Components,
            and the efforts of the Missile Defense Agency. The Joint
            Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense is
            a key element of the ``defenses'' leg of The New Triad concept.
             Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Secretary
            of Defense (SECDEF) recently assigned USSTRATCOM responsibility
            for integrating and synchronizing DOD's efforts for combating
            weapons of mass destruction. As this initiative is in its very
            formative stages, we have yet to formalize any specific
            componency structure. However, we anticipate establishing a
            formal relationship with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as
            an initial starting point.

        This new componency structure is in its infancy and will take
    several months to fully realize. There are detailed issues to work
    through, including the proper distribution of subject matter expertise
    and an assessment of expanding relationships with other U.S. Government
    departments and foreign nations.
        A final element of our evolving organizational structure involves
    developing relationships with the private sector to build upon efforts
    under the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. This important partnership
    with the private sector supports many of our national objectives and
    crosses into relatively uncharted territory.

             Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. The United States has
            achieved success in the global war on terrorism by attacking
            terrorist infrastructure, resources, and sanctuaries.

        Nevertheless, our adversaries continue to plan and conduct
    operations driven by their assessment of our vulnerabilities. The main
    vulnerability requiring our constant vigilance is the Nation's economy
    and one need look no further than the economic aftershock attributed to
    the September 11 terrorist attacks to affirm this assertion. The risk
    is accentuated given the global underpinnings of our economic
    structure. Even a small-scale terrorist attack against a lower tier
    provider in a distant land can have wide-ranging and pervasive economic
    implications.
        Given the evolving understanding of terrorists use of global
    processes, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism was created to intercede
    on behalf of combatant commanders, among others, and positively affect
    outcomes through connections with the private sector. Since November
    2001, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism has successfully combined
    private sector global processes with other elements of national power
    to help fight global terrorism as part of USSTRATCOM's global mission
    responsibilities. This fruitful relationship with the private sector
    has proven effective on a number of occasions and has garnered the
    support of influential leaders both within and outside government.
        Yet, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism is somewhat of an ad hoc
    process based on trusted relationships. As such, the value of the
    program is directly related to the availability of the participants.
    USSTRATCOM was recently contacted by a group of people from various
    non-military sectors, advocating the creation of a working group to
    formalize this ad hoc program to begin planning a more permanent
    approach for the long-term.
        On a strategic level, the value of such an effort is the open
    realization that all elements of national power, which have not
    traditionally operated in a synchronized and coordinated role in
    national security, understand the urgent need for their involvement.
        Full realization of the benefits inherent in the distributed,
    interdependent organizational structure described above requires an
    effective collaborative operation. A true collaborative environment
    provides us the asymmetric advantage necessary to deter and defeat the
    agile adversaries we face in the 21st century environment. In the
    future, these skills will take on even greater importance as we broaden
    our partner base within the U.S. Government, with coalition partners,
    commercial partners, academia, and others, including non-government
    organizations.
                       achieving the strategic imperative
        Agile, responsive, distributed operations, enabled by meaningful
    information exchange, shared objectives, and shared situational
    awareness, are key to the successful performance of USSTRATCOM's global
    missions. We have assessed the capability gaps in our global mission
    areas and have developed action plans, working with our partner
    commands, to improve our collective ability to carry out operations at
    all levels.
        USSTRATCOM's strategy is focused on:

             Stewardship of the Nation's strategic nuclear
            deterrent force;
             Defending against asymmetric approaches used by our
            adversaries, including weapons of mass destruction;
             Responding effectively in a rapidly changing combat
            operations environment;
             Achieving prompt, predictable, precision operations;
             Coordinating with U.S., multinational, interagency,
            and private sector partners in a collaborative environment;

        Implementing this strategy relies on new and enhanced capabilities,
    including:

             Dominant situational awareness;
             A ubiquitous, assured, global information environment;
             Dynamic, persistent, trustworthy collaborative
            planning;
             User Defined Operating Pictures, using distributed,
            globally available information; and
             A culture that embraces ``need to share'' rather than
            ``need to know.''

        We are not there yet. Working with our partner commands, we have
    developed plans to improve our global capabilities. We need your
    continued support to deliver the capabilities needed to combat the
    threats of the 21st century. We need your support for:

             Pursuit of high capacity, internet-like capability to
            extend the Global Information Grid to deployed/mobile users
            worldwide;
             Adoption of data tagging standards and information
            assurance policies to increase government-wide trusted
            information sharing;
             Technology experiments to enhance our understanding of
            the value of accuracy and stressing environments for current
            and future weapons.

        Finally, as an element of our role as steward of the Nation's
    strategic nuclear capabilities, we need you to:

             Consider a new national dialogue on nuclear policy.
            This nation is ready for a genuine policy debate on the role of
            nuclear weapons within the context of the current global
            environment and the potential offered by The New Triad concept.
            We must build a long-term nuclear investment plan suited to
            national security goals.

        USSTRATCOM recognizes what has to be done to be a global command in
    support of the warfighter. We are aggressively moving out on actions to
    ensure USSTRATCOM fulfills our full set of global responsibilities,
    supporting our national security needs in peace and in war.
        Thank you for your continued support.
                                     ______

                 Prepared Statement by Gen. Lance W. Lord, USAF
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and the distinguished members of the
    committee, it is my distinct honor and privilege to appear before you
    today and represent the almost 40,000 space and missile professionals
    in Air Force Space Command. I am pleased to serve with and join the
    acting Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Pete Teets here today.
        Our Nation has developed the most capable space and air forces the
    world has ever seen. The contributions of our United States Air Force
    have been truly remarkable at a time when our Nation has needed us the
    most. Our great leaders and my fellow generals in the United States Air
    Force are certainly proud of each and every airman as they dedicate
    themselves to the defense of this great Nation. I look forward to
    reporting to you on the strong and confident state of our space and
    missile force, our well documented successes over the last year, our
    priorities for the coming year, and the challenges we are poised to
    tackle.
                 proud of our joint team of space professionals
        Modern warfare is not conducted by one Service alone. I am truly
    grateful to my colleagues in the United States Army, Navy, Marine
    Corps, and Coast Guard. I am honored to be joined by the Commander of
    United States Strategic Command, General James ``Hoss'' Cartwright,
    United States Marine Corps. I am also proud to be joined by Lieutenant
    General Larry J. Dodgen, Commanding General, Army Space and Missile
    Defense Command; Vice Admiral Joseph A. Sestak, Deputy Chief of Naval
    Operations, Warfare Requirements, and Programs; and Brigadier General
    Thomas Benes, Director, Strategy and Plans Division, Plans, Policies,
    and Operations Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
        Space capabilities are inherently joint, and we all know you cannot
    go to war and win in the modern era without the battlefield effects
    provided through and from space. Therefore, it is only fitting that we
    appear here together to discuss the importance of defending our Nation
    through space and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) operations.
    Our Air Force Space Command operations project global reach and power
    for all our combatant commanders and their joint warfighters. I applaud
    the effort of this committee to continue our discussions on the
    importance of National Security Space as a joint team. Space
    capabilities significantly impact the flow of national and
    international commerce and we need to understand the significance of
    this from the Main Streets of America to Wall Street.
        I want to express my sincere gratitude to Senator Sessions and
    every member of this committee, for your continued support of military
    space, and the development of our Nation's space capabilities and
    professionals. The commitment and dedication of this committee provides
    critical support to our dedicated space and missile professionals and
    this fact does not go unrecognized in our military circles or by the
    American public.
                support to our nation's global war on terrorism
        I would like to start by briefly describing some of the
    capabilities Air Force Space Command provides daily in defending our
    Nation's interests at home and abroad while protecting the lives of our
    fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. The road to space starts
    on both coasts at one of our Nation's two Space Launch bases, where we
    provide services, facilities, and range safety control to conduct
    launches of Department of Defense (DOD), NASA, and other national and
    commercial payloads. Once our payloads reach space, our satellite
    operators provide force-multiplying effects. Space capabilities are no
    longer nice to have, but are now indispensable to how we fight and win
    our Nation's wars.
        Our people and space systems provide critical, in-theater, secure
    communications, warning of ballistic and tactical missile attacks and
    precise navigation for ground, air, and sea operations to name a few.
    From the earliest weather predictions to the latest Battle Damage
    Assessment, our national leadership depends upon space capabilities to
    plan and execute all operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our
    ground based radar and Defense Support Program satellites monitor
    ballistic missile launches protecting our Homeland and our forces
    deployed worldwide.
        In keeping with our 23 year tradition of protecting and projecting
    America's interests in space, Air Force Space Command provides vital
    information on the location of satellites and space debris for the
    Nation, our allies, and the world. America's ICBM team also plays a
    critical role in maintaining world peace and ensuring our Nation's
    steadfast security. Our ICBM forces offer an extraordinarily capable
    and proven strategic deterrent with a readiness rate above 99 percent.
    We owe a debt of gratitude to our ICBM professionals: maintainers,
    operators, security police, and support personnel who serve in the
    northern tier states of our great Nation for everything they do each
    day to ensure our Nation's security.
        Air Force Space Command is truly a ``global command,'' from our
    continental United States (CONUS) based Launch Control and Space
    Operations Centers to our deployed airmen and systems worldwide. Our
    former Secretary of the Air Force, recently said, ``We look at Space
    capabilities like oxygen. If you have it you take it for granted. If
    you don't have it, it's the only thing you want.'' We know you cannot
    survive without oxygen and our armed forces are realizing we cannot
    have success on the battlefield without space. Air Force Space Command
    maintains worldwide vigilance and global awareness around the clock,
    but we also provide tailored combat effects to our theater commanders
    and their joint warfighters.
        During Operation Iraqi Freedom, American forces transformed modern
    warfare and the basic principles of war. Thanks to space and our
    evolving technology, a single bomber aircraft can deliver the same
    effect as hundreds of aircraft during World War II. Space has allowed
    us to advance the principle of maneuverability to an unprecedented
    level by allowing our forces to be faster, more versatile, and quicker
    to react than ever before. Throughout the history of warfare, speed has
    always been the warrior's lifeline. Today, we rely on the speed of
    information and the data flow our space capabilities provide to, and in
    the theater of operations. Over 60 percent of the communications
    flowing into the area of operations at the height of Operation Iraqi
    Freedom traveled through satellites on orbit, and we provided 100
    percent of the secure satellite communications.
        In a matter of minutes, not weeks, hours or days as in past wars,
    commanders are able to find, fix, track, target, and engage adversaries
    while receiving more timely Battle Damage Assessments. The message is
    crystal clear from our comrades in arms, leaders like Lieutenant
    General Lance Smith, the Deputy Commander of United States Central
    Command, who stated, ``You space [professionals] are providing us our
    lifeline. We use it. We take it for granted, but if we ever lost it;
    people would die.'' Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, who was the
    Commander of the Army's V Corps during the height of Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, echoed the importance of our space capabilities when he said,
    the communications provided by our satellites ``were the lifeblood of
    the Division/Brigade in the attack.''
        One of the biggest problems we face as a military is the ability to
    conduct precision attack against moving targets. This problem is even
    more difficult when the weather does not cooperate and our targets are
    what we call ``under cover'' from air, space, sea, and even land assets
    at times. Our forces in the Pacific theater recently took part in an
    exercise to prove we could respond within hours anywhere in the Pacific
    theater in any type of weather condition, day or night to provide
    Admiral Fallon, the Commander of Pacific Command, with relevant combat
    capability. As with any successful exercise, there is an inherent
    capability to help dissuade potential adversaries. During Exercise
    Resultant Fury in November 2004, the target set was four to six mobile
    and drifting sea targets. A combination of our unmanned and manned
    aircraft provided persistent battlespace awareness allowing our Navy F-
    18 and Air Force B-52 aircraft to conduct unprecedented precision
    strike through the use of precision-guided munitions using our Global
    Positioning System Satellites on moving targets under significant cloud
    cover at sea.
        This demonstration of all-weather precision strike against mobile
    maritime targets across the vast Pacific Ocean would not be possible
    without integrated teamwork across the air and space community and the
    flawless execution of our joint team members. The Pacific Air Force
    team demonstrated a new capability for the Commander of United States
    Pacific Command and the power of our space forces were heard loud and
    clear.
        Not only are our space and missile capabilities available 24 hours
    a day to deter and defeat our adversaries when our Nation calls, but we
    also make the battlespace safer and more secure for our United States
    forces. Our space capabilities play a major role in the protection of
    our troops engaged in combat.
        Lt. Col. Tony Logue, while serving as the Chief of Space Operations
    at Headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command, made a
    tremendous impact upon Air Force Special Operation's units assigned
    around the globe. For 2 years, Lt. Col. Logue led the effort to improve
    situation awareness of pilots flying dangerous missions into some of
    the world's most hostile combat environments. He wrote and justified
    with compelling need the requirement for additional Blue Force Tracker
    equipment (a satellite based identifier which allows us to delineate
    friend from foe) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
        Upon receipt of the Blue Force Tracker equipment, Lt. Col. Logue
    led a team to Afghanistan to install it and train operators on how to
    use it. His 4 person team completed installations on more than 30
    aircraft in 5 locations, without impacting the high tempo of combat
    operations. Upon his return, he developed and implemented an innovative
    program to add Blue Force Tracker capability to all Air Force Special
    Operations aircraft. His planning and actions ensured all aircraft
    across Air Force Special Operations Command were ready for Operation
    Iraqi Freedom. His efforts resulted in an unprecedented level of
    situation awareness for Special Operations Forces at every level and
    consequently, increased the safety of flight and decreased the chances
    of a fratricide incident.
        Blue Force Trackers are traditionally used with our ground forces
    and through precise and timely integration with our space capabilities
    and space operators on the joint operations team, we are routinely able
    to see through the ``Fog of War.'' Together, we precisely locate our
    forces, preventing fratricide while enabling life-saving support and
    necessary reinforcements when needed. Another tremendous capability
    provided by our space systems is the remarkable amount of time saved in
    locating pilots downed in hostile territory. As the Chief of Staff of
    the Air Force, General John Jumper likes to say, ``Space takes the
    search out of search and rescue.'' By minimizing the time it takes to
    precisely locate our downed air crews, space capabilities allow us to
    save young American lives in harm's way.
        Our space capabilities feed and sustain our day to day stability
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while keeping vigilant watch on the
    rest of the world for potential ``hot spots.'' Space allows us to
    quickly switch from stability to battle operations. There's no better
    recent example than our contributions through space systems to Phase IV
    Stability Operations in Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom decapitated
    Saddam's regime in record time, but left areas of resistance in the
    Sunni Triangle.
        Operation Vigilant Resolve featured 1,300 marines from the First
    Marine Expeditionary Force in Fallujah, a hotbed of insurgent activity.
    Marines repeatedly called in precision air strikes against individual
    buildings and structures harboring dangerous terrorists and insurgents.
    We used a combination of persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets, on-call strike aircraft, and Global Positioning
    System satellites to create stunning precision strikes against
    individual structures in dense urban areas. The Predator Unmanned
    Aerial Vehicle (UAV) headed a list of high performing systems and I'm
    happy to report to you, the outstanding contributions of the Predator
    UAV were made available through constant secure satellite
    communications.
        On one particular occasion, we targeted a vehicle clearly moving
    weapons between a residence and a small warehouse. US forces were
    watching this activity thanks to a Predator sensor transmitting through
    satellite communications. As we watched, the driver parked the vehicle
    full of weapons under the carport. We put a Hellfire missile over the
    wall of the house and under the carport. We eliminated the threat of
    the weapons with no damage to the house. Members of this distinguished
    committee, this overwhelming warfighting capability is made possible
    thanks to our space forces.
        We are gathering lessons on how best to conduct urban warfare.
    However, we know one thing for sure, we need the persistent battlespace
    awareness, precision guided attack, and secure, reliable communications
    around the globe our space capabilities provide. The use of GPS aided
    Joint Direct Attack Munitions allowed for substantially less collateral
    damage. The unprecedented precision of this weapon worked in Fallujah
    and it is a great model for air and space support to future urban
    warfare.
        We have many successful stories of Air and Space Power working
    together allowing the engagement of targets with dial up precision and
    immediate command and control. This makes our operations in sensitive
    urban areas more humane and less costly to innocent civilians while
    showing our enemies you can't hide from the United States Air and Space
    forces. As you are well aware, our Nation's space capabilities allow us
    to place fewer people in harm's way. Combined with our air, land, and
    sea forces, we provide enhanced lethal effects helping to bring a
    quicker end to hostilities.
        We have embraced our role as a space faring nation and we must
    fully understand and appreciate our responsibilities to our joint
    warfighters in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and in particular our
    Special Operations Forces who bet their lives on our capabilities.
    Space and missile capabilities are as important to our joint
    warfighters as electricity is to our individual homes and businesses.
        There is absolutely no doubt in my mind, our space capabilities
    will continue to perform brilliantly throughout our operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, and help our Nation keep an ever vigilant eye on
    our Homeland Defense. The demand for space and missile capabilities is
    at an all time high. We are an integrated part of every major military
    operation being conducted worldwide.
        In addition to being enormously successful warfighters, Air Force
    Space Command also experienced several recent successes in the space
    acquisition business. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, he
    stated, ``Today, bandwidth demand exceeds our DOD space systems
    capabilities, and our warfighting requirements continue to increase at
    a very high rate.'' During Operation Iraqi Freedom we were able to
    acquire and make eight times the amount of communication bandwidth
    available to our forward deployed U.S. forces.
        The Space and Missile Systems Center reports 7 successful EELV
    missions and an incredible streak of 40 successful, operational
    launches in a row. We have the healthiest Missile Warning constellation
    ever, and we have taken delivery of the next-generation Space Based
    Infrared System (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit satellite. We currently
    have 29 Global Positioning System satellites on orbit, certainly
    exceeding the 24 ball constellation requirement. The position,
    navigation, and timing data continuously flowing from the GPS
    constellation has allowed almost 70 percent of munitions used in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom to be precision guided. We are constantly
    working to improve upon our capabilities. We are working within the
    theater of operations to provide the ability to predict GPS accuracy
    and derive time over target, weapon systems implications, and
    probability of kill predictions.
                       air force space command priorities
        The Acting Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Pete Teets,
    shared his priorities for National Security Space with this committee
    and Air Force Space Command's priorities are in lock step with our
    National Security Space priorities. I would like to outline my top
    priorities for Air Force Space Command in the coming year. In keeping
    with our command motto, ``Mission First, People Always,'' our overall
    goals for Air Force Space Command remain unchanged. They are:

             To Achieve Mission Success in Operations and
            Acquisitions, and
             Provide for the Professional Development of our people
            while enhancing their Quality of Life

        We fully understand our obligation to organize, train, and equip
    our space and missile forces while our Nation remains engaged in a
    global war against a very dangerous adversary. Therefore, we must
    prioritize our efforts to ensure we are generating the capabilities and
    effects our Nation and warfighters need most.
        Our Priorities for 2005 are:

              1. Ensure Space Superiority and Provide Desired Combat
            Effects for Joint Warfighting
              2. Maintain a Safe and Secure Strategic Deterrent Capability
            and Provide Means for Prompt Global Strike
              3. Continue Our Efforts to Develop Cost-Effective Assured
            Access to Space

        We continually plan the pursuit of necessary, transformational
    capabilities and effects. We work ever diligently to expand and
    maintain effective partnerships throughout the Department of Defense
    and the National Security Space arena to help us in our pursuit of
    innovative solutions and transformational capabilities.
        Air Force Space Command ensures our Nation's warfighters have the
    appropriate capabilities when and where they are needed at any point on
    the planet. We pride ourselves in providing these joint capabilities
    from space. Our space capabilities are used more today than ever before
    in the history of our military. Our Global Positioning System (GPS)
    satellites have become a national resource while providing the greatest
    free utility in the world. The ever-reliable, constant precision
    navigation and timing information from our GPS satellites is used
    worldwide and is intertwined throughout our global economy. An attack
    against this precious resource would be an attack against our way of
    life.
        In our interdependent global society, we travel to the other side
    of the world, and expect our credit cards and phones to work. We expect
    a level of performance in our businesses and an increasing level of
    convenience in our mobile society. We have Marines using GPS
    coordinates to locate and track their position in relationship to the
    enemy. Our military has introduced the world to the concept of
    satellite-aided munitions. Space systems allow bombs to be delivered
    within meters of their desired impact points.
       space superiority and providing desired combat effects for joint
                                  warfighting
        We can no longer expect to send our Service members into combat
    without our space capabilities being challenged. We cannot tell our
    President, or any members of this distinguished body, we don't know if
    our space assets will be attacked. The time for speculation is over. I
    know you are well aware of the numerous attempts during Operation Iraqi
    Freedom by our enemies to jam the signals from our GPS satellites. We
    were extremely fortunate to locate the sources and eliminate the
    rudimentary threat. Given the proliferation of commercial technology
    available today, the future threats to our space systems will be more
    complex and difficult to detect.
        We must prepare to face future threats today. My top priority in
    Air Force Space Command is to ensure Space Superiority. This is at
    times a difficult concept to comprehend. We did not choose saber
    rattling words. We selected doctrinal terms; words we know are well
    understood in the Air Force and throughout the Department of Defense.
    The term Space Superiority is akin to Air Superiority. We would not
    dream of conducting air operations without first establishing and
    ensuring we had Air Superiority. We are not trying to dominate, but we
    must protect and project our interests in the space medium. Our
    reliance on space capabilities has grown as a Nation and as a member of
    a global economy. At the same time our vulnerabilities and the threats
    to our space systems and capabilities have dramatically increased. We
    no longer need to ask if an attack of our space systems will happen,
    but rather when, by what means and from where?
        To better understand the growing threat to our space systems, we
    have conducted a series of high level war games to include the recently
    completed Schriever III space warfare game at Nellis Air Force Base.
    The games are not completely predictive, but they are extremely
    insightful as we pit our space capabilities against capabilities an
    adversary may bring to bear. We use known technologies easily available
    to the rest of the world and combine this with the will to engage our
    space capabilities for advantage. The threats we face are very real and
    dangerous.
        As our dependence on modern space capabilities grows, the need to
    establish and maintain Space Superiority also grows proportionally if
    not exponentially. It is time to proceed with the development of a more
    robust Space Situation Awareness architecture to ensure we adequately
    protect and defend our space capabilities. We all need to subscribe to
    a Defensive Counterspace mindset. We can't leave system anomalies
    uninvestigated. We must carefully track and examine the space
    environment to ensure we have high resolution knowledge of events.
    Finally, to ensure Space Superiority we must field Offensive
    Counterspace capabilities with temporary and reversible effects to deny
    an adversary the ability to exploit the asymmetric advantages space
    provides our Nation's Armed Forces and our global economy. Space
    capabilities provide a lifeline for this Nation. If we ever lost Space
    Superiority it would result in loss of life of our Armed Forces, lost
    economic viability and quite possibly a significant disruption to key
    national security objectives and interests.
                 safe and secure strategic deterrent capability
        Maintaining a safe and secure strategic deterrent capability and
    providing our Nation a means for Prompt Global Strike is another top
    priority for Air Force Space Command. We continue to pursue independent
    nuclear (Land Based Strategic Deterrent (LBSD)) and conventional
    (Prompt Global Strike (PGS)) options along separate, but mutually
    supportive developmental paths. We are excited about the work underway
    in our LBSD Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives study. This landmark
    study will help determine the capability set required to fulfill future
    LBSD critical mission needs. We continue to explore a spiral
    acquisition approach to extend the life of the Minuteman III ICBM while
    providing enhanced capability for our national security. We plan to
    complete our Analysis of Alternatives and provide recommendations to
    the Milestone Decision Authority in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense before the end of this year.
        Space Superiority allows us to provide desired combat effects for
    Joint Warfighting. Space Superiority and maintaining a credible
    strategic deterrent force are the top two Warfighting priorities in our
    command. The United States Air Force's involvement in space started and
    grew from our early ICBM and Intermediate Range Missile programs. Our
    rich past in the development of space and missiles gives power to our
    future.
                     cost-effective assured access to space
        We must continue our efforts to develop Cost-Effective Assured
    Access to space. Responsive launch capabilities have formed the
    foundation of our Nation's space sector for decades and we must
    continue this tradition of excellence with one addition. We must focus
    our attention on providing cost-effective solutions to accessing space.
        The Acting Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Pete Teets,
    mentioned the end of an era in our launch vehicles in his testimony.
    The Atlas III performed brilliantly during its final launch last month
    and the final Titan IV vehicles are being processed for their last
    launches later this year. We are closing the books on these very
    capable and reliable boosters, and we are ready to accept the next
    generation of extremely capable and reliable launch assets in the
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) with both the medium and heavy
    launch classes. The future of our Nation's space faring status hinges
    on our Assured Access to Space. This administration and the Department
    of Defense is committed to securing this much needed launch capability
    to ensure our Nation continues to lead the world in transportation to
    space for military, commercial, and manned space launches.
                              innovative solutions
        While Air Force Space Command continues to defend the United States
    of America through the day to day control and exploitation of space, we
    provide space power to help achieve national security and Joint
    Warfighting objectives. I can proudly report we are successfully
    accomplishing our assigned missions with an increased focus on
    integrating our capabilities and effects with our air, land, and
    maritime forces. In a world of constant change and new challenges, we
    cannot lose sight of the importance of improving our capabilities and
    the effects we provide our joint warfighters. Our Acting Secretary of
    the Air Force has encouraged us to seek innovative solutions to some of
    our most difficult problems in the national security arena.
                            joint warfighting space
        We are intensifying our focus on providing the warfighter with more
    operationally responsive space capabilities. A major first step for us
    to achieve an Operational Responsive Space capability is our Joint
    Warfighting Space (JWS) concept. JWS will provide dedicated, responsive
    space capabilities and effects to the Joint Force Commander in support
    of warfighting objectives. The JWS concept seeks both immediate and
    near-term initial operating capabilities to meet pressing national
    security needs.
        At first glance, we are very excited about the increase in space
    capabilities available through our Joint Warfighting Space concept. We
    are evaluating responsive launch capabilities to meet requirements in a
    matter of hours. Air Force Space Command is taking the lead in
    integrating small and microsatellites with other operational platforms
    on the ground, in the air, or in near space.
        We are evaluating the ability to dedicate assets to real time
    target location, identification, and tracking, predictive awareness
    during a crisis with a persistent capability available to the Joint
    Force Commander. We are committed to fully investigating the military
    utility of small satellites. At first glance, there is a tremendous
    amount of development time saved by using a common micro or small
    satellite bus (spacecraft structure). We will continue our military
    utility analysis through a series of planned demonstrations, lab
    experimentations, and wargame exercises.
        We have several Near Space demonstrations planned that we believe
    will lead to initial Joint Warfighting Space capability. Joint
    Warfighting Space consists of Near Space and on orbit space assets. We
    continue to work with our partners in the research and development
    community to provide future operational capabilities using the TacSat
    demonstration initiative and the Falcon Space Launch Vehicle which
    recently entered into design phase.
                         operationally responsive space
        A robust Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program will provide
    us with a rapid reconstitution capability and the ability to swiftly
    augment existing space assets. We continue to work with our partners in
    the research and development community to provide operational utility
    of Small Satellites through our TacSat demonstration program. Payloads
    and spacecraft developed on a quicker timeline, a responsive range and
    associated infrastructure, and an existing responsive launch vehicle
    are the three main components to Operationally Responsive Space.
        We are actively working to advance the technology of our Small
    Launch Vehicles. We certainly have a need throughout the national
    security sector for a more responsive small launch capability. A small
    launch capability could be used for the deployment of a responsive
    space payload or when combined with the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), a
    near-term conventional Prompt Global Strike capability. The follow-on
    to Small Launch Vehicles is the Affordable Responsive Spacelift
    vehicle. We have an approved way ahead for the Operationally Responsive
    Space Small Scale Affordable Responsive Spacelift Hybrid and plan to
    demonstrate a partially reusable system within the next several years.
    This will be a key demonstration and will definitely move us further
    down the developmental path.
        We are very excited about exploring capabilities in the area known
    as ``Near Space'' at an altitude between 65,000 to 325,000 feet. From
    our preliminary analysis, we believe there's substantial military
    utility in augmenting our current aerospace capabilities with fielded
    capabilities in Near Space. These Near Space platforms are not intended
    to replace air or space assets, but rather to help augment and
    integrate additional capabilities.
        We have already demonstrated military utility in expanding the
    range of Army radios used for contact between ground forces and to
    conduct Close Air Support operations. By using affordable platforms
    like weather balloons, blimps, or air ships, we can help provide much
    needed persistence and direct support to our theater commanders and
    their joint warfighters.
                              common aero vehicle
        As I mentioned earlier, another innovative solution we are
    diligently working to develop is our Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) and the
    Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON) Demonstration Program.
    This is an incredible capability to provide the warfighter with a
    global reach capability against high payoff targets. The CAV matched to
    a responsive launch platform would provide a truly transformational
    capability to anywhere in the world regardless of the level of access.
    The CAV capability could be matched against an anti-access environment
    and still deliver a conventional payload precisely on target within
    minutes of a valid command and control release order. This is the type
    of Prompt Global Strike I have identified as a top priority for our
    space and missile force.
                          modernization and readiness
        We no longer have the challenge of stressing the importance of
    space capabilities. Our senior commanders around the joint community,
    regardless of their service affiliation or background understand, you
    cannot go to war and win without space. The difficult challenge before
    us today, as a Nation and a military, is that we now maintain our
    steadfast readiness in support of our ongoing global war on terrorism.
    To ensure success, we must modernize the very space capabilities and
    assets our armed services and our Nation depend upon.
        Our Global Positioning System satellites have revolutionized modern
    warfare. We are able to provide our warfighters and our national
    leaders unprecedented accuracy and precision strike capabilities
    through the use of our on-orbit assets. We must take all appropriate
    measures to ensure we field a capability that can withstand the robust
    challenges of the future. We need the capabilities provided by the GPS
    III program. A jam resistant, modernized version of the world's
    greatest free utility must be developed and delivered to ensure we have
    the most precise and secure positioning, navigation, and timing
    capability not just for our military forces, but for our Nation and our
    global economy.
        The Transformational Communications Satellite will employ Internet
    Protocol networks and high-bandwidth lasers in space to dramatically
    increase warfighter communications and connectivity. The Air Force (in
    partnership with NASA and the Department of Commerce) continues
    development of the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
    System, which offers cutting edge meteorological capability.
        We have refocused the Space-Based Radar effort to develop a system
    that meets user needs for both the joint warfighting and intelligence
    communities. We are sending one of our most capable general officers
    and visionary leaders, Brigadier General ``Tom'' Sheridan to head up
    the new Space-Based Radar program office. There is no doubt in my mind,
    restructuring of the Space Radar program office guarantees the right
    leaders will be in position to develop this indispensable capability
    for our Nation.
        Finally, we are turning the corner in the Space-Based Infrared
    System program, a critical warfighter need. The Space-Based Infrared
    System will provide an enormous leap in capability over our aging, but
    very dependable Defense Support Program satellites. Our Defense Support
    Program has been Air Force Space Command's ``Old Ironsides,''
    extraordinarily dependable and battle proven. Our missile warning
    capabilities have kept soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed
    around the globe safe from unwarned attack. The next generation Space
    Based Infrared System will continue our proud tradition of providing
    direct support to our joint warfighters worldwide.
        We will continue to develop the necessary capabilities and tighten
    our grip on the space acquisition process. We are already benefiting
    from the initiatives started by the acting Secretary of the Air Force
    over the past several years. We have solidified our requirements
    throughout our major space programs by instituting an urgent and
    compelling need requirements process. This process ensures only
    essential requirements that are both truly needed and funded are added
    to a program in development and will help us avoid ``requirements
    creep'' in our acquisition process.
        I am truly honored and fortunate to serve with Lieutenant General
    Brian Arnold and his team of space professionals at the Space and
    Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles, CA, who are applying the lessons
    learned and making our development and acquisition team even better.
                                challenges ahead
        We are on the right track to addressing the concerns in our space
    acquisition business. We need to ensure technical issues are researched
    and a solid technical risk mitigation plan is created and followed. We
    must ensure our program managers have an adequate management reserve of
    resources to handle developmental problems. We must give our program
    managers the training, tools, and resources to be successful and that's
    clearly a top priority for our Air Force Space Command team.
        How we acquire our space capabilities is distinctly different from
    the acquisition of other Department of Defense capabilities. Because we
    procure small numbers of units, we do not have the ability to reduce
    quantities acquired; therefore, any overruns can only be addressed by
    extending the schedule and ultimately delaying the capability. Almost
    70 percent of our Life Cycle Costs for Space Programs are incurred in
    the development phase alone. Another unique aspect to space is by
    placing our capabilities on orbit it gives us just one shot to be
    successful. We are unable able to take a ``fly, fix, fly'' approach. We
    take a ``test as you fly'' approach. It is absolutely critical to
    understand these profound differences in the acquisition of space
    capabilities when compared to the procurement of other weapons system
    and Department of Defense capabilities. These various factors combine
    to create some tough challenges for us in the future.
        We exist in a global, interdependent economy and we cannot neglect
    how powerful space capabilities have become in our global society. A
    resourceful enemy will look at our centers of gravity and try to attack
    them. Terrorists around the world are not aiming their actions at our
    military alone. They have declared war on our way of life and not
    against our military force in a traditional sense. Our enemies can
    bring crippling destruction to our Nation in a matter of days, or even
    hours, and our space capabilities are not immune to attack. Our
    adversaries understand our growing global dependence on space
    capabilities, and we must be ready to handle any threat to our space
    infrastructure. The strategic challenges we face are different and more
    difficult than past threats.
        Other nations and their militaries understand the importance of our
    space capabilities in how America wages modern war. The threats against
    our space capabilities are building and we must be ready and able to
    face the challenges poised by these evolving threats.
                         space professional development
        During World War II, General George C. Marshall was asked if
    America had a secret weapon to win the war. ``We do indeed,'' he
    replied, ``The best damn kids in the world.'' He was right. Today's
    airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines are the secret weapons of the
    Latest Greatest Generation. The future of our young space force hinges
    on the development of our most precious and valuable resource; our
    people. We look to the challenges before us with the greatest amount of
    confidence, because we truly have dedicated and highly skilled space
    professionals in place; ready to serve the needs of our Nation. The
    biggest threat to our space capabilities and personnel is complacency.
    We have extraordinarily capable systems and people, but we must
    continue to invest in our future.
        Our Air Force leaders have made ``Developing and Maintaining Our
    Space Professionals'' a top priority for our Nation. Personnel
    knowledgeable on the medium of space and highly skilled in their
    respective fields of operations, developmental engineering,
    acquisition, and research are indispensable to our success today and
    will only grow in importance. The dedicated space professionals I have
    the privilege to serve with are some of the best men and women America
    has to offer. The future of military space is bright and we need to
    make sure we give the next generation the proper development to become
    the space experts for the future.
        I was truly honored and pleased to appear before this committee
    last summer to give you our update on the development of our Nation's
    space professionals. We have made some tremendous strides in
    establishing a Space Professional Development Strategy and I would like
    to thank this committee for your support.
        Space Professional Development must be equally applied across our
    Reserve, Guard, civilian, and active duty personnel (both officer and
    enlisted alike.) Furthermore, this is a national skill set we intend to
    build and it can not be limited to an individual Service or
    governmental agency. Given the overwhelming demand and growing
    importance of our Space Professionals there is one key ingredient to
    our future success: teamwork. The synergistic effects of pooling our
    governmental space expertise together far outweighs the sum of the
    individual parts. The Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and our
    civilian professionals are indispensable to our Air Force Space Command
    missions. We will continue to build upon our Space Professional
    Development successes with a strategy for ensuring the development of
    our Space Professionals in our Air Reserve component.
        We have a transcending responsibility as leaders to provide for the
    professional development of our people. Our senior leaders in the
    Department of Defense, Air Force, and Air Reserve component clearly
    understand the commitment this requires. The Space Professional
    Development program is on track and already providing outstanding
    results. We still have some hard work ahead of us, but our dedication
    and energy is well focused on this vital program.
                                   conclusion
        Our most recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq prove our Nation
    relies on capabilities coming from and through space, more than ever
    before. We have many people to thank for the fielded capabilities our
    warfighters are using today to prosecute this dangerous war against
    terrorism. We owe a debt of gratitude to a number of influential
    leaders in the Air Force space and missile community over the years.
        I can only hope our Nation's history will accurately capture the
    incredible leadership of the acting Secretary of the Air Force, the
    Honorable Pete Teets. General Jumper and I have been truly blessed to
    work with such a great American and visionary space leader. There is no
    better example of his legacy than the assistance and leadership he has
    provided Air Force Space Command in the development of our space
    professionals. We understand the significance of developing our space
    professionals, and rest assured we are dedicated to this cause.
        Our Nation cannot rest on the asymmetric advantage we have today in
    space. We must move out and ``Command Our Future'' to make sure we
    continue to provide the world's greatest space and missile capabilities
    to our joint forces operating in harm's way around the globe. We are
    committed to developing our space professionals and I am proud to
    represent Air Force Space Command here today. Once again, I am honored
    to appear here before this distinguished committee.

        Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you want me to start questions?
        Senator Sessions. Yes, I----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Senator Sessions.--I let Senator Inhofe take my time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I don't mind deferring to you.
        Senator Sessions. No, no. Go right ahead.
        Senator Bill Nelson. This is bipartisanship at its best.
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. Secretary, why don't you repeat the administration's
    budgetary proposal for the AEHF and the TSAT.
        Secretary Teets. Okay.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That's AEHF.
        Secretary Teets. Yes. On AEHF, the President's fiscal year
    2006 budget request is for $1,201,000,000. What we are in the
    process of doing is fielding a constellation of three AEHF
    Satellites. We have, with this program, encountered some
    schedule and cost difficulties over the course of this last
    year, generated, in large part, by difficulties in implementing
    the key management system--that is to say, the secure
    communications capability. Very frankly, this was a case of a
    problem in an interface between two major organizations--the
    Air Force developing the AEHF Satellite, and National Security
    Agency (NSA), in providing the requirements for secure
    communication capability. This problem has been dealt with by
    General Hayden, Director of NSA, myself, and General Arnold,
    out at Space and Missiles Center. We have corrected the
    problem. We have put into place a solid plan, and we're
    delivering on it. But it has caused delay and a cost increase
    to the program.
        With respect to TSAT Communications, our budget request is
    $835.8 million. With that money we will bring online an order-
    of-magnitude increase in bandwidth capability and, perhaps even
    more importantly, will bring online Internet-access capability.
    This will truly be an Internet in the sky that can service
    warfighters globally. It'll also have the capability for this
    enormously high bandwidth telecommunications so that we can
    transmit imagery, information, and very high-bit-density
    information.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That would be in 2013?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. No doubt, you've heard of Murphy's
    Law.
        Secretary Teets. I have, indeed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So how are we not blinded?
        Secretary Teets. The way that I--the way that we have, I'll
    say, banked an off-ramp is that if, at the end of the next year
    to year-and-a-half, in that time frame, if we have not been
    making proper advancement on retiring risk and maturing the
    technology associated with TSAT, we will acquire a fourth AEHF
    Satellite system, and we will field it in a timely way that can
    sustain the capability that exists.
        I might just mention to you that we are right at the
    leading edge of a transformation in communications satellite
    capabilities. If you look at our capabilities today, when we
    launch our Wideband Gapfiller Satellites--and I mean that
    literally within this next year--we will increase our bandwidth
    capability by an order of magnitude. When we then move from
    AEHF and Wideband Gapfiller capabilities to TSAT
    Communications, we will achieve another order of magnitude of
    bandwidth capability. So I think that we are on a solid path.
    We've tried to develop a program plan that recognizes that
    there are some technology risks, and in the event that we run
    into a snag, we have off-ramps.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So the decision point on a fourth AEHF
    would come, you said, in a year to a year-and-a-half.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. My advice would be that you better
    have it within a year so we are ready for the next budget
    cycle.
        Secretary Teets. I think that----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Because if you wait a year and a half,
    then we've lost 2 years, instead of one.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What we don't want to be in is the
    situation where we don't have a fourth AEHF, and now TSAT is
    getting delayed, and suddenly we're blind and we can't hear.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. I concur with what you're
    saying. We will need, by next year's budget cycle, to know,
    with confidence, that TSAT is moving along well, or we should
    bank the coals on TSAT and order another AEHF.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead, and I'll come back. Well,
    let me just ask one more.
        Senator Sessions. Sure.
        Senator Bill Nelson. When does the fourth AEHF--when does
    it have to be bought before there's a production break?
        Secretary Teets. It depends on how much the first three
    slip, to be honest with you. But if you look at our current
    program plan, which has slipped significantly due to this
    cryptology problem that I mentioned earlier--if we stay on the
    plan that we currently are on, we will need to make that
    decision a year from now to avoid a production break.
        Senator Bill Nelson. My feeling about this is, this is
    something you can't fool around with. You have to have your
    eyes and ears up there in the sky. I know this is a $400-$500
    million item for a fourth satellite, but you think of all the
    gadgets that are going to rely on this stuff being up there,
    that would be awfully rough, to make the wrong decision on
    this.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. I understand what you're saying,
    and I think a prudent plan is in place to exercise that
    potential.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, you note, in your
    prepared statement, that it is our policy to ``develop the
    ability to protect our space assets and, if necessary, prevent
    potential adversaries from using space.''
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. That would give them an advantage, if
    they can have the same capabilities that we have. You note that
    the Department is developing a range of capabilities to meet
    current and future potential threats. You mentioned,
    specifically, the counter-communications system, which jams
    satellite-based communications. What other capabilities are we
    developing to, in your words, prevent potential adversaries
    from using space?
        Secretary Teets. Sir, those capabilities, other than the
    land-based satellite jammer, are classified kinds of
    activities. We're doing research and development work along
    those lines, but I think it best to not get into details in an
    open hearing.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I would certainly respect that. I
    would just say that that's a real issue of importance to us.
    Could you, any of you, share with us a scenario that would not
    be inappropriate to share in this hearing, where we might need
    to take action to defend our space capabilities or to defend
    against an enemy's space capabilities?
        General Cartwright. A way to approach this is to approach
    it from a holistic approach, the training, the tactics,
    techniques, and procedures and doctrine of our space force, our
    cadre, and making sure that they are trained to, one,
    understand and interpret the data that we have coming back that
    would give us an indication of whether or not we have a space
    event that is somewhat hostile, or could be characterized as
    hostile, is a critical piece of this; designing and protecting
    our infrastructure in a way that it is not susceptible to being
    interfered with. This goes beyond just the intentional regime
    to being able to understand, in space situation awareness,
    what's going on around you, designing your fleet so that you
    have an awareness, not just a kinetic effect, but just
    interference with each other as we put systems up and, is this
    intentional, or isn't it?--and trying to design our systems to
    be able to do that.
        Scenario-wise, the idea that potentially our systems could
    be interfered with in some hostile manner, and making sure that
    we design the system both to realize and understand what's
    going on, and then design the approach that's just layered.
    Just like any other element of warfare, what you'd like to do
    is extend out the decision cycle so that you can start with
    just diplomacy and negotiation, and try to work your way up in
    ratcheting your capabilities.
        I'll turn it over to General Lord but I think a layered
    approach that acknowledges that there are many segments to this
    problem.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. LANCE W. LORD, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                        AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        General Lord. Senator, I think one point to remember is, we
    experienced war in this environment, if you will, in Operation
    Iraqi Freedom, with attempts to jam the GPS from the ground.
    What we were able to do, because of a variety of techniques and
    tactics, work this problem explicitly, and I can----
        Senator Sessions. Could I interrupt just----
        General Lord. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Would you tell us what would have
    happened--for example, what capabilities we would lose if they
    were to successfully jam them. Maybe not everything can be said
    in this room, but some of the things that are pretty obvious,
    the capabilities that we'd lose if they successfully could have
    jammed our GPS system.
        General Lord. It would have been, really, a serious
    situation without the position, navigation, and timing signals
    available to our forces in conflict and in contact in Operation
    Iraqi Freedom--precision effects, GPS direct attack munitions,
    for example, all the other navigation work that's done, all the
    timing that's done on particular effects in the theater would
    have been negated.
        So, the point being, sir, is, we have to not only have a
    way to protect the capability to deliver that signal, but we
    have to have a stronger signal strength on the satellite to
    transmit to the Earth, so that if somebody tries to jam that,
    then they have to raise their signal, so we can identify that
    and deal with it.
        We had an effective team work with GPS interference in
    navigation tools so that we could identify where the jammers
    were and we could route around that. We let General Cartwright
    know and be able to advise the other folks how to work in that
    environment. Lastly, we were able to employ a tactic called GPS
    Enhanced Theater Support, where we were able to make sure that
    when the GPS satellites broke the horizon and were in view of
    our forces in the theater, they had the most accurate timing
    and information available on the satellite. So they had--we had
    driven all the errors, as much as we could, out of the system
    out, so that the satellites were the most accurate when they
    were in view of the theater. We are able to do that----
        Senator Sessions. Is this the satellite that allows a Joint
    Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb--munition--to be dropped and
    hit within 30 feet of any spot----
        General Lord. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions.--consistently----
        General Lord. It's just with the----
        Senator Sessions. Without that satellite capability, the
    ``smart munition'' is seriously degraded.
        General Lord. It depends on the munition and how it's
    integrated with the fusing techniques, et cetera, because some
    bombs have an inertial nav system that's inherently accurate,
    but GPS gives them that extra feet of accuracy so that your
    precision effect is really exactly what you want to achieve.
    So, we think that----
        Senator Sessions. What about communications? What kind of
    theater communications depend on satellite and--systems to be
    effective, if you can share----
        General Lord. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 60 or 80 percent
    of the bandwidth was commercial-leased, and the MILSTAR
    constellation protected communications over our satellite
    constellation that we operate for General Cartwright was really
    the darling of the combat, with the capability to deliver air-
    attack orders, ground-maneuver schemes, et cetera, over this
    protected network to provide the combatant commander in the
    theater very accurate communications. So it was a combination
    of both military and civil that worked in that war.
        Senator Sessions. So, without being able to utilize our
    satellites, if those satellites should be taken out or jammed
    in some effective way, our ability to use the GPS system and
    our communications system would be substantially degraded.
    Under our current military doctrine, we depend on both of those
    to be effective. Is that----
        General Lord. Absolutely.
        Senator Sessions.--correct?
        General Lord. You're right, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. May I follow up on that?
        Senator Sessions. Yes, please.
        Senator Bill Nelson. With the next generation of the GPS
    satellites, what kind of improved capabilities do they have?
        General Lord. We're working them now, sir, Senator Nelson,
    with our GPS-2RM, which is the first satellite we'll launch in
    the next series, which should go, here, within the next 15 or
    20 days from Patrick. It will have an increased power
    capability and another additional code onboard the satellite.
    We get to GPS-2F, which is another system, and then on to GPS-3
    by the end of this decade and early part of the next decade,
    with more signal strength onboard, more anti-jam capability, to
    do just what we talked about, to be able to push that signal to
    everybody so that it can't be jammed or spoofed.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, sort of to follow up on
    Senator Inhofe's question, funding for counterspace activities
    in 2005 to defend, I guess, our system--amounts to about $350
    million. Of that amount, approximately 78 percent goes toward
    space situational awareness, 14 percent toward defensive
    counterspace, and 8 percent toward offensive counterspace.
    Compared to the funding for satellite and launch programs, $350
    million does not seem like it does justice to the importance of
    those two areas. Are you--you indicated, I think, earlier, that
    we may be spending more in the future. Do you think--where are
    we on that? Are we spending enough? Do we need to enhance our
    capabilities at a faster rate?
        Secretary Teets. Sir, I think, in balance, we are spending
    the right amount. I think we need to recapitalize our asset
    base. We have, in our constellation of national security space
    satellites, a number of satellites that are now--have been on
    orbit long enough to be able to vote. They were designed for
    perhaps 6-, 8-, 10-year life, and we have some that are now
    over 21 years old. They are performing well, but they won't
    last forever. So, it is important that we have a flow of
    continuing satellites to repopulate the constellation. They are
    expensive, I do agree with that. I recognize they're expensive.
    But, on balance, we recognize, in a growing sense, the need for
    us to focus on this issue of space control, which, in point of
    fact, needs to be informed by better knowledge of space
    situational awareness. We do know there are 10,000 objects
    around the Earth in orbit now, but we don't know an awful lot
    about many of them. We are focusing, as a first priority, learn
    more about what's there so that we can take some action, if
    necessary.
        Then, second, we want to be able to take some smart
    measures to defend ourselves and seal some of the current
    vulnerabilities in our space assets.
        Lastly, then, we have research and development ongoing for
    some capability to deny an adversary their use of space.
        General Cartwright. Could I add just two----
        Senator Sessions. Please do, yes.
        General Cartwright.--two aspects?
        The first is that we have a ground surveillance
    infrastructure that needs to be recapitalized and upgraded, and
    that's part of this program. We have to make sure that we do
    that, because it has a certain capability that gives us wide-
    area, large ability to catalogue. We need to improve that so
    we're not looking at areas that are as ambiguous as miles, but
    down to very small areas. The second is a command-and-control
    system that integrates all of this so the warfighter gets the
    benefit of the knowledge of this situational awareness, and it
    gets distributed out. We can't forget those two pieces, because
    they tie back to the user's side of this equation, whether it
    be the warfighter or others, that need to manage the system on
    orbit.
        So, in addition to what's on orbit, there is a ground piece
    of this, and a command-and-control piece that we have to keep
    our eye on.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I'm going to go vote while he
    continues, and then I'll come back and do my questions.
        Senator Sessions. Well, wait just a second.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How much----
        Senator Sessions. My question is, how many votes is this?
    All four votes, isn't it? ``Encourage Senators to stay in
    chamber for all four votes. Time limits will be strictly
    adhered to,'' this memo says. It will be the first time--that
    means it will be more seriously adhered to than normal.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Bill Nelson. If it's four votes----
        Senator Sessions. Do you think we ought to take a break and
    just come back?
        Senator Bill Nelson. The big chairman is going to call the
    full committee at 4:30.
        Senator Sessions. 4:30?
        Senator Bill Nelson. So----
        Senator Sessions. All right, let's see if we----
        Senator Bill Nelson.--we have a problem.
        Senator Sessions. Yes, we do. Why don't you pick up here--
    --
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, if we have----
        Senator Sessions. You take your time----
        Senator Bill Nelson.--four votes, there's nothing we can do
    about it.
        Senator Sessions. No. It would leave us about 15 minutes,
    about 10 more minutes, I guess.
        Let's take--I'll take a few more minutes, if--and you can
    go or stay. We have 10 more minutes on this vote.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. I'll meet you over there.
        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, just the way we see the
    schedule, this first vote will be a little longer, probably,
    than the others. So, we'll probably have about 8 or 10 minutes.
    Then it'll take us about a 30-minute recess, if you don't
    mind--if any of you have critical things you have to do, we
    would certainly understand if you need to excuse yourself. I--
    the other hearing the chairman has is not something that is
    mandatory that we attend.
        I guess, General Dodgen, you think about the guys on the
    ground there, in previous wars we've tried to disrupt
    communications by intercepting the guy on the horseback with
    the note. I think that cost Jeb Stuart some of his reputation.
    [Laughter.]
        Then you have telegraphs we've tried to intercept, pigeons
    and communications. But, I mean, wouldn't it be naive of us to
    think that our capabilities in space are, sort of, religiously
    protected from warfare? Isn't it really true that it is
    critical to our communications system that helps our
    warfighter, and, if we were to lose that, we would be damaged.
    If our enemy had that capability, they would be greatly
    advantaged. Does not that just mean that we just, whether we
    wish to or not, have to consider that soldier that we put on
    the ground in harm's way and how we can provide the best
    communication and protection for them?

    STATEMENT OF LTG LARRY J. DODGEN, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
                 ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Dodgen. Senator, to follow on with the soldier
    aspect of what General Cartwright said, we are rebuilding the
    Army, reshaping the Army, and transforming the Army, and we're
    making it much more responsive and more flexible for a variety
    of missions. It's the future combat system that will be coming
    onboard. We will be totally dependent upon very clear
    situational awareness of, and persistent surveillance of, the
    battlefield. Then we'll be dependent upon communications, very
    capable communications that will allow that persistent
    surveillance to get to every--literally every combat vehicle
    that will be on the terrain. That's why the Army has said, in
    the prioritization drills, that we need to get to TSAT, we need
    to get to that type of capability so that we can bring that
    type of imagery to every combat vehicle, because we'll be
    operating in a much broader area than we ever have before.
    We'll be relying on our combat formations to do more with less
    because of that situational awareness. If we don't have those
    capabilities, then we'll be at some risk of being in places
    where we may have overmatch, and we don't want to fight the war
    that way. We'd much rather fight the war using our weapons
    systems and our joint fires to overmatch in places of our
    desire. So, it's very critical to us, I think, to have the
    surveillance systems to clearly see the entire battlefield. I
    think space systems are very much a vital part of that, given
    terrain features. We need to be free of geography for that.
    Then the communications for that broadband to go down to
    every--literally every combat vehicle on the battlefield will
    be very important to us in the future.
        Senator Sessions. So, even more than today, you expect that
    the ground combat future systems will be dependent on satellite
    and communications and space capabilities, and that disrupting
    that would even have a greater impact on our newly-created and
    newly-designed combat systems than even it would today?
        General Dodgen. Absolutely, Senator. I'm concerned about us
    being denied the capability of space, and I'm concerned about
    growing capabilities that may be in our opponents' hands. Both
    of those things, they're a great concern for the future.
        [The prepared statement of General Dodgen follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by LTG Larry J. Dodgen, USA
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is my distinct honor to appear before you today to
    discuss the Army's use of space as a key enabler to accomplish its
    missions and objectives both now and into the era of the ``Future
    Force.'' I express my sincere appreciation to this committee for your
    continuing support of the many endeavors of our Army and particularly
    today's topic--the Army's continued efforts and progress in space. The
    Army is a full member of the Joint Team and we appreciate the
    opportunity to be included in the ranks with Secretary Teets, General
    Lord, Vice Admiral Sestack, and Brigadier General Benes as joint
    advocates of the space planning process and continued advances in our
    Nation's ability to operate in space. The Army is committed to working
    closely with the other Services, the Executive Agent for Space, the
    Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as space
    is absolutely critical to Army transformation. The Army will
    increasingly rely on space-based capabilities that must be responsive,
    timely, and assured to joint warfighters.
                  space support--a core warfighting competency
        During the past decade, the global security environment has changed
    a great deal. Today, many nation-states are no longer constrained by
    spheres of influence as in the Cold War. The dispersion of power and
    widespread instability combined with the direct threat to our homeland
    and worldwide interests, present new challenges for the Army, the joint
    community, and our Nation. The enemies we face today are not
    necessarily a nation-state. They can also be a terrorist cell, able to
    strike almost anywhere and nearly any time. Our response to these
    challenges continues to be seen in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
    Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). These operations continue to reinforce
    the critical importance of space capabilities to the Army, the other
    Defense services and agencies, and the joint warfighter.
        As recently stated by our Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), ``space
    and information are not only enablers, but core warfighting
    competencies.'' Space support to military operations is not a recent
    development. For more than 30 years, the Army has tapped the
    unparalleled potential offered by space-based systems to the modern
    battlefield. In the 1970s, the Army exploited the tactical
    applicability of national space systems at the corps level to improve
    our battlefield intelligence capabilities. The Tactical Exploitation of
    National Capabilities (TENCAP) program is a longstanding success story
    of the Army leveraging the intelligence community space investments for
    tactical military benefits. Throughout the early years, exploitation of
    space-based assets fell to TENCAP and communication communities while
    national systems remained focused on strategic issues. Although Army
    TENCAP made tremendous strides in leveraging national systems for the
    tactical user, it was not until Operation Desert Storm (ODS) that key
    leadership realized the extraordinary value of space-based, beyond
    line-of-sight intelligence and satellite communications (SATCOM), as a
    combat multiplier. The use of the Global Positioning System (GPS),
    near-real-time missile warning, tactical weather information,
    unclassified imagery, and long haul communication satellites truly
    brought space directly to the battlefield. Today, as we have for the
    past 30 years, the Army continues to strive to normalize space-based
    capabilities into our traditional warfighting concepts to achieve
    seamless support to combat operations.
        Since ODS, space-based capabilities have become more entwined in
    the fabric of Army warfighting. Ongoing combat operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq are demonstrating the operational importance of
    space to the joint warfighter. Making space relevant to tactical forces
    has gained primary emphasis along with providing and expediting the
    delivery of space-based capabilities, products, and services to
    warfighters. Space systems extend the range and capabilities of
    communications and enhance situational awareness beyond any terrestrial
    capability. It literally allows us to ``do more with less'' as we
    better use our forces in modular formations to cover larger areas than
    in the past. This is especially critical in asymmetric formations such
    as Iraq. Space systems continue to provide better intelligence and
    synchronization in combat operations by enabling collection of new
    types of data and information. In ODS, command echelons of division and
    above were the only ones that could access space-based TENCAP and
    INSCOM capabilities. Now we can provide support to our joint
    warfighters at the tactical level. Army space support teams now have
    the tactical capability to leverage satellite communications,
    commercial imagery, and enhanced situational awareness in support of
    deployed forces. Direct links now provide timely and assured data from
    national agencies and ground stations to the battalion level. Future
    work is needed to ensure these links are survivable in tomorrow's
    operational environment.
        As our reliance on responsive, timely, and assured access to space-
    based capabilities increases, so does our vulnerability to attack and
    disruption. The ground segments of our space systems are especially
    vulnerable to a conventional attack. It is absolutely essential that
    both space-based and ground segment capabilities are protected against
    our future adversaries' attempts to attack these capabilities and to
    deny us our technological advantage. Space situational awareness is an
    important step to protecting our space assets from attack and in
    denying space-based products to our adversaries.
        The global growth of commercial space systems provides state and
    non-state actors access to products and services that begin to approach
    those of our own. These potential adversaries are seeking to lessen the
    advantages we enjoy by accessing space-based communications and imagery
    offered by third-party entities. In order to retain our advantage, we
    may choose to deny an adversary access to these space-based services.
     the army's organizational space structure and key operational support
        Within our Army, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/
    Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) is the specified
    proponent for space. In addition to the Title 10 Army responsibilities,
    this command also serves as the Army Service Component Command to the
    U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Tasked as the service space
    proponent and working in coordination with other members of the joint
    community, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is at the forefront--supplying vital space
    capabilities to our joint warfighters. In addition to delivering and
    integrating space products and trained professionals into joint
    warfighter operations, USASMDC/ARSTRAT also conducts an extensive
    variety of space mission related research and development activities.
    This capability is one complement to the organic TENCAP equipped Army
    intelligence and tactical signal force structures.
        Soldiers and civilians serving with USASMDC/ARSTRAT's 1st Space
    Brigade (Provisional), the Army's first and only space brigade, provide
    access to products and services that are absolutely essential in all
    phases of combat operations. The brigade's three battalions--the 1st
    Satellite Control Battalion, the 1st Space Battalion, and the 193rd
    Space Support Battalion, Colorado Army National Guard, support
    combatant commanders by providing satellite communications and force
    enhancements. During the ongoing OEF and OIF campaigns, the USASMDC/
    ARSTRAT's Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) supported the Coalition
    Force Land Component Commander, an Army Corps and Division, a Marine
    Expeditionary Force, and the Coalition Provisional Authority. The
    ARSSTs are on-the-ground space experts, pulling down key and critical
    commercial imagery, forecasting the impact of space weather on
    satellite communications, position, navigation and timing, and radio
    intercepts, and providing responsive space support to their units. This
    responsiveness and on-the-ground expertise were invaluable to combatant
    commanders and their planning staffs. TENCAP and INSCOM have increased
    their support from space-based assets by providing enhanced systems and
    more direct interface to the tactical level.
        The USASMDC/ARSTRAT Operations Center, located in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, supports space experts deployed throughout the operational
    force and reduces our forward deployed footprint. This center maintains
    constant situational awareness of deployed elements, continuously
    responds to requests for information, and provides the essential reach-
    back system of connectivity with technical subject matter experts.
    Regional Satellite Communications Support Centers and Defense Satellite
    Communications Systems Operations Centers located in several locations
    in the U.S. and overseas, provide reliable and responsive SATCOM
    support. In addition to ensuring space-based force enhancement,
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT also provides space-based ballistic missile early
    warning and missile defense support from within the theater or region.
    The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Stations Detachments,
    operated by Army and Navy personnel, monitor enemy missile launch
    activity and other infrared events of interest and share the
    information with members of the air and missile defense and operational
    communities. Presently, an array of space-based and missile defense
    resources including forward-deployed Soldiers, civilians, and
    equipment, continue to support our joint warfighters in Afghanistan and
    Iraq. Space capabilities have become and will continue to be
    inextricably linked to warfighting.
                           the army's space successes
        As I appear before this distinguished committee today, Army
    professionals are using the ultimate high ground of space to provide
    products and services that are significantly more capable, abundant,
    and tightly integrated into all phases of combat operations. I would
    like to highlight a few of the Army's fielded operational systems and
    personnel that are providing essential space support to the combatant
    commanders and warfighters.
    Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness (JBFSA)
        Space capabilities save lives by providing critical linkages within
    the current and future JBFSA architectures. Situational awareness is
    particularly vital given the challenges of conducting operations in
    urban areas, as is currently the case in Iraq. The Army is the lead
    service for JBFSA and has the greatest number of soldiers and systems
    to track on the battlefield. JBFSA assets, such as the Force XXI Battle
    Command Brigade and Below, the Movement Tracking System, and the
    Grenadier Beyond Line-of-Sight Reporting and Tracking System, help
    deliver timely situational awareness and have gained broad endorsements
    from tactical units for helping to prevent friendly fire incidents. The
    Army is currently devoting considerable effort to fully incorporate the
    role of blue force tracking (BFT) in identifying friendly forces during
    combat. We have also successfully demonstrated the capability to
    integrate the various JBSFA systems, space-based and line-of-sight, to
    develop a common operating picture into one enterprise system. This
    achievement, especially important until an integrated set of JBFSA
    systems is developed, is a meaningful step to support enhanced
    situational awareness.
    Mission Management Center (MMC)
        The MMC facilitates the dissemination of near-real-time space-based
    data in support of JBFSA. The USASMDC/ARSTRAT MMC, located in Colorado
    Springs, serves as the critical link between warfighters, national
    agencies, and a variety of dissemination architectures.
    Spectral Operations Resource Center (SORC)
        The quality of image resolution and speed of its delivery has
    improved substantially over the years. During ODS, commercial
    resolution was approximately ten meters and filling requests took days
    or weeks. During OIF, USASMDC's SORC (Forward) was able to provide its
    customers with downlinked commercial imagery of approximately one-meter
    resolution within hours of receiving a request. Manned by both Army and
    Air Force personnel, the SORC (Forward) facilitated the downlink of
    commercial imagery, providing the joint warfighter detailed spectral
    products to make crucial operational decisions.
    Tactical Exploitation System (TES)
        The Army's TES as a forerunner to the Distributed Common Ground
    Station-Army (DCGS-A) provides tactical and joint warfighters the
    ability to receive, process, and exploit signals and imagery
    intelligence data from selected national, theater, and tactical
    sensors. Using TES, the time required to gain access to theater and
    national imagery has been substantially reduced. As a result, an
    integrated multi-source intelligence picture from ``space-to-mud'' is
    organic to all corps and divisions and is moving to the brigade level,
    with the DCGS-A which enables combatant commanders to gain improved
    situational awareness and enhance their ability to shape the
    battlefield. Elements of the TES are deployed in OIF and OEF in the
    Stryker brigades and selected Reserve units called to active duty.
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT's Reagan Test Site (RTS)/U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll
            (USAKA)
        RTS is a unique contributor to the national space control mission
    through its space situational awareness data. RTS is one of only four
    Department of Defense (DOD) radar sites that provide unique
    capabilities to monitor objects in deep space. Additionally, RTS is the
    sole contributor of radar metrics on approximately one-third of the
    satellites in the geosynchronous belt. The collection of timely and
    accurate metric data is critical to the space control mission. The RTS
    maintains a vigilant 15-minute recall, 24 hours a day, for providing
    critical radar metric and imagery data on new foreign launches from
    Asia. Due to its geographic location, RTS has first visibility on most
    launches from Asia.
        These systems, assets, and their operators as well as other
    initiatives leveraging U.S. space capabilities are key contributors in
    both holding and improving the asymmetric advantages that exploiting
    space brings to the joint fight.
                    realizing the potential of space--people
        Of course, without well-trained and motivated Army professionals,
    space superiority cannot be realized. As I stated earlier, the
    successful conclusion of the first phases of OIF was supported by well
    trained space professionals serving in Army units around the globe who
    used the superior technology at their disposal to provide vital and
    timely operational support to combatant commanders.
        As outlined before this committee in July 2004, combat operations
    are no longer limited to land, sea, and air. It is clear that we will
    increasingly rely on the ``high ground'' of space as an essential
    capabilities integrator. Today, the Army considers space to be a
    vertical extension of the battlefield essential to joint warfighting.
    Technology in the hands of capable professionals, who are trained to
    harvest the potential of space, has superseded the necessity to mass
    against an enemy force. Instead, space-based capabilities enable us to
    mass the combat power of our forces at the time and place of our
    choosing. As a result, an understanding of space systems and
    capabilities is becoming an increasingly important part of the
    professional soldier's skill set across all Army mission areas.
        The Army recognized this need in 1998 when it created Functional
    Area (FA) 40--Space Operations within our commissioned officer corps.
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army's personnel proponent for FA 40 officers.
    There are more than 150 FA 40s in the Army today, serving in 29
    different Army and Joint commands and DOD organizations across
    tactical, operational, and strategic echelons. These space
    professionals are today's Army space cadre and form the core for the
    future cadre. They are trained, educated, and gaining experience every
    day. They are performing remarkably as indicated by continuous praise
    from our warfighting commanders.
        Promotion rates for space cadre lieutenant colonels and colonels
    during fiscal year 2004 are above the Army average. FA 40s are
    encouraged to complete advanced degrees and 70 percent of our officers
    have done so--60 percent of the advanced degrees are in space related
    fields of study. We currently have 14 FA 40s that have graduated from
    space programs at the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) or the Air Force
    Institute of Technology. Today, seven FA 40s are enrolled at NPS. Once
    sufficiently trained through the 11-week Army Space Officer's
    Operations course, FA 40 officers are responsible for formulating
    policy, developing operational concepts, developing technologies, and
    planning, evaluating, and implementing the tactics and techniques for
    the operational use of space systems.
        The Army's Space Cadre is supporting the fight in both OEF and OIF.
    Twenty-six FA 40s have deployed to the two theaters with six currently
    serving from the Division to Theater command level. In addition to the
    outstanding support they provide today, the Army is realizing future
    benefits as we integrate and institutionalize the lessons our FA 40s
    learn regarding how to best integrate space for tactical commanders.
        As our Army transforms, our space concepts and organizations are
    transforming as well, requiring significant increases in authorizations
    for FA 40s in our tactical echelons. Over the past few years, we have
    developed organic Army Space Support Elements (SSEs) which we will be
    embedding within Army Divisions/Units of Employment (UEx). The 3rd
    Infantry Division was our first Division to transform and stood up the
    initial SSE in June 2004. Over the next few years, all 10 Divisions
    (UEx) are being embedded with SSEs as the Army continues to transform.
    The Army Space Cadre will be the means to bring dedicated space
    expertise to UEx Divisions. In total, the Army could be adding up to 80
    FA 40 authorizations as a result of the ongoing Army transformation.
                              space formal update
        In July 2004, before this distinguished committee, I informed you
    that the Army was commencing Phase I of IV in the Cadre Force
    Management Analysis (FORMAL) which will define how other officers, our
    noncommissioned officer and enlisted force, and Army civilians will be
    addressed as part of our future Space Cadre. FORMAL completion is
    scheduled for August 2005 and we have progressed to Phase III, which is
    scheduled for completion this May. To recap, Phase I developed the Army
    unique Space Cadre definitions. Phase II identified 1,546 potential
    Army Space Cadre positions based on the definition developed during
    Phase I. During Phase III, we will refine the cadre and develop a
    comprehensive Army policy that incorporates the five personnel life
    cycle functions envisioned for the Space Cadre. The 5 life-cycle
    functions are accessing, training, professional development,
    structuring, and sustaining. During the final phase, necessary combat
    enhancement elements such as doctrine, organizational structure,
    training, and leadership development will be finalized and implemented.
        For both present and future members of the Space Cadre, formal
    education and training continues to evolve. Students are trained in the
    planning of space operations, analyzing friendly and enemy force space
    capabilities and limitations, and determining the impact of space
    weather on satellites; communications; position, navigation and timing;
    and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of a
    Joint Force Commander. The demand for training brought the Air Force
    and Army together to offer better training opportunities to the Space
    Cadre of both services.
                         future army space requirements
        Now and in the future, the Army's primary interest in space will be
    the role that space serves as an enabler of 21st century land warfare.
    Continued technological advances and new capabilities in space systems
    will enable the information dominance essential to the transformed Army
    land force envisioned for the future. The task ahead is to hold and
    improve the asymmetrical advantages space capabilities bring to the
    joint fight. The most important space-based capabilities the Army needs
    to leverage to maintain dominance with respect to ground operations
    relate to intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, satellite
    communications, JBFSA, weather, terrain and environmental monitoring,
    position, navigation and timing, missile warning, and space control.
    These capabilities enhance the paradigm of full spectrum dominance that
    is the cornerstone of future joint warfighting.
        To meet these vital requirements, it is essential that space
    systems, currently planned for fielding under the purview of the DOD
    Executive Agent for Space, become reality. The Army needs enabling
    technologies which enhance situational awareness off the ramp, allow us
    to look deep, and communicate rich situational awareness while on the
    move. Planned space-based assets such as Space Radar and
    Transformational Satellite (TSAT)-communication systems, if developed
    to be tactically relevant, will revolutionize how we use space in
    support of ground operations. The Army needs a space capability
    designed and developed from the onset that significantly improves the
    situational awareness, lethality, and survivability of the tactical
    warfighter by providing responsive, timely, and assured persistent
    surveillance and communications. These systems must be dynamically
    taskable and have the ability to provide actionable intelligence to the
    warfighter at multiple locations.
        Tactically responsive capabilities with persistent surveillance and
    enhanced protected wideband communications will improve the situational
    awareness, lethality, survivability, and operations tempo of the Army's
    Future Force. The Army continues to work closely with the DOD Executive
    Agent for Space to ensure transformational capabilities such as theater
    downlink and dynamic tasking in support of the theater warfighter are
    fulfilled.
                                   conclusion
        The Army knows the value that space capabilities bring to the
    battlefield--space is the ultimate high ground. In future conflicts,
    the Army envisions that as an interdependent member of the space
    community, we will rely on space products and services provided by DOD,
    other government agencies, our allies and coalition partners, and
    commercial space systems to enhance situational awareness and joint
    battle command. We will also contribute Army capabilities,
    technologies, and trained and ready personnel to this joint effort. The
    resulting fully integrated joint capability will provide depth,
    persistence, and responsive capabilities for commanders at the
    strategic, operational, and tactical levels. There is no doubt that
    space systems and well-trained and experienced space professionals give
    us an information environment advantage over our adversaries. While we
    have done much thus far, we must continue to increase and improve our
    space capabilities to serve the needs of the future.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee and
    for your interest and support of our Army's space programs and their
    current and future requirements.

        Senator Sessions. Admiral Sestak, do you want to comment on
    that subject or----
        Admiral Sestak. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions.--perspective?
        Admiral Sestak. From the Navy's perspective, being at sea,
    where you can't run fiberoptics, it's pretty critical. We
    launched the first satellite in 1948. We actually bounced a
    radio wave off the moon from Honolulu back to Washington, DC,
    just to see the importance of satellite communications. It was
    probably the first time we had a DOD system deliver on schedule
    and on time. [Laughter.]
        Except for Mr. Teets' tenure, of course. [Laughter.]
        That said, to get back to General Cartwright's issue, when
    he had the J-8 job before where he is, the general, he ran a
    war game with modeling. Some of it was in response to a
    congressional report that mandated a study, on what would be
    the impact of an explosion Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), in
    space, which is one form of trying to deny us space. The
    scenario, without going into specifics of it--and I'm sure
    General Cartwright remembers it well--had three carrier battle
    groups off a certain nation, and they tried to measure the
    impact upon us during that scenario. It was measurable. We
    worked through some of these issues through different means,
    and not just, as people tend to think of kinetic weapons; but
    there were procedures to follow, and there were diverse
    spectrums where we switched to different frequencies--UHF to
    EHF or HF; and we switched weapons from JDAMs to laser-guided.
    So his point of different means to address such threats is well
    taken.
        We then stepped back in the Navy following a directive from
    the JROC to do a study--which is commencing with DARPA and the
    Navy--to try to assess how we, in the Navy, with regard to this
    particular issue, can try to address this through diverse
    means.
        So are we concerned? Yes, sir. I'm concerned, because when
    this soldier next to me goes ashore, the hope is that he is
    going to be able to say, ``I'm calling for fire,'' and to just
    push the button that goes up to the TSAT and comes down
    directly to the warfighter sitting off the coast on a carrier,
    or a Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), and it goes directly into
    the IP address of a Tomahawk missile and launches. Being able
    to use that Communications Intelligence (COMINT), where we can
    be over any country legally, in peacetime as well as war, just
    like we can do on the seas today, to be offshore is really the
    marriage of the future between the ``comms'' of the seas and
    space. Being able to control, by whichever means--tactics,
    Concept of Operations (CONOPs) hardening--is very important to
    us in the future.
        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Sestak follows:]
             Prepared Statement by VADM Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., USN
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored
    to appear before you today to address Navy space activities. As Deputy
    Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, we
    provide the substantive analysis, the ``warfighting story,'' and
    supporting capabilities investment plan to the Chief of Naval
    Operations to ensure naval forces remain operationally relevant today
    and in the future.
        Integrating space capabilities throughout the naval force is
    fundamental to our Sea Power 21 vision. The objective of Sea Power 21
    is to ensure that our Nation possesses credible combat capability on
    scene to promote regional stability, to deter aggression throughout the
    world, to assure access of joint forces and to fight and win should
    deterrence fail. Sea Power 21 guides the Navy's transformation from a
    threat-based platform centric structure to a capabilities-based, fully-
    integrated force. The pillars of Sea Power 21 Sea Strike, Sea Shield,
    and Sea Base are integrated by FORCEnet, the means by which the power
    of sensors, networks, weapons, warriors, and platforms are harnessed in
    a networked combat force. It is this networked force that will provide
    the access with the strategic agility and persistence necessary to
    prevail in the continuing war on terror, as well as the speed and
    overwhelming power to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any
    regional peer competitor in combat operations.
        The Navy of the future must be capabilities-based and threat-
    oriented. While the fabric of our fighting force will still be the
    power and speed needed to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any
    regional threat, we believe FORCEnet's pervasive awareness (C\4\ISR)
    will be more important than mass. Because of its access from the sea,
    the Navy and Marine Corps are focusing significant effort and analysis
    in support of joint combat power projection by leveraging this
    traditional access provided by the oceans through Seabasing, with the
    access now provided by space and cyberspace through FORCEnet. It is the
    synergistic access provided by these great ``commons''--the sea and
    space and cyberspace--that is the revolution of the future.
        To this end, the technological innovations and human-systems
    integration advances in future platforms remain critical. Our future
    warships will sustain operations in forward areas longer, be able to
    respond more quickly to emerging contingencies, and generate more
    sorties and simultaneous attacks against greater numbers of multiple
    aim points and targets with greater effect than our current fleet.
    However, the future is about the capabilities posture of this fleet,
    which is why the future is also about establishing C\4\ISR as a
    warfighting weapon and integrator and understanding the impact of
    changing C\4\ISR investment strategies on the warfight.
                             the navy's investment
        In the last year, we have realigned the Navy staff to establish
    C\4\ISR as a warfighting weapon and integrator of other Sea Power 21
    Pillar efforts (Sea Base, Sea Shield, and Sea Strike). We have also
    established an Analysis Center of Excellence to form the leading edge
    of mission level analysis and align our modeling analysis--including
    the accurate modeling of space and cyberspace networked systems, and
    how they contribute to warfighting effectiveness--under the Sea Power
    21 FORCEnet Pillar. I am particularly enthusiastic about the ongoing
    assessment of space capabilities with regard to their contribution to
    Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), a new operational concept that we have
    been working closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and others to develop so
    that we can better defend the homeland against those who attempt to use
    the seas to transport terror to our shores, as well as to help forgo
    threats early forward overseas. MDA will enable identification of
    threats as early and as distant from our borders as possible to
    determine the optimal course of action. Armed with this better
    awareness and visibility, we will provide an active, layered system of
    defense that incorporates not only the maritime domain, but space and
    cyberspace as well.
        The Navy's space investment portfolio reflects our partnership with
    the Department's Executive Agent for Space and the rest of the National
    Security Space community--as well as our maritime responsibilities. We
    rely on the Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to
    acquire most of the major space platforms, collaborating on the
    required capabilities, and then we buy the user equipment for the
    fleet. We also take the lead in tackling maritime challenges through
    our participation in the Science and Technology/Research and
    Development (S&T/R&D) process.
        The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint
    community is the acquisition of the Mobile User Objective System
    (MUOS). The MUOS contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin on 24
    September 2004 and is fully funded in the fiscal year 2006 budget
    request to meet all threshold requirements with an Initial Operational
    Capability (IOC) of 2010. MUOS will provide ``communications on the
    move,'' through double canopy foliage and in the urban environment to
    small antennas used by bandwidth-disadvantaged users. MUOS is the
    common denominator for command and control providing the capability to
    communicate from tactical to theater levels, to allies and coalition
    partners and between defense and non-defense agencies.
        MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
    communications. During Operation Enduring Freedom, UHF Follow-On (UFO)
    and Leased Satellite 5 (LEASAT 5) supported only 80 percent of
    narrowband tactical UHF satellite communication requirements.
    Additionally, in the 2010-2012 timeframe, LEASAT 5 will reach end of
    life and UFO is expected to reach an unacceptable level of performance.
    Complete loss of these UHF satellite communication resources would have
    a significant impact on combat operations if not replaced by MUOS.
    Today, UFO supports approximately 500 accesses worldwide. Based on
    evolving future warfighting concepts in support of the Defense Planning
    Guidance (DPG), access requirements have grown by at least a factor of
    four. MUOS will provide a minimum of 1,997 worldwide accesses. As
    Lockheed Martin refines its design, we expect this capacity to grow.
                                   innovation
        The Navy continues to invest in its Tactical Exploitation of
    National Capabilities (TENCAP) Program. Navy TENCAP's R&D process
    includes matching innovative responses to emerging Fleet requirements
    and mission capability gaps identified within the analytical Naval
    Capability Development Process (NCDP). This R&D process emphasizes the
    following rigor: (a) rapid prototyping (12-24 months); (b) testing
    under field conditions; and (c) rigorous, independent assessment of
    results. Over the past 24 years, Navy TENCAP has completed 110 R&D
    efforts with 54 percent resulting in new operational and improved ISR
    capabilities for the fleet and joint forces all for a cost less than
    $20 million per year.
        Additionally, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) built tactical
    satelite-1 (TACSAT-1) as part of the Office of Force Transformation
    Operationally Responsive Space initiative, and it is ready for launch
    this year on Space-X's Falcon launch vehicle. TACSAT-1 uses a
    commercial MicroStar spacecraft to carry several sensor payloads into
    low earth orbit. The payloads are designed to allow machine-to-machine
    collaboration between Air and Space assets for geo-location, as well as
    specific sensor discrimination capability. Even more significant,
    TACSAT will demonstrate tactical control of payload and dissemination
    of data through SIPRNET--a truly netcentric thrust. For TACSAT-1, NRL
    is working in partnership with the Air Force Space Command, NRO Office
    of Space Launch, and NASA. The Air Force is leading subsequent TACSAT
    demonstrations, on which Navy will also have secondary payloads;
    TACSAT-2's Navy payload is focused on the Maritime Domain Awareness
    challenge. This partnership is a significant step forward to leverage
    small satellite technology to design more responsive space
    capabilities.
                                  space cadre
        The key to success is the mix of operational experience and space
    savvy found in our Navy Space Cadre. As members of the National
    Security Space team, we participated in the development of the National
    Security Space Human Capital Resources Strategy and the establishment
    of the Space Professional Oversight Board, the Senior Officer Forum for
    the discussion and resolution of matters concerning space professional
    development within the Department of Defense.
        Navy Space Cadre officers are assigned to NRO, the National
    Security Space Office, USSTRATCOM, many Joint Program Offices, and
    throughout the fleet. Their operational expertise provides critical
    insight into how space can optimize warfighting capabilities. To
    further improve the management of our space cadre, we have designated
    VADM McArthur, Commander, Naval Network Warfare Command, as the Navy's
    Space Cadre Functional Authority, providing strategic guidance on
    priorities for the development and employment of the Navy Space Cadre.
    He recently released the Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy, which
    outlines our vision and way ahead.
        The Navy Space Cadre Advisor is working closely with his Service
    counterparts to meet both Navy and National Security Space goals. The
    Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Space Systems Operations and Space
    Systems Engineering curricula continue to provide the Navy and other
    Services graduate education, post-graduate (Engineer) degrees, and
    doctoral degrees. In addition, the Navy has developed a Space
    Certification at the NPS, with courses available online. We also
    created a formal Educational Alliance with the Air Force through a
    memorandum of agreement between NPS and the Air Force Institute of
    Technology (AFIT), with the goal of leveraging strengths and
    eliminating duplication in space education.
                                    summary
        Our mission remains bringing the fight to our enemies. The
    increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
    uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
    future conflict, will continue to drive the need for naval forces and
    the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
    seas, space, and cyberspace.
        Accordingly, we will continue to fight the global war on terror
    while transforming for the future fight. We will continue to refine our
    operational concepts and appropriate technology investments to deliver
    the kind of dominant military power from the sea envisioned in Sea
    Power 21. We will continue to pursue the operational concepts, such as
    MDA, even as we invest in technology and systems to enable naval
    vessels to deliver decisive, effects-based combat power in every
    tactical and operational dimension. We understand that space
    capabilities will be critical to our efforts and must be integrated
    throughout the naval force and we understand that because the future of
    the Navy is tied to space, we must succeed in growing and maintaining
    our space cadre. We also look forward to the future from a strong
    partnership with Congress that has brought us many successes today.
        My highest priority is to transform Navy organizational processes
    and culture to fully integrate the warfighting capabilities that space
    systems present to our warfighters. To that end, Navy intends to be a
    full joint partner in space.

        Senator Sessions. My staff says I only have 3 minutes. We'd
    better stop now.
        General Dodgen. Senator, if I could give you just a----
        Senator Sessions. Well, it's--yes.
        General Dodgen.--if I could just give you a quick--about
    the pace of how we're moving on this. We went into Operation
    Iraqi Freedom with a--and it discusses Blue Force Tracking--we
    went into Operation Iraqi Freedom with a few hundred devices.
    We now have, in the part of that conflict, we went to thousands
    of devices; we are now to tens of thousands; and, over the next
    few years----
        Senator Sessions. Devices, what----
        General Dodgen. These are small devices that let--operating
    in communications through space, let the commanders know where
    their forces are.
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        General Dodgen. Complete Blue Force situational awareness.
    That's growing rapidly, and that's probably a good example of
    the pace at which we're moving.
        Senator Sessions. I would agree.
        Gentlemen, I'm sorry. We'll--if you can stay, I think
    there's some other matters we would like to discuss. If any of
    you--it's such that you're not able to stay, I would certainly
    understand that. We will return in--these are four 10-minute
    votes. Sometimes people give up on a vote, but it's unlikely,
    so it'll probably be at least 30 minutes before we get back.
        We are adjourned for the time being. [Recess.]
        General, we will get started again. I thank you very much
    for your patience. It's--this time of the year, with the
    budget, about--and we have 50 hours, but the hours only count
    during debate; they don't count during votes, and I--we'll
    probably--we may have a hundred or more pending amendments to
    vote on. Hopefully, some will go away. Besides that, they bunch
    them, periodically, and so we just did a bunch.
        I think what I could summarize, the testimony before we
    left, is that domination of space is critical to our defense
    needs. The way we fight wars, we utilize the space, and we
    could never allow our soldiers to be subjected to the kind of
    capabilities that we are able to employ on the battlefield.
    That would place them at a greater risk than we would accept.
    So I do believe it's critical that we be honest and direct and
    commence the necessary programs to ensure that that remains the
    case, as it is today.
        I am a little troubled by the funding level that I asked
    about earlier, Mr. Teets, on the--what would appear to be the
    relatively small amount of money spent on offensive and
    defensive counterspace. Perhaps that's not enough, and we ought
    to be looking at that to make sure that we are moving forward.
        I also think, without going into any details, that we can't
    be squeamish about this subject. We might as well be honest
    about it. They--when you have soldiers at risk on the
    battlefield, pilots at risk in the air, sailors at risk on the
    sea, we can't allow political correctness or other type
    concerns to deflect us from thinking clearly about where we
    need to go and what we need to do.
        So, I want to encourage you in that. That would be one of
    my main concerns, and we'll be pursuing it as we go forward, as
    I chair this subcommittee, to make sure that we are not being
    reluctant to propose, from your perspective, anything necessary
    to maintain our capabilities, and expand them.
        Mr. Teets, you, I believe, one time graded yourself as--on
    contracting and management--contracting, I guess--as a C-plus.
    There are a lot of times I would like to have had that grade,
    but the----[Laughter.]
        How do you see--what lessons have you learned in
    contracting and in management that you might like to share with
    us? I know the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is of the
    opinion that sometimes if we wrote the contract better going
    in, we'd be better off as we managed the contract as we go
    forward. Do you have any comments on how we can avoid the cost
    overruns, the--missed time deadlines, through contracting or
    other actions we might take?
        Secretary Teets. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
    The answer is, yes, I do have a good number of thoughts along
    those lines, and most of the thoughts have been embedded into
    this new acquisition policy for space systems, called 03-01,
    and they include such things as making certain that you have
    the systems engineering necessary for one of these complex
    systems done early on, making certain that you put the key
    decision points on the program, that are fundamental
    acquisition-program milestones, at the right place for a
    program that is largely research and development, not
    production. All of those changes have been codified and put
    into this acquisition policy 03-01.
        Another item that I have been discussing at considerable
    length is the need for us to have, embedded within our
    programs, sufficient program-managers reserve so that when
    problems arise, as inevitably will arise--you can't go through
    a leading-edge technology-development program, which is what
    all of our space systems are--you can't go through that without
    encountering some unexpected problems. When you do encounter
    the unexpected problems, you can't wait for funds to be
    reprogrammed or moved from one program element into another
    program element, or wait to solve the problem. Help is needed
    in a rapid way if you're going to properly respond. Yet the
    system that we have--and I'm not laying this, by any means, all
    at the feet of Congress--I would tell you that the system we
    have doesn't seem to have any discipline for allowing program
    managers to have reserve, and then have access to it. I can't
    tell you how frustrating that kind of a situation is. Because
    the first thing a program manager needs is to have a resource
    to apply to a problem when it arises in a development program.
    So, I've been working hard to try and figure out a way to get
    that done. This year----
        Senator Sessions. Could you give us an example of when that
    kind of thing, that reserve--how it could help the program?
        Secretary Teets. Absolutely. What can easily happen if you
    don't have a Reserve to apply when a problem arises, you will
    have to defer work on the program downstream. You can't bring
    in any extra--any additional resource. All you can do is
    recognize that the end of the fiscal year is coming, and
    you're--you will then delay the program, essentially, while you
    fix the problem. What that leads to is schedule disruption. It
    gets the various elements of a major development program out of
    synchronization, because you'd establish the program in a way
    that had those synchronized. It generates a certain amount of
    chaos in the development program that ends up snowballing on
    you.
        What I've been trying to do is find ways to establish
    meaningful reserve. This year, in the NRO budget, I have
    actually proposed that the NRO director have a significant
    program reserve. Whether I'm allowed to--whether that's
    authorized and appropriated is yet to be seen, but----
        Senator Sessions. So it would--should the DOD request it
    when they propose a program, and put it in their request----
        Secretary Teets. Yes, I think----
        Senator Sessions.--or is it something that Congress ought
    to add on its own?
        Secretary Teets. Well, I think--as a matter of fact, I
    think the DOD should allow creation of Reserves. Then you can't
    move them around. You have to recognize that that program
    reserve is intended for application to the program when
    problems arise, and can't be tapped when some other program
    somewhere else runs into a snag. That has to be honored. There
    has to be integrity in the system to allow that to happen.
        Now, another major item that we've been working hard on,
    and I think we're getting better at, is independent cost
    estimating. It's true that we have had difficulty in properly
    estimating the cost of a program, and we suffer from the
    problem of trying to cram too much program into what might be
    thought of as an optimistic contractor estimate.
        We had an excellent panel formed, under the leadership of
    an old friend of mine by the name of Tom Young, who came in and
    did--with a group of very talented people, did a thorough
    review of where we were on SBIRS, where we were on Future
    Imagery Architecture (FIA), where we were on EELV, several
    other programs, and they came back and gave us their view of
    the situation. One of the things they emphasized was the need
    for us to have better independent cost estimates earlier on in
    the program. We've tried to institute that----
        Senator Sessions. How do you----
        Secretary Teets.--as well.
        Senator Sessions.--get an independent cost estimate?
        Secretary Teets. The right way to get an independent cost
    estimate is to have a group of people who are professionals in
    the field, who are augmented by technical people, who come in
    and do an independent review. That is to say, they're off the
    program, they're--they come in and do an independent review,
    and then create a cost estimate that is unbiased, it's not
    driven by programmatic needs; it's just an honest assessment of
    that program, and it's a combination of technical, as well as
    cost-estimating techniques.
        Senator Sessions. Before--it would be before the program
    starts or in the middle of it or anytime it's appropriate?
        Secretary Teets. Generally speaking, what you want is an
    update to the independent cost estimate at every major
    milestone decision point. When you go to a key decision point
    in the program, you want the milestone decision authority to be
    informed by a new independent program assessment, including
    that cost assessment.
        That's what we've started to implement in this 03-01
    acquisition policy that I referred to. It's going to take time
    to show its value. The fact is, the seeds of the problems that
    we are seeing on SBIRS and FIA were shown in the 1990s. The
    programs were not established with adequate systems engineering
    up front, they were not scoped to have the proper test program
    built into the programmatic flow. Optimistic--very optimistic
    contractor estimates for performance in both of those cases,
    SBIRS as well as FIA--and those are two different, but very
    large independent prime contractors--those estimates that were
    provided in those proposals were unrealistically optimistic.
    They were cost-reimbursable contracts, bid in a competitive
    environment--highly competitive environment, and the costs were
    optimistically bid and then accepted.
        Senator Sessions. So, should--can that be handled by DOD
    policy, or would it need legislation----
        Secretary Teets. I believe----
        Senator Sessions.--or congressional----
        Secretary Teets. No, in this case----
        Senator Sessions.--partnership----
        Secretary Teets. With the exception of the item--that I
    mentioned on reserve, in this case the independent cost
    estimates, the systems engineering up front, the key decision
    points that are tailored to a research and development program,
    all of that is codified in this policy, 03-01, and at the NRO
    in something we call NRO Directive 7. Those have been meshed to
    gain best-practice information from both organizations.
        I think all of that is in place, but the gestation time for
    that to take effect is a long time. Programs like Space Radar
    and TSAT System are, in fact, now being brought into existence
    under this new codified 03-01 acquisition system and, I think,
    downstream, we'll be the beneficiaries of acquiring under this
    new system of acquisition.
        We have to recognize that we're not at the end of our
    problem list on either SBIRS-High or FIA, and we're going to
    have to live with it until those programs come to completion.
        Senator Sessions. It makes sense to me, and I would just
    suggest that, if we do need congressional action, I think we
    should have some hearings on this and consider it. GAO has
    expressed concern throughout the government, not just DOD, in
    contracting procedures. In August, they raised concerns about
    the inadequacy of DOD's Space Acquisition Workforce. It seems
    to be a growing trend to have contractors oversee more of the
    work to make up for the lack of government personnel, and that
    may be a problem.
        I've learned, if you have a family member in the hospital,
    if you don't take an interest in their condition, the doctors
    sometimes get confused or they--the different ones, and you
    have to--if you build a house, I don't think you can just turn
    it over to the architect; you have to be engaged or--because
    you have a greater intensity of interest in having it be
    successful and meet your specifications than anybody else in
    the world would have.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. I don't oppose private contracting,
    because they can create teams and handle peak work levels and
    do things in a way that government employees have a difficulty
    doing. But I guess my question to the panel would be--and let's
    just do this briefly, and I might ask you to submit more for
    the record--is this a concern? Do we need more skilled people
    capable of managing this?
        General Lord?
        General Lord. Senator Sessions, I'll answer the question
    and I'll follow on with what Mr. Teets said. Developing the
    acquisition professionals in the space acquisition business is
    a priority of Mr. Teets and certainly one that we share. I know
    that our other colleagues do agree with us. What we've done at
    our Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles, we're
    keeping our program managers longer was one of the things that
    Mr. Young noticed the first time he took a look at us, that we
    had program managers who didn't stay around long enough to lead
    a program to success. So we've agreed on a minimum 4-year
    tour----
        Senator Sessions. What was it before that? I mean, how long
    did you stay----
        General Lord. Well, in some cases we had--in some major
    programs, we'd have four or five program managers in a period
    of 5 or 6 years, which is just absolutely the wrong way to do
    business. We've put our foot down, and now we're--we have 4-
    year minimum tours for our program managers, we have our----
        Senator Sessions. Can you extend that if----
        General Lord. I can, depending on what's going on. Our
    SBIRS program manager, for example, Colonel Randy Weidenheimer,
    I didn't say he would be the program manager for life, but he's
    going to get the program, and he'll keep working that as long
    as we need him to. Randy's doing a wonderful job, I think,
    given what Mr. Teets said, that he inherited a program that had
    some flaws in it, and we're working those. But the pressure is
    to put the right people in at the right place, train them, have
    the systems engineering schools that they can help understand,
    and then have the right amount of engineers in the systems at
    Los Angeles so that we can do that. Mr. Teets is----
        Senator Sessions. Are these civilian and--I mean----
        General Lord. We have a mixture of military and civilian
    engineers. We're 100 percent manned----
        Senator Sessions. Government employee----
        General Lord. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions.--civilians.
        General Lord.--100 percent in our civilian engineers in the
    Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles against their
    authorizations. That number's probably close to, I would say--I
    don't know exactly--I think it's close to maybe 750, 800, maybe
    even a thousand civilian engineers at Los Angeles.
        Now, our military component is smaller than that, but we
    have key management positions, where we're manned now, or will
    be by the summer, at about the same authorization rate the rest
    of the Air Force is, because engineers in the acquisition
    business are really golden nuggets, and we try to spread them
    around. We have some great ones, and we're going to get up to
    the same level as the rest of the Air Force. So we want to go
    even further. We're taking actions to selectively man, where we
    can, in the space acquisition business.
        So professional development of our acquisition cadre is an
    important part for us.
        Senator Sessions. You believe you are making progress----
        General Lord. We're making progress, but we're competing in
    an environment where there's a lot of other competition for
    engineers, and we want to make sure we have the best and
    brightest that we can get our hands on in the Space and Missile
    Systems Center.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it strikes me, if we have a multi-
    billion-dollar procurement program that's critical to our
    national defense, we may have to provide unusual compensation
    capabilities to the defense management to keep the people you
    need. Have you considered whether or not some change in our----
        General Lord. There's been options like that----
        Senator Sessions.--personnel system might be helpful, or--
    --
        General Lord. Yes, sir, there's been opportunities to--and
    I'll have to provide it for the record; I don't know exactly
    what the bonus is now for some engineers, and we'll provide
    that to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Critical Skills Retention Bonus was offered in fiscal year 2003
    to the following Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs): 32E (Civil
    Engineer), 33S (Communications and Information), 61S (Scientific
    Research), 62E (Developmental Engineer), and 63A (Acquisition Program
    Manager). The goal of the retention bonus was to retain officers in the
    target AFSCs with 4-13 commissioned years of service by offering 1 to 4
    year contracts with a payout of $10,000 per year, not to exceed
    $40,000. In fiscal year 2003, officers who were eligible were required
    to make their decision to accept the bonus by 31 August 2003. New
    contracts have not been awarded since 31 August 2003 and the last
    payment to those originally accepting the bonus will expire on 30
    September 2006.
        The retention bonuses offered to critical skills in fiscal year
    2003 had a positive impact on retention when compared to projected non-
    bonus Cumulative Continuation Rates: Scientists, 5.9 percent increase
    over projection, an additional 28 officers retained; Engineers, 13.8
    percent increase over projection, an additional 173 officers retained;
    Acquisition Program Managers, 10.5 percent increase over projection, an
    additional 86 officers retained; and Communications-Computer, 6.7
    percent increase over projection, an additional 134 officers retained.
        This program proved valuable and should be a consideration in
    developing force shaping initiatives in the future.

        General Lord. But we have used that as an incentive to
    attract people and make sure they stay in that business. But
    we're looking at all the options.
        Senator Sessions. I notice you indicated that you share the
    concern and--just briefly.
        General Cartwright. I think you've hit the key issues. It's
    the stability of the workforce. It's the training and then the
    refreshing and constant interface. Because this is a dynamic
    field, the rules, the laws, the regulations change on a regular
    basis. The technologies change very quickly. If you don't have
    a workforce that's engaged and stable, you lose the benefit.
        Senator Sessions. I'll ask the other--General Cartwright
    and the others, military witnesses--what about the Space Radar?
    Can you give us an appreciation for its utility and where we
    are on that?
        General Cartwright. I'll start off and give you a thumbnail
    of how I see the utility of radar from space and how it's
    evolved. It's more in the context of a warfighter approach. If
    you go back, in particular, to the first Gulf War, one of the
    takeaways out of that war was that we needed to be able to take
    the night away from the enemy and be able to operate 24 hours a
    day. We came out of that war looking at both taking the night
    from the enemy and bringing precision to the war. Those were
    the two big takeaways, from my perspective, out of that
    activity.
        As we moved into the Bosnia and Kosovo era and some of the
    work that we did there, the next major activity we really felt
    like we needed to take away in the scorecard for the enemy was
    weather. That was reinforced again in this most recent
    conflict.
        When you look at taking the night and weather away from the
    enemy, you start to want to use more than one phenomenology to
    see what's going on. Electro-optical or just pure vision
    becomes challenged, obviously, in the night, and particularly
    in the weather. Radar gives you a way of having the opportunity
    to dictate the tempo of the conflict on your terms, because
    you're not held up by night and you're not held up by weather.
    Eventually--I'll extend this out one more iteration, which is
    that we have to start to take away the advantage of mobility
    and deception from the enemy. Again, having more than one
    phenomenology to look at in a very wide area, country size, and
    understand what's in front of you and not be hindered or
    dictated by natural phenomenon or by the enemy's ability to run
    and hide, will be critical to the way we fight battles in the
    future.
        Senator Sessions. They understand when our capabilities are
    at their minimum, and tend to make their movements and actions
    during those periods.
        General Cartwright. They are not unintelligent in that
    area.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, we've been concerned
    about the cost of this program. You've restructured it, I
    understand, some, and how are we doing with that? Is there any
    cost-sharing that we can obtain, or the DOD could obtain
    through the Intelligence Community, to help afford this
    program?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. What we have done is really
    responded to a directive that is cosigned by both the Secretary
    of Defense (SECDEF) and the Director of Central Intelligence
    (DCI), which came out after a number of Space-Based Radar
    Summit meetings that we held among people who are involved in
    both the warfighting community, as well as the intelligence-
    collection community. This particular memorandum that I'm
    referring to really dictates the desire of both the DCI and the
    SECDEF to field a national Space Radar system, one that will
    serve the needs of both the Intelligence Community and the
    warfighting community downstream.
        So, what we've done is put together a program that--for
    example, the President's request in 2006 is $225 million, and
    what we are going to spend a significant portion of that on is
    this demonstration satellite that I mentioned in my oral
    statement, which would fly in 2008, or actually two satellites
    that would fly in 2008. These satellites would be about a
    quarter-scale, roughly speaking, a one-fourth scale model, of
    the full-blown operational satellite that would come online in
    about the 2015 time frame. What we're trying to do on the cost
    equation is mature the technology early, use the transmit-
    receive modules that would ultimately be used on the full-blown
    system, but do it early, and have the Intelligence Community
    and the warfighting community work together to develop the
    concept of operations for how this system would be used--how
    would it be tasked, how would you disseminate the data that you
    receive from it, how would synthetic-aperture radar imagery get
    to imaging analysts while surface moving-target indication
    information would get to combatant commanders in theater--
    develop all of that concept of operations.
        What we've said is, before we spend a very large amount of
    money on a full-blown operational system, let's show you--and
    show ourselves, too, by the way--but let's show ourselves and
    Congress that we can deliver this system at a predictable
    price, we can work together to develop this concept of
    operations. Then there's a separate tasking, in this memo that
    I referred to, which charges the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
    for Community Management to work together to find the right
    formula for sharing the funding, starting in 2008. So, in 2008,
    I do believe that there will be a jointly-funded Space Radar
    Program that will come to Congress.
        Senator Sessions. Anyone want to make a brief comment on
    the priority that we ought to give to this, how critical that
    is to the warfighter, and----
        General Cartwright. I'll throw at least initial comments in
    here. To me, again, owning to the tempo of the fight, being
    able to do it day, night, all weather, is critical. There are
    other capabilities that radar, as a phenomenology offered to us
    in the realm of precision, both for locating a spot on the
    Earth and for describing it, that you cannot get from electro-
    optical, which is the way we do business today. As we move to
    more precise weapons, lower collateral damage, and a better
    understanding of the environment that we operate in, radar is
    going to be critical to us in that environment. Having that
    available and taskable by the warfighter is going to be very
    important, as it will also be to the Intelligence Community.
        Admiral Sestak. Mr. Chairman?
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Sestak?
        Admiral Sestak. Just a short vignette. I talked to you
    about a scenario that was run by the General in the next
    decade, where three aircraft carriers had to show up at a
    conflict. This analysis shows that having five aircraft
    carriers show up, let's say, at ``D Plus 20,'' was interesting,
    but irrelevant. Having two or three carriers there with this
    space capability was totally relevant, on D-Day, to that fight.
        What the U.S. Navy, same as my brethren services, are going
    to face in the next decade against certain regional adversaries
    is pretty much a ``saturation'' tactic by them. For us, it's a
    lot of mines to impede us closing them, a lot of submarines,
    but it's also a lot of arrows going to be shot at us at sea--
    theater ballistic missiles--as well as at our service brethren
    sitting in several overseas bases. There are not enough of our
    arrows to shoot down their arrows. There just aren't.
        To be able to have a space-based capability that can be
    overhead, day in and day out--in peacetime, watching where they
    move what we call Transportable Erector Launches (TELs)--and
    then be able to say, when the flag goes down, that I can shoot
    the archer, I can take him with that quick-response missile is
    exactly what we need to do--which space radar can help with
    enormously. So, the only thing we would need hard-kill for--
    which is still important--is to have a nominal number of arrows
    to shoot the arrows down that were fired from bunchers not
    destroyed--a greatly mitigated threat. It's absolutely critical
    in future conflict for us, from the sea.
        Senator Sessions. Would you care to express an opinion as
    to, in the panoply of matters we are spending money on in
    space, how high you would rate Space Radar?
        Admiral Sestak. I would rate that capability as extremely
    high. Warfare in the future is about speed. Every war we've
    fought since World War II has been one where U.S. industrial
    might--such as in Operation Desert Storm, Korea in 1951, and
    World War II--we had time to build up. Even in this last war,
    it took us several months to get everything over there, and
    then we attacked. Imagine if we had had that capability of
    speed, of being able to see and know what Saddam was doing in
    1990, before he came into Kuwait. Maybe we wouldn't be there
    today.
        So, this capability to see, to know, and to act quickly
    because of intelligence from space is absolutely of a
    heightened concern.
        One last thing. The global war of terror and September 11
    showed us something. We haven't had to worry about any
    adversary coming against our shores from the seas since the
    British of 1812. September 11 has changed this tremendously. To
    some degree, we can protect the airways better, because we know
    that every plane has to be on a certain pathway; and if they're
    off that, alarms go off.
        People or items coming from the seas are many--56,000 ships
    every year come into U.S. ports that are over 10,000 tons,
    never mind the smaller ships. Which one of those ships coming
    from across the sea has something in it we don't want to pull
    into our port?
        The ability of a space-based capability, along with other
    sensors we have under the sea, to fingerprint precisely certain
    critical vessels coming across, is an additional attribute that
    this space capability gives us to control the strategic
    approaches by pervasive awareness from overhead, as well as
    from under the sea. Fingerprinting.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I think that states a strong case for Space Radar, and we
    need to be sure, as we go forward, our budget properly reflects
    that.
        Perhaps our service witnesses could share with us the
    extent to which we have learned lessons from this Iraq
    campaign, or Afghanistan campaign, and--What can we do better?
    Are there some things that Congress needs to do to help you
    meet your goals?
        General Cartwright, do you want to start off? We've talked
    about some of it, I know, but if there's something specific, it
    would be an opportunity to--we'd appreciate hearing from you.
        General Cartwright. I mean, I'll go back to the space
    situation awareness. It has become such a critical enabler for
    our warfighters. I speak from a purple uniform right now, as
    much as from a Marine uniform. To stay on a path that keeps our
    focus there so that we understand what's happening in space,
    since it is so critical, so that we can move from being able to
    assess what happens in very large volumes, but not with any
    great granularity, taking several days to know whether
    something ran into something else, was interfering with
    something else, or just disappeared. Today, there's so much
    ambiguity in an area that is so critical to the way we do
    business, that remaining focused in space situation awareness
    in the next few years is, to me, a critical enabler. Getting
    those capabilities into a command and control system that takes
    that awareness, not just to some headquarters, but down to the
    warfighters, so that they know when GPS is going to be
    available and how accurate it is, and they understand when
    their communications are being interfered with by solar
    activity or by an enemy. To me, that's going to be a critical
    enabler, and I want to stay focused in that area. It is
    resourced now. I'd just urge us to keep it resourced and move
    forward in that area.
        General Lord. Senator Sessions, thanks. Very good question.
    I want to say, with the support of this committee, certainly
    with respect to space professional development, I think that's
    helped us create an important advantage for us in this
    business. It certainly, I think, paid off in Operations
    Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Not only do we have the
    good hardware, but we have good people who understand the
    environment of space and our commitment to their educational
    and professional development helped us integrate space in a
    seamless way. We're not perfect yet. We have to continue to
    grow our people in the right kind of way so they're the bona
    fide warfighters and can stand shoulder to shoulder with their
    colleagues in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
    Coast Guard and be an equal partner in the air, land, sea, and
    space business. I think that's starting to really take hold.
    Because of your support, and the committee's support, we've
    been able to make some great strides there, and will continue.
    So I would, sir, ask you to just keep the pressure on us with
    respect to space professional development.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Dodgen.
        General Dodgen. Sir, I would highlight three things. First
    of all, I echo what General Lord said about the people. Space
    experts are going to be on the battlefield from now on in the
    Army's combat formations. We had gone from support teams, which
    went on call, to now we're in the process of putting organic
    space experts in each one of our division-level formations.
        The second thing I would highlight to you is that we had
    some issues with our missile warning in Operation Iraqi
    Freedom. There were classes of missiles that the current
    constellation DSP did not see. So, we need better infrared
    capability that SBIRS will provide us. The effect of not having
    that constellation up there to give you that missile warning is
    that you become dependent upon your radar resources to pick
    these things up, and you lose in a battle which is--and
    particularly with short-range missiles--is only seconds long,
    you lose some of those seconds. So that warning from space will
    be critical to us as we go forward.
        The last thing I would tell you, that I think we did for
    the first time in this fight that worked pretty well and we
    need to mature at the joint level, is the notion that, as space
    becomes more complicated, that we have a single space-
    coordinating authority which coordinates our efforts in space,
    understands our vulnerability, protects what we have, and
    limits our--the effects of our enemy. I think that's important,
    that we continue that at the theater level, and even at the
    global level.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Admiral Sestak. Sir, I have just two. The first one is that
    I would think of the TV series ``M*A*S*H.'' All those
    casualties are coming in, and the physicians are going around
    trying to find who to take care of first. That's part of the
    problem that we saw in the war, and that we definitely will see
    next decade with the space surveillance radar. We're going to
    have a lot of information; but how much of it is knowledge? We
    need data triage. We need machine-to-machine automatic target
    recognition, automatic mensuration; that is, the ability to
    say, ``These are the important targets and this is definitely a
    tank or a TEL.'' We can have this great space capability system
    up there, but we all know, having operated out there, that our
    minds can only take so much data . . . it needs knowledge
    presented to it. I need that automaticity in these networks Mr.
    Teets and others talked about. Without that, we are just
    getting information into the M*A*S*H tent, but we're not taking
    care of the important targets first on their way out.
        Second, I won't forget the day I got underway on a battle
    group. I'm literally 2, 3 hours out from Norfolk, headed to the
    Persian Gulf, a couple of years ago, when my intelligence
    officer walked in and said, ``I just want you to know, 10
    minutes ago two aircraft took off from this airfield in this
    country in the Persian Gulf.'' I said, ``Why do I care what's
    happening 8,300 nautical miles away, when I won't be there 2
    weeks from now?'' He said, ``Because we're the first battle
    group to ever have a direct downlink from a satellite that was
    able to have the signal intelligence intercept that they were
    getting underway. When you're in the Gulf, those two aircraft
    will be over top of you in 10 minutes.''
        So what's important as we begin to look at things like
    TACSAT, being able to have more responsive systems go up, is,
    our ability to get it directly by the warfighter. It's good to
    send it down and get it processed, data triage, but time is
    also important, and that downlink, increasingly, to that
    warfighter forward--from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to
    national satellites--to TACSATs--is critical in this fight.
        Those are the two I'd take away, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it is certainly a complex thing. I
    agree that discriminating between lethal attackers and
    innocents in time is critical. I've often thought about it. As
    we get more capable and we have more information, it's even
    harder to determine what's friendly and what's not. I don't
    envy you in that regard.
        Secretary Teets, do you have anything to share with us?
    We'll keep the record open so that anyone who wants to submit
    written questions will be able to do so. We'll also make part
    of the record your statements that you've given us. But do you
    have any final comments before we break?
        Secretary Teets. No, sir. I would only, in closing, thank
    you, once again, for the support of this committee. I think
    your attitude, that has been very evident today, is extremely
    helpful, and I appreciate very much the openness with which you
    are willing, and obviously eager, to discuss this entire space-
    control issue. I do think it is a paramount issue, and we need
    your continued support to push this agenda forward. We thank
    you very much.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Well, from this hearing, I think few could dispute that our
    military capability depends on space control, and, therefore we
    need to be investing in things that will allow us to continue
    to have that control and improve our capabilities.
        If there's nothing else, thank you very much for your
    excellent testimony. It has helped us a lot, and we look
    forward to continuing to work with you.
        We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                              general space policy
        1. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, is it U.S. policy to disrupt
    adversary satellite-based communications only in a temporary,
    reversible manner?
        Mr. Teets. U.S. space policy states that we are committed to he
    exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. These
    peaceful uses include intelligence and military-related activities. In
    the event that an adversary is using space in a manner hostile to U.S.
    national interests, we chose to deny the adversary this use. We reserve
    the right to employ a range of options which range from diplomatic
    through military. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is tasked to
    develop a range of options from temporary/reversible to permanent/non-
    reversible denial of an adversary's use of the space system and/or
    service.

        2. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, can we accomplish the space
    control mission solely through reversible effects?
        Mr. Teets. The objective of the U.S. space control mission area is
    to gain and maintain space superiority. Space Superiority is comprised
    of three critical elements. We must have complete Space Situation
    Awareness (SSA) to fully understand what is happening in space, we must
    be able to defend our space assets against hostile attack and the
    environment, and when required, we must have the ability and resources
    to deny our adversaries the use of space. While our focus is on
    temporary, non-destructive means, we reserve the right to use
    destructive force if it becomes necessary.

        3. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, are there any scenarios where
    we might have to consider destructive effects?
        Mr. Teets. Yes, it may be necessary but only after other options
    are considered. The U.S. will employ a range of options to achieve
    space superiority in a time and place as needed. These options include
    both diplomatic as well as military with the military options ranging
    from temporary/reversible to permanent/non-reversible. The decision is
    based on which option will best achieve the combatant commander's
    required effect. All U.S. military planning must be in accordance with
    The Law of Armed Conflict; space control planning is no different.
    Before implementing a plan to destroy any portion of a space system
    (ground, space, user) the planners will ensure that it meets both the
    necessity and proportionality principles associated with the Law of
    Armed Conflict. That is, that the destruction is required to meet the
    combatant commander's intent, the degree of force does not exceed that
    required to accomplish the mission and that the military advantage
    justifies the potential civil loss. Our current destructive
    capabilities are focused on the ground and/or user segment of the space
    system using conventional munitions.

        4. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, commerical imagery
    satellites, owned by other countries or a consortia of other countries,
    could conceivably provide to potential adversaries the location of U.S.
    forces during a crisis or conflict. Would we permit these commercial
    satellite companies to pass such information?
        Mr. Teets. Protecting U.S. and allied forces from overhead
    reconnaissance is a growing concern of ours. Commercial imagery is
    available to anyone with internet access and a credit card. Our
    approach for addressing this issue is multi-pronged. National remote
    sensing policy focuses on establishing agreements to limit the
    distribution of remote sensing information for U.S. licensed remote
    sensing operators in times of crisis. We are working with other
    governments to encourage them to put in place similar mechanisms for
    their commercial/civil operators. In addition, other diplomatic options
    can be pursued if necessary. On the military side, we continue to
    perform research and development on capabilities to deny remote sensing
    in accordance with our National space control policy should diplomatic
    options fail.

        5. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, the United States' Global
    Positioning System (GPS) system provides position and navigation
    information to anyone that has a GPS receiver, including potential
    adversaries. What is U.S. policy with respect to denying this
    information to adversaries, or those cooperating with adversaries,
    during times of crises or conflict?
        Mr. Teets. In accordance with presidential directive, the U.S.
    policy is to deny to adversaries position, navigation, and timing
    services from the GPS, its augmentations, and/or any other space-based
    position, navigation, and timing systems without unduly disrupting
    civil, commercial, and scientific uses of these services outside an
    area of military operations, or for homeland security purposes.

        6. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
    over 80 percent of our military satellite communications was provided
    by commercial carriers, many of which are owned by non-U.S. consortia.
    What are the national security risks of relying on commercial providers
    for military communications?
        Mr. Teets. Commercial satellite systems are an integral part of our
    space capabilities just as commercial aircraft play a vital role in our
    ability to transport troops and cargo when needed. Our challenge in the
    use of commercial space capabilities is to strike a proper balance
    between the risk in the use of commercial communications satellites and
    the cost of operating only military satellite communications to meet
    our needs. We are well aware of this balancing act and are aggressively
    refining strategies to ensure we find the proper balance. To address
    these opportunities and potential threats, a Department of Defense
    (DOD) Commercial Satellite Communications (SATCOM) study was
    established in 2004 where DOD worked directly with the satellite
    industry to improve policies, programs, protection, and processes
    relating to the commercial SATCOM services supporting U.S. Government.
    As part of this effort, I hosted a meeting for the CEOs of our
    commercial SATCOM service providers and other key DOD SATCOM leaders.
    The meetings focused on the vital role that commercial SATCOM plays in
    our current expeditionary force structure.

        7. Senator Sessions. Secretary Teets, should we consider the
    development of a National Commercial Satellite Communications policy
    similar to the existing National Remote Sensing Policy?
        Mr. Teets. Current national space policy (PDD/NSC-49) directs DOD
    and other U.S. Government agencies to ``purchase commercially available
    space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible.'' We see no
    requirement for a comprehensive, interagency National Space
    Communications Policy.
        At the same time, DOD is proactively working to amend the current,
    ``ad-hoc'' approach to leasing commercial SATCOM with a more strategic
    approach for acquiring services to support a variety of missions. The
    DOD Executive Agent for Space recently co-sponsored a comprehensive DOD
    Commercial SATCOM study. This study was conducted in conjunction with
    U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and the Office of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration. The
    study examined protection operations and acquisition practices
    associated with DOD use of commercial SATCOM networks. As a result of
    this study, Acting ASD(NII), Dr. Wells, signed a memorandum on ``Policy
    for the Planning, Acquisition and Management of Commercial Satellite
    Communications Fixed Satellite Services'' on 14 December 2004. This
    policy seeks to establish a capabilities-based, best practices strategy
    that provides more competitive, rapid, and reliable access to
    commercial satellite communications resources.
        In accordance with this action plan, the study co-sponsors are
    working closely with DISA to establish new contract criteria for the
    protection of commercial SATCOM networks, based upon ``best practices''
    for information sharing, physical protection, and cyber security. The
    National Security Space Office also is incorporating commercial
    requirements and capabilities in its update of the Transformational
    Communications Architecture.

        8. Senator Sessions. General Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral
    Sestak, there seems to be general agreement that it is a good idea to
    develop an operationally responsive space capability to provide
    warfighters with the ability to rapidly launch small, militarily useful
    satellites capable of supporting a specific theater of operations. How
    would each of your respective services employ such a capability in
    support of the warfighter?
        General Lord. Air Force Space Command is currently developing an
    Operations Concept for Joint Warfighting Space (JWS). Under this
    concept we will employ small satellites known as Tactical Satellites
    (TACSATs) that feature tailored payloads dedicated for the Theater
    Commander's specific needs. These TACSATs will have standardized
    platforms and payload interfaces for rapid mating and testing of
    payloads. Various payloads/platforms will be kept as War Reserve
    Material (WRM) near the launch pads, analogous to pre-positioned
    munitions on flight lines. The WRM concept, rapid mating and test,
    rapid launch capability, and priority mission planning will enable an
    initial on-orbit capability within 72 hours of call-up. We are planning
    a series of TACSAT flights starting later this year to demonstrate this
    responsive capability.
        General Dodgen. A good example of how we would use such a
    capability is the TACSAT, which is an experimental program that may
    provide a capability to rapidly augment an existing constellation of
    spacecraft, and/or to rapidly deploy space assets with payloads
    tailored to specific requirements of combatant commanders. Such a
    capability could assist in achieving persistent surveillance, precision
    targeting, communications, 360 degrees of situational awareness, and
    the possibility of dynamic re-tasking. Technology advancements in small
    satellites along with small responsive launch offer the potential of
    cost-effective, tactical space systems.
        Admiral Sestak. Small satellite constellations could provide
    additional options to the Battle Group Commander. These options could
    responsively fill capability needs or gaps, such as persistent
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communications
    relay, in a quick reaction manner. For specific problems, it could also
    help us achieve efficiencies by optimizing space capabilities in a
    responsive manner for limited timeframes.
        For instance, in the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom,
    the Navy was concerned about Iraqi use of mines to potentially disrupt
    and delay joint access to the area from the sea. The sheer number of
    ISR requirements and competition inherent for use of National Technical
    Means (NTM) make it difficult to achieve the level of persistent ISR
    needed to detect mine laying operations prior to a conflict. With an
    operationally responsive space capability, the battle group commander
    could request launch of a constellation of small satellites optimized
    against a specific threat (e.g. mines) to achieve Maritime Domain
    Awareness. The battle group commander could expect the small satellite
    constellation to be operational in a matter of weeks and to have direct
    tasking of the payload.

        9. Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, what progress has STRATCOM
    made toward development of a requirement document and a concept of
    operations to support this capability?
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is in the initial stages of writing a
    Space Support Joint Capabilities Document to address responsive space
    capabilities within the context of Joint Doctrine. The ongoing National
    Security Space Office Responsive Space Operations Architecture
    Development Study will also provide key insight to the analysis
    necessary for developing the responsive space attributes and
    capabilities required to support the joint warfighter.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                               space superiority
        10. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Teets, General Cartwright, General
    Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral Sestak, in 2001 the Space Commission
    reported ``an attack on elements of the U.S. space systems during a
    crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable act.'' These
    types of attacks could include but would not be limited to:

            1. Jamming the signal links between satellites and ground
            stations.
            2. Permanently or temporarily degrading satellites with lasers.
            3. Degrading or destroying satellites or ground systems with
            electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks.
            4. Conducting cyber attacks to disrupt computer systems used to
            control satellite functions and to collect, analyze, and
            distribute information.

        The United States has had an ever-evolving reliance on space
    operations to support military and national objectives, beginning with
    1991's Persian Gulf War. Since then, space systems have been heavily
    utilized for navigation, communication, weather, missile warning, and
    targeting information. It is my understanding that approximately 60
    percent of the precision-guided munitions dropped over Afghanistan
    during the first 2 months of Operation Enduring Freedom were GPS-
    directed Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs). I have also been
    informed that commercial satellites are providing more than 70 percent
    of the military's communication network during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
    Non-U.S. companies, I might add, own most of these satellites.
        It seems to me that with the ongoing and escalating use of space
    assets we need to ensure that we have superior systems that are heavily
    defended against attack. I don't have to point out that the threat to
    our space capability need not come directly from the enemy we engage.
    The enemy we engage can buy the threat from a third-party.
        What are we doing to ensure that our space capability is indeed
    superior, and just as importantly, how do we limit any attack on what
    we have come to rely on as a critical information provider to defeat
    the enemy? In other words, should the U.S. do more in the way of
    counter-space operations?
        Mr. Teets. The U.S. can no longer consider space a sanctuary and we
    are taking steps to ensure we are prepared to be meet the increasing
    threat. The National Security Space Community has reviewed and updated
    emergency response procedures and contingency plans to address existing
    and emerging threats. We are improving space situational awareness for
    enhanced warning and assessment of potential threats. Space operators
    and end-users are being educated on the full range of threats to space
    systems. We have taken addition steps and they are outlined in more
    detail in our May 2004 report to Congress titled ``Efforts to Address
    Vulnerabilities in Space Systems.''
        General Cartwright. Our space related assets are true global
    enablers. STRATCOM has an assessment underway to identify space control
    capability gaps and redundancies as well as the potential approaches
    necessary to guarantee our continued ability to operate freely in
    space. This assessment will also help rationalize ongoing space control
    policy development efforts and provide a basis to help focus future
    science and technology and acquisition programs.
        General Lord. Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the importance
    of space systems to military operations. However, the advantages of
    space-enabled warfare are also evident to our adversaries. Space can no
    longer be treated as a sanctuary. Defensive counterspace operations
    need to be a key consideration in the development, acquisition, and
    operation of every space system. For example, the Air Force has
    reviewed and updated emergency response procedures and contingency
    plans to address existing and emerging threats. The Air Force is also
    developing a comprehensive attack detection and characterization
    program that will increase space situation awareness significantly and
    allow us to mitigate the effects of an attack on less protected
    systems. Our space operators and end-users are being educated on the
    full range of threats to space systems. More specifically, the Air
    Force has established a Space Aggressor capability and a Space Test and
    Training Range capability to conduct threat and protection training in
    a realistic, yet secure environment. We have taken additional steps and
    they are encompassed in more detail in the DOD Executive Agent for
    Space May 2004 Report to Congress entitled ``Efforts to Address
    Vulnerabilities in Space Systems.''
        General Dodgen. Counter-space operations are becoming increasingly
    important to warfighting. The increasing reliance on space capabilities
    demands that we protect these potential vulnerabilities. Protection
    must be examined in a holistic view--protection of on-orbit assets,
    protection of the links to ground systems, and protection of the ground
    systems. Besides protecting the ability of U.S. and coalition forces to
    leverage these critical space capabilities, we must remain vigilant to
    deny the enemy's use of various space capabilities that could be used
    against our forces, if required. Preventing the enemy from using space
    capabilities can range from diplomatic and economic measures to
    military ones. We must have the military capability to deny the enemy
    use of space capabilities in cases of last resort. These capabilities
    must strive to be temporary and reversible in nature. The ability to
    deny the enemy the use of space also requires a robust and near real
    time space surveillance capability that provides as complete space
    situational awareness as possible. Our counter-space approach must be a
    balanced but comprehensive one, integrating defensive and offensive
    capabilities and tactics to maintain our warfighting dominance.
        Admiral Sestak. Navy mitigates the effect that an attack might have
    on our space capabilities by building redundancy into our operational
    procedures so we can shift to a different means of transferring data if
    the space segment suffers an outage for any reason (hardware failure,
    adversary denial, etc.). SATCOM is a ship's lifeline after it pulls
    away from the pier, but if there is a hardware failure on a commercial
    satellite, for example, Navy ships have alternate means of
    communication in different frequency bands such as SHF (DSCS and
    Wideband Gap Filler) and EHF (MILSTAR and AEHF). Even if a Navy ship
    lost all satellite communications it could still communicate, albeit at
    a reduced level, using HF communications.
        All of the four mission areas of Space Control are important to
    ensure freedom of action in space for the U.S. Consequently, a balanced
    investment portfolio for SSA, Protection, Prevention, and Negation is
    needed to ensure maximum effectiveness.

                     china's growing anti-satellite threat
        11. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Teets and General Lord, as a follow-
    up, a growing concern of mine is China's increased space capability.
    China is spending large sums of money on jamming and intercept
    technologies, as well as laser technology that can blind electro-
    optical sensors or attack our GPS satellite constellation. Reports also
    highlight that China is thought to be on a path toward a direct-ascent
    (ASAT) system that could be fielded in the 2005-2010 timeframe. What
    are we doing to counteract these advances by China? In other words,
    what redundancies are we developing into our systems to prevent the
    success of these Chinese initiatives?
        Mr. Teets. The National Security Space Community continues to
    monitor threat assessments provided by our intelligence community. As
    the threat changes/evolves we adjust current operations and our
    acquisition programs as deemed necessary. We are facing a much
    different threat today than we did during the first 50 years of space
    operations and are taking appropriate measures to ensure our continued
    operations. The Air Force is investing in programs to improve our space
    situational awareness to allow us to better understand if we are under
    attack. We are developing enhanced capabilities to make it more
    difficult for an enemy to jam GPS or our satellite communication links.
    We continue to enhance force protection at our ground stations while
    maintaining a requirement for alternate control facilities to minimize
    the impact if one of the ground sites is attacked. In addition, space
    operators and end-users are being educated on the full range of threats
    to space systems. We have taken additional steps and they are outlined
    in more detail in our May 2004 report to Congress titled ``Efforts to
    Address Vulnerabilities in Space Systems.''
        General Lord. The importance of space to our military operations
    and the threat to space systems have evolved significantly over the
    first 50 years of space and missile operations and we are taking
    appropriate measures to ensure our continued operations. In concert
    with the rest of the National Security Space Community, the Air Force
    continues to monitor threat assessments provided by our intelligence
    community. As the threat changes and evolves, we adjust current
    operations and our acquisition programs as deemed necessary. The Air
    Force is investing in programs to improve our space situation awareness
    to allow us to better understand if we are under attack. We are
    developing enhanced capabilities to make it more difficult for an enemy
    to jam GPS or our satellite communication links. We continue to enhance
    force protection at our ground stations while maintaining a requirement
    for alternate control facilities to minimize the impact if one of the
    ground sites is attacked. In addition, space operators and end-users
    are being educated on the full range of threats to space systems.
    Additional steps to protect our space systems can be found in the
    Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space Report to Congress
    entitled ``Efforts to Address Vulnerabilities in Space Systems.''

                               space acquisition
        12. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Teets, when it comes to further
    acquisitions of space assets, I, and I am sure many of my colleagues
    would agree that we have to continue to exploit space to meet our
    national security objectives. From strategic missile warning, to
    assured communications, navigation, intelligence, and surveillance,
    modern, more technologically advanced systems are being developed. Yet
    these systems have run into problems with costing, delivery schedule,
    and technical performance.
        The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in June
    2003 entitles, ``Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their
    Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions.'' Are you familiar with
    this report?
        Mr. Teets. Yes.

        13. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Teets, the report specifies that most
    satellite programs cost more than expected and take longer to develop
    and launch than planned. It identifies the causes for these
    shortcomings as:

              1. Inadequate requirements definition and requirements
            instability
              2. Poor investment practices
              3. Poor execution of acquisition strategies
              4. Immature technologies

        The report also listed several contributing factors. I understand
    that you have modified the space acquisition process in an effort to
    address the report's conclusion.
        What positive results have you seen thus far based on the
    modifications you implemented for the space acquisition process, based
    on the findings of this GAO report? What, if any, additional
    adjustments are needed to further correct issues associated with this
    acquisition process?
        Mr. Teets. As the MDA, I am responsible for managing the program
    baselines to satisfy user requirements. We are working with the user
    community to more closely coordinate activities under JCIDS 3170 and
    NSS Acquisition Policy 0301.
        I updated the National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01 this
    past December to incorporate lessons-learned and to position Key
    Decision Point (KDP) reviews such that they will provide more relevant
    information to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) at the time of
    the reviews. I implemented similar changes to NRO policy to more
    closely align the two acquisition processes. The updated policy ensures
    that critical program events occur prior to the KDP. For example, the
    system design review should be completed prior to program initiation
    (Phase B) since it establishes the baseline to begin preliminary
    design. In addition, Requests for Proposals (RFPs) are not releasable
    until after the Defense Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) and Milestone
    Decision Authority (MDA)-approved acquisition strategy.
        Part of the space acquisition process is an Independent Cost
    Assessment Team (ICAT). While cost estimating is not an exact science,
    we've put in place a system to ensure past experience and solid costing
    methods are used and will lead to realistic cost numbers to aligning
    the design reviews with the Key Decision Points (KDP), NSS 03-01
    requires that an initial requirements documents The Independent Cost
    Estimate (ICE) is effective in giving the program's MDA a comprehensive
    estimate. All elements of cost are considered when deciding when or if
    to proceed with a space system. The ICE is a requirement for each DSAB
    meeting when the MDA approves the program's entrance into the next
    phase of the space acquisition process.
        The independent cost estimates are produced by an Office of
    Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led team that includes members from the Air
    Force cost community as well as members from the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and other Services' cost groups. A System
    Program Office (SPO) cost estimate is required as well. Both estimates
    are briefed to the MDA at the DSAB.
        I understand the GAO's concern on technology development
    requirements prior to key decision points. We share their desire to set
    a minimal threshold of maturity for allowing technologies into a
    program. Of equal importance, we must leverage cutting edge technology
    in order to meet the needs of the warfighting community. We must
    achieve a balance and I think the policy addresses this concern by
    formalizing an independent review of the System Program Office (SPO)--
    generated Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA). This means that the
    Component S&T Executive will provide an additional look at the
    technical level of maturity and provide an assessment to the MDA along
    with the exhaustive peer review that is part of the IPA process.
        It will take time to accurately assess the benefits of the modified
    space acquisition process. The systems that are growing up under the
    new process won't be fielded for a number of years. However, more
    frequent engagement of leadership earlier in the acquisition process
    and specific requirements prior to moving into phases are definitely
    positive steps towards addressing the challenges with space
    acquisition. The policy also allows for Program Managers and Program
    Executive Officers to conduct program reviews outside of the DSAB
    process at the request of the DOD Space MDA or designee.
        Whereas, currently, there are no further adjustments to the
    acquisition process, we will continue to focus on ways to improve. One
    future adjustment that would certainly help is a change in budgeting
    for space systems that recognizes the differences in acquiring space
    systems. This could be a management tool as I have talked about
    before--management reserve or a different appropriation other than
    missile procurement. This is a dialogue that needs to continue with
    Congress and within the DOD.
        Another related activity I initiated is development of a highly
    trained space cadre. This activity recognizes the need to establish and
    maintain a reliable source of experienced space personnel in the DOD
    and industry. No matter how good the acquisition review process
    becomes, it is more important to have people able to execute
    acquisition strategies, and recognize and develop good investment
    practices at the program level. Given the proper resources, this day-
    to-day work between government and industry has the greatest impact on
    the government's ability to successfully execute major space
    acquisition programs.
        With our improved acquisition decisionmaking policy and a system
    for space cadre development, we can focus on program execution. We need
    to reinforce more discipline in the program baselining process and our
    ability to get reliable program execution data back to program
    management in a timely fashion. This includes our ability to generate
    more accurate Integrated Master Schedules and the metrics that convey
    program performance. We feel that better program execution and
    management will lead to fewer rebaselinings and baseline breaches.

                           the concept of small space
        14. Senator Inhofe. General Lord, closely aligned with my previous
    question to Secretary Teets is the belief by some experts that our
    space programs are so big, so complex, that they inevitably will lead
    to cost overruns and delivery delays along with performance issues.
    That due to the sheer size of the programs, any shortcomings will have
    a huge impact not only on that program but also on follow-on programs
    or programs being developed in parallel. One alternative to the
    acquisition approach we have typically used would be an initiative
    known as ``Small Space,'' where relatively inexpensive, smaller,
    simpler, satellites would be orbited quickly, in an almost ``just in
    time'' sequence. Less expensive vehicles would be used to launch the
    satellites for military or crisis applications.
        Proponents of ``Small Space'' believe the benefits would include an
    expanded industrial base because of more satellite launches, reduced
    vulnerability due to a single satellite failure or attack, and improved
    responsiveness to the warfighter because of a more flexible launch
    process. How viable is such a low cost launch approach to the
    acquisition process, in your personal professional opinion?
        General Lord. All indications thus far are that a low-cost approach
    using ``Small Space'' is viable. We are working towards a low cost,
    responsive space launch capability. Under a joint AF/DARPA program, we
    are developing launch vehicles that would be able to launch small
    satellites for under $5 million per launch. Our Air Force Space
    Command's Space and Missile Systems Center is actively involved in that
    development program. They are also leading a launch vehicle demo
    program that features a hybrid between a reusable first stage and an
    expendable second stage to reduce launch costs by an estimated factor
    of 3X-6X as compared to current medium launch vehicle costs. Both of
    these programs will leverage from spiral development, where lessons
    learned are incorporated as incremental steps to affordable launch
    vehicles.

        15. Senator Inhofe. General Lord, how do we balance the needs for
    this ``Small Space'' approach, against the costs and technical
    challenges of developing, manufacturing, launching, and servicing
    large, complex systems?
        General Lord. Air Force Space Command sees ``small space''
    satellites and payloads playing an augmentation and a rapid
    reconstitution capability role to ``big space,'' as well as providing
    the potential for risk reduction prototypes or demos for larger
    strategic space systems. This concept allows us to rapidly provide
    capability when and where needed to prevent ``gaps.'' This is analogous
    to Navy PT boats augmenting battleships. ``Small space'' will not
    replace ``big space'' assets but will make capability gap coverage more
    affordable.

                       ``small space'' and the warfighter
        16. Senator Inhofe. General Cartwright and Admiral Sestak, I am
    particularly concerned about how our Space Initiatives will aid and
    benefit our troops on the ground, giving us an advantage that cannot be
    compromised. Do you believe that ``Small Space'' programs may have
    better or more responsive military applications than we currently
    possess with larger systems?
        General Cartwright. There is evidence that ``Small Space'' may be
    ideally suited as a potential surge capability for the warfighter.
    Lessons learned from recent conflicts indicate that, an operationally
    responsive tactical satellite supporting a single function, and/or
    tailored to a specific regional mission, could benefit deployed forces.
        Admiral Sestak. ``Small Space'' programs offer the potential for
    responsive military application and will complement the capacity,
    longevity, and reliability of the larger space systems. ``Small Space''
    programs will offer an additional option from national to organic
    sensors to fill capability needs or gaps such as persistent ISR and
    communications relay in a responsive manner for the military commander.
    They can help us achieve efficiencies by optimizing space capabilities
    for a particular problem in a responsive manner for a limited
    timeframe.
        Precisely because of their responsive nature, ``Small Space''
    programs will not be able to replace the larger space systems. We will
    continue to depend on the large capacity, endurance, and reliability of
    larger systems to provide indications and warning, ISR, communications,
    Meteorogical and Oceanographic (METOC) and Position, Navigation, and
    Timing (PNT) through peace time and crisis. Not only are the long-dwell
    times available from the ``large'' programs critical, but the broad
    range of capabilities offered by them will enable DOD to move toward
    net-centric operations.
                                     ______

                   questions submitted by senator john thune
                           space-based radar program
        17. Senator Thune. Secretary Teets, as we advance battlefield
    technologies we also open the door to advancing civilian dual use
    technologies that can help in a myriad of situations. I will watch with
    great interest the development of the Space-Based Radar (SBR) program.
    There is no dispute that this new system will prove to be a great asset
    to both our Intelligence Community and our warfighters. But this same
    technology--perhaps on a shared basis--can produce many valuable
    applications for civilian government agencies, academic, scientific,
    and industrial interests. These other applications may include
    topographic mapping, coastal zone management, agricultural/water/timber
    analysis, or oil/gas exploration. Will you take into consideration the
    potential benefits of providing at least some shared civilian use of
    the SBR system, and if so how?
        Mr. Teets. Space Radar data and products will have tremendous
    applications for civil agencies across the spectrum of academic,
    scientific, and industrial uses. Space Radar will accommodate civil
    requirements within the community structures for meeting user global
    information needs. The program's initial capabilities document which
    sets forth high level requirements for the Space Radar system will be
    coordinated through the Civil Applications Committee as part of the
    review process inherent to achieve DOD and national approval. This will
    ensure partnership of civil agencies in setting Space Radar
    requirements. Also, we are currently assessing the utility and policy
    implications of using the system for civil applications including
    counterdrug, disaster response, and homeland defense.

        18. Senator Thune. Secretary Teets, is there a real potential for
    cost savings to DOD if we find that other government agencies like the
    United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of the
    Interior, and especially the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), can
    possibly devote some of their budget resources to a program where they
    can also draw clear benefit?
        Mr. Teets. Including civil agency partners in the Space Radar
    program would provide DOD and the National community with opportunities
    to further share the cost of the Space Radar program in a responsible
    way with those agencies that will benefit from its enhanced
    capabilities. In line with cost sharing opportunities, DOD and the
    National Community are working closely together in an effort to review
    the governance and cost responsibilities for the Space Radar program in
    the future. Adding civil agencies to this effort would broaden the
    opportunities inherent in any such discussion. I would welcome the
    opportunity to discuss a cost sharing agreement with other government
    agencies such as the ones you mention. In fact, the SECDEF and DCI have
    recently affirmed their support for one common Space Radar capability.
    As part of this commitment, they have agreed to review the cost sharing
    approach in the fiscal year 2008 budget.

        19. Senator Thune. Secretary Teets, don't we have the technical
    capability and safeguards to provide some civilian use of SBR, perhaps
    by adding a separate, dual-frequency capability, yet still protect the
    classified aspects and military/intelligence uses of this platform?
        Mr. Teets. Space Radar has the ability through community tasking
    management processes to accommodate both DOD/National classified
    information needs and civil unclassified requirements. The community
    structures that exist today and as they will evolve to in the 2015
    timeframe will enable both sets of requirements to be met within a
    common operating process. Policy or material mechanism may be
    instituted over time to make the provision of unclassified civil
    information from the Space Radar system transparent to the user. Space
    Radar is in the concept exploration phase of acquisition, which is the
    time to study these requirements. We can look further at the technical
    aspects of adding a separate, dual-frequency capability, once the
    requirements have been vetted. We will continue to ensure the
    protection of sources and methods consistent with prudent guidelines
    and trusted technology.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
      advanced extremely high frequency satellite and tactical satellites
        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, on March 11, 2005, the
    committee received the report on TSAT acquisition strategies to reduce
    operational risk. That report estimates that with the current MILSTAR
    communications satellite and the three planned Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency (AEHF) satellites, coverage can be maintained through 2017
    over 75 percent of the world. This estimate is based on the assumption
    that the MILSTAR satellites will live longer than the design life. The
    report also assumes that TSAT will launch in 2013. The Air Force senior
    warfighter forum decided that they would accept this program and ``a
    potential gap in the fielding schedule'' in order to enable the
    delivery of T-Sat capability. What is the length of the ``gap,'' and
    when does the ``gap'' get too long?
        Mr. Teets. The third AEHF satellite is scheduled to launch in 2010.
    If a fourth AEHF were procured it would launch in 2011. The first
    Transformational Satellite Communications System \1\ (TSAT) launch is
    currently scheduled for 2013 and will complete the 4-satellite
    constellation required to fully meet AEHF capabilities. This creates a
    2-year gap in the fielding of the complete AEHF capability. While no
    capability gap is desirable, this 2-year gap is acceptable, given the
    estimated life of the combined MILSTAR-AEHF constellation. The
    acceptability of a larger capability gap would have to be assessed by
    the Senior Warfighters' Forum (SWarF).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ not to be mistaken with the Science & Technology demonstration
    platform TACSAT

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, General Lord, General
    Dodgen, Admiral Sestak, how much risk is acceptable?
        General Cartwright. It is critical to have and maintain the
    capability to deliver integrated net-centric communications across
    functional areas with adequate bandwidth to support our deployed forces
    and strategic missions. Potential degradation in the number of
    protected circuits and or loss of medium data rate capacity, could
    create operationally unacceptable conditions.
        General Lord. The current plan for three AEHF satellites and five
    MILSTAR satellites can be deployed to provide coverage for the most
    critical areas. The extended Data Rate (XDR) capability ``gap'' will be
    in the area with the lowest operational risk. Therefore, the Senior
    Warfighter Forum determined that the transformational capabilities
    provided by TSAT outweigh the risks resulting from a possible gap. If
    delays in the TSAT program caused the XDR capability ``gap'' to
    increase significantly, STRATCOM would convene another senior
    warfighter forum to reassess the risks.
        General Dodgen. The ``gap'' in the fielding schedule results from a
    portion of the Earth not being covered by the advanced extremely high
    frequency (AEHF) constellation as a result of the decision to move to
    TACSAT vice launching a fourth AEHF satellite. The first TSAT will
    close the AEHF ring, but requires a 2-3 year period between the launch
    of the third AEHF satellite and the first TSAT to achieve this
    capability. The Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) Senior
    Warfighter Forum accepted this risk and gap because of the vastly
    increased capability that TSAT brings to the warfighter, including
    greater than 20 times the capacity (28.5 Gbps system-wide), beyond line
    of sight comm-on-the-move, optical cross links, IP routing, etc. To
    mitigate the risk, in the interim, during the gap period, an AEHF
    satellite can be relocated if the situation requires this capability
    over an area of the earth not covered by the constellation. It should
    be noted that while the longevity estimate indicates that MILSTAR and
    AEHF can be maintained through 2017, MILSTAR will be a very aged
    satellite at that time, and AEHF, while a valuable transitional
    capability will not meet the transformation needs of the warfighter in
    the 2015-2025 time frame. Operating at the lowest common denominator a
    combined MILSTAR/AEHF constellation provides less than 300Mbps of
    circuit based, medium data communications. Both MILSTAR and AEHF are
    built to satisfy a relatively static, circuit based, post World War II,
    linear battlefield. TSAT is being designed to serve DOD's transformed
    modular, mobile, net-centric warfighter. ASD(NII), the Joint Staff,
    COCOMs, Services, and Agencies are united in unanimously supporting the
    first TSAT, and accepting risk in the period between the last AEHF
    launch and the first TSAT launch.
        Admiral Sestak. The level of risk for launching TSAT is considered
    acceptable because of the legacy our spacecraft manufacturers have
    developed over the past 30 years. Spacecraft are lasting longer than
    their design life and critical component redundancies are standard in
    every design. The satellite communications needs of our warfighters
    continue to exceed the supply of existing satellite constellations. The
    TSAT system will provide such a large increase in capacity, the
    combatant commanders are willing to accept this reasonable risk caused
    by the delayed launch.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    the AEHF satellite is significantly more capable than MILSTAR, and TSAT
    is significantly more capable than the AEHF satellite. I understand
    that everyone wants the most capability, but is there a way to minimize
    the risk associated with the plan for AEHF and TSAT without delaying
    TSAT?
        Mr. Teets. The current approach is the lowest risk considering
    available funding. The SWarF unanimously voted to support this approach
    based on the critical warfighter requirements for the TSAT capability
    and the sound risk mitigation approach being taken for TSAT.
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    what is the risk if MILSTAR fails?
        Mr. Teets. The level of risk depends on the location and
    capabilities of the affected MILSTAR satellite. In the worst case, a
    failure could either expand the existing tactical protected
    communications (Medium Data Rate) coverage gap, or open a temporary gap
    in strategic (Low Data Rate), world-wide protected communications. In
    either case, operational workarounds such as constellation
    reconfigurations or re-routing of data can mitigate these impacts.
        General Cartwright. The amount of risk would be a function of the
    number and location of failed satellites within the overall MILSTAR
    architecture and the time period in which the failure is theorized to
    transpire. Resultant coverage gaps would impact a variety of users
    depending on where the remaining satellite coverage is placed. The
    number of AEHF satellites on-orbit would also offset the failed MILSTAR
    induced coverage gaps. Under any scenario, the remaining MILSTAR and
    AEHF satellites would be re-positioned to maximize coverage.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    what if there are only three AEHF satellites when this failure occurs?
        Mr. Teets. With three operational AEHF satellites and the remaining
    MILSTAR satellites continuing to function, a single MILSTAR failure
    would have short term (e.g., hours to days) operational impact.
    However, we could minimize the long-term impacts with operational
    workarounds.
        General Cartwright. The amount of risk would be a function of the
    number and location of failed satellites within the overall MILSTAR
    architecture and the time period in which the failure is theorized to
    transpire. Resultant coverage gaps would impact a variety of users
    depending on where the remaining satellite coverage is placed. The
    number of AEHF satellites on-orbit would also offset the failed MILSTAR
    induced coverage gaps. Under any scenario, the remaining MILSTAR and
    AEHF satellites would be re-positioned to maximize coverage.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    has there been a decision to not buy the fourth AEHF satellite?
        Mr. Teets. The decision to buy the fourth AEHF satellite will be
    revisited in fiscal year 2005.
        An Interim Program Review was held in October 2004 to assess the
    progress of the TSAT program. Based on the results of that review and
    recommendations from the 16 Sep 04 Senior Warfighter Forum--where
    combatant commanders expressed unanimous support for TSAT development
    instead of procuring AEHF #4--the decision was made to stay with the
    baseline TSAT program. This decision is reflected in the fiscal year
    2006 President's budget request.
        If, at the end of the next year to year and a half, we have not
    been making proper advancement on retiring risks and maturing the
    technologies associated with TSAT, we will acquire a fourth AEHF
    system.
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    when must a decision be made to buy the fourth AEHF satellite without a
    break in the production line?
        Mr. Teets. A production break could be avoided if a decision were
    made in time to allow for budgeting of Advanced Procurement funds in
    the fiscal year 2007 budget.
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright, in
    what budget year must this decision be reflected to avoid a production
    break?
        Mr. Teets. A production break could be avoided if a decision were
    made in time to allow for budgeting of Advanced Procurement funds in
    the fiscal year 2007 budget.
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    when this decision has to be made will you be completely confident that
    the first TACSAT will launch no later than 2013?
        Mr. Teets. The Department believes the Transformational Satellite
    Communications System \2\ (TSAT) program is progressing to meet
    emerging warfighter needs and will launch on time based on the careful
    planning we have done for this program. From a technology standpoint,
    we will be confident of a successful TSAT launch once our final
    technology maturation testing and system design review is complete.
    From a programmatic standpoint, we have high confidence in the TSAT
    program of record. It is sufficiently funded; the upfront systems
    definition and risk reduction are structured to capture lessons from
    previous programs; the acquisition strategy includes significant
    technology maturation activities with comprehensive technology
    demonstrations; and technology off-ramps, which still significantly
    enhance warfighter capability, are available to meet schedule if
    advanced technology is not ready to fly.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ not to be mistaken with the Science & Technology demonstration
    platform TACSAT.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    given that every recent satellite program has experienced substantial
    cost and schedule delays, even the ones that were supposed to be easy
    such as Wideband Gap Filler, why take the risk of giving up the fourth
    AEHF satellite?
        Mr. Teets. The Senior Warfighter Forum unanimously voted to support
    the TSAT baseline program. This was based on the critical warfighter
    need for the capability provided by TSAT, and the worldwide EHF
    coverage supplied by the MILSTAR constellation along with the three
    planned AEHF satellites.
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    the AEHF satellite provides secure, reliable, survivable
    communications. Clearly TACSAT, if successful will provide increased
    capacity and capability. On the other hand, what happens if TACSAT is
    delayed 2, 3, 4, 5 years or more? Why not buy the fourth AEHF satellite
    and offset the possibility that TACSAT might be late?
        Mr. Teets. The SWarF unanimously voted to support the TSAT \3\
    baseline program based on the fact AEHF cannot support communications
    on the move (COTM) and other critical warfighter transformational
    capabilities. The worldwide coverage provided by the three AEHF
    satellites in combination with the existing MILSTAR satellites is
    expected to extend through 2017. This helps mitigate the coverage risk
    associated with a possible delay in the TSAT first launch.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ not to be mistaken with the Science & Technology demonstration
    platform TACSAT.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM is not an acquisition decision
    authority. I respectfully defer to the acting Secretary of the Air
    Force.

                                  space policy
        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the U.S. national
    security space policy is currently under revision. While the policy was
    expected to have been released at the end of 2004, we understand that
    it may not be released until late spring or early summer. When will it
    be finished? What are the issues that are unresolved?
        Mr. Teets. We continue to work closely with the National Security
    Council (NSC) to update this important foundational policy document.
    The NSC has forwarded the draft policy for coordination between the
    deputies of the appropriate departments and agencies. Once the entire
    coordination process is completed, the document will be forwarded to
    the President for signature.

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, what is/was STRATCOM's
    role in developing the new national security policy?
        General Cartwright. STRATCOM has been working closely with the OSD,
    Joint Staff, and other key players to provide the warfighter
    perspective since the process began in June of 2004. We at STRATCOM, in
    turn, have consulted with our associated Service components, ensuring
    them direct insight and an opportunity to contribute to this important
    process.

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    current U.S. policy requires constant access to space operations,
    including denying the use of space to adversaries. Currently the means
    employed to deny access to space by adversaries are temporary and
    reversible effects on adversaries' space systems including ground
    elements. Do you support the current policy that actions against space
    systems should be temporary and reversible?
        Mr. Teets. Current U.S. space policy emphasizes the use of
    temporary and reversible effects but does not limit our options. During
    past conflicts, adversary communications have been interrupted by the
    physical destruction of the ground antennas associated with the space
    system. This remains an option today. The U.S. will employ a range of
    options to achieve space superiority in a time and place as needed.
    These options include both diplomatic as well as military with the
    military options ranging from temporary/reversible to permanent/non-
    reversible.
        General Cartwright. Yes. STRATCOM supports the inherent right to
    self defense and the policy that actions against space systems be
    temporary and reversible.

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    what are the dangers associated with kinetic, anti-satellite weapons?
    Would you oppose the development of such weapons?
        Mr. Teets. We proved in the 1980s that we can develop a kinetic
    antisatellite weapon. Because of the concerns associated with debris
    clouds in orbits used by other nations, the U.S. does not maintain an
    operational program. However, we must be prepared to employ a range of
    options for defending our national security. Secretary Rumsfeld stated
    it best in his February 2002 testimony before the House of
    Representatives.

              ``It is incumbent on the [U.S.] armed services to remain open
            to a wide range of possible capabilities and systems that will
            enable us to deny our adversaries the advantages gained from
            space that could be used in a manner hostile to the United
            States, our citizens, or our national interests. The force
            structure of the armed services is and will continue to be
            fully compliant with our international obligations, treaties,
            and our right to self-defense as spelled out in the U.N.
            Charter.''

        He went on to explain that any capability proposed by the military
    would be provided to the President and Congress for subsequent approval
    and funding. The DOD continues to subscribe to this policy today.
        General Cartwright. One danger associated with kinetic, anti-
    satellite weapons is potential fratricide. Orbital debris caused by a
    high impact anti-satellite weapon could corrupt an operational orbit
    and create risk of hitting our own satellites. As we consider various
    methods for defending our ability to operate freely in space we must be
    mindful of the potential ill effects on our own space systems.

                          space situational awareness
        35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, General Cartwright,
    General Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral Sestak, there is a consensus
    that U.S. space situational awareness, while good, needs to be
    substantially improved. What programs are your highest priorities to
    improve space situational awareness?
        Mr. Teets. The U.S. does currently posses the best space situation
    awareness capability in the world. We are faced with several challenges
    to maintain and improve this capability. We have aging systems that
    provide critical capability, which we must either upgrade or replace.
    Our other challenge is presented by the fact that more countries are
    becoming space-faring countries and satellites are becoming more
    capable. Technology advancements make it possible for these satellites
    to be smaller and more maneuverable than before, thus stressing our
    assets beyond their current capabilities. We have worked over the past
    couple of years to develop a well-balanced space situation awareness
    architecture. Our priorities include updating and replacing our aging
    ground-based radar and optical systems for both increased capability
    and longer lifetimes, and fielding operational space-based systems to
    improve our detection, timeliness and characterization capabilities. In
    addition, we must better ingrate our current surveillance and
    reconnaissance capabilities with the information available to us from
    the intelligence and space environment communities through an updated
    command, control, and information system currently under development
    for STRATCOM.
        Our fiscal year 2006 budget reflects the Department's priorities.
    The budget includes a request for upgrading selected sensors in the
    Space Surveillance Network, design/development work for new space based
    sensors, and funds to integrate these sensors into a space C2 system.
    This request will fund development of sensors and C2 to provide timely
    detection of threats and information about orbiting objects we do not
    have today. In keeping with this budget we have the following program
    on the horizon:

             SB Space Surveillance: Provides timely and accurate
            information on objects in deep space (Program adjustment
            currently on UPL);
             S-Band Fence: Detects small objects in near earth and
            manned spaceflight areas in a timely manner;
             SSA Command and Control: Develops data fusion, data
            exploitation, and presentation prototypes for eventual
            integration into the Combatant Commanders Integrated Command
            and Control System infrastructure;
             Haystack Ultra-Wideband Satellite Imaging Radar
            (HUSIR) Upgrade: Improves Space Situational Awareness by
            providing detailed space system characterization of Low Earth
            Orbit objects;
             Orbital Deep Space Imager: Improves Space Situational
            Awareness by providing detailed space system characterization
            for deep space objects.

        General Cartwright. STRATCOM's priority is to advocate for
    capabilities that enhance interoperability within and among individual
    systems to fuse all sources of information (e.g., ISR and weather). It
    is important to ensure optimum coverage by sensors and to maximize
    information collection and dissemination in support of all facets of
    the space control mission area.
        General Lord. Our fiscal year 2006 budget request includes
    foundational development for this mission area. In the future, we will
    be building on this foundation. This vision includes pursuing a robust
    Command and Control/Information Management (C2/IM) infrastructure to
    autonomously report changes. We also require a small object detection
    capability, more search based capabilities, and the ability to
    characterize space systems across ground, link, space, and launch to
    determine capabilities of satellites that are being placed in orbit. As
    we grow this mission area, we expect to see budget requests that are in
    line with this overall concept. In addition to the budget request, we
    are pursuing service life extension programs (SLEP) for our existing
    sensors (for example, the Eglin and Globus II radars as well as the
    Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) System)
    and have several projects being worked:

            (1) SSA Command and Control (C2): Develops data fusion, data
            exploitation, and presentation prototypes for eventual
            integration into the Combatant Commanders Integrated Command
            and Control System infrastructure.
            (2) Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS): Track and search
            based operations that will provide timely and accurate
            information on objects in deep space.
            (3) Space Fence/S-Band Fence: Search based operations that will
            detect small objects in near earth and manned spaceflight
            orbits in a timely manner.
            (4) Haystack Ultra-Wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR)
            Upgrade: Adds W-band capability to achieve significantly
            improved imaging resolution for detailed space system
            characterization of Low Earth Orbit objects. We are also
            partnering with DARPA on the Deep View program to extend that
            improved imaging resolution to Deep Space orbits out to
            Geosynchronous altitudes.
            (5) Orbital Deep Space Imager (ODSI): Improves Space Situation
            Awareness by providing detailed space system characterization
            for deep space objects.

        General Dodgen. The Army's highest priority in SSA is the Space
    Surveillance Network (SSN) contributing sensor array at Kwajalein.
    Uniquely situated in the South Pacific, Kwajalein is important to
    contributing to near earth and deep space surveillance, satellite
    tracking, and new foreign launches. SMDC/ARSTRAT will continue to
    provide support to the SSN through operations at Kwajalein.
        Admiral Sestak. Our highest priority among all of the Space Control
    initiatives is SSA. We strongly concur with General Cartwright's
    [STRATCOM] comments on SSA before the Senate Armed Services
    Subcommittee on Strategic Forces for fiscal year 2006 budget hearing on
    15 March 2005 when he said: ``The first is that we have a ground
    surveillance infrastructure that needs to be recapitalized and upgraded
    and that's part of this program. We have to make sure that we do that,
    because it has a certain capability that gives us wide area, large
    ability to catalog. We need to improve that so that we're not looking
    at areas that are as ambiguous as miles, but down to very small areas.
    The second is a command-and-control system that integrates all of this
    so that the warfighter gets the benefit of the knowledge of the
    situation awareness and it gets distributed out. We can't forget those
    two pieces because they tie back to the user's side of this equation,
    whether it be the warfighter or others, that need to manage the system
    on orbit. So in addition to what's on orbit, there's a ground piece of
    this, and there is a command-and-control piece of this that we have to
    keep our eye on.''
        As an integral part of upgrading SSA from the ground, Navy is most
    familiar with and particularly supports the Air Force S-Band Fence
    upgrade. This upgrade offers a significant and cost-effective increase
    incapability.
        In addition, Navy has requested a Space Control Architecture be
    developed for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
    (JCIDS) process, in order to determine how specific investments in
    Space Control intelligence, surveillance, protection, and negation will
    contribute to an overall system architecture.

                               space organization
        36. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright, an
    important recommendation of the 2001 Space Commission was the need to
    integrate black and white space. Since 2001, Secretary Teets, you have
    worked very hard to carry out this integration. Do you continue to
    believe that this integration is important and what are the advantages
    gained by integration?
        Mr. Teets. Yes, I strongly recommend that a single individual
    continue to hold the dual positions of Under Secretary of the Air Force
    and Director of the NRO, as well as the responsibility as DOD Executive
    Agent for Space. The advantages gained by integration are: better
    coordination among the government organizations providing and using
    intelligence; authority to oversee the direction of planning,
    programming, and execution of funds spent on space systems used by the
    Pentagon and the Intelligence Community; greater ``unity of effort''
    between black and white space programs; better positioning to apply
    lessons learned across the space arena; greater insight to develop a
    unified science and technology roadmap; ability to develop an
    overarching human capital strategy; and a wider understanding of
    industrial base issues.
        General Cartwright. A net-centric global information system,
    employing agile distributive operations, is the way ahead in
    transitioning to more effective joint warfighting. Integration between
    black and white space is key to the ultimate success of such a system.
    Transitioning from ``need to know'' to ``need to share'' protocols will
    allow the warfighter access to a greater spectrum of national expertise
    and capability.

        37. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets and General Cartwright,
    what still needs to be done to fully integrate black and white space?
        Mr. Teets. I am proud of the accomplishments we have made in
    National Security Space. We took several disparate organizations and
    integrated them in a way that better serves our Nation, and we also
    demonstrated and improved the capabilities our space systems provide on
    and off the battlefield. However, National Security Space remains a
    work in progress. We need to continue modernizing every major space
    system and providing new or enhanced capabilities, while sustaining
    existing constellations that provide critical capabilities and
    intelligence to joint warfighters.
        General Cartwright. Joint warfighting requires agile, distributed
    operations in today's world. The greatest challenge to distributed
    operations is the ``need to know'' caveat. This issue leads to the
    joint warfighter not knowing that a critical piece of information is
    readily available and the existing owner of that information not
    recognizing its importance. Fundamental to this issue is the
    establishment of data tagging standards and associated information
    assurance policies. We must transition to a net-centric global
    information system that allows each user the flexibility to select from
    all appropriate data sources. The continued path of integration between
    ``black'' and ``white'' space helps toward that goal.

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral
    Sestak, from the service perspective has the integration of black and
    white space been successful and what changes should be made or further
    actions taken?
        General Lord. We have undertaken several initiatives to meet the
    Space Commission's recommendation for a closer integration of Air Force
    and National Systems. Establishing the Under Secretary of the Air Force
    as the DOD Executive Agent for Space provided centralized guidance and
    direction. Additionally, dual hatting the Under Secretary of the Air
    Force as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
    consolidated the top leadership to bridge the gap between these two
    premier space organizations. Senior level discussions between the Air
    Force and National Systems agencies are streamlining black and white
    space support to the warfighter and the intelligence community. For
    example, the future launch of the first Space Based Infrared System
    (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) sensor will support not only
    missile warning but provide technical intelligence and battlespace
    characterization as a major contributor to the Defense Intelligence
    Agency's mission. We continue to look for opportunities to transition
    and horizontally integrate the Air Force's and the NRO's current and
    future systems into a common national security space plan.
        General Dodgen. The efforts to integrate black and white space for
    the benefit of the joint warfighter are welcome from the Army's
    perspective. Any changes should focus in two areas--decrease the
    latency of black-space-derived information in reaching the warfighter
    and increase the ability to share this information with the widest
    possible military audience.
        These two areas must be balanced by the imperative to protect the
    sensitive information gathering methods.
        Admiral Sestak. The integration of black and white space, made
    possible by organizational and policy changes as well as technological
    developments, has paid huge dividends to the Fleet. We have
    significantly shortened the warfighter's decision cycle by emphasizing
    tactical and operational level requirements in addition to traditional
    strategic level requirements. Advances in processing and real-time
    information transfer have increased warfighter situational awareness
    and made possible the successes of joint operations over extended
    geographical distances from our shores.

        39. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral
    Sestak, an additional recommendation of the Space Commission was that
    there should be an Under Secretary of Defense for Space. In lieu of
    that recommendation, Secretary Rumsfeld designated the Under Secretary
    of the Air Force as the DOD executive agent for space. In your views
    has this been successful?
        General Lord. Yes. The relationship established by the Secretary
    aligns the Executive Agent for Space at the right level. This
    organizational alignment has worked well in allowing a collaborative
    exchange between all elements that make up the National Security Space
    team. Establishing the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the DOD
    Executive Agent for Space affords the position the ability to provide
    DOD guidance and direction recommended by the Space Commission.
        With regards to Space Professional Development, the Executive Agent
    for Space position is extremely valuable in ensuring all Services chart
    a similar path building on their core competencies while gaining
    valuable information by sharing best practices. The most notable
    example is Former Secretary Teets personally chairing the Space
    Professional Oversight Board (SPOB) which brings the Services together
    quarterly to address the actions defined in the DOD National Security
    Space Human Capital Resource Plan. As a result of Secretary Teets'
    leadership, we jointly built comprehensive programs to address each
    Service's needs regarding education, training, and expertise.
    Specifically, the SPOB ensured that the offerings of the Naval
    Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of Technology regarding
    space engineering and operations were complementary and capable of
    satisfying each Service's unique space education requirements. The SPOB
    was also a key advocate of transitioning the Air Force's Space
    Operations School into the National Security Space Institute charged
    with satisfying all Service requirements for Space Professional
    Education and Advanced Space Training. The Executive Agent for Space
    position has been extremely successful in ensuring the Services jointly
    address all the recommendations of the Space Commission including, but
    certainly not limited to, those regarding Space Professional
    Development.
        General Dodgen. Bringing the roles of Director, National
    Reconnaissance Office (DIRNRO), Under Secretary of the Air Force
    (USECAF), and DOD Executive Agent (EA) for Space together has had
    positive impacts in the fielding of space-based capabilities to the
    joint warfighter. By bringing these roles together under one office, we
    see a synergy of efforts that was not possible under the previous
    construct.
        Admiral Sestak. Due to the lengthy life cycle of space system
    acquisition, it is too early to evaluate the impact that the DOD
    Executive Agent for Space had. The DOD Executive Agent for Space is
    meeting the ``majority of the Navy's needs, particularly in the areas
    where Navy has common needs with other Services through comprehensive
    and collaborative processes to give all stakeholders an equal voice.
    Combining this strategy with a strong JCIDs process will be the key to
    meeting joint warfighter requirements.

        40. Senator Bill Nelson. General Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral
    Sestak, how does each military service remain an active player in
    space?
        General Lord. The Air Force remains an active player in space by
    virtue of our day-to-day duties. We are committed to providing space
    superiority to the warfighter and the Nation. Our Nation demands
    capabilities coming from and through space, now more than ever. Our
    Joint Forces Commanders know we cannot go to war and win without space
    capabilities. Our space capabilities have revolutionized modern warfare
    with GPS giving unparalleled accuracy for 70 percent of the munitions
    used in Operation Iraqi Freedom (up from 30 percent in Operation Desert
    Storm); unprecedented secure global satellite communications having 8
    times more bandwidth than just a few years ago, a robust weather
    constellation giving our warfighters premiere worldwide terrestrial and
    space environment information; the healthiest ever missile warning
    constellation providing real-time defense for the U.S. and our Allies;
    our ICBM forces offer an extraordinarily capable and proven strategic
    deterrent with readiness rates above 99 percent; we continue our
    impressive streak of 40 successful operational space launches in a row
    leading to over $3-$5 billion in savings.
        In addition, we are taking necessary steps to build a community of
    space professionals to take us into the future. Former Secretary Roche
    took a major step when he named the Commander of Air Force Space
    Command as the Space Professional Functional Authority (SPFA). In this
    role, I ensure the Air Force is taking all necessary steps to build a
    community of Credentialed Space Professionals capable of designing,
    acquiring, operating, employing, integrating, and sustaining the
    transformational space systems of the future. We are able to break down
    many of the barriers that could have limited the role the Air Force
    would play in future space systems. For example, about half of the
    personnel assigned to the National Reconnaissance Office are Air Force
    members. Through the SPFA role we are better able to ensure our people
    get both NRO and AFSPC experience so they are better able to represent
    total space needs to and from all the Services and Agencies. This space
    professional community is building upon our current successes to
    design, acquire, operate, integrate, and sustain our future
    transformational space systems.
        The Air Force is an active player in the development of the
    National Security Space Plan as well as the leader in developing and
    operating our Nation's space systems. The National Security Space Plan
    ensures all systems, programs, and agencies are integrated to provide
    coverage of critical capabilities. Our continued participation in these
    National forums as well as development of critical systems ensures that
    we remain an active player in space.
        As the Air Force's lead Major Command for space, we focus on our
    three priorities for 2005:

            1. Continue our emphasis on ensuring Space Superiority and
            providing desired Combat Effectiveness for Joint Warfighting.
            2. Maintain a safe and secure Strategic Deterrent Capability
            and provide means for Prompt Global Strike.
            3. Continue Efforts to develop Cost-Effective Assured Access to
            Space.

        As we move towards achieving these goals, Space Superiority
    continues to emphasize our desire to provide combat effects and
    capabilities to the joint warfighters. There are a number of efforts
    underway to enhance our SSA, Defensive Counterspace (DCS) and Offensive
    Counterspace (OCS) mission areas. Currently, we are working with the
    National Security Space Office to develop desired survivability levels,
    protection strategies and tactics, and techniques and procedures for
    each of these mission areas. We continue to remain active in monitoring
    and characterizing the space environment in order to effectively define
    and depict the ``battlespace'' picture, assess potential future
    adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities, and develop future
    capabilities to deny an adversary's freedom of action in space, or
    their ability to deny the United States and its Allies their use of
    space.
        General Dodgen. Army leadership must commit to developing validated
    ``capability needs'' for space capabilities. These validations must be
    vetted by Army leadership and planned for integration with Army
    capabilities as a whole. We then pass these same requirements to the
    national security space office where we have significant Army presence
    in assigned positions. At the same time, our Army validated
    requirements are submitted to the joint community through coordination
    with U.S. Strategic Command and through insertion in the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System. Here, they are worked
    by joint Functional Capabilities Boards and, when appropriate, sent
    before the Joint Requirement Oversight Council. Therefore, Army and
    joint requirements converge to simultaneously satisfy the needs of land
    warfighting dominance and the joint warfight.
        Admiral Sestak. The Navy participates in the full spectrum of
    space-based systems development beginning with capability-based
    assessments using modeling and simulation to determine operational and
    maritime requirements. The Navy then actively works with the Joint
    community in the definition of system requirements and ensures these
    requirements are accurately captured and documented using the JCIDS.
    The Naval Research Laboratory conducts scientific and technical
    research and development (S&T/R&D) into capabilities to meet our
    maritime requirements in areas like Maritime Domain Awareness and ship
    tracking. The Navy's TENCAP Program also conducts R&D to improve
    utilization of existing space systems, the results of which can also
    influence future systems.
        This S&T/R&D work feeds into the acquisition process where Air
    Force, in its role as Executive Agent for Space, is the primary
    purchaser of satellites with the Navy an active partner in space
    systems requirements development. The Navy is the program manager and
    acquisition lead for the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) that will
    replace the UHF Follow-on narrowband SATCOM constellation for the Joint
    community. In addition to MUOS, the Navy acquires user terminals for
    space systems and prepares its platforms for integrating space products
    into the network via FORCnet. The space-based capability is then
    delivered to the fleet, and operators trained for maximum utility.
    Lessons learned from real world operations feed into the cyclical
    process of assessments, requirements, S&T/R&D, development,
    acquisition, and operations.
        In addition to this, the Navy invests its Space Cadre personnel in
    Joint Program Offices, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National
    Security Space Office, STRATCOM, and many other space forums so that
    both Navy needs and a maritime viewpoint are inherent in the spacebased
    systems development process.

                                  space launch
        41. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the Air Force has decided
    to pick up infrastructure costs for the Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle (EELV) program. The Air Force is also getting ready to complete
    the next group of space launches referred to as ``buy three.'' How will
    you balance and integrate the decision to pay infrastructure costs with
    the need to compete launch services?
        Mr. Teets. In our previous buys, we paid a single price for a
    launch service, which included the contractor's infrastructure and
    launch vehicle hardware, making the contractors assume all the
    financial risks. Consistent with the President's recently-released U.S.
    Space Transportation Policy and in order to share the risk more
    equitably with the contractors, beginning with Buy 3, we will procure a
    national launch capability (infrastructure) separately from launch
    services (which primarily includes launch vehicle hardware). In Buy
    Three, we plan to award up to 24 launch services between the two
    competing providers.

        42. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, in your view how is
    assured access to space maintained in the next 5 years?
        General Cartwright. I echo the U.S. Space Transportation Policy in
    that assuring access to space will require maintaining a viable space
    transportation industrial and technology base. In the next 5 years, the
    capabilities provided by programs such as the EELV will be the
    foundation for space access. The near-term approach of having two space
    launch providers should assure the availability of critical space
    capabilities by providing a mutual backup capability. However, I also
    advocate the need for a future generation of launch technologies where
    access to space is reliable, routine, and affordable.

                           space range modernization
        43. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, General Cartwright,
    General Lord, General Dodgen, and Admiral Sestak, I am concerned that
    the space launch ranges may not be being sufficiently modernized. Could
    each of you provide your thoughts on what needs to be done to ensure
    that the ranges are modernized to meet all national security needs?
        Mr. Teets. We believe our continuing modernization and sustainment
    efforts will enable the spacelift ranges to meet national security
    needs now and in the foreseeable future. Our modernization programs
    have delivered over $240 million worth of modernized systems in the
    past 18 months and are scheduled to deliver $150 million more in the
    next 12 months. Improvements include: automated, interoperable planning
    and scheduling systems; higher capacity, reconfigurable communications
    networks; more reliable, capable, and redundant command destruct
    (flight termination) systems; and fully integrated, centralized flight
    operations and analysis (safety) systems. The increased level of range
    modernization funding in our fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects
    our renewed commitment to making the ranges more responsive, reliable,
    and supportable. It implements our mid term vision of keeping the
    ranges healthy while making upgrades to enable on-demand deployment of
    on-orbit mission assets within days to support crisis and combat
    operations. Additionally, these efforts will help pave the way for the
    long-term transformation to higher capacity, global ranges able to
    support the operationally responsive spacelift systems of the future.
        General Cartwright. The ranges are aging but the support to
    warfighters continues to be outstanding--the ranges are doing their
    job. Recent modernization efforts have focused on enhanced range
    safety, improved responsiveness and flexibility, and the replacement of
    obsolete hardware to sustain reliability and availability. The
    integrated Launch and Test Range System modernization and sustainment
    plan is comprehensive and should keep the ranges healthy for the
    foreseeable future.
        General Lord. We believe our continuing modernization and
    sustainment efforts will enable the spacelift ranges to meet national
    security needs now and in the foreseeable future. Our modernization
    programs have delivered over $240 million worth of modernized systems
    in the past 18 months and are scheduled to deliver $150 million more in
    the next 12 months. Improvements include automated, interoperable
    planning and scheduling systems; higher capacity, reconfigurable
    communications networks; more reliable, capable, and redundant command
    destruct (flight termination) systems; and fully integrated,
    centralized flight operations and analysis (safety) systems. The Air
    Force has increased the level of range modernization funding in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget request by $99 million reflecting our renewed
    commitment to making the ranges more responsive, reliable, and
    supportable. This funding implements our mid-term vision of keeping the
    ranges healthy while making upgrades to enable on-demand deployment of
    on-orbit mission assets within days to support crisis and combat
    operations. Additionally, these efforts will help pave the way for the
    long-term transformation to higher capacity, global ranges able to
    support the operationally responsive spacelift systems of the future.
        General Dodgen. Currently the Army's only space launch range
    capability is at the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site (USAKA/
    RTS) in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. DOD's only land-based
    equatorial launch site, USAKA/RTS has two facilities supporting current
    and future launch customers. Meck Island currently supports the launch
    of interceptors from the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program,
    and is being considered for the additional role of target launches for
    missile defense test events. The second facility, Omelek Island, is
    currently being developed to a minimal launch infrastructure, per the
    requirements of the customer, to support Space Exploration Technologies
    (SpaceX), a commercial space-launch company under contract to Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop and prove-out low-
    cost space-launch capabilities. The most significant challenge this
    range faces in developing and maintaining a level of readiness is
    sufficient and consistent funding to construct, maintain, and modernize
    (pursuant to technological advancements) all supporting facilities,
    including both mission operations and logistic facilities. As these
    activities are accomplished, the range would be able to better meet the
    requirements of other potential DOD space launch customers.
        Current launch customers could potentially benefit from investment
    in fiber connectivity to the continental United States (CONUS), thereby
    improving the bandwidth and latency limitations inherent in relaying
    real time or near-real time data across SATCOM channels. SATCOM is the
    range's only means of off-base communications and data exchange. With
    the assistance of Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), USAKA/RTS
    is currently evaluating the feasibility of establishing submarine
    fiber-optic connectivity with the CONUS in an effort to substantially
    increase this data flow capability.
        Admiral Sestak. Space launch ranges, like our space surveillance
    and GPS capabilities, have become multi-use, serving both government
    and commercial requirements with funding responsibilities remaining
    exclusively with the DOD. Perhaps it's time to rethink our management
    approach to these ``dual use'' space infrastructures to incorporate
    either a cost-sharing approach or an approach that meets the needs of
    both sectors. One idea that may bear further study is to establish some
    sort of government trust fund, similar to the Highway Trust Fund and
    the Aviation Trust Fund, which could be examined as a means of
    earmarking funds for supporting space infrastructure. As an example, a
    very modest tax could be added to commercial GPS equipment. The
    potential for revenue from GPS users is obvious and straightforward an
    this revenue stream could allow our space infrastructure to keep pace
    with user demands.

                        space-based infrared system high
        44. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, the SBIRS has just
    experienced another Nunn-McCurdy breach. What are you doing to ensure
    that all technical problems are identified and resolved, that a new
    realistic cost and schedule baseline is developed, and that this new
    baseline will survive until the program is completed?
        Mr. Teets. To date, SBIRS has had to deal with a number of
    challenges, the legacy of a poor foundation. The 10 March 2005 Nunn
    McCurdy Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) notification is directly
    related to the same issues that drove the 17 June 2004 Program
    Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) breach. The program ``replan,''
    incorporates additional testing, more robust oversight, increased time
    spans, and realistic software productivity estimates, in an effort to
    ensure future technical issues are flushed out and addressed earlier in
    the development. With the 10 March 2005 Nunn McCurdy notification, I
    directed an Independent Program Assessment (IPA) to establish a clear
    and unambiguous program baseline and associated cost estimate. We will
    provide a full briefing of the results upon completion. The program is
    making technical progress--HEO# 1 delivered; HEO#2 on track; GEO
    integration/test proceeding well. This has our complete and undivided
    attention.

                   ballistic missile range safety technology
        45. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, as you are aware, the
    Rocket Systems Launch Program line in the annual DOD budget request has
    been increased by congressional action for each of the past 2 years to
    include a funds for a project we believe has great benefit to the U.S.
    Air Force and the future of the Nation's space launch and test ranges.
    The Ballistic Missile Range Safety Technology (BMRST) is a mobile range
    support unit incorporating today's latest GPS technologies, command
    destruct functions, and telemetry data systems. This system has
    demonstrated operationally improved and flexible down-range reentry
    support and increased range safety at lower range support costs.
        After securing additional funds to develop and demonstrate this
    system, I would have expected the Air Force to have embraced this
    technology program and invest in its final development and fielding. My
    understanding is that those military units utilizing BMRST, such as the
    launch activity at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, are impressed with
    the added flexibility it gives them in performing their mission and
    have embraced it.
        While I appreciate the Air Force's interest in applying the funds
    provided by Congress for continued program development and
    demonstration, I am disappointed that the system has not been picked up
    in the Department's annual budget request and established as an
    acquisition program.
        Please provide the committee your assessment of the Air Force's
    requirements and efforts to modernize safety systems for our launch and
    test ranges. What are the greatest risks to operations or safety
    associated with launch range safety?
        Mr. Teets. The Air Force has validated and documented its
    requirements for modernizing safety systems in the April 2003
    Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for Launch and Test Range
    System (LTRS) Modernization. The Air Force developed these performance-
    based ORD requirements primarily to meet public safety requirements,
    based on years of operational and test experience at the ranges. The
    ongoing Range Standardization and Automation Phase IIA program (RSA
    IIA), managed by the Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles,
    has developed new flight safety systems to meet core safety performance
    requirements at the Eastern and Western Ranges. The Eastern Range
    system has been operational since September 2003 and the Western Range
    system is currently in the integration and test phase. The Eastern
    Range system has demonstrated its greater efficiency and effectiveness
    for a number of launches since being placed in operation, and we expect
    the forthcoming Western Range system will produce the same kinds of
    results. Both systems will have the ability to process and analyze
    tracking data passed through digital telemetry systems from GPS
    tracking sources to ensure flight safety.
        The Air Force believes BMRST has the potential to provide
    additional flexibility in meeting baseline safety and range user
    requirements. A BMRST Integrated Product Team (IPT) has been
    established to closely examine the concept of employment, test,
    certification, maintenance, and sustainment aspects of the BMRST
    system. Once the IPT assessment is complete, and if it is determined
    the system meets ORD requirements and proves cost effective, the AF
    will evaluate how best to integrate BMRST into the current range
    architecture.
        The Air Force has numerous requirements and guidelines that are
    applicable to assured access to space and safety for the general
    public. The greatest risk to operations or safety would be to have
    errant rockets launched from a range cause injuries and loss of life or
    destroy property. The current range safety system has been highly
    successful in preventing injuries, loss of life, and destruction of
    property, and we expect the ongoing modernization efforts to continue
    this record of success.

        46. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what are the Air Force's
    priorities and plans for launch range safety-systems modernization?
        Mr. Teets. Modernization of range safety systems is our number one
    Spacelift Ranges modernization priority. As an integral part of our
    ongoing range modernization efforts, this entails: fully integrated,
    centralized, and automated flight operations and analysis (safety)
    systems; more reliable, capable, and redundant command destruct (flight
    termination) systems; more accurate and cost effective GPS tracking
    systems to replace ground based tracking radars where operationally
    feasible; and more reliable open system architecture upgrades to ground
    based tracking radars which can't be replaced by GPS systems for
    operational reasons. Other modernization efforts contributing to range
    safety include: improved collection and processing of local weather
    data for range safety models; and faster, more accurate air, sea, and
    land range surveillance systems to prevent incursions into launch
    hazard areas. Of course, range safety is also the top priority with
    respect to operating and maintaining the ranges.

        47. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, what is the Air Force's
    evaluation of the capability of BMRST and the potential or promise of a
    GPS-based range safety capability?
        Mr. Teets. The Air Force believes BMRST has the potential to
    provide additional flexibility in meeting baseline safety and range
    user requirements. A BMRST Integrated Product Team has been established
    to closely examine the concept of employment, test, certification,
    maintenance, and sustainment aspects of the BMRST system. Once the IPT
    assessment is complete, and if it is determined the system meets ORD
    requirements and proves cost effective, the AF will evaluate how best
    to integrate BMRST into the current range architecture. Over the long
    term, in order to meet future operationally responsive space launch
    vehicle concepts, the future range architecture must become more
    responsive while providing global connectivity. It is our belief,
    mobile assets like BMRST could become integral components of an
    affordable, global launch and test range architecture.
        The Air Force sees great promise in GPS-based range safety
    technology in the future. The AF already is using GPS-based tracking
    systems for ballistic missile tests and intends to convert to GPS
    tracking for space launch. This will occur as on board systems are
    developed and integrated into new launch vehicle programs, recognizing
    that some legacy systems like the space shuttle will continue to rely
    on radar tracking until they are replaced by newer systems employing
    GPS capabilities.

        48. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, has the Air Force
    conducted any analysis of the benefits of GPS-based range safety
    systems?
        Mr. Teets. The Air Force has analyzed GPS-based range safety
    (tracking) systems extensively, has used them operationally for
    ballistic missile tests, and plans to use them for space launch
    applications. A GPS tracking system cost analysis was conducted when
    the transition to GPS-based tracking was first proposed under the Range
    Standardization and Automation program. Subsequently, the Air Force
    contracted with the National Research Council for an independent
    assessment of GPS-based tracking, which endorsed the use of GPS-based
    systems for ballistic missile testing and recommended the transition to
    GPS-based tracking for space launch purposes as rapidly as feasible.
    The full potential of GPS tracking systems is realized in the downrange
    area, where GPS will reduce the dependence upon costly remote ground
    based radars and will enable operations outside the coverage of these
    fixed ground sites. Where operationally feasible, GPS tracking systems
    could replace up to 9 of 18 Air Force owned and operated ground based
    tracking radars.

        49. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, please provide the
    committee with an estimate of the direct and indirect costs associated
    with our current launch safety systems versus the costs estimated for a
    BMRST system. Given the demonstrated potential of BMRST, why has the
    Air Force declined to establish an acquisition program to complete
    development and deploy this capability?
        Mr. Teets. The Air Force has spent the money given by the Congress
    for the BMRST program to develop and deliver the product. An upgraded
    version is already in work and expected to be delivered in September
    2005. Formal operational test, evaluation, and certification will be
    conducted along with development of a concept of employment. Once these
    efforts are complete, the AF will perform a cost benefit analysis to
    determine the best way to integrate BMRST to augment the range
    architecture should the system meet ORD requirements and prove cost
    effective. It is important to understand that BMRST was initially built
    as a stand-alone, mobile range safety system. It was never designed to
    replace existing command, telemetry or GPS metric tracking safety
    systems. As such, BMRST is a system that could augment existing range
    safety capability. Thus, to provide an estimate of the costs associated
    with current launch safety systems versus the costs estimated for BMRST
    is an inappropriate comparison. The cost benefit analysis we anticipate
    from the system program office this summer will tell us what value we
    expect to gain in employing BMRST (as a supplemental system) for the
    costs involved in operating and sustaining the system. No cost savings
    is anticipated for bringing on a system like BMRST; rather, the cost
    and capability will be additive.

        [Whereupon, at 5:49 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2006

                                  ----------

                             MONDAY, APRIL 4, 2005

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                  STRATEGIC FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions and Bill
    Nelson.
        Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
    and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: William C. Greenwalt,
    professional staff member; Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,
    professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
    member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
        Minority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Catherine E. Sendak and Nicholas
    W. West.
        Committee members' assistant present: William K. Sutey,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The hearing will come to order. I am
    pleased to welcome our witnesses today: General James
    Cartright, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; and Linton
    Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) and the Under Secretary of Energy. I
    would also note that sitting behind General Cartright, Rear
    Admiral Charles Young, the Navy lead for strategic forces, and
    Major General Roger Burg, the Air Force focal point for
    strategic systems. Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our
    Nation and for taking the time and effort to be here with us
    today.
        This subcommittee will also be accepting for the record the
    written statements of Mira Ricardel, Acting Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for International Security Policy, regarding the
    policies used in formulating the Nuclear Posture Review.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Ricardel follows:]
                     Prepared Statement by Mira R. Ricardel
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee: First
    of all, I would like to thank each the members of this subcommittee for
    this opportunity and for your support of our Nation's strategic forces.
    You have devoted considerable time to understanding the need to reshape
    our Nation's strategic capabilities. Only with your support will the
    Nation's strategic posture continue toward the needed transformation
    from its Cold War configuration to one that can meet the challenges of
    the decades ahead.
        Last year, the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the
    National Nuclear Security Administration, conducted an assessment of
    progress by the two Departments in implementing the transformation
    outlined in the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). I will
    discuss the key findings of that assessment, but first, I will review
    the key tenets of the NPR and address some of the erroneous
    characterizations of the administration's strategy for strategic
    capabilities.
                  nuclear posture review: ``key conclusions''
        In December 2001 Secretary Rumsfeld submitted the NPR Report to
    Congress. Conceived even before the terrorist attacks of September 11,
    this new strategy was driven by the President's clear direction to
    reduce the number of nuclear weapons to the lowest level compatible
    with our security needs, and to move the U.S. beyond a Cold War
    deterrent strategy of managing a bi-polar ``balance of terror'' based
    ultimately on mutual offensive nuclear threats. Our Cold War strategic
    nuclear force posture was designed to deter an adversary--the Soviet
    Union--that no longer exists. Under that strategy, the security of the
    United States depended on our ability to deter a major nuclear attack
    because, in reality, there were no other prudent options to prevent
    such an attack. As a result, we settled for ``stability'' based on
    mutual vulnerability and a balance of terror.
        President Bush recognized that the conditions that made deterrence
    feasible and vulnerability an asset during the Cold War will not exist
    in all circumstances in the future security environment. He set a new
    course: a transformational strategy that seeks to strengthen deterrence
    of the new post-Cold War security threats--in particular unpredictable
    regional states that possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--while
    simultaneously preparing for situations where the various conditions
    necessary for reliable deterrence do not exist.
        Secretary Rumsfeld enumerated the key conclusions of the December
    2001 Nuclear Posture Review in his report to Congress:

             Nuclear forces will continue to play a critical
            security role for the United States, its allies and friends.
             Deterrence should not be limited to the threat of
            retaliation, nor rely exclusively on nuclear forces. Existing
            nuclear forces, moreover, are unsuited to many of the
            contingencies that may confront the United States and our
            allies.
             A mix of strategic capabilities, offensive and
            defensive, nuclear and conventional, will provide a broad range
            of military options that are credible to enemies, reassuring to
            allies, and consistent with American values.
             In the post-Cold War period, active and passive
            defenses will contribute to deterrence, and provide useful
            protection in the event deterrence fails.
             Transformation of our Nation's nuclear posture is
            needed and will complement the transformation of U.S.
            conventional forces and capabilities.
             To comply with the President's guidance, we will
            reduce our nuclear forces to the lowest possible level
            consistent with our national security needs, including our
            obligations to our allies.
             This broad range of capabilities will help assure
            allies and friends and will dissuade potential foes from
            investing in capabilities with which to threaten us.

        Instead of the legacy Cold War posture we have inherited, with its
    reliance on the high-yield, offensive nuclear weapons suited to a
    balance of terror, this new approach requires a broad mix of strategic
    capabilities to strengthen our strategic deterrence capability and to
    better tailor our deterrence strategies to the spectrum of post-Cold
    War threats.
                        misunderstandings about the npr
        Despite the advent of this landmark strategy and its unprecedented
    direction to reduce dramatically the number of deployed nuclear
    weapons, there remain misunderstandings about the NPR and the
    President's strategy for nuclear weapons.
        For example, some commentators have suggested that the NPR rejects
    deterrence in favor of nuclear ``warfighting,'' and ``lowers the
    nuclear threshold.'' In fact, as Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized in the
    Foreword to the NPR, the NPR's direction is designed to ``improve our
    ability to deter attack,'' while ``reducing our dependence on nuclear
    weapons'' to do so. The NPR strategy places greater emphasis on
    advanced non-nuclear and defensive capabilities, increases the
    credibility of our deterrent for many possible contingencies, and
    reduces the emphasis on nuclear weapons in our strategic posture. In
    fact, the NPR identified the potential for non-nuclear weapons to
    substitute for nuclear weapons, further reducing our reliance on the
    latter.
        By strengthening the credibility of our strategic deterrent with a
    new strategy that includes nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive
    capabilities, we also strengthen nonproliferation because we can better
    assure our allies and friends that they can rely on the U.S. strategic
    deterrent, and do not need to seek an alternative nuclear deterrent for
    their security. Moreover, this more flexible and capable strategic
    force helps to dissuade potential adversaries from investing in nuclear
    capabilities as a successful way to challenge the U.S.
        Our Cold War nuclear arsenal was designed for a different time, and
    a different threat than we now face. Consequently, in addition to the
    NPR's call for nuclear reductions and an emphasis on non-nuclear and
    defensive capabilities, it identified the need to adapt our nuclear
    capabilities to post-Cold War requirements for deterrence.
        In a regional crisis, for example, the credibility of our deterrent
    from the adversary's perspective may turn on our ability to threaten
    his WMD, missiles, command and control, and leadership bunkers
    protected in hard and deeply buried facilities--while minimizing the
    threat of collateral damage. Thus, rather than rejecting deterrence,
    the NPR's direction to examine the potential for threatening deeply
    buried facilities while minimizing the threat of collateral damage
    seeks to strengthen our deterrent by increasing its credibility for
    post-Cold War contingencies.
        In sum, the NPR's transformation is intended to strengthen our
    capability to deter in circumstances very different from those of the
    Cold War, reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons and our
    reliance on nuclear weapons, and contribute to non-proliferation by
    assuring our allies and dissuading potential adversaries.
                      implementing the npr: status report
        The Department of Defense just completed a review of progress to
    date in implementing the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.
    Noteworthy progress includes:

             To guide the implementation of the NPR, a broad
            framework of new national policy guidance documents has been
            issued covering nuclear forces, ballistic missile defense,
            national command and control, and cyber operations.
             Changes to the Unified Command Plan aligns United
            States Strategic Command missions with the New Triad
            capabilities by making the Commander of Strategic Command
            responsible for ``operationalizing'' the strategy.

                     A Global Strike Concept Plan has been
                    developed and implemented, and non-nuclear strike
                    options are being integrated into strategic deterrence
                    operational plans.
                     The President's direction to deploy ballistic
                    missile defenses is expected to lead to an initial
                    fielded capability later this year.

             Reductions in U.S. nuclear forces are on track toward
            our goal of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic
            nuclear warheads by 2012. This represents a reduction of two-
            thirds from the time this administration entered office.
             By the end of this fiscal year, the last of the
            Peacekeeper intercontinental-range ballistic missiles will have
            been deactivated. Progress is well underway in modifying four
            former ballistic missile submarines to serve in the future as
            delivery platforms for conventional cruise missiles and special
            forces.
             Consistent with the reduction in operationally
            deployed warheads, a new plan for the nuclear stockpile has
            been implemented that will cut the total stockpile (active and
            inactive warheads) nearly in half by 2012.
             The Department is making steady progress on
            improvements in planning, intelligence, and command and control
            capabilities that are needed to integrate New Triad
            capabilities effectively.

        Despite considerable progress in establishing new policies and
    directives in support of the NPR strategy, progress in developing and
    fielding capabilities for the New Triad has been less than desired.
    There are two areas of special concern:

             Non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities

                     If we are fully to realize the goal of reduced
                    reliance on nuclear weapons and a broader range of
                    strategic capabilities for the national leadership, we
                    will need to invest in a portfolio of non-nuclear
                    weapons with unique characteristics. Two general
                    categories of weapons will be needed:

                             Prompt, precise, long-range,
                            conventional weapons that can be used in
                            response to an imminent threat; and
                             Non-nuclear weapons with unique
                            effects that can provide an effective, yet
                            appropriate response for some situations in
                            which an adversary uses weapons of mass
                            destruction.

                     We are actively examining options for non-
                    nuclear weapons for these important roles.

             A responsive infrastructure for nuclear weapons

                     Revitalization of our Nation's nuclear weapons
                    infrastructure (managed by the National Nuclear
                    Security Administration) is essential. This unique
                    defense R&D and industrial capability will continue to
                    be a vital element of our security strategy for the
                    foreseeable future. Our existing nuclear stockpile was
                    designed for a different time and for Cold War
                    missions. The age of most warheads has already exceeded
                    the original design life. While the recently
                    implemented stockpile plan makes dramatic reductions--
                    cutting the stockpile nearly in half by 2012--we don't
                    need a smaller Cold War era nuclear stockpile, we need
                    capabilities appropriate for 21st century threats. That
                    means we need to conduct a range of studies on
                    potential weapon concepts--including the completion of
                    the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) Study. It is
                    also critical to revitalize the nuclear weapon R&D and
                    production infrastructure in order to assure the long-
                    term safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads,
                    strengthens deterrence for the new security
                    environment, and provides a hedge against an
                    unforeseen, catastrophic technological failure of any
                    element of the nuclear force or unanticipated adverse
                    changes in the geopolitical threat environment. In this
                    connection, our joint work with NNSA on Reliable
                    Replacement Warhead concepts, described more fully by
                    Ambassador Brooks in his testimony, is a first step
                    towards enabling the responsive nuclear weapons
                    infrastructure called for in the NPR.

        In short, our goal is an array of integrated, strategic response
    capabilities that will provide unprecedented flexibility, assuredness,
    and effectiveness--essential characteristics for both adversaries and
    allies alike to consider in their calculus of a modernized U.S.
    strategic deterrent.
        With that in mind, I ask for your continued support of the
    President's plan to implement this new strategy.
        Mr. Chairman, once again thank you for this opportunity.

        Senator Sessions. We will begin this hearing in open
    session. At an appropriate time, the hearing will move into
    Russell Room 232-A for a closed session to more fully explore
    some of today's hearing topics in a classified setting. We will
    try to have as much of the policy discussion as we can here in
    this open session. I think it is important that the American
    people and the people of the world for that matter understand
    what our goals are, what our capabilities are, and what we plan
    to do in the future. The details of that, of course, many of
    them are classified and should be discussed only in a
    classified setting.
        Today we will receive testimony on strategic forces and
    nuclear weapons issues. We will examine how the Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM) and the NNSA support global deterrence and
    the extent to which this differs from the Cold War mission of
    strategic deterrence.
        Strategic forces today provide the President and the
    warfighter with a range of global prompt capabilities for time-
    urgent missions, such as global strike. General Cartright, this
    subcommittee is interested in your perspectives regarding
    whether the United States has the capabilities necessary to
    support deterrence and whether there are any shortfalls. That
    is your responsibility in your new position.
        Another critical task for this committee is to exercise its
    oversight function with respect to the United States nuclear
    forces. Nuclear weapons are the most formidable weapons in our
    arsenal. Although an analysis of the appropriate mix of nuclear
    and conventional weapons is ongoing as part of the Quadrennial
    Defense Review, I cannot foresee any circumstances in which
    nuclear weapons will cease to play a central role in our
    nuclear deterrent and our deterrence posture.
        Ambassador Brooks, the subcommittee is interested in
    hearing your assessment of the Stockpile Stewardship Program,
    which is charged with maintaining the safety, security,
    reliability, and effectiveness of our current nuclear
    stockpile, which has been in place for many decades now, and
    also you are in charge of reducing the numbers of those weapons
    in our stockpile.
        Additionally, I wish to explore with you progress being
    made in developing the responsive nuclear weapons
    infrastructure called for in the Nuclear Posture Review of
    2001. I will ask the witnesses to define the term
    ``responsive.'' We use that term, but have we agreed what it
    really means? Do we have the nuclear weapons complex we need or
    do we have the one we inherited from the Cold War? What are our
    needs and what are our capabilities?
        The post-Cold War security environment introduced new
    threats and greater uncertainties that require new, flexible,
    and adaptive strategic forces. Rather than rely exclusively on
    a nuclear triad of land and sea-based intercontinental missiles
    and long-range bombers that has been the historic position
    since the beginning of the Cold War, the Nuclear Posture Review
    outlined a new triad consisting of nuclear and conventional
    offensive strike forces, missile defenses, and a revitalized
    nuclear infrastructure capable of providing new capabilities in
    a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.
        Indeed, the direction taken by the Nuclear Posture Review
    should improve our ability to deter attack by placing greater
    emphasis on advanced non-nuclear and defensive capabilities,
    which in turn reduces the dependence on nuclear weapons in our
    strategic posture.
        A central purpose of this hearing is to explore more fully
    the range of strategic capabilities needed to achieve prompt,
    decisive results when required and to understand the scope and
    cost of the programs that support the objective. We still face
    the reality, however, that nuclear weapons are uniquely capable
    of holding certain critical targets at risk. This subcommittee
    and this Senate have engaged in a debate for a number of years
    regarding a study of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
    (RNEP). This subcommittee and full committee authorized RNEP in
    fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005. The full Senate supported
    the RNEP and funding was appropriated during fiscal years 2003
    and 2004 totaling approximately $22 million. Amendments to
    eliminate funding for RNEP both in this committee and in the
    full Senate have failed in the past.
        Last year, during fiscal year 2005, although RNEP was once
    again fully authorized by this subcommittee at $27 million,
    funding was not continued by the appropriators.
        The budget request for fiscal year 2006 once again requests
    funds for completing the RNEP study. This issue is not new. The
    study will examine if RNEP would provide a capability to deal
    with specific buried and hardened targets in a more precise
    way. The full committee has heard the testimony of both the
    Secretaries of Defense and Energy earlier this year that the
    RNEP study--study only--is needed.
        I would note that not only is the study all that is called
    for; statutory provisions say that no RNEP or like weapon could
    be built without explicit approval by Congress.
        So we have taken the testimony, had the debate, and
    affirmed by our votes the need to complete the feasibility
    study of RNEP, but I know we will deal with that issue again
    this year and there will be an opportunity to discuss it.
        I suspect that some of our debate when it comes to RNEP
    revolves around concerns as to whether we ought to maintain
    nuclear weapons at all. While that is certainly appealing and I
    wish we could get to that point, frankly, I do not foresee that
    as a likely eventuality in our lifetimes. Our nuclear forces
    must be effective in order to provide credibility in our
    deterrence umbrella for the United States and our allies.
    Completing the RNEP study is one more way to help us maintain
    that credibility.
        So these are some of the issues that we will explore in our
    hearing today. Let me now recognize my distinguished ranking
    member, Senator Nelson of Florida. He is a strong and active
    member of the Armed Services Committee, and it is a pleasure
    for me to work with him as the ranking member on this
    subcommittee.
        Senator Nelson.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to welcome our witnesses. It is an important
    hearing. In this hearing I hope that we are going to discuss a
    range of topics, topics on nuclear and strategic issues, and I
    want to focus on two topics. The first, already mentioned here,
    is the RNEP. Last year, Congress denied funds for the program
    and, in spite of this fact, the fiscal year 2006 budget request
    for both the Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA and the Air Force
    includes money for RNEP.
        It would appear that the administration is committed to
    going forward with this controversial program, not just
    completing the feasibility study. If the only goal is to
    develop earth-penetrating capability that could be used for
    either a nuclear or conventional weapon, it would seem logical
    that the focus of the effort would be a conventional and not a
    nuclear weapon. We have had discussions about this in committee
    as well as on the floor of the Senate.
        The second topic is the Reliable Replacement Warhead.
    Congress, the American people, need to understand what it will
    produce and what it will cost. Is it, as some hope, a pivotal
    change in the approach to nuclear deterrence that will enable
    real significant reductions in the number of nuclear warheads
    and reduce the cost of maintaining a nuclear arsenal? Is it an
    opportunity to have a serious review and discussion of nuclear
    weapons and nuclear policy? Or is it just an excuse to develop
    a new nuclear weapon and to return to nuclear weapons testing?
    I hope our witnesses are going to provide some insight and
    clarity on that issue.
        I also hope that we can get a clear understanding on the
    policy context for both of these initiatives, the RNEP and the
    Reliable Replacement Warhead. We need to understand the cost of
    each program, the impact these programs will have on the
    ability to make real reductions in the stockpile, and the
    impact that these programs will have on others. Will these
    programs have a deterrent effect or will it encourage other
    nations to start developing nuclear weapons?
        So I look forward to discussion of these issues today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Cartright, you are our strategic commander of
    STRATCOM. Give us your thoughts, if you would.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Cartwright. Senator Nelson and Mr. Chairman:
    Listening to your statements, it is kind of like being the
    fourth gent in a row of people who are speaking. You are
    hearing all your points being brought out. But let me hit at a
    couple, in particular, and then be ready for your questions.
        One, the acknowledgment that the environment in the world
    has changed is maybe an obvious statement, but the realities
    here of the implications of the global environment we live in,
    both to the discussion of the threat as it exists today, a
    global threat, the context in which we conduct military
    operations from a forces perspective, which is where I spend
    most of my time. Clearly, the world has changed and the
    diversity of the threat compared to the Cold War and what we
    must protect against are things that drove, particularly in the
    Department, the realignment with STRATCOM of a set of global
    enablers that could be provided to the regional combatant
    commanders to allow them to conduct their job in this very
    diverse world that we are living in.
        We have had experience with these types of global enablers
    before, obviously United States Transportation Command and how
    we consolidated all of our logistics functions and our lift
    into one command, because it made sense to approach this from a
    global standpoint. The Special Operations Command is another
    example where we have consolidated because it made sense.
        Our strategic weapons have always been with STRATCOM, but
    we have now added space, as you said, global strike, integrated
    missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) function, have been added in there. Net warfare, the
    information operations side, and the cyber world have been
    added to our set of global capabilities at STRATCOM. We are
    also in the process of evaluating and providing options for
    combating weapons of mass destruction as an additional mission.
        Trying to bring these together as global enablers is really
    an acknowledgment that the threat is very diverse. In the world
    that we live in, almost every action that we take has global
    implications. It's hard not to wake up in the morning and look
    at the world and people who are watching elections in the
    former Soviet Union, Soviet republics; people who are watching
    the implications of the war in Iraq, the elections in Iraq, the
    elections in Afghanistan, et cetera, they have global
    implications, as does the price of oil, the price of coffee.
        So this is a global environment and we need a set of global
    enablers. That is what STRATCOM is trying to bring to the
    table. To do that, we have to do it in an environment that is
    different than what we had in the Cold War.
        [The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: This is my first
    opportunity to appear before you as Commander of the United States
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Thank you for the time you've given me
    to discuss the missions assigned to us as we continue to prosecute the
    global war on terror and take on the challenge of combating weapons of
    mass destruction.
        My prepared remarks cover USSTRATCOM's role in the challenging 21st
    century environment and plans for addressing those challenges with
    capabilities to serve our Nation's needs in war and in peace.
                      the 21st century global environment
        Global interdependence--economic, political, and social--combined
    with near instantaneous global connectivity, is a trademark of the new
    century. It also heightens the importance of strong links between U.S.
    strategic objectives and regional operations. U.S. strategic objectives
    have profound influence on individuals, regions, nations, and non-state
    actors and networks. The tight linkage between U.S. strategic
    objectives and the conduct of regional operations is evident in our
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more recently in Asia in the
    aftermath of the tsunami. In Afghanistan, the strategic objective to
    combat global terrorism guided, as well as constrained, our regional
    decisions. The regional operations in Iraq are clearly influencing
    cultural, economic, and security considerations around the globe.
        Our adversaries are using asymmetric approaches; exploiting social,
    political, and economic vulnerabilities to avoid confronting superior
    U.S. forces head on. We continue to see increases in the speed and
    deceptive scale of proliferation of potential weapons of mass
    destruction, including delivery and concealment capabilities. We see
    adversaries who would use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
    suicide bombs against their own people and infrastructure, as well as
    against deployed multinational forces. These adversaries have easy
    access to the same global technology base we do, and can exploit the
    same communication and information resources as the American public.
    They have proven they are an intelligent and adaptable enemy.
        All operations, while regional in execution, have global
    consequence and therefore require a global perspective. Regional
    combatant commanders, who are responsible and accountable for
    conducting combat and peacekeeping operations in their areas of
    responsibility (AORs), have long depended upon support provided from
    outside their AORs. Much of that support, which in the past was
    provided on an ad hoc basis, has now been codified in the Unified
    Command Plan as a USSTRATCOM global responsibility. We are positioning
    USSTRATCOM to advance a distinctly global and strategic perspective on
    current and emerging capabilities necessary to deter threats to our way
    of life, particularly those threats involving weapons of mass
    destruction. USSTRATCOM will enable combatant commander's regional
    operations through realization of a comprehensive set of global mission
    capabilities, soundly integrated to achieve more effective and
    efficient execution.
        We look upon this responsibility as both an exciting challenge and
    a solemn obligation to the regional combatant commanders, the American
    men and women who serve in their AORs and to the American people.
                                global enablers
        21st century operations are fundamentally different from those of
    the last century. Combat operations are being conducted in rapidly
    changing circumstances, shifting from humanitarian operations to
    intense firefights within a few hundred yards of each other with little
    or no warning. This dynamic nature is matched by a varying composition
    of assisting partners. We must be ready to conduct integrated,
    distributed operations using global and regional military forces. In
    many situations, these forces will be augmented by other U.S.
    Government personnel, coalition and commercial partners, and possibly,
    non-governmental organizations. To plan and effectively execute these
    types of distributed, agile and integrated operations, the regional
    combatant commands increasingly rely on multiple capabilities the
    global commands must support or provide.
        The Unified Command Plan expands USSTRATCOM responsibilities
    through the assignment of global mission areas that span levels of
    authority, cross regional boundaries and intersect with various
    national and international agencies. USSTRATCOM's missions are:

             Global deterrence;
             Global support from space-based operations;
             Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
             Global strike;
             Global information and network operations;
             Global command and control;
             Global integrated missile defense coordination;
             Globally combating weapons of mass destruction.

        Achieving the full potential of these missions is contingent upon
    identifying the right capabilities mix and sustaining our global reach
    through space. However, without the context of advanced situational
    awareness, and the power of collaboration, even the best tools may be
    insufficient to deter and defeat a determined adversary. We are placing
    an emphasis on the following global enablers:
    The New Triad
        USSTRATCOM supports The New Triad concept; a strategic way ahead in
    pursuit of a more diverse set of offensive and defensive warfighting
    capabilities. We are active participants in all three legs of The New
    Triad: offensive nuclear and non-nuclear strike (including non-
    kinetic), passive and active defenses, and a defense infrastructure
    capable of building and sustaining all offensive and defensive
    elements, including the critical support areas of command and control
    and intelligence.
        Coupled with improved collaboration and shared global awareness,
    The New Triad concept will enable more precisely tailored global strike
    operations. With a full spectrum of nuclear, conventional and non-
    kinetic options available, regional combatant commanders will be
    enabled to achieve specific local effects against high value targets in
    the context of the strategic objective.
        While we are confident in our ability to support effective global
    strike operations today, we must continue to evolve that capability to
    meet the demands of an uncertain tomorrow. For example, I intend to
    conduct experiments to better understand the value of weapon accuracy
    within a range of stressing environments. If modeling and testing
    confirm the value of such capability, this may lead to new thoughts on
    the balance between nuclear and conventional strike alternatives.
        The new responsibilities assigned to USSTRATCOM have required the
    command to broaden its Cold War focus from deterring nuclear or large-
    scale conventional aggression to becoming a major contributor to the
    much broader defense strategy. Nuclear weapons; however, continue to be
    important, particularly for assuring allies and friends of US security
    commitments, dissuading arms competition, deterring hostile leaders who
    are willing to accept great risk and cost, and for holding at risk
    those targets that cannot be addressed by other means.
        As steward of the Nation's strategic nuclear capabilities, we have
    two specific areas of focus--rationalizing our nuclear forces, and
    providing for a relevant nuclear stockpile in the context of The New
    Triad. USSTRATCOM's first priority will continue to be the maintenance
    of the absolute security, safety, and surety of the stockpile. At the
    same time we will continue to evaluate and provide a range of options,
    both nuclear and non-nuclear, relevant to the threat and military
    operations.
        The New Triad concept presents an opportunity to reduce our
    reliance on nuclear weapons through the evaluation of alternative
    weapons, defensive capabilities and associated risk. It is our intent
    to have the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review address nuclear issues,
    and the associated infrastructure, to determine transformation
    requirements for our nuclear capabilities in the 21st century. We will
    look at rationalizing our nuclear forces as an element of the overall
    force structure and the proper tailoring of nuclear effects as part of
    the broad spectrum of national power. These assessments will be
    important to future operational planning as well as future budget
    plans.
        Finally, The New Triad concept provides a framework on which to
    establish a new dialogue on the future role for nuclear weapons in our
    national strategy. The challenging security and threat environment of
    the 21st century signals the need for an informed national level
    discussion to hear the voices of government leaders, military, academia
    and the public if we are to effectively establish a long term nuclear
    investment plan.
    Space
        The importance of the space mission to our national security cannot
    be overstated. The U.S. economy, our quality of life, and our Nation's
    defense are all linked to our freedom of action in space. For example,
    satellites are at the heart of routine financial activities such as
    simple automatic teller machine operations or complicated international
    currency and stock market transactions. The telecommunication industry
    is heavily vested in space. Commercial airliners, container ships,
    trains, trucks, police, fire departments and ambulances have also
    become highly dependent upon space-based global positioning systems to
    enhance their ability to safely deliver people, goods and services. The
    fact is, our dependency on space increases every day--a fact not lost
    on our adversaries. This growing national dependence on space-based and
    space-enabled capabilities establishes a true imperative to protect our
    space assets and our ability to operate freely in, and from, space.
        We currently enjoy an asymmetric advantage in space, but our
    adversaries are gaining on us. Our space support infrastructure is
    aging and, in some instances, on the verge of becoming obsolete. We
    will continue to face additional challenges as other nations exploit
    new technologies and capabilities in attempts to bridge the gap between
    them and us.
        The space environment itself is also rapidly changing. For example,
    the number of objects in-orbit increases every month, while the size of
    those objects decreases. This is challenging our space surveillance
    technology, developed in the latter half of the 20th century, because
    it was not designed to detect or track the current magnitude of new,
    smaller objects, including micro-satellites. This increases the chances
    of collisions, which threatens our manned spaceflight program; opens
    the door for unwarned action against U.S. satellites by adversaries;
    and limits our ability to protect our space assets.
        We must do a better job of leveraging the capabilities of our space
    assets--in DOD, national and commercial systems. We must also maintain
    the ability to protect our own space assets and capabilities, both
    actively and passively, while denying our adversaries the military use
    of space--at the time and place of our choosing.
        In order to bring these elements of space control together, our
    near-term plan is to work with the various space programs to identify
    potential gaps and make sure existing information and applications are
    available and provided to authorized users on a global network. This
    plan will serve as the basis for a concept of operations to exploit
    information from our space assets, providing space situational
    awareness to the regional combatant commands.
    Distributed Operations
        For distributed, integrated operations, dominant situational
    awareness is an imperative--globally, regionally, and locally. It must
    exist across the full breadth and depth of operations, from planning
    and combat through post-conflict reconstruction, and ultimately,
    peacetime.
        For our forces to effectively employ collaborative capabilities and
    capitalize upon situational awareness, we must enable them to create
    pictures of the battlespace tailored to their specific needs--what we
    refer to as User Defined Operating Pictures. It is USSTRATCOM's job to
    provide the global capabilities to enhance situational awareness,
    facilitate collaborative planning, and provide a basic User Defined
    Operating Picture capability for all of the combatant commands.
        Many of the capabilities required for agile, distributed operations
    will be facilitated by space and enabled by a global information
    environment with ubiquitous, assured access to information, when and
    where any combatant commander needs it. To achieve this vision, the old
    mantra to provide information on a ``need to know'' basis, must be
    replaced by a ``need to share.'' Critical information that the
    warfighter didn't know existed, and the owner of the information didn't
    know was important, must be made available within a global information
    environment easily accessible to commanders at all levels.
    Interdependent Capabilities
        Our action plan for global command and control focuses on ensuring
    the all-source information needed for effective operations is available
    to all theaters. For the global Intelligence, Surveillance,
    Reconnaissance (ISR) mission, that also means developing integrated and
    persistent systems capable of supporting precision targeting.
    USSTRATCOM has the lead for coordinating global ISR capabilities and
    will be working closely with the regional combatant commanders, Joint
    Forces Command and the services to develop the associated strategy.
        The Department's net-centric global information services, currently
    in development, are essential to our global missions. These services
    will connect global and regional applications and improve both
    horizontal and vertical information integration.
        We are developing a prioritized plan for transitioning away from
    stove-piped legacy systems to capabilities that support broader
    information and applications access. Included in this plan are actions
    focused on leveraging existing legacy applications and data by making
    them more broadly accessible. Each user will be allowed the flexibility
    to select from any available data source, anywhere on the network,
    those objects most useful to them at any particular time. Additionally,
    any new data source will be available the moment it comes onto the
    network, rather than requiring a modification to existing systems, as
    is the case today.
        USSTRATCOM is an advocate for net-centricity. Our focus is on:

             Capability to enable our ``internet-like'' environment
            and access to information;
             Realization of a high-bandwidth, ubiquitous
            communications backbone to deliver information with high
            assurance and low latency; and
             Robust information assurance required to defend our
            networks and our information.

        Creating a collaborative structure is more than just designing and
    disseminating tools--it is also about changing human behavior. Our
    objective is a global, persistent, 24/7 collaborative environment--
    comprising people, systems, and tools. Our future structure must
    support real time command and control at both the global and local
    levels as well as enable dynamic, adaptive planning and execution in
    which USSTRATCOM, the regional combatant commanders, and other
    geographically dispersed commanders can plan and execute operations
    together. Our collaborative environment must also provide the
    capability to ``connect all the dots''--enemy dots, friendly dots,
    neutral dots, contextual dots--all the dots that matter--as they
    appear, rather than wait for a post-event analysis when all of the
    different data stores can be opened. With improved collaboration and
    shared awareness, we can more effectively conduct operations using the
    full spectrum of capabilities to achieve desired, focused effects
    against high value targets.
        In that regard, we are actively assessing the currently available
    collaborative environment and processes and investigating potential
    pilot programs to encourage organizational information sharing to build
    trust in shared information. Fundamental to this issue is the
    establishment of data tagging standards and associated information
    assurance policies.
        With regard to sharing information, we are in some respects
    navigating uncharted waters. While the value of sharing information
    with allies, coalition partners and other Federal departments and
    agencies is well understood, sharing information with industry or other
    private sources presents proprietary, intellectual property and privacy
    concerns which are not well understood. Such information has the
    potential to be of great value to USSTRATCOM and the regional combatant
    commanders in accomplishing our missions. We will be attentive to the
    actions currently being taken throughout the Federal Government in
    response to Executive Order 13356, ``Strengthening the Sharing of
    Terrorism Information To Protect Americans,'' which may provide us
    valuable insight and guidance in this sensitive area.
                        building an asymmetric advantage
        In addition to our role as steward of the Nation's nuclear
    stockpile and guardian of global deterrence, USSTRATCOM now has the
    responsibility for working across regional boundaries to address
    threats in a global perspective. To achieve the asymmetric advantage we
    desire requires us to build the interdependent, collaborative,
    operational environment we've envisioned. It is our responsibility to
    provide global services and global context to the regional combatant
    commands and their deployed forces so we are collectively a more
    effective force--for warfighting, peace and all possible combinations
    of both.
    New Command Structure
        As the latest step in maturing our approach to fulfilling
    USSTRATCOM's global mission responsibilities we are implementing a new
    command structure. This structure is critical to the asymmetric
    advantage we seek, leveraging essential competencies of associated
    components and key supporting agencies through an distributed,
    collaborative environment.
        Rather than creating additional organizational layers, we are
    bringing existing commands and agencies under our global mission
    umbrella through the establishment of Joint Functional Component
    Commands. These interdependent Joint Functional Component Commands will
    have responsibility for the day-to-day planning and execution of our
    primary mission areas: space and global strike, intelligence
    surveillance and reconnaissance, network warfare, integrated missile
    defense, and combating weapons of mass destruction.
        USSTRATCOM headquarters retains responsibility for nuclear command
    and control. Additionally, headquarters will provide strategic
    guidance, exercise global command and control, and conduct strategic
    level integrated and synchronized planning to ensure full-spectrum
    mission accomplishment. USSTRATCOM will also advocate for the
    capabilities necessary to accomplish these missions.
        This construct will allow us to leverage key, in-place expertise
    from across the Department of Defense and make it readily available to
    all regional combatant commanders. Our vision is for the combatant
    commanders to view any Joint Functional Component Command as a means by
    which to access all of the capabilities resident in the USSTRATCOM
    global mission set. Anytime a combatant commander queries one of our
    component commands, they will establish strategic visibility across our
    entire structure through our collaborative environment. The fully
    integrated response USSTRATCOM provides should offer the combatant
    commander greater situational awareness and more options than
    originally thought available. Specific Joint Functional Component
    Command responsibilities include:

             Space and Global Strike. The Commander STRATAF (8th
            Air Force) will serve as the Joint Functional Component
            Commander for Space and Global Strike. This component will
            integrate all elements of military power to conduct, plan, and
            present global strike effects and also direct the deliberate
            planning and execution of assigned space operation missions.
            For plans not aligned with a specific mission set, the Joint
            Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike is
            tasked to work in close coordination with USSTRATCOM
            headquarters as the lead component responsible for the
            integration and coordination of capabilities provided by all
            other Joint Functional Component Commands.
             Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. The
            Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will be dual-hatted
            to lead the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
            Joint Functional Component Command. This component is
            responsible for coordinating global intelligence collection to
            address DOD worldwide operations and national intelligence
            requirements. It will serve as the epicenter for planning,
            execution and assessment of the military's global ISR
            operations; a key enabler to achieving global situational
            awareness.
             Network Warfare. The Director, National Security
            Agency (NSA) will also be dual-hatted to lead the Network
            Warfare Joint Functional Component Command. This component will
            facilitate cooperative engagement with other national entities
            in computer network defense and offensive information warfare
            as part of our global information operations.

        Our coordinated approach to information operations involves two
    other important supporting commands. The Director, Defense Information
    Systems Agency also heads the Joint Task Force for Global Network
    Operations. This organization is responsible for operating and
    defending our worldwide information networks, a function closely
    aligned with the efforts of the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Network Warfare. Additionally, the Commander, Joint Information
    Operations Center coordinates the non-network related pillars of
    information operations: psychological operations, electronic warfare,
    operations security and military deception. Both the Joint Task Force
    for Global Network Operations and the Commander, Joint Information
    Operations Center will be full members of the USSTRATCOM distributed,
    collaborative environment.

             Integrated Missile Defense. The Commander, Army Space
            and Missile Defense Command will head the Integrated Missile
            Defense Joint Functional Component Command. This component will
            be responsible for ensuring we meet USSTRATCOM's Unified
            Command Plan responsibilities for planning, integrating, and
            coordinating global missile defense operations and support. It
            will conduct the day-to-day operations of assigned forces;
            coordinating activities with associated combatant commands,
            other STRATCOM Joint Functional Components and the efforts of
            the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The Joint Functional
            Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense is a key
            element of the ``defenses'' leg of the New Triad concept.
             Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Secretary
            of Defense (SECDEF) recently assigned USSTRATCOM responsibility
            for integrating and synchronizing DOD's efforts for combating
            weapons of mass destruction. As this initiative is in its very
            formative stages, we have yet to formalize any specific
            componency structure. However, we anticipate establishing a
            formal relationship with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as
            an initial starting point.

        This new componency structure is in its infancy and will take
    several months to fully realize. There are detailed issues to work
    through, including the proper distribution of subject matter expertise
    and an assessment of expanding relationships with other U.S. Government
    departments and foreign nations.
        A final element of our evolving organizational structure involves
    developing relationships with the private sector to build upon efforts
    under the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. This important partnership
    with the private sector supports many of our national objectives and
    crosses into relatively uncharted territory.

             Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. The United States has
            achieved success in the global war on terrorism by attacking
            terrorist infrastructure, resources, and sanctuaries.
            Nevertheless, our adversaries continue to plan and conduct
            operations driven by their assessment of our vulnerabilities.
            The main vulnerability requiring our constant vigilance is the
            Nation's economy, and one need look no further than the
            economic aftershock attributed to the September 11 terrorist
            attacks to affirm this assertion. The risk is accentuated given
            the global underpinnings of our economic structure. Even a
            small-scale terrorist attack against a lower tier provider in a
            distant land can have wide-ranging and pervasive economic
            implications.

        Given the evolving understanding of terrorist's use of global
    processes, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism was created to intercede
    on behalf of combatant commanders, among others, and positively affect
    outcomes through connections with the private sector. Since November
    2001, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism has successfully combined
    private sector global processes with other elements of national power
    to help fight global terrorism as part of USSTRATCOM's global mission
    responsibilities. This fruitful relationship with the private sector
    has proven effective on a number of occasions and has garnered the
    support of influential leaders both within and outside government.
        Yet, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism is somewhat of an ad hoc
    process based on trusted relationships. As such, the value of the
    program is directly related to the availability of the participants.
    USSTRATCOM was recently contacted by a group of people from various
    non-military sectors, advocating the creation of a working group to
    formalize this ad hoc program to begin planning a more permanent
    approach for the long-term.
        Evolving plans call for the establishment of a Global Innovation
    and Strategy Center, which will serve as an independent headquarters
    for the work of the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. When fully
    operational, the Global Innovation and Strategy Center will be able to
    access on-site and public/private sector experts to conduct rapid
    analysis of national security situations. The center will also have
    access to a wide range of available technologies to assist in the
    development of strategies incorporating capabilities well in excess of
    those of the military alone.
        On a strategic level, the value of such an effort is the open
    realization that all elements of national power, which have not
    traditionally operated in a synchronized and coordinated role in
    national security, understand the urgent need for their involvement.
        Full realization of the benefits inherent in the distributed,
    interdependent organizational structure described above requires an
    effective collaborative operation. A true collaborative environment
    provides us the asymmetric advantage necessary to deter and defeat the
    agile adversaries we face in the 21st century environment. In the
    future, these skills will take on even greater importance as we broaden
    our partner base within the U.S. Government, with coalition partners,
    commercial partners, academia and others, including non-government
    organizations.
                       achieving the strategic imperative
        Agile, responsive distributed operations, enabled by meaningful
    information exchange, shared objectives, and shared situational
    awareness, are key to the successful performance of USSTRATCOM's global
    missions. We have assessed the capability gaps in our global mission
    areas and have developed action plans, working with our partner
    commands, to improve our collective ability to carry out operations at
    all levels.
        USSTRATCOM's strategy is focused on:

             Stewardship of the strategic nuclear stockpile;
             Defending against asymmetric approaches used by our
            adversaries, including weapons of mass destruction;
             Responding effectively in a rapidly changing combat
            operations environment;
             Achieving prompt, predictable precision operations;
            and
             Coordinating with U.S., multinational, interagency,
            and private sector partners in a collaborative environment.

        Implementing this strategy relies on new and enhanced capabilities,
    including:

             Dominant situational awareness;
             A ubiquitous, assured, global information environment;
             Dynamic, persistent, trustworthy collaborative
            planning;
             User Defined Operating Pictures, using distributed,
            globally available information, and;
             A culture that embraces ``need to share'' rather than
            ``need to know.''

        We are not there yet. Working with our partner commands, we have
    developed plans to improve our global capabilities. We need your
    continued support to deliver the capabilities needed to combat the
    threats of the 21st century. We need your support for:

             Pursuit of high capacity, internet-like capability to
            extend the Global Information Grid to deployed/mobile users
            worldwide;
             Adoption of data tagging standards and information
            assurance policies to increase government-wide trusted
            information sharing; and
             Technology experiments to enhance our understanding of
            the value of accuracy and stressing environments for current
            and future weapons.

        Finally, as an element of our role as steward of the Nation's
    strategic nuclear capabilities, we need you to:

             Consider a new national dialogue on nuclear policy.
            This Nation is ready for a genuine policy debate on the role of
            nuclear weapons within the context of the current global
            environment and the potential offered by The New Triad concept.
            We must build a long-term nuclear investment plan suited to
            national security goals.

        USSTRATCOM recognizes what has to be done to be a global command in
    support of the warfighter. We are aggressively moving out on actions to
    ensure USSTRATCOM fulfills our full set of global responsibilities,
    supporting our national security needs in peace and in war.
        Thank you for your continued support.

        Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, with regard to
    STRATCOM's relationship then to, say, General Abizaid or a
    combatant commander, how do you see that? Will you state that
    again?
        General Cartwright. The way I see that relationship and the
    way I have articulated that relationship is I am trying to
    provide and will provide to General Abizaid, the commander of
    Central Command (CENTCOM), or any other regional commander,
    global capabilities so that that particular commander, in the
    case of General Abizaid, has a set of global skills, things
    like space, global ISR, missile defense, that he can use in his
    region to apply.
        To me that's what's different about STRATCOM today and
    that's what's different about the context in which STRATCOM
    operates today. We have, through the Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR), a new triad which acknowledges the values of offense,
    defense, and infrastructure and tries to balance those legs
    such that the threats of today, the threats that we can imagine
    for tomorrow, we have the opportunity by adjusting those
    balances to adapt to a changing world.
        It is a reality that this world is going to change and it
    is probably going to change at a rate that is more significant
    than it has in the past. So the triad gives us that vehicle by
    which we can address those changes.
        Underpinning that triad, or part and parcel to it, is
    command and control, the ability to connect these three legs,
    understand the balances, and provide to, say, General Abizaid,
    the skills, the capabilities, let us say ISR or network
    warfare, to provide those skills and the command and control
    necessary to actually use these capabilities that we are trying
    to put together.
        So the world and the approach to the threat has definitely
    changed. Around that triad at STRATCOM we have built a set of
    commands that represent each of these mission areas. They are
    called functional commands, joint functional component
    commands. These are commands that provide these skills, whether
    it be integrated missile defense, or whether it be ISR. They
    are to provide those to the regional combatant commanders.
        They are all connected. So if General Abizaid needs
    assistance in ISR and he comes to my commander for ISR, he also
    gets the space component, he gets the missile defense
    component. He gets all of the pieces, no matter where he enters
    into our capability. That is the approach here, a holistic
    approach to try to understand this complex threat and provide
    to a regional combatant commander those kinds of capabilities.
        So that is what is fundamentally different at STRATCOM.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if I could just
    interject here?
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So one of the things that you are
    telling us is that your assets in space have to be reliable.
    You have to know that they are there, they are working, and
    that an enemy cannot take them out. Is that correct?
        General Cartwright. I would add to reliable, assured. They
    have to be there. They have to be in a configuration that a
    regional combatant commander can count on them, whether it be
    in position, timing and navigation, or in communications or any
    of the other capabilities that we currently have in space. We
    have to have them in a position where they are assured and can
    be provided to a regional combatant commander and he can count
    on the effects that they will deliver.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, you almost used in the same
    breath the example of space assets as one component and missile
    defense as the other component. But the National Missile
    Defense System, that is not to the point that a combatant
    commander could rely on that, is it?
        General Cartwright. Clearly, the emerging national missile
    defense, the system that is there to protect the United States,
    is a an emerging, developing capability that we are working our
    way through. But its ties to sensors in space, its ties to
    terrestrial sensors, are all there today and available to, say,
    a regional combatant commander to be used and leveraged. Maybe
    not for missile defense, but again this sensor in one minute
    can be used for missile defense, the sensor in the next minute
    could be used for ISR, radar surveillance, et cetera.
        So how you use the sensor is what we are there to try to
    leverage in more than one way. To build a sensor for a single
    function today is probably less than optimal. You would like to
    be able to build sensors, in particular in this discussion, so
    that missile defense could use it, so that space surveillance
    could use it, so that a regional combatant commander could use
    it for his warfighting requirements.
        So how we do that is what STRATCOM is trying to pull
    together in networking these capabilities in ways that are
    available to the regional combatant commander.
        Let me finish with three points of leverage that I think
    are out there that are areas that we are pursuing to try to
    build this capability for the regional combatant commanders.
    The first is the concept of precision. We have seen over the
    last 10 to 15 years the value that precision brought to our
    conventional forces, weapons like Joint Direct Attack Munitions
    (JDAMs) and laser-guided bombs and things like that.
        Precision has an intrinsic quality of being able to, one,
    define what it is, the effect that you would like to create on
    an enemy's capability; two, to focus it so that you can
    actually provide it in a way that does not require multiple
    delivery vehicles, multiple sensors, multiple warheads. If you
    can get to a point in precision--there is a very clear knee in
    the curve where you can start to have a direct effect on your
    inventory, whether that be of sensors, whether it be delivery
    platforms, or warheads.
        To me, we have to go explore this and understand where
    those leverage points are and make sure that we are applying
    them across the entire set of delivery capabilities that we
    have in the strategic side of the equation.
        That precision also has to go to the issue of intelligence,
    because having the weapons without the precise intelligence is
    a mismatch. We have to try to work on the intelligence and
    approaching intelligence in a fundamentally different way, a
    more holistic way, to try to get at more precise intelligence
    so that weapon-to-target and delivery and sensor all come
    together in a way that is the most effective way that we can
    put it against an adversary.
        The second piece of leverage or point of leverage that I
    think we have to consider is the one that connects the triad to
    the infrastructure. Ambassador Brooks and I have spent a
    considerable amount of time both in analysis, in tabletops and
    exercises trying to understand, as was highlighted in the
    opening comments, what does ``responsive'' mean. What does it
    bring to us, how can we best leverage it so that the Nation
    particularly can be ready for what it does not expect, because
    the world is going to change, that it can recover from what it
    does not expect.
        From a ground perspective, we have an old saying that
    basically no good plan survives first contact. We are going to
    be surprised. There are going to be things that emerge that we
    did not count on. What is our ability to react to that, not
    only to the human dimension of training an individual soldier,
    sailor, airman, or marine to be able to respond to the unknown,
    but to set the entire enterprise on a footing that makes sense
    and allows us to be responsive to emerging threats that we did
    not plan on?
        So that is an attribute of the infrastructure that the two
    of us have spent a great deal of time trying to understand. We
    do not have the exact answers yet, but we are starting to close
    in on what we think are the key leverage points in the
    infrastructure piece and how that relates to the defensive leg
    and the offensive leg. I think that is going to be important
    and I would like to go into that in more detail in the closed
    session.
        The last point that I would touch on, which we talked about
    a little bit here, is the precision and the fundamental change
    in how we do planning. Once again the word ``responsive'' comes
    up. Can we do planning in a responsive way and have the
    precision in our intelligence, have the precision in our
    targeting? We have worked hard to change the way we do our
    planning, to make it more holistic, to make our planning
    reflect that the world is complicated, that the systems that we
    are working against are complicated, and they should be looked
    at as systems of systems and architectures rather than
    individual targets, and to understand that in a complex way.
        We have done a very good job in working against
    infrastructure type targets and understanding the relationships
    of, say, a power grid and how a power grid is put together, and
    that it is probably not necessary to aim at each and every
    element of that grid. We are expanding that work now into a
    much broader target set, to understand the interrelationships.
    That, too, can have a significant effect on the infrastructure
    side of the equation, as well as on the delivery side of the
    equation.
        To me, this is going to be important work that we are going
    to embark on. We are doing this in conjunction with Joint
    Forces Command to get a more holistic approach at how we
    develop targeting and how we employ precise munitions and
    precise intelligence.
        With that, I stand ready for your questions, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, a family from my State
    of Florida is being honored starting at 3 o'clock with the
    first presentation of the first Congressional Medal of Honor
    posthumously to a sergeant that lived in Tampa. So, with your
    permission, I am going to go on down there so that I can be
    with that family at the White House while that presentation is
    made.
        If I may, in my absence if you would just see that a couple
    of those issues that I brought up in my opening comments would
    be addressed for the record.
        Senator Sessions. I will definitely do that, and I know you
    have to be there for that and I know you want to be there for
    that, because I know how deeply you care about those soldiers
    who defend our interests throughout the world. It is a great
    honor. So we thank you for that.
        Ambassador Brooks, you are the Administrator of the NNSA
    and Under Secretary of Energy. So we would be glad to hear your
    comments at this time.

      STATEMENT OF HON. LINTON F. BROOKS, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
     NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AND UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY

        Ambassador Brooks. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I have submitted a statement for the record and I would
    like to summarize just a few of the key points from that
    statement if I may.
        Senator Sessions. If you would, please.
        Ambassador Brooks. I would like to talk about the
    administration's emerging vision for the nuclear weapons
    enterprise, both the stockpile and the complex for the future,
    and how we hope to get to that vision. But before I do, I want
    to emphasize that stockpile stewardship, which you referred to
    in your opening statement, is working. I am confident that
    today's stockpile is safe and reliable and I am confident that
    there is no near-term requirement for nuclear tests. Last month
    the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
    reaffirmed this judgment in reporting to the President their
    ninth annual assessment of the safety and reliability of the
    stockpile.
        Still, if we were starting to build that stockpile today we
    would probably take a different approach than we took during
    the Cold War. The legacy stockpile we have inherited from the
    Cold War may not be the most appropriate from a number of
    perspectives.
        First, it may not be the right stockpile technically. Most
    of our current warheads were designed to maximize explosive
    yield while minimizing size and weight. We did this so we could
    put the maximum number of warheads on a delivery vehicle. This
    was the most cost effective way to meet Cold War military
    requirements.
        As a result, we designed these systems very close to
    performance cliffs, and we were not terribly worried about that
    because we were in an era where we were continually gaining new
    knowledge from an ongoing nuclear test program. If we were
    designing the same stockpile for the same mission today with a
    test moratorium, with a force in which most delivery systems
    will carry fewer warheads than their maximum capability, we
    would manage the technical design risk differently.
        The second technical problem is that our stockpile was not
    designed for longevity. It was designed at a time when we
    introduced new weapons and we turned over weapons every 15 to
    20 years. Today our stockpile is being rebuilt and having its
    life extended in fairly difficult and costly life extension
    programs.
        Now, no one will suggest that rebuilding nuclear weapons
    will ever be cheap, but decisions taken during the Cold War to
    use certain specialized materials make the life extension
    program more costly and more difficult than it would be if we
    were starting from scratch today. More broadly, when we
    designed these weapons we did not have as one of our criteria
    minimizing costs over the entire life cycle of the warhead.
        Now, as a result of these decisions, which made perfect
    sense during the Cold War, it is becoming more difficult and
    more costly to certify remanufacture, despite the extraordinary
    success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The inevitable
    accumulation of small changes over the lifetime of these
    systems will increase uncertainty in long-term weapons
    performance. So we believe that we need to gradually over the
    next decade, 2 decades, shift from today's strategy of
    certifying what we build to a strategy of building things we
    know we can certify and we know we can do so without nuclear
    testing.
        Now, the stockpile we inherited from the Cold War may not
    be the right stockpile militarily, either. This is much more in
    General Cartwright's area than mine, but the NPR identified a
    number of capabilities shortfalls. Our yields are probably too
    high, we have no capability against hard and deeply buried
    targets, our systems are unsuited for some specialized
    missions.
        Now, we do not know when, if ever, the Nation will decide
    that it needs new capabilities. Other than to request
    completing this modest research and development effort on the
    RNEP, we are not investigating any capability changes. Still,
    we need to maintain the capability to respond to potential
    future requirements.
        The stockpile we now plan for the coming decade may also be
    the wrong one from a policy perspective. It is probably still
    too large, even after the President's extraordinarily bold
    decision last May to make one of the largest reductions in the
    total deployed stockpile ever made, total active stockpile ever
    made. Until we achieve a responsive nuclear weapons
    infrastructure, we are going to have to retain substantial non-
    deployed warheads to hedge against technical failure of a
    critical system or to hedge against unforeseen geopolitical
    changes. But that is not the best long-term answer.
        Finally, today's stockpile may not be optimal from a
    physical security standpoint. The Cold War threat was people
    trying to steal secrets. In the post-September 11 world, we
    increasingly realize that there is a terrorist threat, the
    terrorist threat of individuals willing to die in order to gain
    access to a warhead and detonate it in place. This has
    dramatically increased our security costs, and if we were
    designing the stockpile today we would look at new approaches
    to warhead-level use control to reduce these costs.
        So today's stockpile may not be the stockpile you want to
    have 20 years from now. Whatever you think of that, today's
    nuclear weapons complex is certainly not the responsive
    infrastructure we want over the long term. A responsive
    infrastructure would be able to deal with unanticipated events
    or emerging threats and would let us anticipate innovations by
    an adversary and counter them before our deterrent is degraded.
        Our current infrastructure is not responsive. We had over
    the past decade a nearly complete halt to nuclear weapons
    modernization. We have in the past underfunded key elements of
    our manufacturing complex, and those actions have taken their
    toll. For example, we cannot produce plutonium parts for
    nuclear weapons and have not been able to do so for 15 years.
        But we are making progress. We restored tritium production
    in the fall of 2003. We will have the Tritium Extraction
    Facility on line in time to meet the needs of the stockpile. We
    are restoring some lost production capabilities. We are
    devoting substantial resources to restoring facilities that
    suffered from years of deferred maintenance.
        Much remains to be done and we need the continued support
    of Congress. We have to achieve the scientific goals of
    stewardship, continue to revitalize our facilities and
    infrastructure, plan for and construct a modern pit facility
    (MPF) so that we are no longer the only nuclear power that
    cannot make plutonium pits, strengthen test readiness, and
    transfer knowledge to the next generation of weapons
    scientists.
        But we also need to begin to transform to a smaller, less
    costly, more easily secured, safe and reliable stockpile and we
    need to transform the infrastructure that supports that
    stockpile. Part of that transformation will be to retain the
    capability to provide new or different military capabilities
    that the Department of Defense (DOD) requires. But
    transformation is more than that. Even if everybody in this
    room were absolutely convinced that we would never need a
    capability that we do not have today, the need to ensure the
    safety, security, and reliability of the legacy stockpile over
    the long term would still require us to transform, and concerns
    about responsiveness would mandate transformation of the
    weapons complex.
        Now, these two are intertwined. If the stockpile can be
    transformed so it is easier to maintain, then a responsive
    infrastructure becomes easier to construct, and a responsive
    infrastructure is essential to reduce stockpile numbers so that
    we maintain our hedge in the infrastructure rather than in non-
    deployed weapons.
        We are beginning, with the support of Congress, a program
    mentioned in both yours and the ranking member's opening
    statements, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, that may--we are
    at the very early stages--help enable the transformation we
    seek. We will look under this program at whether, if we relax
    some of the design constraints imposed on Cold War systems, we
    can provide replacements for existing weapons that can be more
    easily manufactured, with more readily available and more
    environmentally benign materials.
        Now, these warheads would be delivered by existing systems
    and would have the same military capabilities as the legacy
    warheads they replace. But because they would be designed for
    ease of certification and would be less sensitive to
    incremental aging effects, they would reduce the possibility
    that the United States would ever need to conduct a nuclear
    test in order to diagnose or remedy a reliability problem.
        So the answer to Senator Nelson's question is not only is
    the Reliable Replacement Warhead program not designed to foster
    a return to nuclear testing, it is probably our best hedge
    against the need some time in the future to be faced with the
    question of a return.
        There is another reason why we ought to start this
    transformation now. We have not developed and fielded a new
    warhead in 20 years and we have not modified a warhead in
    nearly 10. We are losing expertise. We need to train the next
    generation of nuclear weapons designers and engineers before
    the last generation retires. Otherwise, we will place at risk
    our ability for stockpile stewardship in the future.
        This kind of training cannot be done except in real design
    work. The enabler for this transformation, as I said earlier,
    is the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. We will use the
    funds Congress provided last year and those requested this year
    to begin concept and feasibility studies on replacement
    warheads or warhead components that provide comparable military
    capabilities to existing warheads. If those studies suggest the
    concept is feasible, then perhaps by 2012, 2015, we should be
    able to demonstrate through a small build of warheads that a
    Reliable Replacement Warhead can be manufactured and certified
    without nuclear testing.
        Once that capability is demonstrated, then the United
    States will have several opportunities. We will have the option
    to cease some of the planned life extension programs, apply the
    savings from the reduced life extension workload to transform
    to a stockpile that is easier and less costly to manufacture,
    and use stockpile transformation to drive a shift to a more
    responsive infrastructure.
        We should not underestimate the very complex challenge this
    kind of transformation will involve. We are transforming an
    enterprise while it is operating at close to full capacity with
    warhead life extension programs. But I believe we need to
    begin.
        If we can establish a responsive infrastructure and
    demonstrate we can produce replacement warheads on the same
    time scale in which geopolitical threats emerge, and if we can
    demonstrate that we can respond quickly to technical problems,
    then I believe we can go much further in reducing non-deployed
    warheads in order to meet the President's stated vision of the
    smallest stockpile consistent with our Nation's system
    requirements.
        Success in realizing our vision for transformation should
    let us achieve a smaller, safer, more secure stockpile, one
    that offers a reduced likelihood that we will ever need to test
    again, one that reduces ownership costs, one that enables a
    much more responsive nuclear infrastructure, and one that helps
    ensure that we maintain a credible deterrent well into the 21st
    century.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]
               Prepared Statement by Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss nuclear weapons programs and policies. I look forward
    to working with you in this new area of responsibility. I also want to
    thank all of the members for their strong support for critical national
    security activities. Before I begin my remarks, I want to say how
    pleased I am to be on this panel today with my colleague, Gen. James E.
    Cartwright, Commander of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),
    who will present the military perspective on these issues.
        Today, I will discuss with you the administration's emerging vision
    for the nuclear weapons enterprise of the future, and the initial steps
    we will be taking, with your support, to realize that vision. This
    vision derives from the work of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the
    August 2003 Conference at Strategic Command, the follow-on NPR
    Strategic Capabilities Assessment and related work on a responsive
    nuclear infrastructure--key elements of which are addressed in Acting
    Assistant Secretary of Defense Mira Ricardel's written statement
    submitted for the record. The Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure
    study, currently underway and scheduled to be completed this summer,
    will further refine this vision. I should add that Gen. Cartwright and
    the Directors at our three National Laboratories have provided both
    leadership and creative impetus to this entire effort.
        The NPR has resulted in a number of conceptual breakthroughs in our
    thinking about nuclear forces--breakthroughs that have enabled concrete
    first steps in the transformation of our nuclear forces and
    capabilities. The recognition of a more dynamic and uncertain
    geopolitical threat environment but one in which Russia does not pose
    an immediate threat, the broad reassessment of the defense goals that
    we want nuclear forces to serve, and the evolution from a threat-based
    to a capabilities-based nuclear force have enabled substantial
    reductions in operationally-deployed strategic warheads through 2012 as
    reflected in the Moscow Treaty. This has also led to the deep
    reduction, directed by the President last May, in the total nuclear
    weapons stockpile required to support operationally-deployed forces. By
    2012 the stockpile will be reduced by nearly one-half from the level it
    was at the time this administration took office, resulting in the
    smallest nuclear stockpile in decades. This represents a factor of four
    reduction in the stockpile since the end of the Cold War.
        Very importantly, the NPR articulated the critical role of the
    defense research and development (R&D) and manufacturing base, of which
    a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key element, in the
    New Triad of strategic capabilities. We have worked closely with the
    Department of Defense (DOD) to identify initial steps on the path to a
    responsive nuclear infrastructure and are beginning to implement them.
        Building on this progress, I want to address the current state of
    our thinking about the characteristics of the future nuclear weapons
    stockpile and supporting nuclear infrastructure. Specifically, I will
    address three key questions:

             What are the limitations of today's stockpile and
            nuclear infrastructure?
             Where do we want the stockpile and infrastructure to
            be in 2030?
             What's the path to get there?

        In laying out these ideas, the administration hopes to foster a
    more comprehensive dialog with Congress on the future nuclear posture.
    I must first emphasize, however, that today stockpile stewardship is
    working, we are confident that the stockpile is safe and reliable, and
    there is no requirement at this time for nuclear tests. Indeed, just
    last month, the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
    reaffirmed this judgment in reporting to the President their ninth
    annual assessment of the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
    weapons stockpile. Like the eight certifications that preceded it, this
    year's assessment is based on a collective judgment of the Directors of
    our National Laboratories and of the Commander, USSTRATCOM, the
    principal steward of our nuclear forces. Our assessment derives from 10
    years of experience with science-based stockpile stewardship, from
    extensive surveillance, from the use of both experiments and
    computation, and from professional judgment.
           what are the limitations of today's stockpile and nuclear
                                infrastructure?
        Although nuclear weapons issues are usually contentious, I believe
    that most would agree that if we were starting to build the stockpile
    from scratch today we would take a much different approach than we took
    during the Cold War. Indeed, today's Cold War legacy stockpile is the
    wrong stockpile from a number of perspectives. Let me explain.
        First, today's stockpile is the wrong stockpile technically. Most
    current warheads were designed to maximize explosive yield with minimum
    size and weight so that many warheads could be carried on a single
    delivery vehicle. During the Cold War, this resulted in the most cost
    effective approach to meet then existing military requirements. As a
    result, our weapons designers, in managing risk during a period when we
    used nuclear tests as part of the tool kit to maintain confidence,
    designed closer to the so-called ``cliffs'' in performance. If we were
    designing the stockpile today under a test moratorium and to support an
    operationally-deployed force in which most delivery systems will carry
    many fewer warheads than the maximum capacity, we would manage
    technical risk differently, for example, by ``trading'' size and weight
    for increased performance margins, system longevity, and ease of
    manufacture.
        Second, the legacy stockpile was not designed for longevity. During
    the Cold War we introduced new weapons into the stockpile routinely and
    ``turned over'' most of the stockpile every 15-20 years exploiting an
    enormous production capacity. Today, our weapons are aging and now are
    being rebuilt in life extension programs that are both difficult and
    costly. Rebuilding nuclear weapons will never be cheap, but decisions
    taken during the Cold War forced the use of certain hazardous materials
    that, in today's health and safety culture, cause warheads to be much
    more costly to remanufacture. Maintaining the capability to produce
    these materials causes the supporting infrastructure to be larger and
    more costly than it might otherwise be.
        More broadly, our nuclear warheads were not designed with priority
    to minimize overall demands on the nuclear weapons enterprise; that is,
    to minimize DOE and DOD costs over the entire life cycle of the warhead
    which includes design, development, production, certification,
    surveillance, deployment, life extension, retirement, and
    dismantlement.
        As a result of these collective decisions, it is becoming more
    difficult and costly to certify warhead remanufacture. The evolution
    away from tested designs resulting from the inevitable accumulations of
    small changes over the extended lifetimes of these systems means that
    we can count on increasing uncertainty in the long-term certification
    of warheads in the stockpile. To address this problem, we must evolve
    our strategy from today's ``certify what we build'' to tomorrow's
    ``build what we can certify.''
        The Cold War legacy stockpile may also be the wrong stockpile from
    a military perspective. The NPR identified a number of capabilities
    shortfalls in the existing arsenal that could undermine deterrence in
    the future. Specifically, the NPR suggested that current explosive
    yields are too high, that our systems are not capable against hard and
    deeply buried targets, that they do not lend themselves to reduced
    collateral damage and that they are unsuited for defeat of biological
    and chemical munitions. The designs of the past do not make full use of
    new precision guidance technologies from which our conventional systems
    have fully benefited, nor are they geared for small-scale strikes or
    flexibility in command, control and delivery. We do not know when, if
    ever, we will need to field new capabilities to deal with these
    shortfalls. Nonetheless, it is vital that we maintain the capability to
    respond to potential future requirements.
        The stockpile we plan for in 2012 is the wrong stockpile
    politically because it is probably still too large. The President's
    decision last May to reduce the stockpile significantly was taken in
    the context of continued progress in creating a responsive nuclear
    weapons infrastructure as part of the New Triad of strategic
    capabilities called for in the NPR. But we have a ways to go to get
    there. Until we achieve this responsive infrastructure, we will need to
    retain a substantial number of non-deployed warheads to hedge against a
    technical failure of a critical warhead or delivery system, or against
    unforeseen geopolitical changes. Because operationally-deployed forces
    are dominated by two weapons types--the W76 SLBM warhead and the W80
    cruise missile warhead--we are particularly sensitive to technical
    problems involving these systems. We retain ``hedge'' warheads in large
    part due to the inability of either today's nuclear infrastructure, or
    the infrastructure we expect to have when the stockpile reductions are
    fully implemented in 2012, to manufacture, in a timely way, warheads
    for replacement or for force augmentation, or to act to correct
    unexpected technical problems. Establishing a responsive nuclear
    infrastructure will provide opportunities for additional stockpile
    reductions because we can rely less on the stockpile and more on
    infrastructure (i.e., ability to produce or repair warheads in
    sufficient quantity in a timely way) in responding to technical
    failures or new or emerging threats.
        Finally, today's stockpile is the wrong stockpile from a physical
    security standpoint. During the Cold War the main security threat to
    our nuclear forces was from spies trying to steal our secrets. Today,
    the threat to classified material remains, but to it has been added a
    post-September 11 terrorist threat that is difficult and costly to
    counter. We now must consider the distinct possibility of well-armed
    and competent terrorist suicide teams seeking to gain access to a
    warhead in order to detonate it in place. This has driven our site
    security posture from one of ``containment and recovery'' of stolen
    warheads to one of ``denial of any access'' to warheads. This change
    has dramatically increased security costs for ``gates, guns, guards''
    at our nuclear weapons sites. If we were designing the stockpile today,
    we would apply new technologies and approaches to warhead-level use
    control as a means to reduce physical security costs.
        Let me turn to issues of the nuclear weapons infrastructure. By
    ``responsive'' nuclear infrastructure we refer to the resilience of the
    nuclear enterprise to unanticipated events or emerging threats, and the
    ability to anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them
    before our deterrent is degraded. The elements of a responsive
    infrastructure include the people, the science and technology base, and
    the facilities and equipment needed to support a right-sized nuclear
    weapons enterprise. But more than that, a responsive infrastructure
    involves practical and streamlined business practices that will enable
    us to respond rapidly and flexibly to emerging DOD needs.
        Our current infrastructure is by no means responsive. A nearly
    complete halt in nuclear weapons modernization over the past decade,
    coupled with past under funding of key elements of our manufacturing
    complex has taken a toll on our ability to be responsive. For example,
    we have been unable to produce certain critical parts for nuclear
    weapons (e.g., plutonium parts) for many years. Today's business
    practices--for example, the paperwork and procedures by which we
    authorize potentially hazardous activities at our labs and plants--are
    unwieldy. But progress is being made. We restored tritium production in
    the fall 2003 with the irradiation of special fuel rods in a TVA
    reactor, and anticipate that we will have a tritium extraction facility
    on-line in time to meet the tritium needs of a reduced stockpile. We
    are restoring some lost production capabilities, and modernizing
    others, so that later this decade we can meet the scheduled startups of
    refurbishment programs to extend the life of three warheads in the
    legacy stockpile. We are devoting substantial resources to restoring
    facilities that had suffered from years of deferred maintenance.
    Finally, we have identified quantitative metrics for
    ``responsiveness,'' that is, timelines to address stockpile problems or
    deal with new or emerging threats. These will help guide our program by
    turning the concept of responsiveness into a measurable reality.
        That said, much remains to be done. Among other things, we must
    achieve the scientific goals of stockpile stewardship, continue
    facilities and infrastructure recapitalization at National Nuclear
    Security Administration's (NNSA) labs and plants, construct a Modern
    Pit Facility (MPF) to restore plutonium pit production, strengthen test
    readiness, streamline business practices, and transfer knowledge to the
    next generation of weapons scientists and engineers who will populate
    this responsive infrastructure. Our challenge is to find ways to carry
    this out that reduce duplication of effort, support consolidation of
    facilities and promote more efficient operations complex-wide. I want
    to stress the importance of a MPF even if the stockpile continues to
    shrink--sooner or later the effects of plutonium aging will require all
    our current pits to be remanufactured.
        where do we want the stockpile and infrastructure to be in 2030?
        Although the legacy stockpile has served us well, it was designed
    to meet the requirements of the Cold War era, many of which are
    irrelevant or inadequate today. We need to begin now to transform to
    the nuclear weapons enterprise of the future--this means transformation
    to a smaller, less costly, more easily secured, safe and reliable
    stockpile as well as transformation of the supporting nuclear
    infrastructure. The two are, of course, intertwined--we see stockpile
    transformation as ``enabling'' transformation to a responsive nuclear
    infrastructure, and a responsive infrastructure as essential to
    reducing total stockpile numbers and associated costs.
        Part of transformation will be to retain the ability to provide new
    or different military capabilities in response to DOD's emerging needs.
    General Cartwright will discuss this aspect of transformation in more
    detail in his testimony.
        But transformation involves more than retaining the capability to
    respond to new military requirements. My main responsibility is to
    assure the continued safety, security and reliability of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile. In this regard, even if we never received another
    DOD requirement for a new military capability for the nuclear
    stockpile, the concerns raised about our ability to assure the safety,
    security and reliability of the legacy stockpile over the very long
    term would still drive the need to transform the stockpile. The
    concerns about responsiveness to technical problems or geopolitical
    change would still mandate transformation of the weapons complex.
        More broadly, we must explore whether there is a better way to
    sustain existing military capabilities in our stockpile absent nuclear
    testing. With the support of Congress, we are beginning a program--the
    Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program--to understand whether, if
    we relaxed warhead design constraints imposed on Cold War systems (that
    have typically driven ``tight'' performance margins in nuclear design)
    we could provide replacements for existing stockpile weapons that could
    be more easily manufactured with more readily available and more
    environmentally benign materials, and whose safety and reliability
    could be assured with highest confidence, without nuclear testing, for
    as long as the United States requires nuclear forces. Such warheads
    would be designed specifically to facilitate less costly remanufacture
    and ease of certification of safety and reliability, and thus would
    reduce infrastructure costs needed to support that component of the
    stockpile. Because they would be designed to be less sensitive to
    incremental aging effects, they would dramatically reduce the
    possibility that the United States would ever be faced with a need to
    conduct a nuclear test in order to diagnose or remedy a reliability
    problem.
        There is another reason why it is critical that we begin now to
    transform the stockpile. We have not developed and fielded a new
    warhead in 20 years, nor have we modified a warhead in nearly 10 years.
    We are losing expertise. We must train the next generation of nuclear
    weapons designers and engineers before the last generation, which honed
    its skills on nuclear testing, retires. If such training--and I cannot
    emphasize this strongly enough--is disconnected from real design work
    that leads to engineered systems, we will, as one laboratory director
    put it, ``create not a new generation of weapons designers and
    engineers but a generation of analysts'' who may understand the theory,
    but not the practice, of warhead development. If that happens, it would
    place at risk our capabilities for stockpile stewardship in the future.
        Along these lines, as part of the transformation of the stockpile,
    we must preserve the ability to produce weapons with new or modified
    military capabilities if this is required in the future. Currently the
    DOD has identified no requirements for such weapons, but our experience
    suggests that we are not always able to predict our future
    requirements. The chief implication is that we must maintain design
    capability for efforts like those being carried out in the RRW program
    but also as a hedge against possible future requirements for new
    capabilities.
                         what's the path to get there?
        Let me briefly describe the broad conceptual approach for stockpile
    and infrastructure transformation. The ``enabler'' for such
    transformation, we believe, is the RRW program. To establish the
    feasibility of the RRW concept, we will use the funds provided by
    Congress last year and those requested this year to begin concept and
    feasibility studies on replacement warheads or warhead components that
    provide the same or comparable military capabilities as existing
    warheads in the stockpile. If those studies suggest the RRW concept is
    technically feasible, and if, as I expect, the DOD establishes a
    requirement, we should be able to develop and produce by the 2012-15
    timeframe a small build of warheads in order to demonstrate that an RRW
    system can be manufactured and certified without nuclear testing.
        Once that capability is demonstrated, the United States will have
    the option to:

             truncate or cease some ongoing life extension programs
            for the legacy stockpile,
             apply the savings from the reduced life extension
            workload to begin to transform to a stockpile with a
            substantial RRW component that is both easier and less costly
            to manufacture and certify, and
             use stockpile transformation to enable and drive
            consolidation to a more responsive infrastructure.

        We should not underestimate the very complex challenge of
    transforming the enterprise while it is operating at close to full
    capacity with on-going warhead life extension programs and potential
    evolving requirements. As a result, as we proceed down this path, we
    will look for opportunities to restructure key life extension programs
    to provide more ``head room'' for transformation. This could also
    provide, in the nearer term, opportunities to ensure appropriate
    diversity in the stockpile, making our nuclear deterrent less sensitive
    to single-point failure of a particular warhead or delivery system.
        Once we establish a responsive infrastructure, and demonstrate that
    we can produce new (or replacement) warheads on a timescale in which
    geopolitical threats could emerge, and can respond in a timely way to
    technical problems in the stockpile, then we can go much further in
    reducing non-deployed warheads and meet the President's vision of the
    smallest stockpile consistent with our Nation's security.
        Success in realizing our vision for transformation will enable us
    to achieve over the long term a smaller stockpile, one that is safer
    and more secure, one that offers a reduced likelihood that we will ever
    need to test again, one that reduces NNSA and DOD ownership costs for
    nuclear forces, and one that enables a much more responsive nuclear
    infrastructure. Most importantly, this effort can go far to ensure a
    credible deterrent for the 21st century that will reduce the likelihood
    we will ever have to employ our nuclear capabilities in defense of the
    Nation.
                                   conclusion
        The administration is eager to work with Congress to forge a broad
    consensus on an approach to stockpile and infrastructure
    transformation. The vision of our future nuclear weapons posture I have
    set forth today is based on the collective judgment of the Directors of
    our National Laboratories and of the Commander, USSTRATCOM. It derives
    from lessons learned from 10 years of experience with science-based
    stockpile stewardship, from many years of effort in planning for and
    carrying out the life extension programs for our legacy stockpile, and
    from coming to grips with national security needs of the 21st century
    as laid out in the NPR.
        I hope that the committee finds our vision both coherent and
    compelling. But I must emphasize that it is simply that, a long-term
    vision, nothing more and nothing less. Much of it has not yet begun to
    be implemented in program planning, or is at the very early stages of
    development. But we believe it is the right vision to guide our near
    term planning and to ensure the Nation's long-term security. I ask for
    the committee's support and leadership as we embark on the path of
    transformation.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Ambassador Brooks. Those were
    excellent comments and I thought you were frank and spoke in
    language that most of us can understand. Sometimes that is not
    true when we deal with these subjects.
        You indicated and suggested that the forces we have may not
    be militarily the best kind of nuclear weapons that we need,
    suggesting that some, maybe many, are too powerful, less
    surgical, I suppose, less available for multiple missions.
    General Cartwright, do you have any thought about that? If you
    had nuclear weapons available to you, would they be exactly the
    kind--if you had them available for your needs, would they be
    exactly the kind that we produced as a result of the Cold War
    situation? Or would you agree with Ambassador Brooks that it
    could be configured perhaps with even fewer, less powerful but
    more effective weapons?
        General Cartwright. I would tend to agree with Ambassador
    Brooks. We can focus both at the effect that the weapon could
    create--the target set of today and tomorrow is probably not
    going to be at least identical for sure, but it is going to be
    much more diverse. But I would also focus on the fact that if I
    were to start today with a clean slate the idea of a more
    secure weapon, a safer weapon to handle, and a weapon that had
    increased surety, such that, again in an inventory type model,
    if applied to a target you were sure it was going to work and
    you only needed to apply one weapon to that target, if that
    could be engineered in, that is the type of engineering that we
    would want to have different today than we had in the past.
        So getting the safety, getting the security, and getting
    the surety of the weapon engineered in the front end rather
    than later on would definitely be a change to the configuration
    of the weapons that we have today.
        Then, going on to the different types of targets that are
    emerging as we look at today's targets and what we expect to
    emerge in the future, we would probably design these weapons
    different than we have.
        Senator Sessions. I think you make a very good point there.
    We might as well begin to discuss it. It is a long way from
    dealing with those issues in any concrete way, but I think
    America believes in free speech and free discussion, so I think
    it is good that you have raised those questions.
        I would just note, Ambassador Brooks, that as part of the
    President's reduction in warhead program we have reduced by
    about two-thirds the number of warheads in the inventory. At
    least that is the plan, and you are moving forward to
    accomplishing that by 2012; is that correct?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. That would reduce the number of
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads we have,
    decommissioning them, by two-thirds, from 1,700 to 2,200
    warheads?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, do you think even
    with these legacy forces does that give you the kind of
    deterrent capability that STRATCOM believes is necessary to
    defend America?
        General Cartwright. It does. It allows us also, given that
    we are talking about 2012, to realize some of the value of this
    new triad called for in the NPR. So the value of a more robust
    infrastructure, the value of a defensive capability, the value
    of an offense that is more than just our nuclear capability,
    but includes the kinetic capabilities of conventional weapons
    and the non-kinetic capabilities that we intend to field, so we
    have time to both meter the downward slope of the weapons and
    the increased capabilities of the other legs.
        Senator Sessions. Would it be fair to say, Ambassador
    Brooks, that as we discuss how to improve and make more
    effective and reliable and helpful our nuclear arsenal, the
    truth is we are reducing it substantially? For those who are
    concerned about nuclear weapons, we are bringing those numbers
    down, even with any kind of changes you are discussing,
    continually, and if you could make some modernization efforts
    in the stockpile, you could take the numbers down even more?
        Ambassador Brooks. I believe that you could. First, let me
    distinguish between what is clearly what the President has
    decided and what I am suggesting to you we might----
        Senator Sessions. I think that is important. Neither this
    Congress nor the President has made any decision to make any
    changes. But I think it is healthy to discuss it.
        Ambassador Brooks. The President decided last year to make
    a substantial reduction in the total stockpile. That is both
    the deployed stockpile and the reserves, if you will. That is a
    reduction of nearly 50 percent, to be implemented by 2012. It
    will end us up with 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed
    strategic weapons plus a number that I will be happy to discuss
    in closed session for spares, but particularly for
    contingencies.
        So for example, if a problem occurs with a warhead, you
    would like to be able to have enough of a different type of
    warhead to deploy to take up the slack. If there is an
    unexpected change in the geopolitical situation, an increase in
    the threat, you would like to be able to match that by
    deploying more weapons.
        What I am suggesting is that right now the only way you can
    maintain those hedges is to maintain a large number of non-
    deployed weapons. But if I have an infrastructure that could
    respond to technical problems by fixing them quickly and that
    could respond to geopolitical problems by remanufacturing
    whatever was needed to meet those problems, I would not need
    even the substantial reductions.
        It is important, Mr. Chairman, to understand that the
    stockpile that we will have in 2012 is the lowest stockpile the
    United States has had in decades. It will be the lowest
    stockpile that I have personally been associated with and I
    have been in the nuclear weapons business for a while now.
        Senator Sessions. In addition to just the warhead numbers,
    we will be reducing, eliminating, retiring the Peacekeeper MX
    missile.
        Ambassador Brooks. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. Which has 10 warheads per missile. We are
    maintaining the Minuteman missile, but reducing the warheads
    from three per missile to one per missile; is that the plan?
        General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Then the nuclear submarines with nuclear
    warheads and missiles on them, 4 of the 18 will be moved from
    nuclear weaponry. That would also reduce the number of warheads
    per missile on those submarines. So you have over a 20-percent
    reduction in the number of nuclear warhead submarines as part
    of the triad and an additional reduction in number of warheads
    per missile on those submarines.
        General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. So I think we have demonstrated our
    Nation's willingness to bring down those numbers.
        Let me ask either of you. We urge that our Russian friends
    maintain strict security on their nuclear weapons. How do you
    feel we are doing with ours? Do you need anything, just
    briefly, to enhance the security of our stockpiles, to avoid
    terrorists perhaps either attacking them or stealing them?
        Ambassador Brooks. Most of the intact nuclear weapons are
    in the custody of the DOD. I have nuclear weapons at the Pantex
    Plant and I move nuclear weapons between the DOD and my
    facilities. The rest of what the DOE has is components, which
    are probably more of a concern for an improvised nuclear device
    than as an intact weapon.
        We have substantially increased the funding for physical
    security. In 2001 the NNSA spent about $400 million. Last year,
    the current year, we are spending $740 million. We are asking
    for $708 million in the budget that is before Congress now.
        So we have made a very substantial investment in improving
    physical security and I am quite comfortable that the weapons
    and materials in my custody or in the Department's custody are
    secure. I will defer to General Cartwright on DOD weapons.
        General Cartwright. We have reviewed the threat, updated
    the threat to understand the change in the character of the
    threat between the Cold War and now, taken the opportunity in
    that review to understand the things we would change that
    currently exist to improve our posture to protect these
    weapons. Both the Navy and the Air Force have very aggressive
    programs to improve all of the issues that we highlighted in
    our review and are on a path to fix those, update those,
    whatever the right characterization of the particular issue is,
    to get us to a footing.
        I am comfortable that we have the weapons protected and
    that we are moving to a posture that will improve that
    protection in light of the changing threat.
        Senator Sessions. That is good news and it is important and
    I think it is just something this Congress needs to assure, and
    you need the resources necessary.
        I think, General Cartwright, you answered in your comments
    as you summarized your thoughts earlier, you answered the
    question about how are we changing from strategic deterrence to
    global deterrence. I think that was something I wanted to get
    at and I think you have covered that pretty well.
        I would want to ask you a little bit more maybe about the
    New Triad. That is a little vague to me or at least I am not
    sure I fully understand it.
        But we also are moving away from solely a nuclear response.
    We have much more capability today with the precision weapons.
    How do the new precision capabilities we have to direct
    conventional weapons, non-nuclear weapons, precisely to a
    target, reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons?
        General Cartwright. To the extent--and let me just go back
    on the offensive side and talk just briefly. On the kinetic
    type weapons, we have the nuclear and then we have the
    conventional weapons. We are also developing a class of weapons
    that we call non-kinetic, that get an effect by attacking a
    network, for instance, that would control a particular
    function, like when we talked about power grids and things like
    that.
        We are developing a set of tools that allows us to go after
    targets in a non-kinetic way. They are just emerging as
    capabilities today, but we are working very hard in that
    environment.
        When we talk about nuclear versus conventional, what
    precision allows you to do is to--if you have both the precise
    intelligence and the ability to deliver a weapon to a precise
    location, then the energy required to destroy a target can be
    more focused.
        Senator Sessions. You mean a smaller bomb?
        General Cartwright. Exactly. So in the conventional world,
    as you saw years ago, we were using 2,000 pound bombs. Just as
    few as 5 years ago, we were down to 1,000 pound bombs from
    aircraft-delivered weapons. We are now in the 500 pound and
    smaller for the same effect, because of precision.
        So it has that ability to start to reduce the amount of
    kinetic energy necessary to create the effect. That is one
    positive. The other thing is this targeting, this new way of
    approaching targeting that I described, which identifies a
    target area from the standpoint of a system and how to effect
    that system with precision such that you do not have to hit
    each of the nodes in any particular system is also offering us
    leverage in the number of weapons necessary to hold a target at
    risk.
        So between the two of those, we start to get at a way to be
    much more efficient in delivering our effect, and to the extent
    that we need large-yield conventional or nuclear weapons there
    is a group of them against a set of targets that can now be
    significantly smaller if we apply this precision.
        Senator Sessions. How would you explain to us the global
    strike concept? How do you utilize that, what the President and
    the SECDEF would like to see, how are you getting along toward
    achieving it?
        General Cartwright. Global strike is one of our mission
    areas. It provides to the Nation the ability to rapidly plan
    and rapidly deliver effects anyplace on the globe. It allows us
    to provide effects for a regional combatant commander if that
    is appropriate, say in the case of CENTCOM, General Abizaid. It
    allows us to provide a strategic capability, which again is not
    necessarily nuclear, for that regional combatant commander, to
    tailor it for his target and deliver it very quickly, with very
    short time lines on the planning and delivery, any place on the
    face of the Earth.
        Senator Sessions. Is that possible? Do we have the
    technology that is available today, if you had the money, that
    you could within a short period of time deliver a conventional
    weapon anywhere in the world?
        General Cartwright. Even with the money, right now we have
    technical challenges that we have to overcome in order to get
    this capability. If we are talking about non-kinetic, we can
    move pretty much anyplace on the earth at the speed of light in
    cyber-type capabilities. But the conventional type capabilities
    and the nuclear type capabilities--nuclear right now is
    delivered in our missiles at very high speeds at very long
    ranges. Our bombers have very long ranges, not quite the
    speeds.
        But trying to pull those attributes together with both
    conventional and nuclear kinetic effects is a little bit of
    what we are trying to work at in the global strike arena. But
    it is much broader. It encompasses both the ability to plan
    rapidly, to apply the precision to the intelligence and gather
    that intelligence in a very rapid manner, and then to apply
    that intelligence to the target and understand the effect we
    want to create.
        All of those are part and parcel to delivering the weapon.
    So we have to get it all. One part of this is not enough.
        Senator Sessions. That is the joint strike capability you
    are working on?
        General Cartwright. The global strike, yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. What about the costs of that? Where are
    we on funding? Do you have adequate funding to achieve what you
    are seeking?
        General Cartwright. I believe that we do. I am trying to
    make sure that I can stay at the right classification level
    here, but I am comfortable that the areas that we are looking
    at for feasibility to ensure that we can deliver this
    capability, both in the intelligence side of the equation, the
    delivery side of the equation, and the weapons side of the
    equation, that we have sufficient latitude and resources to go
    investigate what is feasible, what gives you great leverage,
    and then, if it is a new thing, the opportunity to come back
    and advocate for something new. If it is just a different use
    of a current capability, the ability to put the pieces
    together, connect the dots, so to speak, and provide that
    capability.
        Senator Sessions. But in terms of explosive power, a
    nuclear weapon on a missile, for example, would have far more
    explosive power than a conventional munition would?
        General Cartwright. Yes, sir. But again, if it were----
        Senator Sessions. Obviously it does. But the point is a
    conventional munition might not be sufficient under certain
    circumstances.
        General Cartwright. Under certain circumstances, and there
    are circumstances in which that is the case.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to the hard and deeply buried
    targets, I know a number of our adversaries are proud of their
    tunneling ability and they have worked hard to place deep in
    the ground and in mountains and other areas their strategic
    capabilities. Would you explain, General Cartwright, what your
    concerns are in that regard, what you feel like we need to be
    capable of neutralizing that capability that our adversaries
    have?
        I would just note parenthetically that it is the history of
    warfare that if someone feels threatened in one capability they
    figure out a way to make it not threatened, to eliminate that
    threat, and burying into the ground is a way to do that. It
    also would be historically--so that if we want to be able to
    prevail in a conflict, then we would be able to confront that
    challenge.
        So are we there? Is a study of the capabilities of a Deep
    Earth Penetrator in your opinion justified to see if something
    like that is feasible? Do you support it and why?
        General Cartwright. Yes, sir. First I would say that this
    target set of buried, deeply buried, and hardened targets is a
    very real target set and that it is growing. As you say, if an
    enemy has a capability that they want to protect, they
    generally move toward some way to disguise and deceive us about
    its capability and its location to thwart our targeting and our
    weapons capabilities. Oftentimes they go to mobility. Sometimes
    they go to cover. Sometimes they bury deeply.
        Clearly, the hard and deeply buried targets that go very
    deep into the earth using commercial capabilities are target
    sets that we want to understand better, both what is it they
    are trying to accomplish, what it is that they are trying to
    put in these bunkers, and then to what extent we can hold those
    capabilities at risk.
        We are exploring as many different avenues of approach to
    understanding these target sets and holding them at risk as we
    can come up with. Again, it will probably not be solved by one
    weapon or one approach. We are going to have to understand the
    intelligence necessary to locate and understand what goes on in
    these bunkers. We are going to have to have multiple ways by
    which we can hold them at risk.
        We are working our way through that right now. The RNEP is
    one of several capabilities that we think will be necessary.
    Whether it is a nuclear capability or whether we have other
    capabilities is the work that is being done in the study. But
    that study has implications far beyond just the nuclear
    solution to this in characterizing the facilities, in
    characterizing the effect that can be brought by a weapon
    against those facilities, whether it be kinetic or non-kinetic,
    and in the different types of training for our forces to hold
    these facilities at risk.
        So it is a multifaceted problem which we are trying to get
    our arms around. We have a reasonable base of experience for a
    large amount of this target set, but as it gets more
    sophisticated we have to keep improving our capability.
        Senator Sessions. Well, sort of to recap where we are on
    it, I think we have authorized the study in this committee and
    by the full Senate in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Funding was
    appropriated in 2003 and 2004. It goes to, I believe, the
    Energy Subcommittee for final appropriations of the funds and
    in conference with the House I believe the chairman of the
    House Energy Appropriations Subcommittee objected and
    eventually that funding was not included last year, after
    having been in there previously.
        The President's request this year I believe, Ambassador
    Brooks, is less, but is it sufficient to continue the study
    that we would undergo?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, with the proviso that there is
    another increment in 2007. We are requesting $4 million in the
    current budget and anticipating requesting $14 million in 2007,
    and our 5-year projection shows no additional money for this.
        The reason the level is so much less is we have cut back on
    what it is that we propose to do. Originally we proposed to
    examine two different warheads. Fundamentally, what we are
    doing is taking a warhead, putting a very hard case on it,
    controlling its attitude very precisely so that it can
    penetrate a few meters into rock and still stay intact and go
    off. That way the energy goes into the ground.
        We have concluded that we can demonstrate whether or not
    the concept is feasible by looking at only one warhead. We
    selected the B83 which is one of the two bombs we were looking
    at--because that was where we were when the program was
    stopped.
        If the funding is provided us in 2006 and 2007, we will
    gain enough knowledge to know whether the United States should
    further investigate the concept. We of course will not actually
    be able to deploy anything. As you pointed out in your opening
    statement, that would require a whole different Congressional
    action. That is not what this is about. This is a study.
        Senator Sessions. I think that is a reasonable request and
    have supported that. So the amount of funding will be
    considerably less, but it would give us an indication of how we
    could deal with that, whether we could achieve it or not, even
    if we were to decide to do so.
        Let me ask you this. There is concern expressed that such
    an action would destabilize somehow the nuclear world
    environment, encourage others to build more and dangerous
    weapons. How would you analyze that?
        Ambassador Brooks. I believe that is a misreading of the
    world. Let us look at sort of three kind of classes, four
    really, classes of people. One is the established nuclear
    powers. There is no evidence that the Russian Federation or
    China will take some action in their stockpile because we do or
    do not do this study, and in closed session I can talk a little
    bit more about what those two powers are doing.
        The nuclear wannabes, if you might, the North Koreas of the
    world, seem to be completely uninfluenced by what we do. To the
    extent that they are looking at the U.S., it is our
    overwhelming conventional power that probably causes them to go
    into the search for nuclear weapons.
        Terrorists obviously are not deterred by what we do or what
    we do not do. So the one area in which some believe that this
    kind of nuclear modernization has adverse consequences is the
    large number of non-nuclear states who collectively help us
    preserve the nonproliferation regime through things like export
    control.
        But even here, a study should not make any difference and
    we have empirical evidence because the previous administration
    took a bomb and hardened it to penetrate into frozen soil and
    in essence it had no discernible effect on the actions of any
    other country. So I believe that there is room to debate--
    whenever you want to spend money, there is always room to
    debate whether it is a good use of the public funds, but I
    believe the concern that somehow we are going to destabilize
    the nonproliferation regime is just wrong, not supported by the
    facts.
        Senator Sessions. I think that was a good analysis and I
    thank you for that. Everybody will have to make their own
    decision about that, but I would agree. Again, I think you are
    talking about--we have many nations now with an active nuclear
    weapon program and capabilities of building or updating their
    systems. We are the one nation of the nuclear powers that does
    not have a plutonium pit capability, as you noted. So having a
    precision discreet nuclear weapon capable of dealing with
    hardened targets only in a world in which nuclear research and
    development and production is ongoing in a broad-based way is
    not impressive to me. It does not persuade me that we should be
    afraid of that.
        Ambassador Brooks, I see the New York Times recently had an
    article that indicated that our W76--is that it?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions.--weapons that are a big part of our
    inventory, may not be effective. You have told us that you
    think the stockpile is effective. I just would ask you to
    specifically comment on that and any thoughts you have. I note
    with interest that they sort of criticize you for not having a
    stockpile that would work, but they are also the fiercest
    critic of any testing to see if it would work. But regardless,
    what are your thoughts on the reliability today?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. The W76 is a warhead for the
    Trident missile. It is the most numerous warhead in our
    deployed arsenal, so it is obviously of great concern. The
    dispute has to do with a minority view about interpretation of
    data taken back in the era of underground testing.
        We have looked into this extensively. We went through a
    process in which the lab that did not design a particular
    warhead, in this case the W76, examined it. We held a special
    study or a special examination under Dr. Everet Beckner, who is
    the deputy who runs the Defense Programs in the DOE, bringing
    in the critics, bringing in experts that they suggested. We
    have looked at this a number of ways and I am sure that the
    critics are very sincere and I am sure that they believe what
    they say, but our best technical judgment is they are just
    simply wrong.
        Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, the Common Aero
    Vehicle is a vehicle that, if developed, could lift in low
    orbit a munition or lift other items, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
    (UAVs) or other things, into low orbit and then back into the
    United States, back to the world. We prohibited funding on
    that, I believe, previously, Congress did, awaiting your
    dealing with the concerns that this might be mistaken as some
    sort of attack on, for example, Russia. In other words, they
    have the capability of identifying a launch and they might
    think it would be a launch against them of maybe a nuclear
    warhead, and we wanted to be sure that there could be no
    misunderstanding in that before we authorized going forward
    with this vehicle.
        What can you tell us about the status of the Common Aero
    Vehicle?
        General Cartwright. First let me go to the attributes that
    we are looking at in the system. Those are the attributes of,
    as we talked about earlier in global strike, of being able to
    hold targets at risk at great distances in very short periods
    of time. Now, it could be held at risk in the sensor
    standpoint. It could be held at risk in a weapons standpoint.
    There are many uses, as you alluded to, to a platform that
    could go into low earth orbit and quickly get around the world.
    Associated with that is the responsive lift that would get
    there, that would allow it to get there.
        We are studying that. I think I would turn to Air Force,
    General Burg, back here as to the details of the resources
    associated with it since the moratorium was put on it. I am not
    sure where we are this year exactly in our request.
        What we are trying to understand is in global strike what
    are the options of moving a capability very quickly around the
    world, in the planning, the intelligence, and the delivery, and
    how can we do that and what feasibility is there in using
    space, in moving through the air, in other methods of delivery,
    cyber, et cetera. This is just one of several areas that we are
    investigating.
        Senator Sessions. Have you given thought to the specific
    objection that Congress had with regard to it being
    misinterpreted in some fashion? It seems to me that the
    locations of our Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
    are well known. Would that obviate that fear?
        General Cartwright. I think we have worked our way through
    on this issue over time from bombers, that clearly have
    capabilities to deliver both conventional and nuclear
    capabilities, and how we portray them such that it is
    reasonably unambiguous what our intent is with the weapon.
    Cruise missiles have had the same type of discussion. We are
    now having that discussion with space vehicles and with
    missiles that get you to either low earth orbit or outside the
    atmosphere.
        There are any number of ways to approach the problem if we
    want to take this on. What we have to understand is we have
    done this in the past with basing options so that it is clear,
    with inspection options, protocols, and with profiles of the
    trajectory of the flights, all of which are possibilities, and
    not to exclude the discussion that has gone on about shared
    awareness or warning. We need to make sure that, if we are
    going to use a weapon that is a conventional weapon, but
    somehow could be misunderstood, that we try to provide every
    opportunity to ensure that it is not misunderstood. At the end
    of the day the objective here is to increase the number of
    options, to try to give the Nation more decision time on any
    crisis, and to expand the choices that we might be able to
    offer the President in a crisis.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think that has potential as being
    an effective part of our defense needs and I hope that you will
    pursue it. I think I indicated low earth orbit, but this would
    not be an orbital vehicle; it may go into low earth orbit. It
    would not be a space vehicle.
        I just want to follow up here with the NPR in 2001 and the
    New Triad. Are you confident that we have a clear understanding
    of what is involved in that? How much of it is expected to
    develop over time, and would you share with us, General
    Cartwright, briefly how you understand the New Triad?
        General Cartwright. The three legs associated with the New
    Triad are: the offense, and we talked about that briefly
    before, which is a kinetic capability that is both conventional
    and nuclear, and bringing to bear in particular now more robust
    non-nuclear options, and also the non-kinetic, which is the
    focus right now. We have put probably our greatest effort in
    the cyber type of capabilities on the non-kinetic side, and
    creating both the alternative, which is the ideal state, or in
    combination some way of managing the offensive side of the
    discussion.
        The defense is a combination of, in our terms, active and
    passive capabilities, those things that we would do in a
    passive sense to protect ourselves and then in the active sense
    those things that we would put together, such as missile
    defense, to protect the Nation against those things that would
    cause us significant regret.
        On the infrastructure side, we have had a pretty good
    discussion about the infrastructure pieces and where the
    leverage is there. Clearly there has to be a balance between
    the three. Over time, technology, aging platforms, et cetera,
    will change the balance. The change in the world climate will
    change the balance of those. But the idea here is to hold at
    risk with a credible deterrent through the three legs of the
    triad our capabilities such that no one leg can be targeted and
    eliminated without a credible capability in the other two.
        The underpinning of that activity is the command and
    control system that connects all of it and making sure that
    that is assured and survivable. We cannot forget that
    particular leg, particularly now as we look at the
    transformation going on in our communications globally, moving
    from circuit-based capabilities to Internet protocol type
    capabilities. That transformation has to be considered in the
    context of our command and control systems for the triad, and
    how we make that migration, how we come up with a very robust
    distributed capability, will all be important parts of the New
    Triad.
        Senator Sessions. I thank you for that, and I thank both of
    you for your plainspoken, understandable comments on this
    complex area of our Nation's defense. It is very critical. We
    have to expend an extraordinary amount of money each year, but
    as a percentage of our total defense budget it is probably less
    than, what, 3 or 4 percent that we spend on nuclear weapons,
    although I encourage you, Ambassador Brooks, to keep those
    costs as low as you can.
        So I think we will keep the record open for additional
    questions that are going to be submitted by the other members.
    I know several members for one reason or another could not be
    here today. But we have established a record that I think would
    be a good foundation for us to consider a new defense
    authorization bill this year. We need to know what you believe,
    what the facts are, how you analyze them, as we make our
    decisions about what to authorize as part of our Nation's
    defense in the future.
        So do either of you have any further comments before we go
    to closed session?
        General Cartwright. Just one real quick comment.
        Senator Sessions. Please.
        General Cartwright. Which is associated with the comments
    on the triad, is that it is absolutely critical, and we both
    believe it, that the two of us have to be in a constant
    dialogue in order to make this triad work. There has to be a
    clear, clean relationship and a good dialogue there and we have
    endeavored to develop that and foster it, and we both benefit
    from each other's insights.
        Senator Sessions. That is important.
        I have worked in the Federal Government with a host of
    different agencies in the law enforcement world and you have to
    go beyond rules and regulations. You have to have two people
    talking from different agencies on a regular basis to get the
    kind of sharing and cooperation that you need to be successful.
    So I really think you are wise in saying that and I encourage
    you to continue.
        So if there are no further questions before this meeting
    now, we will be adjourned for closed session later.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
        funding for feasibility studies: responsiveness to dod requests
        1. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, last year this committee
    authorized funding for what was called the ``Advanced Concepts
    Initiative.'' The purpose of advanced concepts was to provide funding
    to respond to Department of Defense (DOD) requests for feasibility
    studies on enhancing the military capabilities of the existing
    stockpile and to support Strategic Command (STRATCOM) by supplying
    quick turnaround, limited scope answers concerning technical questions
    related to the stockpile. Although Advanced Concepts was fully
    authorized, no funding was appropriated. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) has requested no funding for Advanced Concepts in
    fiscal year 2006. Is the Department of Energy (DOE) able to respond to
    technical inquiries and requests from DOD, as was envisioned under
    Advanced Concepts?
        Ambassador Brooks. The fiscal year 2005 Omnibus Appropriations Act
    reassigned the $9 million requested for the Advanced Concepts
    Initiative (ACI) into a new activity entitled ``Reliable Replacement
    Warhead.'' RRW funding will enable the NNSA to work with the DOD to
    assess the feasibility of warhead replacement components--both nuclear
    and nonnuclear--to ensure the long term sustainability of the military
    capabilities provided by the existing stockpile without nulear testing.
    The RRW program has the potential to ``enable'' the long-term
    transformation of the nuclear weapons stockpile and lead to a more
    efficient, less costly nuclear weapons infrastructure. With respect to
    other requests from DOD to respond to technical inquiries and requests
    not currently funded, we would consult with Congress on an approach to
    carry out this work.

        2. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, shouldn't NNSA be able to
    provide this kind of quick turnaround analysis if we are to have a
    truly ``responsive'' system as laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review?
        Ambassador Brooks. With respect to inquiries regarding the existing
    stockpile, we have the capability and authority today to provide the
    DOD with appropriate responses. With respect to requests from DOD to
    carry out feasibility studies on advanced concepts that are not
    currently funded, we would consult with Congress on an approach to
    carry out this important work.

                  design basis threat--timetables and funding
        3. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, since September 11, DOE has
    modified its requirements regarding the kinds of threats against which
    it needs to protect its nuclear facilities. These scenarios are
    described in something known as ``the design basis threat.'' When
    Secretary Bodman was before the full committee, he testified that it
    will take until 2008 before all of DOE's facilities are in compliance
    with the new threat scenarios--which would be 7 years after September
    11. Just as we are concerned with the security of nuclear materials
    around the world, we need to be just as sure that nuclear materials
    here at home are secure. When do you estimate that all of the NNSA
    facilities will be in compliance with the new design basis threat?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Department has issued two Design Basis
    Threat (DBT) policy revisions since September 11, May 2003 and October
    2004. Site DBT Implementation Plans for the May 2003 revision were
    approved by my office in February 2004 and all NNSA sites are on
    schedule to be compliant with this revision by the end of fiscal year
    2006. Site Implementation Plans for the October 2004 DBT revision are
    due to Headquarters in July 2005, with the requirement that sites
    identify the upgrades and funding necessary to be compliant with this
    revision by the end of fiscal year 2008.

        4. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, since the NNSA budget
    request for the nuclear weapons facilities is down slightly in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget request, is the request sufficient to conduct
    your ongoing missions as well as provide for the needed security
    upgrades?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes, the fiscal year 2006 budget presents a
    balanced approach that provides for ongoing mission, supports the
    President's highest priority on detecting and preventing proliferation
    of WMD, and allows us to continue to make improvements to our nuclear
    weapon facilities to address the revised DBT. The fiscal year 2006
    safeguards and security (S&S) budget supports the third and final year
    of the improvements to meet the 2003 Design Basis Threat. The fiscal
    year 2006 budget also includes support for the Vulnerability
    Assessments necessary to develop the implementation plans to come into
    compliance with the 2004 DBT policy issues by the end of 2008.
        Much of the reduction you see in the nuclear weapons facilities-
    related accounts, including Safeguards and Security, results from
    changes in construction project funding.

                          reliable replacement warhead
        5. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the fiscal year 2006 budget
    request includes a program called the Reliable Replacement Warhead. The
    purpose of this program is described in the budget request as: ``to
    demonstrate the feasibility of developing reliable replacement
    components that are producible and certifiable for the existing
    stockpile.'' This objective sounds very similar to the Life Extension
    Program, which DOE has been conducting for many years, in which DOE
    extends the lifetime of a warhead through dismantlement, replacement of
    limited life components, and return of the warhead to the stockpile.
    Could you more fully describe the purpose of the Reliable Replacement
    Warhead program and how it differs from the Life Extension Program?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Reliable Replacement Warhead program is very
    closely aligned with the purpose of ongoing warhead Life Extension
    Programs; that is, to ensure the long-term sustainability of the
    military capabilities provided by warheads in the existing stockpile.
    There is, however, concern that our current path--successive
    refurbishments of existing warheads developed during the Cold War and
    to stringent Cold War specifications--may not be the right path to
    achieve this long-term sustainability. Specifically, the directors of
    our national laboratories have raised concerns about their ability to
    assure the safety and reliability of the legacy stockpile over the very
    long term absent nuclear testing. With the support of Congress, we are
    undertaking the RRW program to understand whether, if we relaxed
    warhead design constraints imposed on Cold War systems that have
    typically driven ``tight'' performance margins in nuclear design, we
    could provide replacement components for existing stockpile weapons
    that could be more easily manufactured with more readily available and
    more environmentally benign materials, and whose safety, security and
    reliability could be assured with high confidence, without nuclear
    testing, for as long as the United States requires nuclear forces.

        6. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, is the goal of the Reliable
    Replacement Warhead program to replace existing warheads with new
    designs and new warheads or is the goal to refurbish and increase the
    reliability of existing nuclear warheads?
        Ambassador Brooks. The focus of the Reliable Replacement Warhead
    program is to extend the life of those military capabilities and the
    reliability provided by existing warheads, not develop new warhead
    types for new or different military missions.

                 modern pit facility--pit production capability
        7. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the Modern Pit Facility
    (MPF) would provide the United States the capability to manufacture
    plutonium pits for our nuclear weapons stockpile. The United States is
    the only nuclear weapons nation without this capability. Attempts to
    determine the production rate for a new pit production facility have
    been complicated by the fact that there is uncertainty regarding the
    exact lifetime of plutonium pits in a nuclear warhead. Pit lifetime is
    currently estimated to be somewhere between 45 and 60 years. This is a
    wide range, and I understand there is considerable uncertainty. What
    activities is DOE currently undertaking to refine its knowledge of the
    lifetime of nuclear weapons pits and the effect of plutonium aging on
    the performance of weapons?
        Ambassador Brooks. The 45- to 60-year estimate of the minimum pit
    lifetime is based on an assessment made at the end of fiscal year 2003
    using the available data and analyses. There is an underlying rationale
    for stating the estimate as a range. Each weapon type in the stockpile
    has a design margin between the baseline performance level and a
    threshold level below which the primary would no longer produce the
    required output. Aging degradation of the pit could diminish critical
    performance parameters until the weapon's design margin is eventually
    reduced to zero and primary output would drop below the required
    threshold. Since the design margin is different for each weapon type,
    pit lifetime estimates must be weapon-specific. The 45- to 60-year
    range accounts for the differences in design margins between the weapon
    types, the current uncertainties in the sensitivity of performance to
    aging degradation, and the lack of aging data beyond the oldest
    available pits (retired units up to 43 years of age).
        The ongoing NNSA effort on pit lifetime is focused on obtaining
    additional data on pit aging, evaluating the aging impacts on critical
    performance parameters, and reducing the uncertainty in the estimate.
    Accelerated aging experiments are underway using carefully prepared
    plutonium alloys that will reach a 60-year equivalent age for
    evaluation in 2006. High-pressure static and dynamic experiments (e.g.,
    diamond anvil cell, Z experiments, TA-55 gun shots, JASPER gas gun
    shots) are being conducted to obtain the needed data on plutonium
    properties at different ages. Modeling and calculations are being
    performed using our most advanced computational capabilities to assess
    aging effects on weapon performance. Relevant historical data from
    underground nuclear tests is also being identified and interpreted to
    illuminate the effects of aging on weapon performance. At the request
    of NNSA, a series of JASON reviews are being conducted on the science
    underpinning the pit lifetime effort as well as an updated estimate.
    Based on the results from these activities, an updated pit lifetime
    estimate will be made at the end of fiscal year 2006. We would still
    expect the updated estimates to be expressed as a range of years but
    specific to each warhead type. Additional work will be necessary beyond
    fiscal year 2006 to further establish the scientific basis for pit
    lifetime prediction. Based on the ``Requirements for a Modern Pit
    Facility'' report to Congress in January 2005, the need for a Modern
    Pit Facility is not likely to be impacted.

        8. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, what is the average age of
    a pit in the current stockpile? If the average age is a classified
    figure, alternatively, could you provide the range of ages of pits in
    the stockpile?
        Ambassador Brooks. The pits in the current stockpile range from
    about 15- to 35-years old with an average age of approximately 20 years
    old.

        9. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, does this country need a
    pit production capability regardless of whether the U.S. ever produces
    new nuclear warhead types?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes. Because pits have ``lifetimes'' (the
    current estimate of 45-60 years is under review) based on changes in
    plutonium over time, the U.S. needs a pit production capability
    regardless of whether we ever produce a new nuclear warhead type. The
    Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, approved by the President,
    requested the Department of Energy to accelerate efforts on a Modern
    Pit Facility to eliminate a serious deficiency in our Nation's nuclear
    security.

        10. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, how long would it take to
    bring such a pit production facility online?
        Ambassador Brooks. Given our current funding profile, our current
    plan is to have operational startup beginning in fiscal year 2019, with
    full production for an MPF projected for fiscal year 2021. The Critical
    Decision-0 for the start of conceptual design of a Modern Pit Facility
    (MPF) was approved in May 2002, with a target of fiscal year 2007 to
    start preliminary design and a 2013 construction start.

        11. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, why do you believe a site
    for this facility needs to be selected in fiscal year 2006?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Fiscal Year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations
    Act bars the use of any funds to select a Modern Pit Facility (MPF)
    construction site in fiscal year 2005 pending the outcome of the
    ongoing review of the nuclear weapons complex and initial results from
    accelerated pit aging experiments in fiscal year 2007. Thus, we have
    deferred site selection. Because pit lifetime will likely remain an
    issue beyond fiscal year 2007, the NNSA needs to proceed with planning
    an MPF or equivalent pit production capability. It is essential to make
    a site selection in fiscal year 2006 to: (1) allow site-specific design
    to proceed, (2) retain the current design team, and (3) avoid repeating
    work already completed on the Environmental Impact Statement for an
    MPF. We look forward to working with Congress towards this goal.
        The interim pit manufacturing capability of 10 pits per year being
    established at Los Alamos National Laboratory in fiscal year 2007 will
    not be sufficient to maintain the 2012 stockpile as determined in the
    May 2004 stockpile plan approved by the President and submitted to
    Congress in June 2004. Further, the NNSA submitted a pit report to
    Congress in January 2005 that confirmed the need for at least a 125 pit
    per year capability starting in 2021.

                            enhanced test readiness
        12. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 requires DOE to achieve and
    maintain thereafter a test readiness posture of not more than 18
    months. In other words, DOE would be able to resume underground nuclear
    testing within 18 months of a Presidential decision to conduct a test.
    DOE is to achieve this readiness no later than October 1, 2006. Will
    DOE achieve the 18-month test readiness by the statutory deadline?
        Ambassador Brooks. We are ``on track'' to meet the statutory
    requirement of an 18-month test readiness posture by the end of fiscal
    year 2006. Successful execution of our test readiness program to
    achieve this requires that Congress appropriate the resources requested
    by NNSA, to carry out this important mission.

        13. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, are there any critical
    path activities--in terms of both facilities and personnel--that might
    cause DOE not to meet the deadline?
        Ambassador Brooks. The National Nuclear Security Administration has
    a well-developed program underway to meet the October 1, 2006, deadline
    to achieve an 18-month test readiness posture as specified in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004. This program
    is described in the February 2005 Nuclear Test Readiness Report to
    Congress. We are confident that we will meet the deadline, assuming our
    budget request is approved by Congress.

        14. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, has DOE been able to hire
    and retain personnel for the ``key'' and ``critical'' testing program
    positions at the Nevada Test Site?
        Ambassador Brooks. Yes. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration's Nevada Site Office has been able to both hire new
    employees and retain key employees in its critical positions for the
    testing program at the Nevada Site Office. NNSA has used its excepted
    service direct appointment authority to fill key positions, and has
    used other incentives such as recruitment bonuses and retention
    allowances to retain employees in critical positions.

                         stockpile stewardship program
        15. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program is the program through which DOE maintains and certifies the
    safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile through the
    use of science based tools such as computer simulations, materials
    research, and component testing. How do you judge the success or
    failure of the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
        Ambassador Brooks. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has been
    a success and is working well to provide the Nation with a safe,
    secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. However, maintaining the aging
    stockpile continues to be a scientific and engineering challenge that
    requires the application of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration's best capabilities. While some aspects of the
    developing stewardship capability have taken longer than envisioned,
    our knowledge of the aging stockpile continues to improve as the SSP
    tools come online. The best indicator of SSP's success boils down to
    the fact that the Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense recently
    provided the President with their ninth annual assessment of the
    nuclear weapons stockpile. Each of these nine assessments has relied on
    the tools and capabilities of the SSP. To date, these assessments have
    not identified a need to augment SSP tools and capabilities with
    nuclear testing.

        16. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, if a President were to
    face a circumstance where he needed to resume full scale nuclear
    weapons testing, would you consider science-based Stockpile Stewardship
    to have ``failed''?
        Ambassador Brooks. No. Discovering a problem in the stockpile
    through SSP would not be a failure, even if we discovered a problem so
    severe that we would recommend a nuclear test to the President. The SSP
    would have failed only if we did not detect a major deficiency in a
    deployed warhead in the U.S. arsenal in time to take appropriate
    corrective actions. The SSP is not a substitute for nuclear testing,
    nor would a return to nuclear testing negate the need for the SSP. SSP
    activities would still be necessary to effectively assess the safety,
    security, and reliability of the aging U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
    The U.S. has not conducted a nuclear weapons test since 1992 and has no
    plans to resume nuclear testing.

        17. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Brooks, does the need for the
    Reliable Replacement Warhead program mean that science-based Stockpile
    Stewardship has ``failed''?
        Ambassador Brooks. No. The stockpile is aging and eventually
    warheads will need to be replaced. The goal of the Reliable Replacement
    Warhead (RRW) program is to demonstrate that we can design, produce and
    certify replacement components and warheads without nuclear testing.
    The replacement components and warheads will be designed to enhance the
    safety and security of the deployed stockpile. The Stockpile
    Stewardship Program is working well but continues to evolve. The RRW
    program is expected to be a significant part of our long-term strategy
    for nuclear forces, serving as the ``enabler'' for our planned
    stockpile and infrastructure transformation.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                           the reliability of the w76
        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, an article in the New
    York Times on April 2, 2005, written by William Broad, questions the
    reliability of the W76 warhead on the D-5 missile. The article suggests
    that the W76 would be the first candidate for the reliable replacement
    warhead program. What is the status of the W76, is it reliable, and is
    it the first candidate for the reliable warhead replacement program?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA is very confident in the reliability of
    the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) designed W76 warhead. This
    warhead was developed and tested between 1973 and 1981. Its history of
    underground nuclear tests in Nevada is one of the most extensive of the
    weapon systems now in the U.S. inventory.
        The Directors of Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National
    Laboratory, and Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory provide an
    annual assessment of all stockpile weapons to the Nation's leadership,
    with extensive internal and external technical review. Their Annual
    Assessment of September 2004 and the draft assessment for September
    2005 reiterates no change in the laboratories' confidence in the
    performance of the W76 warhead.
        Since the W76 warhead is a central pillar in the Nation's deterrent
    force, we have initiated a major Life Extension Program (LEP) to
    address identified aging and surveillance concerns before failure
    occurs. The purpose of the LEP is to extend the service life from 20 to
    60 years. The LEP is manageable, cost effective, maximizes reuse of
    components, and includes modern surety enhancements while minimizing
    system certification risk.
        Today and into the future the W76 warhead has a significant role in
    the Nation's nuclear deterrence.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) and NNSA recognize that further
    steps are needed to fully accomplish Presidential direction to achieve
    ``a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear
    weapons consistent with our national security needs.'' We believe that
    this Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) concept is promising and has
    the potential to save production, maintenance, and environmental costs,
    while at the same time increasing DOD and NNSA confidence in weapon
    reliability over the long-term.
        Because of the significant role the W76 warhead has in the Nation's
    deterrent, the DOD and NNSA believe that the first application to be
    examined for RRW will be in connection with W76 warheads currently
    deployed on the Trident sea-launched ballistic missile.
        The NNSA's RRW strategy will help lead the transition to an
    efficient, responsive infrastructure. This approach is also important
    to sustaining the capabilities of both the NNSA design laboratories and
    the production plants. Our strategy is a critical positive approach
    that is necessary to sustain and improve reliability, safety, and
    security of weapons for the long-term.

                           future of nuclear weapons
        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    the DOE has maintained the nuclear weapons stockpile safely and
    securely, without testing, for just over 12 years. For the most part
    this stockpile was designed and built in the 1970s and 1980s, to meet
    Cold War requirements and priorities. Is it time to reevaluate
    deterrence including the role nuclear weapons play in deterrence, the
    desired capabilities that cannot be achieved with conventional weapons,
    the number and type of nuclear weapons needed, and nuclear weapons
    employment policy?
        Ambassador Brooks. The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and
    follow-on studies including the recently-completed NPR Strategic
    Capabilities Assessment and the DOD Stockpile Transformation study have
    resulted in a number of conceptual breakthroughs in our thinking about
    nuclear forces and their future role in national defense policy. These
    breakthroughs have led to the Treaty of Moscow, which will result, by
    2012, in substantial reductions in operationally-deployed strategic
    forces, and to the subsequent decision by the President to reduce, also
    by 2012, the overall nuclear stockpile consisting of both deployed and
    non-deployed warheads. Moreover, this work has provided the impetus for
    examining the potential of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
    program to facilitate both stockpile and infrastructure transformation
    leading to an even smaller, but safer and more reliable stockpile for
    the long term. Specific questions about the role of nuclear weapons in
    deterrence, nuclear weapons employment policy, and the degree to which
    conventional capabilities could (or could not) achieve certain
    deterrence missions, however, are best directed to the Department of
    Defense.
        General Cartwright. Yes, the New Triad concept presents an
    opportunity to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons through the
    evaluation of alternative weapons, defensive capabilities and
    associated risk. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will also
    help to frame the discussion associated with the future role of nuclear
    weapons in support of our defense policy goals of assurance,
    dissuasion, deterrence and defeating our adversaries, to include the
    number and types of weapons required.

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    I understand the DOD has started to give some thought to these issues,
    as have you General Cartwright. What studies are underway at DOD, at
    the STRATCOM and at DOE that would have a bearing on these questions
    and are there any plans for additional studies?
        Ambassador Brooks. The December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and
    follow-on studies including the recently-completed NPR Strategic
    Capabilities Assessment and the DOD Stockpile Transformation study have
    resulted in a number of conceptual breakthroughs in our thinking about
    nuclear forces and their future role in national defense policy. These
    breakthroughs have led to the Treaty of Moscow, which will result, by
    2012, in substantial reductions in operationally-deployed strategic
    forces, and to the subsequent decision by the President to reduce, also
    by 2012, the overall nuclear stockpile consisting of both deployed and
    non-deployed warheads. Moreover, this work has provided the impetus for
    the joint DOD-NNSA Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) feasibility and
    cost study, scheduled to begin in May 2005, that will examine the
    potential of RRWs to facilitate both stockpile and infrastructure
    transformation leading to an even smaller, but safer and more reliable
    stockpile for the long term. The NNSA Complex Infrastructure Study,
    initiated at the request of Congress and currently underway, when
    completed, will offer recommendations for a more efficient, less costly
    infrastructure for supporting the nuclear stockpile.
        General Cartwright. The New Triad concept presents an opportunity
    to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons through the evaluation of
    alternative weapons, defensive capabilities and associated risk. The
    2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will help frame the discussion
    associated with the future role of nuclear weapons in meeting our
    defense policy goals and any shortfalls or capability gaps that may
    exist in conventional, advanced conventional and non-kinetic
    capabilities.

                        robust nuclear earth penetration
        21. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, what is the Air Force planning to do with the funding in
    its fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Robust
    Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)?
        Ambassador Brooks. It is our understanding that the Air Force plans
    to utilize its requested funds for fiscal year 2006 and 2007 research
    to work on the navigation, guidance, and control kit (NG&C) and
    delivery aircraft integration. But we would look to the Air Force to
    answer this question in better detail.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. USSTRATCOM is not an
    acquisition decision authority. Respectfully defer to the Acting
    Secretary of the Air Force.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, could you please provide a breakout and description of
    the activities planned?
        Ambassador Brooks. We understand the Air Force will provide a
    breakout and description of their planned Fiscal Year 2006-2007 Robust
    Nuclear Earth Penetrator study activities.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. USSTRATCOM is not an
    acquisition decision authority. Respectfully defer to the acting
    Secretary of the Air Force.

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, are these activities coordinated with DOE?
        Ambassador Brooks. An essential part of the Robust Nuclear Earth
    Penetrator (RNEP) study is close coordination of National Nuclear
    Security Administration and Air Force activities. The management
    structure of the RNEP study has been approved by the Nuclear Weapons
    Council, to include a Joint RNEP Study Group and an Executive
    Integrated Product Team.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. Respectfully defer to the
    Acting Secretary of the Air Force.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, if the RNEP study is only a feasibility study, why are
    DOD and DOE developing requirements for RNEP now--doesn't it make more
    sense to develop a requirement after the feasibility of the project is
    established?
        Ambassador Brooks. For this study, the requirements set many of the
    key parameters by which the feasibility will be assessed. There may be
    some confusion on this point. The Joint Phase 6.X process which defines
    the acquisition process for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration requires that the draft requirement Military
    Characteristics and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence--the so-called
    ``requirements''--are developed during Phase 6.2/2A, which is what the
    RNEP study is. These draft requirements are essential in order to
    develop design options and interface documents, and to evaluate those
    design options.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. The RNEP study is
    investigating a solution to a military requirement for Hard and Deeply
    Buried Target (HDBT) defeat that was validated by the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in January 2001. The RNEP phase
    6.2/6.2A study process generated technical requirements that define key
    performance measures that are used in determining the feasibility of
    concepts.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, what performance measures must be met to establish
    feasibility and what is the schedule to meet these performance
    measures?
        Ambassador Brooks. The downselect process that was established to
    evaluate the original two systems had established ``screening''
    criteria and ``selection'' criteria. Each system must first demonstrate
    the screening criteria and then it would be graded against the
    selection criteria. A failure to demonstrate the screening criteria
    eliminates that system from further selection. For the screening
    criteria, the proposed option must demonstrate the feasibility of the
    design to penetrate and survive penetration in the threshold geology
    and meet the other Military Characteristics and Stockpile-to-Target
    Sequence requirements. In addition, each option must show that
    certification is feasible. The National Nuclear Security Administration
    is now considering only the B83 option but the original downselect
    criteria remain the appropriate performance measures.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. The detailed technical
    performance measures of the RNEP concept are documented within draft
    joint technical requirement documents and are classified. However, the
    Phase 6.2/6.2A study effort focused on determining the technical
    feasibility of modifying an existing nuclear explosive package from the
    B61 or B83 family to provide a nuclear earth penetrator capability
    against strategic deep underground facilities. The principal technical
    feasibility question centered on whether the DOE can modify existing
    designs to penetrate a few meters into the threshold surface geology,
    survive impact, and function as intended. The RNEP candidates must be
    certified without nuclear testing and must be compatible with the DOD
    delivery system.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, is the DOE/NNSA going to receive any of the money in the
    Air Force budget?
        Ambassador Brooks. No. The National Nuclear Security Administration
    will not receive any funding designated for the Air Force's portion of
    the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Phase 6.2/2A cost and feasibility
    study.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. Respectfully defer to the
    Acting Secretary of the Air Force.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, DOE/NNSA is only looking at the feasibility of using the
    B83 for the RNEP. Is DOE/NNSA planning an additional feasibility study
    for the B61 as an RNEP?
        Ambassador Brooks. The present funding request does not have any
    provision to continue with the B61. If the B83 option does not appear
    to be feasible, the data will have to be evaluated relevant to the B61
    and a decision will be made with the Department of Defense as to
    whether or not to propose reconstituting the B61 effort.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. Respectfully defer to the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, this year DOE/NNSA did not include any money in its 5-
    year budget for RNEP other than $14 million for fiscal year 2007. Last
    year DOE/NNSA did show the cost of the RNEP in the 5-year budget plan.
    DOE and DOD are developing requirements for RNEP which implies the
    feasibility study is not an intellectual exercise. Why did DOE/NNSA
    drop RNEP from its 5-year budget plan?
        Ambassador Brooks. The National Nuclear Security Administration was
    asked to participate with the Department of Defense to do a study that
    would allow the President to decide on whether or not to go forward
    with the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) program. In the
    interest of transparency, in last year's Future Years Nuclear Security
    Program--our FYNSP--we included the money for the study, as well as the
    estimated funding that it would take should there be a decision to
    actually produce it. Because of this inclusion, some inaccurately
    concluded that the decision to go forward had been made. In this year's
    budget request and FYNSP, we have included only the funding needed to
    complete the study in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. The
    President has made no decision to go forward with the RNEP program, and
    the fiscal year 2006 President's budget requests no funding beyond the
    completion of a phase 6.2/6.2A study.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. Respectfully defer to the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright, and
    General Burg, what is DOE going to do with the $4 million in its fiscal
    year 2006 budget request?
        Ambassador Brooks. The $4 million requested in fiscal year 2006
    will enable NNSA to reconstitute the B83 team and to execute the sled-
    track test. The recovery, disassembly, reduction of the data and
    analysis of any of the data will be done with fiscal year 2007 funding.
        General Cartwright and General Burg. Respectfully defer to the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.

                               advanced concepts
        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, DOE/NNSA was prohibited
    from spending the $6 million for advanced concepts appropriated for
    fiscal year 2004 until it submitted a report describing how the money
    would be spent. $4 million of the $6 million was further prohibited
    from being spent until DOE/NNSA submit a revised stockpile plan. DOE/
    NNSA submitted the spending plan on the first $2 million in March 2004,
    the revised stockpile plan was submitted last summer, but I don't
    believe DOE/NNSA has submitted a funding plan for the remaining $4
    million. Could you either direct us to that report if it was submitted
    or if not when will the plan be submitted? Alternatively, will DOE/NNSA
    reprogram that money for a different purpose?
        Ambassador Brooks. NNSA submitted a report for planned activities
    for fiscal year 2004 for advanced concepts work to Congress on March
    12, 2004. This report was sent to the House and Senate Committees on
    Armed Services and House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on
    Energy and Water Development. This money is being used to complete
    advanced concepts work that started in fiscal year 2004; the National
    Nuclear Security Administration does not intend to reprogram it for
    other purposes.

                      reliable replacement warhead program
        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    what is DOE/NNSA planning to do with the $9 million provided in fiscal
    year 2005 for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program?
        Ambassador Brooks. During fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, a
    National Nuclear Security Administration and multi-laboratory team will
    work with the Department of Defense to assess potential Reliable
    Replacement Warhead (RRW) components and systems, define feasibility of
    key manufacturing processes and design/certification methodology, and
    develop a program plan to achieve project goals.
        General Cartwright. Respectfully defer to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration.

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    the DOE/NNSA budget justification says that the fiscal year 2006
    request will be used ``to provide cost and schedule efficient
    replacement pits that can be certified without underground testing.''
    What does this mean exactly?
        Ambassador Brooks. The objective of the Reliable Replacement
    Warhead (RRW) program is, among other things, to demonstrate the
    feasibility of developing reliable replacement components for existing
    warheads that can be manufactured and certified without nuclear
    testing. During an initial 1- to 2-year feasibility evaluation, the
    NNSA will assess whether reliable replacement components such as pits
    can be manufactured more efficiently and cheaply than current pits. The
    NNSA will also determine whether warheads that would use certain of
    these components can be certified without nuclear testing. Such
    warheads would provide comparable military capabilities to when the
    weapons were first placed in the stockpile. The pit is an ``initial
    focus'' because it is an essential long-lead component.
        General Cartwright. Respectfully defer to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration.

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    what relationship does this activity have to the $23 million in the
    DOE/NNSA budget request for the pit programs to certify and manufacture
    pits other than the W88 pit?
        Ambassador Brooks. The $23 million referred to in your question is
    in the category of ``Pit Manufacturing Capability.'' The objective of
    this $23 million activity is to develop manufacturing processes and
    equipment for all replacement pits including pits being evaluated in
    the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. The budget required for
    certification and development of specific manufacturing techniques for
    an RRW pit will be covered in the RRW program. The manufacturing
    processes and equipment developed in the ``Pit Manufacturing
    Capability'' effort will be applicable for the Modern Pit Facility or
    for pit production at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
        General Cartwright. Respectfully defer to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration.

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    an article in the New York Times from February 7, 2005 states that
    funds provided in fiscal year 2005 are being used to design ``a new
    generation of nuclear weapons meant to be sturdier and more reliable
    and to have longer lives, Federal officials and private experts say.''
    The article goes on to quote John Harvey, an official of the NNSA, that
    the goal of the program is to make nuclear weapons ``inherently more
    reliable.'' ``The goal is to see if we can make smarter, cheaper and
    more easily manufactured designs that we can readily certify as safe
    and reliable for the indefinite future -- and do so without nuclear
    testing.'' In short, is the goal to replace the current stockpile and
    if so, does that mean we will dismantle the current stockpile?
        Ambassador Brooks. The goal of the RRW program is to provide
    reliable replacement warhead components or systems that will ensure the
    long-term sustainability of the military capabilities provided by
    warheads in the existing stockpile. Implementing the RRW program will
    ensure diversity in the nuclear stockpile and reduce the likelihood
    that a common mode technical failure of one or more warheads could
    negate a critical component of our Nation's nuclear deterrent. Over the
    long term, this strategy will enable us to achieve a smaller stockpile,
    one that is reliable, safer and more secure, one that offers a reduced
    likelihood that we will ever need to test again, one that reduces NNSA
    and DOD ownership costs for nuclear forces, and one that enables a much
    more responsive nuclear infrastructure. Thus, if RRW feasibility is
    established, it will provide opportunities to retire and dismantle
    substantial additional warheads from the legacy stockpile--even below
    the historic stockpile level determined by the President last May. At
    the same time, we would expect that some legacy warheads, for example,
    those that will have undergone refurbishment as part of the Life
    Extension Program, will remain in the stockpile through the end of
    their service lives.
        General Cartwright. Respectfully defer to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration.

        35. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    in the article John Harvey goes on to say ``what we are looking at now
    is a long-term vision. We're trying to flesh this out and understand
    the path we need to be on, and to work with Congress to get a
    consensus.'' How do each of you plan to work with Congress to get a
    consensus on nuclear policy?
        Ambassador Brooks. We plan, as we did in today's testimony, to
    inform Congress at all levels and on a regular basis about the promise
    and progress of the RRW program in facilitating transformation toward a
    smaller, safer and more reliable stockpile over the long term, and to a
    more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. We will work with
    Congress to demonstrate that this approach offers a cost effective and
    affordable path to sustain needed nuclear weapons capabilities for the
    long-term future. Finally, in concert with the DOD through the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, we will seek advice and concurrence from Congress as
    we implement this vision.
        General Cartwright. USSTRATCOM pledges to work openly with Congress
    to improve the safety, security, reliability, and surety of the
    Nation's nuclear weapons.

        36. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    will work on the Reliable Replacement Warhead be managed in the same
    way that the DOE manages life extension programs and RNEP through the 6
    ``X'' process or in the way new nuclear warheads were managed
    historically through the phased weapons acquisition, phase 1, 2, 3,
    etc.?
        Ambassador Brooks. A joint Department of Defense/Department of
    Energy Project Officers Group is being established to oversee a
    Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) cost and feasibility study. Because
    the focus of the RRW program is to extend the life of military
    capabilities provided by the existing stockpile, we consider the effort
    to be most closely aligned with the Phase 6.X process.
        General Cartwright. Respectfully defer to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration.

                             nuclear test readiness
        37. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what is the DOE/NNSA
    budget request for test readiness in fiscal year 2006?
        Ambassador Brooks. The National Nuclear Security Administration's
    budget request for Test Readiness in fiscal year 2006 is $25 million.
    Test Readiness maintains underground nuclear test unique capabilities
    that are not supported in stockpile stewardship experimental programs.
    Funds are requested to continue improving the state of readiness to
    reach an 18-month test readiness posture by October 1, 2006.

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what is the DOE/NNSA
    test readiness level planned to be at the end of 2006?
        Ambassador Brooks. With the requested budget, the National Nuclear
    Security Administration's underground nuclear test readiness posture is
    planned to be 18 months at the end of fiscal year 2006, in compliance
    with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.

        39. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, what is the DOE/NNSA
    test readiness level now, and what is it planned to be at the end of
    2005?
        Ambassador Brooks. The National Nuclear Security Administration's
    nuclear test readiness posture is approximately 30 months right now,
    with the goal of reducing this to 24 months by the end of fiscal year
    2005.

        40. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, will the Reliable
    Replacement Warhead program require a resumption of nuclear weapons
    testing?
        Ambassador Brooks. No. The intent of the Reliable Replacement
    Warhead program is to identify replacement options that could be
    fielded without nuclear testing.

        41. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, will any other nuclear
    program under consideration require a return to testing?
        Ambassador Brooks. It has been U.S. policy since 1992 to observe a
    nuclear test moratorium. There are no nuclear programs under
    consideration that would require a return to nuclear testing. The
    potential technical need for testing of the existing stockpile is
    addressed annually by the national laboratory directors' assessment of
    existing warheads.

                              modern pit facility
        42. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, is the Environmental
    Impact Statement (EIS) for the MPF completed?
        Ambassador Brooks. A Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact
    Statement (EIS) has been completed in compliance with the National
    Environmental Policy Act. Five locations are being considered as host
    location for potential new construction of a Modern Pit Facility (MPF)
    (Los Alamos Site, New Mexico; Savannah River Site, South Carolina;
    Carlsbad Site, New Mexico; Pantex Site, Texas; and the Nevada Test
    Site). An upgrade to an existing facility at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory is also considered in the EIS. The Consolidated
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005 bars the use of any funds to
    select an MPF construction site in fiscal year 2005 pending the outcome
    of the ongoing review of the nuclear weapons complex and accelerated
    pit aging experiments. Thus, we have deferred site selection. It is
    essential to make that selection in fiscal year 2006 to allow site
    specific design to proceed and to avoid repeating work already
    completed on the EIS for an MPF. We look forward to working with
    Congress towards this goal.

        43. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright,
    General Burg, and Admiral Young, when will there be an established
    requirement for pits by type by year, including a requirement for new
    types of pits, if any, and what is the process to develop requirements?
        Ambassador Brooks. In response to a request in Public Law 108-375,
    ``Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2005,'' a report was submitted to Congress in January 2005 that
    addresses validated pit production requirements for an MPF. These
    requirements include the total number of pits to be produced per year,
    and the number of pits to be produced per year for each weapon type for
    the nuclear weapons stockpile specified in the revised nuclear weapons
    stockpile plan submitted to the congressional defense committees in
    June 2004. The report consists of an unclassified summary and a
    classified annex and concludes that a 125 pit per year MPF with full
    production starting in 2021 is the minimum capacity to support the
    President's reduced 2012 stockpile assuming a 60-year pit lifetime
    which is the upper end of the current 45- to 60-year estimate by
    National Nuclear Security Administration physics laboratories. There
    are no current requirements for new pit types.
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. Respectfully
    defer to the National Nuclear Security Administration.

        44. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks and General Cartwright,
    does DOE/NNSA have a deadline for making a site selection for a MPF and
    if so, what is the deadline and on what basis was it established?
        Ambassador Brooks. The National Nuclear Security Administration
    does not have a ``deadline'' for making a site selection for the MPF,
    but we desire to make this decision as soon as possible due to the
    complexity of the project. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for
    Fiscal Year 2005 bars the use of any funds to select an MPF
    construction site in fiscal year 2005 pending the outcome of the
    ongoing review of the nuclear weapons complex and accelerated pit aging
    experiments. Thus, we have deferred site selection. Planning for a MPF
    is based on the smallest possible pit manufacturing plant capable of
    supporting a reduced 2012 stockpile consistent with the President's May
    2004 stockpile plan, as reported to Congress in June 2004, and a 60-
    year pit lifetime assumption. Based on these planning assumptions, an
    MPF capacity of at least 125 pits per year (single shift operations)
    with modular expansion capability, a construction start in 2012, and
    full production in fiscal year 2021 is required to maintain the
    stockpile. A site decision is required in fiscal year 2006 to support a
    construction start in fiscal year 2013.
        General Cartwright. Respectfully defer to the National Nuclear
    Security Administration.

        45. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the 5-year budget for
    the MPF apparently does not include the cost for such a facility. What
    is the plan for the funding by year in the budget for the MPF?
        Ambassador Brooks. Funding through fiscal year 2010 for a Modern
    Pit Facility is covered in the Department of Energy (National Nuclear
    Security Administration) Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request to Congress on
    page 171.

                           national ignition facility
        46. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, will you commit to
    provide adequate funding to the National Ignition Facility (NIF) to
    support both ignition by 2010 and a robust series of high density
    physics experiments?
        Ambassador Brooks. We will commit to provide adequate funding to
    support the execution of the first ignition experiment in 2010 and a
    set of high-energy density experiments consistent with the highest
    priority needs of stockpile stewardship and the constrained budget. The
    NIF Activation and Early Use Plan defines the experimental program,
    including non-ignition experiments, to be executed on NIF through the
    execution of the first ignition experiment. Due to reductions in the
    fiscal year 2005 appropriations for the NIF Demonstration Program and
    changes in the fiscal year 2006-2010 funding profile from that
    previously planned, the NIF Activation and Early Use Plan is being
    modified. One of the consequences is that non-ignition work is being
    reduced. The NNSA will provide a revised NIF Activation and Early Use
    Plan to Congress by June 30, 2005, which will describe the implications
    of these budget changes. NNSA intends to focus the program on ignition
    while maintaining capability at the OMEGA and Z facilities to address
    near term issues.

        47. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, how much money would be
    needed in the NIF budget in fiscal year 2006 to fund both stockpile
    experiments and to keep ignition on track?
        Ambassador Brooks. The fiscal year 2006-2010 ICF budget is more
    constrained than previously planned; accordingly, some changes will be
    made in the Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF)
    Campaign, including the NIF Project. Current technical progress on some
    high energy density issues reduces priority for further study of those
    issues. A review of these technical issues together with reductions in
    the fiscal year 2005 appropriations for the NIF Demonstration Program
    and changes in the fiscal year 2006-2010 funding profile is leading to
    modification of the NIF Activation and Early Use Plan. The NNSA will
    provide the final revised Plan to Congress by June 30, 2005.
        NNSA will support a constrained program in stockpile experiments in
    fiscal year 2006 consistent with the available budget, and will delay
    some high energy density stockpile experiments to later years. This
    program, while not robust, will meet minimum requirements and will
    enable a sensible transition into the fiscal year 2007-2011 period,
    where NNSA is examining the outyear changes necessary to bring the
    program back to the required level of support.
        The additional funds required to support the original robust
    program of stockpile experiments can be most easily seen by comparing
    the ``Support of Other Stockpile Programs'' funding line within the ICF
    Campaign in the fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 NNSA
    congressional budget submissions. This comparison is shown in the table
    below:

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Fiscal Year
                                                                        --------------------------------------------
                                                                           2006     2007     2008     2009     2010
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal Year 2005 Request--Support of Other Stockpile Programs......   42,997   45,636   49,089   50,208      n/a
    Fiscal Year 2006 Request--Support of Other Stockpile Programs......    9,872        0   20,394   31,129   27,605
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Difference.........................................................   33,125   45,636   28,695   19,079   19,505
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       navy t-lam-n, the nuclear tomahawk
        48. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Young, I understand that the Navy
    wanted to retire the nuclear Tomahawk. Is this still the Navy's
    position and if not, when and why did it change and how long does the
    Navy plan to keep this system?
        Admiral Young. Respectfully defer to the Secretary of the Navy.

        49. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, what are the targets
    or types of targets that you want to hold at risk with the nuclear
    Tomahawk that cannot be held at risk with any other nuclear or
    conventional weapon?
        General Cartwright. Currently, there are no targets that USSTRATCOM
    needs to hold at risk with the nuclear Tomahawk that cannot be held at
    risk with other nuclear and conventional weapons.

                       tactical nuclear weapons in europe
        50. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, is there any plan to review
    keeping nuclear weapons in Europe?
        General Burg. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review is
    holistically looking at the requirements for strategic deterrence.

        51. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, while I understand
    that tactical nuclear weapons in Europe do not fall within the purview
    of the Strategic Command, have you looked into the question of why
    nuclear weapons are kept in Europe and NATO continues to exercise with
    these tactical nuclear weapons? Should these weapons fall under the
    purview of Strategic Command?
        General Cartwright. Our nuclear forces support the defense policy
    objectives of assuring allies, dissuading competitors, deterring
    adversaries, and defending the United States should deterrence fail.
    The presence of U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to
    NATO provides a political and military link between the European and
    North American members of the Alliance. USSTRATCOM continues to work
    with U.S. European Command and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
    Europe to maintain our longstanding relationship. Current command
    relationships regarding nuclear weapons in Europe are adequate.

                              nuclear capable f-22
        52. Senator Bill Nelson. General Burg, is the Air Force planning to
    have any nuclear capable F-22 aircraft? If yes, what nuclear weapon
    will the F-22 carry?
        General Burg. No.

                               nuclear targeting
        53. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, what will drive the
    number and type of reliable replacement warheads that will be needed in
    the future? For instance, will the number and type be determined by
    specific targets, by specific target types, or will it be driven by a
    desire to have specific capabilities?
        General Cartwright. The National Defense Strategy drives all force
    structure including nuclear force elements. In that context, our
    nuclear force construct must be sized to support the policy objectives
    of assuring allies, dissuading competitors, deterring adversaries, and,
    if necessary, to defend the United States with sufficient force to
    defeat any aggressor. Furthermore, our forces must be flexible to
    provide the capability to deal with immediate, potential, and
    unexpected contingencies.

        54. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, President Clinton and
    Russian President Yeltsin agreed that neither would keep nuclear
    missiles targeted at the other's country. Is this agreement still
    honored?
        General Cartwright. Yes.

        55. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, are U.S. ICBMs or
    SLBMs targeted today on Russia or any other country?
        General Cartwright. There are no U.S. ICBMs or SLBMs targeted today
    on Russia or any other country.

                            long range global strike
        56. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, and
    General Burg, in thinking about long range global strike and the future
    of Trident submarines and SLBMs, ICBMs, and the B-2, B-52, and B-1
    bombers, what is the timetable to identify replacements for these
    missiles programs and platforms? How do conventional strike
    capabilities figure into the thinking?
        General Cartwright and General Burg. The Air Force is conducting
    the Land Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives to explore
    the possibilities for replacing the Minuteman III in the 2020
    timeframe. The oldest Trident submarines will reach end of hull life in
    approximately 2030, driving the identification of a Trident replacement
    nominally around 2015. The Air Force's Next Generation Bomber Program
    is ongoing and is intended to identify capabilities to replace the B-52
    and B-2 that will reach their end of service lives around 2040.
        In reference to conventional strike capabilities, the New Triad
    concept presents an opportunity to reduce our reliance on nuclear
    weapons through the evaluation of alternative weapons, defensive
    capabilities, and associated risk.

        57. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, and
    General Burg, are there currently any plans or serious discussions
    about using an ICBM or SLBM to deliver a conventional warhead? If so,
    what are the policy implications of this approach; that is, how can
    others be assured that a nuclear weapon is not on the missile?
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. We are
    currently assessing the technical feasibility and potential policy
    implications regarding conventional warhead applications on an ICBM or
    SLBM.

        58. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, and
    General Burg, what would the cost be of developing, testing, and
    fielding such a conventional system?
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. USSTRATCOM is
    not an acquisition decision authority. Respectfully defer to the Navy
    and Air Force Services.

        59. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, and
    General Burg, do we have the intelligence capabilities to support this
    type of conventional weapon?
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. ICBM or SLBM-
    delivered munitions require the same U.S. intelligence capabilities as
    any other conventional-delivered munitions. For many potential targets,
    particularly fixed facilities, we have sufficient intelligence to give
    us a high level of confidence about the target's function and status.
    For other potential targets, particularly those that are mobile or
    relocatable, we lack the type of persistent surveillance that allows us
    to find and track a target and then hold it at risk.

        60. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, and
    General Burg, is there any consideration being given to have MMIIIs
    carry only conventional warheads?
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. We are
    currently assessing the technical feasibility and potential policy
    implications regarding conventional warhead applications on an ICBM or
    SLBM.

        61. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, Admiral Young, and
    General Burg, is there any discussion of withdrawing from the
    intermediate range ballistic missile treaty to have either conventional
    or nuclear warheads on intermediate range missiles?
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. Not to my
    knowledge.

                      plans to dismantle nuclear warheads
        62. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, the 2004 stockpile plan
    identified approximately 3,000 to 4,000 warheads (the actual number is
    classified and so this number is not correct) that could be retired.
    Are there specific plans to dismantle these warheads over a specific
    time period? If so, what are these plans and is there money in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget request for DOE to implement these plans?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has developed specific plans to
    dismantle all retired warheads, including those reflected in the
    classified June 2004 Report to Congress, ``A Revised Nuclear Weapons
    Stockpile Plan for 2012.'' The NNSA also provided a classified report
    to Congress in February 2005 specifically regarding dismantlement, with
    specific plans through fiscal year 2010. The funding requested for
    fiscal year 2006 is sufficient for fiscal year 2006 activities.

        63. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, if such plans do not
    exist, what is the significance of a warhead being designated for
    retirement?
        Ambassador Brooks. The NNSA has developed specific plans to
    dismantle all retired warheads, including those reflected in the June
    2004 Report to Congress, ``A Revised Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for
    2012.'' Once a warhead is designated as ``retired'', it is no longer
    part of the nuclear weapons stockpile and the NNSA works with the
    Department of Defense to store, transport, and dismantle the warhead,
    and then ultimately disposition the resultant components.

        64. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, how many total nuclear
    warheads and bombs are there in the stockpile today? How many were
    there 4 years ago?
        Ambassador Brooks. [Deleted.]

                            nuclear weapons security
        65. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright,
    Admiral Young, and General Burg, several years ago the Nuclear Weapons
    Council, the Strategic Command, and the Department of Energy undertook
    what became known as the End-to-End Review. While Congress has never
    been fully briefed on this study, I understand that there were several
    serious issues identified in the study having to deal with nuclear
    weapons security. Can you describe what were the concerns generally,
    what actions have been taken to remedy the concerns, and are there any
    outstanding issues that have not been addressed?
        Ambassador Brooks. The End-to-End Review of the Nuclear Command and
    Control System was completed in 2002 under the chairmanship of Brent
    Scowcroft. The Department of Defense and the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration are working together on a plan
    for implementation of the End-to-End Review. A request for a briefing
    on the conclusions of the Review should be addressed to the Department
    of Defense.
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. The Office of
    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) is
    the releasing authority for the report and its implementer.

                             nuclear policy studies
        66. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, I understand that just
    before Admiral Ellis retired, your predecessor at the Strategic
    Command, he initiated a nuclear force study. Is this study completed,
    what did it cover, and what are the recommendations?
        General Cartwright. Admiral Ellis and his staff were involved in an
    analysis that followed the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and to
    assist in the development of the March 2003 NPR Implementing
    Instructions. It was not a formal study.

        67. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, does this nuclear
    force study exist in a written form and if so, could we get a copy of
    it?
        General Cartwright. No. There was no formal study.

        68. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, what other nuclear
    policies reviews are currently underway?
        General Cartwright. Nuclear policy may be examined in the context
    of the Quadrennial Defense Review for 2005.

                         annual stockpile certification
        69. Senator Bill Nelson. Ambassador Brooks, General Cartwright,
    Admiral Young, and General Burg, each year the Secretaries of the DOE
    and DOD, in consultation with the directors of the National
    laboratories, must certify that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains
    safe, secure, and reliable. If the Secretaries are not able to make
    this certification they must recommend what actions need to be taken to
    resolve the issue identified. The annual certification process for 2005
    is ongoing. Have any issues been identified so far in the 2005 review
    that concern any of you and if so, what are those issues? Will any of
    those issues require a resumption of nuclear weapons testing?
        Ambassador Brooks. Your questions concerning existing issues with
    the stockpile and the need for the resumption of nuclear weapons
    testing are best answered by the results of the Fiscal Year 2004 Annual
    Stockpile Assessment process that you should have now received. The
    results in fiscal year 2004 did note a number of manageable issues with
    the warheads that we continue to follow or work to better understand as
    part of the fiscal year 2005 assessment process; none of these issues
    appear to lead to a recommendation to resume nuclear testing.
        General Cartwright, General Burg, and Admiral Young. None of the
    issues currently identified will require a resumption of nuclear
    weapons testing.

        [Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2006

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 2005

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Sessions,
    Cornyn, Levin, Reed, Bill Nelson, and E. Benjamin Nelson.
        Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
    and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: William C. Greenwalt,
    professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff
    member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Benjamin L.
    Rubin, and Catherine E. Sendak.
        Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
    assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
    Sessions; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn;
    Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
    Senator Ben Nelson; and Andrew Shapiro; assistant to Senator
    Clinton.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, you may take your seats and
    the hearing will come to order.
        We meet today to receive testimony on Ballistic Missile
    Defense Programs and the policies of the Department of Defense
    (DOD).
        I want to welcome Senator Jim Inhofe, one of our senior and
    most active members of the Armed Services Committee and a
    member of this subcommittee, to be with us. Senator Bill
    Nelson, our ranking member, is caught in a meeting but should
    be joining us shortly.
        Though this hearing is being held at the subcommittee
    level, all members of the full Armed Services Committee have
    been invited to participate.
        I appreciate and am pleased to welcome today's witnesses:
    the Honorable Michael Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and General James E.
    Cartwright, Commander of the United States Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM). It is good to meet with you again, General
    Cartwright. You have testified now in the last 2 weeks three
    different times before me, and I am impressed and appreciate
    your time. But these are important issues. I hope that it has
    not been too disruptive of your schedule, but we need a record
    on which to build an authorization bill that will be helpful to
    the country.
        Senator Reed, it is great to have you with us.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. David Duma, the acting Director of the
    Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); and Lieutenant General
    Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
        Gentlemen, we thank you for your service in this highly
    important area that is critical to our Nation's defense and a
    highly technical area. We thank you for the time from your
    schedule.
        We have a lot of ground to cover today, so I will be brief
    with my opening remarks.
        During this hearing, I would like to cover at least two key
    issues. First, how has MDA restructured their missile defense
    program as a result of the administration's $5 billion
    reduction to the missile defense program over the fiscal year
    2006 through 2011, a billion dollar reduction in this year's
    funding? In particular, what is the rationale for MDA's
    proposed balance between the near-term fielding and longer-term
    deployment of systems, and what is the cost impact of cutting
    back or slowing programs as a result of these budget cuts? In
    other words, sometimes by slowing down too much or reducing
    programs too much, they end up costing more than we need to
    have occur. Sometimes it is better to continue the program and
    find the money in some other fashion.
        Second, what is the status of our initial defensive
    capabilities and testing program? That has been a matter of
    concern and we will discuss that today.
        With respect to this testing issue, I had the opportunity
    over the recess to visit with Senator Allard and Senator
    Cornyn--Senator Allard was the former chairman of this
    subcommittee, and Senator Cornyn is a member of the Armed
    Service Committee--to meet some of the men and women that are
    at our missile defense test sites and operational facilities in
    California and the Pacific. I was very impressed with them. I
    was very impressed with the breadth of infrastructure we have
    from the Marshall Islands, to Hawaii, to Vandenberg, to Alaska,
    which we did not visit. But it is quite an impressive array of
    radar, launch sites, and testing facilities.
        I viewed the ground-based interceptor (GBI) at Kwajelein.
    It was being prepared for its next test launch and I had the
    opportunity to inspect the GBI sites at Vandenberg Air Force
    Base that will be used for testing and, should the need arise,
    to defend this country against incoming ballistic missiles.
        We spent considerable time with MDA's Deputy Director for
    Test and Assessment, discussing what went wrong with the recent
    test, the ground-based midcourse defense system (GMD), and I
    feel confident that the last two aborted test launches do not
    represent setbacks for this important program. They represent
    setbacks in the sense that they were unsuccessful, but they do
    not reflect, from what I have learned to date, a serious defect
    in any of the systems. We are going to pursue that today and we
    want to hear your responses to the concerns that have been
    raised from those two failures.
        As far as I can tell, we may have a problem with quality
    control, but the inherent workability of the hit-to-kill
    technology continues to be proven as we were able, for example,
    to be on the destroyer Russell, the Aegis destroyer, and see a
    demonstration of how that and the Aegis cruiser had
    successfully proven once again the SM-3 technology, hit-to-kill
    technology, that the Navy is utilizing.
        General Obering, you are to be commended for taking the
    initiative in commissioning an independent review team to
    examine these recent test failures and recommend improvements
    to the development program.
        Our capability to defend the country against long-range
    ballistic missiles has come a long way since the 1970s when we
    tested national defense interceptors armed with nuclear
    warheads. In fact, last Sunday I had the honor to attend the
    memorial service in Tuscumbia, Alabama for Senator Howard
    Heflin. When he left the Senate, he said one of the things he
    was most proud of was having played a key role in the early
    discussions over national missile defense. I know he felt good
    this past year to realize that that vision he had--and he
    played a key role in keeping it alive--had resulted in the
    deployment of eight missiles capable of defending the United
    States. So we have come a long way.
        We should not forget that between 2000 and 2002, the MDA
    conducted four out of five successful intercept tests using
    prototypes of the GBIs we now have in place, and in 2003 and
    2004, MDA conducted three successful flight tests of the
    operational long-range booster now in place in Alaska and
    California.
        Despite what I believe to be a basically sound approach
    toward developing and fielding this important defensive
    capability, I do share the concern of many of my colleagues
    that additional operationally realistic testing of the GMB
    system is necessary. To address this concern, Congress last
    year directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), in
    consultation with the DOT&E, Mr. Duma, to develop criteria for
    operationally realistic testing and conduct a test consistent
    with that criteria by the end of this fiscal year. My
    understanding is that the DOD has successfully addressed this
    requirement, and MDA now has in place a plan for increasingly
    realistic testing of the GMD systems over the next few years.
        Finally, while much attention is focused on GMD, I would
    also like to note that other ground- and sea-based missile
    defense programs, such as the Patriot and the Navy's Aegis SM-
    3, continue to enjoy successful testing and now stand ready to
    defend our deployed forces and allies against shorter-range
    ballistic missiles.
        Likewise, development continues on the advanced systems
    such as the airborne laser (ABL) and the kinetic energy
    interceptor (KEI), both of which are candidates for a boost-
    phase defense.
        We will want to look carefully at these two programs, as
    they represent a considerable investment well into the next
    decade.
        I would also like to understand why another boost-phase
    option, the spaced-based interceptor, has fallen out of the
    mix.
        I have already gone on too long, but if any of the other
    Senators here would like to make any opening comments, we would
    be glad to hear them before we proceed with questions.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to do that. I
    think when you said how this is of the utmost importance, this
    is the most important thing that we can be dealing with right
    now. I will not be able to stay very long, but I thought I
    would express the concerns I had that perhaps Secretary Wynne
    and the rest of you could address in your opening comments.
        As Mr. Reed just got back--I did too--from Iraq, I think
    that all the hysteria and the war effort has kind of deflected
    attention from a national missile defense system. People are
    not talking about that or as aware of that as they were before.
    When you see the successes--I had occasion to be there right
    after the election to see the E-4 attitude of the people over
    there who said such things as I could not see the ballot
    through my tears. It is the first time that in 7,000 years they
    have had an opportunity for self-determination.
        Then this last week, I had an opportunity to be in the
    Sunni Triangle, going around Fallujah and Tikrit and other
    places, and just seeing people like a former brigade commander
    of Saddam Hussein, a guy named Mahti, is now doing the same
    thing in Fallujah for us. He is one who hated Americans but
    loves Americans now. It was great to watch the successes.
        But in spite of those successes, the imminent threat that I
    have always felt was there is one that I thought was very
    visionary by Ronald Reagan. Mr. Chairman, it was just 2 weeks
    ago that we celebrated the 22nd anniversary of Strategic
    Defense Initiative (SDI). The fact that he saw this coming,
    saying it would take a long period of time for it to get here,
    several decades, and of course, it has.
        I was disturbed and expressed my concern back in 1996 when
    President Clinton at that time vetoed the 1996 defense
    authorization bill. In his veto message, he said, the bill
    requires deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system
    able to defend all 50 States from a long-range missile threat
    that our intelligence community does not think exists. We found
    out afterwards that the intelligence community was wrong.
        I can recall getting a letter--and I think, Mr. Chairman,
    you were there at the time--on August 24, 1998, saying it would
    be about 5 years before North Korea would have the capability
    of reaching the United States with a multi-stage rocket. Seven
    days later on August 31, they fired one.
        Then people are saying, well, that is a country that is run
    by a person that you cannot predict. It is not like the Soviet
    Union was at one time, and then also with others they are
    trading technology and systems with, such as Iran, people say,
    well, it will be 10 years before Iran has the delivery
    capability. Well, that is if it is indigenous. They could have
    it tomorrow.
        So these are things that concern me, and what I would like
    to have you address in your opening statements is how you
    perceive the gravity of the problem. Maybe I am overlooking
    something. It is not as bad as I think.
        Second, with the reduction--the chairman said $5 billion
    over 5 years. Is that not right? Well, $1 billion this coming
    year in the current budget. If that slows you down--I would
    like to have you be very honest with us as the committee as to
    what you think is adequate. We want to make sure that you have
    the resources to get us where we want to go as soon as
    possible. So if you could address those things in your opening
    statements, it would be very helpful.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed, Senator Nelson, do you have any comments
    before the witnesses?
        Senator Ben Nelson. I am anxious to hear the witnesses.
    Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, we would be glad to hear from
    you. Mr. Wynne, are you going to lead off?

     STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL W. WYNNE, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF
           DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

        Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Reed and Senator Nelson, for
    being here and other members of the committee. Thanks for the
    opportunity to testify today on the fiscal year 2006 DOD
    missile defense program and the budget submission.
        As Senator Inhofe indicated, the addition of the global war
    on terror did not diminish the span of missions given to the
    DOD to provide for the common defense. In fact, it highlighted
    and expanded the total mission of the Department.
        One of the reasons potential adversaries have sought
    ballistic missiles is that the United States has historically
    had no defense against long-range missile attack. President
    Bush made it a top priority of his administration to end this
    vulnerability.
        Congress had actually preceded this with its own priority
    challenge when in the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 it
    established the U.S. policy to deploy an effective national
    missile defense system capable of defending us against limited
    ballistic missile attack.
        Last year I testified to the full Senate Armed Services
    Committee that we had encountered and solved a number of
    technical difficulties and can expect further challenges. This
    year my expression is not much different. I am pleased to
    report that we are no longer defenseless against long-range
    ballistic missile attack. As we place additional components of
    our initial configuration into service, the effectiveness of
    our missile defense capability will incrementally improve
    through 2006 and beyond.
        As I have testified in the past, the Ballistic Missile
    Defense (BMD) Program differs from the classical major defense
    acquisition program. I am confident that our unique acquisition
    and the management structure the Department has put into place
    for the BMD Program reduces decision times and promotes the
    capability based incremental development of our highly
    integrated and layered ballistic missile defense systems.
        I believe our innovative approach has proven successful,
    and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) generally
    agrees. The GAO has completed six MDA specific reviews in the
    past year, with more to come, and we have learned from them and
    implemented a number of their recommendations.
        We have made substantial progress in the missile defense
    program. We have placed ground-based interceptors in Alaska and
    in California. We have updated radars and we have modified
    Aegis ships for long-range surveillance and tracking support.
    Logistic support is in place. We have connected the elements to
    the fire control system, and we have a command and control
    battle management and communications capability in place. We
    are also conducting increasingly realistic exercises and tests.
        Our test program is designed to build confidence in our
    missile defense capability. While I am now disappointed in the
    results of the GMD's recent test, I am overall pleased with the
    program's progress and with the director's response to these
    conditions. The essential challenge to the program now is to
    emphasize discipline and quality assurance, and one additional
    goal I have set out is to improve the turnaround time between
    these test events.
        The President's budget for fiscal year 2006 reflects our
    priorities, as well as an implementation plan developed by the
    Secretary and all of his advisors. It responds to the need to
    prepare for an uncertain future that will require more agile, a
    more lethal, and a more responsive force in a most cost
    effective manner.
        The Department did reduce missile defense funding in fiscal
    year 2006 by $1 billion approximately to about $7.8 billion. We
    have not changed our mission in any way but have adapted to
    this fiscal discipline and remain committed to fielding
    effective missile defenses.
        In implementing the reduction, the director of the MDA was
    left to plan how best to structure the program, balancing
    development, testing, and fielding while mitigating risk. I
    believe that the President's budget will allow the Department
    to pursue a missile defense system that meets the needs of the
    warfighter. I urge the committee to support this President's
    budget for the important program.
        We are grateful for the support of Congress, which has made
    this bold effort to field missile defense capabilities possible
    and set it in motion.
        Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the
    committee. I would be happy to answer any questions you might
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wynne follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Michael W. Wynne
        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of
    the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
    to discuss the fiscal year 2006 Department of Defense (DOD) Missile
    Defense Program and budget submission. I am pleased to provide you this
    update on the progress of the Missile Defense development program.
        The United States and our allies face serious and unpredictable
    threats to our homelands, populations, and interests. One of these
    threats is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
    means to deliver them, including ballistic missiles. These weapons have
    proliferated on a global basis and are possessed today by some two
    dozen States, including some of the world's least responsible regimes.
        One of the reasons potential adversaries have sought ballistic
    missiles is that the United States has historically had no defense
    against long-range missile attack. President Bush has made it a top
    priority of his administration to end this vulnerability and to begin
    fielding missile defenses to protect the U.S., its deployed forces, and
    its friends and allies. The DOD has made great progress in ending the
    Nation's vulnerability to missile attack, and I am pleased to appear
    before you today to discuss this progress.
        The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 established that it is the
    policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically
    possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of
    defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic
    missile attack. Upon taking office, President Bush directed that the
    DOD examine the full range of available technologies and basing modes
    for missile defense that could protect the United States, our deployed
    forces, and our friends and allies. In light of the changed security
    environment following September 11 and the progress made in development
    efforts, the President directed the Department to begin fielding
    missile defense capabilities in 2004. We have indeed fielded an
    inherent capability that can be used for limited defense of the United
    States against long-range threats from North Korea. In 2005, we are
    enhancing that capability. Last year, I testified to the full Senate
    Armed Services Committee that we had encountered and solved a number of
    technical difficulties and can expect further challenges on the path
    ahead. This year, I must tell you that my statement from a year ago
    remains true, as our test program has had both successes and
    disappointments. But I am pleased to report that we have made a
    dramatic improvement over our previous condition of being defenseless
    against long-range ballistic missile attack. As we place additional
    components of our initial configuration in service in 2005, the
    effectiveness of the missile defense capability will incrementally
    improve. Further improvements planned for 2006 and beyond will continue
    to enhance both the capability of fielded missile defense components
    and the depth of those capabilities.
        The Secretary's direction to consolidate ballistic missile defense
    development activity within a single program and to streamline our
    oversight process has enabled the Director of the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) to make the program decisions that make the fielding of an
    initial ballistic missile defense capability possible more quickly than
    would be the case for a ``standard'' acquisition program. As I have
    testified in the past, the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program
    differs from the classical major defense acquisition program, so our
    approach to acquisition differs. Rather than produce and deploy a fixed
    ``objective'' missile defense configuration to serve its entire
    operational life, we plan an ambitious program of technology insertions
    and additional fielding actions to enhance the capability. This
    approach is justified not only by the uncertain nature of the security
    environment in which our missile defense system must work, but also by
    the advantages it offers from an acquisition strategy perspective.
        I am confident that our acquisition approach and the management
    structure the Department has put into place for the BMD Program reduces
    decision times and promotes the capabilities-based, incremental
    development of our highly integrated and layered BMD System. The
    Director of the MDA reports directly to me; we meet weekly to discuss
    current issues and quarterly for a full review of the missile defense
    program. In addition, my predecessor created the Missile Defense
    Support Group (MDSG), a group of senior and experienced individuals
    from all the DOD stakeholder organizations to advise the Director of
    the MDA and support the Department's senior leadership in this critical
    area. The MDSG has met over 50 times in the past 3 years to discuss
    complex issues and provide advice to the Director. The frequency of
    these MDSG meetings far exceeds the amount of senior level oversight
    and advice we give programs in the ``normal'' acquisition process. I
    have also encouraged an active interaction between the Director of the
    MDA and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), as
    well as their respective staffs. I am satisfied that their relationship
    has evolved in constructive ways, to the point of the Director of the
    MDA and the DOT&E jointly approving a master test plan. You will also
    find that the testing community has people embedded in the management
    offices of our missile defense elements. These actions give me
    confidence that the Department's management structure for, and
    oversight of, the missile defense program facilitates decisive senior
    leadership action, provides the Director of the MDA the authority he
    needs to execute the BMD Program, and also provides Congress extensive
    and frequent insight into our progress.
        I continue to believe our innovative approach is proving
    successful. Based on recent reviews, the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) appears to agree. The GAO has been actively engaged in
    reviewing the Ballistic Missile Defense Program, having completed six
    MDA-specific reviews in the past year and with additional reviews on-
    going at this time. In many ways, our approach to developing the
    Missile Defense Program shares characteristics of the GAO's knowledge-
    based criteria for major program decisions. We have worked closely with
    the GAO and have implemented a number of their recommendations.
        We have made substantial progress in the Nation's Missile Defense
    Program. We have already emplaced ground-based interceptors in Alaska
    and California, updated radars, and modified Aegis ships for long-range
    surveillance and tracking support. Logistics support is in place. We
    have connected the elements to the fire-control system, and we have a
    command and control, battle management and communications capability in
    place. We are conducting increasingly realistic exercises and tests,
    and are learning more about the system with every exercise and test
    event. By the end of 2005, we will have added still more ground-based
    interceptors, upgraded additional radars, added a sea-based X-band
    radar, additional long-range search and track destroyers, and Aegis
    cruisers with engagement capability using the Standard Missile-3.
        Our test program is designed to build confidence in the
    capabilities we are placing in service. Our sea-based midcourse defense
    element has had notable success while adding increasing realism.
    However, we have to remember that we are in the early stages of
    providing an unprecedented defensive capability. While I am
    disappointed in the results of the GMD's recent tests, I am pleased
    with the program's overall progress and with the Director's response.
    Those setbacks have not shaken our confidence in the system's
    fundamental capability. This is a complex system with a number of
    components that must work together. The essential shift we must now
    make is to emphasize discipline in quality assurance. The problems we
    have seen recently are not unusual for new programs in this phase of
    development. The Director of the MDA has taken strong steps to
    reinforce process and product quality. He has put a plan into place to
    return the GMD Program to a successful flight test program. I wholly
    endorse that plan and also want to improve ``turnaround'' time between
    test events. The Department will further build its confidence in the
    BMD System in the intercept tests we have scheduled for this year and
    next.
        I would also note that our advances in the BMD Program have
    attracted increasing interest and attention from the international
    community. We have signed formal agreements with the United Kingdom,
    Japan, and Australia. These agreements cover cooperation across a range
    of missile defense activities. Japan is acquiring a multi-layered BMD
    system, and we are working with Israel on improvements to the Arrow
    system. We are actively working on our collaboration with Russia on
    theater defense exercises and are in discussions to explore other areas
    of potential missile defense cooperation.
        The President's budget for fiscal year 2006 reflects the priorities
    set by the President and an implementation plan developed by the
    Secretary and his most senior military and civilian advisors. The
    budget was drafted in light of the progress that has been made--and the
    changes that have taken place--since September 11, 2001. As such, it
    responds to the need to prepare for an uncertain future that will
    require a more agile, lethal, and responsive force. At the same time,
    we must ensure that we maximize the capabilities gained from our
    defense dollars. In that regard, the budget fully supports the BMD
    Program. The Department has reduced missile defense funding in fiscal
    year 2006 by $1 billion, to $7.8 billion, compared to our plan a year
    ago. We have not changed our mission in any way, and we are fully
    committed to fielding effective missile defenses. In implementing the
    reduction, we have allowed the Director of the MDA to plan how best to
    structure the program, balancing development, testing, and fielding,
    and I have approved his approach. We will accomplish this by focusing
    on key aspects of the program, through a thorough scrub of
    infrastructure needs and overhead, and through careful restructuring of
    out-year programs while mitigating risk. For example, we have
    established the Airborne Laser (ABL) program as our primary boost-phase
    defense program. But because we will not know for several years whether
    ABL will contribute the capabilities we need, we are continuing with a
    restructured Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program that emphasizes
    critical technology demonstrations. I believe that the President's
    Budget will allow the Department to pursue a fully capable missile
    defense system--one that meets the needs of the warfighter. I urge the
    committee to support the President's budget for this important program.
        We are grateful for the support of Congress, which has made this
    bold effort to field missile defense capabilities possible.
    Congressional approval of the President's requests for missile defense
    funding has been critical to our smooth execution of the program.
    Continued cooperation between the Department and Congress will only
    grow in importance as we execute our mission to provide for the
    national security of the United States. I look forward to continuing
    that cooperation.
        Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the committee. I
    would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

        Senator Sessions. General Cartwright, STRATCOM Commander.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be
    brief, but I do want to address some of the issues that Senator
    Inhofe brought up.
        In 2004, we set off to build an initial capability that
    would defend against a limited threat, two to five missiles
    from North Korea. This was a rudimentary system, in my terms, a
    thin line, critical mission threads. We had just enough command
    and control, sensors and weapons that if we had an emergency,
    we could pull that together and have a capability and present
    that capability to the Nation.
        During that period, we took the time to do, in naval
    parlance, what we call a shakedown. Behind me is Lieutenant
    General Larry Dodgen, who is my commander for integrated
    missile defense. He has put his soldiers through the places to
    understand the system, to start to understand and have a vision
    of where this system is going, and the operational challenges
    that it will bring to the table.
        One thing that I walked away with in that shakedown was
    that I am absolutely convinced that we must have a defensive
    capability. No longer do we face a single foe like we did in
    the Cold War. We have a complex threat out there, multiple
    nations, multiple types of threats. An offense alone is not
    going to be enough to deter them.
        Mr. Chairman, we had this discussion in the closed session,
    but I think it bears mentioning again. As a marine--and some of
    the discussion we had with the forces in Iraq--I would not send
    a marine out into the streets of Fallujah with just an M-16. He
    has to have body armor. It changes the equation. The enemy that
    he faces, when he steps into the street, is lurking in the
    corners. He does not care who gets killed in the cross-fire. It
    is just a fact of life that this is a more complex environment
    and we have to change the mind set of the enemy. We have to
    take away from the enemy the ability to give the first shot and
    have him have his way with that first shot. We just have to
    change that calculus. To me this missile defense system starts
    to give us that capability.
        If, at the end of the day, we put the body armor on the
    marine and we give him a good M-16, then he at least has a
    fighting chance and he has changed the mind set of the enemy.
    But again, at the end of the day, it goes to the story that
    just carrying the M-16 is not going to be enough.
        North Korea and others have and will declare their
    intentions to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North
    Korea and others have and are building delivery systems. The
    rhetoric is bellicose out there and also threatening to us.
    North Korea shows little compassion for its people.
        When we started into this shakedown in 2004, one of the
    things that we had as an objective was to ensure that the
    warfighter, in going through this shakedown, had the
    opportunity to contribute and give input to this operationally
    realistic testing and to start to challenge many of the
    assumptions that we use to build this system.
        We have had that input. We have had an opportunity to
    contribute, and the operational test community and General
    Obering in the MDA side of the house have both been responsive
    to our inputs and the things that we have learned in our
    shakedown. I find that to be refreshing and very valuable and
    it contributes to the overall capability of the system.
        But as we start to field this system this year, the thing
    that we are trying to add, the thing that is important to us is
    a more robust command and control system, one that is
    distributed and has multiple nodes so that one node cannot be
    attacked. That is what is happening in 2005. We are fielding
    that distributed command and control system. We are also
    fielding fixed and mobile sensors, critical to being able to
    have redundancy and a layering effect that will be so essential
    in this system, and we are doing the same with our weapons in
    that we are now fielding both fixed and mobile weapons systems.
        We are moving toward a defensive capability that will
    defend the United States, our forward deployed forces, our
    allies, and friends. That is the goal. We have to have that
    vision and keep it in mind. But again, at the end of the day,
    what I walk away with from the shakedown is that offense alone
    is not enough anymore.
        I stand ready for your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Cartwright follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: This is my first
    opportunity to appear before you as Commander of the United States
    Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Thank you for the time you've given me
    to discuss the missions assigned to us as we continue to prosecute the
    global war on terror and take on the challenge of combating weapons of
    mass destruction.
        My prepared remarks cover USSTRATCOM's role in the challenging 21st
    century environment and plans for addressing those challenges with
    capabilities to serve our Nation's needs in war and in peace.
                      the 21st century global environment
        Global interdependence--economic, political, and social--combined
    with near instantaneous global connectivity, is a trademark of the new
    century. It also heightens the importance of strong links between U.S.
    strategic objectives and regional operations. U.S. strategic objectives
    have profound influence on individuals, regions, nations, and non-state
    actors and networks. The tight linkage between U.S. strategic
    objectives and the conduct of regional operations is evident in our
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more recently in Asia in the
    aftermath of the tsunami. In Afghanistan, the strategic objective to
    combat global terrorism guided, as well as constrained, our regional
    decisions. The regional operations in Iraq are clearly influencing
    cultural, economic, and security considerations around the globe.
        Our adversaries are using asymmetric approaches; exploiting social,
    political, and economic vulnerabilities to avoid confronting superior
    U.S. forces head on. We continue to see increases in the speed and
    deceptive scale of proliferation of potential weapons of mass
    destruction, including delivery and concealment capabilities. We see
    adversaries who would use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
    suicide bombs against their own people and infrastructure, as well as
    against deployed multinational forces. These adversaries have easy
    access to the same global technology base we do, and can exploit the
    same communication and information resources as the American public.
    They have proven they are an intelligent and adaptable enemy.
        All operations, while regional in execution, have global
    consequence and therefore require a global perspective. Regional
    combatant commanders, who are responsible and accountable for
    conducting combat and peacekeeping operations in their areas of
    responsibility (AORs), have long depended upon support provided from
    outside their AORs. Much of that support, which in the past was
    provided on an ad hoc basis, has now been codified in the Unified
    Command Plan as a USSTRATCOM global responsibility. We are positioning
    USSTRATCOM to advance a distinctly global and strategic perspective on
    current and emerging capabilities necessary to deter threats to our way
    of life, particularly those threats involving weapons of mass
    destruction. USSTRATCOM will enable combatant commanders' regional
    operations through realization of a comprehensive set of global mission
    capabilities, soundly integrated to achieve more effective and
    efficient execution.
        We look upon this responsibility as both an exciting challenge and
    a solemn obligation to the regional combatant commanders, the American
    men and women who serve in their AORs, and to the American people.
                                global enablers
        21st century operations are fundamentally different from those of
    the last century. Combat operations are being conducted in rapidly
    changing circumstances, shifting from humanitarian operations to
    intense firefights within a few hundred yards of each other with little
    or no warning. This dynamic nature is matched by a varying composition
    of assisting partners. We must be ready to conduct integrated,
    distributed operations using global and regional military forces. In
    many situations, these forces will be augmented by other U.S.
    Government personnel, coalition and commercial partners, and possibly,
    nongovernmental organizations. To plan and effectively execute these
    types of distributed, agile and integrated operations, the regional
    combatant commands increasingly rely on multiple capabilities the
    global commands must support or provide.
        The Unified Command Plan expands USSTRATCOM responsibilities
    through the assignment of global mission areas that span levels of
    authority, cross regional boundaries and intersect with various
    national and international agencies. USSTRATCOM's missions are:

             Global deterrence;
             Global support from space-based operations;
             Global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
             Global strike;
             Global information and network operations;
             Global command and control;
             Global integrated missile defense coordination; and
             Globally combating weapons of mass destruction.

        Achieving the full potential of these missions is contingent upon
    identifying the right capabilities mix and sustaining our global reach
    through space. However, without the context of advanced situational
    awareness, and the power of collaboration, even the best tools may be
    insufficient to deter and defeat a determined adversary. We are placing
    an emphasis on the following global enablers:
    The New Triad
        USSTRATCOM supports The New Triad concept; a strategic way ahead in
    pursuit of a more diverse set of offensive and defensive warfighting
    capabilities. We are active participants in all three legs of The New
    Triad: offensive nuclear and non-nuclear strike (including nonkinetic),
    passive and active defenses, and a defense infrastructure capable of
    building and sustaining all offensive and defensive elements, including
    the critical support areas of command and control and intelligence.
        Coupled with improved collaboration and shared global awareness,
    The New Triad concept will enable more precisely tailored global strike
    operations. With a full spectrum of nuclear, conventional and
    nonkinetic options available, regional combatant commanders will be
    enabled to achieve specific local effects against high value targets in
    the context of the strategic objective.
        While we are confident in our ability to support effective global
    strike operations today, we must continue to evolve that capability to
    meet the demands of an uncertain tomorrow. For example, I intend to
    conduct experiments to better understand the value of weapon accuracy
    within a range of stressing environments. If modeling and testing
    confirm the value of such capability, this may lead to new thoughts on
    the balance between nuclear and conventional strike alternatives.
        The new responsibilities assigned to USSTRATCOM have required the
    command to broaden its Cold War focus from deterring nuclear or large-
    scale conventional aggression to becoming a major contributor to the
    much broader defense strategy. Nuclear weapons, however, continue to be
    important, particularly for assuring allies and friends of U.S.
    security commitments, dissuading arms competition, deterring hostile
    leaders who are willing to accept great risk and cost, and for holding
    at risk those targets that cannot be addressed by other means. As
    steward of the Nation's strategic nuclear deterrent, we have two
    specific areas of focus--rationalizing our nuclear forces, and
    providing for a relevant nuclear stockpile in the context of The New
    Triad. At the same time we will continue to evaluate and provide a
    range of options, both nuclear and non-nuclear, relevant to the threat
    and military operations.
        The New Triad concept presents an opportunity to reduce our
    reliance on nuclear weapons through the evaluation of alternative
    weapons, defensive capabilities and associated risk. It is our intent
    to have the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review address nuclear issues,
    and the associated infrastructure, to determine transformation
    requirements for our nuclear capabilities in the 21st century. We will
    look at rationalizing our nuclear forces as an element of the overall
    force structure and the proper tailoring of nuclear effects as part of
    the broad spectrum of national power. These assessments will be
    important to future operational planning as well as future budget
    plans.
    Space
        The importance of the space mission to our national security cannot
    be overstated. The U.S. economy, our quality of life, and our Nation's
    defense are all linked to our freedom of action in space. For example,
    satellites are at the heart of routine financial activities such as
    simple automatic teller machine operations or complicated international
    currency and stock market transactions. The telecommunication industry
    is heavily vested in space. Commercial airliners, container ships,
    trains, trucks, police, fire departments, and ambulances have also
    become highly dependent upon space-based global positioning systems to
    enhance their ability to safely deliver people, goods and services. The
    fact is, our dependency on space increases every day--a fact not lost
    on our adversaries. This growing national dependence on space-based and
    space-enabled capabilities establishes a true imperative to protect our
    space assets and our ability to operate freely in and from space.
        We currently enjoy an asymmetric advantage in space, but our
    adversaries are gaining on us. Our space support infrastructure is
    aging and, in some instances, on the verge of becoming obsolete. We
    will continue to face additional challenges as other nations exploit
    new technologies and capabilities in attempts to bridge the gap between
    them and us.
        The space environment itself is also rapidly changing. For example,
    the number of objects in-orbit increases every month, while the size of
    those objects decreases. This is challenging our space surveillance
    technology, developed in the latter half of the 20th century, because
    it was not designed to detect or track the current magnitude of new,
    smaller objects, including micro-satellites. This increases the chances
    of collisions, which threatens our manned spaceflight program; opens
    the door for unwarned action against U.S. satellites by adversaries;
    and limits our ability to protect our space assets.
        We must do a better job of leveraging the capabilities of our space
    assets--in DOD, national and commercial systems. We must also maintain
    the ability to protect our own space assets and capabilities, both
    actively and passively, while denying our adversaries the military use
    of space--at the time and place of our choosing.
        In order to bring these elements of space control together, our
    near-term plan is to work with the various space programs to identify
    potential gaps and make sure existing information and applications are
    available and provided to authorized users on a global network. This
    plan will serve as the basis for a concept of operations to exploit
    information from our space assets, providing space situational
    awareness to the regional combatant commands.
    Distributed Operations
        For distributed, integrated operations, dominant situational
    awareness is an imperative--globally, regionally, and locally. It must
    exist across the full breadth and depth of operations, from planning
    and combat through post-conflict reconstruction, and ultimately,
    peacetime.
        For our forces to effectively employ collaborative capabilities and
    capitalize upon situational awareness, we must enable them to create
    pictures of the battlespace tailored to their specific needs--what we
    refer to as User Defined Operating Pictures. It is USSTRATCOM's job to
    provide the global capabilities to enhance situational awareness,
    facilitate collaborative planning, and provide a basic User Defined
    Operating Picture capability for all of the combatant commands.
        Many of the capabilities required for agile, distributed operations
    will be facilitated by space and enabled by a global information
    environment with ubiquitous, assured access to information, when and
    where any combatant commander needs it. To achieve this vision, the old
    mantra to provide information on a ``need to know'' basis, must be
    replaced by a ``need to share.'' Critical information that the
    warfighter didn't know existed, and the owner of the information didn't
    know was important, must be made available within a global information
    environment easily accessible to commanders at all levels.
    Interdependent Capabilities
        Our action plan for global command and control focuses on ensuring
    the all-source information needed for effective operations is available
    to all theaters. For the global Intelligence, Surveillance,
    Reconnaissance (ISR) mission, that also means developing integrated and
    persistent systems capable of supporting precision targeting.
    USSTRATCOM has the lead for coordinating global ISR capabilities and
    will be working closely with the regional combatant commanders, Joint
    Forces Command and the Services to develop the associated strategy.
        The Department's net-centric global information services, currently
    in development, are essential to our global missions. These services
    will connect global and regional applications and improve both
    horizontal and vertical information integration.
        We are developing a prioritized plan for transitioning away from
    stove-piped legacy systems to capabilities that support broader
    information and applications access. Included in this plan are actions
    focused on leveraging existing legacy applications and data by making
    them more broadly accessible. Each user will be allowed the flexibility
    to select from any available data source, anywhere on the network,
    those objects most useful to them at any particular time. Additionally,
    any new data source will be available the moment it comes onto the
    network, rather than requiring a modification to existing systems, as
    is the case today.
        USSTRATCOM is an advocate for net-centricity. Our focus is on:

             Capability to enable our ``internet-like'' environment
            and access to information;
             Realization of a high-bandwidth, ubiquitous
            communications backbone to deliver information with high
            assurance and low latency; and
             Robust information assurance required to defend our
            networks and our information.

        Creating a collaborative structure is more than just designing and
    disseminating tools--it is also about changing human behavior. Our
    objective is a global, persistent, 24/7 collaborative environment--
    comprising people, systems, and tools. Our future structure must
    support real time command and control at both the global and local
    levels as well as enable dynamic, adaptive planning and execution in
    which USSTRATCOM, the regional combatant commanders, and other
    geographically dispersed commanders can plan and execute operations
    together. Our collaborative environment must also provide the
    capability to ``connect all the dots''--enemy dots, friendly dots,
    neutral dots, contextual dots--all the dots that matter--as they
    appear, rather than wait for a post-event analysis when all of the
    different data stores can be opened. With improved collaboration and
    shared awareness, we can more effectively conduct operations using the
    full spectrum of capabilities to achieve desired, focused effects
    against high value targets.
        In that regard, we are actively assessing the currently available
    collaborative environment and processes and investigating potential
    pilot programs to encourage organizational information sharing to build
    trust in shared information. Fundamental to this issue is the
    establishment of data tagging standards and associated information
    assurance policies.
        With regard to sharing information, we are in some respects
    navigating uncharted waters. While the value of sharing information
    with allies, coalition partners, and other Federal departments and
    agencies is well understood, sharing information with industry or other
    private sources presents proprietary, intellectual property and privacy
    concerns which are not well understood. Such information has the
    potential to be of great value to USSTRATCOM and the regional combatant
    commanders in accomplishing our missions. We will be attentive to the
    actions currently being taken throughout the Federal Government in
    response to Executive Order 13356, ``Strengthening the Sharing of
    Terrorism Information To Protect Americans,'' which may provide us
    valuable insight and guidance in this sensitive area.
                        building an asymmetric advantage
        In addition to our role as steward of the Nation's nuclear forces
    and guardian of global deterrence, USSTRATCOM now has the
    responsibility for working across regional boundaries to address
    threats in a global perspective. To achieve the asymmetric advantage we
    desire requires us to build the interdependent, collaborative,
    operational environment we've envisioned. It is our responsibility to
    provide global services and global context to the regional combatant
    commands and their deployed forces so we are collectively a more
    effective force--for warfighting, peace and all possible combinations
    of both.
    New Command Structure
        As the latest step in maturing our approach to fulfilling
    USSTRATCOM's global mission responsibilities we are implementing a new
    command structure. This structure is critical to the asymmetric
    advantage we seek, leveraging essential competencies of associated
    components and key supporting agencies through an distributed,
    collaborative environment.
        Rather than creating additional organizational layers, we are
    bringing existing commands and agencies under our global mission
    umbrella through the establishment of Joint Functional Component
    Commands. These interdependent Joint Functional Component Commands will
    have responsibility for the day-to-day planning and execution of our
    primary mission areas: space and global strike, intelligence
    surveillance and reconnaissance, network warfare, integrated missile
    defense and combating weapons of mass destruction.
        USSTRATCOM headquarters retains responsibility for nuclear command
    and control. Additionally, headquarters will provide strategic level
    integrated and synchronized planning to ensure full-spectrum mission
    accomplishment. USSTRATCOM will also advocate for the capabilities
    necessary to accomplish these missions.
        This construct will allow us to leverage key, in-place expertise
    from across the DOD and make it readily available to all regional
    combatant commanders. Our vision is for the combatant commanders to
    view any Joint Functional Component Command as a means by which to
    access all of the capabilities resident in the USSTRATCOM global
    mission set. Anytime a combatant commander queries one of our component
    commands, they will establish strategic visibility across our entire
    structure through our collaborative environment. The fully integrated
    response USSTRATCOM provides should offer the combatant commander
    greater situational awareness and more options than originally thought
    available. Specific Joint Functional Component Command responsibilities
    include:

             Space and Global Strike. The Commander of STRATAF (8th
            Air Force) will serve as the Joint Functional Component
            Commander for Space and Global Strike. This component will
            integrate all elements of military power to conduct, plan, and
            present global strike effects and also direct the deliberate
            planning and execution of assigned space operation missions.
            For plans not aligned with a specific mission set, the Joint
            Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike is
            tasked to work in close coordination with USSTRATCOM
            headquarters as the lead component responsible for the
            integration and coordination of capabilities provided by all
            other Joint Functional Component Commands.
             ISR. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
            will be dual-hatted to lead the ISR Joint Functional Component
            Command. This component is responsible for coordinating global
            intelligence collection to address DOD worldwide operations and
            national intelligence requirements. It will serve as the
            epicenter for planning, execution, and assessment of the
            military's global ISR operations; a key enabler to achieving
            global situational awareness.
             Network Warfare. The Director, National Security
            Agency (NSA) will also be dual-hatted to lead the Network
            Warfare Joint Functional Component Command. This component will
            facilitate cooperative engagement with other national entities
            in computer network defense and offensive information warfare
            as part of our global information operations.

        Our coordinated approach to information operations involves two
    other important supporting commands. The Director, Defense Information
    Systems Agency also heads the Joint Task Force for Global Network
    Operations. This organization is responsible for operating and
    defending our worldwide information networks, a function closely
    aligned with the efforts of the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Network Warfare. Additionally, the Commander, Joint Information
    Operations Center coordinates the non-network related pillars of
    information operations: psychological operations, electronic warfare,
    operations security and military deception. Both the Joint Task Force
    for Global Network Operations and the Commander, Joint Information
    Operations Center will be full members of the USSTRATCOM distributed,
    collaborative environment.

             Integrated Missile Defense. The Commander, Army Space
            and Missile Defense Command will head the Integrated Missile
            Defense Joint Functional Component Command. This component will
            be responsible for ensuring we meet USSTRATCOM's Unified
            Command Plan responsibilities for planning, integrating, and
            coordinating global missile defense operations and support. It
            will conduct the day-to-day operations of assigned forces;
            coordinating activities with associated combatant commands,
            other STRATCOM Joint Functional Components, and the efforts of
            the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The Joint Functional
            Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense is a key
            element of the ``defenses'' leg of The New Triad concept.
             Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Secretary
            of Defense (SECDEF) recently assigned USSTRATCOM responsibility
            for integrating and synchronizing DOD's efforts for combating
            weapons of mass destruction. As this initiative is in its very
            formative stages, we have yet to formalize any specific
            componency structure. However, we anticipate establishing a
            formal relationship with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as
            an initial starting point.

        This new componency structure is in its infancy and will take
    several months to fully realize. There are detailed issues to work
    through, including the proper distribution of subject matter expertise
    and an assessment of expanding relationships with other U.S. Government
    departments.
        A final element of our evolving organizational structure involves
    developing relationships with the private sector to build upon efforts
    under the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. This important partnership
    with the private sector supports many of our national objectives and
    crosses into relatively uncharted territory.

             Partnership to Defeat Terrorism. The United States has
            achieved success in the global war on terrorism by attacking
            terrorist infrastructure, resources and sanctuaries.
            Nevertheless, our adversaries continue to plan and conduct
            operations driven by their assessment of our vulnerabilities.
            The main vulnerability requiring our constant vigilance is the
            Nation's economy, and one need look no further than the
            economic aftershock attributed to the September 11 terrorist
            attacks to affirm this assertion. The risk is accentuated given
            the global underpinnings of our economic structure. Even a
            small-scale terrorist attack against a lower tier provider in a
            distant land can have wide-ranging and pervasive economic
            implications.

        Given the evolving understanding of terrorist's use of global
    processes, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism was created to intercede
    on behalf of combatant commanders, among others, and positively affect
    outcomes through connections with the private sector. Since November
    2001, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism has successfully combined
    private sector global processes with other elements of national power
    to help fight global terrorism as part of USSTRATCOM's global mission
    responsibilities. This fruitful relationship with the private sector
    has proven effective on a number of occasions and has garnered the
    support of influential leaders both within and outside government.
        Yet, the Partnership to Defeat Terrorism is somewhat of an ad hoc
    process based on trusted relationships. As such, the value of the
    program is directly related to the availability of the participants.
    USSTRATCOM was recently contacted by a group of people from various
    non-military sectors, advocating the creation of a working group to
    formalize this ad hoc program to begin planning a more permanent
    approach for the long-term.
        On a strategic level, the value of such an effort is the open
    realization that all elements of national power, which have not
    traditionally operated in a synchronized and coordinated role in
    national security, understand the urgent need for their involvement.
        Full realization of the benefits inherent in the distributed,
    interdependent organizational structure described above requires an
    effective collaborative operation. A truly collaborative environment
    provides us the asymmetric advantage necessary to deter and defeat the
    agile adversaries we face in the 21st century environment. In the
    future, these skills will take on even greater importance as we broaden
    our partner base within the U.S. Government, with coalition partners,
    commercial partners, academia, and others, including non-government
    organizations.
                       achieving the strategic imperative
        Agile, responsive distributed operations, enabled by meaningful
    information exchange, shared objectives, and shared situational
    awareness, are key to the successful performance of USSTRATCOM's global
    missions. We have assessed the capability gaps in our global mission
    areas and have developed action plans, working with our partner
    commands, to improve our collective ability to carry out operations at
    all levels.
        USSTRATCOM's strategy is focused on:

             Stewardship of the strategic nuclear stockpile;
             Defending against asymmetric approaches used by our
            adversaries, including weapons of mass destruction;
             Responding effectively in a rapidly changing combat
            operations environment;
             Achieving prompt, predictable precision operations;
             Coordinating with U.S. and private sector partners in
            a collaborative environment;

        Implementing this strategy relies on new and enhanced capabilities,
    including:

             Dominant situational awareness,
             A ubiquitous, assured, global information environment,
             Dynamic, persistent, trustworthy collaborative
            planning,
             User Defined Operating Pictures, using distributed,
            globally available information, and
             A culture that embraces ``need to share'' rather than
            ``need to know.''

        We are not there yet. Working with our partner commands, we have
    developed plans to improve our global capabilities. We need your
    continued support to deliver the capabilities needed to combat the
    threats of the 21st century. We need your support for:

             Pursuit of high capacity, internet-like capability to
            extend the Global Information Grid to deployed/mobile users
            worldwide;
             Adoption of data tagging standards and information
            assurance policies to increase government-wide trusted
            information sharing;
             Technology experiments to enhance our understanding of
            the value of accuracy and stressing environments for current
            and future weapons.

        USSTRATCOM recognizes what has to be done to be a global command in
    support of the warfighter. We are aggressively moving out on actions to
    ensure USSTRATCOM fulfills our full set of global responsibilities,
    supporting our national security needs in peace and in war.
        Thank you for your continued support.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Cartwright.
        Mr. Duma, you are the acting Director of the Operational
    Test and Evaluation area of the DOD. We are delighted to hear
    from you at this time.

     STATEMENT OF DAVID W. DUMA, ACTING DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST
                 AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Duma. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senators, ladies and
    gentlemen, I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak with
    you about the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system test
    program. As you requested, I will talk about the status of
    major test activities, the establishment of criteria for
    operationally realistic testing mandated by section 234 of the
    National Missile Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2005, and finally our relationship with the MDA. Given the
    emphasis placed on fielding a limited defensive capability, my
    remarks will focus primarily on the two elements of ballistic
    missile defense that are the principal contributors to this
    early capability: the GMD and the Aegis BMD systems.
        My full statement addresses my observations about testing
    on other ballistic missile defense elements. I request my full
    statement be included for the record.
        Senator Sessions. It will be made a part of the record.
        Mr. Duma. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I am encouraged by several developments over
    the last year. The MDA has constructed a testbed infrastructure
    and populated it with prototype missiles, six at Fort Greely,
    Alaska and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The
    testbed is a major accomplishment and will address much of the
    prior criticism from my office regarding the lack of
    operational realism for testing the GMD system. The testbed
    supports integration testing, ground testing, and flight
    testing in more operationally stressing geometries and permits
    military operators to operate and control the system.
        Early in development, capability demonstrations and flight
    testing focused on the feasibility of hit-to-kill technology.
    The BMD system testbed significantly improves the test
    infrastructure by providing operational assets to participate
    in more operationally realistic, end-to-end ground tests, and
    flight test scenarios. Integrated ground testing is extremely
    important because it evaluates system interoperability and
    provides the best opportunity for assessing operator training
    and performance.
        To evaluate the testbed operational capabilities, the MDA
    established engagement sequence groups that describe defensive
    capabilities in terms of available sensors, command and control
    networks, and interceptors.
        The first increment of this capability called Limited
    Defensive Capability, is defined by four engagement sequence
    groups to evaluate defense of the 50 States against a limited
    attack from North Korea. This has been a useful way to
    coordinate system development, testing, activation exercises,
    and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures.
    Integrated ground testing results to date indicate the testbed
    has the potential to defend against a limited attack under
    certain conditions. However, difficulties in the flight test
    program have delayed the confirmation of intercept capability
    using the testbed.
        Recent flight test failures in integrated flight test 13C
    and 14 indicate the need to further develop and mature the
    ballistic missile defense system hardware and software. In
    flight test 13C, the system aborted the launch of a missile
    when its internal checks were not satisfied. However, the
    system performed well from target launch until the system
    aborted the interceptor launch.
        In integrated flight test 14, the system performed as
    expected until it detected a problem in the launch sequence and
    again aborted the launching of the interceptor. One of the last
    steps in the launch sequence is to open the silo doors and
    retract the silo horizontal stabilizer bars. In this instance,
    sensors indicated that one of the three stabilizer bars had not
    retracted, causing the missile launch to abort.
        The operational testing community identified 18 operational
    test objectives that addressed operational realism in both
    integrated flight tests 13C and 14. In each case, 10 of these
    objectives were either partially or completely met, and 5
    objectives were not met due to the aborted interceptor launch.
    The Aegis system did not participate in either flight test,
    which resulted in the deferral of three test objectives in each
    case.
        In both integrated flight test 13C and 14, the target
    launched properly and presented a good target scene to the
    ballistic missile defense system. However, from an operational
    mission perspective, the system problems in these tests are
    failures. In an operational mission where the full-up testbed
    is operational, it is possible that other missiles would have
    been available for the user to select and launch against the
    target. The MDA has simulated the capability of the system to
    fail-over to another missile during integrated ground testing.
        After both integrated flight tests 13C and 14, General
    Obering acted quickly to complete root cause analysis and
    incorporate and verify the fixes through regression testing. I
    applaud his commitment to a test-fix-test philosophy that
    results in an event-based test program. These types of setbacks
    are typical of programs in development and they contribute to
    maturing the system.
        In November 2004, my office approved the MDA's first
    version of an integrated master test plan. That plan identified
    developmental testing that the MDA intended to conduct to
    verify the system design and its adherence to system
    specifications. The MDA is incorporating operational objectives
    into system level developmental ground and flight test events
    to increase the operational realism. This approach adds some
    operational realism and insight into the system performance and
    capability during developmental testing.
        The maturity of the testbed will not yet support realistic
    operational end-to-end testing. For example, the sea-based X-
    band radar, which will not be available until the end of this
    year, is an essential element to provide midcourse
    discrimination and track updates.
        I believe we have agreements with the MDA to revise the
    integrated master test plan to continue the combined
    development and operational testing and include focused
    operational testing for each block. This strategy would
    stabilize the system design long enough for the operational
    test and evaluation community to conduct focused operational
    exercises, ground tests, and flight tests on a block
    configuration prior to deploying that capability. It will
    permit testing of the ballistic missile defense system under
    realistic operational conditions, confirm integrated warfighter
    and system performance, and increase confidence of the
    warfighters' ability to execute their mission with the deployed
    system. The operational test community will develop the
    operational evaluation and test plans consistent with the
    maturity of the system, conduct appropriate analyses, and
    prepare a formal report.
        In September 2004, the MDA began a shakedown period where
    they systematically activated and tested the integrated system
    to identify interoperability and performance problems. These
    exercises provided valuable insights and helped develop
    procedures for transitioning the systems to alert. In order to
    support potential activation of the ballistic missile defense
    system for limited defensive operations, the MDA, the
    Operational Test Agency team, STRATCOM, and Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) prepared independent
    assessments of the ballistic missile defense system capability.
    While these assessments varied widely, the process of
    developing and coordinating these analyses provided an
    excellent opportunity to exchange information and perspectives.
        The Aegis ballistic missile defense system is an important
    element of the testbed and contributes to the limited defensive
    capabilities. The Aegis BMD system is making progress in
    demonstrating end-to-end capability to defeat short-range
    ballistic missiles. The Aegis BMD element has demonstrated that
    it can intercept a unitary, short-range target in the ascent
    and descent midcourse phases of flight. The operational realism
    of the Aegis test program has been steadily increasing. The
    Navy Operational Test Force has provided observations on
    operational issues during early developmental tests and has
    introduced more operational realism into recent tests. In the
    last two flight tests, the Aegis crews successfully engaged the
    target without prior information regarding the target launch
    time and direction, and they did this all while on patrol. The
    first flight test in which the ground-based interceptors will
    engage a target using Aegis track data is planned later this
    year.
        The performance of the joint operational test team was
    nothing less than outstanding. Their continuous involvement in
    characterization of the BMD system provides important insight
    into its operational capability. The entire operational test
    and evaluation community has access to all test planning and
    execution meetings, test data, and data analyses. General
    Obering and I meet routinely and my staff coordinates daily
    with the MDA and the element offices. The MDA has not yet
    planned or executed operational testing. So my role is limited
    to providing General Obering advice as to the operational
    realism of the development testing. I also conduct an
    independent annual assessment and provide a report on the past
    year's testing activities and demonstrated system capabilities
    each February.
        In summary, General Obering is executing an event-driven,
    test-fix-test program. Test planning that addresses the
    requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2005 for an operationally realistic test in fiscal
    year 2005 is ongoing. The operational testing community is
    working with the MDA to incorporate operational realism into
    the test plan for that event.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks and I
    welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Duma follows:]
                      Prepared Statement by David W. Duma
        Mr. Chairman, Senators, ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to have
    this opportunity to speak with you about the Ballistic Missile Defense
    (BMD) System test program. As you requested, I will talk about the
    status of the major test activities, the establishment of criteria for
    operationally realistic testing mandated by Section 234 of the 2005
    National Missile Defense Authorization Act, and finally, our
    relationship with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Given the emphasis
    placed on fielding a limited defensive capability, my remarks will
    focus primarily on the two elements of Ballistic Missile Defense that
    are the principle contributors to this early capability--the Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and the Aegis BMD systems. I will
    conclude with a few observations about progress towards testing the
    other theater defense systems.
        I am encouraged by several developments over the last year. The MDA
    has constructed a test bed infrastructure and populated it with
    prototype missiles, six in Fort Greely, Alaska; and two at Vandenberg
    Air Force base, California. The test bed is a major accomplishment and
    addresses much of the prior criticism from my office regarding the lack
    of operational realism for testing the GMD System. The test bed
    supports integration testing, ground testing, and flight testing in
    more operationally stressing test geometries, and permits military
    operators to control the system.
        Early in development, capability demonstrations and flight testing
    focused on the feasibility of hit-to-kill technology. The BMD System
    test bed significantly improves the test infrastructure by providing
    operational assets to participate in more operationally realistic, end-
    to-end ground tests and flight test scenarios. Integrated ground
    testing is extremely important because it evaluates system
    interoperability and provides the best opportunity for assessing
    operator training and performance.
        To define the test bed operational capabilities, the MDA
    established engagement sequence groups that describe defensive
    capabilities in terms of available sensors, command and control
    networks, and interceptors. The first increment of this capability,
    called Limited Defensive Capability, is defined by four engagement
    sequence groups to evaluate defense of the 50 States against a limited
    attack from North Korea. This has been a useful way to coordinate
    system development, testing, activation exercises, and the development
    of tactics and procedures. Integrated ground test results to date
    indicate the test bed has the potential to defend against a limited
    attack, under certain conditions. However, difficulties in the flight
    test program have delayed the confirmation of intercept capability
    using the test bed.
        Recent flight test failures in Integrated Flight Tests -13C and -14
    indicate the need to further develop and mature the BMD System hardware
    and software. In Flight Test-13C, the system aborted the launch of a
    missile when its internal checks were not satisfied. However, the
    system performed well from target launch, until the system aborted the
    interceptor launch.
        The operational testing community identified 18 operational
    objectives that addressed operational realism in Integrated Flight
    Test-13C. Ten of these objectives were partially or completely met.
    Five objectives were not met due to interceptor abort. Sea conditions
    off Alaska prevented Aegis at-sea participation in the test, resulting
    in the deferral of three additional test objectives to later test
    events.
        In Integrated Flight Test-14, the system performed as expected
    until it detected a problem in the launch sequence and again aborted
    the launching of the interceptor. One of the last steps in the launch
    sequence is to open the silo doors and retract the silo horizontal
    stabilizers. In this instance, sensors indicated that one of the three
    stabilizers had not retracted, causing the missile to abort launch.
        Again of the 18 test objectives addressing operational realism in
    Integrated Flight Test-14, 10 objectives were partially or completely
    satisfied, 3 objectives were deferred due to lack of Aegis at-sea
    participation, and 5 objectives were not met due to the aborted
    interceptor launch.
        In both Integrated Flight Tests-13C and -14, the target launched
    properly and presented a good target scene to the BMD System. However,
    from an operational mission perspective, these tests are failures. In
    an operational mission using the full-up test bed, it is possible that
    other missiles would have been available for the user to select and
    launch against the target. During integrated ground testing, the MDA
    simulated the capability of the system to fail-over to another missile.
        After both Integrated Flight Tests-13C and -14, General Obering
    acted quickly to complete a root cause analysis, and incorporate fixes.
    He did not move forward with planning Flight Test-14 until they
    identified the root cause of the Flight Test-13C failure and verified
    the corrective action by both analyses and ground testing. General
    Obering is taking a prudent approach. I applaud his commitment to a
    ``test-fix-test'' philosophy that results in an event-driven test
    program.
        It should be noted that Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis missile defense
    systems have been in development since the early 1990s and are now
    showing a maturity that has accrued from a comprehensive test-fix-test
    program. Conversely, the GMD System has only been in development about
    7 years. These types of setbacks are typical for programs in
    development, and they contribute to maturing the system.
        The MDA has made progress in documenting their test planning
    activities. In November 2004, my office approved the MDA's Integrated
    Master Test Plan. We are working with the MDA and the Operational Test
    Agency team to increase operational realism through the test planning
    process, consistent with the maturity of the BMD System test bed. The
    Integrated Master Test Plan provides a framework for identifying and
    integrating test requirements from the BMD System elements, the MDA,
    the Operational Test Agencies, and my office. As a top-level planning
    document, it identifies criteria for operationally realistic testing
    that apply to system-level events. It also identifies a series of
    planned tests that should demonstrate the progress towards developing
    and maturing the BMD System capability. The operational test community
    and the MDA have agreed on a test strategy and operational criteria to
    test the Limited Defense Capability in 2005, consistent with the
    maturity of the system.
        In a developmental program that is employing a test-fix-test
    philosophy, test plans are necessarily fluid. My office and the
    Operational Test Agency team are working with the MDA to identify the
    impact of schedule changes on achieving the test objectives in the
    Integrated Master Test Plan. The maturity of the test bed will not yet
    support Title 10 end-to-end operational testing. For example, the Sea-
    Based X-Band Radar, which will not be available until the end of this
    year, is essential to provide mid-course discrimination and track
    updates. In addition the test bed is limited to one-on-one intercepts
    against target missiles, and the crew is limited in the amount of
    control they have over the system.
        The MDA is reviewing the live-fire testing programs of the BMD
    System elements in order to coordinate efforts and provide a consistent
    approach to assessing system lethality. This will ensure that data from
    earlier tests and analyses are used to maximum advantage, and that
    future efforts focus on the most critical data needs. As the BMD System
    moves through development and maturation, it is essential that we
    continue our commitment to understanding the lethality of the system
    against the threats associated with each increment of capability.
        In September 2004, the MDA began a ``shakedown'' period, where they
    systematically activated and tested the integrated system to identify
    interoperability and performance problems. These exercises provided
    valuable insights and helped develop procedures for transitioning the
    system to alert. In order to support potential activation of the BMD
    System for Limited Defensive Operations, the MDA, the Operational Test
    Agency team, the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and DOT&E prepared
    independent assessments of the BMD System capability. While these
    assessments varied widely, the process of developing and coordinating
    these analyses provided an excellent opportunity to exchange
    information and perspectives.
        The Aegis BMD System is an important element of the test bed and
    contributes to the Limited Defensive Capabilities. The first flight
    test in which ground-based interceptors (GBIs) will engage a target
    using Aegis track data, is planned later this year. The Aegis BMD
    System is making progress in demonstrating end-to-end capability to
    defeat short-range ballistic missiles. The Aegis BMD element has
    demonstrated that it can intercept a unitary, short-range target in the
    ascent and descent midcourse phases of flight. The operational realism
    of the Aegis test program has been steadily increasing. The Navy
    Operational Test Force has provided observations on operational issues
    during early developmental tests and has introduced more operational
    realism into recent tests. In the last two flight tests, while on
    patrol the Aegis operators successfully engaged the target without
    prior information about the target launch time and direction.
        Other elements of the BMD System clearly reflect the success of the
    MDA's ``test-fix-test'' philosophy and willingness to restructure
    program goals when appropriate. In early 2004, the MDA recognized the
    major technical challenges still faced by the Airborne Laser (ABL)
    program and restructured the program to focus on developing and
    demonstrating specific technical goals annually, instead of pursuing
    future development initiatives. This resulted in the successful ``first
    light'' of the high-energy laser through all six modules in the ground
    aircraft mockup system integration laboratory. It also resulted in the
    successful first flight of the aircraft with the laser turret, and beam
    control and fire control installed.
        The Theater High Altitude Terminal Defense system also accomplished
    extensive component and subsystem testing during 2004. The launcher
    demonstrated the ability to roll-on/roll-off a C-17 transport aircraft.
    The program successfully performed a short hot launch of a missile
    round loaded with only a portion of the normal amount of propellant.
    This test verifies the firing circuits and increases confidence in the
    success of the first flight-test later this year. A new system radar
    arrived at White Sands Missile Range in March 2004 for testing. The
    radar has successfully tracked targets of opportunity, including
    Patriot PAC-3 flight test missiles and targets.
        The performance of the Joint Operational Test Agency team is
    nothing less than outstanding. Their continuous involvement and
    characterization of the BMD System provides important insight into its
    operational capability. The entire operational test and evaluation
    community has access to all test planning and execution meetings, test
    data, and data analyses. General Obering and I meet routinely, and my
    staff coordinates daily with the MDA and the element offices. However,
    the MDA has no operational testing planned, so my role is limited to
    providing General Obering advice as to the operational realism of the
    developmental testing. I also provide an annual assessment report on
    the past years' testing activities and demonstrated system capabilities
    to the Department and Congress each February, as required by law.
        In summary, General Obering is executing an event-driven, test-fix-
    test program. Test planning that addresses the requirement in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 for an
    operationally realistic test in fiscal year 2005 is ongoing. The
    operational testing community is working with the MDA to incorporate
    operational objectives and realism into the test plan for this event.
        That concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Duma.
        Next we will hear from General Henry Obering III, the
    Director of the MDA. General Obering.

      STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, USAF, DIRECTOR,
                         MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Obering. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and
    distinguished members of the committee. It is a privilege to be
    here. I ask that my prepared statement be entered into the
    record.
        Senator Sessions. It will be.
        General Obering. We have had many accomplishments and a few
    disappointments since my predecessor last addressed this
    committee. While overall we remain on track to execute our
    mission, I am planning to make some program adjustments which I
    will describe later in light of our recent flight test
    failures.
        Threats from WMD and proliferating ballistic missiles
    continue to present grave security concerns. In fact, there
    were nearly 100 foreign ballistic missile launches around the
    world in 2004. We must also remember that we have been
    surprised in this area in the past.
        To deal with these threats, we are developing and
    implementing fielding a joint integrated and layered BMD system
    to defend the United States, our deployed forces, allies, and
    friends against all ranges of ballistic missiles. We have put
    the foundation of this system in place today. Our program
    reflected, in the fiscal year 2006 budget submission, is
    structured to balance the fielding of elements of this system
    with its continued steady improvement through an evolutionary
    development and test approach. The budget also balances
    capabilities across an evolving threat spectrum that includes
    rogue nations with increasing expertise.
        We are requesting $7.8 billion to support our program of
    work in fiscal year 2006, which is approximately $1 billion
    less than the fiscal year 2005 request. About $1.4 billion
    covers the continued fielding and sustainment of our block
    increments of long-range, GMD components, our short to
    intermediate range defense involving Aegis ships with their
    interceptors, and the supporting radars, command, control,
    battle management, and communications capabilities. About $6.4
    billion will be invested in the development foundation for the
    continued testing and system evolution.
        To provide the context for our budget submission, I would
    like to review our progress over the past year, explain the
    rationale behind our testing and fielding activities, and
    address the next steps in our evolutionary program.
        In 2001 and 2002, we successfully conducted four out of
    five intercept tests using prototype interceptors against long-
    range ballistic missile targets. These tests gave us the
    confidence to proceed with the development and fielding of a
    system that relies primarily on hit-to-kill technologies. While
    our testing since 2003 has provided us with a wealth of
    critical data, long-range interceptor aborts in recent tests
    have been disappointing. These aborts were due to a minor
    software problem in the first test and a ground support arm
    that failed to retract in the last.
        Now, while these failures do not threaten the basic
    viability of the system, I believe that we needed to take
    strong action to address them. Initially I chartered an
    independent team to review our test program, its processes,
    procedures, and management. They reported the findings to me
    last week. The team indicated that we had successfully
    demonstrated the hit-to-kill technology and achieved a major
    national accomplishment in fielding initial defensive
    capabilities. They described the rapid development and the
    initial deployment of the system as comparable to that of the
    Minute Man and the Polaris ballistic missile programs.
        With the basic functionality demonstrated, the team
    believed that we should now enter a performance and reliability
    verification phase in which mission assurance becomes the
    number one objective. They noted that our system reliability is
    based on multiple interceptors per engagement, whereas our
    system testing is focused on single interceptor performance.
    They also observed that our flight testing has a strategic
    significance well beyond that normally associated with military
    systems development.
        Therefore, the team recommended specific improvements in
    five areas: first, increase the rigor in the flight test
    certification process to include the addition of a concurrent
    and accountable independent assessment of test readiness;
    second, strengthen system engineering by tightening contractor
    configuration management, enforcing process and workmanship
    standards, and ensuring proper specification flow-down; third,
    add more ground test units and expand ground qualification
    testing; fourth, hold the contractor functional organization
    such as quality and mission assurance experts accountable for
    supporting the program in a better fashion; and finally, ensure
    program executability by stabilizing baselines.
        I will drive the implementation of these recommendations,
    along with those provided by a task force I also chartered
    under the leadership of our newly established Director of
    Mission Readiness, Rear Admiral Kate Paige. With her formidable
    leadership, talent and Aegis ballistic missile defense
    expertise, she has the ability to ensure our return to a
    successful flight test program and the authority to ensure that
    mission assurance remains our top program priority.
        Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that while these test aborts
    were major disappointments, they were not major technical
    setbacks. We maintain our confidence in the system's basic
    design, its hit-to-kill effectiveness, and its inherent
    operational capability.
        Nevertheless, neither you, the American public nor our
    enemies will believe in our ground-based ICBM defense until we
    demonstrate its effectiveness by successfully conducting
    additional operationally realistic tests.
        In planning our future test program, the DOT&E and I have
    jointly approved an integrated master test plan effective
    through 2007. The plan includes tests that combine
    developmental and operational testing to reduce costs and
    increase test efficiency. Within our range safety constraints,
    we are committed to increasing the operational aspects of our
    testing. We have also jointly agreed to criteria for
    operational realism which will be incorporated into our test
    planning.
        While the recommendations of the Mission Readiness Task
    Force will impact our testing, we currently plan to conduct a
    test with operational assets this coming year. In 2006, I
    expect to execute three to four integrated flight tests using a
    variety of flight conditions designed to demonstrate the
    operational effectiveness of the missile defense system.
        Our sea-based test program is proceeding very well. The
    last standard missile-3 intercept in February was the fifth
    success of six attempts. We plan to conduct two more tests this
    year using the Aegis cruiser as the primary engagement
    platform. We will use upgraded software and an advanced
    standard missile-3 interceptor to engage a variety of targets,
    including those with separating warheads.
        In completing our initial fielding of the block 2004
    components, we are also on track. We have successfully built
    out the initial GMD capability, including the emplacement of 8
    ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California which we
    will increase to 18 by the end of this year. Currently seven
    Aegis ships providing long-range surveillance and tracking data
    are ready for stationing. Ten should be available by the end of
    the year.
        In addition, we completed the outfitting of one Aegis
    cruiser for standard missile-3 interceptors to provide an
    emergency engagement capability against the short to
    intermediate range ballistic missiles, and we will have another
    cruiser outfitted also by the end of the year.
        In our sensor program, the Cobra Dane radar in the
    Aleutians is ready for missile defense use today, and we are
    integrating upgraded early warning radars in California, the
    United Kingdom, and our most powerful sensor the SBX this year.
    In addition, we are now testing a transportable SBX, which we
    are planning to forward deploy this year as well.
        Since October 2004, we have been in a shakedown period, or
    check-out period, similar to that used by the U.S. Navy ships
    before entering the fleet. Working closely with U.S. STRATCOM
    and the combatant commanders, we have certified missile defense
    crews and put in place the necessary logistic support
    infrastructure. We have successfully exercised the command,
    fire control, battle management, and communications capability
    critical to the operation of the system.
        Since we cannot be certain which specific ballistic missile
    threats we will face in the future, our long-term strategy is
    to strengthen our capability and maximize our flexibility. As
    we proceed with this program into the next decade, we will move
    towards a missile defense that features greater sensor and
    interceptor mobility while adding a boost-phase defense.
        To meet the long-range threat, the GMD element budget
    request is about $2.3 billion for fiscal year 2006. This covers
    continued development, ground and flight testing, fielding and
    support for up to 10 additional GBIs, their silos, and
    associated support equipment and facilities. In addition, it
    funds long-lead items for the next increment.
        To address the short to intermediate range threat, we are
    requesting approximately $1.9 billion to continue development
    and testing of our sea-based midcourse Aegis ballistic missile
    defense capability and our land-based terminal altitude area
    defense (THAAD) element. By the end of 2007, we should have up
    to 28 standard missile-3 interceptors available for use and
    three Aegis cruisers and 8 destroyers. Six additional
    destroyers will be capable of performing the surveillance and
    track mission.
        The THAAD flight testing resumes this year with controlled
    flight tests and will continue into fiscal year 2006 when we
    will conduct the first intercept test. We plan to field the
    first THAAD unit with its 24 missiles by 2009, with a second
    unit available by 2011. We will continue to roll out sensors
    that we will knit together using a strong command, control,
    battle management, and communications foundation.
        In 2007, we plan to deploy another forward based X-band
    radar and launch two space tracking and surveillance systems
    testbed satellites, which will demonstrate our ability to close
    the fire control loop worldwide. We are requesting
    approximately $520 million to accomplish this work.
        In executing our program, we are following a strategy to
    retain alternative development paths until capability is
    proven, a knowledge-based funding approach, that is. We are
    preserving decision flexibility with respect to our boost-phase
    programs until we understand what capabilities they can offer.
    We have requested approximately $680 million for these
    activities.
        In our primary boost-phase weapons program, the ABL, we
    have enjoyed recent success achieving the first light and first
    flight milestones. The next major steps are to complete the
    current lasing test, finish the beam and fire control flight
    test program, and then integrate the laser onto the testbed
    aircraft. I am pleased with where we are today, but we have
    many technical challenges ahead and it is too early to rely
    solely on this capability for boost defense.
        Therefore, as a parallel path, we undertook the KEI program
    in response to a 2002 Defense Science Board recommendation. We
    will not know for 2 or 3 years, however, whether either of
    these programs will be viable. But in order to meet our top
    line budget reductions, I decided to accept more risk in this
    area and restructure the KEI effort to focus on demonstrating a
    high acceleration booster flight in 2008. If this is
    successful, it not only provides risk reduction for the ABL
    program, it also provides us with an alternative mobile
    approach for the next generation of boosters for our long-
    range, midcourse, and terminal programs as well.
        Finally, we have been working closely with a number of
    allies to make missile defense a key element of our security
    relationships and have signed a number of framework agreements
    to that end.
        The Government of Japan is proceeding with the acquisition
    of a multi-layered BMD system and is expanding their
    cooperation with us to develop a more capable Aegis standard
    missile-3 interceptor.
        We have also signed agreements with the United Kingdom and
    Australia and have received approval from Denmark and the
    Greenland home rule government to upgrade the radar at Thule.
        Our work with Israel to implement the Arrow system
    improvement program is on track.
        We are intent on continuing U.S. and Russian collaboration.
    Presently we are developing software that will be used to
    support the ongoing U.S.-Russian missile defense exercise
    program, and a new proposal for target missiles and radar
    cooperation is being discussed within the United States-Russian
    Federation Missile Defense Working Group.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this committee
    for its tremendous continued support. I also want to thank the
    thousands of dedicated and talented Americans working on the
    missile defense program nationwide. I believe that we are on
    the right track to deliver the unprecedented capabilities that
    we need to close off a major avenue of vulnerability for this
    Nation.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Obering follows:]
           Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, USAF
        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is an
    honor to be here today to present the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    Fiscal Year 2006 Missile Defense Program and budget. The Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) mission remains one of developing and
    incrementally fielding a joint, integrated, and multi-layered Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) system to defend the United States, our deployed
    forces, and our allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all
    ranges by engaging them in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of
    flight.
        Our program, reflected in the fiscal year 2006 budget submission,
    is structured to balance the early fielding elements of this system
    with its continued steady improvement through an evolutionary
    development and test approach. The budget also balances our
    capabilities across an evolving threat spectrum that includes rogue
    nations with increasing ballistic missile expertise.
        We are requesting $7.8 billion to support our program of work in
    fiscal year 2006, which is approximately $1 billion less than the
    fiscal year 2005 request. About $1.4 billion covers the continued
    fielding and sustainment of our block increments of long-range ground-
    based midcourse defense (GMD) components; our short- to intermediate-
    range defense involving Aegis ships with their interceptors; as well as
    all of the supporting radars, command, control, battle management, and
    communication capabilities. About $6.4 billion will be invested in the
    development foundation for continued testing and evolution of the
    system.
        To provide the context for our budget submission, I would like to
    review what we have accomplished over the past year. While I believe
    the Missile Defense Program is on the right track to deliver
    multilayered, integrated capabilities to counter current and emerging
    ballistic missile threats, I am planning to make some program
    adjustments in light of our two recent flight test failures.
        I also will explain the rationale behind our testing and fielding
    activities and address the next steps in our evolutionary BMD program.
                       the evolving security environment
        The threat we face from proliferating and evolving ballistic
    missile systems and associated technologies and expertise continues
    unabated. There were nearly 100 foreign ballistic missile launches
    around the world in 2004. This is nearly double the number conducted in
    2003 and slightly greater than the number of launches in 2002. More
    than 60 launches last year involved short-range ballistic missiles,
    over 10 involved medium-range missiles, and nearly 20 involved land-
    and sea-based long-range ballistic missiles.
        Operations Desert Storm (1991) and Iraqi Freedom (2003)
    demonstrated that missile defenses must be integrated into our regional
    military responses if we are to provide adequate protection of
    Coalition Forces, friendly population centers, and military assets. We
    must expect that troops deployed to regional hotspots will continue to
    encounter increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile threats.
        Nuclear-capable North Korea and nuclear-emergent Iran have shown
    serious interest in longer-range missiles. They underscore the severity
    of the proliferation problem. Our current and near-term missile defense
    fielding activities are a direct response to these dangers. There are
    also other ballistic missile threats to the homeland that we must
    address in the years ahead, including the possibility of an off-shore
    launch.
        We have had recent experience with tragic hostage situations
    involving individuals, and we have witnessed how the enemy has
    attempted to use hostages to coerce or blackmail us. Imagine now an
    entire city held hostage by a state or a terrorist organization. This
    is a grim prospect, and we must make every effort to prevent it from
    occurring. Any missile carrying a nuclear or biological payload could
    inflict catastrophic damage. I believe the ability to protect against
    threats of coercion and actively defend our forces, friends and allies,
    and homeland against ballistic missiles will play an increasingly
    critical role in our national security strategy.
                   missile defense approach--layered defense
        We believe that highly integrated layered defenses will improve the
    chances of engaging and destroying a ballistic missile and its payload.
    This approach to missile defense also makes deployment of
    countermeasures much more difficult. If the adversary has a successful
    countermeasure deployment or tactic in the boost phase, for example, he
    may play right into the defense we have set up in midcourse. Layered
    defenses provide defense in depth and create an environment intended to
    frustrate an attacker. The elements of this system play to one
    another's strengths while covering one another's weaknesses.
        With the initial fielding last year of the GMD and Aegis
    surveillance and track capabilities of this integrated system, we are
    establishing a limited defensive capability for the United States
    against a long-range North Korean missile threat. At the same time, we
    are building up our inventory of mobile interceptors to protect
    coalition forces, allies and friends against shorter-range threats.
    With the cooperation of our allies and friends, we plan to evolve this
    defensive capability to improve defenses against all ranges of threats
    in all phases of flight and expand it over time with additional
    interceptors, sensors, and defensive layers.
        Since we cannot be certain which specific ballistic missile threats
    we will face in the future, or from where those threats will originate,
    our long-term strategy is to strengthen and maximize the flexibility of
    our missile defense capabilities. As we proceed with this program into
    the next decade, we will move towards a missile defense force structure
    that features greater sensor and interceptor mobility. In line with our
    multilayer approach, we will expand terminal defense protection and
    place increasing emphasis on boost phase defenses, which today are
    still early in development.
                         initial fielding of block 2004
        Since my predecessor last appeared before this committee, we have
    made tremendous progress and have had a number of accomplishments. We
    also came up short of our expectations in a few areas.
        We stated last year that, by the end of 2004, we would begin
    fielding the initial elements of our integrated BMD system. We have met
    nearly all of our objectives. We have installed six ground-based
    interceptors in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska and two at Vandenberg Air
    Force Base in California. We completed the upgrade of the Cobra Dane
    radar in Alaska and the modification of six Aegis ships for long-range
    surveillance and tracking support. These elements have been fully
    connected to the fire control system and are supported by an extensive
    command, control, battle management, and communications infrastructure.
    In addition, we have put in place the required logistics support
    infrastructure and support centers.
        Since October 2004, we have been in a ``shakedown'' or check-out
    period, similar to that used as part of the commissioning of a U.S.
    Navy ship before it enters the operational fleet. We work closely with
    U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and the combatant commanders to
    certify missile defense crews at all echelons to ensure that they can
    operate the ballistic missile defense system if called upon to do so.
    We have exercised the command, fire control, battle management, and
    communication capabilities critical to the operation of the system. The
    Aegis ships have been periodically put on station in the Sea of Japan
    to provide long-range surveillance and tracking data to our battle
    management system. We have fully integrated the Cobra Dane radar into
    the system, and it is ready for operational use even as it continues to
    play an active role in our test program by providing data on targets of
    opportunity. Finally, we have executed a series of exercises with the
    system that involves temporarily putting the system in a launch-ready
    state. This has enabled us to learn a great deal about the system's
    operability. It also allows us to demonstrate our ability to transition
    from development to operational support and back. This is very
    important since we will continue to improve the capabilities of the
    system over time, even as we remain ready to take advantage of its
    inherent defensive capability should the need arise.
                             completing block 2004
        Today we remain basically on track with interceptor fielding for
    the Test Bed. We have recovered from the 2003 propellant accident,
    which last year affected the long-range ground-based interceptors as
    well as the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Terminal High Altitude
    Area Defense (THAAD) booster production. We should have ten more
    interceptors emplaced in Alaska by December of this year. In October,
    we received the first Standard Missile-3 for deployment aboard an Aegis
    ship. To date, we have five of these interceptors with a total of eight
    scheduled to be delivered by the end of the year. By then, we will also
    have outfitted two Aegis cruisers with this engagement capability. So,
    in addition to providing surveillance and tracking support to the
    integrated BMD system, Aegis will soon provide a flexible sea-mobile
    capability to defeat short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles in
    their midcourse phase.
        Our sensor program is also on track. The Beale radar in California
    is receiving final software upgrades this spring and will be fully
    integrated into the system. We are now testing a transportable X-band
    radar, which can be forward-deployed this year to enhance our
    surveillance and tracking capabilities. Our most powerful sensor
    capability, the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) will be on station, ported
    in Adak, Alaska by December. This radar is so capable that, if it were
    sitting in Chesapeake Bay, it could detect a baseball-sized object in
    space over San Francisco. This sea-mobile midcourse radar will allow us
    to increase the complexity of our tests by enabling different intercept
    geometries. When we deploy it in the Pacific Ocean, it also will have
    an inherent operational capability against threats from Asia. Finally,
    the RAF Fylingdales early warning radar in the United Kingdom will be
    fully integrated for missile defense purposes by early 2006 and will
    provide the initial sensor coverage needed against Middle East threats.
        BMD elements will remain part of the system test bed even after we
    field them for initial capability. However, the MDA does not operate
    the BMD system. Our job is to provide a militarily useful capability to
    the warfighter. Because the BMD system is integrated and involves
    different Services, the MDA will continue to manage system
    configuration to ensure adequate integration of new components and
    elements and the continued smooth operation of the system.
        For these reasons, Congress mandated the Agency to maintain
    configuration control over PAC-3 and the Medium Extended Air Defense
    System (MEADS) following their transfer to the Army. Regarding the
    transition of the system elements, we use several models. Each
    transition, to include time and method of transfer, will be unique. In
    some cases, it may not be appropriate to transfer a BMD system element
    to a Service. The SBX, for example, will likely remain a MDA test bed
    asset and be made available for operational use as appropriate. In
    other words, the Services and the MDA will have shared responsibilities
    and will continue to work with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the
    Services, and the component commanders to arrange appropriate element
    transfer on a case-by-case basis.
                   building confidence through spiral testing
        The development and fielding of Block 2004 was initiated based on
    the confidence we built in our test program between 2000 and 2002. We
    successfully conducted four out of five intercept tests using
    prototypes of the ground-based interceptors we have in place today
    against long-range ballistic missile targets. In addition, in 2002 and
    2003, we successfully conducted three intercept tests against shorter-
    range targets using an earlier version of the sea-based Aegis SM-3
    interceptors we are deploying today. These tests demonstrated the basic
    viability and effectiveness of a system that relies primarily on hit-
    to-kill technologies to defeat in-flight missiles. In fact, we had
    learned as much as we could with the prototypes and decided it was time
    to restructure the program to accelerate the testing of the initial
    operational configurations of the system elements.
        In 2003 and 2004, we had three successful flight tests of the
    operational long-range booster now emplaced in the silos in Alaska and
    California. The booster performed exactly as predicted by our models
    and simulations. In addition, between 2002 and 2004, we successfully
    executed 58 flight tests, 67 ground tests, simulations, and exercises,
    all of which have continued to bolster our confidence in the basic
    ballistic missile defense capabilities. In the past year, however, we
    had several concerns with quality control and, as a result, executed
    only two long-range flight tests since last spring.
        The interceptor launch aborts in Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-13C
    last December and IFT-14 this past February were disappointments, but
    they were not, by any measure, serious setbacks. The anomaly that
    occurred in IFT-13C, in fact, is a very rare occurrence. As the
    interceptor prepares to launch, its on-board computer does a health and
    status check of various components. In that built-in test, interceptor
    operations were automatically terminated because an overly stringent
    parameter measuring the communications rate between the flight computer
    and its guidance components was not met. The launch control system
    actually worked as it was designed when it shut the interceptor down. A
    simple software update to relax that parameter corrected the problem.
    The fix was verified during subsequent ground tests and the next launch
    attempt. We did enjoy some success in the test. We successfully tracked
    the target and fed that information into the fire control system, a
    process that allowed us to successfully build a weapons task plan that
    we then loaded and, which was accepted, into the interceptor's
    computer.
        In February we used the same interceptor to attempt another flight
    test. Again, the target successfully launched. The interceptor
    successfully powered up and worked through built-in test procedures and
    was fully prepared to launch. Again, the system successfully tracked
    the target and fed the information to the fire control system, which
    generated a weapons task plan accepted by the interceptor's computer.
    This time, however, a piece of ground support equipment did not
    properly clear, and the launch control system did not issue a launch
    enable command.
        Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that while these test aborts were
    major disappointments, they were not major technical setbacks. We
    maintain our confidence in the system's basic design, its hit-to-kill
    effectiveness, and its inherent operational capability. Because of our
    recent test launch aborts, I have chartered an independent team to
    review our test processes, procedures, and management. In addition, I
    have named the current Aegis BMD program director, Rear Admiral Kate
    Paige, as the Agency's Director of Mission Assurance with full
    authority to implement the corrections needed to ensure return to a
    successful flight test program. We have pursued a comprehensive and
    integrated approach to missile defense testing under the current
    program and are gradually making our tests more complex. Missile
    defense testing has evolved, and will continue to evolve, based on
    results. We are not in a traditional development, test, and production
    mode where we test a system, then produce hundreds of units without
    further testing. We will always be testing and improving this system,
    using a spiral testing approach that cycles results into our spiral
    development activities. That is the very nature of spiral development.
    This approach also means fielding test assets in operational
    configurations. This dramatically reduces time from development to
    operations, which is critical in a mission area where this nation has
    been defenseless. Nevertheless, neither you, the American public, nor
    our enemies will believe in our ground-based Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile (ICBM) defense until we demonstrate its effectiveness by
    successfully conducting additional operationally realistic flight
    tests.
        We have a very aggressive test program over the next 2 years. After
    we fly the interceptor which aborted in the last two flight tests to
    gain confidence in our corrections, we plan to conduct two more long-
    range interceptor tests this calendar year. These will include: an
    engagement sequence that uses an operationally configured Aegis ship to
    provide tracking information to a long-range interceptor and an
    engagement sequence that uses an interceptor launched from an
    operational site, Vandenberg; tracking information provided by an
    operational radar at Beale; and a target launched out of the Kodiak
    Launch Complex in Alaska. This year we also plan to fly targets across
    the face of the Cobra Dane radar in the Aleutians and Beale in
    California. All of these tests are part of an operationally realistic
    test program as required by law.
        In fiscal year 2006, we are adding new test objectives and using
    more complex scenarios. Also, warfighter participation will grow. We
    plan to execute four flight tests using the long-range interceptor
    under a variety of flight conditions and, for the first time, use
    tracking data from the sea-based X-band radar.
        In terms of our sea-based midcourse defense element, this past
    February, we successfully used a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser to engage a
    short-range target ballistic missile. This test marked the first use of
    an operationally configured Aegis SM-3 interceptor. In the last three
    Aegis BMD intercept flight tests, we incrementally ratcheted up the
    degree of realism and reduced testing limitations to the point where we
    did not notify the operational ship's crew of the target launch time
    and they were forced to react to a dynamic situation. This year, we
    will conduct two more tests using Aegis as the primary engagement
    platform. In fiscal year 2006, Aegis ballistic missile defense will use
    upgraded software and an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor to
    engage a variety of short- and medium-range targets, including targets
    with separating warheads. We also plan to work with Japan to test the
    engagement performance of the SM-3 nosecone developed in the U.S./Japan
    Cooperative Research project.
        Four Missile Defense Integration Exercises involving warfighter
    personnel will test hardware and software in the integrated system
    configuration to demonstrate system interoperability. War games also
    are an integral part of concept of operations development and
    validation. Four integrated missile defense wargames in fiscal year
    2006 will collect data to support characterization, verification, and
    assessment of the ballistic missile defense system with respect to
    operator-in-the-loop planning and the exchange of information in the
    system required for successful development and system operation.
        In addition to having laid out a very ambitious test plan, we are
    working hand-in-hand with the warfighter community and the independent
    testing community. We have more than one hundred people from the test
    community embedded in our program activities, and they are active in
    all phases of test planning, execution, and post-test analysis. We meet
    with them at the senior level on a weekly basis, and they help us
    develop and approve our test plans. All data from testing is available
    to all parties through a Joint Analysis Team and are used to conduct
    independent assessments of the system.
        The MDA and Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) have
    completed and jointly approved an Integrated Master Test Plan,
    effective through 2007. The plan includes tests that combine
    developmental and operational testing to reduce costs and increase
    testing efficiency. Within our range safety constraints, we are
    committed to increasing the operational aspects as I stated earlier.
    This accumulated knowledge helps inform the assessment of operational
    readiness.
                    building the next increment--block 2006
        In building the BMD program of work within the top line budget
    reductions I mentioned earlier, we followed several guiding principles.
    To keep ahead of the rogue nation threats, we recognized the need to
    continue holding to our fielding commitments to the President for
    Blocks 2004 and 2006, including investment in the necessary logistics
    support. We also knew that we must prepare for asymmetric (e.g., the
    threat from off-shore launches) and emerging threat possibilities as
    well in our fielding and development plans.
        In executing our program we are following a strategy to retain
    alternative development paths until capability is proven--a knowledge-
    based funding approach. This is a key concept in how we are executing
    our development program. We have structured the program to make
    decisions as to what we will and will not fund based upon the proven
    success of each program element. The approach involves tradeoffs to
    address sufficiency of defensive layers--boost, midcourse, terminal;
    diversity of basing modes--land, sea, air and space; and considerations
    of technical, schedule and cost performance.
        The funding request for fiscal year 2006 will develop and field the
    next increment of missile defense capability to improve protection of
    the United States from the Middle East, expand coverage to allies and
    friends, improve our capability against short-range threats, and
    increase the resistance of the integrated system to countermeasures. We
    are beginning to lay in more mobile, flexible interceptors and
    associated sensors to meet threats posed from unanticipated launch
    locations, including threats launched off our coasts.
        For midcourse capability against the long-range threat, the GMD
    element budget request is about $2.3 billion for fiscal year 2006 to
    cover continued development, ground and flight testing, fielding and
    support. This request includes up to 10 additional ground-based
    interceptors, their silos, and associated support equipment and
    facilities as well as the long-lead items for the next increment. It
    also continues the upgrade of the Thule radar station in Greenland.
        To address the short- to intermediate-range threat, we are
    requesting approximately $1.9 billion to continue development and
    testing of our sea-based midcourse capability, or Aegis BMD, and our
    land-based THAAD element. We will continue purchases of the SM-3
    interceptor and the upgrading of Aegis ships to perform the BMD
    mission. By the end of 2007 we should have up to 28 SM-3 interceptors
    on 3 Aegis cruisers and 8 Aegis destroyers. This engagement capability
    will improve our ability to defend our deployed troops and our friends
    and allies. Six additional destroyers, for a total of 17 Aegis ships,
    will be capable of performing the surveillance and track mission.
        THAAD flight testing begins this year with controlled flight tests
    as well as radar and seeker characterization tests and will continue
    into fiscal year 2006, when we will conduct the first high endo-
    atmospheric intercept test. We are working toward fielding the first
    THAAD unit in the 2008-2009 timeframe with a second unit available in
    2011.
        We will continue to roll out sensors that we will net together to
    detect and track threat targets and improve discrimination of the
    target suite in different phases of flight. In 2007, we will deploy a
    second forward-based X-band radar. We are working towards a 2007 launch
    of two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) test bed
    satellites. These test bed satellites will demonstrate closing the fire
    control loop and the value of STSS tracking data. We are requesting
    approximately $521 million in fiscal year 2006 to execute this STSS and
    BMDS Radar work.
        All of these system elements must be built on a solid command,
    control, battle management, and communications foundation that spans
    thousands of miles, multiple time zones, hundreds of kilometers in
    space, and several combatant commands. This foundation allows us to mix
    and match sensors, weapons, and command centers to dramatically expand
    our detection and engagement capabilities over that achieved by the
    system's elements operating individually. In fact, without this
    foundation we cannot execute our basic mission. That is why the
    Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications program is so
    vital to the success of our integrated capability.
        Building a single integrated system of layered defenses has forced
    us to transition our thinking to become more system-centric. We
    established the Missile Defense National Team to solve the demanding
    technical problems involved in this unprecedented undertaking. No
    single contractor or government office has all the expertise needed to
    design and engineer an integrated and properly configured BMD system.
    The National Team brings together the best, most experienced people
    from the military and civilian government work forces, industry, and
    the Federal laboratories to work aggressively and collaboratively on
    one of the Nation's top priorities. However, integrating the existing
    elements of the BMD System proved to be very challenging. Today, we
    have streamlined the team's activities and realigned their priorities
    to focus on providing the detailed systems engineering needed for a
    truly integrated capability. The team has now gained traction and is
    leading the way to building the system this Nation will need for the
    future.
                moving toward the future--block 2008 and beyond
        There is no silver bullet in missile defense, and strategic
    uncertainty could surprise us tomorrow with a more capable adversary.
    So it is important to continue our aggressive parallel paths approach
    as we build this integrated, multilayered defensive system. There are
    several important development efforts funded in this budget.
        We are preserving decision flexibility with respect to our boost
    phase programs until we understand what engagement capabilities they
    can offer. We have requested approximately $680 million for these
    activities in fiscal year 2006.
        In fiscal year 2006 we are beginning the integration of the high-
    power laser component of the Airborne Laser (ABL) into the first ABL
    weapon system test bed and will initiate ground-testing. Following that
    we will integrate the high-power laser into the aircraft and conduct a
    campaign of flight tests, including lethal shoot-down of a series of
    targets. We still have many technical challenges with the ABL, but with
    the recent achievements of first light and first flight of the aircraft
    with its beam control/fire control system, I am pleased with where we
    are today. We have proven again that we can generate the power and
    photons necessary to have an effective directed energy capability. An
    operational ABL could provide a valuable boost phase defense capability
    against missiles of all ranges. The revolutionary potential of this
    technology is so significant, that it is worth both the investment and
    our patience.
        We undertook the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) boost-phase
    effort in response to a 2002 Defense Science Board Summer Study
    recommendation to develop a terrestrial-based boost phase interceptor
    as an alternative to the high-risk ABL development effort. We will not
    know for 2 or 3 years, however, whether either of these programs will
    be technically viable. With the recent successes we have had with ABL,
    we are now able to fine-tune our boost-phase development work to better
    align it with our longer-term missile defense strategy of building a
    layered defense capability that has greater flexibility and mobility.
        We have established the ABL as the primary boost phase defense
    element. We are reducing our fiscal year 2006 funding request for the
    KEI effort and have restructured that activity, building in a 1-year
    delay, in order to focus near-term efforts on demonstrating key
    capabilities and reduce development risks. We restructured the KEI
    activity as risk mitigation for the ABL and focused it on development
    of a land-based mobile, high-acceleration booster. It has always been
    our view that the KEI booster, which is envisioned as a flexible and
    high-performance booster capable of defending large areas, could be
    used as part of an affordable, competitive next-generation replacement
    for our midcourse or even terminal interceptors. Decisions on sea-based
    capability and international participation in this effort have been
    deferred until the basic KEI technologies have been demonstrated. The
    restructured KEI activity will emphasize critical technology
    demonstrations and development of a mobile, flexible, land-based ascent
    and midcourse engagement capability around 2011, with a potential sea-
    based capability by 2013. A successful KEI mobile missile defense
    capability also could improve protection of our allies and friends.
        We are requesting $82 million in fiscal year 2006 to continue
    development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV). MKV is a generational
    upgrade to ground-based midcourse interceptors to increase their
    effectiveness in the presence of countermeasures. We look forward to
    the first intercept attempt using MKV sometime in 2008.
        Our flexible management structure allows us to adjust development
    activities based on demonstrated test results, improve decision cycle
    times, and make the most prudent use of the taxpayer's money. Using a
    knowledge-based funding approach in our decisionmaking, we will conduct
    periodic continuation reviews of major development activities against
    cost, schedule, and performance expectations. We have flexibility in
    our funding to support key knowledge-based decision paths, which means
    that we can reward successful demonstrations with reinvestment and
    redirect funds away from efforts that have not met our expectations. We
    have assigned a series of milestones to each of the major program
    activities. The milestones will provide one measure for decisionmaking
    and help determine whether a program stays on its course or is
    accelerated, slowed, or terminated. This approach gives us options
    within our trade space and helps us determine where we should place our
    resources, based on demonstrated progress. The alternative is to
    terminate important development activities without sufficient technical
    data to make smart decisions. We believe that this approach also acts
    as a disincentive to our contractors and program offices to over-
    promise on what they can deliver.
                          international participation
        Interest in missile defense among foreign governments and industry
    has continued to rise. We have been working closely with a number of
    allies to forge international partnerships that will make missile
    defense a key element of our security relationships around the world.
        The Government of Japan is proceeding with the acquisition of a
    multilayered BMD system, basing its initial capability on upgrades of
    its Aegis destroyers and acquisition of the Aegis SM-3 missile. We have
    worked closely with Japan since 1999 to design and develop advanced
    components for the SM-3 missile. This project will culminate in flight
    tests in 2005 and 2006. In addition, Japan and other allied nations are
    upgrading their Patriot fire units with PAC-3 missiles and improved
    ground support equipment. This past December we signed a BMD framework
    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Japan to expand our cooperative
    missile defense activities.
        We have signed three agreements over the past 2 years with the
    United Kingdom, a BMD framework MOU and two annexes. In addition to the
    Fylingdales radar development and integration activities this year, we
    also agreed to continue cooperation in technical areas of mutual
    interest.
        This past summer we signed a BMD framework MOU with our Australian
    partners. This agreement will expand cooperative development work on
    sensors and build on our longstanding defense relationship with
    Australia. We also are negotiating a Research, Development, Test and
    Evaluation annex to the MOU to enable collaborative work on specific
    projects, including: high frequency over-the-horizon radar, track
    fusion and filtering, distributed aperture radar experiments, and
    modeling and simulation.
        We have worked through negotiations with Denmark and the Greenland
    Home Rule Government to upgrade the radar at Thule, which will play an
    important role in the system by giving us an early track on hostile
    missiles. We also have been in sensor discussions with several allies
    located in or near regions where the threat of ballistic missile use is
    high.
        Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have
    initiated a feasibility study for protection of NATO territory and
    population against ballistic missile attacks, which builds upon ongoing
    work to define and develop a NATO capability for protection of deployed
    forces.
        We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System
    Improvement Program and enhance its missile defense capability to
    defeat the longer-range ballistic missile threats emerging in the
    Middle East. We also have established a capability in the United States
    to co-produce components of the Arrow interceptor missile, which will
    help Israel meet its defense requirements more quickly and maintain the
    U.S. industrial work share.
        We are intent on continuing U.S.-Russian collaboration and are now
    working on the development of software that will be used to support the
    ongoing U.S.-Russian Theater Missile Defense exercise program. A
    proposal for target missiles and radar cooperation is being discussed
    within the U.S.-Russian Federation Missile Defense Working Group.
        We have other international interoperability and technical
    cooperation projects underway as well and are working to establish
    formal agreements with other governments.
                                    closing
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this committee for its continued
    support of the Missile Defense Program. As we work through the
    challenges in the coming months, we will conduct several important
    tests and assessments of the system's progress. We will continue our
    close collaboration with the independent testers and the warfighters to
    ensure that the capabilities we field are effective, reliable, and
    militarily useful. There certainly are risks involved in the
    development and fielding activities. However, I believe we have
    adequately structured the program to manage and reduce those risks
    using a knowledge-based approach that requires each program element to
    prove that it is worthy of being fielded.
        I believe we are on the right track to deliver multilayered,
    integrated capabilities to counter current and emerging ballistic
    missile threats. For the first time in its history, the United States
    today has a limited capability to defend our people against long-range
    ballistic missile attack. I believe that future generations will find
    these years to be the turning point in our effort to field an
    unprecedented and decisive military capability, one that closes off a
    major avenue of threat to our country.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Obering.
        Senator Nelson, our ranking member, has joined us now. I
    wonder if you have any opening comments before we get started.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will submit a
    statement for the record. I have some questions that I would
    like to get into right away.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming our
    witnesses, who represent the operational users, the developers, the
    acquisition leadership, and the operational testing community for
    ballistic missile defense (BMD). It is an impressive gathering of
    talent and experience.
        I am pleased that all members of full committee have been invited
    to this hearing. BMD is an important topic of interest to the whole
    committee, and to the Nation.
        We all want to protect our Nation against all serious threats, from
    terrorism to missile attacks. But we also want to be sure that any BMD
    system we build will work effectively, especially since we are
    investing tens of billions of dollars in the system.
        As we hold this hearing, we must acknowledge current reality: we
    began fielding a system last year that has failed its last three
    intercept flight tests. People are concerned that we are deploying a
    system that may not work, or that may require considerable work and
    expense to fix. As it is, the Defense Department (DOD) plans to spend
    more than $55 billion over the next 6 years on BMD, and that assumes
    everything goes well.
        We need to have confidence that we are buying an effective system,
    not a defective system. The best way to gain that confidence is through
    testing, especially through realistic operational testing.
        It would help if there were a plan for operational testing of the
    system, and a schedule for when that testing would begin.
    Unfortunately, that is not the case today. While there is a test plan
    for the development of the system, including an effort to include what
    is called ``operational realism,'' it is still not operational testing.
        I gather that there have been good discussions recently among the
    organizations represented here today on the need for operational
    testing, and on the leading role that the Director of Operational Test
    and Evaluation (DOT&E) will play in establishing a test plan,
    evaluating the results and reporting them to Congress.
        I want to commend our witnesses today for undertaking serious
    discussions on how to do the right thing when it comes to testing this
    system and making sure it works. I want to encourage you all to
    continue working together to get the best possible result. I hope our
    witnesses will describe the progress they are making and what they hope
    to achieve. I believe we should consider legislation that would require
    adequate testing of the BMD system, to help make sure we get it right
    and produce a system that the American taxpayers can rely on.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Dodgen, we are glad to have you with us. General
    Holly, it is good to see you and have you with us.
        Mr. Wynne, the budget decision 753 reduced the planned
    budget for missile defense by $1 billion in fiscal year 2006
    and $5 billion over the fiscal year 2006-2011 time frame. Can
    you explain the rationale for these cuts and what guidance, if
    any, did you or other senior officials provide the MDA
    regarding the cuts and your observations about them?
        Mr. Wynne. Sir, I only will tell you that this is, as is
    every budget, a constrained resource environment, number one.
        Number two, I think the arguments were not carried well
    after two successive missile defense tests based on a need to
    go back and refocus on quality and refocus on flight
    verification. I think the budget argument could have been
    better had those both been successful.
        I think the partnering that has gone on between the DOT&E
    and the Missile Defense Director has been excellent since.
        I will also tell you that the sole direction the MDA
    Director received was that he should go back and balance the
    risk, balance the quality, and balance the performance and meet
    his mission. He accepted that challenge, sir, and provided us
    the results.
        Senator Sessions. Well, you have a good man to take on that
    challenge, I have no doubt.
        General Obering, would you share with us from your
    perspective the impact these reductions have placed on you,
    whether or not you will be able to maintain the missile
    production lines, what it means in terms of other things like
    KEI? Tell us, based on where you are, what the impact would be.
        General Obering. Yes, sir. What happens when we go in and
    do a restructure in our budget, what we have to take a look at
    is balancing the risk. That is exactly what we end up doing.
    Again, as I said in my statement, we want to try to balance our
    commitments to fielding, along with the continued development
    of the program because we know that we are going to have to
    improve it over time.
        Now, specifically we took the $1 billion cut in 2006. I
    looked across the board. I looked at where we were with the
    airborne laser program, the fact that we had had significant
    milestone achievement over the last year. We had started the
    KEI program as a risk reduction alternative in the boost-phase
    to that.
        Senator Sessions. Risk reduction. What do you mean?
        General Obering. That means if ABL does not work out, we
    need to have a boost-phase defense. We cannot be vulnerable in
    that phase. We have to have the multi-phased approach.
        So I took a look and said we are making good progress on
    the ABL, but we are not out of the woods yet. We still have a
    ways to go. But with the first light and the first flight
    milestones, we have answered many of the technical questions
    associated with that program. So we restructured the KEI. We
    stretched it out for a year, and then we focused it down on the
    demonstration of the capability that we really need from that,
    which is a very high acceleration booster, much faster
    acceleration than anything else in our inventory to get to that
    boost-phase defense.
        It turns out that if we can do that--and we planned that
    flight in 2008 now--it also gives us some tremendous way ahead
    with respect to upgrading of our midcourse and terminal phases
    because that high acceleration with the mobile capability of
    the KEI is very attractive in terms of not being fixed to a
    fixed line of defense. So that is why I wanted to not cancel
    that program. I wanted to keep that program, but I also wanted
    to make sure that it demonstrated its critical technical
    progress which is a very high acceleration booster. So that is
    why we focused a lot of our cuts there.
        We also delayed the third site that we had planned for the
    GMD program where we were negotiating with several countries in
    Europe. We delayed that by a year in order to achieve our
    budget reductions. What that does, as that moves out, is to
    provide us with another alternative with our allies, as to
    whether we want to put a fixed site defense there or have a
    mobile option available to them as well.
        I felt that the advantages of the two configurations we
    were carrying on the ground-based midcourse program, the
    Orbital Boost vehicle and the Lockheed Martin configuration,
    the advantage of having those two configurations were no longer
    with us. We have proven the Orbital Booster performance, as you
    said in your opening statement, and we feel comfortable with
    that configuration. It was very good that we had the dual
    configurations 2 years ago, when we had the accident in the
    plant in California, because we were able to go to another
    supplier and continue on with our program.
        The problem we have now is, when we requalified the booster
    motor supplier after that accident, we now have the same
    supplier for both boosters. So we do not enjoy the redundancy
    that we had before in motor suppliers. So I was willing, I
    thought, to take the further risk in that program by
    terminating and backing out of the Lockheed Martin Booster
    program.
        Then finally, General Kadish, my predecessor, did a
    tremendous job in laying the technical foundation for the
    integration of this system. But we never took a very hard look
    at the programmatic integration across all the programs we had
    and how we could get more streamlined in the management of
    those programs. That is what we are taking a look at to try to
    generate some efficiencies in the way that we are overseeing
    and managing the programs. So, that is how we laid in those
    cuts.
        Senator Sessions. Can you just give us some round numbers
    about each one of these programs, about how much reduction from
    your original plans you took?
        General Obering. I can tell you that, about $300 million
    the infrastructure overall.
        Senator Sessions. Does that include the----
        General Obering. That is everything.
        Senator Sessions. Worldwide?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. The $300 million is the
    infrastructure worldwide for managing the program. The KEI
    program, we reduced by about $700 million to $800 million in
    the near term, in the 1 year. Then across the board, about a
    total of $5 billion, if I recall--the KEI program reductions
    accounted for about $4 billion of that total.
        Senator Sessions. I know you have issued a hiring freeze
    notice. What can you tell us about that? Does that reflect cuts
    that may be unhealthy? I mean, a freeze indicates sometimes you
    are not able to have the money to move the way you would like
    to. How would you describe that?
        General Obering. Sir, the way I would describe it is, we
    issued that because we wanted to make sure that we got a good
    snapshot of where we were as we go into this infrastructure
    reduction. So, again, we are going to have to take risk. That
    is part of this, part of meeting our budget top line
    reductions. But I do believe that we will get more efficient in
    our management, and I think we will be able to meet our
    reductions and then continue on because we do not want to keep
    the hiring freeze around too long, because then you can get
    yourself into a tailspin that you do not want to come out of.
        Senator Sessions. I will agree with that.
        What about the interceptors 31 through 40? Will you be able
    to maintain that assembly line? What penalties do we face if
    you do not maintain that level of production of those
    launchers?
        General Obering. Well, sir, if we do not get the money we
    need to do the advanced long lead for that and then we end up
    with a break in our assembly line, it will be about $260
    million to $300 million in terms of the cost of reconstituting
    the assembly line and production.
        The other thing that happens is if we----
        Senator Sessions. But now, you are saying you are not going
    to have to see a break. Are you confident that under this
    budget that you will be able to maintain that production
    without suffering a break and the Government having to face
    that kind of penalty?
        General Obering. Sir, I would say that we have managed this
    to a fine line. We have this down to about the minimum that we
    can do and not have that production break. So it is critical
    that we get the budget request that we have asked for,
    including the long lead for that.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson, do you want to take your
    opening now?
        Senator Bill Nelson. No. I would like to go right into the
    questions.
        Senator Sessions. Go right ahead.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you
    for being here.
        General Cartwright, what we have in the ground in Alaska
    ready to launch--three attempted intercept flight tests have
    failed, and what is in the ground, the operationally tested
    booster and the kill vehicle have never been flight tested. Is
    that correct?
        General Cartwright. That configuration has never been
    tested. That is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, the organization represented by
    Mr. Duma does not believe, as testified here today, that there
    has been sufficient testing to provide confidence that the
    system would work effectively, that which you have in the
    ground. So do you think, General, that it would be wise to
    focus on more testing and development of the system, or do you
    believe that the system is ready now for operational alert
    status?
        General Cartwright. As I stated in my opening comments, our
    focus in 2005 is on more realistic operational testing. If the
    Nation needs it, we have a thin line. We have an emergency
    capability, but the focus needs to be on increasing the depth
    of the sensors, the command and control, and the weapons, and
    realistic operational testing.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So what you are saying is that if the
    focus is on continued testing and development, you think that
    it could be brought up to alert if needed in an emergency.
        General Cartwright. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Then is there any reason not to use
    the testbed to learn more about how well the system works and
    to improve the capability of the system?
        General Cartwright. If I understand your question, that is
    the objective of the shakedown capability or what we are trying
    to do is take operators, put it on the testbed, use the testbed
    to further our knowledge both on this limited capability and
    what we would desire to have in a more expanded and
    comprehensive capability.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want you all to know that I
    appreciate your candor because the previous representation that
    we have had here to this committee was that what is in the
    ground up there in Alaska is ready to go and it is operational.
        General Cartwright. Again, if asked, one, we have the crews
    trained. We have a thin line of command and control, what we
    are calling rudimentary command and control. We have a system
    of sensors and a system of weapons. We have questions about
    different components of that. It has no depth. In other words,
    there are not redundant systems behind it, but we would put
    that system on alert. I am confident of the training of the
    soldiers that operate that system, and we would use it. But I
    think it has to be characterized as rudimentary and one that is
    thin line.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If I were asked to climb on it and
    ride it, it has not exactly been checked out, ready to go.
        General Cartwright. I think that that is a fair statement,
    but I still would use it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, would you agree that the GMD
    system is not mature yet and that it needs continued
    development and testing?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, Senator, I would. In fact, what we have laid
    out with the MDA is continued testing of that system to
    accomplish exactly what General Cartwright addressed, to get
    that redundancy and get out of the thin line aspect, as he puts
    it, so that you have a greater confidence that if the emergency
    came and you had to use it, you would have a greater degree of
    confidence that it would work.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Specifically with regard to
    confidence, is it your opinion that given the lack of flight
    test data, there is no demonstrated basis yet for confidence
    that the system would work in an operationally effective and
    reliable manner?
        Mr. Duma. The system exists. We have the people. We have
    the equipment. We have the procedures. What we do not have is a
    demonstration that they all work together yet. There are still
    things in development in terms of algorithms. The sea-based
    radar is an example that I had in my statement. Those things
    need to be tested to show that we have that capability. It does
    not mean we do not have the assets and we have them to try.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Again, I am not being critical here.
    What we want from this committee is we want a set of rockets
    with a kill vehicle on top of it that is going to hit its mark.
    That is what all of us around this table want. Would you agree
    that given the GMD flight test failures, that the system has
    problems with quality and reliability that need to be fixed?
        Mr. Duma. I do. In fact, I testified to that before the
    House subcommittee, and that is the action that General Obering
    has taken with his independent review teams to identify the
    root causes. There is a quality problem.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Just to nail it down for the record,
    am I correct in understanding that the GMD system is undergoing
    developmental testing and not operational testing, even though
    you tried to squeeze as much operational realism out of each
    developmental flight test?
        Mr. Duma. I believe that is an accurate assessment,
    Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you. Thank you for your candor,
    General and Mr. Duma. That is not the spirit of the testimony
    that this committee has received in the past.
        Senator Sessions. I do not know about the spirit.
        Let us see. Senator Reed or Senator Cornyn. You are okay,
    Senator Reed? We will go to Senator Cornyn. You were here
    earlier I know.
        Senator Cornyn. He was here earlier.
        Senator Reed. John, go ahead.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you, gentlemen for being here today.
        In light of the questions that you just heard, I want to
    make sure I have the story straight. What we have is not so
    much a program budget that is based on a demonstrated ability
    to function and knock down ballistic missiles before they hit
    us but is predicated more on the basis of what we perceive the
    threat to be at this point. Would you agree with that, General
    Cartwright? Maybe my question is not clear. If it is not, just
    let me know.
        General Cartwright. I think what you are saying is that we
    have a perceived threat, which I outlined in my statement is
    both in my mind real, in the judgment of the intelligence
    agencies, and is growing, against which we are trying to match
    a capability that will both influence the way that threat
    behaves and potentially if that threat were realized, could
    defeat it.
        Senator Cornyn. You said it so much better than I did.
    [Laughter.]
        That is my understanding as well.
        What I also understand is that if we waited until we went
    through a traditional test and operation before we then
    concerned ourselves with possibly deploying these, in the case
    of an emergency, it really might be too late. Would you agree
    with that, General Obering?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. You have hit on a very key
    aspect of what we are doing, and it is something that goes back
    to what Mr. Wynne talked about. In this area, where you have no
    defense, it makes sense that as you demonstrate the basic
    functionality of a system, to go ahead and get it out there so
    you can take advantage of that inherent functionality and
    continue to improve the system.
        That is exactly the risk-benefit equation that we are going
    through. We have actually flown the booster that is in the
    ground in Alaska and California three times successfully. We
    have flown the kill vehicle in a prototype fashion that is
    about 67 percent the same hardware and 62 percent the exact
    same software in those intercept tests that were successful
    several years ago. So we think we have demonstrated all the
    basic functionality and now we are taking advantage of that
    inherent capability because, as you said, sir, if we had
    followed the traditional model, we would just now be getting to
    the point where we may be entering operational testing and we
    would be 3 or 4 years from having any inherent capability.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Wynne. If I could add, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Certainly.
        Mr. Wynne. In a bipartisan way, this is the committee where
    this system started in 1999, and I think we have met, in fact,
    the intent, which is to field, as quickly as possible, the
    potential for defeating such a threat.
        The President has actually accelerated, as much as he can,
    the deployment of the system, and what we are doing, in the
    true spirit of spiraling, is allowing the operators as much
    time on this system so that they might train almost in a
    parallel fashion so that as the system comes on line and the
    capabilities are realized, we can meet this greater and greater
    threat. What we are doing now by essentially putting into a
    shakedown, this X-band radar is going to so dramatically
    increase our ability to detect, to track the incoming missiles,
    that maybe we will have an effective deterrence against ever
    having to use it, which as all of my friends that used to be in
    the Strategic Air Command and are now in STRATCOM would say,
    peace is our actual profession.
        Senator Cornyn. My understanding is there are an awful lot
    of countries that we cannot depend on their peaceful
    intentions, that have weapons of mass destruction. They have
    ballistic weapons, and if we did not have what we have now in
    terms of our missile defense system, we would be absolutely
    naked given an unexpected attack. These weapons are capable of
    being used potentially not only against the continental United
    States but against our allies.
        So let me just ask General Obering one last question about
    this. You alluded to the GBI prototypes that flew successfully,
    successfully intercepted four out of five targets in the 2000
    to 2001 time frame, and the current GBI booster that flew
    successfully three times in the 2003-2004 time frame. I believe
    you also talked about the last two failures. One, as I
    understand, was too restrictive a parameter in the software
    that caused the system to shut down.
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Then the second had to do with a
    stabilizing arm that failed to get the signal that it actually
    separated from the rocket. Those were not failures of the
    interceptor itself. I understand they are serious. I think you
    call them major technical concerns but they do not cause you
    major concerns about the functionality of the system overall.
        General Obering. Yes.
        Senator Cornyn. Could you just explain that better than I
    did?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. It is almost like we cannot get
    our starting quarterback on the field because he keeps tripping
    over the bench. [Laughter.]
        But we have addressed the software timing issue that caused
    the abort in the first attempt on IFT-13C in December, and we
    are looking at the root cause of this battle support arm and
    its failure to clear.
        Now, unfortunately, we have been able to check out our
    abort system very well. So it works extremely well. [Laughter.]
        In both of those tests, there are some things that we have
    really learned. I do not want this to sound trite, but we have
    learned a lot in terms of, it was the configuration of the fire
    control software that we have in the field today, that was used
    in both of those tests. We were able to get the target
    information, feed that into that fire control system, generate
    the fire control solution to the weapons test plan, and send
    that to the interceptor. The onboard interceptor computer
    accepted that through a number of checks, and sent it into the
    guidance control system. We have the same guidance control
    algorithms on board the vehicle that we have flown in the past.
    So we think that the basic viability, the basic function of the
    system, we still maintain confidence in, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen
    for your testimony.
        I assume if you are accepting a $1 billion cut in your
    budget, then you do not feel that additional resources would
    affect the operational status of either the midcourse system,
    the ABL system, or the space architecture you need and any
    radars you need. Is that a fair assumption, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Wynne. There is always the unique question, sir, of
    what would you do if you had an extra dollar, which probably I
    would tell you that we, in fact, have structured a program that
    we feel like is sufficient to meet our mission. But we would
    probably spend it on the ABL/KEI risk reduction program, which
    might assist us with moving towards a more mobile system.
        Senator Reed. But it would not affect the operational
    status of the midcourse system, for example.
        Mr. Wynne. The GMD system, as it sits, I think is going
    through some retrospection and some quality checks, and I
    think, sir, that it is, in fact, converting the two failures
    into ground-based test articles, which are going to allow
    people to finally count down through 0, which Senator Nelson
    knows is kind of a valuable thing to have. That will actually
    enhance the training of operational crews which otherwise would
    have always to launch and could not count through 0.
        So I think by converting those vehicles, we are, in fact,
    creating test articles from, if you will, not spent but
    refurbishable rockets. I would tell you that that is probably
    what will happen to all of these vehicles that we are currently
    thinking about either long-lead fielding or have bought is that
    they will all turn into test articles.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask General Obering and Mr. Duma. Will
    you conduct an operationally realistic test of the system by
    October 1st pursuant to the Defense Authorization Act, General
    Obering?
        General Obering. Sir, I will have to answer that question
    after I get the full results from the Mission Readiness Task
    Force that I talked to you about. After they have been able to
    go through the recommendations from the independent team, we
    will know better in a clear picture of what our test outlook
    is. However, I will tell you this. We certainly have plans to
    be able to conduct the operationally realistic testing as
    quickly as we can.
        Senator Reed. But at this juncture, you cannot say with
    confidence whether you will be able to meet that deadline?
        General Obering. I will not know until I get the full
    information.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Duma, do you have anything to add?
        Mr. Duma. We do have that in the plan, Senator. Certainly
    it is up to General Obering to define what corrective action he
    may need to take within the program. That always has a
    potential to impact the plans.
        Senator Reed. Again, General Obering, Mr. Duma, when do you
    foresee scheduling an end-to-end flight test of the system from
    target acquisition to target destruction?
        General Obering. Sir, as I said, in terms of a schedule, I
    cannot give you that, but I can tell you what our plans are. We
    intend, as quickly as we can, to fly a target out of Alaska,
    fly it across the face of the Beale radar in California, an
    operational radar, fly an operationally configured interceptor
    out of an operational site at Vandenberg, have the operational
    fire control system, the battle management communication links
    in place to support that, and have operational crews supporting
    the test.
        We also plan to have that similar type of scenario using an
    Aegis ship, what we call the ``engage-on'' sensor, using that
    information to build a weapons task plan, as well as to have a
    salvo launch in which we fire two interceptors against a
    target. We have all those in our test plan.
        Senator Reed. But again, there is no date that you can give
    with any confidence now of when you can execute.
        General Obering. Not until I get the results of the review
    team.
        Senator Reed. These tests are important, but probably just
    as important is who grades the test. Both MDA and the Office of
    Operational Test and Evaluation are essentially grading the
    tests with different criteria, as I understand it. Just for an
    initial question, Mr. Wynne, who does the DOD look to for the
    evaluation of limited defense operations?
        Mr. Wynne. Actually, sir, what we are looking for is the
    STRATCOM commander, who sits here beside me, to grade all of
    our paper, just like an acquisition program should deliver to
    the warfighter. The tests hopefully are, as you say,
    representative. Using his operational forces, trained and
    ready, I think he is the one who has to grade our paper on
    that.
        Senator Reed. Let me then ask General Cartwright. As you
    look at the technical aspects--I know you have operational
    aspects, the crew training, many things, but when you look at
    the technological issues, what date are you looking at? Is it a
    successful test even though it launches, flies, and whatever?
    How do you decide between what Mr. Duma is concluding versus
    MDA?
        General Cartwright. I think what will be important, one, is
    to have access to all the data, which we now have; two, to have
    access and some say in how the tests are conducted and do they
    actually get it realistic; and three, going back to the
    original assumptions of the system, and making sure they are,
    in fact, operationally relevant and that when we do this test,
    it is in an operationally relevant scenario. All of those will
    be criteria that we will put together and pull together. I will
    use Lieutenant General Dodgen and his capabilities at Space and
    Missile Defense Command as the analytic arm and as the operator
    arm to make sure that this is operational.
        It will not be perfect. In other words, the missile will
    not originate in Korea, things like that. But to the extent
    that we can get every factor as close to operational as we can,
    it will impinge on how we see the system and our ability to use
    it and its ability to defend against the threat that we think
    is out there.
        Senator Reed. When do you think you will have that data and
    can reach that conclusion, which I would think would be the
    minimum for declaring the system operational?
        General Cartwright. Again, it will be event-driven. I will
    have to allow General Obering to get through his review and
    conduct the tests. But the good news is we have had input into
    those tests. We are getting operators up on the consoles now
    rather than waiting until the day of the test. So I feel more
    comfortable that the operators will actually be able to
    understand what is happening technically and operationally and
    give me good input. I feel much better about that right now.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you, General.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here with us today.
        General Obering, we talked yesterday briefly and you
    mentioned something about an independent review team that is
    looking at the latest testing efforts. Can you tell us a little
    bit more about what that would consist of and what you would
    expect to get from them more specifically?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. I mentioned in my opening
    statement that they gave us specific recommendations in about
    five different areas. Primarily the way the leader of the team
    characterized it to me is that we are 90 percent there. We have
    about 10 percent to get over the hump. This has to do with
    enforcing better discipline in our quality control processes,
    primarily strengthening some of the system engineering
    initiatives to make sure that we have proper flow-down in some
    of the specifications, all the way through the system, to
    include silo construction. One of the things we ran into, we
    believe, with this latest failure, is that we are able to reach
    out and touch more of the functional experts within the
    contractors' organizations and get some of the quality missions
    assurance experts to bring to bear on the program. In general,
    the way I characterize it is to install better test
    certification and test discipline in our process as we go.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, in doing that, will we find out
    to what extent something that is technologically at risk or at
    fault versus what may be a personnel or human risk or human
    fault?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. As a result of the review--and
    this is expanded, as I mentioned to you yesterday, to include
    all the ground support equipment and everything else--we should
    be able to determine that.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Then, Mr. Duma, would that, do you
    think, contribute significantly to what you would call a
    defense realistic operational interceptor effort once you get
    the report back and you are able to sift through it and make
    changes that might be suggested?
        Mr. Duma. Clearly the answer to that lies in the corrective
    action taken as a result of the report and the findings. For
    instance, in integrated flight test 13C, where there was a
    software problem and I am reasonably confident that they found
    the root cause and there has been sufficient testing and ground
    testing to confirm that that aspect of it works. The issue with
    the silo at this point I do not have that because we do not
    have the findings back yet. So with the corrective action for
    that, to do another flight test and get that booster to fly
    with the kill vehicle, so we can verify the separation and the
    maneuvers that are required, that will be the first step to
    looking at a more comprehensive operationally realistic test.
        Senator Ben Nelson. How confident are you that they will
    have identified everything or every key factor for your
    consideration?
        Mr. Duma. Well, that is why you have test programs,
    Senator. You design the system as well as you can, but the test
    program is designed to ferret out if you have made a mistake in
    the design, and if the design is helping carry out the mission
    that you intended. If you have a design problem--and we did in
    13C. It was fixed. But that is why you do testing. We have had
    successful booster launches in the past, and now this time we
    had two that did not go and for very different reasons.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So part of it is just based on
    experience. Can a lot of the testing that you are doing be done
    without operational or through the developmental side?
        Mr. Duma. That is exactly what is happening right now. It
    is developmental testing when we are trying to, as Senator
    Nelson put it, infuse as much operational realism in that
    developmental testing as possible. We cannot do everything
    because not all of the system is available. But with what we
    can do, every time you get a successful launch, your confidence
    goes up because every time you do another flight test, you
    challenge the system a little more. So even though you get a
    launch, the next one is a little more difficult scenario
    profile. You have already repeated what you have done and have
    demonstrated works. So over a period of time, that confidence
    grows.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes. I think Senator Nelson said
    something about getting on it and riding it. He has been up in
    space. I have not had that experience and I do not intend to
    get on and ride anything like that anywhere. [Laughter.]
        Senator Sessions. But if an incoming missile were coming at
    him, I suspect Senator Nelson would like to push the button to
    respond. [Laughter.]
        Senator Ben Nelson. If it is coming at me, I will try to
    get out of the way.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we hope one of these would work.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If a ballistic missile were launched
    against us tomorrow and with the systems we have in place right
    now and with what we know and what we believe we do not know,
    what we know we do not know, what is the expectation on a
    percentage basis of being able to have an effective response to
    an incoming missile with the ground defense based system?
    Anyone who wants to respond to that.
        Mr. Wynne. I would say under our current guidelines, sir,
    specific percentages have to be worked out over a longer period
    of time. We do not have the reliability and statistics to
    really add a variability. Of course, our operational
    procedures, as General Cartwright's is, is to launch twice for
    one. We actually test one on one, but our operational
    procedures test twice.
        We are building a reasonable confidence level and perhaps
    in a more classified section you can get what our reasonable
    confidence level is. Had the two failed tests been achieved, we
    would be talking to you far more confidently.
        Reverting to something that happened to me personally, I
    lost three commercial Atlas rockets in the space of 3 years. We
    still launched about 15 rockets over that period. I went
    through tense agony getting a quality program installed in my
    system. They have since launched about 80 without failure. So
    that was a successful intervention, if you will, and putting in
    place a quality system.
        I am very confident that General Obering has heard my
    message very, very clearly and is now focused on that. The fact
    of our budget defense was not up to, I would say, Senator
    Sessions' standards maybe has refocused our efforts on getting
    more successes in the future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I will leave you with this sort
    of question. You do not have to answer it. Is anyone willing to
    say that in this testing that very often we are going to learn
    more from our failures than we do our successes? Obviously, you
    have to analyze what went wrong, but sometimes you do not spend
    as much time on what went right. Is that a fair statement, that
    success and failure depend on how you evaluate what it is that
    you get from the experience?
        Mr. Wynne. There is no doubt, Senator, that success can
    mask future failures.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Nelson. I think you
    make a good point, but I suppose it is fair to say that we did
    not, as a result of the failures get to test as far through the
    system as you would like to have tested. Therefore, those
    portions of the system were not proven to be failures. They
    just did not have the opportunity to prove to be successful. Is
    that right?
        Mr. Wynne. That is correct.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That is quite a spin. [Laughter.]
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is where we are. With
    regard to 13C, there was a very low tolerance for ambiguity
    there, and you discovered that it could have been, what? 100
    times more lenient? We still could have had a successful
    launch. That software has been adjusted and you think that
    problem has been eliminated. Is that right, General Obering?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. We discovered it. It was not
    quite 100 times, but we had more significant margin than we
    needed. So we have adjusted that, yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Then with regard to the 14, I was there
    at Kwajelein and looked down that silo where the arm actually
    came back, and I do not know if this will be the final report,
    but information was provided to me that the pad that arm came
    to rest against was thicker than previous pads, and as a
    result, the arm did not kick the switch.
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. If that part was incorrectly supplied by
    some contractor and that cost us considerable sums of money and
    it did not meet the specifications, it was somewhat different
    than the parts they had been supplying, are you prepared to
    take punitive action and to make clear that we expect
    contractual performance to meet the high standards also?
        General Obering. Sir, we already have. We have an award fee
    structure in our contracts in which there are substantial
    amounts of money, tens of millions of dollars, that are riding
    on these tests. Those measures have been taken. That money has
    been lost to those contractors, and they know that.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is good. I just think
    you have to hold people accountable. It did seem to me a
    maddening kind of error, the kind of error, I guess, that could
    happen in something as complex with as many thousands of parts
    that must all come together. But I know it was maddening to you
    also.
        General Obering, you talked about the testing and your
    evaluation that is ongoing. First of all, tell me what you had
    planned in terms of testing for this calendar year and this
    fiscal year and whether or not you expect to complete the next
    tests before the end of fiscal year 2005.
        General Obering. Yes, sir. We had planned after IFT-14, had
    that been successful, we would have launched the target out of
    Kodiak that I mentioned to you. We would engage with an
    interceptor out of--initially we were going to engage with an
    interceptor out of Kwajelein with a track from Aegis. Then we
    were going to proceed into the next test where we launched the
    target out of Kodiak and then engaged with an interceptor out
    of Vandenberg, an operational site, and we were going to have
    both of those intercept tests completed by the end of this
    calendar year. That was the original plan.
        We still plan to fly two more radar characterization
    flights where we fly across the face of some of these
    operational radars, Cobra Dane and Beale, to make sure we
    understand that they are operating the way that they should be.
        Senator Sessions. For a system and a launch to be effective
    and knock down an incoming missile attack in the United States,
    there has to be tremendously sophisticated communication
    between advance radar systems and the actual launch site. Is
    that correct? You have to test that in the course of this too.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, and we have been successful with
    that.
        Senator Sessions. So you feel good so far about the ability
    to read and transmit the radar signals to your launch site and
    be able to launch a missile at an appropriate time.
        General Obering. Yes, sir. In fact, the major focus of a
    lot of our integrated ground test is where we connect all of
    that up. We actually ring that out and we input the data and
    process that in our ground testing. We also did it with our
    flight testing in terms of communications capabilities. In part
    of the shakedown period that General Cartwright alluded to, we
    have had some of these communication links up with some of our
    forward deployed ships. They have been very stable and very
    reliable, and I am very happy about that.
        Senator Sessions. I do not know that I have ever explicitly
    asked this, but we have had the SM-3--the Navy--they have four?
        General Obering. Five of six successes.
        Senator Sessions. Five of six hit-to-kill successes.
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. We have had hit-to-kill successes with
    the GBI. The PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill technology. THAAD will be a
    hit-to-kill technology. That consistently proves itself
    technologically achievable. A lot of people thought it would
    never happen. I must admit I was pleased to see it happen
    because it seems like such an incredibly technologically
    difficult thing to do. But it has proven to be successful.
        My question to you is are there any larger technological
    problems in making that hit-to-kill technologically work from a
    ground-based interceptor on a strategic missile attack than for
    the SM-3, from a lower missile? I mean, is it basically the
    same technology? Is there any real difference except you have
    to get your missile up to a higher altitude to make the
    intercept?
        General Obering. Yes, sir. That is one of the aspects of
    it. It is the same basic technology. The speeds are different.
    There is a much higher speed associated with an ICBM than with
    the shorter or the medium or intermediate range missiles.
        But again, we feel comfortable, to answer your question
    directly, that we have satisfied all the major technical
    challenges associated with the programs. Now, it is a matter of
    making sure we can do it reliably and on demand.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Duma, just briefly. Would you agree
    that testing has demonstrated the hit-to-kill technology and
    that it is now incumbent on us to do operationally realistic
    testing to make sure the entire system works effectively in a
    realistic situation? Is that our next challenge, to increase
    our confidence that this system will work as a whole?
        Mr. Duma. Partially, Senator. Certainly we have to get into
    the operational realistic testing, but the technology is there.
        But just to give you an example of the growth that we need
    to go through, the SM-3 missile, for instance, has had a good
    success rate, but in this coming year, we are increasing the
    difficulty that they have to encounter by having a separating
    target from the target vehicle. It has not done that yet. So
    while the hit-to-kill technology is there, we now want to
    challenge that to a greater degree with a separating target
    vehicle from the launched missile. That is why we have this
    road pattern in the testing, to try to get more operationally
    realistic, to give General Cartwright something that he can
    handle other than just the basic threat.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Levin. We are delighted our full committee ranking
    member is with us. Senator Levin, I recognize you at this time.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would yield to
    Senator Nelson, if that is okay, first.
        Senator Sessions. Fine.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Of course, we all are hoping and praying that these tests
    are going to be successful because this is an important system.
        I guess I approach this discussion kind of old-fashioned. I
    came up in the idea that what you do is you research and then
    you develop before you deploy, especially before you deploy in
    an operational system. It seems to me that in some cases we
    have so-called operationally deployed before we have done all
    of the RDT&E that is necessary to get to where we are ready for
    operations.
        We had this, for example, in the space shuttle. After four
    flights, they said it was operational. Of course, it was not
    operational. Every one was still an experimental kind of thing.
    Yet, that was a risk that we were willing to take.
        So too, what you all are telling us, that basically this is
    a risk that you are willing to take. Our question, as people
    who have to look out for the resources of the American
    citizens, is are we spending it in the right way as we are
    trying to get to the ultimate goal that all of us are trying to
    get to.
        Now, for example, General Obering, has the kill vehicle
    that is in the ground on top of the booster ever been tested
    with that booster?
        General Obering. In terms of flight tested, sir, no. In
    terms of obviously the ground test and check-out, yes, sir. A
    prototype of the kill vehicle that is in the ground has been
    tested with the booster.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I understand, but I remember what you
    said that the prototype that flew off the kill vehicle was 67
    percent of the components. That means that in this kill vehicle
    that is in the ground, 33 percent is new.
        General Obering. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You also said that 62 percent of the
    software. So that means that in this kill vehicle that is there
    on top of the booster in the ground, 38 percent of it is new.
    So we do not know that this kill vehicle on top of that
    existing booster--what is your confidence in that?
        General Obering. Well, sir, first of all, the reason why we
    were trying to fly IFT-13C and IFT-14 was to prove out that
    capability. Again, the improvements that we have made to the
    kill vehicle had to do primarily with producibility and
    manufacturability because we were, again, going with the
    prototypes earlier. I am confident that the kill vehicle will
    work, sir, but we have yet to prove that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are you confident when this target
    separates from the booster, that it is going to work as well?
        General Obering. Now, you are talking about the Aegis
    program there, not the GMD program. So that is a different kill
    vehicle. Yes, sir. In fact, one of the key milestones there was
    to demonstrate a much higher performing what we call a divert
    attitude control system to accomplish that. That was done
    successfully just this last week.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If there is any confusion there, I am
    not talking about the Aegis. I am talking about the other one,
    the ground-based interceptor.
        General Obering. Yes, sir. In fact, the targets that we
    have flown against, even with the prototype vehicle were a
    separating warhead. That is what the long-range interceptor
    does.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, we had a couple of similar
    sounding phrases here, and if you could clear it up for us, I
    would appreciate it. Can you explain the difference between
    operationally realistic developmental testing and realistic
    operational testing?
        Mr. Duma. If you are talking about developmental testing,
    the primary purpose of that is to determine the functionality
    of the system. That is generally under the complete control of
    the program manager and the development team. When you are
    talking about realistic operational testing, in our traditional
    title X role, that testing is conducted with operators on the
    system and by an independent operational test agency. The
    Services, for example, each have their own independent
    operational test agency which conducts those tests.
        The MDA operates under a different set of rules, as Mr.
    Wynne addressed earlier. So we are in the mode of providing
    advice to add operational realism to those developmental tests.
    The system is in development. It is an RDT&E system. That is
    clear. We are trying to get as much operational realism out of
    each test as we can so that we can get some confidence that the
    equipment, the people, and the procedures that exist will, in
    fact, function in an emergency if we had to use it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is it correct that your organization
    is responsible for realistic operational testing and not
    responsible for operationally realistic developmental testing?
        Mr. Duma. I am responsible for operational testing in the
    DOD. Adding operational realism to developmental testing is a
    unique role for my office associated with the MDA.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If I may, I am going to do an
    interview right next door and I will be back.
        Senator Sessions. Very good.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
        The line between developmental testing and operational
    testing has perhaps been blurred a bit because you are giving
    advice to the program managers to try to make that as realistic
    as possible. But they are still responsible for developmental
    testing. Is that correct?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. Has this program gone beyond developmental
    testing yet?
        Mr. Duma. No, Senator.
        Senator Levin. Approximately how many more tests, if you
    can put it that way, would have to be successful before it gets
    to realistic operational testing?
        Mr. Duma. In the current rules under which we operate for
    the MDA, there is no operational testing, as you might
    understand it, from our traditional title X responsibility.
        Senator Levin. It may never get to operational testing
    under the traditional system.
        Mr. Duma. That is correct. Remember, when the MDA was first
    created, there was a plan to transition systems from
    development in the MDA to the Services at which time an
    operational test agency would be identified and title X
    operational testing would occur to be done by the Services.
    Over the years, as the system has developed, that is no longer
    the plan. There are no transition plans to move this into the
    service for a procurement or operation.
        General Obering. Senator, if I may add some light to this,
    if I could.
        Senator Levin. Let me ask a question first of Secretary
    Wynne and then I will come back to you if this does not clarify
    it. Secretary Wynne and I have had correspondence.
        First of all, congratulations on your appointment,
    Secretary Wynne.
        Mr. Wynne. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Levin. I know it was a long time in coming and it
    is well-deserved.
        Last June, Secretary Wynne wrote me the following: I will
    ensure that the Department conducts operational testing as
    required by statute. The Department is committed to adequate
    testing, even at this early stage of the BMDS program.
    Therefore, a focused operational test and evaluation,
    consistent with the capability demonstrated during combined
    developmental and operational testing, will be conducted on
    each future block configuration of the BMDS. The Director of
    OT&E will approve the operational test planning, evaluate test
    results, and provide a characterization of operational
    effectiveness, suitability, and survivability.
        Now, does that statement of yours in that letter still
    stand?
        Mr. Wynne. Yes, sir. There was a section 234 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 which
    colors some of this, but I tried to live to the spirit of the
    interchanges you and I had by asking the DOT&E's staff and MDA
    to partner on the test and evaluation master plan and the
    specifics of increasing the operational experience of each of
    these test spirals. I think they are a long way along that
    line. It is, I would say, a watershed change from where we have
    been, and I credit Mr. Duma and General Obering in articulating
    that.
        Senator Levin. Do we still need operational testing?
        Mr. Wynne. Sir, we need effective, focused operational
    experience and testing is one of the ways to achieve that. I
    would say to you that the closer and closer we get to having a
    full-up test, the better. I note that the demand for end-to-end
    would, in the world of the Atlas, have actually had a missile
    shot all the way to a target. We never really did that, but we
    are doing something very similar to what we tested on Atlas in
    the early days of setting out that vehicle by stipulating
    parameters by which the vehicle would fly to and testing
    against that set of parameters. Putting the operational crew
    onto the consoles, which are getting more and more hours, and
    allowing them to essentially train in parallel has allowed more
    operator testing than we had ever previously expected.
        Senator Levin. If I phrase the question, though, very
    simply, do we still need realistic operational testing, are you
    able to give a yes or no to that?
        Mr. Wynne. Sir, that is the intent of the partnership
    between Operational Test and MDA, to actually move as close as
    we can to achieve that. As I have mentioned to you, with each
    spiral of capability that we get out there, I am hoping to not
    only check out the components as close as I can get to an
    operational test, but as close as I can get to a realistic
    test.
        Senator Levin. So that we may never get to realistic
    operational testing despite those efforts to get close to it,
    in other words, it does not necessarily mean we will ever
    achieve it. Is that accurate?
        Mr. Wynne. We have asked the Operational Test people to
    establish criteria. We are behaving to the operational
    criteria. We are working and having Missile Defense achieve
    those operational criteria. I think, sir, if we accomplish all
    of these goals, we will have, de facto, accomplished an
    operational realistic test.
        Senator Levin. Do we have those criteria? Have they been
    made available to the committee?
        Mr. Wynne. That part I do not know.
        General Obering. I believe there was a draft that has been
    made available, and Mr. Duma and I have signed off on that
    draft that delineate what those criteria are.
        Senator Levin. If you could just give us the final signed-
    off draft to make sure that what we have is what you signed off
    on, General, we would greatly appreciate that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Levin. Could I just take one more question?
        Senator Sessions. Go ahead.
        Senator Levin. Senator Nelson, would that be all right with
    you?
        Senator Ben Nelson. I have to go anyway.
        Senator Levin. We have not yet demonstrated through
    testing, as I understand it, that we have an operationally-
    effective and reliable system. It has not yet been
    demonstrated. Is that a fair statement, General Cartwright or
    General Obering, either one?
        General Cartwright. I would say, sir, that is a fair
    statement.
        Senator Levin. About what test would we have to get to, if
    things go well, before we could reach that conclusion? How many
    more tests would we have to have, assuming things go reasonably
    well, that would get us to that point?
        General Obering. Sir, if I may, that was the point I was
    going to make earlier. We are in a different mode, and I mean
    that in a very positive sense. In the classic model, the
    developer develops a system, they turn it over to the tester to
    test, and they turn it over to the warfighter, and the
    developer is never to be seen again, for the most part. You go
    through that one-time testing and they clear it out the door
    and off it goes. We are not in that mode.
        We are in a continual spiral development and therefore
    continual spiral test cycles that we want to engage with DOT&E,
    with the operational test agents as well, as we go through the
    development. So to answer your question, we continually build
    out the system and continually improve it, we will continually
    go through these cycles, and we will continue to apply the
    operational criteria that we have agreed upon as we go through
    that.
        So it applies not only to the long-range midcourse system.
    It also applies to Aegis. It applies when you bring in the sea-
    based X-band radar. It applies when we continue to add layers
    such as boost-phase defenses. We are in a constant engagement
    with the operational test community.
        Senator Levin. We are moving in a spiral way, but
    nonetheless, we have not gotten to the point where we know that
    we have an operationally-effective system, and whether we go
    linearly or spirally, that is what we need to get to.
        General Obering. Sir, we have deployed systems in the past
    in combat zones that have not been proven to be operationally
    reliable----
        Senator Levin. I am very much aware of that, but we usually
    do not manufacture all of those systems before we put them in a
    combat zone.
        General Obering. No, sir, and in fact, that is why we are
    going to continually spiral test and develop this one.
        Senator Levin. But we are also at the point where we may be
    producing and manufacturing all of these missiles before we
    complete the spiral development. Is that not correct, at the
    rate we are going?
        General Obering. Sir, like I said, we are going to produce
    them as part of the spiral development program.
        Mr. Wynne. I would say to you, sir, that as a result of the
    fiscal restrictions, General Obering has actually trimmed back
    as much as he can to get to a warm line, the missile
    production. I think he has acted prudently without incurring a
    penalty, yet making sure that there is not an impact
    economically to the fact that the testing has been delayed.
        Further, I would tell you that as we go through the test
    program, we have already converted two of the missiles, even
    though they were not successfully flown out of the thing, to
    essentially ground test articles, which is really going to
    enhance the ground testing and, in fact, the operational crew
    testing of the system. So I would tell you that over the course
    of several years, as we do these spirals, in each case we are
    probably going to be consuming these rockets as quickly as we
    are producing them.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Duma, you are independent. Is that
    right? OT&E is independent?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, Senator, that is correct.
        Senator Levin. Has that independence been retained during
    this spiraling experiment?
        Mr. Duma. It has. Our role as an advisor in the development
    phase is somewhat unique for us. However, I think we have had
    an impact. For instance, in the document that you just
    discussed about having a draft and that General Obering and I
    recently signed, the difference there is that we, as the
    operational test community, that is, my organization and the
    operational test agencies, in this case led by the Army Test
    and Evaluation Command, are preparing the evaluation plan and
    the test plan for certain tests that have that opportunity to
    be as operationally realistic and as end-to-end as can be. That
    document that you are talking about--we have done that for one
    of the tests in this fiscal year 2005. That is a developmental
    test to which we have applied operational realism. I believe I
    have that same agreement with General Obering to do that for
    subsequent tests for each block before that capability is
    fielded for General Cartwright.
        Senator Levin. But not before it is produced?
        Mr. Duma. Well, the test program is going to consume those
    test articles. Just in the next 2-year period for the GMD
    system, there are nine flight tests scheduled, six of which are
    intercepts. So if that goes as planned, we will consume six
    ground-based interceptors in that portion of the test program.
        Senator Levin. Where would that get us to? Number what?
    Number 35, number 40, number 30? Where does the use of those
    six missiles get us to in terms of the production of these
    missiles?
        General Obering. Well, sir, we have requested the funds to
    have 21 through 30 in the 2006-2007 time frame and a long lead
    for 31 through 40.
        Senator Levin. Is that where those six are?
        General Obering. We have test missiles as part of our
    development program at about 3 a year, 4 a year as well.
        Senator Levin. But are those six that were referred to part
    of 31 to 40?
        General Obering. Sir, we would like to take the
    interceptors and we would like to test those, as I think my
    predecessor talked about, where we can take the interceptors
    and rotate them through the test program, very similar to the
    ICBM testing that we do.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the extra time.
    Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Levin. I know you have
    studied this issue for many years and asked some questions that
    are important to us all.
        I do not think it is just a choice between testing and
    deployment. It seems like to me we are doing the only thing
    that realistically is practical to do today. We have a threat.
    We need to be building the radar systems. We need to be
    building the launch pad systems. We need to be building the
    interceptor systems. We need to be proving the technology. Just
    to sit and prove to an absolute certainty that the hit-to-kill
    technology can work and then wait to develop the next phase and
    the next phase and the next phase and then finally, sometime in
    the far distant future, test them all together, to me is
    guaranteeing a delay beyond which our Nation should take,
    considering the risk we are facing. Is that the fundamental
    principle, General Cartwright?
        General Cartwright. I tend to agree with you, Senator. We
    have a realistic threat here. We have an imperative, and we are
    trying to get the best we can out of the system by
    operationally realistic testing mixed with the developmental,
    getting operators on the system as early as possible, having an
    emergency----
        Senator Sessions. We have personnel actually working on
    these radar systems, computer systems, and launch systems right
    now. So as you continue this technology, they will be ready
    immediately to utilize it. Is that correct?
        General Cartwright. That is correct.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is important.
        Is there a legal definition somewhere of developmental and
    operational testing, Mr. Duma, or is it just accepted lingo in
    defense procurement?
        Mr. Duma. There actually is a legal definition of
    operational testing in the title X statute that created my
    office back in the mid-1980s.
        Senator Sessions. So you have been asked all of these
    questions about operational and development and testing and
    realistic, operationally realistic development testing, and so
    forth. Your answers have been, insofar as possible, consistent
    with those definitions in that statute, as you have tried to
    answer those questions here?
        Mr. Duma. Yes, Senator. The definition talks about field
    testing in an operationally realistic environment using the
    soldiers, airmen, seamen to operate the system.
        Senator Sessions. Well, let us take an artillery piece.
    Somebody develops the artillery piece and the manufacturer, I
    am sure, does developmental testing while they are designing
    the piece. Then in a classic artillery piece, you take it out
    and the soldiers actually fire it in a realistic situation at
    targets. Is that correct?
        Mr. Duma. It is actually even more robust than that,
    Senator. Not just firing it, but actually conducting a battle
    scenario where they have missions to accomplish where firing is
    just one element of that. They have the command and control,
    the tasking from commander's intent, and things like that that
    they have to execute, move, shoot, et cetera. So it is a true
    wartime scenario or battle scenario that we put them through in
    operational testing.
        Senator Sessions. The only way you can do that in a
    national missile defense system is really have someone, at
    surprise times, launch a bunch of missiles directed at the
    United States, which is not a very practical thing for us. We
    have to construct testing in a way that does not endanger our
    country or our citizens, and yet, at the same time, get
    realistic testing accomplished.
        Mr. Duma. Operational testing we try to make as realistic
    as possible. There are always test limitations that we have to
    deal with if for no other reason than safety because it would
    be untenable to place our personnel at risk during a test. Risk
    is an inherent factor of warfare but not for testing.
        Senator Sessions. It is just harder to do in this kind of
    system, I do not think there is any doubt.
        Mr. Wynne, when we did this proposal to go forward and
    deploy as soon as technologically feasible a national missile
    system that we passed in 1999--Congress did--we decided to go
    with the spiral development. Is that correct? Did we do
    something legal there or did we just direct you to proceed in
    that fashion?
        Mr. Wynne. Sir, the key phrases were deploying and
    technologically feasible. Now, technologically feasible is I
    think all of those tests that General Obering put together as
    far as knowing that we have checked the square on hit-to-kill,
    that we have checked the square on the guidance equations, we
    have checked the square on checking out the kill vehicle, we
    have checked the square on the missile, and we have seen all of
    those maybe separately, as Senator Nelson pointed out, but
    collectively works out. That is technology feasibility.
        Deployment of that technologically feasible set is exactly
    where we are. So I think, sir, we are approaching the mission
    fulfillment, if you will, of what Congress asked us to do.
        Now, there is another set of responsibilities which we owe
    to the warfighter, which is to increasingly grow the
    reliability of, first, the rudimentary system that General
    Cartwright talked about, and then as we get more and more and
    better sensors on board, to effectively test those sensors and
    that layered defense in an effective manner to increase the
    confidence of not only the soldiers, sailors, and airmen that
    are operating this system, but to ourselves and to the American
    people, and then where we would really like to make the most
    effect, of course, is on anybody who is contemplating a launch
    towards us believing that that launch is fruitless.
        Senator Sessions. I believe that is exactly correct. I
    believe that we need to continue to develop this system so that
    any enemy would realize that they are going to be incapable of
    making a missile system that could penetrate our defense.
    Therefore, they would be wasting money to do it. Not only that,
    I think if we do not have that and we face a nation that has a
    missile capable of hitting the United States, it puts the
    President in an awfully weakened position if this person, this
    nation threatens us in a way because he cannot have confidence
    that the American people would be protected.
        General Cartwright, I guess that is your bailiwick. I guess
    that is what you deal with on a daily basis as you look at the
    strategic defense of America. Would you comment on that?
        General Cartwright. I think to take it back again to the
    opening statement, what we are compelled with right now is that
    the offense alone is not enough. We have to have a combined
    offense-defense capability to change the mind set of the enemy
    so that he or she cannot believe that just because they get a
    sneak first shot, that that is going to be determining.
        Senator Sessions. The stress, General Obering, will
    continue on you to not only make the system that we have work,
    but to enhance it ad infinitum, I suppose, to deal with
    potential targets that may be difficult or disguised or evasive
    in some ways. Is that correct?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, and that is a great point that
    you are bringing up, which is what we are asking for in 2006,
    in terms of our budget, the results of that work will not
    manifest itself for several years. It is incumbent that we
    realize that, that we are playing about 2 years ahead, for the
    most part, in terms of developing our capabilities, and we have
    to try to judge where we need to be that far in advance. It is
    important we continue that momentum as we look out into an
    uncertain world.
        Senator Sessions. Would you comment on using your plans to
    use this testbed to continue to do GMD testing while
    maintaining some degree of operational alert status? How do you
    envision managing this tension between having an operational
    alert status and testing at the same time?
        General Obering. The first thing there, sir, as you said,
    we have been working very, very closely with General Cartwright
    and the STRATCOM folks, as well as Admiral Keating in Northern
    Command, as well as Pacific Command (PACOM), in setting up the
    shakedown period. So we have been developing and working out
    the tactics and the procedures for being able to transition
    from a development state, as we call it, to an operational
    state and back. We feel increasingly confident day to day that
    we are working that out.
        On the materiel side, a lot of the money that we are
    looking at is how do we better develop concurrent tests and
    operational capability so that we do not have, as General
    Cartwright said, single strings through some of our testbed
    such that we can do the duality of continuous operations
    eventually and continuous improvement at the same time.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it is a challenge. We can make
    errors. I think with Mr. Duma watching and Mr. Wynne and some
    of our Members of this Senate are helpful in monitoring how you
    are progressing, and we will be looking closely. But I think it
    is the only way to go. I think we have to proceed in this way.
    I think it will mean that you will be asked to come back more
    often and you will have to continue to explain how we are going
    because if we get off track and make some errors, it could end
    up costing more money than we ought to spend.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You all are relying totally on R&D
    funding. At what point do you expect to move away from R&D
    funding?
        General Obering. Well, sir, we would like to continue that
    as we continue the spiral development mode into the future, and
    as we continue to add layers to the system and improve the
    robustness because of the flexibility that gives us with
    respect to the development.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You are planning to go to one
    contractor for the boosters.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, we are.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Why?
        General Obering. As I said, part of our budget reduction
    that we had to meet the top line, I had to look out to say
    where could I accept more risk, sir.
        There were two reasons why we had the dual contractor.
        One was we did not, at the time that we initiated that
    second contract effort, have confidence in the configuration of
    one booster in terms of its performance. So that was one of the
    reasons.
        The other reason was when you deal in energetics, as you
    are well aware of, you want to have more than one supplier for
    the booster motors. Because of the accident that was suffered
    in the one booster program, we had to move that motor supplier
    to the same supplier basically that we have for the Orbital
    Booster Vehicle (OBV) program.
        Also as I said, we have flown the booster successfully
    three times. It flew exactly as predicted and the performance
    was exactly as predicted. That is another key point. A lot of
    it that is overlooked in our flight test, in addition to just
    press, is the fact that we use those to anchor our models and
    our simulations, because we want to be able to get to where we
    have comfortably got predictable performance. So since we did
    have the success in that, I determined that we could accept
    more risk in that area, and that is why we went to this.
        Now, we have another booster that is coming down the----
        Senator Sessions. Does it save money to go to one supplier?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, it does, considerable.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, of course, that is also a
    question that another part of the Air Force was asking with
    regard to assured access to space on the EELVs, and they
    concluded that you have to have two.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, and that is what I was getting
    ready to say. We have another booster, an interceptor program
    that is on line, and that is the KEI. That is with a totally
    different, a very much different configuration, much more
    capable with respect to acceleration. It is a mobile,
    containerized missile that could be moved worldwide, a
    different contractor, a different set of suppliers there. This
    is a temporary state which we will find ourselves in as we go
    through this.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Has that system been tested?
        General Obering. No, sir. We have static tests this year,
    and we will begin the flight test of that in the 2008 time
    frame.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, how about overall production?
    Can one manufacturer produce reliably the boosters at the
    numbers that are planned for two manufacturers?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, they can. That was part of the
    cost, by the way, in which the result of the accident that
    occurred 2 years ago, where we had to basically go to the one
    supplier. Part of the cost of accelerating boosters with the
    Orbital Boost configuration was due to that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are we in the range of spending about
    $10 billion a year to develop these systems?
        General Obering. Sir, we have, as I said, a $7.8 billion
    request this year, and we have been trying to manage within the
    top line of between $7.5 billion to $8 billion for development
    and $1.5 billion to $2 billion for fielding. So yes, sir, in
    general.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, if we are looking at operating
    this system over the next 30 years, are we talking about $10
    billion a year for 30 years?
        General Obering. No, sir. That gets into, obviously, what
    it takes to sustain the system, the contractor logistic
    support. That is considerably smaller than that. What you have
    done is you have addressed or rolled in the development, as
    well as fielding, as well as the operational support costs.
        But if I could put it in perspective, Senator, if you go
    back and look at every dollar we have spent that has been
    authorized by Congress since 1983 when we started the missile
    defense program, it is about $95 billion. The cost of September
    11, one attack, not a weapon of mass destruction, according to
    the GAO was about $83 billion. So we would recoup the entire
    cost of this system since its inception if we can prevent one
    attack, and that is especially in light of a weapon of mass
    destruction, which was not used in the September 11 attack. So,
    yes, sir, it is a lot of money. It is still less than 3 percent
    of our defense budget, but we think that the return on that
    investment is considerable.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, that is the choice we have to
    make because the enemy does not necessarily launch off of an
    ICBM toward us. He may be coming across the Arizona-Mexico
    border.
        General Obering. Yes, sir, that is correct. Unfortunately,
    we do not have the choice to say either this or that. We have
    to cover both of those situations. You are correct, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask something down in the weeds
    here. In the budget justification that is not included in the
    original budget submission, there is a new funding line that
    ostensibly would begin in 2008 and indicates an intention to
    add about $7.6 billion to the overall funding level through
    fiscal year 2011. But as I look at the budget, the funding is
    not actually in the budget. It is money that you all are
    planning to spend. Thus, you hope that it is in future budgets.
    So it has not been through the process of forcing hard budget
    choices and then all the other calculations that we have to
    make with regard to the deficit and so forth.
        Some of the tables in the justification book show negative
    dollar levels of more than $3.5 billion to make the plan's
    spending totals balance with the actual budget request. I would
    like you all to give some clarification to this.
        So, General, can you explain whether this additional $7.6
    billion that MDA plans to spend in those years of 2008 to 2011
    is in the actual budget or is it planning to spend the money
    that has not been budgeted, and therefore it is not counted
    against the Federal deficit?
        General Obering. Yes, sir, I can address that. That is part
    of the fielding money that I talked about earlier, the $1.5
    billion to $2 billion that the Department has provided. We have
    been given roughly that amount of money I believe since the
    2004 time frame initially, 2004, 2005, and 2006 and 2007. We
    were told to plan on that for 8, 9, 10, and 11, but it has not
    been allocated to us. It is part of the spiral funding approach
    that the Department is taking.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, Mr. Secretary, let me ask you.
    Is this the sort of budget that you consider a standard
    practice and it is it an acceptable practice for the
    Department?
        Mr. Wynne. Senator, that is not quite my lane to respond to
    in that I am not one of the budget makers. However, let me just
    address it as far as I know.
        That money would come from the service O&M budgets as a
    transfer item into the MDA. There is a huge debate over who
    would budget for that money that is really at the Comptroller,
    Deputy Secretary and SECDEF level. I think they asked to put it
    somewhere in the planning documents so that it would not be
    forgotten.
        That was one thing that I tried to push as well. I do not
    want it to be forgotten that once we get this system up and
    started, that as it transitions into a service, which is what
    we planned for PAC-3, as you recall, and we are trying to plan
    for THAAD, even if Missile Defense keeps it to operate, through
    the good offices of General Cartwright, somebody has to pay for
    the logistics, the sustainment, the weather-related problems
    that might go on, and somebody has to pay the Navy to sail the
    ships to go on out and be, if you will, sensors. So all of that
    has to be taken care of. What I was fearful of is, though we
    all have great respect for the MDA and the fact that it is a
    separate agency, gone but not forgotten is the classic budget
    exercise. So that is kind of what it is and how I would relate
    it to you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, General.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Do any of you gentlemen have anything else to add, you feel
    like you need to clarify or make any comments?
        Mr. Wynne. I would just like to thank you, Senator
    Sessions, for holding this. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Your
    words ring true as far as getting us as close as we can to have
    something here. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Well, it is a pleasure to be with you. I
    think an incredible achievement has occurred. We have gone from
    a vision of a hit-to-kill technology that many doubted would
    occur to make that a reality. We have rockets that are capable
    of launching that hit-to-kill technology. We have radars that
    give us warning. The question is whether we can make them all
    work together at the same time and be effective. I believe that
    is basically achieved now, but we need, as Mr. Duma said,
    continual testing, continual stress, continual determination to
    improve and make the system better to handle more complex
    targets, more difficult targets, targets coming when we are not
    expecting them. Those kind of things are important. But I just
    think there is little doubt that you have gotten us to a point
    where we can know that we are going to get there.
        I thank each of you to your service to your country. We
    believe it is important to our Nation's national security and
    the ability of this Nation to be a lead player in the world
    events of today. Thank you.
        We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                                 boost vehicle
        1. Senator Sessions. General Obering, when you appeared before our
    committee recently, you indicated you wanted to stop producing the
    Boost Vehicle (BV+) because the same contractor (ATK) was now providing
    rocket motors for both the BV+ and the Orbital Boost Vehicle (OBV),
    which removed any risk reduction. It seems now that we have put all of
    our eggs into one basket rather than try to keep two boosters and two
    rocket motor suppliers active until we have confidence in the OBV,
    especially considering the devastating effects of the recent CSD
    explosion. Can you explain how this is a prudent decision?
        General Obering. Our booster confidence has improved dramatically
    since the dual booster strategy was introduced. There are several
    advantages to selecting a single booster. First, the challenges of
    planning and integration, associated with manufacturing multiple
    booster vehicles are reduced. Second, we can avoid having to fund
    enough boosters to keep two assembly lines open and viable. Third, the
    costs attributable to restart and lost learning and trained personnel,
    are less severe if a manufacturing break is imposed. Lastly, a single
    booster strategy is inherently cheaper to operate and maintain.
        The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) established the Ground-Based
    Interceptor (GBI) dual booster vehicle strategy as part of the Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program to mitigate the risk of relying
    on a single booster vendor, and to take advantage of a complementary
    booster performance mix. In late fiscal year 2003, two catastrophic
    accidents at the fuel mixing facility of the vendor that manufactures
    the Lockheed Martin Booster Vehicle Plus, ``BV+'', second and third
    stage rocket motors, validated the dual booster strategy. The impact to
    the program was only a 3-month delay in fielding of GBIs 6-8.
        The Orbital Sciences Corporation booster has been flown
    successfully in three missions: Taurus Lite (a near operationally
    configured booster), Booster Verification Flight 6 and Integrated
    Flight Test 13B (both operationally configured boosters with
    Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle emulators). The Lockheed-Martin BV+ flew
    successfully as an operationally configured booster with an
    Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle emulator in Booster Verification Flight 5.
    These tests demonstrated that the technology and design of both
    boosters are viable.
        I recognize, however, that there are challenges and risks if the
    dual booster vehicle strategy is terminated. Lockheed Martin, or its
    suppliers, would not be available as near-term alternatives to the
    Orbital Sciences Corporation, if a manufacturing failure occurs.
    Lockheed Martin has much more experience and infrastructure developing,
    manufacturing, and sustaining ballistic missiles, a capability that
    would be lost if the dual booster strategy were eliminated.
    Additionally, recent flight test failures have left unverified the
    Orbital booster's performance as part of an operationally configured
    Ground Based Interceptor.
        While it is still our intention to terminate the Booster Vehicle
    Plus program for the reasons stated earlier, MDA is looking at several
    options as to the timing of that decision to minimize the risks.
    Regardless, MDA will maintain the dual booster strategy until after
    another successful flight test of an OBV-configured GBI. The options
    being considered are: purchasing no additional BV+ boosters beyond the
    current contract, partially terminating the BV+ booster effort after
    taking delivery of a limited number of boosters, and canceling the BV+
    booster altogether in favor of the Orbital Sciences Corporation Boost
    Vehicle.
        The favored option at the present time is to complete the current
    contract and deliver eight Booster Vehicle Plus (three for flight and
    ground test and five to be deployed at Fort Greely, AK). This option
    provides the taxpayer with the best return on investment provides the
    warfighter with a complementary booster capability, and strikes a
    balance between the benefits and challenges discussed above.

        2. Senator Sessions. General Obering, are all of the motors and
    booster stages actually produced at the same geographical location or
    are they spread out across the country? What is the risk associated
    with these locations and how is it being mitigated?
        General Obering. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., is the vendor for the
    rocket motors for both the OBV and the Lockheed Martin Boost Vehicle-
    Plus. The OBV rocket motors (1st, 2nd, and 3rd stages) and the Boost
    Vehicle-Plus 1st stage rocket motor are cast at the vendor's Magna,
    Utah facility. However, this facility includes geographically separated
    redundancy in both its mixing and casting facilities capable of
    handling both of the ongoing booster activities. The Boost Vehicle-Plus
    2nd and 3rd stage rocket motors are cast at the vendor's Elkton,
    Maryland facilities. Risk is also minimized by the availability of
    additional Alliant Techsystems Inc. mixing and casting facilities at
    Magna and Promontory, Utah that could be modified to support either
    booster.
        Orbital Booster stages are manufactured and integrated into a
    booster stack at the Orbital Sciences Corporation facility at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The Payload Avionics Module (the
    front end of the interceptor which includes the Exoatmospheric Kill
    Vehicle) and the Booster Stack undergo final assembly, test, and
    checkout at the Missile Assembly Buildings at Fort Greely, Alaska or
    Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
        Boost Vehicle-Plus booster stages are manufactured and integrated
    into a booster stack at the Lockheed Martin Courtland, Alabama
    facility. The Payload Avionics Module and the Booster Stack undergo
    final assembly, test and checkout at the Redstone Arsenal, Integration,
    Assembly, Test, and Checkout facility in Alabama.
        The geographical separation of these facilities reduces risk to the
    program in the event of an accident at one of the sites. The
    manufacturing sites have been selected by our industry partners because
    they possess the requisite skills sets, facilities and equipment to
    deliver interceptor assets safely, on time and on cost. The MDA works
    closely with our industry partners to ensure that manufacturing
    quantitiesare adequate to sustain the existing manufacturing lines,
    skilled workers, and 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers.

        3. Senator Sessions. General Obering, I find it strange that we
    have invested quite a lot of money in perfecting the BV and we are now
    casting it aside to make the untested, high-risk Kinetic Energy
    Interceptor (KEI) booster the alternate for OBV. Can OBV be tweaked to
    handle that mission and would it be high-risk?
        General Obering. The Orbital Boost Vehicle booster cannot be
    modified to handle the KEI's boost-phase mission requirements. The
    boost phase mission requires the high acceleration and short bum times
    that have been designed into the KEI's motor set. It is not possible to
    modify the OBV's motors for the boost mission as their bum time is
    three times longer than the requirement.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                           budget for missile defense
        4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wynne and Mr. Duma, this year's budget
    request for MDA is $7.8 billion. This is $1 billion less than last
    year. Further testing is planned on the GMD system for compliance with
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, section 24
    which requires that you conduct tests using operationally realistic
    criteria by October 2005. Understanding that not all $7.8 billion
    requested by MDA is spent on GMD, I am concerned that you are not going
    to have the appropriate level of funding to carry out this testing and
    continue production as planned. Further, Program Budget Directive 753
    has directed a budget cut of an additional $5 billion through fiscal
    year 2011, which means that further down the road, we are going to
    encounter additional challenges. Please comment on this cut and its
    impact on the program overall and on the ability to conduct testing. Is
    more funding needed to stay on the production and testing schedule?
        Mr. Wynne. The fiscal year 2006 President's budget request provides
    sufficient funding for testing and production, as these were priorities
    during its formulation. The Department evaluates its capabilities and
    makes adjustments in programs based on analysis of evolving challenges
    and capability needs. Program Budget Decision (PBD)-753 reduced MDA
    funding by $1 billion in fiscal year 2006 and $0.8 billion/year in
    fiscal year 2007-2011 for a total reduction of $5 billion. The
    resulting $7.8 billion fiscal year 2006 budget request reserves $1.4
    billion for fielding and $6.4 billion for testing and other RDT&E; 35
    percent of the overall request is reserved for testing.
        Mr. Duma. General Obering is managing the budget for all the
    Ballistic Missile Defense program activities. He is strongly committed
    to a robust, event driven testing program. The MDA, the Service
    Operational Test Agencies, and DOT&E are working together to plan and
    execute a realistic operational test that satisfies the requirements in
    section 234, as soon as the program is technically and operationally
    ready to conduct the test. General Obering is committed to planning and
    executing an adequate, long-term ``block'' testing program before
    fielding or producing a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System
    ``block'' configuration. Given his commitment to resource this testing
    out of his core budget, additional funding is not needed for testing.

                       testing of missile defense systems
        5. Senator Inhofe. General Obering, I want to commend you for the
    work thus far on the testing associated with missile defense. The GBI
    prototype successfully engaged four of five targets in 2000-2001 and
    the current GBI booster flew successfully three times in 2003-2004. You
    have put in place an aggressive, operationally realistic test plan that
    schedules two flight tests in 2005 and four intercepts in 2006. Further
    you have established an independent review team to analyze recent test
    failures and whose data can be used by Congress to determine if any
    systematic problems exist. What do we need to stay on course with the
    GMD testing schedule that has been planned by MDA?
        General Obering. In addition to the Independent Review Team that
    you mentioned, I have also established the position of Director,
    Mission Readiness, and have asked Rear Admiral Kathleen Paige, United
    States Navy, to assume this responsibility. As Director of the Mission
    Readiness Task Force, Rear Admiral Paige will initially address
    processes and procedures to enhance the verification of the operational
    readiness of the GMD Weapon System. As a key part of this effort, Rear
    Admiral Paige will focus at least the next 6 months on GMD and its
    flight test program. This mission readiness effort will include
    proposing a plan for the next several flight tests, including
    objectives and schedules. In order to stay on course, this initial
    flight test plan will be part of a larger plan including ground
    testing, which addresses processes and procedures to enhance the
    verification of operational readiness of the GMD weapons system. It is
    imperative that we continue to allow Rear Admiral Paige's team to
    complete their assessment and provide a recommended way ahead for the
    GMD test program.

        6. Senator Inhofe. General Obering, if the results of the tests
    currently planned determine additional flight intercepts are needed, do
    you have the ability to add in additional tests before the end of 2006
    and remain on schedule with production?
        General Obering. The interceptor manufacturing schedule must
    support both the emerging test schedule and the emplacement of
    operational missiles. Since the lead time on an interceptor is 24
    months, to add additional tests by the end of 2006 requires that
    operational missiles be diverted to test events and then subsequently
    replaced with new test assets diverted to operational use.
    Additionally, the current schedule for emplacing operational missiles
    may not be achieved.
        GMD is executing a rigorous and systematic test program to
    demonstrate that hit-to-kill technology is mature and to gain
    confidence in system performance against increasingly complex threat
    representative targets and scenarios. The flight test events are
    carefully and systematically designed to measure technical performance
    and maturity of new hardware / software technology and demonstrate a
    desired engagement sequence group.
        Evaluating the results of each flight is required before proceeding
    to the next test event. Time to analyze the test data and prepare for
    the next event usually takes 3 to 4 months. Based on available
    resources, prudent analysis, personnel tempo and depending upon the as-
    yet unreleased recommendations by the Mission Readiness Task Force, the
    flight test schedule can support up to four flight tests in fiscal year
    2006 and four more in fiscal year 2007. Adding additional flight tests
    will be difficult within time and resource limitations, however,
    additional ground testing is also under consideration.

                         threat drives missile defense
        7. Senator Inhofe. General Cartwright and General Obering, some
    believe that we can continue to push the budget and schedule for
    missile defense production to the right more and more each year and
    that there is no reason that we need to push as aggressively for this
    system. We can't afford a production break for military and cost
    reasons. I think everyone understands that a break in building these
    systems only means it will cost more in the future; estimates as high
    $300 million have been quoted for break in production. However, I am
    not sure that everyone understands that we need to maintain production
    to keep pace with the threat. Without getting into any classified
    information, please tell, from a military perspective, about the
    threats posed that make GBIs a critical program for America's missile
    defense and national security. It is my understanding that North
    Korea's Taepo-Dong 2 is capable of reaching the U.S. with a nuclear
    warhead and Iran is only about 10 years away from ICBM development.
        General Cartwright. North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-
    2) missile, which may have the capability to strike the continental
    United States. The integration of a nuclear payload with the TD-2 will
    probably take several years, however, that timeline could be
    accelerated. In addition to developing ballistic missile and nuclear
    capabilities, North Korea has also shown an interest in proliferating
    their missile technology.
        Iran is a Middle Eastern leader in ballistic missile forces with an
    ambitious development program. Iran's progress in the development of
    longer-range ballistic missiles is, in part, due to assistance from
    North Korea and other countries. Additionally, Iran's nuclear programs
    increase the possibility of future nuclear warhead development.
        General Obering. Yes, your statement is correct. As Vice Admiral
    Jacoby described in his prepared testimony on February 16, the Taepo
    Dong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile could deliver a nuclear
    warhead to parts of the United States in a two stage variant and target
    all of North America with a three stage variant. In addition, the Taepo
    Dong-2, which has never been tested before, may be ready for testing.
    It is assessed that Iran will have the technical capability to develop
    an intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015, though it is not clear
    whether Iran has decided to field such a missile.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
               operational versus test ground-based interceptors
        8. Senator Levin. General Obering, the MDA has provided briefing
    charts to the committee which clearly show a differentiation between
    GBIs intended for operational use and those intended as flight test
    articles. The briefing charts indicate that MDA plans to purchase 50
    operational interceptors (GBIs 1-50), and 28 flight test interceptors
    through fiscal year 2011. Can you confirm that these are MDA's current
    plans, or provide the correct information on how many of each type of
    GBI missile (operational versus test) MDA plans to procure through the
    Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP)?
        General Obering. Yes, the MDA plans to purchase 78 interceptors as
    described above. However, it should be noted that 2 of the 50
    operational interceptors were already re-allocated for test and are not
    available for operational emplacement. I will review the plan once I
    receive recommendations from Rear Admiral Paige and her Mission
    Readiness Task Force Review.

        9. Senator Levin. General Obering, please describe the differences
    between operational missiles and flight test missiles.
        General Obering. Flight test missiles are the same configuration as
    operational missiles with the exception of certain non-tactical
    equipment. This equipment is required for capturing booster performance
    and flight environment data and also for range safety tracking and
    flight termination.

        10. Senator Levin. General Obering, will MDA maintain a distinction
    between each type of interceptor? In other words, will operational GBIs
    be emplaced in operational silos and maintained as operational assets,
    and will flight test articles be used for flight testing, but not for
    operational use?
        General Obering. Our current plan is to maintain a distinction
    between operational assets and flight test articles and to convert
    between the two only on a limited basis. Operational interceptors may
    be removed from operational silos for possible future service life and
    reliability testing. Use of an operational interceptor for flight test
    requires only the addition of non-tactical equipment for transmission
    of booster performance and environment data as well as range safety
    tracking and flight termination. Removal of non-tactical equipment from
    a flight test interceptor would restore it to an operational
    configuration.

        11. Senator Levin. General Obering, will a certain number of
    operational missiles be test launched for reliability and shelf-life
    verification? If so, when will such verification flight tests begin and
    how many operational missiles are planned to be test launched for this
    purpose?
        MDA collects reliability, maintainability, and availability
    information on all BMD System test events. In addition, a Joint
    Reliability and Maintainability Evaluation Team reviews, characterizes
    and scores reliability and maintainability field data on components.
    Reliability, maintainability, and availability data gathered is
    controlled through a centralized database. Reliability analyses are
    performed concurrently with development so that design problem areas
    can be identified and corrective actions can be cycled back into the
    spiral development process.
        MDA does not have a plan in place for shelf-life verification
    testing for Ground Based Midcourse Interceptors (GBIs); MDA is still
    investigating methods for shelf-life verification testing of
    operationally configured GBIs. Accordingly, a certain number of
    operational missiles have not yet been specifically identified for
    reliability and shelf-life verification testing.
        Aegis BMD is using operational SM-3 Block I missiles for the
    current series of test flights. Only two SM-3 Block IA missiles will be
    built specifically as flight test rounds, the remainder of the SM-3
    Block IA flight tests will use operational missiles. Future flight
    tests will use missiles of varying age. Specific missiles have not yet
    been allocated to specific flight tests, so we cannot state the exact
    quantity. MDA collects reliability data on each missile flight test and
    compares it to the reliability predictions for each missile section.
    The overall reliability estimates are then adjusted accordingly.
    Similar to other U.S. Navy developed missiles, Aegis BMD has planned
    for aged rocket motor ground tests of varying aged motors to verify and
    potentially extend the shelf-life of the rocket motors, which are
    notionally the limiting component in missile shelf-life.

        12. Senator Levin. General Obering, how many GBIs are emplaced in
    operational silos now that are not intended for flight testing this
    year?
        General Obering. There are currently eight interceptors emplaced in
    operational silos; six at Fort Greely, Alaska, and two at Vandenberg
    Air Force Base, California. They are not intended for flight testing in
    2005. However, we are collecting environmental and aging data on these
    interceptors.

        13. Senator Levin. General Obering, how many GBIs are planned to be
    placed in operational silos by the end of 2005 that are not intended
    for flight testing in 2006?
        General Obering. There are 10 additional interceptors planned for
    emplacement in operational silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, by the end of
    2005. At this time, they are not intended for flight testing in 2006.

        14. Senator Levin. General Obering, are the missiles currently
    deployed in operational silos equipped with the prototype
    Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) used in earlier flight tests, or
    with the upgraded operationally configured EKV?
        General Obering. The interceptors currently deployed in operational
    silos are equipped with the upgraded operationally configured
    Exoatmospheric Kill Vehic1es.

                      operational versus flight test silos
        15. Senator Levin. General Obering, the briefing charts provided to
    the Committee indicate that MDA plans to build 40 operational silos at
    Fort Greely and four operational silos at Vandenberg AFB, two of which
    are intended for testing, but capable of operational use. Is it correct
    that the operational silos built and planned at Fort Greely are not
    currently intended as flight test silos?
        General Obering. That is not correct. It is our intention to fly
    out of Fort Greely at some future date. However, we have not completed
    the environmental assessments required for a final decision.
    Additionally, we have not yet completed any formal plans to use silos
    at Fort Greely for flight testing. Prior to such plans being completed
    or a final decision on conducting such flight testing, significant
    additional environmental and range safety analysis would be required.

        16. Senator Levin. General Obering, what is the difference between
    an operational silo and a flight test silo?
        General Obering. The GMD silos at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB
    were designed and built for operational use, but can be converted for
    flight test. A silo can be converted for flight test use by the
    addition of support equipment and sensor devices in the silo and
    adjacent infrastructure (the so-called Silo Interface Vault at Fort
    Greely or the Launch Equipment Room at Vandenberg AFB). Two of the
    silos at Vandenberg AFB are already equipped to support either
    operations or flight testing.
        A silo configured for flight test will typically have various heat
    probes, pressure measuring probes, and cameras for the purpose of data
    collection. The silo data is collected using a Data Acquisition System
    mounted inside the Silo Interface Vault or Launch Equipment Room. Real-
    time monitoring is achieved through the transmission of the collected
    data over both physical and radio frequency links to other data
    collection systems. The necessary transmitters and receivers, to
    include associated antenna, would also be required for a flight test
    silo.

              plan for using first 20 missiles for flight testing
        17. Senator Levin. Secretary Wynne, in your June 17, 2004 letter to
    me, you wrote that ``we plan to deploy a developmental, prototype
    system as an initial defense against long range missile attack.
    Congress has authorized and appropriated funding for 20 interceptors
    for this deployment. These eventually will be expended in testing, and
    replaced over time with interceptors requested in the fiscal year 2005
    President's budget. The latter interceptors will have improved
    reliability and discrimination capability.'' Please provide the plan
    and schedule for when any of the first 20 deployed interceptors will be
    expended in flight tests, and the plan and schedule for replacing them
    with interceptors 21-30 authorized and appropriated in fiscal year
    2005. Please provide a detailed description of the improvements in GBIs
    21-30 compared to GBIs 1-20, and when those improved versions will be
    flight tested.
        Mr. Wynne. MDA intends to utilize some of the earliest deployed
    interceptors to support future flight test objectives and reliability
    testing. The formal plan for conducting reliability or shelf life
    testing has not been completed. It is likely all of the original
    interceptors will eventually be used for testing. Interceptors 21-30
    will replace those and will be used to increase the number of
    interceptors on alert.
        General Obering has created a Mission Readiness Task Force to
    address issues associated with two recent GBI flight test failures. We
    must resolve those issues before we set future flight tests and
    reliability testing activities.
        Key improvements in GBIs 21-30 include the addition of a Booster
    Global Positioning System Receiver, which will improve interceptor
    accuracy through booster position error improvement. Another
    improvement is the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Electronics Unit
    Replacement, which will replace the obsolete processor, will upgrade
    processor throughput and memory size, and improve software for target
    selection. Increased processor throughput and memory size will
    facilitate future discrimination upgrades. A third improvement includes
    an enhancement in sensor producibility, which will increase yield and
    improve manufacturing timelines.

                confidence in deployed ground-based interceptors
        18. Senator Levin. Mr. Duma, is it correct to say that, for the
    eight GBIs deployed in operational silos by the end of 2004, you do not
    yet have confidence that the system will be operationally effective
    based on successful intercept flight tests of the operationally
    configured booster with the operationally configured EKV?
        Mr. Duma. Yes. The configuration of the eight testbed missiles has
    not been flight tested. The boosters have been flight tested three
    times with mock payloads, and performed as expected. However, the
    operational kill vehicle has not flown on this new booster. Previous
    problems with kill vehicle-booster separation make this a critical
    aspect of the flight test.

        19. Senator Levin. Mr. Duma, is it accurate to say that, for the 18
    GBIs that are planned to be deployed in operational silos by the end of
    2005, you will not have confidence that the system will be
    operationally effective unless there are successful intercept flight
    tests of the operationally configured booster with the operationally
    configured EKV?
        Mr. Duma. That is accurate. Successful intercept flight tests are
    necessary to characterize performance and build confidence in the
    operational capabilities of the deployed system. However, intercept
    testing must be augmented by robust ground testing to establish
    confidence in the performance of the system in the likely defensive
    scenarios. Integrated ground tests, using operational hardware,
    software, and operators in the loop, are also critical for building
    confidence in the system capabilities and for characterizing system
    effectiveness. MDA has a significant ground testing effort ongoing,
    with more planned this year. Some of the ground testing has included
    dedicated operational tests to check out the system with operators in
    the loop. The integrated ground testing will continue to address
    realistic operational issues.

                  partnership for test planning and execution
        20. Senator Levin. Mr. Duma, at the hearing there was discussion of
    a new partnership between MDA and the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation (DOT&E) for planning and executing the testing program for
    the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System. Your testimony indicated
    that the agreement includes ``focused operational testing for each
    block'' of the BMD system ``prior to deploying that capability.'' You
    also stated that the ``operational test community will develop the
    operational evaluation and test plans consistent with the maturity of
    the system, conduct appropriate analysis, and prepare a formal
    report.'' Can you explain exactly what your role and responsibilities
    are under this new partnership, and what you expect the resulting
    products to be?
        Mr. Duma. My role and responsibilities on the MDA programs have
    significantly increased over this past year. Section 234 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 required an
    operationally realistic test of the deployed Ballistic Missile Defense
    System test bed infrastructure. DOT&E and the operational testing
    community worked with the MDA to prepare the first Integrated Master
    Test Plan, which MDA and DOT&E both approved. We are also preparing a
    detailed test and evaluation plan specifically for the operational
    testing that satisfies section 234.
        Beyond the testing that satisfies section 234, General Obering and
    I have agreed that each BMDS block configuration will be operationally
    tested, consistent with the capability of the system in the block,
    before deploying and producing that system configuration. My staff is
    leading the operational test and evaluation planning efforts for the
    next block level tests. During the detailed test planning for these
    test events, I will work with the Service Operational Test Agencies and
    MDA to incorporate test objectives that measure performance with
    respect to realistic operational mission-level test objectives. I have
    a strong commitment from General Obering to support these efforts,
    which will produce tangible results in two areas. The first area is up-
    to-date test plans for operationally realistic testing (developmental
    testing with operational flavor) and realistic operational testing
    (primarily addresses operational realism and objectives for mission
    accomplishment). This will include periodic updates to the Integrated
    Maser Test Plan and detailed event plans with specific operational test
    objectives identified for both developmental and operational tests that
    are consistent with the system's capability. The second area is test
    reports that clearly identify demonstrated BMD System operational
    capabilities and limitations.

        21. Senator Levin. Secretary Wynne and General Obering, do you
    concur with Mr. Duma's characterization of the agreement on future test
    planning and execution?
        Mr. Wynne and General Obering. Yes. This agreement is consistent
    with section 234 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2005. The statute required that the Secretary of
    Defense (SECDEF) prescribe criteria in consultation with DOT&E for
    operationally realistic testing of fieldable prototypes under the
    spiral development program. I understand you have been provided a copy
    of the signed agreement, which explains the criteria for operationally
    realistic testing.

               procurement of unproven ground-based interceptors
        22. Senator Levin. Secretary Wynne, the Department plans to buy 50
    operational GBIs by fiscal year 2011, and has requested long-lead
    funding for operational missiles 31-40 in the fiscal year 2006 budget
    request. Since there have not yet been any successful intercept flight
    tests of the operationally configured interceptor, we don't know if the
    system works. What protection does the Department have that it is not
    buying faulty interceptors?
        Mr. Wynne. I am confident the interceptors we have procured and
    placed in silos are capable of providing a limited defensive capability
    and that we have minimized risk with the integrated testing we have
    completed to date. Testing begins at the component level and progresses
    to complete Missile Defense integrated exercises and ground tests,
    culminating with flight tests. The two recent flight test failures have
    been frustrating as they have prevented testing all of the system's
    capabilities; we did learn from those tests however, and have taken
    corrective actions to ensure we evaluate and strengthen our emphasis on
    quality systems and processes within the program. Future flight testing
    will demonstrate the full capabilities and quality of the Ground-based
    Interceptor and the entire BMD System.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                          integrated master test plan
        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, what role did DOT&E have in the
    preparation of the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) of November 2004?
    What portions of the IMTP did DOT&E approve?
        Mr. Duma. Together with the Service Operational Test Agencies,
    DOT&E wrote Section 4 of the Integrated Master Test Plan. Statutorily,
    I can have no authority over developmental testing. Thus, my approval
    of the Integrated Master Test Plan is limited to Section 4, Combined
    Developmental and Operational Testing.

                               realism in testing
        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, MDA plans to conduct
    developmental tests of the BMD System with added elements of
    operational realism. Are the planned developmental tests with added
    realism the same as realistic operational tests?
        Mr. Duma. No, developmental tests with added realism are not the
    same as realistic operational tests. There are several important
    differences. A developmental test is precisely controlled to minimize
    the number of variables introduced into the test so specific test
    objectives can be accurately addressed.
        Traditional operational testing employs production representative
    hardware and software to execute an operational mission against a
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) validated threat. Trained military
    personnel operate and maintain the system in accordance with approved
    tactics, techniques, and procedures. The contractor's participation in
    operational testing is prohibited, or limited to the same role they
    would have with an operationally deployed system, as defined in the
    system concept of operations. Further, the Service Operational Test
    Agency plans and executes the operational tests, analyzes the data, and
    prepares a final report. System maturation during developmental test
    phase allows the operational testing to focus on realistic operation of
    the system, system interfaces, and warfighter performance under
    realistic threat conditions.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, do you consider the flight test
    required by section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2005 to be a realistic operational test? If not, please
    explain why.
        Mr. Duma. We are working with the MDA to make the flight test that
    satisfies section 234 as operationally realistic as possible. The
    immaturity of the BMD System testbed, the lack of a mid-course sensor
    to provide target discrimination, and the lack of a mobile target
    launch capability limit the test from being fully operationally
    realistic. The deployment of the Sea-Based Radar (SBR) in late 2005
    will greatly improve the capability to conduct realistic operational
    testing on the BMD System. Since the MDA is delaying the test date for
    the section 234 flight test to resolve technical issues with the test
    bed system, it is possible that we can find ways to improve on the
    operational realism of the test.

                       separation of ekv from gbi booster
        26. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering and Mr. Duma, there has
    not yet been a successful flight test of the operationally configured
    GBI equipped with the operationally configured EKV. The GBI booster has
    considerably greater velocity than the previous prototype booster, and
    the EKV is about 35 percent different from the previous prototype EKV.
    In a flight test in December 2002, the EKV failed to separate from the
    booster. What are the major technical and operational challenges of
    such separation?
        General Obering. The major technical challenges of EKV separation
    are related to the booster shock and vibration stressing of the EKV
    electrical and mechanical components and proper operation of the
    payload-separation laser firing units and ball lock mechanisms.
        The design and qualification of the operational EKV is based upon
    the flight environments induced by the operational, high-velocity
    booster. The operational booster does exhibit greater vibration and
    shock loads than the prototype booster, but the operational EKV was
    tested to this operational environment via ground testing.
        Mr. Duma. Prior flight tests demonstrated problems with EKV
    separation, as well as postseparation seeker performance. Design
    changes have been made to correct these problems. The initial technical
    challenges are to demonstrate that these corrective actions are
    adequate. The operational challenge is to execute separation and
    subsequent seeker functions in a realistic deployment sequence against
    various dynamic threat conditions.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering and Mr. Duma, do you have
    any concerns about potential EKV separation problems with the new high
    velocity booster?
        General Obering. We have high confidence in the operational
    performance of the EKV separation system with the operational Orbital
    booster. Successful in-flight separation of an EKV was demonstrated
    during Integrated Flight Test 13B in February 2004. This successful
    flight test verified upgrades precipitated by the December 2002
    separation failure, including an upgraded Laser Firing Unit on the
    EKV's separation subsystem. A comprehensive ground test campaign to
    verify separation functionality for the operational EKV has also been
    completed. This campaign included over 500 successful tests of the
    critical separation device (laser diodes) as well as shock and
    vibration testing of an operating Laser Firing Unit. In addition, each
    Laser Firing Unit intended for an operational or flight test EKV is
    rigorously tested at component assembly and prior to acceptance for
    integration.
        Mr. Duma. The new booster and new kill vehicle have never flown
    together. At the significantly higher booster motor velocity, the
    primary concern is that the kill vehicle properly separates from the
    booster motor and aligns itself so that it can successfully maneuver to
    intercept a target. Kill vehicle separation from the booster has never
    been conducted at these higher velocities. Vibration measurements taken
    on flight tests of the new booster design, with mock payloads, suggest
    that the shock and vibration environment on the new booster is more
    benign than the surrogate booster. MDA has made changes to the kill
    vehicle mounting hardware design to reduce vibration and increase the
    clearance needed to separate from the new booster. Successful kill
    vehicle separations over several flight tests will increase confidence
    that this should not be a major concern.

                          section 234 testing criteria
        28. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering and Mr. Duma, section 234
    of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005
    requires, among other things, that ``each block configuration of the
    BMD System is tested consistent with'' the criteria required in section
    234(a). Can you confirm that you will jointly develop such
    operationally realistic criteria for future tests, as you have for FTG
    04-3, and that future testing of each block of the BMD System will be
    consistent with the future criteria you develop for operationally
    realistic testing?
        General Obering and Mr. Duma. I believe this is exactly the
    agreement that General Obering and I have reached. Within the structure
    of section 234, we will include appropriate operational realism and
    develop operational criteria for each block configuration of the BMD
    System, and will conduct focused operational testing consistent with
    those criteria and the capability of the system. We will continue to
    combine developmental and operational testing, and will conduct focused
    operational testing on each BMD System block configuration before
    fielding. This will include appropriate configuration control on the
    tested system.

                             outyear funding wedge
        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne, at the hearing you
    explained that the $7.6 billion unbudgeted outyear funding wedge for
    the MDA represented costs that the military departments are expected to
    pay starting in fiscal year 2008. Have the Services been informed that
    they are expected to pay these additional costs, and have they budgeted
    for them?
        Mr. Wynne. The Department allotted approximately $1.5 billion to
    $2.0 billion per year to go to either the Services or BMD System
    deployment. Since fiscal year 2004, MDA has budgeted for deployment,
    including this year's fiscal year 2006 budget request; and they were
    told to continue to budget for it over fiscal year 2008-2011.

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne, are these additional
    funds based on agreed plans between MDA and the Services for transition
    of the missile defense system elements from MDA to the Services? If
    not, what is the basis upon which the Services would be expected to pay
    for the additional $7.6 billion?
        Mr. Wynne. The Department, the Services, and MDA are still working
    to finalize current and future element transition plans. To date these
    funds have been used for initial BMDS element deployment and have not
    been expenses the Services have been asked to budget for; the Services
    have only been asked to budget for certain Operations and Support
    costs.

                     dot&e assessment of gmd effectiveness
        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Duma, your organization issued a
    report in February concerning the capability of the GMD system.
    Although it is a classified report, it contains many unclassified
    portions. From those unclassified parts of the report, it is clear that
    DOT&E and the MDA have different assessments of how likely the GMD
    system is to work effectively. Can you describe, in unclassified terms,
    the major reasons for that difference? For example, does it depend on
    the difference between actual test data--or lack thereof--and estimates
    based on predictive models?
        Mr. Duma. The most significant reason for the disparity between the
    two Ballistic Missile Defense System capability estimates is that the
    DOT&E estimate is based on actual test data available from all credible
    ground and flight test sources, and MDA estimates are based on using
    the same test data, plus data generated from predictive models.
    Predictive models are used to develop the system's design and they
    reflect how the system is designed to work. Once realistic testing has
    been completed over a range of conditions or scenarios to yield data
    that validates these models, they can be used with confidence to
    estimate performance in a wider variety of conditions. However,
    sufficient data is not available at this time to validate these models,
    thus data from the predictive models were not used in the DOT&E
    assessment.

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, the DOT&E February report
    includes an unclassified list (on page 17) of nine areas where they
    have concerns about the ability to characterize the capability of the
    BMDS for limited defensive operations. What is MDA doing to resolve
    these concerns?
        General Obering. The MDA is addressing each of the concerns that
    have been highlighted by the DOT&E report. Overall, the testing program
    for the Ballistic Missile Defense System is one that is building on
    successes, and not taking unreasonable risks when anomalies are
    discovered. We are increasing the comprehensiveness of the testing
    program starting with increased component testing and integrated system
    testing, both in laboratories (using hardware-in-the-loop techniques)
    and in field environments (flight test configurations and distributed
    ground testing of fielded components). In addition I will address each
    area of concern.
        The first area of concern for the DOT&E, was System Maturity. To
    address this concern I have implemented an Evolutionary Acquisition
    program to design, build, integrate, test, and field increasingly
    mature capabilities for missile defense in a Block step-increment
    progression. The Evolutionary Acquisition approach is capability-based,
    with each Block providing a suite of reliability and producibility
    improvements coupled with improved performance capabilities. Each
    successive Block builds upon the previous Block, applying lessons
    learned to improve the system. This evolutionary approach incrementally
    provides decision makers the ability to field militarily useful
    capabilities based on their technological readiness, maturity and
    suitability for operational use, and ongoing threat developments. Each
    MDA Block is 2 years in duration.
        Another concern was the lack of system level test data on the
    Limited Defensive Operations configured elements. We do have limited
    test data on the Limited Defensive Operations configured GMD as an
    element of the BMD System that was collected from the Integrated Ground
    Test 2-4 events and System Integration and Checkout 6B. The Integrated
    GMD ground test (GT 04-1) and the Distributed GMD and system-level
    ground test events (GT 04-2 and GT 04-6) will provide more detailed
    system level test data for the Block 2004 configuration by the end of
    2005.
        A third area of concern was the lack of end-to-end flight test
    engagements. To address this concern, I have implemented a Mission
    Readiness Task Force (MRTF). The Mission Readiness Task Force will make
    recommendations to address flight test engagements with the operational
    realism necessary to meet or exceed the Congressional requirement, and
    the timeline over which these tests can reasonably be expected to
    occur. I will determine the timing, objective and schedule of each
    flight test after receiving those recommendations.
        The DOT&E also addressed test realism and the need for it to
    improve in future testing. As we move forward, our flight tests become
    more stressing and more realistic. That was always our plan. We will
    fold in more and more data from operational sensors (Aegis Ballistic
    Missile Defense Long Range Surveillance and Tracking Destroyers,
    Upgraded Early Warning Radar, Sea-Based X-Band Radar, and the Forward-
    Based X-Band Radar) and will add the capability of launching test
    missiles from an operational site (Vandenberg Air Force Base). The
    azimuth of the target vehicle (launched from Kodiak Island) and
    increasingly more complex target suites will add to the realism. For
    our ground tests we employ simulation techniques and high-fidelity,
    hardware-in-the-loop system components to make our test cases more
    realistic. We will continue to work closely with the Operational Test
    Agencies and the warfighters. As the system maturity improves and is
    demonstrated in test, we will increase the test realism even further,
    commensurate with risk, in a measured fashion, to help us understand
    the system's capabilities.
        Another area of concern I would like to address is the alleged lack
    of government configuration control documentation. The GMD element of
    the BMD System employs a rigorous configuration, control, and
    documentation process that addresses both development and deployment.
        Configuration of the deployed GMD element is captured in a
    configuration-controlled matrix listing deployed hardware and software.
    All proposed changes are processed through the Engineering Review Board
    chaired by the System Engineer. Recommended changes are reviewed and
    approved by the Program Director for Level 1 ECPs and by myself for
    Level 0 ECPs. I have signed off on the official operational baseline
    for the BMDS. MDA/SE has initiated an Operational Configuration Control
    Board (OCMB) that includes MDA and warfighter representatives and the
    OCMB charter is currently being staffed. The Board's approval will be
    required for changes to the approved baseline for tests and for
    permanent changes for upgrades. In summary, there is a rigorous
    configuration control process for the BMDS and the fielded
    configuration is documented.
        The DOT&E expressed concern over MDA's reliance on non-validated
    models and simulations. To address this concern we have employed a GMD
    program policy that requires a disciplined Verification, Validation,
    and Accreditation effort to obtain accreditation of simulated portions
    of ground test events. For Integrated Ground Tests 1,2,3, 4a, and 4b,
    we validated models and simulations used in the Integrated Ground Tests
    when authoritative real world data was available to compare with the
    simulation's output. Our Integrated Ground Tests were conducted using
    simulations for only a limited number of specific components of the GMD
    element. The Integrated Ground Test configurations are approximately 20
    percent simulation and 80 percent actual GMD hardware and software.
    Where there is no flight test data for final validation of the
    simulation, we make note of the fact that we did not have sufficient
    validation data to say with high confidence that the simulation is
    representative of actual component behavior. Once flight tests are
    completed and data becomes available, the data is applied to
    characterize the behavior and functioning of the simulation. This
    completes the Verification, Validation, and Accreditation effort.
        The lack of reliability and maintainability data has also been a
    concern for us. Since the DOT&E Report, the GMD program established and
    is using the GMD Situation Report to supplement the Prime Contractor
    Computerized Inventory Maintenance Management System to identify both
    scheduled and unscheduled maintenance events and provide
    maintainability data for the Limited Defense Capability Prime Mission
    Equipment and contractually provided facilities. To further resolve
    this concern, we are currently negotiating a change to the MDA GMD
    Prime Contract to provide for the development and implementation of a
    Non-Conformance Tracking System. The tracking system will be used to
    collect and consolidate all failure and maintenance data from the GMD
    Prime Mission Equipment, and government provided facilities. The data
    from the system will be used by both the Prime Contractor and the
    Government to identify root cause for failures and to assist in the
    tracking of corrective actions and failure trends.
        The DOT&E expressed concern that our developmental flight-tests to
    date have flown against precisely characterized target complexes in a
    scripted manner. In response to that concern I would note that some
    degree of scripting is required to address flight safety
    considerations, and to ensure maximum engineering flight test value
    through carefully considered test objectives. Limited scripting also
    helps us learn and verify system attributes, capabilities, and
    limitations through empirical data analysis and verification. This is
    accomplished in a measured, step-wise fashion. As the system matures, a
    more operationally oriented test program (that is, less a priori
    information and more randomness in certain test conditions) can be
    achieved. In future flight tests, as we gain confidence in components
    and as system level developmental test objectives are sufficiently
    demonstrated, less a priori information will be made available.
        Another issue concerned prime contractor personnel responsibility
    for conducting flight test missions. I will say that such is not
    unusual in developmental testing. Again, as developmental test
    objectives are satisfied, more and more military operators are included
    in testing. Military operators did man some of the system consoles
    during Integrated Flight Test l3C. This will continue and increase for
    future flight tests. For ground tests conducted for the operational
    system, we use a ground test hardware-in-the-loop system to accomplish
    required developmental objectives. The hardware-in-the-loop system is
    then turned over to military operators for Operational Testing use.
    This practice will also be continued.
        The DOT&E was concerned that ground testing with the deployed
    hardware and software has just recently begun, and is not part of this
    assessment, and that Limited Defensive Operations hardware and software
    configurations have not yet been flight tested. I want to note that
    Distributed GMD and system-level ground tests (GT 04-2 and GT 04-6) are
    scheduled for the end of the calendar year 2005. These two events
    coupled with the preceding laboratory hardware-in-the-loop integrated
    ground test (GT04-1) will provide a comprehensive test of the fielded
    Block 2004 operational hardware and software. Hardware and software
    configurations from these ground tests will be included for the next
    flight tests. Those tests will add to our knowledge of hardware and
    software components of the BMD System that were tested during IFT-13C
    and IFT-14. The GBI will be flight-tested but I will defer setting a
    definitive schedule until I receive the recommendations of the Mission
    Readiness Task Force.
        Lastly, the DOT&E was concerned that due to the contractor
    personnel maintaining the system, reliability and maintainability data
    are very limited. The DOT&E stated that although these data voids are
    normal for a program in this early stage of development, the desire to
    deploy the system for operational missions increases the significance
    of these data voids and increases the risk associated with deployment.
    The GMD Element is comprised of a combination of legacy systems,
    modified legacy systems, contracted Prime Mission Equipment, and
    government provided facilities. The legacy systems, such as Cobra Dane
    and the Early Warning Radar (Beale), have their own existing
    sustainment programs to collect and archive reliability and
    maintainability data. That data is provided to the MDA. The GMD Prime
    Mission Equipment was designed and developed for contractor logistic
    support. As such, the GMD prime contractor is responsible for the
    reliability and maintainability data for the Prime Mission Equipment
    and the government provided facilities. As I discussed earlier, the GMD
    Element has processes to collect reliability and maintainability data.
    This data is made available to the Joint Reliability and
    Maintainability Evaluation Team (Operational Test agency, Warfighter,
    MDA, and Prime Contractor personnel). Although the data is as yet
    limited, when the previous discussed changes to the Prime Contract are
    made later this year, the GMD Program expects sufficient reliability
    and maintainability data will be available over the next year to be
    able to determine the expected availability of the Element and, if
    necessary, what corrective actions are needed. We believe the course we
    have laid out, will mitigate the risks associated with the decision to
    deploy the developmental system.

      military utility assessment of ground-based midcourse defense (gmd)
                                     system
        33. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, you led the military
    utility assessment of the GMD. Did you conclude that the system as it
    is today provides significant military utility and capability, or that
    it needs more time for testing and development to achieve such utility
    and capability?
        General Cartwright. The Military Utility Assessment has been
    forwarded to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) who is the releasing
    authority for the document.

                    strategic command (stratcom) user input
        34. Senator Bill Nelson. General Cartwright, as the responsible
    combatant commander for integrated missile defense, do you have a
    process whereby you can provide user input to the MDA as to the
    warfighter needs of the different regional and functional commanders,
    including yourself? In other words, are you able to tell MDA what
    capabilities would be most useful to the warfighters, rather than
    simply receiving what the developers can produce? If so, how does that
    process work?
        General Cartwright. Yes, the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP)
    injects warfighter needs into the MDA. This process is being evolved to
    improve and streamline warfighter advocacy in the BMDS development
    process.
        The WIP is used to collaboratively develop combatant commander
    (COCOM) capability needs for Integrated Missile Defense (IMD). The WIP
    currently has five subordinate Focus Groups to address specific needs
    in Command and Control Battle Management Communications (C2BMC), Active
    Defense, Sensors, Architecture and Engineering and Test and Evaluation.
    The intent of the Focus Groups is to analyze, validate, and baseline
    capability issues to assist in MDA's development effort. As an example,
    the C2BMC Focus Group just recently convened in March to review 99
    desired capabilities (findings from the October/December 2004 planner
    experiment) that resulted in 29 Modification Requests submitted to MDA
    to enhance C2BMC capability.
        My staff, in conjunction with the Joint Theater Air and Missile
    Defense Organization (JTAMDO) is working to expand the existing WIP to
    address the full spectrum of Doctrine, Organization, Training,
    Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTLMPF)
    issues in support of the IMD mission.

                         cost pressures on mda and bmd
        35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Wynne and General Obering, in
    its recent report on the status of the BMD program in 2004, the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that MDA faced cost
    overruns of some $370 million for fiscal year 2004, and that in the
    future ``MDA will likely face increased funding risks,'' both from
    other DOD programs and from the increased funding required for
    procurement and sustainment as more missile defense components are
    fielded over time. What are you doing to keep the missile defense
    program from having such cost overruns and to remain as affordable as
    possible?
        Mr. Wynne. General Obering continuously monitors development and
    production contractual performance and makes internal adjustments as
    needed. I personally review the entire BMDS program once a quarter. To
    minimize technical risk, and in turn cost risk, MDA has adopted a
    knowledge-based acquisition process, where individual elements have to
    achieve a series of technical and programmatic milestones. Lieutenant
    General Obering has the latitude to terminate, delay, or accelerate
    individual efforts providing him options for various phases of defense.
    This allows him to strike the best balance between the defensive
    capabilities to be fielded and available funding.
        General Obering. Some facets of future layered Missile Defense
    remain technologically challenging. To minimize the technical risk, and
    in turn the cost risk, MDA has adopted a knowledge-based acquisition
    process where individual programs have to achieve a series of technical
    and programmatic milestones. Lieutenant General Obering assesses
    program progress and has the latitude to terminate, delay, or
    accelerate individual programs providing him options for various phases
    of defense. This allows him to strike the best balance between the
    defensive capabilities to be fielded and available funding.

             government accountability office report recommendation
        36. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, GAO recently issued its
    annual report on the status of the BMD program in 2004, as required by
    law that was written by this Committee. GAO found that MDA has not
    consistently aligned its cost and fielding goals. For example, MDA has
    requested funds for Block 2004 activities that will actually be carried
    out in later blocks, a practice that GAO says obscures the relationship
    between requested funding and delivered capabilities. The DOD concurred
    with the GAO's recommendation that MDA should ``clarify and modify, as
    needed, its block policy to ensure that a block's cost and fielding
    goals are consistently aligned.'' What are you doing, or planning to
    do, to implement GAO's recommendation, and when will your
    implementation of this recommendation be complete?
        General Obering. This year the MDA submitted to Congress the
    baseline documentation as required by law and recommended by the GAO. I
    believe the baseline document addresses the shortcomings of our Block
    reporting structure as highlighted by GAO and provides sufficient data
    against which our annual progress in missile defense development and
    fielding can be measured. Specifically, I believe the baseline document
    more appropriately aligns our cost and fielding goals.

                         arrow missile defense program
        37. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, how would you assess the
    success of the Arrow program to date, including the flight test results
    from Point Mugu?
        General Obering. The Arrow Program has been one of our most
    successful Missile Defense programs. It has an outstanding test record
    and is proving to be well suited for its mission as Israel's National
    Missile Defense System. Tests in Israel and in the United States (Point
    Mugu, CA) have shown the system is very effective against short range
    ballistic missile threats such as the various SCUD-class missiles.
        The first test at Point Mugu in July 2004 intercepted a short range
    liquid fueled missile and accomplished all test objectives. The second
    test at Point Mugu in August 2004 was an attempt to intercept a more
    complex short range target with a separating warhead. This test
    completed many of its objectives and confirmed that the system has
    inherent capability to accomplish the mission against a more
    challenging threat. However, an intercept was not achieved due to a
    component failure during the interceptor's second stage of flight.
    Subsequent investigation pointed to damage resulting from high
    vibration levels during the interceptor's transport from Israel to
    Point Mugu as the most likely cause of the component failure.

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. General Obering, given the expanding
    threat of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles in the Middle
    East, do you think there might be utility in a joint U.S.-Israeli
    effort to address this threat?
        General Obering. The Arrow system, supported by Patriot, has been
    developed and optimized to defend Israel against the medium-range and
    most short-range ballistic missiles. Our joint U.S.-Israeli Arrow
    System Improvement Program continues to assess and improve the
    capability of the Arrow Weapon System to meet the evolving threat in
    the region.
        The proliferation of short range ballistic missiles and large-
    caliber rockets is of great concern to both Israel and the United
    States. At present, the Israeli Patriot system has the capability to
    intercept some of these threats, albeit at a relatively high cost. In
    the United States, the MDA and the military services are developing
    other systems that will add to this capability in the future.
        We recognize that developing an effective yet low cost interceptor
    to defend against these short range threats will be a significant
    challenge. Recently, Israel began evaluating the feasibility of two
    concepts for low-cost interceptor systems proposed by Israeli industry.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                          need for operational testing
        39. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne and General Obering, at the
    hearing, General Cartwright and Mr. Duma both said that the currently
    fielded GMD system is not yet mature and needs realistic operational
    testing, consistent with the maturity of the system. Do you agree with
    their assessment?
        Mr. Wynne and General Obering. We are in the early stages of
    providing an unprecedented defensive capability; and our confidence is
    based on performance of individual elements of the system and of
    testing conducted throughout the development program, supplemented by
    modeling and simulation. We now must drive discipline into our
    processes, improve the overall system reliability so that the system
    works every time, and verify this with realistic operational testing.
    In that sense, I agree the system is not yet mature.

                              flight test failure
        40. Senator Reed. General Obering, you have characterized the
    failure in Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-13C of the GBI to launch as a
    minor ``glitch'' involving one line of software code. Can you explain
    why the problem was not found and corrected prior to IFT-13C in the
    engineering and integration phases of development and testing?
        General Obering. The problem was not found in testing prior to
    Integrated Flight Test -13C because one of the GMD system component
    simulators used in ground testing did not exactly reflect the flight
    hardware configuration. Accordingly, all aspects of the interceptor
    behavior were not captured during ground testing. Specifically for
    Integrated Flight Test -13C, the Inertial Measurement Unit Simulator
    used in pre-mission testing did not operate at the exact clock
    frequency used by the flight hardware. This minor clock difference
    meant that certain non-periodic timing behavior of the integrated
    booster vehicle electronics was not properly captured during ground
    testing. The root cause of the Integrated Flight Test-13C failure-to-
    launch was a software threshold set overly conservatively to 10 percent
    of the allowable limit. It was not caught in ground testing because of
    the minor differences in this non-periodic timing behavior between the
    Inertial Measurement Unit flight hardware and the simulator which
    represents it used in ground testing. The software correction made sets
    the threshold at the allowable limit.

        41. Senator Reed. General Obering, how will you ensure that there
    are no other similar software problems in a system that has millions of
    lines of software code, many of which are being revised and changed on
    a regular basis?
        General Obering. The processes used for development, testing, and
    verification of software code are among many areas under review by an
    independent Mission Readiness Task Force that I have formed and asked
    Rear Admiral Paige to lead. The Mission Readiness Task Force is
    reviewing all processes and procedures to ensure needed flight-testing
    corrective actions are taken and that the GMD Program is ready to
    return to flight-testing.
        In addition, we are committed to maintaining configuration control
    of the operational BMD System at all times with the establishment of an
    Operational Configuration Control Board. Under the Operational
    Configuration Control Board, no changes are permitted to the
    operational hardware or software outside of this formal configuration
    control process.
        There is no way to completely guarantee no software errors.
    However, the GMD program has implemented rigorous processes for
    software assurance, peer reviews, end-to-end ground testing using high
    fidelity hardware-in-the-loop system test facilities and actual fielded
    hardware, and Independent Verification and Validation assessments to
    mitigate potential software problems. In addition, fault tolerant
    software design features are built-in to the system wherever possible.
        GMD software development organizations are required to meet the
    Software Engineering Institute's Software Capability Maturity Model
    level three--or higher--which fosters defined, repeatable software
    development processes. The Software Capability Maturity Model is the
    most up to date industry standard recommended for software development
    organizations. The Model describes an evolutionary improvement path to
    a mature, disciplined software development approach. The prime
    contractor and the government provide joint teams to periodically
    verify compliance, following the Software Engineering Institute's
    compliance evaluation process. By following these processes, the
    software development organizations form teams that eliminate faults and
    hold individual developers accountable for their work. Peer reviews
    conducted during the requirements, design, coding, and test procedure
    generation phases of the software development process have proven to be
    an effective means to identify and correct software problems. Other
    errors may be found and corrected during the component unit,
    integration, and system test phases. System level faults can also be
    found by the software development organizations when external
    interfaces can be realistically simulated. It is the strength of these
    processes that determine the quality of the software that is delivered
    to the prime contractor's integration and system test labs.
        The integration of software for various components is done in
    hardware-in-the-loop system test laboratories, where it is further
    tested against all requirements using the standards above. Test
    procedures are well documented and the testing does not proceed to the
    next step until all criteria are met. The software is kept under
    configuration control and if any changes are required in order to
    satisfy a requirement, the software must undergo regression testing to
    confirm all previous results. This rigorous testing and retesting is
    done throughout the integration process in the laboratory. Once the
    system is fully integrated in the laboratory, it is thoroughly tested
    against the established requirements. These system-level tests are
    called Integrated Ground Tests and are used to understand system
    behavior against a wide range of threats and environments.
        Once the software is certified by these laboratory processes, it is
    loaded into the components in the field for a distributed ground or
    flight test. There are well-defined rigorous standards and
    instrumentation for testing conducted during this stage to insure the
    software continues to perform in the same manner as it did in the
    laboratory.
        Finally, concurrent with these Prime Contractor procedures, the
    government conducts Independent Verification and Validation to ensure
    the software meets system requirements. Independent Verification and
    Validation teams evaluate requirements and code development, and
    perform independent testing of component (interceptor, radar, fire
    control) software builds. This process is repeated at the integrated
    GMD system level where all the components are brought together.

          distinguishing ballistic missiles from space launch vehicles
        42. Senator Reed. General Obering, there are currently a number of
    programs underway to produce a boost-phase or ascent-phase missile
    defense capability. If these development efforts succeed in producing
    such a capability, the systems would have to operate on extremely short
    time-lines to succeed. Given the short operational time-lines, how will
    our system distinguish between a space launch vehicle with a satellite
    payload and a threatening ballistic missile with a warhead, so we do
    not shoot down a space launch vehicle?
        General Obering. The battle management process for our boost phase
    intercept systems can potentially take advantage of multiple elements
    of information including the missile launch location, current public
    and intelligence information, and the missile launch trajectory to
    avoid engaging satellite launch vehicles. First, satellite launches are
    normally conducted from well-known launch sites. Second, we would
    expect notification of planned satellite launches in accordance with
    public international practice, or from U.S. intelligence sources.
    Finally, analysis of the trajectory of an ascending space launch
    vehicle, using data from the sensors supporting the boost phase
    intercept systems, can determine whether there are potential targets
    along the projected flight path. In some cases, the launch vehicle's
    heading (launch azimuth) may be well away from any plausible targets,
    and could be excluded from engagement. However, if the vehicle were
    either unannounced or significantly deviated from its planned flight
    path, time of launch, or location, and is determined to be a capable of
    reaching the U.S. our operators may consider it a hostile act.

                         flight tests from fort greely
        43. Senator Reed. General Obering, your predecessor General Kadish
    told this committee last year that he was completing necessary studies
    to support using Fort Greely as a missile test launch site in the
    future. What is the status of that effort to use Fort Greely as a test
    launch site?
        General Obering. The MDA conducted a preliminary study looking at
    the technical feasibility of test launching GBIs from Fort Greely last
    April. Specifically, the MDA performed a quick look feasibility
    analysis of possible flight trajectories from Fort Greely considering
    several factors, including operationally realistic engagements, target
    launch sites, and safety.
        The MDA then conducted an initial range safety assessment often
    preliminary ``most feasible'' GBI trajectories. This preliminary study
    identified three potential flight corridors that if subjected to a more
    refined and rigorous flight safety analysis could pass range safety
    standards for public safety. Results of this additional study could be
    used as inputs to MDA's subsequent environmental studies.
        We are building a Geographical Information System tool to
    facilitate our analysis of mapping data characterizing the Alaska
    region. This Geographical Information System analysis tool will assist
    MDA test planners in developing potential flight test alternatives that
    could be subjected to further safety and environmental analysis if MDA
    considers continuing planning towards a decision for test launches from
    Fort Greely.

        44. Senator Reed. General Obering, does MDA still plan to fire test
    missiles from Fort Greely? If so, what is the earliest point such tests
    would be launched from Fort Greely?
        General Obering. While we have conducted a feasibility analysis and
    are building a Geographic Information System tool to support our
    planning process, we would not make definitive plans to test launch
    GBIs from Fort Greely until after the necessary environmental- and
    safety-related studies are completed, which will take between 13 and 24
    months depending on the complexity of the analyses. In addition, we
    would need to develop the mandatory data collection architecture and
    range safety procedures to safely support GBI's launches from Fort
    Greely, which could take an additional 12 months, for a total of 2 to 3
    years. The earliest such tests could be conducted would be 2 to 3 years
    after the initiation of the National Environmental Policy Act process.

                       bmd mission goal and affordability
        45. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, the stated goal of the BMDS is
    to defeat ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight in
    defense of our homeland, our deployed forces overseas, our allies, and
    our friends. We are spending nearly $10 billion per year to develop
    missile defense systems, and have barely begun to field relatively
    immature systems. What is the order of magnitude you believe it would
    cost to deploy and operate a missile defense system over the next 30
    years that can defeat all short-, medium-, intermediate-, and long-
    range ballistic missiles in their boost, midcourse, and terminal phases
    of flight virtually around the globe on a 24-hour, 365-day basis--if it
    is technically possible?
        Mr. Wynne. Today the U.S. has an initial capability to destroy
    missiles heading toward the U.S. where previously we had none. The BMDS
    now in-place cost roughly $12 billion, which is a small fraction of the
    cost one weapon of mass destruction could inflict on the Nation. The
    spiral development program we have in place will deliver additional
    capabilities in increments. The configuration of these increments, and
    thus the 30-year cost, will be affected by future circumstances,
    including changes in the threat.

        46. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, do you have any concerns about
    the affordability of such a system, especially given the need to
    provide adequate resources for our worldwide effort to defeat
    international terrorism?
        Mr. Wynne. Affordability must be judged in light of the stakes
    involved. The GAO Audit 02-700R estimated damage costs for the
    terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, alone, at $83 billion. A
    single WMD-tipped ballistic missile would cause far greater damage and
    costs to the Nation. September 11 showed us that our adversaries are
    willing to attack by any means available. If we abandon a missile
    defense capability for this Nation, we may be seen as inviting
    terrorists to pursue this form of attack.

        47. Senator Reed. Secretary Wynne, is it possible that, if the
    ballistic missile threat does not become severe, we could decide upon a
    less robust and less costly missile defense system?
        Mr. Wynne. There are currently more than 20 countries with
    ballistic missile technology; and, even after implementing the next few
    blocks of BMD System capability, we will just be catching up with the
    current threat. If, however, the presence of our system dissuades
    further proliferation of ballistic missiles, it may be appropriate to
    scale back future growth.

     airborne laser (abl) program versus kinetic energy interceptor (kei)
                                    funding
        48. Senator Reed. General Obering, your prepared testimony
    indicates it will be at least 3 years before we even know whether the
    Airborne Laser program (ABL) or the KEI program can provide a useful
    boost-phase missile defense capability. In the meantime, the budget
    request indicates that we plan to spend over $9 billion on these two
    systems over the next 6 years. If either program shows that it cannot
    affordably provide a significant military capability, or won't work,
    will you terminate the program, or take whatever steps are appropriate
    to prevent unnecessary spending on a failing program?
        General Obering. Yes. The authority to make terminations and other
    program tradeoffs within the single BMD program has been delegated to
    me by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the MDA charter. In the event
    I terminated a part of the BMDS program, I would redirect funds and
    usable technology from the cancelled program to other, more promising
    efforts elsewhere in the BMDS. I would, of course, consult with the
    Under Secretary (AT&L) and, in the process, I would comply with
    reprogramming requirements and otherwise keep the defense committees
    informed.

        49. Senator Reed. General Obering, are you examining ways of
    learning the technical feasibility and utility of either technology in
    a less costly manner?
        General Obering. We have proven the feasibility of the enabling
    technologies for the ABL/KEI at the subcomponent, assembly, and item
    levels. ABL recently had successful ``first light'' and ``first
    flight'' tests; the KEI design requires no new inventions or technology
    breakthroughs. What we have not done yet is integrate the key ABL/KEI
    capabilities and tested them at the full-scale performance levels
    needed to assess boost phase intercept military utility. This full
    scale design, development, integration, and testing is necessary to
    support a decision to move forward with the acquisition of either the
    ABL/KEI. This is why we established the fiscal year 2008 knowledge
    points for both the ABL/KEI programs. Our plan is to closely monitor
    incremental progress made in each program between now and fiscal year
    2008. If we run into execution issues prior to fiscal year 2008 we will
    make the appropriate decisions and budget adjustments. If ABL and KEI
    are successful through 2008, we may proceed with both because of the
    complementary capabilities they offer the BMD System. We believe this
    is the most efficient acquisition approach for the country in this
    critical capability area.

        50. Senator Reed. General Obering, is it your intention to proceed
    with only one of these programs, depending on which one shows the
    greatest promise--assuming either or both would work? Or would you plan
    on fielding both systems? If the latter, what would be the estimated
    total cost to build and operate both systems?
        General Obering. ABL is our primary boost phase program, and KEI is
    a backup in the boost/ascent phase. The KEI booster also will have
    significant capability as a midcourse interceptor, particularly for
    some of the advanced payloads we are developing, for example the
    Multiple Kill Vehicle payload. The Department will make a decision on
    whether to pursue one, both, or neither of these programs in the fiscal
    year 2008 time frame, after each program has passed through major
    capability demonstrations--or knowledge points.
        If we pursue both programs, we could field one land-based KEI fire
    unit (10 interceptors) in the 2012-2014 timeframe and the two ABL test
    bed aircraft in the 2014-2016 timeframe. In the fiscal year 2006
    President's budget, MDA has included about $4.3 billion for ABL and
    $4.9 billion for KEI in fiscal year 2006-2011. These costs are
    associated with the development programs and do not include funds to
    field or operate these systems. Pending successful capability
    demonstrations, as both of these systems continue to mature MDA intends
    to work with the Department and the Services to determine appropriate
    fielding opportunities and refine the costs beyond the FYDP that would
    be required to build and operate these systems.

                                 space test bed
        51. Senator Reed. General Obering, the budget request documents
    indicate that you plan to begin a space test bed project in fiscal year
    2008 that is intended to produce space-based interceptors on 50-100
    satellites, and include ``multiple space-based intercept tests in Block
    2012-2014 and a constellation production decision in Block 2014.''
    Placing interceptors in space would be a controversial and expensive
    step. Congress eliminated the funding last year for space-based
    interceptor work. We are already fielding the Patriot PAC-3 system and
    the GMD system. We are starting to produce standard missiles for the
    Navy's Aegis BMD system, and pursuing the ABL and KEI systems, as well
    as THAAD--all at a cost of more than $50 billion over the next 6 years.
    We are facing a very limited long-range ballistic missile threat. I
    understand that the budget request indicates some $670 million in the
    FYDP just to start the space test bed. What would a space-based
    interceptor (SBI) system cost to build and operate, including the full
    constellation of satellites and related equipment?
        General Obering. We intend to use the space test bed to explore the
    advantages, and the costs, of engaging ballistic missile threats from
    space. We cannot reliably estimate costs until we learn more. As
    mentioned in our budget documentation, a constellation of 50-100
    satellites would provide a thin boost/ascent capability against ICBMs
    (and a midcourse capability against medium to intercontinental range
    ballistic missiles), regardless of the origin of the threat and the
    size of the threat country. We have not made a decision to produce such
    a constellation. The space test bed effort will examine concepts for,
    and the size and cost of, a space-based interceptor constellation.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
                             missile defense policy
        52. Senator Clinton. Mr. Duma, in mid-February, I had an exchange
    with Secretary Rumsfeld on the administration's Missile Defense Policy.
    I pointed out that the last time there was a successful intercept test
    of the National Missile Defense System was October 2002 and that was
    using immature, surrogate components in a highly choreographed and
    unrealistic test.
        Now, President Bush decided, in December 2002, to begin fielding
    the system by the end of 2004, before any operational tests were
    planned or conducted. Since the President's decision, there have only
    been failed intercept flight tests of the system. The new interceptor
    has not even left the silo during the tests. Would you agree that
    realistic operational tests could give us confidence in whether the
    system works effectively, and that if the system does not work
    effectively, we should not be spending billions of dollars on it?
        Mr. Duma. I agree that realistic operational testing is essential
    to characterizing the capabilities of the BMD System. Until we have
    challenged the system in a realistic testing environment, I do not
    believe we can confidently assess its effectiveness, suitability,
    survivability, and lethality. Characterizing performance is a critical
    step to support prioritizing the Department's resources. The
    appropriate investment strategy for Ballistic Missile Defense is for
    Congress and the administration to decide.

        53. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne, in your testimony, you state
    that ``we have indeed fielded an inherent capability that can be used
    for limited defense of the United States against long-range threats
    from North Korea.'' Given that the last time we had a successful test
    was October 2002 and that was using immature, surrogate components in a
    highly choreographed and unrealistic test, how can you describe the
    U.S. as having ``an inherent capability?''
        Mr. Wynne. Our confidence in the capabilities we are placing in
    service is based on an assessment of the performance of individual
    elements of the system and of the overall system during testing
    conducted throughout the development program, supplemented by modeling
    and simulation. We are in the early stages of providing an
    unprecedented defensive capability. Our recent GBI failures have not
    shaken our confidence in the fundamental system. This is a complex
    system with a number of components that have to work together, and MDA
    is implementing a thorough quality control program that is focused on
    the small details that will improve the overall system reliability. I
    am confident future testing will demonstrate the full capabilities and
    quality of the BMDS.

        54. Senator Clinton. Secretary Wynne, General Cartwright, Mr. Duma,
    and General Obering, during an exchange with Secretary Rumsfeld at an
    Armed Services Committee hearing in February, I said to him: ``I know
    that the decision was made by the President to deploy, to begin
    fielding the system, by the end of 2004. So it's basically the position
    of the administration that we're deploying regardless of whether we
    have any successful tests, for whatever reason--whether it was computer
    errors in getting the silo open or other more serious errors--we're
    still committed to deploying a system that has not proven it can work.
    As I understand the theory behind that, that just by deploying a
    system, it serves a deterrent value. It strikes me a little odd that we
    would deploy a system that hasn't succeeded and expect that to serve a
    deterrent value.''
        Secretary Rumsfeld replied, ``I agree with that point, that there's
    no deterrent if something is known to not work.''
        Do you agree with Secretary Rumsfeld that a missile defense system
    that hasn't succeeded will not have a deterrent value?
        Mr. Wynne. I agree with the Secretary's statement that ``there's no
    deterrent if something is known to not work.'' However, we believe the
    BMDS does work and provides a limited missile defensive capability. The
    BMDS testing to date shows the system is fundamentally sound and has an
    inherent operational capability. The two recent test failures have been
    frustrating as they have prevented testing all of the system's
    capabilities. Lieutenant General Obering has recently implemented an
    extensive quality control program. I approved this program, and I have
    asked him to emphasize it. I am confident the overall system will work;
    now I want to see it work consistently.
        General Cartwright. In the case of the BMD System, we have a system
    that has demonstrated a rudimentary capability through extensive
    testing. While some recent testing has not been successful, the MDA and
    the warfighter community have gained valuable knowledge in the
    evolution of this new mission and we will use the results to further
    refine capabilities. Recent failures have been fixed. Scheduled testing
    in 2005 will provide redundancy and depth to command and control
    sensors and weapons.
        Mr. Duma and General Obering. I agree that a system which is known
    not to work has no deterrent value.

        55. Senator Clinton. General Obering, in your prepared testimony,
    you state that ``with the initial fielding last year of the GMD and
    Aegis surveillance and track capabilities of this integrated system, we
    are establishing a limited defensive capability against a long range
    North Korean missile threat. Is the system in place able to target
    missiles in each phase of launch?
        General Obering. Yes, the system in place is able to track and
    destroy long range missiles in each phase of flight. The Defense
    Support Satellite (DSP) system provides the initial warning to the BMD
    System that a missile has been launched, and will track the missile up
    through its burnout phase. The Aegis BMD ships, by utilizing their on-
    board radars, track the missile while it is still burning through
    burnout and then through the initial ballistic trajectory, i.e.
    unpowered flight. Finally, based upon the information received from
    these two sensors and the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska; the BMD
    System interceptor is launched to intercept the threat missile in the
    midcourse phase of flight. For shorter range missiles, the Patriot PAC-
    3 is our battle tested defense for missiles in the terminal phase. With
    the development, testing and fielding of each subsequent block of the
    system, we will create a layered BMD System and increase our ability to
    respond to all phases of the ballistic missile threat.

        56. Senator Clinton. General Obering and Mr. Duma, MDA documents
    acknowledge that during the midcourse phase, there is a greater
    opportunity to deploy countermeasures against a defensive system. These
    countermeasures include readily available technology such as separating
    reentry vehicles, radar absorbing material, booster fragmentation, low
    power jammers, chaff, and even simple balloon decoys. Has there been
    any testing of the ability of the missile defense system to respond to
    these countermeasures? What has been the result?
        General Obering. [Deleted.]
        General Obering. Yes, by using data from our early sensor flight
    tests and data from other U.S. flight tests, we have conducted several
    ground hardware in the loop tests and high fidelity simulations which
    ``flew'' both simple and moderately complex countermeasures using the
    actual processors and discrimination algorithms from the kill vehicles,
    battle management, and radars. the GMD system, using a prototype EKV,
    has also been successfully tested against threat-representative
    separating reentry vehicles accompanied by various debris and some
    countermeasure objects. We also have conducted non-intercept flight
    tests known as risk reduction flights, which have successfully tested
    the radar discrimination algorithms against a range of countermeasures.
        A more detailed explanation involves classified information, which
    we have provided under separate cover.
        Mr. Duma. [Deleted.]

        57. Senator Clinton. General Obering and Mr. Duma, ostensibly, the
    decision to deploy a missile defense system by 2004 and 2005 is to
    defend the U.S. against a possible missile attack by North Korea. Will
    the system in place this year be able to defend against North Korean
    missiles if they are equipped with countermeasures?
        General Obering. The BMD System currently available for emergency
    operations provides a defensive capability against ballistic missile
    attacks from North Korea. The EKV provides the discrimination
    capability for the GMD Element to defend the United States and it
    demonstrated an initial capability to discriminate between a threat
    warhead and simple countermeasures. The SBX will begin to contribute in
    late 2005 to the GMD element by providing additional capability for
    discriminating the threat warhead from simple countermeasures. These
    additional SBX capabilities will be used to help direct the EKV to the
    threat warhead. In short, if the countermeasures are simple, then the
    current system in place will be able to discriminate between the threat
    warhead and other objects in the threat cluster. Of course, additional
    and more robust discrimination capabilities will be integrated in
    future Block upgrades of the BMD System.
        Mr. Duma. Intelligence estimates suggest the North Korean threat
    has very limited countermeasure capability at this time. MDA has
    achieved intercepts during developmental testing, against some limited
    countermeasures. The two most recent flight test attempts were intended
    to demonstrate capability against other simple countermeasure, but
    difficulties with the missile pre-flight check and the ground support
    equipment prevented the interceptor from launching. MDA is building the
    test bed infrastructure to support testing under more realistic
    operational conditions, including countermeasures.

        58. Senator Clinton. General Obering and Mr. Duma, do we know if
    the North Koreans are researching countermeasures technology for their
    missile program?
        General Obering. The answer is classified, and we have provided it
    under separate cover.
        General Obering. [Deleted.]
        Mr. Duma. [Deleted.]

        59. Senator Clinton. General Cartwright and General Obering, the
    boost phase missile defense approach is the one that seems the least
    affected by possible countermeasures. Given that the location of North
    Korea and Iran--the most likely threats of a ballistic missile threat--
    are such that a boost phase intercept system is technically feasible,
    how are boost phase interceptors incorporated into your missile defense
    plan?
        General Cartwright. Currently, there are no operational active
    defense boost phase systems to support global missile defense. Systems
    in development by the MDA and the Navy have an emergency capability to
    counter short range ballistic missiles and medium range ballistic
    missiles in late boost and early mid-course. This system is
    incorporated into current plans only as a BMDS Emergency Activation
    Capability. Other boost phase active defense capabilities, such as ABL,
    are projected for later spiral blocks but are not currently considered
    in the existing missile defense plans. New boost phase intercept
    capabilities will be incorporated into BMDS Emergency Activation Plans
    and other operational plans as these new system capabilities become
    available for employment by the warfighter.
        General Obering. We plan to have boost phase interceptors ready for
    introduction into the BMD System in Block 12 or Block 14. We are
    currently restructuring the KEIs program to account for reduction of
    our BMD System Interceptors Program Element by $5 billion over fiscal
    years 2006 through 2009 (as compared to President's Budget 2005). The
    results of the restructure, to be completed by the end of calendar year
    2005, will tell us in which of these two blocks boost phase
    interceptors will be available.
        Boost-phase interceptors will initially deploy on land-mobile
    tractor trailers, enabling a boost defense layer against landlocked
    states like Iran. We will design our interceptors for easy adaptation
    to deploy on ships. Sea-mobile interceptors can defend against states
    like North Korea where it may not be possible to use land-mobile
    interceptors. The MDA, working with the Navy, will decide in the next
    year on the appropriate platform and schedule for deploying sea-mobile
    boost phase interceptors.
        In the near term, our KEIs program is focusing on the essential
    development and test efforts required to demonstrate critical boost
    defense capability and support a fiscal year 2008 knowledge-based
    decision point on continuing the program.

        [Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]