[Senate Hearing 109-22]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-22, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1042
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
APRIL 12 AND 19, 2005
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JACK REED, Rhode Island
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Navy Shipbuilding and Industrial Base Status
april 12, 2005
Page
Clark, ADM Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............. 4
Toner, Michael W., Executive Vice President--Marine Systems,
General Dynamics Corporation................................... 22
Dur, Philip A., Ph.D., President, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems.. 43
O'Rourke, Ronald, National Defense Specialist, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 50
United States Marine Corps Ground and Rotary Wing Programs and
Seabasing
april 19, 2005
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 99
Sestak, VADM Joseph A., Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs............... 118
Magnus, Lt. Gen. Robert, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and
Resources; Accompanied by Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC,
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development....................... 127
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NAVY SHIPBUILDING AND INDUSTRIAL BASE STATUS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent, Collins,
Lieberman, and Reed.
Majority staff members present: Gregory T. Kiley,
professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Mackenzie M. Eaglen,
assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
Senator Talent; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; and William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. The subcommittee will come to order. I am
going to start my opening statement. I expect Senator Kennedy
will arrive while I am giving it and, given the lateness of the
hour and the fact we were interrupted with a vote, in order to
maximize your time, Admiral, I will just go ahead and convene
the subcommittee and we will begin.
The subcommittee meets today in open session to receive
testimony on shipbuilding and on the shipbuilding industrial
base. We have just left a very informative closed session with
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, who has
been kind enough to give us more time today as the first
panelist in this open hearing. Thank you again, Admiral, for
taking time out of your busy schedule to be here.
In our second panel this afternoon we have: Michael Toner,
the Executive Vice President of Marine Systems for General
Dynamics; Dr. Philip Dur, the President of Northrop Grumman
Ship Systems; and Ronald O'Rourke, a recognized expert on naval
matters from the Congressional Research Service (CRS). I want
to thank those gentlemen as well for being here this afternoon.
This is an extremely important hearing and the issues are
complex. There has been a tremendous amount of rhetoric
surrounding the shipbuilding budget this year. There is no
doubt that there are significant budgetary pressures on the
Department of the Navy. Those pressures have certainly driven
some of the decisions that have been made, such as slipping the
delivery of CVN-21 and reducing the production rates of surface
combatants and submarines.
The overarching issue, however, budget pressures aside, is
what is the size and composition of the Navy that we need.
Having read the written testimony from members of our second
panel, I think we will find that what the shipbuilding industry
needs first and foremost is stability. The first step in
achieving that stability in the industry is to lay out a plan.
The second step would be to stick to it.
The interim Navy plan delivered last month was, in the
words of Mr. O'Rourke from our second panel in his written
testimony, ``not a plan but a 30-year projection of potential
Navy force levels,'' from which potential annual shipbuilding
rates can only be partially inferred. No one argues that plans
should remain unchanged, but they should not change each and
every year. Mr. Toner points out in his written testimony that
the procurement plan for a Virginia-class submarine has changed
12 times in the last 10 years. The procurement plan for DD(X)
has been no more stable.
As far as what the size and shape of the Navy should be,
the last plan on which there was consensus was the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). By statute, this review is
required to outline what is required to execute the national
military strategy with no more than moderate risk. In 2001, for
the Navy that resulted in a force that included: 12 aircraft
carriers, 10 active and 1 Reserve air wings, 12 amphibious
ready groups, 55 attack submarines, 108 Active and 8 Reserve
surface combatants.
Two years ago, to support Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea
Basing pillars or the Sea Power 21 vision, a force structure of
375 ships was postulated, which would have included 12 carriers
strike groups, 12 expeditionary strike groups, 9 strike or
missile defense surface action groups, and 4 guided missile
submarines for strike and Special Operations Forces.
Certainly the Navy has made great strides in trying to do
more with less. Experimentation with Sea Swap to increase a
ship's forward presence, implementation of the fleet response
plan to provide presence with a purpose, and integration of the
Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation forces all have
contributed to providing more naval combat power for every tax
dollar spent. These efficiencies are noteworthy, but it is my
belief that efficiencies can go only so far before risk and
perhaps unacceptable risk to the national security is
introduced.
Our ships and aircraft have more capability than ever
before in history. The requirements process is now defined in
terms of capabilities rather than threats and I think that is
largely appropriate. But even the most capable ship or airplane
is of little use if it is not in the right place at the right
time.
Perhaps the problem since the end of the Cold War has been
in defining the threat. An article for the New York Times just
last week, on April 8, stated that ``China is quietly
challenging America's reach in the western Pacific by
concentrating strategically on conventional forces,'' and that
in the worst case in a Taiwan crisis, Pentagon officials say
that any delay in American aircraft carriers reaching the
island would mean that the United States would initially depend
on fighter jets and bombers based in Guam and Okinawa, while
Chinese forces could use their amphibious ships to go back and
forth across the narrow Taiwan Strait.
With China's acquisition of modern surface ships,
submarines, and aircraft, combined with the fact that naval
forces would be critical to having a chance of success in such
a scenario, perhaps it is time to start thinking about what
level of naval power is required to deter a potential threat.
I keep coming back to something that has been repeatedly
stated by officials in and out of uniform in testimony before
this subcommittee: numbers count. Capability is important,
maybe more important than we used to think it was, but numbers
count, and the numbers are moving in the wrong direction.
I also think that in a world where the threat is not as
defined as it was during the Cold War numbers may count even
more, especially for the Navy since transit times are so long
and most of the world is still covered by oceans. Increased
capabilities are needed, to be certain, but so are increased
numbers. If resources prevent that, then maybe more resources
are needed.
There is a new national military strategy and a new QDR
that has been started. Hopefully, it will take into account
both the capabilities and numbers that will be required across
the spectrum of warfare globally and to deter first and defeat
if necessary.
That is the end of my opening statement. If everybody will
stand by just a second. Now I understand why Senator Kennedy is
not here. Another vote has been called. Let me recess the
subcommittee for just a second, and I am going to talk to you,
Admiral, about your time. So we will just stand in recess for a
minute. [Recess from 4:08 p.m. to 4:09 p.m.]
I am going to go vote and then we will continue in recess
and we will come back and open this subcommittee hearing.
[Recess from 4:10 p.m. to 4:16 p.m.]
Senator Collins [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order.
Admiral Clark, you know very well that I have always wanted
to be the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, and for the
next few moments until Senator Talent arrives I am going to
assume that role with his permission. I hope that does not fill
you with apprehension in any way.
Admiral, you and I have worked together for many years now
and I very much appreciate the contributions that you have made
in service to your country. I have been very concerned about
the shipbuilding budget, especially this year, but also
previous years when I felt shipbuilding was underfunded. You
and I have talked many times about a shipbuilding budget that
should be in the neighborhood of $10 billion to $12 billion a
year in order to keep us on track. We did a little better for a
few years, but now, unfortunately, we seem to be going
backward.
I understand the budget constraints. You were very frank
about that when last you testified before the full committee. I
am very concerned in particular about the reduction in the
number of DD(X)s, particularly since you have testified that
the military requirements have not changed, that you still see
a need for about a dozen. That suggests to me that the answer
is for us to explore alternative ways of funding ships, ways
that would recognize that trying to fully fund a DD(X) in 1
year may not be the best approach.
I know you tried, and I completely supported you, last year
to construct the first DD(X) in the research and development
(R&D) account, and we have talked about other ways. Could you
elaborate on funding mechanisms that you believe would allow us
to build more ships and would be a more effective and efficient
way for reaching goals that I know we both share?
STATEMENT OF ADM VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Clark. Thank you, Senator. I very much appreciate
the chance to take on that issue because I believe that really
is the issue in front of the subcommittee today. Do you have a
copy of my statement? Did I give you one?
Senator Collins. I do have it.
Admiral Clark. So, if we could, I would like to answer the
question by going to page 11 and looking at the chart there,
figure 7, if you will.
Senator Collins. Yes, thank you.
Admiral Clark. Figure 7 proposes a level funding approach
to shipbuilding. In the early part of my statement I talk about
the requirement for us to deal with shipbuilding as a national
investment issue and I believe that is what is required.
Also, earlier in the written statement I have a graph that
talks to and shows the investment level that we have witnessed
in real terms over the course of the last 15 years. So I
believe that what we are facing here is a couple of issues. The
first one is the level of funding and the second one is the
methodologies that we are using to get the funding
accomplished.
In figure 7, there is no number on the vertical column, and
we could talk about various levels, and so I took the numbers
out of the platforms also. But I had the staff work up what
would happen if the Nation said, Okay, we are going to spend X
every year. The methodology would be that we would be given the
tools to manage inside that fixed amount that I believe would
greatly, in my discussions with the shipbuilders, help them to
figure out what they are supposed to do.
A study was just completed recently by National Defense
University in the shipbuilding industry. The results of the
study point out that there are a number of issues that affect
the shipbuilding industry. One of the realities is that we have
more capacity than we are certainly burning up by buying the
numbers of ships that we are.
In order for them to properly size themselves, they do have
to know where they are going. Chairman Talent in his opening
statement talked about the requirement for stability and I
understand that and appreciate it and would very much like to
be in that kind of position. So this chart represents to me
what it is we have to do. Not only do we have to have a level
income stream, we have to have the rules and regulations that
allow us to operate inside that level income or investment
stream. What that means is we ought to use any tool that we
think would make it work better.
When I appeared before the full committee, I asked the
chair to bring the shipbuilding industry in here, have them
talk about their perspective of this. I cannot give their
perspective. But I have talked to them and I understand what
their issues are with second and third order supply chains, and
the current methodology simply is not meeting our needs. How
long do we have to watch this happen to come to the conclusion
that it is not meeting our need?
So what you see there is the top section, the carrier. The
carrier now takes a number that would eat up the entire annual
investment that we have made over the last 15 years and then
some if we are going to buy a carrier in a given year. What
people do not even imagine when they see this is what it does
to the rest of my budget and the rest of my program. It takes
divots of ineffectiveness and inefficiency out of the rest of
my programs to try to do those kinds of things.
That means that I have to have authorities and tools that
allow me to fund the activity inside a balancing kind of a line
that gives you a fixed investment stream.
Senator, I believe the bottom line is you cannot have the
Navy of your dreams with the mechanisms that we are using and
have used for the last 15 years, and something like this has to
be done. If this is not the perfect answer, I am willing to
look at any other option. I have put forward split funding. I
have put forward advanced approps and incremental
appropriations in the old R&D program.
By the way, you mentioned DD(X). By my estimates--and I am
not the acquisition czar, so I will not attest that these are
perfect--but the requirement and the result of the
congressional action last year and then the resulting budgetary
action that we have had to take as a result has cost that first
ship something in the tune of $380 million, $390 million. We
still do not have the ship. So this is not the way to do it.
Senator Collins. Admiral, I think your point is an
excellent one. This not only is an inefficient way, the current
approach, to shipbuilding, but it also ultimately costs us more
money.
Admiral Clark. It does.
Senator Collins. That is what is particularly frustrating
about the approach. It is not good for the Navy; it is not good
for the shipbuilders; it is not good for our national security;
and it is more costly to the taxpayers.
If I could summarize your answer, your testimony, and our
previous discussions, it seems to me what you are advocating is
a multi-year approach, level funding so that we do not have
these huge peaks and valleys, an even workload, which helps the
industrial base retain those skills that are so important, and
a dependable funding stream.
One of the problems, which the chairman has alluded to and
you have echoed, is the instability in funding is very
difficult for the shipbuilders to deal with, for the Navy to
deal with. But I think your point is excellent, that ultimately
it gets us fewer ships and it costs us more money.
Mr. Chairman, I know how hard you have worked on this issue
and I hope that we can come up with a better approach for
shipbuilding that meets the goals and uses the attributes that
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has suggested. I want to
commend your leadership on this because you have worked very
hard.
I do have one other question, but I know I am no longer the
chairman now that you have returned. So I will give back my
time.
Senator Talent [presiding]. I am willing, if Senator
Kennedy has not returned, to go right to you after this. We are
doing this to some degree on the fly, but I wanted to give the
Admiral a chance to actually give a statement if you want to,
and perhaps you could pull out the parts that you think are the
most important and give those. Then if Senator Kennedy has not
returned, I will be happy to go to you for your questions,
Senator Collins.
Admiral Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly
say a couple of things. First, I do appreciate the fact that
you are having this hearing. I believe that this is very, very
important. I believe it is important for the Navy. I believe it
is important for industry. Ultimately, I believe that makes it
very important for America. Certainly it is of great importance
to the Navy.
I believe that the question of the industrial base and the
state of shipbuilding is something that the United States
should be concerned about. I said in the hearing with the full
committee that I believe this to be a national security issue,
and I want to reinforce this point. We are a maritime nation
still. Even though the world is getting smaller and
globalization is changing the way the economy works and all of
those pieces, we are still an island nation.
The economy's dependence upon safety on the seas is
absolutely without question. We know that well over 95 percent
of the international product moves by sea and over 80 percent
of the value. This is not hypothetical. This is not mythical.
This is reality, and we need to confront reality and understand
what the requirement is for us to be able to command the seas.
I want to make this point. We have worked hard inside the
Navy to present an approach where we were trying to do our
part. The budget that is before you and the cumulative savings
over the time I have been the CNO are now over $50 billion. We
have tried to do our part to run this Navy more effectively and
more efficiently.
The fact remains that I am losing buying power, and I am
losing buying power in the segment of the industry that my
future depends upon. So as I said in the written statement, our
shipbuilding priorities must in my view reflect the changing
strategic environment that we see.
The requirement for more speed and agility in the future.
That said, in my written statement I bring up again the issue
of escalating costs and the loss of my buying power, and that
is what I think makes this hearing so important.
I believe that the greatest risk that we face is the
spiraling cost of our product. Now, it goes without saying that
our product today is better than it has ever been, and I want
to make no bones about it. Unapologetically, I tell you that I
am bringing recommendations up here to buy the best stuff I
know how to buy for the sons and daughters of America. We are
investing in capabilities that will make the long-term cost of
our Navy much lower. In other words, the operating costs for
these platforms are significantly less than the platforms that
they are replacing.
So that leads me to this; I believe that we have to form
partnerships with Congress, with industry, and with the Navy
that regain our buying power. I believe that we have to pursue
acquisition reform. I believe that it is time for us to analyze
the structure that we have. Let us have the courage to see if
our system is serving us well. It is hard for me to imagine
that we would come to the conclusion that the methodologies
that we are using are working well for us.
It is clear to me that if we do not do this, find these
better mechanisms to help build the ships and submarines of the
future, that we cannot build the Navy that we believe we need
in the 21st century. I also believe that there is no stand-
alone single point solution. In other words, if the solution
today became to incrementally fund a product in fiscal year
2006 without the wherewithal for me to deal with the
incremental funding challenges that would exist when we did a
series of new starts in 2006, I cannot stand that kind of
approach to budgeting either.
My written statement includes a notional chart that is I
believe very important, and it shows how level funding can more
efficiently create and sustain a Navy between 260 and 325
ships. Mr. Chairman, I would love to get into your question
about the exact numbers, whether it is 325, 260, or 375, and I
think that that would be a worthwhile discussion.
I do advocate that we take on an approach that uses any
funding mechanism we can figure out how to use, that will
advantage the industry, make it more competitive, allow us to
attack costs at every segment of the production process.
Finally, I believe that anything that we do must be done in
partnership with the industry and that we should do everything
possible to improve our ability to efficiently produce ships.
For that reason, I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for making
them part of this hearing today, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Vern Clark, USN
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I want to express my
gratitude on behalf of the men and women of your Navy for holding these
hearings. These marvelous Americans--Active and Reserve, uniformed and
civilian--will continue to make this nation proud as they take the
fight to today's enemy, while steadily transforming our institution to
meet tomorrow's challenges. Our ability to attract, train, and retain
them is a testament to the health of our Service and an indicator of
our proper heading as we chart our course into the future. It is also
important that we provide them with every advantage--especially
regarding the ships they operate--to fight and win.
i. shaping our navy for the future strategic environment
Our force structure was previously built to fight two major theater
wars. However, the strategic landscape is vastly different today, and
this change requires additional capabilities to accommodate a wide
array of missions (Figure 1). The dependence of our world on the seas,
coupled with the growing challenge for all nations to ensure access in
a future conflict, will emphasize the need for a decisive maritime
capability able to excel in an increasingly joint environment. Emphasis
on the littorals and the global nature of the terrorist threat will
demand the ability to strike where and when required. Therefore the
maritime domain will increase in importance as a key maneuver space for
U.S. military forces.
We will continue to face the requirement to deal with traditional
warfighting challenges on the high seas and ashore. We must also
address the growing 21st century realities of increasing scope and
scale of small-scale contingencies, such as stability operations and
peacekeeping requirements, and the need to extend combat capability to
deeper and longer ranges inland. The future will demand the ability to
confront irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges that are
being introduced today and will grow over time.
Strategic Challenges
To meet these challenges, we must improve our strategic speed to
move significant, joint combat power anywhere around the globe. U.S.
military force must be immediately employable and rapidly deployable,
seizing and maintaining the initiative in any fight, anywhere.
Second, we must continue to develop ``precision.'' As precision
weaponry becomes commonplace throughout the joint force, we must
develop concepts of operation and doctrine to maximize these powerful
capabilities.
Third, we must establish an ``unblinking eye'' above and throughout
the battlespace. Technological leaps in miniaturization have begun to
make possible an increasing array of unmanned sensors, along with the
communications networks and command and control (C2) capacity to yield
pervasive awareness of the battlespace.
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We must also continue to develop the fullest measure of joint
interdependence. We are more effective as a fighting force, and more
efficient with taxpayer dollars, when service missions and doctrine are
designed from the start to be fully integrated.
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Strategic Necessities: Speed & Agility
Speed and agility are the attributes that will define our
operational success. The importance of these qualities extends to the
very foundations of our institution, whether we're talking about our
personnel system, the size and adaptability of our technological and
industrial bases, the design and function of our supporting
infrastructure, or the financial planning necessary to put combat power
to sea. Speed and agility, while defining our operational response,
also need to characterize our acquisition process. We must find new and
better ways to develop and field emerging technologies. The cycle in
which this occurs needs to be measured in months not years.
The drive to increase our speed and agility means increasing the
operational availability of our forces. It means developing a base
structure to ensure that we are best positioned to win. It means
challenging the total joint force to be light enough, and possess the
required sustainability, to deliver adaptive capability packages on
shorter timelines.
Force Capabilities
The number of ships in the Fleet is important. But it is no longer
the only, nor the most meaningful, measure of combat capability. Just
as the number of people is no longer the primary yardstick by which we
measure the strength or productivity of an organization, the number of
ships is not the only way to gauge the Navy's health or combat
capability. The capabilities of the Fleet and its location around the
world are most important. In fact, today's Navy can deliver more combat
power than we could 20 years ago when we had twice as many ships and
half again as many people. Figure 2 for example shows, the effects of
technology and new operational concepts that leverage the greatly
increased capabilities of today's Fleet.
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ii. current shipbuilding
Our shipbuilding priorities reflect emerging strategic challenges,
the operational requirement for speed and agility, and an understanding
of evolving force capabilities. My testimony to Congress on this
subject over the last 5 years has reflected these priorities and been
consistent. My themes have been and remain:
The acquisition mechanisms we possess today will not
produce the Navy we are going to need in the 21st century.
This highly industrialized segment of the military-
industrial complex does not respond well to peak and valley,
sine-cosine investment approaches.
The ship procurement rate--dating back to the
procurement holidays of the 1990s--was insufficient to maintain
objective force levels and is now manifesting itself in the
health of the shipbuilding industry.
We need a system which better partners with Congress
and industry to regain our buying power. Acquisition reforms
and other approaches that help to stabilize production will, in
our view, reduce the per unit cost of ships and increase the
shipbuilding rate.
We need a level investment approach in this industry,
that when coupled with other innovations, will change the
economic underpinning of shipbuilding.
In no other area of our Armed Forces do we make such large capital
investments that, in turn, impact important technological and
industrial sectors of our economy.
Shipbuilding Cost Growth
Among the greatest risks all Services face is the spiraling cost of
procurement for modern military systems, and shipbuilding is no
exception (Figure 3). When adjusted for inflation, the cost increase in
every class of ship that we have bought over the past 4 decades has
been incredible.
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This tremendous increase in cost runs counter to other capital
goods like automobiles, where the inflation-adjusted cost has been
relatively flat over the same period of time.
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Figure (4) shows that shipbuilding costs have grown tremendously
over the past 4 decades. Although newer ships emphasize greater combat
capability, propulsion power, and computing technologies than their
predecessors, costs have spiraled out of control; cost growth that is
not explainable solely due to enhanced complexity or reduced economies
of scale.
This cost spiral comes at a very challenging time because, for the
first time in decades, we are building entirely new types of ships in
fiscal year 2006 and beyond. These ships are needed because their
modular nature will give us great flexibility and adaptability to fight
in diverse environments against a variety of enemies. Such modularity
also allows us to dramatically expand their operational capability over
time with less technical and fiscal risk.
Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request
As the budget is finalized in the coming months, there will be a
number of issues and processes that will impact shipbuilding across the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), including the cost of war in Iraq,
Base Realignment and Closure decisions, and the findings of the
Quadrennial Defense Review. With that in mind, our Navy budget request
for fiscal year 2006 includes four new construction ships.
Our original plan was for six new construction ships but
Congressional action and shipyard factors prevented funding the final
two ships. Our investment plan across the FYDP calls for 49 new
construction ships, including DD(X), LHA(R), MPF(F), CVN-21, and SSN
774s. These new ships reflect our focus on the next generation of naval
combatants and sea basing capabilities.
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The requirement for shipbuilding will be shaped by emerging
technologies, the amount of forward basing, and innovative manning
concepts such as Sea Swap. Additional variables include unit
operational availability and the evolving capabilities needed to
perform our missions.
The following notional diagram (Figure 5) illustrates how
innovative manning concepts and technological adaptation modify the
number of ships required. The blue and yellow lines represent levels of
combat capability and the ships required to achieve that capability.
For example, the left side of the diagram shows our current number of
ships (288) and a projection of ships required to meet global war on
terror requirements (375) using traditional deployment practices. The
right side of the diagram estimates the number of ships needed to
achieve equivalent combat power after fully leveraging technological
advances and employing the maximum use of Sea Swap. The middle portion
of the curve (in the red ellipse) shows a range of ships that assumes a
less extensive use of technology and Sea Swap. This diagram illustrates
how the application of new technologies and manning concepts will
enable us to attain our desired future combat capability with a force
structure between 260 and 325 ships.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The power of the joint force in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
resulted from synergy between the Services. The same concept holds true
within our Navy. We seek the fullest integration of networks, sensors,
weapons, and platforms. Toward that end, we are developing the next
generation of surface combatants as ``sea frames''--analogous to ``air
frames''--as part of a modular system. Growing research and development
investments over the past few years directly support increased
production of the right ships for the future in the years ahead (Figure
6).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
iii. enhancing national shipbuilding
The state of shipbuilding in the United States is a matter of
national security and worthy of priority on the national agenda.
Although there is no stand-alone solution to this challenge, we can
enhance efficiency by changing shipbuilding policies. A national
dialogue is critical, and I will work with the Department of Defense
and the administration to consider changes to these policies for the
fiscal year 2007 budget and beyond.
Although not current policy, I personally recommend modifying our
practice of fully funding most ships in a single year. The current
policy results in funding peaks and valleys that induce uncertainty for
shipbuilders. To compensate, industry retains excess capacity,
increasing costs to the Navy while trying to figure out what we will
do. We will avoid this problem and produce ships more efficiently if we
provide a disciplined level funding approach for shipbuilding over a
period of years coupled with a set of acquisition rules, developed in
partnership with industry, which optimize effectiveness and efficiency.
Figure 7 shows a notional level loaded investment structure to achieve
a 260 ship Navy using level funding for each year. I would personally
recommend to the Department and the administration that we adopt this
level-funding approach for the fiscal year 2007 budget and beyond.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I also personally recommend use of research and development funds
for building the lead ships of new classes. Advance procurement, split
funding, and multi-year acquisition programs round out the
authorizations we need to efficiently execute a disciplined national
shipbuilding plan in fiscal year 2007 and beyond.
iv. conclusion
To make the best shipbuilding investments, more flexible
acquisition policies are needed, to help us deliver the Navy we need in
the future.
Thank you for this opportunity to address my personal concerns
regarding our national shipbuilding program. Thank you also for your
strong and enduring support of the men and women serving our Nation in
the United States Navy. They are deserving of our very best efforts to
build a Navy that will remain the world's finest.
Senator Talent. Senator Collins, why don't you finish.
Senator Collins. Go right ahead.
Senator Talent. I am going to be here until the end anyway.
Seriously, go ahead.
Senator Collins. Admiral Clark, the second issue that I
want to raise with you today is the acquisition strategy. Now,
I realize that it is the Navy's acquisition executive and the
Pentagon's executive that will ultimately be making the
decisions on this, although I think recent events suggest that
Congress is going to have considerable input as well.
But what I want to ask you is for your professional
judgment. In general, we have seen the Navy in the past promote
more competition. For example, in 2001 General Dynamics was
blocked by the Navy and the Justice Department from purchasing
Newport News because the acquisition would have ended
competition in the nuclear submarine construction sector. In
looking back at that example, there are just numerous
statements by Defense Department and Justice Department
officials saying, such as we really had to maintain
competition, we could not afford to let a yard go to what would
end up being a sole source for us for submarines.
In your judgment, is the Navy going to be at risk if we end
up with only one yard capable of constructing surface
combatants?
Admiral Clark. Senator, my view is we are at risk now. That
is my view. I drive you to page 6 and the chart. We are at risk
because we are not producing the product that we need and we
are at risk because look at the investment scheme. This is the
one I said over a 15-year period we spent $6.6 billion a year.
There are the numbers. If that is the way we are going to do
it, I believe that we are more at risk about failing to take
action to reduce the cost of ships than we are at maintaining
too much structure, because at that number the studies prove
that we have more capacity than we can use now.
This is why I believe that this kind of hearing has to be
held. The question about the nuclear industry goes like this.
In the shipbuilding world they want and need long-term
stability. They need this. In the design area, they need to be
designing new platforms. We are at a watershed period in our
history. Everything out there is new. By the way, there is more
turmoil when you are creating the future than when you are just
floating along and doing the status quo, and we certainly have
been working at creating a new future.
So on the one hand, we need stability, and on the other
hand we need new designs to keep unique capabilities that we
alone have in the whole world. The ability to put out nuclear
submarines and nuclear aircraft carriers, that is a capability
that is truly unique in the world.
So the way I see this, I do not think we really have
competition today. I think we have apportionment. I think all
of the numbers are now clear that it is costing us--that
apportionment is costing us money. The numbers show that it
will in the future.
See, I am torn, Senator. I believe in the theoretical
competition in the marketplace and I am also struck with the
realities that I have a 15-year history of the kind of
investments where my shipbuilding numbers are going.
Senator Collins. One final comment or question to you. Do
you believe that the competition in the design of the DD(X)
produced more innovation than otherwise would have occurred if
you had had only one team working on the design?
Admiral Clark. Well, I certainly believe that it was a
stroke of genius to put together the teams that created the
future in DD(X). By the way, it really then gets to the issue
of what the investments have been in shipbuilding. If you look
over time, as opposed to some of the other segments of the
defense industry, we have not invested that much in research
and development. One of the realities--now we are into
confronting reality--we have invested billions of dollars in
research and development and I am proud of that, this budget
that is. You have twice as much R&D in it as when I got to be
the CNO. I am really proud of that.
I am convinced that produced a fantastic potential ship. I
believe DD(X) will change the nature of it forever, and in
closed hearings I can talk about things it will do that in open
hearings I just do not want to talk about. So very obviously,
that design conception process, we were served well.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator Collins.
We have been a little topsy-turvy, Admiral, so I was not
able to say that--to recognize that this is almost certainly
going to be your last appearance before this subcommittee.
Admiral Clark. You are exactly right. To the best of my
knowledge, Mr. Chairman, this is my last hearing.
Senator Talent. I imagine you view that in rather a mixed
way, probably.
Admiral Clark. I meant it when I said it is a privilege to
be here. I really do mean that.
Senator Talent. It has been a privilege to have you before
the subcommittee. I want to personally and on behalf of all the
members of the subcommittee and the committee thank you for
your service to the Navy. You have been a tireless advocate for
the Navy, for your Sea Power 21 vision. You have had a
tremendous emphasis on readiness and on people. I think the
morale in the Navy is as high as I have ever seen it. You have
done a superb job of changing the culture of your Service to
meet the future, while making people like it. It is tremendous
what you have accomplished.
We all care so deeply about these issues and we respect
your expertise so much, we just jump into all these questions.
But I wanted to recognize your service. Thank you.
Admiral Clark. Thank you. You are very generous in your
comments and I appreciate it.
Senator Talent. Now, I came in in the middle of Senator
Collins' questions regarding flexible funding mechanisms. I
want to make certain I understand what mechanisms you would
recommend. Do they vary by size and class of ships? I am very
attracted to the idea of flexible funding, and I think we have
been tardy here in authorizing that. I think there is a general
agreement, at least within the authorizing committee, on that.
There is certainly a lot of support for it here.
But it begins to break down when you get into details about
what you should use, and just for the big ships and just for
the years when you are not buying as many, and what you should
not use. That makes it difficult if we do not have a united
front when we then go over to the appropriators and others who
have more concerns and try and push this change upon them.
So if you would take a minute and say what--and if you have
done this with Senator Collins initially before I was here, I
am sorry.
Admiral Clark. There is more to be said.
Senator Talent. Yes. What mechanisms would you recommend?
Do they vary by size, by class of ship? Tell me what you think?
Admiral Clark. Well, if you go to page 11, to live inside
the architecture that I have presented here you are going to
have to be way more liberal in the development of mechanisms
than we are today. So that means the very first thing that has
to go is you pay for a ship in 1 year. That has to go.
Let me give you an example. In the 2005 program, we were in
R&D coming into the 2005 program. I had the ship in R&D in the
previous years, speaking of stability. That is where it was.
The language in the mark told us exactly what we had to do. We
had to abide by research and development guidelines and
milestones. We did that.
When we got to the point of passing the bill in 2005, the
decision was made that we could not build this ship in an R&D
way. If I had been allowed to do so, I guarantee you we would
have not only done it in 2005, we would have been fine again in
2006. I have $730 million or $740 million against that ship in
the 2006 line.
Now, when you look at and you examine the realities, the
realities are whatever that number is, 15 percent or so is
going to be spent in the first year. I had way more money than
I needed in that to build it in 2006, but I cannot even build
it in 2006. We turned to whoever is going to build it and say,
Okay, do anything you want to do, but do not dare touch your
hands to a piece of steel. So right away we are telling them,
do not get too fast here, go slower because you cannot go fast
enough that you could even start building this. This just does
not make sense any more.
Senator Talent. So you like incremental funding?
Admiral Clark. Incremental funding.
Senator Talent. Without regard to the size of the ship?
Admiral Clark. My view is that we should do it without
regard to the size of the ship, and here is the reason. I
believe that you have to set up some controls in the way to
manage it. But if you look at my chart on page 11, figure 7,
you have to give us enough flexibility to manage within this
construct. The current system does not do that.
So you could decide that you are going to use a split
funding approach and you could do this by size. You could say,
Okay, I will give you 5 years on a carrier and 3 years or 4
years on a submarine. You could draw up some numbers. By the
way, if you did that, I would be a lot better off than I am
today.
But my real view is you should want me to be as efficient
and effective as I can be. To do that, that means you have to
give me freedom to manage. Then you should encourage multi-
years. We should also figure out how for everybody in the
partnership to really like success in the multi-year construct.
We should figure out then what we are going to be able to do if
one of these guys is building a ship and it costs $2 billion.
They figure out in the course of this that they save $100
million. By the way, that is not beyond the realm of
possibility. What could we do with that today?
Under the current construct I could not do anything with
it. I would have to come back and I would have to get a new set
of authorizations. But if I had freedom to manage, it might be
just the right window to optimize the exposure and the capacity
in the shipyard to move on to another platform and get going in
a multi-year kind of a concept.
I believe that if we are really going to fix this and we
look at the seriousness of this, that we have to be much more
liberal in our thinking. Frankly, this is what we call
transformation. It starts with challenging our assumptions.
What are our assumptions about the way this business will best
operate?
Senator Talent. Now, explain again--and you touched on
this--the concerns you had about the amendment that we were
going to offer to the budget resolution this year, which would
have authorized advance appropriations? I think you said that
it would have--well, explain again what your concerns were?
Admiral Clark. I do not have the chart, but draw yourself a
little bell-shaped curve, and you start in the first year and
15 percent of the total amount of the money goes in the first
year, and 24 percent goes in year two, and it peaks out and
then it starts, figure out that kind of a curve. What I have
said, do not subject me to a windfall profit tax that says,
Okay, it is only 15 percent the first year, I will take a
billion dollars and I can start six ships this year, because by
the fourth year I am going to be in chapter 11. That is my
point.
My point was, do not do that to me without the discipline
that goes with the rest of this system. In other words, that is
a little too easy, and I cannot live with the third and the
fourth year. That is my problem with it. I have to have a
package.
Senator Talent. The language we were offering did not
contain enough discipline with it in the out years?
Admiral Clark. It did not give me level funding. It did not
give me freedom to manage. It did not give me other things that
we are going to need to operate in and manage within some fixed
line.
Senator Talent. So what I hear you saying is that
incremental funding is a good idea if the Navy--if you get the
other things that go with it, the freedom to manage, et cetera.
Without it, we could be in a situation where we hit the wall in
a few years. So it has to be a whole kind of package?
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. It is not just throwing in some incremental
funding and that is going to fix everything?
Admiral Clark. That is my view. Now, let me say that 3-plus
years ago I did a war game and I included and asked the
shipyards to participate with us. What we found is that--and
this was sitting down at the table and doing the tabletop
wargame with them--the biggest advantage--the finding was that
you would produce at least 15 percent more product for the same
investment.
The biggest advantage was coming from multi-year contracts.
But it was difficult for them, without specifying specific
levels, to say how much more do you get from the second and
third order supply chain and those kinds of issues. But when
they get up here to talk, I know they are going to talk about
the same points that you made about the importance of
stability. So that stability, that discipline of a stable
investment approach is the centerpiece of this.
Senator Talent. Sure. The comments that I made, we bear our
full share of the responsibility on this end of Pennsylvania
Avenue, so I am not trying to avoid it. Just, we all know
something needs to be done. When we get into the details of
what needs to be done, we face difficult decisions technically
and in some cases from a resources point of view, and it has
been hard to make the decisions.
I am not going to ask you about China. There is really not
a lot you could say in an open hearing. But it is very clear
and I mentioned the newspaper stories in addition to the
responsibilities the Navy is carrying today, we are faced with
the potential of a peer competitor and maybe in a shorter time
frame than we had anticipated before. This is a whole other set
of responsibilities, so we need to get this resolved.
If you could pick a number for level funding for
shipbuilding and conversion, what would the number be?
Admiral Clark. Well, 5 years ago I said $12 billion. My
research so far--and it is not finite yet, and let me make sure
that that is clear. But where I have given you the capability
curves from 260 to 325, my understanding is it is going to take
close to $12 billion in the long term to produce that 260
number. If you want more than that--and by the way, that number
is a 10-carrier force. But that is an attempt to use the best
information that we have and examine reality.
So obviously there are trades that can be made inside that
projection that was given to you about a potential force
structure. With necessity being the mother of invention, you
can see why I started pushing on Sea Swap. You can see why I
did that. I did that out of necessity, and it is my view that
we will produce a DD(X), a littoral combat ship (LCS), as Sea-
Swappable platforms because we will get more return on
investment for those platforms when we do it that way.
I understand that there are concerns that people have about
that. I am happy to weigh their concerns against my concerns
and the ability for me to meet the needs of the Nation.
Senator Talent. What level funding do you say in your gut
would produce the 260-ship Navy?
Admiral Clark. Inside that circle of expectation, and that
is Sea-Swapping these new platforms and the combatants, smaller
combatants, I believe that you are looking at between $10
billion and $12 billion a year.
Senator Talent. $10 billion to $12 billion produces the
260?
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Does that assume that we give you the
ability, give the Navy the ability----
Admiral Clark. Give us the freedom to manage and new
mechanisms.
Senator Talent. That includes LCS at what level?
Admiral Clark. Yes, it does. I have to go back and look at
that particular number. It is 60 to 70, somewhere in that
ballpark. We will provide it for the record, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The $10 billion to $12 billion funding level produces a total of
260 ships including 63 LCS-class ships by fiscal year 2035.
Senator Talent. Now, I am going to ask you a question that,
I am not trying to take you into unreal land. I was going to
preface this by saying, if you were not fiscally constrained.
You are always fiscally constrained.
Admiral Clark. Sure we are. By the way, we should be. The
taxpayers deserve that kind of pressure on us.
Senator Talent. I wanted to say, because we have had a lot
of conversations over the last 2 years and some of them more
formal briefings than otherwise, I never want to be understood
as underrating the impact for good of the internal changes you
have made in the Navy. You mentioned Sea Swap. But just the
whole attitude that you have managed to instill, a can-do
attitude about finding extra dollars, doing things better for
less, that really can work.
This is not some kind of a pretense for saying we can do
more. You can do more with less up to a limit, and it is only
if you have the willingness to take that challenge on. I have
been so impressed talking with officers how you have instilled
that in the Navy, and I think successfully.
What we are talking about is, even given that, what do we
need in order to meet these requirements? I want to take you
back to size and composition of the Navy. If you were not
fiscally constrained as much as you are now, assuming that we
had the ability to go to level funding, at levels say up to,
you mentioned $12 billion, say up to $14 billion, which I am
not saying we do, but assuming we did, what would you like the
size of the Navy to be and maybe the composition of the Navy?
You mentioned 260 to 325. I do not want you to get into
details because you would have to get into classified stuff.
But what would you feel comfortable with as an American as well
as the CNO in terms of the size and composition?
Admiral Clark. Figure 5 is on page 9 and that is where I
give you the 265 to 325 number. I want to make sure everybody
understands what these curves are. That 325 number is my 375-
ship Navy with new concepts applied to it, and that is where, I
believe, I would love to be.
Now, I believe that it will take $14 billion or $15 billion
over time to do that.
Senator Talent. That was my next question.
Admiral Clark. I believe that is not precise, but it is
where we are in our analysis. It is dependent on the mix, but
it is also capability curves and so that top curve is more
capable than the bottom curve.
Senator Talent. So that 325 level, you said that is your
375-ship Navy.
Admiral Clark. That is right.
Senator Talent. What you mean by that--tell me if this is
correct--is that capabilities you have acquired since you
originally gave us the 375 figure allow you to do what you
thought you needed 375 ships to do with 325?
Admiral Clark. That is exactly correct. Let me continue on
the curve. The 302 number would also be the same capability,
but it would mean Sea-Swapping a carrier and large deck
amphibs, and can we do that? I am not ready to say that we can.
So I optimized that in the middle of the figure to think
that is a reasonable thing to seek to achieve. I appreciate the
question because it drives home the point. I have been talking
about a Navy that was 375 capable for us to be in the places
that we need to be around the world. What I am saying, on a
day-to-day basis and responding to the known operational and
war plans, that 325 number with fleet response plan, which is a
much more ready force than we had 5 years ago, with Sea Swap,
that is exactly the same capability. It is fewer ships sitting
around, in airplane parlance, sitting on a ramp.
Senator Talent. Because I take your gut, after how many
years as CNO----
Admiral Clark. Well, 5 years here pretty soon.
Senator Talent. I will take your gut ahead of what the QDR
is likely to produce at this point. So your gut is that if you
could have what you wanted it would be 325, which gives us--you
wanted 375.
Admiral Clark. That is correct.
Senator Talent. Your gut is it takes $14 billion to $15
billion in level funding, with the management changes, to get
us there.
Admiral Clark. That is correct. Well, that is because, the
other slide I just showed you was--look at the past. We have 15
years of underinvestment.
Senator Talent. Right.
Admiral Clark. You are going to have to get through that.
Senator Talent. Right. Oh, I understand. Listen, I
understand entirely.
Thank you. Do you have another round? I hate to give him 8
minutes of free time. He has until 5:00.
Again, we want to thank you, Admiral, for your service, for
your testimony, and for your candor with us. Thank you so much.
Admiral Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, it was a
privilege, and I wish you the best as a group as you take on
these very important challenges.
Senator Talent. We hope to be seeing you again, even if
perhaps in another capacity. Thank you.
We will let the Admiral retire from the witness stand, and
then the second panel, please. [Pause.]
I want to welcome the second panel. Since the hour is late
and you gentlemen are busy, I am going to just start with Mr.
Toner. Michael Toner is the Executive Vice President of Marine
Systems for General Dynamics. Mr. Toner, why do you not just
give us your statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. TONER, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT--MARINE
SYSTEMS, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION
Mr. Toner. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: Thank
you for requesting this hearing. I am Mike Toner, the Executive
Vice President of General Dynamics Corporation Marine Systems.
As I sat and thought about this hearing, it was
inconceivable to me as I entered the gates at Electric Boat in
June 1965 that at some day in my career I would be representing
the shipbuilders of General Dynamics and providing shipbuilding
information to the Senate Seapower Subcommittee. I am honored
and privileged to do so.
I have provided written testimony for the record. Prior to
receiving your questions, I would like to make a short opening
statement.
There are critical issues before us today regarding the
health and future of the Navy's shipbuilding industrial base. I
believe that the country's ability to design and build naval
warships is a true national asset, a legacy capability that
could be lost if it is not continually exercised and advanced
with modern design and construction technology. I believe
strongly that the preservation of this industrial base is
essential to our National security.
Our shipbuilding industrial base produces the most advanced
warships in the world. The strength of our industry lies in our
people and the engineering, design, production, and ship
technology they bring to bear in delivering these ships. We are
an industry, however, that is dependent on Navy ship
procurement plans for our business. Herein lies the risk and
the fragility of our business.
Our fragility is due largely to the instability of the
Navy's shipbuilding procurement plans. This situation is made
worse by unprecedented low rate production levels. These
factors create a business environment that undermines our
ability to effectively plan work, one where minor perturbations
in volume have major cost and schedule consequences.
The fiscal year 2006 Navy shipbuilding plan reflects the
procurement of 49 ships over the Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP). Less than 1 year ago, this plan reflected 68 ships. The
Navy's plan to increase submarine procurement to two ships per
year has again been delayed, this time by 3 years, from fiscal
year 2009 to fiscal year 2012. This is the twelfth change in
Virginia procurement in the plan in 10 years.
The submarine industrial base is not only dealing with an
issue of minimum levels of ship procurement. For the first time
in over 40 years there is no new submarine design being
developed. Like the production industrial base, the submarine
engineering and design industrial base is a highly specialized
and unique capability, with no commercial counterpart. It is a
capability that takes years to develop and must stay actively
engaged in submarine design to retain its viability.
It is interesting to point out the chart that the CNO used
in his testimony, figure 7, shows notionally a ballistic
missile submarine-X (SSBN-X) delivery in 2020. That says in the
standard design criteria 12 years prior to the start of that
design--prior to the delivery of the ship, you would have to
start the design. That says in 2008 we would have to start the
design of the SSBN-X, given the standard protocol of design.
The fiscal year 2006 and association FYDP does not have any
money associated with the design of a submarine to start in the
total period of the FYDP. That leads us to say, where is this
SSBN-X going to come from and who is going to design it, who is
going to be there to design it, since we have not started a new
design in over--for the first time in 40 years, we do not have
one on the board.
The President's budget (PB) for fiscal year 2006 further
diminishes the surface combatant build rate. In PB 2005, 12
DD(X)s were planned over the duration of the FYDP. Just 1 year
later in PB 2006, the total is reduced to only five ships over
the same time span.
The DD-21/DD(X) program was structured from the outset to
incorporate the integrated and cooperative efforts of two U.S.
surface combatant shipyards across all program phases, from
functional design to detailed design and ship construction. The
underlying business premise has been that the ship construction
program will be shared equally by two shipyards. This
integrated approach, applied consistently since 1998, was
designed to ensure that the DD(X) is the beneficiary of the
best ideas, cumulative lessons learned, and the most innovative
manufacturing processes the U.S. industry has to offer.
Given this consistent emphasis on process integration and
open cooperation, General Dynamics finds the government's
recent announcement of a winner-take-all competition at this
late stage in the program, after over 7 years of development,
to be confusing, contradictory, and very disturbing. This
situation is a troubling reminder of the Seawolf submarine
program rescission more than a decade ago, a single program
decision whose consequences have had significant and lasting
impact on the submarine industrial base.
Just as the Seawolf decision was a watershed event for the
submarine industrial base, a misguided DD(X) decision will
undoubtedly impact the surface combatant industrial base in
ways not envisioned today. The end result will be a diminished
shipbuilding capacity, suppliers exiting the defense
businesses, and a higher end unit cost per ship.
In the face of the Seawolf rescission, General Dynamics
Electric Boat responded with an aggressive company-wide
business reengineering that has kept Electric Boat financially
viable, and competitive, while sustaining their key
capabilities. Today we are taking these same steps at Bath Iron
Works and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO).
As we have shown in the past, our shipyards have adapted to
the marketplace by right-sizing our organizations to meet
market demands. But today is different. Today the long-term
implications of further industry contraction could seriously
harm the National security as the U.S. addresses future
threats. The issue for you, today's political leadership, is
whether you are comfortable with the state of the shipbuilding
industry from a national security perspective and, if not, how
to reshape the industrial base in a prudent manner that will
provide industry, the Navy, and the country with financially
healthy, technologically innovative, and affordable shipyards.
It is unlikely that the Navy's procurement plans will
return to the high volume levels maintained in the Cold War.
Given the likelihood of limited production, steps can be taken
to help reduce the cost of naval warships. These are five I
would consider:
One: stability and predictability--you hear it again--are
fundamental to the functioning of any successful business.
Shipbuilding is no exception. Absent a stable and predictable
plan, the industrial base cannot fully leverage its
capabilities and competencies to provide the Navy with the most
affordable ships possible.
Stability is also impacted by the number of lead ships
today under construction in the industry. A lead ship is a
first of a class ship. If you just step back and think about
it, at the end of 2004 we delivered attack submarine-774 (SSN-
774) and the SSN-23, both lead ships. In construction today we
have SSN-775 at Newport News, amphibious transport dock-17
(LPD-17), the auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship (T-AKE), and
LCS-1. On the drawing board we have carrier vessel nuclear-21
(CVN-21), DD(X), LCS-2. This is a level of lead ship activity
which by its nature is somewhat unstable and adds into the
stability factor that we deal with on a day-to-day basis.
Two: alternative financing approaches may give the Navy
enough budgetary flexibility to sustain their procurement
strategy and support their national defense obligations. The
appropriate financing approach will likely vary from program to
program, but advance appropriations, multi-year procurements,
incremental procurements, split funding, lead ship R&D
procurements all potentially offer budget flexibility to the
Navy. Most importantly, while alternative financing may not
provide more ships, it will provide an added level of stability
that is critical to the industrial base.
Three: an alternative to the winner take all acquisition
strategy for the DD(X). Since it is a cost-driven decision, we
should determine what is driving the program cost and how might
that cost be reduced. The DD(X) operational requirements drive
an unprecedented number of new technologies brought to bear
simultaneously on the first ship. From a practical standpoint,
this increases program risk and cost dramatically over an
approach that introduces technology through a spiral
development over the first five ships in the FYDP. A spiral
development approach also allows for analysis of viable less
risky and lower cost alternatives.
Four: in a low-rate production environment, maintenance and
modernization work takes on a more important role in preserving
our production capabilities. We need to look closely at our
policies and plans for accomplishing this work. By performing
more of this work at ship construction yards, we will
strengthen these yards by sustaining critical shipbuilding
skills and capabilities. In addition, we will reduce the cost
of new construction by utilizing existing capacity and
facilities and spreading overhead costs.
Finally, we need to discuss the ideas to revitalize
commercial shipbuilding in the United States. We need a U.S.
merchant marine built and manned by Americans. We need to
define ship types necessary to supplement our national defense
needs. We need to explore with Congress the universe of market
incentives necessary to encourage the private sector to build
and operate ships for our use.
The goal of General Dynamics Marine Systems is to be the
best at what we do, whether it be building surface combatants,
naval auxiliaries, or commercial ships. Toward this end, the
General Dynamics management team remains focused on defining
and operating sophisticated specialized facilities that have
been properly sized for the prevailing customer-defined ship
production rate. Unanticipated changes in volume have a
significant impact on the cost of an hour's worth of labor.
What we in industry need most is market predictability and an
opportunity for a reasonable rate of return on our investments.
When such conditions are not met, businesses close. Once a
major naval shipyard closes, it never successfully reopens.
Once the skilled workforce is lost, reconstitution of a
national treasure becomes too costly and becomes nonfeasible.
That concludes my comments. I would be happy to take any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Toner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Michael W. Toner
opening remarks
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for requesting
this hearing. I am Mike Toner, Executive Vice President of General
Dynamics Corporation Marine Systems. It is a true privilege to be here
today, representing the shipbuilders of General Dynamics Marine
Systems.
I want to speak with you today not only as an industry executive,
but also in the role that I am particularly comfortable with--and that
I am most proud of--an American shipbuilder. I know this business, and
I know it well. I know what it takes to be successful, and I know how
fragile success can be. There are critical issues before us today
regarding the health and future of the Navy's shipbuilding industrial
base. I hope that my 40 years experience as a shipbuilder will help
bring a better understanding of the issues that will impact our
Nation's continued ability to design and build both commercial and
naval warships. This ability is a true national asset, a legacy
capability that could be lost if it is not continually exercised and
advanced with modern design and construction technology.
Over the last 14 years, three of my predecessors at General
Dynamics have spoken to Congress on shipbuilding issues. My message
today is not very different than it was when they spoke. Our U.S.
shipbuilding industrial base produces the most advanced warships in the
world, and preservation of this industrial base is essential to our
national security. The strength of our industry lies in our people, and
the engineering, design, production, and ship technology that they
bring to bear in delivering these warships. We are however, an industry
that is dependent on U.S. Navy ship procurement plans for our business.
Herein lays the risk and fragility of our business. Our fragility is
the result of low-rate production levels such that minor perturbations
in volume have major cost and schedule consequences. It is exacerbated
by the uncertainty in our business forecasts caused by continual
revisions to the Navy's shipbuilding plans. These factors have a ripple
effect on our unique supplier base which in turn further complicates
our ability to ensure timely deliveries at contracted price levels.
In the face of these market conditions, General Dynamics' shipyards
have continued to look for ways to reduce the costs of our products
while ensuring schedule and quality commitments are achieved as well.
We have undertaken difficult reengineering initiatives to adjust to the
unprecedented low-rate production of submarines and surface warships,
consolidated operations and facilities, and aggressively attacked
overhead costs. At the same time, we have made investments in design
tools and systems, and production tools and facilities, with the goal
of improving the quality and reducing the cost of our products. We have
done what we could to keep this industry strong. What we cannot do, and
what we look to Congress and the Navy for, is to provide program and
funding stability. Stability means predictability, and predictability
is fundamental to the performance of any successful business.
Shipbuilding is certainly no exception. Stability will allow us to more
effectively drive out costs by enabling steady, reliable production
plans; by allowing suppliers to more effectively plan component
manufacturing; and by providing us all--shipbuilders and suppliers--
with the confidence to make prudent investments that will improve our
efficiency.
We also need Congress and the Navy to continue to explore
alternative financing approaches for ship acquisition. Alternative
financing approaches may give the Navy budgetary flexibility to sustain
their procurement strategy and support their national defense
obligations, but the appropriate financing approach will likely vary
from program to program. Advance appropriations, multi-year
procurements, incremental procurement, split funding and lead-ship
research and development (R&D) procurements all potentially offer
budget flexibility to the Navy. Most importantly, while alternative
financing will not provide more ships, it will provide an added level
of stability that is so critical to the industrial base.
Finally, so much of the discussions today are in the context of the
Navy's shipbuilding industrial base. Unfortunately, we have lost sight
of just how important commercial shipbuilding could be to the
strengthening of that industrial base. Today, commercial shipbuilding
is a small part of General Dynamics' marine business; it is a much
smaller part of this Nation's participation in the world market. The
U.S. Navy has a vested interest in the revitalization of commercial
shipbuilding in America. Congress and the Navy must not confine their
thinking to new ways of financing how we buy warships. We need to find
new ideas of how shipbuilding, not just naval shipbuilding, can be
revitalized in the U.S.
Within the context of the above, I'd like to discuss my three
shipyards and their business conditions.
electric boat
Submarines
There are over 12,000 engineers, designers, and craftsmen at
Electric Boat. They build the most complex system in the world today--
the nuclear submarine. The U.S. Navy nuclear submarine of today
provides a set of capabilities unmatched by any other military
platform. That complexity is embodied by five critical characteristics:
Nuclear Power
For perspective on the extent to which we build safety into the
nuclear propulsion plants, deployed submarine sailors--who sleep, eat,
and work within yards of the reactor, whose fresh water and fresh air
are made with energy from the reactor--receive less total radiation
exposure each year than the average U.S. citizen gets from natural
background sources.
Quieting
Today's Virginia-class submarine at full speed is, in fact,
generally quieter than the background ocean. Our submarines are about
300 times quieter than a commercial cruise liner.
Shock
The nuclear submarine has much in common with the space shuttle,
both send people and technologically sophisticated vessels into an
unforgiving environment. A nuclear submarine is also designed to go
into combat. Not only must the submarine be able to operate flawlessly
within the ocean depths; the ship must also be able to withstand the
rigors imposed in an underwater combat shock environment.
Design Tolerances
Because of the density of submarine equipment and components, and
critical alignment of that equipment, nuclear submarine construction
must be done to exacting tolerances. Critical equipment must continue
to operate even when the ``as built'' construction tolerances are
further challenged when the ship goes deeper and the external pressure
from the sea causes critical alignments to change as operating
conditions change.
Subsafe
One of the most tragic lessons we have learned in the submarine
industry was the loss of the U.S.S Thresher in 1963. As a result of
that casualty, the Subsafe program was established to provide assurance
that materials and processes used in critical applications were of the
highest quality and can withstand the enormous pressures of deep
submergence. Over 12,000 pieces of material and over 10,000 welds are
Subsafe certified on each nuclear submarine. The recent incident with
the U.S.S San Francisco is truly a testament to the value of our
Quality program. In light of the death and injuries, it is easy to
overlook the fact that the quality of design and workmanship allowed
the ship to not only survive, but also to return to port under its own
power.
Programs
Virginia
The Virginia-class submarine was designed by Electric Boat
Corporation. It is the latest class of advanced capability fast attack
submarines to be designed and delivered to the United States Navy. From
its inception, the challenge of the Virginia Program was to find the
optimum balance between capability and affordability.
The Virginia-class has been designed with reconfigurable spaces and
features that make it adaptable and responsive to the changing and
evolving threat. The Virginia is the first naval combatant to be
designed to meet the post-Cold War challenges of a new, uncertain
threat environment--those conflicts in the near shore littoral
environment. It supports seven critical post-Cold War missions: covert
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); anti-submarine
warfare; special forces warfare; precision strike warfare; anti-surface
ship warfare; mine warfare; and provides support for joint forces.
The Design/Build (Integrated Product and Process Development)
contract was the first of its type for a Department of Defense (DOD)
Cat 1 acquisition program. At the time of the contract award in January
1996, Electric Boat, with no precedent to follow, worked hand-in-hand
with the Navy and led the development of new tools, processes and
procedures, and trained shipyard workforce and oversight organizations
to promulgate the required cultural change in the entire submarine
enterprise. Virginia literally has raised the performance bar for
submarine technology and shipbuilding management and is providing the
model for shipbuilding of the future. One indication of our success was
when we received the Pentagon's David Packard Award for acquisition
excellence. It was the first U.S. Navy warship to be designed using
advanced computer-aided design and visualization technology that
supports integrated design and manufacturing from a single product
model database.
Each ship of the class is being constructed by both General
Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut and Quonset Point, Rhode
Island, and by Northrop Grumman Newport News in Newport News, Virginia.
Construction is being accomplished under a unique co-production teaming
agreement whereby the construction of the ship's 18 major modules has
been assigned to respective yards and the delivery of each ship is
alternated between each yard. Today, the class design is complete and
the program is in low-rate production at one ship per year. Electric
Boat is the prime contractor for the entire construction program.
The program has experienced cost overruns. However, it is important
to view these overruns within the dynamics of an uncertain, low-rate
production market environment; and to look at the specific causes of
these overruns. In 2001, the Navy reported an initial budget shortfall
of $1.234 billion. This shortfall was driven by understated government
inflation estimates, the impact of low-rate production on shipbuilders
and suppliers, and ship requirements growth. More recently, an
additional $419 million shortfall was driven primarily by complex new
lead ship challenges and the reestablishment of dual sources for
submarine construction.
On October 12, 2004, Electric Boat (EB) delivered the lead ship,
U.S.S Virginia (SSN774), just 3\1/2\ months from a contract delivery
date established over 10 years earlier. The lead Virginia, SSN774 was
the first EB submarine delivery in 6 years--and the first lead ship in
7 years. The second ship, SSN775, will be the first Northrop Grumman
Newport News (NGNN) submarine delivery in 8 years--and the first lead
ship delivered by them in 28 years.
Seawolf
The Seawolf Program was designed to counter high performance Soviet
submarines at the end of the Cold War. The need for a large number of
Seawolf-class submarines was obviated by the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1989. Initially planned to be a 30-ship class, the program was
reduced to three ships. The U.S.S Jimmy Carter (SSN23) is the third and
final Seawolf-class submarine. Following closely on the heels of the
delivery of the U.S.S Virginia, U.S.S Jimmy Carter was delivered to the
U.S. Navy on December 22, 2004. This marked the second delivery by
Electric Boat in 4 months.
Differentiating the SSN23 from all other submarines is its Multi-
Mission Platform (MMP), which includes a 100-foot, 2,500-ton hull
section that enhances payload capacity, enabling the ship to
accommodate the advanced technology required to develop, test and
deploy the next generation of weapons, sensors and undersea vehicles.
SSN23 MMP Design/Build program success has been unprecedented. Key
to this success was the ability of experienced design and engineering
personnel to role off of Virginia and immediately onto another major
design program--the MMP, a project as complex as the construction of an
entire Los Angeles-class submarine. Beginning with a notion that was
little more than a Power Point slide, Electric Boat moved from concept
design, to completion of detail design in 29 months--half the time
historically needed to advance through this development cycle. Five
months later, this unique 2,500-ton module was delivered to the Groton
shipyard for assembly with the host ship.
SSGN
Electric Boat is also the prime contractor for the conversion of
four Trident SSBN submarines to nuclear powered cruise missile (SSGN)
configuration taking place at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and at Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard. This effort leverages Electric Boat's experience
as the designer and sole builder of Trident SSBN submarines. Trident
SSGN conversion will provide key capabilities for covert strike and
clandestine Special Operations Force (SOF) missions.
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The SSGN will provide up to 154 Vertical Launch Weapons from
missile tubes previously housing ballistic missiles. Additionally, the
SSGN will include an enhanced Virginia-class communications suite and a
dedicated command and control space for better mission planning. The
platform will also be modified to host two Special Operating Forces
lockout chambers using dual Dry Deck Shelters and/or Advanced SEAL
Delivery Vehicles. The reconfigured ship will be able to house 66 SOF
personnel and provide a dedicated SOF command and control planning
center. SSGN will also function as an experimental test bed to develop
innovative operations concepts and payload/sensor alternatives for
incorporation on future submarines. The large missile tubes inherent on
this platform provide the volume to demonstrate and deploy non-
traditional submarine payloads in an operational environment. The use
of SSGN as a test bed for future capability to be included in future
undersea systems forms the foundation for the transformation of the
submarine force into the future.
Life Cycle Support, Maintenance and Modernization
Electric Boat provides centralized life-cycle support for U.S. Navy
submarines and submersibles via an experienced design, construction and
fleet support organization supporting all classes of submarines.
Electric Boat provides onsite fleet support at Kings Bay, Bangor,
Norfolk, Puget Sound, Groton and Portsmouth and fly away teams at other
locations as requested. Support provided includes design, engineering,
planning, maintenance, material procurement, and installation services
that directly support the safe and reliable operation of the U.S.
submarine force.
Additionally, in 1998 EB began re-establishing itself as a major
depot level submarine maintenance, modernization and repair activity.
Supporting that transition has been a robust engagement with the Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the naval shipyards, and other field
activities in the various initiatives supporting the Navy's One
Shipyard concept. Fundamental to this engagement is Electric Boat's
commitment to align its maintenance related processes with those of the
Navy. Electric Boat is now performing depot level availabilities
including Interim Dry Dockings (IDDs), Selected Restricted
Availabilities (SRAs, Depot Modernization Periods (DMPs), and scheduled
Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availabilities (PIRAs) of Los Angeles- and
Seawolf-class submarines in its Groton shipyard.
The Navy's submarine base in Groton, CT, and Electric Boat, within
short commuting distances of each other, work closely together to
maintain the Navy's nuclear submarine force. This partnership is
significant and can support not only scheduled routine maintenance and
modernization, but also emergent or unscheduled work requiring
technical expertise, depot level capabilities and a skilled resource-
pool to accommodate surge requirements. The complementary SUBASE/EB
relationship affords the Government savings as well as efficiency and
skilled resource flexibility, creating a synergy that is critical to
the Navy and national defense.
Much of the cost debate for naval ships has been focused on
acquisition cost. A truer metric may in fact be total ownership, or
total life cycle costs. Nuclear submarines inherently possess low total
operating costs due to their minimal manning; and, they require no at-
sea logistics train, no protective escorts, and little support
infrastructure ashore. Today, technology advancements have led to the
development of a life of the ship core, eliminating the need for major
refueling overhauls on our attack submarines. On Virginia, crew manning
for at-sea operations, one of the key drivers of program life cycle
cost, has been reduced by 12 percent from 134 to 118. In fact, on the
Virginia program, there has been a 30 percent reduction in total
ownership cost from previous submarine classes.
Tango Bravo
The Tango Bravo Program is a collaborative effort between the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the United States
Navy to execute a technology demonstration program to break through the
``technology barriers'' and enable design options for a future
submarine. This effort is also aimed at decreasing platform
infrastructure and the cost of the design and production of that future
ship.
In October 2004, Tango Bravo proposals were sought in five
technology demonstration areas: (1) shaftless propulsion, (2) external
weapons stow and launch, (3) hull adaptable sonar array, (4) radical
ship infrastructure reduction, and (5) reduced crew/automated attack
center. Electric Boat was notified in March 2005, that they had been
selected for three Tango Bravo contract awards, subject to successful
negotiations. The $600 million programmed in the current Navy plan for
an undersea superiority system could be used to advance these
technologies and integrate them into a future Virginia, or to start a
design effort to produce a lower cost nuclear submarine. Combined,
these technologies could lead to a complete re-architect of the
submarine for the first time since the Nautilus. This new architecture
could remove the constraints in present submarines imposed by the shaft
line and torpedo room/torpedo tubes. The initiative also could provide
for the insertion of new technologies to ensure submarine relevance in
the future threat environment where it will deploy.
Spiral integration of these technologies, such as external weapons,
could be developed in parallel with a new forward end. Shaftless
propulsion, likewise, could become a design/build effort resulting in a
new stern and engine room section. By continuing Virginia production,
ships of opportunity will provide an integrating platform.
Several studies have recently been conducted on future fleet
architectures. All have recognized the enduring value of submarines for
future naval operations. Furthermore, under all known force level
scenarios, including the most recent Navy 30-Year Interim Report to
Congress, procurement of 2 ships per year will be needed to maintain
undersea superiority and replace the aging fleet of Los Angeles-class
(SSN688-class) attack submarines as they retire over the next several
decades. The 30-year report neglects to indicate a new SSBN/SSGN design
will be needed in the next decade. Absent new design work, the
submarine design industrial base will not be around to perform this
effort.
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Reengineered for Low Rate Production
With the abrupt rescission of the Seawolf program in 1991, Electric
Boat was confronted with the challenge of remaining a viable enterprise
in the face of a business future where its sole production program had
been canceled. Electric Boat responded to this challenge with an
immediate and complete reengineering of its business. This was an
aggressive plan to ensure successful completion of its backlog of work
while positioning the company to remain viable in what was expected to
be a dramatically reduced submarine production market. Key objectives
were: to be properly sized to meet demand; to utilize ``best
practices'' for all processes and procedures; and to incorporate a
culture of world-class performance. As a result, Electric Boat has led
the industry in shedding excess production capacity, reducing overhead
and infrastructure costs, and developing tools and methods to preserve
critical skills and capabilities during low-rate production.
One of the most critical steps in the reengineering process was
changing the historical relationship between overhead costs and direct
labor costs. In 1992, at the outset of Electric Boat's reengineering
effort, an aggressive, long range, overhead cost reduction target was
established for 1998. A plan was laid out that included significant
reductions in overhead cost each year. Electric Boat's realization of
its goals necessitated identifying key cost areas, breaking each one
down into discrete elements, and, most importantly, taking aggressive
management actions to minimize these costs. These actions have resulted
in actual and projected cost savings of over $2.7 billion over 1993
through 2010; $1.7 billion from 1993-2004, and $1 billion from 2005-
2010. Over 95 percent of those savings have and will accrue to the
Government.
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Production and Engineering Work Force
The manufacturing, assembly, integration, and test activities
carried out at Electric Boat require a highly skilled workforce with a
wide variety of critical and unique skills and capabilities. Currently
there are over 5,000 trades, supervision, and support personnel
involved in the construction, maintenance, and modernization of U.S.
naval nuclear submarines at Electric Boat.
Analysis done in support of the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Industrial Affairs & Installations), Study of the
Submarine Industrial Base in 1997, concluded that it takes at least 2
to 3 years for a submarine shipyard mechanic to become minimally
proficient and from 5 to 6 years in most trades to achieve relatively
``full proficiency.'' In fact, it was noted that in some critical areas
such as testing, where an extensive trade background is a prerequisite,
it can take up to 10 years at the yard to become proficient.
The time required for the EB production workforce to become
proficient is exacerbated by the uniqueness of some of the skills
required to construct nuclear submarines, such as fabrication of heavy-
wall pressure hull sections to demanding tolerances, lead bonding and
other radiation shielding work, and stringent quality requirements for
nuclear and Subsafe work. These skills and abilities must be developed
inhouse, as they are unavailable elsewhere in the shipbuilding industry
or from other manufacturing sectors.
Electric Boat has identified its production workforce critical mass
at approximately 3,000 production workers (1,500 in Groton Operations
and 1,500 in Quonset Point Operations); it does not include production
support personnel. This would be a ``minimum efficient level'' to
sustain an efficient, affordable production trade workforce, as well as
retain a balance of critical skills.
Current Virginia production forecast results in a workload volume
that will test our ability to sustain key skills and capabilities.
Absent additional new construction volume, submarine maintenance and
conversion work allows us to retain an efficient trade workforce.
Submarine maintenance and conversion work draws on many of the skills
involved in new construction, helping to fill voids in key trades
caused by the low rates of production. The added volume also helps to
reduce the overall labor cost of new construction by absorbing
overhead.
Electric Boat has over 3,000 engineering and design personnel
engaged in all facets of submarine design and engineering. This cadre
of skilled and experienced personnel represents the core of the U.S.
Design Industrial Base for nuclear submarines. Like the production
workforce, the engineering and design force encompasses numerous skills
and abilities unique to the nuclear submarine environment. Among these
unique skills are the acoustic technologies essential to stealth,
advanced analytical capabilities in the areas of shock, hydrodynamics,
and nuclear propulsion, and submarine systems and components
integration.
The Electric Boat engineering and design workforce has not fallen
below 2,500 personnel in the last 40 years. Recent studies show that at
least 2,200 experienced engineers and designers will be required to
retain the capability to do the next full submarine design in a timely
and cost-efficient manner.
The current forecast for submarine R&D and new design development
places the Electric Boat engineering and design workforce at risk. For
the first time since the start of the nuclear submarine program, over
50 years ago, there is no new submarine design planned. Additional
submarine R&D/design efforts are needed in the relatively near future
to maintain this base of skilled engineers and designers. It is
imperative to move forward with a new class design if the Nation is to
retain this national security asset.
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Navy Shipbuilding Plan--Submarines
Beginning with the Seawolf rescission in 1991, the submarine
industrial base has been faced with unprecedented, protracted low-rate
procurement. Although the Seawolf decision did not appear at the time
to have national security ramifications, that was not the case. The
supplier base for nuclear submarines essentially collapsed. The
decision had a ``chilling effect'' on the industries that owned the
suppliers and made them price risk into material and components, thus
driving up the cost of submarines. Low-procurement rate, coupled with
continued uncertainty over future program stability, has left the
Nation's submarine industrial base with a dangerously limited number of
suppliers. Today on the Virginia program, over 83 percent of the
material is supplied by single or sole source suppliers. Over the last
10 years, many key suppliers of major equipment and material have left
the business, resulting in the number of suppliers going from 11,000 to
only 4,500 today. The results are material costs that continue to
escalate at rates that place continued pressure on our ability to
control unit costs.
The fiscal year 2006 Navy shipbuilding plan reflects a procurement
rate of one submarine per year until fiscal year 2012. Once again we
have seen the Navy's plan to increase submarine procurement to two
ships per year delayed; this time by 3 years from fiscal year 2009 to
fiscal year 2012. This is the 12th change to the Virginia procurement
plan in 10 years. Over this time, the forecast for nuclear submarines
has been reduced by almost 40 percent, a reduction from 24 ships to 15
over the 1998-2012 time frames. This is estimated to be a reduction of
about $20 billion to our single product market.
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Despite low procurement volume and uncertainty over future plans,
the shipbuilders and suppliers continue to strive to reduce the cost of
nuclear submarines. Most significantly, with help from Congress, the
six ship, Block II procurement of Virginia ships was awarded under a
multi-year contract, with Economic Order Quantity and funding. This
acquisition strategy will allow the shipbuilders and suppliers to
achieve a significant reduction in material costs that would not have
been achievable under more typical single ship contracts.
The submarine industrial base is not only dealing with the issue of
a minimum level of ship procurement, but for the first time in over 40
years, there are no new submarine designs being developed. Similar to
the production industrial base, the submarine engineering and design
industrial base is a highly specialized, unique capability, with no
commercial counterpart. It is a capability that takes years to develop
and must stay actively engaged in submarine design to retain its
viability.
A vivid example of the impact that procurement instability can have
on a nation's shipbuilding capability can be seen in the depletion of
the United Kingdom's (U.K.) submarine design and construction
capability. Erosion of the U.K.'s submarine industrial base was caused
by reductions in defense spending that led to an extended gap between
designs and low submarine production rates. This resulted in the
closure of a shipyard, major job losses, and the loss of ``corporate
knowledge'' as experienced personnel shifted to other industries.
The U.K. has experienced significant problems in executing their
new submarine design program--Astute--as a result of their eroded
capability. With their submarine engineering and design capability
effectively disbanded they must accomplish their new design using other
industry engineers and designers. This approach has yielded a design
that has required numerous changes and a program that is over budget
and behind schedule. At the U.K.'s request the U.S. Navy has tasked
Electric Boat to assist in design and management support services to
meet resource shortfalls of the U.K.'s current submarine industrial
base.
The rapid and costly depletion of the U.K.'s submarine design and
construction capability has elements that are strikingly similar to
those now faced by the United State's submarine industrial base. We
could face the same dilemma as the U.K. if development funding for
submarines is cut. The U.S. ``corporate knowledge'' base is at risk,
and if reconstitution becomes necessary, there will be no comparable
assistance available. Learning from the U.K.'s experience and
proceeding with a submarine procurement plan that provides
predictability and production rate stability is critical to our
Nation's defense.
bath iron works
Surface Combatants
The name Bath Iron Works (BIW) has been synonymous with U.S. Navy
surface combatants since the closing decade of the 19th century. BIW's
first U.S. Navy warship; U.S.S. Machias was delivered and commissioned
on July 20, 1893, and since then over 230 Bath-built ships have served
America's Fleet in defense of our Nation. BIW delivered 89 ships to the
U.S. Navy during WW II, averaging one destroyer every 17 days during
the peak production years of 1943-1944.
Since World War II, BIW has designed and built the lead ship for 11
of the 20 new, non-nuclear surface combatant classes procured by the
U.S. Navy. As the designer and lead ship builder of the DDG 51-class,
BIW has been at the leading edge of the integration for Aegis and
guided-missile weapons technology delivering 24 DDGs since the fall of
the Berlin wall.
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Programs
DDG 51
BIW is currently constructing DDG 51-class destroyers and will
deliver 10 more of these ships before construction concludes with DDG
112. Ultimately, BIW will build 34 of the 62 ships in the DDG 51-class
before construction completes in 2010 making the DDGs the largest post-
WWII class of Navy ships. Each one of these highly complex,
technological marvels is packed full of equipment and brought to life
by more than 48 miles of pipe and 254 miles of cabling, roughly the
distance from one end of Maine to the other, in a ship that is 50 feet
shorter than the Washington Monument. Each ship is unique and more
capable than its predecessor as new technologies are introduced and
improvements are made. As the lead shipbuilder and design agent for the
class, BIW has been responsible for the introduction of many of these
innovations to the Navy fleet including, dramatic radar cross section
signature reductions, shipboard integration and testing of combat and
sensor systems from multiple vendors, and multiple shipwide capability
upgrades. Most significant of these was the Flight IIA redesign,
essentially a lead ship since more than 75 percent of the construction
drawings were modified. As the planning yard for the DDG Class, BIW
supported the Operational Navy after the terrorist attack on the U.S.S.
Cole by sending engineers with wearable computers directly linked to
BIW's Surface Ship Support Center to assist damage control and
transport operations in Yemen within 48 hours of the attack.
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Performance by the men and women of BIW has provided significant
cost and schedule improvements over the 20-plus years of the DDG 51
Program. This sustained focus on performance improvements has allowed
the cost of an hour of labor in Maine to remain affordable to the
United States Navy. Broadly, over the last three DDGs, the engineering
and support hours have been reduced by more than 20 percent and the
manufacturing hours have been reduced by over 9 percent per ship. These
improvements are attributable to front-loaded work scope, reduced
schedule durations and local innovations.
Since the conversion from traditional inclined building ways to the
Land Level Transfer Facility, BIW has made a concerted effort to move
work scope to earlier, more efficient stages of construction where
access to equipment is less congested and support services are more
readily available. As shown in the bar charts below, the work to be
completed during the water-borne period, which is the least efficient
stage of construction, has been reduced from 36 percent to only 15
percent. Associated process improvements have enabled an 11 percent
reduction in the hours required to complete the most complex outfitting
aboard the ship. Further, the overall ship construction duration has
been reduced by 30 percent since BIW began building ships on its Land
Level Transfer Facility of which the water-borne duration has been
reduced by 62 percent.
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In addition to planning and scheduling driven improvements, the
innovative spirit of BIW's skilled mechanics and managers has generated
great benefits. Some of BIW's surface combatant ``firsts'' include:
``lighting-off'' the Aegis combat system and the ship's generators
before launch; aligning the main propulsion power train before it is
water-borne; using photogrammetry, a technology principally developed
for surveyors and cartographers, to aid in equipment and structural
alignment; and DDG 94, our most recent ship, delivered after only a 1
day sea trial. BIW Land Level Transfer Facility has allowed water-borne
work--the least efficient stage of construction--to be reduced from 36
percent to 15 percent of ship construction.
Littoral Combat Ship
In response to the Navy's evolving requirements for
transformational platforms to combat emerging threats, Bath Iron Works
is leading a multinational team in the Final Systems Design phase of
the Littoral Combat Ship program. The General Dynamics LCS Team concept
couples fully integrated open architecture information systems with an
innovative high-speed trimaran hull form to deliver maximum warfighting
capability. With its superior capacity to carry combat payload volume
and weight, excellent seaway performance and exceptional aviation
capability, the General Dynamics' LCS is a flexible, agile and lethal
solution for the Navy's needs today and for the Joint Operational
Concepts of tomorrow.
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Joint Sea Basing will be a critical element of our future national
defense strategy. A General Dynamics Team lead by Bath Iron Works is
investigating the requirements for Sea Base implementation. In close
collaboration with all military Services, we are developing a new joint
force concept of operations, identifying technology development needs,
and designing two concept ships. These ships, together with the high
speed and versatility of the General Dynamics LCS, can meet all future
Joint Sea Basing requirements and deliver a capability that is
tailorable, scalable, persistent and affordable.
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Workforce and Facilities
The 6,300 employees at Bath Iron Works are skilled craftspeople
producing a sophisticated, complex product in support of our U.S. Navy
customer. The specialized nature of the product demands design and
construction skills that are not readily found in other industries.
Shipbuilding is a labor intensive business that also necessitates
significant investments in time and money to develop and maintain a
proficient workforce. Each skilled shipyard mechanic requires
approximately 5 years to gain full proficiency at a training cost of
$50,000. Similarly, each engineer and designer requires an investment
of 3 years and $60,000-$90,000. These skilled and innovative
craftspeople are vital to maintaining a national shipbuilding
competence.
In response to the evolving Navy priorities, programmatic
instabilities, and diminished build-rates, General Dynamics has
implemented aggressive business restructuring efforts to appropriately
size its shipyards and gain efficiencies. In the late 1990s, General
Dynamics, in cooperation with the state of Maine and the city of Bath,
invested over $300 million in a state-of-the-art Land Level Transfer
Facility at Bath Iron Works to radically improve the shipbuilding
process. This flexible, world-class facility was sized appropriately
for the Navy's PB 1999 projected surface combatant plan; and supported
the Navy's stated desire to maintain two sources of supply for surface
combatants.
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Navy Shipbuilding Plan--Surface Combatants
Predictability is fundamental to the functioning of any successful
business; shipbuilding is no exception. Key business decisions related
to facility modernizations and the retention and enrichment of critical
shipbuilding skills must be made years in advance of when they are
required and must be predicated on reliable workload forecasts. Absent
a predictable plan, the industrial base can not fully leverage its
capabilities and competencies to provide the Navy with the most
affordable ships possible. Unfortunately, the desired stability has
been lacking from the Navy's recent acquisition plans.
The Quadrennial Defense Review is one manner of justification for
Navy ship acquisition plans. Completed in 1997, the current
administration endorsed this plan by incorporating the same Fleet
requirements in 2001, calling for a 300+ ship Fleet. In most basic
terms, sustaining a 300-ship Navy requires building an average of 10
ships/year; however, the steady-state build-rate has been 6 or less
since 1993. PB 2006 further diminishes the build-rate--in PB 2004, 12
DD(X)s were planned over the duration of the Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP), but in just 2 years this total has been reduced to only 5 ships
over the same time span in the currently proposed budget.
Over the past decade, industry has invested heavily in several
programs that were ultimately canceled with no chance to see a return
on the investment, including Arsenal ship, JCC(X), and the SC 21/DD 21
programs, the progenitors of the current DD(X). Similarly, General
Dynamics cooperated to the maximum extent possible with the Navy-
initiated LPD-DDG swap. The Corporation understood and supported the
Navy's clear need to maximize the overall management, technical and
financial stability of the LPD 17 Program by consolidating all private
sector responsibilities under a single business entity. The survival of
the program was at risk; bold actions were essential and it was
implicit that the ``swap'' process could not--would not--balance all
business/financial issues. Knowing that such inequities existed did not
prevent General Dynamics from acting in the best interest of the Navy
to achieve budgetary control of the LPD 17 Program. At the time, this
appeared to be done to our own near-term disadvantage, albeit with
assurances of longer-term stability in Navy combatant new construction
programs. However, recent Navy actions/proposed actions on the DD(X)
Program appear to be in direct conflict with these assurances.
Under the leadership of the U.S. Navy, the DD 21/DD(X) Programs
have been structured from the outset to incorporate the integrated and
cooperative efforts of the two U.S. surface combatant shipyards across
all program phases, from Functional Design to Detail Design and ship
construction. The underlying business premise, which has enabled a
consistent focus on full cooperation, not isolated competition, has
been that the ship construction program would be shared equally by the
two shipyards. This integrated approach, applied consistently since
1998, was designed to ensure that the DD(X) is the beneficiary of the
best ideas, cumulative lessons-learned and most innovative
manufacturing practices that U.S. industry has to offer. BIW has been
cooperating fully with the Navy's directions in all areas, openly
sharing design expertise and manufacturing best-practices with our
primary competitor, NGSS-Ingalls Shipbuilding. Given this consistent
emphasis on process integration and open cooperation, General Dynamics
finds the Navy's recent announcement of a winner-take-all competition
at this late stage in the program, after over 7 years of development,
to be confusing, contradictory and very disturbing. A dangerous
parallel exists today with DD(X) and Seawolf. Just as the Seawolf
decision had unforeseen national security implications, so too does the
DD(X) decision.
The reasoning provided by the Navy for their unilateral proposal of
a ``winner take all'' competition was in reducing the number of DD(X)
ships to be built over the next several years, the costs of two sources
of supply for these ships could no longer be justified. Since it
remains the Navy's intention to buy at least 10 DD(X) warships, an
alternative approach would be to ask industry the simple question:
``what is driving the cost of this ship and under these circumstances
what can you do to reduce the cost of the DD(X) program?''
After thinking about this I offer the following. The DD(X)
operational requirements drive an unprecedented number of new
technologies brought to bear simultaneously on the first ship. While
the need for these advances in capability is unambiguous, from a
practical standpoint both cost and risk are dramatically increased.
These requirements were developed from an evolving document dating back
nearly a decade. During this time the prime threat to the United States
shifted from a major sea-power to an expanded list now including the
war on terror and weapons of mass destruction. Clearly this ship must
be capable against today's lower probability threat--an emerging sea
power--but the path to meeting that threat should be considered as an
evolutionary, affordable one rather than all capability on the first
DD(X).
I would suggest that the five ships in the FYDP be delivered in a
spiral development manner. The first ship would include those
revolutionary technologies that are just too expensive to backfit or
forward fit into later hulls. The tumblehome hull form, the
revolutionary electric drive propulsion system, and the appropriate
level of capability in the combat system are examples of things that
would remain on the first and all following ships.
Some things should be rethought regarding the basic need for them
when considering the threat that has evolved and viable alternatives
with lower risk and cost. An example here might be to review the
composite deckhouse and hanger. I would see if other material could
meet all or most of the needs for the ship but reduce the manufacturing
risks of this revolutionary technology--at least in modules of this
magnitude. This would be a decision that would affect all or most of
the ships in the DD(X) program.
Spiral development of technology and warfighting capability is a
third method of attack--in this case capability that could be
affordably added later. An example here is over the first five ships
sequentially starting with the ASW component, add mine countermeasure
capability later, and use signature reduction techniques in a spiral
fashion after validating the requirement over time for this
enhancement.
Today, BIW is preparing for low-rate production, by working to
further reduce its overhead structures and innovatively exploiting its
existing facilities. Bath Iron Works believes that it can best serve
its Navy customer by remaining a modestly-sized, yet nimble shipyard
that can provide a unique, highly-complex, sophisticated product while
leveraging appropriate resources from across General Dynamics. In light
of the near-term instability of the Navy's overall acquisition plans,
it appears that the DD(X) will be a low-rate production program and BIW
has factored this expectation into its ongoing efforts to rationalize
design and manufacturing cost structures and facility/resource loading
plans.
nassco
Business Overview
National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, NASSCO, in San Diego has
been designing and building ships for almost 50 years, and is the only
remaining private shipyard on the west coast capable of building large,
ocean-going vessels. NASSCO, with its 4,200 engineers, designers, and
skilled, shipbuilding craftsmen is the largest industrial manufacturer
in the San Diego area and is a strategic resource to both the Navy and
Southern California. NASSCO specializes in commercial cargo ships and
Navy auxiliary and underway replenishment ships, as well as Navy repair
and maintenance. In the last 5 years, NASSCO has completed the design
of three first-of-class ships, two for U.S. commercial operators, and
one for the Navy.
One quarter of NASSCO's business activity is devoted to maintenance
and repair of the Navy's fleet home ported in San Diego. NASSCO,
working together with the Navy has developed the most effective mode of
Navy maintenance in the country. Importantly, NASSCO, with its well-
developed new construction capability, is the only private shipyard on
the west coast that can perform major battle damage repair or major
structural modifications to Navy ships.
Programs
T-AKE
The T-AKE 1 Lewis and Clark class dry/cargo and ammunition ship is
the latest in NASSCO's long line of Navy auxiliary ships. It is the
first new underway replenishment ship design in more than 20 years.
NASSCO has eight T-AKEs under contract with options for up to an
additional four. Using computer modeling and simulation design tools
and proven off-the-shelf state-of-the-art commercial marine systems,
NASSCO's T-AKE design incorporates a highly-efficient cargo handling
system and a low life-cycle-cost electric drive propulsion system. The
first two ships are now under construction. The Lewis and Clark lead
ship will launch on May 21 and will deliver in early 2006.
Commercial--TOTE
Two new commercial roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) trailerships, which
feature a diesel-electric propulsion system, were delivered to Tacoma,
Washington-based Totem Enterprises in 2003 and are providing service
between Alaska and the lower 48 States. These ships were designed
specifically for the rigors of the Gulf of Alaska, and have received
many awards for their environmental protection features.
Commercial--BP Tankers
NASSCO has built more of the country's commercial oil tankers than
any other shipyard today. Currently NASSCO has a series of double-hull
Suezmax crude carriers, also with diesel-electric propulsion, under
construction for BP. These ships are designed with a 50-year hull life
and are the most environmentally friendly tankers ever designed and
built. The first two ships are already in service transporting crude
oil between Valdez, Alaska, and BP's west coast refineries. The final
two ships will deliver by third quarter 2006.
Underway Replenishment and Strategic Sealift
For the Navy, NASSCO is a leading builder of underway replenishment
and strategic sealift ships. From the AFS combat stores ships to the
AOE gas-turbine-powered carrier strike group combat support ships, from
T-AKR Maritime Prepositioning to the LMSR large medium speed roll-on/
roll-off sealift ships, NASSCO-built ships are an essential element of
the Navy's ability to operate throughout all regions of the world,
independent of shore-based support. NASSCO's considerable experience in
each of the Navy's past combat logistic ship and sealift ship program
design and production ideally positions NASSCO to be a principal
contributor on the Navy's forthcoming Sea Basing program.
Workforce and Facilities
While NASSCO's three new ship classes were making their way through
the shipyard in the last 3 years, GD made a significant investment of
more than $130 million in upgrading many of NASSCO's production
facilities to world class levels. Although we saw some benefit from
these new facilities on the Totem Ocean Trailer Express (TOTE) and BP
ships, the real beneficiary is the Navy's new, T-AKE dry cargo/
ammunition ships.
Despite this sizable investment in new facilities, NASSCO's
experience on its recent commercial programs has not met our
expectations for improved efficiencies. There are a number of very
relevant observations that I offer to this committee as a result of
this experience at NASSCO that reinforce my own conclusions after 40
years in this industry:
First, an investment in shipyard shipbuilding technology and
facilities does not in itself guarantee improved productivity and
competitiveness. It is steady continuous volume with repeatable product
designs that is the most important element for improving shipyard
efficiency. We see this clearly in benchmarking our production rates
and planning processes against leading commercial shipbuilders around
the world, all of whom deliver between 10 and 60 ships per year. In
contrast, NASSCO's all-time peak output was seven ships way back in
1971. In today's market place, we produce only two or three ships per
year.
Second, production rates must be stable and predictable. When
NASSCO started construction on its TOTE new buildings, its work force
had by then declined from a high of 5,100 employees in 1995 to 2,800 in
mid-2001 as it was winding down production on the very successful Navy
sealift ship program and awaiting the T-AKE contract to be awarded. To
ramp up production for the TOTE ships, NASSCO had to hire and train
more than 1,000 new production employees at a significant recruitment
and training cost, plus lower productivity from these inexperienced
personnel.
Commercial Shipbuilding
Prior to 1981, the U.S. had a robust commercial shipbuilding
industry. For the period 1976 through 1980, U.S shipyards had an
average of 61 commercial ships under construction. Shipbuilding,
however, has always been a global market and an intensely competitive
one. It has always been an industry in which governments have actively
supported their domestic industry. This was true in the U.S. as well.
However, in 1981, our government made a conscious decision to stop
providing the financial support necessary for U.S. shipyards to compete
in the heavily subsidized international commercial shipbuilding market.
The U.S. was going to set an example to the rest of the world, in the
hope that other governments would also eliminate their subsidies to
shipbuilding and provide a more level playing field for our shipyards.
Today, unfortunately, foreign yards are still heavily subsidized by
their governments in various ways led by Japan, Korea, and most
recently China. Over the last almost 25 years, U.S. foreign trade has
grown to 1.2 billion metric tons a year, a 50-percent increase. Yet,
we, the world's largest trading nation, now have a U.S. flag merchant
marine of 234 ships carrying an anemic 2 percent of our foreign trade.
More important from my perspective, very few of the U.S. flag ships
operating in our foreign trade were U.S. built. In 2004, U.S. shipyards
had only 7 commercial ships on order, all for the domestic coastal
trade, not foreign trade, which represents a paltry 0.3 percent share
of the world market.
It is not that U.S yards lack experience building commercial ships.
U.S. yards have built cruise ships, LNG ships, RO/ROs, container ships,
crude and product tankers, etc. In fact, five of our Nation's six
largest shipyards have a heritage rich in building commercial ships. We
are not in this market today because 25 years ago we lost the support
of our elected officials and ceded the international commercial market
to foreign shipyards. U.S. yards instead focused on building ships for
the U.S. Navy which reached a high water mark of just under 600 ships
in the mid-1980s. Today, the U.S. Navy fleet is less than 300 ships and
headed lower.
Ship design and shipbuilding technology evolves from commercial not
naval shipbuilding. For perspective, there are some 2,000 new
commercial ships built in the world every year; at best there might be
100 navy ships built each year around the world.
Commercial shipbuilding brings tremendous benefits to the Navy and
the Nation:
Allows shipbuilding and ship design technology
benchmarking against the best in the world; not just the best
in the U.S.
Ensures access to the best of international marine
technology and competitive prices for commercial marine systems
that are found aboard many Navy ships
Commercial volume allows for the continuous process
improvement in construction technique
Preserves and enhances the employment skill level
necessary to build ships
Helps attract a necessary new generation of engineers
into shipbuilding
Spreads yard overhead costs across a wider base making
Navy ships less expensive
Fills in the valleys between Navy programs
U.S. yards are now in the unenviable situation where Navy
shipbuilding has declined dramatically and we have little or no
commercial business to fill the void.
Under the right circumstances, U.S. Shipbuilders can produce
affordable commercial ships for the Jones Act domestic trade at a
profit in this country and the Navy would be a direct beneficiary. A
line of commercial ships of sufficient numbers, of a proven design, and
totally repeatable from one customer to the next, could lower the
overhead costs on Navy programs and provide the stable and predictable
production volumes that would drive improved efficiency and continued
investment. This would result in a more robust, modern, U.S. flag
fleet, but, equally important, more affordable Navy ships, and a stable
industrial base. The Navy will always need a balanced fleet across its
multiple mission areas from submarines, to surface combatants, to
auxiliary and support ships. We need to do all we can to fund and
preserve an industrial base that can efficiently and cost-effectively
produce ships for each mission area.
Navy Shipbuilding Plan--Naval Auxiliaries
As a final observation, I would offer that in the low-rate
production environment that now characterizes U.S. shipbuilding,
program sequencing is an extremely important consideration. When NASSCO
designed the new TOTE ships, it had not designed a new Navy or
commercial ship in over 5 years. NASSCO essentially rebuilt its
engineering and design capabilities, both software and people, for the
TOTE and BP commercial programs. Such gaps in new ship program starts
are very expensive, create significant inefficiencies, and result in
long cycle times from contract to ship delivery. I fear we will see
similar discontinuities in the current Navy auxiliary ship programs as
the design development gap between T-AKE and the Navy's next planned
program the T-AOEX and the MPF(F) is now over 6 years with the
potential to increase even more as a result of low shipbuilding
budgets. I would strongly urge the Navy to fully consider program
continuity and its many implications when making its programmatic
decisions.
summary
State of the Industrial Base
As we have shown in the past, our shipyards can adjust to the
market place by right-sizing our organizations to meet market demands.
But, I believe today is different. Today, the long term implications of
any further contraction of the capabilities of your major U.S.
shipyards could seriously harm national security as you address our
future threats. The issue for you, today's political leadership, is
whether you are comfortable with the state of our shipbuilding industry
from a national security perspective.
In recent testimony, the CNO has illustrated the fact that over the
last 40 years, ship unit costs have grown, and in some cases have grown
dramatically. It cannot be disputed that there has been cost growth in
naval warships, and that industry and the Navy must be unrelenting in
their efforts to reduce the cost of these ships. What cannot be
overlooked are key factors beyond the shipbuilders' and industry
suppliers' control that have contributed to this growth. Most
specifically, today's naval warships bring tremendous advancements in
capability over those of 40 years ago; advancements in weapons, in
electronics, in stealth, in survivability, and in reliability and
maintainability.
It is unlikely that the Navy's ship procurement plans will return
to the high-volume levels maintained during the Cold War. Given the
likelihood of limited production, steps must be taken to help reduce
the cost of naval warships.
Predictability is fundamental to the functioning of any successful
business; shipbuilding is no exception. Key business decisions related
to facility modernizations and the retention and enrichment of critical
shipbuilding skills must be made years in advance of when they are
required and must be predicated on reliable workload forecasts to
justify such expenditures. Absent a predictable plan, the industrial
base can not fully leverage its capabilities and competencies to
provide the Navy with the most affordable ships possible.
Alternative financing approaches may give the Navy enough budgetary
flexibility to sustain their procurement strategy and support their
national defense obligations. The appropriate financing approach will
likely vary from program to program, but advance appropriations, multi-
year procurements, incremental procurement, split funding and lead ship
R&D procurements all potentially offer budget flexibility to the Navy,
thereby creating the opportunity for industry to reliably predict
volume, and thus provide more cost fidelity for future work. It is
important to recognize, however, that this is not a panacea for the
Navy. It will not buy more ships. What it will provide is an added
level of stability that is so critical the industrial base.
We need to look closely at our policies and plans for accomplishing
maintenance and modernization work. In a low-rate production
environment this work can play a much more important role in preserving
our production capabilities. By performing more of this work at the
ship construction yards, we will strengthen these yards by sustaining
critical shipbuilding skills and capabilities. In addition, we will
reduce the cost of new construction by utilizing existing capacity and
facilities; and by spreading overhead costs.
I also believe we need to discuss ideas to revitalize commercial
shipbuilding in the U.S. We need a U.S. merchant marine built and
manned by Americans and we need to define the ship types necessary to
supplement our national defense needs. Working with Congress, we need
to explore the universe of market incentives necessary to encourage the
private sector to build and keep these vessels in operation.
Toward this end, Congress and industry must do a little thinking
``outside of the box.'' For example, can shipbuilding have a role in
reducing the pressures on our Nation's highway infrastructure? The
amount of freight transported on our highways is staggering. Perhaps
Congress, working with Government agencies, can devise appropriate
legislation and incentives which would result in a more vibrant
merchant marine--a fleet of commercial cargo carriers to service the
domestic trade. The benefits would be tremendous. Such revitalization
of commercial shipbuilding would reduce the cost of Navy platforms if
for no other reason than the increased economies of scale from
additional shipbuilding volume. Revitalization of commercial
shipbuilding would result in development of commercial ``best
practices,'' some of which could be applied to military shipbuilding
and thereby also reduce cost to DOD. Revitalization of commercial
shipbuilding by such a manner would also produce a ready-reserve
capability available to DOD in case of national emergency.
I mentioned Congress and DOD developing legislation and incentives
to facilitate this concept. Consider that the concept outlined provides
significant benefit to DOD. Why can't DOD, therefore, fund development
of a non shipyard-specific design for such a cargo fleet, and then make
that design available to industry for commercial exploitation? This is
not so different an investment philosophy that Congress and the Navy
currently provide to support the National Shipbuilding Research
Program, it just adds a real tangible result to that strategy. This
kind of thinking is what we need to do more of if we are truly going to
strengthen our industrial base.
The Navy, in cooperation with the shipbuilding industrial base,
must make use of all available technical/industrial levers to maximize
the capabilities of the industrial base to provide the Fleet with the
right mix of the capable, affordable ships needed to meet our national
defense needs. Industry stands ready to support the Navy customer and
invest in the future, but a clear, predictable plan must be defined;
then the Navy-industry partnership must work to the plan.
The goal of General Dynamics Marine Systems is to be the best at
what we do, whether that is submarines, surface combatants, naval
auxiliaries or commercial ships. Toward this end, the General Dynamics
management team remains focused on defining and operating
sophisticated, specialized facilities that have been properly sized for
the prevailing, customer-defined, ship production rate. The recent
benchmarking study conducted by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Industrial Policy confirmed that we have met that goal--facility
resources, critical skills and competencies are continually being tuned
to suit prevailing, as well as predicted, market demands. Unanticipated
or uncontrollable changes in volume have a significant impact on the
cost of an hour's worth of labor. While facilities can be readily re-
tooled or taken off-line, this country's highly-skilled shipbuilders
(engineers, designers and craftsmen) are a national treasure; they
cannot simply be placed in ``reserve'' status. GD shipyards have
avoided a reckless pursuit of added capacity; instead they have worked
to right-size in order to be in the best position to meet the
challenges of tomorrow's Navy. GD shipyards are meeting commitments and
expectations. In return, we need predictability and an opportunity for
a reasonable rate of return on our investments. When such conditions
are not met, businesses close. Once a major naval shipbuilding yard
closes it never successfully reopens; once the skilled workforce is
lost, reconstitution of this national treasure is too costly and simply
not feasible.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Toner.
Dr. Dur, you are next and thank you for being here. I would
encourage you to keep your oral statement as brief as possible,
but it is an important hearing and you are kind to give us your
time, so take what time you need.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP A. DUR, PH.D., PRESIDENT, NORTHROP GRUMMAN
SHIP SYSTEMS
Dr. Dur. Mr. Chairman, Senator, I am honored to be asked to
testify before you today on an issue that drives at the heart
of your constitutional mandate to provide and to maintain a
Navy. I believe we are at a strategic crossroads today, not
because we may debate over the numbers of ships that constitute
our fleet, but because of how we as a Nation are arriving at
those numbers.
The issue at hand is really about retaining the industrial
capacity the Nation needs to build the ships it requires to
protect its vital interests. In my considered opinion, the
trends suggest that the maritime security of the country may be
at risk.
I want to reiterate that I for one recognize that the Navy
and the Coast Guard do not exist to keep us, the shipbuilding
industry, in business. I never believed that when I wore the
Nation's cloth and I certainly do not believe it today.
I am a shipbuilder. I build ships. We are in business to
build seven different classes of ships at one time today, and
we do it well. When the sea services adjust their requirements
for cutters, for surface combatants, or expeditionary ships, we
will adjust and scale accordingly. The question is not about
whether we will need the ships, it is how the Nation is going
about acquiring them and at what rate will they be produced.
Make no mistake, the Navy and the Coast Guard want the ships
that they have on order with us and they want our industry to
supply quality assets to the National fleet at affordable cost.
Both customers, however, are in a difficult situation,
squeezed for resources to recapitalize, while at the same
trying to operate forces at very high operating tempos. You
have seen the Navy's well-publicized--in fact, you discussed it
earlier--experiment with Sea Swap and the efforts to trim
operating and life cycle costs to free up funding. This
experiment has and will have a significant and perhaps a
lasting impact on the size and the character of our future
naval forces.
I must be candid, as a guy who commanded two ships and
maintained unit spirit, we in industry are concerned about the
choices that are being made today in the name of force economy
because those choices may have portentous implications for the
future.
For our part, we in industry, in my part of the industry,
have transformed in several extraordinary ways. First, because
the Navy divested its shipbuilding engineering expertise from
its own ranks over the last decade, 7,000 engineers less at
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), it shifted many key program
management responsibilities to industry. This is critical
because we in industry have made significant investments in
turn to respond to a new role.
I will argue that in Northrop Grumman's management of the
DD(X) program to date we have built a new model for the
execution of a development program by forming a truly national
team that is in Phase Three of the program on cost and on
schedule, and want to continue partnering with the Navy to get
that ship to sea.
The recently released Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report on Navy shipbuilding cost growth argues for an
approach which allows for a partnership to develop more
credible and realistic cost estimates for first of class ships
by working to a detailed design before entering a competition
for production contracts.
We believe that we have a responsibility to our
shareholders and to the American taxpayer to become the most
efficient and competitive military shipbuilder in our business.
Last June, I assembled the Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
management team to chart a new course for our business, built
on the proposition that we can become a more contributive
member of our corporation, improve our earnings performance,
improve the rate of return on the investments we are making,
and at the same time provide better value to our customers.
I think we have come a long way in doing that, and I will
tell you a little more in just a second. But we are no longer
two shipyards in Northrop Grumman. The notion that Northrop
Grumman Ship Systems includes separate shipyards is an
anachronistic view. We have streamlined to one sector with
facilities within 100 miles of one another and we are sourcing
these facilities in Louisiana and Mississippi, while benefiting
from a very significant level of investment by both States in
our capital modernization program.
The results I think have been dramatic. For example,
improved production process for new destroyers have resulted in
a reduction of 500,000 man-hours per ship. Construction cycle
estimates for the amphibious assault ship (LHD) will be reduced
by more than 10 percent and by 20 percent for the LPD by LPD-
22.
Here is the catch, Mr. Chairman. There are limits on how
much we can achieve in savings, given the production rates that
are now projected by our customers, which have fallen
dramatically in just the last 6 months. The decrease in the
rate of construction is an all too familiar adjustment and the
lack of predictability and stability costs the taxpayers
heavily.
Some have recently asserted that three new shipyards will
have come into business with the introduction of the LCS
program. I believe that statement may leave some mistaken
impressions. While they are reputable centers of shipbuilding
to be sure, these small yards are limited in what they can
produce. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems is building capital
ships, hard ships, stealthy ships, with capabilities that dwarf
those of little ships, capabilities that will be essential if
we are to dominate battle space in confrontations with peer
competitors and in sea areas where there are no operating
sanctuaries in which to hide.
Some will argue that earlier estimates of numbers of the
large ships needed were not driven by realistic requirements
and that requirements must now be fiscally constrained. Let me
offer another truism for your consideration. The fewer
sophisticated and complex platforms you build and the slower
the production rate, the more costly they will be. The real
costs over the long term will come with the realization that an
American shipbuilding industry is not able to surge to meet
future security requirements because the industry did not
survive.
We have just completed an analysis examining the loss of
learning that results from irregular build intervals and the
introduction of green or inexperienced labor. It demonstrates
conclusively and mathematically that the rate at which we build
ships is critical to learning and hence the cost of ships. A
steady rate with short intervals between starts of fabrication
promotes stable workforce and generates steep learning curves,
which significantly reduces production costs. The need for
green labor that must be employed is exacerbated by layoffs and
then our efforts to rebuild our rolls in reaction to changing
requirements or fickle acquisition strategies. ``Binges and
purges'' is how I describe it. This analysis clearly supports
arguments for a stable shipbuilding plan for the National
fleet.
A very troubling case in point is the Navy's interim fiscal
year 2006 annual long-range plan that I know you have been
reviewing, which offers us a choice between two 30-year
profiles, a 260-ship Navy and one with 325 ships. You will
hopefully understand that this scale or range in numbers causes
us concern precisely because it makes it impossible for us to
make a good business case for the levels of investment in
capital and skilled workers we are going to need.
My concern, Mr. Chairman, is that 5 to 8 years from now,
not 20 years from now, when the peer competitor emerges, our
Nation will discover that our base has atrophied. Our host
States, in my case Mississippi and Louisiana, will have ceased
investing in shipbuilding facilities with no tax returns. The
highly skilled workforce in our shipyards will have gone off to
other jobs and new workers will not have been found. The
extraordinary intellectual capital--the engineers, the
designers--will have migrated to other industries that are seen
to have a future where, believe me, their skills are in high
demand.
The next generation technologies being developed for ships
like DD(X) will never have been developed, and the diaspora of
the best and brightest naval engineers working on DD(X) will
severely limit future ship choices. In short, you do not just
turn a switch for shipbuilders to generate new capacity.
In conclusion, I respectfully submit that the future of
military shipbuilding in the United States turns on a national
commitment. We cannot have a shipbuilding plan that changes
dramatically every year and wreaks havoc on our plans for the
industrial base. The instability in shipbuilding has produced
sinusoidal waves in workforce and floating rates of return on
capital. But with a stable plan we can make our investments and
right-size the industrial base to meet the Nation's
expectations.
I pledge to you on behalf of the shipbuilders that I
represent, Mr. Chairman, that we will honor stable and
predictable plans by designing, developing, and building the
best and most competitive warships in the world.
Thank you for your consideration.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dur follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Philip A. Dur
Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am honored to be able to testify before
you today. I believe we are at a strategic crossroads today--not just
because we may have a debate about the numbers of ships that compose
our fleets--but because of how we as a Nation arrive at those numbers.
The issue at hand has to do with retaining the essential capability the
Nation must have to build the ships essential to its future security.
The current path we are on puts this capability at serious risk.
I want to reiterate that, for one, I recognize that the Navy and
the Coast Guard do not exist to keep us, the shipbuilding industry, in
business. I never believed that when I wore the Nation's cloth and I
certainly do not believe it today.
I am a shipbuilder--I build ships. We are in business to build
them--seven different designs today--and we do it well. When the sea
services adjust their requirements for cutters, surface combatants, or
expeditionary ships to do the Nation's business, industry will adjust
and scale accordingly. The question is not about whether we will need
ships--it is how the Nation is going about acquiring them today and at
what rate will they be produced.
Make no mistake, the Navy and the Coast Guard want the ships that
are on order and they want industry to maintain the ability to supply
quality assets to the national fleet at affordable costs. Both
customers, however, are in a difficult situation--squeezed for
resources while at the same time trying to transform their forces.
You have seen the Navy's well-publicized experiment with Sea Swap
and the efforts to trim operating and life-cycle costs to free up
funding for new construction. This transformation has and will have a
significant and perhaps lasting impact on the character of our future
naval forces. I must be candid and tell you that we, in industry, are
concerned about the choices that are being made today in the name of
force economy because those choices may have portentous implications
for the future.
For our part we have transformed in several extraordinary ways.
First, because the Navy divested shipbuilding engineering expertise
over the last decade (Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)'s loss of
7,000 engineers), it shifted many of the key program management
responsibilities to our industry. This is critical because we have made
significant investments in turn to respond to a new role.
I will argue that in Northrop Grumman's management of the DD(X)
program to date, we have built a new model for the execution of a
developmental program by forming a truly national team that is--in
Phase 3 of the program--on cost and on schedule. The recently released
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Navy shipbuilding cost
growth (Defense Acquisitions, Improved Management Practices Could Help
Minimize Cost Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs) argues for just
such an approach to develop more credible and realistic cost estimates
for first-of-a-class ships by working to detailed design before going
into contract competition for production.
Second, we believe that we have a responsibility to our
shareholders and to the American taxpayer to become the most efficient
and competitive shipbuilders in our business.
We are now seeing extraordinary new efficiencies in production--
compressed build cycles and reduced amount of rework as a result of our
efforts.
Last June, we assembled the Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
management team to chart a new course for our business built on the
proposition that we can become a more contributive member of the
Northrop Grumman Corporation, improve our earnings performance, and
improve the return on the investments that our shareholders are making
today. We call the initiative ``True North''--a new course. We are
committed to trimming the controllable elements in our overhead. We are
reducing the build-span on the ships that we have under construction.
We are improving and have accepted a new standard for ourselves for
first time quality. Our Lean Six Sigma processes are now paying very
tangible dividends in program cost savings.
We have reorganized the supply chain management organizations
across all eight ship class programs that we are currently developing,
working to reduce working capital and to put focus on unit assemblies
(the building blocks for our ships). We have realigned our management
structure so that we have three proven, seasoned experts in
shipbuilding and in business disciplines, running the three categories
of programs. They are aligned with the customer's organization--
expeditionary warfare, surface combatant, and Coast Guard programs.
We are no longer two shipyards. There is not an Avondale shipyard
and an Ingalls shipyard. There is a Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
sector, a single manufacturing entity. Today, we are sourcing every one
of our facilities for elements of amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and
those LPDs are being erected at two different sites.
The notion that the industrial base that is Northrop Grumman Ship
Systems includes separate operating shipyards is an anachronistic view.
It is atavistic thinking. We have streamlined to one sector and we are
sourcing facilities in Louisiana and Mississippi to build ships in
either locality, and in some cases even the same ship.
The results for us I believe have been dramatic. For example:
Improved production processes for new guided missile
destroyers (DDGs) brought a reduction of 500,000 man-hours per
ship.
Construction cycle estimates for the amphibious
assault ship (LHD) are expected to decrease more than 10
percent, while LPD construction times will shrink more than 20
percent.
Unfortunately, there are limits on how much we can achieve in
savings given the production rates currently projected by our
customers--which have fallen dramatically in the last 6 months. But
this decrease in the rate of construction is an all-too-familiar
adjustment, and the lack of predictability and stability costs the
taxpayer heavily.
As shipbuilding gets pushed out into the future, the return on that
investment declines. As fewer ships in each program are built, the cost
per ship goes way up. In that way, the true cost of ``cost-savings''
attained through reduced quality can actually prove to be prohibitively
expensive.
If we were building automobiles or even small ships this might be
an acceptable path--but we are not. Some spokesmen have recently
asserted that three new shipyards had come into business with the
introduction of the littoral combat ship (LCS) program. I believe that
statement may leave mistaken impressions. While reputable centers of
shipbuilding to be sure, these yards are limited in what they can
produce. Northrop Grumman is building capital ships--hard ships,
stealthy ships with capabilities that dwarf those ships we designed and
built just 10 years ago--capabilities that will dominate the battle
space in wars with peer competitors where there are no operating
sanctuaries in which to hide.
Some will argue that earlier estimates of ship numbers were not
driven by requirements, and that requirements must be fiscally
constrained. Let me offer another truism for consideration: the fewer
of these sophisticated and complex platforms you build, and the slower
the production rate, the more costly they will be. The real cost, over
the long term, will come with the realization that an American
shipbuilding industry is not able to surge to future security
requirements because the industry did not survive.
To the point of how cost is driven by numbers and production rates:
We have just completed an analysis examining the loss of learning that
results from irregular build intervals and the introduction of ``green
labor.''
This analysis demonstrates conclusively and mathematically what has
always been intuitively obvious to us--the rate at which we build ships
is critical to stability in learning and hence the cost of ships. A
steady rate with shorter intervals between start of fabrication
promotes stable workforce and generates a steep learning curve, which
significantly reduces production costs. The amount of ``green,'' or
``unskilled labor'' that must be employed is exacerbated by peaks and
valleys caused by our need to lay off and then build back up as a
reaction to changing requirements or acquisition strategies--``binges
and purges'' is how I describe it. The analysis clearly supports
arguments for a stable shipbuilding plan for the National Fleet.
A case in point is the recent release of the Navy's interim fiscal
year 2006 Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels.
This study offers a choice of two 30-year fleet profiles--a 260 ship
Navy and one with 325 ships. You will hopefully understand that this
scale or range in future fleet numbers causes concern for us in
industry and because it becomes almost impossible to make sound
business cases for levels of investment in capital and skilled workers.
The decisions we make today will shape our naval force structure
for decades to come. Ships take a long time to build. Because the
effects of those decisions are not immediately apparent, we can easily
slip into a false sense of security.
Those of us who build these ships, however, see the effects up
front--in a declining labor force--in a reduced ability to attract
capital--in a shrinking industrial base that may not be there in the
future when we need it.
My concern is that 5 to 8 years out our Nation will discover that
our Navy has dangerously atrophied.
The highly-skilled workforce in our shipyards will
have gone off to other jobs . . . and new workers will not have
been trained.
The extraordinary intellectual capital--the engineers,
designers, scientists--will have migrated to other industries
that are seen to have a future, where, believe me, their skills
are in high demand.
The next-generation technologies being developed for
ships like the DD(X) will never have been developed--and the
diaspora of the best and brightest naval engineers will
severely limit future choices.
In short, you don't just turn a switch for shipbuilders to generate
new capacity.
The future of shipbuilding in the United States requires nothing
short of a national commitment. We cannot have shipbuilding plans that
dramatically change every year and wreak havoc on our industrial base.
(Present PPT slides on ``churn'' in force level requirements). The
Nation, and Congress in particular, need to decide what the National
Fleet of the future should be--the aggregate of Coast Guard and Navy
ship requirements.
The instability in shipbuilding rates has produced sinusoidal waves
in workforce. How can we invest in capital projects if we do not have a
clear business gauge to show a return to our investors? There is a
prohibitively high cost to the Nation for this turbulence--measured in
dollar costs and lost capabilities to shape world events, respond to
crisis and fight wars. With planning stability we can adjust our
investments and right-size the industrial base to meet the Nation's
expectations.
We of Northrop Grumman Ship Systems build warships, conventionally
powered surface combatants and expeditionary warfare ships and cutters.
The future of the American shipbuilding industry will be determined by
a national commitment to build a fleet based on clearly defined force
requirements consistently funded by a long-term resourcing plan.
I pledge to you, on behalf of the American shipbuilder, that we
will honor such a commitment by designing, developing and building the
best and most competitive warships in the world.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Talent. Thank you for that powerful statement, Dr.
Dur.
Mr. O'Rourke, who has for 20 years been a specialist in
naval power with CRS, you are next. I do really want you to
paraphrase your statement for us. Of course, the whole thing
will go in the record. We are eager to get to the questions.
Please.
STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, NATIONAL DEFENSE SPECIALIST,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. O'Rourke. Understood. Chairman Talent, thank you for
the honor to be here today. I will briefly summarize my
testimony here in a few remarks.
For the shipbuilding industrial base, a significant current
issue, as I think you have heard, is ambiguity regarding
required numbers of Navy ships and year-to-year volatility in
the Navy shipbuilding program. This situation can make it
difficult for shipbuilders to make decisions in areas such as
workforce management and facilities investment. It can also
make it difficult for Congress to conduct effective oversight
of Navy shipbuilding programs.
Recent Navy testimony and reports on required numbers of
ships, though helpful, do not do very much to resolve this
ambiguity. Of the 49 ships in the FYDP, 21 or more than 40
percent are littoral combat ships that are to be built at yards
other than the six yards that have built the Navy's major ships
in recent years. The 28 remaining ships in the FYDP equate to
an average of 4.7 ships per year, or an average of less than
one ship per year for each of the six yards.
Regarding submarines, there is concern for the stability of
the design and engineering base, which is facing the near-term
prospect, for the first time in more than 40 years, of having
no major submarine design project on which to work. One option
for addressing this situation would be to start design work now
on a new submarine, which could be financed using some portion
of the $600 million budgeted for a future undersea superiority
system. A new-design nuclear-powered attack submarine
incorporating the so-called Tango Bravo technologies could be
equivalent in capability to the Virginia class, but cost
substantially less. Such a boat could be more easily procured
within available resources at a rate of two per year, which is
the rate you will need, starting in fiscal year 2012 or 2013,
to avoid dropping below 40 boats. If design work is begun now,
the first boat might be ready for procurement by fiscal year
2011.
Regarding surface combatants, if the Navy holds a winner-
take-all competition for the DD(X) the consequences for the
losing yard could be very serious, particularly if it is Bath.
In addition, the Navy's decision to reduce the DD(X) to one per
year in the FYDP is a signal that, unless budget conditions
change, DD(X) and CG(X) procurement may never be more than one
per year. Notwithstanding the capabilities of the DD(X) and
CG(X), the prospect of a one-per-year rate could cause the
DD(X)-CG(X) effort to be judged unsatisfactory in terms of
introducing the DD(X)-CG(X) technologies in sufficient numbers
and in terms of getting average total acquisition cost below $3
billion a copy.
Dissatisfaction on one or both of these points could lead
to a decision to terminate the entire DD(X)-CG(X) effort. If
such a decision were made in the near term, a single DD(X)
might be built as a technology demonstrator and a second might
be procured to give the other yard experience in building the
design. If a decision to terminate is made at a later point, a
few more DD(X)s might be procured. But in either case, no
CG(X)s might be procured.
The DD(X) has been described as a bridge to the CG(X) in
fiscal year 2011, but it is possible the Navy and the
industrial base might cross that bridge only to discover that,
for cost reasons, the CG(X) is no longer waiting at the other
end.
There are several options for supporting the surface
combatant industrial base between now and fiscal year 2011. An
additional option for supporting the base in fiscal year 2011
and beyond would be to begin design work now on a new surface
combatant that would be smaller and less expensive than the
DD(X) or CG(X). Such a ship, which might be about the same size
as today's Aegis cruisers and destroyers, would have a smaller
payload than the DD(X) or CG(X), but it could carry many of the
same technologies as the DD(X) or CG(X) and it could be more
easily procured within available resources at a rate of two per
year, which is a rate that might meet operational needs better
and be easier to divide between two yards.
If the DD(X)-CG(X) effort is terminated and no new surface
combatant design is ready for immediate procurement, it could
create operational risks. It could also place enormous stress
on the surface combatant industrial base. The submarine
industrial base went through a period like this in the 1990s
when the Seawolf program was terminated and the Virginia class
was not yet ready for procurement.
My testimony also covers the three independent studies on
fleet architecture and I will just say right now, in
concluding, that those studies contain recommendations which
themselves may have implications for the industrial base.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I will be
happy to respond to any questions the subcommittee might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ronald O'Rourke
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss Navy capabilities
and the force structure required to provide them. As requested, my
testimony will focus on the following:
the status of the shipbuilding industrial base (pages
1-6);
the impact of current Navy shipbuilding plans on the
industrial base (pages 6-21); and
naval capabilities and the recent independent studies
on fleet architecture (pages 22-42).
status of shipbuilding industrial base
Current Situation
Annual Navy ship procurement declined substantially in the early
1990s, following the end of the Cold War, and today remains
substantially below Cold War levels of the 1980s. As a result, among
other things:
current shipyard workloads and employment levels in
many cases are below Cold War levels of the 1980s;
some yards have considerable unused capacity;
production economies of scale are often limited or
poor, putting upward pressure on unit production costs;
opportunities for the Navy to use periodic (e.g.,
annual or biannual) competition in the awarding of shipbuilding
contracts so as to gain the benefits of competition in
production are limited; and
concerns have increased regarding prospects for Navy
shipbuilding supplier firms, many of which are sole sources of
what they make for the Navy.
Improved Processes and Methods
The six yards that have built the Navy's major warships in recent
years \1\ have taken various steps over the last decade or so to
improve their ship-design and ship-production processes and methods.
These steps have narrowed, but perhaps not closed, the gap in these
processes and methods between the six yards and the world's most modern
and capable shipyards. A Department of Defense (DOD) report scheduled
for completion later this year will address this issue in more
detail.\2\
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\1\ These are the three yards owned by General Dynamics--Bath Iron
Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, the Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and National Steel and Shipbuilding
Company (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA--and the three yards owned by
Northrop Grumman--Avondale Shipyards (NG/Avondale) near New Orleans,
LA, Ingalls Shipbuilding (NG/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS, and Newport
News Shipbuilding (NGNN) of Newport News. NG/Avondale and NG/Ingalls,
together with a third production facility at Gulfport, MS, form
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (NGSS).
\2\ The report being prepared by DOD has been referred to as the
Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study. For a press
article discussing this study, see Christopher J. Castelli, ``Patrick:
Congress Has Key Role In Examining U.S. Industrial Base,'' Inside the
Navy, February 28, 2005.
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Rising Material And Component Costs
The six yards have experienced rising costs for materials and
components provided to them by supplier firms. These rising costs are a
contributor to increasing procurement costs for Navy ships.
Dependence on Navy Work and Opportunities For Other Work
As a group, the six yards are highly dependent on Navy shipbuilding
contracts, as they have been for many years. A potentially significant
non-Navy source of shipbuilding work in coming years is procurement of
large and medium cutters under the Coast Guard Deepwater program,
particularly if procurement of these cutters is accelerated and
expanded.\3\
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\3\ For more on the Deepwater program, see CRS Report RS21019,
Coast Guard Deepwater Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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A second potential non-Navy source of shipbuilding work is building
warships for export for foreign countries. Although U.S. yards welcome
and pursue this work, it tends to be a highly uncertain source of work
because it depends on decisions made by foreign governments who in many
cases are also considering competing designs offered by foreign yards.
In addition, because of the small sizes of most foreign navies, the
numbers of ships being contemplated for purchase by these governments
tend to be rather small. One current opportunity in this area is the
project announced by the administration in 2001 to provide eight non-
nuclear-powered submarines to Taiwan.
A third potential non-Navy source of shipbuilding work is building
ocean-going commercial ships, which is an activity that declined
substantially in the United States following the end in 1981 of the
Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) that had previously supported
such work. Options for increasing the amount of commercial-ship
construction work performed in U.S. yards have been discussed or
pursued by Congress at various times, particularly since the early
1990s, when the construction rate of large Navy ships declined.
Some of the six yards that have built the Navy's major warships in
recent years have explored opportunities for building commercial ships,
but with only limited results.\4\ Yards that are configured for
building complex combatant ships may face certain challenges in
attempting to become competitive builders of commercial ships.\5\ One
option that might make it easier for U.S. yards that build complex
combatants to compete for commercial-ship construction work would be to
make Navy combatant ships more like commercial ships. The Office of
Force Transformation (OFT) report on alternative fleet architectures
discussed later in this testimony essentially proposes this by using a
merchant-like hull as the basis for building four kinds of large
surface ships.
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\4\ GD/BIW, for example, examined the option during the 1990s but
ultimately decided against attempting to enter the market. As another
example, NGNN in the 1990s started a program to build double-hulled
tankers, but lost money on the project and stopped it after building a
few ships. The project left NGNN skeptical about the potential for
building commercial ships profitably at NGNN. (See Jason Ma, ``Newport
News Chief Skeptical About Entering Commercial Ship Market,'' Inside
the Navy, March 14, 2005.)
\5\ Yards that are competitive builders of commercial ships
traditionally have been configured somewhat differently from yards that
focus on building complex combatant ships. Commercial ships typically
require less outfitting of their interiors than complex combatant
ships, so yards that are competitive builders of commercial ships
traditionally have had work forces with a fairly high percentage of
basic steel workers (who build the shell of the ship) and lower numbers
of outfitters, while yards that focus on building complex combatant
ships traditionally have had work forces that have included larger
numbers of outfitters. In addition, yards that focus on building
complex combatant ships have equipment for assembling, integrating, and
testing complex ship combat systems and (in the case of GD/EB and NGNN)
equipment for assembling, installing, and testing nuclear-propulsion
equipment. The additional costs associated with maintaining larger
numbers of outfitters and equipment related to complex combat systems
and nuclear propulsion can pose challenges to complex combatant yards
seeking to enter the commercial-ship construction market.
Among the six yards that currently build the Navy's larger
warships, the yards for which the option of increasing commercial-ship
construction work currently might be most suitable are GD/NASSCO and
NG/Avondale. GD/NASSCO builds auxiliary and sealift ships for the Navy
and DOD. Since these ships are similar in design and complexity to
commercial ships, GD/NASSCO is similar to purely commercial
shipbuilding yards in terms of numbers of outfitters and lack of
equipment related to complex combat systems and nuclear propulsion. GD/
NASSCO pursues commercial-ship construction work, and its workload is
often a mix of commercial ships and Navy/DOD auxiliaries and sealift
ships. The yard is currently building 185,000 DWT oil tankers for BP
Oil Shipping Company USA. A total of four of these ships are to be
delivered by 2006. The ships are to be used for transporting crude oil
from Valdez, Alaska, to oil refineries on the U.S. West Coast, meaning
that these ships fall under the Jones Act (Section 27 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920 [46 USC. 883]), which, as discussed in a CRS Report
(Report RS21566, The Jones Act: An Overview, by John F. Frittelli),
``requires that all waterborne shipping between points within the
United States be carried by vessels built in the United States, owned
by U.S. citizens (at least 75 percent), and manned with U.S. citizen
crews. The act essentially bars foreign built and operated vessels from
engaging in U.S. domestic commerce.''
NG/Avondale has also built auxiliary and sealift ships for the Navy
and DOD, but its current workload includes construction of LPD-17
amphibious ships, which are somewhat complex in terms of their
outfitting requirements and combat systems. Recent commercial-ship
construction work at NG/Avondale includes 125,000 DWT oil tankers built
for Polar Tankers, Inc. The first of five such ships was delivered in
2001. These ships also appear intended for transporting crude oil from
Alaska to the U.S. West Coast, which would qualify them under the Jones
Act. (Avondale's web site [http://www.ss.northropgrumman.com/company/
avondale.cfm] states: ``These 895-foot-long, 125,000 DWT ships are
capable of carrying more than 1 million barrels of crude oil along the
treacherous trade route from Alaska to the U.S. West Coast.'')
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Ambiguity And Volatility In Navy Plans
A significant current issue for the shipbuilding industrial base is
ambiguity regarding required numbers of Navy ships and year-to-year
volatility in the composition of the Navy's 6-year shipbuilding plan.
Ambiguity concerning required numbers of Navy ships may make it easier
for industry officials to pour into broad remarks from the Navy or DOD
their own hopes and dreams for individual programs. This could lead to
excessive industry optimism about those programs.
In addition, ambiguity concerning required numbers of Navy ships,
combined with year-to-year volatility in Navy shipbuilding plans, can
make it difficult for shipbuilding firms to make business decisions in
areas such as production planning, workforce management, facilities
investment, company-sponsored research and development, and potential
mergers and acquisitions.\6\
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\6\ In an interview published in the February 2005 issue of
Seapower magazine, for example, Michael Petters, the president of NGNN,
said:
``If there was a clear, stable picture of what the Navy wants, and
what sort of infrastructure needs to be in place to support that, the
industry would adapt. But what you've had instead are the annual
perturbations. That's a challenge for us. We make investments in ships
that take 8 years to build, then the ship gets delayed because of the
way the budget process works.''
In the same published interview, Michael W. Toner, the executive
vice president of General Dynamics' Marine Systems Group, said:
``Mike [Petters] is dead on. I think Secretary [of the Navy Gordon]
England has it right, but it's up to the Navy to establish the
stability. What's the plan? Give us a stable plan and then we can make
the investments. Industry will do what industry needs to do. But it is
a very difficult environment to make investment in, that's for sure.''
(``Shipbuilding: An Uncertain Future,'' Seapower, February 2005: 28.)
Similarly, a July 2004 press article stated:
``Philip Dur, chief executive officer of Northrop Grumman's
Shipbuilding Systems, argued that the Navy's concept of `capabilities
versus numbers' not only would hurt the Service's operations, but
decimate the industry.''
``If the Navy decides it cannot afford 300 ships, it should come up
with a smaller number and set new ship construction plans based on that
number, Dur said.''
``It also would be helpful, he added, if both the Navy and the
Coast Guard jointly planned their long-term shipbuilding buys. `I do
not know that either Service takes the other Service's capabilities
into account,' he said. If both services set their shipbuilding goals
collectively, `then the shipbuilders can lay out an investment plan, a
hiring plan [and] a training plan that was predicated on the assumption
that we would competing for an X-number of platforms per year on a
going-forward basis,' Dur said. . . .''
``If the Department of Defense can frame a requirement for ships
and defend it, the industry would make the necessary adjustments to
either scale down or ramp up, Dur told reporters during a recent tour
of the company's shipyards in Louisiana and Mississippi. (Roxana Tiron,
``Lack of Specificity in Navy Shipbuilding Plans Irks the Industry,''
National Defense, July 2004.)
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Ambiguity concerning required numbers of Navy ships may also make
it difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to conduct effective
oversight by reconciling desired Navy capabilities with planned Navy
force structure, and planned Navy force structure with supporting Navy
programs and budgets. With the middle element of this oversight chain
expressed in only general terms, Congress may find it difficult to
understand whether proposed programs and budgets will produce a Navy
with DOD's desired capabilities. The defense oversight committees in
recent years have criticized the Navy for presenting a confused and
changing picture of Navy ship requirements and procurement plans.\7\
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\7\ For example, the conference report (H.Rept. 107-772 of November
12, 2002) on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 (P.L. 107-314/H.R. 4546) stated
``In many instances, the overall Department of Defense ship
acquisition message is confused. . . . The conferees also believe that
the DON shares blame for this confusion because it has been
inconsistent in its description of force structure requirements. This
situation makes it appear as if the Navy has not fully evaluated the
long-term implications of its annual budget requests. . . .
``The conferees perceive that DOD lacks a commitment to buy the
number and type of ships required to carry out the full range of Navy
missions without redundancy. The DON has proposed to buy more ships
than the stated requirement in some classes, while not requesting
sufficient new hulls in other classes that fall short of the stated
requirement. Additionally, the conferees believe that the cost of ships
will not be reduced by continually changing the number of ships in
acquisition programs or by frequently changing the configuration and
capability of those ships, all frequent attributes of recent DON
shipbuilding plans.'' (Pages 449 and 450)
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 108-553
of June 18, 2004) on the Fiscal Year 2005 DOD appropriations bill (H.R.
4613), stated:
``The committee remains deeply troubled by the lack of stability in
the Navy's shipbuilding program. Often both the current year and out
year ship construction profile is dramatically altered with the
submission of the next budget request. Programs justified to Congress
in terms of mission requirements in 1 year's budget are removed from
the next. This continued shifting of the shipbuilding program promotes
confusion and frustration throughout both the public and private
sectors. Moreover, the committee is concerned that this continual
shifting of priorities within the Navy's shipbuilding account indicates
uncertainty with respect to the validity of requirements and budget
requests in support of shipbuilding proposals.'' (Page 164)
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The Navy's February 2005 testimony that in future years it may
require a total of 260 to 325 ships, or possibly 243 to 302 ships,
depending on how much the Navy uses new technologies and the Sea Swap
concept for crewing and deploying ships,\8\ and the Navy's March 2005
interim report to Congress on long-range shipbuilding requirements,
which details the composition of 260- and 325-ship fleets for fiscal
year 2035,\9\ together do not resolve the current ambiguity regarding
required numbers of Navy ships, for the following reasons:
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\8\ See, for example, Statement of Admiral Vernon Clark, USN, Chief
of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 10
February 2005, pp. 18-19, and Statement of Admiral Vernon Clark, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations, Before the House Armed Services Committee,
17 February 2005, pp. 19-20.
\9\ U.S., Department of the Navy, An Interim Report To Congress on
Annual Long-Range Plan For The Construction Of Naval Vessels For Fiscal
Year 2006. Washington, 2005. 5 pp. (This report was delivered to the
defense committees of Congress on March 23, 2005. Defense trade
publications obtained copies of the report and at least one publication
posted the report on its Web site.)
Using the 260-ship fleet as a baseline, the range of
260 to 325 ships equates to a 25 percent range of variability
in the potential total number of ships. Although for some ship
categories, such as ballistic missile submarines and cruise
missile submarines, there is little or no difference in the
number of ships included in the 260- and 325-ship fleets, for
other ship categories, there are substantial differences. When
translated into percentage terms, the difference is 37 percent
for cruisers and destroyers, 30 percent for littoral combat
ships, 41 percent for amphibious ships, and 43 percent for
maritime prepositioning ships. For the remaining categories of
ships--attack submarines, aircraft carriers, combat logistics
ships, and other ships--the percentage ranges of variability
are 10 percent or less. In the case of aircraft carriers,
however, the one-ship difference under two fleet plans can
translate into a substantial difference in Navy funding
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requirements and shipbuilding work.
The Navy's testimony and report do not make clear
whether the range of 260 to 325 ships, or the compositions of
the 260- and 325-ship fleets, have been endorsed by the
Secretary of Defense as official Department of Defense (DOD)
force-structure planning goals.
The March 2005 report does not present a 30-year
shipbuilding plan. Instead, it presents a 30-year projection of
potential Navy force levels from which potential annual
shipbuilding rates can be only partially inferred.
impact of navy shipbuilding plans on industrial base
Overall Ship-Procurement Rate
The fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2011 plan (see Table 1) would
procure a total of 49 ships, or an average of about 8.2 ships per year.
Assuming an average Navy ship life of 30 to 35 years, an average
procurement rate of about 8.2 ships per year would, over the long run,
maintain a fleet of 245 to 286 ships.
TABLE 1. NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2006-FISCAL YEAR 2011 SHIP-PROCUREMENT PLAN
(Ships fully funded in fiscal year 2005 shown for reference)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
--------------------------------------------------------------- Total Fiscal Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006-2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CVN-21....................... 1 1
SSN-774...................... 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
DDG-51....................... 3 0
DD(X)........................ 1 1 1 1 1 5
CG(X)........................ 1 1
LCS.......................... 1 1 2 3 5 5 5 21
LPD-17....................... 1 1 1 2
LHA(R)....................... 1 1 2
TAKE......................... 2 1 1 1 3
TAOE(X)...................... 1 1 2 4
MPF(F)....................... 1 1 2 4
MPF(A)....................... 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL...................... 8 4 7 7 9 10 12 49
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL less LCSs.......... 7 3 5 4 4 5 7 28
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, Chart 14 (p. 5-
1).
As shown in the table, Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) account for 21
of these 49 ships, or about 43 percent. LCSs are to be built by yards
other than the six yards that have built the Navy's major warships in
recent years. Setting aside LCSs so as to focus on larger ships that
would likely be built by these six yards, the total number of larger
ships is 28, or an average of about 4.7 ships per year. Assuming an
average Navy ship life of 30 to 35 years, an average procurement rate
of about 4.7 ships per year other than LCSs, if maintained over the
long run, would maintain a fleet that included 140 to 163 ships other
than LCSs.
An average procurement rate of 4.7 ships per year other than LCSs
would be about equal to the relatively low rates of Navy ship
procurement of the mid- to late 1990s.\10\ For the six shipyards that
have built the Navy's major warships in recent years, this average ship
procurement rate would result, as a general matter, in relatively low
work loads, revenues, and employment levels. Production economies of
scale would be limited or poor, putting upward pressure on unit
production costs. Layoffs may occur at some of the yards, and the two
companies that own these yards may be less inclined to commit to new
investments aimed at improving the yards' production facilities.
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\10\ The table below shows the number of battle force ships funded
by Congress from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal year 2005.
Battle Force Ships Procured (Fiscal Years 1982-2005)
1982 - 17 1983 - 14 1984 - 16 1985 - 19 1986 - 20
1987 - 17
1988 - 15 1989 - 19 1990 - 15 1991 - 11 1992 - 11
1993 - 7
1994 - 4 1995 - 4 1996 - 5 1997 - 4 1998 - 5
1999 - 5
2000 - 6 2001 - 6 2002 - 6 2003 - 5 2004 - 7
2005 - 8
Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense
authorization and appropriation committee and conference reports for
each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not
count toward the 310- or 375-ship goal, such as sealift and
prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and
oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
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Individual Shipbuilding Programs
CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program
CVN-21, the next aircraft carrier, is to be built by Northrop
Grumman Newport News (NGNN). Compared to the fiscal year 2005-fiscal
year 2009 ship procurement plan submitted to Congress in February 2004,
the fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would defer the procurement of CVN-21
by a year, to fiscal year 2008. Navy officials state this was due to
the need to finance the procurement in fiscal year 2007 of other ships,
including the lead DD(X) destroyer and the LHA(R) amphibious assault
ship. The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would also defer the procurement
of the carrier after CVN-21 from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year
2012.\11\
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\11\ For more on the CVN-21 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy
CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy officials state that the deferral of CVN-21 to fiscal year
2008 increased CVN-21's procurement cost by about $400 million. The
deferral lengthened the already-considerable production gap at NGNN
between CVN-21 and the previous carrier, CVN-77, which was procured in
fiscal year 2001. Lengthening this gap reduced the shipyard's ability
to efficiently shift workers coming off the CVN-77 production effort
onto the CVN-21 effort. As a result, workers coming off the CVN-77
production effort could instead be furloughed, and any new workers
hired later to support the start of CVN-21 construction could require
training and be less productive initially than experienced workers.
The lengthened gap between CVN-77 and CVN-21 may also increase
costs for attack submarine construction work done at NGNN because that
work might, for a time, need to bear a somewhat higher share of the
shipyard's fixed overhead costs.
SSN-774 Attack Submarine Program
Virginia (SSN-774) class submarines are built jointly by GD/EB and
NGNN. The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would maintain Virginia-class
procurement at one per year through fiscal year 2011. The fiscal years
2005-2009 plan had called for increasing Virginia-class procurement to
two per year starting in fiscal year 2009.\12\ Keeping Virginia-class
procurement at one per year through fiscal year 2011 would result in
Virginia-class work loads, revenues, and employment levels at GD/EB and
NGNN that are about equal to current levels. As a result, production
economies of scale for submarines would continue to remain limited or
poor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ For more on the SSN-774 program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy
Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The part of the submarine industrial base that some observers are
currently most concerned about is not the construction portion, but the
design an engineering portion, much of which is resident at GD/EB and
NGNN. With Virginia-class design work now winding down and no other
major submarine-design project underway, the submarine design and
engineering base is facing the near-term prospect, for the first time
in about 50 years, of having no major submarine design project on which
to work.
Some Navy and industry officials are concerned that unless a major
submarine design project is begun soon, the submarine design and
engineering base will begin to atrophy through the departure of
experienced personnel. Rebuilding an atrophied submarine design and
engineering base, these Navy and industry officials believe, could add
substantial time and cost to the next submarine design effort, whenever
it might begin. Concern about this possibility among some Navy and
industry officials has been strengthened by the U.K.'s recent
difficulties in designing its new Astute-class SSN. The U.K. submarine
design and engineering base atrophied for lack of submarine design
work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort has experienced
considerable delays and cost overruns. Submarine designers and
engineers from GD/EB were assigned to the Astute-class project to help
the U.K. overcome these problems.\13\
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\13\ See, for example, Andrew Chuter, ``U.K. Spending Mounts For
U.S. Help On Sub,'' Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott,
``Electric Boat Provides Project Director For Astute Class,'' Jane's
Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, ``Astute Sets Out On
The Long Road To Recovery,'' Jane's Navy International, December 2003:
28-30; Richard Scott, ``Recovery Plan Shapes Up For Astute
Submarines,'' Jane's Defence Weekly, November 19, 2003: 26.
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DD(X) Destroyer Program
DD(X) destroyers are to be built by GD/BIW and/or NG/Ingalls. The
fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2009 plan had called for procuring a total
of eight DD(X)s through fiscal year 2009--one in fiscal year 2005, two
in fiscal year 2007, another two in fiscal year 2008, and three in
fiscal year 2009. The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would reduce
procurement to one ship per year for the period fiscal years 2007-
2011.\14\
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\14\ For more on the DD(X) program, see CRS Report RS21059, Navy
DD(X) and CG(X) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL32109, Navy DD(X), CG(X), and LCS Ship
Acquisition Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A comparison of the fiscal years 2006-2011 plan to the fiscal years
2005-2009 plan suggests at first that the fiscal years 2006-2011 plan
has deferred the procurement of the lead DD(X) destroyer by 2 years, to
fiscal year 2007. The actual effect of the fiscal years 2006-2011 plan
on the schedule for building this ship, however, appears to be less
dramatic.\15\
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\15\ The Navy's fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2009 plan proposed
funding the construction of the lead DD(X) in the Navy's research and
development account through a stream of annual funding increments
stretching out to fiscal year 2011--an approach commonly known as
incremental funding. Under this proposed scheme, the Navy had some
flexibility to choose which year to record as the nominal year of
procurement for the lead DD(X). The Navy chose fiscal year 2005, the
year of the first scheduled increment, even though the amount of
funding requested for the fiscal year 2005 increment equated to only
about 8 percent of the ship's total cost, leaving the remaining 92
percent of the ship's cost to be provided in future years.
Congress, in acting on the Navy's proposed fiscal year 2005 budget,
approved the Navy's fiscal year 2005 funding request for the lead DD(X)
but directed that the ship be procured the traditional way, through the
Navy's shipbuilding account (known formally as the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy, or SCN, account), and that it be funded the
traditional way, in accordance with the full funding policy, which
requires that items acquired through the procurement title of the DOD
appropriation act be fully funded in the year they are procured.
Consistent with this direction, the fiscal year 2005 funding increment
was designated as advance procurement (AP) funding for a lead DD(X) to
be procured in some future fiscal year.
Abiding by this direction required the Navy to alter its funding
profile for the lead DD(X) to one that fully funds the ship in a
particular year. The fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2011 plan suggests
that the Navy, after examining its options, selected fiscal year 2007
as the year in which the ship would be fully funded. The actual
schedule for building the lead ship, however, may delayed by about a
year rather than 2 years. Consequently, although the nominal year of
procurement for the lead DD(X) appears to have been deferred 2 years,
the actual amount of change in the schedule for the lead ship may be
less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fiscal years 2006-2011 Navy plan, however, defers the
procurement of the second DD(X) by a year, to fiscal year 2008, and as
mentioned above, reduces DD(X) procurement to one per year for the 5-
year period fiscal years 2007-2011.
The Navy has recently testified that it requires a total of 8 to 12
DD(X)s. Under previous plans, however, the Navy envisioned stopping
DD(X) procurement at about the time that it started CG(X) procurement.
If the lead CG(X) is procured in fiscal year 2011, as shown in the
fiscal years 2006-2011 plan, and there is a gap year in fiscal year
2012 between the procurement of the lead CG(X) and follow-on CG(X)s
starting in fiscal year 2013, then a sixth DD(X) might be procured in
fiscal year 2012. If so, then the total procurement quantity for the
DD(X) program would be six ships.\16\ The fiscal years 2006-2011 FYDP,
however, contains no advance procurement funding in fiscal year 2011 to
support the procurement of a sixth DD(X) in fiscal year 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ For more on the DD(X) program, see CRS Report RS21059, Navy
DD(X) Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke; and CRS Report RL32109, Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition
Programs: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supporters of the surface combatant industrial base expressed
concern last year about the gap between the end of DDG-51 procurement
and the start of DD(X) procurement. This gap, supporters argued, would
make it difficult for the industrial base to manage the transition from
DDG-51 production to DD(X) production. The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan
appears to increase the length of this gap, which would likely
intensify these concerns.
The light-ship displacement of the DD(X) design (about 12,135 tons)
is about 75 percent greater than that of the DDG-51 design (about 6,950
tons). If shipyard construction work is roughly proportional to light-
ship displacement, then building a DD(X) might generate about 75
percent more shipyard work than building a DD(X), and building one
DD(X) per year would be equivalent to building 1.75 DDG-51s per year.
Supporters of GD/BIW and NG/Ingalls have argued in previous years
that three DDG-51s per year, in conjunction with other work being
performed at the two yards (particularly NG/Ingalls), is the minimum
rate needed to maintain the financial health of the two yards. Navy
officials in recent years have questioned whether this figure is still
valid. Building the equivalent of 1.75 DDG-51s per year equates to
about 58 percent of this rate. If the minimum rate of three DDG-51
equivalents per year is valid, then the one-per-year procurement rate
for the DD(X) program may raise questions about the potential future
financial health of these yards.
Until recently, the DD(X) acquisition strategy called for the first
DD(X) to be built by NG/Ingalls and the second by GD/BIW, and for the
construction contracts for the first six DD(X)s to be divided evenly
between the two yards. As a result of the reduction in the planned
DD(X) procurement rate, however, the Navy is considering holding a
competition between the two yards for the right to become the sole
builder of the DD(X).
If the Navy holds such a competition, then the consequences for the
yard that loses the competition could be very serious. GD/BIW is
involved as a shipbuilder in no shipbuilding programs other than the
DDG-51 and DD(X).\17\ Consequently, if GD/BIW loses the DD(X)
competition and does not receive other new ship-construction work, then
GD/BIW could experience a significant reduction in workloads, revenues,
and employment levels by the end of the decade. Theoretical scenarios
for the yard under such circumstances could include closure and
liquidation of the yard, the ``mothballing'' of the yard or some
portion of it, or reorienting the yard into one that focuses on other
kinds of work, such as building commercial ships, overhauling and
modernizing Navy or commercial ships, or fabricating components of Navy
or commercial ships that are being built by other yards. Reorienting
the yard into one that focuses on other kinds of work, if feasible,
would likely result in workloads, revenues, and employment levels that
are significantly reduced from today's.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ GD/BIW is also the prime contractor for the GD version of the
LCS, but the GD version is to be built by the Austal USA shipyard, of
Mobile, AL.
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If NGSS loses the DD(X) competition and other work being done at
NG/Ingalls (particularly construction of amphibious ships) does not
increase, then NG/Ingalls could similarly experience a reduction in
workloads, revenues, and employment levels. The continuation of
amphibious-ship construction at NG/Ingalls could make the scenarios of
closure and liquidation or mothballing less likely for NG/Ingalls than
for GD/BIW, but workloads, revenues, and employment levels could still
be reduced from current levels, and the cost of amphibious-ship
construction and other work done at NG/Ingalls could increase due to
reduced spreading of shipyard fixed overhead costs.
If surface-combatant construction work at GD/BIW or NG/Ingalls
ceases, the Navy would be left with one yard actively building larger,
complex surface combatants. If the Navy at some point wanted to
reestablish a second source for building these ships, its options would
include reconstituting surface combatant construction at the yard where
the work had ceased, reconstituting it at some other yard with past
experience building larger surface combatants--such as NGNN, which
built nuclear-powered cruisers in the 1970s, NG/Avondale, which built
Knox (FF-1052) class frigates in the 1970s and Hamilton (WHEC-715)
class Coast Guard cutters in the 1960s and 1970s, or perhaps Todd
Pacific Shipyards of Seattle, WA, which built Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-
7) class frigates in the 1980s \18\--or establishing it at a yard that
has not previously built larger, complex surface combatants, but could
be made capable of doing so.
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\18\ The Navy's FFG-7s were built at GD/BIW, Todd Pacific
Shipyards, and Todd Shipyards of San Pedro, CA. The San Pedro yard is
now part of Southwest Marine, Inc., which in turn is part of United
States Marine Repair, a group of shipyards that focuses on repairing,
modernizing, converting, and overhauling nonnuclear-powered ships.
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LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Program
San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are built by NGSS,
particularly NG/Avondale. The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would end
procurement of LPD-17s after procuring the ninth ship in the class in
fiscal year 2007. Previous plans had generally called for building a
total of 12 LPD-17s through fiscal year 2010.\19\ Under the fiscal
years 2006-2011 plan, workloads, revenues, and employment levels
associated with building LPD-17s would wind down about 3 years earlier
than under previous plans. NG/Avondale might be able to compensate for
this by beginning to build TAOE(X) resupply ships or MPF(F) ships, but
procurement of these ships is not scheduled to start until fiscal year
2009, suggesting that NG/Avondale might experience a dip in workloads,
revenues, and employment levels between the winding down of LPD-17
production and the scaling up of TAOE(X) or MPF(F) production. It is
not certain, moreover, whether NG/Avondale will participate in building
either of these ships.
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\19\ For more on the LPD-17 program, see CRS Report RL32513, Navy-
Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs:
Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LHA(R) Amphibious Ship Program
The LHA(R) amphibious assault ship would be built by NGSS,
primarily NG/Ingalls. Compared to the fiscal years 2005-2009 plan, the
fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would accelerate the procurement of LHA(R)
by 1 year, to fiscal year 2007. The fiscal years 2004-2009 shipbuilding
plan that the Navy submitted to Congress in February 2003 showed LHA(R)
in fiscal year 2007. Accelerating procurement of LHA(R) to fiscal year
2007 can thus be viewed as restoring the year of procurement shown in
the plan submitted to Congress in 2003.\20\ The acceleration of LHA(R)
to fiscal year 2007 would improve NG/Ingalls' ability to shift workers
from the previous amphibious assault ship, LHD-8, to LHA(R), and
perhaps help NG/Ingalls somewhat in managing the potential consequences
of decisions regarding the DD(X) program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ For more on the LHA(R) program, see CRS Report RL32513, Navy-
Marine Corps Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs:
Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAKE Auxiliary Cargo Ship Program
Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class auxiliary cargo ships are built by
GD/NASSCO. Under the fiscal years 2005-2009 plan, the final three ships
in the program were to be procured in fiscal year 2006 (two ships) and
fiscal year 2007 (one ship). The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would
instead procure these ships at a rate of one per year during the 3-year
period fiscal years 2006-2008. As a consequence, employment at the yard
associated with building these ships may start to decline around fiscal
year 2006 rather than fiscal year 2007, but construction work on these
ships would continue for an additional year into the future before
ceasing.
TAOE(X) Replenishment Ship Program
The fiscal years 2005-2009 plan called for procuring the first two
TAOE(X) ships in fiscal year 2009. The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan
reduces the fiscal year 2009 procurement to one ship. This would appear
to reduce the potential of the TAOE(X) program to serve as a new source
of work in fiscal year 2009 for yards that may be attempting to
compensate at that time for the winding down of other shipbuilding
programs.
MPF(F)/MPF(A) Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program
The fiscal years 2005-2009 plan included three MPF-type ships in
fiscal year 2009--two MPF(F)s and one MPF(A) (an aviation variant of
the MPF(F) design). The fiscal years 2006-2011 plan would reduce MPF-
type procurement to one ship in fiscal year 2009.\21\ This would
similarly appear to reduce the potential of the MPF program to serve as
a new source of work in fiscal year 2009 for yards that may be
attempting to compensate at that time for the winding down of other
shipbuilding programs.
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\21\ For more on the MPF(F) program, see CRS Report RL32513, op
cit.
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Options For Supporting Shipbuilding Industrial Base
Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base
One option for supporting the aircraft carrier industrial base
would be to restore fiscal year 2007 as the year of procurement for
CVN-21, which would shorten the gap in production between CVN-77 and
CVN-21 and thereby reduce the cost of CVN-21 (and possibly also costs
for submarine construction work at NGNN). Restoring fiscal year 2007 as
CVN-21's year of procurement might be facilitated by making greater use
of incremental funding for CVN-21 than currently planned, by using
advance appropriations for CVN-21, by transferring CVN-21's detailed
design and non-recurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs to the Navy's
research and development account, where they could be incrementally
funded, or by using incremental funding or advance appropriations to
fund other ships currently planned for fiscal year 2007, such as LHA(R)
or the lead DD(X).\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ For more on the potential use of incremental funding or
advance appropriations in Navy ship procurement, see CRS Report
RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches--
Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submarine Industrial Base
One option for supporting the design and engineering portion of the
submarine industrial base would be to design a new type of submarine.
In recent months, two options have emerged for designing and procuring
a new type of attack submarine. One option involves designing a non-
nuclear-powered submarine equipped with an air-independent propulsion
(AIP) system that could be procured in tandem with Virginia-class SSNs.
The other option involves designing a reduced-cost SSN using new
``Tango Bravo'' technologies being developed by the Navy that would be
procured as a successor to the Virginia-class design. Some or all of
$600-million fund included in the fiscal years 2006-2011 FYDP for ``a
future undersea superiority system'' could be used to help finance
either option.
AIP-Equipped Non-Nuclear-Powered Submarine
The OFT report on potential fleet platform architectures that is
discussed later in this testimony proposed a future Navy consisting of
several new kinds of ships, including AIP-equipped non-nuclear-powered
submarines.\23\ AIP-equipped submarines are currently being acquired by
certain foreign navies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See also Christopher J. Castelli, ``Defense Department Nudges
Navy Toward Developing Diesel Subs,'' Inside the Navy, March 7, 2005;
Dave Ahearn, ``Lawmakers Assail Navy Budget, But Eye Non-Nuke Subs,''
Defense Today, March 3, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An AIP system such as a fuel-cell or closed-cycle diesel engine
extends the stationary or low-speed submerged endurance of a non-
nuclear-powered submarine. A conventional diesel-electric submarine has
a stationary or low-speed submerged endurance of a few days, while an
AIP-equipped submarine may have a stationary or low-speed submerged
endurance of up to 2 or 3 weeks.
An AIP system does not, however, significantly increase the high-
speed submerged endurance of a non-nuclear-powered submarine. A non-
nuclear-powered submarine, whether equipped with a conventional diesel-
electric propulsion system or an AIP system, has a high-speed submerged
endurance of perhaps 1 to 3 hours, a performance limited by the
electrical storage capacity of the submarine's batteries, which are
exhausted quickly at high speed.
In contrast, a nuclear-powered submarine's submerged endurance, at
any speed, tends to be limited by the amount of food that it can carry.
In practice, this means that a nuclear-powered submarine can remain
submerged for weeks or months at a time, operating at high speeds
whenever needed.
AIP submarines could be procured in tandem with Virginia-class
boats. One possibility, for example, would be to procure one Virginia-
class boat plus one or more AIP submarines each year.
Reduced-Cost ``Tango Bravo'' SSN
The Virginia class was designed in the early to mid-1990s, using
technologies that were available at the time. New technologies that
have emerged since that time may now permit the design of a new SSN
that is substantially less expensive than the Virginia-class design,
but equivalent in capability. The Navy and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are now pursuing the development of
these technologies under a program called Tango Bravo, a name derived
from the initial letters of the term ``technology barriers.'' As
described by the Navy,
Tango Bravo will execute a technology demonstration program
to enable design options for a reduced-size submarine with
equivalent capability as the Virginia-class design. Implicit in
this focus is the goal to reduce platform infrastructure and,
ultimately, the cost of future design and production.
Additionally, reduced platform infrastructure provides the
opportunity for greater payload volume.
The intent of this collaborative effort is to overcome
selected technology barriers that are judged to have a
significant impact on submarine platform infrastructure cost.
Specifically, DARPA and the Navy will jointly formulate
technical objectives for critical technology demonstrations in
(a) shaftless propulsion, (b) external weapons, (c) conformal
alternatives to the existing spherical array, (d) technologies
that eliminate or substantially simplify existing submarine
systems, and (e) automation to reduce crew workload for
standard tasks.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Navy information paper on advanced submarine system
development provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, Jan.
21, 2005. For additional discussion of the Tango Bravo program, see
Aarti Shah, ``Tango Bravo Technology Contract Awards Expected This
Spring,'' Inside the Navy, March 14, 2005; Andrew Koch, ``US Navy In
Bid To Overhaul Undersea Combat,'' Jane's Defence Weekly, March 9,
2005: 11; Lolita C. Baldor, ``Smaller Subs Could Ride Waves Of The
Future,'' NavyTimes.com, February 4, 2005; Robert A. Hamilton, ``Navy,
DARPA Seek Smaller Submarines,'' Seapower, February 2005: 22, 24-25.
Some Navy and industry officials believe that if these technologies
are developed, it would be possible to design a new submarine
equivalent in capability to the Virginia class, but with a procurement
cost of perhaps no more than 67 percent of the Virginia class, and
possibly less. Such a submarine could more easily be procured within
available resources at a rate of two per year, which is a rate that the
Navy would need to start in fiscal year 2012 or fiscal year 2013, and
sustain for a period of about 12 years, to avoid having the SSN force
drop below 40 boats.
Consequently, as an alternative to the option of procuring AIP
submarines, another option would be to start design work now on a new
``Tango Bravo'' SSN. The goal of such an effort could be to produce an
SSN design with capability equivalent to that of Virginia class and a
procurement cost that is no more than 67 percent that of the Virginia
class. The idea of designing a submarine with these features has been
discussed by Navy and industry officials. Under this option, Virginia-
class procurement could continue at one per year until the Tango Bravo
submarine was ready for procurement, at which point Virginia-class
procurement would end, and procurement of the Tango Bravo submarine
would begin.
If design work on a Tango Bravo submarine is begun now and pursued
in a concerted manner, the first Tango Bravo submarine might be ready
for procurement by fiscal year 2011. (Some industry officials believe
that under ideal program conditions, the lead ship could be procured
earlier than fiscal year 2011; conversely, some Navy officials believe
the lead ship might not be ready for procurement until after fiscal
year 2011.) If the lead ship is procured in fiscal year 2011, then the
procurement rate could be increased to two per year starting in fiscal
year 2012 or fiscal year 2013, meeting the time line needed to avoid
falling below 40 boats.
Factors To Consider In Assessing Options
In weighing these options against one another, and against the
option of simply continuing to procure Virginia-class SSNs, potential
factors for Congress to consider include cost, capability, technical
risk, and effect on the industrial base. Each of these is discussed
below.
Cost. The Virginia-class program has a projected total development
cost of roughly $4 billion. An AIP submarine or Tango Bravo SSN could
similarly require billions of dollars in up-front costs to develop.
The OFT report recommended substituting four AIP-submarines for one
Virginia-class submarine in each carrier strike group, suggesting that
four AIP submarines might be procured for the same cost ($2.4 billion
to $3.0 billion in the fiscal years 2006-2011 FYDP) as one Virginia-
class submarine. This suggests an average unit procurement cost for an
AIP submarine of roughly $600 million to $750 million each when
procured at a rate of four per year. Although AIP submarines being
built by other countries might cost this much to procure, a U.S. Navy
AIP submarine might be built to higher capability standards and
consequently cost more to procure, possibly reducing the equal-cost
ratio of substitution to three to one or possibly something closer two
to one. If so, then the annual cost of procuring one Virginia-class SSN
plus one, two, or perhaps three AIP submarines could be equal to or
less than that of procuring two Virginia-class boats per year.
If the procurement cost of a Tango Bravo SSN were no more than 67
percent that of a Virginia-class boat, then the annual procurement cost
of two Tango Bravo SSNs could be equal to no more than 1.33 Virginia-
class SSNs.
Capability. As a consequence of their very limited high-speed
submerged endurance, non-nuclear-powered submarines, even those
equipped with AIP systems, are not well suited for submarine missions
that require:
long, completely stealthy transits from home port to
the theater of operation,
submerged periods in the theater of operation lasting
more than 2 or 3 weeks, or
submerged periods in the theater of operation lasting
more than a few hours or days that involve moving the submarine
at something more than low speed.
With regard to the first of the three points above, the OFT report
proposes transporting the AIP submarines into the overseas theater of
operations aboard a transport ship.\25\ In doing so, the OFT report
accepts that the presence of a certain number of U.S. AIP submarines in
the theater of operations will become known to others. A potential
force-multiplying attribute of having an SSN in a carrier strike group,
in contrast, is that the SSN can be detached from the strike group, and
redirected to a different theater to perform some other mission,
without alerting others to this fact. Opposing forces in the strike
group's theater of operations could not be sure that the SSN was not in
their own area, and could therefore continue to devote resources to
detecting and countering it. This would permit the SSN to achieve
military effects in two theaters of operation at the same time--the
strike group's theater of operations, and the other theater to which it
is sent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The strategy of transporting the AIP submarines to the theater
using transport ships is not mentioned in the 25 report but was
explained at a Feb. 18, 2005 meeting between CRS and analysts who
contributed to the OFT report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With regard to the second and third points above, the effectiveness
of an AIP submarine would depend on what kinds of operations the
submarine might need to perform on a day-to-day basis or in conflict
situations while operating as part of a forward-deployed carrier strike
group.
One risk of a plan to begin procuring AIP submarines while
continuing to procure Virginia-class submarines at one per year is that
financial pressures in future years could lead to a decision to
increase procurement of AIP submarines while reducing procurement of
Virginia-class submarines to something less than one per year. Such a
decision would result in a total submarine force with more AIP
submarines and fewer SSNs than planned, and consequently with
potentially insufficient capability to meet all submarine mission
requirements. This possibility is a principal reason why supporters of
the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine fleet traditionally have strongly
resisted the idea of initiating construction of non-nuclear-powered
submarines in this country.
One risk of a plan to shift to procurement of Tango Bravo SSNs is
that financial pressures in future years could lead to a decision to
limit procurement of Tango Bravo SSNs to one per year. If the Tango
Bravo SSN were equivalent in capability to the Virginia-class, however,
this would produce a U.S. SSN force no less capable than would have
resulted if Virginia-class procurement were continued at one per year.
Technical Risk. Developing and designing an AIP submarine would
entail a certain amount of technical risk, particularly since a non-
nuclear-powered combat submarine has not been designed and procured for
the U.S. Navy since the 1950s.
Developing and designing a Tango Bravo SSN would similarly entail a
certain amount of technical risk, particularly with regard to maturing
the Tango Bravo technologies and incorporating them into an integrated
SSN design. The earlier the target date for procuring the first Tango
Bravo SSN, the higher the technical risk might be.
In contrast to either of these options, simply continuing to
procure Virginia-class SSNs would likely entail substantially less
technical risk, unless an attempt were made to incorporate very
substantial changes into the Virginia-class design, in which case the
difference in technical risk compared to the two new-design options
might not be as great.
Effect On Industrial Base. Starting design work now on a new
submarine could provide nearterm support to the submarine design and
engineering portion of the submarine industrial base and thereby help
maintain that base.
An AIP submarine could be designed at either GD/EB, NGNN, or a yard
that currently does not design submarines for the U.S. Navy, such as
NG/Ingalls. NG/Ingalls has been associated with proposals in recent
years for building non-nuclear-powered submarines for export to foreign
countries such as Taiwan. If design work for an AIP submarine were to
be done at GD/EB, NGNN, or both, it would help maintain certain
submarine design and engineering skills at one or both of those yards.
It would not, however, maintain certain skills at those yards related
to the design and engineering of submarine nuclear propulsion plants.
If the design were to be done at NG/Ingalls or some other yard, it
might not directly support the maintenance of any submarine design and
engineering skills at GD/EB or NGNN.
A Tango Bravo SSN could be designed by GD/EB, NGNN, or both, so the
potential effect of a Tango Bravo SSN program on the submarine design
and engineering base would depend in part on the acquisition strategy
pursued for the program. At the yard or yards doing the design work, it
would help to maintain various skills related to the design of nuclear-
powered submarines, including skills related to the design and
engineering of submarine nuclear propulsion plants.
After completing the design of an AIP submarine or Tango Bravo SSN,
the submarine design and engineering base could turn to designing the
next-generation ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the lead ship of
which might need to be procured around fiscal year 2020. After
designing this new SSBN, the design and engineering base could turn
back to designing a follow-on attack submarine that would take
advantage of technologies even more advanced than those available
today. This sequence of three successive submarine design projects
could help maintain the submarine design and engineering base for the
next 15 or so years.
The potential effect of an AIP submarine procurement program on the
construction portion of the submarine industrial base would depend in
part on where the submarines would be built. AIP submarines could be
built at either GD/EB, NGNN, or a yard that currently does not build
submarines, such as NG/Ingalls. If financial pressures in future years
lead to a decision to increase procurement of AIP submarines while
reducing procurement of Virginia-class submarines to something less
than one per year, this would benefit the yard building the AIP
submarines but reduce Virginia-class construction work at GD/EB and
NGNN below levels that might have occurred under the option of simply
continuing with Virginia-class procurement.
A Tango Bravo SSN could be built at either GD/EB, NGNN, or both, so
the potential effect of a Tango Bravo SSN program on the submarine
construction industrial base would depend in part on the acquisition
strategy pursued for the program. If Tango Bravo SSNs were procured at
a rate of two per year, this could result in a greater total volume of
SSN construction work than might have occurred under the option of
simply continuing with Virginia-class procurement. Conversely, if
financial pressures in future years lead to a decision to limit
procurement of Tango Bravo SSNs to one per year, this could result in a
lower total volume of SSN construction work than might have occurred
under the option of simply continuing with Virginia-class procurement.
Surface Combatant Industrial Base
Options for supporting the surface combatant industrial base can be
divided into options for supporting the base between now and about
fiscal year 2011, and options for supporting the base in fiscal year
2011 and beyond. Options for supporting the surface combatant
industrial base between now and fiscal year 2011, many of which could
be combined, include the following:
accelerating procurement of the first one or two
DD(X)s by a year;
procuring additional DD(X)s;
procuring additional DDG-51s;
procuring additional LPD-17 or LHA(R) amphibious
ships;
transferring construction of LCSs to these yards;
modernizing Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers;
modernizing Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis
destroyers, perhaps more extensively than currently planned by
the Navy; and
accelerating and expanding procurement of large and
medium Deepwater cutters for the Coast Guard.
Accelerating procurement of the first one or two DD(X)s might be
facilitated by transferring DD(X) DD/NRE costs to the Navy's research
and development account, where they could be incrementally funded, or
by using incremental funding or advance appropriations for these ships.
The Navy has no requirement for additional DDG-51s, but the last
five DDG-51s were arguably procured in part for industrial-base
purposes,\26\ and if additional DDG-51s were procured, the Navy would
find ways to make good use of them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ The Navy for several years stated that it planned to build a
total of 57 DDG-51s. A total of 62 were procured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procuring additional LHA(R)s during the period fiscal years 2006-
2011 might be facilitated by using incremental funding or advance
appropriations.
Transferring construction of LCSs to GD/BIW or NG/Ingalls would
likely increase the cost of these ships due to the higher overhead
costs of these yards compared to the smaller yards where these ships
are currently planned to be built. It might also, however, reduce the
cost of other work being done at GD/BIW or NG/Ingalls by spreading the
fixed overhead costs of these over a broader workload. It might also
avoid the risk of the LCS program creating one or more new yards that
are highly dependent on Navy shipbuilding work, which could make more
complex the task of managing the shipbuilding industrial base.
Options for modernizing DDG-51s more extensively than currently
planned by the Navy include making changes to reduce crewing
requirements to about 200 people per ship, and lengthening the ships
with a plug that would permit an increased payload.
The current Coast Guard Deepwater acquisition program of record
calls for procuring 31 to 33 large and medium cutters (six to eight
large cutters and 25 medium cutters) over a period of many years at low
annual production rates. Some analysts believe that more than 31 to 33
of these cutters will be needed to fully meet the Coast Guard's
expanded post-September 11 mission requirements. The RAND Corporation
published a report in 2003 stating that the Coast Guard might need as
many as 90 of these ships (44 large cutters and 46 medium cutters) to
fully meet its post-September 11 mission requirements.\27\ Members of
Congress and others have expressed interest in accelerating procurement
of these cutters and in expanding the total number of cutters to be
procured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ John Birkler, et al., The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Force
Modernization Plan: Can It Be Accelerated? 27 Will It Meet Changing
Security Needs?, RAND, National Security Research Division, MR-3128.0-
USCG, Sept. 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In terms of light-ship displacement, four or five large or medium
Deepwater cutters would be roughly equivalent to one DD(X). Procuring 4
or 5 of these cutters per year might therefore generate about as much
shipyard construction work as 1 DD(X) per year, and procuring 8 or 10
per year might generate about as much shipyard construction work as two
DD(X)s per year. Although the skill mix for building Deepwater cutters
is somewhat different than the skill mix for building DD(X)s,
accelerating and expanding procurement of Deepwater cutters could:
reduce the Coast Guard's unit procurement costs for
these ships by procuring them at more economic annual rates;
increase Coast Guard capabilities toward post-
September 11 requirements more quickly;
permit the Coast Guard to retire its aging cutters
more quickly, thereby eliminating more quickly the high
operation and support costs of these cutters; and
help sustain the Navy's surface combatant industrial
base through a program funded in the budget of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard's parent
department, rather than the Navy or DOD budget.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ For additional discussion of the Deepwater program, see CRS
Report RS21019, Coast Guard Deepwater 28 Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Options For Fiscal Year 2011 and Beyond
The decision to reduce DD(X) procurement to one ship per year in
fiscal years 2007-2011, which appears to have been driven in large part
by affordability considerations, suggests that, unless budget
conditions change, the Navy may never be able to afford to procure more
than one DD(X) or CG(X) per year.
A procurement rate of one DD(X) or CG(X) per year, if sustained for
a period of many years, might not be enough to maintain the cruiser-
destroyer force at desired levels.
The prospect of a one-per-year rate might also raise questions
about the potential cost effectiveness of the DD(X)/CG(X) effort when
measured in terms of average unit acquisition cost, which is the
average cost to develop and procure each ship. Given the $10 billion in
research and development funding programmed for the DD(X) program, if
DD(X)s or CG(X)s are procured at a rate of one per year for 20 or fewer
years and the combined number of DD(X)s and CG(X)s is consequently 20
or less, then the average acquisition cost for the DD(X)/CG(X) effort
could be more than $3 billion per ship.
Dissatisfaction with a one-per-year procurement rate due to its
potential effects on force structure or average unit acquisition cost
could lead to a decision at some point to terminate the DD(X)/CG(X)
program. If such a decision were made in the near term, the total
number of ships that might be built under the program could be as low
as one or two. Under this scenario, a single DD(X) might be procured as
a technology demonstrator, while a second DD(X) might be procured to
give the other shipyard experience in building the design.
Another scenario is that a total of five DD(X)s are procured
through fiscal year 2011, as currently planned, but that the CG(X)
program is terminated due to concerns about its procurement cost (which
may be greater than that of the DD[X]) and questions about the role of
the CG(X) in the missile-defense mission. Although the DD(X) has been
described by DOD and others as a bridge to CG(X), there is a
possibility (some observers say a probability) that industry may cross
that bridge only to discover that the CG(X) is no longer waiting at the
other end.
If the DD(X)/CG(X) effort is terminated at some point and an
alternative large surface combatant design is not ready to be put into
procurement, it could place pressures on the surface combatant
industrial base that are significantly higher than those it currently
faces under the Navy's fiscal years 2006-2011 plan for procuring
DD(X)s, with consequences that could be more severe.
One option for addressing this situation would be to begin design
work now on a new surface combatant that is substantially less
expensive to procure than the DD(X)/CG(X). Such a surface combatant
could be more easily procured within available resources at a rate of
two ships per year, which might maintain the cruiser-destroyer force at
a level closer to what the Navy may be planning. A rate of two ships
per year might also be easier to divide between two shipyards while
still constraining production costs. This option could aim at having
the new design ready for procurement in fiscal year 2011, which is when
CG(X) procurement is currently scheduled to begin.
Notional options for a less-expensive surface combatant include:
A roughly 9,000-ton surface combatant;
A roughly 6,000-ton frigate; and
A low-cost gunfire support ship.
Each of these is discussed below. An additional option to consider,
even though it might not be less expensive in terms of unit procurement
cost, is the 57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship proposed in the OFT
report on alternative fleet platform architectures.
Roughly 9,000-Ton Surface Combatant (SC(X)). One option for a
smaller, less expensive, new-design ship would be a new-technology
surface combatant about equal in size to the Navy's current 9,000-ton
Aegis cruisers and destroyers. Such a ship, which might be called the
SC(X) (meaning surface combatant, in development) could:
be intended as a replacement for either the CG(X)
program or both the DD(X) and CG(X) programs;
incorporate many of the same technologies now being
developed for the DD(X) and CG(X), including, for example,
technologies permitting a reduced-sized crew and integrated
electric-drive propulsion;
cost substantially less to procure than a DD(X) or
CG(X), and perhaps about as much to procure as a DDG-51
destroyer;
be similar to the DD(X) and CG(X) in terms of using a
reduced-size crew to achieve annual operation and support costs
that are considerably less than those of the current DDG-51
design;
carry a payload--a combination of sensors, weapon
launchers, weapons, and aircraft--that is smaller than that of
the DD(X) or CG(X), but comparable to that of current DDG-51s
or Aegis cruisers.
A land-attack oriented version of the SC(X) might be able to carry
one Advanced Gun System (AGS), as opposed to the two on the DD(X). An
air- and missile-defense version of the SC(X) might have fewer missile
tubes than CG(X), but still a fairly substantial number.
Roughly 6,000-Ton Frigate (FFG(X)). A second option for a smaller,
less expensive, newdesign ship would be a frigate intended as a
replacement for both the DD(X)/CG(X) effort and the LCS program. The
option for a new-design frigate was outlined in a March 2003
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on surface combatants and
CBO's February 2005 report on options for the fiscal year 2006 Federal
budget.\29\ CBO estimates that such a ship, which it called the FFG(X),
might displace about 6,000 tons and have a unit procurement cost of
about $800 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Transforming the Navy's
Surface Combatant Force, Mar. 2003, pp. 29 27-28, 63; and U.S.
Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options, Feb. 2005, pp. 18-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 6,000-ton FFG(X) would likely be too small to be equipped with
the AGS and therefore likely could not provide the additional naval
gunfire capability that would be provided by the DD(X). A 6,000-ton
FFG(X) might, however, be capable of performing the non-gunfire
missions that would be performed by both the DD(X) and the LCS. A
6,000-ton FFG(X) would could be viewed as a replacement in the surface
combatant force structure for the Navy's Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)
class frigates and Spruance (DD-963) class destroyers. Since a 6,000-
ton FFG(X) would be roughly midway in size between the 4,000-ton FFG-7
design and the 9,000-ton DD-963 design, it might be suitable for
carrying more modern versions of the mission equipment currently
carried by the FFG-7s and DD-963s.
Low-Cost Gunfire Support Ship. A third option for a smaller, less
expensive, new-design ship would be a low-cost gunfire support ship--a
relatively simple ship equipped with one or two AGSs and only such
other equipment that is needed for basic ship operation. Other than the
AGSs and perhaps some advanced technologies for reducing crew size and
thus total life-cycle cost, such a ship could use existing rather than
advanced technologies so as to minimize development time, development
cost, and technical risk. Some of these ships might be forward-
stationed at sites such as Guam or Diego Garcia, so as to be available
for rapid crewing and movement to potential contingencies in the
Western Pacific or Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf regions. The goal would be
to procure specialized AGS-armed ships as a niche capability for the
Navy, and then forward-station some of that capability so as to
maximize the odds of being able to bring a desired number of AGSs to an
overseas theater of operation in a timely manner on those occasions
when needed.
independent studies on fleet architecture \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ This section includes some material adapted with permission
from a March 18, 2005 memorandum to the office of Representative Roscoe
Bartlett.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Origin of Studies
Section 216 of the conference report (H.Rept. 108-354 of November
7, 2003) on the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year
2004 (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24, 2003) required the
Secretary of Defense to provide for two independently performed studies
on potential future fleet platform architectures (i.e., potential force
structure plans) for the Navy. Subsection (d) of section 216 stated in
part that ``The results of each study under this section shall--(1)
present the alternative fleet platform architectures considered, with
assumptions and possible scenarios identified for each. . . .'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Section 216 is an amended version of a provision (Section 217)
in the House-reported version of H.R. 1588. See pages 28-29 and 612-613
of H.Rept. 108-354, and pages 255-256 of the House report (H.Rept. 108-
106 of May 16, 2003) on H.R. 1588.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The two studies required by Section 216 were conducted by the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Office of Force Transformation
(OFT) and were submitted to the congressional defense committees in
February 2005.
A third independent study on potential future fleet platform
architectures was conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA). CSBA conducted this study on its own initiative and
made it available to congressional and other audiences in March 2005 as
an alternative to the CNA and OFT studies.
Force Structure Recommendations
CNA Report \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Delwyn Gilmore, with contributions by Mark Lewellyn et al,
Report to Congress Regarding Naval Force Architecture. Alexandria (VA),
Center for Naval Analyses, 2005. (CRM D0011303.A2/1Rev, Jan. 2005) 60
pp. (Hereafter CNA report.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships and naval
formations as those planned by the Navy. The report recommends a Navy
force structure range of 256 to 380 ships. The low end of the range
assumes a greater use of crew rotation and overseas homeporting of Navy
ships than the high end. Table 2 compares the CNA-recommended force
range to the Navy's 375-ship fleet proposal of 2002-2004 and the
notional 260- and 325-ship fleets for fiscal year 2035 presented in the
Navy's March 2005 interim report to Congress.
TABLE 2. CNA--RECOMMENDED FORCE AND OTHER PROPOSALS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notional Navy fleets
CNA force range 375-ship proposal for fiscal year 2035
Ship type Navy of 2002-2004 \1\ ---------------------
260 ships 325 ships
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).............. 14 14 14 14
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs)................. 4 4 4 4
Attack submarines (SSNs).......................... 38 to 62 52 37 41
Aircraft carriers................................. 10 to 12 12 10 11
Cruisers and destroyers........................... 66 to 112 109 67 92
Littoral combat ships (LCSs)...................... 40 to 70 56 63 82
Amphibious ships.................................. 18 to 30 36 17 24
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships...... 19 to 21 18 14 20
Combat logistics (resupply) ships................. 25 to 33 33 24 26
Other \2\......................................... 22 41 10 11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total battle force ships........................ 256 to 380 375 260 325
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on CNA report and March 2005 Navy report.
\1\ Composition as shown in CNA report as the program of record for 2022. An earlier and somewhat different
composition is shown in CRS Report RL32665.
\2\ Includes command ships, support ships (such as salvage ships and submarine tenders), dedicated mine warfare
ships, and sea basing connector ships.
OFT Report
The OFT report \33\ employs eight new ship designs that differ
substantially from the designs of most ships currently in the fleet,
under construction, or planned for procurement. Among the eight new
ship designs are four types of large surface ships that would be built
from a common, relatively inexpensive, merchant-like hull design
developed in 2004 for the Navy's Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
analysis of alternatives. These four types of ships, which would all
displace 57,000 tons, include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Alternative Fleet Architecture Design. 33 Washington, 2005.
(Report for the Congressional Defense Committees, Office of Force
Transformation). 101 pp. (Hereafter OFT report.)
An aircraft carrier that would embark a notional air
wing of 30 Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs), 6 MV-22 Osprey tilt-
rotor aircraft, and 15 unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). The total
of 36 manned aircraft is about half as many as in today's
carrier air wings, and the OFT architecture envisages
substituting two of these new carriers for each of today's
carriers. This new carrier would also have support spaces for
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned surface vehicles
(USVs), and mission modules for the 1,000-ton surface combatant
described below.
A missile-and-rocket ship that would be equipped with
360 vertical launch system (VLS) missile tubes and four
trainable rocket launchers. Additional spaces on this ship
could be used to support UUVs, USVs, and mission modules for
the 1,000-ton surface combatant. Alternatively, these spaces
could be used to provide limited stowage and working space for
the 100-ton surface combatant described below, and mission
modules for these 100-ton ships.
An amphibious assault ship that would embark a
notional air wing of either 30 CH-46 equivalents or 6 JSFs, 18
MV-22s, and 3 gyrocopter heavy-lift helicopters. It would also
have spaces for Marine Corps equipment, unmanned vehicles, and
mission modules for the 1,000-ton surface combatant.
A ``mother ship'' for small combatants that would
contain stowage and support spaces for the 100-ton surface
combatant described below.
The four other new-design ships in the OFT architecture are:
A 13,500-ton aircraft carrier based on a conceptual
surface effect ship (SES)/catamaran hull design developed in
2001 by a team at the Naval Postgraduate School. This ship
would embark a notional air wing of 8 JSFs, 2 MV-22s, and 8
UAVs. The total of 10 manned aircraft is roughly one-eighth as
many as in today's carrier air wings, and the OFT architecture
envisages substituting eight of these new carriers for each of
today's carriers. This new ship would have a maximum speed of
50 to 60 knots.
A 1,000-ton surface combatant with a maximum speed of
40 to 50 knots and standard interfaces for accepting various
modular mission packages. These ships would self-deploy to the
theater and would be supported in theater by one or more of the
57,000-ton ships described above.
A 100-ton surface combatant with a maximum speed of 60
knots and standard interfaces for accepting various modular
mission packages. These ships would be transported to the
theater by the 57,000-ton mother ship and would be supported in
theater by that ship and possibly also the 57,000-ton missile-
and-rocket ship.
A non-nuclear-powered submarine equipped with an air-
independent propulsion (AIP) system. These AIP submarines would
be lower-cost supplements to the Navy's nuclear-powered
submarines (SSNs) and would be transported from home port to
the theater of operations by transport ships. The OFT
architecture envisages substituting four of these submarines
for the SSN in each carrier strike group.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ The report states that ``Alternatives to the SSNs in
formations were diesel Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines and
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). The AIP submarines were substituted
for Virginia class SSNs on a cost basis of roughly four to one. These
submarines could be nuclear-powered if they are designed and built
based upon a competitive, cost suppressing business model.'' (Page 60)
The strategy of transporting the AIP submarines to the theater using
transport ships is not mentioned in the report but was explained at a
February 18, 2005 meeting between CRS and analysts who contributed to
the OFT report.
The 1,000- and 100-ton surface combatants would be built as
relatively inexpensive sea frames, like the LCS.
The OFT report combines these eight types of ships, plus the Navy's
currently planned TAOE-class resupply ship, into a fleet that would
include a much larger total number of ships than planned by the Navy,
about the same number of carrier-based aircraft as planned by the Navy,
and large numbers of unmanned systems. The OFT report presents three
alternative versions of this fleet, which the report calls Alternatives
A, B, and C. The report calculates that each of these alternatives
would be equal in cost to the equivalent parts of the Navy's 375-ship
proposal. Each of these alternative force structures, like the
equivalent parts of the Navy's 375-ship proposal, would be organized
into 12 carrier strike groups (CSGs), 12 expeditionary strike groups
(ESGs), and 9 surface strike groups (SSGs). The three alternative force
structures are shown in Table 3 below.
TABLE 3. ALTERNATIVE FLEET STRUCTURES FROM OFT REPORT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative
Ship type --------------------------------------
A B C
------------------------------------------------------------------------
57,000-ton aircraft carrier...... 24 24 0
57,000-ton missile-and-rocket 33 33 33
ship............................
57,000-ton amphibious assault 24 24 24
ship............................
57,000-ton mother ship........... 0 24 24
13,500-ton aircraft carrier...... 0 0 96
1,000-ton surface combatant...... 417 0 0
100-ton surface combatant........ 0 609 609
AIP submarine.................... 48 48 48
TAOE-class resupply ship......... 12 12 12
----------------------------------
Subtotal 1,000- and 100-ton 417 609 609
ships.........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal other ships........... 141 165 237
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total ships \1\.............. 558 774 846
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on figures in OFT report.
\1\ The totals shown in early copies of the OFT report are 36 ships
lower in each case due to an error in those copies in calculating the
numbers of ships in the 12 carrier strike groups.
The totals shown in the table do not include SSNs, cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating
independently of the 12 CSGs, 12 ESGs, and 9 SSGs. The totals also do
not include combat logistics ships other than the TAOEs (e.g., oilers,
ammunition ships, and general stores ships) and fleet support ships.
The Navy's 375-ship proposal, by comparison, includes all these kinds
of ships.
As can be seen from the shaded cells in the table, the difference
between Alternatives A and B is that the former uses 1,000-ton surface
combatants while the latter uses 100-ton surface combatants that are
transported into the theater by mother ships, and the difference
between Alternatives B and C is that the former uses 57,000-ton
aircraft carriers while the latter substitutes 13,500-ton carriers.
CSBA Report
The CSBA report \35\ uses many of the same ship designs currently
planned by the Navy, but also proposes some new ship designs. The CSBA
report also proposes ship formations that in some cases are different
than those planned by the Navy. Table 4 below compares the CSBA-
recommended force structure to CNA's recommended force range, the
Navy's 375-ship fleet proposal of 2002-2004, and the notional 260- and
325-ship fleets for fiscal year 2035 presented in the Navy's March 2005
interim report to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Robert O. Work, Winning the Race: A Naval Fleet Platform
Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy. Washington, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2005. (Version as of March 1,
2005, which is in the form of a slide briefing with 322 slides.
Hereafter CSBA report.)
TABLE 4. CSBA--RECOMMENDED FORCE AND OTHER PROPOSALS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notional Navy fleets for
Navy 375-ship Fiscal Year 2035
Ship type CSBA force CNA force range proposal of -------------------------
2002-2004 a 260 ships 325 ships
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ballistic missile submarines 12 b 14 14 14 14
(SSBNs)...........................
Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).. 6 b 4 4 4 4
Attack submarines (SSNs)........... 54 c 38 to 62 52 37 41
Large-deck aircraft carriers (CVNs) 10 10 to 12 12 10 11
Medium aircraft carriers (CVEs).... 4 0 0 0 0
Afloat forward staging base (AFSB). 1 0 0 0 0
Cruisers and destroyers............ 84 or 86 66 to 112 109 67 92
Littoral combat ships (LCSs)....... 84 40 to 70 56 63 82
Amphibious ships................... 32 d 18 to 30 36 17 24
Maritime Prepositioning Force ships 16 e 19 to 21 e 18 e 14 e 20 e
Combat logistics (resupply) ships.. 36 f 25 to 33 33 24 26
Other g............................ 34 h 22 41 10 11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total battle force ships......... 373 or 375 i 256 to 380 375 260 325
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on CSBA report, CNA report, and March 2005 Navy report.
a Composition as shown in CNA report as the program of record for 2022. An earlier and somewhat different
composition is shown in CRS Report RL32665.
b Alternatively, 10 SSBNs and 8 SSGNs.
c Includes one special-mission submarine. Total number drops slightly over next 12 years.
d Includes 8 LHDs and 24 LPD-17s.
d In the CSBA force, these are existing MPF ships; in the other fleets, they are MPF(Future) ships.
f Includes 8 TAOEs, 11 TAKEs, and 17 TAOs.
g Includes command ships, and support ships (such as salvage ships and submarine tenders), dedicated mine
warfare ships, and sea basing connector ships.
h Includes, among other ships, two TAVBs and eight TLKAs associated with the amphibious and MPF ships.
i In addition to these ships, the CSBA report notes that U.S. maritime forces would include 35 DOD
prepositioning and surge sealift ships used primarily by the Army and Air Force, and 91 large, medium, and
fast-response (i.e., small) cutters planned for procurement under the Coast Guard Deepwater acquisition
program.
The CSBA report makes numerous specific recommendations for ship
force structure and ship acquisition, including the following:
Aircraft carriers. When the George H.W. Bush (CVN-77)
enters service in 2008 or 2009, do the following:
Retire the two remaining conventional
carriers--the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and the Kennedy (CV-
67).
Convert the Enterprise (CVN-65) into an afloat
forward staging base (AFSB) with a mixed Active/
Reserve/civilian crew, to be used in peacetime for
aviation testing and in crises for embarking Special
Operations Forces, Army or Marine Corps Forces, or
Joint Air Wings.
Begin replacing the 10 Nimitz (CVN-68) class
carriers on a one-for-one basis with CVN-21-class
carriers procured once every 5 years using incremental
funding.
Redesignate the LHA(R) as a medium sized
carrier (CVE) and procure one every 3 years starting in
fiscal year 2007 using incremental funding.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ CSBA report, slides 154-158.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Submarines.
Maintain Virginia-class SSN procurement at one
per year for the next several years, producing an
eventual total of perhaps 20 Virginia-class boats.
Begin immediately to design a new ``undersea
superiority system'' with a procurement cost 50 percent
to 67 percent that of the Virginia-class design, with
the goal of achieving a procurement rate of two or
three of these boats per year no later than fiscal year
2019.
Study options for extending the service lives
of the three Seawolf SSNs and the 31 final Los Angeles-
class SSNs to mitigate the projected drop in SSN force
levels during the 2020s.
Reduce the SSBN force from 14 ships to 12
ships and convert an additional 2 SSBNs into SSGNs, for
a total of 6 SSGNs.
Study the option of reducing the SSBN force
further, to 10 ships, which would permit another 2
SSBNs to be converted into SSGNs, for a total of 8
SSGNs.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ CSBA report, slides 276, 284, 289, 297, 299.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Destroyers and cruisers.
Procure a single DD(X) in fiscal year 2007,
using research and development funding, as the first of
three surface combatant technology demonstrators.
Start a design competition for a next
generation, modular surface combatant or family of
combatants, with capabilities equal to or greater than
the DD(X)/CG(X), but with a substantially lower
procurement cost.
Build two additional surface combatant
technology demonstrators to compete against the DD(X)
design.
Use the results of this competition to inform
the design of a new surface combatant, called SCX, with
a procurement cost perhaps one-third to one-half that
of the DD(X).
Begin procuring this new design in fiscal year
2015 as a replacement for the DD(X)/CG(X) program.
Consider modifying the LPD-17 design into a
low-cost naval surface fire support ship carrying the
Advanced Gun System (AGS) that was to be carried by the
DD(X).
Consider procuring two additional DDG-51s to
help support the surface combatant industrial base in
the near-term.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ CSBA report, slides 246, 249, and 251-253. Slide 249 states
that possibilities for a reduced-cost alternative to the DD(X) include
a surface combatant based on the LPD-17 design, a semi-submersible ship
built to commercial standards (like a ship called the ``Stryker'' that
was proposed several years ago), and a large or medium ``carrier of
large objects,'' perhaps built to relaxed commercial standards.
Littoral Combat Ships and Coast Guard Deepwater
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cutters.
Procure six LCSs per year for a total of 84
LCSs--42 of the Lockheed design, and 42 of the General
Dynamics design.
Organize these 84 ships into 42 divisions,
each consisting of one Lockheed ship and one General
Dynamics ship, so that each division can benefit from
the complementary strengths of the two designs.
Ensure that mission packages for the LCS and
mission packages for the Coast Guard's large and medium
Deepwater cutters are as mutually compatible as
possible.
Include the Coast Guard's Deepwater cutters
when counting ships that contribute to the country's
total fleet battle network.
Begin a research and development and
experimentation program aimed at building several
competing stealth surface combatant technology
demonstrators for operations in contested or denied-
access waters.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ CSBA report, slides 275, 277, and 283.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amphibious ships.
Complete LHD-8 to create a force of eight
LHDs.
Rather than stopping procurement of LPD-17s
after the ninth ship in fiscal year 2007, as now
planned by the Navy, increase the LPD-17 procurement
rate to two ships per year and use multiyear
procurement (MYP) to procure a total of 24 LPD-17s.
Retire the 12 existing LSD-41/49 class ships,
leaving a 32-ship amphibious fleet consisting of eight
LHDs and 24 LPD-17s.
Form eight ``distributed expeditionary strike
bases''--each of which would include one LHD, three
LPD-17s, one Aegis cruiser, three Aegis destroyers, two
LCSs, and one SSGN.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ CSBA report, slides 227 and 236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MPF and other ships.
Retain the three existing MPF squadrons over
the near- to mid-term.
Reconfigure two of the squadrons for irregular
warfare.
Use the third squadron as a swing asset to
either reinforce the two irregular-warfare squadrons or
to provide lift for assault follow-on echelon
amphibious landing forces.
Develop high-speed intra-theater and ship-to-
shore surface connectors.
Design an attack cargo ship (TAKA) to help
support sustained joint operations ashore, with a
target unit procurement cost of $500 million or less,
and begin procuring this ship in fiscal year 2014.
Replace the two existing hospital ships, the
four existing command ships, and existing support
tenders with new ships based on the LPD-17 design.
Initiate a joint experimental program for
future sea-basing platforms and technologies.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ CSBA report, slides 228-232, and 307.
The CSBA report raises several questions about the Navy's emerging
sea basing concept for conducting expeditionary operations ashore. The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
report states:
The work done thus far on sea basing is intriguing, but
neither the concept nor the supporting technologies appear
sufficiently mature to justify any near-term decisions such as
canceling LPD-17 [procurement] in favor of MPF(F) ships, or
removing the well deck from the big deck amphibious assault
platforms, both of which would severely curtail the [fleet's]
ability to launch surface assaults over the longer term.
Given these large uncertainties, no major moves toward the
sea basing vision should be made without further exploring the
sea basing concept itself, and experimenting with different
numbers and types of sea base platforms, connectors, and
capabilities.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ CSBA report, slide 212.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Observations
Observations about the CNA, OFT, and CSBA reports can be made on
several points, including the following:
organizations and authors;
analytical approach;
use of prospective ship-procurement funding levels as
a force-planning consideration;
fleet size and structure;
whether the recommended force qualifies as an
alternative fleet architecture;
fleet capability;
transition risks; and
implications for the industrial base.
Each of these is discussed below.
Organizations and Authors
CNA Report. CNA is a federally funded research and development
center (FFRDC) that does much of its analytical at the Navy's request.
The CNA report's discussion of how crew rotation may alter force-level
requirements for maintaining day-to-day forward deployments is somewhat
detailed and may have been adapted from other work that CNA has done on
the topic for the Navy.
OFT Report. The OFT report was prepared under the direction of
retired Navy admiral Arthur Cebrowski, who was the director of OFT from
October 29, 2001 until January 31, 2005 and the President of the Naval
War College (NWC) from July 24, 1998 to August 22, 2001. During his
time at NWC and OFT, Cebrowski was a leading proponent of network-
centric warfare and distributed force architectures.
CSBA Report. The CSBA report was prepared by Robert Work, CSBA's
analyst for maritime issues. CSBA describes itself as ``an independent,
policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking
about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century.
CSBA's analytic-based research makes clear the inextricable link
between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective
and efficient defense, and the need to transform the U.S. military in
light of an emerging military revolution.'' \43\ CSBA's Executive
Director is Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., whose previous experience
includes work in DOD's Office of Net Assessment, the office directed by
Andrew Marshall. Krepinevich is generally considered a major writer on
defense transformation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Source: CSBA's website [http://www.csbaonline.org].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analytical Approach
CNA Report. The CNA report grounds its analysis in traditional DOD
force-planning considerations and campaign modeling. The report cites
past DOD force-planning studies that reflect similar approaches. The
implicit argument in the CNA report is that its findings have weight in
part because they reflect a well-established and systematic approach to
the problem.
OFT Report. In contrast to the CNA report, the OFT report ``calls
into question the viability of the longstanding logic of naval force
building.'' \44\ The OFT report grounds its analysis in four major
force-design principles that the report identifies as responsive to
future strategic challenges and technological opportunities.\45\ The
report then seeks to design a fleet that it is consistent with these
principles, and assesses that fleet using a new set of metrics that the
report believes to be consistent with these principles. The implicit
argument in the OFT report is that its findings have weight in part
because they reflect major force-design principles that respond to
future strategic challenges and technological opportunities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ OFT report, p. 1
\45\ The principles are complexity, smaller ships and improved
payload fraction, network-centric warfare, and modularity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CSBA Report. The CSBA report employs an extensive historical
analysis of the missions and structure of the U.S. Navy and other
navies. The report argues that the structure of the U.S. Navy has
shifted over time in response to changes in technology and U.S.
security challenges, and that U.S. Military forces have entered a new
security era (which the report calls the ``Joint Expeditionary Era'')
during which the U.S. Navy will need to do three things.\46\ To do
these three things, the report argues, the Navy should be structured to
include four different force elements.\47\ The report constructs these
four force elements and then combines them to arrive at an overall
recommended Navy force structure. The implicit argument in the CSBA
report is that its findings have weight in part because they reflect
insights about future missions and force requirements gained through
careful historical analysis of the missions and structure of the U.S.
Navy and other navies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ These three things are: (1) contribute to the global war on
terrorism; (2) prepare for possible nuclear-armed regional competitors;
and (3) hedge against the possibility of a disruptive maritime
competition with China.
\47\ These four force elements are: (1) a sea-based power-
projection and regional deterrence force; (2) a global patrol, global
war on terrorism, and homeland defense force; (3) a force for
prevailing over enemy anti-access/area-denial forces; and (4) a
strategic deterrence and dissuasion force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prospective Ship-Procurement Funding Levels As A Consideration
CNA Report. The CNA report aims at designing a cost-effective
fleet. It also mentions cost estimates relating to the option of
homeporting additional attack submarines at Guam.\48\ Prospective ship-
procurement funding levels, however, are not prominently featured in
the CNA report as a force-planning consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ CNA Report, p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFT Report. Prospective ship-procurement funding levels are a
significant force-planning consideration in the OFT report. The report
argues that an important metric for assessing a proposed fleet
architecture is the ease or difficulty with which it can be scaled up
or down to adapt to changes in ship-procurement funding levels.
The OFT report contains a fairly detailed discussion of the Navy's
budget situation that calls into question, on several grounds, the
Navy's prospective ability to afford its 375-ship proposal. The report
concludes that funding for Navy ship-procurement in future years may
fall as much as 40 percent short of what would be needed to achieve the
Navy's 375-ship fleet proposal. If the shortfall is 40 percent, the
report estimates, the Navy could maintain a force of 270 to 315 ships,
which is comparable in number to today's force of 288 ships, except
that the future force would include a substantial number of relatively
inexpensive LCSs. If proportionate reductions are applied to the OFT
fleets shown in Table 3, Alternative A would include 402 to 469 ships,
Alternative B would include 557 to 650 ships, and Alternative C would
include 609 to 711 ships. Again, these totals would not include certain
kinds of ships (independently operating SSNs, etc.) that are included
in the total of 270 to 315 ships associated with the Navy's currently
planned architecture.
CSBA Report. As with the OFT report, prospective ship-procurement
funding levels are a significant force-planning consideration in the
CSBA report. The CSBA report estimates that in future years, the Navy
may have an average of about $10 billion per year in ship-acquisition
funding. The report then aims at designing a force whose ships could be
acquired for this average annual amount of funding.
Fleet Size and Structure
CNA Report. The 380-ship fleet at the high end of the CNA range is
similar in size and composition to the Navy's 375-ship fleet proposal.
The 256-ship fleet at the low end of the CNA range is similar in size
and composition to the Navy's 260-ship fleet for fiscal year 2035,
except that the 260-ship fleet has more LCSs and fewer ships in the
``other ships'' category.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Additional points of comparison: The CNA range of 256 to 380
ships overlaps with potential ranges of 290 to 375 ships, 260 to 325
ships, and 243 to 302 ships presented in the Navy's February 2005
testimony to Congress. The mid-point of the CNA-recommended range (318
ships) is similar in terms of total numbers of ships to the 310-ship
fleet from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Unlike the 2001
QDR fleet, however, the CNA-recommended force includes several dozen
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) and smaller numbers of other kinds of
ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFT Report. The OFT-recommended fleet would have a much larger
total number of ships than the Navy's planned fleet. The OFT fleet
would also feature a much larger share of small combatants. Of the
ships shown in Table 3, the small combatants account for about 75
percent in Alternative A, about 79 percent in Alternative B, and about
72 percent in Alternative C. (Adding into the mix SSNs and other kinds
of ships not shown in Table 3 would reduce these percentages somewhat.)
In the Navy's notional 260- and 325-ship fleets, by contrast, LCSs
account for about 25 percent of the total number of ships.
The OFT architecture is similar in certain ways to a fleet
architecture proposed by the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)
between 1989 and 1992 and sometimes referred to as the Carrier of Large
Objects (CLO) proposal. The NSWC architecture, like the OFT
architecture, employed a common hull design for a large ship that could
be built in several variants for various missions, including aviation,
missile launching and fire support, amphibious warfare, logistics
support, and mother-ship support of small, fast, surface combatants.
The small, fast surface combatants in the NSWC architecture were called
scout fighters and were in the same general size range as the 100- and
1,000-ton surface combatants in the OFT architecture.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ For more on this proposed fleet architecture, see Norman
Polmar, ``Carrying Large Objects,'' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
December 1990: 121-122; Michael L. Bosworth et al, ``Multimission Ship
Design for an Alternative Fleet Concept,'' Naval Engineers Journal, May
1991: 91-106; Michael L. Bosworth, ``Fleet Versatility by Distributed
Aviation,'' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 1992: 99-102; and
Victor A. Meyer, ``Naval Surface Warfighting Vision 2030,'' Naval
Engineers Journal, May 1992: 74-88. See also ``USN's `2030' Plan For
Future Fleet,'' Sea Power, Apr. 1992: 79, 82; Edward J. Walsh, ``
`Alternative Battle Force' Stresses Commonality, Capability,'' Sea
Power, Feb. 1991: 33-35; Robert Holzer, ``Navy Floats Revolutionary
Ship Design for Future Fleet,'' Defense News, May 14, 1990: 4, 52; and
Anne Rumsey, ``Navy Plans Ship Look-A-Likes,'' Defense Week, Mar. 13,
1989: 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CSBA Report. The CSBA force would have about the same total number
of ships as the Navy's 375-ship fleet proposal. CSBA's subtotals for
some ship categories are similar to subtotals in one or more of the
other fleet proposals shown in Table 4. Significant differences between
the CSBA proposal and the other fleet proposals shown in Table 4
include:
the four medium-sized aircraft carriers (CVEs);
the conversion of a carrier into an afloat forward
staging base;
the composition of the cruiser-destroyer force (which
would include SCXs rather than DD(X)s and CG(X)s);
the composition of the amphibious fleet (which would
have additional LPD-17s in lieu of today's LSD-41/49s); and
the composition of the maritime prepositioning force
(which would continue to include, for a time at least, today's
MPF ships rather than the Navy's planned MPF(F) ships).
Does It Qualify As An Alternative Force Architecture?
CNA Report. As mentioned earlier, the CNA report uses essentially
the same kinds of ships and naval formations as those planned by the
Navy. If an alternative fleet platform architecture is defined as one
that uses ship types or naval formations that differ in some
significant way from those currently used or planned, then the CNA-
recommended force arguably would not qualify as an alternative fleet
platform architecture.
OFT Report. Since the OFT report proposes building ships that are
substantially different from those currently planned, and combines
these ships into formations which, although similar in name to
currently planned formations (i.e., CSGs, ESGs, and SSGs), might be
viewed by some observers as substantially different in composition from
the currently planned versions of these formations, the OFT-recommended
force arguably would qualify as an alternative fleet platform
architecture.
CSBA Report. Since the CSBA report proposes building ships that in
some cases are different from those currently planned, and combines
these ships into formations that in some cases are different in
composition from those currently planned, the CSBA-recommended force
arguably would qualify as an alternative fleet platform architecture,
though less dramatically so than the OFT-recommended force.
New Ship Designs
CNA Report. The CNA report does not propose any ship designs other
than those already planned by the Navy.
OFT Report. The 57,000-ton aircraft carrier in the OFT report would
be roughly the same size as the United Kingdom's new aircraft carrier
design, and somewhat larger than the U.S. Navy's 40,000-ton LHA/LHD-
type amphibious assault ships. Compared to the U.S. Navy's aircraft
carriers, which displace 81,000 to 102,000 tons, this ship could be
considered a medium-size carrier.
The 57,000-ton missile-and-rocket ship in the OFT report could be
considered similar in some respects to the Navy/DARPA arsenal ship
concept of 1996-1997, which would have been a large, relatively simple
surface ship equipped with about 500 VLS tubes.\51\
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\51\ For more on the arsenal ship, see CRS Report 97-455 F, Navy/
DARPA Arsenal Ship Program: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke. 133 pp.; and CRS Report 97-1044 F, Navy/DARPA Maritime Fire
Support Demonstrator (Arsenal Ship) Program: Issues Arising From Its
Termination, by Ronald O'Rourke. 6 pp. Both reports are out of print
and are available directly from the author.
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The 13,500-ton aircraft carrier in the OFT report would be slightly
larger than Thailand's aircraft carrier, which was commissioned in
1997, and somewhat smaller than Spain's aircraft carrier, which was
based on a U.S. design and was commissioned in 1988. Due to its SES/
catamaran hull design, this 13,500-ton ship would be much faster than
the Thai and Spanish carriers (or any other aircraft carrier now in
operation), and might have a larger flight deck. This ship could be
considered a small, high-speed aircraft carrier.
The 1,000- and 100-ton surface combatants in the OFT report could
be viewed as similar to, but smaller than, the 2,500- to 3,000-ton
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Compared to the LCS, they would be closer
in size to the Streetfighter concept (a precursor to the LCS that was
proposed by retired admiral Cebrowski during his time at the Naval War
College).
The AIP submarine in the OFT report could be similar to AIP
submarines currently being developed and acquired by a some foreign
navies.
CSBA Report. The proposal in the CSBA report for an afloat forward
staging base (AFSB) is similar to other proposals for AFSBs that have
been reported in recent years, though other proposals have suggested
using commercial ships or military sealift ships rather than converted
aircraft carriers as the basis for the AFSB.\52\
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\52\ See, for example, Stephen M. Carmel, ``A Commercial Approach
to Sea Basing--Afloat Forward Staging Bases,'' U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, January 2004: 78-79; Christopher J. Castelli, ``Budget
Anticipates Developing MPF(F) Aviation Variant From LMSR,'' Inside the
Navy, January 19, 2004; Christopher J. Castelli, ``Brewer Proposes
Commercial Ship To Test Seabasing Technologies,'' Inside the Navy,
January 27, 2003; Christopher J. Castelli, ``In POM-04, Navy Cancels
JCC(X), Plans To Substitute MPF(F) Variant,'' Inside the Navy,
September 2, 2002; Christopher J. Castelli, ``Navy May Develop New
Support Ships, Pursue Sealift Experimentation,'' Inside the Navy, May
27, 2002.
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The CVE in the CSBA report, like the 57,000-ton carrier in the OFT
report, can be viewed as a medium-sized carrier. With a full load
displacement of perhaps about 40,000 tons, the CVE would be somewhat
smaller than the 57,000-ton carrier and consequently might embark a
smaller air wing. The CVE, however, would be based on the LHA(R)
amphibious ship design rather than a merchantlike hull, and
consequently could incorporate more survivability features than the
57,000-ton carrier. The proposal in the CSBA report for a new undersea
superiority system with a procurement cost 50 percent to 67 percent
that of the Virginia-class SSN design is similar to the Tango Bravo SSN
discussed earlier in this testimony.
The proposals in the CSBA report for a reduced-cost new-design
surface combatant called the SCX, and for a low-cost gunfire support
ship, are broadly similar to the options for a reduced-cost new-design
surface combatant discussed earlier in this testimony.
Fleet Capability
CNA Report. The CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of ships
and formations as planned by the Navy, and recommends generally the
same numbers of ships as a function of forceplanning variables such as
use of crew rotation. As a consequence, the CNA-recommended force range
would be roughly similar in overall capability to the Navy's planned
architecture.
OFT Report. The OFT architecture differs so significantly from the
Navy's planned architecture that assessing its capability relative to
the Navy's planned architecture is not easy. As a general matter, the
OFT report stresses overall fleet survivability more than individual-
ship survivability, and argues that fleet effectiveness can be enhanced
by presenting the enemy with a complex task of having to detect, track,
and target large numbers of enemy ships. The OFT report argues that in
addition to warfighting capability, a fleet can be judged in terms of
its capability for adapting to changes in strategic demands and funding
levels.\53\
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\53\ The OFT report argues that its recommended fleet architecture
would:
``provide a quantum leap ahead in capabilities against a
spectrum of enemies ranging from large, highly developed competitors to
small but determined asymmetric adversaries'' (page 6) and be
adaptable, in a dynamic and less-predictable security environment, to
changing strategic or operational challenges;
be capable of both participating in joint expeditionary
operations and maintaining ``the strategic advantage the Navy has
developed in the global commons,'' avoiding a need to choose between
optimizing the fleet for ``performance against asymmetric challenges at
the expense of its ability to confront a potential adversary capable of
traditional high intensity conflict,'' such as China; (pages 1 and 2)
pose significant challenges to adversaries seeking to
counter U.S. naval forces due to the ``large numbers of combat entities
that the enemy must deal with; a great variety of platforms with which
the enemy must contend; speed; different combinations of forces;
distribution of forces across large areas; and [adversary] uncertainty
as to the mission and capabilities of a given platform;'' (page i)
permit more constant experimentation with new operational
concepts, and thereby achieve higher rates of learning about how to
evolve the fleet over time; and
recognize potential future constraints on Navy budgets and
make the Navy more smoothly scalable to various potential future
resource levels by shifting from a fleet composed of limited numbers of
relatively expensive ships to one composed of larger numbers of less
expensive ships.
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Readers who agree with most or all of these propositions might
conclude that the OFT-recommended architecture would be more capable
than the Navy's planned architecture. Readers who disagree with most or
all of these propositions might conclude that the OFT-recommended
architecture would be less capable than the Navy's planned
architecture. Readers who agree with some of these propositions but not
others (or who agree with these propositions up to a certain point, but
less fervently than OFT), might conclude that the OFT-recommended
architecture might be roughly equal in total capability to the Navy's
planned architecture.
In addressing the question of fleet capability, the OFT report
states:
Alternative fleet formations consisting of small fast and
relatively inexpensive craft combining knowledge and attaining
flexibility through networking appear superior to the
programmed fleet for non-traditional warfare in a variety of
settings. This is due to increasing the complexity the enemy
faces and increasing U.S. fleet options that in turn reduce
enemy options. The speed and complexity of the alternative
fleets can provide them with the capability to complicate and
possibly defeat the attempts of non-traditional adversaries to
elude surveillance. The enemy could have difficulty determining
what to expect and how to defeat them all. The superior speed
and more numerous participants than in the programmed fleet
provide a stronger intelligence base and more numerous
platforms from which to conduct strikes and interceptions. This
appears to be true even if the smaller craft are individually
somewhat less capable and less able to sustain a hit than the
larger ships in the programmed fleet.
If these circumstances are not achieved, and the enemy can
continue to elude and deceive, the [Navy's] programmed fleet
often is as good as the [OFT] alternatives, sometimes even
better. It is not necessarily better in cases in which
individual ship survivability dominates, a perhaps
counterintuitive result until we realize that fleet
survivability not individual ship survivability is what
dominates.
An area in which programmed fleets might have an advantage
would be when the long loiter time or deep reach of CTOL
[conventional takeoff and landing] aircraft on programmed big-
deck CVNs [nuclear-powered aircraft carriers] is needed. That
said, there need be no great sacrifice. With airborne tanking,
the VSTOL [very short takeoff and landing] aircraft in the
alternatives could meet the deep strike and long loiter
demands. Also, as mentioned earlier, a combination of advances
in EMALS [electromagnetic aircraft launch system] and
modifications to the JSF will make it possible to launch the
JSF with only a marginal range-payload capability penalty.
Moreover, trends in technology are providing unmanned aircraft
greater capability, including greater loiter time and sensor
capability.\54\
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\54\ OFT report, pp. 75-76. Italics as in the original.
CSBA Report. The CSBA report argues that its architecture would
provide a total capability equal to that of the Navy's planned
architecture, but at a lower total cost, because the CSBA architecture
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
would:
employ new ship designs, such as the new undersea
superiority system and the SCX, that, because of their newer
technologies, would cost less than, but be equal in capability
to current designs such as the Virginia-class SSN and DD(X)
destroyer; and
make more use of the LPD-17 hull design, whose basic
design costs have already been paid, and which can be produced
efficiently in large numbers and adapted economically to meet
various mission requirements.
It is plausible that using newer technologies would permit new,
reduced-cost, ship designs to be more capable than such designs would
have been in the past. Whether the increases in capability would always
be enough to permit these ships to be equal in capability to more
expensive current designs is less clear. The Navy may be able to
achieve this with a new SSN design, because several new submarine
technologies have emerged since the Virginia-class design was developed
in the 1990s, but achieving this with a new large surface combatant
design could be more challenging, because the DD(X) design was
developed within the last few years and few new surface combatant
technologies may have emerged since that time. If one or more of the
reduced-cost designs turn out to be less capable than current designs,
then the CSBA architecture would not generate as much total capability
as the report projects.
The CSBA report also argues that its architecture would produce a
force with a mix of capabilities that would better fit future strategic
demands. To achieve this, the report recommends, among other things,
reducing currently planned near-term procurement of new destroyers and
MPF(F) ships, increasing currently planned procurement of new
amphibious ships, and changing the currently planned investment mix for
aircraft carriers.
Readers who agree with CSBA's description of future strategic
demands, and who agree that CSBA's recommended investment changes
respond to those demands, might conclude that the CSBA-recommended
architecture would be better optimized than the Navy's planned
architecture to meet future needs. Readers who disagree with one or
both of these propositions might conclude that the Navy's planned
architecture might be better optimized, or that neither architecture
offers clear advantages in this regard.
Transition Risks
CNA Report. Since the CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of
ships and naval formations as those in use today or planned by the
Navy, and recommends similar numbers of ships, the transition risks of
shifting from the Navy's currently planned force to the CNA-recommended
force would appear to be small.
OFT Report. The OFT report does not include a detailed plan for
transitioning from today's fleet architecture to its proposed
architecture,\55\ but such a plan could be developed as a follow-on
analysis. The plan could involve replacing existing ship designs and
associated formations as they retire with OFT's recommended new ship
designs and associated formations.
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\55\ On the topic of transitioning to the proposed fleet
architecture, the report states:
Implementation of the alternative fleet architecture should start
now and should target option generation, short construction time, and
technology insertion. The alternative further provides an opportunity
to reinvigorate the shipbuilding industrial base. The many smaller
ships, manned and unmanned, in the alternative fleet architecture could
be built in more shipyards and would be relevant to overseas markets.
The potential longevity of the existing fleet will sustain existing
shipyards as they move into building smaller ships more rapidly in this
broader market and more competitive environment. The shipyards would
develop a competence, broad relevance, and operate in an environment
driven by market imperatives instead of a framework of laws that
frustrates market forces.
As the new ships enter service and the fleet has the opportunity
to experiment with new operational concepts (expanded network-centric
warfare in particular) existing ships can be retired sooner to capture
operations savings. At this point, the sooner the existing fleet is
retired, the sooner the benefits of the alternative fleet architecture
design will accrue. (Page 3)
Additional general discussion of implementation is found on pp. 76-
77 of the report.
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Compared to the CNA-recommended force, the OFT-recommended force
would pose significantly greater transition risks because of the number
of new ship designs involved, the differences between several of these
ship designs and today's designs, and the new kinds of naval formations
that would be used, which could require development of new doctrine,
concepts of operations, and tactics.
CSBA Report. A stated goal of the CSBA report is to provide a
detailed, practical transition road map for shifting from today's fleet
structure to the report's recommended fleet structure. The many
specific recommendations made in the report could be viewed as forming
such a road map. Given that the CSBA-recommended force represents, in
terms of ship designs and formations, more of a departure from Navy
plans than the CNA-recomended force, but less of a depature from
current Navy plans than the OFT-recommended force, the transition risks
of the CSBA-recommended force might be viewed as somewhere in between
those of the CNA- and OFT-recommended forces.
Implications For Industrial Base
CNA Report. Since the CNA report uses essentially the same kinds of
ships and naval formations as those in use today or planned by the
Navy, and recommends similar numbers of ships, the industrial-base
implications of the CNA-recommended force would appear to be similar to
those of the Navy's current plans.
OFT Report. The OFT report seeks to reduce unit shipbuilding costs,
and thereby permit an increase in total ship numbers, by shifting the
fleet away from complex, highly integrated ship designs that are
inherently expensive to build and toward less-complex merchant-like
hulls and small sea frames that are inherently less expensive to build.
Similarly, the OFT report seeks to increase shipbuilding options for
the Navy by shifting the fleet away from complex, highly integrated
ship designs that can be built only by a limited number of U.S.
shipyards and toward less-complex merchant-like hulls and small sea
frames that can be built by a broader array of shipyards. The OFT
report also aims to make it easier and less expensive to modernize
ships over their long lives, and thereby take better advantage of rapid
developments in technology, by shifting from highly integrated ship
designs to merchant-like hulls and sea frames.
As a consequence of these objectives, the OFT report poses a
significant potential business challenge to the six shipyards that have
built the Navy's major warships in recent years. The report's
discussion on implementing its proposed architecture states in part:
The shipbuilding industrial base would also need to start to
retool to build different types of ships more rapidly. Smaller
shipyards, which presently do little or no work for the Navy
could compete to build the smaller ships, thereby broadening
the capabilities base of ship design and construction available
to the Navy. The change to smaller, lower unit cost ships would
also open up overseas markets. With more shipyards able to
build the ships and potential for a broader overall market, the
U.S. shipbuilding industry would have the chance to expand its
competence, innovation and relevance. Taken together this would
sharpen the industry's ability to compete and provide
alternatives to a ship procurement system that is beset by laws
and regulations that frustrate, even pervert, market
forces.\56\
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\56\ OFT report, p. 76.
The report's concluding section lists five ``dangers'' that ``risk
the Navy's `losing the way.' '' One of these, the report states, is
``Shielding the shipbuilding industrial base from global competition,''
which the report states ``guarantees high cost, limited innovation, and
long cycle times for building ships.'' \57\
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\57\ OFT report, p. 80.
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CSBA Report. The CSBA report similarly raises significant potential
issues for the six shipyards that have built the Navy's major warships
in recent years. The report states that ``Rationalizing the defense
industrial base is . . . a critical part of the Department of the
Navy's (DON) maritime competition strategy, and should be the subject
of immediate consideration and deliberation by Congress, DOD, and the
DON.'' \58\ The report states:
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\58\ CSBA report, slide 314.
Numerous studies have indicated that the six Tier I yards
[i.e., the six yards that have built the Navy's major warships
in recent years] have ``exorbitant excess capacities,'' which
contribute to the rising costs of [Navy] warships, primarily
because of high industrial overhead costs. These capacities are
the result of ``cabotage laws and fluctuating national security
acquisition policies that force shipbuilders of combatants to
retain capacities to address required surges in coming years.''
This last point is especially important: the DON contributes
greatly to the problem of ``exorbitant capacities'' by its
consistent tendency to portray overly optimistic ramp ups in
ship production in budget ``out years.'' \59\
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\59\ CSBA report, slide 315.
The report recommends the following as part of its overall
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transition strategy:
Minimize production costs for more expensive warships
(defined in the report as ships costing more than $1.4 billion
each) by consolidating production of each kind of such ship in
a single shipyard, pursuing learning curve efficiencies, and
requesting use of multiyear procurement (MYP) whenever
possible.
Minimize production costs for warships and auxiliaries
costing less than $1.4 billion each by emphasizing competition,
shifting production to smaller ``Tier II'' yards, using large
production runs, and enforcing ruthless cost control.\60\
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\60\ CSBA report, slide 316. Other steps recommended as part of the
report's overall transition strategy (see 60 slides 124 and 125)
include the following:
Plan to a fiscally prudent steady-state shipbuilding
budget of $10 billion per year.
Maximize current capabilities and minimize nonrecurring
engineering costs for new platforms by maintaining and pursuing hulls
in service, in production or near production that can meet near- to
mid-term global war on terrorism requirements and that are capable of
operating in defended-access scenarios against nuclear-armed regional
adversaries.
Identify and retain or build large numbers of common hulls
that have a large amount of internal reconfigurable volume, or that can
carry a variety of modular payloads, or that can be easily modified or
adapted over time to new missions.
Pursue increased integration of Navy and Marine
warfighting capabilities and emphasize common systems to increase
operational effectiveness and reduce operation and support (O&S) costs.
Focus research and development efforts on meeting future
disruptive maritime challenges, particularly anti-access/area-denial
networks composed of long-range systems and possibly weapons of mass
destruction.
The report states that ``the strategy developed in this report
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
suggests that [Navy] planners might wish to:''
maintain production of aircraft carriers at NGNN,
consolidate production of large surface combatants and
amphibious ships at NG/Ingalls, and
consolidate submarine building GD/EB, or with a new,
single submarine production company.\61\
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\61\ CSBA report, slides 317-318.
The report states that the second of these possibilities is guided
by the building sequence of LPD-17s and SCXs recommended in the report,
NG/Ingalls' ability to build a wider variety of ships than GD/BIW, NG/
Ingalls' surge capacity, and the availability of space for expanding
NG/Ingalls if needed.\62\
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\62\ CSBA report, slide 318.
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The report states that the third of these possibilities is guided
by the low probability that procurement of Virginia-class submarines
will increase to two per year, the cost savings associated with
consolidating submarine production at one yard, GD/EB's past experience
in building SSBNs and SSNs, GD/EB's surge capacity, and the fact that
building submarines at GD/EB would maintain two shipyards (GD/EB and
NGNN) capable of designing and building nuclear-powered combatants of
some kind.\63\
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\63\ CSBA report, slide 318. See also slide 298.
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The report acknowledges that yard consolidation would reduce the
possibilities for using competition in shipbuilding in the near term
and increase risks associated with an attack on the shipbuilding
infrastructure, but notes that DOD consolidated construction of
nuclear-powered carriers in a single yard years ago, and argues that
competition might be possible in the longer run if future aircraft-
carrying ships, the SCX, and the new undersea superiority system could
be built in Tier II yards.\64\
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\64\ CSBA report, slides 318-319.
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The report states:
Given their current small yearly build numbers, consolidating
construction of aircraft carriers, surface combatants, and
submarines in one yard [for each type] makes sense. However,
the same logic does not hold true for auxiliaries and smaller
combatants. These ships can normally be built at a variety of
Tier I and Tier II yards; competition can thus be maintained in
a reasonable and cost-effective way. For example, competing
auxiliaries and sea lift and maneuver sea base ships between
NASSCO, Avondale, and Tier II yards may help to keep the costs
of these ships down.
Building multiple classes of a single ship [type] is another
prudent way to enforce costs, since the DON can divert
production of any ship class that exceeds its cost target to
another company/class that does not. Simultaneously building
both the [Lockheed] and [General Dynamics] versions of [the]
LCS, and the Northrop Grumman National Security Cutter, Medium
[i.e., the medium-sized Deepwater cutter] gives the DON
enduring capability to shift production to whatever ship stays
within its cost target. . . .
Of course, Congress and the DON may elect to retain
industrial capacity, and to pay the additional ``insurance
premium'' associated with having excess shipbuilding capacity.
For example: Congress and the DON might wish to retain two
submarine yards until the [undersea superiority system] design
is clear, and wait to rationalize the submarine building base
after potential [undersea superiority system] yearly production
rates are clear. . . .
In a similar vein, Congress and the DON might wish to retain
two surface combatant yards until the design of the SCX is
clear, and wait to rationalize the surface combatant building
base after potential SCX yearly production rates are clear. In
this regard, Congress could consider authorizing a modest
additional number of [Aegis destroyers] to keep both BIW and
Ingalls ``hot'' until the SCX is designed. . . .
The key point is that the U.S. shipbuilding infrastructure
must be rationally sized for expected future austere
shipbuilding budgets, and whatever fiscally prudent [Navy]
transition plan is finally developed by DON planners.\65\
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\65\ CSBA report, slide 319.
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summary
In summary, the following can be said about the three reports:
The CNA report presents a fairly traditional approach
to naval force planning in which capability requirements for
warfighting and for maintaining day-to-day naval forward
deployments are calculated and then integrated. The CNA-
recommended force parallels fairly closely current Navy
thinking on the size and composition of the fleet. This is
perhaps not surprising, given that much of CNA's analytical
work is done at the Navy's request.
The OFT report fundamentally challenges current Navy
thinking on the size and composition of the fleet, and presents
an essentially clean-sheet proposal for a future Navy that
would be radically different from the currently planned fleet.
This is perhaps not surprising, given both OFT's institutional
role within DOD as a leading promoter of military
transformation and retired admiral Cebrowski's views on
network-centric warfare and distributed force architectures.
The CSBA report challenges current Navy thinking on
the size and composition of the fleet more dramatically than
the CNA report, and less dramatically than the OFT report.
Compared to the CNA and OFT reports, the CSBA report contains a
more detailed implementation plan and a more detailed
discussion of possibilities for restructuring the shipbuilding
industrial base.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss these issues. I will be pleased to respond to any
questions you might have.
Senator Talent. Thank you.
Mr. Toner and Dr. Dur, let me get this off just asking you
a question. I am going to reference the GAO report about how
improved management practices could help minimize cost growth.
They examined eight shipbuilding programs. They attributed the
overruns to labor hour increases, material price increases--
those two together were 78 percent of the overruns. Do you
think the report accurately calculated labor hour increases? If
so, what factors do you think drive those increases?
Mr. Toner. Well, if I could talk primarily about the
submarine.
Senator Talent. Sure.
Mr. Toner. Mr. O'Rourke brought it forth and I did also--
the issue in the submarine community really goes to how much
labor can you really take out of the program. I know Admiral
Clark is fond of showing the 637 class submarine and the 774
submarine and the tremendous growth. We are expensive and there
is a cost associated with the capability that we provide. But
you have to go dig in a little bit below that because the
changes are very subtle.
If you look at the percentage of man-hours relative to
labor compared to a 637-class ship, which was built in 1967,
which I happened to work on, unfortunately I guess, and the
774, which I also went to sea on, 36 percent--it is about 16
percent less man-hours as a percentage of the whole for labor
on the 774 submarine.
The material portion of the----
Senator Talent. Percentage of the whole cost?
Mr. Toner. Total cost, the mix. It went from close to a 43-
57 into a two-third, one third. So the cost is now wrapped
around a thing called material. What really happened then, in
1991, 1992, with the rescission of the Seawolf the submarine
industrial base collapsed. People had been making plans for a
30-ship fleet. It disappeared. At that time we had something
like on the order of 11,000 suppliers. It shrunk to 4,500
suppliers, 83 percent who are sole source. That phenomenon,
that ability to have that impact on the material cost, drove
the cost significantly.
So how much labor can you take out of a process? We could
probably be on the order of $1 million to $200 million over a
period of time through learning as you build more and more
ships. The real question is what happens to the industrial
base, the material suppliers for your equipment and components
to go on the ship. It has changed dramatically, and it changed
as a result of that decision in 1992.
I feel very strongly that we are at the same decision point
in DD(X). If we have the same type of environment, and it
collapses, the industrial base is going to respond to it and
the number of vendors that we have is going to collapse and our
price is going to go up.
Dr. Dur. May I take a crack at the same question?
Senator Talent. Yes.
Dr. Dur. I will tell you that, let us take a ship with
which I am very familiar, the LPD-17. In the escalation of the
labor portion of that ship, we began construction of the ship
with the design not stable and therefore we were not able to
outfit the unit assemblies to the degree that we wanted to. We
had to begin building the ships before it was outfitted and
every shipbuilder knows that when you outfit at the erection
site or when the ship is in the water you pay a huge premium,
and the time to outfit is when you are building the blocks or
the unit assemblies. We were not able to do that to the degree
we wanted to on that ship and we incurred significant growth as
a result.
Second, sir, the estimates based on----
Senator Talent. Can I jump in just so I understand what you
are saying? Do you mind?
Dr. Dur. Sure.
Senator Talent. Do not forget your second point.
Is it okay with you?
Senator Collins. Yes.
Senator Talent. To emphasize something that I notice when I
visit shipyards. In other kinds of manufacturing--I understand
where the Navy is coming from maybe in not fixing design,
because with technology changing the way it is they want to be
able to take advantage during the design and production process
of changes in technology. If you fix it too much at the
beginning, then you are frozen into technology or the idea is
you may be frozen into technology that may be outmoded by the
time you finish building the ship.
But what I understand you to be saying is that we are
dealing with a product that is so big and so unwieldy that if
you try and design it in the shipyard after you have set it up,
any change generates such extra expenses. Is that basically
what you are saying?
Dr. Dur. Absolutely. What I was saying is that----
Senator Talent. If I had let you make your second point,
you might have covered that.
Dr. Dur. We were anxious to begin building the ship. The
ship was delayed. The ship was delayed for a variety of reasons
which I will not bore you with here, all of them before I came
on the scene. But the ship was delayed, so there was a lot of
anxiety to begin production of the ship. The design was not yet
complete.
So we began building what we had designed, and subsequently
then we had to insert a lot of pipe details, a lot of other
bulkhead structures and the like, that were not available at
the time we began construction. That was an exigency of the
delay in that whole program, but it did result in significant
labor growth.
But the biggest and most important reason, Mr. Chairman, is
that the estimates for how much vessel labor it would take to
build the ship were developed from a contract design generated
by the Navy. That contract design did not have enough detail to
allow us to realistically estimate the cost.
Let me give you an example. When you estimate the cost of a
ship, in the past we have used traditional benchmarks: dollars
per ton of steel, dollars per linear foot of weld, dollars per
feet of cable pulled and connected. When you are dealing with a
ship that is the first ship in the surface Navy to have fiber
optics, for example, to move data around and therefore has to
share cableways with electrical cabling, never having done
that, we ran into huge cost excursions.
Titanium pipe in lieu of the traditional copper-nickel
piping for seawater systems. Blast-proof bulkheads, never
before put on an amphibious ship. Stealth considerations and
fairness of steel, never before an issue in amphibious warfare
ship construction.
One man ballasts and deballasts this 24,000 ton ship from a
single station. The amount of hydraulic, pneumatic piping,
control circuits to make that possible are enormous--all of
them missed in the original cost estimation of the ship and the
vessel labor required to build it.
So no wonder when you rack up the vessel labor on the lead
ship of a class with this kind of sophistication, never built
before in this class of ship, and you compare it to cost
estimates for vessel labor based on old thumb rules and
benchmarks, you end up with huge differences in cost.
We know what they cost now. We are coming down a very good
learning curve. We have five of these ships under construction
and I guarantee you that the committee will be impressed with
what learning yields when you have a steady, stable production
rate of the same class of ship.
Senator Talent. Do you want to comment on that, Mr.
O'Rourke? Then I will defer to Senator Collins.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just one thing, to get back to your question
earlier about the apparent tension between the idea of wanting
to leave spaces in the ship undesigned so as to adapt to new
rapidly changing technologies and the need to outfit sections
of the ship as much as you can before you try and hook the
ships----
Senator Talent. You put it a lot better than I did, thank
you.
Mr. O'Rourke. I think the tension has to do with what parts
of the ship you are looking at. There are some structures in
the ship that you would like to know how to build so that you
can outfit the sections while they are still in the factory,
before you hook them up and put them in the water. That I think
is what Dr. Dur was referring to, that he did not have those
sections designed to a level of detail that he would have
preferred to permit that kind of outfitting and then they had
to take these sections and put them in the water before they
put in these basic structures.
What you were referring to is the idea of having spaces in
the ship that are flexible interfaces, if you will, that will
adapt to rapidly changing technologies that may be installed on
the ship over its life cycle. I do think the Navy wants to
incorporate that more and more into its ship designs, and I
think the ship designers support that because it will allow
these ships to be finally equipped with the most up to date
technology at the point when they enter service and also allow
them to be updated more easily over their life cycle.
But the requirement for that is to have a standard defined
space in the ship with known power outlets and so on, these
standard interfaces, so that the designers of the rapidly
changing technology, the electronics and so on that go aboard
the ship, can know that in advance and work with it. There
really is no contradiction between the two. Dr. Dur was
referring to the fact that the more basic structures on the
ship had not been designed in detail.
Senator Talent. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by thanking all three of our witnesses for
truly excellent statements that are very helpful to the
subcommittee.
I truly believe that the winner take all, or what I call
the one shipyard acquisition strategy, would be disastrous for
our national security. If our Nation needed to surge its
shipbuilding capability, it could not do so overnight.
Mr. Toner, your testimony makes that point very well when
you are talking about Bath Iron Works (BIW) and the skilled
crafts people who are producing very sophisticated, complex
ships. You point out that, ``each skilled shipyard mechanic
requires approximately 5 years to gain full proficiency at a
training cost of $50,000. Similarly, each engineer and designer
requires an investment of 3 years and 60 to $90,000.''
I notice that Dr. Dur is also nodding in agreement about
the investment that is made to get that skilled workforce. That
is why the strategy which the Navy is proposing, which would
jeopardize that skilled industrial base, causes me such
concern.
I would like to ask all three of you to comment on a
question related to this, and that is, if we needed to surge
our shipbuilding capacity would it not be--and we were down to
only one yard or, frankly, if we needed to get our shipbuilding
just to the level that we know from Admiral Clark's testimony
it should be at today--would it not be extremely expensive and
take years to actually reconstitute a shipyard that had been
closed? Would it even be possible to reestablish a shipyard
that had been closed?
Mr. Toner?
Mr. Toner. I can take a crack at that. I think if you look
at our friends in England and their Astute submarine program,
they are trying to reconstitute their submarine capacity in
England, essentially going down to one shipyard. They are
struggling mightily with that. The design capability just does
not exist and in fact they came to, through the Navy, came to
us, Electric Boat, to ask to support them in conducting the
design.
When you go look at the ship--and I have walked the ship
there a couple times--you can see that they want to do the
right things, but they have not gotten all the experience. You
make decisions that are really ingrained in your learning over
40 years of building ships, that if it is gone you do not
really replace it. You have to learn all those things over
again, and all those lessons learned were learned at extreme
expense, both personal and financial for the companies making
those investments. No company today based on the return that
you would get would start down that path once again.
So I firmly believe once a major naval shipyard closes, it
is done. It is not going to come back. More importantly, of
course, are the people. The yard is just bricks and mortar and
what-not. But the people that go every day to that yard, they
are going to go do something else because they are good people;
they are capable people; and they are going to be gone. There
just is not enough time and hours in the day to get it back.
Senator Collins. In fact, at both BIW and Ingalls you see
generations of families working at the shipyards, who have
developed enormous skills that would be lost.
Dr. Dur. I was just going to add, in our case we have
partnerships with Gulf Coast Community College where many of
our basic shipbuilding skills--electrical workers, pipefitters,
pipe welders, machinists--all matriculate in a very, very
sophisticated environment in the Gulf Coast Community College
system, as well as the apprentice programs we have in high
schools for people to learn how to work composites and
polymers.
These are new things that are initiatives that have been
taken by the State and the community. Take the shipyard away
and there is no substitute to regenerate the interest in crafts
and skills.
We may be one of the last vestiges of America's
manufacturing base, and you lose this and regenerating it would
be, in my estimation, very near impossible.
Senator Collins. Mr. O'Rourke?
Mr. O'Rourke. I agree that it would take a lot of time and
money to reconstitute a second yard capable of building complex
surface combatants. To begin with, if you close a yard and sell
off the waterfront property, you cannot reconstitute it at that
site at all. That is a one-time decision. If it gets turned
into condos you are not going back from that decision.
Assuming you have the waterfront property, it then depends
on what is already there at the point in time when you decide
to reconstitute. If you are starting with a bare patch of sand,
it can take several years and possibly hundreds of millions of
dollars in capital investment, and that is just for the
production plant. That does not get to the issue of forming the
workforce and also the management team to supervise that yard.
If it is in fact a yard that is already up and running to
some degree, then the time and cost could be less, but still
substantial.
You asked earlier about the ability to surge. I think your
ability to surge to higher rates of production if needed is
made easier if you have two yards because you have two
different labor markets that you would have available to you on
a regional basis to tap into to make new hires, and also
because you would have two management teams available to
oversee the increased production. Either of the two current
yards could surge to higher rates of production, but together
they can do it with less stress individually on each of them.
If I could return to a question you had earlier when the
CNO was here, you asked what he thought the value was of having
competition in the design of the DD(X). I believe that it was
valuable in spurring innovation in the DD(X) design. As a
general principle, as an analyst, my view is that competition
in design does have value in helping to generate new ideas
sooner, or more of those ideas. I am not sure that the DD(X)
today would have had as many good ideas incorporated into it
had it not been designed in a competitive environment.
Senator Collins. Thank you. You actually anticipated my
next question to you, so thank you for answering it.
Mr. Chairman, I know the hour is very late. I just want to
make one final comment, and it follows up on a question that
you raised with our witnesses about the cost growth, the
spiraling cost growth, that the CNO cited in his testimony. I
think when we look at the cost growth we have to understand the
major causes of that spiraling cost, that escalating cost that
the CNO finds so disturbing, are low procurement rates,
increased capabilities of the ships that we are building,
instability and a lack of predictability in the budgeting that
makes it more difficult for the shipbuilders to plan, and also
a push to get as much advanced cutting edge technology built
into these ships as quickly as possible.
So it really is a disservice if we ignore those very
important factors when we analyze the cost growth. I wanted to
put that on the record because I do not want the impression to
be left that this cost growth is due somehow to mismanagement
of costs by the shipbuilders or unreasonable labor rates or
some other factor. In fact, if we had more stability, more
predictable buying of our ships, that cost growth would not be
as enormous, and it is because we keep wanting ships, as well
we should, with more capabilities, with the best, newest
technology. Those two are factors that drive up the costs.
But it is a tradeoff. It costs more to have that new
technology. So I appreciate your bringing up that issue,
witnesses, as well. Thank you.
Senator Talent. Well, I just say I thank the Senator. Her
time at this hearing shows her commitment to shipbuilding and
naval capabilities, and she and I obviously talk a lot about
this on a personal level.
I wanted them to answer the question. The CNO had just
said--there is clearly disagreement here because he said that
the cost growth is not explainable just by greater combat
capability, propulsion power, computing technology, et cetera.
I certainly agree that with the instability in funding and the
general--it is unstable and it is also too low. Let us just say
that it is not that it is just unstable. If it was unstable at
a level that was adequate--I mean, if it was unstable in the
sense that it was going from 16 to 13, you guys probably would
not be complaining as much.
It is impossible for us to determine really what exactly is
causing it. It is impossible for us to do a reasonable and fair
oversight of what you are doing when we have costs,
expenditures, pingponging around all over the place and at a
level that we all have a sense is too low, because you have
these enormous pressures on you because of unstable funding and
funding that is too low, and the phenomena you are referring to
we all agree are reasonable concerns.
So again, unless we get to a stable and adequate funding
level we are not able to determine how much we should be
pressuring you guys to do more than you are doing in terms of
progress in this area.
Please, Dr. Dur.
Dr. Dur. If I could just comment on the point you are
making, Mr. Chairman. I would agree with you fundamentally.
When you compare the cost of ship production at a stable
production rate with gaps between starts of fabrication that
protect learning ship to ship, you end up with one set of
costs. When you buy ships episodically, you gap years. You
reduce production rate. You lose learning. You use green labor.
The cost per ship goes up dramatically.
But I will tell you, I have not seen the analysis behind
the numbers cited by the CNO in his testimony for the growth,
cost growth in the ship types. But I did look at one in detail,
because we were building destroyers in the 1960s and we are
building destroyers today. Our estimates show that for the
shipbuilding portion of it the cost growth is more on the order
of 9 percent rather than the 23 percent cited.
Most of the growth is in the government-furnished
equipment, which is really not the responsibility of the
shipbuilder. That is provided to us by the government at their
cost.
Senator Talent. Well, and we are all in agreement, you
three and CNO are in agreement, that major issues are stability
in funding--I am reading from your list, Mr. Toner--stability
in funding, the need for flexible funding strategies, the
problem of low-rate production, and then the overall low
funding levels. So we are all in agreement that those are the
problems, and if we eliminated those problems then we would be
in a position to determine whether we were not--whether we
needed more from you in terms of efficiency than you were able
to give us.
Then we are in a position to say--and I know something
about tactical aircraft production for the military. Much
easier in overseeing that, to be able to say to the contractor:
Look, you are not on budget; you are behind time; and the fault
is yours, because you do not have these issues. Even if you do
not buy as many as you think you are going to buy, you are
still buying several hundred of these aircraft.
Senator Lieberman, are you ready or do you need me to
filibuster on your behalf a little longer?
Senator Lieberman. I am glad you did not go to the nuclear
option.
Senator Talent. Constitutional option, you mean.
Senator Lieberman. Right. [Laughter.]
Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I am late. I
had a previous conflict. I was at the closed session with
Admiral Clark and then I had to go to a meeting. But knowing
that would be the case, I actually did read the----
Senator Talent. Would you yield for 2 seconds so I do not
forget something?
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Senator Talent. Evidently it is necessary housekeeping. I
may forget it. Senator Kennedy was also at the closed session,
and may be still trying to get here, but in the event he is not
able to make it he asks that his written statement be made part
of the record, and of course, without objection, we will do
that.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today. I want to
join you in welcoming our witnesses here today. I particularly want to
express my personal gratitude and that of the members of the committee
to Admiral Clark for the wonderful performance of the men and women of
the Armed Forces during the past year.
First, Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on your second
session serving as chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee. I
specifically want to compliment you on your leadership of the
subcommittee and say that I look forward to continuing to work with you
in the same bipartisan fashion that has been a significant aspect of
your chairmanship.
The subcommittee meets this afternoon to discuss Navy shipbuilding
and the status of the shipbuilding industrial base.
Just about every year, we are presented with long-term shipbuilding
plans that show how much better things will be if we can only hold on
until the last years of the Future Years Defense Program. This year, we
see major reductions in the plan, including the prospects for building
more than one attack submarine or more than one DD(X) per year. In
particular, the Navy has indicated a desire to conduct a winner-take-
all competition for the DD(X) program. This raises substantial concerns
about what effect this would have on the shipbuilding industrial base,
not only for building DD(X) vessels, but also for building CG(X)
cruisers or other major surface combatants in the future.
I believe that the world we face will continue to be one of
uncertainty and unrest. Decisions we make this year will have a direct
effect on the forces and capabilities that future combatant commanders
will use to protect our interests. We all know that our men and women
in the Armed Forces will have responded admirably in any crisis, just
as they have been doing to support the operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq. It is our obligation to provide them with the tools they need to
ensure that they are not exposed to extraordinary risk that could have
been prevented. Over the long-term, we cannot count on continual heroic
performance from our sailors and marines to make up for inadequate or
inappropriate investment.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for convening this hearing today.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
But I actually did read the testimony that you submitted,
and I think probably the point made about the importance of the
stability of funding has been gone over in some detail. My own
sense of where we are now, having followed our shipbuilding
programs for some number of years here, is of course there are
never enough resources, but we are in a really resource-
stressed time.
I suppose for some people it would be hard to accept that
because obviously we are spending a lot of money every year on
the Pentagon budget. On the other hand, we are dealing both
with the current threat of the war on Islamic terrorism or the
war of Islamic terrorism against us, and we have a
responsibility to provide for the common defense on into the
future, when we may face other competitors who may be much more
peer competitors fighting modern but more conventional, if I
can put it that way, certainly non-terrorist warfare.
We do not want to make anybody into an enemy. We want to
make everybody into our friend if we can. But there are
countries whose investments in military and particularly in
shipbuilding are worth noting, and China is the most
significant of those. I worry about whether we are investing
enough to maintain our important presence as a balance of power
in the Asian Pacific region.
But to get to the specifics of it, I would say, Mr.
O'Rourke--and now I am going to go and be a little more
parochial in terms of Electric Boat in Connecticut--that as I
read your testimony prepared there was some good news,
relatively speaking, which is that you said that if we keep the
submarine procurement at one per year, which is one less than
we hope for and think we need, but that employment levels will
remain fairly steady at both Electric Boat and at Newport News,
but that may not be so, probably will not be so, for designers
and design capability.
I apologize if you have talked about this, but this does
concern me greatly because I gather you have talked about how
hard it would be to reopen a shipyard once closed. I wonder how
hard it would be to reconstitute this extraordinarily
specialized design capability once lost. That is the question I
wanted to ask any of you to respond to.
Mr. Toner. Well, Senator, I will give a crack at it. Again,
we had talked about it a little bit earlier. If I repeat myself
I apologize. Basically, the design capability for a nuclear
submarine is really a unique capability and once lost it is
extremely difficult to reconstitute. That has been demonstrated
with our friends in England and the Astute program. They
basically struggled mightily with that program, such that we
had to go over with the Navy's guidance to assist them in
completing the design of their next submarine.
In our process, we are in the position for the first time
in 40 years not to have a submarine design on the board.
Senator Lieberman. Exactly. That is the number that jumped
from your testimony.
Mr. Toner. That is a major concern of mine. It is a major
concern of the Nation.
Additionally, when you look at the CNO's testimony, in
figure 7 he talks about an SSBN starting, getting to sea
somewhere around 2020, which seems to make sense. If you
remember, Ohio delivered in 1981 and 40 years crudely,
approximately, is around 2020, and that ship needs to be
replaced.
If that is true, since basically it is 12 years from the
start of design to delivery, given the complex nature of a
nuclear submarine, that would say we would have to start the
design in 2008. If you look at the existing FYDP today, there
is no money for a design in 2008, although there is $600
million available for undersea superiority. If undersea
superiority is not defined as a nuclear submarine, I really do
not know what is.
So I think that has to be looked at and those moneys need
to be moved in a fashion that would allow us to preserve the
design capability and be prepared to design that ship when the
time comes.
Senator Lieberman. I agree with that, of course. But I do
want to express a word of caution, that in some of my own
conversations with folks within the Navy I am not so sure that
they see that $600 million, which is in the budget over the
FYDP for undersea superiority, as being exclusively for
submarines.
Mr. Toner. I know they do not, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You agree with that?
Mr. Toner. I have heard the same thing. I find it hard to
believe, but I have heard the same thing.
Senator Lieberman. I think the notion is that there may be
some other systems to complement submarines that could be
designed or developed or researched with that money. That is a
judgment that this subcommittee and full committee is going to
have to make, and Congress will.
Dr. Dur, do you have anything you would like to add to this
question of design capability?
Dr. Dur. Design capability is a critical element in the
industrial base that I represent, conventionally powered
surface combatants and expeditionary warfare ships. Indeed, the
amount of designer and engineer talent that I retain in the
shipyard is very much a function of the pace of design. When
people speak of year delays in this program or that, that
translates into hundreds of jobs in the designer and the
engineer category.
While I have been relatively successful in getting the
people that I need to design the ships that I have under
contract, I worry always that the day may come when I do not
have the people available to me locally to do what it is I have
to do by way of design. It is a critical problem.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke, how seriously do you see the problem if this
capacity to design atrophies? How long would it take to
reconstitute the capability at the level it now exists?
Mr. O'Rourke. I agree that there are grounds for being
quite concerned about how this situation may develop if a new
submarine design project is not put into place. I think the
experience in the U.K. with the Astute class that has been
referred to is potentially very instructive. If we allow that
design base to atrophy, it could take a lot of time and cost to
reconstitute. That is time and cost that would be built into
whatever the next submarine design project is.
I started my analysis originally from a force structure
point of view, and we have been getting submarines at such a
low rate for so many years that we will now need to get two
submarines per year starting in fiscal year 2012 or fiscal year
2013 and sustain that rate for about a dozen years just to
avoid dropping below 40. That is the position we have now
gotten into.
Senator Lieberman. With apologies, I want to ask you to
repeat that because I do not know that people understand that.
Mr. O'Rourke. We have been procuring submarines over the
last 15 years or so at an average rate of less than one boat
per year. As a consequence of that, we will now need to build
submarines at a rate of two per year starting in fiscal year
2012 or fiscal year 2013 and sustaining that rate for about a
dozen years, just to avoid dropping below 40.
Senator Lieberman. Right, and the low number in the various
projections is 41, right, for attack subs?
Mr. O'Rourke. That is right.
Senator Lieberman. We are now at 58?
Mr. O'Rourke. I think we are at 53, 54, at the moment.
If you wanted to go to something significantly higher than
41 or 45 boats, then you are talking about building more than 2
boats per year. But you need two boats per year just to avoid
dropping below 40.
Now, the reduction of the Virginia class to one boat per
year in the FYDP frankly is a signal that Virginia-class
procurement may never be more than one per year. If you think
there is any truth to that, then you need to begin looking
immediately at a way of getting to two attack submarines per
year starting a few years from now. If the Virginia class is
too expensive for that, then the alternative is to look for a
less expensive submarine.
Now, we happen to be in the potentially happy situation of
having some new technologies at hand that were not available
when the Virginia class was designed, that could allow industry
and the Navy to design a submarine that is substantially less
expensive than the Virginia class and yet still be equivalent
to the Virginia class in capability. If you were to begin the
design of that submarine today and pursue that project in a
concerted manner, then the lead boat might be ready for
procurement in fiscal year 2011.
That could allow you to increase the procurement rate of
that less expensive boat to two per year starting in fiscal
year 2012 or fiscal year 2013. So I started my analysis from a
force structure perspective and it led me to examine that
option. But it also has the happy coincidence of providing a
submarine design project for the design and engineering base,
which otherwise is looking at nothing to do and at the prospect
of atrophying over the next several years. So it could in a
sense take care of two problems at the same time. It could
position the acquisition situation to go to two per year more
easily within available resources and it also provides a way of
sustaining the submarine design and engineering base. Once they
complete that design they could roll over into the design of
the SSBN that was mentioned a few minutes ago, and when they
complete that SSBN they can go back and do a downstream
generation attack submarine. Through that sequence of three
designs, you have a strategy for keeping the submarine design
and engineering base going for 15 or so more years into the
future.
Senator Lieberman. Very interesting proposal.
When you speak of new technologies, are you thinking of the
air-independent propulsion?
Mr. O'Rourke. In the case of the less expensive nuclear
powered submarine, I am talking about the so-called Tango Bravo
technologies.
Senator Lieberman. You are thinking about a less expensive
nuclear submarine, I got you.
Mr. O'Rourke. That is right. In fact, I think it is, from a
capability point of view, it is important to realize the
differences between an air independent propulsion (AIP)
submarine and a nuclear-powered submarine, and also to note
that with the Tango Bravo technologies we are in a situation, I
have been given to understand, where we can have a submarine as
capable as the Virginia class, but at some lower cost.
It is not often in the ship design business that you can be
in a situation of having your cake and eating it too, but we
may just be in that situation right now with submarine design.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, you have been very
generous and gracious with the time.
My final question is just to ask Dr. Dur and Mr. Toner if
they would respond to Mr. O'Rourke's point. It was going to be
my last question, which is rising naturally out of the facts
that we see and the pressure on resources and the concern about
the cost of the Virginia-class attack submarines. The question
is, is this an alternative way to go? I think one of the
concerns the Navy has is that we are unable to match potential
peer competitors one for one because they are turning out
obviously less able submarines, but much less expensive as
well. Is there a point at which we should be trying to
maximize, just as was said, have the continuing one a year of
the Virginia class or something like it at that level of
superiority, and then something less expensive that is also
nuclear?
Mr. Toner. Well, I think what Mr. O'Rourke has said has a
lot of merit to it. The technologies that he is talking about
on the Tango Bravo are really technologies that focus on the
ability to build the ship in an easier fashion. For example,
the external weapons mod would do away with the torpedo room, a
very complex portion of the ship to build, very labor
intensive, very costly. An integrated power supply such that we
are propelling the ship with external motors, does away with
the so-called tyranny of the shaft and all it brings.
So it is possible to go build a smaller ship and perhaps it
would be a little bit cheaper. But again, you have to also
consider there is something good about volume. This concept and
the designs that would do away with these various portions of
the ship allow us to have significant more volume to put a lot
of different things in.
As far as the cost goes, cost is not really dollars per ton
on a submarine. It is how much goes inside the sausage, if you
will. That is where the rubber meets the road.
Senator Lieberman. Obviously we are not going to get into
specific cost estimates, but under the kind of scenario we are
talking about under the Tango Bravo program as an example,
would there be significant savings in comparison to the
Virginia-class subs?
Mr. Toner. It would depend, I think, from my opinion--and
for the record, we can probably provide you a white paper with
those type numbers on it.
Senator Lieberman. Please do that. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Toner. But what I would be concerned about is as you
start to build this, the learning curve is going to come down
on the Virginia-class submarine. Right now both the two ships,
the 774 and 775, are lead ships and they are being produced. As
we start to come down that curve--and we are going to come down
it because there are two very capable shipyards building it--
the price of Virginia is going to come down.
The question will be with regard to the startup of this new
ship, where is that going to cross and is it really going to be
cheaper. Intuitively, you say yes, I think we can get there.
But is it a big number or a little number? I would not
necessarily put all my eggs in that basket to say, I am going
to build a cheaper submarine.
Virginia started out on that same path, and if you look at
the fragility of the vendor base that supplies the material for
these ships, we have significant issues with it. So it could
be, yes, it could be. Is it significant or not? I am not really
sure. But we will put together a white paper to show you that
for the record if I could.
Senator Lieberman. Please do. I appreciate that. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Joint Undersea Superiority
Background: OSD Program Budget Decision 753 directed the Navy to
reduce the Virginia-class submarine procurement rate to one ship per
year through 2011. It also requested an additional $600 million across
the FYDP, $50 million of which is in the fiscal year 2006 President's
budget to design a future undersea superiority system. Although the
undersea superiority system capabilities that will be developed are
still under evaluation, nuclear powered submarines will play a key
role. Concurrently, the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency--in
conjunction with the Navy--is funding the Tango Bravo (Technology
Barriers) program to develop technologies that can break some
traditional design paradigms that drive the cost and construction
schedule of present submarines.
Discussion: The Virginia-class submarines can provide the necessary
stealth, endurance, agility, and firepower to effectively contribute to
joint undersea superiority. Since repeated studies show that combatant
commanders require attack submarines in numbers that can only be
supported by building at least two ships per year, reducing Virginia
acquisition cost through spiral development to allow higher procurement
rates should be a central focus of the joint undersea superiority
study. Virginia acquisition cost reduction is achievable through a
multifaceted approach that as a minimum should include:
Leveraging the class learning curve to reduce the cost
of Block II ships to under $2 billion in current year dollars.
Contracts would be structured to ensure the government that
learning curve savings could be realized.
Funding efforts to redesign aspects of Virginia that
specifically enable a greater use of commercial off-the-shelf
equipment for both contractor and government furnished
equipment. This would counter the ongoing trend of sole source
providers and thus increasingly expensive component costs.
Funding research designed to optimize construction
methodologies including the development of larger modules with
increased outfitting and test to further reduce in-hull
construction man-hours.
The above actions are expected to reduce acquisition cost in the
Virginia class and future submarine designs and can be demonstrated in
the first ship (SSN784) of the Block III Virginia program in 2009. A
Virginia class redesign in selected areas can also incorporate Tango
Bravo technologies as they mature, providing valuable information and
key risk reduction for the design of future submarines (e.g.,
replacement SSBN). This approach brings Tango Bravo technology to sea
earlier and provides submarines with the interface capabilities they
will need to support the off-board elements of future joint undersea
superiority systems. Moreover, these efforts contribute to the
maintenance of the submarine design industrial base that is critical to
the Nation's defense.
Recommendation: Dedicate the $50 million in the fiscal year 2006
budget and the $600 million additional undersea superiority funding
across the FYDP to Virginia redesign efforts that would reduce
acquisition cost and accelerate the deployment of new technologies
needed to maintain joint undersea superiority.
Dr. Dur, do you want to add anything quickly?
Dr. Dur. Senator, I am not an expert on submarine
construction, so I think I will defer to my colleague who is.
Senator Lieberman. A very wise move.
Dr. Dur. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you all very much for excellent
testimony, very provocative, gives us a lot to think about and
hopefully to do something about as we deliberate on the DOD
authorization bill for next year.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for convening this
hearing.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Senator. Those comments I think
will serve as closing comments for the hearing. I want to thank
all three of you for coming and for your expertise.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
intelligence requirements
1. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, your ability to meet wartime
requirements with a smaller force depends on having intimate knowledge
of the intentions of potential enemies to make the Fleet Response Plan
successful. Otherwise, the enemy could fake mobilizations several times
to wear out our ability to respond. Then, after we have taken the fleet
home for necessary maintenance and crew rest, they could attack for
real. Since we have just seen how poorly the Intelligence Community
performed in assessing actual capabilities in Iraq, what gives you any
confidence that we will be able to rely on the Intelligence Community
for an unambiguous assessment of the enemies' intentions?
Admiral Clark. [Deleted.]
submarine force structure
2. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, the last thorough analysis we
have seen regarding attack submarine force structure requirements was
the one conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1999. It stated that,
in the near-term, the Navy needed to have 55 attack submarines, and
that in the middle of the next decade, we would need to have some 68 to
72 attack submarines in the fleet to meet our most pressing
requirements. The latest 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to
Congress in March showed that the long-term force structure goal for
attack submarines, including nuclear-powered cruise missile attack
submarines, would be only 41 to 45 boats. During the hearing, you
implied that other systems or capabilities would provide adequate
capability to substitute for some or all of the peacetime intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) needs being met by our submarine
force. Please provide more information on specifically what systems or
capabilities the Navy has identified, either within the Navy or within
other parts on the Government, that will fulfill these peacetime ISR
requirements of the combatant commanders.
Admiral Clark. [Deleted.]
industrial base study
3. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, we had asked Navy
representatives at previous hearings about the effect of buying smaller
numbers of surface combatants on the surface combatant industrial base.
Now the Navy is proposing to conduct a winner-take-all competition for
the first five ships of the DD(X) program. Previous Navy studies have
said that the two shipyards (Bath and Ingalls) needed the equivalent of
three DDG-51s per year plus additional work to remain viable. Has the
Navy conducted new analyses that says that the Navy's DD(X) acquisition
strategy will be enough to keep the surface combatant industrial base
viable?
Admiral Clark. The DD(X) program budget request for fiscal year
2006 and beyond has been reduced from a class of 24-32 ships to a class
of 8-12 ships. This results in a shipbuilding profile that has moved
from construction of up to three ships per years to construction of one
ship per year from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011. Both
Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics have the capacity to
independently design and construct the programmed class of DD(X) ships.
While I am not assigned responsibility for acquisition programs, I
believe an open competition for the DD(X) program would optimize our
acquisition execution. This is the best business case for maintaining a
financially healthy shipyard to construct DD(X) ships and provides the
most cost efficient method of procuring these destroyers for the Navy
and the taxpayers.
Due to congressional concerns about this competitive winner-take-
all acquisition strategy, other courses of action have been explored.
These potential strategies are being discussed with OSD and other key
stakeholders, but they do not represent the most cost efficient means
to acquire DD(X).
4. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, has the Navy come to a new
assessment about what surface combatant industrial base is necessary?
Admiral Clark. Our assessment is that Navy, Congress, and the
shipbuilding industry must work together to formulate a national
shipbuilding plan that addresses the industrial base issues. We
currently have a system of apportionment, rather than competition, and
excess capacity, both of which contribute to escalating costs. To
ensure we continue to act in the taxpayer's best interest, the
significant increases in shipbuilding costs must be reversed and ships
must be efficiently delivered to the Navy and the Nation. Shipbuilding
costs have significantly exceeded inflation and the current acquisition
policy constrains our ability to effectively manage shipbuilding
accounts. Navy, Congress, and industry must economically deliver--
through industrial improvements and acquisition policy reform--the
ships that the fleet requires to fight and win our country's wars in
the future.
dd(x) destroyer
5. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, the DD(X) destroyer is being
built largely to support shore fire support requirements. At various
times, we have heard that the Navy intended to buy as many as 31 ships
in this class. The latest 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to
Congress in March showed that the DD(X) class would ultimately consist
of only 8 to 12 ships. Have the Navy and Marine Corps done any analysis
which shows that either an 8- or a 12-ship class of DD(X) destroyers
would be sufficient to cover fire support requirements of the combatant
commanders to support Army and Marine Corps operations ashore?
Admiral Clark. Extensive analysis has been conducted on the class
size of the DD(X) destroyer. The submitted construction profile
reflects specific requirements finalized during the DD(X) detail design
as the ship approaches Milestone B and Critical Design Review. Building
on a body of analysis conducted since the 1990s, three separate options
for DD(X) were considered to meet USMC fire support requirements. The
smallest of these included a single 155MM Advanced Gun System and
required a class size of approximately 24 ships, while the larger 2
designs included 2 gun mounts and substantially larger gun magazines
resulting in a ship class of approximately 12 ships.
Recent Navy force structure analysis determined that a DD(X) class
size of 8-12 ships is adequate. This is sufficient to provide one DD(X)
per Expeditionary Strike Group in support of smaller scale distributed
operations. Analysis of projected Major Combat Operations using OSD
approved scenarios indicates that 8-12 DD(X) are also adequate to surge
sufficient ships to the theater to meet Naval Surface Fires Support
requirements in support of one or two Marine Expeditionary Brigade-size
amphibious assaults.
ambiguity of requirements
6. Senator Kennedy. Mr. Toner and Dr. Dur, Mr. O'Rourke's prepared
statement discusses the ambiguity of the Navy's shipbuilding plans. He
indicates that long-term requirements stated in a range of 260 to 325
ships do not go far enough in resolving the ambiguity faced by the
shipbuilders. Do you agree with Mr. O'Rourke's assessment, and if this
is not sufficient, how narrowly would the Department have to state
requirements to allow you sufficient insight for long-term planning?
Mr. Toner. I certainly agree with Mr. O'Rourke's assessment that
the March 2005 report does not present a 30-year shipbuilding plan,
that instead it presents a 30-year projection of potential Navy force
levels from which potential annual shipbuilding rates can be only
partially inferred. That said, I believe a 30-year shipbuilding plan
with a 25 percent variability range would be reasonably narrow enough
for planning purposes, but only if that range was held at the ship-type
level, and only if that plan would be reliable. The Navy's March 2005
report included force level ranges with variability of nearly 40 for
cruisers and destroyers and more than 40 percent for Maritime
Prepositioning Ships. These ``plans'' are not very useful to me even
though the report's total force level variability works out to 25. They
are certainly not very useful to me if the force level projections are
not supported by corresponding procurement plans that prove to be
stable.
I do understand the Navy cannot predict its requirements in 30
years with certainty. What's much more important to me is stability in
that planning. The March 2005 report includes an attack submarine force
level requirement with only 10 percent variability. But as I pointed
out in my prepared statement, the Virginia-class procurement plan has
changed 12 times in the last 10 years, and that is but one example of
instability. In the case of DD(X), the Navy has made five procurement
plan changes since the fiscal year 1998 budget, slipped the lead ship
authorization 4 years (to date), and revised the total force level
projection from 32 ships to what is now a range of 8-12. General
Dynamics made a significant capital investment in its Bath facility
based on the Navy's acquisition plans. Would we have made that
investment based on the current procurement plan? Or would we have made
that investment knowing the Navy might or might not conduct a winner-
take-all competition? Against the backdrop of these major combatant
programs, one can have little confidence in the Navy's plan for future
Maritime Prepositioning Ships. The March 2005 report includes force
level projections that vary 43 percent for these ship types. That
variability factor alone is unsettling enough. The predictability of
any underlying procurement plan then, by definition if not by history,
provides insufficient insight for long-term planning.
The first step must be to define a clear, predictable shipbuilding
plan. As Mr. O'Rourke observed, this has not yet been accomplished.
Dr. Dur. I generally agree with the contention that a range of some
65 ships does not provide industry sufficient insight for long term
planning for capital investments, work force and facilities sizing or
craft training. Ideally, the Navy, the Department of Defense, and
Congress would agree on an ``objective'' Navy force level which would
be reviewed at no less than a 5-year interval. The objective force
would specify ship class, number and general mission requirements. It
is important that the Navy's shipbuilding plan should be derived from
this agreed objective force structure. Congress should then commit to
supporting a ``capital investment plan'' consistent with that
commitment. This would treat ships as the substantial capital
investment that they are and permit companies that comprise all levels
of the shipbuilding industrial base to make informed decisions about
their own investments ultimately lowering the procurement cost of the
ships the Nation needs.
alternate submarine propulsion approaches
7. Senator Kennedy. Mr. O'Rourke, your prepared testimony mentions
that possibility that the Navy could perhaps buy a mix of nuclear
attack submarines and ones employing air-independent propulsion (AIP).
Since a number of European concerns have invested heavily in developing
this technology, it would appear that, if we chose to follow this
approach, we might be able to acquire such technology without spending
a lot more on research and development (R&D). In your opinion, would we
need to invest heavily in R&D for AIP if we chose to pursue this
strategy?
Mr. O'Rourke. If a program were begun to develop and procure an AIP
submarine for the U.S. Navy, and if one or more other countries that
have developed AIP technology agreed to license the technology to, or
otherwise share it with, the U.S. program, then the cost to develop AIP
technology for the U.S. submarine could be reduced, perhaps
substantially. If the safety or performance requirements for the U.S.
AIP system were higher than those for the foreign AIP systems, then
some amount of research and development funding might be needed to
adapt the foreign AIP technology to meet the higher U.S. requirements.
A similar logic would apply to the total development and design
costs for a U.S. AIP submarine. If a country with an AlP submarine
design agreed to license this design to, or otherwise share it with,
the U.S. program, then the total cost to develop and design the U.S.
submarine could be reduced, perhaps substantially. If the safety or
performance requirements for the U.S. submarine were higher than those
for the foreign submarine, then some amount of development and design
funding might be needed to adapt the foreign submarine design to meet
the higher U.S. requirements. If a foreign submarine design is not
available to the U.S. program, or if a foreign design were available
but could not be adapted to meet U.S. requirements, then a substantial
amount of funding would be needed to develop a new design that met U.S.
requirements. The less new design work that is required, the less
potential the program might have for providing near-term support to the
U.S. submarine design and engineering base.
[Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2006
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS GROUND AND ROTARY WING PROGRAMS AND
SEABASING
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator James M.
Talent (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Talent, Kennedy,
Lieberman, and Clinton.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; and
Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr., professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
member; and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Lindsey R. Neas,
assistant to Senator Talent; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to
Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator
Lieberman; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. TALENT, CHAIRMAN
Senator Talent. I will tell you what we will do. We will
get going and when Senator Kennedy arrives maybe at the
beginning of his questioning he can make an opening statement
if he wants to do that.
We are meeting today to receive testimony on Marine Corps
ground and rotary wing programs, on seabasing, in review of the
DOD authorization request for fiscal year 2006. Before I get
going on my statement, I want to recognize a couple of
distinguished visitors. One of our staff assistants, Ben
Rubin's parents are in the room, Steve and Nancy from Boston.
In Senator Kennedy's absence--I am sure he will want to say
hello also--thank you for coming and for lending us your son
for a while.
We are pleased to have with us today: the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition, John Young, who has appeared before this
subcommittee and the full committee on many occasions. The
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Programs and
Resources, Lieutenant General Magnus. Thank you for coming,
General. The Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Lieutenant General James Mattis. General,
thank you for being here. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Warfare Requirements and Programs, Vice Admiral Joseph
Sestak. Joe, thank you for coming.
I want to welcome you, gentlemen, and thank you for taking
time out of your busy schedules to be with us here today. I
especially want you, however, to pass on how proud we are of
the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who are on point in
the global war on terror. The sacrifices that they and their
families are making daily are not going unnoticed. They are
deeply appreciated by this Congress and by all the American
people. This Nation is served by the finest men and women who
have ever served in any military at any time. I know you all
believe that.
The Corps' high operations tempo has tested the limits of
the men and women of the Marine Corps and the equipment they
depend upon to accomplish their mission. Today's hearing will
give this subcommittee the opportunity to hear about the Corps'
current and future programs to provide our marines with the
best equipment available.
There are several areas we want to hear about today. The
committee has closely followed the efforts of the Department of
Defense (DOD) in providing force protection capabilities to our
soldiers and marines in Iraq and Afghanistan for countering the
threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The
committee is supportive of the efforts of the Joint IED Task
Force and believes that the task force has made significant
contributions to force protection solutions for our marines.
However, we want to ensure that we have explored all
opportunities to provide force protection and otherwise to stop
IEDs and we would like to hear the Marine Corps' views on
counter-IED measures, including the procurement of jammers and
armored--and also armoring wheeled vehicles.
The Marine Corps is developing the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle, a replacement for the Assault Amphibian Vehicle, to
carry marines over water and land. The committee has been very
supportive of this program and we were concerned to hear that
the program was slipped a year in the current budget request.
We understand the program not only slipped because of
affordability concerns, but also because of technical issues.
We want to hear about the reasons for the delay and the impact
on the future Marine force.
Operations in the global war on terror have stressed the
Corps' helicopter fleet. This places added importance on the
programs to reset and modernize Marine helicopters. The Navy
and the Marine Corps have several ongoing helicopter
initiatives, but the two we would like to address today are the
programs to acquire new helicopters for presidential support
and for heavy lift replacement.
The Navy recently completed a source selection of the VXX
helicopter and we would like to hear about the source selection
process. Questions raised at a recent Airland Subcommittee
hearing on the replacement for the CH-53 program need to be
addressed as well. We would also like to hear, to the extent
possible, how the MV-22 Osprey is proceeding in its operational
testing.
In addition to other Marine Corps programs, the
subcommittee is also interested in the development of the
seabasing concept. In the interim plan submitted to Congress in
lieu of the annual 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Secretary of
the Navy had a range of between 14 and 20 ships in the Maritime
Prepositioning Force of the future, with each option also
including two high-speed ships and three high-speed connectors.
We have never in the past counted our Maritime Prepositioning
ships in the number of ships we count in the size of the Navy.
The objective of the sea base is to assemble, deliver, and
sustain a sizable force from the sea. The reason for needing
the sea base is that access to a port may not be readily
available. I am aware that the concept for operations is
gaining definition and I look forward to hearing about it from
our witnesses today.
This, however, brings up a point I feel compelled to make.
If these numbers of ships are part of either a 260-ship fleet
or a 325-ship fleet, then the 260-ship Navy is, as
traditionally understood, only 241 ships, including 63 littoral
combat ships, or the 325-ship Navy would be only 300 ships,
counting 82 littoral combat ships. That means that in the
traditional sense the range of size for the fleet in 30 years
would be between 178 and 218 of what we would traditionally
call major combatants.
While the concept of seabasing has some appeal, I am
concerned about the resources required to acquire this
capability and in the world of competing resources what impacts
it might have on the rest of the fleet.
We will get into these and any other questions that the
members of the subcommittee may wish to talk about. Again,
gentlemen, I thank you for appearing before the subcommittee
today. We look forward to your testimony.
We will hold Senator Kennedy's opening statement in
abeyance, unless this is him. It is not. Hello, Senator
Lieberman. We were just about to start the witnesses'
testimony. Do you want to make any kind of a statement?
Senator Lieberman. No, go right ahead.
Senator Talent. We will start with Secretary Young, who is
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition. John, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION
Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman, it is a great
privilege to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss
the status of the fiscal year 2006 Marine Corps programs as
well as our seabasing efforts. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
introducing my colleagues here today. I want to agree with your
comments and add that in multiple theaters throughout the world
today, your Navy-Marine Corps team is prosecuting the global
war on terror in a wide range of operations.
Your naval team has executed these operations superbly,
from pursuit of hostile forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to
providing humanitarian relief after the tsunami. In each of
these operations, marines and sailors provided a unique
demonstration to the world of the immense and timely
capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps team.
We have taken the committee's calls for urgency and
discipline in acquisition to heart and worked to improve our
business practices. I would like to highlight a few of the past
year's actions.
Through the work of the Marine Corps and the leadership of
Secretary England, when the First Marine Expeditionary Force
returned to Iraq in March 2004, every vehicle had some level of
armor protection and every helicopter had advanced
survivability equipment. To build on this momentum, Secretary
England directed and established a formalized process action
team, called Operation Respond, to rapidly meet requirements
generated from deployed marines. Through Operation Respond,
within the limits of funding rules, the Department delivered
enhanced body armor, IED jammers, ballistic goggles, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and other capabilities requested by marines.
Shifting to other programs, we implemented a Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) Independent Review Team and recommended specific
JSF design, ground rule assumptions, and requirements changes
which restored short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL)
viability. All three variants are now projected to meet their
key performance parameters.
Another joint program, the V-22 Osprey, has flown in excess
of 4,900 hours since resuming flight tests in May 2002.
Operational Evaluation began on March 28, 2005, and should lead
to a full-rate production decision in early 2006.
The H-1 upgrades development program is over 90 percent
complete, with operation and evaluation (OPEVAL) for this
program beginning late this summer.
The Marine Corps has taken delivery of 17 KC-130J aircraft
to date, which includes four deliveries during this fiscal
year. Four KC-130Js were procured in fiscal year 2005 and 12
aircraft are budgeted for procurement in fiscal year 2006. We
have also continued to ensure the tactical capability of our
existing KC-130 F, R, and T series aircraft by installing night
vision kits and upgraded aircraft survivability equipment.
The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is a self-
deploying, high water speed, armored amphibious vehicle capable
of transporting marines from ships located beyond the horizon
to inland objectives. The EFV will replace the AAV that was
fielded in 1972 and will be over 35 years old when EFV is
fielded. The Milestone C LRIP is now scheduled for September
2006.
Finally, the Lightweight 155, a joint Marine Corps and Army
program, replaces the current M-198. The Departments of the
Navy and Army awarded an $834 million multi-year contract in
March 2005, the Lightweight 155 is a very successful program.
We have also made significant progress in our shipbuilding
programs that support our Expeditionary Forces. Specifically,
lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan suggested we should maximize
the air capability of Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA(R)) while
leveraging the design changes already made for multi-purpose
amphibious assault system (LHD-8). The Navy's acquisition team
worked with Navy and Marine Corps leadership to restructure
LHA(R) from plug-plus to an aviation variant using the proven
LHD hull and saving over $1.1 billion. The resulting design
provides a transformational capability that leverages our
investment in the Joint Strike Fighter and the MV-22.
The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $66 million
for Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF/F) development
and design. This family of ships is essential to the naval
seabasing strategy and these funds are also very important to
the long-term health of segments of our U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base. We need your support to proceed with Maritime
Prepositional Force (MPF) definition and experimentation
efforts and to maintain a fully funded program. We are
carefully looking at whether current generation platforms can
meet a majority of the MPF requirements at lower risk and cost.
The San Antonio, the lead ship in the Amphibious Assault
Transport Dock (LPD-17) class of amphibious transport dock
ships, is approximately 93 percent complete, with delivery
scheduled for fall 2005.
The much discussed current planned build rate of one DD(X)
per year through the Fiscal Year Defense Program/Plan (FYDP)
does not provide sufficient workload to sustain two yards in an
affordable manner. We are committed to procuring those ships
that the Navy needs in a manner that provides the best value to
the taxpayer. The competition for DD(X) under consideration by
the Navy provides several benefits. First, the competition will
save a billion dollars from fiscal year 2006 to 2011 and $3
billion on the first 10 ships.
Second, the Navy will be able to focus on the design of
critical subsystems of DD(X) and reduce risk and concurrency,
issues of concern to Congress and others on the DD(X) program.
The Navy continues to explore alternative financing
approaches for Navy ship procurement. As Secretary England has
stated, these funding strategies do not allow us to build more
ships in the near term. But they do allow us to more
efficiently execute a program and work within the rules and
challenges of annual budgets. For example, last year the Navy
requested Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
funds for lead ship construction, an approach that mirrors the
development method used in every other DOD weapons program. Our
fiscal year 2006 budget request includes RDT&E funding for the
second Littoral Combat Ship.
Our fiscal year 2006 budget submission also includes two
other shipbuilding financing approaches. We have requested
authority to fund procurement of the LHA(R) replacement ships
and the new generation aircraft carrier over 2 years. This
permits the Department to level out the funding spikes
associated with large-cost capital ships. The other financing
mechanism included in our budget is the use of advanced
procurement funds for lead ship production design. Since
production design for new ships spans between 18 and 30 months,
this jump-start will permit design efforts to begin a year
ahead of full funding so the start of fabrication will be
closer to the year the lead ship is authorized and appropriated
and that budget request will be more informed by the design of
the ship.
Mr. Chairman, out of respect for the subcommittee, I will
stop, leaving much more to say.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's (DON) Fiscal Year 2006 Acquisition and RDT&E programs. In
multiple theaters in the global war on terror today, your Navy and
Marine Corps Team is involved in a range of operations, from combat
ashore to Extended Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) at sea. EMIO
serves as a key maritime component of global war on terror, and its
purpose is to deter, delay, and disrupt the movement of terrorists and
terrorist-related materials at sea. Your team has conducted over 2,200
boardings in this last year alone, even as it has flown more than 3,000
sorties while dropping more than 100,000 pounds of ordnance from sea-
based tactical aircraft in Iraq; and providing nearly 5,000 hours of
dedicated surveillance in and around Iraq to coalition forces.
At the same time, our Nation took advantage of the immediate global
access provided by naval forces to bring time-critical assistance to
tsunami victims in South Asia. By seabasing our relief efforts in
Operation Unified Assistance, the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group
(CSG) and the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)--with
marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit--delivered more than
6,000,000 pounds of relief supplies and equipment quickly, and with
more political acceptance than may have been possible if a larger
footprint ashore might have been required.The fiscal year 2006 budget
request maximizes our Nation's return on its investment by positioning
us to meet today's challenges--from peacekeeping/stability operations
to global war on terror operations and small-scale contingencies--and
by transforming the force for future challenges.
your future navy and marine corps team
We developed the Sea Power 21 vision in support of our National
Military Strategy. The objective of Sea Power 21 is to ensure this
nation possesses credible combat capability on scene to promote
regional stability, to deter aggression throughout the world, to assure
access of Joint Forces and to fight and win should deterrence fail. Sea
Power 21 guides the Navy's transformation from a threat-- based
platform centric structure to a capabilities-based, fully integrated
force. The pillars of Sea Power 21--Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea
Base--are integrated by FORCEnet, the means by which the power of
sensors, networks, weapons, warriors and platforms are harnessed in a
networked combat force. This networked force will provide the strategic
agility and persistence necessary to prevail in the continuing global
war on terror, as well as the speed and overwhelming power to seize the
initiative and swiftly defeat any regional peer competitor in Major
Combat Operations (MCO).
The Navy and Marine Corps Team of the future must be capabilities-
based and threat-oriented. Through agility and persistence, our Navy
and Marine Corps Team needs to be poised for the ``close-in knife
fight'' that is the global war on terror, able to act immediately to a
fleeting target. The challenge is to simultaneously ``set the
conditions'' for a MCO while continuing to fight the global war on
terror, with the understanding that the capabilities required for the
global war on terror cannot necessarily be assumed to be a lesser-
included case of an MCO. Our force must be the right mix of
capabilities that balances persistence and agility with power and speed
in order to fight the global war on terror while prepared to win a MCO.
To do so, it must be properly postured in terms of greater operational
availability from platforms that are much more capable as a
distributed, networked force. While the fabric of our fighting force
will still be the power and speed needed to seize the initiative and
swiftly defeat any regional threat, FORCEnet's pervasive awareness
(C4ISR) will be more important than mass. Because of its access from
the sea, the Navy and Marine Corps are focusing significant effort and
analysis in support of joint combat power projection by leveraging the
maneuver space of the oceans through Seabasing. Seabasing is a national
capability that will project and sustain naval power and joint forces,
assuring joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of
sovereign, distributed and fully networked forces operating globally
from the sea, while accelerating expeditionary deployment and
employment timelines. The Seabased Navy will be distributed, netted,
immediately employable and rapidly deployable, greatly increasing its
operational availability through innovative concepts such as, for
example, Sea Swap and the Fleet Response Plan. At the same time,
innovative transformational platforms under development such as MPF(F),
LHA(R) and High-Speed Connectors, will be instrumental to the Sea Base.
To this end, the technological innovations and human-systems
integration advances in future warships are critical. Our future
warships will sustain operations in forward areas longer, be able to
respond more quickly to emerging contingencies, and generate more
sorties and simultaneous attacks against greater numbers of multiple
aimpoints and targets with greater effect than our current fleet. The
future is about the capabilities posture of the fleet. Our analyses is
unveiling the type and mix of capabilities of the future fleet and has
moved us away from point solutions towards a range of 260-325 ships
that meet all warfighting requirements and hedges against the
uncertainty of alternate futures.
developing transformational joint seabasing capabilities
The Naval Power 21 vision defines the capabilities that the 21st
Century Navy and Marine Corps Team will deliver. Our overarching
transformational operating concept is Sea Basing; a national
capability, for projecting and sustaining naval power and joint forces
that assures joint access by leveraging the operational maneuver of
sovereign, distributed, and networked forces operating globally from
the sea. Seabasing unifies our capabilities for projecting offensive
power, defensive power, command and control, mobility and sustainment
around the world. It will enable commanders to generate high tempo
operational maneuver by making use of the sea as a means of gaining and
maintaining advantage.
Sea Shield is the projection of layered defensive power. It seeks
maritime superiority to assure access, and to project defense overland.
Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent offensive
power. It leverages persistence, precision, stealth, and new force
packaging concepts to increase operational tempo and reach. It includes
strikes by air, missiles, and maneuver by Marine Air Ground Task Forces
(MAGTF) supported by sea based air and long-range gunfires.
Sea Base is the projection of operational independence. It provides
the Joint Force Commander the ability to exploit EMW, and the
capability to retain command and control and logistics at mobile,
secure locations at sea.
FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework
for naval warfare in the joint, information age. It integrates
warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms and weapons
into a networked, distributed combat system.
Sea Trial is the Navy's recently created process for formulating
and testing innovative operational concepts, most of which harness
advanced technologies and are often combined with new organizational
configurations, in pursuit of dramatic improvements in warfighting
effectiveness. Sea Trial concept development and experimentation (CD&E)
is being conducted in close coordination with, the Marine Corps combat/
force development process and reflects a sustained commitment to
innovation. These efforts tie warfare innovation to the core
operational challenges facing the future joint force.
As a means of accelerating our investment in Naval Power 21, we
employ the Naval Capability Development Process (NCDP) and
Expeditionary Force Development System (EFDS). The NCDP and EFDS take a
concepts-to-capabilities approach to direct investment to achieve
future warfighting wholeness. The NCDP takes a sea-based, offensive
approach that provides power projection and access with distributed and
networked forces featuring unmanned and off-board nodes with
penetrating surveillance via pervasive sensing and displaying that
rapidly deliver precision effects. The EFDS assesses, analyzes and
integrates MAGTF warfighting concepts, and requirements in a naval and
joint context to support the overarching operational concept of Joint
Seabasing. Both processes are designed to incorporate innovative
products of Service and Joint CD&E and Science and Technology (S&T)
efforts.
The fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects the investments that
will most improve our warfighting capability by developing and
investing in future sea based and expeditionary capabilities for the
Navy and Marine Corps. I will briefly address transformation of our
capabilites describing some of the key program enablers. I will then
highlight the S&T and CD&E developments that ensure continued
transformation now and well into the future.
sea shield
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
LCS will be built from the keel up to be a part of a netted and
distributed force. The key warfighting capability of LCS will be its
off-board systems: manned helicopters and unmanned aerial, surface and
underwater vehicles. It is the off-board vehicles--with both sensors
and weapons--that will enter the highest threat areas. Its modular
design, built to open-systems architecture standards, provides
flexibility and a means to rapidly reconfigure mission modules and
payloads. Approximately 40 percent of LCS's payload volume will be
reconfigurable. As technology matures, the Navy will not have to buy a
new LCS seaframe, but will upgrade the mission modules or the unmanned
systems. LCS will be different from any warship that has been built for
the U.S. Navy. The program provides the best balance of risk with
affordability and speed of construction. We have partnered with the
Coast Guard. LCS will share a common three-dimensional radar with U.S.
Coast Guard cutters, and in addition, there are other nations
interested in purchasing the seaframe.
Two contracts were competitively awarded in May 2004, for detail
design and construction of two different LCS Flight 0 seaframes. .
Flight 0 is comprised of four ships that will develop and demonstrate
several new approaches to naval warfare including suitability of large-
scale modular mission technologies and new operational concepts in the
littoral. The detail design and construction of the first LCS flight 0
ship began in fiscal year 2005. To date, all milestones have been met
on schedule. Detail design for the second ship is ongoing with
construction starting in fiscal year 2006. The two remaining seaframes
for LCS Flight 0 will be requested in fiscal year 2007. The LCS spiral
development acquisition strategy will support construction of multiple
flights of focused mission ships and mission packages with progressive
capability improvements. Procurement of the three mission packages
(Mine Warfare, Surface Warfare and Anti Submarine Warfare) is also
planned in fiscal year 2006. The Department is well positioned to
proceed with LCS and deliver this needed capability to sailors as soon
as possible.
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)/P-3C
The future for the Navy's maritime patrol force includes plans for
sustainment, modernization, and re-capitalization of the force. Results
of the P-3 Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) have revealed the
need for an aggressive approach to P-3 airframe sustainment. Key
elements of the sustainment plan are strict management of requirements
and flight hour use, special structural inspections to keep the
aircraft safely flying, and increased use of simulators to satisfy
training requirements. The fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects
$74.5 million for Special Structural Inspections (SSI) and Special
Structural Inspections--Kits (SSI-K), which will allow for sustainment
and continued operation of approximately 166 aircraft. As the
sustainment plan progresses, the inventory may be further reduced to a
number approaching 130 aircraft. The fiscal year 2006 budget request
also reflects a modernization budget of $51.3 million for continued
procurement and installation of the USQ-78B acoustic processor and for
completion of final installations of Anti-Surface Warfare Improvement
Program (AIP) kits. We are working on plans for further mission system
modernization to allow us to continue meeting COCOM requirements. To
recapitalize these critical aircraft, the Navy is procuring a MMA. The
MMA program entered System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase in
May 2004 and awarded a contract to the Boeing Corporation for a 737
commercial derivative aircraft. The fiscal year 2006 budget requests
$964.1 million for continuation of MMA SDD. Our comprehensive and
balanced approach has allowed for re-capitalization of these critical
assets.
MH-60R and MH-60S
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $655.5 million in procurement
and $48.1 million in RDT&E for the replacement of the Light Airborne
Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) MK III SH-60B and carrier-based SH-60F
helicopters with the new configuration designated as MH-60R. The
procurement quantity was reduced to provide an orderly production ramp.
A Full Rate Production decision is scheduled during the second quarter
of fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $608.7
million in procurement and $78.6 million in RDT&E funds for the MH-60S,
which is the Navy's primary combat support helicopter designed to
support Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups. It will replace four
legacy platforms with a newly manufactured H-60 airframe. The MH-60S is
currently in the full rate 5-year MYP contract with the Army. The Army
and Navy intend to execute another platform MYP contract commencing in
fiscal year 2007. Navy's total procurement requirement was increased
from 237 to 271 to provide a force structure that supports the Navy-
approved Helicopter concept of operations.
Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS)
The fiscal year 2006 President's budget requests $40.5 million to
complete the Follow-On Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) in U.S.S. San
Antonio (LPD 17) and begin live-fire testing in the SDTS. The SSDS is
designed to expedite the detect-through-engage process for amphibious
ships and aircraft carriers against anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).
SSDS consists of a combination of software and commercial off-the-shelf
hardware intended to integrate sensor and engagement systems. Progress
during fiscal year 2004 focused on the industry formal qualification
tests of the SSDS MK 2 system and the delivery and test of the system
in U.S.S. Reagan, CVN 76. SSDS MK2 is implementing open architecture to
enable sharing of common command systems applications across the
surface fleet.
Organic Mine Countermeasures
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests RDT&E and procurement funding
for a variety of airborne mine countermeasure systems, which will be
employed by the MH-60S helicopter as an organic capability within the
Navy's strike groups. Specific systems are:
The AN/AQS-20A Advanced Mine Hunting Sonar and the
Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) are being developed
to counter deep moored mines and visible bottom mines. The Navy
is requesting $3.4 million for the AN/AQS-20A to complete
system developmental testing, initiate and complete operational
testing and award a contract for six AN/AQS-20A systems. For
AMNS, the Navy is requesting $7.7 million to conduct contractor
testing, complete system developmental testing and to reach
Milestone C.
The AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
(ALMDS) and the AN/AWS-2 Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System
(RAMICS) are being developed to counter near surface and
floating mines. The Navy is requesting $5.9 million in OPN for
four ALMDS units in addition to the four LRIP units purchased
in fiscal year 2005. For RAMICS, the Navy is requesting $16.2
million to complete contractor testing and to begin
developmental testing.
The Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep
(OASIS) System will ensure the Navy will maintain an assured
access capability and counter influence mines that may not be
found using other mine hunting systems. The Navy is requesting
$13.9 million for the completion of developmental and
operational testing leading to LRIP buys in fiscal year 2007.
The Remote Mine Hunting System (RMS) is being
developed as an unmanned semi-submersible vehicle to deploy
from both the DDG-51 Class (hulls 91-96) and the LCS. This
system will provide an over-the-horizon organic mine hunting
capability to ensure our combatants stay free of mine danger
areas. We are also exploring the multi-mission potential of the
RMS vehicle (which is the Remote Mine-hunting Vehicle (RMV)) as
one of the systems for our LCS, ASW mission module package. The
fiscal year 2006 budget request for OPN for RMS is $85 million
for four RMS systems and $34.2 million for RMV ASW mission
package (four vehicles).
The Assault Breaching System involves a family of
systems that provides the capability to detect, avoid, and
defeat mines and obstacles in the surf and beach zone in
support of ship to objective maneuver. The fiscal year 2006
request includes $31 million that would support further
development of a multi-spectral imaging sensor (COBRA) deployed
from the Fire Scout VTUAV to detect mines and obstacles on the
beach and to initiate development of counter-mine counter-
obstacle munitions, as well as navigation and tactical decision
aid systems.
sea strike
DD(X) Destroyer
DD(X) is the centerpiece of a surface combatant family of ships
that will deliver a broad range of capabilities. It is already
providing the baseline for spiral development of technology and
engineering to support a range of future ship classes such as CG(X),
LHA(R), and CVN-21. This advanced multi-mission destroyer will bring
revolutionary improvements to precise time-critical strike and joint
fires for our Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Groups of the future. It
expands the battlespace by over 400 percent; has the radar cross
section of a fishing boat; and is as quiet as a Los Angeles class
submarine. DD(X) will also enable the transformation of our operations
ashore. Its on-demand, persistent, time-critical strike revolutionizes
our joint fire support and ground maneuver concepts of operation so
that our strike fighter aircraft are freed for more difficult targets
at greater ranges. DD(X) will provide credible forward presence while
operating independently or as an integral part of naval, joint, or
combined expeditionary forces.
The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $1.1 billion in RDT&E
for continued technology development and $716 million in SCN advance
procurement funds for the first and second DD(X). DD(X) will
dramatically improve naval surface fire support capabilities available
for joint and coalition forces. Planned technologies, such as
integrated power system and total ship computing environment in an open
architecture, will provide more affordable future ship classes in terms
of both construction and operation. DD(X) will be the first forward-fit
surface combatant with an open architecture combat system. This
investment will be leveraged to other surface ship procurements,
including CVN 21 and LHA(R).
The FYDP includes full funding for the first DD(X) in fiscal year
2007 and construction of one ship per year in each follow on year.
DD(X) will provide the hull form and propulsion for the future
generation of surface combatants that provide an array of 21st century
naval capabilities.
SSGN
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $287 million of procurement
funding for the conversion of the fourth and final submarine to be
converted to SSGN. When completed, these submarines will provide
transformational warfighting capability carrying up to 154 Tomahawk
cruise missiles and support deployed Special Operating Forces. The four
SSGN conversions are being executed utilizing a public-private
partnership conducting the work in naval shipyards, and are scheduled
for delivery by fiscal year 2007. The Navy has experienced minor scope
changes as we have refueled and converted these submarines. The Navy is
working to resolve these issues, but any changes are difficult to
address with the rules and constraints of short duration modifications
relying on procurement funds.
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Our recapitalization plan includes the JSF, a stealthy, multi-role
fighter aircraft designed jointly to be an enabler for Naval Power 21.
The fiscal year 2006 budget request contains $2.4 billion for
continuation of System Development and Demonstration on the JSF. The
JSF will enhance the DON's precision strike capability with
unprecedented stealth, range, sensor fusion, improved radar
performance, combat identification and electronic attack capabilities
compared to legacy platforms. The carrier variant (CV) JSF complements
the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G in providing long-range strike capability and
much improved persistence over the battlefield. The short takeoff and
vertical landing (STOVL) JSF combines the multi-role versatility of the
F/A-18 and the basing flexibility of the AV-8B. The commonality
designed into the JSF program will reduce acquisition and operating
costs of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aircraft and allow enhanced
interoperability with our Allies and sister Services.
The JSF has completed the third year of its development program,
and the program continues working to translate concept designs to three
producible variants. Manufacture/assembly of the first flight test
aircraft conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) is underway and
roughly 40 percent complete, with assembly times much less than
planned. Two thousand engine test hours have been completed through
mid-January 2005. Detailed design work continues for the CTOL and STOVL
variants. First flight is scheduled for 2006. The JSF program has
aggressively addressed the performance issues associated with weight
and airframe design. The STOVL variant weight has been reduced by 2500
lbs. through design optimization. Installed thrust improvements and
aerodynamic drag reduction as well as requirements tailoring are being
incorporated to further improve aerodynamic performance. All three
variants are projected to meet Key Performance Parameter requirements.
The JSF program is completing a replan effort that began
approximately a year ago. The software block plan and test plan are
being reviewed consistent with the revised schedule and Service needs.
The fiscal year 2006 budget reflects the revised System Development and
Demonstration and production schedule.
V-22
The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one aviation acquisition
priority. The Osprey's increased range, speed, payload, and
survivability will generate transformational tactical and operational
capabilities. Ospreys will replace the aging Marine fleets of CH-46E
and CH-53D helicopters beginning in fiscal year 2005, which will
provide both strategic and tactical flexibility to meet emerging
threats in the global war on terror. Utilization far above peacetime
rates, and the physical demands of continuous operations in the harsh
conditions of Iraq and Afghanistan, are accelerating the deterioration
and increasing operating costs of the legacy aircraft that the MV-22
will replace. These factors make a timely fielding of the MV-22
critical. The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $1.3 billion for
nine MV-22s, trainer modifications and retrofits and $206.4 million for
continued development, testing, and evaluation. The V-22 Osprey resumed
flight-testing in May 2002, and it has flown in excess of 4,900 hours.
The Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COTF) Letter of
Observation was completed in February 2005 to support Section 123
Certification to Congress to allow the program to increase production
above minimum sustaining rate of 11 aircraft. Operational Evaluation
will begin in March 2005 leading to Full Rate Production in early
fiscal year 2006.
Heavy Lift Replacement Program (HLR, CH-53X)
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $272 million RDT&E to begin
the SDD phase of the HLR program that will replace the aging fleet of
CH-53E platforms. The Marine Corps' CH-53E continues to demonstrate its
value as an expeditionary heavy-lift platform, with significant assault
support contributions in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and Iraq.
Vertical heavy lift will be critical to successful operations in anti-
access, area-denial environments globally, enabling force application
and focused logistics envisioned within the joint operating concepts.
The CH-53E requires significant design enhancements to meet future
interoperability requirements, improve survivability, expand range and
payload performance, improve cargo handling and turn-around
capabilities, and reduce operations and support costs. An Analysis of
Alternatives determined that a ``new build'' helicopter would be the
most cost-effective solution. The Operational Requirements Document
defining HLR capabilities was approved in December 2004. The HLR will
fill the vertical heavy lift requirement not resident in any other
platform that is necessary for force application and focused logistics
envisioned in Sea Basing and joint operating concepts. With the ability
to transport 27,000 pounds to distances of 110 nautical miles under
most environmental conditions, commanders will have the option to
insert a force equipped with armored combat vehicles or two armored
High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) per sortie. To sustain
the force, the HLR will be able to transport three independent loads
tailored to individual receiving unit requirements and provide the
critical logistics air connector to facilitate sea-based operations.
This reliable, cost-effective heavy lift capability will address
critical challenges in maintainability, reliability, and affordability
found in present-day operations supporting the global war on terror.
F/A-18 A/B/C/D
The fiscal year 2006 budget request contains $422.4 million for the
continuation of the systems upgrade programs for F/A-18 platform. As
the F/A-18 program transitions to the F/A-18E/F, the existing inventory
of over 900 F/A-18A/B/C/Ds will continue to comprise half of the
Carrier Strike Group until 2012. Included in this request is the
continued procurement of recently fielded systems such as Joint Helmet
Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Targeting FLIR, Multi-Function
Information Distribution System, and Digital Communications System. The
Marine Corps continues to upgrade 76 Lot 7-11 F/A-18A and C to Lot 17
F/A-18C aircraft capability with digital communications and tactical
data link. The Marine Corps anticipates programmed upgrades to enhance
the current capabilities of the F/A-18C/D with digital communications,
tactical data link and tactical reconnaissance systems. This upgrade
ensures that our F/A-18s remain viable and relevant in support of
Tactical Air Integration and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The
Marines expect the F/A-18A+ to remain in the active inventory until
2015. The marines are also employing the Litening targeting pod on the
F/A-18 A+ and D aircraft in OIF. When combined with data link hardware,
the Litening pod provides real time video to ground forces engaged with
the enemy. The capabilities of the Litening pod with data link are
highly effective for Marine Corps expeditionary F/A-18 operations. The
fiscal year 2006 budget request also includes procurement of Center
Barrel Replacements to extend service life of F/A-18A/C/Ds 7 years to
meet fleet inventory requirements until 2022.
EA-18G
The E/A-18G continues development as the Navy's replacement for the
EA-6B Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) aircraft. The Navy is using the
F/A-18E/F multi-year contract to buy four Systems Design and
Development aircraft in fiscal year 2006 to install and integrate
Northrop Grumman's in-production Improved Capabilities (ICAP)-III AEA
system. These aircraft will support EA-18G operational testing and
allow the department to deliver the next generation (AEA) capability at
reduced cost and in the shortest possible timeframe. The Marine Corps
initiated studies to examine options for replacing their electronic
attack aircraft. The fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects $409
million for Systems Design and Development. The Systems Design and
Development continues on schedule with construction underway of the two
development aircraft. First flight is scheduled for the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2006. A total quantity of 30 systems will be procured in
LRIP with a planned fiscal year 2009 IOC and fiscal year 2012 FOC. The
EA-18G will replace carrier-based Navy EA-6B aircraft by 2012.
AH-1Z/UH-1Y
The H-1 Upgrades Program will remanufacture 180 AH-1W and 100 UH-1N
helicopters into state-of-the-art AH-1Z and UH-1Y models. The fiscal
year 2006 budget requests $307.5 million APN funds to procure 10 UH-1Y/
AH-1Z aircraft and $42.0 million RDT&E funds to complete the H-1
Upgrades Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase. The
development program is over 90 percent complete with five aircraft
being readied for OPEVAL, which will begin this summer. Work on the
first LRIP lot, awarded to Bell Helicopter in December 2003, is
progressing well and the second LRIP lot will be awarded by the end of
March 2005. The program is seeking opportunities to reduce unit cost
and minimize the negative impact the remanufacture strategy could have
on ongoing military operations. Regarding the latter point, we
anticipate that some number of airframes will be newly fabricated
instead of remanufactured in order to reduce the amount of time
aircraft would otherwise be out of service. The optimum mix of
remanufactured and newly fabricated aircraft is being evaluated with
the results to be reflected in future budget requests. The H-1 Upgrade
Program is a key modernization effort designed to resolve existing
safety deficiencies, enhance operational effectiveness of both the AH-
1W and the UH-1N, and extend the service life of both aircraft. The
program will provide 100 UH-1Ys and 180 AH-1Zs with 10,000 hour
airframes. Additionally, the commonality gained between the AH-1Z and
UH-1Y (84 percent) will significantly reduce life-cycle costs and
logistical footprint, while increasing the maintainability and
deployability of both aircraft.
AV-8B
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $15.5 million RDT&E funds to
support development of the Engine Life Management Plan (ELMP)/
Accelerated Simulated Mission Endurance Testing, Tactical Moving Map
Display, and Aircraft Handling initiatives. The fiscal year 2006 budget
also requests $36.6 million procurement funding for Production Line
Transition efforts, procurement of Open Systems Core Avionics
Requirement, ELMP upgrades, and the Readiness Management Plan which
addresses aircraft obsolescence and deficiency issues associated with
sustaining the AV-8B until JSF transition.
EA-6B
The fiscal year 2006 budget request of $120.6 million reflects the
total budget for wing center section modifications and procurement of
three Improved Capability (ICAP) III systems. The aging EA-6B has been
in ever-increasing demand as DOD's only tactical radar jamming aircraft
that also engages in communications jamming and information operations.
EA-6B operational tempo has continued at extremely high levels during
the past year. Safety considerations, due to wing center section and
outer wing panel fatigue, have reduced aircraft available to the fleet
from 95 to 85. Aircraft inventory is projected to return to above 95 by
the end of fiscal year 2005. Program priorities are current readiness
and successful fleet introduction of the ICAP III selective reactive
jamming system.
Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)
The U.S Navy weapons programs of the 21st century are evolving to
address the challenges of a dynamic and unpredictable enemy. New weapon
systems are planned or have been developed and delivered to the
combatant commanders to provide new options to engage enemy forces in
support of the global war on terror. The Navy's fiscal year 2006 budget
supports PGM programs that continue to allow domination of the maritime
environment, support in-land operational forces, and enhance the
overall department strategy to deter and dissuade potential adversaries
while supporting our allies and friends.
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)
JDAM has been the Department's weapon of choice for OEF/OIF. In
October 2004, the U.S. Navy provided an Early Operational Capability
and accelerated deliveries for a 500 lb. JDAM variant (GBU-38) for Navy
F/A-18 A+/C/D platforms. After approving production of this variant, we
immediately deployed it in order to meet an urgent warfighter need to
employ precision munitions with limited collateral effects in the
congested urban environments of Iraq. The fiscal year 2006 budget
request of $82.6 million procures 3,400 DON JDAM tail kits for all
variants, thus supporting all current and projected warfighter
requirements. The fiscal year 2006 budget reduces procurements to 1,500
kits per year starting in fiscal year 2008; however, the Department
will closely monitor all JDAM variant requirements and combat
expenditures in order to make any necessary adjustments.
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
A new variant of the JSOW called JSOW-C was approved for Full Rate
Production in December 2004. Similar to the new 500 lb. JDAM program,
this capability is in demand by the warfighter to provide new options
for precision attack against point targets vulnerable to blast
fragmentation effects and hardened targets. The new JSOW-C variant
employs an augmenting charge with a follow-through penetrator bomb for
hard targets that can also be set to explode both payloads
simultaneously. This lethal package is coupled with an Imaging Infrared
Seeker and GPS/INS to provide the standoff precision attack capability
in demand by the warfighter. The fiscal year 2006 budget fully funds
JSOW-C production and support. It also shifts funding from production
of a submunition variant of JSOW to all JSOW-Cs until there is
resolution of unexploded battlefield ordnance issues that are of
concern to the Department and our allies. The Navy/contractor JSOW Team
is dedicated to reducing acquisition costs. Specifically, we are
expecting to achieve a unit cost reduction of more than 25 percent by
2006 due to the implementation of lean initiatives, innovative
processes, and engineering changes.
Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM)
The fiscal year 2006 budget supports the Navy's commitment to
replenish our precision-guided munitions inventories utilizing the
Navy's first MYP contract for a weapon. TACTOM entered Full Rate
Production in August 2004. We completed our second and final
remanufacture program, converting all available older Tomahawk
airframes to the latest Block III configuration. The Firm Fixed Price 5
year contract (fiscal years 2004-2008) for TACTOM will save the
taxpayer 12 percent over annual procurements. TACTOM's advanced design
and manufacturing processes have cut procurement cost to $729,000 or
half the cost of a Block III missile and maintenance costs by half of
the cost of its predecessor. TACTOM provides a more capable missile
with a 15-year product warranty and a 15-year recertification interval.
This approach mitigates price growth of follow-on procurements by
providing incentive for the contractor to manage for obsolescence,
which will control future price growth on follow procurements.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
The EFV remains the Marine Corps' number one ground acquisition
priority and will join the MV-22 and the LCAC as an integral component
of the triad required for executing Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The
EFV is a self-deploying, high water speed, armored amphibious vehicle
capable of transporting marines from ships located beyond the horizon
to inland objectives. It will be the primary means of tactical mobility
for the marine rifle squad during expeditionary operations. This
vehicle will replace the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV7A1) that was
fielded in 1972 and that will be over 35 years old when the EFV is
fielded. The Milestone C LRIP is now scheduled for September 2006. The
approved acquisition objective is for 1,013 vehicles. Initial
operational capability is scheduled for fiscal year 2010 and full
operational capability is scheduled for fiscal year 2020. The fiscal
year 2006 RDT&E budget requests $253.7 million to continue a robust
developmental test program, to conduct a comprehensive operational
assessment, to develop the LRIP vehicle design, and to develop
logistics products including integrated electronic technical manuals
and training devices, simulators and courseware.
Lightweight LW-155 Howitzer (M777A1)
The M777A1 is a Joint USMC/Army 155mm towed artillery system that
will replace the current M198. The Marine Corps intends to procure a
total of 356 howitzers with IOC in fiscal year 2005. The M777A1 is
currently finishing LRIP for the Marine Corps and the fiscal year 2006
budget request includes $178.4 million to procure 77 systems. The DON
and the Army awarded a $834 million multi-year contract on March 24,
2005. The M777A1 will be able to fire the Excalibur PGM, currently
under development by the Army to support enhanced range requirements
for joint indirect fires.
sea base
LPD 17
The San Antonio (LPD 17) class of amphibious transport dock ships
is optimized for operational flexibility and designed to meet Marine
Air-Ground Task Force lift requirements and represents a critical
element of the Navy and Marine Corps future in expeditionary warfare.
The fiscal year 2006 budget includes $1.3 billion to fully fund the
construction of the eighth ship of the class. The Navy plans to build
nine LPD 17 ships with the procurement of the ninth ship planned for
fiscal year 2007. The lead ship is approximately 93 percent complete
with delivery scheduled for summer 2005. In addition to the lead ship,
four follow on ships are currently under construction. New Orleans LPD
18 was christened on November 20, 2004, and Mesa Verde LPD 19 was
christened January 15, 2005. Construction also continues on Green Bay
LPD 20 and New York LPD 21. Advance procurement contracts for LPD 22
and 23 have been awarded to support long-lead time material purchases
for these ships.
Lewis and Clark Class Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $380 million for the
ninth ship. The first eight ships have are under contract. Exercise of
the option for the seventh and eighth ships occurred in January 2005.
Lead ship construction commenced in September 2003, with a projected
delivery date of January 2006. Projected delivery dates for the other
ships are as follows: second ship fiscal year 2006; third, fourth and
fifth ships fiscal year 2007; sixth and seventh ships fiscal year 2008
and the eighth ship fiscal year 2009.
CVN 21 Class
The CVN 21 program is designing the aircraft carrier for the 21st
century, as the replacement for the Nimitz class nuclear aircraft
carriers. Overall, CVN 21 will increase sortie generation rate and
increase survivability to better handle future threats. The new design
nuclear propulsion plant and improved electric plant together provide
three times the electrical generation capacity of a Nimitz class
carrier. This capacity allows for the introduction of new systems such
as Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System, advanced arresting gear,
and a new integrated warfare system that will leverage advances in open
systems architecture to be affordably upgraded. Other features include
an enhanced flight deck, improved weapons handling and aircraft
servicing efficiency, and a flexible island arrangement allowing for
future technology insertion. The fiscal year 2006 budget request
includes $565 million of advance procurement for continued development
of CVN 21. The program received Milestone B approval in April 2004. The
construction contract is scheduled for award in fiscal year 2008, with
ship delivery in fiscal year 2015.
Nimitz Class (CVN 68 Class)
The Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) program refuels, repairs, and
modernizes Nimitz class aircraft carriers to provide up to 50 years of
service life. CVN 68 class was originally based on a 30-year design
life with refueling at an estimated 14 years. Ongoing analysis of the
reactor cores show a nominal 23 year life prior to requirement to
refuel allowing the RCOH schedule to be adjusted accordingly. The RCOH
Program recapitalizes these ships in lieu of procurement and is
fundamental to sustaining the nuclear carrier force structure. RCOHs
provide a bridge between maintaining current readiness requirements and
preparing the platform for future readiness initiatives in support of
Sea Power 21. They leverage technologies from other programs and
platforms that support RCOH planning and production schedules for
advantageous insertion during this major recapitalization effort.
In 2004, considerable progress was made on the Eisenhower (CVN 69)
RCOH. Restructuring of the contract in December 2003, reset target cost
and fee, established performance incentives, reduced minimum fee,
modified shareline ratios, and extended the RCOH duration by 11 weeks.
Since the contract restructuring, the shipyard's performance improved
considerably, resulting in an estimated $29 million underrun at
completion. This underrun has allowed the ``buy back'' of work that was
previously descoped to avoid contract cost overruns. Significant work
items reinstituted included the refurbishment of the forward crew
galley and 03 level ward room, embarked flag officer spaces
habitability upgrades, installation of several refurbished antennas,
and combat systems electronic upgrades. Delivery of Eisenhower back to
the fleet is scheduled for 2005.
The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $1.5 billion in the
first of two funding increments for the U.S.S. Carl Vinson RCOH. The
fiscal year 2006 budget also includes $20 million in advance
procurement funding for the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) RCOH
scheduled to start fiscal year 2010.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))
These future Maritime Prepositioning Ships will serve a broader
operational function than current prepositioned ships, creating greatly
expanded operational flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force
that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the at-sea
assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives by high-speed
airlift or sealift from the United States or forward operating
locations or bases. The MPF(F) will support the forcible entry. These
ships will off-load forces, weapons and supplies selectively while
remaining far over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground
maneuver forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland. They
will sustain in-theater logistics, communications and medical
capabilities for the joint force for extended periods as well. The
fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $66 million of RDT&E funds to
develop technologies to support future sea basing needs in MPF(F). The
first MPF(F) ship is planned for fiscal year 2009 with advanced
procurement award scheduled in fiscal year 2008. It is critical to the
Nation's naval capabilities and our shipbuilding industrial base that
we proceed with MPF(F) definition and experimentation efforts and
maintain a fully funded MPF(F) program.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
Our fleet LCACs saw dramatically increased operational tempo
supporting worldwide operations during the past year, underscoring the
need for the LCAC SLEP. SLEP is a vital, ongoing effort to OMFTS and
STOM options for the naval forces. This will provide continued critical
surface lift for the Marine Corps for the future as these upgrades
offer greater flexibility and endurance options that allow naval forces
to continue to remain expeditionary and versatile in support of global
war on terror and into the future. The program, designed to extend the
service life of LCACs to 30 years, had several notable accomplishments
during the past year: LCAC 2 and LCAC 4 delivered ahead of schedule.
The award of the fiscal year 2004 contract for four craft occurred in
March 2004. In 2004, the SLEP effort received a DOD Value Engineering
Award for the revised acquisition strategy that will deliver the
required LCAC capability and service life while providing a cost
savings of $104 million through the FYDP for the program. The first
SLEP craft, LCAC 44, rendered assistance to tsunami victims in
Indonesia as part of Operation Unified Assistance. The Navy is
continuing the strategy of refurbishing vice replacing the buoyancy
boxes and will competitively select the fiscal year 2005 and fiscal
year 2006 SLEP work. The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $111
million for SLEP of six craft.
LHD 8
The Makin Island (LHD 8) last ship of the LHD 1 Class of big deck
amphibious ships represents a critical element of the Navy and Marine
Corps future in expeditionary warfare. LHD 1 Class platforms provide
critical lift and an expeditionary capability allowing rapid naval
force response to differing crises. Offering the Joint Force Commander
(JFC) a variety of options, LHD 1 Class platforms are critical power
projection and C\4\ISR platforms capable of embarking JFC staffs. The
flexibility and versatility of the LHD 8 in Seabasing circumvents the
challenges on obtaining land-basing privileges and over flight
permissions in support of U.S. global war on terror missions. In
accordance with congressional direction to incrementally fund LHD 8,
the fiscal year 2006 budget requests $198 million for the last
increment in the continued construction of LHD 8. LHD 8 will be the
first big deck amphibious ship that will be powered by gas turbine
propulsion, and all of its auxiliary systems will rely on electrical
power rather than steam. This change is expected to realize significant
lifecycle cost savings. Ship construction is proceeding as scheduled
with a contract delivery date of summer 2007.
LHA(R)
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $150 million of advance
procurement funds for LHA(R) that support an accelerated ship
construction start in fiscal year 2007. LHA(R) is the replacement
program for four aging LHA Class ships that reach the end of their
administratively extended service life between 2011 and 2015. LHA(R)
Flight 0 is a modified LHD 1 Class variant with improved aviation
capabilities designed to accommodate aircraft in the future Marine
Corps Air Combat Element including JSF and MV-22 and provides adequate
service life for future growth.
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
The Navy High Speed Connector has been merged with the Army Theater
Support Vessel to form the JHSV program. This program will provide a
high-speed intra-theater surface lift capability gap identified to
implement Sea Power 21 and the Army Future Force operational concepts.
The JHSV will be capable of supporting Joint Force needs for flexible,
fast transport of troops and equipment for the future. Today's only
alternative to meeting this gap is through the leasing of high speed
vessels for rapid troop and equipment transport is airlift. The WestPac
Express is a high-speed surface vessel currently being leased by the
Military Sealift Command and used to transport Marines in the Western
Pacific operating area. With the Navy designated as the lead Service,
the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army are working together to develop the
required documentation to meet a Milestone A decision in February 2006
with a lead ship contract award planned for fiscal year 2008.
KC-130
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $1,093 million for 12 KC-130J
aircraft. These aircraft will be procured under an existing Air Force
multi-year contract. The Marine Corps has taken delivery of 16 KC-130J
aircraft to date, with five more deliveries scheduled for fiscal year
2005. Twelve aircraft are planned for procurement in fiscal year 2006
to bring the total number of KC-130J aircraft to 33. The KC-130 fleet
once again proved itself as a workhorse during operations in Iraq. The
KC-130J provides major enhancements to the current fleet of KC-130s,
extending its range, payload, and refueling capabilities. The first KC-
130J squadron (12 aircraft) has achieved IOC and will immediately be
deployed in support of the global war on terror. Bold steps in
simulator training and joint flight instruction place the KC-130J
program on the leading edge of the transformation continuum.
Additionally, we have continued to ensure the tactical capability of
our existing KC-130F, R, and T series aircraft by installing night
vision kits and upgraded aircraft survivability equipment.
C-40
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $10.3 million to support
delivery of C-40 (Boeing 737-700C) aircraft previously funded. The C-40
replaces the aging C-9 aircraft providing intra-theater logistics
support. To date, the Navy has taken delivery of eight C-40s with one
more on contract. An additional six are planned for procurement in the
FYDP.
command, control, and net-centric capabilities
Deployable Joint Command and Control
The DJC2 system is one of SECDEF's three top transformational
initiatives to equip Combatant Commanders with a scalable, standardized
joint C2 system that can be deployed on short notice. This Navy led
effort serves as an example that rapid acquisition is achievable. DJC2
was required to deliver an IOC within 18 months of program start and we
remain on schedule.
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
We are working with the Air Force to successfully converge
development of Navy and Air Force versions of JTRS (JTRS-AMF) to
provide a common acquisition approach. Closely coupled with the JTRS
Program and building on the initial Multi-functional Information
Distribution System (MIDS), we have developed a promising joint effort
with the Air Force that will significantly improve interoperability to
the cockpit and maintain alignment with our tactical radio transition
to the JTRS environment. This effort also has four international
partners who are paying participants in the program.
Mobile User Operating System (MUOS)
The Department remains a strong participant in the National
Security Space Program with our new start MUOS UHF Satellite Program
that exhibits all the capabilities needed to ensure compliance with the
DOD Net-centric models and regulations. Our SPAWAR Space Field Activity
that supports the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is strong and
very effective in identifying collaborative opportunities for Navy-NRO
partnerships.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
The fiscal year 2006 President's budget requests $88.1 million for
continued development of the Navy's CEC. CEC provides a significant
step forward in transforming our situational awareness of the
battlespace. CEC's successful completion of OPEVAL allows
implementation of this capability within the fleet and is a major step
in developing a network-centric force. The CEC program has been
restructured to achieve alignment with the Navy's OA plans as well as
to meet forthcoming requirements from the Joint Single Integrated Air
Picture Systems Engineering Organization (JSSEO). A revised acquisition
strategy reflecting this restructured approach was approved August 18,
2004. This revision included the implementation of a pre-planned
product improvement (P3I) approach to modify the current equipment to
meet reduced size, weight, cost power and cooling objectives. The P3I
approach will also implement the existing Navy design objective with
regard to open systems, interoperability and program protection. By the
end of fiscal year 2006 a total of 40 shipboard and 5 squadrons will be
equipped with CEC. The fiscal year 2006 budget request $40.3 million to
procure 5 additional CEC systems. The acquisition strategy also
outlines the implementation of a single-track management solution set
for Navy systems that will incorporate the IABM from JSSEO. This will
maximize the potential for joint interoperability across the
battlespace. We are currently in the process of competitively selecting
a System Integrator/Design Agent to implement the developed track
management solution set across the fleet.
Distributed Common Ground System--Navy (DCGS-N)
A further step forward in network-centric warfare and one of the
Navy's transformational initiatives is DCGS-N. In January 2004, the
Navy combined the Joint Service Imagery Processing System--Navy with
the Joint Fires Network into DCGS-N. These programs were combined
organizationally, programmatically, and technically. The fiscal year
2006 budget request includes $12.4 million for continued DCGS-N
development. This capability merges ISR, targeting and command and
control systems into a coherent architecture to improve situational
awareness, fires and time-sensitive targeting. It serves as a building
block for the Navy's more extensive FORCEnet concept.
E-2C and Advanced Hawkeye (AHE)
The E-2C AHE is a critical enabler of transformational
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, providing a robust
overland capability against current and future cruise missile-type
targets. The AHE program will modernize the E-2 platform by replacing
the current radar and other system components to maintain open ocean
capability while adding transformational surveillance as well as
theater air and missile defense capabilities. The fiscal year 2006
budget requests $249 million to procure two TE-2Cs in the third year of
a 4-year MYP. This effort will keep the production line viable while
the AHE, formerly known as the Radar Modernization Program, continues
spiral development toward an Initial Operational Capability in fiscal
year 2011. The AHE program continues to execute the SDD program of
record. Further, OA standards are being integrated into E-2C aircraft
and AHE program to enhance interoperability with DOD systems.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
The global war on terror continues to place emphasis on the
importance of UAVs. The fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects our
commitment to a focused array of UAVs that will support and enhance
both surveillance and strike missions with persistent, distributed,
netted sensors.
Fire Scout UAV
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $77.6 million to continue
development of the Fire Scout UAV. The Fire Scout is a Vertical Takeoff
and Landing Tactical UAV (VTUAV) designed to operate from all air-
capable ships, carry modular mission payloads, and operate using the
Tactical Control System and Tactical Common Data Link. The Fire Scout
UAV will provide day/night real time ISR and Targeting as well as
communication-relay and battlefield management capabilities to support
core Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) mission areas of ASW, MIW and ASUW for
the naval forces. Upgrades will include a four-bladed rotor and
increased payload capacity. Upgraded Fire Scout capability will be
fielded with LCS Flt 0.
The Army has selected the Fire Scout for their Army Future Combat
System Class IV UAV. Numerous similarities in hardware components,
testing, logistics, training, software and support requirements, offer
potential for overall program cost reduction which would clearly
benefit both the Army and Navy. We expect to sign a MOA with the Army
for the acquisition of the Fire Scout airframe, and selected subsystems
on a single Navy contract. The airframes will be subsequently modified
to Service specific requirements under separate existing Navy and Army
contracts. The goal is to maximize common support opportunities,
eliminate redundant costs, maximize common avionics and sensor
configuration to promote interoperability, and eliminate redundant
tests.
Vertical Unmanned Air Vehicle (VUAV).
UAVs have played a critical role in recent operations and are also
a key element of our transformation. The Marine Corps is pursuing the
replacement of its almost 20-year-old Pioneer UAV system that has flown
over 6,950 hours in support of OIF highlighting the criticality of
these systems for our Marine forces. Requirements for VUAV are being
developed in consonance with Ship to Objective Maneuver concepts from
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, the naval concepts of Sea Basing and
Seapower 21, and with lessons learned from recent operational
experience. The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $9.2 million to
evaluate the Eagle Eye UAV, currently being developed by the United
States Coast Guard in connection with its Deepwater Program. The
Department will also continue to evaluate the capabilities of Fire
Scout for this mission, seeking commonality within the Department.
Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (JUCAS)
The fiscal year 2006 budget realigns funding to the Air Force to
establish a Joint Program Office with Navy representation to advance
the JUCAS Program. The Department is committed to a JUCAS initiative,
developed in partnership with the Air Force and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. The Navy and the Air Force have defined a
common set of science and technology requirements that recognize the
unique needs of each Service that will form the basis for developing
air vehicles that will contribute to a joint warfighting concept of
operation.
other significant capabilities
Presidential Helicopter Replacement Aircraft (VXX)
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $936 million RDT&E for SDD
efforts for the VXX program. The goal of this accelerated program is to
introduce a new Presidential helicopter by October 2009. The VXX
program will utilize an evolutionary acquisition approach through a
two-part incremental development to deliver a safe, survivable, and
capable vertical lift aircraft while providing uninterrupted
communications with all required agencies. The Department completed a
Milestone B/C Defense Acquisition Board on January 13, 2005, and on
January 28, 2005, a contract was awarded to LMSI to proceed into SDD
and Pilot Production of the first increment aircraft.
Technology
Technology will never substitute for presence; rather it should
always address a mission requirement of making naval forces more
effective. The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $1.78 billion for a
science and technology (S&T) portfolio designed to provide the best
scientific research and technology in the shortest time to maximize the
benefit to our sailors and marines.
Efforts on behalf of Tomorrow's Fleet/Force--largely technology
development--are organized in terms of a series of Future Naval
Capabilities (FNCs) that focus on major technical barriers challenging
the Navy and Marine Corps in transforming themselves for 21st century
operations. Components and systems developed to solve the operational
problems defined by the FNCs are evaluated in feasibility
demonstrations, prototypes, and field trials, with the results made
available to Navy system developers. FNCs are fully integrated with
Navy and Marine warfighting requirements and budget-development
processes.
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests funding to develop several
Innovative Naval Prototypes (INPs). These initiatives include an
electromagnetic railgun prototype; new concepts for persistent, netted,
littoral anti-submarine warfare; technologies to enable Seabasing; and
the naval tactical utilization of space. INPs represent revolutionary
``game changers'' for future naval warfare.
sea trial and sea viking
Experimentation
Identifying and developing future capabilities for naval forces
will require robust experimentation involving systems, platforms,
organizations, and tactics. The Navy's Sea Trial and Marine's Sea
Viking experimentation elements of our Naval Power 21 strategy give the
Fleet a strong voice in evaluating the potential of new technologies
and warfighting concepts. Extensive use of simulations, modeling, joint
test facilities and actual forces is necessary to maintain our
technical advantage and continual command of the seas. The Sea Viking
04 wargame recently conducted by Joint Forces Command examined many of
the issues surrounding Forced Entry operations from a coalition Sea
Base. Sea Viking 06 is the next experimentation platform that is
developing Distributed Operations and will be using or simulating many
of the technologies and systems we are discussing today.
Sea Trial and Sea Enterprise in Action: Operation Respond
In support of the I Marine Expeditionary Force's (I MEF) return to
Iraq and in support of deployed Marines in Afghanistan, the Secretary
of the Navy established a formalized process and action team, Operation
Respond, to rapidly respond to technological and materiel requirements
generated from deployed marines. A senior Navy Marine Corps team co-
chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development
and Acquisition) and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development
reviews and coordinates technical and materiel requirements for
deployed units and utilizes the technical and engineering expertise
throughout the DON and industry to expedite the best solutions
available to counter rapidly evolving threats. This process served I
MEF well in the initial year of deployment to OIF and OEF. The DON is
establishing a Naval Innovation Lab environment to develop innovative
ways to meet emerging technology problems within the global war on
terror. This effort under the ASN (RDA) will leverage and expand the
current roles and capabilities of our established requirements
generation and materiel development and acquisition commands in order
to better respond to innovative enemy threats.
Counter-Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) Technology, Equipment, and
Operations
The Department has reprogrammed over $28.0 million in fiscal years
2004 and 2005 for the testing, assessment and fielding of technology
and equipment to counter and exploit the IED threat. Specific focus
areas include joint, manportable explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance robots, IED electronic
countermeasures, backscatter X-Ray systems, specialized search dogs and
establishing and maintaining an IED countermeasures group at our Naval
EOD Technical Division, Indian Head, Maryland. This group is
responsible for support to the joint, forward-deployed, and CONUS-based
IED exploitation cells, analysis of tactical and technical IED threats,
development and dissemination of EOD threat advisories and EOD tactics,
techniques and procedures, and provision of technical and training
support to EOD operational teams. The Marine's IED Working Group
coordinates closely with Naval EOD Technical Division, the Army's IED
Task Force, and the Joint IED Defeat Integrated Process Team.
Vehicle Hardening
We reprogrammed $144 million in fiscal year 2004 funds and an
additional $77.7 million of Marine Corps personnel funds in fiscal year
2005 to support various Marine Corps vehicle-hardening programs.
Additionally, $90.1 million was provided from Operation Iraqi Freedom
funds to supplement and accelerate fulfillment of armor requirements
through June 2005. Throughout this effort, both the Marine Corps
Systems Command and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab have worked with
the Army Developmental Test Command to rapidly test and assess various
ballistic materials to include ballistic glass, armor, and ceramic
materials for use in vehicle hardening. To date, over 5,000 vehicles
have been hardened with various combinations of interim armor to
production armor kits. Other vehicle hardening initiatives include the
development of an Explosion Resistant Coating (ERC) and a gunner
shield. ERC is a polymer coating material that provides an additive
lightweight blast and ballistic protection for conventional armor. An
innovative, joint testing linkage was established between the Marine
Corps Warfighting Lab, Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren, United
States Air Force Research Lab, and the Technical Support Working Group
to rapidly test the efficacy of ERC as a ballistic material for
protecting vehicles. Testing was completed for HMMWV protection from
small arms, IED, and mine attacks. ERC is deployed in Iraq on 120 HMMWV
interim armor sets. Gunner shields provide an armored turret as an
additional level of protection for exposed vehicle gunners operating in
HMMWVs and Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements to date just under
1,900 have been fielded to forces in Iraq. ERC in multiple
configurations with added composites may provide a lighter and
promising ballistic protection when applied to vehicles. Testing and
analysis is currently underway. Initial testing of ERC has demonstrated
a lighter level of protection can be attained. We are committed to
fully exploring ERC options.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
The Marine Corps is engaged in initiatives to provide enhanced ISR
capabilities in theater. The Dragon Eye UAV is in full-scale fielding
and the Marine Corps is working to conduct an Extended User Assessment
of the Silver Fox UAV system. The Marine Corps is in the process of
creating requirements for a Tier II UAV system to provide an organic
UAV to the Infantry Regiment. The I MEF Scan Eagle services lease had
codified a capability gap at this echelon and the Marine Corps
Warfighting Lab is coordinating with Marine Corps Combat Development
Command to find a long-term solution. The Marines have also employed
aerostat balloon platforms to provide persistent ISR capability.
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)
As a result of Army aviation lessons learned, Navy and Marine Corps
aviation staffs undertook a coordinated rapid fielding initiative of
more than $152 million to upgrade ASE for Marine aviation units,
preparing to deploy to Iraq in 2004. These efforts focused on ASE to
counter infrared manportable missiles and small arms being employed by
insurgents in more advanced anti-aircraft tactics. As a result of the
focused efforts by our Navy and Marine Corps aviation maintenance teams
and hard-working contractors, every Marine Helicopter engaged in OIF II
is today supporting combat operations with upgraded ASE. All deploying
aircraft receive the ``V2'' upgrade to the AAR-47 Missile and Laser
Warning Set and the new ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispensing systems; AH-1W
aircraft received IR suppressor exhaust modifications to reduce their
signatures; AH-1W, UH-1N and KC-130 aircraft have been equipped with
the more advanced APR-39AV2 radar detection system; CH-53E aircraft
received interior ballistic armor and new ramp-mounted GAU-21 .50
caliber machine guns; existing IR jamming systems on the CH-46E and KC-
130 aircraft were upgraded. CH-46 aircraft received the M-240 7.62
caliber machine guns, lightweight armor, and lightweight armored
cockpit seats.
reforming the acquisition system
The Department is committed to simplifying the acquisition system,
streamlining the bureaucratic decision making process and promoting
innovation. We continue to take advantage of numerous acquisition
reforms to shorten cycle times, leverage commercial products and
capabilities, optimize human systems integration and improve the
quality of equipment being provided to our warfighters. Price-based and
alpha contracting techniques show promise in programs such as the
Tomahawk remanufacture program. We use leverage from international
involvement in our acquisition programs to reduce our research and
development costs and gain economies in production. The Department also
seeks to improve its internal business practices and integrate
commercial ideas. By improving these practices, we expect to be able to
shift more dollars into combat capability and quality of service.
The Department consolidated its directive concerning acquisition
with the capabilities development/requirements direction, which
contributes to joint capabilities integration and to better
communication, cooperation and coordination between the Navy and Marine
Corps capabilities development and acquisition communities. In 2004, we
worked with industry to identify effective ways, including the use of
appropriate profit/incentive arrangements, to encourage improved
performance under Navy and Marine Corps contracts. Navy also led the
Office of the Secretary of Defense commodity council pilot for
strategic sourcing of administrative services, and made wider use of
internal contracting centers of excellence and web-enabled contracting
vehicles.
acquisition logistics
Continuous Improvement
The Navy and Marine Corps Team continues to implement several
continuous improvement initiatives consistent with the goals of the
President's Management Agenda that enable realignment of resources in
order to increase our output and re-capitalize our force. The
cornerstone of our continuous improvement effort is the education and
use of industry proven Lean and Six Sigma efficiency methodologies in
our day-to-day operations. Our industrial activities including back
office support, fleet leadership and our acquisition community are all
embarking on the journey of institutionalizing closed loop continuous
improvement practices.
Lean efficiency events that concentrate on increasing velocity and
productivity in our Supply, and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance
Departments (AIMD) were completed on the U.S.S. Harry Truman (CVN 75).
The outcomes of these events are impressive from operational and
resourcing perspectives. Reductions in supply wait times and
maintenance turn-around-times exceeded 50 percent. The benefit and
migration to all afloat AIMDs will allow us to improve our afloat
processes and influence our future manning requirements on CVN 21 Class
carriers. These were the first Lean events conducted on Navy warships.
Our planning, logistics, and maintenance activities are receiving
intense Lean and Six Sigma training as every improvement workshop to
date has yielded order of magnitude improvements. Our Sea Systems
Enterprise commenced Task Force Lean. Our Aviation Enterprise continues
to yield excellent results with AIRSpeed initiatives. Our Submarine
enterprise through Team Submarine is making great progress in targeting
and leaning our current processes. The acquisition community commenced
initiatives that have a goal to reduce the volume of acquisition
related paperwork by 50 percent and reduction in paperwork cycle time
down to 90 days.
Another pillar of continuous improvement is the shaping of our
business operating systems. Our Converged Enterprise Resource Planning
(CERP) program entered into the System Development and Demonstration
phase in September 2004, and is expected to initially deploy in fiscal
year 2006. The core of this system is SAP. Supply, Maintenance,
Business Operations and Financial communities will use this integrated
software that incorporates commercial best practices. In addition to
increasing productivity, the system provides real time information,
total asset visibility, compliance with the Chief Financial Office Act,
and serves as a forcing function for the integration or sun setting of
legacy, standalone systems. The Marine Corps GCSS-MC operating system
is also in development stage. It will provide increased asset
visibility for our warfighters at our ``last tactical mile.'' These
continuous improvement initiatives enable us to increase our combat
capabilities with the expectation that we become more efficient, agile,
flexible, and reliable at a reduced cost of doing business.
summary
Our mission remains bringing the fight to our enemies. The
increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
future conflict, will continue to drive the need for naval forces and
the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
seas. The increased emphasis on the littorals and the global nature of
the terrorist threat will demand the ability to strike where and when
required, with the maritime domain serving as the key enabler for U.S.
military force.
Accordingly, we will execute the global war on terror while
transforming for the future fight. We will continue to refine our
operational concepts and appropriate technology investments to deliver
the kind of dominant military power from the sea envisioned in Sea
Power 21. We will continue to pursue the operational concepts for
seabasing persistent combat power, even as we invest in technology and
systems to enable naval vessels to deliver decisive, effects-based
combat power in every tactical and operational dimension. We look
forward to the future from a strong partnership with Congress that has
brought the Navy and Marine Corps Team many successes today. Thank you
for your consideration.
Senator Talent. John, do you have your discussion about
procurement changes and flexible funding? Is that in the
statement that you submitted, and if so where is it?
Mr. Young. I am not sure it is in the written statement.
Senator Talent. It is not in the written statement?
Mr. Young. It should be. Can we locate that and tell you?
Senator Talent. If it is in the written statement, yes.
Mr. Young. Okay.
[The information referred to follows:]
Flexible funding was not discussed in my written statement. Below
is a description of alternative financing approaches for ship
procurement that the Navy is exploring.
The Navy's position is that ships, in general, should be fully
funded in the year of authorization and appropriations. The Navy should
be allowed to continue the practice of advance procurement for long
lead materials and design efforts that support delivery schedules and
reduce end item cost. However, the Navy recognizes several situations
where a financing strategy other than full funding has, or will have,
allowed the government to obtain the best possible value for the
taxpayer.
Examples of these include:
a. Incremental Funding, used on LHD 8, LHD 6, and SSN 23.This
is good for very specific types of hulls, which are built at a
rate of less than one per year and where design changes during
construction are anticipated.
b. Two-Year Split Funding, used, or planned for, on CVN RCOH,
CVN 21, and LHA(R). Used to procure large capital ships with a
production rate of less than one per year. Allows the Navy more
efficient and effective use of Navy Total Obligation Authority
for the SCN account.
c. Incremental Detail Design in SCN(AP), used, or planned
for, on VA SSN, CVN-21, DD(X), and MPFF. Allows efficient
execution of Detail Design and an early start of construction
on lead ships.
d. Lead Ship in RDT&E. Used on LCS, requested but rejected by
Congress for DD(X). Allows for maximum flexibility in inserting
new technology and overcoming cost growth as the design is
matured.
While full funding, in general, is important to maintain fiscal
discipline, the Navy believes it should have enough flexibility to
employ financing strategies other than full funding when doing so
represents a path to better overall value to the taxpayer, helps to
maintain the industrial base, and supports CNO priority to deliver
needed assets to the Fleet faster and better in order to achieve our
mission of Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing and support the global
war on terrorism.
You and the members of the committee have played a personal
role in all of this progress and I offer my great thanks on
behalf of the Department, the Nation's marines and sailors for
your insight, leadership, and support. We look forward to the
chance to answer your questions.
Senator Talent. Thank you.
Admiral Sestak.
STATEMENT OF VADM JOSEPH A. SESTAK, JR., USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS
Admiral Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate that at the beginning of this hearing you mentioned
that you wanted us to talk a bit about the seabasing concept.
To some degree I think the military is obligated to come over
here and explain to what function do we serve society so that
we might be maintained. I think the first person that I was
aware of that spoke about seabasing was Samuel Huntington from
Harvard University back in 1954, where in an era of massive
retaliation, where each of us, we and the Soviet Union, both
relied on a nuclear weapons deterrent, he stated that the
Navy's function serving our society is to use the seas as a
base, not to command or gain command of the seas, but rather to
use the seas to gain conventional supremacy on land.
So I want just to take 3 minutes out and talk about the
seabasing concept. It is important to note: to what end does
the Navy serve this Nation. Today we have 85 percent of the
value of all international trade and 99 percent of the volume
sitting at sea. Businesses' warehouses are sitting at sea
today. Two-thirds of our economic growth recently has been
because of our exports. So to some degree, if for no other
reason, it is worth having a Navy to ``keep the dog on the
porch,'' to make sure no one interrupts this commerce that
fuels our Nation in what is a public commons, the seas, where
anyone can be legally at any moment.
But you get a ``two-for'' from the Navy, being forward,
protecting our economic commerce, the dog that does not bark.
That is, a Navy that can reach out, as it did in 1988, at a
moment's notice and touch a Qadafi in Libya, or reach out, as
it did in 1998, to reach into Afghanistan and Somalia
simultaneously to strike against terrorism.
But the third thing that this Nation gains from the Navy is
access. That is what I think you are aware of, Mr. Chairman,
when you were talking about a concept that then can come down
to programs, such as the Maritime Prepositioning Force. If I
could just hold up three short slides to say that as we are
talking about the seabasing concept it is important--and I
passed these out to your staffer--that this [indicating] is
what we are trying to prevent. This is a picture in Operation
Desert Storm. This is a Marine brigade or an Army division--
unloading ashore.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
This is also how we fought the last war, Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). We sat there and stockpiled our forces ashore
until we were ready to go on the offensive. In 1991, Saddam
shot a Scud missile that just missed this formation. There will
be no nation in the future of any heft that will ever permit us
to build up our forces ashore.
So the question in seabasing is how do I marry up this
brigade at sea and put it ashore without permitting a buildup,
that it goes ashore ready to fight? That is the challenge that
you have seen the Navy and the Marine Corps come to grips with
with the seabasing concept the last 2 years.
Second, this picture right here is 1910. This is 1910; this
was the first flight in Hampton Roads of a plane from an
aircraft carrier.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thirty two years later, the very first time we used a
carrier in anger happened today, 63 years ago on the Doolittle
raid. We jointly launched the U.S. Air Force off an aircraft
carrier, a sovereign piece of American territory off Japan,
because we had no other way to strike against the country
because we had no bases except the sea from which to strike.
The importance of this is not that we struck Japan. The
importance is it took us about 32 years to get it right. I came
back from sea with a battle group from the Persian Gulf a
little less than 2 years ago. I could not have explained to
you, Senator, what an MPF ship was. But in 2 years I have seen,
working equally with our Marine Corps, that we are beginning to
not only think the unthinkable and fathom the unfathomable, as
some people say, but we are beginning to ``pay cash'' on this
concept.
So today I am ready to explain to you the programs by which
we are able to now execute this vision, I believe, that is as
innovative as the idea of putting an aircraft at sea, was; now,
we are putting this ``pile of iron'' at sea and deploying it
ashore.
The very last slide is this one--this is an amphibious
assault.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
This is similar to how we did it in Guadalcanal and
Normandy. In the future we may very well do that also. But the
point is this: If a marine gets on a ship in San Diego, it
takes upwards of 4 weeks to assemble a large amphibious task
force off a nation like Korea and insert it ashore. We can be
there 60 percent faster and with 40 percent more force, if
MPF(F), much like that aircraft carrier that launched in 1910
off Hampton Roads, loads out the way that we as a team are
about to present you as the seabasing concept.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Sestak follows:]
Prepared Statement by VADM Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's Fiscal Year 2006 Seabasing programs.
The current and future security environments have become
increasingly challenging to U.S. and allied interests because of
regional security issues, the concern with terrorism globally, the
expanded influence of non-state actors and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). As the U.S. security strategy for the 21st
century evolves, our Nation remains committed to its global
responsibilities to ensure national security through peace, prosperity
and freedom. However, U.S. options to extend global influence through
forward basing of military capability are diminishing. Potential
enemies may be likely to strike U.S. bases abroad in a conflict with
increasingly lethal weapons, including WMD that are either developed by
indigenous industries or purchased abroad. Many nations may find it
politically untenable to host U.S. bases or allow access through their
territory. The strategic challenge for our National and military
leaders will be to maintain a global presence for security in the face
of decreasing access overseas.
sea power 21
The objective of Sea Power 21 is to ensure that our Nation
possesses credible combat capability on scene to promote regional
stability, to deter aggression throughout the world, to assure access
of joint forces and to fight and win should deterrence fail. Sea Power
21 guides the Navy's transformation from a threat-based platform
centric structure to a capabilities-based, fully integrated force. The
pillars of Sea Power 21--Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Base--are
integrated by FORCEnet, the means by which the power of sensors,
networks, weapons, warriors and platforms are harnessed in a networked
combat force. It is this networked force that will provide the access
with the strategic agility and persistence necessary to prevail in the
continuing war on terror, as well as the speed and overwhelming power
to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any regional peer competitor
in combat operations.
The Navy of the future must be capabilities-based and threat-
oriented. While the fabric of our fighting force will still be the
power and speed needed to seize the initiative and swiftly defeat any
regional threat, FORCEnet's pervasive awareness (C\4\ISR) will be more
important than mass. Because of its access from the sea, the Navy and
Marine Corps are focusing significant effort and analysis in support of
joint combat power projection by leveraging this traditional access
provided by the oceans through Seabasing, with the access now provided
by space and cyberspace through FORCEnet. It is the synergistic access
provided by these great ``commons''--the sea and space and cyberspace--
that is the revolution of the future.
To this end, the technological innovations and human-systems
integration advances in future platforms remain critical. Our future
warships will sustain operations in forward areas longer, be able to
respond more quickly to emerging contingencies, and generate more
sorties and simultaneous attacks against greater numbers of multiple
aim points and targets with greater effect than our current fleet.
However, the future is about the capabilities posture of this fleet,
which is why the future is also about establishing C\4\ISR as a
warfighting weapon and integrator from the sea . . . and understanding
the impact of changing C\4\ISR investment strategies on the warfight,
in particular as it enhances our ability to project power from the
seabase.
seabasing vision
Today's U.S. strategic guidance requires secure strategic access
and the freedom to act globally. However, during periods of crisis,
combatant commanders will need the capability to contain the crisis by
deterring potential adversaries or seizing the initiative to swiftly
defeat enemy actions. Given the likely operational environment, the
Joint Force Commander (JFC) must be able to project power when forward
basing may not be available. Even where forward bases are otherwise
available, their use may be politically undesirable or operationally
restricted for military use, and the JFC may desire to reduce the
footprint and visibility of the joint force. Where potential air, sea,
and land entry points are available, their predictability may allow the
enemy to focus his anti-access capabilities against our forces. In
addition, they may be a source of friction in some coalition situations
and present security challenges that theater operational objectives.
Seabasing is one of several evolving Joint Integrating Concepts
that will be a critical capability for joint forces in 2015-2025 that
significantly increases options while decreasing liabilities, both
militarily and politically. Projecting and sustaining joint combat
power from the seas, Seabasing assures joint access by leveraging the
operational maneuver of sovereign, distributed, and networked forces
operating globally. Seabasing capitalizes on the maritime dominance
gained by our Nation's forces, and uses the maneuver space and freedom
of action afforded by the sea, space and cyberspace to project and
sustain joint combat power from an inherently mobile aggregation of
distributed and networked platforms. There are seven overarching
principles that are essential to applying the Seabasing concept across
a wide range of scenarios:
Use the sea as maneuver space. Seabasing exploits the
freedom of the high seas to conduct operational maneuver in the
maritime (to include littoral) environment relatively
unconstrained by political and diplomatic restrictions, for
rapid deployment and immediate employment. Sea based operations
provide JFCs with an operational flexibility to support the
immediate deployment/employment/sustainment of forces across
the extended depth and breadth of the battlespace.
Leverage forward presence and joint interdependence.
Joint forces operating from the sea base, in conjunction with
other globally based joint forces, provide the JFC an on-scene,
unconstrained, credible offensive and defensive capability
during the early stages of a crisis. Combined with other
elements of this joint interdependent force, forward deployed
joint forces can help to deter or preclude a crisis or enable
the subsequent introduction of additional forces, equipment,
and sustainment.
Protect joint force operations. Seabasing provides a
large measure of inherent force protection derived from its
freedom of operational maneuver in a maritime environment. The
combined capabilities of joint platforms in multiple mediums
(surface, sub-surface, and air) provide the joint forces a
defensive shield both at sea and ashore. The integration of
these capabilities and freedom of maneuver effectively degrades
the enemy's ability to successfully target and engage friendly
forces while facilitating joint force deployment, employment,
and sustainment.
Provide scalable, responsive joint power projection.
Forces rapidly closing the sea base by multi-dimensional means
(air, surface, and subsurface) give the JFC the ability to
rapidly scale and tailor forces/capabilities to the mission.
Seabasing provides an option to the JFC to mass, disperse, or
project joint combat power throughout the battlespace at the
desired time to influence, deter, contain, or defeat an
adversary.
Sustain joint force operations from the sea. Sea based
logistics entails sustaining forces through an increasingly
anticipatory and responsive logistics system to support forces
afloat and select joint/multinational forces operating ashore.
The sea base is sustained through the interface with support
bases and strategic logistics pipelines enabling joint forces
to remain on station, where needed, for extended periods of
time. Seabasing uses selective off-load to assemble and deliver
tailored sustainment packages directly to joint forces
operating ashore.
Expand access options and reduce dependence on land
bases. Seabasing integrates global power projection
capabilities with sea based power projection capabilities to
provide the JFC with multiple access options to complement
forward basing in the Joint Operating Area (JOA), and reducing
reliance on forward basing if the security environment
dictates. This includes theater access capabilities at improved
and unimproved ports and airfields.
Create uncertainty for our adversaries. Seabasing
places an adversary in a dilemma through the conduct of
dispersed and distributed operations. The options of multiple
points and means of entry require an adversary to either
disperse or concentrate his forces, creating opportunities to
exploit seams and gaps in his defenses.
These seven overarching principles guide the development of the
Seabasing Concept and address how Seabasing will be employed by the
future Joint Force. Seabasing is the capability to shape a strategic
environment, to be rapidly employed in the global war on terror, and to
win decisively in a major conflict--using the world's greatest maneuver
area, the seas, to project its power.
seabasing operational principles
In order to deliver credible combat power across the full spectrum
of potential future military operations, the Seabasing Vision must be
operationalized. This requires tying together the right Joint
capabilities, in the right manner, to pursue operational and tactical
objectives contributing to overall strategic goals. Seabasing allows
the JFC to do this with minimum, or without, reliance on forward
airfields or ports, providing tremendous operational flexibility. The
key operational principles that make Seabasing a national asset to
pursue national goals are laid out below:
Military Access. Joint forces need to be able to flow
into and out of a theater of operations as the operational
tempo requires and the threat dictates. Among the other strike
groups, our forward deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and
Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) with their supporting
surface combatants and submarines provide a robust capability
to ensure access from the Sea Base in non-permissive
environments. Assured access in a theater of operations is key
not only for naval forces, but for the Joint Force, and
Seabasing acts as a Joint portal through which a Joint Combat
Force can assemble the appropriate mix of capabilities required
to ensure missions success at a time and place of its choosing.
It is important to note that this access is not just from the
seas, but it is also gaining access to information and
intelligence through surveillance and reconnaissance, preparing
the battlespace with credible combat power to shape--that is,
deter or dissuade--an adversary from acting against U.S. or
allied interests. These attributes define Seabasing as a true
national capability.
Distributed. Seabasing will take advantage of the
global commons--the sea, space and cyberspace--to expand our
dominance throughout the battlespace. The JFC will be able to
mass effects, rather than forces, keeping open alternate
avenues of approach and forcing adversaries to remain off
balance. With deep operational reach, we will be able to mask
our intentions and rapidly apply combat power to either
interdict terrorists without warning, or to preempt enemy
action. Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Multi-mission Aircraft (MMA) patrol
aircraft, Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) intelligence aircraft, JSF
operating from the follow-on large-deck amphibious assault ship
(LHA(R)), and Advanced (E-2C) Hawkeye (AHE) operating from CSGs
all provide the critical ISR and command and control necessary
to rapidly survey this massive and distributed battlespace so
forces can react quickly and decisively when required.
Netted. In order to be distributed, we must be netted;
netted in the combat forces' pervasive awareness of the
battlespace; in their ability to communicate across that
battlespace; and netted in the control of forces and effects
throughout the battlespace. This is a Joint net where, for
example, USAF global strike aircraft can seamlessly flow into
and out of the battlespace; this is a Joint net where Army
Styker Brigades can call for supporting fires from DD(X) long
range advanced gun systems (AGS), or USMC Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) flying from LHA(R). The rationale to close the well deck
on LHA(R) and increase its aviation strike capability was
central to delivering a more lethal force and increasing the
nodes within the Joint combat network. Additionally, this joint
net will be enhanced as Special Operations Forces are inserted
by cruise missile-equipped submarines (SSGNs), and then call
for strikes conducted covertly by SSNs and SSGNs with Tactical
Tomahawk (TACTOM) land attack missiles. FORCEnet, with its
constellation of Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) and
Tactical Satellite (TSAT) space platforms, Joint Tactical Radio
System (JTRS) radios, and tactical data links will be key
enablers for coordinating distributed operations in a netted
environment.
Greater Operational Availability. The ability to
rapidly assemble seabasing requirements with robust
capabilities is inextricably linked with Operational
Availability and the sustainment of our Joint forces. Seabasing
is enhanced and enabled by improving our force posture and
having the right forces forward at the right time--presence
with purpose. This includes aggressively using our Forward
Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF), Sea Swapping crews with our
deployed ships and maintaining the readiness required to
quickly surge naval forces in accordance with Fleet Response
Plan (FRP) policies. Operational availability is also enhanced
by the Maritime Preposition Force (Future) (MPF(F)) ships,
which rapidly bring at sea arrival and assembly of significant
ground combat power. This is ground combat power that can be
used for Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), in stability
operations, global war on terrorism missions, or in support of
humanitarian operations seen in Operation Unified Assistance
(the tsunami relief efforts). MPF(F) delivers the JFC the
capability to conduct rapid and decisive combat operations
across a wide spectrum of challenging national objectives.
Joint Transformation. As Seabasing matures and grows
in its sophistication in Joint operations, it will further
enhance transformation for the other Services. The Army and Air
Force will rely on Seabasing when they consider combat lift,
force employment, and sustainment and force protection. This
serves as the foundation for capabilities-based, threat-
oriented force planning--not platform or Service-centric
planning. The JFC will be able to consider flowing U.S. Army
distributed maneuver forces and their logistics through the Sea
Base, utilizing the Theater Support Vessels (TSVs) and High-
Speed Vessels (HSVs). These transformational platforms, coupled
with the robust Sea Shield that Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) of the surface combatant force (DDGs, DD(X),
CG(X)) and the CSG air wing, exploit the advantages of speed
and maneuver. The projection of Sea Shield will not only exist
at sea, but deep overland. Overland defense will be further
enhanced by Naval and Air Force offensive counter-air (OCA) and
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD). Along with Air Force
strategic tanking, Joint Forces from the sea will have
persistence and reach unparalleled in past combat operations.
Capabilities Based . . . Threat Oriented. As the
operational principles above demonstrate, Seabasing will cause
JFCs and their planners to focus on capabilities, not
platforms. They will plan and conduct parallel operations from
vastly different operational approaches. They will synchronize
across a massive battlespace with increased precision and
lethality. They will think in terms of theater-wide force
protection and sustainment. The overall impact is that
Seabasing will drive transformation; a transformation that
delivers the combat power tailored for the threat, rather than
just what is available.
The future security environment and battlespace will be complex,
uncertain, ambiguous, and volatile. Seabasing offers the JFC strategic
options he has not had in the past due to uncertain access and basing
rights. Our robust military capabilities can be assembled and poised
for action without being subject to the constraints and restraints
often imposed in the past by neutral and allied nations alike. When the
security situation requires American commitment and presence, whether
to ensure the free flow of commerce, to strengthen diplomatic actions,
or to demonstrate political will, Seabasing--characterized by the
principles above--provides the Nation the capability to assemble the
joint forces needed to attain the desired end state.
sea base concept of operations--the maritime prepositioning ship of the
future mpf(f)
Our Sea Base Concept of Operations is a Global Concept of
Operations which employs a flexible force posture that includes Carrier
Strike Groups (CSGs), Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs), surface and
submarine strike groups, and logistics groups, among others. These
strike and support groups are capable of responding across the spectrum
of conflict simultaneously around the world. From the period prior to
the onset of a crisis through the completion of stabilization
operations, Joint Seabasing provides scalable power projection options
to the Joint Force Commander. These capabilities provide a framework
for the range of employment options available to the JFC through Joint
Seabasing. With regard to forcible entry and the employment of MPF(F)
in the future, the five tenants of Seabasing are:
a. Close--rapid closure of joint force capabilities from
within, or to, an area of crisis. This force, a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) deploys from the United States to
the MPF(F) via two principal means--high-speed sealift and
strategic airlift. Strategic airlift is used to fly the marines
to a forward base to embark MPF(F) and marry up with their
heavy equipment. Sealift is used to close non-self deploying
aircraft, such as CH-53, and its support equipment directly to
the Sea Base. The MPF(F) with its embarked marines join up with
the high-speed sealift and non-self-deploying aircraft at the
Sea Base, as it is underway for rapid assembly, saving time for
closure to the theater.
b. Assemble--seamless integration of scalable joint force
capabilities on and around secure sea based assets. The
critical capability of the future prepositioning force will be
selective offload, which will require a ``warehouse at sea,''
with ``just in time logistics.'' This movement of combat and
combat support equipment will be executed when required by the
Commander, at sea, vice waiting for its assembly at an advanced
base ashore or within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). This new
capability will dramatically alter the way future forces are
employed, and improve their security while they are being
assembled for combat. These assembly methods will be executed
quickly and in high sea states, with reduced manpower. These
methods involve advanced technologies that include:
i. External cargo transfer and movement, including
the use of sophisticated modern crane technologies
ii. Internal cargo movement, using modern state-of-
the art commercial warehousing techniques, adapted for
use at sea
iii. Inter-Modal Packaging systems that support
efficient and largely automated external and internal
cargo movement
iv. Creative use of internal volume (Internal Broken
Stow factor) creating the required space for selective
cargo breakdown, movement, and assembly.
Under a robust and properly assembled Sea Shield, assembly
for combat will be conducted quickly and without the
vulnerabilities associated with assembly at fixed ports and
airfields. This transformational capability supports the
critical at-sea arrival and sustainment timelines required in
future potential major conflict operations. MPF(F) is also
uniquely suited to respond on short notice to provide
additional combat power in support of the global war on terror.
c. Employ--flexible employment and insertion of scalable
joint force capabilities to meet mission objectives supported
from the sea base. Integrated power projection includes not
only the use of all-weather precision strike throughout the
JOA, but also the insertion of ground forces at key objectives
selected by the JFC. In order to do so, we will use a mix of
vertical and surface assault:
i. Vertical maneuver with rotary-wing platforms
(e.g., MV-22 and CH-53) from the MPF(F) expands the
options for the JFC. Coupled with JSF from LHA(R) to
increase airborne fires, this vertical insertion
enables the JFC to employ combat forces deep into
austere environments with increased lethality, mobility
and survivability.
ii. Simultaneous surface maneuver with the enhanced
Landing Craft, Air-Cushion (LCAC(X)) for forcible entry
operations from the sea provides additional options for
the JFC and supports heavy combat payloads.
The Sea Base must also possess the requisite capabilities to
exercise command, control, computer, communications and
intelligence (C\4\I) functions to support the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) Commander. It must also be able to ``size
up'' to support a JFC or Combined (Coalition) Joint Task Force
(CJTF) Commander, potentially as a part of the MPF(F). These
command elements will have the capability to exercise command
from a forward command platform, using reach-back for support
from ashore.
d. Sustain--persistent sustainment of selected joint forces
afloat and ashore through transition to decisive combat
operations ashore. An essential requirement within the
distributed Sea Base is continual sustainment of joint force
operations, including selected joint forces operating ashore.
The force protection benefit of Seabasing will be to minimize
or eliminate an operational pause caused by the buildup of a
large lodgment ashore. Preventing this pause will reduce the
footprint ashore and move the logistics ``tail'' to the sea
base and within the protection provided by the Sea Shield.
Additionally, the extent and degree with which the Sea Base can
provide medical care at sea and rapidly move injuries to
complex facilities outside the JOA will aid in improved
casualty care and increased efficiencies as the Sea Base
supports the theater commander in the future.
e. Reconstitute--the capability to rapidly recover,
reconstitute and redeploy joint combat capabilities within and
around the maneuverable Sea Base for subsequent operations. As
follow-on forces enter the JOA, or as the operational situation
dictates, the JFC may rapidly transition joint sea-based forces
to sequential or follow-on operations through at-sea
reconstitution. Rapid reconstitution supports persistent combat
operations by eliminating the need to wait for additional
forces or new equipment from the United States to support
additional operations in another theater of operations.
The bridge to naval transformation is Seabasing, centered on its
ability to project, sustain and defend decisive, flexible and credible
Joint combat power ashore. Joint combat forces will operate from the
Sea Base and the Navy is committed to MPF(F) as the centerpiece and key
enabler of the Sea Base. These future Maritime Pre-positioning Ships
will serve a broader operational and expeditionary function than
current pre-positioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational
flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force that will enhance
the responsiveness of the joint team by the at-sea assembly of a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade that arrives by high-speed airlift and sealift
from the United States to the forward operating locations and directly
to the MPF(F), itself. These ships will off-load forces, weapons and
supplies selectively while remaining far over the horizon, and they
will reconstitute ground maneuver forces aboard ship after completing
assaults deep inland; and they will then sustain in-theater logistics,
communications and medical capabilities for the joint force for
extended periods, and then reconstitute (e.g. maneuver to another
theater of operations) to be employed ashore, again, as needed.
summary
Seabasing is a transformational joint concept that exploits the
United States' control of the sea to provide a viable option for the
military commander to project joint power. The Joint Sea Base provides
the operational ``freedom of maneuver'' to conduct a full range of
scalable military operations. The mission of our Navy remains
maintaining ``command of the sea'' and projecting--while protecting and
sustaining--sovereign combat power across the global commons. The
increasing dependence of our world on the seas, coupled with growing
uncertainty of other nations' ability or desire to ensure access in a
future conflict, will continue to drive the need for naval forces and
the capability to project decisive joint power by access through the
seas. The increased emphasis on the littorals and the global nature of
the terrorist threat will demand the ability to apply effective and
adequate combat power at the place and time of the Nation's choosing.
Seabasing and the application of its operational concept within the Sea
Base is a catalyst for transformation--across each Service--and as the
key enabler within the maritime domain as a national capability for the
U.S. military force.
We look forward to the future from a strong partnership with
Congress that has brought the Navy and Marine Corps Team many successes
today. We thank you for your consideration.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Admiral.
General Magnus.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. JAMES N.
MATTIS, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
General Magnus. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Senator Kennedy,
and other members for allowing us to relate to you what we are
doing with our naval forces and our Marine Corps today. With
your permission, we will submit our statement for the record
and I would like to defer comments to my shipmate and fellow
warrior, Lieutenant General Jim Mattis.
Senator Talent. Okay. General Mattis.
General Mattis. Chairman Talent, Senator Kennedy, and
distinguished members of the Seapower Subcommittee: As Bob
Magnus mentioned, our written statement has been submitted and
I ask that it be accepted for the record.
It is our privilege to report to you on how we are meeting
today's combat challenges and how we are developing the
capabilities to ensure marines remain ready for the future. The
Marine Corps remains fully engaged in the global war on
terrorism. With 368 marines killed and 3,879 marines wounded in
the war on terror, we are keenly aware of our priorities.
Together we stand shoulder to shoulder with young Americans
of the Navy and all the Services and in Iraq and Afghanistan
with those nations' maturing security forces. Our marines are
performing extremely well, due in no small part to the support
we have received from Congress. The war's operational costs are
funded through supplemental appropriations. Internally, we have
reorganized to stand up additional units designed to prosecute
this fight. We have cross-leveled equipment and rapidly fielded
equipment in response to our warfighters' emerging
requirements. By adapting our training to lessons learned from
the battlefield, we are successfully staying ahead of the
enemy.
Further, we deeply appreciate the end strength increase you
authorized and appropriated. Our greatest asset and the focus
of our effort is the individual marine, whose intellect,
physical capabilities, morale, and will consistently outperform
the enemy.
Your support has enabled the quick fielding of equipment
and technology that address threats across the detect, collect,
interrupt, and mitigate force protection continuum. In
particular, rotary wing aviation survivability equipment, the
evolution of our vehicle hardening efforts, and the ongoing
development in technologies to disrupt insurgents' IED attacks
continue to save lives and preserve combat power.
While the sobering losses of our killed and wounded sadden
us all, our casualty rate has declined markedly over the last
60 days, due in no small part to those resources you have
provided. We partner closely with the sister services to gain
synergy in effort and economies of scale. Our close working
relationship with our comrades in the Army has been most
beneficial.
While the entire Marine Corps is engaged in supporting the
global war on terror, we are also preparing for future
conflicts. Under the construct of Naval Power 21, Navy and
Marine forces of the future will further exploit our Nation's
premier asymmetric advantage, command of the sea, and be able
to leverage immediate full-scale joint operations in support of
combatant commanders without relying on host nation support or
timely buildup of combat power on foreign soil through seaports
and airports that could be denied to us for political or
military reasons.
Acknowledging that decisive combat today is fought on land
due to our supremacy on sea and in the air, your Navy and
Marine Corps are employing the seabase concept to exploit the
sea as maneuver room against the enemy ashore. We view
seabasing to be the cornerstone of naval transformation and,
more importantly, a national capability. Both OEF and OIF have
proven that we must be sensitive to our friends' cultural
differences and bordering country disputes. Denied access will
be the recurring theme in future conflicts. A national
capability, seabasing, unreliant on the need for a land-based
footprint, one that can loiter over the horizon and project,
protect, and sustain integrated joint warfighting capabilities,
will give the President immediate response options to protect
our Nation's interests and sovereignty, assisting our friends
and checkmating enemy designs early.
We need the help of Congress to take steps now in order for
us to best prepare the Nation to face tomorrow's irregular
threat under any access environments. To fully achieve our
capability, we need our ship, surface connector, air connector,
strike, and MPF future programs funded to bring this national
capability to fruition. We deeply appreciate this hearing.
Without decreasing our flexibility, lethality, or
sustainability, we are increasing our Marine Corps agility
using the capabilities provided by programs such as lighter
weight artillery and new procurement of light armored vehicles.
MV-22 and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, you noted in your
remarks, Mr. Chairman, allow us to strike faster and deeper.
These, combined with the Joint Strike Fighter, Heavy Lift
Replacement Helicopter, and the KC-130J, will make us even more
capable. The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the MV-22 are
our number one ground and air priorities.
We are working initiatives to extend the service life of
the CH-53 Echo until the Heavy Lift Replacement can come on
line. Our 51 KC-130 requirement has the 17 J models already
delivered. These will provide us the aerial refueling
capability needed to support our combatant commanders in the
plan commitments and take full advantage of our rotary and
fixed wing assets. With the Navy's support, we can develop the
needed LPD class, LHA(R), LCAC(X), the Joint High Speed Vessel,
and DD(X) to develop the seabasing national capability that can
provide sovereign options to the President, address any enemy
mischief, and conduct operations from tsunami relief to
forcible entry.
As we look to the future, we will continue to seek joint
solutions. We have strong and continuing dialogue with the Army
to share ideas, concepts, technologies, and acquisition efforts
in areas such as new combat vehicles, counter-IED capabilities,
individual equipment, command and control network solutions,
and joint seabasing interoperability. With your continued
support, we will ensure that your marines, their equipment,
their training, and our organization are ready for any
potential contingency. Marines and their families realize the
danger to the Nation, our vital role, and the magnitude of our
responsibilities.
As the enemy has learned the hard way, we stand ready today
and, with your continued support, we will be ready for
tomorrow's challenges.
General Magnus and I are prepared to take your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Magnus and General
Mattis follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, USMC, and Lt. Gen.
James N. Mattis, USMC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Kennedy, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to
discuss Seabasing and Resetting the Force. For the committee's specific
concern relative to Seabasing, remarks today will focus on those Marine
Corps and Navy capabilities that are most urgently needed to realize
the potential of Seabasing as a strategic concept and the separate but
related needs to reset our heavily committed and hard-used forces.
We are a Nation at war. Our responsibility is both the present and
the future and we are obligated to protect our homeland from the
physical, economic and psychological threats that were cast upon our
Nation's threshold in the opening days of this new century. We must
defeat terrorism and other threats to our way of life at their points
of origin, rather than react to them at their destinations, the cities
and monuments of our homeland. This country must retain the capability
to project power and influence to remote places where access may be
denied.
For over two centuries your marines have demonstrated that they are
the expeditionary force in readiness--Most Ready When the Nation is
Least Ready. Scalable, flexible and adaptable for peacetime crises and
always innovative for future challenges, your Corps' number one
priority is fighting and winning battles. On behalf of all marines, we
thank the committee for your continued support and commitment to the
readiness of your Marine Corps. Your support has made us more effective
in the current fight and will continue to assist us as we reset,
reconstitute and modernize our capabilities for operations in uncertain
and often chaotic future environments.
concepts to capabilities
While the entire Marine Corps is engaged in supporting the global
war on terror, we also have a responsibility to prepare for future
conflicts and contingencies. The Defense Department's Strategic
Planning Guidance directs balanced capabilities for controlling four
principal challenges: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, and
Disruptive. Our challenge is to determine the right balance of those
capabilities that the Marine Corps must provide to meet challenges
across the operational spectrum.
Naval Power 21 is the Department of the Navy's vision that enhances
Navy and Marine Corps capabilities today and tomorrow. This vision
serves as the way ahead for naval programs and operations. It
incorporates the Navy's Sea Power 21 and 21st Century Marine Corps
frameworks as a foundation to ensure naval forces control the seas,
assure access, and project joint power beyond the sea to influence
events and advance American interests across the range of military
operations.
America's ability to use international seas and waterways, as both
maneuver space and an operating base unconstrained by foreign veto,
allows our naval forces to project combat power into the littoral
regions, which contain more than half the world's population and more
than 75 percent of its major urban areas. Highly mobile and ready for
combat, our forward-deployed expeditionary forces are critical
instruments of U.S. diplomacy and central components of joint military
force packages designed to quickly contain a crisis or defeat an
emerging threat.
Reassuring our friends while denying our enemy sanctuary during
hostilities, the Navy and Marine Corps Team offers unmatched amphibious
forcible-entry capabilities and can provide a persistent combat
capability from their mobile sea base, thus reducing the U.S.
logistical ``footprint'' ashore. By exploiting our Nation's premier
asymmetric advantage--command of the sea--the Navy and Marine Corps can
loiter over the horizon and project, protect, and sustain integrated
joint warfighting capabilities, provide additional options for the
President, and ensure operational independence for combatant commanders
across the full spectrum of warfare.
Seabasing
There are four Naval Capability Pillars that enable Seabasing to be
the cornerstone of naval transformation. Seabasing is contingent on
sufficient amphibious ships and MPF(F) vessels to form the Sea Base. It
relies upon robust Sea Shield capabilities that neutralize current and
future threats to the Sea Base and the forces that it supports. It
exploits integrated, Navy and Marine Sea Strike capabilities. It
depends upon FORCEnet capabilities to tie the various elements together
and into the Joint Force. Future Sea Bases will provide a dynamic,
mobile, networked platform from which naval and Special Operations
Forces can operate at will in relative safety from land based
observation and fires. The Sea Base will reduce dependence on
vulnerable facilities ashore while reducing footprint.
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is the Marine Corps capstone
concept that serves as a link between today's institutional
capabilities and our family of Operating, Functional and Enabling
concepts. Those concepts include Operational Maneuver From the Sea
(OMFTS), Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM), and Sustained Operations
Ashore (SOA). OMFTS links naval and maneuver warfare, doctrine, and
technological advances to rapidly identify and exploit enemy weaknesses
across the section of conflict. STOM applies maneuver warfare concepts
to the littoral battle space, envisioning seamless maneuver from over
the horizon directly to the objectives deep inland. SOA envisions the
MAGTF as a general purpose Operation Maneuver Element executing a
series of precise, focused combat actions. OMFTS and STOM compel the
enemy to defend the complete length of his coastline and array his
forces in depth throughout the littoral.
Distributed Operations (DO)
DO is an additive capability to our EMW philosophy and body of
concepts stemming from OMFTS. DO, at the strategic and operational
level, enables Naval forces to establish a worldwide presence while
simultaneously conducting combined and joint training with our allies
in selected regions. This global posture allows naval forces to respond
rapidly to emerging crises with powerful and sustainable combined arms
teams. At the tactical level, the DO can take several forms, based upon
the mission, enemy dispositions, and the nature of the terrain. DO is
predicated on decentralized command and control. It requires
situational awareness, autonomy, and increased freedom of action at
lower tactical levels, enabling subordinate commanders to compress
decision cycles, seize the initiative, and exploit fleeting
opportunities. Improved situational awareness, including real time and
high fidelity data from dispersed teams, improves the vertical
transmission of information. Shared situational awareness, the product
of extensive training as well as a common operating picture,
accelerates the horizontal integration and mutually supporting actions
of spatially dispersed units.
Based on this richer, higher resolution intelligence picture, and
guided by commander's intent, distributed forces could aggregate or
remain distributed. They will be able to use simultaneous, overwhelming
joint firepower against an increasingly confused and paralyzed
adversary, allowing the main force access to the battle space. When
pockets of adversaries are found, the distributed units could use
swarming attacks to defeat them in detail. By attacking from multiple
directions, distributed units will be seemingly everywhere. Using fire
and maneuver with the benefits of a networked operational picture and
combined arms, commanders will present adversary leaders with a rapidly
deteriorating situation. MAGTFs with this additional capability will
confront the enemy with more threats, seizing the initiative, and
forcing our enemies into a more defensive mindset by limiting his
options.
Seabasing, EMW, and DO are the conceptual foundations of the Marine
Corps of the 21st century. They lead directly to our required
capabilities, modernization efforts, and programs and ensure the Marine
Corps continued success in deterring and defeating our Nation's foes.
seabasing--a national capability
The war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan provided a
harsh dose of reality for those who assumed traditional threats and the
availability of friendly, convenient land bases to project airpower and
land forces. In the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
two forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units formed Task Force 58
and projected the first major U.S. ``conventional'' combat units into
Afghanistan--more than 350 miles from its sea base of amphibious
shipping. Yet, their operations were far from traditional or
conventional expectations. We believe these recent experiences such as
the prohibition of the 4th Infantry Division using Turkey in the early
stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom are compelling insights on how
operations can be conducted in the future. As anti-access, military and
political measures proliferate; even friendly nations may deny U.S.
forces land basing and transit due to their own sovereign interests.
Seabasing represents a complex capability, a system-of-systems able
to move at will. Seabasing, enabled by joint integrated and operational
concepts, is the employment of ships and vessels with organic strike
fires and defensive shields of sensors and weapons, strike and
transport aircraft, communications and logistics. We will use the sea
as maneuver space to create uncertainty for adversaries and protect the
joint force while receiving, staging and integrating scalable forces,
at sea, that are capable of a broad range of missions. Its inherent
freedom of movement, appropriate scalability, and sustainable
persistent power provides full spectrum capabilities, from support of
theater engagement strategies, to rapid response to natural or man made
disasters, to military combat operations from raids, to swift defeat of
enemies, to scale of major combat and decisive operations. The
Seabasing concept is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 1. Seabasing Concept
Seabasing:
(1) Provides combatant commanders with the positional
advantage needed for the National Security and National
Military Strategies. It provides the most efficient and
effective means to influence or control littoral regions,
facilitating rapid deployment and immediate employment, often
deep inland. Seabasing provides the combatant commanders a
capability that is optimized for use in the very areas of
greatest concern and already deployed well forward even before
unambiguous indications of crises.
(2) Provides combatant commanders the means, in coordination
with the brokers of other elements of national power, to
concentrate capabilities at critical times and at decisive
locations of our choosing with a degree of surprise.
(3) Gives the combatant commanders the ability to position
significant forces and capabilities within the secure
environment provided by the protective shields of U.S. Navy and
Air Forces in a mobile base that enhances mission security.
(4) Reduces dependence on foreign sovereign ports, airfields,
and host nation support. Recent operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq highlight the difficulties of denied Key Attributes
transit, and the vulnerability of Kuwait's sea and air ports to
a variety of threats.
(5) Provides a strategic hedge against sovereignty concerns
that can either impede or deny altogether U.S. access to
critical regions. The ability to conduct either engagement
activities or military and other operations from secure bases
in international waters can reassure allies concerned about
their domestic reaction to U.S. basing on their sovereign
territory.
seabasing operations
Seabasing remains a primary means for the U.S during the global war
on terror and for future challenges with often chaotic environments
requiring rapid response to peacetime and wartime crises, and follow-on
stability operations.
The committee should note that the necessary ships, vessels,
watercraft, and aircraft currently programmed in the FYDP, represent
the key elements needed to begin implementing Seabasing. Fiscal
constraints and priorities will determine how we can implement this
transformational change for future challenges as we also continue what
may be a long global war on terror.
Today's forcible entry structure is limited to that resident within
the 35 amphibious ships of the Battle Force. Today's Maritime Pre-
positioning Squadrons have no capability to offload in open sea
conditions. Tomorrow's Seabasing force will be an integrated capability
linking forward-deployed and surge-able warships with equipment,
sustainment and capabilities pre-positioned in Seabasing capable MPF(F)
ships capable of selective offload in sea state 3-4, as part of a
networked expeditionary strike force.
Today and tomorrow, a most visible element of assurance to allies
and deterrence to foes will be naval forward presence, including
capabilities of Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable)
(MEU(SOC)) embarked, protected, and sustained by Expeditionary Strike
Group (ESG) ships. These units provide the combatant commanders with
forward-deployed units that can conduct a variety of quick reaction,
sea-based, crises-response options against traditional challenges or
against irregular foes. As Seabasing capable MPF(F) ships are delivered
in the future, the amphibious warships Battle Force will serve as the
advance force to initiate Joint Rapid or Forcible Entry Operations,
building combat power more rapidly and robustly than today's fiscally
constrained amphibious Battle Force and today's MPF, which can only
disembark prepositioned equipment and stocks on friendly shores.
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is the mid-sized Marine Air
Ground Task Force that provides the next level of force from the
forward deployed MEU and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), capable
of persistent major combat operations. MEBs provide supported combatant
commanders with a scalable, war fighting capability for a wide variety
of military operations. Today, it is capable of deployment and
employment via amphibious shipping (normally 15-amphibious ships,
including 5 large-deck amphibious assault ships).
The future Seabasing effort promises more efficiency in generation
of MEBs for operational employment as MEBs will be able to flow direct
from home bases to the forward, on-scene, Seabasing ships, while
leveraging the Sea Shield force protection attributes of the Seabasing
capability. As a crisis builds 1-2 forward deployed MEUs serve as the
``leading edge'' of the MEB, conducting advanced force and limited
objective, initial entry/response efforts, while the remainder of the
strike power of the MEB is assembled on scene as part of the MPF(F)
Seabasing echelon. This will enable MEB-sized Joint Rapid or Forcible
Entry Operations in 10-14 days, instead of a month or we can deliver
twice as much capability in the same time as required for a MEB today.
The current force-sizing construct requires the capability to
respond to 2 swiftly defeat the efforts (SDTE)--each of which could
require 15 amphibious ships. One of these crises may become a
Decisively defeat Campaign, bringing the most powerful force to bear,
the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), for highly capable, lethal mobile
and sustained operations which today would require 28-30 operational,
available amphibious ships. Today's 35 Battle Force amphibious warships
can surge the required 28-30 operationally available warships and also
provide the peacetime rotation load for ESG/MEU(SOC) presence in up to
3 regions.
We have demonstrated capabilities to surge from MEU-sized forces to
MEBs (which can be the MEF forward element) and then to the MEF using
additional amphibious ships, adding MPF shipping from other theatres to
offload mission required equipment at a secure port. This was most
recently done in Operation Iraqi Freedom where the Marine Corps was
able to prepare, offload, and assemble 2 MPF Squadrons worth of
equipment from 11 ships for employment with marines of the MEF flown in
by strategic airlift in less than 16-days. In the future, Seabasing
enables us to conduct this operation without being subject to
sovereignty challenges, through exploitation of the two planned MPF(F)
squadrons in conjunction with forward deployed amphibious shipping,
staging the forces at sea in 10-14 days.
Seabasing Battle Force and Maritime Prepositioning Force Structure
Currently the Department of the Navy has 35 Large Amphibious Ships,
and 3 Squadrons of older, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Ships.
Current MPF ships do not have the capability for Seabasing. In the case
of the current MPF ships, they are built to commercial survivability
standards, manned by civilian mariners, and are not capable of rapid,
large scale off-load at sea (due to their dense-pack loading),
especially in higher sea state conditions. Current MPF operations
normally require a secure port and airfield from which arrival/assembly
operations are conducted to ``marry'' equipment up with strategic
airlifted troops.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) envisioned an amphibious
force structure of 36 warships: 12 large deck aviation ships (LHA/LHD),
12 LPD-17s, and 12 LSD-41/49 class ships. These ships would enable
either 3.0 MEU rotational forward presence, or in wartime provide a 2.5
MEB (assault echelon) forcible entry capability (fiscally constrained
from a requirement of 3.0 MEB). The 12-ship LPD-17 class was needed to
provide the lift capacity for the 2.5 MEB constrained requirement. The
current mix and inventory of 35 active Battle Force amphibious ships
provides slightly more than a 2.0 MEB lift-forcible entry capability.
Recent decisions have reduced the current LPD-17 program to nine ships,
putting increased risk/pressure on the need for ensuring the right
quantities and quality of warships and MPF ships for future challenges.
enabling seabasing capabilities
Elements of Seabasing have been under development for some time.
Expeditionary warships, MPF(F) ships, high speed surface connectors,
vertical air lift connectors, sea-based fires, and ground-based fires
are the major enablers to Seabasing as described below.
Seabasing--the Warships
LPD-17
The U.S.S. San Antonio (LPD-17) Class of amphibious transport dock
ships was designed and planned to replace 61 legacy amphibious assault
ships: This fine class of ships is optimized for operational
flexibility to meet Marine Air Ground Task Force requirements to
project strike (fire and maneuver) forces from the sea deep into
littoral land objectives. With its significantly enhanced
survivability, habitability, and functionality, it represents a
critical element of Seabasing with a spacious well deck for deployment
of LCACs and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFV) and an enhanced
flight deck and maintenance facility for employment of MV-22, medium
assault tiltrotors and CH-53E/X heavy lift helicopters. Survivability
upgrades protect against mines, missiles and surface attack makes it a
highly capable platform for the forward deployed ESG/MEU and larger
forcible entry operations. With the LHA(R) ship design emphasis on
aviation transport and strike fires, the well decks of the LPD-17 and
existing LSD-41/49 class have even more importance to the rapid surface
movement of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles deep inland and LCAC
transport of heavy or bulky ground equipment and sustainment.
The fiscal year 2006 budget includes $1.3 billion to fully fund the
construction of the eighth ship of the class of fighting amphibs. The
lead ship of the class the U.S.S. San Antonio is approximately 93
percent complete with delivery scheduled for the summer of 2005. In
addition to the lead ship, four follow-on ships are under construction.
New Orleans (LPD-18) was christened on November 20, 2004; Mesa Verde
(LPD-19) was christened January 25, 2005; construction continues on
Green Bay (LPD-20) and New York (LPD-21). Advanced Procurement
contracts for San Diego (LPD-22) and Anchorage (LPD-23) have been
awarded for long-lead time material for these ships. The 8th LPD-17,
Arlington (LPD-24), is programmed for funding in the fiscal year 2006
budget. The ninth ship, Somerset (LPD-25) is planned for fiscal year
2007. The LPD-17 class of warships is critical for the Marine Corps'
amphibious lift requirement. LPD-17 ships are used for rapid, early or
forcible entry lift in major combat operations and also provides the
peacetime rotation basis for up to three ESG/MEU(SOC) regionally
forward deployed.
LHD-8
The last of eight LHD class warships capitalizes on the proven
design of the LHD 1 class, U.S.S. Makin Island (LHD 8) will deliver
transformational capabilities when it enters the fleet in 2007.
Combining design alterations from LHD 5 onward with new gas turbine
propulsion, a revolutionary electric drive, and an enhanced combat
systems suite, including Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Makin
Island is like no other expeditionary warship in the world. LHD 8
serves as the basis for LHA(R) hull, mechanical, and electrical
systems, reducing the technology risk normally found in a new class of
ships.
LHA(R)
With $150 million Advanced Procurement funding provided by Congress
in fiscal year 2005 and an additional $150 million requested in fiscal
year 2006, the first of four LHA(R) ships is programmed in fiscal year
2007. LHA(R), which will replace the aging LHA class ships, is a
modified LHD 1 Class design (without well decks) with enhanced aviation
capabilities. LHA(R) is designed to accommodate future Marine Corps
aircraft, with emphasis on the MV-22, CH-53E/X and the Short Take Off,
Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF Joint Strike Fighter. Distributed
Operations conducted from Sea Basing and expeditionary sites ashore,
will leverage the increased strike, and support characteristics of
these ships with ESGs capable of independent operations, or in
conjunction with Carrier Strike groups (CSGs) for large scale
operations when land bases are not available for contingencies.
The LHA(R) will have nearly three times the fuel capacity of
existing LHDs for sustained operations. It will be capable of
operational and maintenance support for either 23 JSF or 28 MV-22
aircraft, or a combination of fixed, rotary wing, and tiltrotor
aircraft. MPF(F) capabilities provide the vehicle square and well deck
spaces not available in the LHA(R) class as part of the future
Seabasing force. The LHA(R) will support Sea Strike operations in
addition to supporting fire and maneuver in support of the MAGTF.
Seabasing--Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))
MPF(F) will allow us to better exploit the sea to conduct
reception, staging integration and projection of forces for joint
operations, especially in an access denied environment. MPF (F) will
provide four capabilities: (1) at-sea arrival and assembly (2) direct
support of the assault echelon of the amphibious task force; (3) long-
term, sea-based sustainment; and (4) at-sea reconstitution and
redeployment.
The MPF(F) will be a key enabler for Seabasing and future Joint
Forcible Entry Operations. During the early phases of a joint campaign,
these ships will provide floating bases to enable the rapid
reinforcement of forward presence ESG/MEU forces with the rapid scaling
up to MEB or MEF-sized forces and follow on elements of the joint
force. The MPF(F) and expeditionary warships operating together at sea
will provide landing platforms for MAGTFs, Special Operations Forces,
and follow-on Army forces.
MPF(F) is part of an integrated Seabasing concept. We will
integrate these ships functionally with the forward deployed amphibious
warships in the Battle Force to leverage their tremendous capability to
reconstitute, re-supply, and rapidly reinforce assault waves launched
from the forward deployed, more survivable assault ships. These two
distinct, yet linked, components of the Sea Base will enable the joint
force to ``surge'' Marines and follow on joint forces through the Sea
Base for more rapid build up of joint capabilities, increasing combat
tempo and responsiveness to combatant commanders' needs.
The concept is for at least two squadrons of MPF(F) ships, a total
of 14-20 ships. Navy and Army Joint High Speed Vessels will enable
rapid movement within the sea base and ashore where conditions permit.
The mix of Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships is being
determined, and will be capable of surface and air transport of Marine
combat units, prepositioning critical equipment, and 20 days of
supplies for Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Seabasing will provide
increased protection and combat capability as well as rapid deployment
and employment of forces compared to our current capabilities.
In addition to $28 million of National Defense Sealift RDT&E funds
in the fiscal year 2005 budget, the fiscal year 2006 budget request
includes $66 million of RDT&E funds to support technology development
such as selective offload in MPF(F). The first MPF(F) ship is planned
for fiscal year 2009 with advanced procurement award scheduled in
fiscal year 2008.
Seabasing--Surface Connectors
Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV)
The Joint High Speed Vessel will provide intra-theater,
interoperable vessels capable of movements between dispersed
operational platforms for inter-modal transfer of troops, combat
equipment and sustainment, as well as high-speed dashes to and from
shore penetration points and austere ports. Army and Navy intra-theater
high-speed vessel programs were recently merged under a Naval Sea
Systems Command program office in order to reduce cost yet leverage
current commercial technologies, and ensure interoperability of vessels
with the Joint Sea Base by acquisition of U.S. built vessels.
The foreign leased high-speed vessels; Swift and WestPac Express
enabled the III Marine Expeditionary Force to expand training and
engagement in the western Pacific while decreasing transit time. They
were also operationally used in support of tsunami relief operations in
the Indian Ocean. The Swift also provides a research and development
test bed and is able to serve in support of contingency response
requirements.
Contract awards for the first Army-funded JHSV is expected in
fiscal year 2008 with delivery in 2010. The first Navy-funded JHSV is
programmed for fiscal year 2009. With currently three JHSVs in Navy
plans, the Department continues joint exercises, experiments, and
warfighting assessments to refine its requirements.
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
LCACs were the first high-speed surface connector for expeditionary
forces. Capable of high-speed dashes up to 50 nautical miles from
shore, they carry heavy equipment, and can access a wider array of
littoral beaches than previous displacement landing craft.
The LCAC SLEP program provides improvements in the navigation,
communication, and hulls for the aging fleet of LCACs, while also
providing them a Sea State 3 heavy lift capability, which is required
performance for both MPF(F) and amphibious ships operating in the
Seabasing environment.
LCACs will remain a critical component of surface lift for the
Marine Corps. Upgrades provided by the LCAC SLEP will ensure its
continued relevance, readiness of our expeditionary forces, and
interoperable capabilities within and from the Joint Sea Base. The LCAC
(SLEP) fleet will begin to reach the end of its service life in 2014.
The follow-on, LCAC(X) program will carry significantly larger loads,
payload weight, have extended ranges, and reduce the number of trips
required for the force to and from the shore from Seabasing ships.
The Department has requested $14 million in R&D funding for the
LCAC(X) program in fiscal year 2006, and programmed to start
procurement in fiscal year 2010. The Department has programmed $111
million for the LCAC SLEP program for six LCACs in the fiscal year 2006
budget.
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
The EFV is the Marine Corps' highest ground combat acquisition
priority, with low rate initial production scheduled to begin in fiscal
year 2007. With Initial Operational Capability in fiscal year 2010, the
EFV will replace our Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV)--7, which is
undergoing a rebuild program to prevent gaps in capability. EFVs will
carry the surface assault echelon's of forcible entry forces, at sea-
speeds four times that of the AAV-7, as part of multi-dimensional
attacks through littoral penetration points to join deep inland with
forces vertically lifted by MV-22 and CH-53E/X aircraft. On reaching
the shore from their over-the-horizon launch point, EFV will have the
speed to maneuver with the M1A1 tanks and Light Armored Vehivles (LAVs)
and the sustainment to continue the assault deep inland for link up
with vertical assault forces, or independent maneuver. They will
provide marines a modern armored nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC)-
protected combat vehicle with a truly impressive 30 mm cannon to
provide close support to dismounted troops and accurate fire on the
move capability.
The EFV gives marine forces a unique ability to use the seas,
rivers, swamps and marshlands for operational and tactical maneuver, a
capability recently demonstrated by the aging AAV7A-1 family in OIF
when maneuver forces crossed Iraqi rivers when bridgeheads were choked
or not existent.
Seabasing--Vertical Lift Aircraft Connectors.
The medium lift MV-22 program is the centerpiece of aviation lift
connectors for the Seabasing force. The MV-22 is designed to replace
the aging CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters. Optimized for speed,
endurance, and survivability to rapidly deploy forces from bases deep
at sea to objectives deep inland. The MV-22 will carry 24 combat loaded
marines, can externally lift the Lightweight 155mm Howitzer, and will
internally lift the Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) 120 mm
mortar, and the Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV).
The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $1.3 billion for nine
MV-22s, trainer modifications and retrofits; $206.4 million is also
included for continued development, testing, and evaluation.
The CH-53E/X Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) program will replace our
aging fleet of CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters for the Marine Corps'
vertical heavy lift requirement. CH-53E helicopters have already begun
retirements due to reaching service life margins, with large block
retirements expected after fiscal year 2012.
The CH-53X/HLR is a derivative design of the existing CH-53E,
remaining within the same shipboard footprint, providing greater lift,
reliability, survivability, maintainability, and cost of ownership
improvements over the legacy CH-53E. It will have shipboard
compatibility with all current and planned amphibious ships, as well as
MPF(F), and be able to remain at sea as part of the Seabasing force for
extended periods. The CH-53E and CH-53X/HLR will be critical to
operations in anti-access, area-denial environments, enabling force
application and focused logistics from far offshore to deep inland
sites. The HLR will transport 27,000 pounds to distances of 110
nautical miles with combat payloads to include the LAV or two-armored
High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). To sustain the force, the
HLR will be the critical logistics air connector for sea-based power
projection operations.
The fiscal year 2006 budget requests $272 million in RDT&E funds
for the System Development and Demonstration phase of the CH-53X/HLR
program.
Seabasing--Fires
The complementary capabilities of surface- and air-delivered fires
continue to be highlighted in ongoing combat operations in Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Precision and volume
fires are critical to the lethality and survivability of Marine, Army,
and Special Operations Forces. Capitalizing on lessons learned, and the
imperative of modernization necessary for select legacy systems, the
Corps is improving our short and long-range organic fires and our
target acquisition sensor platforms in support of Expeditionary
Maneuver Warfare, and especially for Distributed Operations forces.
Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (VUAV)
VUAV performance must achieve the speed, range, payload,
survivability, and reliability, interoperability with command and
control, as well as shipboard compatibility with Joint Rapid or
Forcible Entry Operations as well as existing and future Seabasing
ships. We have begun evaluating the Coast Guard's Eagle Eye UAV, which
is a high-speed tiltrotor craft developed as part of its Deepwater
Program. The VUAV is expected to provide a long-range sensor platform
able to conduct both focused and wide ISR with time-critical targeting
information for Seabased fires as well as maneuver fires deep inland.
The Marine Corps requires a replacement of its almost 20-year-old
Pioneer UAV system, which had flown over 6,950 hours in support of OIF.
Tactical UAVs are clearly critical for marine and other forces. The
fiscal year 2006 budget requests $9.2 million to evaluate the Eagle Eye
program.
STOVL-JSF and Strike Aircraft Upgrades
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Short Take Off Vertical Landing (JSF
STOVL) aircraft will enhance our ability to conduct precision strikes
and provide close support to our marines on the ground. JSF combines
the basing flexibility of the AV-8B with the multi-role capabilities,
speed, and maneuverability of the F/A-18 for both the air-to-ground and
air-to-air requirements of the MAGTF. The aircraft has a very low radar
cross-section and provide superior capabilities over our legacy
aircraft in areas of survivability, lethality, and supportability. The
STOVL version of JSF is being developed specifically for the marines
and seven Allied partners. Use of the STOVL variant doubles the
available Seabasing platforms for basing of strike aircraft, enabling
dispersal of our critical strike aircraft across multiple platforms for
survivability.
The JSF program is due to undergo a critical design review in
November of this year, and if approved for Low Rate Initial Production,
IOC is planned to occur in 2012. As the Marine Corps chose to leap over
the evolutionary improvements of the F-18E/F programs for its aging F-
18A/C/D and AV-8B inventory, it is critical to the MAGTF's combined
arms and Seabasing future to begin fielding the STOVL JSF within the
FYDP. The fiscal year 2006 budget request contains $2.4 billion for
continuation of System Development and Demonstration on the JSF.
DD(X) Land Attack Destroyer
Designed to operate as part of Expeditionary Strike Groups, the
DD(X) will provide long range, time-critical, all-weather, precise, and
high volume fires to the Seabasing force and follow on joint forces.
Its improved stealth enhances its survivability. The DD(X)s 155
millimeter Advanced Gun System (2 per ship) will provide increased rate
of fire, range and lethality over currently available naval guns
through its associated Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP). DD(X)
will provide precision and high volume fires at ranges up to 100
nautical miles in support of Seabasing inserted forces. In addition to
the long-range cannon, DD(X) can employ Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles
from the ship's 60 tubes of the Peripheral Vertical Launch Systems. The
DD(X) will be able to conduct multiple round, simultaneous impact
missions, when combined with its larger shell casing will yield
significantly improved lethality for soft and hard targets. It will be
integrated into the Joint command and control network, through the
Naval Fire Control System at sea, and Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System (fielded with Marines and Army forces) ashore.
Each ship will be designed to carry 600 long-range 155 mm munitions
plus 70 long-range land attack projectiles to provide high volume
support. Planned logistics systems to support the DD(X) in legacy and
future Combat Logistic Force ships of the Seabasing Force will have
unique packaging and handling mechanisms to enable rapid re-supply
missions for the DD(X) to quickly reconstitute its magazines, allowing
the ship to remain engaged in the fight. A range of 8 to 12 DD(X) ships
would support forcible entry operations.
The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes $1.1 billion in RDT&E
for continued technology development and $716 million in SCN advance
procurement funds for the first and second DD(X). The FYDP includes
full funding for the first DD(X) in fiscal year 2007 and construction
of one ship per year in each follow on year.
Organic Ground Combat Fires
The M777A1 Joint Lightweight Howitzer (LW-155) will be the primary
indirect fire artillery weapon of the Marine Corps. A joint program, it
leverages commonality of ammunition with the majority of the war
Reserve stockpile, combined with an extensive family of precision and
lethal munitions, capable of firing both close and deep fires in
support of maneuver. Reductions in weight through use of advanced
materials make it transportable from the Seabasing force by all medium
and heavy lift aircraft.
The Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) will provide the
vertical assault element of MAGTFs with immediately responsive, lethal,
organic indirect fires at ranges beyond current infantry battalion
mortars. The lighter weight, rapid fire, and small profile rifled
mortar, will increase the ability of sea based forces to load more
capabilities than the present truck-intensive artillery batteries. The
Marine Corps is procuring ITV along with the EFSS to give it ground
mobility. The EFSS and the ITV will be internally transportable by the
CH-53E, MV-22, and CH-53X/HLR, and leverage their high speeds in
support of deep or distributed operations forces.
The Joint High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) will
fulfill a critical gap in organic Marine Corps ground based fire
support, providing 24-hour, all weather, precision and high volume
missile fires. HIMARS is air transportable by C-130 aircraft, and will
fit on JHSVs and LCACs from Seabasing ships. It provides a highly
responsive, precision ground-based means to engage time critical,
sensitive targets, complementing aviation fires. As part of the
balanced suite of organic ground combat, naval surface, and air-
delivered fires, HIMARS augments the lightweight artillery
capabilities, providing the Division and MEF commanders the ability for
both precision and mass fires at depth throughout the battlefield. One
active and one Reserve Battalion of HIMARS is being procured, beginning
in 2006.
Complementary Low Altitude Weapon System (CLAWS)
CLAWS is a surface-to-air weapon systems utilizing HMMWV-mounted
AMRAAM missiles. It will possess the mobility and lethality required to
keep pace with supported maneuver elements, and will fill the gap in
naval air defenses during extended littoral operations. Initial
fielding is expected in fiscal year 2009 with FOC expected in fiscal
year 2015.
Training Ranges--The Seabasing concept, will require realistic
training opportunities to ensure that marines are fully prepared to
operate in and from the maritime environment. Our littoral training
bases, Camp Pendleton, California and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina are
absolutely critical in preparing our forward deployed ESGs/MEUs and
exercising the Seabasing capability. Our ability to conduct the
fullrange of air-ground task force missions at these bases has been
seriously eroded by a variety of encroachment issues over the years. It
is imperative that we protect our current capabilities at both
locations while doing our best to recapture some of their former
capacities. We must also continue to invest in our major MAGTF training
ranges at Twentynine Palms, California and Yuma, Arizona. These
locations, though located some distance from the sea, permit us to more
closely exercise the full capability of the air-ground task force in
coordinated, live-fire exercises. Just as the Seabasing concept lends
itself to employment throughout the world, our need to retain access to
the valuable training ranges owned and operated by our sister services
and our allies is of primary importance to the readiness of maritime
forces. The unprecedented level of cross-service utilization of the
portfolio of ranges optimizes the interoperability of joint and
coalition forces.
the marine air ground task force
The Individual Marine
Today's marines, defending our way of life today on the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, personify our ethos that--every
marine is a rifleman. The success of the Corps is today, as it always
has been, built upon Marines and their warrior ethos. We create
warriors who are both expeditionary and interoperable in the joint,
coalition, and interagency arenas as part of a Seabasing force or for
expeditionary operations deep inland, capable of creating stability
anywhere around the globe.
From our advertising, recruiting, training, and education programs,
we develop our marines' ability to think independently and act
aggressively as a matter of routine. We create marines that thrive in
the chaotic and unpredictable situations and environments that
characterize the battlefields of the future. Our combat capability is
built around riflemen, who in turn form scalable, combined arms teams.
We will increase the speed, flexibility, and agility of our MAGTFs
by first renewing emphasis on our greatest asset, the individual
marine, through improved education and training in foreign languages,
cultural awareness, tactical intelligence and urban operations. We are
equipping them to operate in the alleys of the urbanized littoral,
areas they already dominate in places so recently in the headlines like
Fallujah, Ramadi, and the northern Babil Province. Our 21st century
marine will ``out-learn, out-think, and out-fight'' any adversary and
embody an aggressive moral spirit, a refined level of adaptability and
mental agility, and the flexibility necessary to confidently and
successfully operate on the future battlefield. Second, we are focused
on implementing Distributed Operations where we will dominate terrain
with small dispersed units when appropriate, and take hold of terrain
by concentrating as the situation dictates.
In keeping with our principle of equipping the marine for the
fight, we have accelerated efforts to purchase the Modular Weapon
System to replace our M16A2 rifles; to increase the density of Advanced
Combat Optic Gun sights, Sniper Scopes and Thermal Weapon Sights that
will enable our Marines to engage at extended ranges with precision,
and to increase their operational tempo and agility, day or night. We
are accelerating efforts for procurement of Common Laser Rangefinders
to export targeting data to advanced GPS location devices, and hand
them off to our Seabasing Fires enablers via the Target Hand-Off System
for Distributed Operations capable squads and traditional fire support
teams. We are making major improvements in small-unit, and MAGTF
intelligence support equipment to synthesize and disseminate
information from across the spectrum. At the same time we have made
great strides through your support in providing individual and vehicle
protective armor. One of our most significant investments is in radio
systems to enable inter and intra squad communications, as well as
over-the-horizon communications, Joint Tactical Radio Systems, and
Satellite Communication on the Move capability.
In the coming months, we will stand up a Center for Advanced
Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) which will ensure that Marines are
equipped with the requisite regional, cultural, and language knowledge
to allow them to operate successfully in the Joint expeditionary
environment . . . in any region of the world . . . against the range of
irregular, traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive threats.
End Strength
The Marine Corps greatly appreciates your recognition of our
manpower needs after we had extensively reviewed and restructured some
existing capabilities to meet urgent needs, and through use of our
recent temporary manning strength increase to a force level of 178,000
Active-Duty marines. Our first priority is to increase our infantry
units' manning levels and mitigate the stress on these heavily
committed organizations, which have seen upwards of a 1:1 rotation
ratio in the past year due to the demands of global war on terrorism.
We will also create dedicated Foreign Military Training Units (FMTUs),
add to our recruiting force, and provide more support personnel for the
operating forces in order to enhance our training and support to our
marines and their families.
USMC/U.S. Special Operations Command Initiatives
Ongoing operations in support of the global war on terror highlight
the interdependence in the battle space between Marine Corps operating
forces and Special Operation Forces. The Marine Corps' pursuit of
increased irregular warfare capabilities has resulted in formation of
Foreign Military Training Units to assist USSOCOM. Examples of some of
our recent successes include the Republic of Georgia Train and Equip
Program; providing training capability to the Afghan National Army, and
Military Assistance Training Teams to the Iraqi National Army. The
commandant and commander of SOCOM are committed to exploring new ways
to leverage each others capabilities as we continue to fight irregular
wars, to include use of the Joint Seabasing concept for future
deployment and employment options. Equipment compatibility is a crucial
ingredient in this relationship and we continue to pursue the means to
train, work, and operate more fluidly in the special operations
environment.
Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) Initiative
Prior to enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for Fiscal Year 2005, we commenced a comprehensive total force
structure review to better meet the demands of the 21st century and
long-term global war on terror. Subsequently, we began implementing
force structure realignment initiatives intended to enhance low
density/high demand capabilities, and to reduce stress for critical
units as part of global war on terrorism. Since 1991 the Marine Corps
has conducted multiple ``lean-down, reorganize'' initiatives to better
prepare for tomorrow's fight. As before, the FSRG initiatives are end
strength and structure neutral, requiring additional equipment,
facilities, operations and maintenance resources to implement.
Structure changes include the establishment of two additional infantry
battalions, three light armored reconnaissance companies, three
reconnaissance companies, two force reconnaissance platoons, and an
additional Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) for the active
component. Existing explosive ordnance disposal, intelligence, aviation
support, civil affairs, and command and control assets will receive
additional augmentation. The Reserve component's structure initiatives
will increase the capability of Marine Forces Reserve to respond to the
global war on terror and includes the establishment of an intelligence
support battalion, a security/anti-terrorism battalion, and two
additional light armored reconnaissance companies. Civil affairs and
command and control units will receive additional augmentation and some
Reserve units will be converted into Individual Mobilization Augmentee
(IMA) Detachments--allowing more timely access to these Marine
reservists to support contingency operations--in order to improve the
effectiveness of their contributions.
We continue to pursue sensible military to civilian conversions in
order to increase the number of marines in the operating force. The
temporary end strength increase, implementation of force structure
initiatives, and military to civilian conversions are expected to help
mitigate any potential negative effects this high tempo may have on
individual marines and our force's readiness.
The majority of new units created by these initiatives will achieve
IOC in fiscal year 2006, with Full Operating Capability (FOC) by fiscal
year 2008. MILCON and equipment procurement requirements will require
funding in Fiscal Year 2005 to support IOC and FOC because military
construction projects have an average lead time of 2 to 3 years, and
many of the procurement items have lead times ranging from 18-24
months.
Our estimate of force structure initiatives' costs from fiscal
years 2005-2011 totals approximately $1.4 billion, of which $408
million is included in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request. The
fiscal year 2007 and out year costs required to complete and sustain
the FSRG recommendations are being addressed for inclusion in our
baseline budget.
sustaining combat operations and resetting the force
Sustaining the Current Level of Effort
Your support has ensured our near-term readiness remains strong,
even while current demand on the force is high. In the past two years,
we have gone from a pre-global war on terrorism deployment rotation
ratio of just over one-to-two ( 6 months deployed/ 14 months home) to
our current ratio of just above one-to-one ( 7 months deployed/ 7
months home), primarily in our infantry battalions, rotary-wing
aviation squadrons, and other high demand units. This means that many
Marine units in the operating forces are either deployed or are
training to relieve deployed units. Most notable amongst these factors
is the consistent, sustained deployment of approximately 30 percent of
our ground assets and 25 percent of our aviation assets in support of
the global war on terrorism. Those deployment rates, when considered in
the context of our assumption that most of the ground equipment in
theater eventually will be attrited or beyond economical repair,
highlight the potential enormity of our equipment replacement
requirements. Ground and aviation assets will either be replaced
through normal, albeit accelerated, procurement methods or short-term
measures will be taken to mitigate loss of capabilities until
anticipated modern or transformational capabilities enter the force.
The incremental operational costs of both OIF and OEF have been
principally funded through supplemental appropriations based on Office
of the Secretary of Defense guidance. In addition to the supplemental
funding requests, the Marine Corps has reprogrammed $400 million,
through either existing below threshold authority or by above threshold
requests to Congress, for essential warfighting equipment in response
to deployed Marines requests via our Urgent Universal Needs Statement
(UUNS) process. The Marine Corps included some resetting the force
requirements: $71 million for depot maintenance and $139 million in
procurement of equipment and ammunition in the fiscal year 2004
supplemental. That was an initial estimate of a total bill that is
still being accumulated.
In the spring of 2004, the Secretary of Defense requested that the
Services assess the impact of higher operating tempo and environmental
factors on the total inventory of equipment employed in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Marine Corps conducted a Demand on Equipment analysis
on an initial list of 94 high cost/high use items of equipment,
including both ground and aviation systems. That analysis estimeted
$2.2 billion in replacement/repair costs, which were included in the
fiscal year 2005 supplemental request. Additionally, the Marine Corps
requested, through the fiscal year 2005 supplemental, funding to
replace equipment taken from our prepositioning stocks (Maritime
Prepositioning Squadron and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program--Norway
stocks) ($246 million), and CONUS stocks ($400 million), and to fund
urgent warfighting equipment needs in the field ($2.1 billion). In all
instances, we assessed our ability to contract for and obligate fiscal
year 2005 funding to expedite the delivery of this equipment. However,
due to industrial base and other execution issues, a portion of our
requirements must be deferred until fiscal year 2006 and subsequent
fiscal years. At present, the Marine Corps is using the funding
provided by the fiscal year 2005 Bridge Supplemental ($2.1 billion) to
finance global war on terrorism operations and to procure urgently
needed force protection equipment, including additional vehicle armor
kits and aircraft survivability equipment.
Equipment Cross-leveling
A critical aspect of the Marine Corps reconstitution/reset the
force planning effort is our ongoing effort to cross-level equipment
across the total force, to include equipment required in Iraq and
Afghanistan, pre-positioned stocks, and home station operating/training
sets. In order to ensure seamless operational support to OIF and the
most cost effective strategy for force rotations, the commandant
directed that equipment necessary to prosecute OIF operations remain in
theater for as long as practical. This policy has allowed the Marine
Corps to focus our efforts on identifying, attaining, and delivering
the best equipment possible to forces in theater. This policy also
drastically reduces equipment rotation costs, thus husbanding critical
financial resources for other uses.
Although having the best equipment, in the right quantities, in
support of deployed units is paramount, the policy of retaining
equipment in theater has led to home station equipment shortfalls. In
order to fill these shortfalls to a level that will enable satisfactory
pre-deployment training, we have initiated actions to cross level
equipment throughout the Marine Corps, including both active and
Reserve components.
Rapid Acquisition Processes
The Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) process, which we
initiated in 2002, is critical to ensuring our marines are as well
equipped as possible. As a truly bottom up process, it provides a way
for our warfighters in the Operating Forces to identify and forward new
requirements for weapons and gear for quick review and approval
(usually in less than 90 days). Through the leadership of the Secretary
of the Navy, and supported by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN RDA), the Navy-Marine Corps
team worked an expedited process known as ``Operation Respond'' for
expedited review and acquisition of Marine and Navy requirements,
leveraging the Department's R&D and laboratory efforts to employ
cutting edge technology where appropriate. We are also participating in
the Deputy Secretary of Defense-led Joint Rapid Acquisition process,
which recently approved acquisition of 122 Cougar EOD vehicles for
deployed Marine Corps and Army EOD teams. Our UUNS process has enabled
us to aggressively pursue the addition of armor to all of our HMMWV and
MTVR trucks used outside of garrisons within the USCENTCOM Area of
Responsibility, and to quickly provide adequate body armor, improved
rifle optics, counter Improvised Explosive Device equipment, night
vision devices, Blue Force Tracker equipment, personal role radios
(squad level communication devices), unique ammunition items, and
numerous other warfighting and force protection critical items.
Throughout all these processes, the Services have cooperated closely to
ensure we leverage the best ideas and efforts in order to equip our
warriors on the ground and in the air.
Demand on Equipment
The global war on terror usage rates in combat theaters are up to
eight times higher than those in other locations. This increases the
cost of operations and maintenance beyond what is typically budgeted.
During each month of OIF, the Marine Corps incurred equipment
maintenance and sustainment related costs of close to $80 million a
month beyond normal budgeted levels that had to migrate from other
sources. Assuming a similar operational tempo, and making adjustments
for the current equipment density that is deployed in theater, the
Marine Corps can expect in excess of $50 million per month of ground
equipment maintenance requirements over baseline program, non-combat
maintenance needs. In addition to higher usage rates, equipment is
being used under extreme conditions, increasing maintenance
requirements. Further, the practice of adding armor to unarmored
vehicles creates significant stress on vehicle frames and power trains,
and although lives have been saved and injuries prevented, it comes
with detrimental costs to the materiel. To date, more than 1,800
principal end items valued at $94.3 million have been destroyed. An
additional 2,300 damaged end items will require depot maintenance. The
stress on equipment continues.
Our legacy aircraft are performing their assigned missions and
holding up well under highly increased usage rates. The venerable CH-46
troop transport helicopter has been flown in support of OIF at 230
percent of its peacetime usage rate. While utilization rates have
increased, the overall trends for deployed aircraft readiness have
remained fairly constant, averaging 72 percent. In order to improve our
readiness rate in theater, we are creating a limited aircraft depot
maintenance capability. As a result of supporting combat operations,
our non-deployed units are experiencing lower readiness, currently at
69 percent and trending down, while the utilization has remained
constant.
Hellfire missiles continue to be expended in support of current
global war on terrorism operations. The fiscal year 2005 supplemental
requested an additional $43 million to reconstitute our Hellfire
inventories. This request is more urgent due to termination of the
previously planned Hellfire replacement, the Joint Common Missile
program. In addition to Hellfire needs, engineering teams have tested
1036 LAU-7 launchers for our F/A-18s and found 12.5 percent cracked (as
of December 19, 2004), and 53.2 percent worn beyond limits. The current
failure rate would result in non-mission capable F/A-18 aircraft in
2006. Support for the Marine Corps' fiscal year 2005 supplemental
funding request of $11 million for LAU-7s will provide long lead items,
ensure deliveries in 2006 to maintain F/A-18 aircraft readiness.
Marine Aviation Command and Control Systems, specifically our
legacy TPS-63 and TPS-59 (version 3) radar systems, have experienced
heavy utilization and resultant degraded readiness due to the global
war on terrorism. There are no open production lines. Acceleration of
the G/ATOR and HELRASR modern replacement programs is a part of our
mid-term reset requirements.
Prepositioning Programs Reset Actions, Requirements, and Funding
OIF provided an opportunity to employ Maritime Prepositioning as it
was envisioned. The offloading of 11 ships in 16 days through one port
was the second largest MPF operation in history, providing most of the
equipment used by marines in OIF I. The equipment readiness on the
first squadron was 98.5 percent, while the second squadron was 99.1
percent. After OIF I, and concurrent with the reorganization to
``mirror image'' our squadrons, we began reconstituting downloaded
ships even as we continued to support ongoing operations. Equipment and
supplies not used to reconstitute MPSs in Kuwait and not required by
engaged forces were brought to Blount Island Command (BIC) and put in
general support of MPF Maintenance Cycle 8 (MMC-8), which commenced
with the reconstitution of MPSRON-1 beginning in April 2004.
MPSRON-1 completed reconstitution and its maintenance cycle in
March 2005 and is ready to support the operational requirements of the
regional combatant commanders. The squadron's major end item
maintenance readiness is 99.6 percent. In March-April 2004, two ships
from MPSRON-2 and maritime prepositioning equipment and supplies from
Blount Island Command were used to support marines still conducting
operations in Iraq. All of MPSRON-2's maritime prepositioning equipment
and supplies have been downloaded. Four of its ships are in the Common-
User Sealift Pool (CUSP), and one is conducting Extended Maritime
Interdiction Operations (EMIO) in direct support of Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command. Ships from MPSRON-2 will rotate through its
maintenance cycle from June 2005-April 2006.
MPSRON-3 was reconstituted in Kuwait from September 2003-February
2004 and will rotate through its maintenance cycle from March 2006-
April 2007. The squadron's current major end item maintenance readiness
is 98.8 percent .
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N)
The Marine Corps is in the process of transforming its Norway Air-
Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB) prepositioning program
into the MCPP-N. The prepositioning objective for MCPP-N is projected
to be roughly equivalent to the NALMEB prepositioning objective, while
its mission is transforming from a Cold War paradigm to an emphasis on
forward deploying war reserve material pre-positioned stocks in general
support of all regional combatant commanders.
After OIF I, MCPP-N transferred major end items to the MPF program
in support of the back load of prepositioning ships during MMC-8. In
support of OIF II, the Marine Corps deployed approximately 5 percent of
MCPP-N's major end items. On 1 March 2005, the Marine Corps
redistributed 25.6 percent of MCPP-N's readiness-reportable major end
items to units preparing to deploy in support of the global war on
terrorism as part of our equipment cross-leveling plan. The program's
current major end item maintenance readiness is 99.8 percent, and it is
currently at 80.1 percent of its overall major end item's
prepositioning objective. Its on-hand readiness for reportable end
items will decrease to 38.2 percent when ongoing redistributions are
complete.
The Marine Corps is planning the reconstitution of MPSRON-2 and
MCPP-N. The only capability that will prove difficult to reconstitute
in the short term is ground equipment. The foundation of our
reconstitution efforts is the additional Procurement Marine Corps (PMC)
funding from the fiscal year 2005 supplemental. Our fiscal year 2005
supplemental request contained PMC funding to procure the majority of
those MPSRON-2 and MCPP-N major end item shortfalls that are executable
in fiscal year 2005. When approved, and upon completion of fielding,
the projected attainment for major end items will be 75 percent for
MPSRON-2 and 87.5 percent for MCPP-N. The Marine Corps currently
projects we will require additional PMC and O&MMC dollars to complete
the reconstitution of MPSRON-2 and MCPP-N in fiscal year 2006 and
future years.
Reset the force
Fighting the war, and resetting the force for the future, is the
commandant's focus. While it depends on the individual item of
equipment selected, in general, our ground equipment is experiencing
roughly eight times the use normally experienced during peacetime
operations. The decision to replace, rather than repair, major
equipment items is, in most cases, cost-effective due to transportation
costs to and from the central command's area of responsibility,
accelerated aging due to high operational tempo, environmental
degradation, and the need to keep up-armored vehicles in theater to
support future rotations. Completely resetting the force will require
additional investment over several years to accomplish. The cost today
to reset the ground and aviation global war on terrorism force is
estimated to be $4.0 billion and $1.3 billion respectively.
conclusion
Today, we are at war the likes of which we have never fought
before. It is literally for our future, for our way of life. Our enemy
is ruthless and knows no rules, no laws, and no bounds. He fights to
kill Americans and those Iraqis who have stepped forward and are
standing firm to prevent another murderous regime--this one based on
extremism in its most brutal form--from replacing Hussein and his
henchmen. Your marines standing shoulder-to-shoulder with other young
Americans of our military services, and the Iraqi security forces, are
performing extremely well due directly to the support they have
received from Congress. As we sit here today in this great hall
protected by these young Americans, they are fighting an enemy that
shows no quarter, but the ideals of American decency and honor, their
extraordinary courage, dedication, and commitment armor them in a way
that nothing else can. Marines and their families realize the danger to
the Nation, their vital role, and the magnitude of their
responsibilities. Many have been wounded or killed in action over the
past year carrying out these responsibilities. In the national debate
over the root causes of war some of us may doubt the wisdom of our
actions in this troubled land, but they do not as many of you who have
traveled there have discovered. We owe these marines and our sailors,
soldiers, and airmen an irredeemable debt.
Marines continue to demonstrate that we are an expeditionary force
in readiness--Most Ready When the Nation is Least Ready. Our number one
priority is fighting the war and resetting the force for the future.
Your sustained commitment to improving our Nation's Armed Forces to
meet the challenges of today, as well as those of the future, is vital
to the security of our Nation. We recognize Seabasing as being more
than tactical level operations, but rather a National Capability that
regional combatant commanders can immediately apply to emerging threats
transcending all levels of warfare. No longer will we need to rely on
critical airfields and seaports in the initial phases of conflict.
On behalf of all marines, we thank the committee for your continued
support that has made us more effective in the fight, saved lives, and
will allow us to protect the Nation in an uncertain future.
Senator Talent. I am here for the duration and I know that
often committee members come with a question or two in mind. So
I am going to go right to Senator Kennedy and then to the other
members.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to put my full statement in the record and join with the
others.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today. I want to
join you in welcoming these witnesses to the subcommittee this
afternoon. We meet to discuss Marine Corps development and procurement
priorities and the concept of Seabasing.
First, I want to express our deep appreciation for the service and
sacrifices that the men and women of our Armed Forces are making in war
in Iraq today. There may have been spirited debate about the
circumstances leading up to the war, but no one should doubt our
Nation's solidarity behind our armed forces once they are committed to
battle.
However, we must not let outstanding performance by the Navy and
Marine Corps distract our attention from some very real problems that
face the sea services. This subcommittee has been working diligently
with the Department of the Navy to address some of these very important
problems, including:
improving fire support capability, including organic
Marine Corps fire support and Navy shore fire support; and
augmenting our strategic lift capability.
The focus of our hearing will be on the vision for Marine Corps'
operational concepts for the future and how the budget before Congress
supports that vision with development and procurement programs. I
continue to believe that the fundamental problem that we must deal with
in this subcommittee is achieving the proper level of modernization to
support tomorrow's readiness.
Without sufficient modernization aimed at the proper objectives, we
could be faced with a situation of having forces without necessary
capabilities, or we could be in a position of trying to support theater
combatant commanders' requirements with forces that are too small to
meet their requirements. We all know that our men and women in the
armed forces will respond admirably in any crisis, just as they have
been doing to support the operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
However, over the long-term, we cannot count on making up for
inadequate investment by asking our forces to do more with less.
Everyone can agree that we will continue to need strong Marine
Corps forces to protect our interests in many areas overseas. Within
that context, there are a number of investment issues we need to
consider today.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today.
Thank you. I thank those that are under you, the men and
women that are serving so nobly and gallantly in dangerous
circumstances all over the world. We very much appreciate their
service to our country.
I would like to focus initially, General Magnus, on our up-
armoring of our High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs)
and where we are on this with regards to the marines. This has
been an issue which we have been interested in this committee
for some period of time. I have here--we have all got short
periods of time--since September 2003 to April 2005, nine
different estimates about what was going to be necessary in
terms of meeting our military obligations in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the marines have been included in most of
these estimates. They have been pointed out and I am not going
to take the time to do it.
Then the variance in terms of productions and how that has
altered and varied and changed over the period of the last
years. We have probably 35 young men that have lost their lives
from Massachusetts. The best estimate is probably a third of
them have died either because of lack of the up-armoring of the
HMMWVs, some the electronic triggering of the devices. I have
visited with all of the parents of all of the ones that have
been killed or their family members in Massachusetts, and this
is a continuing and ongoing issue and battle.
I would be interested in what your status is at the present
time. We have the supplemental. Actually, even while we are
here trying to negotiate some increase--we have an increase in
this in the House over what was in the Senate by about $250
million. I think that is over what the administration actually
asked for, and Senator Bayh has been enormously interested in
this as well.
Could we--I have a limited period of time. I would like to
know sort of where you are on this, what your own kind of take
is when all your troops are going to feel adequately protected.
We have the up-armoring and then we have the support in terms
of the trucks, and then maybe some information maybe turning to
the electronic devices and whether we have a shortage or not.
We have had testimony before the full committee that there is a
shortage in terms of that, and I know there is important sort
of research both within the military to try and sort of upgrade
technology in that area.
What can you tell us about this?
General Magnus. Senator Kennedy, thank you very much for
the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, the rest of the committee, an
on-point question as to where we are in conducting this war
right now. As the Senator indicated, there were a variety of
estimates that came from the Department starting in late 2003.
In late 2003, the First Marine Expeditionary Force--and General
Mattis was part of that as a division commander--was literally
still on the way coming home and there was not a requirement at
that time for any Marine forces to support what has become OIF
II and the follow-on stability and security operations.
Within a matter of 3 months, we went from no battalions to
three battalions to six battalions to nine battalions, 31,000
marines, and now we are down to about 23,000 marines in what is
essentially our fourth rotation into Iraq. We have a total--
have gone through three different stages evolving to this
threat after the end of the major combat operations in OIF.
Responding to the needs of our commanders through urgent needs
statements, we provided what is now a total of over 3,100
armoring kits, starting out with 3/16ths armor, which is what
we could get them out of rolled hardened armor immediately,
bolted onto the vehicles, rapidly replaced by 3/8ths inch armor
as that armor and those design configurations worked with the
operational commanders over there. I would like to get this as
brief as possible so that General Mattis can lend some comments
because he fought with those marines and with that kit.
In addition to what is now a total of 3,100 HMMWV kits with
the two varying levels of armor that I indicated, we are also
procuring nearly 500 of the M-1114 and M-1116 up-armored
HMMWVs. The United States Army in the Multinational Force Iraq
has already kind of forward-financed that for us by giving us
100 of their vehicles in Iraq because this is a joint fight,
and we will have a total of 3,600 of the HMMWV A-2 variant with
the bolt-on armor as well as the up-armored HMMWVs.
In addition to that, we have nearly a thousand armor kits
that are going on our medium tactical vehicle replacement
(MTVR), our logistics vehicles. Deliveries for those kits are
continuing as we speak. The armor for the A-2 HMMWVs will go
through this spring in May. The M-1114 up-armored HMMWVs goes
through this fall, and we will continue the MTVR armor kits
through this December.
In addition to that, the Secretary of the Navy has been
working this as a high priority over the last nearly year and a
half in what he called Operation Respond, working with
countermeasures equipment for aircraft and for ground systems,
including electronic countermeasures equipment as well as the
armor that we talked about, a variety of issues.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense has initiated a Joint Rapid
Acquisition Council which, along with the other Services,
principally the Army and the defense laboratories, has begun
fielding new technologies and accelerating industry. A recent
example of that, Senator, is that approval for 122 Cougar
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) vehicles, which are going to
be designed and built in South Carolina, 65 of which will go to
the United States Marine Corps, the balance will go to the----
Senator Kennedy. General, my time is already up, but I
would like to--and this is a very complete answer to a
question. Maybe I can write, get information from you.
General Magnus. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Just quickly, in terms of what the unmet
needs today and what funding is in the pipeline, when do you
think you will get what is the necessary at least request that
the Marines have made, either in Afghanistan or Iraq or
wherever? When will you get the last of your unmet needs, and
is there sufficient funding now in the pipeline for that?
General Magnus. We believe between the fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005 supplementals--and I must caveat it and say
that this is an evolving war. This is a very thinking enemy
that literally puts no cost on their side. So our needs for
armor, our needs for other countermeasures and offensive
equipment are evolving.
But we believe that, based upon what we know from the
operational commanders now, this calendar year we will meet the
requirements as we know them now, sir.
Senator Kennedy. This calendar year?
General Magnus. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I see, General, my time is--I might ask
you, you can give a more complete statement for the record. If
I could just ask--I know that the time is up--on the V-22----
Senator Talent. Take your time, Senator. It is important to
the hearing.
Senator Kennedy. We have had a fire in the V-22 engine.
What can you tell us about where we are in terms of that
hydraulic fire testing impacting the V-22? I would be just
interested if you could comment on that.
Then I see where the Fighting Vehicle, Expeditionary, has
been delayed. It started in 1995. It is being delayed a couple
of more years. When is that going to be resolved? You can do
both of those.
General Magnus. Two quick bullets for you, Senator. The
operational assessment testing is ongoing with the V-22. We did
have an incident with a fire which was quickly extinguished and
all of the fire detection and suppression systems worked as
advertised. I will defer further comment on that to Secretary
Young. But we believe the assessment is going very well and,
yes, as in most developmental testing, we continue to uncover
small areas where there are corrections. But the major issues
with this aircraft are well over.
Of course, we will await the decision of Secretary Young
and the Department of Defense on the future of this aircraft,
but we are very positive and it is doing well.
Senator Kennedy. Just, Secretary, maybe you would make a
comment on that; and also about the reconstruction of the
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, which started in 1995, is now
delayed a couple of more years. If you could just comment on
that.
I thank the chair and my colleagues for the courtesy of the
extended time.
Mr. Young. I concur with General Magnus. OPEVAL is going
very well on V-22 and the independent Commander of Operational
Test and Evaluation force approved commencement of that testing
and reviewed all the test procedures. Testing continues out to
the June 2005 time frame. I am very optimistic that those
results will be very good. We have resolved issues.
As you have heard, there was a leak in a hydraulic line. We
have gone back and inspected all of those lines and resolved a
fix for the problem. The information concerning the program is
consistent with what you have watched in recent times, with
other programs, we are very open. We tell people when we have
problems. We fix those problems, and appreciate your patience
as we resolve these problems.
On EFV, we encountered some issues with the hull
electronics unit's ability to control the vehicle and then in
reliability of the vehicle in testing. We were probably
slipping as much as 6 months. The Program Budget Decision
essentially slipped the program a year. It certainly gives us
some more time. It takes risk out of the program and we believe
it is acceptable for the program. However, it extends the
program and that will add some cost, but we definitely had some
issues to resolve with that hull electronics unit and to
improve the reliability of what we want to hand the marines.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will have maybe
some follow-on questions in those areas, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. I have one, Senator.
The Senator raised a couple of issues I was going to raise.
What is the impact on the operational force of the 1-year slip
in the EFV in your view? Obviously, you do not think it is that
great because you were willing to let it slip.
General Magnus. Well, you see, all the initial operating
capability dates slipped because the procurement ramp and rate
is decreased through the psychological operations (PSYOP)
dissemination battalion (PDB). So the force sees those
vehicles--I think initial operational capability (IOC) is now
in fiscal year 2010. It slipped out. Assault amphibious
vehicles (AAV), which I noted in my testimony are 35 years old,
we will have to get some more miles out of those.
Senator Talent. I wanted to ask, General, following up on
the armoring of the HMMWVs. You are planning for a new truck.
Do you think that the up-armor is not working with the HMMWVs?
What is the future of armored wheeled vehicles for the Marine
Corps?
General Mattis. Mr. Chairman, if I could take a shot at
that. I think we have gone just about as far as we can go with
the 1970s technology of the Humvee and adding armor to it.
There are aspects to the design of the vehicle that limit how
much armor you can put on and still have a useful load in the
vehicle. We have gone, we have engaged with industry. We have a
lot of discussions going on. Georgia Tech has some very
interesting work going on as far as what we can do with the
shape of the vehicle and the internal configuration that would
build in survivability from the ground up, rather than kind of
adding on the armor.
What we eventually find is that as we all try to checkmate
the enemy's IED initiatives, that armor is only part of the
solution. There is training solutions, there is jamming
solutions. As far as the armor goes, we probably have to shift
to a new vehicle. We are heavily engaged in this right now. I
cannot give you any design right now that we have settled on
because we have had some setbacks, as we always do when you try
to break in new technology, this sort of thing. We have a lot
of bright people working on it, sir.
Senator Talent. I am going to get more into the IEDs later,
but I am very much in favor of and very supportive of up-
armoring. We obviously have to do it. But there is a negative
side to it as well in terms of cost of maintenance and fuel
costs and all the rest of it. I am pleased you are looking at a
whole universe of options for force protection and not just
armor, which is what we have to do in the short term.
But I guess it is too early to talk about costs or
anything, which is the thing that came to my mind when I read
you were thinking about doing that.
General Mattis. It is still too early, sir. As fast as we
figure it out, we will be coming knocking on your door, I am
sure.
Senator Talent. Okay. I have no doubt of that.
General Magnus. Mr. Chairman, if I could just quickly add
to it. Admiral Jay Cohen, who is the Chief of Naval Research,
working under Secretary Young, has been working in earnest with
industry on clean sheet of paper designs, working with the
folks that design crash and impact-resistant vehicles for
things like NASCAR. Again, we are starting with a clean sheet
of paper, so, knowing that we have to operate these vehicles
with human and other loads, knowing that there is more to the
mission than just being inside of an armored box, and knowing
that our environmental conditions may be upwards of 140
degrees. There is a lot of work going on in earnest with
industry and with the defense laboratories.
Senator Talent. Do you want to follow on?
Senator Kennedy. Just on this, and I give my assurance to
my colleagues it will be the last one.
Just on the jammers, what percent are you on for jammers,
sufficient jammers? This is an issue that there have been at
least some reports that we are deficient in terms of percent of
jammers that we have, Marines, currently.
General Mattis. Senator Kennedy, especially in the
electronics spectrum, it is a constantly evolving threat. We do
something, they do something. We have something waiting for
them, they try it, it does not work, so they adapt again. We
jam the radio frequency, so they go up hardwired. There is a
lot of ways we address this.
Right now--and because it is an open hearing, sir, I would
like to meet with some of your staff privately, but we have an
improved counter-IED set of gear that is being fielded right
now. Even as we are fielding it, we are recognizing we have to
upgrade it, and that upgrade you have funded through the
supplemental. So it is a constant mate and checkmate and back
and forth.
Again, what we have to look at is the power of the enemy
jammers. I do not want to go into that in detail here, but you
can understand that the jammer has to overrule something and so
you can see the challenge that we face, and how many vehicles
have to have it. Where at one time maybe one jammer for every
ten vehicles, maybe one for every three. You can see where we
are going with this.
But I can give you a lot more complete answer privately,
sir.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Could I add a comment to that? Going back a year
to the Operation Respond process, we identified, based on
Secretary England's initiative, $16.5 million in procurement
for the Marine Corps. We bought over 1,000 jamming systems,
some on the low end of the cost scale and also some of the
channel systems. We bought them anticipating the need and
anticipating they would be part of the solution set, but, as
the General said, not the complete solution set.
Over a year ago, we started to put jammers in the pipeline,
because some of them have 12- and 18-month delivery cycles.
Senator Talent. Senator Lieberman has been very patient.
Senator Lieberman. Well, you know, that Senator Kennedy; it
is the long count. No, those were good questions and I
appreciate the answers.
I want to focus on the heavy lift and just to ask you,
Admiral Sestak, I presume that heavy lift capacity is essential
to the seabasing concept that you have described.
Admiral Sestak. Yes, it is. I assume you are referring to
vertical heavy lift; yes, sir. The 53X without a question is
critical both for coming from the future expeditionary strike
group and from the MPF/F of the future. In addition, if
seabasing is to be of value to this Nation it has to be joint.
We have actually moved a million dollars into an Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) project run by the Army to look at
their future heavy lift helicopter in order for them to execute
their strategic maneuver from a distance, to make sure that
that vessel is compatible with the seabase. Much like we use
them to go off of our carriers off Afghanistan or potentially
into Haiti, or the Air Force with Doolittle, that is important
we make this joint.
Senator Lieberman. Right. I appreciate that answer. I
appreciate the joint inquiry proceeding. At a meeting of the
Airland Subcommittee last week and then at the full committee
this morning in the hearing on Secretary England's nomination
to become deputy, there is really a growing, deepening concern
on this committee about acquisition and the process by which it
occurs, the increase in the price of individual items, which
makes it harder for us to buy as many as both a lot of you and
certainly a lot of us think are necessary. So to the extent
that we can economize by cooperating across Service lines, that
is good news.
General Magnus or General Mattis, I wonder whether you
would comment a bit on what has been described as the validated
requirement for the CH-53X and outline what needs--what
critical technologies need to be mature to successfully
implement the program?
General Magnus. Thank you, Senator Lieberman and fellow
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity again
to talk about something critically important, as Admiral Sestak
said, to seabasing.
To put it in simple Marine terms, what we want to do is we
want to modernize our heavy lift fleet with a replacement for
the CH-53 Echo that can do what we are demanding of the CH-53
Echo today that it cannot do, that is to go deeper, to carry
heavier loads, and to go into a high hot environment. We have
already been there and in fact our critical aircraft that went
into Afghanistan with General Mattis in Task Force 58, the KC-
130 to be able to do air and ground refueling and move combat
loads, the CH-53 Echo to be able to do the vertical movement of
personnel and combat equipment, and of course either our strike
aircraft coming off of the Navy's carriers or eventually as we
moved in our attack helicopters to support the troops ashore.
We would like to be able to replace this aircraft and
basically we need to replace the 164 aircraft we have now with
a new fleet of new production CH-53 design aircraft with
elastomeric rotor heads, modern high-reliability,
maintainability, and higher powered engines, with the kind of
electrical and hydraulic systems and displays in the cockpit,
which are available in technology today, great American
technology from the power systems right on through the displays
and the aircraft itself, to be able to lift loads on the order
of 27,000 pounds to 110 miles.
These are not future requirements. These are today
requirements. But in many cases we cannot meet them. We have to
be able to displace refueling ashore. So this is not some
futuristic view of what we need to do from the seabase. This is
what we need to do today, and it will take us about 10 years to
develop this aircraft and get it proven.
We are getting great support from Secretary Young, who is
funding efforts to proceed toward what is expected to be a
milestone decision this year to move out with that development.
Senator Lieberman. Secretary?
Mr. Young. I think that was a great question, and let me
illustrate a couple of points. We believe the engine and the
avionics are particular areas that need work, but have a good
maturity. The main gearbox, rotor blade, and rotor damper are
areas where we are at a technology readiness level of 4. That
is not as mature as you would like it to be to proceed with the
program.
What drives that are the requirements. The requirements are
for additional capability. To achieve that, you have to have
technical performance, a rotor that will lift and go further
and go faster. In those areas, that is where you see cost
issues. If you compromise requirements, you can control costs.
I think it is a great discussion. As you said, the issue came
up this morning. If you push the requirements envelope, you are
going to push the cost envelope and you are going to push the
risk envelope. We have identified these as the first areas of
risk reduction to work to deliver that capability.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Secretary. That is very helpful.
General Magnus or General Mattis, let me ask you. I presume
that we are putting the CH-53Es under some real stress in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. I wonder if you could talk a little bit
about that. Of course, part of what we talked about today, this
morning at the full committee, is how long it takes to get from
the need, which you say is right now today, to satisfying the
need, which will be 10 years from now. Nobody in the private
sector would put up with that kind of delay.
Having given that speech, let me ask you what we have
learned and whether I am right that the current aircraft are
being stressed by their use and what we have learned in these
two conflicts about what we need.
General Mattis. Senator Lieberman, operating in
Afghanistan--and granted we never thought we would be putting
naval forces 350 miles in----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Mattis.--I will tell you that I was pushing people
to the limits of man or woman and machine. That is the bottom
line. We were pushing to the very edge of the envelope going
into the mountains there, 350, 450, 500 miles from the ships at
sea, refueling them in the air at night over the mountains.
We have continued to use these aircraft under very trying
conditions at rates of use that far exceed, of course, our
peacetime measures, how long we thought they would hold up
based on a certain number of flight hours each month. We are
flying them anywhere from four to seven and sometimes ten times
what we expected to be flying them at.
So the spare parts usage and the excess wear on the
aircraft means that we do need the replacement. We need to get
this program under way is the bottom line. We can keep the
birds flying. They are old, they are old iron. Eventually there
is just so much you can do with them. It will cost more each
year to maintain them. We can buy the time, sir. But we can
reduce risk, operational risk. What we do not want to do is
come to you with something that has such a design or cost risk
that we end up pricing ourselves out of business.
So it is a balancing act as we try to take what we
anticipate to be the true requirement, knowing that none of us
can think of the future perfectly. I think if we were sitting
in this room in 1805 we would not realize this room was going
to be burned to the ground about 10 years later. We have to
anticipate these kind of surprises and put our young men and
women in positions where what we are asking them to do is
reasonable. They will put their lives on the line. They know we
are not an insurance corporation. But we owe them gear that can
perform, going deeper. We do not want the enemy to be able to
hide from us and have sanctuary. We need to hunt them down.
This aircraft is critical and we need to get on with
explaining to you what it is exactly we need. I think it is in
process, but it is a challenge technologically and even
operationally to make certain we keep the balance.
General Magnus. Senator, if I could just quickly add on to
what my shipmate said.
Senator Talent. Yes.
General Magnus. We have already begun putting some of these
aircraft into desert storage. We will not fly an aircraft that
we knowingly believe is materially unsafe. Clearly, from a
maintenance point of view we will not do that. In last year's
supplemental we pulled the first aircraft out of the desert
that had already been retired, to send it back into rework so
that we could bring it up to operationally safe standards.
But there is an attrition over time, both through peacetime
losses as well as fatigue, the old iron that was mentioned,
where we absolutely will need to have replacement aircraft
because we will not be able to remanufacture the ones that
attrite, in the 2012 to 2014. I share your frustration,
Senator, and I also share the Secretary's concerns about making
something so hard that the risk goes up and it becomes
unaffordable in the sense that we will not be able to get what
we need.
We intend to work in earnest with our shipmates in the Navy
and with the acquisition executive to continue this program
along a strong path to get this new aircraft in development as
soon as possible.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Secretary, let me ask you just a final one or two
questions. Having heard this, it is somewhat like the
conversation we had last week, but is there enough money in the
pipeline to expedite basically the lessons learned, in a more
direct sense to mature the critical technologies that the
Marines know from experience they need? I know there was a
recent GAO study that pointed to three critical technologies
that are needed for this H-53X, CH-53X.
Mr. Young. Let me provide a couple answers. I actually had
a T-45 example I wanted to use as an illustration, but I will
just say, the program that is in the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2006 to 2011 is funded assuming what initially
started as a remanufacture program for the CH-53s. The decision
has been for some time now that it should be a new build
program. That will cost more money.
The independent cost estimate and Sikorski's estimate are
indeed for something on the order of an additional $800
million. As you and I had a chance to discuss last week, I have
been anxious that the enterprise identify those funds. Could
the program go faster? That is conceivable. However, across the
Department, there are cases where we do not execute the best
business case and sometimes we do take 10 years, because you
have to balance the need across the enterprise for resources.
This program is short of funding right now based on the
current information we have that changes it to a new build
program. We have adequate funds for the risk reduction efforts.
We will definitely have to adjust the profile as long as the
requirements stay where they are. This is a healthy discussion
about whether some adjustment in the requirements will get us
to a ``knee'' in the curve where we are getting the maximum
amount for the taxpayers' dollar instead of extra requirements.
But, we have to get that system that is easily put in the hands
of the warfighter and they can use it, as General Mattis has
seen, to the extreme conditions.
Senator Lieberman. How do you--this will be my last
question. How do you determine that? Those are very reasonable
questions. They need a new fleet of aircraft and you are asking
a very practical question, that maybe we have to settle for
less than the ideal so long as we are giving the Marines a new
fleet of heavy lift aircraft that can do the job that we ask
them to do better than the existing fleet.
Mr. Young. That is exactly what is going on right now with
some of the study funding you asked me about last week that are
committed and released. The acquisition team is working
extensively with General Mattis and the Marine Corps team to
talk about which requirements are costing more, which
requirements if relaxed could yield savings, and which
requirements are just not compromisable because you have to
have the capability to meet the mission.
As I said, that is a healthy discussion and these are
critical discussions at this early phase of the program. Once
these issues are settled, we need to make a funding commitment
to this program and move forward. But, those issues need to be
settled now and not changed midstream, because change will
drive the cost in the program.
Senator Lieberman. Just a final quick question. Do you
think that you are going to be ready in this budget cycle to
tell us what additional needs you have to put adequate money in
the pipeline to get this program moving more quickly?
Mr. Young. I think we may know by mid-summer. During the
next couple of months, we are supposed to have updated
independent cost estimates, an independent non-advocate review
of the program, somebody independently looking from outside,
and then completion of these discussions on requirements. So
yes, I believe so.
Senator Lieberman. So if the DOD authorization bill moves
as slowly this year as it did last year, that will be plenty of
time, even though we hope that it does not move as slowly.
Mr. Young. I think we will be late to your timely movement
of the National Defense Authorization Bill, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. Let me just strike while the iron is hot,
because I had a question about the 53 also. Do I understand,
taking your answers as a collectivity, that you are committed
to a new build solution to this concern? Because you have this
independent review ongoing and my understanding is that they
are going to report on alternatives to a new build, maybe going
back to a service life extension program. But are you committed
to a new build and just concerned about balancing capabilities
and costs? Or are you actively thinking about an alternative to
a new build on the helicopter?
Mr. Young. The FYDP reflected in fiscal year 2006 the
President's budget request has $3.376 billion for system design
and development of the H-53X. According to the independent cost
estimate and the company's estimate, that is not enough money
for a new build program. If the requirements stay at new build,
the decision is new build, we will do new build as long as the
enterprise finds the money to fully fund that program. I cannot
sign a contract for a program that is not fully funded.
Senator Talent. It sounds like there are issues you have
not reconciled which might affect the decision about going
ahead with the new build program. I am not being critical.
Mr. Young. No, sir, I understand. I cannot commit to new
build unless the enterprise is going to commit to fully fund
it. That is my hesitation.
Senator Lieberman. Then the enterprise you are speaking of
is the Marines or us?
Mr. Young. Department of the Navy and Department of
Defense.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Senator Talent. I think I will start referring to us as an
``enterprise.'' Nobody will know what we are talking about.
[Laughter.]
It is a pleasure to have Senator Clinton with us at today's
subcommittee meeting, and thank you for your patience.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your courtesy. I am not a member of this subcommittee, but
there are two issues that I am particularly concerned about
that I would like to inquire of both--in the first instance
Secretary Young, in the second instance the Admiral.
Secretary, I wanted to ask about the recently awarded VXX
Marine One presidential helicopter program, which was recently
awarded to Lockheed Martin Systems Integration of Owego, New
York, after a very exhaustive competition. It was a tremendous
example of what competition can bring, because they were both
excellent proposals. It was also a terrific example of what DOD
does in the face of a great competition by conducting a highly
detailed and disciplined source selection process.
The end of that process led to the awarding of the contract
to Lockheed Martin. There have been questions raised.
Obviously, we understand the reasons behind that. But now that
the contract has been awarded, we think it is important we
proceed expeditiously.
I strongly support therefore the President's budget request
of $936 million for VXX development in fiscal year 2006. Can
you provide a brief overview on what full funding of that
request in 2006 is important to keep the program on track?
Mr. Young. At a macro level, I would start with what we
said when we announced the program.
There are risks out there in the environment. We obviously
would not carry the President in a vehicle that was not safe.
We can improve the safety, security, and performance of the
vehicle. There is urgency to move forward.
We received proposals from companies that said they can
deliver a product that is significantly more capable and safer
on the schedule we had outlined. We are going to have
independent executive reviews and I will personally monitor the
progress of the program. We have the first review scheduled for
myself to chair here in the next month or so. This program
unquestionably has some level of risk, I think a level of risk
that is merited in light of the need to give the President more
capability.
We delayed the source selection, as you are well aware, so
both teams had more than adequate effort to propose and fully
understand what we require. They made excellent proposals, they
understand the level of integration and the complexity of the
challenge we put before them.
So, within our budget request, those funds are critical to
get started with those efforts. Those funds include money to
buy the first three helicopters, which we intend to put
significant test hours on. I would tell you that every aspect
of that budget is somewhat timely relative to the fact that we
extended the source selection to make the best possible
decision. We are now prepared to move forward. Both companies
have come in with plans that tell us they can execute and also
tell us that having the funds to begin integration and test at
an early stage is critical to having any chance to make the
schedule.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
Obviously I have some experience with Marine One and adding to
the defensive capacity of that helicopter is critical in these
times. So I hope that we will vigorously support the
President's request so that we can get this moving in a very
expeditious manner.
Admiral, I would like just to ask about the planning
process that is leading to the recommendations coming out of
the Navy in light of the information now available that
confirms China's very significant investment in a blue water
navy. I think that we talk, rightly so, about the challenges we
face from IEDs from the current war that we are fighting
against the enemy that we have on the battlefield at the
moment, but I am increasingly concerned about what additional
measures and planning we need to undertake to ensure that our
Navy remains superior.
It would be helpful to me to just get some brief overview
from your perspective as Deputy Chief and also the work you
have done--you have been very involved over the years in all
kinds of planning and strategic assessments--where we are in
that process at this time?
Admiral Sestak. Senator Clinton, thanks for the question.
Without going into classified material here, at the one end of
the spectrum, as you rightfully said, we plan for the global
war on terror. Often it is finding the needle in the haystack:
where is that IED, where is that terrorist crossing the sea
among the 86,000 merchant ships at sea today--which is one
challenge.
At the other side of the spectrum, we see three potential
major conflicts which we plan for. Let us talk about one we
have done extensively in the past 2 years through campaign
analysis. We see three major challenges. One is access. Where
the global war on terror is finding the needle in the haystack,
in a major conflict we have what you might say is a saturation
strategy--a lot of submarines, a lot of mines, a lot of
ballistic missiles. Not just one nation; there are several that
we have to think about, much as before World War II, we thought
about different nations.
That takes a different type of planning. It takes speed to
get inside their ring prior to their being able to shut us
down. It takes persistence. You cannot just deploy from the
United States. You need to be there already. So in our approach
to this we look at several aspects of our capabilities--that
are absolutely critical. The submarine force. How else can you
be there, inside someone's door covertly, even today?
But we do not look at future warfare as platform on
platform. That is the massive change. That submarine can lay a
lot of individual distributed sensors on the ground, the bottom
of the ocean, that can begin to track submarines. Once an enemy
submarine goes past our submarine towards where the seabase is,
our submarine can say: here it comes, and here comes another
and another--and those distributed sensors, networked, begin to
track in force.
Second, we have to have the capability to shoot not just
the arrows, scores, hundreds of potential archers that are
shooting lots of arrows towards us, ballistic missiles and
anti-ship cruise missiles. To do that, we have to do three
things.
Please, Senator, if I go on too long stop me, but this is
something pretty important. The Navy is, as we are engaged
somewhere else, really a strategic option elsewhere for what is
primarily potentially a maritime conflict. But needs to be
joint. We cannot win without the other Services.
Take that archer, that transportable erector launcher, the
one that comes out of the mountain, scoots out, and we have 1
hour to shoot it before it all shoots a lot of arrows. So we
need to be able to have time-critical strike. We need to be
able to see him scoot out and that takes a space capability. We
can be over any country in peacetime with space and be able to
network back to some missile to shoot the archer.
Second, it takes information operations, the ability to
make a missile go awry, software--soft power, I mean.
Third, it takes the ability to protect the seabase from the
missiles that still are coming down, the last few. More
important than that we cannot just protect the seabase. The
Navy of today can no longer say, as it did in the Soviet Union
days, I will get command of the seas and 4 weeks later I will
finally show up off of Europe with 15 aircraft carriers and
say, I am going to defend, help out, in a war that is probably
over.
In most conflicts of the future, we talked about speed,
getting the marines there quickly--think if we could have done
that with Saddam Hussein in 1990. We might not be there today.
Speed.
So that means that we have to have the ability to see the
remaining arrows come down, but also protect the ports and the
airfields that our sister services are going to flow into, or
else they will not be able to help us in the fight.
So in summary, what I see in the future, at this end, is a
Navy, which I mentioned, that hopefully keeps the dog from
barking. It is the Navy that is able to say to another nation,
today is not your day. Where that military person on the other
side begins to turn around to his political master and says:
today is not my day. It includes forces forward every day.
Today one-third of your Navy is overseas, one-third,
immediately employable, to lay the sensors to tell us about the
submarines, to join up with the joint force to see the archer,
and to be able to have the ability to shoot them down or make
them go awry--and that takes DD(X), CGX, and all.
If I could, one last item. I will never forget the briefing
by General Schwarzkopf at the end of 283 days into Operation
Desert Storm. He said to the question from a reporter that
queried why the Marine Corps waited a moment, a little bit,
before they went over the berm because they had to clear a
minefield. The General looked at the young reporter and said:
Son, have you ever been in a minefield? Which Schwarzkopf had
in Vietnam.
Today we plan to put our sailors and men and women at sea
into scores of mines; but in the future, we finally will have a
craft--you are familiar with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
that is going to finally put unmanned vessels forward to sweep
in stem prior to our sailors, similar to our marines, go
forward so they know where the mines are not.
So in summary, we could go into, and I would be happy to
give your staff a detailed classified briefing on this, but it
is truly one where we believe properly positioned, with the
right capabilities procured, it is a Navy that can help say to
someone that truly has interest in regional influence that,
today is not your day.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Talent. I thank the Senator for her participation
and would like to invite her any time she wants to come to the
subcommittee.
General Magnus, one more question about EFV for you. You
were quoted in a Defense Daily article as talking about the
reason the schedule needed to slip was to reduce risks. I take
it you would agree with what Secretary Young talked about in
terms of the risks that we are trying to reduce with EFV?
General Magnus. Mr. Chairman, yes, I would agree with what
Secretary Young said.
Senator Talent. Anything you want to add or any particular
insights?
General Magnus. Sir, given the opportunity, of course a
marine will take it. In actuality, the schedule----
Senator Talent. That is what you have common with Senators.
[Laughter.]
General Magnus. The schedule has moved a little bit more
than 1 year to the right. Certainly we have--with that, we are
going to do risk reduction. This system is doing well. Just
like other systems developments, we will uncover things that
need to be changed in terms of design. What we are most
concerned--since we are demonstrating great performance with
this vehicle now, the 30 millimeter cannon is operating
remarkably, the water speeds are demonstrated in excess of 30
knots, and we continue to work that. But of course, system
reliability and maintainability and habitability for not just
the crew, but the combat marines that will be riding in the
back, is something that we want to make sure that when we
deliver this to the operational forces later on this decade we
are delivering all that this system and General Dynamics and
our SYSCOM can deliver.
However, some of the shift to the right in this program was
simply because of overall DOD affordability considerations. So
we have been able to--the good part is that we are mitigating
risk in this program, that we have great--even if they are
older, the legacy AAVs, which we have built with the Bradley
suspension system and they are doing awesomely well and have
done awesomely well over the last 2 years--but this is like the
iron we talked about with the replacement for the CH-53 Echo.
We are using in particular light armored vehicles and our
armored amphibians at up to eight times the rate.
Unlike where you can replace a lot of dynamic components
like transmissions, we are talking about the hull form and the
suspension itself. These are doing awesomely well and, although
they did not do the classic amphibious assault, they have
crossed rivers in Iraq where there were not any bridges or the
bridges were blocked, and they knocked down buildings in
Fallujah late last year, and they have shown a remarkable
capability and we are looking forward to a modern replacement
that, quite frankly, is also going to be capable of operations
in a contaminated nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC)
environment.
Senator Talent. All throughout the service we have legacy
platforms from the Cold War era that are being deployed at a
tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) far more than we thought they
would be when we bought them and doing things that were not
exactly anticipated, because we are fighting a very different
kind of war than we anticipated. We are all having to scramble
to adjust.
So you think the EFV emerges from the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) unscathed, despite the program costs, which is
what, $13 billion, something like that?
General Magnus. The program cost before the schedule was
adjusted last year was slightly over $8 billion, again
extending that out past the FYDP. Obviously, as we move it to
the right we will incur costs simply due to the inflation and
other reasons.
As far as what is going to happen at the other end of the
QDR, I think this is a system that has tremendous capability as
one of our primary surface connectors in forcible and rapid
entry operations from the sea. I think, recognizing that it is
part of a system of systems in seabasing, but is critical to
the combat projection of Marine maneuver forces, I think it
should do very well in the QDR.
Senator Talent. Yes. It is pretty central to what we all
understand the Corps to be doing, is it not?
General Magnus. Yes, sir. The Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle, the MV-22, and the heavy lift replacement aircraft are
fundamental to projecting Marine maneuver forces ashore.
Senator Talent. So is DD(X), but we will not get into that.
Admiral Sestak. He meant to mention it, sir.
Senator Talent. General Mattis, let us talk about IED. One
of the advantages of having other Senators go is that takes
things off the plate. There were some really good questions in
areas that I had intended to address, but we did not get very
heavily into IEDs.
I know the Corps is investing a lot of energy in looking
for ways to detect and neutralize IEDs. Let me ask, if you can,
in an open hearing what conclusions you are drawing from those
studies. I am also particularly interested in your opinion of
how the Joint Task Force is working and I would like your
assurance that the Corps in its own studies is working very
closely with the Joint Task Force. We do not need a bunch of
stovepipes out there.
I bet anything you are going to tell me that you are
working closely with them, but expound a little bit on what you
are finding and where you think all that is going.
General Mattis. Sir, in country, in Baghdad, we have
marines on the Joint IED Task Force, the ones who do the
forensics, this sort of thing. The information-sharing--I could
tell you within hours, if First Infantry Division got hit by an
IED, I could tell you what had happened to them in the First
Marine Division area. The information-sharing is real-time and
it was very, very effective for us. As we tried to anticipate
as tactics and techniques were passed around amongst the enemy,
we could be in a position to block them.
If I were to sum up everything I have learned about
fighting over the last 30 years, it is improvise, improvise,
improvise. Nowhere is this more obvious than with the IEDs. We
were actually hit with the first of them before we came out of
Iraq from OIF I down in the southern area, an area called
Northern Babil Province. The initial ones, sir, had tripwires
on them, tripwires going across the road. The enemy does not
care one bit if they kill innocent people. To tell you the
truth, we are ready to fight them, but their ruthlessness
toward even their own people was still a bit of an eye-opener
to us over there.
As we adapted to that, and there are very easy ways, as you
can understand, how we would adapt to something that obvious,
and they went to the hardwire. These were people in a part of
Iraq where they built all of Saddam's munitions. It is the area
south of Baghdad running down toward northern Babylon. In that
area, the enemy adapted very, very quickly. So we were working
with them at the same time, almost working alongside the enemy.
They do something, we would do something. They would see what
we were doing, and it would go back and forth.
Today what we have matured to are a number of radio
frequency interrupters, jammers, this sort of thing, that
identify different parts of the spectrum. I will tell you right
now how we can reverse the whole construct of this war: Find
something that will prematurely detonate IEDs. At the Office of
Naval Research (ONR), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), and other places--I will not go into the details--
there are people who are striving valiantly for this and
working some very long hours.
Senator Talent. Everybody is working for that and I just
hope that they are sharing information.
Let me just take you down that road a little bit, because
you mentioned before how ruthless this enemy is. He is also
very highly adaptive. You really have to on that level respect
them. My concern is that our efforts not be so technology-based
that we think that there is a technological silver bullet,
because--it would be great if we could come up with something
that would prematurely cause those things to explode, but then
they might be able to find a way around that as well.
General Mattis. Right. Sir, we are more adaptive than the
enemy is. That is one point.
Stovepipes would be a concern. If we do not have some way
of fusing all this together, we could have people stumbling
through experience-based learning that somebody else has done
and some other university had already picked up on, this sort
of thing. The Secretary of the Navy has funded every one of
these issues. He has told me there is no budget on this. He
says, whatever you need.
We have a few surprises for the enemy. I am here alive
today thanks to one of those surprises, I can go into detail
on, and I will salute the Air Force on that one. But you are
right, it is not all based on technology. Marines with rifle
scopes on the rifles, we put them out--where we used to have
about a dozen snipers in each battalion, now we have hundreds
of men in each battalion carrying scopes on rifles--are able to
spot the little antenna alongside the road. We never imagined
that, but you give the gear to the young men, they will figure
out how to best use it.
Senator Talent. So you think the training for force
protection, situational awareness, all that, you are satisfied?
General Mattis. We are never going to be satisfied, but we
interview every one of the grievously wounded young men that
comes to Bethesda. These would be the worst wounded that we
have, and we have them be the ones who grade our training, our
predeployment training on us.
We have made subtle variations to the training based on
their input, but overwhelmingly we have received very positive
responses from them about the quality of the training and
preparing them for this.
Senator Talent. How would you sum up intelligence that you
are getting and what role that is playing?
General Mattis. Ninety percent of the intelligence we get
on IEDs comes from Iraqi people. They are the ones who call our
tip lines. As fast as they would set off a bomb in a
marketplace, we would have pictures of the bruised and dead up
on the walls there in that same market hours later, with a tip
line for people to call.
The intelligence is good, but we work closely with the
Royal Marines, the French Marines, and the Los Angeles Police
Department before we got sent back in. We had just gotten home,
we got the word we were going back into the Sunni Triangle,
Fallujah, Ramadi. They explained about community policing, and
it is remarkable how consistent Los Angeles Police Department
policing the barrios, the Royal Marines in Northern Ireland,
the French Marines in various places around the world. There
are very common techniques that they all use, and it is all
intelligence-based.
We also get a fair amount off signals intelligence I will
not go into in this hearing. But it is that combination of a
little technology kind of intelligence, primarily human
intelligence, and the old policeman on the beat way of picking
it up.
Senator Talent. I hear it is getting better. It got better
after Fallujah and better still after the elections. Is that
your sense also?
General Mattis. That is absolutely the case, and I think
the number of attacks and the casualty rates, plus the enemy's
more desperate attacks, where they are attacking the forward
operating bases now. That will be a quick trip to disaster for
them, as we have seen on two cases. It will be a tough fight,
but we will always win those.
When they come out like that, they are losing their suasion
over the people and they are losing the capability the IED once
gave them, driving them to something that is very, very
dangerous for them.
Senator Talent. This is a war you are winning. As Secretary
England said, this is a war we have to win, not just for Iraq
but for the whole global war on terror. Very pleased to hear
that you are doing the lessons learned with the British and the
French and Los Angeles Police.
I do not know if you have felt this way, but I am going to
say it for the record. When you talk to these young marines and
soldiers, their ability to go out among the populace and move
from one role to another, their sense, the instinct that they
have--and this is stuff they have been trained up in in the
last couple of years, because they did not have that in basic
or anything like it, to be a sort of a general policeman in one
instance, and then just a friendly person making contact,
somebody getting intelligence, and then maybe having to turn
and be a warrior the minute after that. It is just incredible,
the skills that they have developed.
I just, I am lost in admiration for them, their ability to
handle those situations.
General Mattis. I have seen the same thing, Mr. Chairman, a
marine literally shoot an enemy down, handing out candy within
2 or 3 minutes to a little kid, and then driving off and waving
to the people, without any of the potential racism or any of
this kind of negative stuff. They are doing us proud, sir.
Senator Talent. It is an essential role.
You are satisfied we are capturing the forensics? When one
of these things goes off, we are going out and getting it and
sending it back?
General Mattis. One hundred percent confident. Now, that is
when you can get something. There are times, sir, if they put
off something that has 500 pounds and it takes apart an M-1
tank, all you can say is one heck of a big bomb, because there
is probably not much left around of even the detonating
material, or it is a half a mile away, blown off into some
bushes.
So where it is possible, there is a very good forensics
data collection and passing around of what we found.
Mr. Young. Senator, may I add some comments?
Senator Talent. Go ahead.
Mr. Young. I cannot add to the experience level, but I
wanted to assure you that--and you have heard from Secretary
England--he meets every month or so on OIF updates, and that
has been the senior leadership drive that has helped force
several of these issues. We have done things across the board
including an ONR initiative with small business to look at any
idea out there for counter-Soviet shoulder-fired antitank
grenade launcher, counter-IED, counter-mortar fire.
In the Secretary's meetings, in the Operation Respond
meetings, we have asked Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF), and
Army personnel to come to either set of the Secretary's
meetings. We were injecting every idea we have into the Joint
Task Force. So could we improve? Maybe. But we are doing
everything we can to share ideas. There is no pride of
ownership here in what we are doing.
We are looking and we have used every available tool out
there, too. The Marine Corps has been a leader in using
military off-leash dogs to go and inspect. We have applied our
aircraft and our aircraft sensors in unique ways to find these
devices. We have exploited every tool we have available to us
in trying to address the problem.
Senator Talent. This is a subject that interests me, so I
bring it up at every available opportunity. I have been
pleased, and with the emphasis from the top with Secretary
Wolfowitz, and I am satisfied that Secretary England is going
to do the same thing, assuming he is confirmed, as I hope he
is.
So I am pleased at that. We just have to consistently
emphasize every aspect of this to keep these people on the run.
I like to make them sweat, too. Instead of us worrying about
when the next one of these things is going to go off, make them
sweat about whether a Special Ops guy is going to be at
whatever safe house they think they are hiding at that night.
Let us switch into my last set of questions. I want to talk
a little bit more about seabasing. Admiral Sestak, I
appreciated your vision. We are still at such an early phase of
this. I guess I do not want to get too much into details of it.
From what I can see in terms of your planning, you programmed
$6.6 billion for MPF ships, which is about $1.7 billion apiece.
Does that include, by the way, ship to shore connectors,
intratheater capabilities, or would that have to be added
later?
Admiral Sestak. That particular line does not, sir. There
are four landing craft, air cushion-type vessels that are
funded to get the marines ashore, as well as that vertical lift
we talked about, the CH-53E.
Sir, let me answer your questions. I want to make sure I am
not wasting your time.
Senator Talent. I am not going to go heavily into this
because I think it is still a little bit too early and I just
do not want to have a vague back and forth here. But we were
talking before about affordability versus capabilities and the
fact that we may want a capability but then we look at whether
we can afford it and then we start asking can we do this some
other way.
Now, you are a very strong supporter of seabasing. I am a
very strong supporter of the current Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) and this is part of his whole Sea 21 concept. I have gone
along with it, but I have to ask myself, as I understand it it
seems to me like seabasing will take over a responsibility that
had previously been performed by other parts of the force
besides the Navy, in other words securing land bases from which
we could operate, and that was done diplomatically or
militarily. It depends on what war or engagement we are talking
about.
Now it seems that what we are going to develop is the
ability within the Navy to do that at sea, I guess on the
assumption, which I think is probably correct, that there may
be difficulty in getting adequate land bases to operate from.
So I guess the question is, in view of the fact that it
looks like it is going to be expensive going in, we are all
struggling to find more money for ships, is this a
responsibility that we want to undertake within the Navy or
should we within the overall structure of OSD say, you know
what, we are going to anticipate where the conflicts may occur,
we are going to try and secure the land bases that we need;
diplomatically, however, if we cannot, we will task the Marines
or we will task the Army to go and take a land base, because we
may never have to do that and it will probably be less
expensive than building all these ships and this whole
seabasing concept?
Now, I am talking on a conceptual level here.
Admiral Sestak. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. Give me your answer to that.
Admiral Sestak. Sir, I think it goes back to what do we
believe. Do you believe that we will have access in 20 years?
Turkey did not permit us complete access to this last war, a
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally. We were limited
to what we could bring into several NATO nations for weapons in
recent times.
Do you believe that we had access for Afghanistan on day
one? No. It took us a couple weeks to months to get a base to
operate from from Uzbekistan. So from the sea went the first
foot soldier, from an aircraft carrier. Did we have access to
Haiti? No, and again, it was from the sea as well as from the
air.
So it comes back to what do we believe. Do you believe that
we want to have the United States have to ask for a permission
slip from an ally, a friend, a neutral nation, for what is our
vital interest overseas? If the answer is yes, you have
answered--not you--this Nation has answered the question.
But the trends have been such, if you look at the 1960s,
from many bases overseas, to the very recent past, and a study
done by DOD of what forces we want to take back, such as from
Europe, the question becomes what do you want: to either leave
forces there that you can use with surety or to assure you have
a right to use any forces?
So, sir, actually I believe two things. One is that this is
not a revolution we are talking about; it is a natural
evolution, using two-thirds of the face of this Earth as a base
that we command. Nobody, nobody, doubts the ability for us to
own that base. It would be a shame for us not to think about
having the Marines capture a base, but they have one way truly
to get there. They can pull into a port, like they did in OIF,
and administratively offload their tanks and their Light
Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and line them up, like that picture I
showed and hope, like I pointed out with Senator Clinton,
nobody has a missile that is going to rain down on them in the
30 days or whatever it takes.
Or we can also come from the sea, as a United States force,
as we did in Afghanistan, as General Mattis did, coming from an
expeditionary strike force, he went in with a Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). We can build that force, but then you
come to the point--the devil unfortunately is in the details.
Senator Talent. We have to make sure that the sea base is
survivable as well. They can shoot missiles at that.
Admiral Sestak. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. If you are looking at a peer competitor
possibility, what is going to happen to the cost of these ships
to try and ensure survivability?
Admiral Sestak. Two answers, please, because this is such
an important issue. How do we own the seas or not use the seas?
So, we are on the cusp, I believe, in the next few weeks of
having an affordable--an affordable--Maritime Prepositioning
Squadron that meets the requirements that, by and large--and we
have another little portion here to look at, as we have been
talking to Mr. Young recently--of being able to have an option
that truly is affordable to put a brigade from the sea, not
just prepositioned, but expeditionary. I could go into those
details if we need it.
But it also brings me back to the second issue. I can
surely remember reading about the battleship sailors that said:
How can you build an aircraft carrier that is half empty with a
great big hangar? It will never survive. The one thing the
Marine Corps never lets us stop thinking about is what we call
the sea shield. Sir, that is why, while MPF(F) is absolutely
important and a marine coming off a commercial standard ship
potentially, it is still a warship if it can be protected
sufficiently. But what this Congress has thus far funded and
why the CNO feels so confident about it is this: we are going
to put standard missiles, air-to-air missiles in concept, on an
aircraft in the sky, an E2C Hawkeye. It is going to be up
there, not physically with the missile, but as soon as it sees
a missile with its new radar, the Radar Modernization Program
(RMP) radar, connected by a Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC), Cooperative Engagement Capability Link, we can merely
push a button on a surface ship and, instead of waiting for
that missile coming over the horizon at 10 feet above the water
where a ship cannot shoot until it is 12 miles away even though
it is an Aegis, it can shoot 100, 150 miles away, based upon
what the E2C can see.
So the shield and the modeling we have done shows that,
yes, with surety we feel this platform on the greatest maneuver
space in the world can be defended. Not just conceptually, sir,
for the details we do have here finally, after the last year of
work.
Senator Talent. Secretary Young, do you have any comment
you want to add?
Mr. Young. No, I think that is a great description. We just
have to work very hard. It is just like the H-53 discussion.
The acquisition team is working very closely with the Marine
Corps and the Navy to say these capabilities come at a price
and where are your balancing levels. We need to bring you an
affordable program. I think you have hit on exactly the right
issue.
Senator Talent. This is exactly what the QDR is supposed to
look at, is it not?
Mr. Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Talent. To reexamine assumptions going in.
All right, let me see if I have anything else. No, I think
we have covered it. It has been I think a really informative
hearing.
We will leave the record open for questions that we may
submit for written answers, but I do thank you all for your
time. The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Talent
ch-53x heavy lift replacement program
1. Senator Talent. Secretary Young, at the April 6 Airland
Subcommittee hearing, you testified that you had concerns regarding the
CH-53X program. I understand that you have released $50 million to date
for fiscal year 2005 risk reduction efforts. I understand that you are
withholding an additional $50 million until you receive the results of
an independent review team (IRT) of the program. I understand that one
of the items you expect to hear from the independent study team is
other alternatives to the new build program. Does this mean you
challenge the results of the formal Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), and
if so, could you please tell us of your specific concerns?
Mr. Young. While I'm not challenging the results of the formal AoA,
I am concerned about the overall affordability of the Heavy Lift
Replacement (HLR) program. This is particularly true given the current
fiscal environment, and the challenges of continuing to balance
recapitalization for obtaining new capabilities while simultaneously
sustaining the legacy fleet aircraft that are performing magnificently
in current operations. Because of my concerns, I directed that an IRT
be established to assess the HLR program-of-record. This IRT is
evaluating system trade-offs, analyzing capabilities versus
requirements, and will provide recommendations for economical and
efficient acquisition approaches. The goal of this process is to
aggressively pursue all options that will result in the most effective
and efficient use of our resources given today's fiscal constraints.
2. Senator Talent. General Mattis, do you agree with Secretary
Young's assessment?
General Mattis. While I'm not challenging the results of the formal
AoA, I am concerned about the overall affordability of the HLR program.
This is particularly true given the current fiscal environment, and the
challenges of continuing to balance recapitalization for obtaining new
capabilities while simultaneously sustaining the legacy fleet aircraft
that are performing magnificently in current operations. Because of my
concerns, I directed that an IRT be established to assess the HLR
program-of-record. This IRT is evaluating system trade-offs, analyzing
capabilities versus requirements, and will provide recommendations for
economical and efficient acquisition approaches. The goal of this
process is to aggressively pursue all options that will result in the
most effective and efficient use of our resources given today's fiscal
constraints.
3. Senator Talent. Secretary Young and General Mattis, in a recent
report on selected major programs, GAO stated that there were three
critical technologies that must be matured for the CH-53X program. I
understand that of the $50 million released to date for risk reduction,
only $3 million have been dedicated to these technologies. Do you
believe this is sufficient financing to address these three critical
technologies, and if not, how much more should be dedicated?
Mr. Young and General Mattis. The Navy has allocated funding
amounts to the three CH-53X Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) that
are consistent with the very early stage of the program. At this stage
in the acquisition process, which is prior to formal program
initiation, the program office is engaged in a broad range of concept
studies and trades analyses. These efforts support an understanding of
the user's requirements; definition of subsystem technologies and their
alternatives; cost estimations; and the complete range of planning for
an efficient and executable program. A sustained emphasis has been
placed on fully preparing for the System Development and Demonstration
(SDD) efforts that would begin shortly after a successful Milestone B
decision. Efforts to mature CTEs are a part of the total effort in this
pre-Milestone B environment; the Navy is doing as much as is possible
in the pre-Milestone B environment for the CTEs while continuing to
work towards a near-term Milestone B decision. Once MS-B is achieved
and entry into SDD is approved, significant amounts of funding and
effort will be expended to mature the CTEs in accordance with approved
Technology Maturation Plans, ensuring a successful conclusion to SDD.
4. Senator Talent. Secretary Young and General Mattis, how do you
assess the executability of the program given that only $3 million have
been invested for these critical technologies?
Mr. Young and General Mattis. The CH-53X program, currently known
as the USMC HLR program, is developing an acquisition approach that
will ensure the program's executability. The Milestone Decision
Authority will closely examine the program for executability at the
program's Milestone B review, which will be the first Milestone review
for the CH-53X program and signify formal program initiation. A
Milestone B review not only assesses technology maturities and
maturation plans, but also includes assessments for stable and well-
defined user requirements and baselines; an efficient and realistic
schedule; full funding and affordability of the program; and compliance
with all statutory and regulatory mandates for program plans and
documents. The program office, supervisory staffs, and independent
agencies are actively scrutinizing and refining preliminary CH-53X
engineering, logistics, contractual and other program strategies and
budgets to ensure successful execution of the HLR program following
formal program initiation.
5. Senator Talent. General Magnus, do you need a heavy lift
helicopter given the fact that the Marine Corps is getting ready to
build the MV-22 Osprey?
General Magnus. Yes. The MV-22 is a medium lift aircraft designed
to replace our aging medium lift CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters, while
the HLR will replace our aging heavy lift CH-53E helicopters. The MV-22
will function primarily as a troop carrier and is also capable of
transporting external cargo up to 10,000 pounds. The speed and range of
the MV-22 make it essential in transporting large numbers of marines
long distances such as those envisioned in Expeditionary Maneuver
Warfare (EMW) and Seabasing concepts. Studies have shown that the
capability to move troops over long distances rapidly is indispensable
to executing this concept. The HLR is the Marine Corps' vertical heavy
lift aircraft and will be capable of moving a 27,000 pound load 110
nautical miles. This is critical in providing the ground combat element
with the equipment and logistical support they need to conduct EMW and
Seabasing.
6. Senator Talent. General Magnus, what is the operational concept
of the employment of the MV-22 Osprey and the CH-53 helicopter?
General Mattis. The MV-22 is a medium lift aircraft designed to
replace our aging medium lift CH-46E and CH-53D helicopters. The HLR
will replace our aging heavy lift CH-53E helicopters. Together, the MV-
22 and HLR will provide the air connector capability to the EMW/
Seabasing concepts, where the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV),
Landing Craft Air Cushion, and high speed vessels provide the surface
connector capability. Air and surface connectors are an integral part
of the Seabasing pillars necessary to execute EMW. MV-22 specific
missions include expeditionary assault from land or sea, raid
operations, medium cargo lift, tactical recovery of aircraft and
personnel, fleet logistics support, and special warfare. The Heavy Lift
Replacement will fill the vertical heavy lift requirement not resident
in any other platform that is necessary for force application and
focused logistics envisioned in Seabasing and joint operating concepts.
expeditionary fighting vehicle program
7. Senator Talent. General Magnus, you were quoted in an April 7,
2005 Defense Daily article as saying, ``The Pentagon took the money out
of EFV, in part because the program probably needed to slip schedule a
year to reduce some risks. A lot of things concern us.'' What are your
concerns with the EFV that lead you to say that a 1-year slip was
``probably needed?''
General Magnus. The EFV program has been executing an aggressive
developmental test (DT) program on the second-generation prototypes.
This testing is designed to identify technical issues, including those
causing Operational Mission Failures. The program has identified and
developed solutions for the top reliability drivers, including
hydraulic system improvements and hardware and software changes for the
Hull Electronics Unit (HEU). Design changes will be incorporated into
the vehicles this summer to resolve the identified problems. The
additional time provided by the 1-year change in the production
decision will enable the program to perform follow-on DT on the
modified vehicles prior to the conduct of the Operational Assessment
scheduled for early next year.
8. Senator Talent. General Magnus, what is the impact on the
operational force of the EFV restructure?
General Magnus. Delay in the fielding of EFV equates to a delay in
the realization of our emerging operational concepts such as
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (particularly Ship To Objective
Maneuver) and Seabasing. EFV is an enabler of these concepts as it
provides the requisite mobility, lethality, command and control, and
force protection to turn these concepts into fielded capabilities. A
delay in EFV fielding also puts pressure on the legacy Assault
Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) as it must now remain in service longer than
originally anticipated. The EFV restructure requires our Operational
Forces to keep the AAV running longer and delays their access to the
increased capabilities EFV will provide.
9. Senator Talent. General Magnus, is the Marine Corps committed to
the EFV program?
General Magnus. Yes, as a principal enabler of our emerging
concepts of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (particularly Ship To
Objective Maneuver) and Seabasing, the Marine Corps is fully committed
to the EFV program. It remains our number one ground acquisition
program.
10. Senator Talent. General Magnus, how do you think the EFV
program will fare coming out of the QDR?
General Magnus. I believe the EFV program will fare exceptionally
well coming out of the QDR. When the capabilities of this system are
examined in their entirety, one finds that the EFV brings much more to
the Joint Force Commander than a credible forcible entry capability.
While forcible entry executed from over the horizon was the genesis of
the EFV, the survivability, force protection (to include NBC collective
protection), mobility, and lethality requirements levied upon this
system will provide our maneuver forces with a world class armored
personnel carrier to meet the challenges we will face in the 21st
century.
11. Senator Talent. Secretary Young, with total program costs
approaching $13 billion, do you have concerns regarding the
affordability of the program?
Mr. Young. I will always be concerned about maximizing the
affordability of programs. However, with the EFV program investment
costs at approximately $12.6 billion, we will field 1,013 highly-
capable EFVs to the Operating Forces with water and land mobility,
direct fire lethality, survivability, and command and control
capabilities that are significantly enhanced from the capabilities we
have on the battlefield today. EFV is critical to the combat projection
and tactical mobility of the marine maneuver forces ashore and we are
committed to providing this much-needed capability.
mv-22 osprey
12. Senator Talent. Secretary Young, Admiral Sestak, General
Magnus, and General Mattis, since two fatal mishaps in calendar year
2000, the MV-22 Osprey has been redesigned and testing was resumed. It
is now in its operational test phase. Section 123 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 keeps the program at
minimum sustaining rate (11 aircraft) until the Secretary of Defense
certifies that the aircraft's previous problems have been resolved
through operational testing. We are aware that the MV-22 is going
through its operational testing. Can you give us any information on how
the testing is going?
Mr. Young, Admiral Sestak, General Magnus, and General Mattis. The
V-22 was certified ready for operational evaluation on February 24,
2005. Under the auspices of the Navy's Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, the Marine Tiltrotor Operational Test Squadron, VMX-
22, formally began the V22 OPEVAL (OT-IIG) on March 28, 2005. It is
ongoing today with an estimated completion at the end of June or
beginning of July. The independent test community will not release a
report until the testing is complete, as such, it would be
inappropriate to comment on OPEVAL progress at this time.
13. Senator Talent. Secretary Young, Admiral Sestak, General
Magnus, and General Mattis, can we expect that we will be seeing the
Secretary of Defense's certification that the aircraft's previous
problems have been resolved?
Mr. Young, Admiral Sestak, General Magnus, and General Mattis. Yes.
Section 123 compliance documentation will be forwarded to USD(AT&L) on
May 10, 2005, to support Section 123 Certification to Congress. The
documentation package contains both the Commander, Operational Test and
Evaluation Force (COTF) Letter of Observation as well as an independent
assessment by OUSD(AT&L) DS/SE/AS in support of section 123 compliance.
Both documents concluded that the MV-22 Block A has operationally
demonstrated compliance with the four key areas (hydraulic system
components and flight control software, reliability and
maintainability, operations with other MV-22 and other types of
aircraft, and downwash effects) cited in section 123 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002.
14. Senator Talent. Secretary Young, Admiral Sestak, General
Magnus, and General Mattis, how much more costly do you expect the MV-
22 to be from earlier estimates?
Mr. Young, Admiral Sestak, General Magnus, and General Mattis. The
program office is working to support the CAIG Independent Cost Estimate
for the MS-III FRP decision. Overall costs and requirements are largely
understood and much data exists with respect to building V-22
production aircraft forming the basis of the Program Office estimate
and likely the CAIG estimate. However, the CAIG's final position will
not be complete until the August/September timeframe in support of the
DAB decision.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]