

**EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005**

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SPECIAL HEARINGS

FEBRUARY 16, 2005—WASHINGTON, DC

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EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 2:02 p.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Shelby, Bennett, Craig, Hutchison, Brownback, Allard, Byrd, Inouye, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Durbin, and Landrieu.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Chairman COCHRAN. The committee will please come to order. I want to welcome everybody to our hearing on the President's emergency supplemental budget request.

We will have two hearings—this is the first of two hearings on the President's emergency supplemental request for appropriations in the amount of \$81.9 billion. Approximately \$75 billion is for the Department of Defense, and over \$5 billion is for international functions of the Department of State. Appropriations in the amount of \$949.6 million are requested for a multiagency tsunami relief effort, and \$400 million for other agencies to support the war on terrorism.

Our witness this afternoon is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He's accompanied by General Richard Meyers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Ms. Tina Jonas. Tomorrow morning, we will hear from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

It's my understanding that the House of Representatives hopes to pass their bill prior to the March recess. I expect we will have a markup of their bill shortly after we return from that recess so that we may have final action on the request before the end of April.

I'm pleased to recognize my friend and colleague, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Senator Byrd, for an opening statement, and then we will hear from Secretary Rumsfeld and others for opening statement, if you have opening statements. Members will then have 10 minutes each for an initial round of questions, and I will recognize members in the order of their arrival at the hearing.

Senator Byrd.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I am greatly pleased that you are now serving as the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Your predecessor in this Chair, my friend, Senator Ted Stevens, was an extraordinarily good chairman, but he has moved on to the chairmanship of another Senate committee because of the term-limit rules of the Republican Caucus. I know that he will bring much wisdom and vigor and initiative to this new assignment.

Mr. Chairman, we have known each other for a long time, and have traveled abroad on Senate business together. I remember our trip to Turkey a few years ago, on the eve of the first Persian Gulf war. How history repeats itself. We were working together during the first Persian Gulf war, and we are working together now, once again, in a second Persian Gulf conflict.

Our new chairman has a healthy respect for the Senate's rules and for proceeding according to what is spoken of as the regular order. He and I share these views. While I may not be able to agree with the chairman on every issue, he can count on my strong support for proceeding according to the rules of the committee and the Senate. He can also count on me to continue to appreciate the bipartisanship that has been repeatedly demonstrated by this committee over the years as the committee proceeds to process this supplemental and the annual individual fiscally responsible appropriations bills.

So my best to you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for calling this very important hearing. We are reminded every day, by the grim statistics reported in the press, of the perils that our troops continue to face in the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. Like you, I am committed to doing everything in my power to provide our military personnel with the resources they need to do their jobs, and I look forward to working with you to provide those needed resources.

My admiration for our servicemen and -women, and my heartfelt gratitude for the great sacrifices they are making for our country, knows no bounds. Our men and women in uniform are, indeed, among the best and the brightest of our country's citizens. I salute them for their valor, and I thank them for their service.

But, Mr. Chairman, we owe our troops more than mere gratitude for a job well done. We owe them the confidence of a clearly defined military mission, one that has measurable goals and benchmarks, and, most importantly, one that has an identifiable endpoint. In short, we owe our troops in Iraq not only the resources with which to fight the war, but also a strategy to end that war.

Unfortunately, this supplemental budget request fails to deliver what our troops need most. The President is asking Congress to continue to shovel out money into United States (U.S.) military operations in Iraq with no further clarity as to what goals the military is expected to achieve, no hint of a possible timetable, no end to the occupation in sight.

The recent elections in Iraq gave the United States a unique window of opportunity to change course to lower the profile of the American military presence and open the door to greater inter-

national cooperation. I fear that the administration, despite all of its conciliatory gestures to our European allies, has effectively squandered that opportunity with this supplemental request.

This request sends a clear and strident message that the United States is not winding down its military operations in Iraq. To the contrary, the United States appears to be gearing up either to accommodate a permanent military presence in Iraq or to establish a launching pad for other military operations in the region. Either way, we are sending the wrong signal to the people of Iraq, to its neighbors in the region, and to the larger international community. Instead of taking this opportunity to temper anti-American sentiment among nervous Iraqis and their neighbors, the administration has effectively decided to turn up the heat.

Mr. Chairman, I am exceedingly troubled by many aspects of this request. I want, and I fully intend to support our troops, but I am unwilling to give the executive branch carte blanche to run roughshod over the Congress. This request is fraught with ambiguous flexibilities and ambitious political initiatives, including the construction of a permanent detention facility at Guantanamo, Cuba, and a host of seemingly enduring military facilities in Iraq and in Afghanistan. These are policy decisions, not simply pocketbook issues.

I worry that the President is using this supplemental to tunnel deeper and deeper into Iraq with no definitive exit strategy in sight and no light on the horizon. This request encompasses serious and far-reaching policy questions. I hope that we will give them the scrutiny they deserve.

I thank you.

Chairman COCHRAN. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ACCOMPANIED BY:

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHIEF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DR. DAVID CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary RUMSFELD. Good afternoon. I certainly appreciate this opportunity to discuss the President's supplemental request for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A few days ago, I returned to Iraq for the first time since the elections on January 30. The Iraqi people are, understandably, very proud of their accomplishment. They chose to defy the extremists and cast their lot with the forces of freedom, as did the people of Afghanistan only a few months before.

The great sweep of history is for freedom, and it is finding its way to some of the world's most violent regions, giving those most susceptible to extremist recruitment an opportunity to choose a different way of life. None of this would have been possible were it not for the valor and the grit of the American men and women in uniform. And I know you share my gratitude to them and to their families for their service and sacrifice.

I thank the members of the committee and the American people for providing the resources and support they need to complete their missions.


The President's supplemental appropriation request of \$74.9 billion for the Department of Defense will sustain ongoing U.S. military operations, provide assistance to important allies, help bring greater stability to Iraq and to Afghanistan, and ensure that, after returning from combat, America's Armed Forces are fully reset and repaired and restructured for the future.

The increase in this supplemental from 2004 can be attributed to three war-related priorities: training and equipping Iraqi and Afghanistan security forces, resetting the Army for the future, and repairing and procuring equipment that is essential to warfighting. I'd like to spend a few moments talking about each of those items.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

First, the Iraqi security forces. This supplemental allots \$5.7 billion to assist in the training of the Iraqi security forces. We're making progress toward that goal.

The military is frequently reassessing the performance and progress of the various Iraqi units. We've gone from no newly trained and equipped Iraqi security personnel, in 2003—we're talking about police, border officials, military forces, special commando teams, protection of dignitaries, and the like—we've gone from zero to 136,000 today.



The chart on the right indicates the historical perspective. We started from zero, in the beginning of 2003. We've had four assessment teams go in—one in January 2003, another in January 2004—the Eikenberry one—and then another one in August 2004, and, most recently, General Luck went in.

The original assessment we made just listed the numbers of them. We then decided we had better visibility and more information, and we could list the ones that were trained. And so, you see the drop-down to the ones that are on duty. And then, where it says "trained," it's a lower number.

As we got more visibility, in terms of their equipment, we then looked at training and equipping. And so, the figures you now see are the ones that are trained and equipped. The other anomaly there is, we took 73,000—74,000 Iraqi site-protection people out of the numbers, because they no longer report to the Ministry of Interior. So the 136,000 are Iraqis that are trained and equipped, and it does not include the site-protection people.

The numbers are interesting, but capability is also important. No one should expect that Iraqi security forces are going to come out of their training periods and be battle-hardened veterans, like the fine men and women in the U.S. military. And, ultimately, it will be the Iraqi people, not the coalition, who will defeat the Iraqi extremists. And the bravery of the Iraqi security forces in safeguarding the January 30 elections demonstrates their growing commitment and capability to do just that.

The inner perimeter and the outer perimeter of 5,000 polling places on January 30 were protected by Iraqis. They have lost something like 1,392 Iraqi security people killed in action. So these people are increasing their capability, getting more experience as they go along, improving their access to intelligence, developing better leadership and greater strength in the ministries. And so, it's not just numbers, but it's also their capability that really is important.

AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

The Afghan security forces, next. The President is requesting \$1.3 billion for the Department to assist Afghan security forces in their development. The Afghan army continues to grow in both size and capability, working closely with United States and International Security Assistance Force troops to secure the country and to deal with the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants.

Here again, the Afghan security forces did an excellent job when their elections took place. The Afghans have elections coming up for parliament again this summer, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense forces will be even further developed by then.

Supplemental funding will continue to strengthen the Afghan forces with new training and equipment that will move them toward a larger role in defending their own country. It's worth noting that last week the Afghan National Military Academy accepted its first class of cadets, soldiers that represent that country's next generation of professional military officers.

The Department of Defense (DOD) portion of the supplemental request also includes \$1.4 billion for payments to Pakistan and Jordan and other key cooperating countries for logistic and other support to the U.S. military in their efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and in their efforts in Iraq.

REPAIRING AND REPLACING EQUIPMENT

As one would expect in war, the high pace of operations is causing military hardware to wear out at a faster rate than would be the case during peacetime operations where basically all they're engaged in is training and preparing for conflict. On average, combat vehicles in war are experiencing 4½ years of peacetime wear in a single year. For example, the Bradley fighting vehicle, that usually

runs about 800 miles a year in peacetime—that’s in peacetime training—now sometimes is being driven in the range of 4,000 miles in Iraq.

This supplemental request provides \$5.4 billion to replace military items destroyed or expended during combat, and \$3.2 billion for depot maintenance to overhaul and repair equipment to restore it to mission-capable standards.

FORCE RESTRUCTURING

The President is requesting \$5 billion to help the Army provide more deployable combat power by reconfiguring its forces to be more agile, more flexible and responsive. The new modular brigade combat teams can deploy quickly to trouble spots, but, unlike today’s light airborne or air-assault units, they will have greater fire power, armor, and administrative and logistics support built in so that they can operate over a sustained period.

Army Modularity

Old:

33 Active Brigades $\xrightarrow{\text{supplying}}$ 15, one-year deployments per year \Rightarrow 1.2 years at home per year deployed



New:

43 Active Brigades $\xrightarrow{\text{supplying}}$ 15, one-year deployments per year \Rightarrow 1.8 years at home per year deployed

In the next 2 years, the Army will increase its deployable combat power by expanding from 33 maneuver brigades to 43, much more capable modular brigade combat teams. That’s by the end of 2007. That’s nearly a 30 percent increase in available combat power. The plan also provides the Army with modern weapons, equipment, and communications.

In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the Department proposes to fund Army restructuring primarily through supplemental appropriations, as this program has been accelerated as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Beginning in 2007, we will have had enough information before-the-fact, and the plan is for the modularization program to be funded in the base budget, which is my understanding of the understanding that’s been arranged between Congress and the executive branch. This request also includes approximately \$300 million to support restructuring of Marine Corps to add more combat and support units.


I would also like to touch briefly on other funding priorities that reflect the military’s commitment to ensuring that U.S. troops deployed in the field are given the support they need to complete their missions.

FORCE PROTECTION

The President is requesting \$3.3 billion for force-protection equipment to assist the military in ensuring that our forces have the latest equipment to fight and protect themselves from roadside bombs, rocket attacks, including armor plating for vehicles, improved night-vision equipment, and new systems that help helicopters evade and survive attacks.

Our enemies, as you know, have brains. They watch what we do, they look for our vulnerabilities, they adapt their tactics frequently. And we must do the same. For example, since U.S. forces first began to face the improvised-explosive-device (IED) threat in Iraq, the Army has ramped-up production of armored Humvees by more than 1,000 percent. As you can see on this chart—and I believe copies of the charts have been passed out—there has been a very dramatic ramp-up since the beginning of the IED threats.

Up Armored Humvee Production Rates




At that time, according to Army Chief of Staff, General Pete Schoomaker, there were some 500 tactical wheeled vehicles with armor in the Army inventory. Today there are about 26,000. So they've gone from 500 to 26,000. I think this shows the level of effort and the skill with which they have worked the problem.

This funding and previous funding from Congress should keep the Army on track to meet Central Command's current fiscal year request of 8,275 up-armor Humvees by next month. The Army is also working toward a further increase in production to 550 per month, from 450 at present, which it expects to achieve next month.

In addition, since March 2003, the military has produced in excess of 400,000 sets of body armor. They were originally at a rate of 1,200 sets per month, and they're currently at a rate of over 25,000 per month.

Small Arms Protective Insert sets - Production Rates




I'm told that by this week, with a few exceptions, U.S. military vehicles in Iraq that are carrying American troops outside of a protected compound will have an appropriate level of armor to protect against the most likely threats. Note that not every vehicle requires armor at all times, such as those that are confined to military bases.

Further, U.S. forces are finding and destroying bomb-making production facilities, developing technical countermeasures which either reveal IEDs or disable them, and changing their tactics to minimize the effectiveness of such bombs, including the fielding of robots and a technology developed in a matter of weeks to counter cellphone activation of these bombs. U.S. forces are now discovering and destroying more than one-third of IEDs before they can detonate. They have every reason to believe that that rate will improve still further. Additionally, the U.S. military has made force protection institutionalized across the services as part of its core capabilities.

MILITARY PERSONNEL

The President is requesting \$16.9 billion to aid military personnel, including salaries for mobilized reservists and guardsmen, and special pay for combat and separation. This number includes the added cost of \$1.7 billion for paying salaries for the additional 29,400 Army soldiers and about 2,600 marines. These are additional troops needed for ongoing operations above those services' nominal end strength.

Active Army End Strength
Statutory vs Actual Since September 2001



September 2005 Active Army End Strength Projection: 511,710

1. FY05 projection based on December 2004 data.
2. Program reflects 20K permanent strength increase beginning in FY05 and 10K temporary authority from FY05-FY09.

3. End Strength constraints waived due to State of National Emergency declared by President (effective 14 Sep 01).

Even with these increased troop levels, ground forces are stressed. That has produced some calls for increases in so-called permanent end strength, the force strength that's required by law on one day each year, that's what the statutory end strength is—on September 30, you have to be at a certain number. The Army has undertaken a range of initiatives and reforms to stabilize the force and to increase the pool of available troops in high-demand specialties. The chart here indicates that we have been well above the statutory end strength using the emergency powers provided by Congress to the President. And so, with these important steps now well underway, it would be a mistake, in my view—in the Department's view—to arbitrarily increase statutory end strength. For the present, we have all the flexibility that's needed under the emergency provisions. In the event the efficiencies now underway prove to be insufficient, or in the event that emergency powers were no longer available, it would be then time to discuss the legal end-strength issue.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

General Abizaid and his commanders in the field have requested—this supplemental request supports—military construction projects to improve living and working conditions in the U.S. Central Command area of operation. This construction is primarily to move U.S. service members out of tents and trailers and field latrines and into somewhat more comfortable and safer barracks and billeting facilities. The supplemental request includes \$1.1 billion for military construction unrelated to force restructuring.

HEALTHCARE

The supplemental provides for quality medical care, as is appropriate for U.S. service members both in theater and back home. The request for healthcare in the supplemental is \$176 million to cover patient transportation and other medical-related activities.

SURVIVOR BENEFITS

The President requests about \$400 million to fund enhanced benefits of the survivors of service members killed while serving our country in the global war on terror. As this committee knows well, we've entered an era of great challenge and of great opportunity. We're responding to serious threats and also working to reshape our military to be better able to combat them.

Consider the challenge our country faces, not only to reorganize the Army to fit the 21st century, but to better organize all of the military services plus transform the Department of Defense's bureaucracy to fight the war on terror. And, if that were not enough, to be fighting a war, for the first time in history, in an era where we have 24-hour worldwide satellite news coverage, including terrorist attacks, disasters, and combat operations, cell phones, digital cameras, global Internet, e-mails, embedded reporters, a casual regard for the protection of classified documents and information, and a U.S. Government still organized for the Industrial Age, not for the Information Age. And all of this not in a conventional conflict for which the U.S. military had been organized, trained, and equipped for decades, but in an unconventional war against asymmetric threats from enemies that are unburdened by bureaucracies or legal constraints. The task is daunting.

But consider what's taking place. Across the world, brave men and women, wearing America's uniform, are doing the hard work of history. And I know you share my desire to see that they have all the support they need to complete their important missions. They're bringing the hope of freedom to some of the darkest corners of the Earth, and that will render a powerful blow to the forces of extremism that have killed thousands of our innocent people and in countries across the globe.

PREPARED STATEMENT

I thank you for all you have done on behalf of our troops, and I look forward to responding to your questions after General Myers has had an opportunity to make some remarks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, good afternoon. I'm here today to discuss the President's supplemental request for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A few days ago, I returned to Iraq for the first time since the elections on January 30th. The Iraqi people are understandably proud of their accomplishment.

They chose to defy the extremists and cast their lot with the forces of freedom—as did the people of Afghanistan a few months before.

The great sweep of history is for freedom and it is finding its way to some of the world's most violent regions, giving those most susceptible to extremist recruitment an opportunity to choose a different way of life.

None of this would have been possible were it not for the valor and grit of America's men and women in uniform.

I know you share my gratitude to them and to their families for their service and sacrifices. And I thank the members of this Committee and the American people for providing the resources and support they need to complete their missions.

The President's supplemental appropriations request of \$74.9 billion for the Department of Defense will: Sustain ongoing U.S. military operations; provide assistance to important allies; help bring greater stability to Iraq and Afghanistan; and ensure that after returning from combat America's armed forces are fully re-set, repaired and re-structured for the future.

The increase in this supplemental from 2004 can be attributed to three war-related priorities added this year: Training and equipping Iraqi and Afghan security forces; resetting the Army for the future; and repairing and procuring equipment essential to warfighting.

I would like to spend a few moments talking about each.

First, the Iraqi Security Forces

This supplemental allots \$5.7 billion to assist in the training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces. We are making progress toward that goal.

The military is frequently re-assessing the performance and progress of Iraqi units.

We have gone from no newly trained and equipped Iraqi security personnel in 2003 (police, border officers, military forces, etc.) to 136,000 today.

There are an additional 74,000 site protection forces that are on duty, but not considered part of the 136,000, since they do not report to the Ministers of Defense or Interior.

But capability is every bit as important as numbers. No one should expect that Iraqi security forces are going to come out of their training pipelines and be battle-hardened veterans like the fine men and women of the U.S. military.

Ultimately, it is the Iraqi people—not the Coalition—who will defeat Iraqi extremists. And the bravery of Iraqi security forces in safeguarding the January 30th elections demonstrates their growing commitment and capability to do just that.

Afghan Security Forces

The President is requesting \$1.3 billion for the Department of Defense to assist Afghan security forces.

The Afghan army continues to grow in both size and capability, working closely with United States and International Security Assistance Force troops to secure the country and battle Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants. The Afghan Ministry of Defense forces now number some 19,000 soldiers, and the Ministry of Interior forces number approximately 33,000.

Supplemental funding will continue to strengthen Afghan forces with new training and equipment that will move them toward a larger role in defending their own country. It is worth noting that last week the Afghan National Military Academy accepted its first class of cadets—soldiers who represent that country's next generation of professional military officers.

The DOD portion of the supplemental request also includes \$1.4 billion for payments to Pakistan, Jordan and other key cooperating countries for logistical and other support for the U.S. military.

Repairing and Replacing Equipment

As one would expect in war, the high pace of operations is causing military hardware to wear out at a faster rate.

On average, combat vehicles in war are experiencing 4½ years of peacetime wear in a single year. For example, Bradley Fighting Vehicles that usually run about 800 miles per year in peacetime training are now sometimes driven over 4,000 miles in Iraq.

This supplemental request provides \$5.4 billion to replace military items destroyed or expended during combat, and \$3.2 billion for depot maintenance, to overhaul and repair equipment to restore it to mission capable standards.

Force Re-Structuring

The President is requesting \$5 billion to help the Army provide more deployable combat power by reconfiguring its forces to be more agile, flexible and responsive. The new "modular" Brigade Combat Teams can deploy quickly to trouble spots, but, unlike today's light Airborne, or Air Assault units, will have greater firepower,

armor and administrative and logistics support “built in” to operate over a sustained period of time.

In the next two years, the active duty Army will increase its deployable combat power by expanding from 33 maneuver brigades to 43 more capable modular Brigade Combat Teams by the end of fiscal year 2007, a nearly 30 percent increase in available combat power. The plan also provides the Army with modern weapons, equipment, and communications.

In fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, the Department proposes to fund Army restructuring primarily through supplemental appropriations, as this program has been accelerated as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Beginning in fiscal year 2007, the plan is for the modularization program to be funded in the base budget. This request also includes approximately \$300 million to support restructuring of Marine Corps to add more combat and support units.

OGROWING AND SUSTAINING AN ARMY AT WAR

I would also like to touch briefly on other funding priorities that reflect the military’s commitment to ensuring that U.S. troops deployed in the field are given the support they need to complete their missions.

Force Protection

The President is requesting \$3.3 billion for force protection equipment to assist the military in ensuring that our forces have the latest equipment to fight and protect themselves from roadside bombs and rocket attacks, including armor plating for vehicles, improved night vision equipment, and new systems that help helicopters evade and survive insurgent attacks.

Our enemies have brains. They watch what we do, they look for our vulnerabilities, and they adapt their tactics frequently. And we must.

For example, since U.S. forces first began to face the improvised explosive device threat in Iraq, the Army has ramped up production of armored Humvees by more than 1,000 percent.

At that time, according to Army Chief of Staff General Pete Schoomaker, there were some 500 tactical wheeled vehicles with armor in the Army inventory. Today, there are about 26,000.

This funding and previous funding from Congress should keep the Army on track to meet Central Command’s current fiscal year request of 8,275 up-armored Humvees by next month.

The Army also is working towards a further increase in production to 550 per month (from 450 at present), which it expects to achieve next month.

In addition, since March 2003, the military has produced in excess of 400,000 sets of body armor—from a rate of 1,200 sets per month to a rate of over 25,000 per month.

I am told that by this week, with few exceptions, U.S. military vehicles in Iraq carrying American troops outside of protected areas will have an appropriate level of armor to protect against the most likely threats.

Note that not every vehicle requires armor at all times, such as those confined to military bases.

Further, U.S. forces are finding and destroying bomb-making production facilities, developing technical counter-measures which either reveal IEDs or disable them, and changing their tactics to minimize the effectiveness of such bombs—including the fielding of robots and a technology developed in a matter of weeks to counter cell-phone activation of these bombs.

U.S. forces are now discovering and destroying more than one-third of IEDs before they can detonate. They have every reason to believe that this rate will improve.

Additionally, the U.S. military has made force protection institutionalized across the Services as part of its core capabilities.

Military Personnel

The President is requesting \$16.8 billion to aid military personnel, including salaries for mobilized reservists and guardsmen and special pay for combat and separation. This number includes the added cost of \$1.7 billion for paying salaries for the additional 29,400 Army soldiers and about 2,600 Marines—additional troops needed for ongoing operations above those services’ normal end strength.

Even with these increased troop levels, ground forces are stressed. That has produced some calls for increases in so-called “permanent statutory end strength”—the force strength required by law on one day each year. The Army has undertaken a range of initiatives and reforms to stabilize the force and to increase the pool of available troops in high demand specialties.

With these important steps well underway, it would be a mistake to arbitrarily increase our statutory end strength. For the present, we have all the flexibility that is needed under the emergency provisions. In the event the efficiencies now underway prove to be insufficient, or the emergency powers were no longer available, it would be time to discuss the legal end strength issue.

Military Construction

General Abizaid and his commanders in the field have requested and this supplemental request supports, military construction projects to improve living and working conditions in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. This construction is primarily to move U.S. service members out of tents, trailers and field latrines, and into somewhat more comfortable—and safer—barracks and billeting facilities. The supplemental request includes \$1.1 billion for military construction unrelated to force restructuring.

Health Care

The supplemental provides for quality medical care as is appropriate for U.S. service members both in theater and back home. The request for health care in the supplemental is \$176 million, to cover patient transportation and other medical related activities.

Enhanced Survivor Benefits

The President requests nearly \$400 million to fund enhanced benefits for the survivors of service members killed while serving our country in the War on Terror.

As this committee knows well, we have entered an era of great challenge and great opportunity. We are responding to serious threats and also working to reshape our military to better combat them.

Consider the challenge our country faces to not only reorganize the Army, but to better organize all of the military services, plus transform the enormous Defense bureaucracy, and fight two wars at the same time. And, if that were not enough, to be fighting a war for the first time in history in an era with: 24 hour worldwide satellite news coverage, including terrorist attacks, disasters and combat operations; cell phones; digital cameras; global internet; emails; embedded reporters; an increasingly casual regard for the protection of classified documents and information; and a U.S. government still organized for the industrial age, not the information age.

And, all of this, not in a conventional conflict for which the U.S. military had organized, trained and equipped over the decades, but in an unconventional war, against asymmetric threats from enemies unburdened by bureaucracies or legal constraints. The task is daunting. But consider what is being accomplished.

Across the world, brave men and women wearing America's uniform are doing the hard work of history. I know you share my desire to see that they have all the support they need to complete their missions. We are bringing the hope of freedom to some of the darkest corners of the Earth, and that will render a powerful blow to the forces of extremism who have killed thousands of innocent people in our country and in countries across the globe.

I thank you for all you have done on behalf of our troops, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

FUNDING OPERATION IRAQI

Chairman COCHRAN. General Myers, you may proceed.

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Byrd, members of the committee.

Once again, thank you for your unwavering support of our Armed Forces, and, more specifically, our men and women in uniform, as they fight this all-important global war on terrorism and extremism. The U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen, and U.S. Government civilians who have been killed or wounded sacrificed to make the world safer and provide hope to millions. We grieve with their families and their friends, and with the families of all coalition forces and civilians who made the ultimate sacrifice in these noble endeavors.

This supplemental request provides funding for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Unified Assistance, and emerging requirements. It sustains our force rotations in

Iraq and Afghanistan, funds operational accounts, and helps restore the readiness of the force. These funds are vital to ensuring our troops are trained and resourced for the missions they're assigned, and to avoid any decrease in readiness or capability while they're deployed.

Building democracy and hope in areas long ruled by terror and oppression is a long, hard task, as we know. Our significant progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world is a tribute to the hard work and sacrifice of our dedicated American service members and our coalition partners, and to the continuing dedication of the American people and the Congress.

I can assure you that we remain committed to helping the Iraqis build a secure and peaceful future with a representative government based on the rule of law, and we are committed to supporting the Iraqis on their road to self-reliance.

The list of accomplishments in Iraq, in every sector, is long and growing. The January 30 elections are just one example of the determination of the Iraqi people to create a peaceful, democratic, and prosperous future.

We are making tremendous progress in Afghanistan, as well. Congress' firm commitment is leading the international effort to fund and equip Iraqi reconstruction. The coalition and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will continue to help build the commands and institutions the Afghans need to sustain and manage their military.

Even as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, we have responded to a number of other challenges and demands for military capabilities. During Operation Unified Assistance in South and Southeast Asia, the U.S. military led the international relief effort to aid the victims of the tsunami disaster. Our service members flew over 3,300 sorties and delivered over 5,000 tons of supplies, including over 400,000 gallons of water, to many remote locations.

All of these operations come at a cost, and the current stresses on the force are significant, and will remain so in the near future. I am particularly concerned with the operational demands on our people, both Active and Reserve component. They are so tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very, very well. They understand what a huge difference they are making, and their morale is good.

Our Reserve components are serving critical roles around the world, as you know. This supplemental request includes funds to support our Reserve and National Guard forces and their resources. We must ensure we properly compensate both our Active and Reserve component service members, and provide them with the best resources possible to succeed in these operations.

I am also concerned with the wear and tear on our equipment, as the Secretary said, especially our vehicles. This supplemental is essential to restoring and reconstituting our forces. The current operational tempo is challenging, and harsh environmental conditions are accelerating the aging of our equipment, placing a huge demand on our maintenance, supply, depot repair, and production. Readiness challenges exist, but, thanks to the continued support of

Congress, we have trained personnel and resources to accomplish our national defense strategy.

We are now in the fourth year of sustained combat operations, and we are still a nation at war. Our servicemen and -women continue to perform superbly under very challenging conditions. I am tremendously proud of them, as I know you are.

In my view, this is a pivotal moment in our Nation's history and in world history. We must stay committed if we are to win the global war on terrorism and extremism. With Congress' continued strong support, our military is unwavering in our focus, our resolve, and our dedication to peace and freedom.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We look forward to your questions.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, General Myers. We appreciate your being here.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your cooperation with our committee.

I'm going to yield, for the first questions, to the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, Senator Ted Stevens, of Alaska.

Senator STEVENS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate it. Some of us are going to the Negroponte meeting, and I did have a couple of questions.

Mr. Secretary and General Myers, I want to join in congratulating you for what you are doing and the presentations you just made, and to tell you, Mr. Secretary, in the meetings we've had over the past months with you and the Chiefs, I've never seen such a great working team, in terms of the ambience and the friendship between you. So that's a great thing to see, because it means a great deal to our men and women in the armed services, I think, to know that the civilian and military portions of the Department of Defense are working together very amicably.

COMBATING IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

So I do want to ask a couple of questions. So, one pertains to this comment concerning the IED that you mentioned. It's my understanding there's \$200 million for this Improvised Explosive Device Task Force. Can you describe what that's about? And can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, or maybe General Myers, how much money is really included in this bill for fielding this equipment?

General MYERS. Well, first of all, as I think people understand, perhaps the biggest threat to, not only coalition troops in Iraq, but also Iraqi civilians—and, as we saw yesterday, we think it was a vehicle-borne explosive device that killed the former prime minister of Lebanon. And I think people now have seen the crater that that device left. So this is a very serious threat. Our most serious injuries, for the most part, come from this kind of threat.

And the Secretary put together a team, in Defense, to look broadly at whatever technologies we might bring to the problem to solve the issue of improvised explosive devices. My understanding is there's \$267 million in the supplemental request for this, and it's to do research and development to field systems that show promise. We know, in the end, that it's primarily, probably, going to be tactics, techniques, and procedures that solve this problem, but a lot of it will yield to technology, and we're trying to leave no stone

unturned as we look for technology that will protect our service members, not only in Iraq, but in Afghanistan and perhaps other places in the world, as this horrific device, this improvised explosive device—vehicle-borne being one method to employ it—to defeat these devices.

Senator STEVENS. Well, how does this equipment work?—is what I'm interested in. Is this a task force developing equipment that enables us to locate them in advance of being exploded—

General MYERS. We're looking at—

Senator STEVENS [continuing]. And to explode them?

General MYERS [continuing]. We're looking at several different types of equipment. And I probably have to be careful how much I get into here, because, for every effective counter we have, there's a counter to the counter. But let me just say that there is a surveillance piece, where we try to see them while they're being emplaced, or after they've been emplaced, to detect them. Other detection methods that we're looking at—and I'd be happy to discuss any of this, offline—there's the issue of jamming equipment and technologies like that.

So it's—but it's the full gamut, and we're—I mean, what we'd like to equate it to—and it's not that yet—but almost to a Manhattan Project, in terms of the level of effort this Government is putting toward this effort. So it spans the spectrum. And we'll go down and test items that turn out to be feasible for fielding, in hopes that we can come across, you know, something that might help our troops. But we can get offline with a few other specifics on that.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

FUNDING FOR IRAQI AND AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

Mr. Secretary, the supplemental has \$5.7 billion, and \$1.3 billion for training and equipping Iraqi and Afghan security forces. You mentioned that. But I'm interested to know, How did you develop the amount that's in this supplemental? Aren't there also funds in the fiscal year 2005 budget for the same function?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are. And there were some—yes, there were some in last year's budget, and there is some in the supplemental.

Of course, you know the Department of State has programs, the Government has programs, that are managed through the Department of State in various types of assistance to other countries for these types of things, training, and equipping. Those tend to be long-term relationships—5, 10, 15 years. The things that these funds will address are the things that come up more rapidly, like the fact that we were not able to fund the Afghan army in the early days, because we didn't have any authority to do train and equip of that type. We've since gotten some money, in the last budget.

These funds reflect the reality that, by helping an Afghan or an Iraqi to provide security for his own country, we can achieve about a 19- or 20-to-1 ratio advantage, as opposed to having an American military person there. And our first choice is not to have American military people in these countries. Our goal is to assist those countries to get on a democratic path, and the funds that are in there are to assist the Iraqi and the Afghan governments in getting their

security forces up to speed to take over the responsibility for the security for their own country.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

INCREASING SURVIVOR BENEFITS

One last question. I note, from the request, that we now have a request to increase the death gratuity for the military from \$12,420 to \$100,000, and the maximum serviceman's life insurance payment from \$250,000 to \$400,000. Now, I have two questions. Is this a permanent change in the law you're seeking? It's my understanding there is nothing in the proposal to request additional funding for this, that this money will have to come out of the available sources to the Department. This is going to be quite substantial, probably \$1.5 to \$2 billion a year. That's a pretty big bite to have to swallow. What is the policy? Is this a permanent change? And can you tell us how you determine that? I think we may face amendments to increase it further, but I do think we have to understand where we're going in this regard. Is this for these emergencies, or is this a permanent change?

Secretary RUMSFELD. My impression is that if we were to do it for those that are killed and fall in the Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, that it very likely would be a permanent change, and you would end up in the future—if there were to be future conflicts—working at that same level of death benefit.

My further recollection is that there is about \$400 million in this request, for that benefit, in this supplemental.

Senator STEVENS. I did not note that.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Pardon me?

Senator STEVENS. I did not note that.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think—

Senator STEVENS. My estimate was \$1.5 to \$2 billion annually for this expense.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I have never heard that number.

Senator STEVENS. That is if it becomes permanent.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I suppose that depends on what the terms of the benefit are.

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

Secretary RUMSFELD. And those are, I think, under negotiation and discussion with the House, the Senate, and the White House.

Senator STEVENS. You're really, then, just asking for the money now to be governed by the law that comes forth from the Congress, from the Armed Services Committee, this year?

Secretary RUMSFELD. My understanding is that the \$400 million that's in the supplemental was an estimate based on the discussions that are taking place at the present time between the White House and the Senate and the House.

Senator STEVENS. Well, during Desert Storm we temporarily raised death benefits, and after that time they went back down.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I didn't know that.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Byrd, you may proceed.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

WHY IS ARMY RESTRUCTURING IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL?

Mr. Secretary, why are you asking for billions in multiyear funds to change the structure of the Army in an emergency supplemental bill?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator Byrd, that's a tough question that we were wrestling with, and it's a good question. The answer is this. The Army came to us and said, "We simply have got to reorganize the Army. The Army is not organized properly. We have too big of an institutional Army and too small of a combat Army. We have to increase from 33 to 43 brigades. We have to bring down capabilities from the divisions into the brigades. We have to make them more sustainable and more capable."

And I said, "Well, for Pete's sake, the last thing we want to do is, when you bring forces back from Iraq or Afghanistan, is to reset them the way they used to be. They have to be reset the way we want them for the 21st century." So the question is where should that be funded?

Now, the problem is that the budget cycle, as you know better than anyone in the room, it takes us 1 year to develop the budget, it takes the Congress 8, 10 months to pass the budget, and it takes 1 year after that to expend the budget. You're talking about 32 months.

Now, these people are already coming back. So these are needs that are immediate, and that's why we believe they're appropriate, for the first 2 years, to fit into the supplemental. After that, I quite agree, anything that has to do with reforming the Army probably ought to be in the baseline budget, and that's the way we've proposed it, sir.

Senator BYRD. Why did you choose to ask for \$5 billion in Army modularity funds in a supplemental? It seems to me that this is the kind of program that ought to be funded and budgeted through the normal appropriations process. Here, we're hit with this request in a supplemental bill.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, Senator, it would cost so much more if we did it the other way. We have the opportunity, right now, when these forces come back from wherever they are—Germany, Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq—and they come back to the United States, that's the time to recast them.

Let me give you an example. If we go over to Iraq and we expend 100 "dumb bombs," and we know we're using up inventory we really don't want to replace, and we come back, and we want to buy "smart bombs," precision instruments. Now, is that a replacement, in the reset of what you had, or is that an enhancement and an improvement? It's both.

And so, this issue of what goes in a supplemental is something that really is beyond my pay grade. It's something that the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) work on together, and they end up making judgments, and this is the way the judgments came down. I think it's the right judgment. I think we have to reset the force to fit the 21st century instead of recasting it the way it was. And, therefore, the supplemental for this year and next, we don't have a 3-year cycle to wait—correction—a 32-month cycle to wait for a normal budget cycle.

Senator BYRD. When will these funds be built into the regular appropriations request?

Secretary RUMSFELD. After 2 years. My recollection is 2007. We've—in 2005 and 2006, they're in the supplemental. And I think in 2007 or 2008, and thereafter, any modularity money would be in the regular budget.

Senator BYRD. Well, I have to tell you, Mr. Secretary, this seems to me to be an abuse, a serious abuse, of supplemental appropriations requests. I haven't seen anything like this.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, of course, the Army hasn't been reset in a way that fits the future in a whale of a long time, so it's not surprising we haven't seen it. It has to be done. The Army needs to be substantially changed to be more effective.

Senator BYRD. I may agree, but, I just tell you, to start—in an appropriations supplemental, a multiyear appropriations request, strikes me to be very, very strange.

INCREASED FORCE PROTECTION

Mr. Secretary, the President's supplemental request includes \$3.3 billion for increased force protection, including adding armor onto supply vehicles in Iraq. These funds are now 2 years overdue. I cannot understand why the administration chose to begin a major war knowing that our troops did not have enough body and vehicle armor. Will these funds provide armor for every vehicle in Iraq that needs it? Will the funds be sufficient to address the complaints that we have heard that our troops are scrounging for armor in trash dumps?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, first let me just make this point. This, as you know, is the amount of time—30 to 33 months—that it takes for a regular budget cycle. And just to punctuate the point, because it's a terribly important one, when the divisions come back from Iraq, they either come back and are left like they are as they refit to the old way, or they're adjusted. There is no way to go back 32 months and get ready to do it in the regular budget. It has to be done—it's urgently needed—in the supplemental for the first year or two. After that, we quite agree with you.

Senator BYRD. Shouldn't we have seen this thing coming so that we could have given some attention to it earlier, rather than waiting and hitting us with a request like this in a supplemental? That's what I'm asking.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I—there are a lot of things that should have been done years ago. I quite agree with you.

Senator BYRD. No, we're not talking about a lot of things; we're talking about this particular request for modularity.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely. It would have been wonderful if, 5, 10 years ago, the Army had decided that they were going to adjust how they were organized and arranged, improved their teeth-to-tail ratio. And it didn't happen, and it needs to be done now. So I really feel very strongly that I hope you'll consider it carefully, because it's terribly important.

On the armor—do you want to put up the armor chart? Do you want to comment on this, Dick?

General MYERS. You bet. The supplemental would contain all the funding that we know about, in terms of armoring. But let me

just—there's the production—leave the first one up—these are the protective inserts that go into the vest to protect against small arms. And you can see how production has been ramped up, with the help of Congress. And we'll continue to need to produce and improve those sets against newer threats.

And—if you'll put up the other chart—and this, of course, is the up-armored Humvee monthly production rate. And, again, we've had good funds for that. We'll continue to need good funds.

It's interesting to note, on up-armored Humvees, Senator Byrd, that there was no requirement in-theater when we went in, and that requirement developed over time. In fact, for the whole Army there was only a handful of up-armored Humvees deemed necessary, early on. And you can see what we've built to.

And if you'll put up the chart on totaled armored vehicles in Iraq, please. Maybe it's on this side. But of the 35,000 vehicles that we have in Iraq—I'll wait until the chart goes up—it should be—28,900-and-some are armored, trying to meet the commanders'—28,907 that have been armored—to meet the requirements.

So, yes, the supplemental contains the funds we know about, in terms of current requirements. Requirements can always change.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the one thing I'd add on the brigades—to go from 33 to 43 brigades, which is what modularity does—it is going to change the active duty personnel's time at home. It'll go from 1.2 years at home per year deployed to 1.8 years at home per year deployed. It'll be a 50 percent increase in that time not deployed, which is a significant reduction in the stress on the force. And to delay achieving that reduction in the stress on the force, I think, would be unfortunate.

You asked one other question, sir, and it had to do with, When will we have the proper armor on the vehicles in Iraq? And the answer is that General Casey assures us that, as of yesterday, February 15, with very few exceptions, all U.S. vehicles in Iraq that are operating outside of a protected compound will—with U.S. personnel in them—will have an appropriate level of armor.

TIMING OF FORCE PROTECTION IMPROVEMENTS

Senator BYRD. Will these funds be sufficient to address the complaints that we have heard, and that you heard also, Mr. Secretary, when you were visiting there, that our troops are scrounging for armor in trash dumps?

General MYERS. Let me start with that, Senator Byrd. Let me start with that question.

Would you put up the chart with the Humvees, showing the various levels of armament?

I don't know where the comment that troops are scrounging in trash dumps for armor comes from, because to the best of my knowledge, it's simply not true. Now, what happens sometimes, and what they—how they refer to things, when units leave Iraq they take off the add-on armor on some of the Humvees, and they leave it in a specific place. And I think the lingo goes, and the jargon is, they refer to that as the "trash dump." But the armor is specifically designed with specific metal and steel to fit on these vehicles. And there, across the top, are the Humvees, as they're armored—some from the factory, some that are added on at the fac-

tory, some that are added on in the field, on the far right. And none of that is done with junk. Those are all very specifically designed pieces of equipment. So I don't know of the junk heap—

Senator BYRD. Why has it taken nearly 2 years of fighting in Iraq before the Pentagon asked for armor for all of these supply vehicles?

General MYERS. Because the threat situation on the ground changed, Senator Byrd, and we were responding to the request from the theater. And the request went through several levels. And it's up to, now, I think a little—almost 9,000 units—a little over 9,000 units, they want, of the up-armored Humvee. But we also have the trucks and the other vehicles in the theater—

Secretary RUMSFELD. And, in fact, it did not take that period of time, Senator. If you look at this chart you can see that the ramp-up was very steep, going from 55 total armored Humvees up to 450. And the time that question was posed was in December 2004, and we were already up over 450 up-armor Humvees a month, and the numbers were soaring, as you can see from the left.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You've been very liberal with my time.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

In recognition of Senators, it's the intention of the Chair to go from the Republican side to the Democrat's side. Senator Leahy was the first Democrat here at the hearing. Senator Burns was the first Republican. I will move from Senator—

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I—

Chairman COCHRAN [continuing]. Byrd to Senator Burns. You're recognized, Senator.

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have one question and short comment as you look at this supplemental request and the other requests, I'd just like some information and answers for the committee. Now, it's my understanding that last week, at a meeting in France, NATO Defense Ministers discussed the possibility of an expanded role for the alliance in Iraq and Afghanistan. As we see the numbers for training security forces in both areas, I would ask, What is the status of the possible expanded role of NATO in Afghanistan?

POSSIBLE EXPANDED ROLE FOR NATO

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is—

Senator BURNS. Additionally, if NATO is moving forward with an expanded role, exactly what will it be, on what sort of timeframe, and is there funding in the supplemental request for its support?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The NATO organization took over the International Security Assistance Force as the various Provincial Reconstruction Teams were formed—first in the north, then moving west, then south, and then east—the International Security Assistance Force, under NATO, agreed to take over responsibility for those sectors in the country of Afghanistan. They currently have the Kabul area and the north, and I believe they're getting ready to take over the Herat area, and the next step would be to move down toward Kandahar. The last area would be along the Pakistan border, which is obviously the most difficult area, and that's where our forces have tended to operate.

With respect to Iraq, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed, at the summit in Istanbul, to assist with training and equipping the Iraqi security forces. That is quite apart from what the individual NATO countries are doing in Afghanistan and in Iraq. We have something like 25 or 30 in one or the other of the two countries.

With respect to train and equip, the Secretary General of NATO announced publicly that his hope is that, by the President's visit to Brussels, coming up in 1 week or so, that every one of the 26 NATO countries will have done one of the following four things with respect to the train and equip in Iraq: either put forces into Iraq to assist in the training in the country, agree to train Iraqi security forces outside the country—and we're currently training some of them in Jordan and various other places—third, give money to the trust funds to help pay for these activities, or, fourth, actually provide equipment. And a number of the Eastern European countries are providing fairly sizable chunks of equipment—tanks, AK-47s, and what have you. And that's the Secretary General's goal. I think at the moment he's got all but 3 or 4 out of the 26 committed.

Senator BURNS. Are there funds in this supplemental request to pick up those shortcomings? Are you aware?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The supplemental is designed to—I'm sorry, I can't read that—the answer to the question is that the funds that are being requested are the funds that the Government believes are the appropriate portion of U.S. contribution to helping to develop the Afghan and Iraqi security forces. The Iraqis, of course, have oil money, and they have their own budget, and they're contributing money to this activity, as well. The Afghans, less so; they don't have oil, and they don't have water. They have a much more difficult situation.

MILITARY RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Senator BURNS. My second question more pertains to the domestic situation here in the United States. Tell me about recent retention and recruitment, and your success or shortcomings, whichever they may be.

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Myers, do you want to do that?

General MYERS. Senator Burns, across all the components it's uneven. For the Active component, generally, recruiting and retention are basically meeting standards, and are not of concern right now. On the Reserve component, where you focus very quickly is to the Army Reserves and Army National Guard. And to meet that challenge, we've beefed up the number of recruiters and the re-enlistment bonuses and other things we can do to attract people to stay or to sign up.

Part of this is exacerbated by the fact that the Army is, in fact, increasing its forces; therefore, there aren't as many people that—leaving the active duty Army that would join up with—available to join up with the Reserves or the National Guard, which is an issue. But we think we can overcome that.

One of our problems is trying to predict what it's going to be next month and the month after. So this is something that the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary's staff—Dr. Chu—

we try to look around corners and try to predict this. We're going to have to watch this very carefully this year. It'll be a challenge.

But it turns out that retention is highest in those units that have been called up, mobilized, and have served, which is interesting, and not all that surprising to those of us in uniform.

So we're not in a crisis mode at all yet. We are in a mode of watching very carefully, particularly the Army Reserve components.

Secretary RUMSFELD. And the other interesting thing is, this fact that the pool that the Guard and Reserve draw from is from the active force, but the people who have gone to Afghanistan and Iraq on active duty are wanting to stay in. Their retention rate is higher than the ones who have not been deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq; and, therefore, the pool that the Guard and the Reserve would normally draw from is reduced because of the higher retention rate by those people.

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In light of time and the fact that there's a lot of questions and a lot of members—I thank the chairman, and yield to the next Senator.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the committee. You and I have served on this committee for over a quarter of a century. It's good to see the white-haired guys make it.

WHAT WAS INCLUDED IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL

I was interested, Mr. Secretary, in your conversation with Senator Byrd. It made sense when Senator Byrd asked, Why are some of these things that are basically supplemental—doing in here? You said it's beyond your pay grade. Well, unless you exclude the Commander in Chief, there's nothing beyond your pay grade in the Department of Defense; you're the Secretary of Defense, you're the one who's supposed to make that decision.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I thought—

Senator LEAHY. It was—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. The Congress was Article I of the Constitution.

Senator LEAHY. Well, if I could finish—at least in this—at least in what is submitted to us. This is the point. We were asked about the up-armorings. And it was said here today that we didn't anticipate the problems. Didn't anticipate? I wonder if some of the planners were simply listening to some of the rosy scenarios coming out of the administration that somehow we're going to be greeted as liberators when we came in there, it would be like Paris after World War II. Of course these weren't anticipated. People like General Shinseki were pushed aside when they were told you needed more, and that's why they were not anticipated. But it has taken a very long time to get where we are.

Now, the White House has put tens of billions of dollars for continuing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan off budget. It's not in the budget that the President submitted last week.

Now, this is an emergency supplemental. I realize the aid for tsunami victims, that was an unforeseen disaster of biblical propor-

tions. And, incidentally, I compliment you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military for the way you surged to get water and equipment and everything in to these victims, something no other country on Earth could do, and I compliment you for that.

But we're talking, here, about wars that have been going on for years. You knew they were going to have to have money to fund ongoing military operations. You knew the war's going to go on a lot longer. I mean, the administration testified before this committee 2 or 3 years ago, "The most we'd spend would be about \$1.5 billion," or something like that. We're into hundreds of billions of dollars. Aren't we adding more billions to the deficit? More than the White House wants the American people to know about? I mean, how much is this going to add to the deficit before we start being straight-talk about it?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, you used the term "before we use straight talk." This is straight talk. There's nothing other than straight talk. Everyone knows the size of the supplemental, everyone knows the size of the budget. There's no mystery.

I'll let General Myers respond. He's the one that used the phrase "not anticipated," not I.

General MYERS. My comment referred to the up-armored Humvees, I think, specifically, when I said "unanticipated." We were building an Army for a different purpose than we find ourselves—for circumstances different than we find ourselves in today, Senator Leahy, as you know. And so, we have tried to adapt to that and meet the commanders' needs to provide the appropriate armor so that our forces, when out and about, in an insurgency like we face, that they are protected.

When we went into Iraq, when we did our initial planning, there were lots of things that were planned for. Some came true. Some did not come true. Some of the things that did not come true are very good that they didn't come true. And some of the things that we thought wouldn't happen, happened. And the insurgency has intensified over time, but—I believe that's coming to an end, by the way—but, I mean, it has intensified over time.

And there are clearly things in this supplemental that were not predictable, in lead-time away, to put in the 2006 budget. And I would offer examples, in terms of helping the Iraqis—

Senator LEAHY. General—and I—you know I have enormous respect for you, and I would ask that that—those examples be included in the record, because of the time constraints.

[The information follows:]

Although the question was directed at CJCS, the Joint Staff was not involved in the process that determined what elements would be placed in the baseline fiscal year 2005 budget and what would be placed in the Supplemental. These were decisions made by OSD Comptroller and OMB.

Senator LEAHY. My point was that this—the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on these wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not in our budgets when we talk about the size of the budget. That's more of a editorial comment.

FUNDING GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT

I'll give you something more specific, though. We know how the Guard and Reserve has been performing very well. And you have

all been very good in saying that. But the deployments reveal there are significant equipment deficiencies within the Guard. I understand there's supposed to be, included in the Army's modularity concept for the Guard, but as I go through the budget, I can't find any specifics about funding levels for these National Guard brigades. I don't know if it's in a supplement or a further budget—could somebody provide that to me for the record, please?

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Myers points out that the Army's plan, he believes, is to do the active brigades first, and that the Guard and Reserve funds would probably be more in the out-years, as opposed to in this supplemental.

Senator LEAHY. Can somebody give me a specific time—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure.

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Timeline on that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

MODULARITY SCHEDULE FOR THE GUARD AND RESERVE

Funding for the Army modular force is prioritized based on the needs of the unit scheduled for deployment. Resources to convert Guard brigades and to establish the Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces are included within the overall Army resources identified for the Army modular force. As the Army determines deployment schedules and analyzes equipment needs of the individual brigades, resources for the Army modular force could shift between the Army components. The fiscal year 2005 supplemental request includes \$787 million for National Guard and Army Reserve modularity equipment needs.

PERMANENT BASES IN IRAQ

Senator LEAHY. Now, does the Pentagon—Mr. Secretary, does the Pentagon plan to maintain any permanent military bases or combat troops in Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Not to my knowledge.

Senator LEAHY. So have you ruled out the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It's not for me to rule them out. It's a matter for the U.S. Government and the Iraqi Government to make a judgment, and we have no—it would be an incorrect impression to suggest that anything in this budget, or in any budget that I'm aware of, has any implication for any permanent activity of the U.S. Government in Iraq.

Senator LEAHY. You've said, and all have said, that we want the Iraqis to be able to take over—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Senator LEAHY. Are there any plans, tentative or otherwise, when that day comes, for us to stay in Iraq?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Not to my knowledge.

Senator LEAHY. Not to your knowledge.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Not to my knowledge. I have no knowledge of—

Senator LEAHY. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Anything like that.

Senator LEAHY. There have been reports.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would certainly think so, except it's in—you know, who knows? The Iraqi people are—

Senator LEAHY. Well, if you don't know, who does?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I'll give you an example of what you can't know. Let me put it that way. If such plans existed in the Pentagon, I would know. They do not exist.

Senator LEAHY. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD. They did not exist for Afghanistan either, and yet you had President Karzai run on a platform asking the United States to maintain some sort of a presence in that country for some period into the future. And that then is something that I don't decide. It's something that would then be for discussion between President Karzai, the Iraqi Government, and the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, and eventually the Congress, to make a decision as to whether or not it's appropriate for the United States—useful to us—to have a presence there. I don't mean a permanent base, but some assistance to them, or some training and equipping like we're doing in the country of Georgia. I don't know what those relationships will be and how they'll evolve. In fact, I would say, no one can know, because until a permanent Iraqi Government is selected, after a constitution is drafted, nobody in Iraq could be in a position to discuss with the United States something like that.

So there should be no thought in this committee of anything permanent in Iraq.

Senator LEAHY. Okay. You know, the Guard funding, I know there's been agreements between the Army and the Guard, and I think we're going to want a very full answer on that one. And I—because I am concerned—the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector General said \$8.8 billion development fund for Iraq monies—\$8.8 billion—can't be accounted for, and I'd like a report on just where that is. We're asking for—we toss billions around here somewhat easily, but in my little State of Vermont \$8.8 billion is a lot of money, and I'd kind of like to know how it got lost. And I would like a detailed report, and perhaps a briefing, of where that is.

ASSAULTS ON WOMEN DETAINEES

And my last question, though, is from the Taguba report. That comment on the video—talking about the abuse of Iraqi women in U.S. custody—the comment on the videotaping and photographing of naked male and female detainees—the Fay-Jones report describes similar incidences; there's other information that there may be much worse, including rape—insurgents in Iraq have cited the abuse of female detainees as a motivation for their violent acts. Whether it's an excuse or not, they've cited it. Are you aware—are you, Mr. Secretary—aware of reports that Iraqi women detainees in U.S. custody were assaulted or raped? And, if so, who's investigating that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There have been nine reports on detainee investigations. There's two that are still open. There have been over 15,000 pages of—plus another 16,000 pages—delivered to Congress; 950 interviews have been completed. There have been 33 court-martials, 55 non-judicial punishments, 17 reprimands—

Senator LEAHY. That's not my question.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. And—

Senator LEAHY. The question was, Are Iraqi women being—detained by the United States—have they been assaulted or raped?

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator—

Senator LEAHY. Yes or no?

Chairman COCHRAN [continuing]. Senator, he heard your question. Let him have a chance to answer.

Senator LEAHY. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Contained in—

Senator LEAHY. Well, I'd like an answer.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Contained in all of these pages are various allegations. And the question is, have any of them been validated? And that, I don't know. We can go back and get that answer for the record.

But there have been, as I say, any number of people who have been court-martialed and received various other types of punishment, and whether, buried in there, there is that particular allegation that you've cited, I'll be happy to try to find out for you.

[The information follows:]

The Department investigates every allegation of abuse, sexual or otherwise.

There have been five allegations of sexual misconduct by U.S. personnel against Muslim women, including three sexual assault allegations and two cases of sexually abusive behavior. Two allegations have resulted in punishment, one remains under investigation and two have been closed for lack of evidence.

—Private Graner, now serving 10 years for multiple offenses against detainees, induced an Iraqi woman to expose her breasts and photographed her. That offense was included in his court martial. He also was alleged to have engaged in consensual sexual misconduct with U.S. personnel.

—Three soldiers were demoted and fined for taking a female detainee to an unsupervised area of the Abu Ghraib prison where one kissed her and she was threatened.

—There is a case involving allegations of sexual assault and other misconduct against a 75 year old Iraqi woman. It is under investigation.

—A rape allegation, reported in the Los Angeles Times, was investigated but closed for lack of evidence.

—A rape allegation, reported in Playboy Magazine, was investigated but closed for lack of evidence.

Senator LEAHY. I appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I, for one, would like to thank both General Myers and the Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld, for his good work in trying to keep us on track in dealing with the problems that have emerged. I think they have done a reasonable job in trying to anticipate what would happen on the war against terrorism in Iraq and also to respond to the current-day crisis.

NATO'S LEVEL OF SUPPORT

I'm somewhat disappointed in what some of our allies have done in responding to the needs that we have there. NATO has promised to give us some support, and currently haven't lived up to what they promised, in a couple of areas. And I wondered if you might anticipate any further participation from our friends and allies out of NATO, above the level at which—or anywhere near meeting the promises that they were making? I think at one point they had promised that they would help train 1,000 Iraqi officers. They only

sent out somewhere around 300 military trainers to Iraq. I think this is an issue that I'd like to hear you respond to.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Any organization of 26 countries does not move as rapidly as an organization that involves one or two or three. It's just the nature of things. It's the difference between an executive and legislative branch. It takes discussion and time, and that's the nature of it. That doesn't make it wrong or bad; it's just a fact.

NATO tends, over time, to find its way to the right decision and to do the right thing. It's doing some amazing things right now. It is in Afghanistan, and it's got activities in Iraq. Historically, they've never been outside of the European area. Kosovo and Bosnia was a big step. The airborne warning and control system (AWACS) for the United States, after 9/11, was a big step. This is an organization that, in its whole history, stayed inside the NATO Treaty area. Second, they're developing a NATO Response Force.

So they're doing some things. They're doing some things that are important. And we've been working with them, and initiating these things. And I think that progress is being made. I think, over time, you'll find—we have found, in Afghanistan—every 6 months, they increase their contribution and their activity. I think you'll find the same thing in Iraq over a period of time.

Do you want to comment on that?

General MYERS. I would just add, you know, in Afghanistan, of course, they are really stepping up. And, as the Secretary mentioned earlier, it's not hard to envision a total NATO operation in the next year and a half inside Afghanistan, which I think is a big commitment on NATO's part. And they are moving toward that at a pretty good clip.

In Iraq, they're just getting started with the training mission. You were right, they have about 80-some people in Iraq right now. They're going to build to 400, here in the near term, a little over 400, of which we'll be a piece of that. We'll have about 25 percent—20, 25 percent of that force. But that's the first stage. There could be other stages later on. And, as the Secretary said, NATO countries are encouraged to help in four other areas besides the one I just mentioned—three other areas besides the one I just mentioned.

And I just made a trip to France. I know the French are looking at training the Iraqi police on the gendarmerie model, which is not a bad model for Iraq. It's a negotiation and discussions are going on between the Iraqi Government and the French Government right now as to where and how many and so forth. But things like that are really, really important, so—it's improving every day.

HOW MUCH FLEXIBILITY NEEDED IN SUPPLEMENTAL?

Senator ALLARD. Well, I know that both of you need to have some flexibility in the money that we send you, and I think past history, trying to deal with the unexpected with what has happened in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has documented the fact that you need to have some flexibility. How much flexibility is in this supplemental, and how much do you think you're going to need?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I guess I'd say two things. I think having the ability to provide some funds to help develop the Af-

ghan and Iraqi security forces, having the funds to assist other countries—for example, a country that wants to put some forces into Iraq, which is good for us, and doesn't have the lift to bring them in, having the funds to do that, having the funds to work with Pakistan—is important, because they're doing such a good job on that side of the border. And, heretofore, we didn't have that flexibility, and the flexibility that Congress has provided to enable us to do that, I believe, saves the use of U.S. forces, saves the lives of U.S. forces, and is vastly cheaper than trying to do it ourselves. So I appreciate the flexibility we've got.

REFURBISHING AND REPLACING EQUIPMENT

Senator ALLARD. I understand the supplemental request includes \$5.4 billion to refurbish and replace some worn and damaged equipment. It's a rough environment over there. Can you clarify whether this money is going to be used to reset units returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, or to purchase brand-new equipment to replace equipment being used in these theaters?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I'm told it varies, and they make a calculation, when they look at the equipment, on several bases. One, is that the piece of equipment they want? And, if not, they don't replace that, they replace it, as I indicated, with something that's appropriate, like a precision weapon instead of a "dumb bomb." Second, if it's a truck or a vehicle like that, I'm told they take a look at it and they decide the cost-benefit ratio of either repairing it or replacing it.

SUFFICIENCY OF FISCAL YEAR 2005 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Senator ALLARD. In your supplemental, you've addressed many issues that are relevant to the men and women on the field. There's support in Congress that helps keep them able to do their job. Are you pretty satisfied with where you are right now, or are going to have to come back later for more money in the future.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The supplemental was put together in the hope that it would carry us through the period. You know, life being what it is, there have been times that you're surprised and things are needed that you had not anticipated. I mean, we had no idea the country was going to get hit on September 11 and we were going to have to go into Afghanistan. And so, things can happen. But my impression is that the supplemental was designed and fashioned to be very straightforward as to what's needed.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, could I ask—

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

ACCOUNTING FOR \$8.8 BILLION IN IRAQI FUNDS

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Ask a personal favor? I'm sorry Senator Leahy left, but he asked a question that I did not answer, and I apologize. He asked about the \$8.8 billion, that there's some audit report. I think it's important to point out that this was not U.S. money, this was Iraqi money. The CPA immediately put in a good many auditors and inspector generals and the like, and that money was, in large measure, used to pay Iraqis who had been

on the payroll. And the goal was to get them off the streets. The goal was to try to reduce the insurgency. And so, they paid teachers, and they paid retired military people, and they paid various other people. I'll be happy to get the report, for the record, that the CPA prepared.

[The information follows:]

The CPA-IG Audit Report is attached. Responses to the Audit by Ambassador Bremer and Office of the Secretary of Defense are included at page 33 of the attached report. The report can be found on the web at the following address: http://www.cpa-ig.org/pdf/dfi_ministry_report.pdf.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But I noticed that Ambassador Bremer had explained that to somebody, and I was just given the paper.

Thank you.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you for clarifying the record.

Senator MURRAY.

Senator MURRAY. Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for being here today.

First, I do want to applaud you for including an increase to the military death benefit and the service members group life insurance program. Many of us have encouraged the administration to increase those programs. My home State of Washington has lost nearly 100 soldiers since the war began, and I really agree that it is an emergency situation for those families, and they paid the ultimate price for our country, and it's the right thing to do. So I appreciate that.

I'm also pleased to see the additional funding has been added for equipment, including the armored security vehicles. That is going to really help our soldiers complete their mission more safely and successfully. And my State, that has thousands of soldiers on the ground in Iraq and in Afghanistan—and I just know their families are really going to appreciate that so that they know their loved ones are protected. So I thank you for that.

As you can imagine, I do share some of the concerns of my colleagues, but rather than take my time to rehash why some of these items have not been included in the President's budget, but, rather, came to us as supplemental, I want to focus my time on one glaring omission that I do see from this supplemental request.

Mr. Secretary, just a few weeks ago we listened to President Bush outline his priorities for the Nation during his State of the Union Address, and he told us that that document reflected his priorities, and he said, and I quote, his budget "substantially reduces or eliminates more than 150 Government programs that are not getting results, that are duplicate current efforts, or do not fulfill essential priorities."

Now, just last week, as a member of the Budget Committee, I listened to the OMB Director repeat that mantra about these so-called nonessential priorities. But the President's essential priorities had the same glaring omission.

According to the President's letter to Congress, this request, this supplemental request, reflects urgent and essential requirements. The President said that the majority of this emergency request, and I quote, "will ensure that our troops continue to get what they need to protect themselves and complete their mission." He said—

and I agree with him—that we have to move quickly so that our troops and diplomats have the tools they need to succeed.

FUNDING FOR CARE OF VETERANS

That is why I'm very troubled by this request. There is no mention in here of our responsibility to pay for the continued emotional and physical cost of war. It's as if once these brave men and women leave the service, they're no longer considered an essential priority for the administration.

Mr. Secretary, my father was a World War II veteran. He came home disabled. During the Vietnam war, I interned in a Seattle VA hospital, and I know firsthand the scars and the wounds that our veterans carry. And as I look at this request, I see money for everything from reorganization to training to armor to bullets, but I do not see one dollar, not one dime, to take care of our troops and ensure that they have the tools they need to succeed when they become veterans. This administration decided to fund this war and all of its implications through supplemental requests, yet this request in front of us does not provide even one dollar for a very important cost of war, and that is the care of our heroes when they return home.

Mr. Secretary, can you share with this committee why we are not—why, when we are creating more veterans who need healthcare, who are coming home with tremendous costs that we have a responsibility to pay for, that they are not considered part of the cost of war?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I'll have to supply for the record details of all the places where those funds are.

[The information follows:]

The fiscal year 2005 supplemental includes funding to support severely injured members and their families as well as the active and reserve Service members and their families deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Funding for veterans health care is included in the fiscal year 2006 budget request for the Department of Veterans Affairs. The request can be found at the following web site: www.va.gov/budget/summary/index.htm.

Senator MURRAY. For veterans' services?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, of course, the veterans' budget is in the Veterans budgets. I'm here testifying—

Senator MURRAY. Well—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. On the Defense Department.

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. Well, we're looking at a supplemental request to take care of the costs of war. Would you not agree with me that taking care of our veterans when they return home is not a cost of war?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely. And—

Senator MURRAY. But we do not see one dime in this budget. In this supplemental cost-of-war emergency funding, we do not see one dime for veterans.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I take a minute and try to respond? I am here testifying on the Department of Defense portion of the supplemental, not the entire supplemental. I don't know—I'm sure you're correct, but I just don't happen to know how much is in the Veterans Administration. I know the Veterans Administration budget is about \$30 billion—

Senator MURRAY. Well—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. And it—I think that's right—

Senator MURRAY. Well, Mr. Secretary, let me just share with you—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Could I just finish, please? And I'm told that mental health is in the regular budget. And I want to add that the Department of Defense works with the Veterans Administration, and we just opened a military Severely Injured Joint Support Operation Center, which provides 24/7 family support, it augments the military services' efforts. We have a totally different family support effort, which is called Military One Source, which is available 24 hours a day.

You're absolutely right, when a person is injured, and he gets wonderful care, medical care, while they're in active duty, and, at some moment, they transfer over, and they leave the base and the support group that fits around their unit, and they're home, and they're still severely wounded, and they still get excellent medical care, but they need a variety of other things. And we have—and maybe General Myers wants to respond—but we have put a great deal of time and effort in it, because, we agree with you, it's terribly important.

Senator MURRAY. And it is part of costs of the war, I think you would agree. The cost of caring—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. For our veterans is—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. A cost of the war. The supplemental that is in front of us is to cover the costs of war. And I will tell you, there's not one dime in it.

Now, I have to tell you, I'm a member of the Veterans Committee. The VA Secretary was in front of us yesterday. I asked him these questions. He couldn't provide me with an answer. When I ask you, you tell me—you're Secretary of Defense—you can't answer me. Well, I want to know who I'm supposed to ask.

We do not have the services available to take care of our soldiers once they come home and come out of service and are—become veterans. In Washington State, we have 3,000 soldiers who are going to be coming home in a couple of weeks—Guard and Reserve folks—who are going to go into the veterans services. I met with all of our service personnel and with the veterans services. They know that they do not have the services to take care of this. They told me that 20 percent of these soldiers, at least, will need help for posttraumatic stress syndrome. And we have lines today. We do not have the services for these folks.

So, Mr. Chairman, I just have to say, if this is a cost of war, then we should have money in the supplemental, in the emergency supplemental, to take care of these veterans. And I am deeply disappointed by this request, that it does not take care of those soldiers when they return home. I think all of us agree that they are a part of the cost of war, and we have a responsibility to make sure they get cared for. But we also have to recognize it is part of our recruitment and retention, and if we are not taking care of these

veterans when we return home, it is going to be very hard in the future to take care of them.

So, Mr. Secretary, I will let you respond. But, Mr. Chairman, I want you to know that I will be offering an amendment on this supplemental when it comes before this committee for \$2 billion to care for our veterans, because I do believe it's a cost of war, I do believe it's the responsibility of the U.S. Senate and Congress, and I think we have an obligation to those who serve us to make sure we're there for them.

Secretary RUMSFELD. We will get you a written response.
[The information follows:]

The fiscal year 2005 supplemental includes funding to support severely injured members and their families as well as the active and reserve Service members and their families deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Funding for veterans health care is included in the budget for the Department of Veterans Affairs. This request can be found at the following web site: www.va.gov/budget/summary/index.htm.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I am just passed a note saying that the Severely Wounded Operations Center is in the supplemental.

Senator MURRAY. That's—how many soldiers does that cover?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It covers severely wounded—

Senator MURRAY. Do you have a number for me on how many—

General MYERS. It's unlimited. It's anybody who wants to avail themselves of service.

Senator MURRAY. Well—

General MYERS. It's set up for severely—

Senator MURRAY. Well, we're—

General MYERS [continuing]. Wounded, but it can handle—

Senator MURRAY. You—

General MYERS [continuing]. Any number of—

Senator MURRAY. Well, in the President's budget request on veterans, we'll be cutting more than 3,000 people out of the VA system who are covering healthcare, at a time when we have thousands of veterans who are coming home. I don't have time this morning to outline for this committee the inadequacy we have, but I will tell any of you go home next week and visit your veterans facilities, talk to the service people who are responsible for reintegration for your Guard and Reserve and veterans who are coming home, and you will know, as I do, that we have an emergency in front of us in not being there to take care of these soldiers. It is a crisis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Domenici.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Murray, first of all, might I say to you, with reference to this concern, I think we all share it. I think there is a difference between being a veteran that is injured or mentally ill or in need of posttraumatic care, and a member of the military, that's still in the military, that needs hospitalization and care and the like.

Senator MURRAY. Well, I would just say to you, with all due respect, if we don't care for these soldiers when they come home, recruitment or—

Senator DOMENICI. Oh, I'm agreeing—

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. Retention is very—

Senator DOMENICI [continuing]. I'm agreeing with you.

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. Difficult. And it is part of the cost of the war, to take care of these soldiers when they return.

Senator DOMENICI. Senator, I wasn't arguing with you. I just said there is a difference between the costs of taking care of a military person who is injured and taking care of a veteran who is injured because he was in war. We still have to cover it. It is just two different items. Perhaps in this budget—

Senator MURRAY. But there is—but there is no money there to do it. It's a—this is a supplemental—

Senator DOMENICI. I understand.

Senator MURRAY. Right.

Senator DOMENICI. I hope we get the information. I'm not arguing. I hope we get it. I thank you very much for asking the question.

General MYERS. Senator Domenici, can I—

Senator DOMENICI. Yes. Yes.

General MYERS [continuing]. Stop you for just a second? I wanted to address this earlier, and I—

Senator Murray, you probably know that the services have—this doesn't directly address your issue. Your issue is more with the VA piece of it. And my understanding there is that the VA has set up centers to address the stress and—posttraumatic stress syndrome of returning warriors and our heroes. So I'm told they have set up centers. And I don't—

Senator MURRAY. There's a plan. There is not the personnel.

General MYERS. Well, that's—like I said, that's—the VA is going to have to work that. And we'll help them.

The other thing I would say, though, that all the services have reacted very proactively to deal with those folks that are turning from the battlefield, much different than we have, I think, in previous conflicts. And I think that's a really good sign. We have learned from our past experiences. So, in terms of those that are returning, we work that very, very hard in the services.

DATA ON IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Secretary, first, excuse my voice. I have a cold. I hope it goes away before I go back to New Mexico, to that beautiful country that you share sometimes.

I would like very much, in the few minutes that I have, to focus on what I think is currently the most important thing for us to try to understand and for you to tell us about, and that has to do with the training of Iraqis.

As I understand it, the more the Iraqis are trained to occupy positions in the military and as policemen and all of those areas, and the sooner they are ready to do their job, the sooner we are probably going to be leaving, in groups, and, ultimately, en mass. I am somewhat confused, because I have now seen all kinds of numbers. Today, you give us the last one, which I assume is your authentic number, which is the one that came back with the last general that went over there. What was his name?

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Luck.

Senator DOMENICI. What?

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Luck.

Senator DOMENICI. General Luck?

Secretary RUMSFELD. These numbers are not General Luck's. These numbers are the Department of Defense, from the ground—

Senator DOMENICI. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. General Casey, General Petraeus.

Senator DOMENICI. Okay. What does the number that you gave us, one-hundred-and-thirty—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Six thousand.

Senator DOMENICI. What does that mean?

Secretary RUMSFELD. That means that—in the Ministry of Interior, there are police, civil intervention, emergency response forces, border enforcement, highway patrols, dignitary protection, special police commandos—

Senator DOMENICI. Right.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. And 79,000 of them have been trained and equipped and are on duty. It means that, in the Ministry of Defense forces, which are army, national guard, intervention forces, special operations, air force, and navy, there's 57,000. And that comes to a total of 136,000. It does not include 74,000 site-protection people. So all Iraqi security forces, excluding the site protection, are 136,000. Today.

Senator DOMENICI. Now, Mr. Secretary, you know I hold you in great respect, but I want to know, which of these are directly related to us getting out of there? The whole 136,000 or are there some special ones that are more related to how we can get out and when we can get out? Do you understand my question?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I sure do. I sure do.

It is a tough question to answer. It's like saying which is more important to the security of the United States, the police in Chicago or the special forces or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)? You need them all.

Senator DOMENICI. No, it isn't.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You need them all.

Senator DOMENICI. No, it isn't.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think so.

Senator DOMENICI. I mean, if they have established a country, and they can defend themselves from outside forces and from bombers inside, we don't need to be their police force. Their police force will take care of a lot of other things. We don't have to wait around until policemen—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I see your point. Okay.

Senator DOMENICI. My point is, it's very hard for us, and for Americans, to understand. If the end of this war is when they no longer need us, how close are we to having them trained so that we will not be needed anymore? I don't want months, I want to know about training.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. I think—

Senator DOMENICI. Will they be ready in 2 years? In 1½ years? When will they have enough trained?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, it may—it could be before that.

Senator DOMENICI. Yes.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I mean, it depends on the level of the insurgency, how much force it takes to subdue the insurgency.

Senator DOMENICI. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But—in my view—and I think you could get different answers from different people on this in the Pentagon—but my personal view is that the forces that are going to have the greatest leverage on suppressing and eliminating the insurgency are the special police commandos, the intervention forces, the special operation forces, the forces that are mobile. And to the extent the insurgents go around and intimidate public officials or intimidate security forces, they need people—the Iraqis need people that can go around and intimidate them and stop them from intimidating. They need counterintimidators. And I think those people are going to be the ones that, in a period of time, will probably do the most to weaken the insurgency and dissuade them from getting new recruits. You do need the police, you do need the border patrol, you do need the dignitary protection and these other elements of it, highway patrols, but my personal view is that those are going to be the most important.

I would say one other thing. You mentioned protecting, externally. I don't think we need to hang around in Iraq until they have a military capable of defending against their neighbors. That's the kind of thing that would take a good deal of time. I think we need to help them subdue the insurgency and take charge of their own country, and then we can go about our business.

Senator DOMENICI. Now, Mr. Secretary, some questions have been asked about whether we plan to be there permanently. I think you tried to answer that—an American plan. I think the answer that you've given, if I might paraphrase it, is that you will be there, as some have said, as long as we're needed; some have said, as long as they want us.

IRAQI CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEIR TRAINING

Now, let me ask, first, are the Iraqis contributing significant amounts of money to training themselves now?

Secretary RUMSFELD. They do. They have a budget, and they are contributing to it. And I would have to get, for the record, what the precise amounts are.

Senator DOMENICI. Could you give us that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. You bet.

Senator DOMENICI. Could you give us that portion of their budget that is going to train them, men and women, for the military?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We will do that, sir.

Senator DOMENICI. Could you give us what they plan in the future, if they have a budget—if it's 20, 30, 40 percent of what they get in for their defense? Because we need to make sure that we aren't staying there because they don't spend enough of their money on defense. I think it ought to be that they are spending plenty, and doing it right, because we can't pay forever. It's already a very, very expensive war. Those worried about the deficit, you understand—we can't have very many wars like this, Mr. Secretary. I hope you know that.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree.

[The information follows:]

The Iraq budget for 2005 is approximately \$24 billion. Of this amount, \$2.8 billion is budgeted to support all Iraq Security Forces. However, most of this money is spent on salaries, sustainment, and other non-training costs. A portion of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund as well as funds requested for the Iraq Security Forces Fund, will be used to train and equip all Iraq Security Forces.

While we do not have the specific numbers for future Iraqi budgets, we anticipate the Iraqi government will continue to adequately support their Security Forces to at least a level commensurate with their current efforts.

Senator DOMENICI. You're not going be around here forever, but we can't do very many more, at least at the cost of this one, for sure.

QUALITY OF U.S. MILITARY PEOPLE

Now, with reference to the performance of the men and women of the military, somebody asked something very specific here about malfeasance. You said you'd look through all these records, right? I want to ask you both about our men and women over there, that we continue to say are the best we've ever had, the brightest we've ever had—how about the way they behave? Do they behave as well as our men and women in the military have in other wars, or are they worse? Could you give us your ideas? Europe, wherever else we've been?

General MYERS. I'll give you my view, Senator. I think they behave a lot better than we have in the past. I think they are our models. I think one of the reasons we're successful in Afghanistan and Iraq is because our servicemen and -women take America's values with them into those countries.

And, yes, there's always a few bad apples. If you would calculate out the percentage, my guess is that you'd find that 99.99999—run that out for a while—percent of our Armed Forces behave admirably at all times. And it's—but it's like the rest of society—in fact, it's better than the rest of society—there will be a few bad apples that will conduct themselves in ways that we're not proud of. But it's such a small percentage.

So they are in some of the toughest conditions I've ever seen. Their comforts are minimal. They do have, in most cases, pretty good contact, electronically, information technology, back to the home front. But, other than that, they have very few comforts. There are still folks over there that are lucky to get a shower day. And they're making all the difference. I think they are terrific.

Senator DOMENICI. That's enough. I want to ask a couple of additional questions.

General MYERS. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree with the chairman.

Senator DOMENICI. All right. You understand my question. I don't think the General answers it when he says they take their culture over there, because, frankly, I think they're behaving better than our culture here. I mean, there probably is more malfeasance on the part of men, versus women, per units of adults, here than there are over there. So, I don't think it's American culture.

General MYERS. That's generally been true in the military, Senator, as you know.

Senator DOMENICI. I was comparing military to military. You're saying this is probably a better-behaved group of military people than past militaries.

General MYERS. Than I've ever seen before—certainly my personal experience when I was a young captain fighting a war.

Senator DOMENICI. Okay. Now, let me ask the Secretary—

Chairman COCHRAN. The Senator's time has expired.

Senator DOMENICI. Oh, I thought I had 20 seconds.

Chairman COCHRAN. That's the amount that you've gone over.

Senator DOMENICI. Oh, oh, oh, oh.

Chairman COCHRAN. After it turns red.

Senator DOMENICI. Oh, I see. I'm sorry.

Chairman COCHRAN. These are newfangled machines. We have a new sound system, and it's—we're all learning how to use it and what the signals mean when the time is expired.

But thank you very much.

PAYING FOR TRANSFORMATION

Senator DOMENICI. Could I just follow on, on the way out?

Chairman COCHRAN. Go ahead and complete your question.

Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Secretary, you've explained to Senator Byrd why the modality and the other transformational costs are in here. Let me ask you. If you don't put them in here, and you don't implement it, you bring those people home, then you have a military that is not what you want it to be. You have to pay for it anyway.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Eventually, you'll pay for it, and you'll pay more, and we will not have the benefit of the modernized force.

Senator DOMENICI. Right.

Secretary RUMSFELD. And the young men and women will have to spend less time home before being redeployed.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Feinstein.

ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AGAINST FEMALE DETAINEES

Senator FEINSTEIN. Mr. Secretary, I was puzzled by your answer to Senator Leahy's question. Let me just ask it bluntly. Do you have reports—does the Pentagon have reports of rapes carried out on female Muslim detainees?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I can't understand why you could be confused by the response. I said I simply do not know. We've got allegations, complaints, that are numerous.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me—

Secretary RUMSFELD. And we will be happy to get the answer for the record.

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right.

Secretary RUMSFELD. And I—I mean, I saw the photographs from Abu Ghraib, like everybody else did, and they're just terribly disturbing.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, let me ask General Myers.

General Myers, are there allegations of rape, by our personnel, of Muslim women who are detainees?

General MYERS. I don't recall specifically seeing those, but it's possible.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well—I mean, it would seem to me, when that's in the press, that both of you ought to move very fast to see if it's true or not. It's a terrible indictment.

Secretary RUMSFELD. We have moved very fast on every allegation. We have set up procedures and systems and investigations and have spent hundreds and thousands of hours with people dedicated to doing nothing but investigating every single complaint that's been made. We've set up procedures so that the training of military police has been changed, the doctrine's been changed, the reporting responsibilities have been altered. There have been so many adjustments made in the Department of Defense, for the first time in history, to try to avoid it, because we agree with you how terrible—

General MYERS. And when we train Iraqis—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. The charges have been.

General MYERS [continuing]. When we train Iraqis, as we do, we train them in human rights, as well. That's part of their training. In fact, it's—I think it's 40 hours out of their total training, we talk about human rights.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, because these things have surfaced, you know, I really wish that both of you would make very strong public comments about how reprehensible this is. You know, you now have a Government issued (GI) reporting—I guess it was in the New York Times—about the use of sex in Guantanamo interrogations. I mean, it seems to me that there needs to be a strong, firm response, and I—these things just keep going on and on and on, which leads me to believe there's some credibility to it. I just wanted to say that.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AT GUANTANAMO

Let me put on my Milcon hat for a minute. And, Mr. Secretary, Senator Hutchison and I were with you in Guantanamo early on, so we know the general layout. I note the \$42 million request to build a permanent detention facility at Guantanamo, and I also note that recent decisions by the Federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have called into question the legal validity of whether detainees are, in fact, you know, beyond the legal due-process system of this country. In view of that, is it not premature to be building a permanent detention facility at Guantanamo?

Secretary RUMSFELD. First, let me respond to the rest of your previous question. There are 2.2—something like 2.2 million men and women in the Guard and the Reserve and the Active Force. In any given year, there are literally hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of court-martials for things that have been done wrong. It's like a city of 2.2 million people. Think San Francisco or any other city in the world. People are raped, people are murdered, charges are made, and court-martials take place, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice handles that.

Some prove to be valid, some prove not to be valid. And there are hundreds and hundreds of them going on as we sit here today. There is no way in the world anyone can keep track of all of them, except the people who are charged with doing that.

Second, General Myers and I have both made very strong public statements before congressional committees, before the press, about

how deeply we feel about the behavior that resulted in abuse of detainees. We have done it publicly, we have done it internally in the Department of Defense. There is, I do not believe, any doubt about what our views are on those subjects. And we feel very strongly about it.

General MYERS. On Guantanamo, we have about 550 detainees there now. What you said about the courts is absolutely right, so we have to wait and see, in terms of some of the rights. But what we're doing is transitioning from a—to a long-term detention mission, because there are some there that are bad enough that you do not want to release them. And so, they're going to have to be detained in some location. And no matter how the courts come out, that's probably going to be the location. There are still some there that are yielding intelligence results and have the ability to inform us so we can protect the United States or our allies and our partners. So that's what this is about.

We have—as you know when you first went down there, what we did on Guantanamo is, we brute-forced it. We went to an inadequate facility, and we covered the inadequacy with manpower. What we'd like to get to is Federal standards, in terms of the detainee accommodations and the rest of it, so we can go to more efficient operations, for sure. Because some of those will probably be a long-term effort. So that's what it's all about.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me add this. The Department of Defense would prefer not to have the responsibility for any detainees. I'm working with the Iraqi Government to take over the Iraqi prisoners of war. We're trying to get them to take the prisons, and them to train the guards, so that they can manage that. The same thing with Afghanistan. The Department of Defense does not want to be in that business.

The detention facility upgrades, I am told, that you see in the budget for Guantanamo, are to meet Geneva Convention standards, and as the General says, it's not knowable how long they'll be there.

What we're doing is carrying out a U.S. Government policy that exists, and trying to do it to the best extent it can be done.

DEALING WITH IRAQI AMMUNITION SITES

Senator FEINSTEIN. I'd like to ask this question, and we've talked about it, last year, on Defense appropriations, and that is, the ammunition dumps throughout Iraq, particularly the unsecured one. And I think, thanks to Senator Stevens and Senator Byrd at the time, we added \$100 million to the last supplemental to secure and also destroy munitions in those dumps. What is the status of securing munitions sites? And is that \$100 million that was appropriated now obligated and used? Do you need more money? I view that as an extraordinary—a high priority.

General MYERS. I think, to date, it's now over 10,000 weapons caches that have been found, over 300,000 tons of ammunition that's been destroyed, more to be destroyed. We'll get you the obligation rates. I don't have that on the top of my head. We'll have to get that to you for the record.

[The information follows:]

As of the end of January, the Army has obligated \$12.8 million of the funds provided. The munitions sites that we have identified are secured and work is proceeding, along with work on identifying and disposing of unexploded ordnance. I think the funding we have will get us through the fiscal year. Our biggest challenge right now is the general security situation in Iraq. We are using both Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers, so you can understand how the work is affected when there are insurgent threats or attacks aimed at the local nationals.

General MYERS. We appreciate that assistance, because, it's true, we've got to try our best to rid that country of these—this tremendous weapons stockpile.

It turns out that—intelligence has told us lately that the price of weapons on the market there, the black market, has gone up, indicating that we may be getting—may be having some effect on the availability of these weapons. And so, supply and demand are taking over and driving the prices up. That's a good-news story.

But we continue to find large caches there, as we do in Afghanistan; and, for that matter, as we do in Bosnia, and we've been there now 9 years. So it's going to be a continuing effort. It's one that, as you know—we've talked about this before—

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right.

General MYERS [continuing]. Senator Feinstein—

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right.

General MYERS [continuing]. That we take very seriously.

STATUS OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Senator FEINSTEIN. Last question. Because I was, in December, in Baghdad with Senator Biden, and then in Jordan at the training program with Senator Biden, who has very specific ideas on the number of security and police that have been trained—does that chart say that today there are 136,000 trained, and that training is vetted—Iraqi army and domestic police that have been trained are in the field and are vetted as trained?

Secretary RUMSFELD. What it means is that—General Petraeus and General Casey report every week, and their report says—this week, dated February 14—that the Ministry of Interior forces have trained and equipped and deployed—they're on duty—79,039 forces, and the Ministry of Defense has trained and equipped and put on duty 57,303, for a total of 136,342. That is a fact.

Senator FEINSTEIN. See, the problem is, when we were in Jordan, and the head of the police training program sat down with us, they didn't know how many were actually in the field, because this was never vetted. They never knew—

Secretary RUMSFELD. What does “vetted” mean in—

Senator FEINSTEIN [continuing]. That they showed up.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. What's “vetted” mean in this context?

Senator FEINSTEIN. In this—that they actually were on duty—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, on duty.

Senator FEINSTEIN [continuing]. In Mosul or Baghdad, that they ever showed up for service. That's, I think, a point—

Secretary RUMSFELD. I see.

General MYERS. We have pretty good visibility into the reporting for the Ministry of Defense forces. As the chart indicates, on the Ministry of Interior forces, since we're not out there with them, like

we're with their national guard and some of the—and the regular army, we're not as confident about those numbers.

In the end, this becomes a Ministry of Interior issue. They need to track these people as they go to the field. So those numbers—there may be absences there that we're counting as present for duty that aren't present for duty. In the Ministry of Defense numbers, that's all included. Those are present for duty, for sure. And, over time, as the Iraqi ministries and their bureaucracies get better, they'll be able to track those better. But we have a lot more visibility into the Ministry of Defense than we do the Ministry of Interior.

Secretary RUMSFELD. And I should add, these ministries are very weak. They are understaffed. The personnel, in some instances, have been appointed because they were friends or same tribe or same group. And one of the serious problems both Afghanistan and Iraq have is seeing that they get strength in ministries so that they can manage these things better.

There are also cultural differences. In Iraq, there's no banking system to speak of. So when a soldier gets paid, and he has a wife and kids at home, he may just leave and go give the money to his wife and children, and then come back. I mean, we had people in the Revolutionary War in the United States doing things like that. They'd go home for harvest and then come back.

So each of these countries do it somewhat differently, and it's perfectly possible for anyone to put on a green eyeshade and look at the numbers and say, "Well, the Ministry of Defense does not include unauthorized absences and the Ministry of Interior does. So, therefore, the numbers aren't any good." The numbers are what they are. We're dealing in a country that's gone through a war, that's refiguring itself for a democratic system, and they're doing a pretty good job. They just had a very successful election.

Senator FEINSTEIN. My time is—

Chairman COCHRAN. The time of the Senator—

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

Chairman COCHRAN [continuing]. Has expired.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for being here.

First, I want to say, I apologize for slipping out for another meeting for a little while, but—and a couple of things I say may have already been covered, but I would like to catch your thoughts.

One, the elections were certainly very encouraging to all of us. I know you've heard that time and again. But, you know, so much of the American public, I think, was getting weakened in the resolve and support, because they kept wondering: Is this doing any good? Is it moving anything forward? And with that election, I think the Iraqis' resolve and standing up and willing to show up in face of danger really did encourage us that it's worth the cost. The American people will pay a high cost for freedom. They'll pay a high cost for somebody else's freedom. And they have been paying that, and the soldiers have been paying. But they want to know that somebody else believes that they're actually getting freedom in this. And that really did bolster the support here. And I congratu-

late you and, via you, the soldiers of the United States that have done that.

Second, I was in the tsunami region a couple of weeks after the tsunami, and I want to report one thing to you. I met with the Prime Minister of India, several of the top people there. The cooperation between the United States and the Indian Government right after that tsunami was outstanding. It was unprecedented. We've never had that level of military-to-military cooperation, I don't—in the history between the two countries. And they were very excited about that, of what that would hold for the future, and that the planning that you have done, and the work that you've done on a military-to-military basis, paid off in a very tangible way of lives saved and people helped, and just bolstered a feeling in that region, of, "Okay, now the United States, we can work with, and need to work with." And we share democratic traditions and a lot of things. Their economy's growing now, strong, at about 9 percent rate, they're getting some real growth taking place, and confidence in this relationship. And that was one where it was a terrible tragedy that occurred, but because of your prior working of that relationship back and forth, that you could hit immediately and help—and, as I understand, the Indian forces were there ahead of ours—but working cooperatively, it saved lives, and I think it really has helped strengthen that relationship, which I'm very supportive and excited to see.

The problem area—and I keep hearing this coming up on Syria, and perhaps you've addressed it tangentially or a little earlier—but about the level of support coming across from Syria that's attacking our troops, or the inability—or the unwillingness of the Syrian Government to stop transitting Saddamists, of weaponry, of planning. What is taking place now to really try to target that issue? I presume there's some that you'll be using in this budget to do that because of the support that's coming across here. And so do you need any more authority from the Congress? Does the administration need any more authority from the Congress to try to bring additional pressure on the Syrian Government to stop this?

WORKING WITH INDIA

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, first, thank you very much for your observation on India. The Department of Defense started, 4 years ago, to work with the Indian Government, and the military-to-military relationship has been growing every single year. And it is impressive. And it, fortunately, to my great pleasure, has succeeded in the new government. That is to say, the new government feels exactly the same way, and they have applied themselves with the same attentiveness to that relationship. And, I quite agree with you, here's the world's largest democracy, they've got the second largest Muslim population on the face of the Earth, and it's important that we have a good relationship with India. It's a very important country.

ELECTION IN IRAQ

Second, your comment about the election. We've talked about the fine work of the men and women in uniform in Iraq that helped facilitate that election. But I have to add, the courage of the Iraqi

people going out there, putting their lives at risk, when the signs on the wall, graffiti, said, "You vote, you die," and they went and voted. And the Iraqi security forces went out there and did a wonderful job. And the people in the polling places were told, if they did it, they would get killed, and they went right ahead and worked in the polling places, 5,000 of them.

And people were skeptical. They said the Iraqis weren't ready for democracy. "It's too violent. You can't have it." And, quite frankly, thanks to the determination of the President of the United States—he had individual organization after organization come and tell him we should delay the election, and he said, "Not on your life. We're going to go forward with it." And it worked.

ROLE OF SYRIA

Syria. They are harmful to what we're trying to do. They are holding Iraqi assets and refuse to release them. They have harbored Ba'athists in their country. They are occupying Lebanon. They are facilitating, with Iran, the Hezbollah into Lebanon and Israel. They, during the war, facilitated and permitted the transit of jihadists, busloads of them, coming into Iraq to attempt to defeat U.S. forces. And they've been unhelpful. They're not a country that is cooperating, and it's harmful to what we're trying to do.

Senator BROWNBAC. Is there anything further that we can do from here to try to bring pressure? You've stated this, you've stated it previously. We've been confronting Syria for some period of time. Is there anything that we can bring in the international bodies, particularly in light of what just took place in Lebanon yesterday in that enormous bombing, that's getting some international pressure and focus on Syria?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It's a matter that we've been working. The President of the United States and successive Secretaries of State have been attempting to persuade Syria that it's not in their interest to continue on the path they're on, and that the interest of the region, from an economic standpoint and from a political standpoint, would be vastly advantaged if they would behave in a way that was consistent with other civilized nations. And they, thus far, have been unwilling to do it.

Senator BROWNBAC. How much of our problem in Mosul is related directly to the Syrians?

Secretary RUMSFELD. That's awfully hard. I wouldn't want to pretend I could come up with a percentage. I just can't. There's just no way for me to know. They've got a long border with Iraq. They're also a Ba'athist regime. They're undemocratic. Obviously, the thought of a democracy flourishing in Iraq, a country with that wealth and that oil and that water and the educated population and that size, would be just enormously harmful to Syria's dictatorial regime. It just is—it's the last thing in the world people like that would want to happen. They wouldn't want success in Iraq.

Senator BROWNBAC. Thank you. Thank you for your service.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It's been a long day, Mr. Secretary.

Current law requires that any covert action by any component of our Government requires an approval by the President and a report to the Congress in the formal procedure called "Findings." Traditional clandestine military activities, on the other hand, are excluded from the covert-action definition. But I believe Congress made it clear that recruiting agents was not a traditional military activity. I also believe that it made it very clear that military elements could not carry out an operation to achieve a military or political objective where there is no intent to acknowledge the involvement of the United States. Finally, I believe Congress limited clandestine activity in preparing for hostilities to those countries already approved by the National Command Authority.

I've cited this because, Mr. Secretary, I've been disturbed by several recent press reports and meetings between the administration and the Congress regarding clandestine activities of the Defense Department. I realize that what was discussed is classified, and I'm not going to ask you about that. But I just wanted to know how you interpret your authority to conduct clandestine activities, if such were done, which are not subject to the laws and regulations regarding and governing covert action.

I believe most scholars would agree that the President of the United States has wide latitude under the Constitution to conduct military operations during a war. However, do you feel that the Secretary of Defense also has an authority to conduct military activities, clandestine ones, against countries that we have not declared war, outside the laws governing covert action?

COVERT AND CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, that is a complicated subject, an important subject, and I can say a number of things about it, and some other things that I probably can't, in this circumstance.

As you know, the Department of Defense does not do covert operations. Covert operations are done by other Government agencies. The Department of Defense does do clandestine operations; that is to say, operations that support military missions. And yet we do attempt to keep some things secret, some aspects of things, which is why the word "clandestine" is used.

A clandestine activity of that type, in support of a military mission, is done to safeguard the activity and our people from exposure so that an adversary will not know what we have learned about them or know our preparations.

You asked, can you do that with respect to a country that you have not declared war on? And the answer is, yes. Prior to the Iraq invasion, while we were still in the process of negotiating, the U.S. military did engage in some clandestine activities inside of Iraq to prepare in the event that the invasion were to take place. It was basically to gain information and knowledge and awareness, situational awareness, preparation for forces, were they needed to be used at some future time.

These activities are authorized generally by the President. People have asked, is the Department of Defense building a spy agency? And the answer is, no. The articles in the paper suggesting that the Department of Defense has—it was a front page story in the Washington Post—was just plain wrong. The idea that we bypassed

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and created a separate spy network is just not correct.

George Tenet and I talked about the need for additional human intelligence. We went to the President. The idea that we bypassed the Congress or the Appropriations Committee is false. The justifications are there in the record for people to see. We went to the President, got approval, came to the Congress, got approval for additional human intelligence resources, the overwhelming portion of which went to the Central Intelligence Agency, and some portion of which went to the Department of Defense.

Department of Defense has had human intelligence activities for decades, and there's nothing new about it, there's nothing surprising about it, there was nothing magic from the Congress, or there was nothing hidden from the Congress at all. It was an article that was just unfortunate.

They then called up some congressmen, apparently, and asked, "Have you ever heard of this?" And they said, no, of course they hadn't heard of it, because it hadn't happened the way they said it happened. The idea that I'm managing spies is nonsensical. I think it said they reported to me, or something, which is mythical.

And the word "strategic support branch" was just simply what they named the way they were going to manage these human-intelligence assets, people.

I guess the only other thing I'd say is that, also prior to going into Iraq, when the United Nations (U.N.) process was still in play—there are times when the Department of Defense is asked by other Government agencies to provide some assistance of various types. It may be medical, it may be intelligence gathering, it may be whatever, things we do. And we might become part of a team that's led by someone else. But not for the purpose of this Department doing covert activities. The Department of Defense does, as I say, clandestine, but not covert, activities.

Do you want to calibrate me on that at all?

General MYERS. No, I think it's exactly right. It was interesting to me, Senator, how much activity an article that tried to link events together in a way that was fictitious created so much issue. I mean, they built an article that was absolutely wrong in almost every respect.

Secretary RUMSFELD. And we brief the Congress on these things on an annual basis, on a quarterly basis. The staffs of the appropriate committees that have oversight responsibilities for these things get briefed. The Congress approved the budget that included the funds that were described in that article. Someone asked, Do we use secret funds? Some of the funds for human intelligence, which the Department has responsibility for come from the national foreign intelligence program (NFIP), which is classified, so the intelligence community approves that. And, as I say, Congress gets notified on a regular basis.

Senator INOUE. If I may ask another question, sir. In response to one of the questions asked by my colleagues, on modularity, you responded by using three words, "stress on forces," and suggested that if nothing is done, our forces would have to fight, go home for 1.2 years, and go back again; but if you carry out this new pro-

gram, they can stay home for 1.8 years before they go back again for deployment.

Secretary RUMSFELD. At this current level of activity.

Senator INOUE. Yes.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

Senator INOUE. Now, to come up with those statistics, I would believe, mathematically, you'll have to make an assumption that we're going to be there for about 4 years. Is that correct?

Secretary RUMSFELD. No. It would be a mistake, Senator, to connect anything to that. All I was using is the math. If we stayed at the current level of activity, whether there or someplace else, we would end up improving the situation by going from 33 modular brigades to 43. We'd go from 1.2 to 1.8, versus 1 year deployed. If we aren't there, which is everybody's first choice, then the numbers would get higher, obviously, because you'd be functioning at a lower level. You'd be having some forces in Afghanistan, you'd have some forces in the Philippines, some people training and equipping in Georgia, maybe, you're going to be doing what we're doing in Bosnia or Kosovo. We're going to have—or the tsunami—we're going to have things going on, presumably, but those numbers would improve.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Chairman, may I submit questions?

Chairman COCHRAN. Yes, certainly, Senator, you may submit questions for the record if you'd like.

Senator INOUE. I'd just like to make a closing statement.

I was just thinking about my life, listening to you, Mr. Secretary, that I was involved in a very easy war, where I could identify the enemy. He had a uniform on. He had an insignia on. He had a command process. And I knew what I was shooting at.

Today, you have no idea who you're shooting at. The rules of war do not apply. In my time, if the German troops came out with a Red Cross flag, we stopped firing and let them fix up their patients; they did the same thing with us.

So I can understand that this is a new war, that you have a real burden on your shoulders. We'll do our best.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Harkin.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I get to the essence of my question, I just wanted to comment on something that General Myers said a little bit ago that caught my ear. He said that the French would be training the Iraqi police. Are they putting Inspector Clouseau in charge?

It's time for a little levity around here.

General MYERS. That doesn't require a response.

Senator HARKIN. I couldn't resist the image of that, anyway.

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Myers has a Legion d'Honneur on his lapel. I just thought I would mention that.

Senator HARKIN. I don't think I'll follow up on that one.

Mr. Secretary, again, we appreciate your coming today, and your extreme patience here.

Harry Truman is one of those special Presidents, who, in retrospect at least, is much admired and respected by folks from both parties. Senator Harry Truman first gained national attention dur-

ing World War II by using a Senate oversight committee to root out waste and corruption in defense contracting. Here was a Democratic Senator holding a Democratic administration accountable, doing his duty under the Constitution. And he was not considered unpatriotic, nor was he ever considered to be undermining the morale of our troops.

Regrettably, in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have not had meaningful accountability or congressional oversight of defense contracting, despite reports of rampant waste and fraud. Now, I'm talking about Congress, not you.

Mr. Secretary, when you came before this committee last May, I read excerpts from an article about the Pentagon's inability to even identify the contract under which certain civilians working for private companies were engaged. We had a colloquy. I've got it right here in front of me.

DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR IRAQ AND CONTRACTING ABUSES IN IRAQ

Just yesterday in the Washington Post there was a story about contractor abuse in Iraq. As it turns out, this article concerned a matter that I, along with Senators Dorgan and Senator Wyden, had written you about last August. In light of reports that some \$8.8 billion in development funds for Iraq could not be accounted for, we asked you for an explanation. We wrote you in August.

In October, we received a response from one of your assistant secretaries that I frankly think failed to give an adequate account of what happened to the \$8.8 billion.

Now, earlier, you responded, when Senator Leahy was gone, by reading something, and you said that \$8.8 billion was Iraqi money.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That's my understanding.

Senator HARKIN. Well, that's my understanding, too.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Good.

Senator HARKIN. I agree with you on that.

Senator LEAHY. That was my question.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah.

Senator LEAHY. That was in my question.

Senator HARKIN. Yeah, it was.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.

Senator HARKIN. But you had left, and he responded to you, and I—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. Picked up on that. So you had said that that was Iraqi money. Okay.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That's what I've been told.

Senator HARKIN. Well, that's what I've been told, too.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Okay.

Senator HARKIN. How do I know?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah, okay.

Senator HARKIN. That's what I'm being told, too.

But my point is that the Assistant Secretary, Powell Moore, who wrote back to us, had said, quote, "Iraqi ministries used Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds for purposes that directly benefited the people of Iraq," end quote.

Now, that's not what the Inspector General (IG) concluded. According to the final draft of the IG report, the answer seems to be

that much of that \$8.8 billion was pilfered by officials in those ministries. For example, there is the infamous case of one Iraqi ministry that padded its payroll with thousands of ghost employees. It listed more than 8,000 guards on its payroll, but could only account for 603 individuals during the audit.

Yesterday's Washington Post reported that a security firm was paid \$15 million to provide security at Baghdad International Airport for civilian flights, even though no civilian planes flew in or out of the airport during the contract term.

Now, according to the article, at a hearing called Monday by Senator Dorgan on contracting abuse in Iraq, a former Coalition Provisional Authority official testified that he and others in the CPA realized early on that the firm was not carrying out its obligations, that the CPA contracting officials were stretched far too thin to police questionable contracts of this type.

Now, why do I go on about this? The supplemental request now before us asks for \$5.7 billion in emergency funding for the purpose of providing assistance to Iraqi security forces. I can't help but think that we would not need that much money if the \$8.8 billion of Iraqi money had been accounted for. That's my point.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Uh-huh.

Senator HARKIN. You responded, saying, "Well, that \$8.8 billion was Iraqi money." Well, but—

Secretary RUMSFELD. That's fair enough.

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. But we were managing it through the CPA. And a lot of that was run by the U.S. Army, according to your statement last May, I think.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah, I think the Army became a contracting officer for the Coalition Provisional Authority. You're quite right.

Senator HARKIN. And that's exactly what you told us last May.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yup. That's my understanding.

Senator HARKIN. So, again, my concern is, if we go ahead and fund this request at this level—and I'm not talking about the whole thing, I'm just talking about that \$5.7 billion—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Uh-huh.

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. I think we're still going to be reading news reports, like the Associated Press (AP) article that I asked about last May, like the articles that were in yesterday's Washington Post.

I guess I would sum up by saying, it seems to me that there's a failure of contract oversight at the Pentagon. What I need to know, or what I'd like to, again, ask you, Mr. Secretary, is, What steps have been taken since we talked about this last year? What steps are being taken by the Department to address the inadequacies identified by the IG's audit that we've talked about. It's been in newspaper articles and other things like that. I mean, what steps are being taken? This is \$5.7 billion. This is not chump change.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You're quite right. And I don't disagree with you at all that if there were another \$5.7 billion available, that the Iraqis could spend on the security forces, it would be a good thing.

Senator HARKIN. Yeah, right.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Now, how do I respond to that? I think that there have been something like nine Inspector General reports and audits agencies auditing and investigating and monitoring the funds and contracts. The Army is considered to be a pretty good contracting agency, and they are frequently asked by other organizations to do it, because they have people who can be deployed into a war zone and function. Very few other organizations exist that can be told, "Go in there and monitor, in a hostile environment, at 120 degrees, in tents, and in an unhappy environment, a dangerous environment, where people get killed. You go in there and monitor those things." That's the first point I would make.

Is it perfect? Apparently not.

The second thing I'd say is that the ministries—there's a tension in a situation like that, where you're trying to get the Iraqis to do more. So the Iraqis have a governing council, 25 members, and they have ministries. And the goal is to stand up the ministries and to strengthen them and to encourage them and to give them responsibilities. And the ministries come to you and say, "We've got x number of people here, and we have to pay them." There's no way in the world, in a war zone, in that environment, where you can go into the ministry and do the kind of careful audit and check to see that they actually have those people. Then they came and said—I'm not talking facts, I'm talking generalities of the moment—they came and said, "Look, the Iraqi teachers need to get paid. The Iraqi security forces need to get paid. The oil pipelines need to be guarded. We've got people guarding them. Someone has to pay them."

So I'm told by the Coalition Provisional Authority that that is the environment that that happened in. And we'll know more, with all these audits and all these inspector generals, as to how bad it was or how good it was, and then, at some point, we'll have the benefit of 20–20 hindsight. We can look at it and say, "Well, it wasn't good enough," or, "It should have been better," or, "These are the lessons learned, where we can do it better in the future."

I am just simply not knowledgeable enough to give you details, at the moment, but that is a general thought.

Senator HARKIN. Fair enough. Fair enough.

General MYERS. Can I add—could I add—Senator, just let me add a couple of words to that.

The date of that report, I'm not sure of. There have been so many, so I'll just say I don't know, right off. But I do know what changed on the ground. One of the things that changed on the ground was that, at some point in this process, the Department of Defense was made responsible for the Ministry of Interior forces that were being trained, as well. And then General Petraeus went in as they transitioned to a sovereign government, in July—late June, early July last year, in 2004.

I feel very confident that we equipped General Petraeus with the right wherewithal to monitor and account for his expenditures. And I know, in terms of equipment, he accounts for every gun and every bullet. He is meticulous. And I would be very surprised if it's carried on. I just have a lot of confidence in the system since the Department was made responsible for the entire security piece.

Senator HARKIN. One last thing, Mr. Secretary—my time is—

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR \$5.7 BILLION FOR SECURITY FORCES

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, one last—excuse me—could she just make this comment?

Ms. JONAS. Senator, I—

Secretary RUMSFELD. It goes to your \$5.7 billion.

Senator HARKIN. Oh, okay.

Ms. JONAS [continuing]. I appreciate, sir, your concern. We do have fairly strict internal controls regarding U.S. appropriated funds, and we routinely audit funds. So our auditors will be taking a look at that. So should the Congress act to appropriate those funds, we would have sufficient internal controls.

CALLING BACK TO SERVICE FORMER IRAQI MILITARY

Senator HARKIN. Well, I appreciate that. My time is over. I just had one last thing, if I might, Mr. Chairman.

The size of the Iraqi army before the invasion was 350,000 to 389,000, I'm told. You said, Mr. Secretary, that we have about 57,000 now that we're training in the Iraqi military. I believe you used that figure earlier. Has any thought ever been given. There are some who say that we never should have let the CPA dismiss the Iraqi military, anyway, and I know we've talked about that before. Has any thought ever been given to trying to find some of those 350,000 out there and, not only get them back, but pay them what they missed in the last couple of years and—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes—

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. Get them back on our side?

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Yes, sir, Senator. I'm going to guess a large fraction of the 136,000 you saw up on the board are former military people. They are being called back as fast as they can be called back.

There was some thought, by some people, that it might be conceivable to call back whole units. Turned out not to be possible, I'm told.

Senator HARKIN. That's interesting.

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are some instances where some leaders have called back small units. That is to say, a former Iraqi brigadier general or colonel has called back people he knew from a unit and formed a cohesive unit—there's one particular one that's operated rather effectively. But it wasn't like they just reestablished the same unit. It was handpicking, kind of.

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to Mr. Rumsfeld, General Myers, the Comptroller.

I do have a question, and it's related to benefits, because we want to be sure that our troops have, not only the body armor and equipment, but the benefits to their health and other benefits.

ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AGAINST FEMALE DETAINEES

But I just want to make one comment about the issue of rape that was raised by Senators Leahy and Feinstein. The point of that

was to ask a question. But, Mr. Rumsfeld, what I think bothered us about the response was that there was—you might not know the number, we don't need to hear about the 15,000 pages, et cetera, but I think what we were looking for is to say, "I don't know that, but I'm sure in hell going to go look and find out. I'm outraged at the possibility that my troops, the troops that wear the uniform of the U.S. military, would engage in brutal, savage tactics. I won't put up with it. We're going to scrub those documents, we're going to find out, because, not only is it wrong to do that to the Muslim, but God forbid if our female troops or our female contractors are taken into custody and they do that to us." Feel the outrage. Restore our national honor. That's what we're looking for.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You can be sure—

Senator MIKULSKI. We want—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. I made a note, and I'll find out.

Senator MIKULSKI. But you—this is beyond note taking. This is what we're looking at here. We want to know, number one, Do you know what's going on? And if you don't, at least to express some feeling about it. That's number one.

FUNDING FOR VETERANS NEEDS

Number two, sure, we know about vets, we know it's a different item. But I can tell you, as hard as it works on the supplemental, I'm the ranking member on the VA. Senator Biden, my colleague, and I are \$1.5 billion short every year for our veterans, and there is practically no money for the returning Iraq/Afghan soldiers when they return to their communities. God bless Senator Stevens in his amazing \$20 million prosthetic initiative. It was fantastic. Senator Biden and I want to be able to do that in VA. We have to forage for funds to do it. We want—we'd love to be able to be in this supplemental. This is what we're talking about.

INCREASED DEATH BENEFIT RETROACTIVE AND TAX FREE?

Now, let me get to the death benefit here. At least now we're raising it from \$12,000 to \$100,000. Here is my question. Would this be retroactive to September 11?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think to October 7, which was the beginning of—first of all, you and the White House are going to decide when it will be retroactive to. The last thing I saw was that it—the current proposals by some people took it to the day that the war started in Afghanistan, which was October 7, as opposed to September 11.

Senator MIKULSKI. Will this be limited only to Iraq and Afghanistan?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't know. It is—

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, what is your recommendation? You're the Secretary of Defense. You go to the funerals. You give out the flags and say "a grateful nation." What would you want it to be?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I'm uncomfortable—

Senator MIKULSKI. You're here for the supplemental.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I know I am, and I am uncomfortable with the answer, but the reality is that I am told that the lawyers in

the Government are looking at an issue as to—and I'm not a lawyer, so I'm not—

Senator MIKULSKI. Say it again? Why don't you respond?

General MYERS. It's the Feres Doctrine, and the basis of the Feres Doctrine that all military personnel are treated the same. And there is some legal concern—I'm not a lawyer either, which will be obvious in a minute—some concern that if we don't treat all uniformed members the same, that it could jeopardize that particular doctrine. So they're looking at this in terms of who it should apply—

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, let me just say this. Maybe we need tort reform in our own Government so that—maybe that's where we ought to have tort reform—and that when a soldier or a sailor or an airman is killed in the line of duty, we love to do the "grateful nation never forgets," but this is one way we'll never forget.

TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF INCREASED BENEFITS

Now, let me ask, then, about tax deductibility. Will this death benefit be tax free to the family, or will they have to pay taxes to reduce the debt caused by the war?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Again, I am told there are three or four or five different proposals floating around, and I don't know whether some may or may not do that. I'm told that the one that is currently in play does not provide a tax benefit.

Senator MIKULSKI. General Myers.

General MYERS. No different answer, Senator.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, when you're there with OMB and, you know, with the President and all, do you all speak up and say, "This is what we think ought to be the way?" Or are we bogged down in lawyers and OMBs and Internal Revenue Servicing, or what? I've got—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, you bet we're—

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. 30 people in Maryland who—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Bogged down with lawyers and OMBs and IRS—

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, it sure sounds like it.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, we are. The whole Government of the United States is.

Senator MIKULSKI. Now, let's not go globalize, Secretary. Let's not do those kind of global answers with me. This is a death benefit.

Secretary RUMSFELD. It's fact.

Senator MIKULSKI. I've got 30 Marylanders dead. There are more nationwide. What is their benefit? I read these obituaries. Corporal So-and-So, 27 years old, two children. Captain So-and-So, 35 years old, three children—10, 8, and 6. This is what I'm talking about here. I'm talking about human beings. I'm talking about their families. I don't want their families to end up in poverty. I don't want their families ending up on food stamps, while the contractors that Senator Harkin talked about are drinking their Chablis and getting their kids in early admission to fancy Ivy League schools. I'm pretty hot about this.

So can we have a death benefit for all of the soldiers? Could we make it tax free? Are you going to speak to the President about this so he could give some direction?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, Senator, I don't know how I can respond, beyond what I've said. I give my advice to the President, and you dismiss the idea that lawyers don't have a role. They do. And—

Senator MIKULSKI. I didn't dismiss you.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. When I have the general counsel of the Department—when we are constantly—we've got so many lawsuits in that Department, we've got so many non-intuitive things that people can do, and we have to go to lawyers, and we have to ask them those questions, and they have to comment to us, and we have to make judgments based on the best information available. It may not be appealing—

Senator MIKULSKI. Are these the same lawyers that said the Geneva Convention was quaint?

Secretary RUMSFELD. They were not Defense Department lawyers who said that.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Obviously, they're not.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. My time is up, but I think, really—you know, I remember when this war began. First of all, I find this hearing to be really sad. One, that we have to have a supplemental at all. I remember your testimony that said, "This war isn't going to cost us anything."

Secretary RUMSFELD. I never—

Senator MIKULSKI. "It's going to be"—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Said anything—

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. "Paid for"—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Like that.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. "By frozen assets"—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Ever.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. "Or by Iraqi oil money." Well, I haven't seen a frozen asset. I haven't even seen an ice cube asset. Then, I don't know where this Iraqi oil was coming from. When we debated it last time, Senator Dorgan at least wanted to make a loan. Well, we didn't go there. So that's that.

Then we looked at this body-armor thing, and then saw that it didn't—we didn't start using plus-up-armor, as we called it, until well into the war. Now we're talking about death benefits. And I just find this—that we had to push to get a death benefit raised from \$12,000 to \$100,000. So can you see how—what we think about this?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the Defense Department takes wonderful care of the men and women who are wounded, while they're in the military. You're involved with the Veterans Administration. I'm not. And we—

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, maybe you ought to.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, just a minute, now. Give me just a moment. I think your saying that I said that "this war's not going to cost anything" is just flat wrong. I never said that. And you must know that. And to lay that out—

Senator MIKULSKI. Did you say that it would—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Imply that I——

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. Did you say that it——

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Said that is false.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. Didn't you say that a good part of the war was going to be paid for by frozen assets?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I'll go back and find my quote, and you can go back and find my quote, but it certainly wasn't what you said.

[The information follows:]

The Department's staff has searched extensively and can find no indication that the Secretary ever said that "this war isn't going to cost us anything" or "it's going to be paid for by frozen assets." In fact, on February 27, 2003, in a public media availability, he emphasized that it was "not useful" to try and give even a range of cost estimates.

The Department urges the Senator to produce any specific reference to the Secretary having made any comment that would support her assertion, and we could be better able to understand what she may have been referring to. Absent that, the Senator should be aware that we have found no indication the Secretary said what the Senator said he said.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, we're back into "you said, we said," but I think I know what you said, because I remember what we said when we had to vote on this.

My time's up.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Dorgan.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman. It's been a long hearing.

And, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, thank you for being here, and thanks for spending the time with us.

You can see there is a great deal of passion about a range of these issues. And I want to make just a couple of quick comments.

First, I think all of us on this committee are going to support all the funds that are needed to support the troops. Our troops are fighting, and I don't think any member of this committee is ever going to short the funds that you request as necessary to support those troops.

Second, it is, as I said 1 year ago, Mr. Secretary—you heard me say it—it is a budget game, regrettably, to be asking for emergency supplemental money, and then have zero money to fight the war in the regular budget. The Congress passed a piece of legislation that asked you to put in the budget your best guess of what the costs would be for Iraq and Afghanistan, and this really ought to be a part of the regular budget, to the extent that we can determine it. But we know that zero is wrong. That's—it's just a game to be doing this with emergency supplementals of \$82 billion.

And, third, taking care of those who have served, whether active or retired, is also a cost of war. But those needs are very seldom fully met. You've heard from a couple of my colleagues, and the concern and the angst about that. A soldier doesn't stop being a soldier one day from the next, and we need to do better with respect to these veterans issues.

On May 13, 2003, Mr. Secretary, you wrote the letter designating the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the head of the CPA—this was Ambassador Bremer—with the title of administrator, responsible for the CPA. And you're quite correct, the Inspector General's report, with respect to the \$8.8 billion, that

was not American money. That was Iraqi money, but under control of the CPA, under control of the agency that was our responsibility, that you were responsible for. And so, when we see these examples of inspector generals saying the money wasn't accounted for, whether it's Iraqi money in our charge, or our taxpayers' own money, still it raises questions about, do we have accountability here? And then you go from that point to the point of the money that is taxpayers' dollars being spent in Iraq.

And I know—and, Mr. Chairman, let me also say—I know, when I raise the name Halliburton, immediately people think of politics. It's not politics for me. I don't care if Jimmy Carter would have been president of Halliburton. I'm talking about the last 4 years.

Let me just read a couple of headlines, because this is, I think, the biggest contractor that we've spent taxpayers' money for in Iraq, and most of it's sole-source contracts. Halliburton overcharged \$27.4 million for meals. Halliburton overcharged \$61 million for oil delivery. Pentagon auditors recommend withholding 15 percent of payments to Halliburton. Whistleblowers have documented Halliburton waste, fraud, and abuse. The list goes on and on.

And, in fact—I'll get to a question—but the retired director of the Defense Energy Support Center, the person that just retired, testified before the Congress that the gasoline that was being sent into Iraq by Halliburton was costing about \$1 more per gallon than it should have. He said, "We've moved gasoline into virtually every war area and never paid that much." And at the same time that Halliburton was charging—I think it was \$2.65 a gallon through their subcontractor, the Defense Department was moving it in for \$1 less, and the Defense Department had always done that.

So my question is this, Mr. Secretary, and that's—this is not a political question. There's no political inference in it. It's just that we're going to spend massive, massive amounts of money in Iraq, and there is substantial evidence that there is a great deal of fraud and abuse and waste, and I certainly hope that there is much more aggressiveness in trying to get to the bottom of all of that and deal with it, because I worry that not much is happening in that area. And let me ask you if you can respond.

USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me say several things. First, if my memory serves me correctly—and it's not perfect—I think that we tried to put money in for the Afghan war 2 years ago, and the Congress refused to appropriate it and told us it should be done in a supplemental.

Senator DORGAN. We could check that, but if that's the case, Congress was wrong, and I would think—

Secretary RUMSFELD. That's my recommendation. I can remember trying to do it, and I—I could be wrong, but that's my—do you—you were at the FBI then.

Ms. JONAS. I was at the FBI, sir.

Secretary RUMSFELD. We'll check that.

[The information follows:]

In the fiscal year 2003 budget the Department requested \$20.1 billion in the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). \$10.1 billion was for specific, identified requirements and \$10 billion was for variable costs associated with the cost of global

war on terrorism operations. The Congress decided not to appropriate the \$10 billion in the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Appropriations Act.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But I was dissuaded, either in the executive branch or in the Congress—and I think here—the first year.

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LARGE CONTRACTS

Next, large amounts of money, large contracts—public-private sector, this country, any country on the face of the Earth—tend to be argued about after the fact. They tend to—pluses, minuses, this has to go over, and they make agreements, and they say, “Well, you didn’t do this, you should have,” and they said, “You didn’t do that, you should have,” and, “The reason we didn’t do this is because you didn’t tell us in time.” In big, complicated contracts, that’s the nature of them.

Now, third, you mentioned that a lot of the dollars are not spent from the reconstruction funds in—

Senator DORGAN. About \$15 billion is, as of yet, unspent.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Right.

Senator DORGAN. So that will be still moving to Iraq.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly.

Senator DORGAN. The question is, Is there accountability?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah. One of the reasons a lot of that hasn’t been spent is because the Government of the United States made a conscious decision to try to spend the Iraqi money first and to use more of their oil money and to flow—and we had many more checks and balances on the \$18 billion. I think it was \$18 billion. A good portion of that is obligated, but not expended and not paid out.

I am told that the Defense Department Contract Audit Agency is the place where the problems that you’re citing were all pointed up. These weren’t discovered by people—by the press or by Congress or by some outsider. We had an audit agency assigned to go in there and to look at all of that and report on all of that. And everything’s public. So every time there’s a big contract and the audit agency that the taxpayers pay for go in and look at these things, and then they announce to the world what’s happened, and then they get worked on, and that’s part of the process. That’s why they have the auditors.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, some, over the course, has come from whistleblowers—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure.

Senator DORGAN [continuing]. And—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Which is a good system.

Senator DORGAN [continuing]. But which is not the contracting agency, it’s a different system—some of whom have been threatened, and some have lost their jobs, and so on.

But my point is this. When you are reading the morning paper, as I am, and you see report after report after report of one or two companies, allegations of waste or fraud or abuse—\$85,000 new trucks that have a flat tire, and they leave it on the road and abandon it to be torched; 25 tons of nails that are ordered, and it’s the wrong size, so they’re laying on the ground in Iraq; you know, those kinds of things—when you see those reports, do you feel, like I do, “What on Earth is going on here? Can we get to the bottom

of it? Is this a bad contractor?" Is that—what's your impression of that?

Secretary RUMSFELD. You bet I do. I'm a taxpayer, just like you are. There isn't anybody who sees waste anywhere, in the Government or out of the Government, that isn't concerned about it. And it's just—frankly, during a war, the thought that there's waste or mismanagement when you've got a war going on and you've got people out there that are giving their lives and they're making all kinds of sacrifices to serve their country, it just breaks your heart to see it.

Senator DORGAN. I come from a town of 300 people. And in my hometown you only got a chance to cheat somebody once. That was it. You didn't do business with them after that. Because they wouldn't do business with you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Uh-huh.

Senator DORGAN. Here, it's just a Byzantine circumstance. The reason I raise these questions about contracting abuse is that I just think we have to be much, much, much more aggressive. Massive amounts of money are going to continue to move through this pipeline, and the American taxpayers need to feel that there's accountability here, and aggressive accountability, and that somebody has to pay the price for cheating the taxpayer. Somebody has to pay the price for it.

So I just—I raise the questions because they must be raised when we're talking about—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure.

Senator DORGAN [continuing]. This quantity of money.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, there are laws under which we operate, and we have to live within them, and they provide for audits, they provide for accountability if somebody doesn't manage something properly, in terms of a contractor, and there are penalties for it. And to the extent that there's criminal violations, people are put in jail.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Secretary, you have a tough job, and I would just observe this. Too often, my sense is the penalty for these abuses is to get another contract for the same company.

I hope you understand the angst, at least among some of us, about the amount of money that's going and the contracting and so on. In the end, we're going to support what's necessary to support our troops. But the American people want accountability for all the other things that are being spent in this war zone. And waste is waste, whether it's in Iraq or in a war zone or in the United States. And that money ought to be invested in things that do support our troops, instead of being wasted.

Mr. Secretary—

Chairman COCHRAN. The time of—

Senator DORGAN [continuing]. Thank you very much.

Chairman COCHRAN [continuing]. The Senator's time has expired.

Senator DORGAN. General, thank you very much.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I sure agree.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Durbin.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Myers, and the staff that joined you.

Mr. Secretary, we all owe a great debt of gratitude to the men and women in service to our country. And I think we owe a special debt, in this war, to the men and women in the Guard and Reserve, who have been called up in extraordinarily large numbers for deployments that are not traditional. Those who serve in the Guard and Reserve expect to be called, but these deployments now are longer than most ever anticipated, which has created some hardship.

I think you feel, as I do, that the employers, the private employers and others, that stand by these Guard and Reserve—activated Guard and Reserve—deserve special credit. There's a website in the Department of Defense which acknowledges some of these employers. Some are public entities, some are private. They range from very small employers to large. They include General Motors and Toyota, a lot of towns, a lot of cities.

MAKING UP FOR PAY DIFFERENCES FOR ACTIVATED GUARD AND RESERVE

The thing that troubles me is this, Mr. Secretary. As we praise these employers for doing the right thing for the Guard and Reserve, there is one major employer in America that is not standing behind its troops, that is not making up the difference in pay, that really is creating some hardship. It's estimated that about 40 percent of the activated Guard and Reserve have a reduction in pay when they are activated. Ten percent of all of the Guard and Reserve in active duty today are employees of the Federal Government. Our Government. Our Government does not provide a pay differential, does not make up the difference in pay, for activated guardsmen and reserves.

Does it strike you as troubling that we are, on one website, sponsored by the Federal Government, praising employees who stand by the activated Guard and Reserve, and yet we, as a Government, will not do the same? Twice I have passed this proposal in the Senate, twice it's been killed in conference committee. Do you think it's time that the Federal Government meets the same responsibility as these private employers and makes up the difference in pay for activated Guard and Reserve?

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is something that I'd be happy to take a look at and see what the cost is and where the expense for that might come from and what the implications of it would be. I haven't looked at it in quite the way you've described. I suppose the Guard also gets called up by States, and the States then would have that question, as well.

There's two ways to look at it. One is the way you're characterizing it, which is fair, to say we're asking employers to take care of these folks, and we've got a website, americasupportsyou.mil, which—I've got my pin on—and if people look at it, they can find all kinds of ways to support it. We appreciate and express our gratitude to the employers who step up and pay that differential.

The other way to look at it is that—the way to look at a personnel force, a management—the U.S. military and the civilians in the Department of Defense is to look at it in total, and to see that

you have arranged yourself so that you're paying the retirees an appropriate amount that sees that—people look at that and say they'd like to serve in that service because they take care of their people. The Guard and Reserve, who have a different circumstance than the Active Force, and see that they're available periodically, when needed—and they volunteer, they know what they're getting into when they volunteer, just like the Active Force does—and that you pay the Active Force in a way that is balanced among all of those. And that—reaching into the middle of it and saying, “Gee, shouldn't we pay that differential?” is appealing and desirable, just like the death benefit is. You want to do it. As a human being, you want to do it.

In the last analysis, our job is to look at the totality of it and see how it balances out. What are the tensions between the Active Force benefits and the Reserve? What do people look for who are coming in? What do people look for who are in the decision point of being retained or not being retained and leaving? And it's the broader picture that I feel compelled to try to look at.

Senator DURBIN. I'm sure we should, and I hope you will. But it is not fair, on one hand, to praise an employer who stands behind the Guard and Reserve—

Secretary RUMSFELD. I see it.

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Activated person, and then for the Federal Government to say, “We're not going to do the same thing.”

Secretary RUMSFELD. Uh-huh.

Senator DURBIN. Forty-one percent of them take cuts in pay. We're now going to enact a new bankruptcy bill, which will make it tougher for those who lose their businesses and have to file bankruptcy because they've been deployed for 1 year or 2 years. Those things are literally happening to these men and women. So I hope you will look at it.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't think—

Senator DURBIN. Second—

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. I don't think folks have been involuntarily deployed for 2 years yet, have they, Dick?

Senator DURBIN. I can only give you one illustration of a Guard unit in Illinois, from Litchfield, a military police unit that has been deployed now for 19 months. There will be training—there will be movement, training, and deployment—total period of time gone from home, 19 months. Now, that is what they face.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yeah, 18 is frequent.

Senator DURBIN. I don't know if there are others that face more—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. But that is a reality. Did they know, signing up for the Guard, that they might be called out for 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 6 months? Probably they suspected it. This deployment is extraordinary, I think we would agree. So I hope that we can do something extraordinary to stand with them.

May I ask you, when it comes to the survivor benefits, have you considered the other elements? For example, there is a provision for the children of those who have fallen in battle or lost their lives in service to our country to receive health insurance. Have you con-

sidered, as part of the benefit package, covering these children with TRICARE health insurance for a longer period of time, or additional educational assistance for the spouse and children of that fallen soldier, as part of what you're proposing?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not believe that's been part of the debate with respect to the death benefit.

Senator DURBIN. I would hope you'd look at it, because I think the death benefit, as well as monthly benefits, health insurance, and educational assistance—

General MYERS. Senator, the—

Senator DURBIN. General.

General MYERS [continuing]. Survivors of somebody that is killed on active duty, combat or not, the children are covered like they—I mean, it's like they retired from active duty, so the dependents are covered—the children, until age 23, like my children were—already. That's already a current benefit.

Senator DURBIN. There's a 3-year under TRICARE Prime, and then they move into the retiree dependent premium rate, which I'm going to have to explore to see what the difference is, but they change their classification of healthcare for the children.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Do you want to have—Dr. Chu knows the answer, and he's sitting right here, Senator.

Dr. CHU. Sir, we cover the surviving spouse for her or his lifetime, unless there is remarriage. As you say, the first coverage is under—as if they were still on active duty. They then are treated as if they're a military retiree. So there's a highly—there is premium—highly subsidized premium rate. The children are covered, in essence, to about age 23.

Senator DURBIN. All right.

Dr. CHU. Now, on educational benefits, the spouse's rights to the educational assistance go on for 20 years, a change made recently, to allow for the fact that many—most of the spouses are women, they often want to spend the first years finishing the raising of the children and then go back to school. And so, the Federal Government has made that change. It took statutory action to do it, and the Congress supported that change several years ago, and that's there.

So I think we have a pretty good program on both healthcare coverage for the family and educational support for the spouses. Also, VA educational is paid through the VA, both the spouse and children's education. There's also educational support for the children.

Senator DURBIN. I'd like to get back to you. Some of the figures that I have are a little different, and I just want to make sure that I understand the law as it currently applies.

IS TORTURE EVER PERMISSIBLE?

I only have a minute left, and I'd like to give you, Mr. Secretary, an opportunity to respond, because there have been many references to this already, but can you tell me, for the record, on this issue of torture, is it ever permissible for any American personnel to engage in torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment of any detainee, regardless of that detainee's legal status?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I cannot answer the question legally. I can tell you that it's prohibited by the President of the United States. The President of the United States, at the outset of the conflict in Afghanistan, advised that all detainees, prisoners, unlawful combatants, regardless of what you call them, will be treated humanely. And you know the legal distinctions between the Afghan terrorists that were picked up on the battlefield, relative, for example, to the Iraqis, who were prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. But the President specifically said that.

So no one can assert that there has been any policy, tolerance, approval of any kind of torture as part of U.S. Government policy.

Senator DURBIN. My time is expired. The difficulty, of course, is the Bibey memo, which says the Commander in Chief can create an exception to this policy, and that is what troubles us.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I see.

Senator DURBIN. What you have said is, I believe, unequivocal, and that is the right answer, as far as I'm concerned. And I hope that that is the standard, as understood through the ranks and—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I can—

Senator DURBIN [continuing]. Among others.

Secretary RUMSFELD [continuing]. Sure tell you that those were the orders that were given the Department of Defense, and that the orders that I repeated, on behalf of the President, to the Department, and the chairman repeated on behalf of the President to the Department. As far as the Department of Defense goes, that's the policy.

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, sir.

Senator DURBIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kohl.

Senator KOHL. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

DECREASING ACTIVATION TIMES

Mr. Secretary, Army National Guard forces in my State, as well as across the country, as you know, are under a lot of pressure. Currently, they're facing tours of duty between 15 and 17 months, on average, with 12 of those months, as you know, served in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East. Obviously, this much time away from home is very hard on families, and you know it's hurting the Guard's ability to recruit and to retain. Is there a plan underway to reduce these long activation times?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, there is stress on the force. The up-to-18 months is a long time for a person who's in the Guard or Reserve. The current deployment pattern for the Marines is 7 months. The current deployment pattern for the Army, the Reserve, and the Guard is up to 1 year in the area of responsibility, into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area.

General Myers and I have talked to the Army about that practice. I think they would like to reduce that number by some amount. Don't you, Chairman? And what they're trying to do is, by increasing the number of active combat brigades and re-balancing the Active Force with the Guard and Reserve so they can have more of the needed skill sets on active duty and fewer of them in

the Guard and Reserve, where we have to overuse those people—and the Army is, I think, in the process of expanding their combat capability, going to probably come back to us at some point with some kind of a plan where they might be able to reduce the deployment period from the 12 months that it currently is. Now, I don't know if they'll make it or when that would happen, but I think that's accurate.

Do you want to—

General MYERS. The only thing I would add to that, Senator, is that, as the Secretary said, we're going to try to re-balance our force, and it's going to take us several years to do that. We are not properly arranged for the 21st century security environment which we find ourselves in. We're also a Nation at war. And so, we've had to rely heavily on the Reserve component, as the Nation does when it's at war, when a lot of your capabilities are perhaps mal-distributed. A lot of them are in the Reserve component; and, in a perfect world, they would not be.

And so, we are asking a lot of our Reserve—as you said, of your Reserve component. And I think the good news is that the morale is high, they performed extremely well, and that, as we look particularly at the Army National Guard, they're pretty optimistic about meeting their end-year end strength. They think they're going to make their end strength. Now, we'll have—time will tell, and we know they're stressed, but they're going to wind up in this year in pretty good shape, which—

Senator KOHL. Do you think—

General MYERS [continuing]. Which I think tells us how the people are responding to the tasking.

It is a long time, and we've talked about some of the issues. We have tried—the Secretary has tried very hard to put great predictability into their deployment schedule, which helps a little—helps the families a little, helps the businesses that support them a little. We get better at that as we find better tools to manage that whole force.

So we're very sensitive to all this, trying to work it very hard. But they have performed magnificently.

HOW LONG WILL RESTRUCTURING TAKE?

Senator KOHL. I get—what I think you're saying is that you are very sensitive and you intend to do everything you can as quickly as you can, which is much appreciated, but you're looking at several years before you will be able to bring their tour of duty down to where it was—it is supposed to be?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't know how long it'll take. The Army will have to come back with its assessment. I've had two or three meetings, where I've said, "Why does it make sense for the Marines to have a 7-month rotation, and why does it make sense for the Army to have a 12-month rotation? Is there something that's different for ground forces?" And it's basically because of the way they're organized. And so, the Army, I think, wants to reduce that by some extent, but they're just going to have to come back to me when they can.

I would say another thing. General Myers pointed out that we're not properly organized. We're not even properly organized within

the Reserves. I mean, we've only called up about half the Reserves, less than half of the Reserves, during this entire period, for the deployments that we've had. This is individuals. It's different for units. It means that something over 50 percent are not mobilized yet, which means that we've got too many of certain skill sets, and not enough of other skill sets.

So the task is complex. We are hard at it. We live with what we've got, and that's how this country was arranged. And it isn't the way it should be arranged. And we're fixing it. And we're fixing it as fast as we can.

Senator KOHL. I hope so.

GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS

Mr. Secretary, another concern I'm hearing from Guard units is that they are facing, as I'm sure you know, significant equipment shortages. Two engineering units from my State of Wisconsin were told to leave their equipment in Iraq for the units that were replacing them. Now that they're back from Iraq, they don't have the equipment that they need to do their training and stay ready for future deployment.

In another case, a 32nd Brigade in my State had to lend their M-4 rifles to a Tennessee National Guard unit that was deploying to Iraq, and now the 32nd Brigade are training to be sent to Iraq with old M-16 rifles that the brigade will not be able to use when they get to Iraq. So this, I'm sure, is a very difficult situation, as you can recognize, not to be training with the equipment that they will be using when they get to Iraq.

My question is: Will the supplemental address the requirements of these units so that they can have the equipment they need to do their job?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me just start by saying that we can save a lot of money by having people who are being deployed into the theater fall in on equipment that's already there. That is a big saving in expense. And it's rather than shipping the people home, and the equipment home, and the equipment has to go by sea, and it takes a long time. So to the extent we can have the units coming in fall in on equipment that's there, it's to our advantage. Furthermore, the equipment that's there tends to be the up-armored and the body armor is up to snuff; whereas, we don't have a lot of that back in the States.

The second thing is that, because we're re-balancing these forces, both within the Reserve and the Guard, and between the Active Force and the Guard and Reserve, they may not get the same equipment. They may come back and get trained up as a military police unit or some skill set that's needed. There are so many moving parts to this, trying to refashion the U.S. Army to fit the 21st century in a relatively short period of time.

Dick, do you want to comment?

General MYERS. Senator Kohl, I think that the answer to this question is embodied in your last question and my answer to that, is that our Reserve forces, particularly in the Army, were not at proper readiness levels that many of us thought they should be at. So they start in this formation; and we go to war, and they start behind. And that's what we're seeing, is in catch up.

To your specific question, Is it contained in the supplemental? Absolutely. There is just shy of \$16 billion in the supplemental for procurement and refurbishment of equipment, and that's not just active duty, that's the Reserve component, as well. And as we march down the road to Army modularity, that's just not the active duty Army, that's the Army Reserve component, as well there, too, so we can avoid these situations. Because when we send them over there—what I'm concerned about is that they train as they're going to fight, with the equipment they're going to fight with. So I'm going to personally look into the issue that you brought up.

Senator KOHL. The 32nd—

General MYERS. Because that would be—

Senator KOHL [continuing]. Brigade, in Wisconsin, yes.

General MYERS. I'll do it. It'll be easy to find.

Senator KOHL. Would you?

General MYERS. Yes, sir.

Senator KOHL. I'm sure they would appreciate it—

General MYERS. Oh, absolutely. It's important.

Senator KOHL [continuing]. And so would I.

General MYERS. Yes, sir.

Senator KOHL. I do appreciate it.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your patient and deliberate way of answering the questions, responding to our request that we have this hearing today.

General Myers, we appreciate your cooperation with the committee.

WHEN WILL FISCAL YEAR 2005 FUNDS RUN OUT WITHOUT THE SUPPLEMENTAL?

Ms. Jonas, thank you very much, and, Dr. Chu, for your participation and your help in answering questions, as well.

It's our information that, if congressional action on this supplemental is delayed, the Army could run out of money in April, the Air Force has indicated it could run out of money in July. And I want to ask, for the record, for you to confirm that, if that's true, or if there has been a change since we received that information. Let us know whether or not this is something that's—where time is of the essence and we would actually suffer shortfalls in our ability to bring these operations to a successful conclusion if the appropriation isn't approved.

[The information follows:]

It is critical that the Services get supplemental appropriations by early May to avoid harmful impacts to readiness. The Army's operating funds will be exhausted by early May and it has already had to take action to stretch available funds, such as restraining supply orders.

ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENT

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Craig has asked that his submitted statement be made a part of the record.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY CRAIG

Mr. Chairman thank you for holding this hearing, and thank you Secretary Rumsfeld for appearing today regarding the Supplemental request geared toward fighting the Global War on Terror.

Let me first say that I am proud of the two-thousand Idaho National Guard soldiers serving in the 116th Cavalry Brigade. My State is paying a great cost in this war, but let me say that the men and women of the 116th are proud to be serving their nation in this effort.

That being said, I would like to commend the efforts taken to provide our soldiers with the equipment they need. Not too long ago, many questions were being asked about the lack of necessary equipment for our troops. I am happy to report that I have not heard one complaint from my Idaho troops regarding the lack of military equipment—and I think that is in large part because of the response and steps taken by the DOD, and Congress, to ensure our troops are receiving what they deserve.

In addition to fully funding our troops, it is my hope that the DOD and Congress will continue to provide ample oversight in the rewarding of contracts for military, security and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. On behalf of the American troops and the American taxpayer we have a sincere obligation to make certain that these contracts are in good faith, fair, and that any abuse in these contracts will be made public and those abusing the U.S. taxpayer money will be punished.

I only say this because it is obvious the opportunity, a world away, presents itself. Any abuse can and will take away the confidence of the American people—and more importantly it deprives our troops of potential and necessary funding.

Let me close by saying that we have embarked on a noble path—but the path to freedom must be assured with the support of the American people and our troops. To carry on our success of defeating terrorism we must stand side by side with our soldiers and comfort our American taxpayer by demonstrating that this money is being spent wisely and in good faith.

Again, thank you for testifying today. I look forward to hearing about our past, present and future achievements in the war on terror.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Ms. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I think we'll be fine through the second quarter, but we would appreciate your speedy action regarding this legislation.

Chairman COCHRAN. Well, I thank you very much for your cooperation with the committee.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED STEVENS

VEHICLE ARMORING

Question. You recently indicated that all vehicles operating outside of protected compounds in Iraq will have "appropriate armor." How close are you to meeting the objective of providing armor protection for all vehicles operating outside of protected areas in Iraq?

Answer. We met the goal of armoring all vehicles operating outside protected compounds. As of February 15, 2005, all vehicles operating outside of protected compounds in Iraq, with certain classified exceptions, had either Level I (armor integrated at vehicle production), Level II (Department of the Army approved add on armor kits) or Level III armor (locally fabricated kits comparable to Level II armor without ballistic glass).

Question. How much money has been spent so far on vehicle armoring and how many vehicles have you armored? In addition, what is included in the supplement request to continue this effort?

Answer. As of February 2005, a total of \$1.6 billion has been spent on vehicle armoring. These funds procured armor for a total of 27,079 Add-on-Armor (AoA) kits. In addition, as of February 12, 2005 the following quantities of armored vehicles/armor kitted wheeled vehicles have been provided to the theater commanders:

10,557 HMMWVs, 700 FMTV, 839 HEMTTs, 432 PLS, 176 M915 Trucks, 4 900 series 5-ton trucks, and 93 HETs.

Additionally, the following quantities have been provided the appropriate steel for local fabrication of hardened vehicle kits: 1,951 HMMWVs, 1,359 FMTV, 608 HEMTT, 274 PLS, 1,601 M915 trucks, 1,867 900 series 5-ton trucks, and 849 HETs for a grand total of 27,597 armored/hardened vehicles.

A total of \$608 million is included in the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental for add-on-armor. A total of \$64 million will be used to procure add-on-armor for the M113, with the balance procuring add-on-armor for the light, medium, and heavy tactical vehicles.

Question. The supplemental request includes \$5 billion for Army modularity. Why are you requesting funding to re-design the Army in this supplemental request? Do you intend to follow this funding practice in the future?

Answer. The \$5 billion is in the supplemental because it is a wartime requirement. It will allow us to increase the number of ground force units available for deployment, which is vital to our war effort. It will enable Army divisions returning to Iraq to have more capabilities than they would without the supplemental. Beginning in fiscal year 2007, restructuring will be funded in the baseline Army budget.

Question. Are there sufficient controls placed on the use of CERP funds to ensure they are being used in the most effective manner? Are Commanders coordinating these efforts with the reconstruction efforts being administered by the State Department?

Answer. Yes, there are sufficient controls placed on the use of CERP funds. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, recently provided additional guidance defining broad limits for which CERP could be used, which will be incorporated into the Financial Management Regulation. This guidance is in addition to the original guidance provided by the Comptroller in the November 2003 policy statement and is based upon findings and recommendations from the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General and other audits. Commander, USCENTCOM, and the commanders for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have issued more detailed guidance to all subordinate commanders to ensure funds are used in the most effective manner. The Department intends to provide as much flexibility in program management to the commanders as possible while maintaining adequate financial management internal controls.

The dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the establishment of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, under the control of the Chief of Mission, enables commanders to synchronize their CERP expenditures with the overall distribution of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund resources. This helps to ensure that CERP projects do not duplicate or negate national level efforts. A similar approach is being used in Afghanistan, referred to as the Interagency Resources Cell.

Question. I understand that the Department is spending about \$5.1 billion per month for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on that spending rate, how soon do you need the supplemental funds before you run out of cash in your operating accounts?

Answer. During the first three months of fiscal year 2005, the Department has experienced an average monthly obligation rate of approximately \$5.7 billion. The first quarter is normally somewhat higher than later quarters because some annual contracts are obligated early in a fiscal year.

To meet the near-term financial needs, the Services have brought forward the apportionment of funds in the Military Personnel appropriations that had been planned for use in the 3rd and 4th quarters and are using these funds in the first half of fiscal year 2005. This realignment has left a funding shortfall in the 3rd and 4th quarters that will have to be replenished in order to avoid disrupting readiness and other vital military activities later this fiscal year.

The Department plans to release the balance of the remaining Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Title IX funds (\$3.1 billion) to the Components in early April (at the start of the 3rd quarter). This action will keep the Services solvent through April. After that, if supplemental funds have not been appropriated, the Department will be forced to begin curtailing planned non-global war on terror 3rd quarter activity. Based on current obligation trends, our most critical funding risk will be in the Army's Operation & Maintenance appropriation, which will be out of funds by May.

Question. What actions have the Services taken or operations have they deferred in order to "cash flow" current operations, and what effect is it having on the readiness of our troops?

Answer. Through the first half of fiscal year 2005, the Services have not had to defer any significant peacetime spending due to the global war on terror operations. The Services have instead used a combination of Title IX funds appropriated by the Congress in the fiscal year 2005 Appropriation Act, and Military Personnel and Op-

eration and Maintenance baseline funds budgeted for the 3rd and 4th quarter of fiscal year 2005 to finance operations. Because these baseline funds were not scheduled to be obligated until the second half of the fiscal year, military peacetime readiness has not been affected by the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Department anticipates that the supplemental request will be approved by the Congress shortly after the start of the 3rd quarter (April). If this happens, the Department believes there will be no adverse impact of having “cash flowed” 1st and 2nd quarter operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from funds budgeted for the second half of the fiscal year.

Question. The supplemental request includes \$5.7 billion and \$1.3 billion for training and equipping Iraqi and Afghan security forces, respectively. How did you develop the requirements for this mission, and will the requested funds be executed in fiscal year 2005?

Answer. The Iraqi Interim Government, in close consultation with LTG Petraeus and his staff, derived the requirements for Iraqi Security Forces. The original sets of requirements were derived from an August 2004 analysis. As conditions within Iraq changed, the Iraqis developed additional forces and requirements designed to meet the emerging challenges. Examples include the Special Police Commando Battalions, the Highway Patrol, the Emergency Response Unit, and the Army’s mechanized forces. Current expenditure estimates show an obligation of funds through the second quarter of fiscal year 2006. This approach precludes potential funding gaps and disruption of Iraqi security force development. It also accounts for extended contracting lead times and provides flexibility to meet rapidly changing conditions on the ground.

The Afghan funding plan for fiscal year 2005 is a subset of a 5-year funding plan through fiscal year 2009 that achieves USG objectives in building a professional, multi-ethnic, and capable force based on our best estimate of security threats at that time. The Afghanistan Security Forces supplemental was developed in close consultation with Major General Weston (Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan) and the Afghan Ministry of Defense. The requirements provide for the purchase of long lead-time items such as vehicles and communications equipment as well as the construction of three brigade headquarters and battalion garrisons. This approach ensures the Afghan National Army training programs will continue with no gaps in funding. All funds will be obligated in fiscal year 2005, but may not be fully executed in fiscal year 2005 to ensure equipment arrivals are coordinated with units completing training.

Question. How much of the requested funding will be used to train and equip non military entities, like police units?

Answer. Approximately \$1.5 billion will be dedicated to training and equipping non-military forces in Iraq. In Afghanistan, all of the funds will be used for training and equipping military forces.

Question. Can you tell us what these funds will buy us in terms of number of troops trained and the types of equipment that will be purchased?

Answer. For Iraqi Forces, the fiscal year 2005 supplemental will fund all known institutional training, equipment and infrastructure requirements for the Iraqi security forces, about 270,000 by August 2006. Types of infrastructure and equipment that will be purchased include:

- Basing facilities for several National Guard battalions;
- Construction of Intervention Force and Regular Army facilities in Al Anbar and Ninewa provinces;
- Infrastructure for 15 Special Police battalions and the remainder of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces;
- Stations and outposts for the Department of Border Enforcement and Highway Patrol;
- Equipment required for expanding training capacity and capability;
- Secure communications equipment;
- Vehicles, weapons, body armor, radios and individual uniforms and equipment for the Highway Patrol, Special Police Commando Battalions, Public Order Battalions, Reconnaissance Companies and conventional police forces;
- Forensics equipment and vehicles for three police forensics laboratories;
- Local area network communications equipment;
- Night vision devices;
- Low Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) equipment for intelligence collection;
- Tactical counterintelligence equipment;
- Maintenance tools and test equipment;
- Trucks and command and control equipment for eight transportation battalions;
- Aircraft survivability equipment;

- Vehicles, weapons, body armor, radios and individual uniforms and equipment for the National Guard battalions being integrated into the regular Army; and
 - Tanks and armored vehicles for up to two mechanized divisions.
- For Afghan forces, the fiscal year 2005 supplemental will fund:
- Three Brigade garrison headquarters at Paktika, Farah and Konduz;
 - National Maintenance Depot to repair and sustain vehicles, communications equipment and weapons;
 - Communications links to Regional Corps;
 - Afghan National Army Air Corps Infrastructure at Kabul International Airport;
 - Ministry of Defense/General Staff Headquarters infrastructure to accommodate staffing;
 - Corps and below organizational clothing and individual equipment, vehicles, communications and weapons;
 - Fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft and ground support equipment;
 - Communications equipment to link regional commands to each other and to the Ministry of Defense and General Staff;
 - Design and development of Defense Sector information technology architecture;
 - Initial vehicles to equip the Logistics Command;
 - Mentors for senior Ministry of Defense/General Staff leadership;
 - Contract mentors for leadership of Logistics, Communications, Installation Management and Education, Training and Doctrine Commands;
 - Contract Embedded Training Teams for Afghan National Army;
 - Train presidential airlift aircrews;
 - Logistics Capability contract at multiple compounds for OMC-A and Afghan National Army trainers;
 - Land leases to provide force protection buffers, safe house leases, interpreter contracts and OMC-A compound expansion;
 - Supplies Defense Sector with fuel, ammunition, construction materials, major end items and medical items;
 - Repair and maintenance of Defense Sector (Academies, recruiting centers, hospitals, and garrison) infrastructure;
 - Agency unique equipment for Medical and Installation Management Commands;
 - Facility engineering agency infrastructure at 13 garrison locations;
 - Repair and maintenance of Ministry of Defense, Afghan National Army and Intermediate Command equipment;
 - Ammo and Medical Depots; logistic site for fuel and ranges; and
 - Continued construction/renovation of central hospital and construction of six regional medical clinics.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

USE OF SUPPLEMENTALS TO COVER WAR COSTS

Question. Would you explain why the Department of Defense views these costs associated with new equipment, Army modularity, and increased end-strength as a justifiable part of an emergency spending measure?

Answer. All three of costs you cite are a justifiable part of an emergency spending measure because they are war-related requirements.

First, equipment. The supplemental includes funding for restoring or replacing equipment damaged or destroyed in war-time operations. This funding is crucial because the restored or new equipment must be available for our forces for future operations. It includes \$3.2 billion for depot maintenance, \$5.4 billion to replace military items destroyed or expended during combat operations, and \$3.3 billion to improve protection of our forces. Without this supplemental funding, our forces would be delayed in getting the equipment they need to be fully prepared for future operations.

Second, Army modularity. The \$5 billion is requested in the supplemental because it is a wartime requirement. It will allow us to increase the number of ground force units available for deployment, which is vital to our war effort. It will enable Army divisions returning to Iraq to have more capabilities than they would without the supplemental.

Third, increased end-strength. Again, this is a war-time requirement. The increase enables us to have the added people and units needed to support the war.

Question. Could you also discuss how the difficulty of making assumptions about military operations, makes these supplemental requests necessary?

Answer. The intensity and requirements of military operations, especially against an elusive enemy like terrorists, are difficult to predict. This difficulty is magnified by political uncertainty, which we faced in Iraq with its election at the end of January. Consider the detailed funding in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental released in February 2005. To be included in the regular fiscal year 2005 President's budget, we would have had the impossible task of estimating those detailed costs back in November 2003.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES/U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Question. Mr. Secretary, as we all know, the key to bringing our troops home from Iraq is creating a viable Iraqi security force. Only then can the elected government of Iraq capably face the insurgents on its own. And it seems to me we should do this right and not set artificial deadlines for withdrawal and give the insurgents hope that they can "wait us out" and then attack unprepared Iraqi security forces.

In light of your recent visit to Iraq, what is your view of the progress we are making training Iraqi forces?

Answer. Iraqi security forces successfully secured polling sites for democratic elections on January 30. The specialized police units, including eight Police Commando Battalions, six Public Order Battalions and two Mechanized Battalions are emerging as relatively effective fighters and are serving well as interim forces between regular police and Army units.

While we see these trends as encouraging, most forces still lack the capacity to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations. Progression of the Iraqi security forces is occurring at different rates depending on their geographic location, the level of insurgency, and the mentoring provided by coalition forces. The pace of development is faster in the southern and northern most provinces than in the Sunni dominated areas. For example, forces in the Kurdish province of As Sulaymaniyah are performing very well while forces in Sunni Al Anbar province are almost completely ineffective.

The key elements that need to be addressed are: leadership, establishing properly manned, trained and capable headquarters, reversing absenteeism, the development of effective ministries (especially the Ministries of Interior and Defense), and revitalizing an ethos where the ISF committed to service to the nation.

Likewise, efforts to develop a capable national intelligence organization are a key element in the counterinsurgency. These efforts are at an early stage, and the development of police and military intelligence remains a key focus for MNF-I.

Question. What commitments has NATO made to training Iraqi officers and do you expect them to keep their commitments?

Answer. NATO is training and mentoring middle and senior level personnel from the Iraqi security forces at NATO schools and training centers in and outside of Iraq. The alliance also plays a role in coordinating offers of equipment and training from individual NATO and partner countries.

The NATO Training Mission aims to provide training to about 1,000 Iraqi officers in the country, and about 500 outside of Iraq per year, as well as a significant amount of military equipment.

Since August 2004, about 50 NATO officers have been working on the ground in Baghdad to train and mentor senior-level personnel from the Iraqi security forces. At the February 22, 2005 summit, NATO's heads of state agreed to fully fund and staff the NATO training mission in Iraq with up to 360 personnel.

The next stage of expansion, which would lead to a further increase in personnel, will be to help establish an Iraqi Training Education and Doctrine Centre in 2005, designed to provide leadership and management training for the middle and senior level of the Iraqi forces.

Given the pledges made by the heads of state at the February 22 summit, we are hopeful that each of the member states will meet its commitments.

Question. Has the success of the Iraqi elections changed the attitudes of some NATO allies concerning their role in building a free Iraq?

Answer. Yes. Since the NATO Summit on February 22, 2005, every NATO ally has committed to supporting the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) by either training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), donating military equipment to the ISF, or providing financial resources to implement the NTM-I mission.

Question. Do you agree setting artificial deadlines for our withdrawal is a mistake?

Answer. Yes. Setting a specific date for withdrawal would undermine confidence in our commitment to defeating the terrorists in Iraq. To create such doubts about American resolve would only lead to increased attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, and would likely lead to more attacks against Americans throughout the world. I

think it is far more important, therefore, to focus on the objectives we are trying to achieve rather than set arbitrary deadlines.

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT NEEDS

Question. It is also my understanding that some of the equipment brought into the OIF theater by Army National Guard units stays behind for use by active component units and is not replaced when the Guard units come home.

Are you aware of this situation and will any of the funds in this supplemental go toward replacing Army National Guard equipment for those stateside units that have missions to perform at home as well?

Answer. Yes, we are aware of this situation. The Army and ARNG are addressing the near term issue by cross leveling equipment staying behind in CONUS. We will also be using resources from the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental request to manage additional ARNG equipment shortfalls.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Question. Is this enough so that Indonesia can be effective in a counter-terrorism mission? Are our restrictions on full IMET hurting our ability to address the security issue fully?

Answer. The emergency supplemental requests for the war on terror and for tsunami relief contain no funding for counter-terrorism in Indonesia. The Department of Defense supports counter-terrorism in Indonesia through the provision of training under the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Fellowship Program.

Under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program funded by the Department of State, Indonesia has been limited to training under the category of Expanded IMET, (i.e., defense resource management, civil-military relations, military justice and human rights). Secretary of State Rice on February 25, 2005 determined and reported to the Congress that the Indonesian Government and armed forces are cooperating with the FBI investigation into the August 31, 2002 murders of two American citizens and one Indonesian citizen in Timika, Indonesia. This determination means that Indonesia will no longer be limited to Expanded-IMET training. I believe this will contribute to our ability to work more closely with the Government of Indonesia to support continued reform of the Indonesian military (TNI) and to foster the further development of democracy there.

Question. Otherwise, do we have the means to collect information throughout the archipelago absent a better relationship with the TNI?

Answer. The Government of Indonesia has made the police the primary agency responsible for addressing terrorism with the military assigned a supporting role. Indonesia has been successful in capturing and prosecuting over 100 terrorists involved in the Bali and Jakarta terrorist attacks. I would refer you to the Department of State for information on assistance the U.S. is providing to Indonesian law enforcement agencies.

Question. Where do we go from here to put ourselves in the best position to deal with this potential threat?

Answer. The threat of terrorism in Indonesia is best addressed by supporting the development of democracy in Indonesia and the elimination of corruption. I believe that the provision of IMET training to Indonesia and expanding military-to-military contacts with the military (TNI) will allow us to positively influence the reform of the TNI, which in turn will support and nurture the establishment of democratic institutions in Indonesia. This will serve the twin purposes of reinforcing democracy and defeating corruption.

Question. Because of PBD 753 the Army is getting help for funding modularity but does the PBD and the current supplemental provide sufficient funding for modularity and current operations while also addressing the significant recapitalization, transformation and modernization costs for our returning Guard and reserve units?

Answer. Yes, we believe that the fiscal year 2005 supplemental plus our baseline budget will address the requirements of our Guard and reserve units returning from deployment. The supplemental includes nearly \$12 billion for restoring or replacing equipment damaged or destroyed in combat operations, for addressing other equipment needs—for both our Active and Reserve Components.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

STRYKER ARMOR

Question. With over \$5 billion available for various up-armorings initiatives, why is there no research or procurement money specifically identified for armor protection for the Stryker?

Answer. The Stryker program is currently working three different force protection initiatives for the Stryker Family of vehicles. First, the SLAT armor initiative was worked in an accelerated 4-month concurrent development & procurement process between Army Test and Evaluation Command & Program Manager Stryker Brigade Combat Team (PM SBCT) in order to provide an enhanced level of rocket propelled grenade (RPG) protection to the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team's deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom. SLAT armor is evenly spaced high-hard steel strips surrounding the vehicle designed to disable the RPG fuse device prior to impact. The second initiative is the Stryker Add-on Armor (AoA, Reactive Armor) program that has been fully funded since inception and has completed all of its live fire testing. Add-on Armor was approved by Mr. Bolton, Army Acquisition Executive for Low Rate Initial Production on February 23, 2005. The delivery of the first SBCT set of Stryker Add-on Armor is projected to be complete for possible contingency operation usage in the May–June 2006 timeframe. Stryker Reactive Armor works like Bradley Reactive Armor, by explosively deflecting the RPG warheads effects upon impact. Finally, the PM SBCT is working a third initiative with the Army Research Development Engineering Command (ARDEC) on the integration and testing of an Active Protection System (APS) for possible use on the Stryker Family of Vehicles. This effort thus far has been funded (\$10 million) within the PM SBCT program. This system, if proven as a reliable & viable alternative to SLAT armor and AoA, would provide enhanced protection against a wider array of potential threats, greatly reduce the combat weights of each Stryker and provide another opportunity to spiral Future Combat System technologies into the current force. APS is a system that engages incoming direct fire threat munitions (RPG) at a stand-off distance from the vehicle.

Question. Can you explain the discrepancy between Army Personnel and Operations & Maintenance funds for the Guard and Reserve? Why are the Army Reserves so significantly underfunded compared to their Guard counterparts?

Answer. There are several reasons for the differences between Guard and Reserve supplemental requests. The Army Reserve requirements submission was approximately 60 percent less than the Guard, due to modular conversion and differences in the impact of mobilization on the Full Time Support force. The Guard is converting four Brigade Combat Teams to a modular design in fiscal year 2005. The Army Reserve will begin unit conversions for Sustainment Brigades in fiscal year 2006. The Guard requested additional Military Pay for AGRs in order to back-fill Soldiers in deploying units in fiscal year 2005. The Army Reserve did not request additional Full-Time support but rather additional funding to support pre-mobilization training. The Guard emphasized Recruiting Retention NCOs to expand their recruiting missions and the Reserve focused on Military Pay incentives for their recruiting efforts.

Question. Why does the Supplemental not include more funding for Military Construction for the Global War on Terrorism? Specifically, it is my understanding that Marines in the Horn of Africa and Djibouti have inadequate housing facilities and submitted a request for funding in the Supplemental. Why was it not included?

Answer. In response to the first question, the Supplemental only includes items that are emergency in nature, are directly related to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, or the Global War on Terrorism and are executable in fiscal year 2005. In response to the second question, the supplemental does include the \$27.7 million the Marine Corps requested for billeting at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON

FORT BLISS

Question. Mr. Secretary, in the Military Construction Army account you have funded site preparation for a variety of installations including Fort Bliss, Texas. Is this in preparation for the modularized Brigades that are coming to these installations? With the tremendous geographic advantages at Fort Bliss in terms of maneuver and air space, are you actively looking at Fort Bliss to be the home for more of our troops being brought home from abroad?

Answer. In July 2004, the Army announced that in fiscal year 2006, pending permanent stationing consistent with Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) analysis in 2005, it would form and temporarily station a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Unit of Action (UA) at Fort Bliss, Texas. The site preparation at Fort Bliss is for temporary facilities to house the previously announced BCT(UA). Fort Bliss was selected as a temporary location based on existing capacities, available training space, and current locations of similar units. The capabilities resident at Fort Bliss will be fully considered during the development of permanent basing recommendations during the 2005 BRAC process.

OVERSEAS BASING COMMISSION

Question. I am proud of our servicemen and women who are serving with distinction in combat, and want to ensure the Department of Defense has what it needs to swiftly win this war. As the Department of Defense begins a shift in where we station our soldiers overseas and we see more of our troops coming home, how does this supplemental take this movement into account?

Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget, not his supplemental request, takes this into account. Over the next several months, the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission will need to take into account this return from overseas as it decides how best to streamline and restructure the Department's stateside installations. Funding to implement 2005 BRAC Commission decisions will begin in fiscal year 2006 and is included in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget.

DEATH GRATUITY

Question. The supplemental provides over \$92 million to increase the death benefit (gratuity) from \$12,000 to \$100,000 for men and women who have died in combat. The legislation additionally provides over \$158 million to increase coverage from \$250,000 to \$400,000 under Serviceman's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) for combat deaths. Both of these benefits are for combat zone duty only and are inclusive of the following dates: October 2001 to January 2005.

Do you have plans to increase coverage to service members who are serving in non-combat zones? Will these increased benefits be extended to future casualties?

Answer. The Administration's proposal is to increase SGLI by \$150,000 (to \$400,000), provide \$150,000 of SGLI at no cost to the member in an area, operation, or circumstance designated by the Secretary of Defense, and increase the death gratuity from \$12,420 to \$100,000 for deaths in an area, operation, or circumstance designated by the Secretary of Defense. The \$400,000 SGLI would be automatic for all Service members. A member would have to opt out of the automatic maximum amount, and if married, would be required to have spousal consent. A recently submitted report to Congress confirms the need for enhanced death benefits based upon two separate, independent studies. Based on the Department's assessment, the Department submitted legislation for death benefits program enhancements with the Administration's fiscal year 2005 supplemental request, retroactive to October 7, 2001.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. Many have questioned the wisdom of not budgeting for the modularity of the of the Army's combat units in the President's base budget. It is my understanding that modularity allows the Army to increase the number of combat brigades on the ground which enhances our ability to fight the Global War on Terrorism, so funding this transformation is critical to effectively fielding units in Iraq. Is that how you see it?

Answer. Yes.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN CENTCOM

Question. Mr. Secretary, you have requested nearly \$200 million for permanent Air Force facilities in the Central Command area of operations. These are outside Iraq and Afghanistan and are clearly establishing permanent infrastructure in the region. I'm not necessarily opposed to such investments but we need to have an understanding of the Department's long term plan for the region in order to evaluate these requests. When do you intend to present the report on your master plan which Congress requested in last year's supplemental?

Answer. The plan was submitted to Congress on March 7, 2005.

ARMY RESTRUCTURING

Question. Can you assure us that, if the Army does intend to create these additional BCTs, you'll go ahead and get these facilities into the normal construction cycle so we don't have to build them twice?

Answer. Until the BRAC 2005 announcements are approved, all Brigade Combat Team (BCT) stationing actions are temporary. As such, the Army is not programming nor constructing permanent facilities at this time. However, the Army has programmed site preparation and utility infrastructure work to support interim relocatable buildings in the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental request. These relocatable complexes will provide temporary facilities to meet BCT operational dates. Meeting these activation dates supports operational and deployment requirements, which cannot be met if we waited for the normal Military Construction (MILCON) cycle.

If final stationing decisions determine that the new BCTs should stay at their current locations, the Army will maximize use of MILCON infrastructure installed for the temporary sites when constructing permanent facilities.

MARINE CORPS RESTRUCTURING

Question. Why is it that permanent basing decisions can't be made before BRAC for Army restructuring but can be for Marine restructuring?

Answer. The Army decided as part of its BRAC strategy to take a holistic approach to these and a host of other issues. Rather than solve the permanent basing of overseas forces as one problem, and then make decisions on the stand up of new Units of Action (UAs) as another challenge, and then use BRAC to transform the rest of the Army, the Army decided that we should use the power and opportunity afforded by BRAC to address all these decisions at once and seek an integrated, optimal solution.

To that end, the Army announced the stationing of several Units of Action based on operational necessity but made it clear that these were temporary decisions pending further review under BRAC. We agreed to use BRAC to resolve the stationing of overseas forces. Moreover, we continue with OSD's help to complete our BRAC analyses so that these, and other BRAC issues can be examined and resolved as part of a single analytical package.

 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE DEWINE

Question. Isn't it true that the Emergency Supplemental only includes a death gratuity increase in the event of the death of service members in Iraq/Afghanistan or future combat zones and does not account for those in training incidents or in transit to combat zones? What about the Ohio sailor that died of injuries sustained when his submarine ran aground near Guam? This sailor was involved in a training accident. Should the death of a service member in a combat zone be compensated differently from the death of a service member training for combat or in transit to a combat zone?

Answer. The principal source of death benefits for military members is the Servicemembers Group Life Insurance (SGLI), now and in the future. Whereas the purpose of the death gratuity is to provide survivors immediate cash for expenses incurred, such as burial costs and/or transportation of family members to funeral locations, SGLI is an insurance program that enables Service members to increase substantially the amount available to their beneficiaries in the event of their death.

The Department's proposal for the additional payment of a death gratuity includes a member in an area, operation, or circumstance designated by the Secretary of Defense; no specific decision has been made by the Secretary on the limits he would set. The Department contracted with the SAG Corporation in 2004 to conduct an independent study on the DOD death benefits program. The study found the system of benefits provided to survivors of members who die on active duty to be adequate, substantial and comprehensive. However, it identified a lack of recognition for direct sacrifice of life, as is provided by the Public Safety Officers' Benefit Act (pays over \$267,000 to survivors in recognition of deaths while performing the hazardous law-enforcement or firefighting duties). Additionally, a 2004 GAO report, "Survivor Benefits for Servicemembers and Federal, State, and City Government Employees" found the survivors of civilian government employees in some high-risk occupations may receive supplemental benefits for deaths while performing dangerous duties. DOD's proposed death benefits program enhancements recognize the direct sacrifice of life in service to the Nation while serving in harm's way.

Question. Adequate and reliable healthcare is essential to the growth and development of children. The cost of this healthcare can put a tremendous strain on family budgets for general care, as well as create dire budget situations if a child has special needs. Isn't it true that during the life of the service member, dependents have cost-free access to the military health system, including many services for special needs children?

Answer. Dependents of active duty members have cost-free access to the Military Health System only if enrolled in TRICARE Prime or TRICARE Prime Remote for Active Duty Family Members, and all (except the active duty member) have pharmacy cost shares unless they get their drugs at the military treatment facility. By statute, the Program for Persons With Disabilities (PFPWD) and the successor program, the Extended Care Health Option (ECHO), are supplemental programs to the TRICARE Program designed to provide additional services exclusively for active duty family members with disabilities. By law, there is a monthly cost share based on the rank of the member (between \$25 for an E-1 and \$250 for an O-10).

Question. Isn't it further true that following the death of a service member, the surviving dependents continue to receive military healthcare cost free for three years and then are subject to yearly enrollment fees and co-payments?

Answer. Yes. Under current law, the dependent spouse and children of a member of the uniformed services who dies while on active duty are entitled to TRICARE benefits under the same terms and conditions as active duty family members during the three-year period beginning on the date of the death of the member. However, they are not eligible for TRICARE Prime Remote for Active Duty Family Members. Thereafter, they are entitled to TRICARE benefits under the same terms and conditions as dependents of a former member entitled to retired or retainer pay or equivalent pay.

If enrolled in the TRICARE Dental Program at the time of death, the government pays 100 percent of the premium for three years, whereafter, they are entitled to enroll in the TRICARE Retiree Dental Program. Pharmacy cost shares (unless drugs are obtained at the military treatment facility) are applicable, and the PFPWD (ECHO) program has a monthly cost share. By statute, the Program for Persons With Disabilities (PFPWD) and the successor program, the Extended Care Health Option (ECHO), is a supplemental program to the TRICARE Program designed to provide additional services exclusively for active duty family members with disabilities. By law, there is a monthly cost share based on the rank of the member (between \$25 for an E-1 and \$250 for an O-10).

Question. Wouldn't it be helpful to the families of deceased service members if we could remove the unnecessary burden and worry of enrollment fees and co-payments that can become substantial in the case of a special needs child?

Answer. There is no enrollment fee for TRICARE Prime for active duty family member survivors during the three year survivor period. Certain co-payments apply for certain programs. For example, dependents of active duty members have cost-free access to the Military Health System only if enrolled in TRICARE Prime or TRICARE Prime Remote for Active Duty Family Members, and all (except the active duty member) have pharmacy cost shares unless they get their drugs at the military treatment facility. By statute, the Program for Persons With Disabilities (PFPWD) and successor program, the Extended Care Health Option (ECHO), is a supplemental program to the TRICARE Program designed to provide additional services exclusively for active duty family members with disabilities. By law, there is a monthly cost share based on the rank of the member (between \$25 for an E-1 and \$250 for an O-10).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

IRAQ: TROOP ROTATIONS/RETURNS FROM DUTY

Question. How are our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere going to affect near-term troop rotations and troop realignment plans further down the road?

Answer. Force deployment commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have sufficiently stabilized to allow the Services to predict and plan for future rotations. This predictability has also allowed the Services to continue their transformation and modernization efforts.

Question. I understand that there is growing discussion of how to help soldiers coming back home from combat zones who are in need of mental health assistance. I have seen evidence of this need while visiting with my constituents in Kansas. What plans do you have for aiding these returning troops and how do you intend

to implement a program to help them? Will DOD be working with the Veterans Affairs Administration on this issue?

Answer. We share your concern for Service members coming back from combat zones who may be in need of mental health assistance. We offer a full continuum of care to address issues ranging from prevention through rehabilitation and case management for the whole person, including mental health as an integral part of overall health of our Service members. We continuously improve and refine that system of care as new information comes to light and as additional needs are identified.

The continuum begins with prevention and education in garrison before and after deployments. All the Services have a system established to provide Service members with information about potential medical threats, including mental health threats, ranging from stress management to suicide prevention.

We conduct pre-deployment health assessments, post-deployment health assessments, and are in the process of implementing a post-deployment reassessment to identify health concerns that emerge months after the Service member returns. We are working to establish an annual preventive health assessment that will incorporate mental health screening as part of the annual health risk assessment process for all Service members, including the Reserve component.

We have implemented the Post-deployment Health Clinical Practice Guideline as a mandatory practice in all military medical facility primary care clinics. When a patient enters the system, whether they are active duty, family member, or retiree, they are asked whether their visit is related to a deployment. They are provided health risk communication during those visits and are actively encouraged to present their deployment-related health concerns to their primary care manager. Additional clinical practice guidelines support this post-deployment health guideline, including guidelines for depression, post-deployment stress disorder, and medically unexplained symptoms. These guidelines were developed jointly by DOD and VA and have been fielded in both systems to provide evaluation and standard of care to our Service members and their families. Army installations have also bolstered their care provision and case management by adding care managers to medical facilities at high-deployment platforms. These social workers facilitate access and coordination of care for those who report health concerns, especially behavioral or mental health concerns related to deployment.

To further increase access to mental health services, we have begun embedding mental health providers into line units for prevention, education, and early intervention, such as with the new Marine Corps OSCAR (Operational Stress Control and Readiness) program. Increased access in the military medical facilities is accomplished through positioning behavioral health providers into primary care clinics, such as in the Air Force Behavioral Health Optimization Program. These programs are offered in addition to our traditional mental health specialty care service. TRICARE benefits are available for family members and have been extended for 6 months post-deployment for reserve and guard members returning from combat. These benefits provide for direct, self-referral to mental health care without the need to get a referral or authorization from a primary care manager for up to 8 treatment sessions. This benefit can be extended beyond 8 sessions with TRICARE authorization.

When a Service member returns from a deployment, they receive a briefing and a handout of the health care services available to them. The VA joins with DOD to provide these education and outreach services to ensure that troops are aware of the services offered to them both in the military healthcare, TRICARE, and the VA healthcare system.

For those seriously ill, wounded, or injured Service members returning from combat, we offer comprehensive case management. The Army and Marine Corps have case management programs and the DOD has recently implemented a broad-reaching Military Severely Injured Joint Support Operations Center. This center brings together the individual Service programs into a comprehensive program that follows, supports, and facilitates care for the Service member and their family members from the time the individual leaves theater to ensure there are no gaps in care or problems in access to support services.

Finally, we have rehabilitative care programs for treatment of those who are unsuccessfully treated in either primary care or specialty care. This Specialized Care Program is operated by the DOD Deployment Health Clinical Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. It provides 3-week programs of treatment for medically unexplained symptoms as well as specific programs for PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) treatment. This Center also provides staff assistance and training to military and VA clinicians around the world in deployment-related clinical care and partners closely with the VA War Related Illness and Injury Centers.

To improve strategic planning and seamless integration of services across disciplines, across Service branches, and with the VA, we have established cross-functional working groups, including a Deployment Mental Health Sub-group within the DOD/VA Deployment Health Working Group. This sub-group will add to the integration of mental health services across the military and VA healthcare systems. Within the DOD, we have established a Joint Operational Stress and Deployment Mental Health Working Group to bring together the individual Services as well as different disciplines, such as the family and community support providers, chaplains, and line representation with health care providers to develop integrated strategic plans. Continuous quality improvement, ready access, and consistent seamless care provision remains at the forefront of the work of these councils.

Question. I noted that this supplemental request proposes two new accounts to support the effort to build Iraqi and Afghan security forces: the Iraq Security Forces Fund at \$5.7 billion and the Afghan Security Forces Fund at \$1.3 billion. How will this money be used for the respective national forces? Also, what affect will this money have on the timeline to return American troops home from the field?

Answer. For Iraqi security forces, the request of \$5.7 billion supports:

- Training, equipment, spare parts and infrastructure for Iraq's mechanized forces;
- Training, equipment and initial support for Iraqi Army units to include transportation and logistical battalions;
- Infrastructure and support for Special Operations Forces;
- Development of sustainment, training and communications capabilities within Iraqi security forces;
- The addition of 400 Iraqi Police Liaison Officers;
- Equipment and infrastructure for Iraqi Special Police Battalions; and
- The operation and maintenance of police academies.

For Afghan security forces, the request of \$1.3 billion supports:

- The continued development, support, and training of the Afghan National Army at a simultaneous training rate of five Kandaks; and
- The development of training institutions, sustainment capacity, command and control capabilities and quick-response improvements for all the security forces.

Without the funds requested in the fiscal year 2005 supplemental, it will be impossible to bring the Iraq and Afghan security forces up to a level of capability that will enable U.S. forces to begin returning home.

IRAQ: RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UKRAINE

Question. In the lead up to the war in Iraq there were indications that the Kuchma regime in Ukraine and others had supplied Saddam Hussain with sophisticated radars and other equipment. Presumably we have gained access to materials Iraq that document such links. Does such documentation indeed exist, and if so, is there any follow up with the governments concerned?

Answer. The Coalition in Iraq has found no physical or documentary evidence to confirm allegations made in the lead-up to the war that Ukraine sold sophisticated radars (Kolchuga-M) to Iraq, either officially or through intermediaries. Following extensive documentary and physical searches in Iraq, it is my understanding that the Intelligence Community believes that no version of the Kolchuga-M was delivered to Iraq. I would refer you to the Intelligence Community for their analysis.

RUSSIA: WAR ON TERROR

Question. Russia has maintained a longstanding relationship with Syria, a destabilizing influence in the Middle East. What is your assessment of the Syrian factor in the region? Is the issue being raised with the Russians, if so, are they being helpful? How does comport with Russia's status as a partner in the war against international terrorism?

Answer. Syria is a charter member of the State Department's list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and is actively developing WMD and delivery systems. Syria also has a long and sordid history of attempting to undermine all of its neighbors: Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. These factors—and the authoritarian nature of the Syrian regime—paint a truly unflattering picture of this country. We see daily pictures of the Lebanese people trying to throw off the yolk of repressive Syrian occupation. In Iraq, too, the Syrians have been extremely unhelpful by supporting the insurgency. So Syria continues to be a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. Syria is a topic we discuss with our allies in the Global War on Terrorism.

I have met frequently with Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov and have raised U.S. concerns regarding Syria and the potentially destabilizing effect of new arms transfers. Typically, Minister Ivanov notes U.S. concerns, responds that he will look

into certain matters, and then follows-up with me. The ability to have open and frank discussions on issues of concern supports U.S.-Russia cooperation in the Global War on Terror.

Question. Next week the President will meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. We often hear that Russia is a partner in the war on terrorism. While this sounds good, are there any specific actions that Moscow has taken to merit this claim?

Answer. Russia has granted overflight rights and allowed the transshipment of non-lethal goods in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The United States and Russia share information on terrorist threats, and our two militaries participate in regular discussions on countering terrorist activity. In October 2004, the United States and Russia held a joint Naval exercise in the North Atlantic that was focused on maritime interdiction and search and rescue. In April 2005, Russian forces will participate in a U.S. exercise on nuclear weapons convoy security in Wyoming.

CENTRAL ASIA

Question. Much was made of cooperation by governments in Central Asia in connection with the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, some may have been left with the impression that this cooperation was somehow one-way to the exclusive benefit to the United States. How would you respond? What is your assessment of the relationships, and how they have changed over the last couple of years?

Answer. Security assistance and military to military activities with the countries of Central Asia has increased since operations in Afghanistan began. Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, security assistance (FMF & IMET) to the region for fiscal year 2001 was approximately \$8.61 million¹. Since then it has increased to over \$13 million in fiscal year 2004. Assistance has been focused on defense reform and counterterrorism cooperation. FMF and IMET is used to make these militaries more interoperable with U.S. and NATO forces by giving them the opportunity to train alongside western forces and equip themselves with western standard equipment.

We are working with all countries in the region and the relationships we have cultivated have given us important access in support of operations in Afghanistan. The countries of Central Asia agree that the U.S. presence in the region is a stabilizing factor.

Question. Kyrgyzstan has refused a U.S. request to base AWACs on Kyrgyz territory, where we already have a base. Could you explain what was behind our request and why Kyrgyzstan decided not to comply?

Answer. The request was made to support operations in Afghanistan.

Question. Do we have any plans for long-term military bases in the Caucasus or Central Asia?

Answer. No. Our plans center on access and building relationships in these regions. Our partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia have provided valuable staging, overflight, and logistical support during of the Global War on Terrorism. As one part of our broad, long-term security relationships with these partners, we will continue to seek access to their host-nation facilities in pursuit of our common objective of maintaining the offensive against terrorist networks.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

RENDITION OF PRISONERS

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld, new information is coming to light about Administration policies on transferring prisoners to third countries where they might face torture. There is now a lawsuit pending in Federal court about an American who has been imprisoned on secret charges in a Saudi prison, and news articles have described a CIA-owned executive jet that transports prisoners around the world.

What is Defense Department policy on rendition of prisoners? Have our armed forces ever participated, directly or indirectly, with the rendition of detainees to countries in which they were likely to be subjected to torture? Wouldn't this practice violate the U.N. Convention Against Torture and U.S. law?

Answer. The United States transfers detainees, under appropriate conditions, to the control of other governments for investigation and possible prosecution and continued detention when those governments are willing to accept responsibility for ensuring, consistent with their laws, that the detainees will not continue to pose a threat to the United States and its allies. Such governments can include the government of a detainee's home country or the government of a country other than the

¹This figure does not include the fiscal year 2001 supplemental.

detainee's home country that may have law enforcement or prosecution interest in the detainee.

When DOD transfers detainees to the control of other governments, DOD does not ask or direct the receiving government to detain the individual on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, the detainees are no longer subject to the control of the United States once they are transferred.

It is the policy of the United States that an individual may not be transferred to the control of another country where the United States believes the individual will be tortured. The Department of Defense adheres to this policy.

Decisions on transfer are made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country, and the detainee concerned, as well as any assurances received from the country. If a case were to arise in which the assurances obtained from the receiving government were insufficient, the United States would not transfer a detainee. Circumstances have arisen in the past where DOD elected not to transfer detainees to their country of origin because of torture concerns.

Question. What is Defense Department policy on "ghost detainees?" Are our armed forces assisting the CIA in any way with keeping secret prisoners?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains accountability and oversight of detainees under its control. It is DOD policy to register all detainees under DOD control promptly, normally within 14 days of capture. The ICRC is provided information on all DOD detainees (including "capture card" information and Internment Serial Numbers). We are aware that the ICRC compiles and tracks this information, as it deems appropriate.

ICRC representatives have access to DOD theater internment facilities. DOD provides ICRC the opportunity to have access to all DOD detainees. In certain instances, ICRC access to detainees may be temporarily limited for reasons of imperative military necessity.

If other government agencies use DOD facilities they are required to follow DOD policies.

Question. How many detention facilities does the Department of Defense now operate in relation to the war on terrorism? Does the International Committee of the Red Cross have full access to every DOD detention facility?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) operates three theater internment facilities for the War on Terrorism. These facilities are located in Afghanistan at Bagram and Kandahar, and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In Iraq, we operate theater internment facilities at Camp Cropper, Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib. We also hold detainees at the Navy Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.

DOD periodically holds individuals for short periods of time at locations in the vicinity or near the area of capture. These are not internment facilities, but short-term field site locations within the area of operations used for staging and awaiting transportation of detainees to theater internment facilities. They have been established to ensure the safety of both U.S. personnel and detainees during the often difficult operations involved with the movement of detainees after capture. As soon as practicable, subject to military necessity, detainees in Afghanistan are transferred from the forward field sites to the theater internment facilities.

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ICRC representatives have access to DOD theater internment facilities. DOD provides ICRC the opportunity to have access to all DOD detainees. In certain instances, ICRC access to detainees may be temporarily limited for reasons of imperative military necessity.

GUANTANAMO PRISON

Question. The President's request includes \$41.8 million to build a permanent detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Secretary Rumsfeld, does this mean that the Administration intends to keep prisoners at Guantanamo permanently?

Answer. Construction of the new facility is important to our efforts to maintain this commitment to humane treatment, and to wage the war on terrorism effectively. The current facilities are temporary structures and are not well-suited for long term detention; the new facility will be based on U.S. prison standards and will allow detainees to eat and exercise together more safely.

This does not imply that the Administration intends to keep detainees at this facility permanently. The DOD does not want to hold anyone any longer than necessary, but this effort recognizes that many detainees at GTMO will remain a threat for the foreseeable future.

Question. Isn't building a permanent prison putting the cart before the horse? Major portions of the Administration's detention policies have been struck down by Federal courts. Why should Congress fund a permanent detention facility if we don't even know if the courts will strike down even more parts of the President's detention policies?

Answer. DOD remains committed to treating GTMO detainees humanely, and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

Construction of the new facility is important to our efforts to maintain this commitment to humane treatment, and to wage the war on terrorism effectively. The current facilities are temporary structures and are not well-suited for long term detention; the new facility will be based on U.S. prison standards and will allow detainees to eat and exercise together more safely.

With respect to waging the war on terrorism, this construction will free up personnel, who are needed elsewhere. DOD does not want to hold anyone any longer than necessary, but this effort recognizes that many detainees at GTMO will remain a threat for the foreseeable future.

Question. New allegations of abuse of prisoners at Guantanamo are now coming to light. Won't this request for a permanent prison simply make the world more outraged at the Administration's detention policies? Why not make a clean break with these policies tainted by scandal, forego the permanent prison, and develop a new detention policy that passes legal and international scrutiny?

Answer. DOD remains committed to treating GTMO detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

Construction of the new facility is important to our efforts to maintain this commitment to humane treatment, and to wage the war on terrorism effectively. The current facilities are temporary structures and are not well-suited for long term detention; the new facility will be based on U.S. prison standards and will allow detainees to eat and exercise together more safely.

With respect to waging the war on terrorism, this construction will free up personnel, who are needed elsewhere. DOD does not want to hold anyone any longer than necessary, but this effort recognizes that many detainees at GTMO will remain a threat for the foreseeable future.

Moreover, the Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum of January 27, 2005, requested a review of all relevant directives, regulations, policies, and procedures relating to detention operations including interrogation operations, transfer of detainees, medical care of detainees and involvement of medical personnel, reporting potential violations of the Geneva conventions and other relevant obligations, and training of military and civilian interrogators, guards and contractors.

BUDGETING FOR THE WAR

Question. Secretary Rumsfeld, when you came into office in 2001, one of your first changes to the Pentagon's budget was to move the funding for operations in the Balkans out of supplementals and build it into the regular defense budget. I supported that move because it was the fiscally responsible thing to do.

If the United States and NATO are going to be in Afghanistan for the long term, why are those costs excluded from the regular budget request? Why is there such fierce resistance to making the same move for the cost of operations in Afghanistan? Why not also budget for the war in Iraq?

Answer. DOD costs for operations in Afghanistan could not be estimated far enough ahead or precisely enough to be included in the President's regular annual budget for fiscal year 2005 nor for fiscal year 2006. The same is true for DOD costs for operations in Iraq.

Question. In 2003, I offered an amendment to the defense appropriations bill that urged the President to budget for ongoing military operations in his fiscal year 2005 budget. That amendment got 81 votes in the Senate. In 2004, I offered the same amendment for the fiscal year 2006 budget, and it received 89 votes. Why does the Administration continue to dismiss this commonsense advice to budget for the war, which is supported by such a large number of Senators on both sides of the aisle?

Answer. DOD costs for these ongoing war-time operations could not be estimated far enough ahead or precisely enough to be included in the President's regular annual budget for fiscal year 2005 nor for fiscal year 2006.

STANDARDS FOR SUCCESS

Question. For weeks, questions have been raised about how many Iraqi security forces are ready to take over for U.S. troops. Based upon the answers from Administration officials, the only thing I can gather is that the number is somewhere between zero and 136,000.

What are the benchmarks or standards for success for training Iraqi security forces to take over for U.S. troops? How will you know when Iraqi police and soldiers are ready to take full responsibility for security in a particular city or region?

Answer. There are three general categories of standards that Iraqi security forces must meet before they are considered ready to take over for U.S. forces. First, they must meet the institutional training standards for their respective basic and advanced training courses prior to graduation and assignment to operational forces. Essentially, they must demonstrate proficiency in the individual and low-level collective tasks one would find taught in any military basic training program or police academy: basic marksmanship squad-level tactics, basic law enforcement, etc. Secondly, they must demonstrate proficiency at the higher-level collective tasks required for the mission of their unit. For example, company and battalion-level maneuver, cordon and search of an urban area, citywide law enforcement, etc. Finally, the practical part of these standards is how well Iraqi forces fight. The pace of transition from U.S. forces to Iraqi security forces will be driven by the capability of the Iraqi forces, the level of insurgent activity, and the ability of the Iraqi government to provide essential services and infrastructure in the areas of security, governance, economic development, and communications. General Casey is developing a set of standards for these higher order collective tasks for each Iraqi security force component, as well as methods to regularly measure the Iraqi's progress in meeting those standards. Iraqi security forces are gaining valuable combat experience and continue to make progress toward taking the lead in the counterinsurgency fight. Our goal is to help this happen as soon as possible. Achievement of those higher level collective standards, combined with the level of insurgent activity and the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces and local government are what will indicate whether other Iraqis are ready to assume full responsibility for security in a particular city or region, which is the ultimate standard.

Question. How many Iraqi police and soldiers now meet those benchmarks or standards for success? How many more police and soldiers do you expect to meet that standard if the \$5.7 billion you have requested for security training is appropriated?

Answer. About 140,000 Iraqis have achieved the established standards for the institutional phase of their training and have graduated from their respective courses. Most forces, however, still lack the capacity to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations and therefore continue to develop their skills through on-the-job training, mentoring and experience gained in actual operations. The key elements that need to be addressed with the "post-graduate" forces are: leadership, the establishment of properly manned, trained and capable headquarters, reversing absenteeism and revitalizing a warrior ethos committed to service to the nation.

The additional \$5.7 billion in this supplemental will allow LTG Petraeus and his command to complete the institutional training for an additional 130,000 Iraqis, but as with their predecessors, they will require additional mentoring and experience before they will be ready for sustained independent operations.

Question. How close are we to turning over full responsibility for security in some cities, towns, or regions to Iraqis? Might that happen in a matter of weeks, of months, or is that goal still too far in the future? When is the Congress going to hear less about the acceleration of training, and more about the acceleration of responsibility?

Answer. The Iraqi Security Forces continue to take on more responsibility for security within their country, especially since the January 2005 elections. MNF-I hopes to be able to turn full responsibility for security in some cities over to Iraqi security forces over the next several months. Cities in the far north and south will likely be the first to establish the conditions necessary for assumption of responsibility. MNF-I is developing ways to accelerate this transition to self-reliance, with getting the Iraqi Security Forces out in front as quickly as possible being General Casey's overarching strategy.

Question. How many trained police and soldiers do you expect to have in the next six to twelve months if Congress appropriates the additional funds for Iraqi security forces?

Answer. By August 1, 2005, we expect to have trained and equipped about 179,000 Iraqi security forces. The number of trained and equipped forces should grow to about 235,000 by March 1, 2006.

Question. How many of the Iraqi police and troops that will be trained in the coming months be trained by the United States, and how many by NATO or other countries? Will the United States still be expected to pay for training carried out by NATO or other countries? If so, how much of the \$5.7 billion request will be used to pay for training carried out by NATO or other countries?

Answer. To date, the Jordan International Police Training Center, staffed with one-third United States and two-thirds non-U.S. trainers, has graduated over 12,500 police cadets. The Baghdad and regional police academies, predominately all U.S. staffed, have trained an additional 12,300. We expect that the percentage of U.S. trained to non-U.S. trained will grow slightly as additional regional academies open. A good planning figure for the future would be about 60 percent U.S. trained and 40 percent trained by international trainers in Jordan.

Military training is being done largely by U.S. forces although some nations, such as Jordan, Egypt, Poland, UAE, the UK and Germany have conducted some small-scale training. There are no provisions in the Iraqi security forces portion of the fiscal year 2005 supplemental to cover costs associated with NATO's training mission in Iraq, although the United States is providing funds from other sources to NATO's Training Trust Fund as part of its member state requirements.

PLAN AFGHANISTAN

Question. The President's budget request includes \$773 million for expanding the current counter-drug program in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that drug production has become a very serious problem in Afghanistan, but Congress needs to know more about this program before signing off on a request for hundreds of millions of dollars.

Right now, British forces are in charge of counter-drug operations in Afghanistan. Since the Administration is asking the U.S. taxpayer for \$773 million for this new program, how much money will Britain, NATO, and other countries contribute for these expanded counter-drug programs?

Answer. The Department of State/INL provided the following response.

Although the United Kingdom plays the lead international role in delivering and coordinating counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan, the Government of Afghanistan is in charge of counternarcotics operations in the country.

The United States developed its current counternarcotics plan in close consultation with the United Kingdom. We have briefed and sought additional contributions to our efforts, especially in the area of alternative livelihoods from the G-8, European Union and many of Afghanistan's neighbors, among others. The U.S. government is in consultations with the British on next steps for increasing other donors' assistance on counternarcotics. The United Kingdom recently announced it would double its annual contribution to \$100 million, with half of the contribution funding alternative development programs. The United Kingdom has also announced plans to assist the Afghans in establishing a counternarcotics trust fund into which other nations could pledge contributions, and hopes to raise \$300 million through that fund this year. U.S. Department of State/INL has funded a U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime project to create and maintain a database of donor activities related to counternarcotics in order to better track contributions.

The United States has led discussions on this issue in the North Atlantic Council, in the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO's Economic Committee, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and in informal interactions with diplomats from Allied countries. We have also raised Afghan narcotics in multilateral fora, such as the G-8, the Paris Pact, the International Conference on Afghanistan, and the UNODC's Major Donors Meeting. These efforts are showing some success. A number of donors, including NATO Allies, have contributed to broader law enforcement, border security, criminal justice sector, alternative development, and demand-reduction programs. The proposed request, in fact, takes into account the contributions made by other donors for other aspects of a balanced counternarcotics/law enforcement effort.

For example, G-8 countries other than the United Kingdom and United States, have pledged in excess of \$350 million toward counternarcotics and related programs in Afghanistan. Specifically, Canada has pledged \$84 million, France \$32.5 million, Germany \$37.6 million, Italy \$36.8 million, and Japan \$70.7 million towards counternarcotics enforcement, alternative livelihoods, criminal justice, anti-corruption, as well as reconstruction, and vocational, drug-demand and capacity building training. Additionally, Russia reports that it has or will provide about \$92.5 million in assistance for programs related to counternarcotics in Afghanistan, including donations to the Afghan National Army.

Donor contributions to the UNODC for ongoing counternarcotics projects in Afghanistan, including alternative development, monitoring of opium production, drug

demand reduction, verification of eradication, drug control and capacity building, interdiction, border control, and counternarcotics enforcement total \$20 million from such contributors as Finland, Australia, Austria, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, European Commission, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Japan, and the U.N. Human Security Fund.

The United States will continue to engage the NATO Allies regarding the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, stressing the need to increase and accelerate efforts to support the Afghan government in implementing its counternarcotics strategy. Also, like the United States, the United Kingdom, in its lead role, continues to press other donors, including NATO Allies, to contribute to the effort.

Question. Will U.S. troops in Afghanistan be ordered to track down drug lords or to eradicate opium fields? Will any troops be taken off the hunt for Al Qaeda in order to carry out counter-drug missions? Will additional U.S. troops be sent to Afghanistan to carry out this mission?

Answer. Our first priority in Afghanistan has been our combat mission to dismantle the terrorist organizations. The growing drug trade in Afghanistan poses a threat to our strategic interests in that country. CENTCOM knows drug production and trafficking is a grave threat to U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and the region. CENTCOM's role is critical in implementing and supporting a program put together by the Afghan government, our Allies, the State Department, DEA, and other U.S. agencies to effectively counter drug production and trafficking in that country. The centerpiece of that program is to develop an Afghan capacity to aggressively address the threat.

In Afghanistan, U.S. troops are authorized to conduct military operations against drug trafficking targets when those military operations support our stability mission in Afghanistan. If our troops come across drugs or drug producing equipment during the conduct of other military operations, they are authorized to take action against these targets and report all drug related discoveries. There are no plans for U.S. troops to be involved in eradication.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

IRAQI FORCES

Question. The President and Secretary of State have said the training of Iraqi security forces is the key to bringing our troops home.

What is the estimated total number of fully trained Iraqis needed in order for the Iraqi Security Forces to take over for our forces in Iraq, and how long will it take to get them trained?

Answer. Current assessments indicate that the Iraqis will need about 180,000 conventional police and border officers, about 16,500 specialized police officers, and a military force of about 100,000. Training of the border officers will take the longest, with institutional training not complete until August 2006. Training of the specialized police forces should be complete by August 2005, and most military forces will have completed their institutional training programs by November 2005. It is important to note, however, that completion of institutional training programs will not mean that forces have achieved full capability to accomplish their assigned missions. In all categories of forces, further mentoring as well as practical operational experience will be required before the forces can be considered fully capable.

AHMED CHALABI

Question. According to press reports, Ahmed Chalabi may receive an important post in the new Iraqi Government. Does that concern you?

Answer. No. The Iraqi political process is working itself out as established in the Transitional Administrative Law. It is now up to the Iraqis to choose their own leadership, and we are confident that we will be able to work with whomever they select.

ABUSE OF IRAQI WOMEN DETAINEES

Question. During the hearing, I asked whether you were personally aware of, and whether the Pentagon is investigating, allegations of abuse of female detainees in Iraq, including at Abu Ghraib and other locations. You offered to follow-up on this question for me. As I mentioned, the Taguba report commented on the videotaping and photographing of naked male and female detainees. The Fay-Jones report described an incident in which a female detainee was shown lifting her shirt with both breasts exposed. But anecdotal evidence suggests that much worse has also occurred, including allegations of rape. The Army's response to one press inquiry, pub-

lished in the American Prospect, seemed to suggest that investigators can only respond to the information volunteered to them by former detainees. This is not good enough. For cultural reasons and even for fear of honor killing, it is rare for Muslim women to report sexual assault. Meanwhile, insurgents in Iraq have cited the treatment of female detainees as a motivation for their abhorrent acts, including the kidnapping of CARE International's Margaret Hassan.

Please inform me of any completed or ongoing investigation that will examine (a) any allegations of abuse, threats or assaults of a sexual nature, or rape by female prisoners; or (b) any such allegations reported by other individuals, such as soldiers or doctors.

Answer. The Department of Defense investigates all allegations of abuse of detainees. There have been five investigations into allegations of sexual misconduct involving female detainees. The investigations are described below:

(1) The Taguba Report included an incident where 3 soldiers took a female detainee to another area of Abu Ghraib. There was an allegation of sexual assault in which the detainee's blouse was removed and one soldier apparently kissed the detainee. An investigation concerning this incident was opened. The soldiers involved were assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC. Initially, the soldiers were charged with sexual assault, conspiracy, maltreatment of a prisoner and communicating a threat (for allegedly telling a female detainee that she would be left in the cell with a naked male detainee). The investigation was closed as a result of insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegations. However, the unit commander determined that the soldiers violated a unit policy that prohibits male soldiers from interviewing female detainees. The soldiers received non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for violation of a lawful regulation or order, (Article 92, UCMJ). A Sergeant was reduced from the grade of E-5 to the grade of Specialist, E-4 and forfeited \$500 of his pay and allowances for one month; a Specialist, was reduced from the grade of E-4 to the grade of Private First Class, E-3 (the reduction was suspended), and also forfeited \$750 of his pay and allowances for one month; and a second Specialist was reduced from the grade of E-4 to the grade of Private First Class, E-3 and forfeited \$500 of his pay and allowances for one month.

(2) The Taguba Report includes a statement that a male MP Guard had sex with a female detainee. The witness statement references a video of Private Graner having sex with a female in the prison. After an extensive investigation into the allegations of abuse by Private Graner and others at the Abu Ghraib prison, there has been no evidence uncovered that establishes that Private Graner had sexual intercourse with female detainees.

An allegation was substantiated against Private Graner, however, for photographing a female detainee exposing her breasts. On January 10, 2005, Private Graner was convicted by a ten-member enlisted panel at a General Court-martial for numerous offenses stemming from his abuse of detainees while stationed as a guard at Abu Ghraib prison. Included in the charges was a multi-specification charge of Dereliction of Duty which included one specification alleging that "[t]he accused photographed a female detainee exposing her breasts." Private Graner was found guilty of this specification. He was sentenced on all the charges to which he was found guilty and sentenced to reduction from the grade of Staff Sergeant, E-6, to the lowest enlisted grade, Private, E-1, to total forfeitures of pay and allowances, to confinement for 10 years, and to a Dishonorable Discharge.

(3) A 75-year old Iraqi female alleged she was captured and detained for 10 days and claimed that she was robbed, sodomized, indecently assaulted and deprived of food and water at a remote location. The woman described her captors as American Coalition Forces but could not provide any further descriptions of the personnel allegedly involved. The investigation was initially closed for insufficient evidence, but has since been re-opened for further investigation after the identification of additional leads.

(4) A female detainee alleged she was raped and knifed in the back by unknown U.S. personnel at the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility. These allegations were reported via a newspaper article in the Los Angeles Times. Following the publication of the article, CID opened an investigation and attempted to locate the alleged victim and her attorney. CID coordinated with the Iraqi Ministry of Justice and made numerous attempts to locate witnesses for information. After extensive efforts, CID closed the investigation as a result of insufficient evidence either to identify potential suspects or to prove or disprove the allegations.

(5) There was an allegation of rape against unidentified members of an infantry battalion, reported in Playboy Magazine. The article claimed that soldiers admitted to various acts of violence against Iraqi civilian and captives including murder, rape,

and assault. The CID investigated the incident and found the allegations to be unsubstantiated. The case closed.

Question. Given the information contained in the Taguba and Fay-Jones reports, and the anecdotal evidence of other, more aggressive sexual abuses, please describe any affirmative steps the Pentagon has taken to investigate allegations of rape and sexual assault of female detainees in Iraq.

Answer. The Department of Defense investigates all allegations of abuse of detainees. There have been five investigations into allegations of sexual misconduct involving female detainees. The investigations are described below:

(1) The Taguba Report included an incident where 3 soldiers took a female detainee to another area of Abu Ghraib. There was an allegation of sexual assault in which the detainee's blouse was removed and one soldier apparently kissed the detainee. An investigation concerning this incident was opened. The soldiers involved were assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC. Initially, the soldiers were charged with sexual assault, conspiracy, maltreatment of a prisoner and communicating a threat (for allegedly telling a female detainee that she would be left in the cell with a naked male detainee). The investigation was closed as a result of insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegations. However, the unit commander determined that the soldiers violated a unit policy that prohibits male soldiers from interviewing female detainees. The soldiers received non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for violation of a lawful regulation or order, (Article 92, UCMJ). A Sergeant was reduced from the grade of E-5 to the grade of Specialist, E-4 and forfeited \$500 of his pay and allowances for one month; a Specialist, was reduced from the grade of E-4 to the grade of Private First Class, E-3 (the reduction was suspended), and also forfeited \$750 of his pay and allowances for one month; and a second Specialist was reduced from the grade of E-4 to the grade of Private First Class, E-3 and forfeited \$500 of his pay and allowances for one month.

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RENDITION

Question. What role does the Defense Department play in the extraordinary rendition process?

Answer. It is appropriate for DOD to detain enemy combatants as long as hostilities are ongoing. Nonetheless, DOD has no interest in detaining enemy combatants longer than necessary. Accordingly, DOD conducts reviews of detainees to determine whether continued detention is warranted based on factors such as whether the detainee continues to pose a threat to the United States and its allies. Where continued detention is deemed no longer necessary, a detainee may be transferred to the control of another government for release. Furthermore, the United States also transfers detainees, under appropriate conditions, to the control of other governments for investigation and possible prosecution and continued detention when those governments are willing to accept responsibility for ensuring, consistent with their laws, that the detainees will not continue to pose a threat to the United States and its allies. Such governments can include the government of a detainee's home country or the government of a country other than the detainee's home country that may have law enforcement or prosecution interest in the detainee.

When DOD transfers detainees to the control of other governments, DOD does not ask or direct the receiving government to detain the individual on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, the detainees are no longer subject to the control of the United States once they are transferred.

At the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, DOD developed a policy for transfer of detainees to control of foreign governments. For the purposes of such a transfer, it is the policy of the United States, consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, not to repatriate or transfer individuals to other countries where it believes they will be tortured. Therefore, if a transfer is deemed appropriate, a process is undertaken, typically involving the Department of State, in which appropriate assurances regarding the detainee's treatment are sought from the country to whom the transfer of the detainee is proposed.

Decisions on transfer are made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country, and the detainee concerned, as well as any assurances received from the country. If a case were to arise in which the assurances obtained from the receiving government were insufficient, the United States would not transfer the detainee. Circumstances have arisen in the past where DOD elected not to transfer detainees to their country of origin because of torture concerns.

Question. Has the Defense Department transferred detainees to countries where they are likely to be tortured?

Answer. For the purposes of such a transfer, it is the policy of the United States, consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, not to repatriate or transfer individuals to other countries where it believes they will be tortured. Therefore, if a transfer is deemed appropriate, a Government process is undertaken in which appropriate assurances regarding the detainee's treatment are sought from the country to which the transfer of the detainee is proposed.

Decisions on transfer are made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the transfer, the country, and the detainee concerned, as well as any assurances received from the country. If a case were to arise in which the assurances obtained from the receiving government were insufficient, the United States would not transfer the detainee. Circumstances have arisen in the past where the Department of Defense (DOD) elected not to transfer detainees to their country of origin because adequate assurances of humane treatment were not obtained.

When DOD transfers detainees to the control of other governments, DOD does not ask or direct the receiving government to detain the individual on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, the detainees are no longer subject to the control of the United States once they are transferred.

Question. Has the Defense Department assisted the CIA in extraordinary renditions of detainees to countries where they are likely to be tortured?

Answer. It is the policy of the United States that an individual may not be transferred to the control of another country where the United States believes the individual will be tortured.

The Department of Defense adheres to this policy. Should you have questions about Central Intelligence Agency actions, I respectfully request that you direct such questions to the Director of Central Intelligence.

Question. Does the Defense Department have a policy on this issue?

Answer. When DOD transfers detainees to the control of other governments, DOD does not ask or direct the receiving government to detain the individual on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, the detainees are no longer subject to the control of the United States once they are transferred.

At the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, DOD developed a policy for transfer of detainees to control of foreign governments. For the purposes of such a transfer, it is the policy of the United States, consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, not to repatriate or transfer individuals to other countries where it believes they will be tortured. Therefore, if a transfer is deemed appropriate, a process is undertaken, typically involving the Department of State, in which appropriate assurances regarding the detainee's treatment are sought from the country to whom the transfer of the detainee is proposed.

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GUANTANAMO

Question. A February 13, 2005, article in the New York Daily News states that "military lawyers at the Guantanamo Bay terrorist prison tried to stop inhumane interrogations, but were ignored by senior Pentagon officials." The article claims that JAG lawyers repeatedly objected to aggressive interrogations by an intelligence unit at Camp Delta, but their complaints went unanswered. Were you aware of JAG lawyers' complaints about inhumane interrogations at Guantanamo Bay, or any other facility conducting interrogations? If so, what action did you take?

Answer. I do not recall being aware of objections by Judge Advocate Officers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

On December 29, 2004, the Commander, U.S. Southern Command appointed a General Officer to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of detainee abuse contained in documents recently released under the Freedom of Information Act, including those released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and to conduct an inquiry into any credible allegation contained in those documents. This investigation will consider any such objections allegedly made by judge advocate officers at Guantanamo. This investigation is expected to be completed soon.

TORTURE MEMO

Question. The April 4, 2003 Department of Defense Working Group Memo on interrogations quoted extensively from the infamous Office of Legal Counsel "torture memo" dated August 1, 2002. The Working Group memo adopted the legal argument that the President is not bound by the laws banning torture, and it presented a number of legal doctrines, including the principles of "necessity" and "self-defense," for evading the prohibition on torture. After letting the torture memo stand as policy for two years, the Department of Justice issued a new memo interpreting the torture statute on December 30, 2004. In January, a Pentagon spokesman told the New York Daily News that the Department of Defense did not plan to revise the Working Group Memo. Please clarify for us all today: does the Working Group Memo represent current interrogation policy for the military?

Answer. The Department of Justice (DOJ) released a memo in December 2004 that defines U.S. legal standards under the Federal Torture statute. The DOJ memorandum of 2004 supersedes the August 2002 DOJ memorandum in its entirety.

Interrogation practices used by the Department of Defense (DOD) comply with the DOJ memo, as well as with all U.S. laws and treaties.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense's memorandum of January 27, 2005, requested a review of all relevant directives, regulations, policies and procedures to ensure current practice for treatment of detainees is consistent with the DOJ December 2004 memorandum.

Simply stated, our policies regarding the treatment of detainees continue to require that all detainees will be treated humanely.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Question. It is impossible to determine the length of the conflict in which we are engaged, but, do we assume that we are expected to stay so long that we need to build permanent facilities? For example, in Afghanistan, the Department has requested \$57 million to build a permanent fuel tank farm at Bagram Airfield. The current cost for temporary fuel baldders is approximately \$2 million a year. Should I assume from this request that we intend to stay at Bagram over 28 years?

Answer. There are no plans at this time to establish permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. The infrastructure expenditures associated with the \$5.7 billion in this supplemental are tied to the establishment of facilities for the Iraqi military and police forces. USCENTCOM is, however, developing a Regional Basing plan that may include a base or bases in Afghanistan. Bagram is a potential long-term site for basing. The facilities at Bagram and the work already completed represent a significant up-front investment to leverage for possible long-term presence in Central Asia.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Question. General Myers, the importance of a trained and viable Iraqi police force to support the progress made since the election cannot be overstated. One aspect of putting together a successful training program is the identification suitable candidates through effective screening. I understand that since October 2004, Lieutenant General Petraeus has been making use of the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team to screen Iraqi police candidates similar to how many of our police departments in the United States screen candidates. I have been informed this approach has reduced cadet training cost and reduced failure rates of Iraqi police cadets, however, there may be thought of not funding this program beyond February 2005. General Myers, would you provide this committee an update on this important function?

Answer. MNSTC-I will continue to use the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team approach until the institutional training of Iraqi border enforcement forces is complete (about August 2006).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TED STEVENS

Question. Does funding included in the supplemental request for Modularity include costs to re-design the Army National Guard?

Answer. Yes, the supplemental includes \$787 million to convert Guard brigades to the modular force.

Question. Could you please explain how Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds are being used by the commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The CERP allows military commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction requirements, enhancing their ability to combat violent extremism and to support U.S. military operations. CERP builds trust and support at the local community level, provides needed jobs and continues to be an effective tool in Afghanistan and Iraq. Examples of projects include purchasing school supplies for students, providing electricity by connecting villages to the electrical grid, providing medical and dental supplies and equipment to local health clinics, and funding trash clean-up through local job programs.

Question. Is industry able to keep pace with your needs for vehicle armoring? What are the major obstacles to continuing effort?

Answer. Industry has been able to consistently adjust production to meet the Defense Department's armor requirements. The dynamic operational environment has impacted the Defense Department's requirements. The changing requirement has resulted in temporary lags while industry adjusts its production. We anticipate industry's capacity will continue to keep pace with future requirements and there are no major obstacles preventing the Defense Department from reaching its armor requirements.

COMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman COCHRAN. We are going to have another hearing tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, where we will hear from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Also, the committee should be on notice that we should adopt our rules so they can be printed in the Congressional Record. And tomorrow, before the hearing—as the hear-

ing begins, I'm going to ask that we approve our rules of procedure so Members will know the rules under which we are operating and we can be in compliance with the requirement that those rules be printed in the record.

Until then, the committee will stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., Wednesday, February 16, the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, February 17.]

**EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005**

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Domenici, Bond, McConnell, Burns, Bennett, Craig, DeWine, Brownback, Allard, Byrd, Inouye, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, and Feinstein.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Chairman COCHRAN. The committee will please come to order.

This morning our committee will continue full committee hearings on the President's fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental budget request by hearing testimony from the distinguished Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

Slightly more than \$5 billion of the President's request is for programs and accounts under the jurisdiction of the Department of State. I would like to follow the same procedure the committee followed yesterday and yield to Senator Byrd for an opening statement, and then recognize the Secretary for her testimony. We will then have a period for questions from members of the committee, with each Senator being recognized for 10 minutes. And I will recognize Senators in the order of their arrival, going from one side of the aisle to the other, alternating.

But before proceeding, I would like to ask the committee to approve the committee rules for the 109th Congress so we may print those in the Record before March 1, in accordance with Senate Rule 26.2. The proposed rules are identical to those we have used for about 30 years. The Senate is a continuing body, we don't reorganize every 2 years, as the House does, but there is this requirement under the Senate Rules that rules of the committees be printed in the Congressional Record at the beginning of each Congress. And so, following the admonition of that rule, we need to adopt the rules.

I've made available copies of the rules of the committee. The chairman and ranking minority member of the full committee are ex officio members of all subcommittees. And we have added one statement in connection with that custom. And in compliance with the Senate Rule 25.4, they may not vote in subcommittee, and their presence does not count toward constituting a quorum. Other than that, the rules are the same as they have been.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I so move that your proposal, as explained, be adopted.

Chairman COCHRAN. Is there any objection or any discussion by members?

[No response.]

Chairman COCHRAN. All in favor, say aye.

[A chorus of ayes.]

Chairman COCHRAN. All opposed, no.

[No response.]

Chairman COCHRAN. The ayes have it, and the motion is agreed to. I thank the Senators and thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.

Madam Secretary, we welcome you, and we appreciate your cooperation with our committee. We have some very important issues to resolve. We're trying to help control the growth of spending. We want to be sure that the funds being requested are those that are needed, that, consistent with the President's statement in the submission that this is to deal with emergencies, we would like to have the benefit of your advice about that issue and also the need for the funds that are being requested.

Senator Byrd, I don't have anything further to say, but I recognize you for any comments you might have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the way that you are proceeding. Thank you for the 10-minute opening period.

And thank you, Madam Secretary, and welcome. I look forward to hearing your testimony today.

Let me say that I greatly admire you. I have watched you from afar, as it were, and this is the first time, I believe, that you will have appeared before this committee in this way. I just want to stress that I do have a genuine and very, very deep feeling of admiration for you. I think you're extremely well prepared, extremely able, and you have a kind of charm that disarms almost any adversary, perhaps, except this one.

But we're in a position here where we have to ask adversarial questions. But I just want you to know that, although I did not vote for your confirmation, and for reasons that I stated on the floor; nevertheless, I have a very warm and high regard and great respect for you and for your background and for your accomplishments and your great achievements, and I look forward to working with you in the days and years ahead.

I am very interested, Madam Secretary, in your thoughts, not only on the current situation in Iraq, but also on how you see events unfolding in other hotspots on the map, including Iran and Syria and North Korea. I won't mince words with you, I am profoundly worried that the President may have a hidden agenda for dealing with Iran and Syria. I am equally worried that the administration has no agenda to manage what appears to be a worsening nuclear crisis in North Korea.

As I see it, Iraq is only one facet, albeit the bloodiest one, of a constellation of dangerous challenges facing the United States today. The ongoing strife in Iraq, and the billions of dollars that

the President is seeking in this supplemental to continue the war in that country, give me little comfort that this administration has learned from its mistakes in Iraq. Today, we are hearing the same kind of tough talk from the administration on Iran and Syria that we heard on Iraq only a few years ago. Then the President and his advisors, including you, Secretary Rice, were carefully and deliberately building a case for war, a case, as we later learned, that was built on a house of cards.

My concern is that the administration is leading us down the same path once again with respect to Iran and Syria, substituting saber-rattling for negotiations and, just maybe, allowing armed conflict to trump diplomacy.

I noted with interest and a bit of concern that, during your first trip abroad as Secretary of State, you were quoted as saying that an attack on Iran was, quote, "not on the agenda at this point," close quote. Well, the words, quote, "at this point," close quote, constitute a powerful caveat, particularly when coupled with the hard line that you and the President and the Vice President have espoused on Iran. Given the fact that the President has ruled out negotiations with Iran, but has not ruled out an attack, I must conclude that, when it comes to foreign policy, the only thing that the President is willing to take off the table is diplomacy. In the context of the war on Iraq, that is not a comforting thought.

I raise these issues because the actions that the United States is taking in Iraq are being watched very carefully by Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, and by the larger international community, including North Korea. The State Department will play a key role in determining whether the United States is seen as a moderating influence in Iraq or as a growing irritant to the region.

As I told Secretary Rumsfeld yesterday, I am absolutely committed to doing everything in my power to provide our troops with the resources that they need to do their jobs, but I'm also committed to making sure that the dollars we are allocating in this supplemental are being wisely spent for the purposes for which they are intended and not used to maneuver the United States into any further conflicts in the region.

I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll look forward to your testimony, Madam Secretary.

Chairman COCHRAN. Madam Secretary, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter my full statement for the record, but I will simply excerpt so that we might reserve as much time as possible for questions.

Chairman COCHRAN. Without objection, your statement will be printed in full in the record.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I welcome and appreciate this opportunity to support and describe the President's fiscal year 2005 supplemental budget request as it relates to our diplomatic and assistance efforts.

As you know, the bulk of the \$82 billion supplemental request—some \$75 billion—would go to the Department of Defense, and I know that you heard from Secretary Rumsfeld yesterday about this portion of the request. Today, I would like to address the \$5.6 billion intended for urgent and essential international affairs activities and the \$950 million intended for multi-agency tsunami relief efforts. I wish to emphasize to the Committee that the entire request of \$82 billion—for both military and international affairs activities—is for spending that we believe necessary to our national security.

I also wish to underscore that the supplemental funds for international affairs activities that we are requesting are meant to cover costs we could not have anticipated in our fiscal year 2005 budget request, or to help us seize new opportunities that have arisen to advance the cause of freedom and peace. This supplemental funding will ensure that we are able to respond speedily and effectively to the needs of our steadfast coalition partners in the War on Terror, to newly elected governments who seek our stabilizing assistance to move forward with reforms, and to the men, women and children swept up in humanitarian emergencies who turn to us in need.

Mr. Chairman, during the grim decades of Cold War, there was strong bipartisan consensus behind our diplomatic efforts to win over the hearts and minds of men and women around the world and tip the great scales of power toward the forces of freedom.

We and our partners in freedom are now engaged in another long-term struggle for hearts and minds against a new ideology of tyranny and terror, and it is a struggle that we must win. Defending and extending freedom in a post-September 11, 2001 world requires an equally energetic and effective application of our diplomatic assets, and equally broad-based and sustained congressional support.

The funds we are requesting in the supplemental for our political, economic and humanitarian activities will help us rise to new challenges—and grasp new opportunities—to build a safer, better, freer world.

Let me now highlight key elements of the supplemental request:

The historic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq were dramatic victories for the human spirit. The Iraqi and Afghan peoples have bravely set their countries on a course to democracy. The supplemental funds we are seeking will help stabilize and accelerate their democratic progress.

The \$2.05 billion in international affairs funding we propose for Afghanistan would help widen the reach of the Karzai government, particularly in this critical time before the Spring parliamentary elections. The funds would go to high impact projects that could show results in the short term or complete programs funded in the prior supplemental request. The funds would also be used to address the serious narcotics situation, which threatens to undermine progress on democracy and security to date. And we are requesting funding for embassy operations and diplomatic security.

We seek approximately \$265 million for democracy and governance programs. These monies would assist the government in the upcoming parliamentary elections, train parliamentarians, and support activities to strengthen the rule of law, independent media, and civil society—and we intend to put a special emphasis on efforts to increase the participation of women in public life.

\$796 million is for infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction to improve the lives of Afghan citizens. The monies would go to such activities as completing our commitment for roads, for building schools and health clinics and for expanding the work of our civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

\$509 million would be applied to a comprehensive counter narcotics effort, with initiatives in five areas: public information, law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, interdiction and eradication. About \$233 million of this funding would be to replenish resources reprogrammed earlier in the fiscal year to fund urgent counter narcotics activity.

\$400 million is to accelerate efforts to provide assistance to the Afghan police so that they can increasingly assume responsibility for their nation's security.

We must continue to build on the momentum of the October elections through our political engagement on the ground and so we also are seeking \$60 million to fund increased operating and security costs of the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan.

We are requesting \$1.4 billion for Iraq in international operations funding.

For our diplomatic efforts in Iraq, we are requesting \$690 million to cover the extraordinary security and support costs of operating our embassy, and \$658 million to construct a secure new embassy compound for our mission in Baghdad.

The supplemental also would provide \$24 million for security and other extraordinary operating costs for USAID, and \$2.5 million would pay for the operating

costs of USAID's office of Inspector General to audit relief and reconstruction expenditures.

The supplemental request also would support key partners in freedom.

We propose \$150 million for Pakistan to improve its border security and increase interoperability with the United States and coalition forces. President Bush has made a 5-year, \$3 billion assistance commitment to Pakistan, and the supplemental would help us meet the full \$300 million pledged for fiscal year 2005 without having to gut other important ongoing programs.

Jordan's political and material contributions remain critical to our efforts in Iraq. We seek \$100 million in economic assistance to promote stabilizing growth in Jordan—through the expansion of job opportunities, support for educational reform and the improvement of government performance and services. We are also seeking \$100 million in military assistance to bolster Jordan's counter-terrorism and border security efforts.

All of our partners are critical to our success in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the prosecution of the global War on Terror. We seek \$400 million for support and assistance to partners that face political, financial or military hardship as a result of having contributed to coalition efforts. Half of the funding would go to military and other security assistance for key partners with troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to help them meet the extraordinary defense costs they have incurred as a result of coalition participation. The other half would go to a Global War on Terror Partners Fund for economic assistance, which we would apply on a discretionary basis to provide a timely infusion of aid that would strengthen the ability of our partners to contribute to democracy and security around the world.

Mr. Chairman, we have seen how states where chaos, corruption and cruelty reign can pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the entire world. And so we are working to strengthen our capacity to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict states. President Bush has charged us at the State Department with coordinating our nation's post-conflict and stabilization efforts. We are asking for a little over \$17 million in supplemental funding for start-up and personnel costs for the Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Another objective of the supplemental is to help fund our compassionate response to humanitarian emergencies.

We are proposing \$701 million for tsunami relief and long-term recovery and reconstruction. This includes the initial \$350 million pledge made by President Bush in December. \$120 million would go to costs already incurred by USAID for its immediate response efforts. \$581 million will be used to: rebuild critical infrastructure that re-energizes economies and strengthens societies; accelerate the transition of victims back into their homes and communities; provide the option of debt deferral; promote good governance and political reconciliation, and; build disaster mitigation and early warning capabilities in the region.

We also seek over \$242 million to replenish funds spent and to meet emergency humanitarian needs, particularly those arising from the Darfur crisis in Sudan. The supplemental funds would provide clean water and sanitation, food, shelter and healthcare to some two million conflict-affected people in Darfur and Eastern Chad. In addition, we are seeking \$100 million to support implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan that was signed on January 9. When budget decisions were made for fiscal year 2005, the prospects for conclusion of the peace process were uncertain. Now, we must move quickly to help meet immediate unmet resource needs critical to ensuring that the peace agreement holds.

Since we submitted our fiscal year 2005 budget request, the United States has strongly supported the establishment by the United Nations Security Council of peacekeeping missions for Sudan/Darfur, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and Burundi. The supplemental requests \$780 million to pay assessed costs for these new missions. In addition, up to \$55 million of this request may be made available to support an assessed or voluntary U.S. contribution to a possible Sudan War Crimes tribunal.

Supplemental funding not only can help us meet unanticipated needs in emergencies, it can also help us seize unexpected, and welcome, opportunities.

The successful Palestinian elections of January 9, and the Israeli withdrawal plan for Gaza and parts of the West Bank, have created a new climate that is propitious for movement back to the Roadmap. Both Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas called this a time of opportunity that must not be lost. President Bush has announced an additional \$350 million to help the Palestinians build infrastructure and sustain their reform process over the next two years, and \$200 million is included in the supplemental.

Supplemental funding can also help us seize opportunities to translate the recent victory for democracy in Ukraine into successful governance. The new pro-Western

government has reached out to us and to others for assistance, and the \$60 million in supplemental funds would go to helping Ukraine's new leaders demonstrate in advance of the March 2006 parliamentary elections that their reform policies are improving the lives of ordinary citizens.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this time of global transformation calls for transformational diplomacy. More than ever in today's fast-evolving international environment, America's diplomats need to have the resources to act swiftly and effectively to avert dangers and seize opportunities to tip the global balance decisively toward freedom. The supplemental funds we are seeking will help us do just that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you and the other distinguished Committee Members may have.

Secretary RICE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, members of the committee, I welcome and appreciate this opportunity to support and describe the President's fiscal year 2005 supplemental budget request as it relates to our diplomatic efforts.

Today, I would like to address the 4.6—five—

The mike's not on? I think it's better. Thank you.

Today, I would like to address the \$5.6 billion intended for urgent and essential international affairs activities. This is spending that we believe is absolutely crucial to our national security. I also wish to underscore that the supplemental funds for international affairs activities that we are requesting are meant to cover costs we could not have anticipated in fiscal year 2005 in the budget request or to help us seize new opportunities that have arisen to advance the cause of freedom and peace since that time.

This supplemental funding will ensure that we are able to respond speedily and effectively to the needs of our steadfast coalition partners in the war on terror, to newly elected governments who are seeking our stabilizing assistance to move forward with reforms, and to the men, women, and children, swept up in humanitarian emergencies, who have turned to us in need.

Let me now highlight several key elements of the supplemental request.

The historic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq were dramatic victories for the human spirit. The Iraqi and Afghan peoples have bravely set their countries on a course to democracy. The supplemental funds we are seeking will help stabilize and accelerate their democratic progress.

The \$2.2 billion in international affairs funding that we propose for Afghanistan would help to widen the reach of the Karzai government, particularly in this critical time before the spring parliamentary elections. The funds would go to high-impact projects that could show results in the short term or complete programs funded in prior supplemental requests.

We seek approximately \$265 million for democracy and governance programs there. These monies would assist the government in the upcoming parliamentary elections, train parliamentarians, and support activities to strengthen the rule of law, independent media, and civil society. We intend to put a special emphasis on efforts to increase the participation of women in public life.

\$796 million is for infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction to improve the lives of Afghan citizens. This money would go to such activities as completing our commitment for roads, building schools and health clinics, and expanding the work of our civil/military provincial reconstruction teams as quickly as possible.

\$509 million would be applied to a comprehensive counter-narcotics effort, with initiatives in five areas: public information, law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, interdiction, and eradication. About \$233 million of this funding would be needed to replenish resources that were reprogrammed earlier so that we could begin to fund this urgent counter-narcotics activity.

And \$400 million is to accelerate efforts to provide assistance to the Afghan police so that they can increasingly assume responsibility for their own nation's security.

We are requesting also \$60 million to fund increased operating and security costs of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, given the security situation there.

Members of the committee, we are also requesting \$1.4 billion for Iraq in international operations funding. For our diplomatic efforts in Iraq, we are requesting \$690 million to cover the extraordinary security and support costs of our operating—of operating our Embassies, and \$658 million to construct a secure new Embassy compound for our mission in Baghdad. These costs are directly related to the security and well-being of our men and women who are very much in danger's way in Baghdad.

The supplemental request would also support key partners in freedom. We propose \$150 million for Pakistan to improve its border security and increased interoperability with United States and coalition forces.

Jordan, one of the front-line states in this war on terrorism, would receive \$100 million in economic assistance to promote stabilizing growth there, and \$100 million in military assistance to bolster Jordan's counterterrorism and border security efforts.

All of our partners are critical to our success in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the prosecution of the global war on terror; therefore, we seek \$400 million for support and assistance to partners that have faced financial and military hardship, as well as political hardship, as a result of having contributed to the coalition efforts. Half of that funding would go to military funding so that security assistance could be provided to key partners with troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other half would go to the global war on terror partners funds for economic assistance, which could be applied in a timely way to strengthen our ability of our partners to contribute to democracy and security around the world.

Mr. Chairman, we have seen how states where chaos and corruption and cruelty reign pose a threat to our neighbors, but also to us. President Bush has charged us, at the State Department, with coordinating our Nation's post-conflict and stabilization efforts. We are asking for a little over \$17 million in supplemental funding for startup and personnel costs for the Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Another objective in this supplemental is to help our compassionate response to humanitarian emergencies. We are proposing \$701 million for tsunami relief and long-term recovery and reconstruction programs in that devastated area.

We seek, too, \$242 million to replenish funds spent to meet the emergency humanitarian needs arising from the Darfur crisis in Sudan.

Since we submitted our fiscal year 2005 budget request, the United States has strongly supported the establishment by the United Nations Security Council of peacekeeping missions for Sudan Darfur, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, and Burundi. This supplemental requests \$780 million to pay the assessed costs for these new missions; these are missions that were not assessed at the time of the 2005 budget request. In addition, up to \$55 million of this request may be available to support a voluntary contribution to a possible Sudan war crimes tribunal.

Supplemental funding can help us not only to meet unanticipated needs in emergencies, but it can also help us to seize unexpected and welcome opportunities in a timely fashion. The successful Palestinian elections of January 9 and the Israeli withdrawal plan from the Gaza and parts of the West Bank have created a new climate that is propitious for movement back to the roadmap. Both Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas have called this a time of opportunity. And President Bush has announced an additional \$350 million to help the Palestinians build their infrastructure and sustain their reform process. \$200 million of that is included in this supplemental.

Supplemental funding can also help us to seize opportunities to translate the recent victory for democracy in Ukraine into successful governance. We seek \$60 million in supplemental funding that would go to help Ukraine's new leaders, in advance of the March 2006 parliamentary elections, seize this opportunity to consolidate their gains.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this time of global transformation calls for transformational diplomacy. More than ever in today's fast-evolving international environment, America's diplomats need to have the resources to act swiftly and effectively to avert dangers and seize opportunities that allow us to tip the global balance of power toward freedom. The supplemental funding that we are seeking will help us to do just that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to answer any questions that you or the committee's members may have.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

We proceed with the assumption that the supplemental request is being submitted because accounts have been depleted that were unexpected, in terms of the pressure on those accounts and demands that could not have been known when the budget for this fiscal year was first submitted to the Congress. In that vein, because the war was already in progress, is the new global war on terror partners fund something that was created since the budget submission was made at the beginning of this fiscal year? And how will the \$200 million for peacekeeping operations be used in connection with the war on terror?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed, this is a fund that was envisioned and created after the 2005 budget supplemental request as we have seen the strain on partners, particularly, some of them, young democracies that, themselves, are just barely out of tyranny, who have put forces on the ground to try to support us, states that are trying to support our efforts, particularly in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan. The Poles, for instance, tell us that they have, in their efforts in Iraq, spent

almost \$500 million of their own resources. One might imagine that, for a country just barely out of the communist phase itself, this is an extraordinary expenditure of forces. They need help in terms of their own military sustainment and modernization, they need help in terms of their own economic sustainment.

These are countries that came to the aid of democracy. They have taken some of the load off of our forces by being able to deploy to certain places. They have been an important part of the coalition. But we've noted that they operate under great strain, and these funds are meant to address that concern, and, in fact, was not even envisioned at the time of the 2005 budget submission.

IRAQ

Chairman COCHRAN. We also notice that some of the money that is being requested is for an Iraq security forces fund for training, equipping, and providing other forms of security assistance for Iraqi police, military, protective services, and border personnel. These are activities that sound like Department of Defense responsibilities. Why is it that the request is being made by the Department of State for funding for these activities?

Secretary RICE. Well, most of the funding for security forces is, in fact, a part of the Defense Department supplemental under what Secretary—I believe that's correct—yes—under what Secretary Rumsfeld will direct General Petraeus to do.

When it comes to Afghanistan, we have, still, the police training function in the State Department. Afghanistan and Iraq are a little bit different, in that in Iraq the security forces—there needs to be one plan for the use of police, border, army, all of security forces in rather urgent counterterrorism missions, and we felt that that needed to be an integrated plan under General Petraeus. When it came to Afghan police functions, we're a little bit further along in the counterterrorism efforts there. Some of the training of the Afghan police is also associated with counternarcotics. So the Afghan police are associated with the State Department function, which has been the tradition, Senator. It's the Iraq case that is, in fact, different.

AFGHANISTAN

Chairman COCHRAN. I see. And I also noticed that, in connection with international narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, you're asking for \$89 million for leasing or purchasing aircraft and other equipment, vehicles, to carry out counternarcotics programs. Will the State Department actually be managing these activities? And to what extent do you foresee cooperation from local government officials to make that a successful program?

Secretary RICE. We will, indeed, at the State Department, be managing these activities, Senator, and we have quite a lot of experience in that, having managed Plan Colombia and the Andean regional initiative on counternarcotics.

The local government in Afghanistan has taken, now, I think, a very strong stand on counternarcotics. They've created a minister for the effort. President Karzai, actually, in his inaugural speech, devoted a whole section to the importance of dealing with the counternarcotics problem. The Afghans also are talking with us about

the role of aerial spraying, versus hand eradication. There, we still have some work to do.

But, on all elements of this program, we are in very close contact with them. They believe very strongly in this. And it has, Mr. Chairman, two important functions for us. One is, obviously one wants to get the product off the streets. It is principally going into Europe, and the Europeans are very interested in this. The British have just said that they will double their contribution on the counternarcotics section.

But counternarcotics—or narcotics can also be an enormously destabilizing force to this young democracy. If you have drug lords who are occupying parts of territory, using their money to feed terrorism, using their money to put themselves in a good position politically—we do not want to repeat the situation that we had in Colombia a few years ago, where these drug lords, in effect, owned parts of the country. And so, the counternarcotics effort is directly related to stabilizing Afghanistan and permitting us to see this as a place that we've finished the job.

TSUNAMI RELIEF

Chairman COCHRAN. My final question, before yielding to others for questions they may have, deals with the funds that are being requested for tsunami relief, reimbursement of accounts that were depleted in connection with our efforts to provide emergency relief for the victims of that horrible disaster. \$700 million is being requested for a fund for recovery and reconstruction. Some of that would be rebuilding infrastructure—housing, roads, sanitation systems, and the like. And I assume this goes to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for response and relief efforts that they were providing. Is that correct? And what safeguards are we going to have in place to be sure that U.S. foreign assistance is free from local government mismanagement or corruption that might develop? I'm not suggesting that it will, but what safeguards do you see being put in place to make sure the funds are being spent for those purposes?

Secretary RICE. The USAID, which will implement this, has a very extensive system—having operated in all kinds of parts of the world—a very extensive system of checks and of transparency mechanisms and of reporting—indeed, auditing—its activities. And I would expect that they would use that extensive system.

We have good cooperation with the Indonesian Government, with the other governments in the region, where this money will be spent. And so, the combination of USAID's normal processes for doing this, which we really have to do in practically every part of the world, and the cooperation that we have with the government, I think, will help us to ensure that the money is well spent.

And it is correct, Mr. Chairman, that this funding is both to reimburse some costs from accounts that were used so we could have an emergency response, as well as, now, this immediate need to start on the reconstruction effort.

Chairman COCHRAN. Okay. Thank you.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SYRIA

Madam Secretary, what can you tell us about the suspicions of Syrian involvement in the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister? Do you believe that the Syrians played an active role in the bombing?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

I don't think we know who was responsible, directly, for the bombing. And we've been very careful not to accuse anyone of this bombing, but we have said that there needs to be a very thorough investigation of it.

The Syrian link is that, because Syrian forces are deployed in Lebanon, because Syria has been, in a sense, a shield for terrorist activities in southern Lebanon, both against, by the way, the Israeli-Palestinian peace and against Lebanon itself, we believe that Damascus bears some responsibility for the overall conditions in Lebanon, and that it ought to respond to Resolution 1559, which calls for its withdrawal. The Syrians need to allow Lebanese elections to take place without foreign interference, and to stop interfering in a way that is destabilizing.

But as to complicity in the bombing, I think we need to wait for the investigation.

Senator BYRD. Madam Secretary, The Wall Street Journal yesterday ran an editorial calling for military strikes against Syria. Does the administration have any plans for attacks against Syria, either because of the assassination in Lebanon or for its supposed hand in the Iraqi insurgency?

Secretary RICE. Senator Byrd, as I'm sure you will understand, the President always reserves his options. However, in this case of Syria, we believe that the concerted international pressure of the international community can and should move the Syrians to act, and to act in a way that is in accordance with the Resolution 1559 that has already been passed in the Security Council.

We have also directly gone to the Syrians to say—Assistant Secretary Bill Burns was just there—to say to them that we do need Syria to deal with the insurgents, or the support for the insurgents, that is coming out of Damascus. But we believe we have many, many diplomatic tools at our disposal here. And, although the President always keeps his options open, we are employing those tools, and, I think, employing them very well. The recall of the Ambassador was one. The Syrian Accountability Act, which we appreciate being able to use as a tool, we've already employed part of that, and we may look at other such measures.

IRAQ/SYRIA/IRAN

Senator BYRD. Madam Secretary, the Congress has passed two use-of-force resolutions, one almost immediately after the September 11 attacks, and one that foolishly handed to the President and to his successors, whether they be Democrats or Republicans, the open-ended authority to attack and occupy Iraq. Is it your opinion that the administration can use those resolutions to attack Syria or Iran?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I would not want to get into a discussion of constitutional priorities and—or prerogatives, because

you're an expert at that. And so, I'm not going to go down that road. But I believe it is very clear to us that the resolutions that were passed had a rather specific—the resolution on Iraq that was passed had a specific character, and it related to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Senator BYRD. Yes. I'm concerned, however, that the—I believe it was September 14, 2001, resolution might be used by the administration as a premise to attack Syria and/or Iran. Do you care to express your opinion on this?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I do not want to express an opinion, but I do want the body to understand that the President understands the coequal role of the Senate in these decisions, and would do nothing to violate that understanding and that trust between the executive branch and the legislative branch.

We are in the war on terror. I think we all understood that we entered a different kind of war when we entered the war on terror. But the President and all of us understand fully the responsibilities and the prerogatives of the Senate in these matters, and I am quite certain that the President would do nothing to violate that trust.

IRAN AND SYRIA

Senator BYRD. Madam Secretary, I don't agree with you on everything you said with respect to the President, but let that be for some other time.

Do you believe that the President would need additional authorization from the Congress in the event of a U.S. attack on Iran and/or on Syria?

Secretary RICE. Senator Byrd, I don't want to speculate on what the President might or might not need, but I just want to repeat that we all understand fully the prerogatives of this body when it comes to matters of war and peace. The President sought, before the decision to take down the regime of Saddam Hussein, a resolution in this body, and I think that that speaks to the President's understanding of the relationship between the executive branch and the Senate on these matters.

IRAQ

Senator BYRD. Well, that relationship has as its source the Constitution of the United States, by which we are all bound, and under which, if this Nation goes to war, as it did with Iraq, there should be a declaration or authorization by the U.S. Congress. Now, I'm concerned that the same situation that obtained prior to the entry of the war with Iraq might, in some respects, lend itself to a repeat in the case of Syria and/or Iran. And we'll have to talk about that at another time.

As to the \$200 million, which Senator Cochran referred to, the administration has requested \$200 million for a new account entitled global war on terror partners fund. Well, according to the President's request, this \$200 million could be spent, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for any country on Earth, for any purpose under the sun, and it would not have to report to Congress before spending the money.

What I would be particularly interested in would be—is to learn how the administration feels—in particular, how you might see it—

that the Congress should turn over \$200 million of the taxpayers' money with no constraints on how it might be used. Why does the administration believe that the Appropriations Committee, or Congress, should have no say in how this \$200 million foreign aid program should be spent? Is this not an assault on the congressional power of the purse?

Finally, what does it say about the state of our relations with all of these countries of the coalition of the willing, when, 2 years into the war against Iraq, the United States has to create a new foreign aid program to repay these countries for their support? When are we going to reach the point that our allies will spend their own money to join our troops in the field, instead of having the U.S. taxpayers subsidize these foreign troops?

Would you react to what I've just said?

Secretary RICE. Certainly, Senator Byrd.

First of all, on the support funding for our coalition partners, there are many of our coalition partners who are, of course, footing the entire bill themselves—the British, the Australians, the Italians, and so on. And, in fact, these coalition partners that we propose to be able to help, now some 2 years into their effort, have footed the bill on their own, as—for instance, the Poles, who, as I said, told me the other day, that they've spent almost \$500 million on their efforts in Iraq. And \$500 million is a lot of money, particularly for a small economy, or a small country like Poland, just barely, itself, out of the clutches of communism. This—

Senator BYRD. Madam Secretary, forgive me for interrupting. My time is up. But would you just answer this final question? Why should Congress not have some limitations on this? It is the taxpayers' money. Why should we just have a fund out there that the State Department or the administration can use, as it will, without any approval by Congress?

Secretary RICE. I understand, Senator. We need to be able to respond in a way that goes directly to the problem at hand, at any given time, in a way that is quick and that is responsive to the needs. We know that these are places that have significant economic difficulty because of what they have been willing to help us and to do. And we would propose to use the funding simply to respond as quickly as possible, as flexibly as possible, to states that need this funding.

I can say, without any fear of contradiction, Senator, we would consult fully with the Congress about how these funds were being used so that the Congress has a role to play in the way that this is being disbursed. I would expect that there would be consultation with the Congress on this. But this is to recognize that, in the time between now and the 2006 budget, there are unanticipated, unforeseen circumstances that are bound to arise. If we have learned anything over this last couple of years, 3 years, in fighting the war on terrorism, it is that you cannot predict what is needed at any given time. And that's what this is meant to respond to, not to try to get around congressional responsibility or oversight.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I will simply say that I cannot support this item unless there are some limitations on it, unless

Congress can exercise its power over the purse, as the Constitution provides.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Secretary Rice, I think that your recent trip to Europe had fantastic results. And you are now, as you were in the academic community, a role model for young women, not only in this country, but throughout the world. We thank you very much for taking on that role, and I know you will carry it, as you have in the past, in just a great manner. We sincerely are proud of what you are doing, at least this Senator is.

Now, I have some questions to follow up on what Senator Byrd was saying. Is there a list of these partners that these funds might go to? Do we know who are the global partners?

Secretary RICE. Senator, we do not have a list, although I am quite certain that if you wanted me to give you some examples of countries that we might expect to be part of this partners list, I could do it. The real danger, of course, is then I create a list, and I'd rather not do that. I think there's—

Senator STEVENS. I realized that as I asked, but, at the same time, we have traveled, many of us, around the world, we have met with the partners, those who are really providing assistance, in one way or another, and, for many, in accordance with their annual budget, they are contributing considerably. I understand the need for the fund, but I'm not sure that the fund is in connection with their continued assistance or for their past assistance.

Secretary RICE. In these cases, I think you're talking about people who intend to try to continue to assist us. It's no surprise to people on the committee that the strains on some of these countries have become such that it is hard for them to imagine a continuing presence, and we would like to be able to help. We have small allies in—just to mention some regions—in central Europe, in central Asia, in Central America—small states that have helped us enormously, and have done it on their own nickel. It would be terrific to be able to help them, going forward, so that they can continue that contribution.

And I want to note, again, that it's not always foreseeable who will need a little help to be able to help us. When we look at the tremendous costs that we incur when our forces are on the ground or when we're using our own people, it is really considerably less expensive, in many cases, to use the forces or the personnel of some other country to do tasks that Americans then don't have to do. And we'd like to be able to use this funding in that way—again, in full consultation with Congress. But the reason that things are not named here is, it's sometimes hard to foresee them in advance.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Senator STEVENS. Well, we have financed, through the Department of Defense, considerable aid for some of them, in terms of transportation and equipment and supplies and uniforms. There's sort of a hope that you'll let us have some idea of what kind of help this is.

I understand some of them. The former Soviet satellites—they've sent assistance, they have been partners. And that's strained their

economy. Now, maybe the need a foreign aid of a different type. But I think we're stepping into a new era here, and we should have some way to keep track of that type of assistance.

There are two funds here—one is the peacekeeping operations, the other is the global war on terror partners funds—\$200 million in the latter, \$210 million in the former. Tell us the different between them, will you?

Secretary RICE. The funding, Senator, that is related to global—or to peacekeeping relates, really, to people who have forces on the ground. And we would expect that these would be principally to support military and potentially police and other kinds of activities that are related to security.

Senator STEVENS. Why isn't that in the defense budget?

Secretary RICE. Senator, there is some longer-term support. These would be rather quicker infusions of funding. The President, for instance, talked to the Poles about some help that they might need on modernization of their military forces in a rather rapid way. They've drawn down funds for that, and for rather rapid use of this funding to help them with those tasks.

When it comes to the other fund, we envision that those would not have to be states that have troops on the ground, but might be—in Iraq or in Afghanistan—but might be helping us in other ways in the global war on terror, and might need—if they're using their own resources, might need help—for instance, let me give you an example—border support. We've heard from some small states that they're simply not capable of dealing with some of the things that we've asked them to do, in terms of security on their borders. We might be able to help them through this additional fund even if they don't have troops on the ground.

So it's all directly related to helping others to help us in the global war on terror. It's not an issue of paying them back for what they've already done. It really is to enhance their capability to keep going in ways that take the pressure off of American forces, to take the pressure off of American personnel, that enhance their capabilities in a very timely fashion, sometimes within months—weeks or a month, rather than over a long budget cycle, to be able to help us.

Senator STEVENS. Well, there's \$2 billion in the supplemental for the Department of Defense for the same purpose of the peacekeeping operations, and I think what some of us think that there may be a redundancy here. I can understand that the administration wants a fund to help, but this is \$2.2 billion at a time when we're trying to find money for other things. I really think that we have to, sort of, ask again how we're going to coordinate these funds to prevent assisting the same people for the same thing.

Secretary RICE. I agree completely, Senator, and we are very coordinated on what we are doing for our various partners. It's something that is usually done at the level of at least deputies, but sometimes principals in the National Security Council (NSC) system. So I don't think you have to worry about redundancy.

The ability to use certain kinds of funding out of State Department allows us to fund certain kinds of programs that we cannot fund under Defense authorization. And so, we do need funding in both places.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Just to comment upon what my good friend from West Virginia was talking about, about the presidential powers—we are good friends—I just want to state, for the record, that I believe the resolution we passed after the 9/11 tragedy gave the President the power to use our forces to go after the al Qaeda wherever they are found, and to use whatever force that's necessary to destroy them. I also am mindful of the Marine hymn, "From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli."

And I remember Lebanon, when President Eisenhower sent forces into Lebanon. And I remember Korea, when President Truman sent forces there. And I remember Vietnam, when President Johnson sent forces there. I want to state, for the record, if Presidents believe they have to take action, as Commander-in-Chief, to protect the interests of this Nation, the War Powers Act confirms that. Those Presidents were right in exercising that power. It does put into law some checks on the use of that power, an after-the-event category of checks.

But I do hope that the President continues, and you continue, to let the world know we're still after the al Qaeda and we're still after terrorism on a global basis. And I would much prefer to see that terrorism put down abroad than to have us deal with its effects here.

Thank you very much.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much.

Senator Byrd is right, we gave unprecedented powers to the administration. I've been here 30 years. I've never known any administration, Republican or Democrat, when the Congress has just said, "Here, here's a blank check, money urgently needed," and so forth. It turned out the money wasn't that urgently needed. A lot of it still hasn't been spent. And now we hear of money going missing or wasted.

I think flexibility is one thing, but slush fund is another. The administration has the responsibility to say where the money went.

IRAQ GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

But let's talk about Iraq. We went to war in Iraq for a lot of reasons that turned out not to be valid. One reason we were given was we were doing this to stop terrorism. Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan, but we went to war in Iraq to stop terrorism. The Vice President repeatedly tried to link Saddam Hussein with 9/11. The President, and I applaud him for finally saying no, it wasn't linked. Even after he said that, the Vice President continued to say it.

I was reading, in the Washington Post today, an article entitled "War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told." It quotes administration officials saying that Islamic extremists are using the Iraqi conflict to fuel Islamic resentment against the West and recruit new terrorists to attack Americans. Many people, on both sides of the aisle, predicted this might happen but they were ignored by top White House officials and Pentagon officials.

The administration planned for a very different result. Again, we were told, by one of the highest ranking administration officials,

that we'd be welcomed as liberators in Baghdad, this Paris after World War II scenario.

If this is happening, does it surprise you that the administration keeps saying this war is helping to defeat terrorism, when we're finding this has become a recruiting and a training, and an operational base for al Qaeda and others?

Secretary RICE. Senator, this is a matter of timeframe, I believe, and I do think we have to understand how we defeat terrorism in the short term and how we defeat it in the long run. It is not surprising to me that, since we finally decided to take on the terrorist threat, rather than to let it simply be there in an insidious fashion in the way that it was in the 1990s, that—

Senator LEAHY. Well—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. They are trying to mobilize themselves.

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Madam Secretary, if I might, we were going after the terrorists in Afghanistan even before we announced the war plans in Iraq. As has now come out in the press, we were pulling some of our best troops, some of our best special operations people out of Afghanistan, moving them into Iraq even before there was congressional authorization to go there, and al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were still in Afghanistan. Wouldn't have made more sense to go and clean up that mess first?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I don't believe that that would have given us a long-term solution to the war on terror. I understand that people view this differently. But simply defeating al Qaeda, taking away their operating bases in Afghanistan, is not going to defeat Islamic extremism. The only thing that's going to defeat Islamic extremism is to improve the chances in the Middle East that a form of moderate Islam will emerge in countries like Iraq, in addition to places like Afghanistan; is to have allies in the war on terrorism in the heart of the Arab world and to have a fundamentally different kind of Middle East than we have. And we're not going to get a fundamentally different kind of Middle East with Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the middle of it who had an unbreakable link with weapons of mass destruction, a person who had attacked his neighbors in the past, who did harbor terrorists, and who did pay \$25,000 to suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories.

And so, I don't think that the answer to the war on terrorism, or to winning the war on terrorism, was to simply find Osama bin Laden, break up the al Qaeda network, and take them out of Afghanistan. This—

Senator LEAHY. Well—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Requires a much broader strategy. And the emergence of an Iraq that is moderate and eventually democratic will be a fundamental pillar in a different kind of Middle East, and that's the only way that you defeat terrorism over the—

Senator LEAHY. Well, we'll—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Long run.

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. We'll see how moderate and democratic it is. I mean, I agreed with the President's decision to go forward with the elections at the time he did. But we also have a whole lot of people who are closely allied with Iran now.

IRAN

Iran is part of the picture. And the administration's policy on that—it's a bit like that old Johnny Cash song, you know, "I've Been Everywhere." The President says, and I'm quoting him, "We're relying on others because we've sanctioned ourselves out of influence with Iran." Then the Vice President starts talking about the possibility of an Israeli attack. In Berlin, you declared that an attack in Iran is imply not on the agenda. Last, but not least, a senior administration official states, "Sometimes a mixed message is the message you're trying to send." I think the only thing more dangerous than no message is a mixed message when you have a country that's developing nuclear weapons, when it's a state sponsor of terrorism, and involved in meddling in Iraq. Look how the world was on edge just yesterday when there was an explosion near an Iranian nuclear reactor.

If we don't have a policy, doesn't that just strengthen the hands of the Iranian hardliners? I understand the administration has attempted, since 2001, to formulate a Presidential directive on Iran. If Iran is so important, and I believe it is, why can't we come to a decision on something as important as this?

Secretary RICE. Senator, we have come to a decision about how to deal with Iran. We don't have Presidential directives on every country in the world. We don't have a Presidential directive on Russia, for instance.

Senator LEAHY. Do we have one on North Korea?

Secretary RICE. I probably shouldn't—

Senator LEAHY. That was rhetorical. But when you put, in Presidential speeches, "the axis of evil" and all, and you raise them up to that level, and they are nuclear powers and were discussed as threats, I would think you would have Presidential directives. I don't care if we have one for Madagascar.

Secretary RICE. Right.

Senator LEAHY. But I sure would think we would have one on Iran.

Secretary RICE. We have a policy, Senator. My only point is that we don't have Presidential directives on every important relationship or country in the world. On Iran, we have a very clear view that the Iranian regime is out of step with the developments in the Middle East that we wish to see emerge. It is a regime that, both in terms of its internal and external behavior, is out of step. And so, what we have tried to do is to work with others to mitigate the effects of Iranian bad behavior, whether it is Iranian bad behavior on the nuclear side, where we are working with the IAEA, where we're working with the Russians, who have come to the decision now that they will demand a fuel take back in addition—or if they're going to go forward with civilian nuclear power development in Iran. That's a very big step from where the Russians were 2 years ago.

We work with the Europeans. It is true that these are negotiations between the Europeans and Iran, but it should not be understood that we do not have close relationships with the Europeans on exactly what they're doing there. We do—

Senator LEAHY. No, we don't. And we should discuss this further.

SUDAN

Let me ask you one other question, because time is limited, and I will submit a number of questions, Mr. Chairman, for the record. But you've asked for authority to spend money on an ad hoc tribunal for Sudan. I sent you a letter on this a couple of weeks ago—you've been traveling, and you haven't had a chance to respond. But here's my understanding. Under current law, the United States is prohibited from spending any money on the International Criminal Court, which is perfectly capable of handling these cases. Instead, you want to set up a new tribunal, which will cost \$530 million over the next 5 years. Here is what your Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes said about ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda, "The professionalism of some of the personnel has been called into question"—lacked efficiencies, too slow, and all.

Now, we've got a tribunal at The Hague already. Other than the fact that the Sudanese victims of violence haven't even been asked what they'd like. They would say, "Let's go to the court that's already set up." Other than trying to make some geopolitical statement of undermining a court that's working, why, in heaven's name, not give these victims a chance to have cases heard against those who committed, basically, genocide against them in a court that's up and running?

Secretary RICE. Well, we believe very strongly in the need for accountability of those who have committed these crimes. We do not believe that people who are not party—countries that are not party to the ICC should be held to an unaccountable, potentially politically motivated prosecution. That's the reason we are not a part of the—

Senator LEAHY. Yeah, but we're not doing anything.

Chairman COCHRAN. The Senator's time has expired.

Senator LEAHY. I'll follow up later. And please answer my letter on that.

Secretary RICE. I certainly will, Senator. I—

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Will go back and find it.

Chairman COCHRAN [continuing]. Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to join you and the ranking member in welcoming Madam Secretary here to the committee. I've had an opportunity to hear her testimony and presentations in both open and closed sessions, and I would have to say that I don't believe that there was any hidden policy agenda in any of those presentations. I thought that—I think this administration, this President, certainly respects the role of Congress; in fact, has probably been—shown more respect, in some instances, than previous administrations I can think of. I don't think, in that area, can he be blamed for not being open and respecting the role of Congress.

I'd also like to comment that your clarity and forthrightness in testifying before those sessions, I think added confidence to the members were attending that particular meeting. And I do applaud you on becoming the Secretary of State. I think our country is blessed with your skills.

AFGHANISTAN

Having said that, I want to move on to Afghanistan. I had an opportunity to visit Afghanistan. I had an opportunity to visit with President Karzai. And one of the concerns he had was that we would become preoccupied with Iraq and that there would not be adequate support for his country as we progressed in time. So I was pleased to see that you did have some money in there where you did talk about the needs in Afghanistan.

You used some terminology which I would like to have you clarify, in that you used the terminology "high-impact programs." When you use that terminology, are you—and you used it not only in regard to Afghanistan, but other countries, too—when you talk about high-impact programs are you talking in terms of the emergency need of those funds or—because they—or some other parameter? I'd like to have you clarify that.

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

It's both in terms of the impact on the population and doing it quickly. And so, it's both. Because, for instance, you have parliamentary elections in Afghanistan that are coming up. We would like to be able to have projects that improve the chances for those parliamentary elections to take place in an environment in which moderate forces are understood to having a positive impact on the people. And so, a clinic or completing a road or a school is a very important way to show that these moderate forces are, indeed, having an effect on the lives of their people. And you want to be able to do it quickly, not over a long period of time.

Afghanistan is an example of why the funding needs to be there both for our military and for these kinds of activities, because we made a mistake before, when we left Afghanistan after having helped to fund the opposition there that ended up in the Soviet withdrawal, and Afghanistan fell into chaos and became the territory that al Qaeda inhabited, and we paid the price in—tremendously, several—almost a decade later. We can't repeat that mistake again. This time, we have to finish the job. And finishing the job doesn't just mean using our military forces to root out al Qaeda and the Taliban, it means the emergence of a democratic state, strengthening that state, strengthening the Karzai administration, and, when we are then able to consider the job done in Afghanistan, not having to look back and see a place that falls into chaos again.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION TREATY

Senator ALLARD. I thank you for your response. And I have talked with—many of my colleagues have had an opportunity to visit both Afghanistan and Iraq, post-election. They are very impressed with the change in attitude of the people in those countries, and how things seem to have jumped forward after those elections.

I want to bring up an issue related to the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, which this Congress ratified in 1997, and then it was signed by President Clinton at the time. And there were some specific deadlines in that treaty as to compliance. And in looking—I have a schedule here of when some eight sites are sup-

posed to be closed, and we have six of them that look like they're going to go beyond that time. There's one—in fact, there's one that goes out as far—the deadline is 2012—one site in Colorado goes out to 2021. The one in Kentucky goes, it looks like, out to 2020, the cleanup of those sites. I know that Senator McConnell has been working extremely hard on these, and I've been supporting him in that effort.

The question that I have, as far as U.S. policy is concerned, What happens when we don't comply with international treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention? Does that have an adverse impact when we negotiate future provisions? What kind of enforcement actions may we have to deal with if we don't comply?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I'll have to get back to you on whether or not they are actually enforcement actions contemplated in the CWC.

[The information follows:]

On April 29, 2012, if the United States has not completely destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile, the United States would then be in noncompliance with the CWC. U.S. noncompliance, or even expected future noncompliance, would undercut our ability to get other States Parties to comply with the Convention. International concern would be mitigated if the United States could demonstrate that it is doing everything it reasonably can to come into compliance as rapidly as possible.

Secretary RICE. I don't remember. But I do know that if the United States of America is not complying with its obligations, then it's going to be hard to force anybody else to comply. I mean, we have been very much a country of laws that insisted on our own compliance. And so, we want to keep that record.

INDONESIA

Senator ALLARD. Thank you.

The other area I want to talk a little bit about is Indonesia. There is a supplemental request for disaster relief for Indonesia. And, for over 2 years, the Indonesian Government has not fully cooperated on the investigation into the murder of two Americans, including one from Colorado, and they have not arrested the individual the FBI believes was responsible for the killings. Shouldn't we be very careful about the type of aid that we provide with Indonesia? Shouldn't we make sure that we have pretty good transparency in doing that? And have you decided to certify to Congress that Indonesia has cooperated with the FBI and seeks—and seek the release of military education and training for Indonesia?

Secretary RICE. Let me take the second question first, Senator. I am in the latter stages of consultations with Members of Congress about a decision to certify that Indonesia is in cooperation with the—or has met the cooperation requirements set forth in the law so that—on the *Timika* case—so that it is possible to restore full IMET privileges to Indonesia. I think it's a good time to do that. They've just had a presidential election, a successful democratic exercise in a huge country with a huge Muslim population.

We also do believe that they are cooperating. I've talked personally to Bob Mueller about this, Director of the FBI. They are cooperating well enough that we've been able to get an indictment in this case. And I am in the final stages of consultation. I would be more than happy to give you a call and hear anything that might

be on your mind, Senator, but I do believe that the time may have come to do that, because we said they needed to cooperate, and I think the FBI believes that they are cooperating. And support for this democratic government there is important.

In terms of the tsunami aid, there will, of course, be full transparency and checks used to make sure that the aid is being spent appropriately.

Senator ALLARD. I will probably visit with you further on that particular issue. It's important, I notice, to both Senator Smith and myself. And so, you may hear further from either one of us.

Secretary RICE. I'll call you, Senator.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you very much.

IRAQ

My time's getting close to expiring here, but I wonder if you'd just give us some comments about, Where do we go from here, as far as what's happening in Iraq? You know, they've had a very successful election. And what are we going to do with things like the Sunni and getting them incorporated in? It seems to me like, in a democracy, if they participate, you've kind of excluded yourself. So the question is, How do you bring them back into the process?

Secretary RICE. Yes. In fact, they have had a very successful election. And what has been impressive to me is the temperament of those who did very well, which seems to be a sense that they need to bring those in who did not do particularly well—most especially the Sunni, who, for a variety of reasons, some having to do with intimidation in large Sunni areas, where it was just difficult for people to vote, some having to do with people who decided to sit it out, but, whatever the reasons, the majority populations appear very intent on a government of national reconciliation, bringing people in.

We need to remember that this is still an intermediate step for them. They are really trying to just produce a government that can write a constitution and hold elections for a permanent government in December. But we were—our counseling that, of course, it needs to be an inclusive government, and they seem very intent on trying to make it an inclusive government.

The other thing that we will try to do is to be as supportive as we can of the new government, in terms of capacity building, getting the ministries really up and running, using our reconstruction assistance to help with the lives of the people, and to build their security forces as quickly as possible, because, as their security forces are more capable, that takes the pressure off of coalition forces. So that is the program, moving forward.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank you.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator, thank you very much.

Senator Kohl.

TSUNAMI RELIEF

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Secretary, the supplemental request includes funds for reimbursement of certain programs that were tapped to meet emergency needs, such as the South Asia tsunami relief effort. Will this

request fully reimburse all nonemergency food aid programs for fiscal year 2005?

Secretary RICE. It is meant to replace that funding, Senator, yes.

Senator KOHL. In full.

Secretary RICE. I believe, in full. Yes, in full.

Senator KOHL. All right.

IRAQ

Madam Secretary, the security situation in Iraq continues to plague us. I know you've been asked many times when we can realistically expect to turn over security to the Iraqis. I understand the difficulties of announcing a specific date, but I am concerned that we will never see a complete end to these insurgent attacks. At what point will we consider the situation secure enough to bring our troops home? What are the conditions, beyond, quote, "democracy," end quote, and peace? Will we stay until there are no attacks? Will 10 a day or 20 a day be enough of a reduction to pull back our forces? Do we have a measure of when it will be appropriate to leave?

Secretary RICE. Senator, I don't think that we have a number in mind of how many attacks a day are acceptable, but clearly this is a country that may experience insurgency for some time. And the issue is, Will the Iraqis themselves be capable of dealing with that insurgency in a way that it does not either destabilize or threaten the existence of a democratic government? It's not a matter that there wouldn't be any insurgency or any attacks—I think nobody really expects that that may be the case for some time to come—but that the Iraqis themselves would be capable of making certain that that insurgency is not a threat to the continued function and existence—the kinds of levels that now make it impossible or make it at least difficult to maintain a program of the production of oil and transfer of the ability to maintain an electrical supply to the population. Those are obviously events and circumstances that are very threatening to the very existence of a fragile government.

So I would not think of this in absolute terms, by any means. This is not, "There are no attacks, they're"—but that the Iraqis themselves are capable enough of dealing with that insurgency. I think that is really the issue.

Senator KOHL. I agree with that. And it's not hard to imagine that this will be years and years before they will be capable of dealing with their own security. Isn't that true?

Secretary RICE. I don't know, Senator. But I wouldn't say that it has to be years and years. If you look at the progress, even in the last several months, of Iraqi security forces—and I know that there have been questions about how many, and how many are trained, and I don't want to get into the numbers—I think it's really a question of, How effective have they been in performing? And there has been a steady improvement in their performance from the time, last April, I think, when we all were disappointed in how poorly they performed in large parts of the country, to their performance even in places like Najaf and Fallujah, more recently, to the performance that was really quite good in supporting their own

elections, where General Casey says that he knows of few, if any, circumstances in which coalition forces had to step in for them.

So I think you're seeing a steady evolution toward more capable forces. And insurgencies are defeated not just militarily, but politically. And the fact that you will now have an elected Iraqi Government, not an appointed one, as was the IIG, I think gives that government more legitimacy to deal with the insurgency. And I would hope that you'll see even steadier improvement. So I don't think this is necessarily a matter of years. I don't know, and I hate to put a timeframe on it. But we're seeing pretty steady improvement in their capacity.

Senator KOHL. Madam Secretary, the supplemental request includes \$658 million toward the construction of a new United States Embassy compound in Iraq, as you know. Clearly, we plan to have a longstanding presence in this country, but isn't it premature to begin construction of a new Embassy in the current security situation?

Secretary RICE. Senator, this is one that I really hope that everyone will look at, and look at favorably, because if you look at where our people are functioning now, it just isn't adequate to the kind of security environment that we have there. We're doing our very best. We worry about the security every day. The Diplomatic Security is doing everything that they can. But the kinds of normal—even normal security measures that we would be able to take, in terms of setbacks on land, that we take even in places that are not high risk, it's difficult to do in these circumstances. And so, we need to get started, and we need to get this Embassy built, because I, myself, am not satisfied with the circumstances in which our people are having to operate. That's why we've put this on an accelerated schedule, 24 months for the building of this Embassy. We also told the Iraqi Government that we would get out of the presidential palace and other governmental buildings there. But we've put this on an accelerated schedule because we really think that this is a matter of the security of our people. We need to get this done.

The money is in the supplemental because we really do now have a program to get this done in an extraordinary way, with extraordinary effort. And I think we will all be in much better shape when this Embassy is there for the protection of our people.

ISRAEL/PALESTINE

Senator KOHL. Dr. Rice, the supplement request includes \$200 million for assistance to help the Palestinians build democratic institutions and develop infrastructure, also for education, home construction, and basic social services. This is in addition to the \$150 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget request. The death of Arafat has created an opportunity, and the parties in the region have taken some positive steps toward a cease fire in the last few weeks. And we understand that Lieutenant General Ward, who will serve as U.S.-appointed security coordinator, will be traveling to the region soon for preliminary talks. Beyond General Ward's involvement in security coordination, what do you expect the United States role will be in helping the parties move forward? How extensively will we be participating in aspects of the peace process, beyond security?

Secretary RICE. We will be very involved in all aspects of this, Senator. The money that the President is proposing is so that we might, as quickly as possible, begin to work with the Palestinians on, again, quick-acting, high-impact reconstruction activities, particularly when the Israelis withdraw from the Gaza. Anyone who has ever seen the Gaza, you know the conditions there. And if a quick effort is not made to improve the lives of the people there, I think we fear that the moderate forces that are represented by President Mahmoud Abbas, who, after all, has said that the armed intifada is over, are going to be supplanted by more radical forces who are able to meet the needs of the people. Hamas, for instance, did well, 9 out of 10 municipal elections, largely related to provision of basic services for the people.

And so, we will be very involved in the reconstruction and development assistance for the Palestinians, which I think is very important to their political stability. We also will be involved with the Europeans in helping them to build institutions that can give rule-of-law anti-corruption initiatives with the Palestinians so that they have a governing structure that can be the basis for a state.

And, of course, we are working with the Israelis, as well, to help the parties to move to a coordinated mechanism—or coordination of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza and the four settlements in the West Bank.

So we will be full spectrum in what we do. Eventually, when we're back on the roadmap, of course, the United States will be there to help the parties to move toward the recognition of the realization of two states living side by side.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BURNS.

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TSUNAMI RELIEF

I want to state, from the outset, we can argue with policy, but I think it is the charge of this committee to take a look at the dollars that are being expended, and to make sure that those dollars are needed and that we have them. I also want to associate myself with the statements of the Senators from Alaska and West Virginia.

My question is this: Yesterday we were asked to replace funds in the Defense Department request on their operations in Asia with regard to the tsunami relief there. We moved an aircraft carrier into those waters, and we flew many missions in life saving and these kinds of operations. We were asked to replace that money, to a tune of almost \$1 billion. And now, here we come with monies from the State Department, which is requesting another billion. Almost. A freckle under it, maybe. And that's about it.

Our initial pledge was around \$350 million to that area of the world for relief and other activities. I'm seeing some redundancy here being requested by two different departments, despite what you stated awhile ago that you can do some things that the Department of Defense cannot. Nonetheless, when we look at the total effort in that part of the world, we're looking at almost \$2 billion.

Was there that much money spent or dispensed in that area? We're dealing in numbers here that just are beyond my comprehension. Can you, rather, would you want to respond to that?

Secretary RICE. Certainly, Senator. The replacement costs are not the entire amount here. The \$120 million is for costs that the USAID incurred for immediate response in relief, and those are accounts that have to be now replenished. But \$581 million that the State Department is requesting is for recovery and reconstruction efforts, going forward, that we can do this in a quick way.

The effort here is to build on, I think, what was a highly successful effort to aid these people in what was a certainly once-in-a-lifetime kind of devastation, and it spoke volumes about the compassion of the American people to be able to do that. And I think it spoke volumes in a part of the world where we aren't often heard for our compassion.

And so, I do believe that the efforts that we made have been enormously beneficial, not just to the people of the affected countries, but to our overall effort in the war on terrorism, to change the minds and hearts, as we often say, of people in the Muslim world, which we desperately need to do, in terms of the war on terror. And so, I think the money was well spent.

This is not all replenishment costs. Replenishment costs are a portion of this, where we did, in order to be able to respond quickly, have to take money out of accounts that now need to be replenished for other means or for other purposes. But the bulk of this is not replenishment for us, at least. I can't speak to the Defense Department.

Senator BURNS. When you add this amount to the dollars that are being donated and accepted for relief from the private sector of this country, this figure is going to be astronomical. I don't know where all this money's going. And I think, to this committee, anyway, I think further explanation is going to have to be heard. Because whenever you deal with two different departments here, I just see maybe too big a slush fund. No wonder we've got some fraud and abuse in this thing. Whenever we start talking about the numbers that we're talking about here, and especially if some of us get the feeling that there's a redundant system—situation here that plays with the American taxpayer dollar.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think that what may be important here is to recognize that there's an overall number. A portion of that is for the Defense Department for things that they did to support efforts that were being undertaken by USAID and others. It's about \$226 million to replace. For the State Department, the number is \$701 million, and that is \$120 million to replace USAID accounts that were mobilized very quickly to be able to be used in this for the tsunami, and then money to begin very quickly in the reconstruction and recovery efforts.

There really isn't any redundancy here, but I'm happy to give you a further report of this. We worked this out with the Defense Department. OMB is the place that makes certain that this is not a redundant effort. And I'm quite certain that we're not looking at redundancy here.

IRAQ

Senator BURNS. Well, I don't have all the details on this, and I don't have the mentality, really, to deal with a lot of it. But I come at it from the standpoint of knowing it's taxpayer money. If there's some redundancy here, we need to know. So far, it doesn't make sense the way I've been adding up numbers. Now, maybe we add wrong on the ranch. I don't know. We've been pretty close before. It just seems like it to me.

The Embassy in Iraq, right now, I would say, with the facilities that exist in Iraq today, is a little extravagant. How many people will this Embassy employ, specifically, how many American people and how many personnel total will be in this Embassy?

Secretary RICE. It's about—a little over \$750 million, Senator, that will be in this Embassy.

But let me go back. The situation we're in today is not tolerable for the long run. It would not be responsible of me to say that the circumstances in which our people are operating now is tolerable for the long run. We need to build an Embassy that will have full security measures available to it. We're doing everything we can right now to protect these people—and I want to be very clear on that—everything we can—in a sense, by brute strength, by having a lot of force trying to protect it. But the fact is that we need to build an Embassy that really is in accordance with the circumstances of being in a high-risk area like Baghdad. And this is one that I really hope you will look on favorably, because we need to do it, we need to get started right away. We've designed a very ambitious program to try and get it done. But this is an Embassy that's going to have to operate in quite extraordinary circumstances, and it's about the security of our people.

Senator BURNS. I thank the Secretary for coming today. And I admire her work. And our only charge here is to protect the dollars of the American taxpayer. And right now I think in some areas we're a little extravagant, and in some areas I think we've got some redundancy that we should look at. Again, I thank you for coming today.

Secretary RICE. Thank you. And, Senator, I'm very happy, if you have further questions, I will try to get back to you.

Senator BURNS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mikulski.

POLAND

Senator MIKULSKI. Good morning, Madam Secretary. And, first of all, I want to congratulate you on your very successful trip to Europe. We were very proud of your diplomacy and your efforts to repair those tattered relationships.

That brings me to a question not directly related to this supplemental, but it goes to Poland, a very able and willing ally in this war. And, as you know, they have a visa problem with us that has been rather prickly. We don't need to discuss it here, but Senator Santorum and I have got a legislative approach to this, and we

would like to be able to discuss this with you either in person or in a conference call.

Secretary RICE. Of course, Senator. I'd be very happy to discuss it with you. We made a little progress with the Poles in developing a roadmap for them to come into compliance with the numbers that are needed for the Visa Waiver Program, but I would be more than happy to talk with you about it.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, we know it's a big issue among the people of Poland. And, gosh, we were proud of the way they went to the Ukraine and even represented the European Union. Senator Feinstein, I know, has questions about it, because they have, kind of—I'll call it a denial rate. But I think if we could have a roadmap, look at our legislative solution to maintain not only the relationship with the governmental ally, but the support of the Polish people, who feel that countries who are less supportive of us have the Visa Waiver Program, and they don't. So this is kind of where I'm coming from and working with Senator Santorum.

Secretary RICE. I look forward to talking about with you about it, Senator.

TSUNAMI RELIEF

Senator MIKULSKI. The next question I want to get to is to the tsunami relief. First of all, we're so proud of the way our Government responded, our military responded. What I'm concerned about, and I know others—particularly the women of the Senate—we've discussed this—is about the vulnerable populations. And we're concerned, number one, on how the assistance will be used to also, in addition to livelihood and infrastructure, which are crucial—what we're going to do to protect the vulnerable populations. And we're concerned about compassion fatigue, that when CNN leaves, the TV cameras end, there's no more rock concerts, what will happen with orphanages, et cetera, and particularly the issues related to ongoing help to children that'll be really long, because these kids are orphans, and then also the despicable predatory practice of trafficking.

Could you share with us where, not only in the supplemental, but as CEO of the State Department, where you see what we could do here using the terror of this—the terrible consequences, to stick with them over the long haul, protect the children, and also look out for the issue of trafficking.

Secretary RICE. It's a very good point, Senator, because, you're right, often after the cameras leave then the most vulnerable people are the ones who are left, in a sense, to fend for themselves. And we've focused here principally on immediate needs in the supplemental, like getting the reconstruction started. But, for instance, there is work here on the displaced persons piece of this, which women and children tend to be terribly vulnerable in these displaced persons camps, and trying to get people returned to their villages and their homes in—away.

We've been very active on the trafficking issue, running down the leads that were given, working with particularly, the Indonesia Government, but also the Thai Government, where there were concerns about what might be happening with these children.

This is an infusion at the front end to try and deal with the immediate effects, but I think you rightly point out that we will want to look at our follow-on assistance programs to make sure that they are, indeed, through our various development assistance and child support programs, that they're dealing with vulnerable populations. But dealing with the IDP camps will certainly address part of that concern.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, we look forward to working with you on this, speaking for a wonderful man, like Senator Brownback, who's been a real leader on the trafficking issue, working with us. The women of the Senate are very concerned about the long-range consequences on these children—

Secretary RICE. Right.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. And they know, in a part of the world where we want to win friends—but that's not why we're doing it, but it could be a consequence—that we really stick with them as they go through, either finding new homes or whether they're going to be staying in some kind of orphanage educational camps.

So when we meet again, in a future hearing—we're kind of in flux here—I hope we can deal with this, because we do feel that, in standing up for the vulnerable populations, it's a message to the world that we're on the side of the weak—

Secretary RICE. I agree.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. And we can be counted on.

Secretary RICE. I agree.

PALESTINE

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me then go to another opportunity for building relationships. This is the aid to the Palestinians. And I absolutely want to support the President in this initiative. But there has been a long history of Arafat corruption. And I'm not saying this applies to the new leadership in the Palestinian Authority. But Mahmoud Abbas has got to not only dismantle the security forces, but he's got to dismantle a mindset where, as you know, Arafat skimmed money off for lavish subsidies for hotels in Paris, Swiss bank accounts. What can we do as we move forward to really move this incredible opportunity in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, to ensure that we help a process move ahead—concentrating exactly on what you said: public health, public infrastructure, et cetera—and yet not have it go to the usual corrupt practices, and work with Abbas, not in a schoolmarmish way—where America is a friend, not a nanny, but, nevertheless, ensure we have that accountability, and set the framework for future accountability.

Secretary RICE. Absolutely. And I'd like to start with that last point, because what the Palestinians need to do is—not just for this assistance, but for the well-being of their future state—to have a set of accountability and transparency measures in their financial dealings that can give confidence to the international system and also confidence to the Palestinian people that this money is being spent well. Because, as you said, there has been a reputation there for corruption. They have made a lot of progress over the last couple of years, because they've had a very good Finance Minister in Salam Fayyad, who I think everybody in the international system

has confidence in. He, himself, has put in place some transparency measures, including international transparency measures that we have helped with, Treasury Department officials who have gone over and set those up. We can use those as we put this aid forward.

Some of this money would, in any case, go through nongovernmental organizations where we have some controls. But you make the key point that, in the functioning of the state, it has to be rule of law, it has to be transparent, it has to be non-corrupt. And when I talked with President Abbas during my recent trip, we talked about the need for anti-corruption measures, because the Palestinian people have to have that confidence. So it's very high on our agenda to make sure that American money is well spent, but also to make sure that the Palestinians are developing the kind of state—or the kind of institutions that will produce a state that can live in peace with a democratic Israel. So this is very high on our priority list.

A lot of this will be project support, and we will definitely consult very widely with the Congress on that project support. To the degree that it is direct to the Palestinians, then we are going to insist on these transparency measures.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, first of all, I think that's very heartening to hear, and also the events that have unfolded are quite heartening. But in the words of someone we both admired, Ronald Reagan, "Trust, but verify," both when we go forward now in the emergency supplemental, and again in the State Department appropriations. These things are long haul, and if we don't put in the measures now for both out of the State Department funds, foreign operations funds, and even investment from private sector or international institutions, like the World Bank—I mean, our \$350 million will be a down payment. Things like water, which is a very challenging issue, water conservation, that will all be the topic of another hearing. So we want to make sure that they have the accountability so that if this really begins to move, that we're, again, in it for a period of time, because if we could bring stability here and have a successful conclusion of a peace process, I think it would be so satisfying—

Secretary RICE. Thank you.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. And to ensure that our ally Israel is secure.

So thank you. We look forward to working with you. And, again, good wishes—

Thank you, Senator.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Madam Secretary, thank you very much for joining us.

As you stated, the goal of this supplemental is to provide immediate funding for U.S. priorities that can't wait for the regular appropriations cycle, and, therefore, I was certainly glad to see increases for Sudan, and support of both the north-south peace agreement, as well as the horrible crisis in Darfur, as well as increases for Afghanistan, where we face a war on drugs that we really simply cannot afford to lose. So I appreciate that. I commend you for that, and commend the administration.

But I must say that I was disappointed in that the supplemental ignores the needs of this hemisphere. With the exception of the money for the peacekeepers in Haiti, which was the assessment—our assessment and our share of that—there's just nothing for this hemisphere. We've got a deteriorating situation in Bolivia. The situation in Colombia continues to need our assistance, and we could talk about that.

HAITI

But let me focus on, to me, the most glaring hole, and that is Haiti. You know, in the fiscal 2006 presidential request, Haiti was understandably recognized, and I quote, "as a priority fragile state." I think that's an understatement. You know, the situation there continues to deteriorate. We have—the Latortue government is a very, very fragile government. We have elections now that have been scheduled. How in the world those elections are going to be paid for, I don't know. I don't think your administration knows how they're going to be paid for or how that money is going to be found. This was a perfect case for money to be put in the supplemental. Haiti is an environmental disaster. We've got the peacekeepers trying to keep peace between the old Aristide people, the old "Papa Doc" people, to simplify it.

Madam Secretary, if we're going to avoid sending U.S. troops down there for the third time in a decade, if we're going to avoid having "boat people" float in up toward Florida again, we're going to have to get serious about what's going on in Haiti. And to not have any money in this supplemental—this is a classic case of where there should have been money in a supplemental, because there were things that have occurred since the last 2005 request that simply could not have been anticipated—Aristide leaving, the Latortue government coming in, the scheduling of elections, the disasters that have occurred, that flooding that has occurred, landslides that have occurred. All of these things have occurred.

Now, we did—the administration did set aside, and the Congress did set aside, some additional money when the disasters occurred, but Haiti's just a continuing disaster, and I don't really understand why there is no money in the supplemental at all. And I don't know how you're ever going to backfill this money in the regular appropriations process.

Secretary RICE. Well—

Senator DEWINE. Would you like to comment on that?

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

I think we believed that we had accounted for Haiti in a number of ways. As you said, we had the supplemental on disaster relief after the floods, and that money—some of that went to Haiti. We did account here for the Haiti peacekeeping operation, which is very important to stabilization of that country.

As you know, the principal concerns that we've had have been to deal with the police training in Haiti and to try to get Haiti a professional police force that can finally supplant some of the militias that have been really the problem in Haiti. And we have a program to do that, which is funded. And the funding in the 2006 budget is there for programs in Haiti through this new transitions initiative that we have under USAID. So I think we believed that we

were able to deal with the unanticipated side of this. We were very quick on the ground, after Aristide left, with American forces to—

Senator DEWINE. And they did a great job, and it made—

Secretary RICE. And they did a great job.

Senator DEWINE [continuing]. An unbelievable difference. I was down there when they were there. They just—they saved lives, and they did a phenomenal job.

Secretary RICE. Right. And I think we feel that we had responded to the immediate need, that we were able to respond to the disaster, and that now we have a program with Haiti, over the next years, starting really with getting them ready for elections, that adequately addresses—

Senator DEWINE. Yeah, well—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. This need.

Senator DEWINE [continuing]. Well, Madam Secretary, I appreciate your comments. We'll continue this dialogue. I just would say this very candidly, with all the great respect that I have for you—and it is tremendous respect—I don't think anyone seriously can look at this amount of money that we have set aside for Haiti and the amount of money that we're going to be able to pull out of next year's budget, Mr. Chairman, of the future amount of money for Haiti, and think that it's adequate or it's going to do the job. I mean, literally, we don't have the money for the elections. We do not have the money to begin with the infrastructure. We're going to have another failed state, and it will not be long until we're going to have to send U.S. troops down to Haiti again, unless we get serious about what's going on in Haiti.

So, Mr. Chairman, I intend, when this supplemental comes to the floor, to offer an amendment to add money into this supplemental for Haiti. It is the perfect place to do it. We have to do it. It's put money in now, or put a lot of money in later. It is the right thing to do.

AFGHANISTAN

Let me just, if I could, move to another area of the world. And this has been covered a little bit before, but I'd like to get back into it. I had the opportunity to travel with the Majority Leader and others to Afghanistan, a great success story. I commend you for your great work, and the administration. It's kind of the untold story of what's happened in the last few years. But one thing that—it troubles all of us, of course, is what's going on with drugs and the poppy, and we're getting, kind of, some mixed reports.

But how do you, Madam Secretary, convince a farmer—President Karzai does not want to do aerial spraying. We understand that. That's not a tool we're going to be able to use. But how do we get someone to do what we refer to as crop substitution? And how do we put enough resources into that to get the job done? And how do we combine that with getting enough helicopters in there and supplying the Afghan Government with enough resources? Some of us who have looked at it don't think that, frankly, we have given them enough helicopters. We hope that, from the military side, we'll be able to supply them with that to do, kind of, a carrot and

stick, as well. I wonder if you can just, in the 2½ minutes I have left, comment—

Secretary RICE. Sure.

Senator DEWINE [continuing]. On that.

Secretary RICE. Of course. The narcotics problem, and our counternarcotics efforts, are really very central. As I said, this has the potential to destabilize this very fragile government.

The Karzai government now, I think, takes it very seriously. I think that's why he has put such a public effort—he said to us that he needed, after 25 years of civil war, to de-legitimize poppy growing with the Afghan population, which is, in part, the answer to the question of, How do you get people to substitute crop? If they don't believe that what they're doing is illegitimate, they're not going to substitute crop. If you can get it to be illegitimate in their minds, and enforceable in law that it is illegitimate—and really the Afghans have not had the capacity to do that—then I think you've got a chance at crop substitution, and the alternative livelihood programs actually do work.

We're not in this alone. This is really something where I think we can mobilize a quite impressive international effort. The British have doubled their commitment to the counternarcotics effort. We're working to see what the Russians might be able to do. These are countries—the EU has expressed an interest in doing more here—because these are countries that are actually seeing the product show up on their streets. But we need an integrated effort on the Afghan side, and that means public education, it means alternative livelihoods, it means legal enforcement, which is training of police and having the right laws, it means interdiction, which we've been very involved with the Afghans in helping them do, and it means, finally, eradication.

And we continue to discuss, with the Afghans, aerial spraying and the experience that we've had in Latin America with it. And we will see where that comes out. But it is a very intensive effort on our part. One reason that it's here in the supplemental is that we now, I think, have a more comprehensive strategy with the Afghans after their presidential election, and we want to get started moving this ahead.

Senator DEWINE. Well, I appreciate it. And I—you know, it's just vitally important. As you say, it really is the future of the state. It's a great success story, but this is the one area that is very, very troubling and poses the real risk, I think, to the future state of Afghanistan. So we will all be monitoring that and be willing, I think, to supply the funds that are needed to get the job done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Secretary Rice, thank you so much for being here today. I think this is your first appearance before the Appropriations Committee, and I do want to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your new responsibility as Secretary of State. I come from a State that is very internationally engaged in the country, and I appreciate the many challenges before you, and I look forward to working with you on many of those.

IRAQ

Let me just say, at the outset, you know I voted against President Bush's request for authority to take military action in Iraq, and one of the concerns that I expressed at the time was the costs associated with this effort and the administration's inability to tell Congress and the American people what the true costs associated were. So I, today, remain very concerned that we are adding the entire cost of this supplemental to the deficit, and that is, I think, something we all should continue to be concerned about.

But let me ask you today about the issue of accountability. As you know, as with other requests from the administration, you've asked for very broad discretionary authority for the use of these supplemental funds. And the Pentagon Inspector General issued a report a couple of weeks ago describing how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) failed to account for nearly \$9 billion in funds handed over to the Iraqi ministries. We've all seen the press reports about other instances of potential financial mismanagement, and I wanted you to talk today about what assurances you can give this committee that the administration is taking this issue seriously and that you will be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollar.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator Murray.

I can only say that I, personally, and, I think, we, collectively, as an administration, will do everything that we can and everything that we can to make sure that the dollars are well spent. Inspector generals are for exactly the purpose of determining when there are problems. And in light of inspector general reports, people will, I'm sure—within Defense, will seek to address the questions that have been raised there.

In terms of accountability for the funds that are spent through the State Department programs, I recognize that in some cases there is more flexibility asked for here than in a normal appropriation. It's rather the nature of the enterprise that we're in that things come up really rather quickly. If you can't respond to them quickly, then you end up with a far worse problem within several months. And that's why some of this is built in. But it does not, to my mind, in any way obviate the need for consultation with the Congress, for oversight from the Congress, and, indeed, of accountability of the administration to the Congress for how those funds are used. And so, I can promise you that that will be very high priority for me.

Senator MURRAY. Well, I appreciate your response. I would just caution you to take the issue of accountability very seriously, because if we fail to address it, it will undermine the confidence of the American public. So I just give you that caution.

Let me ask you about reconstruction in Iraq. You know with the demise of the CPA our reconstruction efforts have now shifted to the U.S. Embassy. And we have seen a number of reports now that are very critical of our reconstruction efforts. Last September, the International Crisis Group cited the lack of a reconstruction plan, failure to adequately fund reconstruction, unrealistic application of U.S. views, and organization incompetency of the CPA as barriers to our reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Can you give this committee

your frank assessment of where we are with reconstruction efforts and if that is still a U.S. priority?

Secretary RICE. The reconstruction efforts, Senator, are very high priority, because—both in terms of security, because you defeated an insurgency politically and economically as much as you do militarily, but also for the long-term health of the Iraqi economy and the Iraqi state, we need to wisely use the reconstruction funds that are available to us.

The office that runs the Baghdad Embassy is ably run by Ambassador Bill Taylor. And I have personally spent some time with him recently talking about our reconstruction efforts. Obviously, we've run into a security environment that was not foreseen at the time, that we sought the supplemental funding for reconstruction. The reconstruction funding was always intended to be multiyear, not to be spent in 1 year.

The good news is that I believe that the funding that we have spent, we have spent very wisely, that \$3 plus billion that has actually been spent. We've obligated funding for another set of projects, of almost \$11 million. And we have reprogrammed, through Ambassador Negroponte's request, some of the funding that was anticipated to go to longer-term projects to more short-term, higher-impact, short-acting projects to help in areas where we are post-conflict, where—for instance, like Fallujah or Najaf, where a conflict is now no longer the problem, but you need rebuilding.

So I think we've used the supplemental flexibly enough to deal with very changing circumstances on the ground, but still in mind to deal both with the short-term problems of Iraq and with its long-term—

Senator MURRAY. But it—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Reconstruction efforts.

Senator MURRAY [continuing]. It's still a U.S. high priority.

Secretary RICE. It's a very high priority. And I believe that we are going to have to, with the new Iraqi Government, accelerate our efforts in this area.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. Well, let me switch topics for a minute. We've all seen today's news, that Ambassador Negroponte's nomination to serve as the National Intelligence Director has gone forward. And, obviously, that's a really important job. And no one doubts his capable—that he's a capable public servant. My concern I just wanted to raise with you today is the message that we are sending now to Iraq by taking Ambassador Negroponte from that critical job at this time. We will now have had, as understand, three separate U.S. leaders of our Iraq presence since last June—of just last year. And I encourage you and the President to act quickly to place a senior respected new leader in Iraq. I think that we'd all feel better about this supplemental request and events on the ground in Iraq if we could show some continuity in leadership on the ground in Iraq.

Secretary RICE. We'll act very quickly. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you.

TSUNAMI RELIEF

I just have one more comment to make, Mr. Chairman. And I listened very carefully to my friend from Montana as he questioned our overall assistance to Southeast Asia and to the tsunami victims. And I have a very different view than he does. Dialogue by the administration and the Congress is good. Accountability on behalf of taxpayers is always critical. And as much as much as I appreciate the administration's increased request for tsunami assistance, I believe we should be taking an even larger leadership role in this region.

I think we all know that the tsunami was one of the largest and most devastating natural disasters we've seen in recent history. On the humanitarian side alone, we have a moral obligation, I believe, to respond. And I'm really proud of this country, I'm proud of the American people in their efforts in this regard. And I think we have to also really recognize the importance of the Southeast Asian region to our Nation's economy and to our national security. And I hope that you, Madam Secretary, will be an aggressive defender of our obligations and interests in Southeast Asia at this time. It really is critically important to our region.

I know the American people would question aid to this region when you're talking billions of dollars. It is a lot of money, but it, I think, falls to you to speak for our Nation's national interests in this case, and I really encourage you to be aggressive in defending and standing for our presence in Southeast Asia, now and for the long term, as well.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Domenici.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to try very hard, Mr. Chairman, from my own standpoint, not to be so late. It looks like I have nobody around to listen, except Senator Byrd, you, and a couple of people. I'm glad to be with the Secretary. Thank you so much for coming and for your wonderful testimony.

First of all, I want to say, with a few exceptions as we proceed through discussions on the committee, I intend to support this supplemental request. Before I get to a couple of specifics, I want to tell you that, I'm beginning to worry very much about the deficit and the debt of the United States. It represents—we call it debt—the deficit—but it really means, how much can we afford the things we're trying to do, not only here, in that area that you're talking about, but everywhere? We promise more medical care than we can afford. We promise more military preparedness than we can afford over time. That worries me greatly as we look at this area. So I would hope, as you consider options, that you would also have in mind America's future. We're not going to help this world if we don't have anything going for us here at home. This is a huge expenditure of money. If we've got some options, we surely ought to take a few of them that cost less, even if they're a little more risky. I don't expect you to comment, but I believe I'm right, in the sense

we can't afford too many more Iraqs. I guess that's what I'd like to say.

IRAN

I want to also say that I'm very discouraged by the press and their analysis of what's going on in post-election Iraq. One day you read that the person that's a frontrunner to become the prime minister has close ties to Iran. That leaves a lot of Americans and the other media the impression that we did all this work, we spent all this money, we risked all our lives, and now we're going to get an Iranian running Iraq. It turns out that isn't true at all.

So I'd like to ask you, just quickly, this man—I guess it's J-a-a-f-a-r-i—would you tell me how you say that?

Secretary RICE. Mr. Jaafari.

Senator DOMENICI. Yes. What about him? Is he going to be okay? Does he have a good head on his shoulders? Is he going to work with us, or is he an Iranian?

Secretary RICE. Well, I was fortunate to spend some time with him just a few months ago, and I found him very intelligent, very committed to his country, and very committed to principles that I think we would find ourselves associated with. And I don't—you know, Iran is a neighbor. A lot of people have relations with Iran. But—

Senator DOMENICI. Sure, if you—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. But I believe this is a now democratically elected government that we're going to be able to work with, and work with very well, because he worked with us before, and I think he will continue to work with us.

Senator DOMENICI. So if Saddam Hussein kicked you out, you might go to Iran for awhile. That's what happened to him, right?

Secretary RICE. Some of them did. Some of them did.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, he did, too.

Secretary RICE. He did, yes. That's right.

IRAQ

Senator DOMENICI. Now, let me ask you, with reference to something that's been asked over and over—we don't really intend to stay in Iraq forever, do we?

Secretary RICE. We intend to be there only as long as we're needed, and not a day longer.

Senator DOMENICI. So whenever people comment about the fact that the United States intends to be there and be the guiding force for Iraq, be in there as possessors of that country, that isn't why we're there, are we?

Secretary RICE. Everything we've tried to do, Senator, is to turn this over to the Iraqi people, and that continues to be our goal in every sector.

Senator DOMENICI. Now, when we go for military, and even now while the military is doing things, you have a role of doing some other things that are not military, right?

Secretary RICE. That's right, Senator. And I think we would be mistaken if we think about either the war on terror or what we're trying to do in Iraq as just a military matter. In fact, we've learned that you have to have economic and political and other measures

in order to make this work. And I hope that people will understand that the State Department part of this is a critical part of our national security effort. This is not foreign assistance. I think of this as critical national security funding to those who are helping us.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, I want to suggest to you, as one Senator who's been around here a little while, that I'm thrilled with the President's declarations that "we are for freedom in the world." Freedom brings peace. Freedom is apt to, much less, have warring partners. I also think freedom and democracy are short lived under one simple proposition. Freedom without bread—without bread—is an invitation to revolution. No doubt about it.

Now, don't you think it's just as important, having gone to all this trouble, spent all our money, lost all our young men and women—I'm not saying this is a Vietnam—don't you think we ought to apply as much brain power and intelligence to helping them work toward an economically strong country, as we do toward getting rid of the terrorists and those rabble-rousers in that country?

Secretary RICE. Senator, that's the only way we're going to finish this job. We learned in Afghanistan that we left early, we learned in Pakistan that we didn't maintain support, and we lived to pay for it. And I think if we don't do these things and—

Senator DOMENICI. Well—

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Help these countries become stable, we're going to pay for it later.

Senator DOMENICI [continuing]. Well, my impression—again, this is just my impression—if we look at everything we're spending—and I don't say we ought to go over there and give them everything so they'll have a subsistence, but we'll be there giving them their subsistence. They have oil. They are a country that might be able to do their own things. I see far less emphasis on helping them with this basic economic development than I do on the military. I assume that's the way it's got to be. But I tell you, if we don't have a formidable plan, not just a little plan that you have to administer, or we say "USAID, you go over there for a little bit." That isn't going to work. Same with Afghanistan. Mark my words, it won't be too long—maybe I won't be here, but this guy'll be here, the chairman will—but you're going to see Afghanistan fall apart, too, if we don't provide a better underpinning for economic prosperity. There's no way you're going to talk them out of poppies if they're hungry. No way. You don't have poppies, you don't have food and you can't feed the people. Poppy's a good money making crop, I think.

So I'm trying to leave you with my impression of what worries me. I hope you know that. I hope that wherever you can share your views, you will, because it's pretty easy in history to see this. We've done it over and over, too, where we've gone on and helped and encouraged democracy, and then everything falls apart.

RUSSIA AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

My last questions go to a completely different subject, and it has to do with trying to get plutonium and other matter out of the hands of those who might use it, and get it into some kind of stor-

age or change it so it won't or can't be used for weapons of mass destruction.

First, I thank you for the letter of February 14 that you sent to me acknowledging that the very maximum and large program for plutonium disposition by way of exchanging efforts between Russia and us, where a huge amount of plutonium, 38 tons on each side—if we get rid of that, it's enough for 6,000 or 8,000 weapons, Senator Byrd, just that plutonium. We put up the money to pay for that. It's been languishing for 5 years.

I want to ask you, Madam Secretary, do you agree with me that it's a rare opportunity to have one of the largest decommissioning nonproliferation abatement events in history if we make this concrete and get it done?

Secretary RICE. It's a very—absolutely, Senator, it is a rare opportunity. And, as you know, we recently made a proposal. We're hoping that we can get the Russians moving on this. Thank you for your work on this. It's been extremely important to our Nation's security, and we're going to try to push it forward.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, Madam Secretary, I don't want to put you on the spot, because, you know, there are all kinds of philosophies that ebb and flow in your Department. Sometimes it's hard for you to get control over them. Some of them act like I do with reference to Russia. Some are neo-conservatives, and they don't think you should spend a minute—a penny on Russia, because if you do they're going to build nuclear bombs. But, in this area, we pay, they pay, we start to make some headway—have some success.

I'm very glad that the person that's held this up, without cluttering up the record, is gone. I thank you for pursuing it.

My last observation is, Do you think there's a chance of completing this agreement by the time the President meets with Putin here in the next 2 or 3 weeks?

Secretary RICE. Well, we're trying to work with the Russians. I don't know if we'll make it by Bratislava, but it's a very high priority for us, Senator.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Madam Secretary, we are aware of the fact that you need to leave, but we have one more Senator here who is entitled to ask a question.

Secretary RICE. Of course.

Chairman COCHRAN. If you can stay and listen to Senator Harkin's—

Secretary RICE. Of course.

Chairman COCHRAN [continuing]. Questions and answer him, we'd appreciate it very much.

Secretary RICE. Of course, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Harkin,

Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Madam Secretary. You're very patient, and I appreciate that.

Madam Secretary, I've been a long-time advocate for people with disabilities, having been one of the main authors, along with others, of the Americans with Disabilities Act. It was brought to my

attention several years ago that U.S. money to rebuild schools and other facilities in Kosovo and Bosnia were being rebuilt without taking into consideration the needs of people with disabilities, many of whom were maimed during the war.

I brought this up with your predecessor, Secretary Powell, 2 years ago, and he was very sensitive to this, and was very helpful. And over the last couple of years, we have developed with the State Department some protocols and procedures for addressing the needs of people with disabilities. We also work very closely with Mr. Natsios at the United States Agency for International Development on programmatic issues. They requested that we put a change in the law, which we did. The fiscal year 2005 foreign operations appropriations bill states that, "The Secretary of State and USAID Administrator shall designate, within their respective agencies, an individual to serve as disability advisor or coordinator, whose function it shall be to ensure that disability rights are addressed where appropriate in United States policies and programs."

It's my understanding that that person has not been designated yet, and I would hope that you would—in all the things you've got to think about, would move ahead aggressively on getting that person designated at the State Department.

IRAQ

Now, USAID has developed accessibility guidelines. I am pleased these standards are in place and being used in all of the reconstruction activities, I am informed, taking place with U.S. funding in Iraq and Afghanistan. This clearly applies to facilities such as schools, hospitals, and airports. Again these facilities will be built in compliance with these standards. So I commend you and the people at USAID for implementing these provisions.

Now, there's another part of this equation. I was visited earlier this week by an Iraqi doctor—I just met her for the first time—Dr. al Gohbori—and who has recently suffered a tragedy. Her 5-year-old child, who was driving with her grandmother was injured in a severe car accident with U.S./Coalition forces. It was an accident. Nothing intentional. The grandmother was killed, and the 5-year-old child is now in a coma—but in our military hospital, so they're doing everything they can. It was just a tragedy. But this doctor was telling me how thousands of Iraqis with disabilities are trapped in their homes. They have no access to rehabilitation services. Unfortunately if they don't receive proper rehabilitation services they're going to get further disabled. And so, they're not getting any kind of help to get them to stem their disabilities and to get them more active, and programs that will enable them to live a more full life. She was asking me to ask you if there's anything in this supplemental that could assist with this vitally important need.

Now, again, on the one hand, as I am informed, in terms of reconstruction, when our money's being used they are designing facilities to be accessible. On the other hand, some of the young people that have disabilities in Iraq now are just not being paid attention to. I don't expect an answer to that, but I just hope that you would really again take a look at that and see if there's something in the supplemental that we could do for that.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. I will take a look at it. It's obviously a very heart-rending thing to see this sort of thing. And I do know that there are a lot of private groups that have tried to help with the disabilities that were associated with the torture of Saddam Hussein. But I will look and see what might be done. I don't know about in the supplement, but what we might be able to do.

Senator HARKIN. Well, she mentioned that. She said some of the NGOs doing work on disabilities has had to leave because of the security situation. Dr. al Gohbori is looking to us to help try to help provide assistance to those NGOs doing work in this area.

Secretary RICE. I'll certainly take a look at it, Senator, and be in touch with you about it.

Senator HARKIN. I'd appreciate that.

FOOD AID

And one last thing, then, shifting from that to food aid. Last December, the United Nations released a report and found there were nearly 852 million chronically hungry people in the world. On January 13, 43 Senators, Republicans and Democrats, wrote a letter to President Bush urging him to seek more funds for food aid. Ninety-three Members of the House also wrote a similar letter. Nonprofit groups that deliver food aid in developing countries, such as Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, Lutheran Church Services, others—all of these agree that about \$700 million, beyond existing appropriations levels, would be needed to provide the typical U.S. share to meet the critical food needs that have emerged this year, because of all the different calamities that have happened. This number is supported by figures provided to our Senate Agriculture Committee by USAID in December. It would also require about \$300 million to fully replenish the food stocks of the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. So that's about \$1 billion.

\$700 million to provide the typical U.S. share to meet the needs that emerge this year, \$300 million to replenish the Bill Emerson Trust.

The President is requesting only about \$200 million for these purposes, most of which is targeted to reimburse funds under the Title II Food for Peace Program already expended this year for relief in South Asia and the Darfur province of Sudan.

Now, my question is, we have a supplemental here, \$82 billion. It's emergency. Madam Secretary, hungry people are an emergency. I know you agree with me. I know you're sensitive to that. It seems to me that maybe \$1 billion of this emergency could go for food aid, that it could be put in the supplemental, and should be put in the supplemental, at least \$700 million to meet the existing needs. Maybe we could do—the \$300 million in the Bill Emerson Trust—maybe we do that under regular appropriations. But it seems to me that if we have this need for food aid in the world, it seems to me this is part of an emergency. And so, I'm asking why you're not asking for that in the supplemental.

Secretary RICE. Senator, I believe that we think we've accounted for the food-aid needs as we need them, but I'd like to get back to you, because—

Senator HARKIN. I'd appreciate that.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. This is not an area that I've gone into in great depth myself, and I would like to get back to you with an answer.

[The information follows:]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, May 11, 2005.

The Honorable Senator TOM HARKIN,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR HARKIN: This is to follow up on your question posed to Secretary Rice during the February 17 Appropriations Committee hearing on the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request regarding international disabilities issues. Knowing of your leadership in this area, we want to update you on our efforts.

As you noted during your discussion with Secretary Rice, USAID has adopted accessibility guidelines, which are being used in Iraq. This is vitally important, as USAID has been actively restoring and building existing and new schools, medical clinics and other public facilities throughout Iraq. These programs are funded through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (I and II). The attached document outlines USAID programmed activities supporting the disabled in Iraq.

The State Department is also working closely with USAID to utilize the \$2.5 million in fiscal year 2005 ESF funding appropriated for the disabilities issues in Public Law 108-447.

As you know, the Emergency Supplemental Report language urges the Department of State and USAID to place an emphasis on programs that address the needs of people with disabilities. We appreciate your raising the issue of disabilities in the context of foreign operations. We have spent over \$10 million through USAID to assist war victims and families of war victims, and we recently notified our intent to spend an additional \$100 million in the Community Action Program, from which USAID will program an additional \$10 million to assist war victims and their families.

We also note that the Emergency Supplemental provides \$5 million to USAID for humanitarian, conflict mitigation and relief and recovery assistance for needy families and communities in Chechnya, Ingushetia and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.

We have established the Advisory Committee on Persons with Disabilities, which includes the Secretary of State, the USAID Administrator, the Committee's Executive Director and eight members from outside government. We now have eight public members with varied expertise, experiences and viewpoints, and plan to host the first Committee meeting shortly. We fully expect these committee members to share with Secretary Rice and Administrator Natsios their perspectives on incorporating disability issues within U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance. The Executive Director for the Advisory Committee is Christopher Camponovo in the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau.

We look forward to working with you to continue to help the disabled. Please feel free to let us know if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

MATTHEW A. REYNOLDS,
Assistant Secretary Legislative Affairs.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITIES FOR THE DISABLED IN IRAQ

Local Governance

Both the Local Governance Program and the Iraq Transition Initiative are supporting the development of civil society in Iraq. Iraqi citizens are now actively organizing civil society organizations (CSO), including civil rights and women's rights organizations, business associations, youth groups, sports clubs, disabled veterans advocacy groups, and media groups. These organizations are expanding civic awareness within Iraqi society and promoting institutional advocacy and watchdog capacities to foster local government transparency.

Facilities for the Disabled

USAID has completed two projects to improve facilities for disabled individuals in Iraq. People with disabilities in Iraq were often marginalized by the former regime. They received few services and their needs were not considered by the rest

of society. These projects are part of a larger USAID effort to ensure that all of its projects address the needs of the disabled, as feasible. The new projects include:

- A project to rehabilitate and re-equip a center for the disabled in Baghdad was completed on August 4. The \$49,443 project supplied the institute with videos, CDs, toys, water coolers, plastic chairs, plastic tables, and other furniture. This center provides primary education for disabled students ages 6–15, and currently has a capacity for about 280 students. The center also provides early detection services which help with the admission of children into special education programs. Following completion of their studies, the students are automatically transferred to another local center for the disabled, which was also rehabilitated by USAID as part of the Community Action Program.
- An organization in southern Iraq has completed renovations at a rehabilitation center for the disabled under a \$235,699 grant from USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative. The center will provide rehabilitation services to the disabled, offer educational programs, and teach skills which will allow them to be reintegrated into society. The program was launched in response to a government initiative and it will lay the foundation for more collaborative efforts between the government and the private sector. The ITI grant was used to renovate the center's facility and provide necessary equipment, including wheelchairs for handicapped individuals.

Summer Sports for Youth

Community members in Wasit Governorate organized a sports tournament for Iraqi youth during the summer months. This tournament provided young Iraqis with a chance to participate in physical activities that promote leadership and teamwork. Participants were rewarded with prizes ranging from new equipment to new playing facilities. Each participant also received donated sports equipment. In cooperation with teachers and local youth clubs, the tournament included sports for boys and girls as well as for disabled participants. Female participants overcame initial objections from local officials in order to participate. "In the beginning, they didn't include us in the tournament," said one girl, "but . . . we wanted to play a fair game with the other schools and we wanted to participate regardless of what the prizes would be." After students and teachers objected to the omission of girls in the competition, all children were allowed to participate. This initiative was supported by USAID's Community Action Program.

Home for Iraqi Orphans Renovated

A home for orphans and handicapped children in northern Iraq has been renovated with a \$28,000 grant from USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI). Children suffered greatly under the former regime. They were often orphaned or left disabled by wars and atrocities carried out by the former government. The home provides a place for these children to live and programs that help them be reintegrated into society with self-confidence and dignity. The home will also receive new furniture that will improve the conditions at the facility and ensure a healthy living and learning environment.

Civic Dialogue with Disabled Iraqi Veterans

A branch of the Disabled Veterans Association received assistance from USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI) to present a series of Civic Dialogue workshops for their members. The \$6,600 grant covered the logistical expenses of hosting the workshops, and provided wheelchairs and walking sticks to the most needy to aid them in attending.

Through this initiative, the organization has sponsored gatherings and discussions to promote an understanding of the political process that will transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people and encourage participants to be engaged in the process. The activities educated them about the Transitional Administrative Law, increased awareness about human rights issues and promoted dialogue among disabled veterans and other Iraqi citizens. The project was coordinated with USAID's Local Governance Program in support of their Civic Education Campaign to educate Iraqis on the transition to a democratic Iraq. The Civic Dialogues will improve public understanding of the transition to democracy and increase participation in the political process.

Support for Iraq's Mentally and Physically Disabled

Baghdad community members are working with USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) to rehabilitate facilities providing support for Iraq's mentally and physically disabled citizens. The communities identified facilities which were damaged and looted during and after the 2003 conflict and CAP is helping prioritize and implement the projects. The projects have included:

- The rehabilitation of Baghdad's only psychiatric hospital will improve care for Iraqis with mental and addiction problems. Much of the center still remains in ruins and nearly all of the center's equipment was stolen, including air conditioners, wires, water heaters, and hospital beds. One nurse stated "The wards are out of order because of broken glass, broken windows, and there's no electricity network or water supply". This project will cost approximately \$40,000 and benefit more than 6,000 people.
- The rehabilitation of a center which offers workshops and physical therapy for the disabled is complete. This facility was looted of equipment, furnishings, and even things like windows and ceiling material after the conflict. After community members identified the center as a priority project, the building was renovated and re-equipped. The center will now provide training in sewing, woodwork, sports, and computer applications. In addition to the work done by the community and USAID, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs contributed stationery and food supplies valued at \$5,142. The total project cost was \$68,111 with a community contribution of \$1,600.

Supporting the Needs of the Disabled

USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI) is supporting the needs of Iraq's disabled citizens by developing social programs and rehabilitating facilities that meet their needs. This initiative is part of a larger USAID effort to ensure that all of its assistance addresses the disabled, as feasible. Recent initiatives addressing the needs of the disabled include:

- ITI has awarded a \$17,000 in-kind grant to an organization that provides services to individuals with physical disabilities in a rural area of northern Iraq. The group is helping to integrate disabled people into society by giving them skills to obtain employment and educating people about the value of all human beings in the community. The grant will allow the NGO to re-equip and supply its vocational education program with sewing machines and computers, as well as provide other materials for the expansion of its English language, music and health awareness programs.
- Twenty-four physically handicapped individuals are taking part in computer training courses offered with the support of a \$14,000 grant from ITI. Many Iraqis have been disabled as a result of past violent conflicts, land mines, or from hereditary conditions. These people receive little aid from the government beyond that required for subsistence. Concerned individuals have established a nongovernmental organization in northern Iraq with the goal of providing rehabilitation services and assisting the handicapped to become active members of their communities. The NGO is offering the courses that will teach basic word processing, spreadsheet and database programs, as well as how to use the Internet and email. These are valuable skills in the workplace and will help the disabled obtain employment that will allow them to become self-sufficient.

Disabled Iraqis Benefit from the Experience of NGOs

In communities in Southeast Iraq, Persons with Disabilities advisors will begin to work with USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) as mediators between USAID and groups representing disabled persons in order to better understand and address the needs of the beneficiaries. Group advisors are currently receiving training from a U.S. NGO on designing rights-based advocacy projects to benefit disabled individuals in their governorates.

Forum for Disabled

On July 17, a symposium on issues of interest to the disabled community was held for more than 120 participants. The participants included individuals with disabilities as well as members of Babil Governorate. Medical equipment, including 55 wheelchairs, was distributed to the disabled participants. This forum was supported by USAID's Local Governance Program as well as a local non-governmental organization. This initiative is part of a larger USAID effort to ensure that its assistance addresses the disabled community, as feasible. Currently, areas of particular opportunity include community development, health services, and infrastructure.

Civic Dialogue Conferences in Salah ad Din

Four civic dialogue conferences held over the past two weeks in Salah ad Din Governorate are engaging residents of this conflicted area in discussions on democracy and the incorporation of democratic ideals in Iraqi society. More than 240 Salah ad Din residents participated.

On June 28, 70 participants came together for a conference on minority rights. Among participants' comments were that Turkman and Assyrian minorities should

receive full rights, that Iraq should remain a united country, and that Iraqis denounce terrorist organizations.

On July 3 and 4, three conferences with more than 270 participants were held to discuss Iraq's upcoming elections. Participants concluded with the following comments and recommendations:

- Elections should not be based on ethnic, sectarian, tribal, or any other affiliations.
- Elected citizens should be competent, honest, and have leadership capability and experience in politics.
- International organizations such as the United Nations and the Arab League should be in charge of election supervision to ensure fair elections.
- Security issues during the elections need to be addressed to guarantee a maximum number of voters.
- Elections should take place at all levels and as soon as possible—it is the only way to ensure that the right people are leading communities, governorates, and the nation.
- There should be more women's representation at all levels of government.

These civic dialogue conferences are part of a larger effort by USAID to educate Iraqis on democracy and engage them in democratic debates. USAID conducts Democracy Dialogue Activities throughout Iraq; more than 15,000 have been conducted. Finally, USAID is supporting a series of ten National Agenda Conferences, targeting special interest groups—such as lawyers, the disabled, or academics—and including participants from all over Iraq.

Educating Children with Special Needs in Al Basrah

USAID's Community Action Program is working with an Iraqi NGO to establish an institute for the disabled. The institute will teach children to read and write and to enable them to better understand and communicate with each other as well as with the community. New equipment and furniture is helping to improve education for this group.

Up to now, the disabled children have been taught alongside all of the other children with no adjustments made for their special needs. This project provided toys and educational equipment as well as furniture. This new institute is the first of its kind in Basrah governorate.

Communities Helping Neighboring Communities

Communities in Maysan Governorate are not only supporting improvements in their own communities, but are helping to improve neighborhoods outside their communities. Under USAID's Community Action Program (CAP), three Maysan Governorate technical schools are being re-equipped with modern tools and technology. To participate in the CAP program, communities must contribute money, labor, or other resources to the development projects. As part of their contributions, the communities around these schools are volunteering time and resources to help other local communities.

Students will contribute to their respective projects by providing free technical training in welding, carpentry, and electrical work to 30–40 local youth; free computer training and electronics training for approximately 20 individuals with disabilities; free wheelchair maintenance for the disabled; free electric maintenance work in 10 local schools; and mechanical and carpentry assistance to local schools. These contributions, valued at \$25,000, have the added benefit of providing a training ground for the students of these schools to practice the skills they acquire over the course of their studies.

The CAP program is implemented through five U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGO) which are helping to create representative, participatory community groups to identify critical needs and priorities that are then developed into projects funded by the NGOs. The goal is to foster stability and improve lives by meeting citizens' basic needs in their communities. USAID has committed over \$57 million to 1,485 projects. The Iraqi communities have committed more than 25 percent of total funding to projects in their communities. CAP has established over 650 community associations in 17 governorates.

Students Compete in Community Projects

Students at schools in Wasit Governorate are becoming more involved in the development of their communities as a result of a contest called "I Love My Town" implemented by USAID's Community Action Program. Students from more than 35 intermediate schools competed in creative writing, drawing, and community service activities. The creative writing and drawing components allowed students to develop their creative skills and encouraged them to generate new ideas. In the third component of the contest, students designed and implemented volunteer activities to ben-

efit the community. Activities included: cleaning schools; visiting poor neighborhoods and hospitals; implementing health and hygiene campaigns; planting flowers; and assisting institutions such as the Institution of Disabled People, the local orphanage, and the Institution for the Deaf and Mute. These projects are engaging young people in their communities and increasing their awareness of what is going on in their town to emphasize the importance of their participation for the future of their community.

The contest was judged by a panel of representatives from the Department of Education, USAID Community Action Program staff, and teachers. The school's community projects were judged based on the idea, level of organization, participation of students and teachers, and project results. The top eight schools were awarded Internet centers and basic school furniture for their efforts. For the writing and drawing components, individual students won prizes such as drawing kits, CD players, books, and cameras.

This activity received a great deal of positive feedback and, as a result, another program for youth is currently being developed. The new program will include 24 local high schools who will participate in a football tournament. The winner of the tournament will be awarded with a gym and football field.

Assistance for the Disabled

USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI) is supporting the needs of Iraq's disabled citizens by developing social programs and rehabilitating facilities that meet their needs. This initiative is part of a larger USAID effort to ensure that all of its assistance addresses the disabled, as feasible. The areas of particular opportunity include community development, health services, and infrastructure. A recent initiative addressing the needs of the disabled includes:

- People with disabilities in several northern Iraqi cities will learn computer skills with the aid of a grant from ITI. The award, valued at \$14,000 is being made to a local NGO that will offer computer training courses to their members. These courses will provide a chance for people with disabilities to learn marketable skills and build their self-confidence in order to have an active and productive role in Iraqi society. The ITI grant will supply computers and furniture to support the course and enhance the capacity of the NGO.

New Community Programs to Assist Iraqis Affected by Conflict

Four new projects have been developed benefiting people and families injured as a result of U.S. military operations in Iraq. These projects are being implemented through USAID's Community Action Program (CAP), which has received \$10 million to be distributed among the five CAP non-governmental organization implementing partners. The partners will be developing a diverse set of projects to assist this group, including repairing the social infrastructure that provides services to victims; providing medical and health services; addressing special needs for orphans, children, and vulnerable peoples; providing support for income and employment generation; supporting home repair needs; supporting targeted education activities and vocational training; and supporting social institutions that provide specific services to victims. The most recently identified projects are being implemented in south-central Iraq and include:

- Community members are supporting the construction of an emergency ward in a Karbala' Governorate health clinic. This clinic is the only one in its area, serving approximately 30,000 individuals. The large expanse of the clinic's coverage area prevented adequate care for all residents. In addition to improving health care access for the community, the new emergency ward will treat victims of the war. The clinic will also provide medical care and services to 67 victims of military action at no cost.
- Two projects will provide sewing machines as well as training in business marketing for women who lost their husbands during the conflict. These activities will enable the women to increase their income and provide for their families. Both projects are being implemented by local NGO partners with the assistance of CHF. The first project, located in Karbala' Governorate, will provide six sewing machines, potentially benefiting 71 people, including the women and their immediate families. The second project, in Babil Governorate, will provide seven sewing machines, potentially benefiting 139 people.
- A fourth project will rehabilitate a Babil Governorate center that provides vocational training for physically disabled individuals to help them enter the job market. The facility was looted and partially destroyed in April 2003, preventing the center from assisting their patients. The rehabilitation will allow the center to improve trainings to people with special needs; currently, the center is providing vocational training services to 25 victims of the conflict.

Wheelchair Distribution

More than 900 wheelchairs have been distributed to persons with disabilities in Qadisiyah Governorate. This project first began in February and the last shipment of 350 wheelchairs was distributed through the local councils in 30 communities of Ad Diwaniyah, the capital of Qadisiyah, at the end of April. This initiative was a collaborative effort between the local councils of Ad Diwaniyah, the Red Crescent Society, the Diwaniyah Society for the Disabled, and USAID Community Action Program partner Mercy Corps. The Iraqi local government officials and NGO partners identified the beneficiaries who needed wheelchairs; transported and distributed the chairs; and monitored the process to ensure the chairs were received and used properly.

Improving Communities through Civil Society

Iraqi civil society organizations enhance the civic participation that is essential to the formation and maintenance of a vibrant democracy. Civil society is an important component of the June transition to sovereignty.

The Salah ad Din Women's Committee received office furniture, equipment, and supplies from the Iraq Transition Initiative program, enabling them to open their office at the Tikrit Teaching Hospital. The Committee is made up of 50 professional women from Tikrit and the surrounding area who are working together to address women's needs in Salah ad Din Governorate. This Committee was formed following a civic dialogue event sponsored by USAID's LGP. During planning meetings, members identified future priorities, which included driving lessons, media projects, work with disabled children, language and computer classes, and the establishment of a fitness center for women. The equipment and supplies from ITI will allow them to begin their work.

Computer equipment has been installed at the Arbil Youth Development and Activity Center (AYDAC). The AYDAC is a youth organization established in 2003 to build the confidence and skills of young people. The organization has more than 500 members, most of whom are unemployed and disadvantaged youth between 14 and 22 years of age. The computer equipment supports training in word processing, Internet applications, and English and Arabic language courses. AYDAC also assists the youth to express themselves constructively by hosting forums and discussions on local issues thus encouraging their participation in community activities. The AYDAC received a grant from USAID's Local Governance Program.

Over Two-Hundred Wheelchairs for Users in Ad Diwaniyah

More than two-hundred wheelchairs have been distributed to the disabled in the city of Ad Diwaniyah in Al Qadisiyah Governorate through USAID's Community Action Program. The initiative began with the selection of a Community Action Group by Ad Diwaniyah community members who then identified this project as a local priority. The chairs were distributed by USAID partner Mercy Corps through local NGO partners who were also part of the Community Action Group. Seventy-five chairs were distributed by the Disabled Society and another 125 by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society with the active participation of the local council members.

Rehabilitation of Schools for the Deaf

Through USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID partner CARE has rehabilitated 13 schools for the deaf. Work included repairs to latrines, piping, sanitation and sewage systems, tiles, floors, sinks, lighting, doors and windows. The first set of eight schools was completed in November and the second set of five was completed in mid-March. As a result of the repairs, more than 1,200 deaf children will be able to return to school.

USAID provides assistance to Iraq's disabled citizens by developing social programs and rehabilitating facilities that meet their needs. USAID also seeks to ensure that all of its assistance addresses the disabled, as feasible. With respect to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the areas of particular opportunity include community development, health services, and infrastructure.

National Conference for the Disabled

On March 31 and April 1, more than 185 people attended the National Conference for the Disabled in As Sulaymaniyah Governorate, the third of ten national Civic Dialogue Program conferences to be held throughout Iraq with support from USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP). The conference was organized by The Rozh Society, an Iraqi non-profit organization which has received support from LGP.

The first day of the conference focused on defining the issues important to the participants. A plenary session in the morning covered welcome speeches as well as presentations on international legal standards for people with disabilities, equal access to public facilities and institutions for the disabled, and the special needs of

people disabled by war and landmines. In the afternoon, participants divided into four breakout sessions to engage in an active dialogue on the presentation material and what they would like to see in the new Iraq. Participants also had the opportunity to view and discuss short films about disabled people produced by a local journalist. The second day focused on finding solutions, recommending actions, and planning for the future. The discussion was lively and the attendees recommended that March 31 be declared National Disabled Persons Day in Iraq. The conference received excellent press coverage from Arabic, Kurdish, and international press. As a next step, the establishment of a National Association for Disabled People in Iraq is under consideration.

These civic dialogues are part of the CPA Civic Education Campaign to inform Iraqis about the transition to democracy. USAID has committed \$2.4 million to implement a nationwide campaign of civic education activities including a print and broadcast media campaign and civic forums and town meetings.

Improving Health Services and Facilities in Baghdad

USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) partner International Relief and Development (IRD) is working to improve health services and facilities in Baghdad. CAP works with community members to develop Community Action Groups that identify priorities in their neighborhoods and initiate projects to meet community goals. To date, IRD has completed 200 projects addressing many diverse needs in the community. Recent projects addressing health needs include:

Baghdad's Center for Rehabilitation and Physiotherapy

Currently, this center is the only provider of comprehensive services in Iraq for the disabled of all ages. The center's services include health consultations, a prosthetics center, and physical therapy. The center's prosthetics practice, which fits casts, artificial limbs, prosthetics, and braces, is the only operational practice in Iraq. It currently provides services to approximately 50 to 80 patients from all over Iraq every day. With the support of the CAP program, the center received \$118,000 of rehabilitation work and \$28,000 worth of equipment.

USAID partner International Medical Corps (IMC) reconstructed the center's water system and rehabilitated the hydrotherapy department's specialty baths, pools, and lifts in February.

Ibn Al Bettar Hospital

Plans to rehabilitate and re-equip this Baghdad hospital are underway. The facility has a 200-bed capacity and serves approximately 216,000 people and provides key training and education to healthcare students and trainees. Under this \$65,440 project, IRD will renovate the building and equip the staff with supplies such as tables, chairs, fans, and heaters.

Manar Handicap Center

The rehabilitation of this center, located in Baghdad's Rashid district, is underway and will improve educational opportunities for disabled Iraqi citizens. The handicap center accepts male and female students aged 15 and older with varying degrees of disabilities and provides the students with the same classes as other public schools, physical therapy, and vocational training. The \$50,000 renovation by IRD will renovate bathrooms, fix windows and doors, provide water tanks, mend the fence, and paint the building. The community will contribute ten volunteers who will assist in cleaning the center and unclogging the sewage lines. The community has also contributed funds for a monthly payment to the center's guard, who will protect the property.

Disability Centers Receiving Assistance

USAID implementing partner World Vision International is assisting disability centers that provide support, education, social activities, and vocational training to approximately 8,000 disabled persons in Mosul, Iraq's second largest city. World Vision is supporting emergency winterization of the disability centers by providing heaters, winter clothing, floor rugs, and one daily hot meal for three months. In addition, World Vision is providing general disability aids such as wheelchairs, crutches, and specialized furniture. This project is being implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Health's Society for the Disabled, the organization that oversees the disabilities centers.

Assistance for Iraq's Handicapped

USAID provides assistance to Iraq's disabled citizens by developing social programs and rehabilitating facilities to meet the needs of the disabled. USAID seeks to ensure that all of its assistance addresses the disabled, as feasible. With respect

to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the areas of particular opportunity include community development, health services and infrastructure.

Social Assistance

The Community Action Program (CAP) works with communities to identify development priorities and support community members in executing the projects. In this capacity, CAP is working on 13 projects nation-wide through its five U.S. NGO partners to improve the lives of Iraq's disabled citizens. These projects have provided assistance to associations for the handicapped and blind and physical therapy centers.

Grants from USAID's partner Development Alternatives, Inc. support the rehabilitation of facilities serving Iraq's disabled. Such projects have provided computers for As Sulaymaniyah Deaf & Mute Institute, rehabilitated the Al Amarah Primary School for the Deaf and Mute and renovated the Children's Institute for the Blind.

Improving Medical Facilities

USAID is improving medical facilities and services to better serve the unique needs of Iraq's disabled citizens through the Iraq Health System Strengthening project. Projects to re-equip and reconstruct existing facilities which specialize in assisting the disabled have already been completed. Examples include the reconstruction of the Medical Rehabilitation and Arthritis Center in northern Baghdad and refurbishment of the Ibn Al-Qiff Spinal Injury Hospital, also in Baghdad.

Accessible Public Facilities

To date, USAID has focused on meeting the most basic critical infrastructure needs in the areas of electricity; airports and seaport; telecommunications; bridges, roads and railroads; and water and sanitation systems. One major effort to improve access for the disabled has included the refurbishment of the Kirkuk Rehabilitation Center, which serves Iraqi veterans and others who have lost limbs. Ongoing work in Iraq's airports, seaports and other public buildings includes ramps and lavatories which will increase access for the disabled.

Al Huda Institute, Vocational Institute for the Handicapped

The Al Huda Institute in the Masbah area of Karada (Baghdad) is one of the centers being rehabilitated through the Community Action Program to improve its capacity to serve its handicapped students. The Institute provides training to over 350 students in the fields of sewing, secretarial services, TV repair, welding, and electrical repair. Rehabilitation of the institute will include repairing plaster, water damage, and utilities within the Institute. Equipment such as sewing machines, typewriters, and electric training boards will also be provided.

Reconstructing Physiotherapy and Hydrotherapy Clinic

The Medical Rehabilitation and Arthritis center in northern Baghdad is the only specialized clinic of its kind in Iraq equipped for physiotherapy and hydrotherapy. It treated 600 patients a day before the conflict, many of whom were disabled in the Iran-Iraq war and the first Gulf War.

USAID partner International Medical Corps (IMC) recently reconstructed the center's water system, including building a 300-meter water pipe and installing elevated water storage tanks that ensure a three-day supply of drinking water for patients. IMC also rehabilitated all the hydrotherapy department's specialty baths, pools, and lifts.

Severely looted after the war, the center now sees only 300 patients a day. Currently, the center treats 100 patients injured in the recent conflict. Patients with cerebral palsy, paralysis, arthritis, and other handicaps travel to the center from all over Iraq for group therapy, workshops, and amputee rehabilitation therapy. The center has no inpatient facilities, creating a serious strain on patients living outside Baghdad. "We are grateful to IMC for the work they've done and hope for more cooperation in the future," said hospital director Dr. Eman Khudair. USAID and IMC have rehabilitated water and other facilities at 20 hospitals around Baghdad.

Education

One of the enduring legacies of Saddam's rule is the rigid mindset that was imposed on society, and which Iraqis are beginning to cast aside. Originality and innovation led to suspicion under the old regime. The Contemporary Visual Arts Society, an Iraqi NGO, is working in elementary schools to promote freedom of thought through artistic expression. More than 1,200 boys and girls from Baghdad's Sadr City district will attend three-day workshops, where they will learn basic techniques of painting and collage. The society will extend the series to developmentally dis-

abled children in Sadr City and, due to the enthusiastic response from educators, begin training teachers to lead their own art workshops.

Future workshops will be conducted in Al Fallujah and Ar Ramadi for an additional 1,700 students. The society is using a \$37,000 USAID grant to obtain equipment and materials for the program.

Local Governance

The Baghdad Interim City Advisory Council held its weekly meeting on October 21. Items on the agenda included:

- Establishing effective communications between the Council and the Ministries.
- Payment of the Iraqi security force, the Facility Protection Service (FPS), now that the responsibility has moved from the CPA to the Council.
- The need to provide pensions to war veterans, the disabled, widows, etc. This subject was referred to the Woman and Childhood Committee for handling.
- The reorganization of Council committees and the establishment of their roles and processes.
- The opening of the 14th of July Bridge.
- The CPA-approved move of U.S. military units out of the student dormitories at Al-Mustansiriyah University.

Community Action

Neighborhood committees in Baghdad received approval for eighteen new projects last week. Projects were selected based on their contribution to bridging divides within the community. The newly approved projects include:

- Twelve schools. Rehabilitating 4 intermediate schools, 7 primary schools, and one technical school in six Baghdad districts—Rashid, Ahdamiyah, Karada, Sadr City, Nissan 9, and Mansour.
- One center for the disabled. Providing tables, chairs, water coolers, air conditioners, and heaters to a center that serves 250 deaf and mute students.
- Baghdad University. Rehabilitating university administration building and fixing windows of 16 other departments.
- One soccer stadium. Renovating a soccer field used by more than 600 local youths in Baghdad's Rissala neighborhood.
- One fire station. Rehabilitating looted fire engines at the only fire station in the area.
- Iraqi Tribe Confederation. Provide administrative support to the center, benefiting 1,000 people.

Community Action Program

A grant provided by Iraq Community Action Program (CAP) implementer Mercy Corps International is providing 140 sewing machines to widows of the Iran-Iraq War in Wasit Governorate. Wasit Governorate, along the Iran-Iraq border, was devastated during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980's. Before March 2003, the Women's Cooperative Society (WCS) in Al Kut engaged more than 700 women in sewing and textile-related activities under the Productive Families Program. In April 2003, the WCS compound was attacked by prisoners released by the former regime, forcing the women who worked there to flee. Five WCS buildings were subsequently looted, and others burned.

The grant will allow the WCS to resume assistance to the women of Al Kut. In addition to providing sewing machines and training, Mercy Corps is renovating WCS's main compound building. The WCS women have been commissioned to sew linens and garments for Al Kut area hospitals. The program will benefit 150 women.

In Wasit Governorate, Mercy Corps has completed renovation of the Center for Disabled and Orphaned Children in Al Kut. Services provided include the replacement of vandalized and looted assets, such as furniture, air conditioners, toys and special learning aids. The \$8,000 project benefited 160 people.

Senator HARKIN. And I understand, you've got a lot on your plate. But have your people look at that, and talk to your boss. I mean, it's not too late to maybe ask this to be put in the supplemental. You know, there's a lot of things—we can't carve it out, but it should be in the supplemental. It is an emergency. And I don't think you would find any opposition to it on either side of the aisle for this kind of food aid to be put in the supplemental appropriations bill.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. We'll look at it. I know—
Senator HARKIN. Thank you.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. We have been incredibly generous, as a country, as you know—

Senator HARKIN. We have been.

Secretary RICE [continuing]. In terms of food aid. But I will look at it. I—

Senator HARKIN. And if there's one thing we've got, we've got food.

Secretary RICE. I'll take a look.

Senator HARKIN. We've got a lot of it. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Madam Secretary, the Senator didn't use all his time. I'm going to ask you if you could be indulgent for the purpose of hearing questions from Senator Bond, as well.

Secretary RICE. Of course, Senator.

Chairman COCHRAN. Senator Bond.

Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Byrd.

Madam Secretary, I apologize for holding you up. I had to be on the floor to introduce a bill. But I had two points I wanted to bring up.

INDONESIA

Number one, I visited Banda Aceh 2 weeks after the tsunami, and I want to commend all the State Department people, who responded magnificently. This was a tremendous effort. We've got to restore the funds that Ambassador Pascoe moved quickly, got the funds out there. USAID people, all the people in the State Department and their spouses were out there loading planes. Thank you, and thank them for us. I believe they saved literally tens of thousands of people by their quick actions.

But the question I have—over there, I believe that Indonesia and Southeast Asia is really the second front in the war on terrorism. And yesterday, Director Porter Goss said that he is most concerned about the escalating intensity of terrorist activities. One of the questions I asked, and your State Department INR witness responded, it seems to me that times have changed and that congressional restrictions on military assistance in cooperation with Indonesia are actually hurting us. The TNI, the Indonesian military, is the one that gets—that can get out into the 13,000 islands. Admiral Jacoby said it was a problem for him, other witnesses said it was a problem for them, because they were not trained together. What is your view of, now that we have a government, in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is committed to democracy and human rights and cleaning up government, should be our position with respect to aid to Indonesia?

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, there are two different things, one on—in terms of potential further legal aid to Indonesia, I think there are a set of things that they still need to do. But in terms of IMET training, for instance, which President Yudhoyono is, himself, a graduate of, the IMET—

Senator BOND. The last program, yeah.

Secretary RICE. Right. I was just saying, I am reviewing actively now, and in consultations with Congress, the certification of the In-

Indonesians for IMET, given their cooperation with the FBI in trying to resolve the *Timika* case. And I expect to come to a determination really rather soon on that matter.

Senator BOND. Madam Secretary, if I can help you out, we need to work with the Indonesians, and there is beginning to be a real resentment in Indonesian parliaments that they are trying very hard, and they are sanctioned by the United States. I hope you come to the right decision.

SAUDI ARABIA

The second point I want to raise is one which has deeply troubled me—I heard about it on the media. I read the Freedom House report—on the influence of the Wahabi religion in the United States, and the Government of Saudi Arabia continues to make available, through mosques and other places, the extreme, bigoted, hateful Wahabiist doctrine, telling people that they cannot associate with, or deal with, the infidels. They seem to be continuing the practice of promoting that religion, which I would have to say is the breeding ground for our own indigenous terrorist development, something that FBI Director Mueller said was his great concern.

Has the State Department looked into the Saudi Government, and the king of Saudi Arabia, funding and supporting this—these hateful documents? Now, if you haven't seen the report, I'll give you a copy of the report. But what the Freedom House found is totally unacceptable. Do you have a position on that?

Secretary RICE. Well, we are working with the Saudi Government on activities that may be funded, particularly through non-governmental organizations and so-called charitable organizations that have the effect of spreading hateful propaganda or training people or even funding terrorism. It's a very active program on the financing of terrorism. We've made some progress. The Saudis listed, for instance, one of the big charitable organizations, al Haramain, which has been active in this way. And we're going to continue to work with them on it, because there can't be support for radical extremist activities in other countries. I think the Saudis understand that, and we're working very actively with them.

Senator BOND. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I'm not sure they understand it, because the comments I paraphrased were from documents in the King Fahd Mosque, which bore the imprint, "Publication of the Embassy of Saudi Arabia Cultural Department." That isn't a charity. That is government, not an NGO.

Thank you very much, Madam Secretary—

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much.

Senator BOND [continuing]. For your indulgence—Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Byrd, for any closing comments you may have, you are recognized.

Senator BYRD. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.

May I thank you again for these extraordinarily good hearings? I compliment you. I think you're off to an excellent start as the new chairman.

Also, I think our witness today is off to a very excellent start in her presence here before this committee. She has done a commendable job this morning, and I compliment her for it. I'll be happy to work with her in the future in her overall effort.

In closing, may I say that the President's request includes \$658 million for construction of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. There's already been comments concerning this by other Senators. But, if approved, this would be the most expensive compound ever built for a U.S. Embassy. The next most expensive construction, \$450 million for the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which has a staff of 788. China has 1.3 billion people. U.S. businesses have \$231.4 billion in trade with China. This compares to 25 million people in Iraq and trade with the United States of \$9.3 billion annually. According to your projections, the \$20 billion in reconstruction contracts started by the CPA and continued by State and Defense staff would be obligated within the next 2 years, before we even occupy the new Embassy. The President hasn't requested one dime of his \$81.9 billion supplemental for the veterans' healthcare system. He has not requested one dime for improving security at our borders. And so, I wonder, how is it that we can afford \$658 million for a huge new Embassy that will not be occupied for years? Doesn't this send a signal—and this is just a rhetorical question, I understand you have to go, Madam Secretary—but, to me, doesn't this send a signal to the Iraqi people and to the American people that the United States intends to have a large permanent presence there? I'll leave that for the record.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Madam Secretary.

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman COCHRAN. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

I thank all Senators for their cooperation with the committee.

And Madam Secretary, especially, we are very grateful to you for making this time available to discuss with us the supplemental budget request submitted by the President that affects the State Department and its accounts. We wish you continued success as you undertake this very important job for our country. I think you are off to a great start. You credit our country and every individual citizen in the United States in the way you are conducting yourself and carrying out your responsibilities as Secretary of State. Thank you for your service.

ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENTS

Senators McConnell and Craig have asked that their submitted statements be made a part of the record.

[The statements follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

Welcome, Secretary Rice. I appreciate your appearing before the Committee today as it underscores the importance the Administration places on the pending fiscal year 2005 Emergency Supplemental.

I will keep my remarks short today as the best use of time is undoubtedly for questions and answers. Let me make a few, brief observations.

First, the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense deserve recognition and praise for the immediate and effective response to the Asian tsunami last month. America reaffirmed its role as the world's sole superpower in responding to a crisis literally half a world away in a generous and timely manner. There has

been nothing cheap about our response—whether from taxpayer funds or the kindness of private donations from the American people.

Second, having returned from a trip to Kabul just last month, I am pleased to see proposed funding for a number of important programs in Afghanistan, including infrastructure and economic development, democracy and governance, counter-narcotics, and police training. With parliamentary elections on the horizon this spring, it is imperative that we assist the Afghan people in solidifying their already notable gains. To this end, I encourage the State Department to continue funding the important civic education work of Voice for Humanity that reaches rural, illiterate Afghan women.

Of concern is the narcotics trade. President Karzai believes that he can get control of poppy growth without aerial eradication, and our counterdrug assistance in the Supplemental—and the fiscal year 2006 budget request—is critical to this end. I note that the combined budget request for Afghanistan totals nearly \$3 billion: \$1.9 billion in the supplemental and \$920 million in the budget request.

Finally, I share the view that the United States should help those who help us in the Global War on Terror. In Franklin Roosevelt's words, America is indeed the "great arsenal of democracy". The Supplemental request contains \$200 million for a new Global War on Terror Partners Fund, and I hope you will shed light on how this account will work, and which partners will receive funding.

Again, welcome Secretary Rice.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY CRAIG

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and thank you, Madame Secretary, for appearing today to discuss the supplemental request and the global war on terror.

Madame Secretary, as the United States continues to embark on our efforts to fight terror, it is no secret that realistically our fighting men and women are on the verge of being stretched thin. That being said, in regards to our policies toward adversaries like Syria, Iran, North Korea and others, I ask you this: what is our overall policy of engagement?

As you know, this country was extremely successful in engaging the Soviet Union, China, and recently Libya. Few bullets were ever fired, and the result of our active engagement with some of these countries has paid off with stronger diplomatic ties and economic exchange.

My question to you, is our new foreign policy toward adversaries a policy of isolation? Have we completely backed off the idea of dialogue and engagement? How many, if any, carrot-and-stick approaches do we have with these adversaries?

I ask these questions because I am concerned that we are on the brink of solely relying on our military to achieve our end game. This country has had a remarkable record of engagement and dialogue. Even with an apparent enemy we have sometimes produced unexpected achievements.

It is no secret that I am completely disappointed in our approach toward Cuba—a country that could change in due time if we engaged them through other means, instead of isolation. We did engage with the Soviet Union and are engaging with China. As a matter of fact, I probably agree wholeheartedly with Larry Wilkerson, Colin Powell's former Chief of Staff when he said recently that our policy toward Cuba is the, "Dumbest policy on the face of the earth. It's crazy." Our isolationist policy of over 45 years has not produced any of its goals, and that dictator remains.

I fear that if we take the same approach toward Syria, Iran, and North Korea as we have with Cuba, realistically the only option we have left, if we want change, is a military option. I say this because our military is stretched thin and not in a position to effectively engage in some new areas. If we don't actively engage specific countries through other means, those terrible dictators and governments will remain.

I am reminded of a quote by President Bush a couple years ago regarding economic engagement. He said:

"Open trade is not just an economic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. When we negotiate for open markets, we are providing new hope for the world's poor. And when we promote open trade, we are promoting political freedom. Societies that open to commerce across their borders will open to democracy within their borders, not always immediately, and not always smoothly, but in good time."

Now, I am not saying that we economically engage all of these countries in question; what I am getting at is the fact that we cannot continue to rely on our military for every engagement and achievement.

With that, it is my hope that U.S. Foreign Policy doesn't diverge from all foreign policy options to produce intended results. I can honestly tell you that the people of this country, and my state, will hesitate to support future military engagements with other countries if the tools and means were there to do otherwise and achieve similar results.

I look forward to hearing from you about U.S. foreign policy and engagement as we proceed in this war on terror.

Thank you.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Chairman COCHRAN. If there are any additional questions from members, they will be submitted to you for your response.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

Question. Please update the Committee on the status of the negotiations and whether or not you are optimistic regarding the outcome of these discussions?

Answer. On January 27, the United States provided the Russian Federation a new proposal to resolve the liability issue for cooperation on Russia's plutonium disposition program. The proposal addresses some key Russian concerns. A constructive round of experts talks began on February 17, the first opportunity the Russian side could meet, and the U.S. side anticipates holding the following round in mid-March. We will continue to pursue an intensive schedule of talks to clarify and resolve remaining issues before the Presidents meet again in May in Moscow. In order to reach a solution, the Russian Government will also, for its part, need to find flexibility in areas of concern to the United States. I am confident that if the Russian Government wants to resolve the liability issue and to pursue the cooperative program for converting surplus weapon-grade plutonium into forms unusable for weapons, a solution acceptable to both sides can be found.

Question. Will you guarantee that we have seen the last of the interagency fights that have delayed this program and that you will work with Secretary Bodman to implement this program as soon as possible?

Answer. The Department of State and the Department of Energy will continue to work very closely to bring to fruition the U.S.-Russian cooperation on plutonium disposition in the earliest possible time frame. We have found ways to move forward with Russia on design and licensing to avoid unnecessary delays in the program, while working in parallel on funding, management, and liability protection. The interagency—including other interested agencies such as the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget—has worked hard this last year to develop a sound proposal for resolving the liability issue, and the U.S. experts team has authority to negotiate on that proposal. Not every issue can be anticipated in such negotiations, and Russia will need to find some flexibility in its previous positions just as we have demonstrated flexibility in ours. I am confident that the involved agencies have worked and will work constructively to bring these negotiations promptly to successful conclusion.

Question. Do you believe the Russian Federation has done enough to secure their own nuclear materials and do you believe the Russians have an accurate inventory of their own nuclear material and where it is located today?

Answer. To date, Russian security measures for their fissile material are limited compared to the challenges they face, and we are working closely with Moscow to make further improvements. Our joint work is increasing both the physical protection measures against armed attack, as well as the controls and accounting needed to prevent illicit diversion of fissile material by insiders.

The Russian system for accounting for their fissile material is of uneven quality. Some of the control system still in use was inherited from the Soviets and features a paper-based system that lacks the careful accounting for fissile material needed to prevent illicit diversion by insiders. We are working with the Russians to promptly deploy a more advanced system of fissile material accounting at all their fissile material facilities. Recent agreement at the Bratislava summit to develop a plan for such security upgrades is designed to further accelerate progress in this important area.

Question. If not, what do you propose to improve this relationship so that we might be able to ensure that it is no longer a proliferation threat?

Answer. We have been working jointly with Moscow to improve nuclear security in Russian for over a decade. Both countries share the objective of ensuring that fissile material and WMD is secured against terrorists and the states that support them. We believe we are continuing to make progress on improving nuclear security but if we encounter challenges we will work closely with senior Russian officials to address them.

At the recent Bratislava summit the Presidents agreed to continue to work closely to improve nuclear security and their experts will report back to them on these efforts before the Presidents meet again in July.

Question. Can you please update the committee on the status of the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea and what is being done to address this threat?

Answer. We believe that Iran is continuing its program to develop nuclear weapons. Its nuclear fuel cycle programs are applicable to producing fissile material for nuclear weapons and, as currently configured, are not consistent with the scale of Iran's planned nuclear energy production program. Our current activities are focused on achieving a permanent cessation of those fuel cycle activities that would provide Iran with a fissile material production capability. Russia has agreed to supply low enriched uranium fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant it has built in Iran with the stipulation that Russia will take back the spent fuel from the reactor. The United States has urged Russia not to supply such fuel until the questions that have been raised about Iran's nuclear program have been resolved.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General ElBaradei has issued numerous written reports that document Iran's covert nuclear activities over a period of at least 18 years. There is no evidence that Iran has yet succeeded in operating enrichment facilities. Nonetheless, the infrastructure that Iran is establishing—particularly in its gas centrifuge enrichment program—could, once fully operational, produce significant amounts of weapons-grade fissile material.

In October 2003, Iran reached agreement with the United Kingdom, France and Germany (the EU3) to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in exchange for expanded cooperation in a variety of areas, to include the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran never fully implemented this suspension, but in the ensuing months the EU3 pressed for a more detailed agreement on activities covered under the suspension. That agreement was reached on November 14, 2004, and specifies, *inter alia*, the following activities: centrifuge manufacture, assembly, installation, testing and operation, as well as any "tests and production for conversion at any uranium conversion installation."

The IAEA is continuing to monitor and verify Iran's adherence to its November 14 commitment to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities. We are deeply concerned by reports that Iran is pressing the limits of its suspension promise and expect the IAEA to report to the Board of Governors any Iranian violations of that pledge.

Other actions by Iran also are cause for concern. For example, Iran has defied repeated calls by the Board of Governors to reconsider its decision to start construction of a heavy water research reactor. Iran continues to refuse full access to IAEA inspectors visiting certain nuclear sites. Iran has announced it intends to open a uranium ore concentrate production plant near Bandar Abbas within a year. Iran continues to prolong conversion activities at the Esfahan uranium conversion facility (UCF) and failed to notify the IAEA in a timely fashion that it was constructing tunnels at that facility.

These and other activities suggest that Iran has no intention of abandoning its pursuit of fissile material production capability. Given Iran's history of clandestine nuclear activities, grudging cooperation with the IAEA, and documented efforts to deceive the IAEA and the international community, only the full cessation and dismantling of Iran's fissile material production efforts can give us any confidence that Iran is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

The United States has long stated that the IAEA Board of Governors must report Iran's documented noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement to the United Nations Security Council. The Board has a statutory obligation to do so, but has thus far failed to take that step. While the IAEA must continue to have a role in investigating Iran's past and ongoing nuclear activities and in monitoring its suspension pledge, the Security Council has the international legal and political authority that we believe will be required to bring this issue to a successful and peaceful resolution. The Council has the authority to require that Iran take all necessary corrective measures, including those steps called for by the Board that Iran has failed to take. The Security Council has the authority to require and enforce a suspension of Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. In each of these areas, the Security Council can support and reinforce the IAEA's ability to pursue its investigations in Iran until the Agency can provide this Board with all necessary assurances.

On February 10, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a lengthy statement, including the assertion that the North has “manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense . . .” The statement also said that the DPRK “will inevitably suspend participation in the Six-Party Talks for an indefinite period . . .” but added “there is no change in the [DPRK’s] principled stance of resolving the issue through dialogue and negotiations and in the ultimate goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”

The United States publicly assessed in the mid 1990s that North Korea had produced one, or possibly two, nuclear weapons. Since that assessment, North Korea has engaged in further nuclear weapons activities.

The recent North Korean statement highlights our long-standing concerns and reflects a history of the DPRK not respecting its international commitments and obligations, including the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The United States continues to call for the permanent, thorough and transparent dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear programs, subject to effective verification. Dismantlement would have to include the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program, the existence of which the DPRK continues to deny, despite its earlier admission of such a program in October 2002 and reports of A.Q. Khan’s activities.

The United States continues to believe that the Six-Party Talks are the best opportunity for North Korea to chart a new course with the international community. In June 2004, we tabled a fair and reasonable proposal that the North has not answered. At that meeting, we told North Korea that if it made the strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear program, including both its plutonium and uranium enrichment activities, and agreed to dismantle their nuclear program and weapons completely, verifiably and irreversibly, our proposal would provide for corresponding steps, including multilateral security assurances and progress toward a new political and economic relationship with the United States, the other members of the Six-Party Talks, and the entire international community.

There is unanimous agreement among five members of the Six-Party process that North Korea should immediately re-engage in Six-Party Talks and commit to ending its nuclear ambitions permanently. For our part, we are ready to return to the Six Party Talks at an early date without preconditions.

Three rounds of Six-Party Talks (August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004) have been aimed at ending North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Although all parties agreed to reconvene by the end of September 2004, the DPRK has so far refused to do so, offering a variety of pretexts—including what it calls “U.S. hostile policy” and the recently passed North Korean Human Rights Act. We have repeatedly explained to North Korea, including in meetings with the DPRK U.N. Ambassador in New York in November and December, that the United States does not have a hostile policy and has no intention of invading or attacking North Korea. We have also explained to them the purpose of the North Korean Human Rights Act.

We have been consulting with our Six-Party partners on next steps. The Secretary met with ROK Foreign Minister Ban on February 14. In addition, we announced on February 14 that Ambassador Christopher Hill will take over as head of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks. We continue consultations at all levels with each of the four Six-Party partners.

Question. Are there any other opportunities you believe the United States could pursue that might help break the current stalemate?

Answer. The United States has pursued vigorously a diplomatic solution to address the threats posed by Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs.

While the Administration cannot take any option permanently off the table, we have consistently stated that we believe both these issues can be resolved diplomatically and peacefully. We will continue to work toward that end in close cooperation with our friends and allies.

Question. As the Secretary of State, will you commit to using your considerable influence to move more aggressively to secure agreements with the countries that have yet to repatriate their Russian or U.S.-origin fuel?

Answer. The Department of State has been working closely with the Department of Energy to create and implement the new Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) announced by Secretary Abraham last May. The primary focus of that program is to expand and accelerate U.S. efforts to secure dangerous nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. State’s role in GTRI is to use whatever diplomatic tools are available to educate and persuade countries holding such materials of the importance of improving their security and converting them to less threatening forms as soon as possible. I and the State Department are fully committed to making this effort succeed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Question. Yesterday at the intelligence hearing I discussed the threat of terrorism and the second front of the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia with Director Goss. I am greatly concerned with the Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) which has put Indonesia on the front line of the global war against terror. We know the JI is aligned with al Qaeda in Indonesia and the Philippines and actively working to expand their influence in the region. This is why I applauded Chairman McConnell in providing \$1 million in FMF funds to the Government of Indonesia for maritime security. As you know, the Strait of Malacca is a vital choke point for international shipping and potentially vulnerable to terrorist activity if we do not take the initiative with the Government of Indonesia in building its maritime security forces.

What is the impact on our ability to support the Government of Indonesia if the Congress maintains sanctions on the Government of Indonesia?

Answer. Current sanctions apply to providing equipment to the Indonesian Armed Forces. The United States provides training and education to the Armed Forces through the Defense Department's Regional Defense CT Fellowship (RDCTF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. The United States also provides assistance for reform and counterterrorism purposes to the Indonesian National Police (INP), which has the lead role in domestic security functions.

Legislative sanctions on Indonesia in section 572(a) of the 2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act restrict the export of lethal defense articles and use of FMF funds for the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) until the Secretary of State certifies that certain conditions are met, including countering international terrorism in a manner consistent with democratic principles and the rule of law, prosecuting and punishing members of the Armed Forces guilty of gross human rights violations, cooperating with civilian judicial authorities and with international efforts to resolve cases of gross violations of human rights in East Timor and elsewhere, and greater transparency and accountability in military finances. (The only exception, in section 590(a) of the FOAA, is the ability to provide \$1 million in FMF for the Indonesian Navy, if the Secretary of State certifies that the Indonesian Navy is not violating human rights and is cooperating with investigations into alleged violations of human rights.) Concrete steps must be taken by Indonesia to address the requirements of section 572(a), before any further FMF assistance is provided.

Through IMET, we seek to begin to incrementally improve TNI's capability to fulfill its legitimate role in Indonesia's emerging democracy, in coordination with demonstrated and concrete improvements in their respect for human rights and accountability to the civilian government. The RDCTF program also builds capacity for TNI's legitimate security role. This balanced approach is necessary so that our support for the Government of Indonesia engenders sustainable results and remains consistent with democratic principles.

The equipment restrictions have the greatest impact in areas where there is limited or no civilian law enforcement capability, or where the military plays a significant collaborative role. Currently the Indonesian Armed Forces have significant roles in fields such as maritime security, intelligence, mobility, logistics, border security and communications, which are hampered by inadequate government budgets. They are also responsible for providing assistance to the INP in any situations exceeding police capabilities.

Question. I understand the Department of State has not yet provided the certification necessary to release the \$1 million in FMF for the Government of Indonesia. Can you tell us the status of the certification process?

Answer. Section 590(a) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2005, authorizes \$1 million in FMF assistance for the Indonesian Navy if the Secretary of State certifies to Congress that the Indonesian Navy is not violating human rights and is cooperating with investigations into alleged violations of human rights.

Consistent with this requirement, the Department is investigating reports of potential human rights violations by the Indonesian Navy. Indonesian democracy has advanced significantly since former President Suharto stepped down, but its democratic institutions and civil-military relations are still developing. We hope to provide the certification as soon as we can determine it is warranted.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

Question. The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri is deeply troubling, particularly as there appears to be much finger-pointing in Beirut to-

wards Syria. What actions do you anticipate taking should Syria's complicity—directly or indirectly—be determined in this murder?

Answer. At this point we do not know who is responsible for the brutal murder of former Prime Minister Hariri and 18 others on February 14, 2005. Those responsible for this heinous attack must be brought to justice as soon as possible.

We support the United Nations Secretary General's appointment of Mr. Peter Fitzgerald to head an independent U.N. commission of inquiry to examine the causes, circumstances, and consequences of the Hariri murder.

We expect cooperation without reservations from both the Lebanese and Syrian authorities with the Fitzgerald team. We look forward to the report to the U.N. Secretariat on the results of the inquiry.

Question. What programs or activities is State doing to bolster democracy and the rule of law in Lebanon?

Answer. We support several programs which bolster Lebanese democracy and reform. Through our AID programs and MEPI grants, we are strengthening the foundation for good governance and civil society in Lebanon, including improving municipal governance, media training, supporting civic education, and increasing Parliament's responsiveness. IMET funding reinforces the democratic principle of civilian control of the military as well as reduces sectarianism in one of the country's major institutions.

However, progress is hampered by the legacy of the civil war, the presence of Syrian forces and continued Syrian interference in Lebanese politics. We will therefore continue calling for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, including the full and immediate withdrawal of all Syrian military and intelligence forces. We will also continue to insist that Lebanon's forthcoming parliamentary elections must be verifiably free, fair, and competitive, conducted without outside interference, and guaranteed by international observers.

Question. The supplemental request contains \$240 million for democracy and governance activities in Afghanistan. How will these funds support parliamentary elections this spring?

Answer. Of the allotted \$240 million in the supplemental request, \$60 million has been set aside for elections and democracy programs. The United States will use these funds to make a contribution to cover some of the operational and logistical activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)—the primary organization responsible for the conduct of the elections. We expect other donors also to contribute funding for the costs of U.N. support of the elections.

The democracy and elections funding will also cover the activities of other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in support of the elections. These organizations will implement programs to register voters, provide logistical and other operational support for the elections, conduct voter and civic education, and provide elections observers. In addition, the funding will cover programs to train parliamentarians, provincial and district council members.

As in the October 2004 presidential election, the media will play an essential role in providing civic education and critical coverage of and information about the upcoming elections. Therefore the United States will also support independent media through funding for radio broadcasting and professional training for journalists for the elections.

UKRAINE/BELARUS

Question. The supplemental request contains \$60 million to further democratic gains in Ukraine.

Are any funds intended to support the Chernobyl sarcophagus?

Answer. No. The Administration has not asked for any funds to support the Chernobyl sarcophagus as part of the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request. Since 1997, the USG has committed \$158 million of the \$717 million pledged by 26 countries and the European Commission to safely confine the aging sarcophagus. The EBRD now estimates that the total cost of the project will reach \$1.091 billion. It is unclear if the international community will be able to fund the shortfall.

Question. Are the Russians paying their fair share of the Chernobyl sarcophagus?

Answer. The Chernobyl decommissioning and the shelter implementation project are being paid for by a consortium of 26 international donors. The Russian Federation has not contributed to this effort. Russia takes the view that it was not part of the G7 agreement on this with the government of Ukraine, but now that Russia is within the G8, we have the prospect of persuading them. We have pressed them on this issue and we expect to continue to do so.

Question. Given the success of elections in Ukraine in advancing democracy in the region, why were no funds requested to promote freedom in Belarus?

Answer. While we agree that promoting democracy and freedom in Belarus are worthy goals, and we will devote virtually all of the \$6.5 million in fiscal year 2005 Freedom Support Act funding for Belarus to that effort, we also recognize that promoting freedom in Belarus is an ongoing and long-term effort. Therefore the judgment was made that this was not appropriate for an emergency supplemental request. Nevertheless, we have asked for additional money for fiscal year 2006 to work for freedom in Belarus.

Question. What programs or material support is contemplated through the \$50 million to improve the flow of Palestinian goods and services?

Answer. The USG supports establishing a World Bank-recommended pilot program to upgrade and improve the passages through which Palestinian goods and people transit to Israel and the rest of the world. This project will help ensure that Israeli security needs are met as disengagement goes forward, and will respond to Israel's continuing effort to find the appropriate balance between the imperative need to respond to terrorism and the humanitarian interests of the Palestinian people.

This is urgently needed in order to help the Palestinian economy recover and become less dependent on outside assistance, something in the mutual interest of the USG, Palestinians, Israelis and the donor community. Such a pilot program would focus on a total management approach to improving the crossings. The project could include the provision of the latest generation of cargo scanners and other technology to ensure that freedom of movement and security concerns are addressed. It would also lower the cost of doing business by improving the infrastructure, technology, efficiency, and professionalism of the crossings.

To this end, we would use \$50 million of the supplemental to contribute to such a project. We anticipate underwriting mutually agreed-upon programs through U.S. direct procurement of goods and services or other mechanisms as appropriate. We would implement the project in coordination and cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government, the World Bank, and the broader donor community.

Question. Is Israel the intended recipient of this assistance?

Answer. The main goal of the supplemental assistance is to help both Palestinians and Israelis move forward together on key economic issues that must be addressed in order to seize the opportunity for peace.

Chief among these economic issues is improving the flow of Palestinian goods and people. Accordingly, the USG supports establishing a World Bank-recommended pilot program to upgrade and improve the passages through which Palestinian goods and people transit to Israel and the rest of the world. This project will help ensure that Israeli security needs are met as disengagement goes forward, and will respond to Israel's continuing effort to find the appropriate balance between the imperative need to respond to terrorism and the humanitarian interests of the Palestinian people.

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Question. Why does the \$200 million supplemental request exclude funding for the West Bank and Gaza from restrictions contained in current law—specifically, restrictions on funding for the Palestinian Authority?

Answer. The President requested the notwithstanding authority to allow us maximum flexibility to implement assistance quickly for Palestinians. We will, of course, keep the Hill fully informed of our proposed programs.

Question. Will assistance be provided directly to the PA, and if so, for what purpose?

Answer. We do not have any plans to provide direct budget support to the Palestinian Authority at this time, but would like to keep the option available, particularly in light of the PA's estimated \$500 million budget gap for 2005. We are encouraging others, including Arab states, to contribute to the PA in order to mitigate this budgetary shortfall. In December 2004 the President utilized the waiver authority provided in section 552(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 to provide \$20 million in budget support to the PA Finance Ministry to pay utility bills in arrears to Israel; we also provided \$20 million in budget support to the PA in June 2003 for payment of utility bills and badly needed infrastructure improvements. USAID has maintained a complete accounting of these funds.

Question. How will State and USAID ensure that assistance for the West Bank/Gaza will not benefit—directly or indirectly—terrorists or terrorist organizations, including Hamas?

Answer. This is an issue we take most seriously. The U.S. Government, working through USAID, maintains close accounting of all USG funds. Working with the full range of agencies and resources available at Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem, USAID carries out background checks on all Palestinian NGOs that are recipients of funds to ensure there are no links to terrorist organizations or to organizations that advocate or practice violence. We have confidence in the fiscal accountability and transparency established by the PA through the efforts of PA Finance Minister Fayyad.

USG assistance is not provided directly to the PA but is channeled primarily through existing mechanisms, including United States, Palestinian, and international NGOs. Since 1995, the GAO has conducted five separate program reviews, one each in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2003. None of these reviews has reported any irregularities in the management or controls of ESF funds by USAID or its contractors and grantees. Since then, the USAID Mission has developed a comprehensive risk assessment strategy. All Mission institutional contracts and grants—of which there are approximately 100—are audited on an annual basis by local accounting firms under the guidance and direction of USAID's Inspector General.

The United States also funds a program in the West Bank and Gaza to help ensure UNRWA's facilities are not being misused for political purposes or militant activity. Operation Support Officers (OSO's) regularly visit and inspect UNRWA facilities. We also receive a report every six months from UNRWA noting any abuse, or attempted abuse, of its facilities. In this regard, UNRWA has an excellent record.

Question. How much have Arab states pledged to the Palestinians, and how many of these pledges remain unmet? Have there been any additional pledges since the election of Abu Mazen?

Answer. The IMF provides the USG with updates on contributions to the Palestinian Authority. Major contributors since 2002 include: Saudi Arabia, which has provided bi-monthly budgetary support in the amount of approximately \$15 million; Libya (contributed \$11 million in 2004); and Tunisia (contributed \$2 million in 2004). Several other Arab states have made pledges to the Palestinian Authority in 2002, which currently remain unmet. We are encouraging them, and others, to recognize the opportunity that now exists and do what they can to help the PA close its budget gap and support the new PA leadership as it moves forward with reforms and a renewed dialogue for peace.

Question. Is the United States satisfied with the amount pledged by Arab states? What more could they be doing to help further prospects for peace?

Answer. The Administration recognizes that this is the most promising moment for progress between Israelis and Palestinians in recent years and we will do all we can to take advantage of this moment of opportunity in the weeks and months ahead. This includes encouraging the international community to play a key role in supporting Israeli and Palestinian efforts. We want to work with others, in particular Gulf Arab states that have made financial commitments to the Palestinians to do more to provide much needed financial support. We are urging them to help strengthen the Palestinian Authority at this crucial point by providing additional financial assistance.

Other nations in the region have a wider responsibility to support peace and reconciliation, as well as following through or increasing their financial assistance to the Palestinians. Securing additional assistance in the near term can reinforce to Palestinians the international community's commitment to support and strengthen the PA.

Recently, Egypt and Jordan reaffirmed their critical roles in supporting the peace process: Egypt hosted the February 8 summit at Sharm El Sheikh where the basis for a cease fire was agreed upon by the Israelis and the Palestinians, and Jordan has agreed to reinstate formal diplomatic relations. These are important steps in bringing stability to the region and in helping to resolve future disagreements.

Question. What safeguards do State and USAID contemplate to ensure that tsunami assistance does not fall victim to corruption?

Answer. The Administration takes very seriously our duty to the American taxpayers to ensure all U.S. assistance is used effectively and for its intended purpose. All USAID grants and contracts are subject to strict monitoring and financial audits, which require implementing partners to establish financial and accounting practices that safeguard U.S. Government funds. USAID will be working with its Office of Inspector General (OIG) to ensure the required financial and performance audits are conducted. The OIG participates directly with USAID's Tsunami Relief

and Reconstruction Task Force in Washington, and the OIG's regional office in Manila is coordinating with Missions in the affected countries.

Question. How does State intend to pursue opportunities for engagement with Indonesia on Aceh, specifically, and in overall relations with Indonesia, generally?

Answer. The successful cooperation between the United States and Indonesian governments in responding to the December 26 tsunami with almost immediate relief and recovery efforts offers an excellent opportunity to build on that momentum in order to strengthen relations with Indonesia. In order to help resolve the separatist conflict in Aceh, we will continue our support of the Yudhoyono administration's efforts to engage the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in peace talks. We have communicated our belief that the conflict in Aceh cannot be resolved through military means and that any negotiations must include Acehenese civil society. In this way, those who have paid the highest cost of both the conflict and the devastating tsunami will have a voice in how rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts move forward. In the wake of the tsunami, we have seen both overall violence and human rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military (TNI) and GAM decrease. Acehenese civil society has responded to this opening of social and political space by becoming a more visible and active force. We have encouraged the GOI to use this momentum to find a peaceful solution that will not only end the conflict in Aceh, but also result in the overall strengthening of Indonesia's democracy. In addition, the certification of full International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs will help to raise the professional standards of TNI, offering training in respect for democratic institutions and human rights. Military reforms are essential in completing Indonesia's democratic transition, and to improving Indonesia's human rights record. We will also continue to pursue justice on the Timika investigation, an issue of utmost importance to our bilateral relationship. We support President Yudhoyono's efforts to fight corruption and improve Indonesia's economy and investment climate. To that end, Aceh could serve as a model for increased political decentralization and decision-making, improved transparency, and best practices for preventing corruption in the distribution of financial aid and other resources. As the Indonesian government transitions from relief to reconstruction activities in Aceh, the United States will be deeply engaged in long-term infrastructure development projects both inside and also outside Aceh. This poses an excellent opportunity to engage in a new dialogue on business climate reform and foreign investment, key issues in President Yudhoyono's electoral campaign. Our exchange and training programs that are part of the President's Education Initiative in Indonesia also present a new avenue of engagement that will strengthen cultural exchange, improve the quality of teaching and learning, and help Indonesia prepare its youth to be effective participants in a democratic society that works to reduce intolerance.

Question. Do you see a requirement for additional tsunami-related assistance in the future?

Answer. The international outpouring of assistance to tsunami victims has been truly remarkable. USAID reports that, as of February 8, just over \$7.8 billion has been pledged in bilateral aid, as well as from the multilateral development banks. In addition, corporations and private citizens around the world have donated extremely generously. Drawing from publicly available sources, USAID reports that over \$2.9 billion has been raised from private sources world-wide.

Early damage assessments indicate reconstruction costs will be between \$1.5–\$2 billion in Sri Lanka, between \$3.5–\$4.5 billion in Indonesia and \$304 million for the Maldives. India has announced plans for a \$2.3 billion reconstruction program and expressed interest in World Bank support. Thailand has not requested international financial assistance, but has asked for U.S. technical assistance. While there may be some upward revision of these figures as full needs assessments are finalized, we do not anticipate significant changes. Given the resources already pledged, we do not anticipate any further U.S. funding beyond the President's \$950 million request.

IRAQ

Question. Given the success of Voice for Humanity's (VFH) pilot project in Iraq in support of parliamentary elections, what plans does the State Department have for expanding these activities to support future polls?

Answer. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) seeks to support innovative, cutting-edge democracy programs with its Human Rights and Democracy Fund, and is proud to have provided the initial funding for the Voice for Humanity's (VFH) first Afghanistan project, in partnership with the International Republican Institute (IRI). USAID then funded a sec-

ond project to support the October 9, 2004, presidential election. USAID funded the third project, undertaken in Iraq, which helped build support for national unity and the January 30, 2005, national elections among the rival tribal and religious groups.

VFH specializes in using technology to deliver information and training in the context of indigenous social networks. In Afghanistan and Iraq, VFH has implemented civic education projects to reach people in remote areas who were the most resistant to the messages of democracy and human rights. In Iraq, those who listened to the VFH programs reported that listening helped them decide to vote.

The Department of State and USAID are currently in discussion with VFH on a variety of projects worldwide, including support for future polls in Iraq, and will notify Congress of any projects we seek to fund.

Question. Given the portability of VFH's devices, is the State Department willing to find VFH programs targeted toward Iran and North Korea?

Answer. VFH has developed a solar powered, handheld digital audio player to convey in-depth and consistent information that respects the known and trusted relational networks relied upon by oral communicators. VFH's simple to use device, called a Voice player, is capable of playing over 80 hours of indexed content, depending on the size of the memory chip. Modular "plug and play" chips make it a potential oral library of valuable information and educational materials. Among its features, the Voice player can provide reference and educational information in a format that can be replayed, discussed, and shared with others.

The portability of VFH's devices make them a useful way to communicate information and education about democracy, human rights, and political freedom at the grassroots level. While the results are still being evaluated, we recognize the potential applicability of these devices to closed societies, such as Iran and North Korea.

With respect to Iran, the fiscal year 2005 appropriation for democracy programs includes not less than \$3 million in Economic Support Fund assistance to make grants to educational, humanitarian and non-governmental organizations, and individuals to support the advancement of democracy and human rights inside Iran. DRL is implementing this program, and announced an open competition for assistance awards for projects pertaining to Iran. The competition closed in late May, and DRL is highly pleased by the large number of proposals received. The Voice for Humanity project falls within the scope of the official Request for Proposals for Iran. However, the Bureau has not yet identified any group for funding, and will only do so after conducting an open, fair, and competitive review of all proposals received. The Department will notify Congress of which Iran projects it hopes to fund this summer, prior to obligating funds.

The Department of State is currently exploring means to improve the abysmal human rights conditions in North Korea and to support the democratic aspirations of the North Korean people. As we work to implement the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 and build on the North Korea programs already supported by the Department, we are considering a variety of means to improve North Koreans' access to information.

Question. Please explain why police training activities in Iraq are included under DOD authorities, rather than the State Department's INCLE account.

Answer. In order to consolidate the leadership of Coalition efforts to quickly establish robust Iraqi security forces, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD-36) on May 10, 2004. This Directive states that USCENTCOM shall be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. The Commander, USCENTCOM, along with policy guidance from the Chief of Mission, directs all U.S. Government efforts and coordinates international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training of all Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi Police Service. Consequently, by Presidential directive, police training is under DOD authority and therefore does not fall under State Department's INCLE account. The State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs supports DOD's efforts in this regard by managing the Jordan International Police Training Center; furnishing civilian International Police Liaison Officers through its contractor, DynCorp and supplying Police Trainers through an interagency agreement with the Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). DOD receives and distributes all funding for police training.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY

Question. Could you please describe the process that you will go through to decide which of our allies in the War on Iraq will receive economic aid or security assistance? Specifically, what are your criteria?

Answer. Funds will be allocated to countries based on a determination by the President that a timely infusion of economic assistance will support the Global War on Terror. These funds will help strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance democracy and stability around the world.

Question. While I support the need for additional funds for drug eradication—which is a vital component to ensuring security—are you providing viable options for alternative sources of income? Specifically, have you worked with USDA or USAID to provide assistance or education in other agricultural endeavors?

Answer. The USG's five-part plan for providing counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan covers eradication, law enforcement, interdiction, public information, and, just as vitally, development of alternative livelihoods. The U.S. interagency, including USAID, is working closely together and with officials from the United Kingdom and Afghan governments, to ensure that a coordinated alternative livelihood effort will cushion the economic effects of poppy eradication for small farmers in Afghanistan.

We recently notified Congress of \$70 million in fiscal year 2005 and prior-year DA and ESF reprogramming for alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan. Current USAID programs are focused on making a quick impact, including cash-for-work projects that build farm-to-market roads and clean out irrigation ditches, among other infrastructure. In 2005, as part of our overall counternarcotics strategy, we will undertake regional economic growth initiatives focusing on planting high-value crops, utilizing new agriculture technologies, and developing credit, financial, and business-development services.

This year alternative livelihood programs will focus on up to seven provinces with the most extensive poppy cultivation. Other donor nations, including the United Kingdom as the lead nation on counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan, will focus on additional poppy-growing provinces.

On the ground in Afghanistan, representatives from USAID and the Department of State work within many Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. USDA representatives are also on hand at several of the PRTs, providing their agricultural expertise as alternative livelihood programs are implemented.

The United States is not the only government involved in funding alternative livelihood programs in Afghanistan. The United Kingdom government, for example, recently announced that it will double its Afghanistan counternarcotics contribution this year to \$100 million, with fully half going toward alternative livelihood programs. Also, several nations, including Finland, Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have pledged a total of \$20 million to U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) programs in Afghanistan, which include alternative development projects.

Question. The Supplemental includes \$200 million to provide critical economic assistance to U.S. allies in the Global War on Terror. What constitutes "critical economic assistance?"

Answer. While many of our coalition partners have the ability to shoulder the costs of troop contributions and other support requirements, many other of our partners in freedom have limited national budgets to offset these costs. In many cases, these willing allies are faced with constrained budget resources while at the same time facing a growing demand from their citizens for increased social spending. Thus, this Fund reflects the principle that an investment in a partner in freedom today will help ensure that America will stand united with stronger partners in the future. The criticality of these funds is to ensure that we:

- Support the broader strategy against terrorism.
- Prevent/diminish economic and political dislocation that threatens security of key friends and allies.
- Promote economic growth, good governance and democracy; mitigating root cause of terrorism.
- Offset budget costs associated with troop contributions that would otherwise support increasing civil demands for social programs.
- Programs may include:
 - Enhanced support for border security units and improving interdiction and enforcement infrastructure of counternarcotics units
 - Accelerate training and equipping border personnel to prevent illegal migration, smuggling of goods, narcotics trafficking and transiting of terrorists.

Without the immediate influx of assistance supporting these objectives and our partners, our ability to conduct the Global War on Terror could easily be reversed.

Question. How will these funds help strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance democracy and stability around the world?

Answer. Economic dislocation and political strife continue to place great strains on many of our coalition partners. In such circumstances, bilateral economic assist-

ance can help to prevent or diminish economic and political dislocation that may threaten the security of these key friends and allies.

By promoting economic growth, good governance, and strong democratic institutions, U.S. assistance can ease the economic and political disparity that often underlies social tension and can lead to radical, violent reactions against government institutions. To this end, economic assistance programs can assist in mitigating the root causes of terrorism.

There are currently 49 countries and NATO contributing forces to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as a number of other coalition partners providing support to these operations through base access, over-flight rights, and intelligence support. Further, there are a number of other partners fighting terrorism to promote freedom in other parts of the world.

While many of our coalition partners have the ability to shoulder the costs of troop contributions and other support requirements, many other of our partners in freedom have limited national budgets to offset these costs. In many cases, these willing allies are faced with constrained budget resources while at the same time facing a growing demand from their citizens for increased social spending. Thus, this Fund reflects the principle that an investment in a partner in freedom today will help ensure that America will stand united with stronger partners in the future.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

Question. Can you tell me what role microcredit will play in Tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts of USAID?

Answer. Microcredit can jump-start economic activities for individuals and markets by helping affected households rebuild assets and income-generating activities. USAID partners such as microcredit organizations are important actors in the relief and reconstruction effort. They can offer financial services to rehabilitate small businesses and finance other household needs.

Like thousands of households across the Indian Ocean, microcredit organizations have suffered losses due to the tsunami. For example, Sri Lanka's Women's Development Federation lost five full-time staff and 13 volunteers. Among its 32,000 borrowers, approximately 1,000 are dead or missing. As a result, affected households are having difficulty accessing savings and new loans as microcredit organizations are not fully operational. In Sri Lanka, USAID is enabling microcredit organizations to restart operations, thereby helping people and businesses get back on their feet.

USAID recognizes that microcredit is not for every affected household. Targeted grants and business support services are also essential to USAID plan for reconstruction in tsunami-affected areas.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Question. The President's request calls for \$780 million for general peacekeeping activities worldwide, of which up to \$55 million can be used for U.S. contributions to a Sudan War Crimes Tribunal. What are the Administration's concerns with referring this to the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a recipient of this funding? I think building regional capacity is increasingly important in Africa. How does the Administration's plan for a hybrid court promote this idea?

Answer. Our overall ICC policy is consistent with the American Servicemembers' Protection Act, passed by the Congress with strong bipartisan support, which prohibits assistance and support for the ICC. We believe the Rome Statute establishing the ICC is fundamentally flawed and cannot support it. It creates a prosecutorial system that is an unchecked power and is open for exploitation and politically motivated prosecutions. A referral by the UNSC would not address these fundamental ongoing concerns we have with the ICC, and our concerns about the exposure of U.S. servicemembers, officials, aid workers, and other citizens to unwarranted investigation and prosecution by the ICC.

At the same time, we strongly support a call for accountability for the on-going human rights violations and atrocities in Darfur, and believe that a "Sudan Tribunal"—created and mandated by a UNSC resolution and administered by the African Union (AU) and the United Nations—is the best means of providing this accountability.

This approach would respect the AU role in building institutions and solving problems in Africa. It also would ensure African ownership in securing justice and accountability on the continent, while giving it strong support and expertise from the United Nations and the international community. The AU has played a critical lead-

ership role in international efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur; this type of court would allow the AU to continue that leadership role as accountability is pursued and would also contribute to development of the AU's overall judicial capacity on the continent.

Question. What portion of the funding for peacekeeping activities will go for troops on the ground in Darfur and how many troops will that provide? Will these forces be provided by the African Union?

Answer. The U.N. peace monitoring operation in Sudan is to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Bureau of African Affairs is providing support to the African Union Mission in Sudan, whose authorized troop strength is 3,320. The United States has committed about \$95 million to the African Union mission to date. The proposed U.N. mission, estimated to cost \$1.009 billion for the first twelve months, will involve phased deployment of up to 10,130 military personnel, 755 civilian police officers, 1,018 international staff, 2,263 Sudanese staff and 214 U.N. volunteers. The United Nations has initiated contingency planning for Darfur to assist the African Union mission and to support implementation of a future agreement in Darfur in cooperation with the African Union. The United Nations also plans to deploy human rights monitors to Darfur. The Security Council resolution that the United States has circulated requests the United Nations to complete a full assessment for its engagement in Darfur within 30 days.

Question. On an additional note, many of my colleagues and I remain very concerned about the emerging scandal involving U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the reported sexual exploitation and severe misconduct against civilians. I am interested to know what is being done to ensure that U.S. dollars are not being funneled to operations where troops are engaging in severe exploitation of civilians. Is this misconduct being addressed on a bilateral level with host or contributing troop countries?

Answer. The United States circulated a draft U.N. Security Council Resolution that would require the U.N. Secretariat to take concrete measures to effectively combat sexual exploitation and abuse. The resolution specifically addresses the requirement of pre-deployment training, rapid and thorough investigations, commitment by troop contributors to undertake disciplinary measures against perpetrators and their commanders. We anticipate that the draft resolution will be considered after the U.N. General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) completes its review of a proposed strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

On the diplomatic front, we are demarching troop contributing countries to take swift action to investigate and punish those troops who committed sexual abuse while serving as U.N. peacekeepers. Additionally, the United States and Japan, as chair of the Committee on Peacekeeping, sent a joint letter to SYG Annan, encouraging the United Nations to adopt effective preventive measures, as well as procedures to ensure that perpetrators are disciplined and if necessary, prosecuted.

Also, with a State Department grant of US\$200,000, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has produced: (i) awareness-raising posters and brochures on sexual exploitation and abuse, which are being distributed in all missions; and (ii) a DPKO Human Trafficking Resource Package, which provides practical guidance for peacekeeping operations on how best to combat human trafficking.

Question. This request would provide \$63 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Sudan to support the good-faith implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan. The President's request reads, "these funds will be used primarily to support activities in south Sudan, such as building infrastructure, health, governance, education, capacity-building, and the local purchase of food." What is meant by "primarily used"—does this mean that these funds may be used elsewhere? Where else would the President use this funding?

Answer. It is USAID's intention to use the bulk of the funding for assistance to southern Sudan. However, within the appropriate legislative parameters, our plan for funding includes activities in the transition zone between North and South, which is part of northern Sudan. These areas act like a fault zone of an earthquake where radicals on each side live side by side and where conflict could easily erupt. The importance of the three areas (Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile) in the transition zone was highlighted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement due to their particular importance during the interim period. Thus, USAID requests flexibility to use the supplemental funds strategically in northern Sudan in areas that may be susceptible to conflict, inundated with returnees, or newly accessible for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

Question. The President has requested \$150 million to reimburse accounts for funds used to address "emergency food needs for the growing population of individ-

uals in need of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region of Sudan and would allow additional U.S. contributions to this and other critical food situations.” What other critical food situations do you anticipate? In addition, how much of that \$150 million is expected to reimburse accounts?

Answer. In addition to the burgeoning food crisis in Darfur and Sudan’s transition areas, rapidly deteriorating food situations in Ethiopia and Eritrea will quickly overwhelm existing donor resources. This year it is anticipated that beneficiary numbers could surpass 13 million in these two countries alone, generating emergency food requirements approaching \$750 million. USAID has already re-prioritized and re-allocated its Title II funding to provide \$220 million for Ethiopia and Eritrea; however these supplemental funds will be required to assist in the prevention of famine. If supplemental funding becomes available, USAID prioritizes Sudan, but requests flexibility to program some funding to meet urgent emergency needs in these two countries. Given the critical nature of these needs, supplemental funding will primarily be used to meet ongoing needs rather than reimburse accounts. These supplemental resources will help meet immediate shortfalls in Sudan and the Horn, and help address anticipated severe food pipeline breaks in these and other food assistance programs in Africa during the last months of the fiscal year.

Question. What specific measure of funding will be provided to ensure the safety of vulnerable children in tsunami affected areas? In particular, what needs to be done to ensure that all children separated from family or orphaned are documented properly to avoid the risk of exploitation or trafficking?

Answer. The USG contributed \$62 million to the distribution of aid to areas devastated by the tsunami. The Department plans to provide approximately \$1 million on two specific anti-trafficking in persons programs to support prevention activities in India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.

—One project in India provides assistance to Catholic Relief Services and a network of Indian anti-trafficking in persons NGOs for rehabilitation assistance to children in the tsunami affected areas of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.

—One project in Sri Lanka provides assistance to the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) for \$350,000 to raise awareness about the risk of trafficking among vulnerable groups, mainly women and children. It will also help tsunami-displaced persons obtain legal services needed to document land claims and file missing persons reports.

—One project in Indonesia provides assistance to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to use up to \$200,000 for immediate protection of unaccompanied children.

Funding will also be made available for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to conduct a public awareness campaign in the tsunami-affected areas of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India.

—IOM will work in camps and in damaged towns to raise awareness about trafficking and the dangers of trafficking schemes so neither children nor adults fall victim.

The vast majority of orphaned children throughout the tsunami-affected region have found homes with extended families or others in their local community. In order to ensure that children orphaned or separated from their parents are not trafficked or exploited, officials from the government and/or international organizations must register all children in camps.

—In Indonesia, UNICEF and IOM are registering all children and providing secure areas within camps for those orphaned or separated.

—In India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, the governments have registered separated or orphaned children while working closely with non-governmental organizations to find extended family members.

Question. The President has requested “\$200 million for assistance to help Palestinians build democratic institutions, develop infrastructure, and support critical sectors such as education, home construction, and basic social services. Of these funds, up to \$50 million will also be used on programs to help Israelis and Palestinians work together on economic and social matters, including movement of people and goods in and out of Israel.” Does the Administration have any plans to attach specific requirements to this funding?

Answer. The \$200 million in supplemental assistance for the West Bank and Gaza project assistance is intended to support reform and expand economic opportunities for the Palestinian people, including job creation. The assistance will help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It will also assist Palestinians with institution building, civil society strengthening and infrastructure development—necessary foundations for democracy and revitalizing the economy. Much of the assistance is targeted to help the PA provide basic social services that Hamas cur-

rently provides, particularly in Gaza. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.

Question. Last year, we spent \$84.8 million on direct USAID grants to NGOs working in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, we gave \$40 million to the United Nation's Relief and Works Agency's Emergency Appeal for the West Bank and Gaza and another \$87.4 million to UNRWA's general account, much of which is spent in the West Bank and Gaza. The UNRWA's Commissioner-General (who steps down at the end of March) Peter Hansen has openly admitted that his agency hired known members of Hamas. Do we have plans in place to ensure that no U.S. dollars, whether from this supplemental or other funding streams, end up in the hands of terrorists?

Answer. This is an issue we take most seriously. The U.S. Government, working through USAID, maintains close accounting of all USG funds. Working with the full range of agencies and resources available at Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem, USAID carries out background checks on all Palestinian NGOs that are recipients of funds to ensure there are no links to terrorist organizations or to organizations that advocate or practice violence.

Since 1995, the GAO has conducted four separate program reviews, one each in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. None of these reviews has reported any irregularities in the management or controls of ESF funds by USAID or its contractors and grantees. Since then, the USAID Mission has developed a comprehensive risk assessment strategy. All Mission institutional contacts and grants—of which there are approximately 100—are audited on an annual basis by local accounting firms under the guidance and direction of USAID's Inspector General.

The United States also funds a program in the West Bank and Gaza to help ensure UNRWA's facilities are not being misused for political purposes or militant activity. Operation Support Officers (OSO's) regularly visit and inspect UNRWA facilities. We also receive a report every six months from UNRWA noting any abuse, or attempted abuse, of its facilities. In this regard, UNRWA has an excellent record.

Question. The President has requested \$150 million in military financing for Pakistan in the Supplemental. He has also requested \$150 million in military financing for Pakistan in his fiscal year 2006 Budget. What is the reason as to why this funding is being parceled out in two separate requests instead of being sent to Congress in the regular cycle as one request?

Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 request for Pakistan was \$300 million in ESF and \$300 million in FMF. Congress provided \$300 million in ESF, but only authorized \$150 million in FMF for Pakistan, directing the Administration to take the remaining \$150 million from unobligated, prior-year ESF and FMF balances. Because FMF is "obligated upon apportionment" and pursuant to the transfer statute in the fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act, there are no unobligated FMF funds. Reprogramming unobligated ESF funds for military purposes runs counter to the traditional view of the Foreign Operations Subcommittees that funds provided for economic purposes should not be transferred for military purposes. This is further codified in permanent legislation in section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits the transfer of ESF into FMF. Furthermore, tapping \$150 million in unobligated ESF would cause us to cut significantly ongoing programs supported by the Committees.

De-obligating and reprogramming prior-year FMF funds to make up for the shortfall would be a strategic mistake. In fiscal year 2004, 87 percent of discretionary FMF went to Coalition partners with troops in Iraq or Afghanistan, countries providing critical support to military operations associated with OIF or OEF, and front-line states in the Global War on Terrorism. Taking funds already committed to these countries would be inconsistent with national priorities, would send a mixed message to our key partners, and thwart capabilities needed to fight the Global War on Terrorism. Of the remaining 13 percent, and excluding FMF for Colombia, only \$48.5 million in FMF is left for all of the remaining countries in the world. Totally eliminating every other existing FMF program is not a viable option nor would it approach the funding needed to make up the Pakistan shortfall. This limited amount of FMF provides modest amounts to dozens of countries primarily in East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and supports basic goals that the FMF program was designed to accomplish.

If the Supplemental does not contain the \$150 million requested, there is a risk the United States will fail to deliver fully the first tranche of its five-year pledge and that there will not be significant near-term improvements in Pakistani military capabilities essential to the war on terrorism. We have strongly supported Pakistan's improvements in border security and control as a tool to win the war on ter-

rorism. The Administration request encourages and allows Pakistan to continue to improve its capabilities, which are essential in the war on terrorism.

In fiscal year 2006, the request for \$300 million in FMF is part of the regular budget and represents the second year of the Presidential commitment.

Question. We were very generous to Pakistan last year, appropriating a total of \$450 million to them for military and economic aid in various accounts. Do you have concerns that Pakistan is leveraging some of this direct aid against India by investing it in weaponry that could be used in Kashmir or other border conflicts? Do we have the mechanisms in place that allow us to oversee how they are spending American taxpayer dollars?

Answer. If the Pakistanis are to make the hard choices needed to support us in the war on terror, they must be confident of our support, and the United States must be prepared to make the long-term commitment to Pakistan called for in the 9/11 Commission Report. The President has made a commitment to Pakistan of an aid package totaling \$3 billion over five years, starting with fiscal year 2005.

There are manifold mechanisms in place to monitor all tax monies spent in Pakistan and elsewhere. Of the \$300 million appropriated in fiscal year 2005 in Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources, \$200 million will be provided to the Government of Pakistan as budget support and will be spent in accordance with a set of "Shared Objectives" worked out between the two governments. The remaining funds in ESF, or around \$100 million, and an additional \$49 million in Development Assistance, will be spent by USAID on education reform, democracy and governance, basic health services, and economic growth. USAID, of course, has a long record of oversight for monies they expend.

FMF funds will provide the Pakistani military with capabilities that contribute to counter-terrorism operations, enhance border security, and meet Pakistan's legitimate defense needs without upsetting the military balance between India and Pakistan. FMF monies are monitored throughout the process through the arms transfers decision-making process. Congress maintains oversight through notifications as required by the Arms Export Control Act. Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) include appropriate language regarding the recipient government's commitment to provide adequate protection to defense articles procured from the USG. The country team monitors these sales, regardless of dollar amount.

Question. The President has requested \$299 million be directed to the government of Jordan for various anti-terror and military uses. Could you expound upon what the Jordanian government will use this funding for?

Answer. The President's request of \$299 million in supplemental funds for Jordan, includes \$100 million in Foreign Military Funds, \$100 million in Economic Support Funds and \$99 million for the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center.

The \$100 million in Foreign Military Funds will meet an urgent need to significantly improve Jordan's border security capabilities in the near-term. Funding requested will address the regional security environment and the border security and control threat faced by Jordan. Within the amount requested, \$60 million will be used for border security equipment and infrastructure, including aerostats, sensors, night-vision goggles and ground surveillance radars. The remaining \$40 million will help fund the next phase of Jordan's existing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) program.

The \$100 million in Economic Support Funds will go to support poverty alleviation and job creation to mitigate unemployment and relieve economic dislocation. Reaching these objectives will help King Abdullah and the Government of Jordan stay the course on economic and political reform necessary for the long-term stability of the region.

The Department of Defense has requested \$99 million to assist Jordan in the development of the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center which will significantly improve Jordan's counter-terrorism capabilities and potentially those of our regional allies. Jordan is a key partner in the training Iraqi security forces.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Question. Secretary Rice, since you are asking the American taxpayer to send additional billions of dollars to Iraq, how much more do you expect the 48 countries that make up the "Coalition of the Willing" to contribute—not just pledge, but actually contribute—to Iraqi reconstruction?

Answer. The international community, coalition and non-coalition countries alike, has been very engaged in efforts to rebuild Iraq. Of the \$32 billion in pledges for 2004–2007 at the Madrid Donors' Conference, \$13.584 billion was from non-U.S. sources. Since the Madrid Conference, additional pledges have been announced—

most notably the European Commission's recent pledge of an additional 200 million Euros. Disbursement of these pledges is intended to occur over a four-year period, and while we welcome additional pledges, our current focus is on encouraging donors to accelerate implementation of their planned reconstruction efforts. It is important to note that these figures do not include the significant amounts of humanitarian assistance that many donors have contributed, nor do they reflect the costs of their military contributions.

The security situation represents the largest obstacle to the success of our common reconstruction effort. As the Iraqi political process moves forward and builds upon the January 30 elections, we expect greater engagement by bilateral donors and international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations.

Question. I understand that a new donors conference for Iraqi reconstruction is supposed to take place in Jordan in the coming months. Has the President established any goals for how many billions of dollars in contributions he expects this conference to raise? Or would you advise Congress lower its expectations on this conference raising a substantial amount of new funds for Iraqi reconstruction?

Answer. The fourth meeting of the Donors' Committee of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)—the United Nations and World Bank trust funds—will be held in Amman later this Spring at the invitation of Jordan as host and Canada as chair of the Facility's Donors' Committee. These IRFFI Donors' Committee meetings have not been pledging conferences; rather they have focused on disbursement, implementation, and coordination issues. Of course, any announcements of new assistance would be welcome, but that is not the focus of this meeting. The EU, for example, used the last meeting of the Committee in Tokyo to make an additional pledge of 200 million Euros.

Our key objectives for the meeting are to provide the newly-elected Iraqi Transitional Government the opportunity to articulate Iraq's reconstruction priorities, and to review the progress to date on disbursements and project implementation by donors and by the United Nations and World Bank trust funds that comprise the IRFFI. At the end of 2004, the U.N. trust fund had about \$630 million in deposits and had disbursed about \$115 million on projects. The World Bank trust fund had about \$390 million in deposits and had disbursed about \$11 million.

NORTH KOREA

Question. Secretary Rice, why has the Administration flat-out refused any bilateral talks with North Korea? What is wrong with holding bilateral talks in parallel with multilateral negotiations?

Answer. While we have had bilateral contact with the North Koreans, we feel this is a multilateral problem. We tried the bilateral approach with the Agreed Framework and the North Koreans violated it. We are prepared to speak directly with all the parties, including North Korea, at the Six-Party Talks. Indeed, at the last round of talks in June 2004, the U.S. delegation met directly with the North Korean delegation during the course of the plenary session, and we would be prepared to do so in the context of the Six-Party Talks. However, because North Korea's nuclear program threatens the international community and the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime, it requires a multilateral response and a multilateral solution.

The practical and symbolic effect of the six parties at one table at the same time gives weight to the proceedings, solidarity to the cause, and notice to North Korea that their actions affect the entire region's security and stability.

Question. Where is the balance between carrots and sticks in our approach to North Korea? We have heard the talk about ratcheting up even more sanctions on North Korea, and there has even been loose talk about an increased chance of war. But what are the carrots? What has the United States put on the table to entice the North Koreans to end their nuclear weapons programs?

Answer. While no President would take any option off the table when dealing with matters of national security, we are working with our partners in the Six-Party Talks to resolve this issue through diplomatic means.

The United States tabled a comprehensive proposal at the Third Round of Six-Party Talks, in June 2004, to dismantle the North's nuclear programs irreversibly and verifiably, including its plutonium and uranium programs, and to end the North's international isolation.

Under the U.S. proposal, the DPRK would, as a first step, commit to dismantle all of its nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough, transparent and effectively verifiable manner. The parties would then reach agreement on a detailed implementation plan requiring, at a minimum, supervised disabling, dismantlement and elimination of all nuclear-related facilities and materials; removal of all nuclear

weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program.

We envisage a short initial preparatory period, of perhaps three months' duration, to prepare for the dismantlement and removal of the DPRK's nuclear programs.

During that initial period, the DPRK would: provide a complete listing of all nuclear programs, materials and facilities, including all uranium enrichment activities; cease operations of all of nuclear programs and activities, seal all materials and facilities, and put them under effective monitoring; permit the securing of all fissile material and monitoring of all fuel rods; and permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key centrifuge parts.

Under our proposal, as the DPRK carried out its commitments, other parties would take some corresponding steps. Upon acceptance of the overall approach, non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the DPRK.

Upon acceptance of the DPRK's declaration, and as required DPRK actions called for above were being verifiably accomplished, the parties would also: provide a provisional multilateral security assurance; begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs; begin discussion of steps necessary to lift the remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, and on steps necessary for the removal of the DPRK from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism; and provide technical and financial assistance with the disablement and dismantlement process, including retraining for DPRK scientists and engineers.

Following the initial preparatory period, the parties would complete the remaining steps to accomplish full elimination and removal of all DPRK nuclear programs. The parties would also address the remaining issues that are obstacles to normalization of relations and to economic cooperation.

We remain ready to return to the table at an early date without preconditions. We are prepared to discuss our proposal, and respond to any questions the DPRK may have about it, at the next round of Six-Party Talks.

Diplomatic contacts among all parties are continuing through the Six-Party process. We have made clear to North Korea, both publicly and privately, that we have no intention of invading or attacking. We have also made clear that the Six-Party Talks are the best way for the North to respond to the concerns of the international community by dismantling its nuclear programs irreversibly and verifiably, including its plutonium and uranium programs, and to end its international isolation and reap the benefits of trade, aid and investment.

The other parties—Japan, the ROK, China and Russia—have joined us to urge the North to return to the table and stay there for serious negotiation. While we deplore the DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement of February 10, 2005, in which Pyongyang asserted it had manufactured nuclear weapons, we note that in that and other public statements, the North has left itself room to return to the table.

Question. Secretary Rice, why is the electrical reconstruction project in such a dismal state? How many Iraqi hearts and minds do you think this project has won over, and how many hearts and minds might we have lost for the failure to follow through on Administration promises to keep the lights on in Iraq?

Answer. To give an overview of reconstruction progress in Iraq's electricity sector: as February 27, 2005, there are 80 USG-funded electricity projects in progress and 33 completed. Electricity reconstruction projects span generation, transmission, distribution, control systems and security. To date, USG-funded projects have added over 1,971 MW to Iraq's grid, a 20 percent increase to Iraq's pre-war rated capacity. Of the \$4,369 million designated to the electricity sector designated in the Section 2207 quarterly report, submitted to Congress on January 5, \$4,077 million has been apportioned, \$2,756 million has been obligated to projects and \$830 million has been disbursed on the ground (as of March 2, 2005).

Despite the 1,971 MW added capacity through our projects, electricity supply to Iraqis is stagnant at present owing to two factors: inadequate fuel supplies and insufficient operations and maintenance programs (O&M) for sector assets. Insurgent attacks on pipelines have interrupted the supply of fuels to power plants creating the shortage. Equipment breakdown as a result of insufficient O&M is symptomatic of the great need for capacity building within the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity. The Embassy is working with the Ministries of Oil, Electricity, Defense and Interior to address these issues before the expected record-level demands in Summer 2005, including:

- An MNF-I-chaired infrastructure security cell to coordinate between the military and the Iraqi Ministries of Oil and Electricity.
- The USG's provision of reconstruction funds to maintain two Emergency Rapid Pipeline Repair teams.

- Hosting weekly meetings with the highest levels of the Iraqi government to devise and implement strategies to respond to an ever-changing insurgent campaign to disrupt fuel and power supplies.
- Support for the creation of a unified Iraqi infrastructure security force, which will be responsible for both mobile and static protection of pipelines and transmission wires.
- An ongoing multi-tier capacity building program with 239 Ministry of Electricity employees through USAID to upgrade skills and enable more reliable and efficient power generation.

Power outages and rationing is no doubt difficult, frustrating and costly to Iraqis. Hours of available power average approximately eight hours in Baghdad and nationwide, and range from three hours in the south-central governorates to over 16 hours in some of the northern governorates. While we are unable to estimate the specific impacts of insufficient electricity on the Iraqi population, we know from opinion polls that electricity is Iraqis' second greatest priority after improved security and despite poor electricity service, most feel optimistic about improved economic conditions in the country as a whole. Because the insurgency plays a large role in the availability of electricity, the United States and its Coalition partners are working publicly and diligently to ensure that the Iraqi population that protection and the provision of essential services remain the highest of priorities.

Question. Right now, British forces are in charge of counter-drug operations in Afghanistan. Since the Administration is asking the U.S. taxpayer for \$773 million for this new program, how much money will Britain, NATO, and other countries contribute for these expanded counter-drug programs.

Answer. While the United Kingdom government is playing the lead international role in delivering and coordinating counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan, it is in fact the Afghan government that is in charge of the overall effort. All actions are taken in close consultation with Afghan officials, who are ultimately responsible for counternarcotics operations in their country.

Regarding international donations, the United Kingdom recently announced that it will double its contribution this year to \$100 million, with half of the contribution funding alternative livelihood programs. The United Kingdom has also announced plans to assist the Afghans in establishing a counternarcotics trust fund into which other nations will be able to make contributions, and hopes to raise \$300 million through the fund this year. The trust fund will support the Government of Afghanistan's Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan, which comprehensively addresses the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit narcotics in Afghanistan.

The United States has led discussions on this issue in the North Atlantic Council, the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO's Economic Committee, at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and in informal interactions with diplomats around the world. We have also raised the Afghan narcotics issue in multilateral settings, such as the G-8, the Paris Pact, the International Conference on Afghanistan, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Major Donors Meeting.

These efforts have shown some success; a number of donors, including NATO allies, have contributed to alternative-development and demand-reduction programs, as well as to broader programs in law enforcement and the criminal justice sector. Among G-8 nations, Canada has pledged \$84 million, France \$32.5 million, Germany \$37.6 million, Italy \$36.8 million, and Japan \$70.7 million. Additionally, Russia says it has or will provide about \$92.5 million in assistance for programs related to counternarcotics in Afghanistan, including donations to the Afghan National Army.

Also, nations including Finland, Australia, Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have pledged a total of \$20 million to UNODC projects in Afghanistan that provide for alternative development, monitoring of opium production, drug demand reduction, eradication verification, drug control, interdiction, and counternarcotics enforcement. It is important to note that the Administration's proposed budget request takes into account these contributions.

Question. Why not work to increase British and other foreign military contributions to attack the drug problem? Shouldn't we be seeking to share the burden in Afghanistan? Or is this another case of "when the going gets tough, the Americans take over?"

Answer. As described in the answer to question 6 above, the United States and the United Kingdom are actively seeking contributions from other countries to fund and provide counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan. We agree that the international community should share the burden. The United States has thus raised the issue of counternarcotics assistance for Afghanistan during discussions in the North Atlantic Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO Economic Committee, at the

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and in informal interactions with diplomats from allied nations. We have also sought assistance in multi-lateral settings, such as the G-8, the Paris Pact, the International Conference on Afghanistan, and the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime Major Donors Meeting. The United States will continue to engage other nations, stressing the need to increase and accelerate efforts to support the Afghan government in its counternarcotics fight. The United Kingdom is also engaged in an effort to press other nations, in coordination with our own lobbying efforts.

We believe it is important that the United Kingdom maintain its lead role in providing and coordinating counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan. While the United States should not be taking over, we also must not minimize the effect of Afghanistan's narcotics problem on our own national interests. With record-setting poppy crops in 2004, and indications that the 2005 crop will also be large, the narcotics problem threatens to create a narco-state in Afghanistan, reversing the considerable progress the United States and its allies have made in all sectors of Afghan society over the past three and a half years and jeopardizing the Global War on Terror. The United States must be willing to commit the resources needed to ensure that that does not occur.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Question. Madame Secretary, my understanding is that there is a burgeoning food crisis in Ethiopia. Is there any estimate of how much U.S. food aid is needed in the short term to prevent starvation there?

Answer. For 2005, an estimated 7.3 million people in Ethiopia face food insecurity. The United States will provide \$205 million in food aid. The Government of Ethiopia will utilize two mechanisms to coordinate donor efforts to meet their needs.

—The 2005 Joint Humanitarian Appeal for Ethiopia. The appeal requested 387,482 tons of food valued at \$159 million and will feed an estimated 2.2 million people if fully subscribed by donors. The United States will provide \$65 million in emergency food aid. However, current donor pledges fall short of the overall request. Moreover, it is widely believed that the appeal underestimates needs and that the GOE will increase the appeal level in July.

—The GOE's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). This program seeks to prevent asset depletion at the household level and create assets at the community level through transfers to 5.1 million people. The United States will provide \$140 million to support the PNSP. Without the PNSP, the emergency appeal for 2005 would have been for over 7 million Ethiopians.

All signs indicate that 2005 will be a bad drought year for eastern Ethiopia, with the most critical food problems being experienced in the pastoralist or agro-pastoralist areas. Harvests traditionally run short in March through May, depending on the rains, but we are already seeing signs of distress. In the Afar and Somali Regions, large numbers of out-migrations (families are already moving towards water, food and health care) have already been reported by USAID/Ethiopia.

—In the Afar Region, half of the 1.2 million residents require food aid. There are visible cases of severe malnutrition, high livestock mortality, and early movement of herds from the zone.

—In the Somali Region, there is an immediate nutritional crisis—20 percent global acute malnutrition and an under-five mortality rate of 4.8/10,000 per day.

Question. The legislation that Senator Gregg and I included in the Foreign Operations bill contains a waiver, which allows assistance to go forward to Nigeria if the State Department submits a strategy to Congress outlining how Taylor will be brought to justice. I want to be consulted about this waiver. More importantly, if the waiver is used—and I hope it is not—I want to see a serious plan, with timetables and benchmarks—and not just rhetoric. Otherwise, we will not include a waiver in next year's bill. Could you please describe what progress the State Department has made in developing a strategy for bringing Charles Taylor to justice?

Answer. The Administration and the Congress share a common goal of seeing former Liberian President Charles Taylor appear before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The Administration's strategy for realizing that result is to engage with Nigeria, Liberia, the United Nations, the SCSL, the Economic Community of West African States and other regional organizations, and others to seek the best means of effecting Taylor's transfer to the SCSL, sooner rather than later. The United States is in frequent contact with Nigerian President Obasanjo on this issue, including in meetings with President Bush and former Secretary Powell, and we have made clear that our mutual goal must be for Taylor to be answerable to the SCSL's charges.

In the event that the Administration pursues a waiver to allow security assistance to Nigeria, we will consult with you and other Congressional leaders. In the meantime, we continue to remain alert to threats to Liberia's hard-won stability and that of its neighbors, and are keeping a close watch on Taylor's activities so that he can neither subvert that stability nor return to Liberia. We have encouraged Nigeria to do the same, and have received assurances that they will do so.

COLOMBIA DEMOBILIZATION

Question. We want to support this process, but we need to be confident that it is based on a legal framework that will result in the dismantlement of these groups, and accountability for those who perpetrated atrocities. I hope our Ambassador in Bogot will reinforce this message.

Answer. The United States supports a demobilization that serves the goal of ensuring peace with justice in Colombia. A credible peace process can help end the violence in Colombia and achieve an enduring peace. We continue to work with and assist the Government of Colombia to ensure that its process includes the rapid disarmament and demobilization of illegal armed groups, justice and reparation for victims, and legal accountability for the perpetrators of atrocities, narcotics trafficking, and other major crimes.

The Colombian government knows that the United States places great importance on a legal framework that provides peace with justice and mechanisms to effectively dismantle the paramilitaries, and eventually other illegal armed groups. Former Under Secretary Grossman, Assistant Secretary Noriega, and Ambassador Wood, among other senior State Department officials, have consistently emphasized this message to the Colombian government. We will continue to stress the U.S. position.

The Colombian government recognizes the need to establish a credible legal framework to hold accountable former AUC members guilty of major crimes and settle questions about disclosure of information, return of illegal assets, and reparations. Currently, the Colombian government and Colombian congress are vigorously considering drafts of legislation to provide a legal framework that, for the first time, would require that demobilized members of illegal armed groups who have committed serious crimes, especially crimes of violence against civilians, be punished for their crimes, including by mandatory incarceration. All current drafts mandate that the demobilized must acknowledge responsibility for their crimes and offer reparations.

While peace in Colombia is ultimately up to the Colombians, the United States and other nations' support to the process will be critical to Colombia's continued success against terrorism. We are studying the possibility of providing U.S. support to the reintegration phase and are reviewing this possibility in close consultations with the Congress. Any U.S. support would only be provided consistent with U.S. law and policy. The United States will not drop its requests for the extradition of any Colombians, including United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia leaders, who have been indicted in the United States or may be indicted in the future.

Question. There is no indication that the Lavalas party will participate in elections scheduled for later this year, and I don't see how you can have a successful election without them. I share Senator DeWine's disappointment that there is nothing in this supplemental for the Haitian elections. Do you have a plan to avoid a train wreck down there?

Answer. Successful elections will allow the Haitian people to democratically select officials who represent the Haitian people. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (U.N.) are working with Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council to organize local, parliamentary, and presidential elections in October and November, with a presidential runoff possible in December. We have already provided significant support to the OAS voter registration effort as well as other election-related activities.

Although the Interim Government of Haiti (IGOH), United Nations and OAS have the lead role in administering the elections, we are closely involved. We meet regularly with the parties to monitor progress and assist. We plan to allocate over \$14 million of our fiscal year 2005 ESF to provide additional support for the registration and voting process, assistance for the logistical preparations, support for political party development, voter education, and elections monitoring, and funding for an elections awareness campaign. We have also taken an active role encouraging other donors to come forward with additional funds to support elections.

With the encouragement of the United Nations and the international community, the IGOH is launching a national dialogue to promote unity and build support for elections. We believe this dialogue is crucial to establishing an open and inclusive campaign atmosphere. We have made clear to the IGOH that both the campaign

and the dialogue must be open to all those who reject violence and adhere to democratic norms.

Ex-President Aristide's failure as a leader and subsequent departure from power left a void that remains unfilled; his refusal to anoint a successor in his political party, Lavalas, has left it adrift. Key members of Lavalas have told us that they do plan to participate in the election, but the party remains divided on that point. We continue to work with and provide training to those members of the Lavalas party that have rejected violence to encourage their full participation in the upcoming elections.

Democratic elections have taught us to expect the unexpected. Though we cannot foresee the results of the election, our programs aim to create an environment of security and stability in which all Haitians have the opportunity to choose their leaders. Our goal is that the elections will result in an elected government that can work with the international community to consolidate democracy in Haiti and continue to provide security, stability, protection and economic opportunity to the people of Haiti.

Question. I am told that not all of what was agreed to between Israel and Jordan in 1996 has been implemented. With the new sense of optimism in the Middle East, do you agree that the United States should nurture some of these things along? I am particularly thinking about the Aqaba-Eilat Airport that not only would signal an important change in the region but it would also have real environmental and economic benefits.

Answer. We agree that it is important to move forward with initiatives that will provide tangible benefits and help to catalyze the peace process. As the prospects for peace increase, and as confidence-building measures begin to take hold, we expect initiatives with real economic and environmental benefits will multiply. We were pleased to see the Jordanian Ambassador recently returned to Israel, a positive sign in relations between those two neighbors.

Question. I understand that this request contains \$780 million for assessed contributions for U.N. peacekeeping missions?

Answer. Yes, that is correct. The full \$780 million requested in the fiscal year 2005 CIPA Supplemental request is needed to pay: (a) the increased costs for new missions in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and Burundi, and (b) the initial costs of a new peacekeeping mission for Sudan.

The Administration has been at the forefront of efforts to resolve the unfolding tragedies in Africa, particularly for the Sudan. If the United States is unable to pay U.N. assessments for these peacekeeping missions, our credibility in the Council related to future peacekeeping operations could be severely undercut.

Question. Does the Administration support conditioning or withholding a portion of these or any other U.S. contributions to the United Nations in response to the report on the Oil for Food scandal?

Answer. We take the Oil for Food problem very seriously and have been at the forefront of calling for increased U.N. accountability and transparency in its programs. The report will be helpful in generating momentum for such increased accountability and transparency. It already has prompted the United Nations to take certain disciplinary actions. We do not believe, however, that withholding U.S. payments of U.N. assessments would be a useful way forward.

Question. Secretary Rice, what programs are in place to train officials in Iraq's ministries and directorates on corruption prevention methods and mechanisms, including modern bidding procedures, accounting methods, independent audits, and the establishment of watchdog agencies? How much does the United States Government spend annually on these programs? Are there any programs currently operating to train Iraqi nongovernmental organizations in techniques to monitor and address corrupt practices? If so, how much does the United States Government spend annually on these programs?

Answer. The United States has been and remains committed to supporting public integrity and anti-corruption efforts at all levels in Iraq. We have worked closely with Iraqis to support good government during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period, through the current Iraqi Interim Government and will do so with the upcoming Iraqi Transitional Government.

In January 2004, the Governing Council, exercising authority delegated to it by the Coalition Provisional Authority, established the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) to help the Iraqi people by being able to investigate cases of corruption and to promote good government practices by Iraqi government officials. The CPI is an independent office of the Iraqi Government and as such was set up to, among other things, receive allegations of corruption from citizens, investigate such allegations of corruption, refer violations of the law to criminal courts, and propose legislation to strengthen standards of ethical conduct for public employees. The Commission

would further require that public officials file a statement in which they disclose personal financial information, and require all government employees to sign a written pledge promising to adhere to Iraq's public employee Code of Conduct.

\$5 million of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) was allocated for the CPI to use advanced accounting techniques to detect, deter, identify, and investigate illegal activities and organizations. U.S. law enforcement personnel continue to train Iraqi investigators while plans for a tracking system to manage the investigative caseload are underway. CPI has expanded to over 200 employees, of which 27 are full-time investigators, and is expected to grow to approximately 800 employees and open 6 provincial branch offices. Ethics training is ongoing and a location has been identified for a training institute, which will concentrate on transparency, investigation, forensic accounting, internal audit procedures, human rights, legal reform, capacity building, management, public relations and public education as a means of combating corruption. Since its establishment in October 2004, the CPI hotline has generated over 300 phone calls, which have resulted in over 150 active cases—including allegations surrounding suspects held in police custody, paybacks, and solicitation of bribes.

In addition to the CPI, CPA Orders No. 57 and No. 87 established independent Offices of Inspector General within each ministry and a government contract policy, respectively; Order No. 77 reestablished the Board of Supreme Audit—providing accurate information about government operations and financial conditions and carrying out a broad range of financial and performance audits and program evaluations. Principles of public procurement and government public contract policy, among other things, were outlined in CPA Order No. 87. CPA set up Inspectors General in each ministry to “establish an effective program of audit, investigation, and performance review to provide increased accountability, integrity and oversight of the ministries and to prevent, deter and identify waste, fraud, abuse of authority and illegal acts”. These Inspectors General are tasked with “conducting investigations, audits, evaluations, inspections and other reviews in accordance with generally accepted professional standards.”

One of the primary objectives of USAID's local governance program is improving the delivery of basic essential services. This includes training on competitive bid and internal audit procedures. As this activity is embedded in the larger \$256 million program of supporting local governance, it is not possible to specify exactly how much is dedicated to anti-corruption efforts. USAID's program to strengthen civil society and the media specifically includes \$15 million for technical assistance to civil society nongovernmental organizations engaged in watchdog activities and to the independent media to enable it to report on corruption in a professional manner. Part of the strategy includes the awarding of small grants, of which \$2.15 million will be made available for anti-corruption efforts. Under its economic governance program, USAID has worked to install a financial management information system in approximately 50 Iraqi government institutions. This automated networked accounting and budget execution system is enabling stronger fiscal controls through the recording of payment and revenue transactions and ultimately transparency on the use of public funds.

More still needs to be done to combat corruption among Iraqi government officials. Inconsistencies exist among ministries and directorates as to the competency of inspectors and investigators, while more needs to be done on enforcement and compliance. We will continue to work with the newly elected officials of the upcoming Iraqi Transitional Government to support the establishment of laws and processes that promote transparency and accountability.

Question. Madame Secretary, I recently heard from a high-ranking official of a friendly Arab government about what the United States could do to help move the Middle East peace process forward. He asked only that the United States adhere to 3 principles: (1) be honest; (2) be fair; (3) be engaged. Candidly, and I suspect you disagree with me, I don't think the Bush Administration has always adhered to these principles, at least not until recently. Do you agree with his advice, and, if so, can you assure me that the Administration will follow these three basic principles?

Answer. President Bush has spoken clearly about his vision of two states living side-by-side in peace and security, and he has articulated the steps that both sides need to take in order to get there. The roadmap spells out those steps in greater detail, and, fairly, puts meaningful obligations on both sides. And the Administration has been engaged at the highest levels, whether through our diplomatic representatives in the region, through the office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, and through the office of the Secretary of State, working bilaterally and through the multilateral fora in which we are active, including the Quartet. The latest signs of that engagement are our \$350 million assistance package to help Pal-

estinians and Israelis move forward together on key economic issues that must be addressed in order to seize the opportunity for peace, and the appointment of General Ward as security coordinator to help the Palestinians reform their security apparatus and fight terror.

The United States recognizes that this is the best opportunity that we have had for peace in many years, and continues to support the Roadmap as the best way to move towards the goal of a safe and secure Israel coexisting peacefully with a viable, democratic Palestinian state. Much work lies ahead, but America is determined to do its utmost to help achieve that goal.

Question. If you are following these principles, will you, here today, re-commit to following them?

Answer. The United States recognizes that this is the best opportunity that we have had for peace in many years, and continues to support the Roadmap as the best way to move towards the goal of a safe and secure Israel coexisting peacefully with and viable, democratic Palestinian state. Recent events in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship are very encouraging; the Palestinian Presidential elections on January 9 and the February 8 summit at Sharm El Sheikh are positive steps that can lead both sides back on the path towards realization of the President's two-state vision. Much work lies ahead, but America will continue to engage—honestly and fairly—to help achieve that goal.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM HARKIN

Question. My question deals with the tsunami situation. As we move from relief efforts to reconstruction planning efforts, I believe that it is essential that the U.S. government coordinate with other bilateral and multilateral donors to ensure accessibility in all new construction activities. Furthermore, as you know Madam Secretary natural disasters hurt people and damage economies. They maim and they kill and they disrupt critical systems of medical and social support that people with disabilities rely on. In January, the Washington Post told the story of Sri Lanka only having only one psychiatrist for 1.3 million people and his other job was coordinating relief efforts to ensure that all areas were covered. It is my hope that these systems are not overlooked.

Can you tell me how much funding the Administration has allocated in this supplemental to ensure that the mental and physical rehabilitation needs of people with disabilities will be adequately addressed?

Answer. USAID is responding to the mental and physical rehabilitation needs of people affected by the tsunami including those who are disabled. The Indonesia Mission's recently issued Annual Program Statement (APS) solicits proposals that consider vulnerable populations including: community based psychosocial support programs for children and adults; anti-trafficking in persons activities; and children with special needs, orphans and disabilities. The USAID Sri Lanka Mission has also submitted a request for \$1 million to support rehabilitation and integration of people with special mobility needs. The U.S. government reconstruction plan includes considerable infrastructure construction and rehabilitation projects. It is agency policy that all new or renovation construction projects funded by USAID address access issues for people with disabilities. The use of these types of standards is required in all USAID acquisition and assistance for construction.

Question. Can you tell me your views on ensuring coordination between bilateral and multilateral donors on accessibility standards?

Answer. USAID has formally shared and disseminated copies of its Accessibility Standards within our own Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance as well as other USAID management units that are engaged in implementing tsunami emergency response and reconstruction efforts. We have also met with, discussed and disseminated the standards with the World Bank, and through a very wide network of members of the Bank's "Global Partnership for Disability and Development" (GPDD), which includes bi-lateral and multi-lateral representatives, as well as faith-based and other private, civil society organizations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

Question. Do you expect to fully reimburse all (including Public Law 480 and Food for Progress) food aid programs from which funds have been diverted in fiscal year 2005 for response to the tsunami disaster?

Answer. With respect to Public Law 480 Title II programs, approximately \$23 million worth of assistance is being provided to assist victims of the Tsunami. This assistance is being distributed through the World Food Program (WFP) and non-gov-

ernmental organization (NGO) implementing partners. The resources were made available both from existing resources already committed to WFP programs in Indonesia as well as Title II commodities programmed for NGO development activities. We intend to reimburse fully the amount diverted to meet Tsunami-related emergency needs from the existing WFP and NGO programs within Title II. The Administration request does not envision or include a reimbursement to USDA food aid programs.

Question. Do you expect to fully reimburse Public Law 480 Title II non-emergency programs from which funds have been withheld in order to meet other emergency needs?

Answer. Given current resource constraints, and increasing emergency needs in the Greater Horn of Africa, we do not expect to be able to restore all of these programs to fully funded levels.

Question. Don't you think canceling our agreements in those developing countries sends a wrong message? Don't you think that it is now more important than ever for the United States to assist those countries in ways that, in the long term, can help provide prosperity and reduce the chance they will adopt policies and practices harmful to U.S. interests?

Answer. Given the number and size of current and projected emergencies, USAID's Office of Food for Peace carefully analyzed its fiscal year 2005 non-emergency portfolio and made the difficult decision to reduce resources for some ongoing development programs. We would prefer not to cut Title II development program budgets, because these programs are geared toward reducing chronic food insecurity among vulnerable populations and preventing future emergencies from occurring. However, as you know, our first objective must be to save lives in emergency situations, such as in Ethiopia and Darfur, Sudan. Second is the need to reduce the number of undernourished people in the developing world so that they can become economically productive.

Question. For those accounts, other than Public Law 480, can you identify the amounts within the supplemental request that relates to food aid?

Answer. An amount of \$7.7 million was requested under the International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) account to support emergency food security interventions including the procurement and distribution of seeds and tools and emergency restocking. IDFA funds have also been used for the local procurement of food commodities when necessary to prevent life-threatening pipeline breaks in WFP and NGO food assistance programming.

Question. It is our understanding that early fiscal year 2005 estimates showed a need for U.S. contributions of \$1.3 billion to meet food emergencies worldwide. As you know, the Congress appropriated nearly the full amount requested by the President for the current year for both emergency and non-emergency food aid programs. Not counting relief related to the South Asia Tsunami, can you describe the level of emergency food aid that will be provided in fiscal year 2005 and where you expect that assistance will be provided?

Answer. USAID has budgeted \$850 million out of a total Title II appropriation of \$1.173 billion to meet acute and protracted emergency food needs in fiscal year 2005. An estimated \$23 million of this amount is being used for the Tsunami response. In addition to appropriated Title II resources, wheat valued at \$172 million was released from the Bill Emerson trust in response to the Darfur, Sudan, crisis. Barring any adjustments or increases to the Title II operating budget, and including Emerson trust resources, USAID anticipates programming \$839.1 million of emergency food assistance in Africa, \$124.7 million in Asia and the Near East (including response to the Tsunami), \$9 million in Eastern Europe/Caucasus, and \$12.7 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. The balance, approximately \$37 million, maintains prepositioned stocks and USAID's new International Food Relief Partnership programs.

Question. Can you identify areas that will receive reduced or no emergency U.S. food aid assistance this fiscal year, but for which the need does exist?

Answer. Thus far in the fiscal year, USAID has been able to respond to all verified emergency needs for which an in-kind, Title II response was found to be appropriate. USAID is currently in the process of determining how to meet increasing requirements projected in the third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year.

Question. Do you think you will request additional draw downs from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust this year?

Answer. USAID anticipates that current U.N. projections of needs in the Greater Horn of Africa will be revised significantly upwards in the third quarter of the fiscal year. The Agency is working with USDA, NSC, and OMB to ensure that the United States is able to respond in the timeframe that life-threatening hunger demands. There are no immediate plans for a second draw-down from the Emerson Trust.

Question. I understand that Title II non-emergency programs have been cutback to set aside funds for emergencies. Please tell us the originally approved amount for Title II non-emergency programs for fiscal year 2005 and the amount you now plan to provide to these programs.

Answer. The originally approved budget for Title II non-emergency programs for fiscal year 2005 was \$432 million. It was reduced to \$317 million to meet food emergency needs in Darfur (Sudan), Southern Sudan, Afghanistan and Ethiopia.

Question. Which regions or countries which were part of the original plan will now receive reduced or no assistance?

Answer. While no Title II non-emergency programs were terminated or closed as a result of this reduced budget, start-up of 18 planned, new fiscal year 2005 programs was slowed or delayed. In addition, the following countries will receive reduced funding, as compared with the original plan for fiscal year 2005:

—Africa—Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda.

—Asia/Eurasia—Bangladesh, India, Tajikistan.

—Latin America/Caribbean—Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru.

Question. The supplemental request provides \$150 million for the Public Law 480 Title II program. Can you explain how the figure of \$150 million was derived for unmet emergency needs relating to Title II?

Answer. USAID has estimated that in fiscal year 2005, emergency food needs in Sudan alone could exceed 1 million metric tons (MT): 750,000 MT in Darfur and a further 300,000 MT in the south. Added to currently programmed Title II and Emerson resources, \$150 million (150,000–175,000 MT) will enable USAID to meet approximately half the projected needs in Sudan. Further, we have a growing concern about Ethiopia, where yet another failed set of rains is once again raising the specter of famine.

Question. What level of food aid is being directed for assistance in Afghanistan this year?

Answer. A total of \$58.5 million in Title II resources has been allocated to meet emergency requirements in Afghanistan.

Question. World response to the Tsunami disaster was impressive, and other nations are contributing to a proportionately higher level to the WFP appeal for food aid in this instance than they are for other recent emergencies, even in areas of highly publicized need such as Darfur, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and other regions. As Secretary of State, what role do you intend to play to convince those nations to continue the levels of contribution they have provided to Tsunami victims to other regions of the world?

Answer. We are pursuing an initiative within the G8 to increase donor food aid levels and agricultural productivity in food insecure countries through improved policies, open markets, and use of science and technology. For example, the G8 has made significant progress in meeting emergency food needs in Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa. Working closely with the Ethiopian Government, the World Bank, and other donors, we have agreed on a policy and assistance framework that offers a chance to break the cycle of famine. We have agreed on a joint response to the crucial problem of raising agricultural productivity by increasing the policy-making capacity of governments, improving rural infrastructure, harnessing agricultural science and technology, and unleashing the power of markets for rural producers. We have cooperated closely with the World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to improve global food emergency assessment and response systems, ensuring that future food aid will flow to the areas that need it most. However, in a climate of tighter food aid budgets, regardless of the public outreach and diplomatic strategy to gain further support in response to humanitarian food aid crises, pipeline breaks will continue. In this regard, the United States has been working closely with the WFP to broaden its donor base.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Question. This past week I met with (1) Palestinians serving as part of the Aspen Institute's Middle East Strategy Group, (2) in my office with Palestinian businessmen that have formed a group called the Palestinian Business Committee for Peace and Reform and (3) Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboulgeit. It is clear to me that we need to deliver real economic benefits to the maximum number of Palestinian individuals and families as quickly as possible. For these purposes, though, the Administration's \$200 million aid request for the Palestinians is short on specifics. How exactly will these funds be divided up among ongoing USAID and State Department programs such as:

- USAID's Palestinian Enterprise Revitalization Program aimed at economic growth/job creation in Gaza and the West Bank;
- State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative focused on education reform in the Middle East;
- And others?

Answer. This \$200 million in supplemental assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is intended to support reform and expand economic opportunities for the Palestinian people. It is urgently necessary because the next six months—well before fiscal year 2006 resources would be available—will see opportunities for progress unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e. General Ward's mission; completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July-September); Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen and Palestinian moderates.

The assistance detailed below will help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It will also assist Palestinians with institution building, civil society strengthening and infrastructure development—necessary foundations for emerging democracy. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.

Question. Might these funds be used to contribute to short and long-term U.S. private investment projects (such as the possibility of an "OPIC-Palestinian Investment Fund Trust" that could help microfinance specific projects and increase lending for economic and infrastructure development into Gaza and the West Bank)? Please find attached a brief description of this idea which I've discussed with fellow participants in the Aspen Institute's Middle East Strategy Group.

Answer. Tapping Palestinian diaspora money and international private investment will be crucial in revitalizing the Palestinian economy. The timing and effectiveness of such assistance is related to the pace of progress on Palestinian reforms and the peace process.

The private sector has an important role to play in Palestinian economic revitalization. The private sector has an important role to play in Palestinian economic revitalization. We are in interagency consultations, including with OPIC, on determining the best vehicle for increasing our credit and lending assistance to the Palestinian people and ensuring this effort is coordinated in the context of our overall policy on assisting Palestinian economic recovery.

Question. Will funds be distributed only through U.S. Nongovernmental Organizations? Or will Palestinian NGOs receive funds (such as the Welfare Association, for example, which helps Palestinian families pay educational fees for their children and contributes funding to improving Palestinian economic and civil society)?

Answer. Assistance will not be provided directly to the PA but will be channeled primarily through existing mechanisms, including United States, Palestinian, and international NGOs.

Question. On a larger policy question, will the State Department and FBI step up efforts to investigate the deaths of the three USAID contractors in Gaza? Specifically, can the FBI send representatives to meet with Muhammad Dahlan to highlight the importance of these unresolved cases? Apparently Abu Mazen raised this directly with you during your recent visit to the region, in recognition of the fact that some sort of resolution of the case is necessary so that the suspension on USAID activities can be lifted.

Answer. We are very encouraged by the initial steps that the Palestinian leadership has taken on security, toward the restoration of law and order, and in establishing the basis for a cease-fire. Nevertheless, we have made clear to President Abbas the need for the Palestinian Authority to bring to justice those who murdered three American Personnel in Gaza in 2003. President Abbas has affirmed to us the PA's commitment to follow through on this issue, and we are continuing to emphasize its importance in our meetings with the Palestinian Authority.

Question. The Administration has requested \$200 million for a Global War on Terror Partners Fund. The funds will be allocated by the President "to countries in need of a timely infusion of economic assistance for their support for the Global War on Terror." It seems to me, that Congress will have no role to play in determining how the funds will be spent and, once again, the Administration is asking the elected representatives of the American people to "just trust us."

Will the President have the sole authority to determine which countries receive funding and how much? Why does the money not go through the State Department?

Answer. Funds may be used for countries with respect to which the President has determined that furnishing economic assistance to these partners support the Global War on Terror. These funds will help strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance democracy and stability around the world. These funds shall be considered to be economic assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act and as contemplated in the provision will be administered by the Secretary of State.

Question. What is the request being made now? Why not go through the regular appropriations process?

Answer. While many of our coalition partners have the ability to shoulder the costs of troop contributions and other support requirements, many other of our partners in freedom have limited national budgets to offset these costs. In many cases, these willing allies are faced with constrained budget resources while at the same time facing a growing demand from their citizens for increased social spending. Thus, this Fund reflects the principle that an investment in a partner in freedom today will help ensure that America will stand united with stronger partners in the future. The criticality of these funds is to ensure that we:

- Support the broader strategy against terrorism.
- Prevent/diminish economic and political dislocation that threatens security of key friends and allies.
- Promote economic growth, good governance and democracy; mitigating root cause of terrorism.
- Offset budget costs associated with troop contributions that would otherwise support increasing civil demands for social programs.
- Programs may include:
 - Enhanced support for border security units and improving interdiction and enforcement infrastructure of counternarcotics units
 - Accelerate training and equipping border personnel to prevent illegal migration, smuggling of goods, narcotics trafficking and transiting of terrorists.

Foreign assistance is in important ways the flip side of the national security coin. What we do now hastens the day our troops can depart Afghanistan and Iraq. It supports the involvement of other nation's troops in crises so that ours don't need to be there, and helps consolidate opportunities for reform and democratization to prevent future crises.

Question. How will the funds be spent? Which countries will be selected and what are the "priority" projects?

Answer. Funds will be allocated to countries based on a determination by the President that a timely infusion of economic assistance for such countries will support the Global War on Terror. Please see question 6 above the types of projects anticipated to be implemented with these funds.

Question. What criteria will the President use? What assurances will he seek to ensure that the funds are spent wisely and effectively?

Answer. Many of our coalition partners have the ability to shoulder the costs of troop contributions and other support requirements, however, many other of them have limited national budgets to offset these costs. In many cases, these willing allies are faced with constrained budget resources while at the same time facing a growing demand from their citizens for increased social spending. The criteria will be based on need. For example, coalition partners that require assistance to address domestic shortfalls such as those noted above, which are all key elements of our partners' abilities to conduct the Global War on Terror.

Question. Will he ensure that funds are not allocated to countries with questionable human rights records? Again, what criteria will he use?

Answer. We carefully consider beneficiary countries human rights conduct in shaping our policy, conducting diplomacy and specifically, making assistance decisions. This same process and careful policy considerations will be used in developing assistance recommendations.

Question. What role is there for Congress to provide meaningful oversight? Will congress be notified when funds are distributed?

Answer. These funds shall be considered to be economic assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act and as such, and as contemplated in the provision will be administered by the Secretary of State. Since these funds would not have been justified in our annual Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Justification, funds would then be subject to Section 634A—Notification of Program Changes—of the Foreign Assistance Act requiring a 15-day notification prior to obligation.

Question. Will assistance be provided directly to the Palestinian Authority? How will USAID or international Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) be involved?

Answer. We do not have any plans to provide direct budgetary support to the PA at this time, and assistance will be channeled through NGOs using existing mechanisms. While we do not have plans to provide direct budgetary support, we would

like to keep the option available, particularly in light of the PA's estimated \$500 million budget gap for 2005. We are encouraging others, including Arab states, to contribute to the PA in order to mitigate this budgetary shortfall.

Question. What conditions, if any, will the Administration set for distributing the funds? What steps will the Administration take to ensure that the funds are spent wisely and effectively and that they go to the people who need it?

Answer. USG assistance is not provided directly to the PA but is channeled primarily through existing mechanisms, including United States, Palestinian, and international NGOs. Since 1995, the GAO has conducted five separate program reviews, one each in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2003. None of these reviews has reported any irregularities in the management or controls of ESF funds by USAID or its contractors and grantees. Since then, the USAID Mission has developed a comprehensive risk assessment strategy. All Mission institutional contracts and grants—of which there are approximately 100—are audited on an annual basis by local accounting firms under the guidance and direction of USAID's Inspector General.

This package of aid is designed to make an impact, both immediately and in the long-term, on the lives of Palestinians, and to support the PA as it continues its reform efforts. The \$200 million in supplemental assistance for the West Bank and Gaza is intended to support reform and expand economic opportunities for the Palestinian people. It is urgently necessary because the next six months—well before fiscal year 2006 resources would be available—will see opportunities for progress unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e. General Ward's mission; completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July-September); Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen and Palestinian moderates.

The assistance will help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It will also assist Palestinians with institution building, civil society strengthening and infrastructure development—necessary foundations for emerging democracy. Much of the assistance is targeted to help the PA provide services that Hamas currently provides, particularly in Gaza. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.

The U.S. Government, working through USAID, maintains close accounting of all USG funds, and we have confidence in the fiscal accountability and transparency established by the PA. Working with the full range of agencies and resources available at Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem, USAID carries out background checks on all Palestinian NGOs that are recipients of funds to ensure there are no links to terrorist organizations or to organizations that advocate or practice violence.

Question. What are the priorities? What areas require immediate attention and resources? How will the funds bring Palestinian and Israeli businessmen together?

Answer. The Administration will seek \$200 million in program assistance via the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental Appropriation to support reform and expand economic opportunities for the Palestinian people. Over the next six months—well before fiscal year 2006 resources would be available—we will see opportunities for progress in the peace process that are unprecedented in recent years: intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services (i.e., General Ward's mission); completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July-September); Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority. Key priorities include: addressing the economic and technical issues identified by the World Bank as the Palestinians coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement; assisting Palestinians to build institutions, strengthen civil society, and develop infrastructure—necessary foundations for emerging democracy; and strengthening the rule of law so as to help create an investment-friendly economic environment.

In order to assist the Palestinian private sector generally, including increasing its capacity to do business with Israeli counterparts, we will work with other donors and the World Bank to encourage increased international private-sector investment and support efforts to hold a private sector business and investment event by the summer of 2005. At the same time, we will look for ways to assist the Palestinian

private sector as the PA moves forward with reform and Israel proceeds with disengagement.

Among the anticipated uses of the supplemental are: \$50 million to improve the flow of people and goods into and out of the West Bank and Gaza; \$15 million to support Palestinian agriculture/agribusiness; and \$23 million for trade promotion and capacity building to enable access to international markets.

Question. In your view, is the Palestinian Authority prepared to reform its educational curricula to eliminate extremist religious messages and end incitement and hatred of Israel?

Answer. The Administration has been very clear that all Arab states must work to end incitement in their media and stop their support for extremist education. To date, the Palestinian Authority has made a significant effort to revise textbooks used by Palestinian students, but more needs to be done. Since 2002, we have provided grant aid to The Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) to evaluate the content of new textbooks and develop materials for use in teaching peace and tolerance. IPCRI's reports indicate the areas in which PA curriculum needs to improve, and we will continue to monitor and raise this issue with the PA.

In the broader context of combating incitement, we are witnessing efforts by the Palestinian Authority that were previously unseen, including the reforming of their security forces, efforts to get people off the streets with weapons, and the approval of a new Palestinian cabinet. President Abbas's strong condemnation of the February 25 terrorist attack in Tel Aviv and the efforts of the Palestinian people to create democratic institutions—evident from their strong turnout in the January 9 Palestinian Presidential elections—are positive steps that indicate a willingness to turn away from violence and embrace liberty and peace.

Question. How much do our coalition partners spend on their own participation in Iraq and Afghanistan? What is the U.S. contribution and percentage of overall costs?

Answer. Our coalition partners from affluent countries pay all the costs associated with their participation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States only provides assistance to countries for which such assistance is an absolute financial necessity. For those nations, the United States often provides strategic lift (i.e., transportation to and from the region), sustainment (i.e., consumables such as food, water, fuel and ammunition), and certain items of individual soldier equipment (e.g., desert pattern uniforms, flack jackets, helmets, boots, etc.). This assistance still leaves every coalition partner responsible for a significant set of financial obligations, including soldier salaries, benefits and insurance and the depreciation and recapitalization of all nationally owned equipment such as weapons, vehicles, communications gear, etc. As a result, a significant share of the financial burden remains with our coalition partners. As a concrete example, the Polish government estimates it has spent over \$409 million in support of its operations in Iraq thus far, in addition to other bilateral contributions and assistance they have provided to the Iraqi government and people. All of our coalition partners sustain significant expenses to stand with us in Iraq and Afghanistan, relieving the U.S. taxpayer of those financial burdens.

Question. If the United States did not subsidize the costs of our partners' participation, would they withdraw their troops? Who would stay and who would go?

Answer. The United States provides assistance only to countries for which such assistance is a financial necessity. This support enables participation in Iraq or Afghanistan by nations that possess the political will, but lack the financial means. Based on the conditions under which this support is provided, it is logical to assume that some recipient countries would be forced to significantly reduce or completely withdraw their forces if U.S. assistance were not forthcoming.

Question. Do we really have coalitions of the willing in Iraq and Afghanistan if the American taxpayer is paying the bill for the participation of our allies?

Answer. While the United States assists some of our coalition partners with a portion of their deployment costs, to characterize their participation as anything other than "willing" would demean their contributions and sacrifices. The lift and sustainment support that the United States provides to less-wealthy coalition partners still leaves them with significant financial burdens. Moreover, their soldiers assume many of the same physical risks run by American service personnel. To date, coalition partners have suffered 136 KIAs, and 389 WIAs. U.S. assistance enables the participation of countries that would not otherwise have the financial means equal to their political will.

The United States has a proud tradition, reaching back to WWII and beyond, of using our status as one of the world's largest industrial economies to help supply our allies when needed. Many of our coalition partners have only in recent memory won their own struggles against dictatorship and tyranny, and want very much to help the people of Iraq and Afghanistan secure the same freedoms. Many of them

are also still working to achieve economic prosperity for their own citizens, making their financial sacrifices all the more significant, despite U.S. assistance. The United States can be proud to have partners who share our vision of a secure and democratic future for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Question. What steps has the Administration taken and plan to take to ensure that members of the coalition will assume a greater financial burden for their own troops?

Answer. Every time a new troop contributor comes forward, or when a current coalition partner decides to deploy additional troops, military-to-military discussions take place to work out such details as timing and location of the deployment, equipment requirements, logistical support, financial costs, etc. The United States does not offer assistance to Coalition partners that do not require it. When offered, this support does not come close to covering all of our partners' deployment costs. However, it is often the key enabler that allows a country to contribute forces, or more forces than it could otherwise afford to deploy. While we believe that the amount of assistance given to a country is, in all cases, the required amount that will enable that nation to deploy its troops, we have sought to alleviate even this minimum financial burden on the U.S. taxpayer. We have worked with our European allies to establish a U.N. Trust Fund to pay the salaries of nations contributing to the tough task of protecting the United Nations in Iraq. We have worked with our NATO allies to provide all finances required to resource the NATO Training Mission. And we will continue to work with the international community to appropriately share future costs.

Question. Does the Administration anticipate assistance from outside the coalition?

Answer. We are already seeing significant financial contributions from our wealthier coalition partners, as well as countries that are not currently troop contributors. For example, in addition to troops, 14 countries have pledged over \$20 million thus far to fund "middle ring" security for the United Nations in Iraq; half of the contributions are from non-troop contributing countries. The NATO Training Mission—Iraq (NTM-I) is also benefiting from financial as well as troop contributions. To date over \$6 million has been pledged to a recently established NATO trust fund in support of training for Iraqi Security Forces. All 26 NATO members have now pledged personnel, equipment, financial assistance or some combination of these to NTM-I.

In addition to contributions that relate directly to Iraq's security needs, international donor governments (not including the United States) have pledged a total of \$8 billion for Iraq's reconstruction requirements over the four years of 2004–2007, of which \$2.2 billion have already been disbursed. For Afghanistan, \$13 billion has been pledged to aid reconstruction. Finally, in support of Iraq's long-term economic well-being, 17 countries have agreed to provide approximately \$27 billion in debt relief through the Paris Club, again including many non-troop contributors. These contributions directly impact expenses incurred by the United States as we seek to establish a secure, democratic and prosperous future for the Afghan and Iraqi people.

Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure adequate Sunni representation in the new government and the drafting of a new constitution?

Answer. Most of the major Iraqi political parties that will be represented in the Transitional National Assembly have publicly signaled their intention to include Arab Sunnis in the Iraqi Transitional Government and ensure that the views of all Iraq's communities are reflected in the drafting of Iraq's permanent constitution. The United States supports these efforts at outreach, and we continue to underscore our commitment to a pluralist Iraq with broad and inclusive political participation in our regular dialogue with Iraqi leaders. The USG has also provided training opportunities to all Iraqi political parties, representing all ethnicities and sects, through the National Democratic Institute and the International Republic Institute.

We are encouraged that prominent Arab Sunnis such as Muhsin Abdul Hamid of the Iraqi Islamic Party and Adnan Pachachi of the Iraqi Democratic Gathering have declared their intent to remain involved in Iraq's political process and the drafting of a permanent constitution. We believe this trend towards broader participation in the political process will continue as the Transitional National Assembly convenes and the drafting of a permanent constitution begins.

It is also important to note that Iraqis will go to the polls twice more in 2005, first to participate in the constitutional referendum and then to elect a constitutionally-based government. Iraq's continuing political process represents an opportunity for all groups within Iraq to help shape their country's future. The United States will continue to work with the Iraqi Government to ensure that as many Iraqis as possible seize this opportunity.

Question. How concerned are you about the level of Iranian influence in a Shia dominated National Assembly and Government? Will Iraq become another Islamic Republic? How will the constitution handle the role of Islam in Iraqi society and government?

Answer. Iraqis—of all religious identities and ethnicities—are a proud and an independent people; I believe it is unlikely that the Iranian government would be able to dominate an Iraqi government. The United States supports Prime Minister Allawi's call to respect Iraq's sovereignty and urges all states, particularly those neighboring Iraq, to cease interference in Iraq's internal politics and support the development of democratic norms and institutions.

Iraqis alone will determine the contents of their constitution, and it is too early to tell now exactly how they will deal with the role of religion. I am pleased, though, that diverse Iraqi leaders, including those that fared well in the elections, have made statements calling for an inclusive government and society.

I assure you that the United States will continue to support in Iraq—as it does throughout the world—democracy and strong legal and institutional protections for the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of women, due process, religious freedom, and other fundamental freedoms. The language that Iraqi leaders included in the Transitional Administrative Law in this regard was excellent, and I am confident that the TNA will conclude that it is in the interest of the Iraqi nation to include similar strong protections in the constitution.

Question. What are the most urgent and pressing needs related to tsunami relief?

Answer. Coordinating reconstruction efforts is a high priority as there are so many different organizations already involved or who want to be involved. Minimizing duplication of efforts and matching donors with projects is a challenge as so much should be done simultaneously. As governments and the donors want to integrate reconstruction with longer-term development and poverty reduction, reconstruction then means tackling difficult questions such as land use in coastal zones and property ownership.

Ensuring accountability and transparency for how funds are spent is essential. The donor community will want to see that funds reach those in need in an expeditious fashion but that they are carefully spent. Having mechanisms in place to monitor how funds are spent will be important.

Question. What are the long-term goals? Do you anticipate requesting additional assistance in future years?

Answer. The long-term goals are to assist the tsunami-affected countries in rebuilding infrastructure and damaged economies in a manner that advances longer-term development, poverty reduction, and strengthens U.S. relations with the affected countries.

The international outpouring of assistance to tsunami victims has been truly remarkable. As of February 8, USAID reports that over \$7.8 billion has been pledged in bilateral aid, as well as from multilateral development banks. Private sector fundraising continues and recent reports indicate over \$2.9 billion has been raised from those sources.

Early damage assessments indicate reconstruction costs will be between \$1.5–\$2 billion in Sri Lanka, between \$3.5–\$4.5 billion in Indonesia and over \$300 million for the Maldives. India has announced plans for a \$2.3 billion reconstruction program and expressed interest in World Bank support. Thailand has not requested international financial assistance, but has asked for U.S. technical assistance. While there may be some upward revision of these figures as full needs assessments are finalized, we do not anticipate significant changes. Given the resources already pledged, we do not anticipate any further U.S. funding beyond the President's \$950 million request.

Question. How will the Administration coordinate relief efforts with our friends and allies in the international community, the United Nations, and groups such as the Red Cross?

Answer. The outpouring of donor assistance to tsunami victims has been truly remarkable. Donor and recipient governments all recognize that all must coordinate efforts in order to ensure assistance is used effectively. Such coordination includes working with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations to develop coordinated needs assessments, communicating among donors about our plans and resources, and working with recipients to respond to their needs and priorities. Given the substantial role of corporate donations and non-governmental organizations in tsunami relief and reconstruction, these groups should be incorporated early in all aspects of coordination.

The State Department, working closely with USAID, has the lead to work with affected countries and the international community to coordinate U.S. assistance. We are also working to insure that key NGO's and private sector donors are in-

cluded in this process. Ambassador Douglas A. Hartwick has been designated as the Senior Coordinator for Tsunami Reconstruction, and is leading this effort. We are reaching out to recipient countries and our international partners to make sure that the resources the United States and others are providing will reach tsunami victims swiftly and effectively.

Question. Have you considered possible tariff relief for affected countries to allow greater access to the U.S. market for selected exports?

Answer. We have been in active consultations with affected countries' trade ministries to discuss ways to help facilitate reconstruction efforts, and will be consulting with domestic stakeholders and with the Congress as this process continues. We have stressed in discussions that possible tariff relief measures other than adjustments under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences require legislation.

Question. How did the Administration arrive at such a figure? What are the most expensive components of the new embassy?

Answer. The cost of the New Embassy Compound (NEC) (\$658 million) is derived from projected staffing and unique building conditions in Baghdad. The cost is in line with other OBO construction when the unique circumstances of Baghdad are removed. The total cost of the NEC reflects the size of the mission population, special security features, e.g. pre-detonation roofs on the office buildings and housing, upgrades to the windows on the housing units, blast protection, and some additional costs due to the risks involved with construction in Iraq.

The NEC cost estimates are based on a requirement to construct a Chancery, Public Annex, multi-purpose swing space, and a Support Annex for 767 desk positions, 343 housing units, support facilities and utility systems, with the appropriate compound perimeter security necessary for a 104-acre site. A typical NEC does not include on-site employee housing or a utility plant, and is constructed on a site of approximately 10-acres. However, this large site, acquired at no cost, allows for more security setback, simultaneous construction on a fast track, and greater flexibility for this mission in the future (i.e., scalability).

Question. Will there be open and public bidding for the contracts?

Answer. Yes, full and open competition will be used in the selection of the design/build construction contractor, subject to the preference for U.S. firms required by the Foreign Service Buildings Act and the Diplomatic Security Act.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Question. Can you tell me, what is the U.S. policy on re-unifying children with their families and on adoption?

Answer. U.S. policy, and the international standard in a crisis, is to keep children as close to their surviving parents and family members as possible. It can be extremely difficult to determine whether children whose parents are missing are truly orphans while efforts to locate missing persons are still underway. This was especially true in the aftermath of the tsunami, as many children were separated from one or both of their parents. Even when children are indeed orphaned, they are often taken in by other relatives. Staying with relatives in extended family units is recognized as a generally better solution than uprooting the child completely.

We believe that permanent family placement through intercountry adoption is in the best interests of a child when domestic adoption is not possible. Consistent with international treaties, we view intercountry adoption as a far better solution for children than long-term institutionalization. Unfortunately, it may be many months before the situation in those countries affected by the tsunami stabilizes to the point where it will be possible to identify children who are legitimate orphans in need of intercountry adoption. If and when these countries decide that these orphans are in need of a permanent placement through international adoption, the Department will work promptly to assist American citizens that may wish to pursue adoption proceedings for these children. None of the countries affected by the tsunami prohibit intercountry adoptions to the United States.

Question. And, if that is the case, what are you doing to ensure that these policies are being reflected in the field?

Answer. The United States, as part of the international community responding to the tragedy of the tsunami, works closely with the governments of the affected countries; with other donor countries; and with the various relief agencies involved to ensure that all adhere to international standards on the protection of children and their reunification, if possible, with family members.

Soon after the tsunami struck, the Department of State issued a notice in response to the many calls we received from compassionate Americans wanting to adopt children from tsunami-stricken regions. The notice advised concerned Amer-

ican citizens of the critical importance of reunifying children with their families, even as we help these families rebuild their communities.

The emphasis of efforts by the U.S. government and our NGO partners is to provide relief assistance and protection to victims of the tsunami, including children, in their home countries. Our concern must be to address the immediate needs of tsunami victims, including their need for food, shelter, clothing, counseling, and medical care, and their reunification with family members. We believe our international efforts must remain focused on these and other recovery efforts. We note that other donor governments have the same policy.

Question. We have seen some encouraging stories on children being reunited with their parents in the aftermath of the tsunami. What support is our government giving to work with the organizations that are coordinating these tracing and reunification efforts? Are you working with the governments of these countries to build their capacity to do this sort of work?

As a result of the Asian tsunami, children have not only been exposed to a lack of basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter, they also face a disruption of their social structures. Many children are separated from their families. Many can't go to school as they normally would. Children may not even have a safe place to play. To help children recover from the deep psychological and social trauma caused by the tsunami, we must provide them with the interventions necessary to regain normalcy in their lives. I am aware that some international NGO's are working to provide interventions to address these needs through programs that offer children protection from psychosocial distress, family separation, and the denial of access to education.

Answer. The United States is working closely with governments of the affected countries, as well as with the various relief organizations and NGOs, to provide relief assistance and protection to victims of the tsunami, including children. We strongly believe that reunification with family members is a high priority and are working to ensure that all adhere to international standards on the protection of children. Various NGOs, including the American Red Cross, have been taking the lead in helping tsunami-affected governments in terms of restoring family links and fostering reunification. We have supported governments' efforts to prevent trafficking in persons in the tsunami-affected region. We will certainly give serious consideration to any request for capacity building, as the governments identify their future needs, as well as reinforcing our ongoing programs already at work in the region.

Question. What type of assistance is our government providing to carry out these child protection programs? Is there funding specifically dedicated to these purposes? How many of the DART (Disaster Assistance Response Teams) have qualifications and "know how" in child protection?

Answer. USAID is supporting child protection programs in several areas, including reunification, creation of "safe spaces" for children, and support for rapid resumption of education. The Tsunami DART has identified needs, and recommended non-governmental organization (NGO) and international organization (IO) activities for funding, based on review by USAID protection officers. Two DART team members have protection experience, with children and other vulnerable groups. In addition, USAID maintains at least two additional dedicated human rights/protection officers available to review proposals and to provide guidance to the DART. Given the enormity of protection issues in the context of the tsunami and other global disasters, USAID is expanding its protection capabilities, including implementation of a course on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and protection to provide training for all personnel involved in disaster relief.

USAID is giving support to the work of NGOs and IOs to register, trace, and reunify affected children in the tsunami-affected countries. In Indonesia, USAID has provided support to UNICEF, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Christian Children's Fund (CCF), who are all involved in the tracing and reunification effort in Aceh province. Similar support is being provided to UNICEF in Sri Lanka.

USAID is also supporting the work of organizations that are carrying out interventions to mitigate the psychological trauma of the tsunami, including education programs and the creation of "safe spaces" for children. USAID has provided over \$5 million in funding to support the work of organizations that provide psychological and social support interventions for survivors of the tsunami in India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. We have given particular attention to the needs of children and are supporting several organizations that are facilitating structured activities for children and adolescents, often through child-centered "safe spaces". Such activities help large numbers of children assert control over their environment, build emotional and social skills that are critical to recovery, and regain a sense of normalcy.

These approaches also allow trained adults to identify children who may be in more severe distress and in need of additional forms of support. These activities are being implemented in IDP settlements and tsunami-affected communities alike. Additionally, child protection committees have been formed. These committees oversee the activities in child centered spaces and are a mechanism for monitoring the status of children in the future.

In both Sri Lanka and Indonesia, USAID support has been provided for the rapid resumption of education including funding for “school-in-a-box” kits. NGO partners will soon be commencing training with and support for teachers. The purpose of this training is two-fold: (1) to help them manage their distress so that they are ready to resume their important role in the classroom; and (2) to educate them on common responses that children may be experiencing so that they are better prepared to manage children in the classroom. Resumption of normal activities is vital to psychological and social recovery. To this end, USAID is also funding cash-for-work and livelihood support programs, which have critical secondary benefits in mitigating the psychological and social consequences of the tsunami on children.

Question. Can you explain to me why there is such a significant delay in getting the necessary funding to these international NGO’s and what you plan to do to address this in future disasters?

Answer. Given the magnitude of the tragedy, the U.S. government has moved quickly to work with tsunami-affected governments, NGOs and the private sector to speed assistance to those in need. Within the first week after the tsunami struck, USAID had programmed \$30 million in immediate relief assistance to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) including the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), and local Red Cross and Red Crescent societies in the region. As of the end of February 2005, USAID has programmed over \$110 million in emergency humanitarian assistance. The focus in the immediate relief phase was on providing support to NGOs and IOs for programs in health care, water and sanitation, shelter, rehabilitation, and provision of emergency relief supplies.

As we await final action on the fiscal year 2005 supplemental bill, our Embassies in tsunami-affected countries are coordinating with NGOs on preparing tsunami reconstruction project plans so that as soon as funds become available, we can speed disbursement.

Question. Recent reports from the disaster-affected areas of South Asia have highlighted reports of rape and potential exploitation of children. In many crises across the globe, women and children are disproportionately affected by gender-based violence and exploitation. What steps or specific measures has your agency taken to document reports of physical harm including abduction, abuse, rape, exploitation, trafficking, recruitment into armed conflict, or any other violation of human rights? How does your agency plan to use this information?

Answer. The Department of State has taken the following steps to document reports of trafficking, reports of abduction, rape, and exploitation:

- Sent a cable to our embassies and USAID missions in the region urging engagement with governments and NGOs and requesting feedback on the veracity of reports of trafficking, abduction, abuse, etc. following the tsunami.
- Transmitted a mass-email to NGOs and other anti-trafficking partners around the world requesting safety precautions such as warning vulnerable people of trafficking schemes; training and monitoring of temporary relief workers; and registration of and security for people most vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation.
- Contacted NGOs on the ground such as UNICEF, World Vision, and IOM to get solid information on trafficking in the affected countries, to confirm any cases, and to determine whether trafficking-related projects are needed.

CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. And thank you to members of the committee. I look forward to working with you.

Chairman COCHRAN. The hearing is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., Thursday, February 17, the hearings were concluded, and the committee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]