[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,
BORDER SECURITY, AND CLAIMS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 10, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-5
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary
______
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE PENCE, Indiana CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, Chief of Staff-General Counsel
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana, Chairman
STEVE KING, Iowa SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
ELTON GALLEGLY, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia MAXINE WATERS, California
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
DARRELL ISSA, California
George Fishman, Chief Counsel
Art Arthur, Counsel
Luke Bellocchi, Full Committee Counsel
Cindy Blackston, Professional Staff
Nolan Rappaport, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MARCH 10, 2005
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable John N. Hostettler, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Indiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims....................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims....................... 3
WITNESSES
Mr. Paul K. Martin, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Michael W. Cutler, Former I.N.S. Special Agent
Oral Testimony................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Randy Callahan, Executive Vice President, National Homeland
Security Council, AFGE
Oral Testimony................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Dr. Craig Haney, Professor, University of California at Santa
Cruz
Oral Testimony................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Questions submitted to DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement by
the Honorable John Hostettler.................................. 77
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of the Texas......... 79
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Linda Sanchez, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California........ 80
INTERIOR IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:14 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John N.
Hostettler (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Hostettler. The Subcommittee will come to order.
Last week, this Subcommittee reviewed the lack of adequate
resources to secure our national borders against the entry of
criminals, gangs, terrorists, and other law breakers. But what
resources have we committed to finding and removing such aliens
who are already living among us? That is the subject of this
week's hearing.
The 9/11 Commission staff report on terrorist travel stated
it had, ``identified numerous entry and embedding tactics
associated with earlier attacks in the United States,'' and
that prior to 9/11, ``abuse of the immigration system and a
lack of interior immigration enforcement were unwittingly
working together to support terrorist activity.''
But this threat is hardly one for the history books.
Admiral James Loy, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security,
recently testified that, ``We believe that attacking the
homeland remains at the top of al-Qaeda's operational priority
list. . . . We judge . . . that the next dramatic attack will
attempt to replicate the 9/11 model of multiple attacks against
geographically distant and symbolic targets that cause
unprecedented economic damage, mass casualties, and physical
destruction. . . . Thus, the probability of an attack in the
United States is assessed to be high.''
And Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert
S. Mueller, testified that, ``In 2004, we learned that
operatives had conducted detailed surveillance of financial
targets in New York, Washington, D.C., and New Jersey . . . a
sobering reminder of the threat we continue to face. . . .
[There] is the threat from covert operatives who may be inside
the U.S. who have the intention to facilitate or conduct an
attack. I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing.
Efforts by extremists to obtain training inside the U.S. is
also an ongoing concern.''
Also, Representative Solomon Ortiz told us last week that,
``Enforcement officers routinely release illegal immigrants
into the general population of the U.S. because they do not
have the sufficient funds and space to detain them at detention
facilities. Captured [Other-Than-Mexican aliens] are released
on their own recognizance and are ordered to appear at a
deportation hearing weeks after their release . . . but the
number of released illegal immigrants not returning for
deportation grows by the hundreds each week. [This is]
undermining our national objective to take the war to the enemy
so we do not have to fight the war on terror inside our
country.''
My colleague from the minority is quite correct. I am
concerned that we must, indeed, `fight the war on terror inside
our own country.' And while an aggressive and committed
strengthening of our borders by the doubling of Border Patrol
agents is a vitally important layer in our homeland security,
it is but one layer of what should be a multi-layered approach.
Recently, there has been much discussion centering around
the comments of members of the Administration regarding the use
of our porous borders by terrorists to enter this country
illegally and striking the homeland. But the question that I
ask today is this, `Why would a terrorist, or group of
terrorists, risk possible interdiction at the border and
subsequent detention, questioning, arrest, or removal when they
could obtain, say, a student visa or visas, enter the country
legally, melt into society, and stay as long as they wish,
knowing the Federal Government will likely never give them
another thought, even if they overstay their visa?'
Purely imaginary, you would say? Well, imagine this. All 19
of the 9/11 hijackers legally entered the United States.
However, on September 11, 2001, three of the 19 were illegally
present in our country because their visas had lapsed. Due to a
lack of resources, a lack of policy emphasis of removal of
illegal aliens, or a combination of the two, there was no
action taken to aggressively enforce the immigration laws in
the interior United States, and the rest, as they say, is
history.
These facts led the 9/11 Commission to report that
apprehension of, [b]oth Hazmi and Mihdhar [two of the 9/11
hijackers] could have derailed the plan.' `[The] plan' that the
Commission refers to is the flying of planes into buildings and
that cornfield on that fateful day. The continuation of the
lack of interior enforcement most probably encourages future
terrorists to ask, `If it's broke and they're not going to fix
it, why change tactics?'
But as our colleague, Mr. Ortiz of Texas, testified last
week, terrorists do not come into our country with a big ``T''
painted on their forehead. They make their way into our
country-to use the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King's, analogy-as
that needle in a haystack of millions of legal and illegal
immigrants. If we are to have any hope of ever exposing the
needle, we must greatly diminish the size of the haystack.
`How do we do that?' You may ask? By remembering what the
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform said in its 1997
Executive Summary when it stated, ``[r]educing the employment
magnet is the lynchpin of a comprehensive strategy to deter
unlawful migration.'' By aggressively enforcing our immigration
laws in the interior United States and especially worksite
enforcement, significantly increased numbers of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, or ICE Agents, will complement the
increased manpower defending the integrity of our borders.
Likewise, Representative Ortiz told us the consequences of
inadequate detention beds. And because of a lack of ICE Agents,
absconders go free and as I said earlier, employer sanctions
have been abandoned.
As Hal Rogers, Chairman of the Appropriation Committee's
Homeland Security Subcommittee recently stated, ``Detention and
removal officers had to reduce the number of detainees held at
one time, about 23,000, to below 18,000. . . . ICE has not been
fully engaged in going after absconders and is removing
deportable aliens at a slower rate than in 2004. . . . There is
roughly 465,000 absconders. . . . Forty-five of those are
criminals . . . this has got to be on the top of our list, has
it not?''
Last year, this Congress passed and the President signed
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. This Act
called for an 800-agent increase in ICE strength in 2006 and
for 8,000 more detention beds in 2006. Yet, the President's
budget calls for only 143 new ICE investigators, and 1,920
detention beds, both less than 20% of the number we authorized.
I am deeply disappointed by the Administration's budget. It
would be a horrible lapse of duty for this Subcommittee to
allow a lack of resources to facilitate the embedding of
terrorists and criminals in our country. I will do my utmost to
ensure that the promise that Congress made to the American
people in last year's legislation will be fulfilled.
The witnesses at today's hearing will examine the need for
the increases set forth in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act from each of their unique
perspectives.
At this time, the chair now recognizes the Ranking Member
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for purposes of an opening
statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
also welcome the witnesses, and as well, welcome new Members of
our Committee, particularly those on the minority side. We
welcome, as the Chairman has done, those who have been added on
the majority side.
We have had now a series of hearings on how we can do
better, and frankly, we have also had a series of hearings that
would point out some of the fractures in the system. Today, we
talk about the ICE functions and the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement that was merged--had merged investigative
functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
and the Customs Service.
Yesterday, in Homeland Security, we had an opportunity, as
well, to listen to the questions being raised as to whether or
not we should reengage those two entities under one and whether
or not the idea of the enforcement inside the United States and
enforcement at the border should be as one.
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I think that in light of the needed
requirements to up it, if you will, to ratchet it up on
protecting this nation, I think we should leave no stone
unturned on how we could be more effective in doing that. So
this is a particularly important hearing as we address the
question of whether or not we have the appropriate resources.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement merged
the investigative function of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Customs Service, the INS
detention and removal functions, most of the INS intelligence
operation, the Federal Protective Service, and the Federal Air
Marshals Service. ICE's areas of responsibility include the
enforcement of laws dealing with the presence and activities of
terrorists, human trafficking, commercial alien smuggling
operations, document fraud, and drug trafficking, and many
important aspects of their work have been successful.
Just recently, for example, we were able to applaud
Operation Predator, which was able to bring in 5,000 arrests
since 2003 on the question of those who are non-citizens who
have come into this country and who have been predators against
our children.
Also, for instance, ICE investigators conducted an 8-month
investigation last year of two men who were selling false
identity documents to members of terrorist organizations. The
ICE investigators developed such a strong case against these
individuals that they pleaded guilty on February 28, 2005, to a
charge of involvement in a conspiracy to sell false documents
to purported members of Abu Sayyaf, a Philippines-based group
that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 authorized 800 new ICE investigators for FY 2006 through
FY 2010. The President's budget only requests funding for 143
new ICE investigators for FY 2006, which is only 17 percent of
the authorized number. We need all of the 800 additional ICE
investigators authorized by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act.
And with a little lightness, Mr. Chairman, maybe the
Administration was simply trying to tease us, to egg us on, to
see if we had the stomach to do what is right, and that means
that we need to fully fund the 800 additional ICE
investigators. Let's take the bait, if you will, accept the
challenge, and do what we need to do.
The National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act also authorized 8,000 new detention beds each year from FY
2006 through 2010. The President, however, has requested
funding for 1,920 beds for FY 2006, which is only 24 percent of
the authorized number. Mr. Chairman, I know that you are headed
to the border, at least a portion thereof. I have spent some
time at the border with Congressman Ortiz. I saw what the need
was and the crisis--hard-working men and women who understand
the needs of securing the border, but more importantly,
understanding the needs of retaining those who have entered
this country illegally. They cannot do their job without the
full funding of these detention beds and the recognition that,
in fact, we have a responsibility to provide them with the
necessary resources.
Now, to have 8,000 detention beds also means that we must
have a process that recognizes the need for an expedited
response to individuals who are detained. It doesn't make any
sense to detain individuals for months and months, separating
them from their family and not allowing them to petition their
rights in the immigration judicial system. We must fix that, as
well.
Again, these beds are necessary to provide appropriate
detention facilities for asylum seekers and to detain people
who might be dangerous, but as I said, we must find a pathway,
a justice system that allows those asylum systems to be heard
as quickly as possible.
In a recently issued report on asylum seekers and expedited
removal proceeding, the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom provides information about 19 detention
facilities that house asylum seekers. The facilities are
located in 12 different States and include six county jails, 15
Homeland Security facilities, 17 private contract facilities,
and one special county-run detention facility for alien
families. These institutions housed more than 70 percent of all
aliens subject to expedited removal in FY 2003. Overall, they
house approximately 5,585 alien men and 1,015 alien women. More
than half of the facilities reported that they house asylum
seekers with criminals. Among the eight facilities that housed
criminal inmates, seven permitted some contact between them and
the detained alien. In four of the facilities, this included
shared sleeping quarters.
Mr. Chairman, I think all of us would admit that is
inappropriate and it must stop. The 8,000 beds are necessary
not only for detention, but simply for justice and what is
fairness. In only one of these facilities were the line
officers or guards explicitly told which inmates were asylum
seekers. Also, very few of the facilities provide any specific
training to sensitize guards to the special needs or concerns
of asylum seekers. Even fewer facilities provide training to
recognize or address the special problems experienced by
victims of torture and other forms of trauma.
One of the oppositions, or one of the reasons for opposing
the intelligence bill before it had been amended or before that
language had been eliminated was the language that was included
about asylum seekers, and one of the reasons for opposing the
recent bill that was on the floor dealing with asylum seekers
was it was simply inappropriate, unfair, and did not recognize
the plight that asylum seekers face.
All the facilities but five reported that they used strip
or other kinds of invasive searches on detainees as a standard
procedure during the time they were processed into the
facility. All but three reported using strip or invasive
searches for security-related reasons during the detainees'
subsequent confinement. Virtually all of the facilities
reported using physical restraints. For example, the Tri-County
Jail in Illinois used handcuffs, belly chains, and leg shackles
when detainees left the facility. Only a few of the facilities
provide the detainees with access to private, individual
toilets, and only slightly more of our facilities were
detainees able to shower privately. The overwhelming majority
of the facilities require detainees to wear uniforms.
Some might say these individuals are undocumented and
illegal, but what I would simply say to those in this country,
to our Committee Members, that we can do better. America is
known to do better and we would want to be treated in such a
way if we were detained elsewhere around the world. It is what
you do within your own boundaries and, as well, in what you do
in upholding your values that speaks more volumes to the world.
It is unconscionable that we are treating asylum seekers
this way. They have not been sentenced to incarceration as
convicted criminals. Why are they being treated as if they were
convicted criminals? This is especially distressing in view of
the fact that some of them have come to the United States
seeking refuge from torture and other forms of oppression and
abuse.
The failure to provide adequate detention facilities does
not just result in inappropriate incarceration of asylum
seekers. It also results in the release of aliens who might be
a threat to our national security. Although a large number of
aliens cross the border between Mexico and the United States
illegally, the U.S. Border Patrol catches many of them and
returns many of them to Mexico.
The Mexican government, however, usually does not accept
aliens from other countries. These aliens are referred to as
``other than a Mexican,'' or OTMs. Due to a shortage of
detention beds, these individuals cannot be detained. According
to information from the Congressional Research Service, USBP
released 30,000 OTMs last year on their own recognizance and
many of them do not return for trial. Most of the OTMs are
ordinary people who come to the United States to seek a better
life for themselves and their families.
There is a concern, however, that has been expressed by my
colleague, Congressman Ortiz, that terrorists can use these
fractures in our system, these weaknesses in our border
security as a way to enter the country to do harm. Also, we
have a growing number of MS-13, Mara Salvatrucha, gangs in our
major cities and members of these bloody, violent Central
American gangs are entering the United States as OTMs.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the desire to fix our
immigration system and you also mentioned the fact that visas
can be abused. You are absolutely right, but I don't think we
should use a blanket concern about a broken immigration system
and our borders being porous to not recognize the validity of
student visas. Even universities throughout America, some in
your State and district, I know, find the student visa program
and other visa programs to be helpful in the intellectual
exchange and international exchange and the positiveness of
working together around the world, collaborating to fight
terror, to promote peace, to educate and understand each
other's customs and values. It is important to have a system
like that that works in a positive sense.
But we must fix our broken immigration system and provide
adequate lawful access to the United States. The population of
undocumented aliens and the number of aliens who come here
illegally will be reduced greatly. Then it will be easier to
deal with enforcement problems. We can even find a way to re-
merge, if you will, these two entities, internal defense and
external defense. But we need many more detention beds, and
might I add, we need 10,000 Border Patrol Agents for the
Northern and Southern border.
In the meantime, however, we need additional ICE
investigators and more detention beds. We also need to stop the
inhumane practice of housing asylum seekers in penal settings
where they are treated as incarcerated criminals.
I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, on these
very important issues.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady, and without
objection, all Members may insert their opening statements into
the record.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the Subcommittee proceeded to
other business, to resume at 12:42 p.m.]
Mr. Hostettler. The Subcommittee now moves to the
consideration of the hearing before us, and will the witnesses
please return to the panel. Thank you for your indulgence, and
I want to thank Members of the Subcommittee for your
attendance.
Paul K. Martin has served as Deputy Inspector General at
the Department of Justice since June 2003, and in the Inspector
General's office since 1998. Mr. Martin was a founding staff
member of the United States Sentencing Commission and served as
its Deputy Director for 7 years. Mr. Martin received his Juris
Doctorate from the Georgetown University Law Center in 1990 and
a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism from the Pennsylvania State
University in 1982. He is married to Rebekah Liu, an attorney
in Washington, D.C., and they have three daughters.
Mr. Michael Cutler began working for the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service, or INS, in 1971, as an Immigration
Inspector assigned to JFK International Airport in New York. In
1973, he was assigned as an examiner responsible for
adjudicating petitions filed by American citizens on behalf of
their alien spouses. His goal in this assignment was to attempt
to uncover fraudulent marriage scams. In August 1975, he became
a criminal investigator for the INS. From 1988 on, he was
assigned as the INS representative to the Unified Intelligence
Division of the Drug Enforcement Agency. In 1991, he was
promoted to the position of Senior Special Agent and was
assigned to the Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement Task Force.
His investigations of major alien drug trafficking
organizations ultimately resulted in successful prosecutions
for a wide variety of criminal violations. Mr. Cutler graduated
from Brooklyn College of the City University of New York in
1971 with a B.A. in Communications, Arts, and Sciences.
Randy Alan Callahan is Executive Vice President of the
National Homeland Security Council, AFGE, the union
representing ICE Agents. He began his career in the Federal
Government in 1996 as an Immigration Inspector in Calexico,
California. In August 1997, he transferred to San Diego to be a
Detention Enforcement Officer. Randy served in that capacity
until 2003, when his position was reclassified and called
Immigration Enforcement Agent. Randy served 14 years in the
U.S. Army and Army Reserves and is a Desert Storm veteran. He
became a union steward in July 1998 and quickly rose through
the ranks, becoming Western Region Vice President in August of
2000, Secretary-Treasurer in 2002, and Executive Vice President
in 2004.
Professor Craig Haney is currently a professor in the
Psychology Department at the University of California at Santa
Cruz. He is most well known for his work as one of the
principal researchers on the highly publicized Stanford prison
experiment in 1971. Professor Haney has published widely on
prison-related topics in a variety of scholarly journals. Craig
Haney was appointed by the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom to serve as an expert on
detention issues. He received his Ph.D. in psychology and J.D.
degrees from Stanford University in 1978.
At this time, due to the Committee's policy with regard to
an oath, I ask the witnesses to please rise and raise your
right hand.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give before the Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Martin. I do.
Mr. Cutler. I do.
Mr. Callahan. I do.
Mr. Haney. I do.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, and let the record reflect that
the witnesses have responded in the affirmative.
Gentlemen, once again, thank you for being here. We have a
5-minute limit to our opening statements. We would hope that
you would stay as closely to that 5 minutes as possible.
Mr. Martin, you're recognized.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL K. MARTIN, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Martin. Thank you very much. Chairman Hostettler,
Congresswoman Jackson Lee, and Members of the Subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee
as it examines the issue of interior immigration enforcement. I
represent the Office of the Inspector General at the U.S.
Department of Justice where, up until March 2003, we were
responsible for oversight of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service until it transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security.
In 1996 and again in 2003, the OIG examined the INS's
effectiveness at removing aliens after they had received final
orders of removal. In both reviews, we found the INS generally
successful at removing a high percentage of aliens it had
detained, pending their removal. However, both reviews found
that the INS was far less effective at apprehending and
removing non-detained aliens with final orders. In addition to
a lack of resources, we concluded that the INS had not
effectively implemented the recommendations in our 1996 report
to improve its performance at removing these aliens.
While 2 years have passed since we issued our last report
on this subject, our findings remain relevant as this
Subcommittee examines the appropriate level of resources to
dedicate to interior immigration enforcement.
Our reports found that the INS was effective at removing
more than 90 percent of detained aliens issued final removal
orders. However, in 1996, we found that the INS removed only 11
percent of non-detained aliens. To improve its ability to carry
out removals, our 1996 report recommended that the INS take
more aggressive actions to remove non-detained aliens,
including moving more quickly to present surrender notices to
aliens after receiving final orders, delivering such notices to
aliens instead of mailing them, and coordinating with other
Government agencies to make use of all available databases for
tracking aliens who failed to appear for removal.
In late 2002, we initiated a follow-up review to assess the
INS's progress in implementing these recommendations. Our
February 2003 report found that the INS had made little
progress in removing non-detained aliens since 1996 and had
increased its removal rate to only 13 percent. We also found
that the INS did not act timely, or, in some cases, did not act
at all to correct deficiencies that were within its control.
These included failing to follow through on a pilot project
that targeted alien absconders for removal and failing, at
least prior to September 11, to enter alien absconder
information into the FBI's National Crime Information Center so
that Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies could
assist in apprehending criminal absconders.
Our 2003 review also examined three high-risk groups of
non-detained aliens and found that the INS was ineffective at
removing these individuals. Specifically, we found that during
a 15-month period ending in December 2001, the INS removed only
6 percent of non-detained aliens from countries identified by
the State Department as sponsors of terrorism.
In addition, although the INS had established removal of
criminal aliens as its first priority, we found that it had
removed only 35 percent of the non-detained criminals in our
sample.
And third, we found that the INS removed only 3 percent of
the non-detained aliens who sought asylum, were denied, and had
received final removal orders. We were concerned by the low
removal rate for unsuccessful asylum seekers because several
individuals convicted of terrorist acts in the United States
requested asylum as part of their efforts to remain in this
country.
As a result of these continuing problems, our February 2003
report made eight additional recommendations to the INS to help
improve its ability to remove aliens issued final orders. The
INS did not respond to these recommendations before the agency
was transferred to the DHS in March 2003. Since then, the DHS
Inspector General's office has had the responsibility for
monitoring the response to these recommendations.
Oversight of the Federal Government's immigration
enforcement efforts now rests with the DHS Inspector General.
We, therefore, cannot provide the Subcommittee with definitive
information about the DHS's current progress in removing aliens
issued final orders. However, we believe that effective
interior enforcement remains an important issue and the DHS, as
well as this Subcommittee and the DHS IG's Office, should
continue to focus attention on this important area.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Martin.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul K. Martin
Chairman Hostettler, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, and Members of the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims:
I. INTRODUCTION
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee as
it examines the level of resources dedicated to interior immigration
enforcement. I represent the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at
the Department of Justice (DOJ) where, up until March 2003, we were
responsible for oversight of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) until it transferred from the DOJ to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
The 2000 census estimated that as many as 8 million unlawful aliens
reside in the United States. That total includes individuals who
entered the United States without proper documentation and those who
entered legally but overstayed or violated their visas or terms of
entry.
In 1996 and in 2003, the OIG examined the INS's effectiveness at
removing aliens after they had received final orders of removal from
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).\1\ In both reviews,
we found that the INS removed more than 90 percent of aliens it
detained pending their removal.\2\ However, both reviews also found
that the INS was far less effective at apprehending and removing non-
detained aliens who had received final orders to leave the country. In
both reviews, no more than 13 percent of the non-detained aliens in our
samples left the country. Importantly, the 2003 review found that non-
detained aliens in high-risk groups such as those from countries
designated as state sponsors of terrorism and aliens with criminal
records generally were not removed. In addition, we found that the INS
had made little progress between 1996 and 2003 in implementing
recommendations to improve its ability to remove aliens issued final
orders of removal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The EOIR, a DOJ component, is responsible for adjudicating
immigration cases at the trial and appellate levels.
\2\ See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector
General, Immigration and Naturalization Service's Deportation of Aliens
After Final Orders Have Been Issued (Report No. I-96-03), March 1996,
and The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Removal of Aliens
Issued Final Orders (Report No. I-2003-004), February 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of a variety of factors, it is clear that detaining every
alien undergoing a removal proceeding is not practical or desirable.
However, we reviewed the INS's experience in removing aliens who had
been issued final orders of removal after their cases had been
adjudicated and finalized, including all appeals. We concluded that the
INS did not effectively use all means at its disposal to improve its
performance at removing aliens who were not detained. While two years
have passed since we issued our last report and the INS moved to the
DHS, the reasons for the agency's historical inability to remove non-
detained aliens, as documented in our reports, and the possible
approaches we identified for improving its capability in this area
remain relevant as the Subcommittee examines the appropriate level of
resources to dedicate to interior immigration enforcement.
II. REMOVAL OF UNLAWFUL ALIENS WITH FINAL ORDERS
When unlawful aliens are apprehended, the removal process begins
with the filing of charging documents with the EOIR. After court
hearings are scheduled with the EOIR, the INS--now the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the DHS--mails information
about the dates, times, and locations of the hearings to aliens. To
ensure that aliens that could pose a danger are removed, the INS was
required to detain certain categories of aliens. In September 1996, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act required
that aliens with criminal backgrounds, those deemed a flight risk,
those with mental illnesses, and those with dangerous physical
illnesses be detained pending their removal. Other aliens are ``non-
detained,'' the term used to describe aliens who either are not taken
into custody or are released from custody while their immigration cases
are pending. At the removal hearings, an Immigration Judge adjudicates
the alien's case and either allows the alien to remain in the United
States or orders the alien removed. Aliens may appeal EOIR rulings to
the Board of Immigration Appeals and then to federal courts.
The cases we reviewed for our 1996 and 2003 reports included aliens
who either had exhausted their appeals or did not appeal the initial
court decisions. Therefore, the removal orders for these aliens were
final and could be carried out by the INS. Both reports found that the
INS was effective at removing more than 90 percent of detained aliens
issued final removal orders by the EOIR. The reasons for allowing the
other detained aliens to remain in the United States included political
or humanitarian concerns, grants of administrative relief, and the
INS's inability to obtain necessary travel documents from the aliens'
home countries.
However, both of our reviews found that the INS was far less
effective at apprehending and removing non-detained aliens ordered to
leave the country. In 1996, only 11 percent of non-detained aliens who
had received final orders were removed. In some cases, the INS did not
pursue removal because of political or humanitarian concerns, but in
most cases the aliens had moved or failed to appear for removal after
issuance of final orders (i.e., absconded), and the INS was unable to
find them. Delays in transmitting the aliens' final removal orders from
the EOIR to the INS may have contributed to the INS's difficulty in
locating aliens. In addition, the INS did not always act promptly to
carry out removals, and these delays also may have contributed to
making it difficult to locate aliens for removal.
To improve the INS's ability to carry out removals, in 1996 the OIG
recommended that the INS take more aggressive actions to remove non-
detained aliens, such as:
Moving more quickly to present surrender notices to
aliens after receiving final orders;
Delivering surrender notices instead of mailing them
to aliens;
Taking aliens into custody at hearings when final
orders are issued;
Pursuing aliens who fail to appear and reviewing
procedures for closing cases for aliens who fail to appear; and
Coordinating with other government agencies to make
use of all databases available for tracking aliens who fail to
appear.
In late 2002, we began a follow-up review to assess the status of
the INS's efforts to remove aliens with final orders and the progress
of the INS's actions to implement the recommendations in our 1996
report. Our February 2003 report found that the INS had made little
progress in removing non-detained aliens since 1996, improving its rate
of removal to only 13 percent. We also examined three high-risk groups
of non-detained aliens and found that the INS was ineffective at
removing these individuals. The groups we examined were:
Aliens from countries identified as sponsors of
terrorism. In 2001, the Department of State identified seven
countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. We found that from
October 1, 2000, to December 31, 2001, the INS removed only 6
percent of the non-detained aliens from these countries.
Further, half of these removals occurred in the 3\1/2\ months
after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Aliens with criminal records. Although the INS
established the removal of criminal aliens as its first
priority in its 1999 Interior Enforcement Strategy, we found
that it had removed only 35 percent of the non-detained
criminals in our sample.
Aliens denied asylum. We found that the INS removed
only 3 percent of the non-detained asylum seekers who received
final removal orders. We were concerned by the low removal rate
for unsuccessful asylum seekers because this group may include
potential terrorists. Several individuals convicted of
terrorist acts in the United States requested asylum as a part
of their efforts to remain in the country.
Because of its ineffectiveness at removing aliens with final
orders, as of June 2002 the INS estimated that a backlog of about
355,000 aliens remained in the United States with unexecuted removal
orders. According to the INS, at the rate that the INS removed aliens
in 2002 that backlog represented a 20- to 30-year workload. During our
2003 review, INS officials acknowledged that they did not have the
resources to mount a substantial effort to locate and remove the large
number of aliens who had absconded.
We also found that the INS had done little to timely or fully
implement the recommendations we made in 1996 to improve its removal
rate of aliens issued final orders. I will now briefly describe the
INS's lack of progress in addressing the recommendations from our 1996
report before discussing other factors that affect alien removals.
III. THE INS FAILED TO TAKE TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
While some factors regarding removal of aliens issued final orders,
such as resource limitations, were wholly or partially outside the
control of the INS, our reviews found that the agency did not act to
correct factors that were within its control. In response to our 1996
report, the INS agreed to implement a variety of specific actions we
recommended that would improve its effectiveness at removing non-
detained aliens. However, in our 2003 follow-up review we found that
the INS had delayed or failed to complete the implementation of these
corrective actions and had failed to significantly improve its removal
of non-detained aliens between 1996 and 2002.
Pilot absconder removal project. In response to our 1996 report,
the INS agreed to conduct field tests in which alien absconders would
be targeted for removal. The INS later reported to us that a limited
duration pilot had been conducted with positive results and that the
INS intended to conduct two additional field tests before expanding the
program. However, when we conducted our 2003 follow-up review, the INS
was unable to provide any information regarding the pilot projects, the
implementation of the program in response to the pilot projects, or
even to locate anyone who could remember the pilot program.
Resources for apprehending absconders. In response to our 1996
report, the INS agreed to use a fiscal year (FY) 1996 budget
enhancement of $11.2 million to fund 142 positions to remove alien
absconders. It also agreed to use its Law Enforcement Support Center to
enter alien absconder information into the National Crime Information
Center and develop an automated list of criminal absconders so that
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies could assist in
apprehending them. However, the INS did not establish absconder removal
teams or develop an automated list of absconders until after the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Moreover, the INS was unable to
document how it used the $11.2 million budget enhancement it received
in FY 1996 for this program.
Rulemaking to improve notification methods. In 1996 we found that
the INS was not effective at notifying aliens to surrender for removal
and therefore we recommended that the INS present surrender notices to
aliens more promptly after the aliens had received their final orders.
We also recommended that the INS deliver surrender notices instead of
mailing them to aliens. After agreeing to improve its methods of
notifying aliens of their duty to surrender for removal and publishing
a proposed rule in 1998 that would have enhanced its ability to remove
aliens expeditiously if they failed to appear, the INS allowed the
rulemaking to lapse. After the September 11 attacks, the INS revived
and expanded the rulemaking titled Requiring Aliens Ordered Removed
from the United States to Surrender to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for Removal. In preparation for this hearing, we
checked with the EOIR on the status of the rulemaking and were told
that as of March 2005 the rule still was not final.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS IN OUR FEBRUARY 2003 REPORT
As a result of the continued problems we found in our follow-up
review, our February 2003 report made eight additional recommendations
to the INS to improve its ability to remove aliens issued final orders
of removal. For example, we recommended that the INS establish annual
goals for apprehending and removing absconders and other non-detained
aliens with final orders. In addition, we recommended that the INS
identify the resources required to achieve its annual and strategic
performance goals and track its resources to ensure they were used as
intended.
Because of the data problems we encountered in reviewing the INS's
electronic records, we also recommended that the INS establish a
program to correct missing and inaccurate data and work with the EOIR
to reconcile discrepancies between INS and EOIR data systems. We
recommended that the INS work with the EOIR to implement a shared data
system for case tracking, similar to the Interagency Border Inspections
System, to identify and process aliens with final orders.\3\ Finally,
we recommended that the INS improve the utility of its website for
informing the public about high-risk absconders and to facilitate
reporting of leads on absconders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Interagency Border Inspections System is an interagency
effort by the INS, U.S. Customs Service (now part of ICE), Department
of State, and Department of Agriculture to improve border enforcement
and controls and to facilitate the inspections of applicants for
admission to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The INS did not respond to these recommendations before the agency
was transferred to the DHS in March 2003. Since March 2003, the DHS
Inspector General's Office has had the responsibility for tracking and
monitoring the DHS's response to these recommendations. In preparation
for this hearing, we asked the DHS OIG about the status of the response
to these recommendations. The DHS OIG provided us with information that
indicates that ICE has followed up on several of our recommendations.
According to a March 2004 DHS report on management challenges, ICE
developed a six-year plan to align its long-term detention and removal
strategies with the resources required to fulfill those missions. ICE
also created fugitive operations teams, issued new guidance to ensure
administrative case closures were not abused, was working to replace
its electronic case tracking system, and was working with the EOIR to
improve the quality of data in its system. Finally, ICE established a
``Most Wanted'' section on its website.
V. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING ALIEN REMOVALS
In our two reviews, we also identified a variety of factors that
limited the INS's effectiveness at removing aliens with final orders.
Some of these factors were within the INS's control, but others were
not. For example, limitations in resources are an issue in addressing
the detention and removal of aliens issued final orders. The resource
limitations that hindered the INS's removal of aliens included a lack
of detention space, limited numbers of detention officers, and too few
investigators and special agents to locate aliens in order to carry out
the removals. According to the DOJ's FY 2001 Performance Report, the
INS continued to face a ``severe shortage of bed space and personnel to
effectively handle the processing and removal of aliens in immigration
proceedings.'' \4\ Although we have not reviewed this issue since the
INS left the DOJ two years ago, February 2004 congressional testimony
by a DHS official indicated that ICE had a daily detention population
of approximately 21,000 aliens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The DOJ's FY 01 Performance Report/FY 02 Revised Final
Performance Plan/FY 03 Performance Plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We note that the DHS appears to have directed some additional
resources to removing aliens with final orders. According to the DHS
Office of Detention and Removal's Strategic Plan for 2003 to 2012, the
agency has dedicated 40 officers to its National Fugitive Operations
Program/
Absconder Apprehension Initiative. However, the plan acknowledges
that the staffing level is ``woefully inadequate to achieve the goal''
of eliminating 100 percent of the backlogged unexecuted orders of
removal.
Another factor we found that affected the INS's ability to remove
aliens was the lack of complete and accurate data, especially correct
addresses for aliens. Our own reviews, as well as Government
Accountability Office and INS internal audits conducted between 1996
and 2003, found that the INS had serious and continuing problems with
data reliability that impaired its ability to process aliens for
removal. For example, in our 2003 review we found errors in aliens'
names, missing cases, nationality errors, and incorrect case file
numbers in 11 percent of the files we reviewed from the group of aliens
from states that sponsor terrorism.
In addition, during our field work for our 1996 and 2003 reports,
we found that the INS and the EOIR were unable to share information on
immigration cases automatically. As a result, according to an INS
statistician we interviewed for our 2003 report, an estimated 20
percent of the total cases in INS and EOIR systems did not contain
matching data. Moreover, 195,000 files in the EOIR's system did not
appear in the INS's system. As I noted earlier, the DHS has reported
that ICE is working to correct its data problems.
External factors limiting removals include the quality of
diplomatic relations between the United States and other nations. The
INS was unable to remove aliens with final orders if they were from
countries designated by the President for Deferred Enforced Departure.
Examples of these cases include deferrals granted over the last 15
years to aliens from China, Haiti, and Liberia. The INS also was unable
to remove aliens if they had been granted Temporary Protected Status by
the Attorney General for humanitarian or other reasons.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In 1990, Congress provided the Attorney General authority to
grant Temporary Protected Status to aliens from certain countries if
the aliens' lives would be threatened by natural disasters, armed
conflicts, or other extraordinary conditions. As of July 2002, the
Attorney General had granted or extended Temporary Protected Status to
nationals from Angola, Burundi, El Salvador, Honduras, Montserrat,
Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. CONCLUSION
Our office no longer has oversight of the federal government's
immigration enforcement efforts. That jurisdiction now rests with the
DHS Inspector General's Office. We therefore cannot provide the
Subcommittee with definitive information regarding whether the actions
taken by ICE during the past two years fully implement our February
2003 recommendations or the extent to which ICE has made progress in
removing aliens issued final orders. However, we believe that effective
interior enforcement remains an important issue, and we believe that
the DHS--as well as this Subcommittee and the DHS OIG--should continue
to focus attention on this important area.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions.
Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Cutler, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL W. CUTLER, FORMER I.N.S. SPECIAL AGENT
Mr. Cutler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hostettler,
Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members of Congress,
members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, I welcome this
opportunity to provide testimony today on the critical issue of
interior enforcement resources for the immigration laws.
A country without secure borders can no more stand than can
a house without walls. The task of securing America's borders
falls to the dedicated men and women of CBP and ICE. These law
enforcement officers are often put in harm's way as they try to
prevent aliens from gaining unauthorized entry into our
country. They are not succeeding in this vital mission, as
evidenced by the millions of illegal aliens who currently live
within our nation's borders today. This is not because of
failings which the employees of ICE or CBP bear the
responsibility, but rather because our Government has
consistently failed to provide them with the resources that
they need to make certain that this basic job gets done.
The 9/11 Commission ultimately came to recognize the
critical nature of immigration law enforcement where the war on
terror is concerned. In fact, page 49 of the report entitled,
``9/11 and Terrorist Travel: A Staff Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,''
contains a sentence that reads, and I quote, ``Thus abuse of
the immigration system and a lack of interior immigration
enforcement were unwittingly working together to support
terrorist activity,'' unquote.
Acting on recommendations of the Commission, Congress
authorized the expenditure of funds to enable 800 new special
agents to be hired to enforce the immigration laws from within
the United States for each of the next 5 years. I would
actually argue that this number of new agents would not be
enough, especially considering the findings of the 9/11
Commission staff report that I have just quoted, and,
therefore, I am frankly at a loss to understand why the
Administration is not requesting at least as many new special
agents as Congress authorized rather than the requested funding
for the hiring of only 143 new special agents. I firmly believe
that this represents a false economy and jeopardizes our
nation's security.
Clearly, the effective enforcement of the immigration laws
from within the interior of the United States is critical for
our nation to gain control of its borders and to protect its
citizens from aliens who come to this country to engage in
criminal activities and terrorism.
Our nation's inability and apparent unwillingness to
enforce the immigration laws has caused our nation to pay a
heavy price. As we know, on September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks were launched from within our borders by aliens who
exploited various weaknesses in the immigration system. We must
not think of the attacks of September 11 as being a single
attack, nor should we think of the attacks as being consisting
of three attacks, the destruction of the World Trade Center,
the destruction of a segment of the Pentagon, and the downing
of United Airlines Flight 93 in that field in Pennsylvania.
Rather, I would ask that you think of those attacks as being
thousands of separate attacks because each of the nearly 3,000
lives that were so violently and horrifically ended was a
precious and irreplaceable life. The loss of these lives to
their families, loved ones, and friends has forever altered
their lives, as well. Additionally, thousands more people were
grievously injured, both emotionally as well as physically.
The victims of 9/11 came from all over the United States
and from other countries. No American city is safe if any
American city is attacked, and I would like to point to that
map that we've put up over there that shows how many States
suffered how many casualties on that day, on September 11,
2001, and I would love to see that remain on permanent display
somewhere as a reminder to Members of Congress that it was the
entire country, not just New York and Washington, that were
attacked on that day.
The specter of terrorist attacks is not the only price to
be paid for our failure to secure our borders. Illegal
immigration impacts more aspects of this country than does any
other issue. It impacts everything from education, the economy,
health care, criminal justice, and national security. In fact,
it is estimated that some 30 percent of the Federal inmate
population is comprised of aliens. It is not unreasonable to
say that more people lose their lives each year as a result of
crimes committed by criminal aliens within our borders than
were killed on that horrific day in September of 2001.
When he testified before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence last month, FBI Director Robert Mueller testified
that he is very concerned about the lack of data on a network
of al Qaeda sleeper cells in the United States. He went on to
say, and I quote, ``finding them is a top priority for the FBI,
but it's also one of the most difficult challenges,'' unquote.
Sleeper cells are not like cicadas. They do not simply slip
into our country and then burrow into a hole for months or
years awaiting instructions to emerge to carry out a terrorist
attack. Sleepers are, in fact, aliens who, upon entering our
country, manage to hide in plain sight by finding a job,
attending a school, or managing to hide in plain sight by doing
things that do not call attention to them. Someone once said
that an effective spy is someone who could not attract the
attention of a waitress at a greasy spoon diner, and the same
could be said of an effective terrorist.
It is, therefore, vital that we regain control of our
borders and the entire immigration bureaucracy and enforcement
program if we are to protect our nation against terrorists and
criminals, and this requires that we have an adequate number of
law enforcement agents dedicated to this critical mission.
It has been estimated that more than 40 percent of the
illegal aliens in the United States did not evade the valiant
Border Patrol Agents who stand watch on our nation's border,
but rather strolled through ports of entry, having been
inspected by the process and then went on to hide in plain
sight within our country, and many aliens find this to be a
relatively easy endeavor. And as you know, I speak from
experience, having been an immigration inspector at JFK
Airport. Additionally, the visa waiver program further hampers
the inspections process.
There's another critical element to the interior
enforcement of the immigration laws that's seldom discussed,
the investigation of applications for immigration benefits to
uncover fraud, which, according to a GAO report issued 3 years
ago, is a pervasive problem within the immigration benefits
program. A terrorist bent on attacking the United States would
most want three things to attack our nation: Money, a weapon of
mass destruction, and a U.S. passport. The passport enables an
alien to easily travel across our borders, but also across the
borders of other countries. And, as we now know, the 9/11
commission found that the ability to travel freely and
extensively was essential to the terrorists of 9/11 as they
prepared to attack us.
Aliens who succeed in acquiring resident alien status can
more readily embed themselves in our country and ultimately
attain U.S. citizenship, making them eligible for that highly
coveted U.S. passport. Immigration fraud enables aliens to
avail themselves of this opportunity through deception.
While technology can and should play a role in enforcing
the laws and helping to lend integrity to these processes, we
must remember that law enforcement is a labor-intensive
activity. Computers don't arrest law violators, law enforcement
officers do. We can use computers for data mining to help
uncover fraud, but again, it is the agent conducting field
investigations who is most likely to uncover fraud or other
criminal activities. While technology can be a force
multiplier, in the end, without sufficient numbers of dedicated
law enforcement officers and appropriate resources, including
sufficient detention facilities, the job will simply not get
done.
Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Cutler, could you summarize the
remainder of your testimony?
Mr. Cutler. Sure. The one point that I would make is that
Vice President Cheney aptly compared 9/11 to what happened on
December 7. After December 7, this nation made a tremendous
effort to build airplanes, battleships, nuclear weapons,
whatever was needed to get the job done. The efforts that we do
today must be no less intensive to wage war on the terrorists
who are just as intent on destroying us today.
I know there's a clip. I don't know if this would be the
time to do it or not. But CNN did a piece that I think relates
to what we're doing today and I would like the opportunity for
the Committee to see it.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
Mr. Cutler. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[A videotape was shown.]
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Cutler. I just wanted to thank CNN for providing that
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cutler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael W. Cutler
Chairman Hostettler, Ranking member Jackson Lee, distinguished
members of Congress, members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen. I
welcome this opportunity to provide testimony today on the critical
issue of interior immigration enforcement resources.
A country without secure borders can no more stand than can a house
without walls. The task of securing America's borders falls to the
dedicated men and women of CBP and ICE. These law enforcement officers
are often put in harm's way as they try to prevent aliens from gaining
unauthorized entry into our country. They are not succeeding in this
vital mission as evidenced by the millions of illegal aliens who
currently live within our nation's borders. This is not because of
failings for which the employees of ICE or CBP bear the responsibility,
but rather because our government has consistently failed to provide
them with the resources they need to make certain that this basic job
gets done.
The 9/11 Commission ultimately came to recognize the critical
nature of immigration law enforcement where the ``War on Terror'' is
concerned. In fact, page 49 of the report entitled, ``9/11 and
Terrorist Travel, A Staff Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States'' contains a sentence that
reads, ``Thus abuse of the immigration system and a lack of interior
immigration enforcement were unwittingly working together to support
terrorist activity.'' This page incidentally is contained in the
chapter entitled, ``Terrorist Travel and Embedding Tactics.'' Acting on
recommendations of the Commission, Congress authorized the expenditure
of funds to enable 800 new special agents to be hired to enforce the
immigration laws from within the United States for each of the next 5
years. I would actually argue that these new agents would not be enough
especially considering the findings of the 9/11 Commission staff report
I quoted. Therefore I am frankly at a loss to understand why the
administration is not requesting at least as many new special agents as
Congress authorized rather than the requested funding for the hiring of
only 143 new special agents. I firmly believe that this represents a
false economy and jeopardizes our nation's security.
Clearly the effective enforcement of the immigration laws from
within the interior of the United States is critical for our nation to
gain control of its borders and to protect our citizens from aliens who
come to this country to engage in criminal activities and terrorism.
Our nation's inability and apparent unwillingness to enforce the
immigration laws has caused our nation to pay a heavy price. As we
know, on September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were launched within our
borders by aliens who exploited various weaknesses in the immigration
system. We must not think of the attacks of September 11 as being a
single attack, nor should we think of the attacks as consisting of
three attacks; the destruction of the World Trade Center, the
destruction of a segment of the Pentagon and the downing of United
Airlines Flight 93 in that field in Pennsylvania. I would ask that you
think of those attacks as being thousands of separate attacks, because
each of the nearly 3,000 lives that was so violently and horrifically
ended was a precious and irreplaceable life. The loss of these lives to
their families, loved ones and friends has forever altered their lives
as well. Additionally, thousands more people were grievously injured,
both emotionally as well as physically. The victims of 9/11 came from
all over the United States and from many countries. No American city is
safe if any American city is attacked. However, the specter of
terrorist attacks is not the only price to be paid for our failure to
secure our borders. Illegal immigration impacts more aspects of this
country than does any other issue. It impacts everything from
education, the economy, health care and the environment to criminal
justice and national security. It has been estimated that aliens
account for some 30% of the inmate population in federal correctional
institutions. It is not unreasonable to say that more people lose their
lives each year as a result of crimes committed by criminal aliens than
were killed on that horrific day in September of 2001.
When he testified before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence last month, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III testified
that he is ``very concerned'' about the lack of data on a network of al
Qaeda ``sleeper'' cells in the United States. He went on to say that,
``Finding them is a top priority for the FBI, but it is also one of the
most difficult challenges.''
Sleeper agents are not like cicadas; they do not simply slip into
our country and then burrow into a hole for months or years awaiting
their instructions to emerge to carry out a deadly terrorist attack.
Sleepers are, in fact, aliens who, upon entering our country, manage to
hide in plain sight by finding a job, attending a school or doing other
such ``ordinary things'' that do not call attention to them. Someone
once said that an effective spy is someone who could not attract the
attention of a waitress at a greasy spoon diner. The same can be said
of an effective terrorist. It is vital that we regain control of our
borders and the entire immigration bureaucracy and enforcement program
if we are to protect our nation against terrorists and criminals. This
requires that we have an adequate number of law enforcement officers
who are dedicated to this critical mission.
I have read estimates that more than 40% of the illegal aliens in
the United States did not evade the valiant Border Patrol agents who
stand watch on our borders, but rather strolled through ports of entry
intent on violating our laws. Many aliens find this to be a relatively
easy endeavor. As you know, I speak from experience, having spent four
years as an Immigration Inspector assigned to John F. Kennedy
International Airport in New York before I became a Special Agent for
the former INS. The inspectors are supposed to conduct an inspection of
an arriving alien in about one minute. In that brief period of time the
inspector is supposed to examine the arriving alien's passport, compare
the alien's name against a watch list to make certain that the person
standing before him is not prohibited from entering the United States
and then ask a few questions to try to determine the intentions of the
alien seeking to enter our country. Of course, if serious questions are
raised the inspector has the option of referring the alien to a section
known as ``Secondary'' where a more intensive effort can be made to
determine whether or not the alien in question should be admitted, but
the pressure is on to quickly move the lines of arriving aliens.
Additionally, the Visa Waiver Program further hampers the inspection
process.
An adequate number of special agents is needed to back up the
Border Patrol and the CBP inspectors.
There is another critical element to the interior enforcement of
the immigration laws that is seldom discussed. The investigation of
applications for immigration benefits to uncover fraud, which according
to a GAO report issued three years ago, was a pervasive problem within
the immigration benefits program. A terrorist bent on attacking the
United States would most want three things in order to attack our
country; money, a weapon of mass destruction and a United States
passport to facilitate travel not only across the borders of the United
States, but to also facilitate travel into many other countries. The 9/
11 Commission found, in fact, that the ability to travel freely and
extensively was essential to the terrorists of 9/11 as they prepared to
attack us. Aliens who succeed in acquiring resident alien status can
more readily embed themselves in our country and ultimately attain
United States citizenship thereby making them eligible to receive that
highly coveted United States passport. Immigration fraud enables aliens
to avail themselves of that opportunity through deception and places
such aliens on the road to United States citizenship. It is therefore
crucial that we do a far better job of making certain that the
immigration benefits program has real integrity.
While technology can and should play a role in enforcing the laws
and helping to lend integrity to these processes, we must remember that
law enforcement is a labor-intensive activity. Computers don't arrest
law violators, law enforcement officers do. We can use computers for
data mining to help uncover fraud, but again, it is the agent
conducting field investigations who is most likely to uncover fraud or
other criminal activities. While technology can be a force multiplier,
in the end, without sufficient numbers of dedicated law enforcement
officers and appropriate resources, including sufficient detention
facilities, the job will simply not get done.
During the last Presidential campaign, Vice President Cheney aptly
compared the attacks of September 11, 2001 with the attack on Pearl
Harbor launched on December 7, 1941. I would like to point out that
after the attack on Pearl Harbor our nation created fleets of aircraft
that had never existed before. We created fleets of ocean going
warships that had never existed before and we even created nuclear
weapons that had never been constructed before. Less than 4 years after
that terrible attack we defeated the enemy that was bent on the
destruction of our nation, our allies and our way of life. The
terrorists that attacked us on September 11 are just as determined to
destroy us today. We are in the fourth year of our ``War on terror.''
Our resolve to win this war must be as strong as it was for those who
fought World War II. We must do everything reasonable to secure our
country's borders, and the time to act is now. Our nation's future
hangs in the balance.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Hostettler. Mr. Callahan.
TESTIMONY OF RANDY CALLAHAN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, AFGE
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ms.
Jackson Lee, Members of the Subcommittee. I'm an Immigration
Enforcement Agent with the Department of Homeland Security's
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Today, I'm here
as the Executive Vice President of the National Homeland
Security Council, AFGE. The Council represents approximately
15,000 employees of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service, which was split into three bureaus, Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
Citizenship and Immigration Services.
The purpose of today's hearing is to address the budget
crisis at ICE, and believe me, there is a crisis. Though the
overall budget for ICE in fiscal year 2005 increased over
fiscal year 2004, many of the programs that had full funding in
2004 do not have funding in 2005. ICE programs are short-
staffed due to a hiring freeze that has been in place for some
time now.
The Detention and Removal Operations Division alone is
short approximately 1,300 full-time and part-time employees. If
Detention Removal, or DRO, were a military unit, it would be
considered nondeployable.
All academy training for fiscal year 2005 and ICE has been
canceled for the rest of the year. This includes training
designed to train up to approximately 2,000 former Detention
Enforcement Officers who were reclassified and combined with
Immigration Agents into one position called Immigration
Enforcement Agent. There are approximately 900 employees who
anxiously await the opportunity to attend this training because
it would mean they would then have the training and the
authority to perform expanded immigration law enforcement
functions, which would allow DRO to locate and apprehend more
fugitive aliens at large across the country, thereby making the
country safer.
There are no funds available for uniforms, so uniformed
Immigration Enforcement Agents are not able to replace worn-out
uniforms. Worse than this is the fact that the uniform in use
today still has the Immigration and Naturalization Service
patch on it. I've been trying to work with ICE to develop a new
uniform and a grooming standards policy, but ICE simply has no
money to develop or purchase new uniforms.
My badge still says Immigration Detention Enforcement
Officer, a position which no longer exists, and my credentials
still say Department of Justice. This was understandable for
about the first six to 9 months after the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, but now it is just
embarrassing.
The most disturbing fact with regard to ICE's budget is the
detention bed space issue. Within 5 days after today's hearing,
I am told that ICE will no longer have enough money to detain
suspected illegal aliens in custody. I've talked with ICE
management about this issue and they believe they will receive
either an approved reprogramming request to continue detention
operations or they will receive a supplemental appropriation
from Congress to keep over 17,000 illegal aliens, many of which
are criminals, in custody. I have since found out that many
offices are already reducing their adult detained population.
What are ICE's immediate funding needs? First and foremost,
funding needs to be immediately approved for the continued
detention of immigration law violators. To do otherwise would
be a violation of the public trust.
The hiring freeze needs to be lifted. We need to train our
Immigration Enforcement Agents and other ICE officers. We need
new badges and credentials issued. ICE needs funds to develop a
new uniform with the correct bureau patch on it, or eliminate
the uniform entirely and save a million dollars a year or more.
ICE is a bureau in financial crisis. They don't have enough
money to hold people in custody, buy new uniforms and equipment
for employees, or even issue badges and credentials with the
correct Department on them. Something needs to be done to
correct this problem.
The union asks that you fast-track approval of funding--
funds to keep ICE operating and investigate potential
mismanagement issues.
On a final unrelated note, my ability to testify at this
hearing stems from my right to be part of a union. It is an
honor for me to be here, and I hope to be the voice of ICE
employees for a long time to come.
My colleagues in the ICE Office of Investigations, the
Federal Air Marshals Service, the Transportation Security
Agency, and other agencies that make up the Department of
Homeland Security do not have the same protective rights.
Please correct this injustice by allowing them to join the
union and strengthening whistleblower protection laws.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this
testimony, and I will be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Callahan.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Callahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randy Callahan
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Randy Callahan. I am currently an Immigration
Enforcement Agent with the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal
Operations. I began my career in 1996, when I was hired by the
Immigration & Naturalization Service as an Immigration Inspector. In
1997, I became an Immigration Detention Enforcement Officer. In August
of 2003, the Detention Enforcement Officer was reclassified into my
current position. I am here today as the Executive Vice-President of
Council 117 of the American Federation of Government Employees, also
known as the National Homeland Security Council 117. The Council,
represents approximately fifteen thousand employees of the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service, which was split into three
separate Bureaus: Customs and Border Protection (C.B.P), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E) and Citizenship and Immigration
Services (C.I.S) in March of 2003. On behalf of the bargaining unit
members of these Bureaus, I thank you for inviting me to present our
organization's views on the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (I.C.E) budget crisis.
CURRENT FINANCIAL STATUS OF I.C.E:
The purpose of the hearing is to address the budget crisis at I.C.E
and believe me, there is a crisis. Though the overall budget for I.C.E
in FY 2005 increased over FY 2004, many of the programs that had full
funding in 2004 do not have funding in 2005. For several months, there
has been a hiring freeze in place. All Academy training has been
canceled for the remainder of FY 2005, so even if I.C.E began hiring
today, it would take months to ready the Academy for classes. I am told
that the Detention & Removal Operations (DRO) branch of I.C.E is short
approximately 1300 full time and part time employees. I am told that
our ``warfighter'' levels are down to approximately 70%, which I hear
would make DRO undeployable if it were a military unit. In addition to
the hiring freeze, I.C.E has put a hold on all permanent changes of
station (PCS) moves.
I mentioned the cancellation of training earlier, this includes
activities designed to fully train approximately two thousand former
Detention Enforcement Officers, who were reclassified and combined with
Immigration Agent into a position called, Immigration Enforcement Agent
(IEA). The training is just over half way completed, but I.C.E still
has a significant number of employees, approximately nine hundred, who
do not have the training yet. Without the training, which is called the
enforcement transition program (ETP), I.C.E cannot use the officers for
any type of law enforcement function, except transportation officer and
possibly some computer work.
There is no money for uniforms, so uniformed Immigration
Enforcement Agents are not able to order replacement uniforms. In fact,
the uniforms being used nationwide right now still have Immigration &
Naturalization Service patches on them. The Union has been trying for
several months to work with I.C.E to develop a new uniform and grooming
standards policies, but with the budget problems, I.C.E can not afford
to do it. I.C.E employees still use Department of Justice credentials
and old INS badges to identify themselves as federal agents. One would
think that two years after the creation of I.C.E they would be able to
design and get approval for new uniforms, as well as badges and
credentials. While I.C.E can not get out of the expense of changing the
badges and credentials of I.C.E employees, the Union has recommended
that DRO eliminate the uniform requirement and make all positions
``plain clothes'' positions. This would save at least $1 million per
year. It may be a drop in the bucket in the grand scheme of things, but
it's a start!
Perhaps the most disturbing fact with regard to the I.C.E budget,
is the detention bed space issue. I received a call about two weeks ago
from a concerned employee, who told me that Headquarters I.C.E was
seriously discussing the release of detainees from custody, because
I.C.E would run out of money by March 1st. I later found out that the
money will actually run out in the middle of March. I attempted to
secure documentation that would corroborate the rumors I had heard, but
I.C.E management said that the release of detainees from custody would
only be considered as a last resort.
Unfortunately, I found out last week that DRO in San Diego, CA was
already releasing detainees from custody. Apparently, management told
employees that the office had to reduce their adult detention bed space
to one hundred from over several hundred. I.C.E management said that
they believed they would get the funding they needed to keep the
detention spaces open, either by the reallocation of funds request
currently on its way to the Department, or by a supplemental
appropriations request. Just one of these funding requests will keep
current funding levels of bed space, which is approximately 17,000
nationwide, for a few more months. I understand that Congress funded
approximately 22,000 bed spaces nationwide in the FY 2005
Appropriations bill. If it is true that the current bed space used is
at 17,000, so I am forced to ask: What happened to the funds that were
appropriated for the remaining five thousand beds?
POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE I.C.E BUDGET CRISIS:
The Department's Office of Inspector General (OIG) was ordered to
conduct an audit of I.C.E's financial records. Though I have not seen
the OIG report, I have heard that approximately $300 million to $500
million was given to the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
(C.B.P) and Citizenship and Immigration Services (C.I.S).
It is unclear where this money has gone, but DHS mismanagement is
certainly a possibility. I hear from employees who complain that their
managers may be misusing government vehicles. In San Diego, for
example, several managers are assigned their own government vehicle as
a commuting vehicle. These managers are not supervising fugitive
operations teams, conducting investigations or surveillance in the
field, so how is it they are authorized a take home government vehicle
for commuting purposes? I hear also that these same managers are
offering ride sharing opportunities to their friends that work in the
same location. The Union asks that an inquiry be done to determine if
any vehicles are being misused by I.C.E managers and take appropriate
action to correct the problem. In our view, this kind of government
excess and waste is unforgiveable, especially when the security
interests of the nation are at stake.
IMMEDIATE FUNDING NEEDS:
First and foremost, funding needs to be approved for the continued
detention of immigration law violators. To do otherwise would be a
violation of the public trust. I.C.E needs funds to start training back
up again. IEAs that need the ETP classes should be started up ASAP,
while at the same time bringing in new hires. The Bureau needs to
fund the development and purchase of new uniforms for DRO
personnel, or make it a plain-clothes position. We need new badges and
credentials issued. I.C.E needs to fill approximately 1300 positions.
All they need is money to bring the new hires on board and get them to
training.
CONCLUSION:
I.C.E is a bureau in financial crisis. They do not have enough
money to hold people in custody, buy new uniforms and equipment for
employees, or even issue badges and credentials with the correct
Department on them. Some of the funds for I.C.E were incorrectly sent
to the other two Bureaus created from the former Immigration &
Naturalization Service. Some of I.C.E's resources have been misused.
Something needs to be done to correct this problem. The Union asks that
you fast track approval of the reallocation of funds request, any and
all supplemental appropriations requests, as well as investigate the
allegation of misuse of government vehicles.
Mr. Chairman, I want to express our Organization's strong support
for provisions in the 2005 Intelligence Reform legislation that
increased the number of I.C.E Investigators by 4,000 over the next five
years and the number of detention beds by 40,000 over the same period
of time. We were disappointed to see that the Administration proposed
an increase of only 1920 beds in FY06 and 484 I.C.E Investigators. I
can only hope that the Appropriations Committees share your commitment
to improving the desperate situation which currently exists in I.C.E.
On a final, unrelated note, my ability to testify at this hearing
stems from my right to be part of a union. It is an honor for me to be
here and I hope to the voice of I.C.E employees for a long time to
come. My colleagues in the I.C.E Office of Investigations, the Federal
Air Marshal Service, the TSA, and other agencies that make up the
Department of Homeland Security do not have the same protected right.
Please correct this injustice, whether by allowing them to join a
union, or by strengthening whistleblower protections. Employees should
not have to suffer gladly management fraud, waste and abuse. Thank you
again for the opportunity to provide this testimony.
Mr. Hostettler. Professor Haney.
TESTIMONY OF CRAIG HANEY, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT SANTA CRUZ
Mr. Haney. Chairman Hostettler, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity
to testify. I'm here to speak today about what I learned as a
detention expert appointed by the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom to conduct a Congressionally
authorized study of the treatment of asylum seekers who were
placed in expedited removal proceedings. The study uncovered
serious problems with the way in which asylum seekers are
detained and released. These problems are disturbing from a
national security standpoint as well as a human rights
standpoint.
The study findings and recommendations that relate to
detention are attached to my written testimony and I
respectfully request that these be included in the record.
Mr. Hostettler. Without objection.
Mr. Haney. My testimony represents only my views except for
when I cite to the specific findings in which the Commission
and the other experts concurred.
Among other things, the study found that the availability
of bed space is clearly an important issue, made more important
by dramatic regional variations in release rates that appear to
be related to the number of incoming asylum seekers and the
space available in which to house them.
However, I would suggest that the answer is not simply for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement to provide more bed space.
We urge that ICE consistently enforce its own policies to
ensure that aliens who should be detained are detained, but
also that aliens who need not be detained, particularly non-
criminal asylum seekers who establish identity and pose neither
a flight nor security risk are released.
In addition, the part of the study that I conducted focused
on the conditions of detention for asylum seekers, aliens who
claim to have fled religious, political, or other forms of
persecution and applied to the United States for protection. As
someone whose academic expertise is not in immigration law or
the asylum issue per se, I have spent more than three decades
studying the psychological effects of conditions of
confinement, what happens to people when they are confined in
prisons and jails in the United States and other countries. But
I was not sure what to expect when I began to examine the
conditions under which asylum seekers were detained in the
United States.
The results of the study were sobering. Unfortunately, in
fact, I found that the conditions of confinement for asylum
seekers were remarkably similar to those I had often
encountered in the past in examining domestic prisons and
jails. In virtually every important respect in the overwhelming
majority of facilities that we investigated, examined, and
surveyed, asylum seekers were being kept under conditions that
were virtually identical to the harsh places that our society
has reserved for persons who have committed crimes.
Indeed, one-third of asylum seekers are detained not merely
in jail-like facilities but in actual jails and prisons in
which DHS rents beds. And although a violation of DHS's own
detention standards, asylum seekers in such facilities are
often intermingled with criminal aliens and even with inmates
still serving criminal sentences.
Let me be more specific. In terms of the training of the
staff who operate the facilities, the way the facilities
themselves are physically constructed, the kind of elaborate
security procedures that are imposed, multiple fences,
barriers, locked gates and doors that separate the exterior of
the facilities from the housing areas where detainees are kept
and the tightly restricted movement of asylum seekers inside,
these facilities are virtually identical to conventional
prisons and jails. There are widespread and commonplace
invasions of privacies and asylum seekers are denied the
opportunity to take a shower or use toilet facilities outside
the presence of another person. They are limited in terms of
meaningful programming opportunities.
Many asylum seekers in detention are not proactively
monitored for signs of psychological distress or exacerbated
mental illness. Their contact with the outside world is greatly
constricted. Virtually all the facilities we surveyed limited
the ability of asylum seekers to make phone calls, correspond
with others, and even have contact visits.
Precisely because of what we know about the potential
negative psychological consequences of jail or prison
confinement on inmates, no matter who they are or why they are
incarcerated, the authors of the study concluded that the kind
of detention to which these asylum seekers are being subjected
is inappropriate, unnecessarily severe, and a matter of grave
concern. Thus, any expansion of DHS bed space must address the
nature of the conditions of confinement themselves.
We strongly urge that for non-criminal asylum seekers, a
model of non-jail-like confinement be adopted. In fact, as you
will see in the report and in our discussion of the
recommendations supplementing my testimony, we found one model
actually in operation in the United States, the Broward
Facility in Florida, which again is elaborately detailed in my
report and in the supplement to my testimony. It is a humane
alternative which demonstrates that those asylum seekers who
genuinely must be detained can be kept under conditions that
are secure, that better protect their mental health and well-
being, and also that this can be done in a way that is no more
costly than the jail-like facilities currently in use.
In addition to recommending that ICE ensure that its field
officers implement existing ICE parole policies in a consistent
manner and that ICE stop using jail-like facilities to detain
asylum seekers who do not meet those release criteria, we also
urge Secretary Chertoff to establish a refugee coordinator
position with delegated authority to see such reforms through,
since under current organizational structure of DHS only the
DHS Secretary and Deputy Secretary have the authority to
coordinate changes affecting the expedited removal process, as
these procedures involve three distinct DHS bureaus, U.S. CIS,
ICE, and CBP.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Professor Haney.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Haney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Craig Haney
Mr. Hostettler. At this time, we will move to questions by
Members of the Subcommittee.
First of all, Mr. Martin, your testimony asserts that,
historically, formerly INS and now DHS has been unable to
remove non-detained aliens to a great extent. Is that because
it simply doesn't have enough agents to find the absconders?
Mr. Martin. Certainly, resources was one of the issues over
the years. As our report indicates, in the 15-month period that
we examined, there were 140,000 aliens who were issued final
orders of removal. Fifty-five percent of those aliens issued
final orders of removal were detained. Forty-five percent were
non-detained. The INS was effective in removing 90 percent of
the detained aliens. So I think resources is one issue. It's
also a priority issue of INS over the years.
Mr. Hostettler. Your testimony also states that resource
limitations that hindered the removal of aliens included a lack
of detention space. Are you saying that ICE needs more
detention space?
Mr. Martin. I think what we're saying in our reports is the
INS was very effective at removing aliens issued final orders
if they were detained. They were significantly less effective
if they were not detained.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you. Then are you saying that the
only way to enforce the laws is to actually detain all aliens
who have final removal orders?
Mr. Martin. I don't think that's the only way. I think our
report also points out that the INS had not been as effective
with the resources that it had been afforded as it could have
been, and we made a series of recommendations to improve that.
Mr. Hostettler. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Callahan, as an experienced veteran of immigration
enforcement, can you tell us how you assess the security
situation, the national security situation, with regard to
dangerous aliens today?
Mr. Callahan. Dangerous aliens as in out in the public at
large or in the criminal population? I'm not sure I understand
the question.
Mr. Hostettler. Dangerous aliens who are at large.
Mr. Callahan. It is a priority for our fugitive operations
teams, of which there are only a few nationwide, that those are
the people that we try to find first. Unfortunately, we're not
as successful as we could be if we had, again, the resources,
the staffing levels and the authority to really go out and do
more fugitive operations.
Mr. Hostettler. How is morale for ICE Agents in the field?
Mr. Callahan. Right now, morale is at an all-time low. We
have, as I mentioned, 900 people that are waiting to go to
training, there are two things with the training. Number one,
after completing the training, the employee is going to get a
promotion because they're going to be expected to do higher-
level work. The other aspect of it, the more operational aspect
of it is, right now, these officers don't have the authority to
go out and find people that are out in the public that are
removable. With this training, they'll then have the authority
to go out and effect those arrests.
Mr. Hostettler. Are ICE Agents being told to concentrate
more on Customs enforcement than Immigration enforcement?
Mr. Callahan. Unfortunately, I can't answer that very well
because our criminal investigators that were INS criminal
investigators were taken out of the union, and a lot of them
honestly are afraid to talk to me as a union rep. They're
afraid to talk to me for fear of reprisal by managers. I have
heard that they are focusing more on money laundering and
traditional Customs-type investigations, but that's the best
information I have.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you.
Mr. Cutler, about our security situation, has ICE been able
to enforce the immigration laws enough to say that potential
alien terrorists have been deterred from embedding themselves
safely in our society?
Mr. Cutler. I wish I could say it was, but that's not the
case. And there are two things that I need to make clear. You
just asked about whether or not the mission is being pushed
over toward the Customs side. Let's start with training.
Right now, the new agents going through ICE Academy are not
even getting Spanish language training. Customs traditionally
never gave Spanish language training. The new agents aren't
getting it. It's been estimated that 80 percent of the illegal
alien population is Spanish speaking. There's no way that you
can investigate people that you can't communicate with. So to
my thinking, it's perfectly clear that the Immigration mission
is being made secondary to the Customs mission. So that's a
major problem right there.
And with the lack of resources, we're very much at risk.
You know, I spoke during my prepared testimony about the
problem of benefit fraud. The whole idea to embedding himself
in our society for a terrorist or a criminal is to do whatever
it takes to keep a low profile. Obtaining immigration benefits
is the best way of doing it. This means they no longer have to
fear deportation, not that that's a very big fear the way
things now stand. There are so few Immigration Agents. Let me
just give you a fast analogy.
I'm a New Yorker. New York likes to brag that it's the
safest big city in America. We have eight million people. We
are policed by a department that has nearly 40,000 police
officers confined to the City of New York. There is probably at
least double that number, 15, 16, 17 million illegal aliens
living in the United States, scattered across a third of the
North American continent, being policed by 2,000 special
agents. What would happen to New York's crime rate if there
were only 2,000 police officers instead of 40,000 police
officers? That's the reason that we're in such chaos right now.
We need the agents desperately. We need it not only to
react to people that have committed crimes and people who are
working illegally. Frauds have been ignored. And when I've
spoken to people who were involved with the adjudications
process, there's a great reliance on computers, almost no
reliance on field agents. You can't uncover fraud without
putting boots on the ground, people out there to knock on the
doors and conduct the field investigations. It's labor-
intensive work, but it's critical work to prevent terrorists
and bad guys from putting themselves on the road to that very
much desirable U.S. passport.
So right now, I would say that we are no safer than we were
in the days before 9/11, and that's not acceptable, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Cutler.
The chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman. It causes one to
just want to sit and be still and absorb the testimony of all
of the witnesses because it is striking where we find ourselves
today.
We spent 2 days as Members of the Homeland Security
Committee looking at some of the stark realities of securing
the nation. It was a very effective opportunity for a Committee
now that has been established as a permanent Committee of the
House of Representatives, enunciating or at least reaffirming
to America that the Congress believes this is an important
duty.
Mr. Chairman, this is a budget hearing and therefore, I
think, I am going to focus my questioning along the lines of
ratcheting up, as I said, the crisis that we face. Now, let me
say this. I think there needs to be a balance and some order to
this question of removal. I think, Mr. Cutler, the vignette
that you showed us is an abomination, criminals, predators
running amok and not being detained. The interesting thing is,
a Palestinian family of seven who had given out flags after 9/
11, whose children were in medical school and other schools,
was easily deported, people who begged to be able to stay in a
country they love. But we have criminal predators and others
who we don't know who might do harm to this country running
amok.
Frankly, we have an expedited or a supplemental
appropriations coming through this Congress that I will
purposely go and look Mr. Callahan, for funding for your
agency. The question is, in the wisdom of the Administration,
have they failed to acknowledge that we are in the midst of an
abysmal crisis, in a dark hole, if you will, struggling to get
out? Eight hundred requested, 143 still--143 as the offering.
It's a pittance. We shouldn't even dignify that number. Eight
hundred ICE recommended, which I'm sure was at the low end, and
only 143 in the Administration's budget. And an emergency
supplemental of $82 billion.
Now, let me say this. You know, we won't quarrel over
supporting troops, and that's what's going to be utilized
against those of us who are going to be challenging the
emergency supplemental as failing America. Oh, we're supporting
troops. In fact, we would like them to come home and have a
secure Iraq. This is not a hearing on that at this point, but
it is a hearing dealing with emergencies. You have said and
indicated we have an emergency.
So my line of questioning will focus on that because we
have a budget that is going to put us in a trillion dollars'
worth of debt, with tax cuts to those who don't need it, the 1
percent of this country that happen to be beyond the need of
tax cuts, and we have Mr. Callahan and his team without badges.
Frankly, you know that if someone was doing their duty, they
could tell you to go away. You are not credentialed. You are
not documented. In fact, as you walked into this building, if
someone asked you for your documentation, you are, in essence,
misrepresenting to law enforcement officers in the United
States Capitol that you are someone who you are not. You have
no documentation----
Mr. Callahan. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee.--in a hearing on immigration that wants
people to be documented.
So, Mr. Cutler, let me just--we had a hearing yesterday.
Could you just give me just a sentence that ties into this, of
fixing this split that we have? Did you come to a conclusion at
the Homeland Security hearing that this is something we need to
expedite and fix, and this question of the divide between
Border and ICE, is that something that we need to fix, as well,
as we look at the budget process here?
Mr. Cutler. We need to fix it. We need to fix it quickly.
My recommendation, to sum it up as briefly as I know how, we've
erected an artificial border between two agencies that are
supposed to be doing the same job, that is CBP and ICE. I think
that makes no sense. We need to fortify our nation's exterior
border but not create internal borders among the bureaucracies
that are charged with this vital mission.
So what I've recommended is that we should link the two
agencies together, eliminate this gap that exists between CBP
and ICE, put it under one roof, but at the same time, I would
like to see a separate chain of command, separate training, and
separate budgeting for the immigration mission simply so that
we don't wind up with what I referred to yesterday as the
Customization of immigration law enforcement. We need to make
certain that the resources that are dedicated to Immigration
enforcement are, indeed, dedicated to Immigration enforcement,
not to say that Customs enforcement isn't critical, but what
I'm seeing here is the total abdication, or close to a total
abdication, of the enforcement of the immigration statutes that
would protect us from criminal aliens and terrorists. So that
was the Cliff Note, the short version, of my recommendation at
yesterday's hearing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Callahan--thank you very much. Mr.
Callahan, obviously, the lack of firewalls on 9/11 was raised
as a problem when the intelligence agencies were not speaking
to each other. Obviously, that is what is happening now with
ICE and Border Patrol.
But Mr. Callahan, just quickly, you mentioned some
terrible, beyond your documentation and lack of a badge, but
you mentioned the issue of the hiring freeze and the fact that
you are unable even to have funding for detention. Would you
view this as an emergency deserving of being looked at as to be
included in what is now called an emergency supplemental? Would
you think we're at a point where your funding needs to be
included in the emergency supplemental?
Mr. Callahan. Absolutely. I mean, within 5 days, as I
testified, we either have to go in to violate the Anti-Deficit
Act and keep people in custody but be in violation of that Act,
or we have to release them. So I'd say it is an emergency.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I would just simply ask that
we, as a Committee, make a request that the full funding for
ICE be included into the emergency supplemental and, as well,
on Mr. Haney's testimony, realize that the brutalizing of
asylum seekers is not compatible with the values of America,
and if necessary, ask for emergency funding, as Mr. Haney has
indicated, the problems we face with asylum seekers, and I make
that request. I thank the Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Gohmert, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you people
for your testimony at this hearing. You are all so equivocal in
your positions. Sarcasm. [Laughter.]
We obviously have a major problem. As a former district
judge and Chief Justice, I ran into this problem constantly. We
had one INS Agent for the entire East Texas area. But I do have
some questions to clarify some of the testimony.
Mr. Martin, you had indicated 35 percent of the non-
detained aliens who were criminals were deported, I believe, of
the sample, and I think maybe those figures you were giving us
were of the sample that was taken. Can you tell us what sample
was taken?
Mr. Martin. Right. The aliens in the database when I used
the 55 percent detained versus the 45 percent was over a 15-
month period. It was approximately 141,000 aliens.
Mr. Gohmert. Oh, your sample was 141,000?
Mr. Martin. A hundred-and-forty-one-thousand----
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. That's a good sample.
Mr. Martin. It was a smaller sample, though, when we looked
at these high-risk groups, the state-sponsored terrorism, the
asylum seekers who were denied and not detained. That was a
smaller group.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. What would you give as the number one
reason why people are not detained in the various categories
that you mentioned?
Mr. Martin. I think it's a lack of resources coupled with a
lack of priority.
Mr. Gohmert. Lack of resources, meaning what?
Mr. Martin. Meaning officers, meaning detention space.
Mr. Gohmert. So you're saying we need more detention space
to get them out of the country?
Mr. Martin. Well, again, our reviews have shown that the
INS is effective, and if they detain the alien, they are
effective in removing the alien.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, I can tell you from my own experience
that one anecdotal situation, for example, a guy is repeatedly
arrested for DWI. He doesn't get deported until it's a felony,
comes to my felony court. I send him to prison. He's
immediately deported once he gets to prison. He comes back to
my court because he's in an accident and hits somebody while
drunk and I see that he's going to keep coming back. I send him
to 10 months of treatment where I can at least lock him down
where he won't hurt people, and after a few months, they get
him and deport him and who knows where he is now hurting whom.
But those kind of things lead me to ask, when aliens are
deported, where are they taken? What is done with them?
Mr. Martin. I will defer to the ICE Agent.
Mr. Gohmert. Is that Mr. Callahan? Is that your bailiwick?
Mr. Callahan. I can actually answer that. It depends on
where they're from. If they're from Mexico, we just take them
down to the border at Mexico. There is a program----
Mr. Gohmert. You take them down there and do what?
Mr. Callahan. We watch them go across the border.
Mr. Gohmert. Watch them go across the border. Okay. Do you
know if people hang around long enough to watch them come back,
or do they just turn around and leave?
Mr. Callahan. Where I'm from in San Diego, there's a large
Border Patrol contingent there that is at the border and if
they are coming back--a lot of times, what'll happen is they
speak good enough English to where they can go around to come
in through the port of entry, and if they can convince that
inspector, since there's no requirement--right now, there's no
requirement to have a U.S. passport or U.S. documentation to
come in from Mexico. So if he speaks good enough English and
can convince that inspector that he's a U.S. citizen, they'll
let him through.
Mr. Gohmert. Another question, Mr. Callahan. You said you
could do more if you had more staffing and authority to go into
the field. We heard discussion and I think a couple of you have
indicated there may be more priority with Customs than with
Immigration. Who makes that decision as to what is the
priority?
Mr. Callahan. Well, right now Detention and Removal
Operations is charged with locating fugitive aliens. So we need
more staff there. There are about 2,000 to 3,000 Immigration
Enforcement Agents and Detention or Deportation Officers, but
not all of them are assigned that work. I'd say probably, you
know, 200, 300 at best.
Mr. Gohmert. Yes, but my question was who makes the
priority? Who sets the priority?
Mr. Callahan. It would be the headquarters ICE or
headquarters Detention Removal.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Mr. Cutler, I appreciated everything you
had to say. I couldn't agree more with everything you had to
say except for one thing. You said, we're no safer now than we
were on 9/11. It seems like in so many areas we have become
safer, everywhere except in the area of immigration, that
that's----
Mr. Cutler. Well, I do have to clarify that----
Mr. Gohmert. Yes?
Mr. Cutler.--and that is the area of concern for me,
though. And if you read the----
Mr. Gohmert. Well, for a lot of us.
Mr. Cutler. Well, yes. And if you read this 9/11 staff
report, they talk about terrorist travel. It seems as though
our Government, and I don't mean you, I mean the powers that
be----
Mr. Gohmert. We're all part of it.
Mr. Cutler. Well, but you understand what I'm trying to
say, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. Sure.
Mr. Cutler. As a New Yorker, as an American, as a former
agent, I don't think that the Government has learned the
lessons that we should have learned. The fact that we haven't
appreciably increased the number of agents to do interior
enforcement, the fact that we're talking about 843--goodness
gracious, 2,000 special agents for the entire country. Look at
the manpower that we flooded into Iraq, and this isn't going to
be about Iraq, but the point is, we should match the effort to
secure Iraq with an effort to secure our own country up close
and in person, and it really pales by comparison.
Mr. Gohmert. Yes.
Mr. Cutler. It's troubling.
Mr. Gohmert. Yes. I'm not advocating pulling from one to go
to the other. We just need to----
Mr. Cutler. No, no, no. You understand what I'm saying,
sir?
Mr. Gohmert. Yes. We need to make this a priority.
Mr. Cutler. And to say we're fighting it there so we don't
have to fight it here is foolish. I mean----
Mr. Gohmert. I think we're on the same page. Thank you very
much for your efforts.
Mr. Cutler. Okay, sir. Yes.
Mr. Hostettler. Thank you, Mr. Gohmert.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Sanchez, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Mr. Callahan, I found your
testimony particularly compelling, I must say, because you're
one of those folks that, day in and day out, are on the front
lines. And what I found particularly interesting about your
testimony is that on numerous occasions, we have had Department
heads from ICE and Border Patrol tell this Committee that they
have sufficient resources to do the job, and yet I'm hearing
the exact opposite from your mouth. I just want to reassure you
that you're not alone, because I recently heard from several
ICE Agents that, in fact, they oftentimes have to pay for their
own gasoline to do their patrols and conduct their raids.
Now, a question I have for you is why do you think there's
this discrepancy between what the Administration officials are
telling us and what the folks who are on the front line doing
the job day in, day out, are experiencing firsthand?
Mr. Callahan. Well, I think it comes down to the fact that
the senior leadership in the Department serve, honestly, at the
will of the President, and so they need to reflect what--they
need to show support for his budget, and that's where I think
the discrepancy comes from. It's not that they don't want to
come out and say, we need more; I think you'd have to ask them
that question themselves, but I think they honestly feel that
they need to support the President's budget.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask you something. Do you think that
we're safer since September 11 in how we conduct our internal
security and our homeland security?
Mr. Callahan. I think we're more focused than we were
before September 11, but we've got a long way to go.
Ms. Sanchez. As another note, as an IBEW member myself, I
know how helpful unions can be in giving workers a voice and a
say in what is going on and getting some of these concerns
addressed by higher-ups in the organization. What are some
things that you can suggest perhaps to Congress that we can do
to help return--or retain, pardon me, ICE Agents and to overall
try to improve the retention rate of employees for the
Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Callahan. Well, that's a very good question and one of
the ways is awarding--recognizing employees that perform. It's
funny that you bring that up, because I'm told that we don't
have funds right now to award employees for performance, and as
you know, in the future, the very near future, we will be
moving to a pay-for-performance system, and if our budget is so
tight that we can't afford to award employees, then effectively
you're saying to them, you didn't perform well enough this
year.
Ms. Sanchez. Excellent. Another question that I have for
you is with respect to the training, or the lack of training, I
guess is a better way of addressing it. How important do you
think training is for new officers who are just coming onto the
job?
Mr. Callahan. Well, training is critical, not just for new
officers. I mean, obviously, you have to get them through a
basic level of training to begin with, but it's also important
for those that go into the field, especially these Immigration
Enforcement Agents that were Detention Enforcement Officers
before that had never gone through the type of training to
identify someone who's here illegally. It's critical for that.
If you're going to give them the authority to determine their
alienage, or determine alienage and put people into removal
proceedings, they need to know the law, and right now, they
don't have it. So that's absolutely critical.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask you something. Do you think it
would be--this is my last question--a good idea to have local
law enforcement officers who have no training to do the job
that agents like you are supposed to be doing? Does that sound
like a good idea to you?
Mr. Callahan. Well, without any training, certainly, it's
not a good idea. If the idea is to hold someone until an INS-
trained officer can come in and determine alienage and begin
the removal proceedings, that would be a good idea. That would
actually be helpful, because that--and that does happen
somewhat in the field.
Ms. Sanchez. But doing something proactively, going out on
a day-to-day basis trying to do the similar type of job that
you are doing, do you think that's a good idea, without any
training?
Mr. Callahan. Without any training, I would disagree with
that.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions.
I yield back.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Smith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Mr. Martin, thank you for your past good work
as Inspector General at the INS. We both go back to those times
that you always did a great job.
I had a number of questions today, but let me start off
with trying to make the point that I think the problem is
greater than any of us think that it is. You mentioned in your
testimony that you thought there were eight million illegal
aliens in the United States. I think the Census actually
revised that to ten to 11 million. But the census figure, as
you and I know, is based upon the number of illegal aliens who
are permanent residents, who are residents in the United
States. It does not count the number of illegal immigrants who
might be in this country on a temporary basis, whether it be 1
day or 11 months and 29 days.
So to me, it's reasonable to say that the problem may be
twice as great as many of us, or as most people think. Instead
of having ten million illegal aliens, there may be 20 million
on a given day in the United States. Would you agree,
generally, with that statement?
Mr. Martin. I can't disagree with that statement. I haven't
done enough research on that. We haven't looked at that.
Mr. Smith. Suffice it to say the problem is greater than
just the people who are in the country illegally on a permanent
basis.
Mr. Martin. We would agree with that.
Mr. Smith. The question that I wanted to ask Mr. Martin,
Mr. Cutler, and Mr. Callahan, and Mr. Haney, I don't mean to
omit you, but your testimony is primarily on asylum and that's
not the thrust of my question, but do you all support Congress
in our efforts to try to get 800 new ICE investigators a year
and the 8,000 new detention beds a year? Mr. Callahan, you said
we had a budget crisis in your testimony, and Mr. Cutler
pointed out accurately that 40 percent of the people in the
country illegally actually came over legally on visas and then
overstayed, and Mr. Martin pointed to the need, as well. Would
you support our efforts to get those numbers? Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. I would support--I think we support--our
research has shown that, again, the INS is effective if aliens
issued final orders for removal are detained. And so whatever
resources are provided to the ICE----
Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Cutler?
Mr. Cutler. Absolutely.
Mr. Smith. And Mr. Callahan?
Mr. Callahan. Absolutely, but in addition to detention bed
space, we need to realize that you could have 10,000 more bed
spaces, but if you don't have personnel to manage that----
Mr. Smith. Actually, you anticipated my next question,
which is why did the Administration cancel the training when
you've got people waiting to and want to go through that
training and when you have such a great demonstrated need?
Mr. Callahan. You'd have to ask Mr. Garcia that question,
but I believe they just don't have any money.
Mr. Smith. They ought to request the money if they don't
have it.
Mr. Cutler. But the training also needs to be in-service,
document training, for example. Documents are the lynchpin that
holds immigration together. And I don't know that there's any
ongoing program to give document training to any of our line
personnel. Now, this isn't an acceptable situation, so----
Mr. Smith. Let me try to bring another question to you. We
have a series of votes that have been called.
Mr. Martin, we have a problem with non-detained aliens who
receive their final deportation orders. What is the solution to
that? What would you recommend, and then I will ask Mr. Cutler
and Mr. Callahan the same question?
Mr. Martin. I think resources are a big part of it. I think
it's also a focus on interior enforcement, which we do go back
a lot of years looking at the INS. It has not been a historic--
--
Mr. Smith. Speaking of interior enforcement, do you all
realize that the Administration in 2004 did not fine a single
employer for hiring illegal immigrants?
Mr. Callahan. Yes, I'm aware of it and I think it's
outrageous.
Mr. Smith. I interrupted you, Mr. Martin, but we need to--
--
Mr. Martin. No, I'm all right.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Cutler, what is your solution to the non-
detained aliens who have received final deportation notice?
Mr. Cutler. All I can tell you is I know right now, there's
well in excess of 400,000 such aliens that are wandering around
the United States. I think we need many more beds. We need to
do a better job. And I think we need to be more creative in the
way we try to enforce the laws, also.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Callahan?
Mr. Callahan. The Fugitive Operations Team in San Diego
started to, instead of mailing out the notice that their final
hearing has been adjudicated and they're removed, we've gone
out to their residence to hand deliver it to them and pick them
up at the same time. So I think something along those lines
would be effective.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members.
I am new to this Committee, but I have witnessed this
Administration organize the so-called war on terror and they
said that homeland security was perhaps the top priority. To
come into this Committee today and hear that we do not have
enough agents, that we don't have enough beds to detain illegal
aliens who have been involved in criminal activity, to find out
that we're releasing aliens out into the general public and we
don't track them, we don't know where they are, it's all very
strange to me.
Mr. Martin, does the President of the United States know
that his homeland security is at great risk because of the
problems that were identified here today and other problems we
have?
I want to add to this the fact that I just learned that
suspected terrorists can buy handguns in the United States, and
also, we are--and I am from Los Angeles here. We're real
worried about a lack of security at our ports, and still we
don't have the answer to how we secure containers, let alone
nuclear facilities. So, I mean, every day, I learn something
new.
Mr. Martin, does the President of the United States know
that homeland security is not working in the United States?
Mr. Martin. Congresswoman, since March of 2003, the
immigration enforcement effort has been moved out of the
Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security.
We are the Inspector General's office for the Department of
Justice, so I think that's probably a more appropriate question
for the IG's Office of Homeland Security.
Ms. Waters. But you haven't heard anything? Aren't you
concerned about security, even though it's not in your
Department, as you have described?
Mr. Martin. As the father of three daughters, I'm concerned
about security.
Ms. Waters. So what have you heard? Tell us what you know
about this. You must know more than you say.
Mr. Martin. Again, what we're reporting on today at this
hearing are studies that we have conducted in 1996 and 2003
that focus on the INS's effectiveness at removing detained and
non-detained aliens.
Ms. Waters. All right. Well, let me just ask Mr. Cutler,
you mentioned something about sleeper cells.
Mr. Cutler. Yes.
Ms. Waters. Is that true?
Mr. Cutler. Well, if you're concerned about sleepers, then
what you need to do is remove the foliage that they hide
behind. I mean, that's the whole idea of embedding. If somebody
is in the United States looking to hide in plain sight, which
is really what a sleeper is, it's somebody that you might pass
on the street 1 day and not realize that this person is waiting
for that phone call or that letter to arrive in the mail
telling him or her to go out and commit an attack against us.
That's what a sleeper is.
What we saw when you look at the report from the 9/11
Commission was that the terrorists who attacked us became very
adept at using our systems against us to go out there, hide in
plain sight, and then position themselves so that they could
attack us. And we're not using the resources and we aren't
getting the resources that we need to defend ourselves against
this sort of thing and it makes no sense to me. I don't
understand it.
I don't understand why have a 9/11 Commission if you're not
going to take the advice that they give you at great expense
and at great effort.
Ms. Waters. I agree with you and I guess, you know, being
new to this Committee, I don't understand why the Members on
the opposite side of the aisle who represent the majority in
the Congress of the United States can't convince their
President that there's something wrong with not having enough
agents to investigate and protect the interior and not having
enough detention beds, not having a real homeland security
program as it does with immigration. I don't know why we are
here. This is the kind of problem that should be discussed
right inside the Administration and the Members on the opposite
side of the aisle, we would like us to feel safer since 9/11,
should be in the forefront of this in ways that we shouldn't be
dallying around. It should be reflected in the budget. I just
don't understand.
Mr. Cutler. I want to say one thing. I don't think it's one
side of the aisle or the other. If you look at what happened in
1993 after the first Trade Center attack, nothing changed in
terms of immigration enforcement. We don't, as a country, seem
to learn the lessons, and I blame both sides of the aisle for
this. We've got to get away from the idea that we can ignore
the problem and it'll go away. It only gets worse.
Ms. Waters. Yes, but we've had 9/11 and it's been referred
to many times here today as you talk about the Commission----
Mr. Cutler. Absolutely.
Ms. Waters. The definition of this Administration is the
war on terror.
Mr. Cutler. Absolutely.
Ms. Waters. This is what the President is all about. This
is his big push. This is his top priority. So we are to sit
here and talk about he's nickel and diming us on the agents
that are supposed to be responsible for the investigation and
enforcement in the interior? What are we talking about? So what
do you suggest we do, Mr. Callahan?
Mr. Callahan. I think we definitely need to go beyond what
was requested in the President's budget. We need to go with
what was recommended on the Congressional side.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Waters. I'm not finished yet----
Mr. Hostettler. Well, the red light is--we're facing----
Ms. Waters. Unanimous consent for 30 more seconds so I can
put a little heat on you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Hostettler. For 30 more seconds, without objection.
Ms. Waters. Well, let me just address my comments in these
30 seconds to say time is very precious around here and it
seems absolutely ridiculous that we should be spending time
trying to convince the President of the United States to do
what he said he was doing, and that is protect the homeland.
And so I would hope we would not take up more time with
witnesses, we would not keep identifying what's wrong in
immigration, that somehow, my friends on the opposite side of
the aisle would just tell the President to do the right thing
and to advance the budget, increase the numbers for the agents,
put the money where it's supposed to be, and let's protect the
homeland.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Waters. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Hostettler. I thank the gentlelady and welcome you to
the Subcommittee.
For the time being, the Subcommittee will recess. We have
votes on the floor, two votes. We will return shortly
thereafter. I appreciate the indulgence of the witnesses. We
have at least a couple more Members that would like to ask you
questions. We are recessed.
[Recess.]
Mr. Hostettler. The Subcommittee is called back to order.
The chair thanks the witnesses for your patience and recognizes
now the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank
the panelists for being here. I appreciate this. This is a
subject I've been dealing with for the last 26 years, both as a
Member of Congress and then as Attorney General of California
and now as a Member of Congress again.
Some of the questions that have been raised about lack of
support for interior enforcement, and maybe you don't want to
venture this opinion, but I would just ask you, have you ever
noticed Congress attempting to influence this Administration
and prior Administrations about interior enforcement? And by
that, I recall not too long ago Congress trying to stop some
interior enforcement and giving some rather strong signals to
the Administration in charge that we ought not to do this
because somehow, it would cause discrimination against folks.
Are any of you aware of Congress being part of the problem
rather than just the executive branch? Yes, sir, Mr. Cutler?
Mr. Cutler. Well, I recall a Member of Congress making a
speech in Mexico equating a raid on, I believe it was Wal-Mart,
with an act of terrorism being committed against aliens. I have
to tell you that as a former INS Agent, I had steam blowing out
of my ears when I heard it.
The bottom line is we've politicized immigration to an
extent that's incredible. You know, they call Social Security
the third rail. It doesn't have nearly as much juice as a third
rail as the immigration issue does. And I think what we really
need to understand is that you get one shot at a first
impression. It's the immigration laws that serve as that first
impression for people from all over the world and we can't
afford to politicize it.
And now, of course, with the war on terror ongoing, we
certainly need to make certain that the immigration laws are
properly, fairly, and effectively enforced and interior
enforcement is the key. You can't control the border at the
border if you don't take care of the interior. The Maginot Line
didn't work in the Second World War and it certainly doesn't
work here.
Mr. Lungren. See, my problem is sometimes it looks like
we're too busy finger pointing rather than realizing that we
have a national problem----
Mr. Cutler. Right.
Mr. Lungren.--that stems from a lack of national will and a
lack of national strategy, which stems from both the Congress
and the executive branch, Democrat and Republican, not taking
this subject seriously.
I was one of those who volunteered for service on this
Subcommittee 26 years ago and it was not difficult to get on
the Subcommittee because nobody wanted to be on the
Subcommittee.
Mr. Cutler. I suspect your colleagues thought it was
political suicide.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I can show you some results in some
campaigns that I've been in that might suggest that to be true.
The question I have is, does it make sense to have a
division between the CBP and ICE? Am I wrong in assuming that
this is similar to a police department dividing its detectives
from its foot patrol?
Mr. Cutler. I think that's a great analogy and it makes no
sense, because what we've done is to erect an artificial
barrier between the interior and the border, and it's a
continuum and there's so much overlap and we need to understand
that they're all trying to work the same goal. And, in fact,
I've spoken to people at ICE and at CBP, and by the way, under
the new management rules, these people were petrified that I
might identify them in any way, shape, or form for fear of
reprisal, and that's not the way the Congress can do effective
oversight, but that's an effective issue.
But the point of the matter is that we need to have a
coordinated effort, because right now, we have CBP Agents
calling up the FBI when there are violations of law that more
appropriately should be handled by ICE, and that's
counterproductive. It's terrible for morale. It's terrible for
a sense of continuity. You need to have seamless enforcement.
Years ago, I called for a tripod. I want everybody in this
enforcement tripod. You've got the inspectors enforcing the
laws at ports of entry, the Border Patrol between ports of
entry, backed up by the special agents and Deportation Officers
operating from within the interior of the United States, making
up the third leg. Well, look how truncated that third leg is,
2,000 interior agents versus 10,000 Border Agents. We need to
have legs of equal length, and so we need to have equal
emphasis on the interior and the border and they need to be
coordinated and understand that they all work in the same
program to accomplish a common goal. The problem is, no one's
ever established what the goal is.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Martin, I'd like to ask you to address
this question. In my prior service in the Congress, I remember
many times there were questions raised by Members of Congress
concerning the separation between the Customs Service and the
INS, Border Patrol, that it would make more sense from an
efficiency standpoint if we brought them together. Do you fear,
as Mr. Cutler has suggested, that the result of the
reorganization has been an over-emphasis on Customs duties to
the exclusion of or to the detriment of Immigration or Border
Patrol, as we used to call it?
Mr. Martin. Congressman, our expertise looking at the
immigration matter really ended almost 2 years ago when INS
moved to the Department of Homeland Security. I understand the
DHS IG's office is currently studying the issue about whether
or not the two entities should be brought together.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Callahan?
Mr. Callahan. I think that irregardless of the
organizational structure, you need to have good leaders in
place to concentrate on the mission and you need to have
adequate staff and resources to get the job done.
Mr. Lungren. There's been a suggestion here that we don't
have enough money, don't have enough people. You know
something? That's absolutely true, and one of the reasons that
we never talk about here in Congress is when you try to do
everything, you don't do anything well.
I was in a hearing yesterday on the budget, and as we were
marking up budget people are saying, ``We are responsible in
the Congress for putting boots on the ground in every single
law enforcement agency in the country. That, somehow, it's the
Federal obligation to pay for local law enforcement officers.
It's a Federal obligation to pay for local drug agents. It's a
Federal obligation to do all of these things.'' But frankly,
under the Constitution, it is the Federal Government that has
the sole responsibility for Border Patrol. We can ask local law
enforcement to assist us but because we're spreading ourselves
so thin to do everything for everybody and never say no, we
can't do the job that we're supposed to be doing here.
I'm absolutely convinced that if the Administration didn't
have these other concerns and other responsibilities in many
ways imposed upon them by this and prior Congresses, they would
give you the money and the manpower you need because we'd have
it. But the problem is, we are three-plus years past 9/11 and
we have not reorganized ourselves in terms of priorities to
recognize the Federal Government has the sole responsibility
for Border Patrol. The Federal Government has the primary
responsibility for dealing with terror inside and outside this
country.
And if that be true, then we ought to organize ourselves
that way and maybe in some ways we tell, as tough as it is
politically, some local governments and State governments, you
know, police responsibility is primarily yours, and if you
don't do that, there's no reason for you to exist, and we have
to go about the business of doing what we're supposed to do.
Instead of having an Administration bragging about the fact
they put 100,000 cops across this nation, and that was a little
bait-and-switch because the original program was we pay 100
percent the first year, 75 percent the second year, 50 percent
the third, 25 percent the fourth year, and nothing the fifth
year, and you all know what happened. Around the fourth year,
local jurisdictions came here and said, ``You're responsible
for paying for these folks.''
What if we instead had gotten 100,000 Federal officers
involved with Border Patrol, interior inspection, and the other
things that are our responsibility? I doubt any of you'd be
here. We'd probably have enough money to treat people properly
under Mr. Haney's consideration. But instead, we're sitting
here chasing our tails. Sorry, that's not a question.
[Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hostettler. No, but it does deserve a hearty amen.
I thank the witnesses for your testimony today and your
service to our country. All Members will have seven legislative
days to enter remarks into the record, extension of remarks
into the record.
The business before this Subcommittee being completed, we
are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Questions For the Record Submitted to DHS Immigration and Customs
Enforcement by Chairman John Hostettler
How many spaces did ICE commit to using contract/ local
facilities instead of its own?
DACS indicates 19,508 detainees on March 1. Of those, 16,013
were NOT in SPCs
Have contract facilities ever released detained aliens by
mistake?
In FY 2005, we have had six detainees escape from custody. DRO
will have to look into the individual incident reports to see
if any of these escapees used false IDs and was ``released.''
How many previously detained aliens were released last year?
(similar - how many aliens with final orders were released last
year?)
The attached Excel sheet has the releases by type and month for
all locations, locations excluding SPCs, and SPCs only.
``Unknown'' releases are those in which the last detention
record for an alien indicates a transfer to another facility
but there is no record from that facility.
----------
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Prepared Statement of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) merged the
investigative functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and the Customs Service, the INS detention and removal
functions, most of the INS intelligence operations, the Federal
Protective Service, and the Federal Air Marshals Service. ICE's areas
of responsibility include the enforcement of laws dealing with the
presence and activities of terrorists, human trafficking, commercial
alien smuggling operations, document fraud, and drug trafficking.
For instance, ICE investigators conducted an eight-month
investigation last year of two men who were selling false identity
documents to members of terrorist organizations. The ICE investigators
developed such a strong case against these individuals that they
pleaded guilty on February 28, 2005, to a charge of involvement in a
conspiracy to sell false documents to purported members of Abu Sayyaf,
a Philippines-based group that has been designated as a foreign
terrorist organization.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
authorized 800 new ICE investigators for FY2006 through FY2010. The
President's budget only requests funding for 143 new Ice investigators
for FY 2006, which is only 17% of the authorized number. We need all of
the 800 additional ICE investigators authorized by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
The National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also
authorized 8,000 new detention beds each year from FY2006 through
FY2010. The President, however, has requested funding for 1,920 beds
for FY2006, which is only 24% of the authorized number. We need all of
the 8,000 beds that were authorized. They are necessary to provide
appropriate detention facilities for asylum seekers and to detain
people who might be dangerous.
In a recently issued Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal
Proceedings, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
provides information about 19 detention facilities that house asylum
seekers. The facilities are located in 12 different states and include
6 county jails, 5 Homeland Security facilities, 7 private contract
facilities, and one special county-run detention facility for alien
families. These institutions housed more than 70 percent of all aliens
subject to Expedited Removal in FY 2003. Overall, they housed
approximately 5585 alien men and 1015 alien women.
More than half of the facilities reported that they housed asylum
seekers with criminals. Among the 8 facilities that housed criminal
inmates, 7 permitted some contact between them and the detained aliens.
In 4 of the facilities, this included shared sleeping quarters.
In only one of these facilities were the line officers or guards
explicitly told which inmates were asylum seekers. Also, very few of
the facilities provide any specific training to sensitize guards to the
special needs or concerns of asylum seekers. Even fewer facilities
provided training to recognize or address the special problems
experienced by victims of torture and other forms of trauma.
All of the facilities but 5 reported that they used strip or other
kinds of invasive searches on detainees as a standard procedure during
the time they were processed into the facility. All but 3 reported
using strip or invasive searches for security-related reasons during
the detainees' subsequent confinement.
Virtually all of the facilities reported using physical restraints.
For example, the Tri-County Jail in Ullin, Illinois, used handcuffs,
belly chains, and leg shackles when detainees left the facility.
Only a few of the facilities provided the detainees with access to
private, individual toilets. In only slightly more of the facilities
were detainees able to shower privately. The overwhelming majority of
the facilities required detainees to wear uniforms.
It is unconscionable that we are treating asylum seekers this way.
They have not been sentenced to incarceration as convicted criminals.
Why are they being treated as if they were convicted criminals? This is
especially distressing in view of the fact that some of them have come
to the United States seeking refuge from torture and other forms of
extreme abuse.
The failure to provide adequate detention facilities does not just
result in inappropriate incarceration of asylum seekers. It also
results in the release of aliens who might be a threat to our national
security. Although a large number of aliens cross the border between
Mexico and the United States illegally, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)
catches many of them and returns them to Mexico. The Mexican
government, however, usually does not accept aliens from other
countries. These aliens are referred to as ``Other than Mexican'' or
``OTMs.'' Due to a shortage of detention beds, USBP cannot detain all
of them. According to information from the Congressional Research
Service, USBP released 35,000 OTMs last year on their own recognizance.
Most of the OTMs are ordinary people who have come to the United
States to seek a better life for themselves and their families. There
is concern, however, that terrorists will use this weakness in our
border security as an easy way to enter the country. Also, we have a
growing number of Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13) gangs in our major cities,
and members of these bloody, violent Central American gangs are
entering the United States as OTMs.
If we fix our broken immigration system and provide adequate,
lawful access to the United States, the population of undocumented
aliens and the number of aliens coming here illegally will be reduced
greatly. Then, it will be easier to deal with enforcement problems, and
we will not need as many detention beds. In the meantime, however, we
need additional ICE investigators and more detention beds. We also need
to stop the inhumane practice of housing asylum seekers in penal
settings where they are treated as incarcerated criminals.
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Prepared Statement of Representative Linda Sanchez
I want to thank Chairman Hostettler and Ranking
Member Jackson Lee for holding this important oversight hearing
on our nation's Interior Immigration Enforcement Resources.
Like all Americans, I know that our immigration
system is broken. Without a doubt we need to fix it and we need
the Bush Administration to provide the necessary funding to
secure our borders.
However, let's not forget in all of our discussions
about enforcement, that the U.S. has always been a beacon of
hope and we must continue to guard the light of liberty for
those who are oppressed or displaced, or are coming here to
seek new opportunities for their families.
The Committee's last two immigration hearings have
focused on attacking immigrants and not the Republican
Administration's failure to meet its promise to secure our
borders.
Providing funding for only 210 CBP agents when 2,000
agents were authorized. And funding only 137 new ICE
investigators, which is 17% of the 800 additional
investigators, this just doesn't cut it!
Not only is this frustrating, but it undermines the
term, ``Homeland Security.''
There is no excuse for this! Time and time again, the
Bush Administration guts funding to secure our borders and
ports. Instead of providing resources, they use immigrants as a
smoke-screen for our security and immigration problems.
Attacking immigrants alone is not going to resolve
the issue, since the majority of immigrants come to this
country seeking a better life for themselves and their
families.
Let's remember who these immigrants are--they are my
parents, they are people who do the jobs that Americans don't
want, and they are those seeking refuge from blood-thirsty
regimes.
If we fix our broken immigration system and provide
adequate, lawful access to the United States through an earned
legalization and guestworker program, the population of
undocumented immigrants will greatly decrease.
This would also make it easier for us to deal with
enforcement problems.
I'd ask that we all remember our humanity as we
discuss ways to improve our immigration system. These are real
people--not just statistics--trying to achieve the American
Dream.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses who are
trying to protect our borders and ports everyday.
I thank both the Ranking Member and Chairman for
convening this hearing.
I yield back.