[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IRAQ: DEMOCRACY OR CIVIL WAR?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-249
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
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38-581 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
David Marin, Staff Director
Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
Benjamin Chance, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., Staff Director
Kaleb Redden, Professional Staff Member
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 13, 2006............................... 1
Statement of:
Al-Hasani, Hajim, member of Parliament (Sunni), former
speaker, Iraqi Parliament 2005; Karim AlMusawi, Washington
representative, Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (Sciri) (Shia); and Qubad Talabany, representative
of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to the United
States..................................................... 59
Al-Hasani, Hajim......................................... 59
AlMusawi, Karim.......................................... 64
Talabany, Qubad.......................................... 75
Satterfield, David, senior advisor on Iraq to the Secretary
of State................................................... 21
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Al-Hasani, Hajim, member of Parliament (Sunni), former
speaker, Iraqi Parliament 2005, prepared statement of...... 62
AlMusawi, Karim, Washington representative, Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri) (Shia), prepared
statement of............................................... 66
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 10
Satterfield, David, senior advisor on Iraq to the Secretary
of State, prepared statement of............................ 25
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 4
Talabany, Qubad, representative of the Kurdistan Regional
Government of Iraq to the United States, prepared statement
of......................................................... 79
IRAQ: DEMOCRACY OR CIVIL WAR?
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Platts, Duncan, Dent,
Kucinich, Van Hollen, Lynch, and Higgins.
Also present: Representative Waxman.
Staff present: J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R.
Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., staff director; Kaleb Redden,
professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, analyst; Robert
Kelley, chief counsel; Micheal Girbov, graduate assistant; Phil
Barnett, minority staff director/chief counsel; Karen
Lightfoot, minority communications director/senior policy
advisor; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa,
minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations entitled ``Iraq, Democracy or Civil War? What Will It
Take to Achieve a National Reconciliation'' is called back to
order.
This is an extremely important topic, and thus, we want the
record to be complete. Today's hearing is a continuation of
Monday's hearing. At the end of today we will again recess, not
adjourn, and we will reconvene on Friday for the hearing's
final day.
At the start of each reconvened session, Members have the
opportunity to make opening statements. In all other respects,
we will proceed as usual, without prejudice to the rights and
privileges of any Member.
Today, we continue our 3-day hearing, ``Iraq: Democracy Or
Civil War,'' examining security force levels; prospects for a
national reconciliation; and the consequence of leaving Iraq
immediately, later but still prematurely, or when Iraqis are
capable of taking over for Coalition forces.
The conflict in Iraq finds United States and Coalition
forces up against increasing insurgent, sectarian and terrorist
violence. Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, who has
supported the U.S. objective to foster progressive democracy in
the Middle East, bluntly stated, ``It is now obvious that we
are not midwifing democracy in Iraq, we are baby-sitting a
civil war.'' While some may take issue with Mr. Friedman's
choice of words, the broad contours of his point are clear: The
violence in Iraq continues, if not increases. The new Iraqi
leadership has not yet shown the political will to confront it,
and its efforts to promote peace and democracy are stalled.
Iraq security forces are truly improving and growing in
number, but they face an uphill battle if Iraq politicians are
not willing to confront the militias and make peace among
themselves.
Our witnesses this past Monday came to different
conclusions about security in Iraq, but one thing was clear
from their testimony: Our current baseline for overall security
forces is inadequate; we do not have enough Coalition forces in
Iraq. In addition, it is clear to me, based on my 14 visits to
Iraq and all our hearings, that 325,500 projected Iraqi
security force level to be reached in December of this year
will be inadequate and not allow us to bring most of our troops
home. Only when we establish credible, realistic estimates of
the number of Coalition forces and competent Iraq security
forces will we be able to set the conditions to eventually
withdraw the U.S. troop commitment in Iraq.
We cannot delude ourselves. If we want to be successful,
the administration needs to work with the Iraqi Government to
reassess the total number of forces needed to secure Iraq, and
this reassessment must be completed as quickly as possible.
Today we investigate what may be the most important issue
for achieving stability in and democracy in Iraq: the political
will to implement national reconciliation. Since January of
this year, little progress has been made. Some of our diplomats
and military officers openly question whether Iraq's leaders
have the political will to make tough decisions required to
drive down current violence and maintain security. Last week
when the Iraqi legislators returned from vacation, the Speaker
of their Parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani said the Iraqis,
``have 3 to 4 months to reconcile with each other. If the
country doesn't survive this, it will go under.''
Make no mistake. I understand the Iraqi people and the
officials they elected are grappling with daunting issues that
have no easy solutions, amnesty, rollback of de-
Ba'athification, federalism, share the oil wealth, and standing
down militias; but their current inaction is alarming and
should trouble every American's concern for our men and women
who are there in harm's way.
Each of the political milestones achieved in Iraq so far
has been preceded by strong U.S. pressure. They were more than
benchmarks, they were specific timelines established to produce
specific results. These timelines were not easy to meet, but
they forced Iraqis to make the difficult choices and
compromises to move forward.
It is time for the U.S. Government to be blunt with the
Iraqi leadership. If they are not willing to make peace among
themselves, the United States will have no choice but to
rethink how long troops can remain in Iraq. It is time to
expect results.
The topics we will discuss today are the prospects, timing,
and conditions for achieving national reconciliation, and a
permanent Constitution. We asked our witnesses to address the
following questions: What are the positions of the Shia, Sunni
and Kurdish political leadership on each issue related to
national reconciliation? What are possible ways to bridge the
differences among the political leadership? What are prospects
for agreement among the political leadership, and when can we
expect such agreements to be reached?
During our first panel we will hear testimony from
Ambassador David Satterfield. Ambassador Satterfield is the
senior advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State and was
formerly Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad.
Also testifying on panel one will be Mr. Jim Bever, Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Near East and Asia, U.S. Agency for
International Development.
On our second panel we are fortunate to hear the
perspectives of three prominent Iraqis, Dr. Hajim Al-Hassani,
former Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament and currently a Sunni
member of Parliament; Mr. Karim Al-Musawi, Washington
representative of the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, the largest political party in Iraq; and
Mr. Qubad Talabani, Washington representative of the Kurdish
Regional Government and son of Iraq's President Jalal Talabani.
We thank all our witnesses for taking the time to appear
before us today; in fact, we're very grateful that they're
here.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 38581.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 38581.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 38581.003
Mr. Shays. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr.
Kucinich, the ranking member of the committee.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And since the
ranking member of the full committee Mr. Waxman is here, I'd be
glad to yield to him.
Mr. Shays. Absolutely.
Mr. Kucinich. I thank Mr. Waxman.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and to the witnesses. I want to
thank you and all the witnesses for being here today.
Today's hearing asks the question, ``Iraq: Democracy or
Civil War? What Will It Take to Achieve National
Reconciliation?'' the President's assertions that Iraq is not
in a civil war is not honest. Over 3 years after the
administration's misguided war of choice, failed occupation and
disastrous reconstruction effort, Iraq today is mired in a
civil war, with U.S. troops and innocent Iraqis caught in the
crossfire. The fact that July was the deadliest month for
innocent civilians since the start of the war only further
proves that after 3 years of the administration's ill-advised
and misguided war and occupation of Iraq, the situation on the
ground is getting worse, not better. The civil war in Iraq
cannot and will not be won by the administration's military
occupation of Iraq.
Today's hearing asks the question, what will it take to
achieve national reconciliation? That's a good question. Maybe
we could begin by asking first how that relates to the United
States, and what would it take to achieve national
reconciliation in the United States? Because the truth of the
matter is that unless you talk about national reconciliation in
the same breath as truth--South Africa, truth in
reconciliation--Americans will continue to go down the blind
alley in which the President laid another brick in with his
speech the other night by continuing to conflate Iraq and
September 11th.
The Bible says, you shall know the truth, and the truth
shall set you free. The only way the people of this country are
going to be free from the lies of September 11th is to have the
truth come out. Iraq had nothing to do with September 11th, it
was al Qaeda's role in September 11th. Iraq did not have the
intention or the capability of attacking the United States, and
therefore the President's statement the other night that
Saddam's regime posed a risk the world could not afford to take
and that the regime of Saddam Hussein was a clear threat, there
is a mountain of facts to the contrary.
Yes, we need national reconciliation not just in Iraq, we
need it in here in the United States, and the only way we can
get to it is to have the truth. And I'm hopeful these hearings
will provide some semblance of a forum to accomplish that.
Let's talk about national reconciliation in Iraq today,
because maybe talking about it in the United States in the full
committee might not be within the scope of this particular
Congress. But I think that we need to focus on another
question, and that is the desire to end the U.S. occupation,
because ending the U.S. occupation may be the only thing that
unifies the various factions in Iraq.
Three years after our so-called liberation of Iraq, a
recent public opinion poll found that nearly half of all
Iraqis, 47 percent, approve of attacks on Americans. Think
about that. The policy of this administration has placed
130,000 U.S. troops in the middle of a civil war in a country
in which almost half the population supports the idea of
killing our troops. National reconciliation indeed.
In addition, last week a coalition of 300 tribal leaders
demanded the release of Saddam Hussein to possibly reinstate
him to his post as President. While not a majority, it's
certainly a troubling sign. ``When the Iraqis stand up, we will
stand down.'' That's a slogan, it's not a plan. When the desire
to kill our soldiers may be the most agreed-upon thing in Iraq,
one would have to wonder if sticking to our guns is a rational
thought. Our presence in Iraq is entirely counterproductive and
only fuels the growing insurgency. The disastrous
reconstruction of Iraq, conducted with virtually no
congressional oversight, has served only to line the pockets of
Halliburton and other defense contractors, while average Iraqis
continue to suffer daily without the most basic of services.
American taxpayers have footed the bill for nearly $400
billion in war costs, but have those dollars actually improved
the quality of life of Iraqis? Iraqis are still without
reliable electricity, clean water or sewage, and garbage piles
up in the streets. Schools and hospitals remain unbuilt. And
the oil sector, which was to finance reconstruction costs and
was the lifeblood and economic driver of the nation, is nowhere
near to its previous capacity. By almost any standard, the
quality of life of the average Iraqi is worse off today than it
was before our invasion.
While we tried a military solution, that has failed to
bring about peace and stability to Iraq. We learned this week
that all military intelligence officials have given up on Anbar
Province. In addition, after 3 years of military presence, even
Baghdad, Iraq's capital, is not safe. Read today's news. The
bodies are just piling up. It would be interesting to hear in
the testimony today from some of the witnesses whom is killing
whom there. What is fueling this tremendous increase in murder?
Repeatedly, our own generals have told us that the war in
Iraq cannot be won by military force alone; unfortunately, the
policymakers here in Washington have arrogantly refused to
listen.
Mr. Chairman, I think a better topic for this hearing would
be, ``Three years later, what in the world have we
accomplished?'' it's increasingly clear that this
administration's occupation and reconstruction of Iraq have
failed. After 3\1/2\ years, Iraqi is less safe, not more. Al
Qaeda, which prior to the U.S. invasion had no influence, has
now grown in influence and number of recruits. The fact is, Mr.
Chairman, this administration's policies have turned Iraq into
a breeding ground and training ground for terrorists and
created the greatest recruiting tool ever for al Qaeda.
Mr. Chairman, the greatest tragedy of this war is the 2,669
American soldiers who have been irrevocably lost, and tens of
thousands more injured. Between 100,000 and 200,000 innocent
Iraqis have died as a result of the U.S. invasion. Every day
120 more Iraqis die at the hands of execution-style death
squads, kidnappings, murders, IEDs and sectarian violence. The
war in Iraq was a great and a tragic mistake, it has cost us in
blood and treasure, it has damaged our once unchallenged
reputation in the world and squandered the goodwill that rained
on this Nation after September 11th, and has been a distraction
for our efforts to root out terrorism worldwide and bring to
justice those responsible for September 11th.
The President's promise that we would not leave Iraq until
after his Presidency will only compound past failures and make
our Nation less safe. Our continued occupation of Iraq is not
only counterproductive, but it fuels a civil war.
Mr. Chairman, I believe it's time we end this great
misadventure in Iraq, bring our troops home with honor and
dignity. Thanks again, and I look forward to hearing the
testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 38581.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 38581.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 38581.006
Mr. Shays. The Chair would recognize Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for calling this important hearing. And your 14 trips to
Iraq, I think, surely are more than any other Member of
Congress has been there, and no one has worked harder on this
issue than you have.
This morning on CNN it was reported that a bombing earlier
today killed 14 and injured 67, and that 60 other bodies were
found around which had been--who had been tortured. And I doubt
that anybody in this country was shocked by that report or even
surprised by that report because we hear these reports daily.
Almost every article that I ever read says that 100,000
civilians have been killed in Iraq over the past 3\1/2\ years.
Is that civil war? Well, this is a country with one-twelfth the
population of our country, so 100,000 civilians would be like
1.2 million people being killed in this Nation. Would we say we
were at civil war if 1.2 million Americans had been killed in
the past 3\1/2\ years? I think so.
Then on September 1st, the Pentagon released a report that
all the new stories described as grim, saying that attacks on
American soldiers have increased 15 percent over the previous 3
months, and that civilian deaths were going up averaging 120 a
day, equal to 43,000 a year, which in our country would be the
equivalent of 516,000 a year. The report also said that marine
intelligence report said--the report on CNN this morning said a
marine intelligence report said al-Anbar Province, which
includes Ramadi and Fallujah and other key areas, have been
lost, and that even the addition of 15,000 or 20,000 more
troops would just be a temporary fix at best.
This was a war against an evil man, but a man who had a
military budget slightly over 2/10 of 1 percent of ours, and he
spent most of that protecting himself and his family. He was
absolutely no threat to us whatsoever.
Fortune Magazine on November 25, 2002, said, before the
war, ``Iraq, we win, what then?'' The article said a military
victory could turn into a strategic defeat, and that an
American occupation would be, ``prolonged and expensive, and
could turn U.S. troops into sitting ducks for Islamic
terrorists.''
A columnist for the National Journal wrote that,
``throughout the Middle East anti-Americanism has grown along
with U.S. influence.'' He said the lessons of great power
breeds great resentment.
William Buckley, Jr., the godfather of conservatism, wrote
in 2004 that if he had known in 2002 what he knew in 2004, he
would have opposed the war. Then last year he said something
very profound, I think. He wrote that if the killings of
Americans continued at the same rate for the next year--and
they have actually, and they have actually increased--he said
we would reach a point, ``at which to remain would become not
steadfastness of purpose, but, rather, misapplication of
pride.''
In fact, the fact is--and few people realize this because
the conservatives with national television audiences or
national radio audiences have supported the war, but over half
of conservative newspaper columnists have opposed this war
since the beginning. Now, some say that it was a mistake to go
in; in fact, more than some, many have said, I've heard many
times, many have said it was a mistake to go in, but now that
we're there, we must stay the course or finish the job or
complete the mission, we can't cut and run. But I think if you
find out that you're going the wrong way down an interstate,
you don't just keep on going in that wrong direction, you get
off at the next exit.
And so I'm saddened at what has occurred there. I'm
saddened at the tremendous expense to our taxpayers and our
military, the deaths, the maimings and serious injuries to so
many thousands of young Americans. This is no criticism of the
American military, they do a good job wherever they're sent,
but over half of what we've spent over there has been just pure
foreign aid, which conservatives have traditionally been
against. Governor Bush, when he was running for President,
criticized President Clinton for nation building and said we
need a more humble foreign policy. I agree with that. And so I
thank you for calling this hearing today, and I yield back.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman very much.
And, Mr. Waxman, you will be recognized--I need to make a
phone call, that's the only reason I will be relinquishing the
chair, but you have the floor.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
for holding this hearing, and I want to tell you I was very
impressed and moved by the comments of my Republican colleague
Mr. Duncan in his statement that he has just made.
It is difficult to take responsibility; it's difficult to
say that sometimes mistakes are made by those who make them.
And we speak as Americans, not as Democrats or Republicans, as
we look at the tragedy that's been unfolding before us.
Three and a half years have passed since the invasion of
Iraq, but the situation on the ground today can only be
described as dismal. The violence in Iraq is spiraling out of
control. In July, 3,000 Iraqis were killed. The number of
attacks reached an all time high. There were more than 1,600
sectarian execution-style killings. By early August there were
almost 800 attacks per week. Death squads and terrorists are
running rampant, and independent observers believe a civil war
has already started.
And we know that reconstruction hasn't gone any better. In
Baghdad they don't have electricity except for a few hours
during the day, and that's in Baghdad. Millions of Iraqis don't
have access to drinkable water, and the oil production in Iraq
is below prewar levels.
Well, there are several ways to approach the reality of
what we've seen, repeatedly seen. One could be what the
administration has been saying. They're saying that Iraq stands
as a shining example of great progress. I don't think there is
any basis for this kind of optimism. It took 4 months to form a
government, and the current Iraqi leaders seem to lack the
political will to reach agreement on the issues that divide
them.
So how has the President responded to all of this? Over and
over again we get the same kind of talk from this
administration: We are just about to turn the corner. We have a
steady stream of optimistic projections, we're at a key turning
point, we're going to have a crucial breakthrough.
Before the war began, Vice President Cheney promised the
American people that we will, in fact, be greeted as
liberators. Well, that never happened. About a month after the
war, President Bush stood in front of a giant ``Mission
Accomplished'' sign and said, we have seen the turning of the
tide, and since then we've had that steady stream of nonsense.
On June 28, 2004, when we turned over sovereignty,
President Bush promised that Iraq was at a turning point, but
the violence just intensified. And even at the January 2005
elections, President Bush explained, tomorrow the world will
witness a turning point in the history of Iraq, a milestone to
the advance of freedom. It sounded good, but it was a complete
fantasy.
A few months later Vice President Cheney presented the
American people with the ultimate of happy talk. On Larry King
Live he said, ``the level of activity that we see today from a
military standpoint, I think, will clearly decline. I think
we're in the last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.''
In December 2005, President Bush: ``we're making an quiet,
steady progress in Iraq.'' Well, if 2005 was a turning point,
it was definitely a turning point for the worse.
Over and over again the approach of the Republican
administration has been to tell us, we need to stay the course,
it's working out well for the Iraqi people and for the American
people. That's why I'm so impressed by our Republican colleague
making the statement this morning that we've got to face
reality, it is not turning out well. It is a mess.
Now, I know that some people on this committee have said in
the past--I'm one person who believes that our involvement in
Iraq is a noble effort. That was stated by one of the members
of our committee. They never say, I was wrong. Now we have
people saying what we need to do is have a reassessment of the
forces that are needed to control the security in Iraq. Do we
trust this administration to reassess the number of forces that
we need to have stability in Iraq? They weren't able to even
assess the number of troops we needed from the very beginning
to maintain security in Iraq. And we heard that we ought to be
blunt with the Iraqi leadership, we're going to give them a
deadline. And if they can't work out their differences, then
what? Are we threatening to leave? Well, in the middle of a
civil war, if you tell people at this deadline you've got to
work out your problems, the aggrieved party in the civil war
will not agree to work out the problems because they would like
to see us leave, and maybe both sides would like to see us
leave. But we have no leverage because we told them we're going
to reconstruct the country, and we failed. We told them we're
going to bring about security, and we failed. We told them that
they're at a turning point, and they turned the wrong way.
So I think it is a mistake to say, for those who thought
this was a noble war, that what we need to do is set some
deadlines, tell them to work it all out, reassess the number of
troops, and, well, that will get us past the election, won't
it? But it's not an answer. What we need is honest talk from
those who thought this was a noble war. We need them to admit
that they were wrong. We need to learn that somebody's got to
be held accountable. This administration has to be held
accountable; the Republicans and the Congress that supported it
have to be held accountable. The Democrats that never learned
after event after event after event should have alerted them to
the fact that we've made a mistake and we're getting deeper and
deeper in this quagmire need to admit as well. And after that,
you hold people responsible, you move forward, and you don't
hold on to a noble cause until you lose more and more lives for
that noble cause and face the end of the road. And we already
may be at the end of the road.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Waxman, thank you.
The Chair would recognize Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding these hearings, and I'm looking forward to hearing the
testimony of the witnesses. But I do think that given the fact
that we're gathered here just a few days after the solemn 5th
anniversary of the September 11th attacks on our country, it is
very worth pointing out that the attacks on our country had
nothing to do with Iraq and had nothing to do with Saddam
Hussein.
And I think it's important that we take a look at the
situation in Afghanistan today because, after all, the attack
launched by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda came from there
because they were given safe haven by the Taliban Government in
a failed state. And this country was absolutely united in
taking action against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and the
international community was united as well. NATO invoked the
article of the Charter that said an attack on one is an attack
on all. The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution
condemning the terrorist attack on the United States and said
they would join us on the war on terrorism, and here we are 5
years later with a world divided and a country divided.
And in Afghanistan, al Qaeda still remains active. Osama
bin Laden is still at large. We've seen in the last many months
a resurgence of Taliban activity in southern Afghanistan, and
despite that resurgence, which has been testified to by General
Maples, the head of the DIA, and cleared everybody following
events in southern Afghanistan, despite that, we have actually
reduced the number of American forces in southern Afghanistan.
We see today that opium production in Afghanistan is at an
all-time historic high, and we learned within the last 10 days
that the Pakistani Government has essentially entered into a
cease-fire agreement with the Taliban in the northern part of
Afghanistan and with those in the northwest frontier area, in
the Waziristan area, that they're backing off.
And so when I think back to President Bush on the aircraft
carrier, the USS Lincoln, back in May 2003 declaring mission
accomplished, it wasn't only that we didn't begin to accomplish
any kind of mission in Iraq, we haven't come close to
accomplishing the chief mission that we've set out to do as a
united country uniting the national community of making sure
that we totally disabled al Qaeda, because they're still there,
and they're still planning, and they're still plotting, and we
have not begun to accomplish the mission, and we haven't
provided the resources necessary as a Nation to complete the
job, and we haven't gotten the cooperation of the Pakistanis
and others to complete the job.
And instead, we took our eye off the ball. We took our eye
off the ball. We invaded a country that had absolutely nothing
to do with the attacks on this country on September 11th, and
we have created a mess there. We now confirmed what we already
knew from the Select Senate Intelligence Committee report, a
bipartisan report: There was no collaboration between al Qaeda
and Saddam Hussein; in fact, they were ideological opposites.
Saddam Hussein didn't want any Islamic extremists in Iraq
upsetting the apple cart, and yet as a result of our activity,
we have created a mess there, we've opened Pandora's box, and
now we're left with trying to deal with the mess that's been
created.
And as my colleague Mr. Waxman said, we continue to get
happy talk. We had mission accomplished 1 day. We had the plan
for victory charts back in November at the Naval Academy--this
White House seems to really like these charts a lot--and then
we had Vice President Cheney saying, as Mr. Waxman said,
``we're in the last throes.''
I think the Vice President should read the Pentagon report
that just came out about a week ago. He said the insurgency was
in the last throes. That report says the insurgency remains,
``potent and viable.'' And on top of that, we now understand
from the Pentagon and people above that the insurgency is
really the lesser of our problems. We now also have an
incipient civil war. Call it what you want, read today's paper,
read yesterday's paper, people are being brutally killed.
They've had their hands cuffed, they've been shot through the
head, reprisal killing, cycle of violence that continues, and
yet nobody has been held accountable.
Stay the course is a slogan, it's not a strategy. More of
the same. More of the same of what? Now, there are some people
that have talked about different ways to try to achieve a
political settlement, which is the only way we're going to be
able to resolve this issue. I'm not sure there is going to be a
peaceful political reconciliation, but certainly that should be
our goal. But this constant talk of just keep doing exactly
what we're doing is a recipe for disaster as well. We need some
real thinking.
And I will close with this, Mr. Chairman: When you have a
system that rewards those people who constantly got it wrong,
and yet punishes or marginalizes those in the administration or
those, frankly, in the professional civil service who got it
right, whether it was on weapons of mass destruction, whether
it was on the question of no connections between Saddam Hussein
and al Qaeda, when you punish or ignore the people who got it
right, and you reward the people who get it wrong, you're going
to get a continuation of a failed policy.
And unfortunately, when the President has said he has all
the answers, the Republican leadership certainly in Congress
says, yes, Mr. President, you do have all the answers, and they
haven't asked all the questions. It's been a blank check, it's
been a rubber-stamp Congress, and at the very least, if we're
going to have a national conversation, which the President says
he wants, we shouldn't say that 1 day and then point fingers at
people who disagree with the administration on the other day.
That is just political partisanship. And when the President
says, let's have a united conversation, and then the Vice
President otherwise goes out and goes name-calling everybody
else, that is not a two-way conversation.
I hope that we will begin to have a two-way conversation,
but it doesn't appear that we're going to get there. I hope
people will begin to be held accountable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no statement at
this point.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for being here.
Mr. Higgins, welcome. You have the floor.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate very
much having had the opportunity to travel with Chairman Shays
and other Members of Congress to the Middle East in the month
of August. We spent time in Iraq, we spent time in Lebanon, and
Israel and in the Sudanese region of Darfur, but.
I think the most difficult thing about this issue is that
it's not one-dimensional, it's multidimensional. When you talk
about Iraq, you also have to talk about Iran, you also have to
talk about the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. And I think the
one, perhaps only, clear conclusion about this is that despite
all the tough talk, despite all the fake bravado, this
administration fails to recognize that at the source of this
problem is our Nation's addiction to oil.
When you look at the situation in Syria, when you look at
the situation in Iran, they're not exporting goods to the rest
of the world, they're exporting hate and intolerance. That
stands as the basis for the conflict that we are now
confronting in the Middle East. Places like Iran and Syria,
they use oil money; they use oil money to insulate themselves
from real political and economic reform. And unless and until
this Nation, our Nation, gets serious about developing energy
independence, we will always have a conflict that we can't
control and obviously can't control today.
I look forward to the testimony from this expert panel of
witnesses, and look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman,
moving forward. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
We've been joined by Mr. Lynch.
Welcome. You have the floor, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Lynch. First of all, I want to thank Chairman Shays and
Ranking Member Kucinich for holding this hearing. I'd also like
to welcome today's panelists and thank you for your willingness
to help the committee in this work.
Over the past 2 years, we've witnessed major events in
Iraq, from the June 2004 transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim
Government, and to the December 2005 Council of Representatives
elections, to the May 2006 formation of a new Iraqi Government.
Regrettably, however, Iraq's political developments have been
accompanied by heightened sectarian violence. It has changed
the dynamic in the country where we first faced a resistance
among the Ba'athist regime under--previously under the control
of Saddam Hussein, to one in which on a daily basis we hear of
major conflict between Sunni and Shia tribal leaders within
Iraq, and it has changed the dynamic of our mission there
enormously.
The focus of ethnic and sectarian identity has sharpened as
a result of Iraq's political process, while nationalism and a
sense of Iraqi identity have weakened. And accordingly, the
political process of national reconciliation in Iraq has borne
an additional military obligation for our brave men and women
in uniform who are already shouldering enormous burdens of
battling a terrorist insurgency.
As noted by the Department of Defense in its August 2006
quarterly report on Iraq to the Congress, rising sectarian
strife defines the emerging nature of violence in mid-2006 in
Iraq. And since the last report, the core conflict in Iraq
changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists
seeking to control key areas in Baghdad, create or protect
sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources and impose their
own respective political and religious agendas. That is what is
going on in Iraq today, and as a result, U.S. forces levels in
Baghdad have been significantly increased with an additional
7,000 American troops sent to Baghdad largely for the purpose
of curbing sectarian violence between Iraqis.
And, Mr. Chairman, in light of the deterioration in the
security environment in Iraq, and following my fifth visit to
the country, I believe that Iraq's strategy is clearly lacking
in one clear respect: It is the absence of an effective
mechanism by which to expeditiously and fully transition Iraqi
Government operations, including political tasks of national
reconciliation, to the newly elected Iraqi Government.
I was in Fallujah back in April, and during my visit we got
hit with a sandstorm, so I spent a couple of days there, stayed
overnight. And I noticed that when in east Fallujah they had
problems with water and electricity, it was the U.S. Marines,
the engineers, who went out there and put the water back on and
tried to get the electricity back on. Those are functions that
should be, by now, in the hands of the Iraqi Government. They
were elected back in December, and yet they still do not handle
the basic operations, the basic day-to-day duties of
government.
And we need to make sure that responsibility is shifted
over to the Iraqis not only to reduce our own need for
personnel in those respects, but also because I think it's
common sense that if their government is elected--and they have
been elected since December--and yet for the daily duties and
obligations of government, the Iraqi people continue to look to
the United States and Coalition forces, eventually they will
lose credibility. The Iraqi elected government, if they are
considered a puppet government and they do nothing in the main
realm of what governments should do, they will lose credibility
among their own people, and we see some of that happening
today. Recent reports in the last few days coming directly from
the Iraqi leadership complain of this point directly.
And the function of moving that governmental responsibility
to the Iraqis is a necessary precondition of any United States
withdrawal. That needs to happen, but no one right now is
focusing on that specific job, and we need to establish an
organization that looks at that issue and makes sure that the
Iraqis do stand up and take responsibility for those basic
government operations in their own country.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome our panel's thoughts on the
suggestions that are put forward, and I look forward to their
respective positions on the progress of the national
reconciliation efforts in Iraq.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman very much.
Before recognizing our witnesses, I want to just take care
of some business. I ask unanimous consent that all members of
the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in
the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask future unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statement, in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
We have before us our first panel. And I appreciate our
panel understanding that it's important for Members to put on
the record their concerns about this particular hearing and the
issue in general, and hopefully that will help you address some
of the questions and responses. And I say that as well to our
second panel, we are clearly divided on a very important issue
facing our country and the world.
Ambassador David Satterfield is the senior advisor on Iraq
to the Secretary of State. He's the former Deputy Chief of
Mission from Baghdad. And I will just say that in my
interaction with him in Iraq, I found him to be extraordinarily
candid, obviously very aware of the issues that our country
faces, and someone that I have just unbelievable respect for.
And I thank him for his service in Iraq and his service now.
Mr. James Bever is the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Near
East and Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development. I
understand you've been assigned to this position in the last
few months. You do not have a statement for us, but you're here
to respond to questions, and I appreciate that very much.
I will say, before swearing the witnesses in, the vote on
authorized use of U.S. Air Force--Armed Forces against Iraq
passed 296 to 133, with 3 not voting. Mr. Platts voted for this
resolution, I did, Mr. Lynch did, and Mr. Waxman. Mr. Kucinich
voted against it, and Mr. Duncan voted against it, and two of
the other Members here today were not here when we voted on
that resolution.
Ambassador, if you will stand up, I will swear you in.
Mr. Kucinich. Would the Chair yield to a question?
Mr. Shays. Let me just swear the witnesses in. Excuse me,
Mr. Bever as well. As you know, we swear in all the witnesses.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I note for the record that our witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
Was there a question?
Mr. Kucinich. Yeah. I always appreciate the Chair bringing
information to the committee to illuminate us in the context of
hearings, but could I inquire of the Chair what was the purpose
of citing my vote against that resolution?
Mr. Shays. The purpose was to help enlighten our witnesses
that some of the Members who have spoken for or against this
war, in fact, voted for the war. I just wanted them to realize
that.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, since you mentioned my name, I
did vote for that resolution because I was concerned about
nuclear weapons of mass destruction. I didn't know it was all a
fantasy of this administration's.
I also hoped that we would do better, and then found that
reconstruction was just lining of pockets of Halliburton and
the contractors. I saw that the Iraqi people weren't taking
control of things. I saw that the civil war was coming. I saw
the disaster year after year after year. It was as late as June
13, 2006, that I said, as you did, I'm one person this on this
committee who believes that our investment in Iraq is a noble
effort. I don't believe it was a noble effort, and I thought--
my vote was a vote that I would certainly not have cast had we
known the facts, and I wouldn't vote that way today. And I do
not think it's a noble effort.
I don't know why you decided to cite something that took
place so long ago when we knew so little of what we know now.
Mr. Shays. Just in response to your comments, Mr. Waxman,
since I was the gentleman who said it was a noble effort, I
felt that your comments were directed at me without using my
name, and then you talked about people being honest. And so I
would like to put for the record that I voted for this war. I
believe it is an absolutely noble effort with all my heart and
soul. I believe it would be a catastrophe if we were to leave
prematurely. I believe the Iraqi--the terrorists, Islamist
terrorists, would win. I believe there would be an all-out
civil war, and I believe Iran would be the dominant force, and
that's what I believe with regard to that.
And I was noting the Member's attack against me, and I did
want to make sure that my name is associated with that noble
cause.
Ambassador Satterfield, you have the floor.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR ON IRAQ TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity----
Mr. Shays. Let me explain. We do 5 minutes. We will roll
over another 5 minutes. Since you're the only one with
testimony, I don't want you to feel rushed to make whatever
statement you want to make. Thank you.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I do appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to testify on
developments in Iraq, especially on the urgent critical need
for reconciliation among Iraq's sectarian groups. And I
appreciate the opportunity to enter into the record my prepared
remarks. I would like to make some brief summary comments
before taking questions.
The Iraqi people, as well as Iraqi and Coalition forces,
have suffered through a violent summer. While the insurgency
and al Qaeda terror remain challenges, lethal challenges,
sustained sectarian violence is perhaps the greatest threat
today to a stable, unified, prosperous Iraq. If sectarian
violence cannot be demonstrably, tangibly reduced and
sustained, that reduction over the next several months, an
Iraqi Government that represents all of its people, is a
partner against terror, and is at peace both at home and with
its neighbors will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
The challenges facing the citizens in the Government of
Iraq are serious, and they are very difficult, but, I believe,
still surmountable. However, it will take a concerted urgent
effort to achieve success. Iraq's future is dependent upon the
performance and commitment over a sustained period of time of
three basic pillars of actors? first and foremost, the Iraqi
Government itself and the Iraqi people; the Coalition; and the
international community, in particular Iraq's neighbors. If any
one of these pillars should fail to fulfill its
responsibilities and to sustain those responsibilities, each
will suffer the consequences of a destabilized and violent
Iraq.
For the Iraqis themselves, failure means the reality of a
civil conflict that would lead to loss of life, disintegration
of a national government, division of the country along
sectarian lines.
For the United States, for the Coalition, failure means the
possibility that Iraq would either become a permanent haven for
terrorists, a satellite of Iranian influence, or both. Either
outcome would pose a direct threat to American national
interests and to the security of the American people.
For international actors, especially for Iraq's neighbors
in the region, failure would mean a further destabilized Middle
East that could disrupt national economies, provoke refugee
flows, and, in a worst-case scenario, lead to regional
conflict. To avoid these specters of failure, all must do their
part.
The U.S. Government, the Coalition have already begun to
make progress, and progress on a changed basis in several
critical areas. We are not engaged in business as usual in
Iraq, all is not the same. We have adapted and we will continue
to adapt to changing dynamics on the ground, to our assessment,
which evolves with the nature of the threat and the manner of
dealing with that threat most effectively. We have responded to
criticism from the Congress and from the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction to improve performance.
On security. Multinational and Iraqi security forces
reacted to the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad,
which many of the Members present have commented on, and have
launched Operation Together Forward, a strategy to clear
Baghdad of armed elements, terrorists, criminal groups and
insurgents one key neighborhood at a time.
After clearing armed groups from these neighborhoods,
they're clearing the streets, they're restoring basic services.
The object here is to provide a greater sense of normalcy for
Baghdad residents in their daily lives.
Since August 7, almost 50,000 buildings have been cleared,
hundreds of weapons seized, dozens of militants, armed elements
detained, and we are seeing results. Over the first 5 weeks of
this operation, there has been a significant drop in execution-
style sectarian killings in Baghdad city. Much work remains,
but we appear to be--we, meaning the Iraqi forces in the lead
on the streets, with support from Coalition elements--turning
around the trend line of violence that followed the bombing of
the Samarra Mosque in February.
I do not want to overstate success in Baghdad. This is an
ongoing proposition, and we assess on a daily basis what is
being done and what needs to be done, but the trend has been
positive.
On reconstruction and good governance, critical elements
both to putting Iraq on a sustainable path, a stable future, we
have shifted the focus of our contracting efforts from foreign
companies to Iraqi contractors. We're helping to support Iraqi
businesses, to create Iraqi jobs, and not just make-work jobs,
but sustainable positions. Both of these are necessary for the
economic future of Iraq, and they're both necessary to provide
a state for those who want to oppose violence, for those who
see their future not in struggle, not in conflict, but in
peaceful and normal lives.
We're working jointly in an unprecedented fashion, in
military civilian teams, to stand up and to run provincial
reconstruction efforts throughout Iraq as well as in the
capital. These are helping to rebuild critical infrastructure,
to train Iraqi officials in democratic best practices so they
can indeed take over the lead, because the lead is what must be
handed to Iraqis.
We already have seven provincial reconstruction teams up
and running. Two more are operational and will launch
officially very shortly.
On essential services. We have rehabilitated or maintained
more than twice the electrical capacity now on line in Iraq. We
have improved access to fresh water and to sewage treatment for
over 5 million Iraqis. And while our focus in the past was on
building national capacity in these services, we have moved
forward. We are now focusing on what we call the next mile. It
is connecting the capacity which exists in the system to homes,
to the user when they turn on the light switch or turn on the
tap.
Our goal is simple. We want Iraqis, particularly in
Baghdad, to be able to see, feel and touch the accomplishments
that U.S. taxpayer money and the effort of committed men and
women have brought in their country. We're making progress in
that direction.
Finally, on oil production. We have worked hard, and we
have successfully increased Iraq's crude output above prewar
levels from an average of 2 million barrels a day to 2.2
million barrel as day, with a significant increase in that
latter figure by the end of the year as now wells come on line
in the south.
Now, these are all positive developments, but they cannot
exist or be assessed in a vacuum. To have lasting impact, to
have strategic impact, the Iraqi Government and the
international community must reinforce them by addressing other
critical areas of concern, and there is no such area that
requires more immediate attention in Iraq right now than
reconciliation. On this issue the United States and the
Coalition can only do so much. Only the Iraqis themselves,
their elected leaders, can ultimately resolve the differences
that currently divide them, and the clock is very much ticking.
We are pressing the government of Prime Minister Maliki to
move now to match excellent rhetoric with real action. Prime
Minister Maliki made a positive step forward in June when he
presented a national reconciliation and dialog project to the
Council of Representatives, but the Iraqi Government now must
move forward to implement this swiftly and comprehensively. As
Iraq's partner, we stand willing to help in any way we can to
advance this process, and we understand the stakes, but only
the Iraqis can make the difficult decisions and compromises
that will guarantee for them and for their people a secure,
peaceful future.
Success in Iraq will not be possible unless all
extragovernmental armed groups, terrorists and insurgents are
demobilized, and Iraq's main sectarian groups, Shia, Sunni and
Kurd, resolve their differences peacefully and in a manner that
supports a democratic process.
I'd like to say, Mr. Chairman, a word about the important
role of the international community at this point.
This month the United Nations and the Iraqi Government are
launching an International Compact for Iraq that is loosely
based on the successful International Compact for Afghanistan
that was concluded in January of this year. The goal of the
compact is for the Iraqi Government to demonstrate to the
international community, to the region, to the world and to its
own people its commitment to implementing needed social,
political and economic reforms, to move forward on security, to
promote private sector investment and public sector
development. The United Nations will be holding a compact
meeting in New York on September 18th, less than a week from
now, after a very successful preparatory meeting this past week
in Abu Dhabi.
Now, as the Iraqis reach out to the international community
and to their neighbors, it's critical that the international
community and the region reach back. Now, this is especially
true for Iraq's neighbors, who have for too long sat on the
fence and complained about conditions in Iraq without doing
anything about them. We share the concerns expressed by many of
our friends in the region about Iranian influence, about the
growth of Sunni Islamic terror, al Qaeda in Iraq, but the way
to deal with this phenomenon is not to isolate and exclude
Iraq, it is to recognize that a new Iraq exists, to embrace
that change, and to work actively with us, with the Coalition,
to support a different, better, stable future for Iraq. It is
time for the region to invest, as we have, in Iraq's future.
Mr. Chairman, President Bush, Secretary Rice, Ambassador
Khalilzad, everyone in this administration, is committed to
completing the mission in Iraq. If all of us, the United
States, our Coalition partners, the Iraqi Government and the
international community, do our part, we can and I believe we
will succeed. And I would be happy to answer any questions the
committee may have. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Considering we have so many of my Democratic
colleagues, I think I will start with them first, and then I'll
go to Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Kucinich, you have the floor first.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. And what we are going to do--we are going to do
10 minutes. We'll do 5 minutes. Then we'll roll over for
another 5 minutes. That way I think we can really get into some
issues.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, thank you for being here.
A recent report by a marine intelligence official in Iraq
publicized in the Washington Post claims that this situation at
Anbar Province is almost hopeless. It says there's nothing the
United States can do to improve the political and social
situation there. You read the report?
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes.
Mr. Kucinich. Do you agree or disagree with its findings?
Ambassador Satterfield. We certainly agree.
Mr. Kucinich. I can't hear you.
Ambassador Satterfield. We certainly agree. The situation
in Anbar Province is, indeed, very serious, and we agree that
major measures need to be taken to address the social, the
political situation there. We disagree that the situation is
hopeless, and we disagree that it is not possible to address
the underlying factors which make the violence in Anbar so
untrackable.
Mr. Kucinich. Have you read any State Department reports
that draw a similar conclusion?
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, Mr. Kucinich, we have many,
many reports from our staff, from military staff in Anbar
Province. All of them confirm the difficult nature of the
situation there, and it's a situation which through a
combination of means outreached to the Sunni community, not
just in Anbar Province, but the exile community outside Anbar
Province in other countries; extension of government services
as best as can be done to provide a better stake for the
residents of that area; but above all----
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. I want to ask you,
if you have read such State Department reports, are you willing
to provide them to this committee?
Ambassador Satterfield. That is an issue I will take back
to the Department, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. If you've read such reports, when is the
first time that you read a report saying that the situation at
Anbar Province had deteriorated sharply?
Ambassador Satterfield. There are consistent reporting.
There is consistent reporting from Anbar Province underscoring
the serious nature of both violence, political situation,
essential services provision in that province. It is not any
one report or any one dramatic event. Anbar is a very, very
difficult area. It is the most violent province in Iraq. It has
been the most violent province since 2004.
Mr. Kucinich. Is the State Department recommending to the
President that we send more troops there?
Ambassador Satterfield. That is not the role of the State
Department.
Mr. Kucinich. Does the State Department feel that there is
a military solution in Anbar Province?
Ambassador Satterfield. The U.S. Government, the mission in
Baghdad, civilian and military, is united in a strategy of
approaching the violence in Anbar, the political situation in
Anbar as elsewhere in Iraq on a basis of both security steps
and political and assistance steps.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Ambassador, to what do you attribute the
sharp increase in extrajudicial killings in the Baghdad area?
Ambassador Satterfield. The al-Sadr Hamas bombing in
February was the beginning of a shift in tactics by al Qaeda
and its followers in Iraq from broadbrush attacks against
civilians to a specific targeting of Shia holy sites, Shia
communities. The object, as we know from Zarqawi's own letters,
was to prompt Shia responses, Shia violence against Sunnis,
and, in his distorted mind, to then provoke a civil war which
he believed would be the prompt for the creation of a Sunni
caliphate in Iraq.
Mr. Kucinich. Are there State Department reports of rising
al Qaeda influence in Anbar Province?
Ambassador Satterfield. Again, sir, there is a consistent
problem in Anbar Province not just with the insurgency, but
also with the presence of al Qaeda elements.
Mr. Kucinich. And when were these reports first written?
Ambassador Satterfield. These reports have been present for
several years.
Mr. Kucinich. And what is the position of the State
Department with respect to reports of men in army uniforms
arriving in villages, seizing individuals, and then those
individuals turn up handcuffed and blindfolded and shot to
death?
Ambassador Satterfield. There is a consistent occurrence of
individuals in the uniform, the garb of Iraqi security forces,
usually police but sometimes army, operating under the color of
authority, taking prisoners, executing individuals. It is for
that----
Mr. Kucinich. Are you saying people connected to the Iraqi
Ministry----
Ambassador Satterfield. No, operating under color of
authority.
Mr. Kucinich. What does that mean?
Ambassador Satterfield. That means purporting the----
Mr. Kucinich. Who is killing all these people?
Ambassador Satterfield. Killing is taking place at the
hands of insurgents. Killing is taking place at the hands of al
Qaeda terrorists. Killing is taking place at the hands of
extragovernmental armed groups that have a sectarian color to
them and a criminal color to them.
Mr. Kucinich. You have victims of extrajudicial killings.
There seems to be some systematic approach here--victims' hands
tied or handcuffed, blindfolded, shot in the head, people
showing up in military uniforms, gathering the--gathering
people before they take them away, people in white Toyota Land
Cruisers with police markings.
What is the position of the State Department on who is
responsible for these murders.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Kucinich, there are two sets of
issues here. One is dealing with the critical need for reform
within Iraq's Ministry of Interior, within its police services
to ensure that none of those security officers are operating in
a manner that is not national, appropriate, and it contributes
to reconciliation.
The second issue is the presence of armed gangs, armed
groups, some with a militia identity, others with a criminal
identity, who are conducting these targeted executions and
killings. Both need ``addressal.''
Mr. Kucinich. Are you familiar with reports that kidnappers
have appeared with expensive foreign equipment issued to
security forces such as the Toyota Land Cruisers, Glock 0.9-
millimeter pistols? Have you heard those reports?
Ambassador Satterfield. We're certainly aware of those
reports, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. And what is the relationship now between the
State Department and the Iraq Ministry of--Interior Ministry?
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, the mission in Iraq, civilian
and military, is working with the Iraqi Government to undertake
reforms of the Ministry of Interior, both its leadership as
well as the police services under the Ministry's control.
Mr. Kucinich. What responsibility should the United States
have with respect to a Ministry of Interior of a government
that we helped set up, working, apparently, to provide
circumstances that result in extrajudicial killings?
Ambassador Satterfield. Sir, our mission is to help the
Iraqis set up credible national institutions and credible means
institutions that work and are seen as working on behalf of all
Iraqis that are not engaged in armed activities outside
official government sanction.
Mr. Kucinich. Has the State Department conducted an
investigation of who is responsible for the extrajudicial
killings?
Ambassador Satterfield. The U.S. Government, all of its
entities, civilian and military, do, indeed, examine this issue
on a continuing basis and have done so for quite some time, and
respond to the results of that investigation both through
efforts such as the Baghdad security plan, our press for
reconciliation efforts, as well as addressal of the specific
need for reform within the Ministry of Interior.
Mr. Kucinich. So who's doing the killings? Are these people
that are killing with the United States looking the other way?
Ambassador Satterfield. No, they are not.
Mr. Kucinich, as I noted previously, the killing is being
done by a number of groups, some who are, indeed, part of Iraqi
security forces, and that's something that must be stopped.
Others are operating wholly outside any official color or
sanction. They are insurgents. They are terrorists. They are
sectarian groups, militias and gangs.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, you're pretty specific about that. Do
you have incident-by-incident reports that would indicate
exactly who has been doing the kidnapping and the executions
and the extrajudicial killings?
Ambassador Satterfield. There is often no such precise,
instant-by-instant accounting, but there are patterns of
behavior, sir, which we do, indeed, follow which allows us to
give a best estimate of who is responsible for patterns of
events.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, we're learning now there were 162
bodies found last night. Maybe 100 people died in a day. We're
talking about national reconciliation. What is the United
States of America doing with respect to trying to stop the
extrajudicial killings?
Ambassador Satterfield. Sir, we have committed additional
forces to Iraq. Iraqi Government forces have been added to the
capital. We, along with the Iraqis, have devised a new security
plan which evolves continuously, and it has achieved over the
month of August significant results. We are working on reform
of the Iraqi security forces, particularly the Ministry of
Interior, and we are promoting a reconciliation process from
which must come a DDR process, disarmament, mobilization and
reintegration that ends militia activity.
Mr. Kucinich. How many Ministry of Interior officials have
been held accountable for their role or support of these
extrajudicial killings and are militias?
Ambassador Satterfield. Sir, one of the issues which we
have urged Prime Minister Maliki to focus upon is the critical
need to show that there are consequences, real consequences,
through the judicial process for violations of human rights,
for actions that involve torture, for corruption, large and
small. Consequences need to be demonstrated.
Establishing the rule of law in Iraq, starting at the level
of government officials, is critical. This is a difficult area,
and I will not mince words on this point. It is hard to move
this forward. Prime Minister Maliki has made the right
statements. He has pledged his support for efforts against
officials involved in violence, involved in corruption, but you
need two things here, sir. You need a government that provides
strong political backing for rule of law, for the fight against
corruption, and you need a judiciary which is able to stand up
free of intimidation, free of threat, and carry forward a fair
and transparent process of bringing these individuals to
justice, both present issues in Iraq which we are addressing.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. Are we going to have another round here?
Mr. Shays. No, we won't have another round here because we
have to be out by 2. I can do--let me just explain. We can do 5
minutes and then do a certain amount, or we can do 10 minutes.
Now, I just need 10 minutes, but do you just have a quick
followup?
Mr. Kucinich. Well, I just want the record to show that the
Ambassador has essentially said that no one's right now being
held accountable. There's nobody being charged with anything,
and you've got all these extrajudicial killings going on and
tied to the Ministry of the Interior, and we're supporting
them. Hello?
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time, Mr. Duncan has the floor.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, you know from my opening statement and also
from the vote that Chairman Shays called out that I have
opposed this war from the start, and I feel it was a very
unnecessary war, and I think it will go down in the history as
one of the biggest foreign policy mistakes in this country's
history. However, I will say this: I have many good friends
here and at home that supported this war and still support it,
and certainly I think good people can disagree in respectful
ways. And I certainly have no disrespect for you or people like
you because I think that you're just trying to do the best you
can in a very difficult situation. But having said that, I
just--really just have two questions, and they boil down to
these: How much and how long? And I'll make just a few
statements to explain those questions.
When they found out that I was leaning against the war
before we cast our original vote, as Chairman Shays just
mentioned, about 4 days or so before that vote in October 2002,
I was called to the White House for a briefing by Secretary
Rice and George Tenet and John McLaughlin, and I asked--one of
the questions that I asked was Lawrence Lindsey had just lost
his job at the White House because he said the war would cost
$100 to $200 billion, and I asked Secretary Rice in that
meeting--there were six members there. I said, how much--I
asked her about that estimate by Lawrence Lindsey, and she
said, oh, no. It wouldn't cost anywhere close to that much, $50
or $60 billion at the most.
Well, now most estimates are higher, it's cost $300 billion
or more, and I think most Americans, while they don't want, you
know, Iraq to pull out or some sort of specific exit date, they
would like to see us wind this down at some point. Yet we're
going in the other direction. We recently increased our troop
levels by 13,000 to, I think, 140,000 roughly is what--the
figure that I read.
This is a Nation that Newsweek Magazine said in the year
before the war had a gross domestic product, the GDP, of $65
billion total, so I know they love all of our money coming in
there. And at this same committee a year and a half or 2 years
ago, we had David Walker, who is the head of the GAO. I'm sure
you know him. He was inspector general of the Defense
Department at that time. He had issued a report saying that
35--that he had found $35 billion that had been just totally
misspent in Iraq and another $9 billion that couldn't be
accounted for at all, $44 billion.
And then just about 3 weeks ago I led a congressional
delegation to Europe, and in one of the countries--and I won't
say the man's name because I don't want to get him in trouble--
but one of the highest-ranking Foreign Service officers that we
met said that--in one of the countries said that he had spent--
that he had--not too long before we finished a year in Iraq,
and he said that he saw SUVs just stuffed full of cash with
barely room for the driver, and that he just saw horrendous
waste.
And so I'm wondering, sir, how much? I've read a report. I
don't have it in front of me. Joseph Stiglitz, I think his name
is, and another Nobel Prize-winning economist say the ultimate
costs of this war will be well over $1 trillion counting what
we--what we have spent, what we will spend and the medical
costs of the troops and so forth. And then a couple of years
ago, before the Armed Services Committee, Secretary Wolfowitz
said we would have to be there at least 10 years.
So what I'm wondering about is how much do you think this
war is going to cost us in the end, how much; and then, since
things seem to be getting worse rather than better, according
to the Pentagon report and other reports, what do you think of
that original estimate from a couple of years ago that
Secretary Wolfowitz made that we would have to be there at
least 10 years.
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, Congressman, the cost of the
war has been considerable. I am not able at this point to look
back on what has been said, what has been done or the basis for
those assessments. My role is to focus on where we are today
and how best to move forward to a success, a success which, for
Americans as well as for Iraqis and for the world, ensures that
the cost of Iraq, the real cost of Iraq, is not just something
that we measure in dollars or even in the tragic loss of life
of American citizens there, but rather the cost in terms of
both the terror, the cost in terms of instability in the region
and elsewhere, and the cost in terms of our ability to promote
a process of democratization not just in the Middle East, but
elsewhere around the world. And that could be a very high cost,
indeed, if there is not a success in Iraq.
With respect to lessons learned, we have learned lessons,
sharp lessons, from the experience of the Coalition Provisional
Authority in terms of accountability. There has been excellent
work done and continuing to be done in Iraq by Stu Bowen, the
Office of the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction, and
we have taken to heart the steps that need to be taken to
ensure that there is not waste or mismanagement of U.S. funds.
Well, when you speak of cost, Congressman, the cost has to
be viewed in the broadest perspective. What is the price for a
failure in Iraq? Now, transition to Iraqi lead is critical. As
I underscored in my remarks, as the Secretary and the President
and Ambassador Khalilzad have said, the Iraqis have to take
over here. They have to take over from the standpoint of
security. They have to take over from the standpoint of
governance, establishing a rule of law, moving forward their
own reconciliation deal that provides a new national compact, a
basis for living in the country, and we're pressing them on
these points.
On security we have seen very significant progress made in
terms of the standup of Iraqi forces. This is not just a
notional concept. It's not just rhetoric on our or the Iraqi
parts. Iraqi forces are in the lead in many parts of the
country. They have made significant command transfers over the
course of the last 60 days, some within the last 30 days. That
process is going to continue.
Now, Baghdad is a special focus. Because of the phenomenon
of sectarian violence, because it is the center of the country
and the heart of its national life, it's essential that success
there come as quickly as possible, and it is why both we and
Iraqis have committed additional elements to that fight. But I
would note, sir, the ability that we have--the Coalition has--
and the Iraqis have to move significant elements from elsewhere
in Iraq to Baghdad is a sign that, in most parts of the
country, the security situation has significantly improved,
that those elements can be shifted to areas where the security
situation remains threatening.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you very much. I'll just simply
close and yield back the balance of my time to the chairman by
saying--after I say this, that, you know, I read a few months
ago a column by Ann McFetters, a columnist for the Scripps
Howard news chain, in which she said we're headed for a
financial tsunami when the baby boomers start retiring in large
numbers in 2008.
So I just don't see how this Nation can afford to keep
spending $100 billion or more every year in Iraq and do all of
the things that we've promised, and I also don't see how a
person can call themselves a fiscal conservative and not be
horrified when they hear David Walker say that $35 billion was
misspent in Iraq, and $9 billion--$9 billion with a B--had just
been totally lost. And when we hear these rip-offs by all these
contractors, if you're a fiscal conservative, it seems to me
you have to be horrified by that, and at some point in the very
near future, we are going to have to see some decreases in
these costs because, with a national debt of $8.5 trillion, we
just simply can't afford it.
I yield the balance of my time to the chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
The gentleman just has 2 minutes left, and I'll use those
times just to set up for questions I'll do later. But
Ambassador, you are a career diplomat; is that true.
Ambassador Satterfield. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. And you clearly didn't vote to send us into
Iraq, Members of Congress did, and you're being tasked with the
effort to help us and the Iraqis win this effort. Let me ask
you, how long were you in Iraq as the Deputy?
Ambassador Satterfield. Fifteen months, sir.
Mr. Shays. Yeah, and have you been there--when did you go
in, and when did you leave?
Ambassador Satterfield. I arrived in late spring of last
year. I left a little over a month ago.
Mr. Shays. So you basically were there a year after the
power had been transferred to the Iraqis in June 2004.
I'm going to want you to react to what is motivating this
whole series of hearings, but I want to say to you, I believe
in the beginning we made huge mistakes. We disbanded their
army, their police and their border patrol. We allowed the
looting. We were part of a de-Baathification that basically
took too many Iraqis out of the opportunity to be part of this
new government. I thought we turned it around, but having now
dug a deep hole when we transferred power in June 2004--and
that was a deadline, and a lot of the critics of the war were
angry when we transferred power.
The bottom line is I then saw tremendous success when--for
18 months when we saw an election to create a transitional
government. A transitional government was elected. They created
the constitutional convention. The constitutional convention
created the Constitution. All of these were deadlines, and then
you had the election, allowed from the case of the Constitution
an election of the new government, and my point will be when I
start to question is what has happened since January of this
year to now, and what do we do to get the Iraqi politicians to
do all of the things they need to do on reconciliation, the
Constitution and provisional election?
So that's where I'm going to be headed, but my time has run
out now. Let me go to Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman, you have 15--10 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Satterfield, I am familiar with your career in
the Foreign Service and your service to our country. You are an
expert in the Middle East. You've served in Lebanon and Jeddah,
and you've been in Iraq. You've been involved in the Arab-
Israeli issues, so you're very familiar with that part of the
world and fully cognizant of the consequences of our actions in
that part of the world.
Repeatedly in your testimony, which I very much appreciate,
it was very sobering, you repeatedly say we've got to hold the
Iraqi Government accountable. They have to be accountable for
torture and violation of human rights. They've got to be
accountable for national reconciliation. They've got to be
accountable for security.
My question is shouldn't we be holding the U.S. Government
accountable as well and the administration that has brought us
to this point?
Things have not gone the way we were told they would go
when we engaged in this whole so-called noble cause. We were
told it was going to be easy; we were going to be greeted as
liberators; that we were going to create a democracy; that it's
going to be a shining star on the hill; that we would produce
further democracies throughout the Middle East.
Isn't it the case that we have strengthened Iran's hand and
the role of the Shiites in what could be something of a civil
war throughout the Arab and Muslim world.
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, I do not believe that
our actions in Iraq or elsewhere in the region have contributed
to a strengthening of Iran's hand, and we specifically reject
the concept that there is some threatening Shia, our core Shia
crescent, that extends throughout the region that links all the
Shia populations of Lebanon, of Syria, of Iraq, the Gulf in
some unified conspiracy which has nefarious ends.
Mr. Waxman. Well, let me just--I appreciate that answer,
but it seems to me hard to believe that if we are successful in
our mission as we now have redefined it, that we're going to
have anything other than a government in Iraq that is going to
be very dependent on Iran. And the party that has now taken
power in Iraq is a religious Shiite party that has strong ties
to Iran; is that true?
Ambassador Satterfield. Sir, the majority of Iraq's
population is Shia. In democratic, free and fair elections,
representatives, the majority of whom are Shia, were chosen,
and the complex of the government, including the sectarian
identity of the Prime Minister, reflect that democratic
outcome. But we do not believe, very strongly do not believe,
that the Shia of Iraq are Iranian, that their allegiance is
anything other than to Iraq, or that they are not committed to
the concept of nationhood as we would see the best future for
Iraq or other countries in the region.
Mr. Waxman. While I appreciate that answer, I would hope
you're right, but I'm afraid that what you're expressing is
wishful thinking, and what we've had consistently in this noble
experiment, this noble cause, is wishful thinking that turned
out not to be accurate.
I don't know at what point you hold people accountable when
we found out there were no weapons of mass destruction, there
was no tie between Iraq and al Qaeda, that the people didn't
greet us as liberators, that we needed more troops, and we made
serious mistakes in not getting enough. In fact, we penalized
the Americans who gave us warnings, like General Shinseki who
said we needed more troops, or others in the administration who
said it was going to cost more, and we've gone step by step by
step, and every step of the way we are told that we're at a
turning point, that things are really going to get better, and
we're not at a very good point.
I don't know if it was just hopelessly naive talk, but
would you agree that the insurgency was far from dead in 2005
when we were told that they're in their last throes, and would
you say now that, in fact, the insurgency is far from dead at
this time.
Ambassador Satterfield. The insurgency is a very
significant element in Iraq.
Mr. Waxman. So we were told that the insurgency was going
to be taken care of, and now we find ourselves hoping this
government--and trying to help this government in Iraq--can
deal with the insurgency.
I think we need to ask ourselves when is a noble effort a
mistake. In 2000, 672 American soldiers have died in Iraq;
19,000, close to 20,000, have been wounded. We spent over $300
billion in taxpayers' funds, yet the violence is spiraling out
of control. Iraq is in the midst of a civil war, and Iran is
far more powerful in the Middle East than it was 3 years ago.
I think it's time for the administration to accept
responsibility for this debacle, and I think the American
people want accountability.
Mr. Chairman, I didn't attack you. I did criticize your
views, and I don't want you to take it personally. We have a
difference of opinion on this issue. I don't think you said all
the things this administration has said, but when you tell us
that, with all your heart and your soul, you believe it was--it
is a noble cause, that does not impress me, because all you're
telling me is you're sincere. And I believe that President Bush
has been sincere, but I think this war has been wrong, and the
estimates have been wrong, and the happy assessments and the
wishful thinking has turned out not to be accurate, and now
we're in the very difficult situation that Ambassador
Satterfield has described for us.
You said, Ambassador, that we need to complete our mission
in Iraq. Is our mission the same mission that we hoped it would
be in the very beginning, that this would be a democracy, that
it would be an example to the rest of the world, or do we just
hope now our mission is to have this government stable enough
to take over from us.
Ambassador Satterfield. Sir, our mission is a stable,
democratic, prosperous Iraq.
Mr. Waxman. Do you think that some of the insurgency and
internal strife is due to the fact that the Iraqi people don't
respect this government because they think we've set it up?
Ambassador Satterfield. No, I do not believe, sir, that is
an element, but it is quite true that any government, including
the government of Prime Minister Maliki, that is not able to
deliver on basic commitments in terms of provision of essential
services, identification with a national program, including the
security services composition and behavior, is not a government
which is going to be able to succeed, and no government that
does not establish or significantly strengthen the rule of law
can succeed.
Mr. Waxman. Well, I think you're absolutely correct in that
statement, but they looked at the United States as a country
that occupied Iraq, caused a war against the regime in Iraq,
brought it down, and then tried to occupy the country, and we
were not successful in any of those activities either. We
didn't provide security. We didn't provide reconstruction. We
didn't provide any credible thinking on the part of the Iraqi
people that they were going to be better off, at least I think
the majority, because we were there.
Now we want a government that we've helped set up through a
process, a democratic process, to accomplish that goal as well,
and I hope we get there. I hope we get there, but I just wonder
at some point when the President is going to say, as the
chairman of this committee has said, ``Well, there have been
mistakes, and I'm responsible for those mistakes. There are
other opinions that I should have listened to, and there have
been consequences for the errors,'' rather than that whole
pattern over and over again of never taking responsibility and
telling us they're in the last throes. We're at a turning
point. We've got to stay the course. Things are going to get
better. We're going to redo the Middle East.
As the Secretary of State said during this Lebanon war,
we're going through the growing pains of a new Middle East.
Right now that new Middle East does not look very encouraging
to me, and I don't think it would look very encouraging to the
people in Iraq or their neighbors or the international
community.
You said we need the role of the international community to
be more involved, but didn't we take the position that we
didn't care what the international community had to say, that
we were going to go into this war alone? Didn't we also take
the position after the first military victory that we wouldn't
even let some of those other countries bid for contracts in
Iraq because they weren't with us in the beginning? Do you
think that those actions on our part might lead to some of the
other countries we want now to be involved to feel that we
stepped in it, and it's our responsibility, and they can sit on
the sidelines? Is that a problem still.
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, our focus, and indeed,
I think, collectively all of our focus, is on how to deal with
the situation today and move forward to a success, because the
stakes of success or failure are so significant for us, for
others.
Among the steps needed is to reach out, something we have
been very much engaged in, to a broad community of
international and regional support for Iraq.
Mr. Waxman. Well, I agree we have to do what we can do, and
we have to reach out as best we can, but I think we've made it
a lot more difficult for that to happen successfully based on
our previous actions. Very sincere people running this country
were very arrogant. They told these countries we didn't need
them. We told the world we could accomplish this easily; we are
the power, and we're going to throw our weight around. And I
think that we have caused many, many more difficulties for
ourselves than otherwise would have been the case. You agree
with that, don't you?
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, we have acknowledged
that the situation is extremely troubled in Iraq and that
everything possible needs to be done to address it from the
standpoint of our own strategies and policies. What the
international and the regional communities do and, above all,
what the Iraqi Government must do and how we urge them to take
those steps, that's the course, that's the strategy we're
embarked in.
Mr. Waxman. And when did you say we measure whether the set
strategy has failed or succeeded, and is there a timeframe in
which we can make that judgment?
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, one of the aspects of
the way we have tried to execute our assessments, our strategy
and policy over the course of the past year in Baghdad and here
in Washington is to constantly assess and to know what the
benchmarks are for that assessment of whether or not what we
are doing is working, and, if it isn't, to know that and to
make changes.
Now, whether we're looking at the security area, the
standup of Iraqi forces, the effectiveness of Iraqi forces, the
government's provisions of essential services, capacity-
building on the civilian side, or the issue of rule of law and
corruption, we know what the goals are. We and the Iraqis talk
together about where the hollowness, the weaknesses are, and we
assess what can be done to address them.
There are some pieces we can't fill, the Iraqis must; some
pieces we and they cannot address. The international community
and the region have to come to help. But we assess every day
what we are doing, whether it's succeeding or not, and we do
not stay on the same rigid line. We reassess, reevaluate
constantly, and we hold ourselves up against very real
benchmarks of whether what we are doing is working or not,
Baghdad security or civilian issues.
Mr. Waxman. Not just staying the course, we may even change
the course as we reevaluate matters.
Ambassador Satterfield. We assess what is necessary to
achieve success in Iraq.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman very much, and, Mr. Dent,
you have the floor.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
About 13 months ago at this time I was in Iraq. I visited
Kirkuk. I was down in the southern areas near Basra and also in
Baghdad within the Green Zone, and at that time the Iraqis were
dealing with the constitutional issues and specifically the
allocation of resources, which is a continuing problem there.
And I think just last week one of the Deputy Prime Ministers of
Iraq declared that issue had been resolved, but really gave no
details, the issue of distribution or allocation of those
resources or oil.
My specific question to you, Ambassador--Mr. Ambassador, is
has that issue of the oil revenue allocation been resolved as
indicated by the Deputy Prime Minister--I believe his last name
is Sulih--and if it has been resolved, what are the provisions
of that settlement.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Congressman, there is no
resolution to the issue of a national oil and hydrocarbons law.
The essence of such a law, which is an urgent priority for
Iraq, will be a distribution both in terms of commercial
rights, revenues between the center and provincial and regional
authorities. That is something very much under discussion at a
local as well as a national level, but it is not resolved.
Mr. Dent. They have not determined where those decisions
will be made, either at the central level or at the provisional
level then?
Ambassador Satterfield. The law itself will set out what
the relationship is for development exploitation as well as for
profits and control between local and national authorities, and
that remains very much under debate.
Mr. Dent. OK. On the issue of de-Baathification, Ambassador
Bremer has been very candid that he believed we made a mistake
in allowing Shia politicians to administer much of the de-
Baathification process. I think it was the Ambassador's intent
to affect about only 1 percent, the top 1 percent, of the
Baathist Party members.
I guess the question I have for you is, since this is such
a key issue to the Sunni Arabs in Iraq, do you believe that
Prime Minister Maliki and the Shia political parties and the
parliamentary bloc agree, and what action is Prime Minister
Maliki's government taking to reform this whole de-
Baathification process, and can we get the Sunni buy-in.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Congressman, the manner in
which de-Baathification has been applied has indeed been
extremely troublesome and divisive for Iraq; it has not been a
unifying process, and it has not contributed to reconciliation.
In June, when Prime Minister Maliki made his speech to the
Council of Representatives on the reconciliation issue, he
specifically raised reform of de-Baathification as one of the
issues that had to be addressed. This is an issue under the
control of the Council of Representatives, but it is important
for the government and for Iraq's political leadership both to
have a view and to advance that view in a manner that supports
national reconciliation. There cannot be a new national
compact, a reconciliation deal for Iraq, without addressing the
issue of how de-Baathification is to proceed.
Our hope would be that issue moves forward on the basis of
punishment for individual criminal action and not some blanket
or class proscription or prohibition as has been applied in the
past, or, worse, the use of de-Baathification as a political or
sectarian weapon.
Mr. Dent. On the issue of Kirkuk, I visited Kirkuk last
year. I visited the big power-generating facility. I've
forgotten the name of the town now, but I visited that
facility, and I was struck by the ethnic diversity of Kirkuk--
the Turkmen, the Sunni Arab, Shiite Arab, and the Kurds--and
there was a very heavy Kurdish population at one time there
until Saddam Hussein, I guess, Arabized Kirkuk.
What is the position, in your view, of the Sunni, Shia and
Kurds respectively on the status of the city of Kirkuk, and
what is the prospect that this issue can be resolved.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Congressman, the Constitution,
as was the case with the preceding transitional administration
law for Iraq, calls for an addressal of the issue of Kirkuk in
its future in a manner that reflects the will of its people.
The Constitution specifically requires a process to be entered
into which could include, but does not specifically have to
include, a referendum.
This is an issue that will need to be addressed, but it
needs to be addressed, if I could say, in the context of
national reconciliation. It needs to be addressed in the
context of a resolution on how oil revenues, oil expectation,
oil investment will be managed. It's not something that can be
seen in isolation. It is part of the national compact, part of
the package deal that needs to set forth a basis for Iraqis,
all Iraqis, including in Kirkuk, to live together.
Mr. Dent. And on the issue of Kurdish autonomy, generally,
I believe--I guess the President of the Kurdistan Regional
Government barred the Iraqi flag from flying over government
buildings and in the Kurdish regional area. What is the
significance of the Prime Minister's recent actions barring
that Iraqi flag flying and his talk of independence? What is
your sense of what this means?
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, the Iraqi Constitution
recognizes the Kurdish Regional Government's area of
responsibility as a Federal region of Iraq, but I would
underscore ``region of Iraq.'' We were quite concerned at the
decision you referred to regarding flying of the Iraqi national
flag. We addressed those concerns urgently and directly with
very senior Kurdish officials. It did not contribute to the
process of national reconciliation.
Mr. Dent. Has there been any response from the Turkish
Government with respect to that action by the Kurds?
Ambassador Satterfield. By the Turkish Government, sir?
Mr. Dent. Yeah.
Ambassador Satterfield. The Turkish Government and we, the
Turkish Government and Kurdish officials, the Turkish
Government and officials of the central government in Baghdad,
are in continuing contact on a great many issues, but on this
specific issue there was no significant public reaction.
Mr. Dent. In the event that Iraq were ever to deteriorate
into a full-blown civil war--I don't believe we're there
today--but if that were the case, what do you believe the
Turkish Government would do to protect its interests?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Congressman, I don't want to
comment on hypotheticals because we do not concede that Iraq is
destined for a full-blown civil war.
Mr. Dent. I'm not saying that either, but there is a lot of
concern that, should that occur, the Turkish Government might
take actions.
Ambassador Satterfield. I would refer you to officials of
the Turkish Government for an assessment of their possible
steps.
Mr. Dent. And finally the issue of an--there has been a lot
of talk, of course, about an autonomous region in the south, a
Shia autonomous region. What are the prospects, in your view--
just get right back to this issue of civil war, but what do you
think are the prospects for a civil war if a Shia autonomous
region is established in the south of Iraq as some experts have
predicted?
Ambassador Satterfield. The Constitution provides for a law
to be passed on how regions may be formed from provinces, and
then, of course, a provision for how provinces could request
such a step to be taken. There is considerable debate, Mr.
Congressman, not just between Shia and the other communities of
Iraq, but within the Shia community, over what should be the
shape of governance in southern Iraq. There is no one position
on this issue. There is no agreement even within the Shia
community on this question, and our position would be any
addressal of an issue as fundamental to the nature of
governance and life in Iraq as setting up new Federal regions
should be done in a manner which is transparent, which reflects
clearly the will not only of those individuals in that region,
but also contributes to the cause of a unified, national,
peaceful Iraq, and that is not intrinsically destabilizing.
Mr. Dent. Did I understand that the position of our
Government of the United States is that the issue of a Shia
autonomous region should be left to the Iraqis? Is that our
government's position?
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, sir, it is an Iraqi decision,
and it is provided for in the Constitution. There must be
legislation passed to set up the specific procedures for
establishing these regions beyond the Kurdish region. That
debate is ongoing, but we believe the debate should be
conducted, and the results of that debate should certainly
contribute to national unity, not division.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to yield the balance of my
time back to you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Ambassador, what is the significance of the statement by
the Iraqi Speaker of the Council of Representatives that
reconciliation must be achieved in 3 to 4 months or Iraq will
go under?
Ambassador Satterfield. Speaker al Mashhadani was
reflecting in that comment the need for urgent action on
national reconciliation, on a national compact on a basis for
Iraqis to live together, and the elements of that deal, of that
compact, are all of the things we've touched on today,
economic, a national oil or hydrocarbons law, a relationship
between the center and provinces or the center and potential
Federal regions, good governance, and the ability to extend
essential services in a sustained manner and a rule of law. All
of those have to be part of that deal, and the clock, as I said
in my remarks, is ticking and in an unforgiving fashion. There
does need to be urgent progress on these issues.
Mr. Shays. OK. One of the things that I will be asking you
with the next round of questions is I'm going to want you to
rank--maybe some of your staff can write this down so you can
then rank it--the issue of amnesty, rollback of de-
Baathification, federalism, sharing the oil wealth, and
standing down the militias. I want you to rank them in the ones
that are going to be the most difficult to the most--to the
easiest. That's amnesty, rollback of de-Baathification,
federalism, sharing the oil wealth, and standing down the
militia.
We have a huge opportunity in our next panel to have a
representative from the Sunni community, the Shia community and
the Kurdish community make a case for their country in how they
can work together and where the problems are, and we're eager,
though, to have your view about that.
At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Van Hollen.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of you
gentlemen for being here.
Ambassador Satterfield, thank you for your testimony, and
thank you for your service as well. As a Foreign Service brat,
I really do appreciate all your--all you've done for our
country and what you've done in the Middle East in your
service.
Mr. Shays. Note for the record he called himself that, not
anyone else.
Mr. Van Hollen. That's right. And before I turn to sort of
looking at the future, I do think it's important, though, for
the American people listening to us as we discuss what's at
stake in Iraq and, as you've described, the potential of al
Qaeda and Iraq taking--using Iraq as a base for the export of
religious extremism, that I think you would agree that those
consequences that you've talked to emanating from Iraq if we
don't succeed did not exist coming out of Iraq before we
invaded Iraq. I hope you would agree with that assessment. Iraq
before we invaded was not a base of operations for al Qaeda,
and there was not a danger of the export of extremist al Qaeda
etiology and terrorism emanating from Iraq in that form before
the invasion of Iraq.
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, I will take that
question for a considered response.
Mr. Van Hollen. I appreciate that. If there's any way you
can get back to that--and I understand the difficulty of the
question, but I think it's important as we debate this because
we're in the political season now. The President's given a
series of speeches essentially saying, if you're not with him
on his particular ``stay the course'' proposals on Iraq, he
sort of questioned those who have questioned him, and I do
think it's important that, regardless of what people think of
the consequences that might happen if we don't succeed by
whatever definition in Iraq, that those consequences are a
result of us having invaded Iraq. And I don't need for you to
respond any further to that.
On the question of national reconciliation, clearly that's
the key to this, and as you pointed out, many of those key
decisions are in the hands of the Iraqis, right? You would
agree?
Ambassador Satterfield. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. OK.
Ambassador Satterfield. All of those key decisions are in
the hands----
Mr. Van Hollen. So I think it's also important for the
American people to understand that in this exchange that we're
having that when we talk about whether or not we succeed in
Iraq, we very much mean that we're depending on the Iraqi
people to make the right decisions in order for success to be
defined as we would like it to; isn't that right?
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, I could not state more
clearly that the use of ``we'' is we, the United States and
Coalition; we, the Iraqi Government and people; and we, the
international community.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right, but as--I think your point was well
taken that many of their critical decisions that are going to
be made are decisions made by Iraqis with respect to how they
see the future of Iraq; isn't that right?
Ambassador Satterfield. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. OK. Now, on this question of national
reconciliation, I think the real issue here is within the
Government of Iraq, who has made up their mind that the future
of Iraq is a unified Iraq, or whether there are parties that
are currently part of the government that have made up their
mind that they see their future differently, more of an
autonomous region either totally separated or with a very weak
central government.
And in that regard, let me just ask you, we had the
testimony yesterday of Colonel Alan King, someone who had been
on the ground in Iraq. He wrote a book, and just with respect
to the services, to the Ministry of Interior, he pointed out
Iraq has formed an internal security--and I'm quoting from his
testimony yesterday--formed its internal security along
sectarian lines with the Shia-dominated Ministry of Interior
and the existence of the militias imposing strict
fundamentalist policies, including death squads, operating what
is sequaciously being attributed to the Government's inaction
or complacency. He went on to say, ``The SCIRI's Badr Corps
domination of the security forces has positioned a nonstate
actor in a state-sponsored position to pursue its objectives
independent of the government's objectives.''
Are you persuaded as we're here today that the Minister of
Interior has made a decision to purge itself of those
connections to the Badr Corps?
Ambassador Satterfield. Prime Minister Maliki and his
Minister of Interior, indeed the government as a whole, has
made a pledge both recognizing the problems in the Ministry of
Interior that preceded this government and the problems ongoing
in the Ministry of Interior and its forces to reform both
structures and leadership.
Mr. Van Hollen. And are you convinced--as you pointed out
in your earlier testimony, we have rhetoric, and we have
action. Have you seen the actions taken to meet the rhetoric
that you just mentioned?
Ambassador Satterfield. Sir, we have seen some actions
taken already in terms of actions against senior officials of
the Ministry of Interior. We have seen some actions initiated
in terms of reform of the security services under control of
the Ministry of Interior, but much more needs to be done.
Mr. Van Hollen. Let me get back to this question about
the--Barzani's decision to fly the Kurdish flag, and I
understand that the United States made known that they didn't
think that was helpful, but I think the real question is the
sentiment underlying that decision that he made because, as you
said, this is a question for the people in Iraq, whether
they're Kurd or Shia or Sunni or whatever background they may
be. And as we know, at the time of the January elections, there
was a sort of straw poll taken in the Kurdish area. It wasn't a
legally binding thing, but it did go to the question of whether
there should be an independent Kurdistan, which has been the
aspiration, understandably, of many of the Kurds in the region,
and over 90 percent of the people said they would like an
independent Kurdistan. The Peshmerga, you know, is already--
essentially, that's an independent militia in many ways, but we
recognize that the Kurds believe that's necessary for their own
security.
So, given that fact, doesn't it suggest that many in Iraq
have not made up their mind that they want to live in a united
Iraq; that, in fact, many Iraqis--and I think this is--many
Iraqis would prefer to see some form of whether it's real
autonomy for each of the three regions or some form of
partition.
Ambassador Satterfield. I would make two general comments.
First, the views of the majority of Iraqis as reflected in the
view of the majority of their political representatives are
very much in favor of an Iraq which is unitary. What
``unitary'' means, how the relationship between the center and
current provinces or the center and potential regions should be
defined is very much a matter for debate, and there is the
broadest spectrum of views which transcend Sunni, Shia,
sectarian identification. There are many, many Shia who support
a strong central government. There are many Shia who would like
to see a different kind of formula followed for the south.
The important issue here is how is the debate conducted.
What is the outcome of the debate? Does it leave an Iraq which
is capable of being prosperous, secure and stable, or does it
threaten those three goals? And those are not just for us to
postulate; although, we do and must with our colleagues in the
Iraqi Government. It's an issue for them to debate, and the
next weeks and months must see these issues, whether it's
focusing on oil, the question of federalism, governance as a
whole, and de-Baathification and the other issues the chairman
mentioned that are part of the reconciliation, move forward.
How does it all work together to create that stable, prosperous
and secure Iraq.
Mr. Van Hollen. Well, in closing, I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for the time. I think you're right in stating the
challenge with respect to bringing it all together. I guess the
question is what will the final answer be, and a lot of that
answer will come from the Iraqi people. All we do know is that
there does continue to be this terrible and escalating cycle of
violence, large internal migrations of people who used to live
side by side as Sunni and Shia having to move out of their
neighborhoods. And the real fear is, as time goes on, that the
situation doesn't become even worse, and, you know, it
doesn't--looking at the situation on the ground in the last
couple weeks doesn't give you a lot of hope, as much as I hope
for a good result.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.
Mr. Satterfield, just speak first to the question that I
tried to discuss with you, and that is I've seen significant
progress from June 2004 until January with tremendous
expectation, and I understand that this new government took a
while to form because the Kurdish community and the Sunni
community exercised a veto as a minority over the choice of the
selected Prime Minister. And so there was this debate between
majority rule, minority rights, majority rule, minority rights,
and minority won, and they got another Prime Minister; but the
majority got to select that Prime Minister in the name of Mr.
Maliki, Prime Minister Maliki, but that took 3\1/2\ months. And
now I have seen this government operate for over 3\1/2\ months
now, I'm hearing them say the right thing, and I'm not seeing
them do what needs to be done.
Would you agree that there was some significant timelines
in 2005 and timelines met that we are not seeing right now?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, let me respond to
your question by telling you about two different issues, one of
which is in direct response to what you just outlined. We
certainly did see during the course of 2005 a series of fixed
benchmarks, which laid in front of the Iraqi people the region,
the Coalition-specific goals, the various referenda and
national elections that took place. Holding Iraqis to those
deadlines, Iraqis holding themselves to those deadlines, was an
important factor in leveraging or driving progress, and as each
deadline, as each event was reached and successfully held, and,
indeed, with increasing success in terms of the participation
particularly from the Sunni community as each referendum and
election took place, we saw a burst of confidence, of support
for the concept of governance, sovereignty in Iraq take place.
And you're right, that momentum faltered with the beginning of
2006.
Mr. Shays. I'd like to say, as someone who was there four
times during that year, it was remarkable.
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes.
Mr. Shays. It was remarkable. In just 11 months, a new
nation was created with three elections--one to create this
transitional government. It was remarkable that they were able
to agree on a body to write this Constitution and then invite
Sunnis in, because they didn't have the legal representation on
the transitional government because they didn't participate,
and then to see that ratified and then to see this new
government elected.
What troubles me is that there was this huge success, but
it was--they had timelines to basically follow, and they met
them. What will get this new government to act given there
aren't timelines?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, there needs to be a
clear sense of urgency instilled in the Government of Iraq and,
indeed, beyond the government; I would say, in the political
leadership of Iraq, representatives in or outside of
government, from all significant political groupings, all
ethnic and sectarian groups in the country, that their future,
the future of all of their peoples, the people of Iraq
collectively, depends upon movement, movement on
reconciliation. And I would say, sir, reconciliation includes
all of the elements which you outlined in your remarks.
Mr. Shays. Why don't we get to that, and if you could give
me how you rank them. It's amnesty, rollback of de-
Baathification, federalism, sharing the oil wealth, standing
down militia. I'm going to ask you to rank them in two ways,
one in terms of difficulty and another in terms of the
importance.
What is the most important as you would--and maybe some of
them are so equal you have to put them all in the same. But how
would you rank them in terms of importance; amnesty, rollback,
federalism, sharing the oil wealth, staring down the militias.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there
is any question that a decisive elimination of the presence of
extragovernmental armed groups, militias, gangs operating as
militias, whether with a sectarian or other identification, is
the key challenge, and it is essential to moving Iraq forward
to a better future.
Mr. Shays. What would you put second?
Ambassador Satterfield. When you raise the issue of
amnesty, that is part and parcel of the question of how you
strike a reconciliation deal out of which flows a resolution on
militias. You can't deal with militias, a DDR process, in
isolation from a political package deal on reconciliation in
which de-Baathification, amnesty have to be critical elements.
I have a young man in my office who is an Iraqi; I mean,
he's now back at school. I asked him about, you know, some
issues I was taking a stand on as it related to this. I asked
him to comment about the militia. And he said, my parents never
thought of themselves as Sunnis, they thought of themselves as
Iraqis, but when they started to feel endangered as Sunnis,
they then gravitated to the Sunni militia that could protect
them. Which got me to think about the fact that, do I cut this
Prime Minister a little slack in eliminating the militia,
because if you eliminate the militia, is there going to be a
void that no one then can take the place? In other words,
through--in the process of wanting to bring peace, endanger my
intern's parents by eliminating the Sunni militia that are
protecting them.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, three key elements
have to go together here, three very broad elements. Security
has to be advanced. An element of security, a critical one
right now, particularly in Baghdad, is extra governmental armed
groups, militia violence. But dealing with the insurgency and
the threat it poses, dealing with al Qaeda terror and the
threat it poses must continue to be addressed. Security is one
critical underpinning of the state. A reconciliation deal that
helps drain off support for the insurgency, that helps turn
Iraqis against terror, that's a critical element as well.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry to interrupt you. I have 5 minutes
left. I'm so eager to get your expertise here. But one of the
points that he was really making to me that got me to think of
it in a different light is the militia have a huge negative;
they were created, in part, to provide the protection when we
limited all security. I mean, if we eliminated all security in
New York State of 19 million people, all security, you would
have banks hiring private police, you would have local streets
hiring protective police, you have--isn't part of the militia,
the positive part, that they are protecting communities? The
negative is that some are being aggressive and going beyond
that.
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, we question exactly how much
protection militias truly offer to their communities, as
opposed to their role, which is essentially violent and
criminal, in advancing very particular objectives. So we would
challenge the entire legitimacy of the protective----
Mr. Shays. If all militias left, I could see your point.
The bottom line is there has to be something that takes their
place to protect them. Which gets me back to the whole issue of
whether we have enough security in Iraq to start with, which is
another issue.
Tell me, what is--it seems to me the sharing of oil has to
be the easiest. I had Bunker Hunt come to my office, stretch
out a map, and basically tell me that he thinks Iraq has almost
as much oil as Saudi Arabia, and that it is everywhere, not
just in pockets; it's in pockets now, but he says when full
research is done, you will find it everywhere throughout Iraq.
What is--is the oil, sharing of the oil revenue the most
difficult? Because it seems to me to be one that should be able
to bring people together.
Ambassador Satterfield. We don't think it is the most
difficult issue to be addressed, we certainly don't. We think
an equitable, rational basis for sharing exploitation as well
as revenues can be devised. Our guidelines here would be a
process of dealing with revenues and exploitation that
contributes to national unity, that contributes to the
stability of Iraq, and which is not intrinsically divisive.
Mr. Shays. Some of--and this is not everyone--but some who
are most opposed to the war in Iraq spoke out very strongly
when Iraqis started to talk about amnesty and they started to
talk about forgiving acts. And then there was this point that
anyone who killed Americans should not be forgiven. And I'd
love to know the administration's opinion on this, because I'll
tell you mine. My view is you need amnesty, you need--unless
there were those who did heinous crimes of cutting off heads
and so on. But it seems to me that you will not get amnesty--
you will not have peace unless you have amnesty. And amnesty
will require forgiveness, and forgiveness will mean that you
have to forgive not only deaths of Iraqis, but of Americans.
And it seems to me that's the one way you save future American
lives is if you have amnesty.
Is amnesty, one, important? And, second, are you prepared
to address it as it relates to Americans?
Ambassador Satterfield. Amnesty is critical, Mr. Chairman.
It is an essential element in any reconciliation deal. And
without a comprehensive amnesty, that reconciliation deal
cannot be struck. Now, our point has been made quite clearly to
the Iraqi leadership and its political elites that we cannot
accept any amnesty which differentiates between the legitimacy
of killing Iraqis and the so-called legitimacy of killing
Americans or Coalition members. But an amnesty deal will need
to be there if this country is to move forward as part of--not
stand alone--as part of a broader reconciliation package.
Mr. Shays. OK. In the minute we have thus left, would you
just tell me what gets the Iraqi politicians--and I have
tremendous respect for them, but I don't respect what I've seen
happen in this last year--what gets them to move more quickly
before, frankly, the United States pulls the rug out from under
them? And I say that, not that the President will, but you
could have a new Congress who may.
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, I'll comment on the
first part of what must be done to move the Iraqis forward. It
is, I believe, the clearest possible message that, without
movement, without concrete progress and urgent progress in the
weeks and few months ahead on all of these issues--
reconciliation, economic questions, good governance, security,
end to sectarian violence, the beginnings of a demobilization
process for militias--that success for them as they would
define it cannot be achieved, much less success as we define
it.
Urgent progress has to be made. And that message is one
which we are passing and will continue to pass at the highest
levels. We do have an interest in this succeeding.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lynch, you have the floor.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Chairman. And, again, I want to thank
you and the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich, for holding this
hearing.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to start my questioning off with a
quote which comes from H.L. Mencken, and he says that--let's
see if I can get it here--for every problem--for every
complicated problem there is a solution that is simple, neat,
and almost always wrong. And I just want to start out by saying
that given the complex nature of the problems that we have in
Iraq and the changing nature of our challenges there, that
staying the course may be clear and simple, but it is most
definitely wrong.
And I've had an opportunity on five occasions to travel to
Iraq and spend time there. I was there back in the beginning
when General Gardner was actually serving in a role as
Ambassador. I met also with Ambassador Bremer, and most
recently Ambassador Khalizad, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
One of the things that I want to ask you about is, sitting
here in Congress, the initial mission for our operation in
Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, was to remove Saddam Hussein and
basically to give the Iraqis a chance--give the Iraqis a chance
at having a stable democratic state. And when I went there on
my earliest trips, that was definitely the mission. We were
fighting Ba'athist loyalists and Fedajin, and we moved on to
some of the milestones that have been cited here about the
elections, and had the pleasure of meeting with President Jalal
Talabani. There have been milestones there in terms of us
creating the possibility, the chance, if you will, for Iraqis
to have a stable democracy there.
But now the mission--indeed, the title and subject of this
hearing is what do we need to reconcile the differences between
the Shia and the Sunni? Now, I'm no historian, but I believe
that schism between the Sunni and the Shia goes back to the
year 632 A.D., the death of Mohammed, and the split over his
successor. That has been a constant battle between Shia and
Sunni for 1,400 years. And now we're trying to figure out a way
to reconcile the differences between Shia and Sunni in Iraq?
I have to say that if that was the vote, if that was the
vote that the chairman talked about, if the question on the war
was are we going to commit our troops for the purpose of
reconciling the differences between the Shia and the Sunni in
Iraq, no votes--no votes--I don't think there is a single
Member in this body that would have committed our troops for
that purpose----
Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lynch. Sir, I've sat here on this quietly for several
hours----
Mr. Shays. I'm just asking, as chairman, if you will yield.
I am not going to take away from your time.
Mr. Lynch. OK, great.
Mr. Shays. I just have tremendous respect for the
gentleman. I'm only saying that I really hope you're able to
stay for the second panel when we have Sunnis, Shias and Kurds
here.
Mr. Lynch. Yes, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry.
Mr. Shays. And I give the gentleman an extra minute,
please.
Mr. Lynch. I thought you would give me a quick clock,
that's all.
Mr. Shays. No, absolutely not.
Mr. Lynch. And I appreciate Mr. Talabani's son is here. And
I'm a big fan of his dad--wherever he is. I had a chance to
meet with him on the first session of the Iraqi Parliament in
the Convention Center when the air conditioning went out and it
was 125 degrees. So I remember that day well.
But the mission has shifted here. And I think it requires
us, as responsible leaders of this Nation and trying to be
loyal to our sons and daughters in uniform and the resources of
this country, being preserving of those resources and being
mindful of the developments in the Middle East, it is just
stunning in my mind that we have not taken a good hard look at
what's going on there and adjusted our policy to the reality of
Iraq today.
I want to say that in my visits to Iraq, one of the things
that I've noticed over and over--and it was understandable at
first, but even in my most recent visits back in April--and I
talked about this in my opening statement--was the inability or
the unwillingness or the resistance of some in terms of
transferring the basic government operations over to the Iraqi
Government, the Iraqi Government being elected back in
December, and the idea that, at least among the people who went
out and voted in those elections, that their own government was
going to take over responsibility for their country, and that
has not happened. And I hear complaints not only from, you
know, average Iraqis when we go into Iraq, but also from the
Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi Parliament that they don't have
enough responsibility and power in their own country, and that
when people need the services, basic services of government,
they still after 3 years have to go the U.S. forces and the
U.S. Marines, the engineering divisions of our Army, in order
to get basic services provided.
And I just want to ask you, do you believe or do you not
believe that in order to create the stable preconditions for
U.S. withdrawal, that basic government operations substantially
have to be shifted over to the Iraqi Government?
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, we certainly agree
that Iraqis must take the lead both on security and on
governance.
Mr. Lynch. My question is this: When I travel to Iraq, it's
a very choppy assessment. As a Member of Congress and someone
who is charged with the responsibility of oversight--and I'm
sure the chairman will agree, he's been there 14 times, I've
been there 5--but it is very difficult to make a clear
assessment on where we are in terms of making that transition
over to the Iraqis sector by sector, oil, energy, roads and
bridges, security, obviously.
But I have, you know--I came back and I tried to think
about what is the most responsible way of getting our troops
home, given the reality of the situation in Iraq. And as I said
before, stay the course is a simple answer, but it's wrong. And
also I think announcing a date and evacuating is also a very
simple answer but may have tremendously disastrous consequences
for our troops in the theater and for the country, as a
responsible power.
But I do believe that we need to make that happen, and I
don't see anyone whose sole responsibility is to make that
transition happen. I see it's everybody's job but it's nobody's
job. And it's very difficult to track that transition, to
monitor it, to encourage it, facilitate it.
And so what I've done is adopted--drafted a bill, with the
help of others, that would establish a national commission to
make sure that transition goes forward, and to track it, to
facilitate it, and to make sure the Iraqis are in a position to
assume responsibility for their own government and let our
people get the heck out of there. We have tens of thousands of
our troops whose duties there on a daily basis are to provide
the basic services of civilian government. And the Iraqis at
this point need to pick up that responsibility, and I just
don't think they're being pushed hard enough to do that. It's
understandable under the circumstances that they're reluctant,
but we have to make them do it nonetheless. As long as we're
paying for it and as long as we're doing it, they're going to
let us; that's human nature.
And I just don't see any agency within Iraq that's pushing
hard on that issue and making that happen. You may have
different observations, and I'm happy to hear them.
Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, with all respect, I do
disagree with the thrust of your remarks. There are two
individuals--one in uniform, one not--in Iraq who very much
have as their central responsibility ensuring that this
transition occurs: General George Casey and Ambassador Khalizad
and the mission working under them. There is a very, very
focused, structured effort with goals, with benchmarks, with
monitoring mechanisms in place to determine what is needed from
day to day, from week to week, to see whether success is being
achieved on issues of capacity, on issues of security
transition. We'd be happy to provide a briefing on this
process.
This is the focus of our lives as an administration, as a
mission, every day, and it does have a leadership.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Ambassador, with all due respect to you,
look, I think General Casey is a fine man, and he has seen way
too much of me, I think; every time I go to Iraq I have at
least a couple of hours to spend with him. And I do think that
he regards that as a central responsibility. However, I also
know from the situation on the ground that responsibility is
secondary to the military responsibility. He has to address the
insurgency and the military confrontation that's going on
there, and that should be, and is, his first and by far most
dominant concern. And every time that the transition to Iraqi
control gets pushed back because of his military mission, I
just feel that it's languishing. It is not anybody's first job.
It's not General Casey's first job, it's not Ambassador
Khalizad's first job.
And what I'm trying to do is to make sure this happens,
because as long as this doesn't happen--it's not going to
happen unless it's somebody's responsibility, if somebody is
held accountable to making sure the Iraqis are transitioned
into a governing role--it's just not happening. And it's
extremely frustrating to watch that process continue. And I
just think we need some transparency there.
My bill draws from an example during the Second World War,
quite frankly, when we found ourselves inadvertently in control
of the Philippines militarily. We had driven the Japanese out
and we controlled the Philippine islands. And the U.S.
Government was fully supportive of their independence. And we
set up a national commission, FDI did, and Truman after him, to
create a national commission basically to transition the
control of the Philippines from the military to the newly
forming Philippine Government, and we did it very effectively.
And I think a similar panel needs to be established here to
make sure that happens. The President--the White House had a
role in it, the Senate and the House of Representatives each
had roles in it, the State Department had a role in it, Defense
Department. But it was a unified effort; it had transparancy,
it had accountability, it had benchmarks, and it got done
because it was somebody's job and because there would have been
hell to pay if nobody did it.
And I just think this bill offers the same framework. It's
proven to be successful on at least that one occasion. And
that's my assessment of it. I'm no expert. I just spend a lot
of time on this, as you do, and we've just got to see some
movement here, and I don't believe that maintaining our current
course of action is an answer in any respect.
Mr. Shays. I would just thank the gentleman and say that
maybe after the election, depending on who's back, we can
practice what we're preaching with our esteemed colleagues in
Iraq. When we ask Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds to work together,
maybe there will be a way where we can find Republicans and
Democrats can work together on this very important issue and
find some common ground. And I appreciate your efforts to find
an initiative and to move this forward, and I thank you for
that.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Van Hollen, you had one little point.
Mr. Van Hollen. I had one question. Mr. Ambassador, I don't
want to get into a long dialog on Iran. I happen to think Iran
has been strengthened and emboldened because of the chaos in
Iraq, but Ambassador Khalizad some time ago proposed that we
engage in direct discussions with the Iranians with respect to
the situation in Iraq. And my question is, what has come of
that proposal and have there been discussions?
Ambassador Satterfield. There have been no such discussions
conducted. We are interested in addressing issues of Iranian
behavior in Iraq in an appropriate forum, at an appropriate
time.
Mr. Van Hollen. If I could just followup, Mr. Chairman.
Have we had no discussions with the Iranians on the Iraq
question because of their lack of interest or of our failure to
follow through with the proposal of Ambassador Khalizad?
Ambassador Satterfield. No discussions have been held.
Mr. Van Hollen. If you're saying you don't want to answer--
--
Ambassador Satterfield. In this forum.
Mr. Van Hollen. All right. I would like to followup on that
in the appropriate forum.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Let me just ask, Ambassador, if there
are any points you want to put on the record before we go to
our next panel. Is there anything that we should have asked you
that we didn't, that you were prepared to answer, that you
think we need to put on the record?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to
draw together comments made, I think, by every member here, and
by you, Mr. Chairman.
One cannot deal, as you look at success in Iraq, in taking
individual issues--amnesty, an oil deal, a demobilization/
reintegration process--in isolation, or federalism. They're
also interlaced, they're all interlinked. Success in Iraq,
success for the Iraqis will depend upon an approach that brings
these critical issues together, allows a deal to be struck that
has elements taken and given on all of these points, and that
moves the country forward and moves it forward in an urgent
manner. The challenge is to find a way to do that and to do it
quickly. All are important. If any one is taken away, you'll
get failure, or less than success on the others. It is putting
together those elements of a national compact that has to be
advanced at this point.
And the only other comment I would make is to note we have
made progress. Our soldiers, our civilians in Iraq, have
achieved significant progress. Iraqis must do their part to
continue that progress. So does the international community and
the region. But on security transition, on capacity, on basic
services, the situation is not what it was a year ago, and in
turn, not what it was 3 years ago.
Mr. Shays. Not to leave a false impression, because this
panel will be followed by a panel of Iraqi representatives of
this government, I think you would agree there are a number of
things we did that made their job more difficult; is that not
true?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, the job for the Iraqi
government is a very challenging one. We try constantly to do
what we can to contribute to their success--because in the end
that is our success--and not to thwart it.
Mr. Shays. OK. Well, then, I'm going to say it for the
record, if you won't. We attacked them, we disbanded their
army, their police, and their border patrol and left them with
no security. We allowed huge amounts of looting to go on. And
then we basically said, you know, let's move forward.
I realize they made decisions that were a mistake, but we
made a number of them as well. And maybe it's more appropriate
that I say it than you. But I realize that we've asked them to
do some very difficult things, made more difficult by some of
the decisions we made early on. So I will say that.
And I will conclude by saying to you, Ambassador, you are
an American hero. You have served your country tremendously, in
some of the most difficult places, and you have done it with a
tremendous amount of class and honesty. You have received high
marks from Republicans and Democrats alike, and we are very,
very grateful for your service.
And, Mr. Bever, I want you to know that you have done your
job perfectly, because no one wanted to ask you any questions,
and the Ambassador was able to do what he needed to do. And
given that you're fairly new on this job, you must have someone
up there who loves you, who was looking out for you. And so I
thank you for your presence as a back-up if it was needed.
We're going to just take a 2-minute break, and then I am
very eager to welcome our next witnesses. Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. I'd like to recognize our second panel. It's a
distinguished panel and we are so grateful that they are
participating in this hearing. We have Dr. Hajim Al-Hasani, a
member of Parliament, a former Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament
of 2005; and, something that gives him tremendous credibility
with me, I think he earned his doctorate, but I know he
attended school at UCON, University of Connecticut.
And we have Mr. AlMusawi, the Washington Representative of
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI.
And we welcome him.
And we have Mr. Qubad Talibany, the Representative of
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to the United States. And
his father is the President of Iraq and a wonderful man, who I
have had many occasion to visit with.
Gentlemen, as you know, we swear in our witnesses, and we
would like to do that with you as well. We ask you either to
swear or affirm, whatever is appropriate, but if you would
stand and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I just note for the record we are an
investigative committee and all our witnesses are sworn in,
every one of them, so that's why we do it.
Doctor, we're going to start with you, and we'll just go
right down the list. You are a member of the Parliament, and
it's wonderful to have you here. The mic, you might just tap
this to see if it's on. OK, thank you, welcome.
STATEMENTS OF HAJIM AL-HASANI, MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT (SUNNI),
FORMER SPEAKER, IRAQI PARLIAMENT 2005; KARIM ALMUSAWI,
WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI) (SHIA); AND QUBAD TALABANY,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO
THE UNITED STATES
STATEMENT OF HAJIM AL-HASANI
Dr. Al-Hasani. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, almost 3\1/2\ years ago
the United States and its allies went to Baghdad and removed
Saddam's regime, abolished the oil state, and started the
process of nation building in Iraq. However, incorrect policies
that were based on wrong information provided by major Iraqi
politicians led us to flawed fundamentals in building the new
state. It is worthwhile here to mention a few major ones
without going into details.
The biggest policy mistakes were dividing Iraqis into Shia,
Sunni, Kurd. This is something we can't see even in this panel.
This is something--I personally didn't accept it from the
beginning, and I personally don't accept it now. I'm Iraqi
first, Iraqi second, Iraqi last.
The second mistake was the Iraqi security forces--disarming
the Iraqi security forces, and then debaathification policy and
open border.
Now let's let bygones be bygones. The issue now is, how can
we overcome those mistakes? Here I would like to make a few
points that are vital for the success of both the Iraqis and
the United States, and could pave the roadmap to resolve Iraq's
major problematic issues. First, the national reconciliation
process should be the cornerstone of present United States and
Iraqi policy, and we should not allow partisan, sectarian, and
regional politics to spoil it. For this to succeed we need to
identify the parties that we need to reconcile with. Some
insurgency groups are important ones. Find a common vision
among Iraqis on the new Iraqi state. This is what
reconciliation is about. This vision includes building
professional security forces that are well balanced and loyal
to the state and Iraqi people; building a state based on the
rule of law; support building democratic institutions; help
parties reach an agreement on amending the new Iraqi
constitution that will be accepted by all major groups, Sunni,
Shia and Kurds; strengthen the Iraqi economy by stimulating
strategic investments; fight and prosecute corruption to the
maximum extent; dissolve all militia forces; stop regional
meddling in Iraq's affairs; halt the debaathification process.
Current Ba'athists should be processed by the judicial system.
Determine who the real enemies are, al Qaeda and loyal
Saddamists, and fight them together; general amnesty in Iraq.
This cannot be accomplished without strong regional and
international pressure. The United States has a major role to
play, especially by manipulating its political, economic and
military leverages to compel Iraqi players to abide by any
agreement or progress. The emphasis here is that the United
States has the ability to create a stable, economically viable
democratic state as long as it stays engaged.
It must work to implement the aforementioned policies for
us to see real progress in Iraq.
Finally, don't think about withdrawing U.S. troops now.
That is not and must not be an option. If it happens, it will
lead to communal civil war that would give the terrorists a
victory and might lead to regional war, disruption of oil
supplies, and will end what is today a unified Iraq. That will
put blame on the United States and will shake the United States
standing in the region and the world, not to mention the grim
reality that terrorists will soon be knocking on your doors
here in the United States. The war in Iraq is not an Iraq-
specific war, it is an international war against terrorism. We
are in this together and must fight it together.
It took 3 years to create this mess in Iraq; it is very
difficult to sum up, you know, the solution for it in 5
minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Doctor, we will have plenty of time to have a
dialog. There will be no limit to how you respond to questions,
and I'll give you every opportunity because we don't want to
bring it down to just 5 minutes. You're one of the few speakers
that's ever come before this committee that's actually tried to
live within the 5-minute rule, so thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Al-Hasani follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. AlMusawi, thank you, sir. Sir, I'm going to
ask you to move the mic toward you in the middle.
STATEMENT OF KARIM ALMUSAWI
Mr. AlMusawi. Chairman Shays, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, good afternoon.
First, allow me to express the deep appreciation and
admiration for the American men and women, military and
civilians, who are trying hard to make Iraq succeed in
partnership with Iraq's elected government.
Also, as we are remembering the fifth tragic anniversary of
the September 11th crime, I want to express my sincere
condolences to the American people and the families who lost
their loved ones.
Since the day Prime Minister Al-Maliki announced his
courageous reconciliation plan, his goals have been clear: to
open a dialog with theinsurgents, dismantle the militias, and
implement certain measures to defuse the escalating sectarian
tension and violence that has increased in the past few months,
especially after the explosion of the Holy Shrine.
Reconciliation is a very immediate and most vital priority,
and it is a collective mission of all Iraqi religious,
political, and tribal leaders. Consequently, the national unity
and the building of Iraq are two key pillars which reinforce
all other activities of this new government.
Also, the cause of dividing Iraq as a part of the solution
to get rid of the current sectarian congestion have been
rejected. And the recent polls and surveys show that most
Iraqis are again partitioning the country. By setting the
priorities, the Iraqis could easily control the chaotic
situation.
For instance, security isn't a priority for certain
government aides and consultants in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.
Construction and investment might be the priority there. On the
contrary, security is a priority in Baghdad.
The following terms need to be clarified:
First, the transferring of debaathification from its
political category to the judicial security priority authority
is good progress to define debaathification.
The formation of militia outside the framework of the Armed
Forces is prohibited. Dismantling the militias should come
through the legal channels in accordance with the Law 91.
Iraq issue amnesty to all the prisoners who have not
committed any war or terrorist crimes or crimes against
humanity. Indeed, it has become clear, following the killing of
Zarqawi, that the Saddamists have been responsible for fueling
violence a lot more than terrorists.
Accountability is necessary for rebuilding in Iraq, but it
should be part of a system that includes all Iraqi
institutions; otherwise, it will target one party and exclude
others.
Second, the real interpretation of Article 3 is that all
oil, gas and natural resources for the current fields or the
ones which will be discovered in the future are all owned by
the people of Iraq and all the regions and Governorates.
Revenues will again be distributed fairly among Iraqis.
Third, the Powers of the Regions and the rights of forming
federations are the main contentious issues. We have no major
concern regarding any amendment if it would go through a legal
process.
Fourth, the relationship between the Coalition forces and
the Iraqi Government represents the focal point bringing
security to success. And in view of this, any talking about the
withdrawal of the Coalition forces unilaterally would
definitely lead to the failure of the Iraqi experience.
Fifth, success will be in the benefit of all Iraqis,
Coalition troops, the region's stability, and the international
community. The original states should start viewing the newly
elected Government of Iraq as a threat to the original systems.
It is of utmost importance of the original states to secure the
borders and to dry up the financial resources.
Also, I would like to agree with my brother, Dr. Al-Hasani,
about identifying us as Shia and Sunnis. I would just like to
mention that as well. And it's very important. This is my sense
all my life; there is no sense that I am Shia, as AlMusawi
said, I am first Iraqi and second Iraqi and last Iraqi. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. AlMusawi follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Talabany.
STATEMENT OF QUBAD TALABANY
Mr. Talabany. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry to be the
bad egg that might break the 5-minute rule, but I will try to
do my best to stick within the----
Mr. Shays. You do exactly what you want to do. And I
apologize to our first two speakers if we overemphasized the 5-
minute rule because, frankly, I consider it so important that
you say whatever you need to say. So I'll invite you, before I
even ask questions, if there are any other points that you want
to say. But Mr. Talabany, you have the floor.
Mr. Talabany. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to testify on the critical topic of national reconciliation in
Iraq. I'd also like to take this opportunity to thank you and
the ranking member for your leadership on this important
subcommittee, and the work of the entire subcommittee on the
subject of Iraq.
We are also grateful, Mr. Chairman, for the many visits you
have led to Iraq, including the two individuals recently to
Iraqi Kurdistan.
I'd also like to take this opportunity to thank the brave
men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are serving or have
served in Iraq, as well as the diplomats and civilians who
labor tirelessly with Iraqi officials.
Iraq is a country traumatized by its horrific past and at
times its faltering present. To overcome that trauma and to
build a robust inclusive political process, Iraq requires
national reconciliation. The Iraqi Government has put forth a
National Reconciliation Plan that, if carried out, will help to
begin to heal the pain of this country.
There are many aspects of this plan. These include
reforming the debaathification policy and amnesty program, and
dealing with the problems caused by militias. However, before
addressing these key issues, we must understand that national
reconciliation means something very different to each of Iraq's
major communities: Kurds, Shia and Sunni Arabs. Each regard the
national reconciliation through the prism of their political
goals because of their profound insecurities about the future.
Iraq was built as a state in which conflict was part of its
architecture, a country that many of its inhabitants did not
want. Outsiders must recognize that inside Iraq there is no
common understanding of what it means to be Iraqi. The lack of
a core common identity has been exacerbated by evolving
political and security situations since 2003. Iraqi
expectations were high, and many of these expectations were not
met. Instead, the violent and illogical opposition of a
minority within the Sunni Arab community, coupled with a weak
Iraqi state, has led to the further polarization of the Iraqi
society. Insecure about the future, Iraqis have emphasized
their ethnic and sectarian identities. In Iraq, families are
being torn apart by the Sunni-Shia divide. Kurds have mediated
between these two sects. Ironically, the Kurds, once Iraq's
internally displaced, have become hosts to tens of thousands of
Arabs who are becoming displaced by the violence.
Ethnic and sectarian identities are inescapable and cannot
be ignored, even though they did not fit with the vision that
some had for the new Iraq. Instead, we must deal with what we
have and treat the ethnic and sectarian divisions not as the
end of Iraq, but, rather, if addressed properly, our last
opportunity to save it. By embracing Iraqi's identities as they
are and shaping the political order that accommodates and
accepts them, we can achieve true national reconciliation.
Iraqi's past and present is defined by a fundamental clash
of two visions. One seeks a unitary state. Many, but not all,
of those who advocate this central autocracy are a minority
motivated by supremist ideology. The second vision, held by
most of Iraq's two largest communities, the Shia Arabs and the
Kurds, by and large advocate a decentralized government, a
democratic federation. This vision was endorsed in a democratic
referendum that ratified the constitution. Like all democratic
constitutions, ours is not a perfect document. It is,
nonetheless, the only democratically ratified constitution in
the region, and, if implemented, could lay the foundations for
a functioning democracy.
The constitution allows for Iraqis to organize themselves
the way they want. Kurdistan today stands as a Federal region
with its own governance and security. And I'm proud to state
that today the Kurdistan region stands as a success story, in
part because of the support and the protection of the United
States and the United Kingdom over the past 15 years. If others
in the country want to Federalize the rest of the country,
providing such steps are taken democratically and with the
support of the people who live in these regions, then we must
stand on the side of the constitution.
The Iraqi Government's National Reconciliation Plan
compliments the democratic federalism of the constitution by
seeking to provide justice for the victims and the
perpetrators. To provide justice, the plan seeks to reform the
debaathification process in order to bring to justice those who
committed crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide, while
allowing those who want to participate in rebuilding this
country and play a constructive role the opportunity. We should
not punish everyone who joined the Ba'ath party. Nonetheless,
national reconciliation requires that those with blood on their
hands should never hold senior government posts or security
posts, or be in the position to harm Iraqi citizens again. If
we allow criminals of the former regime to hold senior posts in
the new political order, we will be building a new country on
rotten foundations.
Bringing elements of the insurgency into the political
process will also be difficult. Again, the Kurds have led the
way in this effort.
A major component of the National Reconciliation Plan
involves a potential amnesty for certain elements of the
insurgency. Amnesty should not be extended to foreign
terrorists or home-grown extremists who are not willing to
cease fighting. What it should do is allow the mass of the
insurgency to know that it can lay down its arms and be part of
the new Iraq that will not exact retribution.
National reconciliation also means tackling the militias.
As CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid said at an Armed Services
Committee hearing, there are militia that are benign or that
are working closely in conjunction with the state to provide
some additional security, and they do not need to be disbanded
right away.
Our goal should be to have security forces that are
accountable to government institutions. We must not tolerate
the existence of death squads and those who abuse the cover of
an official uniform to commit sectarian crimes, as Ambassador
Satterfield correctly stated.
Much has been said regarding the Kurdish security forces
known as the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga are not a militia. It is
a professional military force that possesses a transparent
chain of command that is always accountable to a government
elected by the people. These fighters have been called upon by
civilian leadership to defend the security of the Kurdistan
region. And it is in part due to their bravery and competency
that the Kurdistan region today is Iraq's most stable and
secure.
Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, many thousands of Peshmergas
have joined the Iraiqi security forces and have led the fight
against the terrorists. What needs to complement the main
planks of the national reconciliation is a national pact on oil
and potential constitutional revisions. Oil is Iraq's greatest
asset and its most abused resource. Many Iraqis, the Kurds in
particular, feel that the oil has been a curse. It was only
when Iraq was obliged by the Oil-for-Food Program in 1996 did
Kurdistan benefit from the nation's oil.
Iraq's history has engrained in us and others in the
country immense insecurities. Given these experiences, Kurds
have little confidence that any government in Baghdad,
including one that has many Kurdish ministers, will safeguard
our share of the country's wealth.
What is needed for a sound oil policy is balance. We need
to end the complete centralization of the country's resources,
while recognizing that Baghdad can play a useful role in
ensuring fairness and imposing checks and balances. Iraq's
regions, including Kurdistan, must play a key role in the
development of the nation's oil and gas sectors, as called for
in the constitution.
A preliminary agreement on oil has been reached recently,
but more work needs to be done to overcome the insecurities,
especially of the people that live in the non-oil-producing
regions.
The final element of the current Iraqi Government policy is
to allow for constitutional revisions. There are, of course,
those who say that there is no need to revise the constitution,
as it reflects the will of the vast majority of Iraqis. Such a
view has its logic, but it is the wrong approach. It is in the
spirit of consensus and cooperation that Iraqi officials have
agreed on a 4-month period to allow for those who were not part
of the constitutional drafting process to recommend textual
amendments. Discussions are ongoing on this issue, but have yet
to yield results.
Throughout this endeavor, we will require American support.
The American people have, as always, been generous. The United
States must continue to play an important role in our
development politically, economically, and militarily. We all
look to the day when American Armed Forces can return home with
their heads held high, but unfortunately today is not that day.
It is critical for U.S. forces to continue working side by side
with Iraqi forces to fight those who want to do us both harm.
We are not naive about the political climate in an election
year in the United States. We understand the growing impatience
of the American people. No war is easy to a people. And yet I
ask you, as elected representatives of your great people, to
urge patience.
We are trying to lay the groundwork for a democratic
society. We face many challenges; most we hope to win. Victory,
however, requires that we stand together. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Talabany follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I thank all three of you for your very, very
thoughtful comments. And I regret that, for whatever reason,
some of my Democratic colleagues who feel we shouldn't be in
Iraq aren't here to hear your words and to question you and to
hear your response to their questions. But I have more than
enough questions to ask.
I view your participation in this congressional hearing as
historic, and I believe that what you say will have impact well
beyond this committee. So I thank you more than you can imagine
for your presence.
I'd like to start by saying to you a few things so you kind
of know where I'm coming from and you can react to it. When I
ask an Iraqi if they're a Shia, they say, sir, I'm a Shia, but
I'm married to a Sunni. I'll ask a Sunni, are you a Sunni? And
they will say I'm a Sunni, but my daughter is married to a
Shia. And then I ask a Kurd, are you a Kurd? And they said yes,
but sir, we're Sunnis. And you're lecturing me about what--how
we kind of view you.
My first visit to Iraq was in October 2003--excuse me, in
April 2003. And I went in with a nongovernment organization
before the fighting had stopped, and I met a man named Mohammed
Abdul Musaad. And he told me that he got married in his fifties
because he had been in an Iranian prison for many years and
missed the first exchange of prisoners because Iraq didn't have
as many Iranians as Iranians had Iraqis. And I found myself
saying, you've had a tough life. And he looked at me in some
amazement and said, sir, no different than any other Iraqi. And
it was a huge kind of message to me that I can't compare my
life with their life. And he was so excited about the prospect
of the newness of a democracy where he would have an
opportunity to participate in its government. And I think he
had tremendous overexpectations as well.
I think that what I've seen from the Iraqi people is they
saw the United States as such a big and powerful Nation that we
can just do this and everything would be good. At one point I
asked him if there are things that we did that concerned him.
He said when you throw candy on the ground and our kids pick
them up like they're chickens, he said our kids aren't
chickens. And I thought, well, you know, back home soldiers in
parades, we throw the candy on the ground, the kids run and
pick it up; but again, this told me, wow. He said to me, when
you extend your hand out to a Muslim woman and she does this,
your soldiers are offended--or some--and he said she is
honoring you by saying thank you. But Muslim women don't shake
hands with strangers.
And then at one point he grabbed my shoulders--which I
don't know if it's a very Iraqi thing to do or not--he looked
me in the face and said, you don't know us and I don't know
you.
I couldn't wait to get back home to say to our State
Department and Defense, bring back Iraqi Americans to Iraq,
bring back Arabic speakers, because otherwise we're going to
make some huge mistakes.
Now, what I want to first do, I don't want to dwell on the
mistakes I just want to be honest about them. I want to be
honest about--I think you, Mr. Speaker, were--and we call once
a Speaker always a Speaker in this Chamber--you pointed out the
mistakes. I'd like you tell me what you think the mistakes
were. I'd like you, Mr. AlMusawi, to say what you think, Mr.
Talabany as well.
I want to know where there is agreement and disagreement.
And I will say this: You help this committee by having an
honest dialog about your disagreements and not trying to be
good soldiers among all of you to try to cover over those.
So I will go with you first, Mr. Speaker. What were the
mistakes, in your judgment? You alluded to some of them. I just
want you to kind of list them, and what do you think were the
most significant mistakes?
Mr. Al Hasani. I wish Democrats were here, you know, to
tell them what changed in Iraq. I think there was a change in
U.S. policy in Iraq in the last 6 months or 8 months. And
because of the violence that we are experiencing in Iraq, all
three groups right now probably believe it is essential for the
American forces to stay in Iraq.
Today, if I speak in the terms of Sunnis, they are more
comfortable to see U.S. forces patrolling their areas more than
seeing Iraqi security forces patrolling the areas. I think Shia
would have fears if the American troops leave, it could lead to
some kind of civil war in Iraq. Kurds, I think they are very
happy. I can't speak in the name of all three groups. I think I
represent Iraqis.
Mr. Shays. I know you say that and I know you believe it
and I know that for you it is true. But for the purposes of
discussion now, it would be helpful for you to tell us what you
think many Sunnis feel, what the Shias feel, and what those who
are Kurds feel. It would help us in understanding the issues.
So I'm going to ask you to take off what you personally believe
and tell us what you hear from a community that is primarily
Sunni.
Mr. Al Hasani. I think that the biggest mistakes that the
United States did in Iraq was, as I said, you know, dividing
Iraqis into Shia and Sunni and Kurds. That mistake led that
each group started to look into their agendas, rather than
looking into comprehensive Iraqi agenda.
Mr. Shays. What would be another mistake?
Mr. Al Hasani. Let me add another thing now about this
mistake. This mistake also gave the religious parties in Iraq
more power than they should have, because people started to
vote for the parties because they are either Sunni religious
party or Shia religious parties. Set aside the Kurds, because
the Kurds are a different story when it comes to the Shia and
Sunni issue. They are Sunni, but right now, you know, in this
equation that we have, they are not considered neither Shia or
Sunni. There are some Shia elements within the Kurds too.
The second important mistake, I think, was dissolving the
Iraqi security forces. That was the worst thing that can happen
to any country. I think we should have probably taken out some
of the major generals in the Iraqi Army, the big generals, and
some other people who committed crimes against the Iraqi
people. But the rest of the Iraqi Army should have stayed
there. Once we dissolved the security forces and didn't even
find ways to pay these people so they can find some dignified
life for themselves, we left these people to be, you know,
victims; and the terrorists groups started to take these people
and make them part of their insurgency. Today, the insurgency
in Iraq mostly are ex-Iraqi officers. And unless we deal with
the insurgency with the understanding that, because of the
dissolving of the Iraqi Army, that's what happened, we cannot
solve a security problem in Iraq.
And the way we proceeded in bringing back some of the Iraqi
security officers, it was done in a biased way. I think even
today we have problems to bring some of the ``Sunni officers''
back to the security forces. I remember that--at least I heard
it just recently by General Nash--when he talked about the
components of the Sunni in the Iraqi Army, said there are
probably less than 10 percent. Where the population of the
Sunnis, it is very difficult to determine who is the majority
in Iraq, whether they are the Shia or the Sunni. There is no
census in Iraq that tells anyone that this----
Mr. Shays. I will tell you what we think. We think that the
Sunni population is closer to 20 percent. We think the Kurdish
population is closer to 20 percent. And we tend to think of the
Shia population as closer to 60 percent. That's what we
believe.
Mr. Al Hasani. Well, there is no basis for that. And I--I
really don't like, you know, even dividing the Iraqis, as I
said.
Mr. Shays. I know that.
Mr. Al Hasani. But once you start, you know, putting
numbers and you don't have census, because this issue is very
delicate issue. It has to do with the election. When you
divide, you know, the people in this way, you give majority to
certain people. Then people start claiming that they are a
majority. Are deepening the division among the Iraqi population
when we talk in that sense.
Mr. Shays. You have given me two very serious mistakes you
think were made.
Mr. AlMusawi, what do you think were the mistakes?
Mr. AlMusawi. One of the most crucial issues that we can
consider as a mistake is the security issue.
Mr. Shays. Is the what issue?
Mr. AlMusawi. The security issue. From the beginning, I
think there is a lack of how to install or how to create
security institutions. I believe there is kind of lack of trust
between the Americans and some Iraqi security parties. From the
beginning, we--we called for the security forces must be leaned
on the Iraqis. The Iraqis should take the initiative and should
run the security files.
This mistrust, I would like to call it, between the
Coalition troops and some Iraqi--Iraqi parties and the concerns
from some militias and what they called that they have some
relations or links with their original countries. Actually,
this one caused a lot of losers for all Iraqi security forces.
Militias should--as soon as Alawi government, the militias
that from 91--and in 91 there is certain articles of--and if we
applied this law on all militias I think there is no big deal
about how to deal with the militias. Many of the militias, they
are recruited. Most of them, they were in the Iraqi forces.
Most of them educated people. So we can make use of those
militias. This is one.
Second, there is many security plans prepared by the Iraqi
political parties. And just last year, there is a serious
comprehensive security plan prepared by SCIRI, and this
security plan contains many measures to help the security in
Iraq. One of these measures to get the Iraqis themselves
participating in their security cases. And crucial to the
people's committees.
Mr. Shays. What I need to understand, though, is tell me
the mistakes that were made. Did the United States make any
mistakes? One of the mistakes was dividing Sunnis, Shias, and
Kurds. The other was dissolving the Iraqi security forces. I
believe both of those were mistakes, particularly the second.
I'm not clear with where you think the mistakes were made. Did
the United States make any mistakes before we transferred power
in June 2004?
Mr. AlMusawi. I am talking about this time.
Mr. Shays. I am talking about the early on, the first year
or so. Is there a point where you think we made some--some big
mistakes in that first year?
Mr. AlMusawi. After the dissolving of the security forces--
--
Mr. Shays. Do you think that was a mistake?
Mr. AlMusawi. Absolutely. I believe so.
Mr. Shays. OK. That is helpful, thank you. Mr. Talabany.
Mr. Talabany. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mistakes have been
made. And I think mistakes have been made on both sides, both
on the Coalition side and also on the Iraqi side. To go through
a few, I think first the allowing of the looting to go on hurt
us and America's credibility considerably in the country.
Mr. Shays. Tell me--I don't want to bias it--tell me how
Iraqis viewed the looting. What did they interpret from the
looting?
Mr. Talabany. Well, it fed into the conspiracy theories.
There were many conspiracy theories floating around the
country. The fact that the oil ministry was one of the few
ministries that the Coalition protected fed into many thinking
that the Americans are coming in only for the oil. We know that
is not the case, but once this spreads throughout the tea
houses of the country, it spreads like wildfire.
Mr. Shays. Having spent $300 billion, we hardly got a
benefit out of oil. I mean, in other words, you could never
repay what the United States has already spent. But I
understand your point. Your point is the looting made people
feel that we were only protecting what we were interested in
and the rest of the country be damned.
Mr. Talabany. Is a perception.
Mr. Shays. I understand. I understand.
Mr. Talabany. Another major mistake was the political
vacuum that was left open. And I think here what many people
actually don't know is that when General Garner was heading up
the office of ORHA, the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance, there was discussions with the then
U.S. envoy, Ambassador Khalilzad, to have an interim
government, form an interim government--we are talking April
and May 2003--to have an interim government that would step in
and run the country. The Iraqis failed to form this government.
And they failed because of the divisions that have existed in
the country along ethnic and sectarian lines and will continue
to exist in this country.
We could not reach an agreement on who, how, and where this
government would take shape. This created the CPA and,
ultimately, a year lost with American rule in the country. So.
Mr. Shays. Did it give the view that there was an
occupational government?
Mr. Talabany. It wasn't just a perception issue, Mr.
Chairman. The United States and the United Kingdom officially
and legally changed their status from liberators to occupiers
by going to the U.N. and forcibly becoming an occupier in the
country.
Mr. Shays. Hold your thoughts. I would like to ask the two
other witnesses, do you think that was a mistake? Do you think
we could have transferred power sooner, and do you think it was
a mistake to call it occupiers?
Mr. Al Hasani. I think it would have been very difficult to
do it. Although it would have been also wise to do it, to try
to find ways to form an Iraqi government earlier as possible.
But I think there were some really difficulties to do that at
that time too.
So you needed some transitional period, you know, to form
an Iraqi Government, but I think it should have been done much
earlier than we did it later on.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. AlMusawi. I think we had an opportunity in March, early
March 2003, in Salahadin to form a transitional government. But
unfortunately, there is a kind of contentions between the
parties at that time, the American officials and Salahadin. I
think this was a missed opportunity, unfortunately.
Mr. Shays. One of the challenges would have been, whatever
government it was, it would have been set up by the United
States so it would have looked potentially like a puppet
government. That would have been one of the challenges that you
would have had.
Should we have reached out--while we are on it, I will come
back to you Mr. Talabany. Should we have looked at Iraq more
from a tribal standpoint than a religious standpoint? Would we
have gotten better results, may I ask you, Mr. Speaker, if we
viewed it more from a tribal standpoint?
Mr. Al Hasani. Well, I think even tribal standpoints are
not good points to look at the Iraqis. I think the way we
should have handled the Iraqi situation, I disagree with
probably my fellow Iraqis that from the beginning we should
have not talked about Sunni and Shia and Kurd issue. This has
been done in the opposition before even the troops went to
Iraq, there was talks about, you know, Shia and Kurdish
alliance, and Sunnis they were out somewhere else. It is their
fault they didn't participate from the beginning in the
opposition the way they should have been, but that's, you know,
something that they paid a high price for. But that was planned
even long before we went to Iraq. So when you went to Iraq
there was only that formula that people were looking at it.
But I think the United States had the responsibility, you
know, to impose probably another form here. Citizenship in Iraq
should be built on citizenship rather than being built on
sectarian differences--oh, you know, tribal differences.
Mr. Shays. I am going to just tell you--obviously I have no
credibility since I'm not an Iraqi--but I am more sympathetic
to the message that Mr. Talabany said, that basically there are
differences. And they're not as big in my judgment as people in
this country want to make them out to be, but they are
probably--I view them bigger probably than you do in terms of I
do think the Middle East tends to view Sunni, Shias, and Kurds
differently.
Let me just ask you to comment on Mr. Talabany's comment
about the whole issue of this last point, if you could, and
then I'm going to go back to Mr. Talabany.
Mr. Al Hasani. I differ with Mr. Talabany. I differed with
him even when we were on the governing council.
Mr. Talabany. That is democracy.
Mr. Al Hasani. This is the new Iraq. We can at this time
differ in Iraq, but I would hope that the difference wouldn't
unleash the point that we are killing each other. But I differ
with Mr. Talabany that these differences existed a long time
ago. And it isn't the 1,400 years that we're talking about.
This is political differences right now we are talking about.
And what happened in Iraq, I left Iraq in 1979. Came to the
United States, OK? When I returned back, I didn't know which of
my friends were Shia or Sunni. I didn't. It was easy to know
which one is Kurd because the language differences, but it was
very difficult to know who is Shia and Sunni. But when I came
back, you know, I found out that, you know, that we--that the
Iraqis themselves played a major role in dividing the Iraqi
site for political reason, for political gains. And that's the
mistake that we're paying the prices for right now. And unless
we go back to be Iraqis, it will be very difficult to resolve
the Iraqi problem.
Mr. Shays. Let me just have you finish your points. Mr. Van
Hollen is here, and I want to make sure he can join in this
discussion which I think is very interesting. Mr. Talabany,
what were some other potential mistakes?
Mr. Talabany. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think--I don't
disagree with the notion that it was wrong to disband the
security force. I agree with my esteemed colleague, Speaker Al
Hasani, that we didn't do enough to bring people back, because
the reality was there was no Iraqi forces after the United
States had rolled in. The military had itself disbanded. The
order by the CPA was just basically a rubber stamp on the facts
on the ground that had happened.
The mistake, in my opinion, wasn't the disbanding of the
army; the mistake actually was not bringing people back into a
new security force quick enough. I think the way, when we did
start to rebuild the Iraqi security force, the way we just
accepted everybody into the security force was another mistake.
There was very little vetting going into who was actually being
recruited. And much of the insurgency that first started
happened from within the security services by people who had
received senior posts in the security services. Ninety percent
of the police stations in Mosul that were set up with the help
of the U.S. military were overrun by the insurgents because of
the insurgents from within those police stations.
One other, I think, mistake--and this again is a combined
mistake on the Iraqi side--is the economic development
strategy. We haven't focused enough on developing the country's
economy, improving people's lives. We focused too much on the
political and security developments, but we need that third
track to bring stability to the country; because it is
ultimately feeding citizens, giving them electricity, providing
them the basic services and getting them a job that is going to
calm the situation and bring people on the side of the
government and stop them from acquiescing to the activities of
the insurgents and the terrorists.
Mr. Shays. Let me, before turning to Mr. Van Hollen, say
that in my early times in Iraq I literally went outside the
umbrella of the military, and DOD actually discouraged me from
coming to Iraq, which I found outrageous. And I would go with
nongovernmental organizations, and I will leave their names
anonymous because I don't want to endanger them. But what they
did, they were given a small amount of economic dollars, but
these nongovernment organization were throughout Iraq. They
hired Iraqis to be their office managers and to work in the
offices, and then these nongovernment organizations hired
Iraqis to do the work. And instead of bringing, in some some
cases, a backhoe, they brought in a hundred shovels. In some
cases it may have been a contractor who had a backhoe. And I'm
told that hardly any of the projects done by the
nongovernmental organizations, which were done by Iraqis, have
been destroyed; that they have all thrived.
Mr. Talabany. If I can just comment and on that, Mr.
Chairman, I agree with you 100 percent. And I think one of the
successes in Iraq has been what is called the CERP program, the
Commodities Emergency Response Program, where it has again been
U.S. military commanders working directly with Iraqis, not
through giant contractors who are hiring very expensive private
security companies that are siphoning all the funds out of the
country. In order for these projects to be successful, the
Iraqis must take ownership of these projects.
Mr. Shays. Would you agree that we would have been better
off hiring the Iraqis to do the construction work instead of
hiring Europeans and Americans and others from outside Iraq to
do a lot of this work?
Mr. Al Hasani. Sure. But we also probably needed to monitor
even the Iraqis. We have, you know, a large number of corrupted
people in Iraq, too. So we should not blame only the people
from the United States, the contractors from the United States
being corrupted. But we have, you know, large corruption in
Iraq itself. And a lot of the billions of dollars that the
people are talking about went to the pockets of the Iraqis,
not, you know, Americans. Probably American money went to the
pockets of some of the American contractors, but Iraqi money
went definitely into the pockets of some big Iraqi corrupted
people.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you gentlemen for being here today to testify. Sorry I had to
go out for a minute, but I had an opportunity to look at your
testimony. And we have talked a lot this morning about the
importance of national reconciliation within Iraq in order to
move forward.
And my question to each of you would be in order to achieve
national reconciliation, will there have to be changes made to
the Constitution? And if that has to happen in order to achieve
national reconciliation, what would the timeline be and what
are the key changes that you believe have to happen?
Mr. Al Hasani. Absolutely. I think what this reconciliation
is about is about the fundamentals of building the new State of
Iraq. As I mentioned, the fundamentals were flawed before when
we went over there. I think the way we built the state was
wrong.
We need to change that. And amending the Constitution is
one of the important issues to reach reconciliation.
Right now, I am very worried about this thing, because at
the time when we were writing the Constitution, people agreed
from different groups that they worked together to amend the
Constitution. The signals that I am seeing right now worries
me. I see that some of the parties who agreed to amend the
Constitution, they are backing out. That is not good for the
country. This Constitution has not been agreed upon by all
major component Iraqi components.
And it isn't, you know, an issue that you say majority of
Iraqis voted for this Constitution. We have a problem in Iraq
that we need to realize that problem. Iraq is right now divided
into three different societies. It wasn't our mistake--well, it
was our mistake in the first place because some of our
political actors informed Americans that the Iraqis are, you
know, Shia and Sunni and Kurd.
But anyway, this is what we have right now. And you cannot
pass a Constitution and say the majority of Iraqi people agreed
upon it, Kurds and Shia agreed upon it, and you leave the
Sunnis. You cannot marginalize Sunnis. It is very dangerous to
marginalize the Sunnis. Iraq will not be stabilized if any of
its components are marginalized. Kurds were marginalized for 80
years and they were an element of destabilization of every
Iraqi government, and they had the right to do that because
their rights were taken away from them. And the same thing
applies to Shia or the Sunni in Iraq. That's why I think it is
very important there are certain important issues within the
current Constitution needs to be amended and we need to reach
some agreement between different political parties in that
regard.
Mr. AlMusawi. I differ with my friend Hayim Al Hasani,
because I believe that from the beginning we said that
amendment is essential for the reconciliation of the land. And
from that we believe that we shouldn't talk about the majority
element. We have to understand that we believe that the most
important issue to rebuild our Iraq, to agree with the equation
of one man, one vote. This is the issue: We shouldn't talk--Al
Hasani has said we are not Shia and not the Sunnis. So if we do
not agree about this, we will not reach agreement between the
Sunnis, the Shia and the Kurds. This is the issue.
Unfortunately, we have to talk about this directly. The
reconciliation means don't abuse the majority; that democracy,
talking about the majority, should rule the country with
respect to the minorities. This is the truth. We shouldn't
focus on the Shia and the Sunnis. We respect their cause,
talking about the amendments, and SCIRI also agreed on all
amendments that should go through the legal processes.
This is the issue. The reconciliation is a vital issue
today in Iraq. But we have also it is a mutual mission for all
Iraqis. All Iraqis should accept each other. All Iraqis
shouldn't be making the kind of accusations regarding each
other. The Iraqi leadership, political leadership, should agree
on making consensus regarding each other. And from this point,
I would mention that the political current of the initial
Security Council must be activated to take initiative, to make
consensus and compromises regarding the contentious issues in
the Constitution. All Iraqis believe that there is--there is an
article in the Constitution talking about the amendments so
there is no big problem. There is no big deal about making
amendment in the Constitution.
We believe we have all Iraqis, and all Iraqi political
parties--there is no exceptions--must backing al-Malaki and his
reconciliation of Iraq.
Mr. Van Hollen. Before we go to Mr. Talabany, let me make
sure I understand your response there. The Constitution has a
provision in it for amendment, just like the U.S. Constitution
has a provision for amendment.
Mr. AlMusawi. Yes.
Mr. Van Hollen. I guess my question is, in order to achieve
national reconciliation do you believe it has to be amended?
And if so, what amendments would be required? Or do you believe
it doesn't have to be amended?
Mr. AlMusawi. That's right. Also the Constitution--talking
about forming a reviewing committee for the Constitution. And
this committee should be formed in any time this has belonged
to the Council of Representatives. So after forming this
committee, they should take care of all contentious articles in
the Constitution. Then they should report to the Council of
Representatives. This is the process of the amendment in the
Constitution.
Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Talabany.
Mr. Talabany. Congressman, I think as Ambassador
Satterfield said, it all has to be part of a package. And in
reaching national reconciliation, certainly making amendments
to the Constitution is a component of it. Now, I think you will
probably get different ideas about what changes need to be
made, because these changes will ultimately reflect the
insecurities and concerns of the various communities in the
country. But one thing we have learned all along from our days
in the opposition through the days in the interim governments
and now this current government is that all-or-nothing policies
fail. Nobody can have an all-or-nothing policy on any subject.
And it is only through principles of consensus and compromise
can we actually make progress and start to heal the pain of
this country.
There is a timeline that has been set for any proposed
amendments to the Constitution, which was a timeline of 4
months. Now there is some confusion as to when the 4 months
actually begins; is it from the first day of the forming of the
government, or was it before that? But I think if we haven't
reached that deadline, we're almost there. And there has been
very little dialog between Iraqi Parliamentarians and the Iraqi
government officials and those who were seeking to make
amendments to the Constitution on this particular issue. It has
only just in the last week or so come to the fore and is
starting to be debated. And the debate is going slowly.
Mr. Van Hollen. Well, that is why I asked the question,
because looking from here, it does appear that the process has
been going very slowly. And there appears to be a disagreement
as to exactly what was agreed to, not just on the timeline, but
whether or not there was an agreement to change certain
provisions with respect to the Constitution and what changes
those would be.
And I got caught up, I guess, in this current discussion
with respect to the proposals that have been put forth by the
SCIRI party, Mr. Hakim, about creating an autonomous region in
the south. It has drawn a response from the Speaker in
Parliament, saying that is not going to happen, that is a
nonstarter. If you could all comment on what is going on right
now with respect to the proposal to move ahead with the
legislation now on creating the more autonomous region and what
the implications would be.
Mr. AlMusawi. I would first say that there is no
marginalization to the Sunnis. The Sunnis are right now heavily
participating in the government and in the Parliament. This is
first.
Second, the Hakim call, it is a call like their cause
regarding the federalism. How to form the federalism. The
contentious issue right now in the Council of Representatives
is not about federalism itself, it is about how and when to
form these federations. So one of the calls--one of the calls
of for how to form the federations is this is a call of Hakim.
He believes that provinces in the south could help stability in
Iraq and could help improving the situation in the south. There
is many other different calls. Some of the Iraqis thinking that
one government should become a federation. The second call
talking about each three government areas should form a
federation, some have said one or more. And the Constitution,
the article talking about one or more government areas could
form a federation. So from that it is get this call, it is
within the Constitution, this first.
Second it is the call also a debatable call. This is belong
to the Council of Representatives. If they pass it, that's
fine. This they don't, this is another call.
I have here a poll--I have here a poll from Nasarina news
agency talking about a poll in the south and in Iraq in
general, and they get a sample from 874 Iraqis. They asked them
about the federalism. Do you believe in federalism? The people
who refused the idea, 29.29 percent. The Iraqis who accept the
idea for one government to be one federation is 12.01
percentage. The Iraqis who believe----
Mr. Van Hollen. I'm sorry; I don't mean to interrupt you,
but the bells are ringing, which means that the votes are going
to be soon. And I understand, I think, what you are saying. Let
me just ask this, because, you know, clearly I understand the
thrust of the testimony is that all of you support a one united
Iraq, and it would be better not to have the distinctions
between, in some cases, the different groups in the way we
approach it. On the other hand, it is very clear from your
testimony----
Mr. Shays. If I could interrupt the gentleman. Mr.
Talabany, from his perspective, said that the reality is we are
different and we have to respect some of those differences. But
in essence, Mr. Talabany, you are not suggesting breaking up
Iraq. So you are right on that basic premise.
Mr. Talabany. Not at all.
Mr. Van Hollen. I was going to get to that. The last part
of the question is for Mr. Talabany. But clearly in the
testimony you have very important issues in the negotiations to
protect minorities within a majority Shia population.
I guess my question is for you, Mr. Talabany. We have a
mutual friend of you and me and your father, Peter Galbraith,
Ambassador Galbraith, who has just written a book. And the
title of the book is The End of Iraq. Mr. Galbraith has had a
long association with Iraq, and, as you know, what he says is
the reality on the ground today is that the different
communities are moving in their own separate directions. You
have internal migrations going on within Baghdad on a massive
basis. And he is not saying that he wants to split up Iraq as
part of what he wants to do. He is more saying it is a
reflection of what has happened on the ground.
And we heard earlier in the testimony about Mr. Barzani's
decision on the flag, and we know that back in January in the
referendum in the Kurdish area, people at least on a straw vote
basis said they wanted an independent Kurdistan. So what, I
guess, is your view of Ambassador Galbraith's analysis,
situation in Iraq today?
Mr. Talabany. I think Ambassador Galbraith highlights the
divisions that exist in the country today. And why or how those
divisions came about into being, can debate that. But when you
have a lacking of a political order, when the state cannot
protect the citizens but being Shia protects him, when a state
cannot protect a Sunni but being a Sunni protects him, it
brings forth the identities that people have. And it is not
about what we hoped Iraq would look like or whether we have a
nostalgic view of what Iraq looked like before Saddam's regime.
It is a reality on the ground that is clear in this violence
going on today. There are Shiites killing Sunnis and Sunnis
killing Shiites and this violence is there for all to see.
What we are saying is that this can be addressed by coming
up with a political order that takes into consideration the
realities on the ground, the facts on the ground, and by not
ignoring them and hoping that Iraq was a certain way.
I think as far as--if I can address the flag issue, it is a
major issue as far as national reconciliation is concerned. The
flag of the country should represent the country. The ``Old
Glory'' has representation of every State in the flag. The
Kurdish people do not feel that the current Iraqi flag
represents the people of Kurdistan as Iraqis. It was a flag
that was used by a regime that tried to kill us, that tried to
exterminate us, that committed genocide against us. And what we
are trying to do is build a new country. Kurds have proven
themselves more than anyone else, Kurds have proven themselves
more than anybody else to be Iraqi. They have sent their
brightest and best to Baghdad in the cause of unity in Iraq.
Mr. Shays. I am sure there is no bias here. Just sent my
dad there.
Mr. Talabany. In all of the discussions where we tried to
reach a compromise--and I don't want to play our own trumpets
here, but it has been the Kurds who have made the concessions
on all sides.
Mr. Van Hollen. I thank all of you. Unfortunately, we have
a vote. This is a discussion we could pursue. I thank the
chairman.
Mr. Shays. I am just going to say this. We are going to
invite--in fact, plead that you come back on Friday. I think we
warned you that might be the case. At 2 o'clock, this committee
reverts--at 2 o'clock, this committee reverts to another
committee. This room converts to another committee of--we don't
have this room all day. But what would make it, I think,
advantageous for you to in fact come back and speak, I am going
to ask you to comment before we leave now, but what would be
advantageous is the topic will be as well--the topic on Friday
is Consequences of Leaving: now, prematurely, or after power is
transferred and so on.
So it is a nice segue. We would like to have you come back
on Friday to talk about what we haven't yet talked about the
reconciliation, all the things, specifically federalism, you
know, the allocation of oil resources, and have you be very
clear as to where the differences lie on all of these issues
and which are going to be the most difficult.
So what I will ask, after our Speaker speaks, is to ask you
to come back. Is that possible for each you to do? On Friday?
We would ask to you come back at 10 o'clock. And then before
the panel--the next panel will speak--it is only one panel,
they will speak after you. And we will then go on to their
topic, but you could then speak on their topic as well. Would
you like to close?
Mr. Al Hasani. I just wanted to comment on some of the
issues that the Congressman raised. When I sit here at the
beginning, I say I am Iraqi. Then sometimes I talk about Sunni.
It is like when a white American Congressman sits here and
defends a Mexican American or African Americans. It isn't like,
you know, you are taking sides with this group or that group.
This is how, you know, I proceed with this issue.
Mr. Shays. Exactly.
Mr. Al Hasani. The other issue is that it is amazing that
we agree what the problem is. Problem is, can we form a
government that is going to be loyal to the Iraqi people, can
protect the Iraqi people, whether they are Sunni or Kurd or
Shia? And instead of working on that project, we keep saying
that, well, that's not achievable, so probably we have to find,
you know, different ways for every one of us to go.
So the issue is that probably we all agree on major things.
And I think the same thing is true back home. But what needs
is, you know, some people to help us to get together and work
these differences. I think that party is the United States. The
United States is right now the glue that glues the Iraqis
together. And that's why I warn if the troops leave Iraq, we
will be----
Mr. Shays. But we will have that dialog. And I thank you
for--I think we told you this might happen. What we're doing is
we are recessing. We are going to impanel you first. You are
already sworn in. We don't need to swear you in again. And we
would like to talk about these very issues that you are talking
about. And then we will get to the full hearing afterwards.
I view the three of you as essential to the dialog that
we're having. This is an important panel. And we don't want to
cut it short. So thank you so very much. So we will stand
recessed. We stand recessed until 10 o'clock on Friday morning.
Thank you all very very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 10 o'clock a.m., Friday, September 15, 2006.]