[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENLISTING FOREIGN COOPERATION IN U.S. EFFORTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 25, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-81
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
37-277 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
Committee on Homeland Security
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland....................................................... 3
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 35
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washinton......................................... 37
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 31
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State if Connecticut.................................. 37
Witnesses
Mr. Jayson Ahern, Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations,
Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. David Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator, International
Material Protection and Cooperation, National Nuclear Security
Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Frank Record, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of
State:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Appendix
Questions and Responses from Mr. Jayson Ahern.................... 41
ENLISTING FOREIGN COOPERATION
IN U.S. EFFORTS TO PREVENT
NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
----------
Thursday, May 25, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear
and Biological Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Shays, Gibbons, Dent,
Langevin, Dicks, Norton, and Thompson, ex officio.
Mr. Linder. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Prevention
of Nuclear and Biological Attack will come to order. I would
like to welcome my witnesses and thank them this afternoon for
appearing before the subcommittee.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is one that requires an
immediate, complete and global response. As Congress works to
strengthen our maritime and land borders, we understand that
stopping an attack before it reaches the U.S. should be the
highest priority.
Increasing the security of our ports, for example, is key
to preventing the smuggling of nuclear material. The SAFE Port
Act, which the House recently passed, takes an important step
toward that end. Prevention, however, given the consequences,
is not the first option; it is the only option.
And the U.S. simply cannot prevent nuclear attacks by
acting alone. We need the support and active cooperation of
friends and allies around the world. By helping them, they, in
turn, help us keep this country safe.
We have seen a number of cases where international
cooperation has produced significant results. And in testimony
to this subcommittee last year, it was noted that monitors
deployed along the Russian border as part of the Department of
Energy's second line of defense program recorded 14,000 hits,
of which 200 were deemed worthy of investigation by Russian
inspectors. This action would not have occurred without the
U.S.-Russian cooperation.
In October of 2003, uranium centrifuge parts en route from
Malaysia to Libya were seized in an international interdiction
effort involving multiple foreign entities. Equipment departed
the Port of Dubai on a German-owned ship, the BBC China, and
after passing through the Suez Canal, was diverted to the
Italian port of Taranto for inspection and subsequent seizure.
The Department of State's proliferation security initiative
has built upon the successful model of cooperation.
To better protect our homeland, we must expend our
cooperative and international outreach efforts to obtain as
much participation in U.S. nuclear counterproliferation
programs as possible. At the same time, if we are to be
confident in these programs, we must ensure that they are
implemented effectively.
So I have raised concerns that foreign inspection programs
are vulnerable to corruption and that foreign operated
detection equipment may not be used properly. It is important
that we put in place measures to ensure that while our global
network grows, it continues to be strengthened with better
technology implemented under tighter bilateral control.
Let me reiterate that this effort must strike a balance.
The U.S. must ask neither too much nor too little of its
foreign partners. We want foreign governments to sign on to
this effort and work with us, but we also want their
obligations to be fulfilled in a meaningful way. Achieving this
goal will make both us and them safer.
The focus of our hearing today is to assess this balance.
It is my hope that the witnesses before us will share their
experiences working with our foreign partners, both their
progress and setbacks, so that we can better grasp what, if
anything, needs to be done to ensure that these important
programs are even more successful in the future.
I now yield to my friend from Rhode Island for any
statement he might make. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank our witnesses for appearing before us today.
And I certainly look forward to your testimony.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is real. Our government
must move aggressively if we are going to prevent a nuclear or
radiological attack on our shores. We must ensure that we have
an integrated policy when our government negotiates security
agreements with our foreign trading partners.
On Tuesday, I had a very good meeting with Mr. Huizenga,
and he made a compelling case as to why Megaports should stay
within the Department of Energy. I am concerned, however, that
certain countries can agree to participate in the Container
Security Initiative, but not Megaports.
I understand that these programs require foreign ports to
perform different tasks, but the overall goal is the same, to
prevent nuclear weapons from being smuggled in the container
supply chain. I would like to hear how the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Energy are leveraging
existing foreign agreements to benefit both programs.
I am also concerned about the deployment of radiation--or I
should say the slow pace of deployment of radiation portal
monitors at U.S. ports of entry. The recent GAO report of the
Department of Homeland Security's progress on the deployment of
radiation portal monitors confirmed my worst fears: our
government is not moving fast enough to deploy radiation portal
monitors.
I want to state for the record that I do fully support the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and its director Vayl Oxford.
However, I am not satisfied with the fact that we still do not
have a deployment strategy, and we have insufficient funding
for this program.
2009 is simply too long a time to wait to deploy radiation
detection equipment at all of our ports of entry. And according
to GAO that is the earliest that deployment will be completed.
We simply cannot afford to wait that long to ensure that our
Nation has basic nuclear deterrent capability.
I would like the witnesses to address what the
administration is doing to convince our foreign trading
partners to sign joint Megaports-CSI agreements, what the
administration is doing to complete the deployment of radiation
portal monitors before 2009, and the status of the advanced
spectroscopic portal program.
Before I conclude, I would like to thank Al Thompson. I
just want to pause, if I could, for a moment to thank Al
Thompson for his years of service to me personally, and to this
committee and to our country. As you know, Al is leaving for
greener pastures, Mr. Chairman, and--
Mr. Linder. There are lots of them out there.
Mr. Langevin. I don't know about that.
And this is his last hearing. So I just want to wish Al and
his wife and his sons, Tyson and Hunter, all the best.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Does the gentleman from Mississippi seek to
make a statement?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief in light
of the witnesses. As you know, I requested this hearing, and
you and ranking member graciously agreed to it. There are some
issues between DOE and Homeland Security that I think we need
to get resolved.
There is no sense in my mind for two entities going down
the same street together and not, at least, coordinating what
is happening. So this is an opportunity to hear the difference
between the Megaports program with DOE and DNDO with homeland
security. And I look forward to some of the issues that have
been raised around it.
I yield back.
Mr. Linder. I thank the ranking member.
I want to welcome our guests today, witnesses. Mr. Jayson
Ahern is the Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations For
Customs and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland
Security. Mr. David Huizenga, the other Huizenga, is the
Assistant Deputy Administrator of International Material
Protection and Cooperation of the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Mr. Frank Record is Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for International Security and Nonproliferation at the
Department of State. And our old friend Vayl Oxford is back,
the Director of the DNDO. Welcome.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Ahern, I would like to ask each of you to
try to limit your comments. All of your written statements have
been made part of the record, without objection. Please try to
limit your comments to 5 minutes.
Mr. Ahern.
STATEMENT OF JAYSON AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR FIELD
OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER AND PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Ahern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members here
today. I am pleased to join my colleagues to discuss U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's efforts in eliciting foreign
cooperation and U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling.
Mr. Chairman, CBP's mission is homeland security and
keeping terrorists and their weapons of terror, including
weapons of mass destruction, from getting into this country.
After 9/11 CBP developed and implemented unprecedented
initiatives, all driven by the understanding that the threat
still very much exists, and that CBP must and will do
everything humanly possible to prevent a second attack.
Each year, 108 million cargo containers are transported in
seaports around the world, and 11 million of those maritime
containers come into the United States. That represents about
90 percent of all the world's manufactured goods, moving by
containers, much of it stacked high on board vessels destined
for the United States.
As such, CBP's mission is constantly a balancing act of
protecting and facilitating legitimate travel and trade. But
these dual missions are not mutually exclusive; they are, in
fact, very complementary.
Clearly, the risk to international maritime cargo demands a
robust security strategy that can identify, prevent and deter
threats at the earliest point in the international supply chain
before arrival in the United States. In response, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection has developed a cohesive national cargo
security strategy that protects our national and global trade
against the threat posed by international terrorism, but does
so without impeding the flow of legitimate trade that could
damage this country's economy.
Our strategy to secure cargo moving into the United States
is a layered strategy, based on many interrelated initiatives,
that includes targeting and inspecting all high risk shipments
through cooperation with foreign administrations and engaging
the private sector to increase supply chain security. We do
that by using information analysis targeting, employing
advanced inspection technologies and expanding our zone of
security by prescreening shipments that pose a risk prior to
arrival in the United States.
Those include programs such as a 24-hour initiative where
we get our information 24 hours prior to lading overseas that
supports our Container Security Initiative, which I would like
to spend the balance of my time on.
Before 9/11 there were no Customs and Border Protection
officers working together with our counterparts in foreign
countries to identify and screen high-risk shipments before
they were bound for the United States. As of today, over 90,000
such examinations have occurred and been performed in sovereign
countries by our foreign partners.
CSI was proposed in January 02 to enhance our ability to
interdict terrorists and terrorist weapons prior to reaching
United States seaports by inspecting containers abroad. Today,
CSI and the Department of Energy-Megaports program are the
multinational programs in the world, the only ones I might say,
that actually are protecting the primary system of global trade
containerized shipping from being exploited or disrupted by
international terrorists.
CSI adds security to the movement of maritime cargo
containers to the U.S. and allows containers to move faster,
more expeditiously and more predictably through the supply
chain.
The core elements of CSI identify the high-risk shipments,
using the automated targeting tools we have developed, that
pose potential risks for terrorism, based on advance
information I have spoken about along with strategic
intelligence. We prescreen and evaluate those containers before
they are shipped, and the containers are screened early in that
supply chain, most likely at the foreign ports of departure.
Through the use of technologies such as large-scale x-ray
machines and radiation detection devices, we prescreen those
high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done
rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade.
Through the CSI program, CBP deploys multidiscipline teams
to include CBP officers, intelligence research specialists, and
special agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement to
selected foreign seaports throughout the world. As of today,
CSI is operational in 44 ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, North and Central and South America.
Since CSI began in 2002, we have added an average of one
port a month to the CSI fold. The 44 ports today represent 75
percent of the maritime cargo containers that are destined for
the United States.
By the end of 2007, we plan to have CBP officers stationed
at 58 total seaports in a foreign environment that will cover
85 percent of the cargo containers destined for this country.
And we will continue to foster relationships with other
countries and our trading partners to ensure that we inspect
all the high-risk containers before they are loaded on vessels
to the United States.
In addition, the World Customs Organization, the European
Union and G-8 also support the CSI expansion and have adopted a
resolution to introduce and implement security measures like
those of CSI at ports throughout the world.
Through a framework for security and facilitation of global
trade unanimously adopted by 169 members of the World Customs
Organization in June of 2005, CBP intends to promote harmonized
standards for data elements, examinations and risk assessments.
To date, over 130 of those 169 members have signed letters of
intent signaling their commitment to implement the standards of
the framework, which were built on the underlying tenets of the
Container Security Initiative.
In conclusion, we all know that America's borders and
securing those borders is an ongoing and long-term effort. But
I would say, since 9/11, our country has made great strides
towards securing those borders, protecting trade and travel
into this country and ensuring the vitality of the economy of
this country. We are grateful for this opportunity to talk to
this committee and the members today about our difficult and
dual mission.
I look forward to taking any opportunity for questions to
be answered after the other witnesses have testified.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Ahern.
[The statement of Mr. Ahern follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jayson P. Ahern
Good afternoon Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and
distinguished Member of the subcommittee. I am Jayson Ahern, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs & Border
Protection (CBP). It is a privilege to appear before you today and I
thank you for this opportunity to discuss the CBP programs that are
fundamental to securing our ports of entry from the threat of nuclear
terrorism.
First of all, let me assure you that preventing the smuggling of
nuclear weapons and radiological materials remains one of CBP's highest
priorities. Although the focus of this hearing is on our relationship
with our foreign partners and especially the Container Security
Initiative (CSI), CBP employs a multi-layered defense strategy to
substantially increase the likelihood that nuclear or radiological
material will be detected.
CBP has integrated its radiation detection technology deployment
initiative into its multi-layered defense strategy to address the
threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism that begins outside the
United States where the movement of illicit nuclear and radiological
materials is initiated and continues all the way to the U.S. borders.
CBP, as the guardian of the Nation's borders, safeguards the
homeland by protecting the American public against terrorists and the
instruments of terror and ensuring all cargo and people enter this
country legally. At the same time, CBP enforces the laws of the United
States and fosters the Nation's economic security through lawful travel
and trade.Sec.
In fiscal year 2005, CBP processed over 431 million passengers,
more than 121 million land border passenger vehicles, 1 million
aircraft, 113,325 vessels, and over 25 million sea, rail and truck
containers. In fiscal year 2005, CBP made 22,727 arrests and 23,802
narcotic seizures; seized over 798,000 pounds of narcotics,
approximately $28 million in currency, and over $120 million in
merchandise. We cannot protect against the entry of terrorists and the
instruments of terror without performing all missions.
We must perform all missions without stifling the flow of
legitimate trade and travel that is so important to our nation's
economy. We have ``twin goals''--building more secure and more
efficient borders.
Meeting Our Twin Goals - Building More Secure and More Efficient
Borders:
As the single, unified border agency of the United States, CBP's
missions are extraordinarily important to the protection of America and
the American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, CBP has developed initiatives to meet our twin goals of
improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
travel. Our homeland strategy to secure and facilitate cargo moving to
the United States is a layered defense approach built upon interrelated
initiatives. They are: the 24-Hour and Trade Act rules, the Automated
Targeting System (ATS), housed in CBP's National Targeting Center, the
use of Non-Intrusive Inspection equipment and Radiation Portal
Monitors, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiative. These
complementary layers enhance seaport security, and protect the nation.
Advance Electronic Information:
As a result of the 24-Hour rule and the Trade Act, CBP requires
advance electronic information on all cargo shipments coming to the
United States by land, air, and sea, so that we know who and what is
coming before it arrives in the United States. The 24-Hour Advanced
Cargo Rule requires all sea carriers, with the exception of bulk
carriers and approved break-bulk cargo, to provide proper cargo
descriptions and valid consignee addresses 24 hours before cargo is
loaded at the foreign port for shipment to the United States. Failure
to meet the 24-Hour Advanced Cargo Rule results in a ``do not load''
message and other penalties. This program gives CBP greater awareness
of what is being loaded onto ships bound for the United States and the
advance information enables CBP to evaluate the terrorist risk from sea
containers on 100% of shipments.
Automated Targeting System:
The Automated Targeting System, which is used by the National
Targeting Center and field targeting units in the United States and
overseas, is essential to our ability to target high-risk cargo and
passengers entering the United States. ATS is the system through which
we process advance manifest and passenger information to detect
anomalies and ``red flags,'' and determine which passengers and cargo
are ``high risk,'' and should be scrutinized at the port of entry, or
in some cases, overseas.
ATS is a flexible, constantly evolving system that integrates
enforcement and commercial databases. ATS analyzes electronic data
related to individual shipments prior to arrival and ranks them in
order of risk, based on the application of algorithms and rules. The
scores are divided into thresholds associated with further action by
CBP, such as document review and inspection.
The National Targeting Center, working closely with the Coast
Guard, also vets and risk scores all cargo and cruise-ship passengers
and crew prior to arrival. This ensures that DHS has full port security
awareness for international maritime activity.
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)--Extending our Zone of Security Outward &
Partnering with Other Countries:
In fiscal year 2005, over 11.3 million seagoing containers arrived
at our nation's seaports. Another 11.3 million cargo conveyances
arrived by land. About 90% of the world's manufactured goods move by
container, much of it stacked many stories high on huge transport
ships. Each year, two hundred million cargo containers are transported
between the world's seaports, constituting the most critical component
of global trade. The greatest threat to global maritime security is the
potential for terrorists to use the international maritime system to
smuggle terrorist weapons--or even terrorist operatives--into a
targeted country.
Clearly, the risk to international maritime cargo demands a robust
security strategy that can identify, prevent and deter threats, at the
earliest point in the international supply chain, before arrival at the
seaports of the targeted country. We must have a cohesive national
cargo security strategy that better protects us against the threat
posed by global terrorism without choking off the flow of legitimate
trade, so important to our economic security, to our economy, and, to
the global economy.
We developed a layered enforcement approach that addresses cargo
moving from areas outside of the United States to our ports of entry.
Our approach focuses on stopping any shipment by terrorists before it
reaches the United States, and only as a last resort, when it arrives
at a port of entry.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) initiatives bolster port
security. Through CSI, CBP works with host government Customs Services
to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports,
before they are loaded on-board vessels destined for the United States.
In addition to the current 44 foreign ports participating in CSI
covering 75% of maritime containerized cargo shipped to the U.S., many
more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, we expect
that 50 ports, covering 82% of maritime containerized cargo shipped to
the U.S. will participate in CSI.
Through C-TPAT, CBP is establishing successful security practices
for all parts of the supply chain, making it more difficult for a
terrorist or terrorist sympathizer to introduce a weapon into a
container being sent by a legitimate party to the United States. C-TPAT
covers a wide variety of security practices, from fences and lighting
to requiring that member companies conduct background checks on their
employees, maintain current employee lists, and require that employees
display proper identification.
C-TPAT's criteria also address physical access controls, facility
security, information technology security, container security, security
awareness and training, personnel screening, and important business
partner requirements. These business partner requirements encourage C-
TPAT members to conduct business with other C-TPAT members who have
committed to the same enhanced security requirements established by the
C-TPAT program.
The C-TPAT program has created public-private and international
partnership with approximately 6,000 businesses (over 10,000 have
applied), including most of the largest U.S. importers. Forty-five
percent of all merchandise imported into the United States is done so
by C-TPAT member importers. C-TPAT, CBP and partner companies are
working together to improve baseline security standards for supply
chain and container security. CBP reviews the security practices of not
only the company shipping the goods, but also the companies that
provided them with any services.
The validation process employed by CBP demonstrates and confirms
the effectiveness, efficiency and accuracy of a C-TPAT certified
member's supply chain security. At present, the C-TPAT program has
completed validations on 30 percent (1,902 validations completed) of
the certified membership, up from 8 percent (403 validations) completed
a year ago. Additionally, validations are in progress on another 35
percent (2,262 in progress) of certified members, and these validations
will be completed throughout 2006, bringing the total percentage of
certified members to 65 percent by year-end. In 2007, the C-TPAT
program validations will continue. We will have validated 100 percent
by the end of CY 2007.
Additionally, CBP has moved to tighten minimum-security criteria
for membership in this voluntary program. Working closely with the
trade community and key stakeholders, CBP has developed and implemented
baseline security standards for member importers, sea carriers, and
highway carriers. CBP will complete this process by the end of CY 2006,
defining the minimum-security criteria for the remaining enrollment
sectors--air carriers, rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders, and
foreign manufacturers.
In order to promulgate the best security practices, C-TPAT recently
compiled and published a best practice catalog, which was distributed
to all members and made available at its recent training seminar. Each
year C-TPAT conducts an annual seminar providing additional security
training and presentations from the trade community on how
implementation of C-TPAT has improved their security and provided a
measurable return on investment. C-TPAT will also be implementing a
discussion board available on their secure web portal whereby members
can exchange ideas and discussions on security practices and benefits.
Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment and Radiation Detection Portals:
CBP also uses cutting-edge technology, including large-scale X-ray
and Gamma-ray Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) systems to image cargo,
and radiation detection devices to screen cargo for the presence of
radiological materials.
Since CBP was formed in March 2003, we have increased our large-
scale NII inventory by 60 systems, including 19 additional systems to
the northern border, 16 additional systems to the southern border and
25 additional systems to seaports. CBP currently has an inventory of
176 large-scale NII systems deployed nationwide.
In fiscal year 2005, CBP examined nearly 80 percent of all rail
cars, nearly 25 percent of all land conveyances, and 5 percent of all
sea-borne containers that arrived in the U.S. The majority of these
examinations were accomplished with the use of large-scale NII
technology. At a minimum, 100 percent of all high-risk conveyances are
imaged with large-scale NII technology and screened with a hand-held
Radiation Isotope Identifier Device for the presence of radiation.
Approximately 2 million examinations were conducted with large-scale
NII technology at our nation's ports of entry prior to 2003.
In fiscal year 2005, that number increased to 5.4 million. Since
March 2003, large-scale NII technology has been used to conduct
approximately 12 million examinations. Since March 2003, in addition to
large-scale NII technology, CBP has deployed over 700 additional
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), 300 Radiation Isotope Identifier
Devices (RIID) and approximately 6,000 Personal Radiation Detectors
(PRD) to our ports of entry.
CBP currently operates 791 RPMs at our nation's ports, including
225 RPMs at seaports. RPMs are our most robust radiation detection
devices that provide CBP with a passive non-intrusive means to quickly
and thoroughly screen conveyances and/or shipments for the presence of
illicit radiological materials. CBP has also deployed a total of 566
RIIDs and approximately 13,000 PRDs to our nation's ports of entry.
CBP currently screens 100 percent of mail and express consignment
packages, 90 percent of all containerized cargo and 80 percent of all
privately owned vehicles entering the U.S. along the Northern Border,
90 percent of all containerized cargo and 82 percent of all privately
owned vehicles entering the U.S. along the Southern Border, and 57
percent of all arriving sea-borne containers for the presence of
radiation with RPMs.
Overall, CBP currently screens approximately 73 percent of all
arriving land/sea containerized cargo entering the United States with
RPMs. That number will continue to grow through the remainder of this
year and 2007. CBP will deploy a total of 621 RPMs to our Nation's top
seaports, which will allow us to screen approximately 98 percent of
inbound sea-borne containers by December 2007. A portion of these
deployed systems will be next-generation Advanced Spectroscopic
Portals, which will begin to be deployed in mid-FY 2007. In addition,
CBP will deploy 60 Mobile RPM Systems to seaports in 2006. Mobile RPMs
will provide us with the flexibility to conduct screening operations at
low-volume locations and to screen high-risk containers in a real-time
fashion. Initial deployment of Mobile RPMs has recently taken place
with 2 units deployed to Newark. The remaining 58 units are expected to
be in place by the end of CY2006. CBP's ultimate goal is to screen 100
percent of all high-risk people, cargo and conveyances for radiation.
CBP has strict response protocols in place to address and resolve
all radiation alarms. If our field officers require assistance in
resolving a radiation alarm, technical reach-back support is available
24 hours a day 365 days a year. Our Laboratories and Scientific
Services (LSS) scientists located at the National Targeting Center
provide that support. Beyond this support, further technical assistance
is available through the DNDO Secondary Reachback program, which
provides access to the nuclear design and spectroscopy expertise
resident in the National Laboratories.
To date, CBP has screened over 80 million conveyances with RPMs.
Radiation-screening results are shared with other Federal agencies as
well as certain State and Local entities as appropriate. The total
number of gamma and/or neutron-related radiation alarms to date is over
318,000. However, all alarms have been resolved and the overwhelming
majority have been attributed to naturally occurring radioactive
materials (NORM) or medical patients. Thus far, no RPM alarms have been
attributed to the illicit transport of special nuclear material.
Also, over 600 canine detection teams, capable of identifying
narcotics, bulk currency, human beings, explosives, agricultural pests,
and chemical weapons, are deployed at our ports of entry.
CBP Coordination with DNDO:
In addition to increased screening efforts at our own ports of
entry for radioactive and nuclear materials, the DHS Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) fully endorses the concept of increased active
and passive detection at foreign ports of departure. Foreign ports can
also use the systems DNDO are acquiring and developing with a CSI
presence, as well as the Department of Energy's Megaports program. We
must continue to stress the need for increased screening at foreign
ports of departure; while at the same time have a robust screening
effort at our own ports of entry.
The DNDO FY 2007 budget request of nearly $536 million includes
$157 million for the acquisition and deployment of current and next-
generation radiation detection systems at our ports of entry. These
systems will be deployed and operated by CBP. In addition, DNDO's FY
2007 budget also includes funding for the development of enhanced cargo
radiography screening systems for our ports of entry. CBP will continue
to work closely with DNDO to explore new and emerging technologies in
an effort to enhance our antiterrorism capabilities. These enhanced
screening efforts will complement the many information-based programs
CBP already has in place for enhanced port security.
CBP Coordination with DOE:
As CBP moved forward with the CSI program, we have also developed a
very important partnership with the Department of Energy and its
Megaports program.
CSI and Megaports are complementary programs, with both serving as
elements of a comprehensive maritime security strategy. Megaports
complements CSI in that it enhances foreign governments' capabilities
to detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and
other radiological materials and it provides another data element to
support CSI targeting and evaluation of suspect containers.
Integrated Container Inspection System (ICIS):
DHS and CBP acknowledge that the Hong Kong Container Terminal
Operators Association (HKCTOA) and Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) have taken an important step forward in an effort to
improve container security. The Integrated Container Inspection System
(ICIS) pilot demonstrates that the concept of collecting and
integrating radiation detection spectral data with radiographic imaging
on containers departing Hong Kong is complementary and consistent with
our agency's goals.
As the HKCTOA continues to make progress in collecting valuable
screening data, CBP remains committed to working with the Association,
the Hong Kong Customs & Excise Department and the Hong Kong Government
to develop the policies, procedures and response protocols that will
allow us to take full advantage of the investment the Hong Kong
shipping community is making to better protect maritime trade and the
global supply chain.
CBP and DNDO meet regularly to discuss potential implementation
strategies. Results from the ongoing analysis will impact future
discussions.
Conclusion:
In summary, as I have previously noted, CBP screens 100 percent (%)
of containers for risk. All containers that CBP determines to be of
risk are examined using a variety of technologies, either at the
foreign port of loading under the Container Security Initiative, or
upon arrival into the U.S. port of entry. The technologies used include
radiation screening, non-intrusive x-ray inspection, and as
appropriate, physical examination. CBP officers tasked with the
security of our seaports carry out this screening and examination.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have briefly addressed
CBP's critical initiatives today that will help CBP protect America
against terrorists and the instruments of terror, while at the same
time enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the Nation's
economic security through lawful travel and trade. With the continued
support of the President, DHS, and the Congress, CBP will succeed in
meeting the challenges posed by the ongoing terrorist threat and the
need to facilitate ever-increasing numbers of legitimate shipments and
travelers.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be happy to
answer any of your questions.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Huizenga.
STATEMENT OF DAVID HUIZENGA
Mr. Huizenga. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Langevin and other distinguished members of the
subcommittee for inviting us here today.
I would like to take this opportunity to discuss progress
made under the Megaports initiative, as well as to address some
of the hurdles we must overcome to advance and accelerate
overseas scanning of containers.
I will focus my remarks in three areas, agreements of
foreign countries, interagency cooperation and detection
equipment.
The Megaports initiative grew out of our comprehensive
second line of defense program under which we had been
installing radiation portal monitors overseas for more than a
decade at land borders, seaports and airports, primarily in the
former Soviet Union. Building on the 20 seaports we equipped in
Russia, in 2003, we expanded this to Megaports worldwide. We
began with a focus on the 20 CSI ports, based on the volume of
containers shipped to the United States. We added a threat
component to our prioritization strategy that led to our
current list of approximately 70 Megaports which largely
mirrors the current list of CSI ports that Mr. Ahern referred
to.
The number of countries signed on to the program has
increased each year. We are currently working in 17 ports in 14
countries and are close to signing agreements with 10 more
countries.
Completion of an agreement with the host nation is the
first step toward implementation. The agreement establishes a
clear understanding of roles and responsibilities by both
parties and creates the necessary framework for us to be able
to provide equipment, training and maintenance. Further, the
agreement documents the host government's commitment to notify
the U.S. Government of all detections or seizures of illicit
nuclear or other radioactive materials.
The DOE doesn't station people on the ground under
Megaports as they do in CSI. Rather, we provide the equipment
and training and allow the host governments to carry out their
nonproliferation security responsibilities. Therefore, the
effectiveness of this program depends on the commitment of our
foreign partners to devote the necessary resources to monitor
the detection systems and, most importantly, to detect and
detain suspect containers and quickly and accurately resolve
alarms, a task only they are authorized to perform.
Unfortunately, the time it takes to establish such
agreements can vary widely from one country to the next. For
example, we negotiated with one country for 2 years without
much progress; and then completed an agreement in 4 days in
advance of a Presidential visit. So you can see, at times, we
can use the leverage of high-level administration officials to
trigger things to advance our cause, and indeed we try.
Each sovereign country has its unique sensitivities and
national security agendas. Questions generally center on how
many customs agents will be needed to implement the program,
whether port operations will be slowed in any way, and the
sharing of potentially sensitive alarm data. The cooperation of
terminal operators is always an important factor. And we are
working with all the major private port operators.
One area in which the cooperation of terminal operators is
particularly important relates to transshipped cargo. Scanning
container traffic moving through entry and exit gates is a
relatively straightforward task, but assessing and accessing
transhipped containers has proven to be more challenging. We
are now working several strategies, however, with terminal
operators to efficiently scan this transhipped container cargo.
Despite the difficulties we have encountered, we have been
successful in overcoming the concerns of both the host
governments and the terminal operators and have, in fact,
gained significant cooperation of a large number of important
countries and significantly increased international recognition
of the nuclear smuggling threat. We have done this by working
with an interagency group. The Megaports initiatives is an
integral element of the U.S. maritime security strategy, and we
work closely with our interagency partners.
From the beginning, we worked very closely with our
partners in CBP's container security initiative. Our current
effort to equip each CSI port with radiation detection
capability is evidence of our partnership. We have undertaken
over 20 joint outreach missions and port assessments with the
CSI staff and have signed two joint agreements with foreign
deployments and are anticipating signing several more yet this
fiscal year.
We are working closely with CSI to evaluate innovative
approaches to scanning containers, such as the integrated
container inspection system which has been tested as a pilot in
Hong Kong. Indeed, I am leading an interagency delegation that
includes CSI and State Department representatives this Memorial
Day weekend to Hong Kong to assess this important technology
and process.
We also coordinated closely with DNDO in defining the
global nuclear detection architecture and exploring mechanisms
to share overseas alarm data. We plan on using DNDO's
procurement vehicle to purchase advance spectroscopic monitors,
thus benefiting from DNDO research and leveraging our joint
buying power.
Finally, we work closely with State Department here in
Washington and the embassies around the world to ensure that
our work is carried out as part of a wider U.S. Government
foreign policy presence.
Before I close, let me turn just briefly to the detection
equipment. The radiation detection equipment deployed under
Megaports is a proven technology developed to ensure nuclear
material security at the DOE weapons sites. The equipment
includes fixed, handheld and at times portable detection
systems which have been evaluated by our national laboratories,
as well as at the DNDO test facility in Nevada.
At the same time, we recognize the need for the next
generation of equipment. We are closely tracking research and
development efforts at DNDO and within DOE and hope that such
equipment will provide increased power to identify shielded
nuclear materials and better support the prompt adjudication of
alarms.
In closing, I would like to restate that the Megaports
Initiative is dedicated to preventing the smuggling of nuclear
and radiological material at international seaports; we
accomplish this goal by working with foreign governments and
terminal operators, maintaining strong relationships with other
agencies and departments of the U.S. Government and deploying
the best and appropriate technology for the job.
We firmly believe that the unique capabilities of each
department and agency are being leveraged to accomplish our
common objective of preventing nuclear material from reaching
the shores of the U.S.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you Mr. Huizenga.
[The statement of Mr. Huizenga follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Huizenga
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin and other
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to highlight the substantial progress we have made in
expanding the Megaports Initiative to high priority countries. I would
also like to take a few minutes to describe some of the hurdles we must
overcome to accelerate the radiation scanning of overseas container
traffic. The topic of today's hearing is a priority for our country and
indeed for the world. The risk of nuclear terrorism is not limited to
the United States and the success of our efforts to detect and deter
nuclear smuggling is very much dependent on whether our foreign
partners share a common recognition of the threat and a willingness to
combat it. For that reason, we have expended a significant amount of
efforts on international outreach to garner support for this critical
initiative.
I am the Assistant Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear
Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of International Material
Protection and Cooperation (IMPC). My office is one of six program
offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN).
The collective mission of DNN is to detect, prevent, and reverse the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our programs are
structured in support of multiple layers of defense against nuclear
terrorism and state-sponsored nuclear proliferation. This multi-layered
approach is intended to identify and address potential vulnerabilities
within the international nonproliferation regime, to limit terrorists'
access to deadly weapons and material, and to prevent the illicit
trafficking of dangerous materials that could be used in a nuclear or
radiological weapon. The Megaports Initiative plays a critical role
within the IMPC program.
Megaports Mission
We established the Megaports program in response to the concern
that terrorists and states of concern could use the global maritime
shipping lanes to smuggle nuclear or other radiological material. The
Megaports mission is focused on preventing the trafficking of nuclear
material or weapons to our borders as well as interdicting nuclear
smuggling attempts within regions of concern. In support of these
objectives, we work with host nations to install radiation detection
equipment at foreign ports to provide the capability to scan
containerized cargo for the potential presence of radiation.
We have been installing radiation monitors overseas for more than a
decade at land borders, seaports, airports, and nuclear facilities,
mostly in the Former Soviet Union. Building on the 20 seaports we
equipped in Russia under the Second Line of Defense program, we
expanded to large seaports worldwide in 2003 (i.e., Megaports). We
began with a focus on the first 20 Container Security Initiative (CSI)
ports, whose selection was based on sheer volume to the United States.
We later added a threat component to our prioritization strategy
following consultations with the Intelligence Community, private-sector
threat specialists, and our national labs. This led to our current list
of approximately 70 ports of interest under Megaports.
I am pleased to report that we have steadily increased the number
of countries participating in the Megaports program over the last three
years. We are currently working in 14 ports, are close to signing
agreements with about 10 more countries, and are in various stages of
discussions with another 10. We have purchased equipment to outfit
several more ports and have contracts in place to support design,
engineering and construction. Once all 70 ports are equipped, we
conservatively estimate that we will be scanning at least 40 percent of
global traffic and over 50 percent of U.S.-bound containers.
Role in NNSA's Nonproliferation Strategy
The Megaports Initiative is a key component of NNSA's larger
strategy to prevent the diversion of nuclear weapons and material.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, we have focused
on securing nuclear materials and weapons at well over one hundred
research, storage and manufacturing facilities in Russia and other
states of the Former Soviet Union. Backed by strong Congressional
support, we are on track to complete these security upgrades by the end
of 2008. By addressing the vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities,
NNSA's global nonproliferation programs seek and capitalize on the
widely accepted notion that working close to the source of a threat is
the most effective way to reduce risks to the United States.
Our Second Line of Defense Program, which enhances security on
foreign borders by providing a technical tool to interdict illicit
trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials, is a natural
complement to these activities. The deployment of radiation detection
systems at high-risk land border crossings, airports and seaports
provide a backstop to the nuclear site security systems, increasing the
likelihood that nuclear materials stolen from protected facilities will
be detected and interdicted.
The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program was also designed to
confront the threat of nuclear terrorism as close to the source of the
threat as possible. Given the vast amount of nuclear material spread
across Russia's nuclear complex, our cooperative work with the Federal
Customs Service of the Russian Federation to secure Russian points of
entry and exit remains our highest priority. However, we have expanded
SLD deployments to countries of the Former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and established the Megaports program in recognition that
significant quantities of nuclear materials are generated and stored
outside of Russia and that redundant layers of detection are necessary
to address such a grave threat.
Agreements with Foreign Partners
The completion of agreements with our foreign partners is key to
our ability to implement the Megaports Initiative. The long-term
benefit of the program will largely hinge upon the strength of our
international cooperation, and these agreements lay the foundation for
this cooperation. These agreements represent a political commitment by
both governments and document a mutual understanding of overall roles
and responsibilities. At times it can be difficult to put these
agreements in place, despite the best efforts of the U.S. Ambassadors
and high-level focus within the Administration.
The agreements create a framework for NNSA's provision of the
necessary radiation detection equipment as well as the follow-on
training and maintenance assistance to support the Megaports mission.
The terms of our agreements make clear that host government officials
are responsible for the operation of the equipment and the response to
all alarms. In addition to these commitments, they also contain
important clauses that protect NNSA's interests such as the
understanding that NNSA will not pay foreign taxes on the assistance it
provides, a position that is consistent with Congressional guidance on
this topic. Most importantly, the agreements document the host
government's commitment to notify the U.S. Government of all detections
or seizures of illicit nuclear and other radioactive materials made as
a result of the use of NNSA supplied equipment.
In a number of instances, concluding Megaports agreements has
required several months and sometimes years of active engagement. While
there are obvious mutual security benefits of implementing Megaports,
there are also inherent resource commitments that must be met by the
host government to successfully implement the Megaports program. The
effectiveness of the program depends on the host government's
willingness to devote the resources necessary to operate the detection
systems and quickly resolve alarms. Only the host nation has the
authority to adjudicate suspicious or suspect containers. In many
cases, the host government must hire or realign staff to continuously
man the Central Alarm Station and to conduct secondary inspections for
high-risk containers. Finally, the data sharing provisions of the
agreements touch on sensitive national security and sovereignty
matters. In light of these commitments, a decision to join the
Megaports program usually requires interagency approval at the most
senior levels of the host government and this can take a significant
period of time. All prospective partners understandably seek to ensure
that Megaports cooperation is within their national interest. In many
cases, our negotiation process is often influenced by broader bilateral
issues that a host country may choose to link to progress on Megaports
discussions. As with all foreign negotiations, our effectiveness is
dependent on the degree of leverage at our disposal. We are
continuously seeking additional ways to convince host countries to
embrace the program. For example, we highlight the new World Customs
Organization standards requiring radiation detection during our efforts
to elicit foreign interest in the program. The growing number of
agreements we have signed has also created added incentive for other
countries to join the Megaports program, as they observe our progress
in their region and witness the benefits of our cooperation. We also
attempt to capitalize on Presidential and other Administration
officials? visits to bring difficult negotiations to conclusion. By way
of example, one country in particular refused to conclude negotiations
for over two years, but then agreed to complete an agreement in a
matter of four days due to a Presidential visit. Finally, the
additional Congressional focus on international port security is bound
to help in this regard as well.
While we establish formal agreements with foreign governments, the
cooperation of terminal operators in foreign ports is always an
important factor in the successful implementation of the Megaports
program. To that end, we have engaged the terminal operators early on
in the discussions with our foreign partners to ensure their buy-in and
to determine the optimal placement of the detection systems.
Additionally, we often benefit from the willingness of these terminal
operators to exert pressure on the host government to implement the
program. We have ongoing exchanges with all of the major private port
terminal operators by virtue of the negotiations and implementation
activities we are currently supporting. In fact, we have already agreed
upon an arrangement with one of the largest port terminal opertators to
partner in ports where they have an interest in funding the
installation of radiation detection systems. While drawing the private
sector into our outreach discussions is an important part of the
Megaports strategy, is essential to establish agreements with host
governments, who perform the vital tasks of resolving alarms and
detaining suspect containers. In short, we must continue to focus our
efforts on persuading foreign customs services to adopt the program
along with the private sector, since sovereign countries will not
accept private sector inspections of cargo in their ports.
Finally, while accelerating the completion of agreements is
important, it will not in and of itself solve one of the more complex
issues in overseas scanning--capturing transshipped cargo. Working
directly with terminal operators is imperative to address this issue.
Although scanning containers as they enter or exit a gate is relatively
straightforward for terminal operators, scanning transshipped cargo can
be a complex challenge. Containers are unloaded from one ship, placed
on the dock for a varying period of time, and placed on another ship,
without ever transiting a natural choke point where it would be
convenient to set up radiation portal monitors. Operators must disrupt
normal operations to drive transshipped containers to a location for
scanning. Since timing is so critical to port efficiency and
competitiveness, we recognize that a country's decision to join the
Megaports program hinges on the perceived impact to port operations. We
continue to work on strategies with host governments and terminal
operators to scan transshipped cargo with minimal impact on the
terminal operations.
Interagency Relationships
As with all of our international programs, we recognize that
closely coordinating Megaports activities with those of related
programs within other departments and agencies reinforces our
objectives and is important to our success. The Megaports Initiative is
an integral element of the U.S. maritime security strategy,
complementing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Container
Security Initiative (CSI), Coast Guard's International Port Security
Program (IPSP) and the Department of State?s Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).
Partnership with CSI
We have long recognized that Megaports and CSI form synergistic
layers in the larger, multi-tiered defense against nuclear terrorism.
We have accordingly built and maintain a strong partnership with DHS's
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to closely align the
implementation of the two programs. In support of this partnership, we
are working to equip each CSI port with a radiation detection
capability. The extraordinary collaboration and coordination between
CSI and the Megaports Initiative is evident in the over 20 joint
outreach missions, port assessments, briefings, and high level meetings
we have undertaken and the joint agreements we have signed with foreign
partners. We have already signed two joint Megaports-CSI agreements
with Oman and Honduras, anticipate signing several more this year and
continue to seek additional opportunities to jointly implement both
programs. Signing such joint agreements is arguably the best way to
leverage our interagency partnership and accelerate Megaports.
Given the critical role that technology plays in support of our
common goal, we have also partnered with CSI to evaluate innovative
scanning configurations, such as the Integrated Container Inspection
System (ICIS) deployed in the port of Hong Kong. Adding an imaging
capability to the detection system should help reduce secondary
inspections and may play a role in analyzing the risk of non-alarmed
containers. We are further investigating opportunities with CSI to
partner with private sector port terminal operators. Many private
sector port terminal operators are keenly aware that in the era of
globalization, a nuclear or radiological incident at one port could
adversely impact the entire global trading system. We welcome the
private sector's promotion of stronger port security measures and
believe that an appropriate partnership with the private sector could
accelerate the number of ports equipped to detect nuclear smuggling.
We will continue to explore additional avenues to leverage our
partnership with CSI to accelerate the implementation and augment the
effectiveness of Megaports. I strongly believe that the best way to
expand overseas scanning of cargo containers is to continue to build
upon the strong ties between our two agencies.
DNDO
Another important interagency relationship is that with the
Domestic Nuclear Defense Office (DNDO). Because the SLD program forms a
critical layer in the global nuclear detection architecture, NNSA and
DNDO's cooperation in the campaign to reduce the threat of nuclear
terrorism is crucial. Given our role as the primary agency responsible
for international deployment of radiation detection equipment, we
routinely exchange information with DNDO to ensure that our efforts fit
cohesively together in support of a comprehensive global architecture.
In support of DNDO?s mission, we are jointly exploring the means to
share the overseas alarm data from SLD deployments directly with DNDO.
We are working collaboratively to establish operational
requirements for future detection systems. We support DNDO's
operational testing and evaluation program, as improvements in nuclear
detection equipment will benefit our international deployment efforts.
Currently, we are exploring the possibility of joining DNDO?s
procurement vehicles to leverage our combined purchasing power to
reduce overall costs to the taxpayers and accelerate our deployments.
We look forward to further strengthening this relationship as we
move toward implementation of the DHS vision to more fully integrate
radiation detection systems world-wide to better evaluate potential
threats to the United States and to the global transportation system.
Department of State
We could not be successful in the development and implementation of
this international effort without a close relationship with the State
Department. On that front, we work closely with the Office of Export
Control Cooperation and the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Terrorism to coordinate with one another in carrying out our
complementary missions. The Office of Export Control Cooperation chairs
a bi-monthly Interagency Working Group to coordinate efforts of
agencies and programs involved in the area of export control and
related border security and holds periodic meetings to discuss
strategic and country-specific visions and priorities, as well as to
discuss the planned scope of work in specific countries. Under the
Second Line of Defense program, we periodically execute projects on
behalf of the State Department to provide radiation detection systems.
This helps to ensure consistent deployment of systems and allows us to
provide more efficiently for the maintenance of the equipment.
The State Department also leads the Nuclear Trafficking Response
Group, an interagency group that is responsible for ensuring rapid
dissemination of information pertaining to significant trafficking
incidents and for coordinating recommendations on diplomatic and other
responses to such incidents. In doing so, the NTRG seeks to advance USG
interests in (1) securing smuggled material and the facilities from
which they were diverted, (2) encouraging the prosecution of those
involved, and (3) developing information on related security threats,
e.g. connections between smugglers and terrorists.
Detection Equipment
The radiation detection equipment currently being deployed by NNSA
under the SLD program is proven technology that was developed to ensure
nuclear material security at DOE weapons sites. NNSA currently provides
host country partners with an integrated suite of equipment, which
includes radiation portal monitors that utilize plastic scintillators
and Helium-3 tube technology to detect highly enriched uranium,
plutonium, and other radioactive isotopes. The comprehensive system
also includes computers and cameras and, as appropriate, Optical
Character Recognition (OCR) equipment to collect and transmit alarm
information for analysis by host country Customs officials. Finally,
handheld equipment is supplied that is used to conduct secondary
inspections to isolate and identify radioactive sources within
containers, vehicles, or on persons. The equipment has been evaluated
by our technical experts at the National Laboratories as well as at the
Domestic Nuclear Defense Office's test facility in Nevada and has
proven to be operationally effective and robust in harsh, and often
remote, international environments.
That being said, we recognize that there are limitations in its
capabilities and that there is a need for next generation equipment
that will identify both highly enriched uranium and plutonium with a
high degree of efficiency and will support the prompt adjudication of
innocent alarms so as not to impede commerce flow. We are closely
tracking the efforts within the NNSA and DNDO research and development
programs so that we may capitalize on advancements in detection
capabilities. For example, we are working with DNDO to purchase a
number of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) as soon as the equipment
has been sufficiently evaluated and is ready for deployment. The ASP is
expected to enhance the ability of Customs officials to resolve alarms
by providing a more sophisticated capability to quickly identify the
radioactive isotopes of concern. NNSA plans to use the ASPs at
Megaports locations as secondary inspection tools and, as necessary,
for primary inspection at locations that have larger traffic volumes.
We have also initiated efforts to modify existing technologies to
address scanning challenges in transshipment ports. For example, in the
Port of Freeport in The Bahamas, we expect to be able to scan more than
90 percent of the transshipped cargo using a straddle carrier vehicle
outfitted with radiation detection equipment, including spectroscopic
detection capabilities. This modified straddler can travel through rows
of shipping containers in the stacks, a reverse of our normal
deployment strategy that is based on the permanent placement of the
detection equipment and transit of the container through the portal.
While this approach is not applicable at all ports, for those terminals
that stack in a compatible configuration, this type of deployment
provides an opportunity to maximize scanning of transshipped
containers. We are also working closely with the private sector on
other promising mobile configurations to address transshipment at ports
with more traditional stacking configurations.
Finally, we continue to look to the future and eagerly await the
development of even more revolutionary detection enhancements, such as
the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) currently under
development within DNDO. This advanced radiography system will provide
better imaging in drive through capacities and is expected to improve
our ability to identify shielded highly enriched uranium in
containerized cargo.
Conclusion
In closing, I would like to restate that the Megaports Initiative
under the NNSA/SLD Program is dedicated to preventing the smuggling of
nuclear and radiological material at international seaports. We
accomplish this goal by working closely with foreign governments and by
maintaining strong relationships with other agencies and departments in
the U.S. Government. We firmly believe that the unique capabilities of
each department and agency are being leveraged to accomplish our common
objective of preventing nuclear material from reaching the shores of
the United States.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Record.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK RECORD, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATION SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION
Mr. Record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by
thanking you and Ranking Member Langevin and other
distinguished members of the subcommittee, as well as Chairman
King and Ranking Member Thompson for giving me the opportunity
today to address one of our most urgent national security
priorities.
Over the last decade, the nuclear threat to our national
security has undergone fundamental transformation. Today, we
face the risk of a terrorist acquiring nuclear and radiological
material from shadowy networks of smugglers, state sponsors of
terrorism and organized criminal elements; and then deploying
such material in the form of a nuclear device or dirty bomb
against one of our cities.
We recognize that we cannot meet this challenge alone and
must work with like-minded nations around the world who will
join us in achieving this objective. Building on the Department
of State's lead responsibility to engage foreign governments
and institutions, we place the highest emphasis on enlisting
foreign cooperation to prevent nuclear smuggling.
We currently manage a number of programs and initiatives
that address this issue, both through the provision of
financial assistance to foreign governments as well as through
cooperative activities to deter, interdict and prevent
terrorist acquisition and the use of nuclear and radiological
material.
Let me begin by making two overarching points about our
approach to enlisting international cooperation. First, I would
like to point out, the State Department oversees efforts to
prevent nuclear smuggling built on years of collaboration with
the Departments of Energy and Defense, as well as the
establishment of cooperative links with the recently
established Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO.
Second, we must recognize that each country that we work
with faces unique challenges to do their part to prevent
terrorists from acquiring or using a nuclear weapon. In fact,
no two countries share identical risks from nuclear smuggling
or nuclear terrorism.
Some countries, for example, may suffer from poor border
controls or lack of laws, regulations or enforcement capacity
to stop the smuggling activities. Other countries may have laws
and security forces to interdict and bring to justice nuclear
smugglers, but only a limited means to detect movement of
material or related transactions.
Today, I will provide an overview of Department programs
and initiatives established in whole or in part to prevent
nuclear smuggling. I will also make some brief remarks about
our efforts to implement Secretary Rice's vision of
transformational democracy.
First, I would like to talk to you about the activities of
the Export Control and Related Border Security program, EXBS
program, which is designed to help source--to help key source
transit and transshipment countries, develop and improve their
strategic trade and related border patrol systems.
In developing and improving these systems, we work to
ensure conformity within international standards for
controlling items on lists of nonproliferation export control
regimes and also to prevent the authorization and transfer of
end uses and end users of proliferation concern and to detect
and interdict illicit transfers at the border.
In building countries' capacities in this critical area,
the EXBS program helps key partners meet their obligations and
commitments pursuant to other important U.S. and international
initiatives, such as U.N. Security Council's Resolution 1540
proliferation security initiative, which I will address in a
minute, and adherence to a number of multilateral export
regimes.
Now, with respect to the deployment of radiation detection
equipment, the State Department's Office of Export Control
Cooperation manages the EXBS program and coordinates the
efforts of other U.S. agencies and facilitates the efforts of
other agencies includingSec. by helping them to conclude
government-to-government agreement.
While the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration provides the bulk of the radiation portal
monitors deployed to foreign governments, in certain
circumstances the EXBS program provides some portal monitors in
close consultation with NNSA, based on a memorandum of
understanding through our agents.
For instance, this MOU clarifies that NNSA agrees to
maintain the equipment, as it does for other U.S.-provided
portal monitors, including a substantial number of those
provided previously by the State Department's Nonproliferation
Disarmament Fund.
As a complement to the overall effort to build enforcement
capacity, the EXBS program also provides handheld radiation
detection equipment, imaging devices and enforcement training,
targeting and inspecting cargo to help partner countries
prevent illicit transfers of weapons and weapons-related items,
including nuclear and radioactive material.
In addition, the proliferation--another important program
of the Department of State is proliferation security initiative
PSI. It is a global effort launched by President Bush on May1,
2003, to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems and related materials to and from
state and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. Its
underlying premise is that our efforts in this area are
enhanced through partnership of states working in concert,
employing a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic,
military and other tools to interdict WMD-related shipments.
The PSI creates the basis for practical cooperation among
state partners. It is a set of activities based on
participating countries' common commitments to the PSI
statement of interdiction principles. It is not, however, a
formal organization. Endorsement of the statement of
interdiction principles by a state does not create formal
obligation, but it does represent a political commitment to
stop proliferation-related shipments whenever and wherever
possible.
The principles are consistent with national legal
authorities and relevant international law and framework.
Participation in any given PSI activity is a voluntary national
decision. And we encourage PSI partners to strengthen their
national legal authorities and enforcement capabilities to
improve their ability to interdict WMD trafficking.
The primary focus of PSI is on interdicting WMD-related
shipments. To prepare for these interdictions, participants
engage in a wide range of operational exercises, with more than
50 countries participating in one or more of our interdiction
exercises.
Mr. Chairman, I know you mentioned the BBC interdiction,
that was one of the interdictions of PSI operations and was an
example of a number of countries successfully working together
to meet this threat.
Mr. Chairman, I realize I am just about out of time, so I
would be glad to answer any questions that you or your
colleagues have about our other programs relating to the
nuclear smuggling outreach initiative as well as the NTRG
efforts as well.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francis C. Record
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, I want to start by thanking you, along with Ranking
Member Langevin and the other distinguished members of the
subcommittee, for giving me the opportunity today to address one of our
most urgent national security priorities.
Over the last decade, the nuclear threat to our national and
homeland security has undergone a fundamental transformation. Today we
face the risk of a terrorist acquiring nuclear and radiological
material from shadowy networks of smugglers, state sponsors of
terrorism, and organized criminal elements, and then deploying such
material in the form of a nuclear device or dirty bomb against one of
our cities.
We recognize that we cannot meet this challenge alone and must work
with like-minded nations around the world that will join with us to
achieve this objective. Building on the Department of State's lead
responsibility to engage foreign governments and institutions, we place
the highest emphasis on enlisting foreign cooperation to prevent
nuclear smuggling. We currently manage a number of programs and
initiatives that address this issue, both through the provision of
financial assistance to foreign governments as well as through
cooperative activities to deter, interdict, and prevent terrorist
acquisition and use of nuclear and radiological material.
Let me begin by making two overarching points about our approach to
enlisting international cooperation in this mission. First, the State
Department's overseas efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling build on
years of collaboration with the Departments of Energy and Defense, as
well as the establishment of cooperative links with the recently-
established Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Second, we must
recognize that each country faces unique challenges to do their part to
prevent terrorists from acquiring or using a nuclear weapon. In fact,
no two countries share identical risks from nuclear smuggling or
nuclear terrorism. Some countries may suffer from poor border controls
and lack the laws, regulations, and enforcement capacity to stop
nuclear smuggling. Other countries may have laws and the security
forces to interdict and bring to justice nuclear smugglers but only
limited means to detect the movement of material or related illicit
transactions. To succeed in this complex environment, we must ensure
that our risk assessments and our programs account for country and
region-specific factors. In short, diplomatic approaches that may work
with one country or a group of countries will often not work with
others.
Today, I will provide an overview of Department programs and
initiatives established in whole or in part to prevent nuclear
smuggling. I will also explain how our recent reorganization has
strengthened our ability to implement Secretary Rice's vision of
Transformational Diplomacy.
There are four specific programs and initiatives in this area--the
Export Control and Related Border Security program, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, and the
Nuclear Trafficking Response Group--and I will begin first with an
overview of our
Export Control and Border Assistance Program.
The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program is
designed to help key source, transit and transshipment countries
develop and improve their strategic trade and related border control
systems. In developing and improving these systems, we work to ensure
conformity with international standards for controlling items on the
control lists of the nonproliferation export control regimes, to
prevent the authorization of transfers to end-uses and end-users of
proliferation concern, and to detect and interdict illicit transfers at
the border. In building countries' capacity in this critical area, the
EXBS program helps key partners meet their obligations and commitments
pursuant to other important U.S. and international initiatives,
including U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, and adherence to the multilateral export control
regimes, and it advances U.S. efforts to establish a global WMD
detection architecture.
With respect to the deployment of radiation detection equipment,
the State Department's Office of Export Control Cooperation, which
manages the EXBS program, has two main roles. The first is to
coordinate with and support the efforts of other U.S. agencies in order
to avoid duplication and ensure that deployments occur on a prioritized
basis, and the second is to facilitate the efforts of other agencies,
including helping them conclude government-to-government agreements.
While the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) provides the bulk of the radiation portal
monitors deployed to foreign governments, in certain circumstances the
EXBS program provides some portal monitors in close coordination with
NNSA based on a Memorandum of Understanding between our agencies. For
instance, this MOU clarifies that NNSA agrees to maintain the
equipment, as it does for other U.S.-provided portal monitors,
including the substantial number provided previously by the State
Department's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. All of these
equipment deployments are subject to the NSC's Nuclear Guidelines, and
are coordinated via the State Department-chaired Export and Border
Control Assistance Working Group as well as the International Nuclear
Detection Working Group.
As a complement to the overall effort to build enforcement
capacity, the EXBS program also provides handheld radiation detection
equipment, imaging devices, and enforcement training in targeting and
inspecting cargo to help partner countries prevent illicit transfers of
weapons and weapons-related items, including nuclear and radioactive
material.
Proliferation Security Initiative
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort,
launched by President Bush on May 31, 2003, to stop trafficking of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern. Its underlying premise is that our efforts in this area are
enhanced through partnerships of states working in concert, employing a
broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military, and other tools
to interdict WMD-related shipments. The PSI creates the basis for
practical cooperation among states in this area.
The PSI is a set of activities based on participating countries'
common commitment to the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. It
is not a formal organization. Endorsement of the Statement of
Interdiction Principles by a state does not create formal
``obligations'', but does represent a political commitment to stop
proliferation-related shipments whenever possible. The Principles are
consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international
law and frameworks. Participation in any given PSI activity is a
voluntary national decision. We encourage PSI partners to strengthen
their national legal authorities and enforcement capabilities to
improve their ability to interdict WMD-related trafficking.
The primary focus of PSI is on interdicting WMD-related shipments.
To prepare for interdictions, participants engage in a range of
operational exercise activities. More than 50 countries have
participated in one or more of the over 20 multinational PSI
interdiction exercises designed to improve national capabilities and
participants' ability to operate together. These exercises are hosted
throughout the world by individual PSI participants. PSI participants
have also conducted sophisticated simulations of interdictions to
develop new and creative methods for stopping proliferation shipments.
The PSI Operational Experts Group--an expanding network of military,
law enforcement, intelligence, and legal experts--meets periodically to
develop new operational concepts, organize the interdiction exercise
program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue
cooperation with key industry sectors.
We are further operationalizing the PSI by pursuing and concluding
bilateral shipboarding agreements. We have signed agreements with the
world's largest ship registries, thereby covering much of the world's
shipping tonnage. Shipboarding agreements establish key points of
contact and procedures to facilitate requests to board and search
vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipments of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, or related materials. They also
serve to deter proliferators. We are pursuing these agreements covering
vessels in international waters with a number of countries.
More than 70 countries now support PSI, and the number is growing.
We are working intensively to broaden the circle of countries that
count themselves as PSI supporters. On June 23, Poland will host a
high-level political meeting of all PSI participants, to assess the
Initiative to date and plan for its continued broadening and deepening
of participation and activity.
Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative
The State Department also enlists foreign cooperation against
nuclear smuggling through a new Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative,
which is aimed at identifying and addressing shortcomings and gaps in
nuclear smuggling security capabilities of states at risk. Through this
initiative, we conduct outreach both to countries with source material
as well as those at risk from nuclear smuggling activity. Our outreach
builds on interagency assessments of country-specific risks that take
into account existing programs and ongoing work, both by the United
States and by other governments. These assessments address the
capabilities of host governments to prevent, detect, and prosecute
illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material.
Following a rigorous assessment process, an interagency team
engages with officials of the at-risk state to determine its precise
needs and to reach agreement on a list of priority projects designed to
close the capability gaps identified in the assessment. We then work
closely with potential donors in various fora to arrange funding for
the priority projects identified and agreed to. The matching of
priority projects to donors can occur under the auspices of the
European Union, the G8's Global Partnership or directly in bilateral
discussions with donor governments.
The success of the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative depends to
a large degree on the willingness of the government of the at-risk
country to participate and to use the assistance effectively. Assessing
and engaging an at-risk country can take months, and matching suitable
donors to worthy projects can take a similar period of time. Although
still in a start-up phase, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative is
showing promising signs based on the initial round of assessments
completed.
Nuclear Trafficking Response Group
For over ten years, the State Department has chaired an inter-
agency committee, the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG) that
was established pursuant to a Presidential Decision for the purpose of
reducing the risk of illicit transfer of nuclear weapons, fissile
materials, and other dangerous nuclear and radioactive substances to
states or to terrorists. The goals of the NTRG are to develop
information on smuggling-related threats, secure smuggled material,
encourage foreign governments to prosecute nuclear smugglers and trace
linkages between smuggling incidents and gangs. Representatives from
the Departments of Energy, Defense, Justice and Homeland Security,
along with other agencies, participate in the NTRG's deliberations. The
functions performed by the NTRG include: identifying the material and/
or verifying that an illicit transfer is or has taken place, which may
include facilitating an inspection by competent foreign and/or USG
authorities; helping to secure the illicit material to prevent its
transfer; obtaining a sample of the illicit material for further expert
testing; tracing the diversion path of the illicit material; and
facilitating criminal prosecution of traffickers. Any or all of these
tasks may be performed in addressing a single incident of potential
illicit trafficking or smuggling.
The NTRG obtains its information from a combination of open and
classified sources, including reports from foreign governments and
international organizations such as the IAEA. In addition to actions
that it coordinates, the NTRG examines cases to see if actions, such as
interdictions or emergency response measures, should be taken by other
inter-agency groups. Much of the State Department's work in chairing
the NTRG consists of facilitating foreign cooperation with U.S.
Government technical experts so our experts can inspect and identify
suspect materials and help foreign governments verify evidence needed
to apprehend and prosecute smugglers. Successful prosecutions can help
to deter smugglers and active U.S. engagement with foreign governments
can encourage partner nations to take additional steps to combat
nuclear smuggling.
Transforming our Diplomacy to Combat 21st century Nuclear Threats
I would also like to take a moment to explain how our work in
preventing nuclear smuggling fits in with the larger context of
Secretary Rice's vision of transformational diplomacy. As the Secretary
articulated in her Georgetown University speech, the essence of
transformational diplomacy is:
``to work with our many partners around the world, to build and
sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to
the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in
the international system. Let me be clear, transformational
diplomacy is rooted in partnership; not in paternalism. In
doing things with people, not for them; we seek to use
America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better
their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform
their own futures.''
Our efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and the risk of nuclear
terrorism must build on this transformational vision of partnership--
both at home and abroad. The many interagency and foreign partnerships
that we develop and sustain in this mission will help to bring a
regional and local focus to our international cooperation efforts and
enhance the effectiveness of our global strategy.
A transformational approach to preventing nuclear smuggling should
seek not only to provide assistance to foreign partners but to develop
a global interoperable architecture with them. Recognizing that no
single capability can assure success in stopping nuclear smuggling or
preventing nuclear terrorism, we, as the U.S. Government, are building
a global architecture that includes multiple layers and enables the
U.S. and its partners to confront threats at their earliest stage of
development. We call this approach a layered defense-in-depth. A
layered defense against nuclear smuggling and nuclear terrorism focuses
attention on stopping the flow of material at the source, detecting the
movement of material or related illicit transactions, responding to
material en route to a terrorist or to a terrorist target, and
mitigating consequences and attributing responsibility should an attack
involving nuclear or radiological material take place.
As the Secretary has outlined, transformational diplomacy also
demands that we empower our diplomats to work more closely with their
interagency partners. Our initiatives in this area and the recent
formation of our new International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau
build on this vision of joint interagency cooperation. For example, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, whose implementation is supported by
our new Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives, is a Presidential-
level initiative that brings together representatives from the
Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce, among
others, to interdict shipments of WMD and related materials. Our new
Office of WMD Terrorism represents the State Department in national-
level strategic operational planning regarding the nexus of WMD and
terrorism at the new National Counterterrorism Center and is developing
a new model bilateral agreement to enable the real-time sharing of
nuclear and radiological detection information with foreign partners to
enable faster emergency response. The work of the International
Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, as a whole, will continue to
foster the necessary interagency partnerships to strengthen our ability
to prevent, detect, and respond to the trafficking of nuclear and
radiological materials to state, non-state, and terrorist actors of
concern.
As I alluded to earlier in my testimony, transformational diplomacy
emphasizes the importance of regionalizing and localizing our efforts.
In combating nuclear smuggling and terrorism, we cannot remain content
with one-size-fits-all global approaches. We must ensure that our
strategies, initiatives, and plans are tailored to the specific
conditions prevailing within our partner countries. In some, the
private sector will play the lead role in improving security. In
others, international organizations will be the engine of cooperation.
In still others, joint interagency teams will be required to achieve
mission success. Regional differences may also affect our approach.
Some regions may be centers of nuclear smuggling, while others may be
at greater risk from a terrorist attack enabled by a smuggling
transaction occurring thousands of miles away.
Transformational diplomacy also offers us an opportunity to build
new kinds of partnerships that transcend the State Department's
customary relationships with foreign governments and international
organizations. We must consider the appropriate role the private sector
can and should play to prevent nuclear smuggling and reduce the risk of
nuclear terrorism. For example, terrorists may identify potential
smugglers or smuggling routes through the Internet, whose
infrastructure is privately owned. Smugglers may engage in illicit
financial transactions with organized crime or terrorist networks
through banking institutions and nuclear and radiological material may
pass through ports, airports, or intermodal transport infrastructure
owned or operated by the private sector.
With this in mind, we need to make clear to the private sector the
common interest we share in ensuring that their assets and
infrastructure are protected from either direct attack or from
exploitation by terrorist actors seeking to acquire or use nuclear or
radiological materials. We must develop voluntary public-private
partnerships that offer a low-cost means to reduce the risk of nuclear
smuggling and nuclear terrorism. For example, we are encouraged by the
efforts underway at the port of Hong Kong to develop a pilot project to
scan outgoing containers coming to the U.S. This pilot project suggests
that the intermodal transport industry is becoming increasingly aware
of both the reputational and transactional risks it faces from those
actors who would exploit its infrastructure to transport the world's
most dangerous weapons.
Conclusion
The State Department has taken many steps since September 11, 2001
to reduce the risk of nuclear smuggling and enlist foreign cooperation
in our efforts, but we can--and must--do more. Since 2002, we have been
guided by the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,
which provided the first comprehensive strategy to integrate all
elements of national power to combat the threat of weapons of mass
destruction. In the years ahead, we will continue to build on this
strategy and work with our international partners to build a flexible
global architecture capable of adapting to, confronting, and defeating
the nuclear threats that lie ahead.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Oxford.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oxford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is
my pleasure to come before you today to discuss how we are
dealing with the threats associated with nuclear and
radiological terrorism. I would like to thank the committee for
the opportunity to share the progress we are making within the
DNDO and at DHS in general.
Today, I would like to discuss several topics related to
the use of technology to detect radiological and nuclear
materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. I will
review the DNDO accomplishments in the past year and some of
our program priorities for the upcoming years. I will touch
upon the progress we have made with Customs and Border
Protection and the Department of Energy regarding the
deployment of radiation detection technologies, both overseas
and domestically, and how DNDO, and the larger interagency
community, are exploring innovative approaches to screening
containers abroad.
Before describing these efforts, I would like to thank our
partners in the Department of Energy, the Department of State
and CBP, who are here with me today, as well as the Department
of Defense, the FBI and the NRC for their contributions to our
interagency office.
A few of our accomplishments over the last year and some of
our priorities for the future include the fact that we have
completed the first-ever global detection architecture and, in
doing so, have identified key priorities and vulnerabilities
across the Federal, State and local arenas. We have completed
the initial phase of the advanced spectroscopic portal program
that will provide RPMs that will both detect radiation and
discriminate between threat and nonthreat materials.
We have completed the high fidelity test and evaluation
campaign to measure improvements and performance that those
systems will provide. And that data is currently informing our
source selection process for the vendors that will go forward
to low-rate production for our next generation systems. We have
begun the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System program
to deliver imaging systems that will automatically detect high-
density materials that could be used to shield threat material
from detection by radiation portal monitors.
The DNDO is also working with Federal, State and local
partners to refine the U.S. Government's approach to alarm
response and adjudication, with a focus on improving technical
reachback capabilities to support operations. As part of this
operational support activity, the DNDO is leading an effort to
develop a comprehensive U.S. Government process for alarm
resolution.
Regarding overseas deployment of the detection technology,
this committee, and others, have expressed particular interest
in the progress of deployment of radiation detection
technologies overseas. So I would like to spend a couple of
minutes addressing this topic.
The DNDO is an interagency office that has a unique
perspective in which to evaluate the effectiveness of programs
such as Megaports and CSI. As I have stated in the past, DNDO
is charged with developing the global nuclear detection
architecture, but implementation of this plan continues to be
dispersed among our partner agencies. In its role as the global
detection architect, DNDO will continue to advocate for
programs with merit and highlight areas for improvement in
those programs.
I want to make it very clear that Megaports and CSI
programs are critical to protecting against the nuclear and
radiological threat, and currently are the best means for
expanding efforts overseas to detect threats before they reach
the U.S.
Overall, Megaports and CSI operate in tandem at any port,
providing the opportunity to gather more information about
individual containers in order to assess risk prior to those
containers departing for U.S. ports. As the architecture
evolves, the DNDO will bring forward program recommendations to
include the use of advanced systems for Megaports and CSI to
close identified gaps in our layered defense. For example, we
have ongoing discussions with Megaports about the merits of
deploying advanced systems overseas to include the ASP program.
We also continue to highlight the need for more consistent
and stringent information-sharing requirements if U.S. funds
are to continue to be used to deploy systems overseas. The
information-sharing clause within each Megaports agreement
stipulates that the host country will notify the in-country,
designated U.S. Government official of data on detections or
seizures made as a result of the use of equipment provided.
DNDO, through its Joint Analysis Center, works with DOE and CBP
in the sharing of information and the alarm resolution process
overseas.
Deploying these technologies and having in place solid
information-sharing agreements will get us closer to the goal
pushing our Nation's borders outward and increasing the chances
that we will stop a threat before it reaches our shores.
However, we should look at other opportunities for developing
new strategies and for expanding this capability overseas.
As the committee knows, there is a pilot project at the
Hong Kong Modern Terminal called the ICIS program. It is a
model for public and private partnership, but it is just a
model. It is important to note that ICIS, as currently
deployed, is not an operational system. It utilizes currently
available technology that is not optimized for radiation
detection.
DHS and others have sent teams to observe the ICIS pilot
and determined that the technology they have has potential. In
fact, as Mr. Huizenga pointed out, a joint team is returning to
Hong Kong this weekend to review ICIS once more.
But the important lesson we have learned is that private
sector container screening can be compatible with the U.S.
Government's layered defense strategy and is another tool to
further our abilities overseas. However, such efforts must
supplement, not replace, the need for advanced data reporting
at ports at home and abroad.
For the sake of time, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude with
that and be glad to answer any questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Oxford.
[The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford
Introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to come
before you today to discuss how we are responding to the threat of
nuclear or radiological terrorism. I would like to thank the committee
for the opportunity to share the progress we are making at DNDO and
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Today, I would like to discuss several topics related to the use of
technology to detect nuclear and radiological materials that could be
used in a terrorist attack. I will review DNDO accomplishments in the
past year, some of our program priorities for the upcoming years, and
key, long-term challenges that we face. I will specifically touch upon
the progress we have made with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and
the Department of Energy (DOE) regarding the deployment of radiation
detection technologies overseas, and how DNDO and the larger
interagency community are exploring innovative approaches to screening
containers abroad.
Before describing our efforts, I would like to point out that
protecting the United States from nuclear threats is a job that extends
beyond the work of DNDO and I would like to thank our partners, in
particular the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense and State, and CBP,
who are here with me today, as well as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for
their tireless dedication to this mission and for their contributions
to our interagency office.
DNDO Accomplishments and the Road Ahead
In the year since its founding, the DNDO has taken major steps
towards achieving its stated mission. We completed the first ever
global nuclear detection architecture analysis, which identified
vulnerabilities and priority initiatives across Federal, State, and
local governments. The architecture study was completed four months
ahead of schedule and briefed to partner agencies and the White House
in October and November of 2005. This architecture effort was funded
and led by DNDO, but involved considerable interagency participation to
deliver a consensus strategy.
Other accomplishments include our acceleration of several
technology development programs. We have completed the initial
engineering development phase of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
(ASP) program. This system development and acquisition program is
improving current generation radiation portal monitors with the ability
not only to detect the presence of radiation, but to identify the
materials causing the alarms so that we can dismiss non-threatening
sources. This enhanced capability will provide significant improvement
for CBP secondary inspection operations, as well as greatly reduce
secondary referral rates when operated as a means of primary
inspection. Last fall, these engineering development programs
culminated in the first ever high fidelity test and evaluation campaign
to measure the true improvement in performance provided by these next-
generation systems. The test data collected is now being used to
support the selection of multiple vendors to begin low-rate initial
production (LRIP). Additionally, these vendors will continue the
development of the technology so we can deliver enhanced capabilities
and additional design variants for unique operational venues. Twenty-
four of the ASP LRIP units will be delivered to CBP for operational
test and evaluation in the fall of this year, with full-rate production
expected to begin in 2007.
We have recently begun the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography
System (CAARS) development program to deliver imaging systems that will
automatically detect high-density material within cargo that could be
used to shield threat materials from detection by radiation portal
monitors like ASP. The automated image processing techniques envisioned
for CAARS will also substantially improve throughput rates over current
generation radiography systems. These improved throughput rates will,
in turn, enable CBP and other operators to effectively scan a much
higher portion of cargo. Ultimately, ASP and CAARS systems must be
deployed together to ensure our ability to detect either unshielded or
shielded materials across the entire threat spectrum.
The DNDO is also working with Federal, State, and local partners to
refine the U.S. Government's approach to alarm response and
adjudication, with a focus on improving technical reachback
capabilities to support operations. As alarms escalate, this program
will provide technical expertise to operators to ensure that alarms are
resolved properly or, if necessary, that alarms are elevated to the
appropriate response assets. As part of this operational support
activity, the DNDO is leading an effort to develop a comprehensive U.S.
Government process for alarm resolution that brings our procedures in
line with the drastically altered security environment that we now
face. This new alarm resolution process represents the first
restructuring of the Federal alarm resolution and response protocols in
over a decade.
Even with all of the accomplishments I have outlined, there are
still key, long-term challenges in our detection architecture that
require a well-supported research and development program. These
challenges include detecting threat materials from greater distances,
in highly cluttered backgrounds, and in the presence of shielding and
masking materials. We are launching initiatives to develop technologies
to meet these challenges, as well as commencing a broad basic research
program across private industry, the national labs, and academia to
stimulate the entire field of nuclear detection sciences.
Overseas Deployment of Detection Technology
This committee has expressed particular interest in the progress of
deployment of radiation detection technologies overseas. I would like
to take the opportunity to address this topic in detail.
The DNDO has been afforded, given its interagency nature, a unique
perspective from which to evaluate the effectiveness of both Megaports
and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). As I have stated in the
past, while the DNDO was charged with developing the global nuclear
detection architecture, implementation of this plan continues to be
dispersed amongst multiple agencies. In its role as the original
architect, the DNDO will continue to advocate for programs with merit
and highlight areas for improvement. I want to make it very clear that
the Megaports and CSI programs are critical to protecting against the
nuclear and radiological threat, and are the best means of expanding
efforts overseas to detect threats before they reach U.S. shores.
Overall, Megaports and CSI operating in tandem at any port provides the
opportunity to gather more information about individual containers in
order to assess risk prior to those containers departing for U.S.
ports.
While the collaboration between Megaports and CSI is significant
and continues to increase, we continue to look at opportunities to
increase radiation detection effectiveness overseas. The most important
question that arises is: how can we, as the Federal Government,
assemble all these existing programs into a cogent international
strategy that significantly reduces risk? At a strategic level, the
efforts of Megaports and CSI have been incorporated into the
development of the international portion of the DNDO global detection
architecture. We view Megaports as a complement to CSI in that it
enhances host governments? capabilities to detect, deter, and interdict
illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological materials, and it
could provide another data element to support CSI targeting and
evaluation of suspect containers. As the architecture evolves, the DNDO
will bring forward options and recommendations at a programmatic level
to include the use of advanced detection systems for Megaports and CSI
to close identified gaps in our layered defense. We are in ongoing
discussions about the potential merit of deploying next-generation ASP
systems overseas through Megaports.
We also continue to highlight the need for more consistent and
stringent information sharing requirements if U.S. funds are to
continue to be used to deploy systems overseas. The information-sharing
clause within each Megaports agreement stipulates that the host country
will notify the in-country designated U.S. government official of data
on detections or seizures made as a result of the use of the equipment
provided. For sites where CSI personnel are present, DOE is developing
procedures with host country counterparts whereby CSI is notified of
alarms on containers bound for the U.S. The DNDO, through its Joint
Analysis Center, pledges to work with partners like DOE and CBP to help
secure agreements for more timely and uniform information sharing.
Deploying better technologies and having in place solid information
sharing agreements will get us closer to our goal of ``pushing out the
Nation's borders'' and increasing the chances that we will stop a
threat before it reaches our shores. But as this Committee has
recognized, there still remains the key challenge of negotiating with
our foreign partners. If we cannot talk to the right people and get
agreements into place, progress overseas will slow dramatically.
Therefore, we need to change the way we approach our partners overseas
and we need to change who we approach.
We now need to focus our attention upon building the existing
relationships that Megaports and CSI have already established. An
integrated international port security program must include strong
partnerships with the international community, as well as private
industry. Currently, we will continue to work with host countries to
expand scanning opportunities, including information sharing, and
strategic partnerships with private industry.
There is a pilot project at the Hong Kong Modern Terminal called
the Integrated Container Inspection System, or ICIS, which is a model
for public-private partnership, as well as a model for comprehensive
passive and active inspection. It is important to note that ICIS, as
deployed, is not an operational system. It utilizes currently available
technology that is not optimized for radiation detection. DHS has sent
teams to observe the ICIS pilot and determined that the technology they
have used has potential, but still faces significant limitations. But
the important lesson we have learned is that private sector container
screening can be compatible with the U.S. Government's layered security
strategy, and is another tool to further our ability to identify and
address risks in an expedited manner. However, such efforts must
supplement, not replace, the need for advance data reporting and
targeted inspection at ports at home and abroad.
The DNDO favors an integrated system approach. This would enable us
to detect unshielded or lightly shielded materials with current and
next-generation RPMs like ASP, as well as automatically detect highly-
shielded threat materials using a radiographic scanner like CAARS.
Detector data should be analyzed by the U.S. Government prior to cargo
transit, with the CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS), manifest and
detector data integrated for enhanced targeting capability. Additional
targeted inspection utilizing mobile advanced RPMs with radiography
systems could be performed upon arrival at a port of entry. Possible
approaches could include public-private partnerships with the mandate
that the U.S. Government would receive all raw data streams. This type
of integrated cargo inspection system, one that combines targeting,
passive detection, radiographic imaging and information analysis would
be a robust solution to the nuclear and radiological detection
challenges that we face.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the DNDO recognizes that the successful deployment
of these technologies must be done as part of a larger strategy, one
that extends to deployments executed by other agencies. Whether we are
addressing the issue of port security and overseas screening or we are
supporting the detection efforts first responders, the systems that we
put in place must be well connected and work within an environment that
responds to information obtained from intelligence, counterterrorism,
and law enforcement communities.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
Chairman, Congressman Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, I
thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Record, were you folks involved with the
DNDO in defining this global architecture?
Mr. Record. Yes, we played a role in that process.
Mr. Linder. And you are still doing that?
Mr. Record. Yes.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Oxford, do other nations have better
detection equipment than we have? What is the state of the
technology?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, most of the systems that are
fielded to date overseas are pretty much replicas of what we
were fielding in the plastic portal systems. They are pretty
much plastic scintillator material. The Russians have developed
and deployed some of those, but they are very similar in terms
of the systems we are currently deploying.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Ahern, how many of the 8 million containers
that leave the American ports for other nations are inspected?
Mr. Ahern. On the outbound numbers, I don't have them
specifically.
Mr. Linder. Rough guess?
Mr. Ahern. Very few. Very few.
Mr. Huizenga. Very few.
Mr. Linder. Why do we expect them to cooperate with us and
inspect all of the containers coming to the United States when
we are not doing it for them? Mr. Ahern.
Mr. Ahern. One of the things, certainly we are taking a
look at initially, was risk for the United States in the post-
9/11 environment. That is why we want to begin the strategy
with pushing the layers out.
One of the things, through the World Customs Organization
in part of the global security framework, is to take a look at
should there be a reciprocal aspect to it? That is something we
are considering, and having dialogue with countries, as part of
the global framework and the World Customs Organization.
Mr. Linder. Are you involved with this global partnering
also?
Mr. Ahern. We are very much partnering with DNDO.
Mr. Linder. I have been recently to the Dubai port and
Taiwan and seen how our customs folks are on the ground--very
cooperative environment. And if a suspicious container comes
either through the scoring mechanism that they provide to the
terminal operators or the operators find something suspicious,
they get called over to look at it.
Why don't we have technology that gives us, in our own
offices of our own customs folks, a real-time view of what that
inspector, what that x-ray machine is doing?
Mr. Ahern. I think the simple answer is, the technology is
not there today to do that. That is certainly one of the goals
that we are looking for as we go forward with expansion of the
overseas footprint.
The radiography, as well as the radiation read, can
actually be remoted to a location in one of our CSI offices
overseas so we can have the ability to look at it right there,
then take that information, match it up with the manifest and
the targeting score so we have a complete picture of that
transaction.
Mr. Linder. It is my understanding that states can refuse
to inspect containers that we consider to be high-risk, and
that early on in this program, some of that was going on.
Is that still the case or is it, is our relationship better
than it was?
Mr. Ahern. The relationship is much better. It certainly is
country-by-country specific, and in each one of the countries
we have different relationships as we go forward.
I would go back to one of the key points in my testimony I
did speak about, though, that since we started this program in
2002, 90,000 containers that posed an imminent risk to the
United States were examined overseas.
There is oftentimes some debate of what poses a risk. And
when we do have an imminent risk posed to the United States
through a container of shipments destined for this country, and
if we cannot get the host country counterpart to examine it, we
will issue a Do Not Lade order to the carrier, so it is not
brought to this country.
Mr. Linder. Ninety percent of high-risk containers were
inspected?
Mr. Ahern. Ninety thousand is the number I used.
Mr. Linder. And how many of those yielded a concern?
Mr. Ahern. At the end they were resolved.
Mr. Linder. They were?
Mr. Ahern. They were resolved to be not of risk for any
kind of a significant nuclear radiological incident.
Mr. Linder. We have 70 ports right now, Mr. Huizenga?
Mr. Huizenga. That is right, Mr. Chairman. There are 70
ports on our priority list.
Mr. Linder. And we have contracts with how many?
Mr. Huizenga. We have contracted now with 14 countries and
17 ports in those countries.
Mr. Linder. Let me ask you again, if we are not
inspecting--you and I talked about this. If we are not
inspecting things going out, what right do we have to expect
other nations to clear these containers for us coming in?
Mr. Huizenga. You are correct in pointing this out as an
issue. It comes up and, frankly, it is one of the issues that
we have had to deal with as we are trying to negotiate
agreements with our foreign partners.
I think, as Mr. Ahern pointed out, we try to suggest to
them that we feel like after 9/11 we are a particularly unique
target, and from that standpoint we are trying to do everything
we can to try to make sure that doesn't happen again.
Mr. Linder. Do other nations think we are a unique target?
Mr. Huizenga. I presume some think we are a unique target
and others resist that belief, thinking perhaps they have some
risk themselves.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you all for your testimony today.
I am going to begin, if I could, Mr. Oxford, first of all,
I want to thank you for--Vayl, I want to thank you for hosting
us out at the nuclear test facility, and that gave the chairman
and other members the opportunity to see exactly what you are
doing out there. And it is an impressive operation. Even though
you are just beginning the stage of standing up the test site
out there, I think it is impressive and it is very important.
I would like to begin, if I could, first of all, with the
March 06 GAO report. It stated that it is highly unlikely that
DHS will complete the deployment of radiation portal monitors
until after 2009 due to lack of sufficient funding.
What is DNDO doing to accelerate the deployment of
radiation portal monitors at U.S. ports of entry?
Mr. Oxford. First of all, let me thank you for having come
out to Nevada test site. I was out there again this week, and
significant progress on the permanent test site has been made.
We are almost 70 percent done and we will turn operational
later this fall.
We have worked very closely, first of all, with CBP to come
up with a joint development or joint deployment plan. Our
methodology wasn't just to look at technology, but was to look
at blends of technology based on the operational workload. And
we have now devised a joint strategy that would allow us to put
current generation systems at low-volume locations with the
next-generation systems in a secondary mode. It significantly
reduces risk, but also reduces cost.
If we had gone solely to a next-generation system, which is
where we were this time last year, it was about a $3 billion
proposal. We have now been able to cut the deployment strategy
cost down to about $1.4 billion by working closely with CBP,
understanding their actual operational burden. By doing that,
we are able to cut the cost and therefore will be able to come
up with an optimized deployment strategy.
For example, I think Mr. Ahern mentioned the Secretary is
on record as saying we will complete all of our major seaports
that handle 98 percent of containerized cargo by the end of
2007.
In terms of containerized cargo at seaports, we will be at
98 percent by 2007, and we think that is a tremendous
improvement over where we may have reported to you last year.
The land border crossings, again will provide significant
capability; we will be requesting additional funds in 2008 as
well.
One thing you may recognize is that the DNDO budget was the
largest single request in the 2007 budget in terms of Homeland
Security's percentage increase; it was up 70 percent from 2006
to 2007, so the trend is upwards in terms of spending in this
area.
So we can close the gap that you are talking about.
Mr. Langevin. On that point, I know that the President's
budget did request $536 million for DNDO. And right now, the
Homeland Security Appropriations bill that is being considered
today only has $500 million and so it is $36 million short.
So if you are not given the full $536 million, where are
you going to have to cut because you are not going to get that
additional $36 million?
Mr. Oxford. We are working very closely, not only on the
House side, but on the Senate side, to make sure that, first of
all, acquisition funds are retained. I will tell you my number
one priority is go ahead and commit to the deployment of
systems. We will have to offset that either through some delay
in some of the programs on the R&D side or other measures
within the program, like our longer-range research. But our
commitment and our priority is on the acquisition money so,
again working with CBP, we implement the strategy we have now
developed.
Mr. Langevin. I am in the process now of trying to offer an
amendment to include the additional $36 million in the Homeland
Security Appropriations bill, so that DNDO is funded. I
certainly hope my colleagues will join me in making sure that
funding is there.
Last question before my time runs out, the DNDO, I know is
in the process of announcing the award for the advanced
spectroscopic portal monitors. At the Nevada Test Site. You had
mentioned that the award would be announced in April.
Can you tell me when the award is going to be announced?
Mr. Oxford. Let me give you some detail without divulging
source selection information.
We had a very robust response to our Request for Proposals.
We did find in the course of the initial stages that there were
several vendors that were not competitive, and we have now gone
and debriefed them. And we are releasing a revised RFP this
week that will clarify some of the issues that we still need to
deal with, with the remaining vendors. We expect those
proposals then by the middle of June. I am expecting to sign
the source selection decision on or about 6 July.
Mr. Langevin. I just want to conclude by again thanking you
all for your testimony. In particular, I have had a great deal
of interaction with Mr. Oxford. I am impressed by him and with
DNDO.
And the work that you are doing is obviously important to
the Nation, and I appreciate your leadership. Thank you.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you.
Mr. Ahern. Congressman, if I could add some specifics for
the current implementation rate of radiation portal monitors at
our seaports. I think it is important for the record to show
that we have had substantial improvements since the GAO report
was done. Ninety percent of all cargo containers coming across
the border from Canada into the United States are screened
through radiation portal monitors today. Ninety percent of all
trucks coming from Mexico into the United States are scanned
today.
And I had the opportunity to testify before many of you
throughout the port security hearings back in and--March and
April, and we were at 44 percent at that point. We are at 57
percent of the sea containers now. Coming into the country
today are now put through radiation portal monitors before they
enter into the commerce of the United States. And we will be at
98 percent by the end of fiscal year 2007.
There is considerable progress.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Gibbons, do you wish to inquire?
Mr. Gibbons. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. We appreciate your
presence and we appreciate your testimony, hoping it is not a
great deal. Forty-four seaports, 75 percent of the cargo; 58
seaports, 85 percent of the cargo; obviously a diminishing
number as we continue on.
Any chance of giving us a time frame when you will have a
majority of those seaports under a CSI or other type of
agreement?
Mr. Ahern. I would be happy to give you specifically where,
with the 44-seaports, we have 75 percent of the container
traffic. We will actually be, by the end of this fiscal year,
at 50 seaports, which will get 82 percent, and we are hitting
the point of diminishing returns.
The additional container traffic we add with the ports
remain; we will go to eight more ports in fiscal year 2007,
which will get us to 85 percent.
And I think it is important to put in context as we talk of
the overseas footprint and what it would take, there are
actually 704 ports that will ship to the United States. So you
can see, with 58 ports, that will bring us to 85 percent. You
do hit a rapid point of diminishing returns when you take a
look, really, at the logistics of the global supply chain that
ships container traffic to the United States.
Mr. Gibbons. Is there any way to get 100 percent coverage?
Or is that simply a goal that is well beyond our financial
capability?
Mr. Ahern. I will again state some of the numbers.
I think, certainly, 100 percent is a challenging goal. Is
it a realistic goal? My opinion is no. When you take a look, I
think we need to make sure as far as, what is the risk, assess
that risk and deploy according to that risk.
I believe with the 58 ports that we will be at by the end
of next year and capturing 85 percent of that universe, I think
that is sufficient to manage the risk, in my opinion.
Mr. Gibbons. Is there any way to direct the 15 percent
balance to--of the cargo that is coming in, that doesn't today
come through one of these 58 ports, to one of these other
ports? Can we manage that cargo routing so that it does go
through a port?
Mr. Ahern. That certainly is an option. That would
certainly be a lot of impact to the global supply chain and to
the carrier movements throughout the world.
But what I would offer is an additional alternative to
consider, something we are considering as we move forward into
the fall with Pakistan. It is a very small universe of
containers that come to the United States. So if you were to
look at it just by volume alone, it may not make sense to
deploy assets there. But through some of the technology that is
emerging, we have a declaration of principles that has been
signed with the Government of Pakistan. Our ambassador signed
it over there about 3 months ago. And we will be deploying
technology there so we can begin to test remoting the images
back to the United States.
Again, the universe is only about 3,000 containers. We
think that is a manageable universe to actually use the
technology, have it remoted back, so we can look at some of
these locations where it may not make sense to deploy a
complete footprint of assets, but also as far as the technology
capabilities that might be there. And we are going to work with
the Government of Pakistan to have an embedded unit there to
provide some assistance if we need to intervene.
Mr. Gibbons. Let me ask one more question along that line,
because if we are looking at 15 percent of the cargo coming in
that hasn't gone through one of our national agreement security
protocols, do we have in place the ability to add extra
security screening to that amount of cargo coming through these
isolated, few ports so that when it gets here, it is identified
that it does require additional screening?
Mr. Ahern. I would offer several points for consideration
on that.
First off, I would just again state that 100 percent of all
the information of all the container traffic coming to this
country is fully vetted through our automated targeting system,
and we always have the ability, if it is coming from any one of
those 704 ports to issue a Do Not Lade order to the carrier. So
if it poses a significant risk we can't resolve through our
information or intelligence systems, we will give a Do Not Lade
order to that container. So that is the first opportunity.
And if we believe it doesn't pose an imminent risk en
route, we have assets that can meet it upon arrival, as it is
anchored before it comes into a port, and take some of the
mobile technology out to board the ship and actually inspect
that container. And also with the recent deployment of the
mobile RPMs, we can actually be there shipside to run it
through the mobile RPMs as it is being offloaded from the
vessel, right alongside the ship that it is being discharged
from.
So there are some advancements that are coming online that
really give us the potential to provide a better level of
security, beyond just the ones that are in the terminal as they
enter into the commerce of the United States.
Mr. Gibbons. Very briefly, Mr. Oxford, the Nevada Test
Site, are we seeing an increase in the number of vendors,
private vendors, who are taking advantage of the facilities out
there with regard to their R&D, and in terms of development and
testing of screening devices for nuclear materials?
Mr. Oxford. In some cases, we have had to turn customers
away as we try to figure out how to do the cost management
associated with conducting a test for individual organizations,
as opposed to what I will call ``running campaigns'' as we
accumulate customers.
But the test bed is now known, and we are now coming up
with a strategy by which we could probably host two campaigns
per year that we would then ``agglomerate,'' if you will, the
number of customers that could come at any given time. If they
are not a federally funded program, for example, if private
vendors want to validate the performance of their equipment, we
will give them the opportunity to do that under a controlled
environment.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Does the gentleman from Mississippi wish to
inquire?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In March of this year, I wrote Secretaries Chertoff and
Bodman a letter concerning the Megaports agreement with
Hutchison Port Holdings in Freeport, Bahamas. And I received a
response from the Department of Energy, but to this date I have
not received a response from the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Ahern, can you give me an idea of when I would be able
to receive a response on this?
Mr. Ahern. Unfortunately, I do not have specifics. But I
would be happy to provide that back, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, you know every hearing we kind
of go through months of delay in getting information back to
the committee. One of the reasons, when I requested this
hearing, is, I needed a response back so we could kind of
balance what was being said.
And we continue to have this difficulty from DHS on
responding to congressional requests, either individually from
Members or congressional inquiries.
So I would like the record to reflect that that March 24th
letter to Secretary Chertoff is still outstanding. And we need
to get it resolved.
Now, on the other issue, there are some who would say that
Megaports and DNDO are doing some of the same things. Why will
we need both operations at a port? And can somebody explain why
we would have two separate entities join certain inspections?
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you. I will take an opportunity to try
to answer that.
I think it is important for people to recognize that we are
doing slightly different things, and we build on essentially
the expertise within the National Nuclear Security
Administration. We are the nuclear experts. So we are there to
help Mr. Ahern's people, who don't have that same expertise
necessarily, to try to find nuclear materials.
You have suggested, and the chairman, that we need to work
closely together. And I think my goal here today is to try to
convince you that indeed we are. We really do have regular
interactions. We regularly send our staff on trips to the same
seaports together.
Al Gina, the head of CSI, and I commissioned Sri Lanka
earlier this year together. We are on our way to Hong Kong this
weekend. So we have found each other and we are working
closely.
What can we provide the CSI people on the ground who are
checking manifests, working their ATS system. We provide the
technology in a sense to be able to help them make sure that
there isn't radioactive material in those containers.
I think, Mr. Chairman, you asked earlier, would it be
possible for us to feed real-time data to the CSI people on the
ground. And indeed that is exactly what we have committed to
do. So for the DOE-Megaports monitors, we are now negotiating
and discussing with the host countries the need to feed a
direct live feed to Mr. Ahern's people or the CSI people on the
ground.
So these suggestions that are coming from the committee
members and others, I think we have taken to heart and we
recognize the importance of closely working together.
And if I may, with all due respect, I really think at this
point if there was a series of serious attempts to move the
program, I think we would be going backwards instead of
forwards, because we are taking the strengths of both agencies
at this point and working very closely together.
Mr. Thompson. Are you using similar equipment?
Mr. Huizenga. No. The equipment we are using is radiation
portal monitors and Mr. Ahern's people are using--the host
countries are actually using is imaging equipment, x-ray or
gamma ray equipment. So it does completely different things.
We are putting up things that detect radiation. They are
putting up things that x-ray containers to see what is inside
the containers.
As Mr. Oxford mentioned, combining those two activities
together, which is what we are currently in the process of
trying to do, and linking the information that comes from both
systems will be important to us to help accelerate the
examination of these containers. But it is really--it is
separate types of equipment with separate purposes.
So I can understand if people thought that the CSI people
were putting the same equipment in place that the DOE people,
that there would be some confusion. But indeed it is different
equipment. And we make it very clear when we go to the host
nations that we are a complementary exercise.
Mr. Thompson. Well, then, do we now have the staffing to
accommodate that?
Mr. Huizenga. Are you asking whether we have enough staff
to make this happen?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Huizenga. As we continue to negotiate and be successful
in signing up more countries, I am pressing my management for
more staff.
And as the chairman asked me earlier, so we are in 14
countries and 17 ports, I neglected to point out that there are
10 more likely to sign up in the very near future; and I will
be going back to my management and asking them for staff to
make sure that we can properly take care of that business.
Mr. Linder. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania wish to
inquire?
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Also, to Mr. Oxford, thank you for hosting us at the DNDO,
earlier this year at the Nevada test site. Mr. Gibbons's
district was very helpful and I enjoyed the experience.
On the issue of Hong Kong, we hear quite a bit about Hong
Kong has a system where they can inspect or scan 100 percent of
outgoing cargo. I have been told that the problem we are faced
with is that we can't basically view all those images. I am
also told--correct me if I am wrong--that it takes 6 minutes to
scan each image.
Mr. Ahern. If I could first add my thoughts on it, I have
had the opportunity to go see it; I was there in the fall of
this year. And currently it is in one lane of one terminal and
also an additional lane of a second terminal in Hong Kong and
there are multiple lanes of trucks that come through there.
The current capability of throughput is running about 300
trucks per hour through that one lane in each one of the two
terminals. The radiation capability, using the same RPMs we
have on our land border here in the United States.
Mr. Dent. Same technology?
Mr. Ahern. Same technology both for radiation portal
monitor and also for the x-ray system, the VAC system.
Mr. Dent. Are those the same portals we witnessed at the
Nevada test site?
Mr. Oxford. We had both the current generation, that are
fielded at our borders, as well as the next generation on
display.
Mr. Dent. Continue.
Mr. Ahern. So we have both complementary systems working
because we believe we need to have the radiation read and also
to take a look at the radiography to see if there is any
anomaly that could be shielding any type of device in that
container.
As it is currently being modeled--this is where we have
been trying to continue to correct the record on this--we
believe the concept has great potential. In its current
application it is not a realistic test. We need to work with
the contractor involved with it, and we are and have been for
the last couple of months taking a look at pulling the data
files, making sure that the threshold settings are appropriate,
and then we will take a look as far as what can we then do for
a concept of operation to respond to alarms that would occur.
Mr. Dent. What do the folks in Hong Kong do? Once they run
all those trucks through, you said 2 to 300 trucks an hour.
Mr. Ahern. 300 trucks an hour is the average throughput
through the two lanes.
Mr. Dent. They take these images and if there is some kind
of positive, what happens?
Mr. Ahern. Nothing.
Mr. Huizenga. They are storing the images now. They want us
to come there and actually pipe the information to the host
country and pipe it over to the CSI people.
Mr. Ahern. Currently nothing is being done with those. It
is being stored for data collection purposes by the contractor
and that is what we have been looking at for the last couple of
months. As for any kind of an operational perspective or
concept of operations or any response from the host country
nation, that was not built into this. That is why we are
interested in how to get fully engaged to make sure we can put
some operational sense into this technology because it has been
misrepresented repeatedly with respect to what it is currently
doing.
Mr. Dent. So how do you develop the architecture in such a
way that, okay, you can take the image but then have you to do
something with that image? Can you explain, when you are
talking in terms of what the next generation technology is? How
do you get us from--to a realistic 100 percent scanning system
that is reliable and effective and one that can sell to the
public, not one that is not just not going to achieve what we
think it will?
Mr. Ahern. If I can begin with an operator's perspective
and then hand it off to people with more technical expertise on
the technology, I would be happy to do with that. First off, we
need to make sure there is appropriate throughput and capacity
in those lanes. We need to make sure that the technology works.
We need to make sure that the radiation being read through the
monitors or the next generation has the ability to detect
certainly if there is any special nuclear material.
We need to make sure that it also has the ability to
eliminate what could be natural occurring radiation in the
background or nuisance alarms. That is where next generation
technology will help us.
At the same time we need to have the capabilities looking
with x-ray systems to find out if there is something in there
that could be shielding it. Then we need to have that pushed
into the operator's hands and be able to link back into the
technological aspects of it.
Mr. Dent. Stop right there with the shielding. How
effective is the Hong Kong system in terms of shielding; in
other words, you take an image in Hong Kong. If something is
shielded, how reliable is the system?
Mr. Ahern. Right now until we actually get on the ground
and do a live testing, I think it would be inappropriate to
comment on how effective it is. Certainly with the throughput
that is currently happening and the lack of a good concept of
operation, I think it is questionable, and need to put some
rigor into it as we go forward.
Again, we are intrigued by the options that this presents
for the government to partner with the private sector, and we
think that is a very good model for us to move forward on. A
lot of it needs to be worked out with both DNDO, DOE. That is
where Mr. Huizenga and some of our folks are going over this
weekend to work with the contractor to find out more of what is
going on so we can actually develop a good concept of
operations with the appropriate protocols.
Mr. Linder. Let me talk to the committee members. We have
Mr. Dicks, Mr. Shays, Ms. Norton who still have questions.
Would you like to submit questions in writing, would you like
to ask them to stay here and come back after a series of four
votes?
Mr. Shays. We have 10 more minutes. If we could just divide
the next 6 minutes, maybe we can cover it.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I would like to ask my questions, if I could.
Mr. Shays. Go for it.
Mr. Dent. Yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you this quickly. On megaports, the
administration's request for megaports in fiscal year 2007 was
40 million, 33 million less than its fiscal year 2006 request.
The House Appropriations Committee has approved 105 million for
megaports in fiscal year 2007, Energy and Water appropriations.
Why such a big cut in this program by the administration?
Mr. Huizenga. Frankly, we were trying to monitor how
quickly we were signing up agreements and--
Mr. Dicks. It hasn't been a wonderful record.
Mr. Huizenga. When we were building the budget we were
anticipating where we would be and we submitted a budget
appropriately. Now things are starting to come together and I
think Congress is perhaps going to respond to the fact that if
we had some additional agreements it would take some additional
money to get the job done.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Again, and I am a layman here, why aren't
you guys working together? You say you are but why have you not
been more successful in getting joint agreements? Apparently
you have got two, one in Oman and one in Honduras. Why can't
you go in and say to this country we want to work with you on
both CSI and megaports, and get an agreement? And CSI has done
a lot better in terms of getting these agreements than
megaports. Why is this?
Mr. Huizenga. There is a fundamental difference between
what the CSI people are trying to do and what we are trying to
do. Our activities under megaports are significantly more
intrusive. The host country has to staff up, find their own
people to help resolve the alarms, and it could be a
significant number of additional normal alarms.
Mr. Dicks. So we don't staff this?
Mr. Huizenga. We are not deploying DOE people in country.
Mr. Dicks. If we want to be successful do we have to do
that?
Mr. Huizenga. I think our strategy right now is to try to
partner with our CSI people who are already going to be in
country and have them help to address some of the analysis.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Ahern, do you agree with that? Can you do
that or are you having enough problems staffing your own
progress?
Mr. Ahern. We are not having any problems with staffing our
CSI ports.
Mr. Dicks. Can you do their work too?
Mr. Ahern. I think it is a complementary role. I think it
is important to state, going back to I believe May of last
year, DOE and DHS Customs and Border Protection signed a joint
agreement. As far as we moved forward, we would have joint
undertaking with the foreign countries. In fact, now with our
declaration of principles, we actually have them for both CBP
and DOE with the host country counterpart.
You are correct that two have been signed thus far, and
there is commitment to do them together as we launch forward.
Mr. Dicks. How many ports are you talking about, 44 or 71.
What is the number?
Mr. Ahern. Forty-four is what we currently have and we are
working with DOE to make sure, as we circle back to those 44
ports, to have the appropriate radiation equipment installed as
well.
Mr. Dicks. Only four megaport agreement, right?
Mr. Huizenga. We have 14 countries signed up, which
includes 17 ports and there are an additional 10 countries
about ready to sign up, having an addition of more than 10
ports. Our goal and commitment is to put the radiation
detection equipment in each of the 44 CSI ports.
Mr. Dicks. In order to give you a chance to ask questions,
I will yield to you.
Mr. Shays. [Presiding]. I appreciate that.
Gentlemen, when you do FBI work and you do fingerprints, it
is done automatically. The computer can spit back to you
matches. Why can't we develop technology that would alert us
without people having to study these pictures? Is that on its
way, and is it is on its way fairly quickly?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Shays, the CAARS program that I have
referenced in my opening statement is exactly intended to do
that--to look at shielding and do an automated alert to the
operator that there is something in the cargo we have to
inspect.
Mr. Shays. Not just on radiation but other issues as well?
Mr. Oxford. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, what states, let's do it this
way, what foreign states have been resistant to participating
with us and what are the reasons?
Mr. Huizenga. Well, we have run into--the chairman asked
earlier about the reciprocity issue; some states actually ask
us this question, are you going to do a reciprocal scanning of
containers outbound?
Mr. Shays. What states? What states are we finding most
resistant? It is not an indictment against them, just have a
problem.
Mr. Huizenga. Frankly, the Japanese have asked that
question repeatedly.
Mr. Shays. I will tell you, if I was a foreign nation I
would ask it. What other ones?
Mr. Huizenga. Almost all countries ask the question. Some
are more recalcitrant than others.
Mr. Shays. If you want to be on the positive, which are the
most cooperative?
Mr. Huizenga. It took 2 weeks to sign up Sri Lanka. So it
didn't take them any time at all to figure out it was an
important activity. I don't know--
Mr. Shays. Dubai has been very cooperative.
Mr. Huizenga. Dubai was on board from the day we started
talking to them.
Mr. Shays. Are there some that are very, very resistant?
You mentioned the Japanese. What other ones?
Mr. Dicks. Can I ask one quick one? What about Freeport.
What is the status with Freeport?
Mr. Huizenga. Freeport, we are doing operational testing
right now and things are going well.
Mr. Dicks. Has there been a capacity assessment problem
there?
Mr. Huizenga. I am not sure that I understand--
Mr. Dicks. Let me read this. We would like to know the
status of CBP's efforts to get customs folks in Freeport as
part of CSI and whether the capacity assessments to date have
revealed any concern about Freeport's participation as a CSI
port?
Mr. Shays. I leave that question with you so you know
exactly what he is asking and I will reclaim my time. Leave it
in writing with him, okay.
Is that all right, sir?
Mr. Dicks. That is fine.
Mr. Shays. Just quickly to finish up here, I would like you
to provide to the committee which states we have the biggest
concern about corruption, improper operations, and so on. The
GAO has voiced some concerns. It doesn't have to be a public
document to us, and I will make sure the committee will follow
up on that. I do want the answer to this. If you would tell us
which ones we have the biggest concern.
And let me ask you, finally--I will end with that.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. Is there anything--excuse me.
Before we adjourn, is there anything we should have put on the
record that we didn't, anything that you wish we had asked that
we didn't ask? Seriously. Those are sometimes the best answers.
Anything before you leave?
Hearing none, let me just thank you for your work and thank
you for cooperation with this committee and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
For the Record
Questions From Representative John Linder For Jayson Ahern Responses
On March 24, 2006, Representative Bennie Thompson sent a letter to
Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security and
Secretary Samuel Bodman of the Department of Energy. The letter
pertained to the operation of detection equipment under DHS's Container
Security Initiative and DOE's Megaports program and contained four
specific questions.
It is important that the Committee members receive prompt responses
to questions they pose to the Department. Mr. Thompson has received a
written response from Secretary Bodman but has yet to receive a written
response from Secretary Chertoff or his designee. We understand there
were mitigating circumstances but remain interested in a response.
Question: When can Mr. Thompson expect to receive an answer from
DHS to the questions contained his letter of March 24?
Response: Immediately after receiving Representative Thompson's
letter, DHS congressional affairs coordinated a meeting with members of
his staff for the purpose of personally addressing all concerns raised
in that correspondence in lieu of a written response. DHS regrets this
miscommunication; a written response has been formulated and is
forthcoming. Please excuse the delay in the transmission of this
letter.
Questions from Representative Christopher Shays
1. Concerns about the adequacy of foreign inspection protocols, the
operation of detection equipment, and its vulnerability to tampering or
neglect have been raised. These issues have been discussed in a recent
GAO report ``Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to Other Countries.'' Russia was mentioned
specifically in the report as a State where evidence of some of these
problems has been found. The Committee would like to understand how
widespread this concern is and what actions have been taken to limit
such vulnerabilities.
Question: What States do you have the greatest concerns with in
terms of possible corruption and/or the improper execution of screening
and inspection protocols?
Response: With respect to CSI, CBP has negotiated measures and
procedures where it does operate to address any concerns of possible
corruption and the screening and inspection of targeted shipments.
These procedures include being present during the examination and
viewing the x-ray image and discussing any findings with the host
government officials, providing them with our recommendations.
Additionally, CBP presently has an Agreement with The Government of
The Russian Federation on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs
Matters even though CSI does not actually operate in Russia. Through
this Agreement, the U.S. and Russian governments have affirmed their
commitment to the facilitation of the legitimate movement of goods and
individuals and will, by mutual arrangement of the Customs
Administrations, undertake measures to improve customs systems,
techniques, and procedures with a view toward achieving that objective
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. More details about
this agreement are available on CBPs website at: .
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Second Line of Defense program has
also recognized corruption as a major problem and has designed its
installations using practical, verifiable means to reduce opportunities
for corruption. DOE also reports that its National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) has been working for years to understand and
address the effects of corruption and criminal activity on cooperative
security programs.
Question: In each case, what steps are being taken to limit
vulnerabilities?
Response: CBP has negotiated appropriate measures to address any
vulnerability, and would be happy to meet with Representative Shay and
his staff or other Members and staff to discuss the measures we have
taken in an appropriate venue and upon their request, due to the
sensitive nature of this information.
2. During the hearing, it was noted that States have responded in
different ways to U.S. requests to participate in CSI and Megaports.
Some states such as Sri Lanka agreed to participate within a few weeks,
others remained reluctant to participate after months or longer of
negotiations.
Question: What States have been the most reluctant to participate
in CSI and Megaports respectively? Are they key States? What reasons or
concerns have they raised?
Response: Regarding CSI, the track record of success has resulted
in foreign governments now approaching CBP to participate in the
program. CBP has completed the initial phase of CSI, comprising the top
20 foreign seaports with the most direct maritime cargo containers
destined to the United States, in July 2005 when all top twenty foreign
seaports became operational. CSI is currently operational in forty-four
seaports covering 78.44 percent of maritime cargo destined to the
United States. By the end of 2006, CSI will be operational in fifty
seaports covering 81.77 percent of maritime cargo destined to the
United States. Additional host governments are currently being
considered for the CSI program and are in various stages of the process
from signing a Declaration of Principles to becoming operational. CBP
defers to DOE/NNSA to address issues relating to Megaports.
Question: What reasons have been given by the top 5 ports in
Megaports' prioritization model for not agreeing to participate?
Response: As stated above, the top twenty foreign seaports
identified by CBP have become CSI operational ports. CBP defers to DOE/
NNSA address issues relating to regarding Megaports prioritization.
Question: What steps have been taken to address the concerns raised
in these cases?
Response: As the top twenty seaports with the greatest volume of
maritime container traffic destined to the United States are now
participating in CSI, CBP has no concerns that need to be addressed.
CBP defers to DOE/NNSA to address issues relating to Megaports.
Questions from Representative Bennie Thompson
Question: 1. Megaports is planning to deploy equipment to forty-two
foreign nations, yet only four have fully operational Megaports
systems. In addition, the Megaports status sheet shows that twenty
nations still do not have Megaports agreements. Eleven of these have a
CSI agreement in place. What is being done to leverage existing
agreements with foreign ports?
Response: CSI continues to leverage the WCO Framework of Security
Standards (adopted in June 2005) as a basis for persuading foreign
partners to employ radiation detection equipment at their seaports. The
Framework incorporates the use of radiation detection and imaging
systems in the seaport environment. DOE/NNSA will be presenting the
Megaports program at the annual CSI conference of current and
prospective foreign partners to discuss best practices. DOE/NNSA
Megaports will have a separate workshop to market the program and
invite foreign governments to join.
2. Mr. Huizenga, a March 2005 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report concluded that DOE is struggling to reach agreements with
foreign governments and does not have a long term plan for Megaports to
guide the implementation of this program in the future.
Question: What steps is the Department of Energy (DOE) taking to
address the GAO conclusions?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security defers to the
Department of Energy for the response to this question.
3. According to the Administration's budget request, Megaports
would receive $33 million less than last year ($73 million in FY06, $40
million in FY07). The Energy and Water Appropriations bill currently
moving through the House would increase funding by $65 million above
the Administration's request.
Question: Mr. Huizenga, why did the Administration cut your budget
and what impact does this have on the Megaports program?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security defers to the
Department of Energy for the response to this question.
4. One of the biggest weaknesses in the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) is that high-risk containers transshipped through a
CSI port are not inspected overseas, because of the difficulty of
unloading a ship to inspect a container.
Question: Mr. Ahern, what steps is Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) taking to close the security gap with regards to high risk
containers that are transshipped through a CSI port?
Response: Containers laden (loaded) on a vessel at a CSI port are
subject to analysis and possible examination by the in-country CBP CSI
officers and their respective host government counterparts.
Containers remaining on the vessel as Freight Remaining on Board
(FROB) as the vessel transits a foreign seaport en route to the United
States are subject to the following enforcement protocols: (1) All
maritime containerized cargo information is required to be sent to CBP
twenty-four hours prior to that container being put on the vessel that
will be bringing the cargo to the United States. (2) The information
transmitted is screened at the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC) via
the Advanced Targeting System (ATS). (3) If CBP suspects that a
container poses an imminent risk, CBP can issue a ``Do Not Load''
order, can work with the host government to have the container
examined, or can advise the carrier and seek their assistance in
ensuring any concerns are mitigated. In addition to the steps taken
above, CBP also utilizes the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) program to enhance security measures throughout the
supply chain, including the place of stuffing. Additionally CBP is
working with industry members to develop an advanced container security
device that can be placed in a container at place of origin and help
secure the integrity of the container while transiting the supply
chain.
Question: Mr. Huizenga, is DOE addressing the transshipment issue
in Megaports or through other Second Line of Defense programs? Have you
looked at deploying equipment in smaller feeder ports?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security defers to the
Department of Energy for the response to this question.
5. It is widely known that the current version of the radiation
portal monitors have a high false alarm rate because they cannot
distinguish between special nuclear material and naturally occurring
nuclear material. We have received testimony that the monitors deployed
at U.S. seaports have as many as 150 false alarms in a day.
Question: Mr. Huizenga, is Megaports experiencing the same problem
in its installations? If so, how are those alarms resolved?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security defers to the
Department of Energy as to the response to this question.
6. In December 2003, former CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner stated
the CBP will ``red team'' (or test) the soundness of its container
security programs, particularly C-TPAT, to determine if the program is
improving supply chain security. CBP officials however, have stated
that to date, there have been no red team exercises for C-TPAT.
Question: What is CBP doing to evaluate whether C-TPAT is actually
preventing terrorists from taking advantage of weaknesses that exist in
the supply chain to smuggle weapons of mass destruction in the U.S.?
Response: CBP has not conducted ``red team'' tests of the C-TPAT
program. To determine the effectiveness of the enhanced security
measures employed by C-TPAT members, CBP has significantly increased
the number of on-site verifications or validations it performs. To
date, CBP has completed over 2,400 validations of the 6,100 members (or
forty percent of the membership), a significant increase over the 403
validations that had been completed in January 2005. These on site
validations confirm that the C-TPAT members have adopted stronger
security measures throughout their supply chains, reducing the
likelihood that a C-TPAT shipment will be compromised and exploited by
terrorists. CBP is also currently developing performance measures to
help demonstrate the effectiveness of C-TPAT as an anti-terrorism
program.
7. The GAO has stated that unbalanced staffing at CSI ports has
resulted in thirty-five percent of the containers shipped through these
ports not being targeted, and therefore not subject to inspection
overseas. This means that it is likely that high risk containers were
not inspected.
Question: What is CBP doing to fix the staffing imbalances
mentioned in the GAO report? How many CSI ports have permanently
assigned personnel?
Response: Based upon the findings of the GAO, CBP adjusted the CSI
staffing levels by assigning dedicated CSI staff to the CBP National
Targeting Center. This dedicated staff augments the work being done at
large volume CSI locations like Hong Kong. CBP has currently
transitioned twenty-six of the CSI ports to permanent staff.
8. One of the major issues with container security is the absence
of seal standards. The MTSA requires standards be developed for
container seals and locks. These standards have never been established.
Additionally, the MTSA regulations require that seal verifications take
place when a container is moved through a port. However, I have heard
from many port workers that this does not occur.
Question: Why has it taken the Department three and a half years to
develop seal standards? When will the container seal regulation be
issued?
Response: In September 2004, the Department announced that DHS,
pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 70116 and section 111 of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), would pursue a mandatory
requirement that ocean carriers verify the application of high security
seals on all loaded containers destined for the United States.
Subsequently, CBP drafted a Notice of Proposed Rule- Making (NPRM) that
would require sealing and verification of a seal on loaded containers
being transported by vessel to the United States. The draft NPRM
remains under review in the Department of Homeland Security, Office of
General Counsel.
It should be noted, however, that CBP has moved to complement this
proposed rule by strengthening sealing requirements within the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. As an example,
minimum security criteria for C-TPAT importers requires that for all
loaded containers destined for the United States, a high security seal
meeting the current PAS ISO 17712 standard must be applied to the
container. Additionally, minimum security criteria for C-TPAT sea
carriers requires that container integrity for all containers in the
sea carrier's custody be maintained to protect against the introduction
of unauthorized material and/or persons. C-TPAT sea carriers must have
procedures in place to maintain the integrity of the shipping
containers while in their custody. Lastly, sea carriers must fully
comply with seal verification rules and seal anomaly reporting
requirements once promulgated and mandated by the U.S. government.
Under the MTSA, the U.S. Coast Guard regulates vessel and facility
security (33 CFR 104 and 105) including access controls and security
requirements at U.S. seaports. It is within the USCG's purview to
address concerns regarding seal verifications required under 33 CFR.
Question: 9. Could you study the possibility of deploying ICIS to
CSI ports and get back to me within the month on your results?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) remains
interested in ICIS. The concept of collecting and integrating radiation
detection spectral data with radiographic imaging of containers
complements and is consistent with our agency's goals.
DHS remains committed to working with the Hong Kong government and
the Hong Kong Container Operators Association (HKCTOA) in the
development of policies, procedures, and response protocols related to
ICIS. This will permit us to take full advantage of the investment that
the Hong Kong shipping community has taken to strengthening the global
supply chain.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), in conjunction with
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and under the auspices of the
Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, recently completed an
analysis of a large sampling of ICIS data files supplied by the HKCTOA.
Initial findings have revealed that further work is required to
optimize the technology and better utilize the data sets captured by
ICIS. A team comprised of representatives from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), Department of Energy's Megaports Program, PNNL and
ORNL are traveling to Hong Kong in the coming weeks in furtherance of
this effort. The team also includes a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) representative to evaluate implications for the next generation
of nuclear detection equipment. While in Hong Kong, the team will study
the feasibility of providing CBP's Container Security Initiative
personnel with a live data directly from the ICIS lanes. Additionally,
the team will identify the necessary steps to network the ICIS system
in order to provide DHS with the capability to remotely monitor in the
United States.
10. I understand that Secretary Chertoff observed the ICIS system a
few weeks ago.
Question: When will the Department make a decision on this
technology so that sectors of the industry that are willing to purchase
and install this system can begin doing so?
Response: As indicated in our response to a previous question the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) remains interested in ICIS and in
the concept of collecting and integrating radiation detection spectral
data with radiographic imaging of containers, which complements and is
consistent with our agency's goals. DHS also is committed to working
with the Hong Kong government and the Hong Kong Container Operators
Association (HKCTOA) in the development of policies, procedures, and
response protocols related to ICIS in order to take full advantage of
the investment that the Hong Kong shipping community has taken to
strengthen the global supply chain.
Since further work is required to optimize the technology and
better utilize the data sets captured by ICIS, DHS is sending a team
comprised of representatives from U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the Department of Energy's Megaports Program, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to
Hong Kong in the coming weeks to study the feasibility of providing
CBP's Container Security Initiative personnel with live data directly
from the ICIS lanes. The team also includes a Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) representative to evaluate implications for the
next generation of nuclear detection equipment. Moreover, this team
will identify the necessary steps to network the ICIS system in order
to provide DHS with the capability to remotely monitor in the United
States.
11. When I look at the CSI and Megaports programs, I see that they
are they are trying to address the same problem, which is preventing
weapons of mass destruction from being smuggled into the country though
the supply chain. Currently, DOE is negotiating Megaports agreements
with 32 of the 44 nations participating in CSI. Since both Departments
are trying to accomplish the same goal in the same foreign ports, I
wonder whether Megaports may work better if it was moved to DHS in the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
Question: Mr. Huizenga, why should Megaports remain in DOE?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security defers to the
Department of Energy as to the response to this question.
Question: Mr. Oxford, considering the goal of the DNDO to develop a
global nuclear architecture, do you feel that moving Megaports to DNDO
would allow for this to happen?
Response: The development of the global nuclear detection
architecture does not necessitate the transfer of Megaports to the
DNDO. One of the founding principles of the DNDO is the belief that
centralized planning and reporting with decentralized execution enables
DNDO to fully utilize expertise from partner agencies to leverage, not
duplicate, existing initiatives related to nuclear detection. Moving
Megaports to the DNDO would violate this principle and provide little
added benefit to the architecture development process.
There are several coordination and information sharing mechanisms
in place that allow the DNDO to incorporate a program like Megaports
into the global architecture. These mechanisms include use of the
Interagency Coordination Council (ICC), the policy coordinating
committees of the Homeland Security Council and National Security
Council, as well as the use of interagency detailees. These formal
mechanisms form the foundation of what has become a strong working
relationship with implementing partners like Megaports.
The frequent dialogue with DOE personnel results in a thorough
understanding of Megaports operations, technological requirements,
reporting and information analysis needs--all of which are elements of
the DNDO architectural analysis. As the global detection architecture
evolves, the DNDO will bring forward options and recommendations to
programs like Megaports. In fact, the DNDO is now working with DOE/NNSA
to acquire ASP systems for deployment through the Megaports Initiative,
further enhancing the broader U.S. strategy to scan incoming cargo
before it reaches our borders. This demonstrates that the development
of the global detection architecture, and proposed improvements to that
architecture, do not require a management construct that infringes or
subsumes the statutory responsibilities of partner agencies.
Question: Considering that DOE is trying to place Megaports at many
of the same ports as those participating in CSI, why isn't DOE
leveraging the existing CSI agreements to accelerate portal monitor
deployments through the Megaports Initiative?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security defers to the
Department of Energy for the response to this question.
Question: Why can't there be one U.S. government position requiring
foreign ports to participate in CSI and C-TPAT?
Response: CBP does have a single position when it comes to securing
the global trade lanes from terrorist activities in a maritime
environment. CBP employs a multi-layered strategy in protecting the
trade with the following programs: Container Security Initiative (CSI);
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT); National
Targeting Center; and 24-hour Rule. Both CSI and C-TPAT are voluntary
programs and CBP believes that both programs are functioning as they
were designed.
The CSI and C-TPAT programs are part of an overall layered defense
strategy, which is predicated on the belief that several different
programs, from security at the source to screening at a port of entry,
provide many opportunities to stop a potential threat from reaching its
intended target. A layered defense reduces risk while not hinging
success on participation in a single program.
While the Department hopes to maximize the number of foreign ports
that participate in programs such as CSI and C-TPAT, making
participation a requirement would be difficult to enforce and could
negatively affect the free flow of commerce. CBP believes that the C-
TPAT program should remain a voluntary, incentives based partnership
program. C-TPAT was initiated to help enhance security throughout the
international supply chain, from point of stuffing, through the final
delivery in the United States. CBP is able to reach deep into the
international supply chain, especially to the two most vulnerable
points--the point of stuffing and the inland drayage to the port of
export--by offering U.S. importers trade facilitation benefits in
exchange for pushing security enhancements back throughout the supply
chain, into areas outside the regulatory reach of the U.S. government.
A regulated program may not be able to effectively influence the
actions needed on foreign soil. Additionally, a regulated program would
likely take a ``one size fits all approach'' and could reduce the
current flexibility afforded through the C-TPAT program. A voluntary,
incentives-based program, by contrast, allows for customization of
supply chain security measures based on risk and operational realities.
12. I wrote a letter to Secretaries Chertoff and Bodman on March
24, 2006 concerning the Megaports agreement with Hutchinson Ports
Holding in Freeport, Bahamas. I received a response from the Department
of Energy. I have not received a response from DHS. I don't like being
flip, but I'm not surprised given DHS is habitually late in responding
to this Committee.
Question: Mr. Ahearn, when will I receive a response to my letter?
Response: Immediately after receiving Representative Thompson's
letter, DHS congressional affairs coordinated a meeting with members of
his staff for the purpose of personally addressing the concerns raised
in that correspondence in lieu of a written response. DHS regrets this
miscommunication; a written response has been formulated and is
forthcoming. Please excuse the delay in the transmission of this
letter.
Shortly after my letter, I learned that CBP is going to finally
deploy a CSI team to Freeport.
Question: When will the CSI team in Freeport be operational and do
the capacity assessments performed by CBP give you concerns about
Freeport participation in CSI?
Response: CBP has performed capacity assessments of Freeport,
Bahamas. CBP anticipates it will be operational in Freeport by the end
of September, 2006. The two capacity assessments did not give rise to
any concerns regarding Freeport's participation in CSI.
13. Please provide to the Committee, the status of CBP's efforts to
deploy Customs Inspectors to Freeport as part of CSI. Please also
detail whether any of CBP's capacity assessments have revealed concerns
regarding Freeport's potential involvement as a CSI port.
Response: CBP is in the process of formalizing the addition of
Freeport, Bahamas as a CSI port. The Declaration of Principles (DOP),
which demonstrates the willingness of the government of the Bahamas to
participate in the CSI program, has not been signed. The DOP is pending
review by the Bahamian cabinet. Once this process is completed, CBP
will work with the State Department to deploy CBP officers to begin the
screening process of maritime cargo containers destined to the United
States.