[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE 9/11 REFORM ACT: EXAMINING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMAN
SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 8, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-68
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
36-544 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�0900012007
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
John Linder, Georgia Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Katherine Harris, Florida Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Michael McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight..................................... 1
The Honorable Kendrick Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight......................... 2
The Honorable Katherine Harris, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 12
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 22
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 21
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 20
Witnesses
Mr. John Clark, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Mare Gorelick, Acting Director, Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Chris Swecker, Acting Executive Assistant Director of Law
Enforcement Services, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
For the Record
Ms. Susan Ginsburg, Nonresident Fellow, Migration Policy
Institute:
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
THE 9/11 REFORM ACT: EXAMINING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING CENTER
----------
Wednesday, March 8, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management,
Integration and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Harris, Reichert, Meek,
Jackson-Lee, and Pascrell.
Mr. Rogers. The Subcommittee on Management, Integration and
Oversight will come to order. Today we are holding a hearing to
discuss the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. This
facility was established by the 9/11 Reform Act and is designed
to combat terrorist travel. Let me begin by welcoming our panel
of guests to this hearing.
Also I want to recognize our colleague from Florida, Ms.
Harris, who has been a leader in addressing problems associated
with human trafficking.
The 9/11 Commission correctly pointed out that before
September 11, 2001, no U.S. Government agency systemically
analyzed terrorists' travel strategies. The 9/11 Commission
also believed if the Federal Government had done so, we could
have discovered how terrorist predecessors to al-Qa'ida
exploited the weaknesses in our border security.
As a result, and based on the Commission's recommendation,
the Committee on Homeland Security, along with the Committee on
International Relations, pushed for the terrorist travel
provisions in the 9/11 Reform Act.
Through the Act, Congress directed the Departments of
Justice, State and Homeland Security to address the problem of
terrorist travel, including human smuggling and trafficking, in
a comprehensive way. The result was the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center.
We look forward to hearing about the effectiveness of the
Center today, as well as challenges to this interagency effort.
I now yield to our Ranking Member, Mr. Meek, from Florida
for any statement he may have.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to not
only thank you and Ms. Harris but also our witnesses for being
a part of this discussion today. I know our time is limited on
this hearing, so I am going to make my opening comments very
brief.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a major issue to our
country. And as we start looking at protecting our borders and
also protecting those individuals that are victims of smugglers
and others that are out there, that is our biggest challenge. I
know that this office is one of the offices that we are going
to be talking about today, is only staffed with 12 individuals
to deal with the whole country on this subject. I am looking
forward to hearing from all of our witnesses here today on how
we can accomplish that and if they are getting full cooperation
from other Federal agencies to combat human smuggling and also
cutting down on trafficking or possible terrorist travel.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back the balance
of my time so that hopefully we can get to these witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. I now recognize the Gentlelady from Florida for
any opening statement she may have.
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. I
wish to express my gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, for granting
my request to bring this important issue out of the shadows and
into a public forum, and I also want to thank all our witnesses
today on both panels for their contributions to the
subcommittee's examination of the implementation status of one
of the key provisions outlined in the 9/11 Reform Act, the
Terrorist Travel and Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.
We are here today in order to determine the extent to which
this interagency effort is meeting the statutory intent of the
law. The Committee on Homeland Security was instrumental in
ensuring the inclusion of these terrorist travel provisions in
the 9/11 Reform Act, including section 7202, which would
authorize the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center.
The exercise of this committee's oversight responsibilities
demand that we ascertain whether the current staff structure,
the funding levels and the overall strategy are sufficient to
ensure compliance with the statutorily defined mission of the
Center. And if not, we must resolve to identify and address any
of these insufficiencies.
Today, the integrity of our immigration system and our
Nation's security is comprised of three increasingly pervasive
threats: Clandestine terrorist travel, sex trafficking and
human smuggling. These criminal acts may be a distinct
phenomenon, but they share a number of unique characteristics,
and it is essential that we first understand the subtle
differences between the crimes.
The crime of clandestine terrorist travel acts involves
surreptitious movements of the terrorists by means of
fraudulent documentation or alias support of a terrorist
operation, often with the help of illicit travel networks,
which can either be terrorist or criminal networks.
The sex trafficking involves the exploitation of people
through force, coercion, threats, or deception, and includes
human rights abuses such as debt bondage, deprivation of
liberty or lack of control over their freedom and labor.
Trafficking can be for purposes of sexual exploitation or
labor exploitation and accordingly the INS estimates that the
trafficking of human beings, including sex trafficking, exceeds
$10 billion in the global industry that now compromises the
third largest source of money for organized crime after drugs
and arms.
Human smuggling, on the other hand, is defined as the
facilitation, transportation or attempted transportation or
illegal entry of persons across an international border in
violation of one or more of the country's laws. In many cases,
individuals engaged in human smuggling do so willingly and
voluntarily.
The conditions which give rise to terrorist travel, sex
trafficking and human smuggling, as well as the modes, methods
and means of transportation are often similar. The absence of
moral conscience and willingness to engage in these unspeakable
acts of brutality is evident in the terrorists and traffickers
alike.
In Florida the threat is a particular concern because of
our State's designation as one of the top three destination
States within the U.S. for trafficking of victims.
Florida's demographics are a large number of immigrants and
the presence of 12 international airports, 14 deep water
seaports and our significant water borders that make our State
particularly attractive to traffickers and terrorists.
The grave nature of this threat was acknowledged in the 9/
11 Commission's report on August 2004 in the recommendations.
And in response to the Commission's proposals, Congress passed
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004,
also called the 9/11 Reform Act. Many of the provisions were
designed to eradicate the institutional weaknesses that led to
the Government's failure to adequately protect our Nation from
terrorist attack and in particular for its failure to, quote,
connect the dots.
The terrorist exploitation of our transportation and
immigration system galvanized the Commission's focus on the
need to combat terrorism by targeting terrorist travel. The
Commission recommended, and I quote, targeting travel is at
least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting
their money. The United States should combine terrorist travel
intelligence operations and law enforcement into a strategy to
intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and
constrain terrorists' mobility, end quote.
The Center constituted an integral component of an overall
strategy to combat all violations of our immigration system,
and as asserted in the Center's charter, quote, migrant
smuggling, trafficking in persons and clandestine terrorist
travel are transnational issues that threaten national
security. They also raise significant human rights and rule of
law concerns.
Finally, there is no ambiguity in the law with regard to
this center's function. Section 7202 clearly states that the
primary function of the Center is that it shall serve as the
focal point for the interagency efforts to address terrorist
travel.
And today I wish to clarify that Congress' intent was for
the Federal Government to address the problem of terrorist
travel, including the ancillary crimes of human smuggling and
sex trafficking, in a coordinated and comprehensive way. The
subsequent meetings held by the committee with the staffs of
the 9/11 Commission of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking
Center, the Center's significant potential to play a key roll
in combating terrorist travel emerged.
It is for this reason that the Committee on Homeland
Security, along with International Relations Committee pushed
for the statutory authorization of the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center. However, I am concerned by the reports that
this Center lacks sufficient resources, including a dedicated
full-time staff, dedicated management, and dedicated
appropriations needed for the Center's fulfilling of the
legislative intent.
In a time of limited resources, it is incumbent upon
Members of Congress to ask each agency the tough questions, how
does your agency envision the future of the Center, is the
Center adequately staffed, funded and organized in order to
fulfill its mission, does it have the appropriate leadership
involved, and what obstacles exist to the Center's receiving
full support?
Again, I wish to thank the witnesses for appearing today,
and I look forward to hearing their testimony. I now yield back
to the ranking member for any opening statement that he may
have.
Mr. Rogers. I want to thank the witnesses. We have a very
distinguished panel with us now. We thank you for being here.
And I want to let you know your entire statements will be
submitted for the record in their entirety. But I would ask so
that we can get to the questions that you limit your comments
to 5 minutes.
We are going be called for votes at about 3:30. We would
like to wrap this up so we don't keep you waiting here for an
hour while we are over there voting.
So with that, the Chair now recognizes Mr. John Clark,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for
any statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CLARK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Clark. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor for
me to appear before you today to share the Department of
Homeland Security's role in the implementation of the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center and the Department's
commitment to its critical mission.
I would like to stray a little from my written statement in
giving my oral summary. I have two reasons for doing so. The
first is I want to more concretely underscore the strong
relationship Department of Homeland Security is developing with
the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. It is a
relationship that is maturing and growing as the Center and
Department move beyond our first years of existence.
The second reason is not to wave the flag of immigration
and customs enforcement, or ICE, but as an executive of ICE to
also underscore a part of the reason as to why I am appearing
before you today representing the Department of Homeland
Security at this hearing.
The mission of the Center marries very well into part of
the core mission of ICE. My agency has the primary Federal
responsibility for investigating transnational organizations
responsible for human smuggling and trafficking. The Center
provides a venue in which various agencies within DHS, but
principally ICE, can share all information on these
organizations, classified or otherwise, and work
collaboratively with our partners in DOJ, State and the
Intelligence Community to ensure that criminal organizations
involved in human smuggling and trafficking aren't also
connected with terrorism.
Should we identify any such links, we are able to
seamlessly hand off to the FBI, the agency with primary
jurisdiction for such terrorist related investigations. There
is currently no other center that provides such a venue.
From the perspective of the Department, the Center has been
providing strategic operational and tactical information as
well as analytic support, which has supported ICE smuggling
investigations, human smuggling investigations, and have
resulted in the disruption and/or dismantling of criminal
travel networks engaged in the movement of foreign nationals of
special interest to the United States.
I would like to summarize some of these contributions, with
the understanding that some of the locations have been
generalized due to the ongoing nature of the investigation and
the nature that the Center supports us.
For example, the Center provided valuable support for an
ICE investigation conducted by one of our field offices in the
northeastern United States that focused on a travel network
engaged in the smuggling of Indian nationals through the
Caribbean and South America. The investigation disclosed that
these smugglers had engaged in the illegal movement of special
interest aliens. Both smugglers were indicted and are in U.S.
custody at this time.
In a recent event, a flagless fishing vessel transporting
over 100 migrants capsized in the Pacific Ocean off the coast
of South America while en route to Central America. This Center
rapidly provided tactical information to ICE investigators and
DOJ officials who deployed to South America to assist the host
government in the ensuing criminal investigation. The
collaborative efforts of both governments led to the arrest by
the foreign authorities of the smuggler responsible for the
tragedy.
During an ICE human smuggling investigation, the Center
provided intelligence information that was shared with the
foreign government. The foreign government detained the ICE
suspect in accordance with international law. The detention of
the subject allowed both the United States and the foreign
government to use the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, specifically the Protocol
Against the Smuggling of Migrants, for the first time for both
countries in making extradition to the United States legally
possible. The extradition has been granted, although it is
still pending an appeal by the subject in that country.
The subject was identified as a member of a criminal
organization engaged in the smuggling of Albanian and
Macedonian nationals. This criminal organization procured
fraudulent travel documents to facilitate the movement of
foreign nationals through Europe and South America with the
United States as the ultimate destination.
ICE has unparalleled experience investigating organizations
in both human smuggling and trafficking of persons. In fiscal
years 2004, 2005 ICE human smuggling and trafficking
investigations resulted in approximately 4,000 arrests, 2,000
indictments, and more than 1,500 convictions. As it pertains to
significant travel networks, ICE engages in multiagency
intelligence driven targeting.
As a result of these U.S. Government targeting efforts,
ICE-led investigations have resulted in the disruption and/or
dismantling of 24 signify criminal travel networks engaged in
the global movement of third country nationals, mostly foreign
nationals of countries of interest to the United States.
In their similar initiative abroad, the U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico requested that the U.S. Embassy's Fusion Center be
renamed the Alien Smuggling Coordination Center, ASCC, with a
refocused mission on human smuggling travel patterns of third
country nationals. The Ambassador requested that ICE assume the
U.S. government lead for the operational responsibilities of
the new ASCC.
To that end, ICE has allocated manpower, inclusive of a
designated agent to coordinate the implementation of the ASCC
and to collaborate with all U.S. Government stakeholders at
post. The ASCC is intended to operate in the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico along similar lines of the HSTC by bringing
representatives from Law Enforcement and Intelligence and State
to share and review data on human smuggling and trafficking
organizations looking for any connections with terrorism and
enhanced enforcement actions as appropriate.
As it relates to trafficking in persons, ICE has an
unprecedented role in preventing the revictimization of
trafficking victims through the issuance of short-term
immigration relief in the form of continued presence. Although
there are several government entities involved in the fight
against trafficking in persons, ICE is the single Federal
entity authorized to provide CP for victims of trafficking.
Within that context, in 2005, ICE agents sponsored 78 percent
of all initial requests and extensions for CP governmentwide.
These statistics illustrate the significant contribution by
ICE as it relates to investigations of individuals and criminal
organizations engaged in the exploitation of men, women and
children for the purpose of commercial, sex or forced labor. To
that end, ICE has 305 collateral duty victim witness
coordinators who work with nongovernment organizations to
assist in the provision of victim services.
Finally, in the Global Trafficking in Persons, or G-TIP
program, the Department of Homeland Security works
cooperatively with the Department of State and justice. ICE
manages some of the G-TIP projects with the overall goal of
building foreign government capacity to increase the
effectiveness of their anti-trafficking law enforcement
efforts.
Additionally, ICE seeks to develop and conduct joint
bilateral investigations to dismantle criminal organizations
engaged in the trafficking of persons. The ICE Office of
Investigations provides oversight, guidance and support to
ongoing criminal trafficking and child sex tourism
investigations, both domestically and internationally.
ICE coordinates and shares information and intelligence
with the Center. The Department participates in the Senior
Policy and Operating Group, or SPOG, and the Peer Review Panel,
both established by the President's G-TIP Initiative.
The men and women of DHS are grateful for the chance to
serve the American people on their behalf. I thank you and your
colleagues for the continued support for the Department and the
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and I would be pleased
to answer any of your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Clark follows:]
Prepared Sttement of John P. Clark
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, it is an honor for me to appear before you today to
share the Department of Homeland Security's role in the implementation
of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (Center) and the
Department's commitment to its critical mission.
Criminal travel networks pose a threat to our national security by
providing a readily available conduit through which persons potentially
seeking to harm United States interests can enter our country. These
networks, primarily engaged in human smuggling and trafficking in
persons, rely on highly effective transnational alliances involving
service providers such as recruiters, brokers, document manufacturers,
transporters and corrupt government officials. To effectively cripple
these criminal travel networks at source and transit countries, as well
as in the United States, interagency cooperation and information
exchange are of the utmost importance.
To this end, in July 2004, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General created the Human Smuggling
and Trafficking Center. In December 2004, the Congress formalized the
establishment of the Center in Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Since its inception, the Department of Homeland Security has fully
supported this very important interagency venture. The Department,
through a senior manager from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), served as the first director of the Center. In recognition of
our continuing commitment to the Center, DHS has forwarded the
nomination of another ICE executive to the steering group for
consideration. In addition, DHS Assistant Secretary Randy Beardsworth
has been involved in guiding the Center by serving as Co-Chair and as
the Senior DHS representative to the Center's Steering Group.
The Department of Homeland Security has contributed a significant
and expanding presence at the Center. In FY 05, DHS had six
representatives assigned to the Center. ICE had five full-time
personnel from the Offices of Investigations and Intelligence and the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) assigned one intelligence analyst. In FY 06,
the ICE personnel assigned to the Center will reach seven
representatives: six investigators, one of which will be the Center
Director, and one intelligence analyst. Analysts from DHS's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the USCG are planning to assign
additional personnel to the Center to enhance the Center's
capabilities.
With respect to budget for the Center, the Department has entered
into a cost reimbursement agreement with the Departments of State and
Justice to address operating expenses for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
The Center and its stakeholders continue to work to identify the scope
of the Center's long-term resource needs.
The Center has made significant achievements, including meeting
statutory requirements of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, such as the President's 180-Day Report to
Congress relating to the establishment of the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center and the Vulnerabilities Assessment produced jointly
with the National Counter-Terrorism Center. The latter product focused
on vulnerabilities in the U.S. and international travel systems that
can be exploited by terrorists, smugglers and human traffickers.
In addition to meeting statutory requirements, the Center has
produced valuable intelligence assessments of countries in Latin
America and Asia as well as an assessment of the Document Fraud
industry in a specific country. As part of the Security and Prosperity
Partnership, a trilateral initiative between the governments of Mexico,
Canada and the United States, the Center was tasked to conduct a joint
U.S./Canada assessment on Trafficking in Persons.
From the perspective of the Department, the Center has been
providing strategic, operational and tactical information as well as
analytical support, which have supported ICE human smuggling
investigations and have resulted in the disruption and/or dismantling
of criminal travel networks engaged in the movement of foreign
nationals of special interest to the United States.
I would like to summarize some of these contributions with the
understanding that some of the locations have been generalized due to
the ongoing nature of the investigations and the nature of the Center's
support to us. For example, the Center provided valuable support for an
ICE investigation conducted by one of our field offices in the
northeastern United States that focused on a travel network engaged in
the smuggling of Indian nationals through the Caribbean and South
America. The investigation disclosed that these smugglers had engaged
in the illegal movement of Special Interest Aliens. Both smugglers were
indicted and are in U.S. custody at this time.
In a recent event, a flagless fishing vessel transporting over 100
migrants capsized in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of South America
while en route to Central America. The Center rapidly provided tactical
information to ICE investigators that had deployed to South America to
assist the host government in the criminal investigation. The
collaborative effort of both governments led to the arrest by the
foreign authorities of the smuggler responsible for the tragedy.
During an ICE human smuggling investigation, the Center provided
intelligence information that was shared with a foreign government. The
foreign government detained the ICE suspect in accordance with
international law. The detention of the subject allow both the United
States and the foreign government to use the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime; specifically, the Protocol
Against the Smuggling of Migrants, for the first time for both
countries and make an extradition to the United States legally
possible. The extradition has been granted, although it is still
pending appeal by the subject in that country. The subject was
identified as a member of a criminal organization engaged in the
smuggling of Albanian and Macedonian nationals. This criminal
organization procured fraudulent travel documents to facilitate the
movement of foreign nationals through Europe and South America, with
the United States as the ultimate destination.
Lastly, in the Global Trafficking in Persons (G-TIP) program, the
Department works cooperatively with the Departments of State and
Justice. ICE manages some of the G-TIP projects with the overall goal
of building foreign government capacity to increase the effectiveness
of their anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Additionally, ICE
seeks to develop and conduct joint bilateral investigations to
dismantle criminal organizations engaged in the trafficking in persons.
The ICE Office of Investigations provides oversight, guidance and
support to ongoing ICE criminal trafficking and child sex tourism
investigations, both domestically and internationally. ICE coordinates
and shares information and intelligence with the Center. The Department
participates in the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) and on the
Peer Review Panel, both established by the President's TIP Initiative.
The ICE TIP efforts are provided to and included in the semiannual
Department of State G-TIP POTUS Initiative Program Status Report, and
to the Attorney General's Annual Report to Congress on the U.S.
Government Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons.
In conclusion, the Center brings together federal agency
representatives from the policy, law enforcement, intelligence and
diplomatic arenas to work together to achieve increased progress in
addressing the problems of human smuggling, human trafficking and
clandestine terrorist mobility. The Department is committed to
supporting the Center. Its success enhances the Department's
capabilities to address these criminal threats and exploitable
vulnerabilities.
The men and women of DHS are grateful for the chance to serve the
American people and on their behalf, I thank you and your colleagues
for your continued support of the Department and the Human Smuggling
and Trafficking Center.
I would be pleased to answer your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Clark.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Chris Swecker, Acting
Executive Director of Law Enforcement Services at the U.S.
Department of Justice, for any statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS SWECKER, ACTING EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Swecker. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Meek, and members of the committee. We appreciate the
opportunity to come here to talk to you today about the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center. This Center now serves as the
Federal Government's information clearinghouse and intelligence
fusion center for all Federal agencies addressing human
smuggling, human trafficking and potential use of human
smuggling routes, networks and organizations by known or
suspected terrorists.
The Department of Justice is represented on the Center's
Steering Committee through the participation of the Assistant
Attorney Generals of the Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions
and the FBI Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative
Division. The Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of State also have representatives on the Steering
Committee.
The Steering Committee meets regularly to help provide the
growth and direction of the new venture. Each of the AAGs and
the AD have designated high level staff to work closely with
the Center Director to provide more day-to-day guidance on the
number of issues that arise given that the HSTC is still in
development.
The Steering Committee is considering the appropriate
staffing levels needed in order to carry out the Center's
mission. The Steering Committee created a working group for
that purpose, and that working group has been meeting and is
expected to make recommendations to the Steering Committee
about staffing issues.
The HSTC develops intelligence into action by law
enforcement agencies, serves as the focal point for interagency
efforts to address clandestine terrorist travel, serves as the
clearinghouse for deconfliction of member agencies' efforts
regarding human smuggling, human trafficking and clandestine
terrorist travel, supports the efforts of the National
Counterterrorism Center, and prepares an annual strategic
assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the United States and
international travel systems.
The HSTC is staffed by administrators, investigators and
analysts from the Departments of State, Homeland Security and
Justice and Intelligence Community representatives. The FBI's
Criminal Investigative Division has a supervisory special agent
and an intelligence analyst assigned to the HSTC. Both work
closely with their counterparts in the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division to ensure the free flow of intelligence and
investigative information regarding any possible connections to
terrorism.
Our analyst at the Center has direct contact with their
counterpart in the Counterterrorism Division. There are
analysts in the FBI that stand behind the ones detailed tO the
Center. Thus, the analysts detailed to the Center contribute to
the combined product of all of the analysts back at
headquarters.
FBI databases are in the Center, and the information in the
databases is available to other participants through the FBI
detailees. The FBI and HSTC recently identified a criminal
enterprise that was smuggling special interest aliens into the
United States, and the FBI subsequently determined this
criminal enterprise had a potential nexus to terrorist groups.
This intelligence was provided to and is being investigated by
the FBI's Counterterrorism Division in conjunction with the
appropriate FBI Legal Attache Offices.
FBI personnel at the HSTC also work with and share
intelligence with the Mexico City Intelligence Fusion Center,
as well as the FBI Mexico City Legal Attache Office regarding
human smuggling and trafficking and any potential connections
to terrorist travel or terrorist organizations.
FBI representatives at the HSTC are in the process of
establishing intelligence sharing protocols on human smuggling
and trafficking matters with all of the Latin American FBI
Legal Attache Offices and plan to do the same for the FBI
Legats in Africa and Asia.
The HSTC is currently coordinating the pursuit of another
human smuggling and trafficking matter with the Department of
State, FBI, ICE and international law enforcement counterparts
in Asia and Europe regarding smugglers from the United States
as part of a human trafficking ring operating in Europe.
The HSTC is coordinating the investigation of this
trafficking ring with the appropriate FBI Legat office in
Europe and Asia, and field offices. In addition to its
participation in the HSTC, the FBI is also using its
participation in the Southeastern European Cooperative
Initiative, SECI, to address its responsibilities for
investigating international criminal enterprises engaged in a
variety of criminal activity, including human smuggling and
trafficking.
The SECI operates in much the same way as the HSTC does to
facilitate the exchange of information and coordinate
international law enforcement efforts among 12 member and 14
observer countries, primarily focused on transborder crime in
the Balkan region. The 12 member countries are listed in my
statement. I won't go through all of them, but they are all in
Eastern Europe and the Balkan area.
SECI also supports the following specialized task forces
for countering transborder crime, including human trafficking
and people smuggling, drug trafficking, trafficking stolen
vehicles, financial crimes, smuggling of goods and customs
frauds, terrorism and other serious transborder crimes.
Currently we have three agents on assignment in SECI in
Bucharest, Romania; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Tirana, Albania.
The FBI uses the Enterprise Theory of Investigation as one
of our main strategies to investigate criminal enterprises that
are involved in human smuggling and human trafficking, as well
as other organized criminal organizations.
The Enterprise Theory of Investigation is an intelligence
driven investigative technique which seeks to identify the full
scope of a criminal organization. It is a two-step process
which involves identifying the organization and the activities
surrounding the organization while simultaneously identifying
the financial assets of the criminal investigation for possible
forfeiture. Sophisticated techniques are used as well as the
RICO statutes and the complex conspiracy statutes.
The FBI has received some intelligence reports from the
Center that some members of MS-13 have been involved in human
smuggling by facilitating the transportation of illegal
immigrants from Latin American countries through Mexico to the
U.S., but not on a large scale. Some MS-13 gang members have
been smuggled into the U.S. utilizing the services of
established human trafficking networks. This information was
derived from interviews of MS-13 gang members at the time of
their arrest in the United States.
The FBI will continue to support the efforts of the Center
and its effectiveness in combating human smuggling and human
trafficking. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Swecker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Swecker
Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, and Members of
the Committee. I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify
before you today about the FBI's role in the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center. The Acting Director of the Center is submitting
testimony that outlines in detail the structure, staffing and mission
of the Center.
Pursuant to Section 7202 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the Departments of State, Homeland
Security, and Justice signed a charter in July 2004 to establish the
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). This Center now serves
as the federal government's information clearinghouse and intelligence
fusion center for all federal agencies addressing human smuggling,
human trafficking, and the potential use of human smuggling routes,
networks and organizations by known or suspected terrorists. The
Department of Justice is represented on the Center's Steering Committee
through the participation of the Assistant Attorney Generals of Civil
Rights and Criminal Divisions and the FBI Assistant Director of the
Criminal Investigative Division. The Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of State also have representatives on the Steering
Committee. The Steering Committee meets regularly to help guide the
growth and direction of this new venture. Each of the AAGs and the AD
have designated high-level staff to work closely with the Center
Director to provide more day-to-day guidance on the number of issues
that arise given that the HSTC is still in development. The Steering
Committee is considering the appropriate staffing levels needed in
order to carry out the Center's mission. The Steering Committee created
a working group for that purpose. The working group has been meeting
and is expected to make recommendations to the Steering Committee about
staffing issues.
The HSTC develops intelligence into action by law enforcement
agencies; serves as the focal point for interagency efforts to address
clandestine terrorist travel; serves as the clearinghouse for
deconfliction of member agencies efforts regarding human smuggling,
human trafficking and clandestine terrorist travel; supports the
efforts of the National Counterterrorist Center (NCTC), and prepares an
annual strategic assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the United
States and international travel systems.
The HSTC is staffed by administrators, investigators, and analysts
from the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, and intelligence community representatives.
The FBI's Criminal Investigative Division has a Supervisory Special
Agent and an Intelligence Analyst assigned to the HSTC. Both work
closely with their counterparts in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division
to ensure the free flow of intelligence and investigative information
regarding any possible connections to terrorism. Our analyst at the
Center has direct contact with their counterpart in the
Counterterrorism Division. There are analysts in the FBI that "stand
behind" the ones detailed to the Center. Thus, the analysts detailed to
the Center contribute the combined product of all the analysts back at
headquarters. FBI databases are in the Center and the information in
the databases is available to other participants through the FBI
detailees.
The FBI and the HSTC recently identified a criminal enterprise that
was smuggling Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) into the United States,
and the FBI subsequently determined this criminal enterprise had a
potential nexus to terrorist groups. This intelligence was provided to
and is being investigated by the FBI's Counterterrorism Division in
conjunction with the appropriate FBI Legal Attaches.
FBI personnel at the HSTC also work with and share intelligence
with the Mexico City Intelligence Fusion Center (MCIFC), as well as the
FBI Mexico City Legal Attache office, regarding human smuggling and
trafficking, and any potential connections to terrorist travel or
terrorist organizations. FBI representatives at the HSTC are in the
process of establishing intelligence sharing protocols on human
smuggling and trafficking matters with all of the Latin American FBI
Legal Attache offices, and plan to do the same for the FBI Legal
Attaches in Africa and Asia.
The HSTC is currently coordinating the pursuit of another human
smuggling and trafficking matter with the Department of State, FBI,
Immigration and Custom Enforcement, and international law enforcement
counterparts in Asia and Europe regarding smugglers from the United
States that are part of a human trafficking ring operating in Europe.
The HSTC is coordinating the investigation of this trafficking ring
with the appropriate FBI Legal Attache offices in Europe and Asia.
In addition to its participation in the HSTC, the FBI is also using
its participation in the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
(SECI) to address its responsibilities for investigating international
criminal enterprises engaged in a variety of criminal activity,
including human smuggling and trafficking. The SECI operates in much
the same way as the HSTC does to facilitate the exchange of information
and to coordinate international law enforcement efforts among 12 member
and 14 observer countries, primarily focused on transborder crime in
the Balkan Region. The 12 member countries included in SECI are
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary,
Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, Serbia/Montenegro, and Turkey.
The observer countries are from Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada,
France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The SECI also supports the following specialized task forces for
countering transborder crime:
1. Human trafficking and people smuggling
2. Drug trafficking
3. Trafficking in stolen vehicles
4. Financial crimes
5. Smuggling of goods and customs frauds
6. Terrorism
7. Other serious transborder crimes
The FBI currently has three agents on TDY assignments for SECI in
Bucharest, Romania; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Tirana, Albania.
The FBI utilizes the Enterprise Theory of Investigation (ETI) as
one of our main strategies to investigate criminal enterprises that are
involved in human smuggling and human trafficking, as well other
organized criminal organizations.
ETI is an intelligence driven investigative technique which seeks
to identify the full scope of a criminal organization.
ETI is a two step process, which involves identifying the
organization and the criminal activities surrounding the organization,
while simultaneously identifying the financial assets of the criminal
organization for possible forfeiture.
ETI can involve covert techniques, which include informants,
physical surveillance, electronic surveillance (wiretaps), undercover
operations, and the use of pen registers. ETI can also utilize overt
techniques, such as Federal Grand Jury subpoenas, witness interviews,
and the review of media reporting.
The ETI approach is used with the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations statute, which is better known as the RICO statute. ETI
furthers RICO prosecutions by identifying predicate crimes, identifying
the existence of a criminal enterprise, and by identifying the
individuals in control of the enterprise.
The FBI has received intelligence reports from the Center that some
members of MS-13 have been involved in human smuggling by facilitating
the transportation of illegal migrants from Latin American countries,
through Mexico to the United States, but not on a large scale.
Also, some MS-13 gang members have been smuggled into the United
States utilizing the services of established human smuggling networks.
This information was derived from interviews of MS-13 gang members at
the time of their arrests in the United States.
The FBI supports the efforts of the Center and its effectiveness in
combating human smuggling and human trafficking. The FBI's
counterterrorism, international organized crime, and domestic
trafficking and involuntary servitude/slavery efforts have been and
will continue to be enhanced by the valuable contributions of the
Center. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I would be
happy to answer any of your questions.
Ms. Harris. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Swecker, for your
testimony.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Marc Gorelick, Acting Director
for Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center at the United States
Department of State, to testify. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MARC GORELICK, ACTING DIRECTOR, HUMAN SMUGGLING
AND TRAFFICKING CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Gorelick. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and
distinguished members of the committee.
Before I begin I would like to extend my sincere gratitude
to you and the members of your subcommittee for this
opportunity to share with you the status of the interagency
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and the strides we have
taken to build the Center ensure that it plays a significant
role in protecting the United States. Your interest in our work
is greatly appreciated.
As Acting Director, I wish to make it clear that I am
speaking on behalf of the Center and not any of the
participating agencies.
Human smuggling and trafficking into the United States
constitutes significant risks to national security and public
safety.
Global pipelines present an unacceptable vulnerability to
our Nation's security. These pipelines are used by smuggling
and trafficking organizations for moving undocumented aliens
and may be exploited by terrorists and extremist organizations
to gain clandestine entry into the United States.
The interagency Center is designed to turn all source
intelligence into law enforcement or other action in three main
mission areas: Human smuggling, human trafficking--especially
the criminal facilitation and movement of the victims--and the
third is the criminal smuggler and document provider support of
clandestine terrorist travel.
Basically, the HSTC helps fight the global illicit travel
industry. It is an intelligence fusion center and information
clearinghouse that was established to break down the
information stovepipes to ensure that the people and agencies
that need intelligence get it on a timely basis. It is a
valuable new tool that collates, vets and analyzes information
from a range of sources and disseminates actionable operational
leads to Federal law enforcement, foreign policy, and
intelligence agencies and informs policy makers of threats to
help them make informed decisions.
When the HSTC is fully staffed, resourced and supported by
participating agencies, it will be better able to draw upon and
leverage their resources, strengths, authorities, and expertise
in order to achieve greater integration and overall
effectiveness in the U.S. Government's enforcement and other
response efforts and also to work with other governments.
It is now beginning to fulfill this potential by providing
a mechanism to bring together Federal agency representatives
from the policy, law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic
areas to work together on a full-time basis to achieve
increased effectiveness and convert intelligence into effective
action. We also serve a deconfliction role.
Under the terms of the HSTC charter, the Center is a
voluntary initiative. Agencies choose to participate because
they see the benefits in doing so. These agencies are the
Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of
Homeland Security, and members of the Intelligence Community.
The Center's efforts are fundamentally supportive as it is
intended to fuse information obtained from multiple sources and
provide participating agencies with tailored intelligence that
can enhance law enforcement and other action. It does not
direct any activities or develop policy.
While under construction, the Center has become a center of
excellence. U.S. Government agencies are turning to it because
of its unique expertise and knowledge in the related realms of
terrorist travel, human smuggling and human trafficking. While
we are proud of this recognition, we realize that it can be a
two-edged sword as the Center can become subject to rising
expectations beyond its capabilities.
When the charter was negotiated and signed, the Center was
originally envisioned as a small operation with a limited
mission and responsibilities. Section 7202 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 added significant
new functions and responsibilities to the Center for which the
Center was not originally created or organized to handle.
The HSTC is still very much a work in progress and in the
short time since the charter was signed and the IRTPA
established the Center in law, the Center staff has made
substantial progress in building the organization
infrastructure and fulfilling its responsibilities. These
results were achieved with the minimum of fiscal information
technology and human resources. However, it still has a way to
go before it can fulfill all that is required by law or
expected of it by its agencies.
Currently, the Center staff is made up of only 11 full-time
and 5 part-time people, all of whom are detailed or assigned to
the Center by their parent agencies. We also have one contract
support person.
Mr. Chairman, the Center and the people assigned to it are
dedicated to its mission and safeguarding America. We look
forward to working with the subcommittee in our efforts to
secure our national interests. I also thank you for this
opportunity to appear before the subcommittee, and I will be
happy to answer any questions you and the other members may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Gorelick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc Gorelick
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Before I begin I would like to extend my sincere
gratitude to you and the members of your subcommittee for this
opportunity to share with you the status of the interagency Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center, and the strides we have taken to
build the Center and ensure that it plays a significant role in United
States efforts against the criminal support of clandestine terrorist
travel, alien smuggling and trafficking in persons. Your interest in
our work is greatly appreciated. As Acting Director I wish to make it
clear that I am speaking on behalf of the interagency Center and not
any of the participating agencies.
Human smuggling and trafficking into the United States constitute
significant risks to national security and public safety. Global
pipelines present an unacceptable vulnerability to our nation's
security. These pipelines can be used by smuggling and trafficking
organizations for the clandestine entry of undocumented aliens and may
be exploited by terrorist and extremist organizations to gain entry
into the United States.
The interagency Center is designed to turn all-source intelligence
into law enforcement or other action in three main mission areas:
Human smuggling;
Human trafficking (criminal movement aspect); and
Criminal smuggler and document provider support of
clandestine terrorist travel.
Basically the HSTC helps fight the illicit travel business.
It is an intelligence fusion center and information clearinghouse
that was established to break down the information stovepipes to ensure
that the people and agencies that need intelligence get it on a timely
basis. It is a valuable new tool that is designed to collate, vet and
analyze intelligence and related information from a vast range of
sources and disseminate actionable operational leads to federal law
enforcement, foreign policy and intelligence agencies. It is also
designed to inform policy makers of threats in order to help them make
informed decisions.
When the HSTC is fully staffed, resourced and supported by
participating agencies, it will be better able to draw upon, and
leverage their resources, strengths, authorities and expertise in order
to achieve greater integration and overall effectiveness in the U.S.
Government's enforcement and other response efforts, and work with
other governments. It is now beginning to fulfill this potential by
providing a mechanism to bring together federal agency representatives
from the policy, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic areas to
work together on a full time basis to achieve increased effectiveness,
and to convert intelligence into effective law enforcement, diplomatic,
and other action.
Under the terms of the HSTC Charter, the Center is a voluntary
initiative. Agencies choose to participate because they see benefits.
These agencies are: Department of State--(International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security);
Department of Justice--(Criminal Division, Civil Rights Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation); Department of Homeland Security--
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Coast Guard, Office
of Intelligence Analysis) and members of the Intelligence Community.
The Center's efforts are fundamentally supportive in nature as the
HSTC is intended to fuse information obtained from multiple sources and
provide participating agencies with tailored intelligence that can
enhance law enforcement and other action. It does not direct any
activities or develop policy.
Even while under construction, the Center has become a ``center of
excellence'' that US government agencies turn to more and more because
of its unique expertise and knowledge in the realms of smuggler support
of terrorist travel, human smuggling and human trafficking. While we
are proud of this recognition, we realize that it can be a two edged
sword, as the Center can become subject to rising expectations beyond
its capabilities.
The HSTC is still very much a work in progress. In the year and
half since the Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security
signed the Center Charter, and the little over a year since the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) established
the Center in law, we have made substantial progress in building a
useful organization and fulfilling its responsibilities. However, it
still has a way to go before it can fulfill all that is required by the
IRTPA or expected of it by agencies or other interagency centers such
as the National Counterterrorism Center, with which the HSTC
cooperates.
Under the Charter, the HSTC was originally envisioned as a small
operation with a limited mission and responsibilities; with the
following functions:
Facilitate the broad dissemination of all-source
information;
Prepare strategic assessments that provide accurate
and timely information about: organizations' organization,
infrastructure and methods of operation; smuggling routes,
countries and geographic regions; and criminal methodologies;
Identify issues for interagency attention or
coordination;
If requested, coordinate select initiatives and
provide support; and
Serve as a point of contact for cooperation with
foreign authorities.
Section 7202 of the IRTPA of 2004 added significant new functions
and responsibilities to the Center, which the Center was not originally
created or organized to handle:
Serve as the focal point for interagency efforts to
address terrorist travel;
Serve as a clearinghouse with respect to all relevant
information from all Federal Government agencies in support of
the United States strategy to address the issues of clandestine
terrorist travel, migrant smuggling and trafficking of persons;
Ensure cooperation among all relevant policy, law
enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies of the
Federal Government to improve effectiveness and to convert all
information available to the Government relating to the three
mission areas into tactical, operational, and strategic
intelligence that can be used to combat such illegal
activities;
Prepare and submit to Congress, on an annual basis, a
strategic assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the United
States and foreign travel systems that may be exploited by
international terrorists, human smugglers and traffickers, and
their facilitators;
Support the efforts of the National Counter Terrorism
Center.
The Center staff has labored diligently over the last year. Their
efforts have produced significant results in the areas of building the
Center's infrastructure, fulfilling some of the requirements assigned
to it by the IRTPA, and fostering greater U.S. and international
cooperation to combat terrorist mobility, human smuggling and human
trafficking. These results were achieved with a minimum of fiscal,
information technology (IT), and human resources. Currently the Center
staff is made up of 11 full-time and five part-time people, all of whom
are detailed or assigned to the Center by their parent agencies. We
also have one contract support person. The following outlines some of
the accomplishments that have resulted from their efforts:
On June 20, 2005, the HSTC fulfilled IRTPA Section 7202(d), which
required the President to transmit a report to the Congress outlining
progress that has been made in standing up the HSTC and to identify its
staffing and resource needs.
The Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security signed a
cost reimbursement agreement to cover the HSTC's non-personnel related
operating costs for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. This will significantly
increase the Center's ability to fulfill its many missions.
The HSTC is located in a secure location that is supported by the
State Department. Although it uses a State Department IT backbone, as a
fusion center, classified connectivity and information management are
critical. We are establishing IT connectivity to many participating
agencies, including the Intelligence Community. We are also working
closely with our partners and have an especially close relationship
with the National Counter Terrorism Center.
The Center has disseminated almost 2000 cables and reports since
May 2005. Center staff created an Intelligence Dissemination Tracking
System and Database in December 2005, which also includes any feedback
we receive from the recipients.
The Department of Homeland Security established a searchable HSTC
database and webpage on the DHS Intelligence Fusion Web-page and
uploaded thousands of records. The HSTC updates the database daily.
The Coast Guard established and upgraded a classified website for
the Center on its SIPRNET Website where the Center's products are
posted.
The State Department established a public information Internet
website to give general information about the HSTC (http://
www.state.gov/g/inl/c14079.htm)
All personnel assigned to the Center have available, on their
desktops, the State Department's unclassified and classified (up to
Secret) systems and the DHS unclassified network, providing the HSTC
access to numerous DHS databases. The State systems provide access to
the State Intranet, e-mail, cable traffic and the Consolidated Consular
Database, a powerful tool that contains millions of visa records.
We have completed installation and activation of DOJnet, which
provides more efficient and secure communications between DOJ personnel
assigned to the HSTC, and the Justice Data Network. We have also
completed installation and activation of FBInet terminals, providing
the HSTC access to critical FBI data.
The Center installed secure video conferencing capability for real-
time conferencing with overseas posts as well as domestic locations.
The HSTC and the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs are
negotiating an agreement to give the Center access to the U.S. Passport
database. We are also negotiating with DHS U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services for appropriate HSTC access to USCIS records.
Secure desktop connectivity with the Intelligence Community has
been approved by the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI)
Interagency Policy Board (IAPB). We hope to have this, and other secure
connectivity, installed in the next few months.
The Center created an electronic and hard copy library of images of
genuine and fraudulent U.S. and foreign travel documents, and U.S. and
foreign fraudulent document alerts. This is a limited internal database
that is meant to be a research tool for analysts in the HSTC. It is not
meant to be all inclusive nor is it meant to duplicate the library at
the DHS/ICE Forensic Document Laboratory.
The Center's staff is also producing a body of useful intelligence
assessments and reports at the same time they were building its
infrastructure and establishing its procedures. These products were
initiated by statutory requirements, requests from participating
agencies, and self generation, where the Center staff saw a
vulnerability or need to inform. Some of the more notable products
include:
IRTPA Sec. 7202(c)(4) requires the HSTC to prepare and transmit to
Congress a strategic assessment regarding vulnerabilities in the US and
international travel systems that can be exploited by terrorists,
smugglers, traffickers and their facilitators. The HSTC and the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) jointly drafted a comprehensive
vulnerabilities assessment and released it as a finished intelligence
product on September 14, 2005. The report was delivered to Congress on
December 16, 2005. We will be gearing up for the next report.
The Center is heavily involved in the production of the National
Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel, which the NCTC produced. Most of
the Center staff were involved in drafting the strategy and one staff
member was a lead drafter of this product.
The Coast Guard and the HSTC jointly issued intelligence products
that identified certain asylum applicants in the United States, and a
foreign national immigrant visa applicant with suspected extremist
ties. These products resulted in two Joint Terrorism Task Force
investigations and an individual being excluded from the US and having
his visa revoked.
The Center has also produced several joint intelligence assessments
with partner agencies regarding human smuggling from the East Asia/
Pacific region, global smuggling routes and trends, human smuggling
from China; smuggling and trafficking from the East Asia/Pacific
region. The Center published, with the Coast Guard, a major threat
assessment of smuggling from a South American country. The HSTC worked
with the FBI to produce joint intelligence products looking at human
smuggling front companies, human smuggling via Native American
reservations, and human smuggling utilizing public conveyances. And we
worked with the FBI and DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis to produce
an assessment of smugglers believed to present special security risks.
The Center has also produced numerous other products on its own
initiative. These include a comprehensive intelligence assessment
looking at human smuggling via a Caribbean country; an intelligence
report identifying suspected fraudulent shipping companies in India
that has proven particularly useful to Consular Affairs; an
intelligence report on how the high number of lost/stolen US passports
in two Middle East countries could facilitate illegal travel; and a
report about a corrupt foreign consul who was selling passports and
visas.
The HSTC is assigned the U.S. lead on a joint U.S./Canada cross-
border trafficking in persons threat assessment that is being produced
under auspices of the US/Canada Cross Border Crime Forum.
The Center also produced a fact sheet outlining the distinctions
between human smuggling and human trafficking. This product is being
widely used for training throughout the U.S. government, and has been
used by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and New York State law
enforcement in their training programs. We also produced, for the State
Department Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, two
regional ``snapshots'' of trafficking inside the United States. The
HSTC provided analytical support to an Assistant United States Attorney
investigating an overseas sex tourism case, resulting in a guilty plea
by the defendant.
As part of its foreign affairs function the Center, in coordination
with the State Department, is cultivating relationships with several
foreign immigration services and regularly exchanges information with
them. This information is being disseminated to appropriate U.S.
agencies. The Center is the U.S. representative to the Pacific Rim
Immigration Intelligence Conference. The Center also supports various
U.S. foreign affairs initiatives, for instance support to the US
delegation to the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on
Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols. We drafted a report on
fraudulent document production in Bangkok that serves as the basis for
the G-8's action plan to address that issue.
The HSTC Director sits on the National Security Council Policy
Coordination Committee on International Organized Crime (PCC). An HSTC
staff member drafted a section of the threat assessment that will be
used as a basis for updating the U.S. Government's strategy for
addressing international organized crime.
Section 104 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2005 requires the Center to submit a report to Congress on links
between trafficking in persons and terrorism--specifically links
between the profits from trafficking and terrorist financing.
Mr. Chairman, the Center and the people assigned to it are
dedicated to its missions. We look forward to working with this
subcommittee in our efforts to secure our national interests. I also
thank you for this opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and I
will be happy to answer any questions you and the other members may
have.
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Gorelick, for your testimony. At
this time I have several questions I would like to ask. As
noted in my opening statement, I requested Chairman Rogers to
convene this hearing to address my concerns about national
security threats posed by terrorist travel, human smuggling and
sex trafficking and whether the Federal Government is
effectively tackling this growth problem.
Today I have even more concerns because of the numerous
obstacles we received in trying to arrange this hearing in the
first place, and I am frustrated as well as disappointed that
several witnesses to whom we repeatedly extended invitations
have failed to avail themselves to this committee. Principally
Randy Beerswith, the Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning
for DHS, and chairs DHS D.C. Steering Committee, which of
course is responsible for providing policy guidance and
oversight of the Center, was not available. State was not
available nor sent anyone, and so I want to once again thank
the witnesses who have chosen to be here today.
And I would appreciate if you could keep your answers to
these initial questions, just a yes or no, just kind of just to
get an overview.
The first question is do you believe that there are
adequate staffing levels at the HSTC? Mr. Clark, Mr. Swecker
and Mr. Gorelick.
Mr. Clark. This is a yes or no?
Ms. Harris. We will start out. I will come back to you to
give you a little more information.
Mr. Clark. Then no.
Ms. Harris. Mr. Swecker.
Mr. Swecker. At this point in time, yes.
Mr. Gorelick. No.
Ms. Harris. With regard to funding, do you think there is
adequate funding and would a dedicated item, line item of
funding, from the Federal Government help the Center? Mr.
Gorelick?
Mr. Gorelick. If I could, the Steering Group established
the Working Group to look into that and make recommendations to
the Steering Group, which the Steering Group will follow up on.
Ms. Harris. Presently, do you think the funding levels are
adequate?
Mr. Gorelick. No.
Ms. Harris. Mr. Swecker.
Mr. Swecker. They always tell us to stay away from budget
questions, but the funding comes from each individual agency.
So I would say no. It needs to be funded separately.
Ms. Harris. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. I would second what Mr. SWecker said.
Ms. Harris. Do you think that the Center should have an
operational capability? I mean you have all of these
organizational issues but then how--and they are not always
implemented. Is there a problem in the operations?
While I understand this is an interagency fusion center of
information, do you feel that there should be an operational
capability to follow up on the leads in intelligence that are
developed by the Center? Mr.Swecker?
Mr. Swecker. No.
Ms. Harris. Mr. Clark?
Mr. Clark. No.
Ms. Harris. Mr. Gorelick?
Mr. Gorelick. No.
Ms. Harris. And finally on these yes or no questions, in
your review is the mission of the Center clearly defined? Mr.
Clark?
Mr. Clark. Yes.
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Mr. Gorelick. Yes.
Ms. Harris. I have a couple more minutes.
Mr. Swecker, I know that there are 650 intelligence
analysts that were hired in 2004. There is supposed to be up to
over a thousand by the end of 2005. Would any of those analysts
be assigned to the Center to your knowledge?
Mr. Swecker. One is assigned out there full time right now
along with an agent. There is a counterterrorism analyst that
supports the Center but sits out at NCTC.
Ms. Harris. Do you anticipate any more of those additional
400 analysts, will any more be assigned to the Center?
Mr. Swecker. It is possible. We are trying to get a
counterterrorism analyst out there full time.
Ms. Harris. Do you think it requires more?
Mr. Swecker. A counterterrorism analyst should be out there
full time, yes.
Ms. Harris. Thank you. And Mr. Clark, there was a joint
vision between Secretary Rice and Secretary of Homeland
Security Chertoff that said that the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center as part of their smarter screening goal
would be to develop and use travel intelligence before
travelers arrive. What is your time frame in accomplishing
this, and what steps are you taking and what will you do to
achieve this goal?
Mr. Clark. I am not familiar with the particulars. I know
the Customs and Border Protection is working especially with
foreign governments to work on that screening process and part
of their moving the borders out. Unfortunately, I don't have a
timetable for when they feel that would be most effectively
implemented.
Ms. Harris. Okay, and finally, Mr. Gorelick, thank you for
your service as Acting Director of this very important center.
I would ask you, what changes would you recommend in how the
three Cabinet departments support the Center?
Mr. Gorelick. As I stated before, the Working Group that
the Steering Group formed is going to be making recommendations
to the Steering Group.
Ms. Harris. Thank you. My time is completed.
Thank you for your answers. I am going to call on the
members as they have arrived accordingly, and the order of
questions that will be, Congressman Meek, Pascrell--Reichert
and Pascrell and, sorry, and Ms. Jackson-Lee.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Ms. Harris. I would like, this
question is to either one of you on the panel.
How does HSTC plan to produce any reports examining
operational challenges at the Center? How do you produce your
plans? Because I hear your response to Ms. Harris, but also I
had an opportunity to see your statement today. And none of you
really put forth any real statement to we can do more if we had
this level of cooperation, or we could do more if we had a line
item budget, because from what I understand now you all kind of
come together and share budgets.
How do you measure your success versus what you can do if
there was more organization and structure in an operation that,
number one, the watchword should be organization?
Mr. Gorelick. The Center--management at the Center has
created a work plan, a multi-year work plan in which we have
taken requests from various agencies for joint projects as well
as requests for projects that the Center should do, self-
generated projects and of course statutory required reports. We
have laid those out and looked at our resources, we have drawn
a line on what we can do and prioritized those projects. The
priorities first are based on threats to national security, and
second based on threats to public safety.
National security threats of course are the terrorist
travel threats, and public safety are human smuggling and human
trafficking. That is how we basically prioritize our work and
develop our work plan.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much. I am going to limit my
questions because we are about--they just called a vote so,
Madam Chair, I am going to relinquish the rest of my time so
hopefully other members will be able to ask questions.
Ms. Harris. Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
In March of this year, an article appeared in the Seattle
Times. It was reported that the UAE has had some involvement in
trafficking young boys for camel races.
Have you been involved in that investigation? What is your
responsibility and role? Do you know anything about that?
Mr Clark. I am not familiar. I have read the story. I don't
know that there was an ICE investigation per se over there in
any capacity on that.
Mr. Swecker. No FBI investigation I am aware of.
Mr. Gorelick. I believe that that was also mentioned in
previous TIP reports, annual TIP reports. But I also believe
that the UAE has curtailed that practice or tried. I would have
to defer to G-TIP to answer more fully.
Mr. Reichert. This is not a new issue that has come up. It
has been an issue that they have been dealing with for a while.
But no one here at the table has been involved in that
investigation, knows anything about it?
Mr. Gorelick. No.
Mr. Reichert. Can you explain your program called Lost
Innocence?
Mr. Swecker. That is an FBI initiative that was designed to
consolidate task forces around the country or establish task
forces around the country to address underage female forced
prostitution. I think it exists in over, almost two dozen
offices around the country. It consists of sort of a multi-
disciplinary team of State and local law enforcement officers,
FBI agents and components from the social services, various
social service agencies in the country designed to get at sex
prostitution rings, especially, or targeting specifically
underage girls. It has been a--we did a takedown about 2 or 3
months ago, national takedown, and I think there were over 100
arrests. It has been a very successful initiative which we hope
to enhance and build on.
Mr. Reichert. It is an initiative that works with local law
enforcement then?
Mr. Swecker. Yes, sir. State and local law enforcement
generally come across this type of crime first through their
vice squads and through their street operations, and part of
the issue is to educate the officers that these girls are
victims, not necessarily criminals.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. I will yield the balance of my
time.
Ms. Harris. Thank you. Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. One question I have, and anybody can respond
to it, is how many--not how many. We know how many folks have
been intercepted that were smuggled into this country. I would
like to know for the majority, where are the majority coming
from?
Mr. Clark. The vast majority are coming from Mexico just
because of the contiguous border. I think we probably have the
larger numbers as geographically we move south through Central
and South America, just because of the difficulty of maritime
smuggling in terms of getting here to the United States.
Mr. Pascrell. And that is where most of the networking is
being done through the Mexican-American borders?
Mr. Clark. We find that most of the routes are coming
probably up through Central America, then land routes up in
terms of the larger networks in the global smuggling mapping,
heading toward South America, up through Central America or
some of it going through the Caribbean then by maritime.
Mr. Pascrell. And that is more of a problem than those that
are being smuggled in from the Balkans and Russia?
Mr. Clark. Less so coming to the United States, although we
do see it on the East Coast. And a lot of that can even be
through commercial airlines with phony documents and things of
that nature, not usually in terms of mass numbers.
Mr. Pascrell. And finally, are you getting cooperation from
the Mexican government because of the preponderance of this
networking?
Mr. Clark. We are. We are getting increased cooperation. In
fact, the government of Mexico through the TIP program is
setting up various task forces. We have assigned various ICE
assets down to Mexico to work with them collaboratively on
smuggling and trafficking as well.
Mr. Pascrell. What is the major reason for the smuggling?
What is the purpose coming from Central America in your eyes?
Mr. Clark. The organizations, it is always just profit. The
smuggling organizations, it is pure profit.
Mr. Pascrell. Are there members, are there citizens
involved in this, United States citizens?
Mr. Clark. Not usually as much. It is usually foreign
nationals.
Mr. Pascrell. So foreign nationals are setting up this
whole network on their own without the help of any citizens in
the United States? Do you believe that?
Mr. Clark. I am not saying they don't help them. I am
saying generally it is more foreign nationals involved with it.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Ms. Harris. Thank you. Representative Jackson-Lee.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much. This is obviously an
enormously important issue and I am going to have a short
period of time, and if I can yield to you gentlemen for a
succinct answer to a question of range.
Are we at a crisis and to what extent does the crisis
exist, meaning the porousness of our border and the utilization
of human smuggling for terrorists activities? I want the
highest range of crisis. I want to know what problem we are
dealing with.
And then secondarily it befuddles me about the ability of
intelligence sharing with the HSTC. I understand that the ICE
database may be different from the FBI, and there may not be a
singular stream of intelligence that is shared so that these
particular infractions, intrusions into our security system can
be corrected.
Would you answer, each of you, the crisis question and
secondarily the question of the stream of intelligence and
databases that connect to each other, or are you able to be
shared? Starting with Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. I would say that the pressure on the border in
terms of smuggling has increased recently. I think we are doing
a better job in terms of enhancing the Border Patrol's
capabilities between the ports, educating and training the
inspectors at the ports relative to phony documents, on
enhancing ICE to investigate some of the smuggling
organizations. But I still think it has been an increasing
problem.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. One to 10?
Mr. Clark. It is hard to say. In terms of comparisons I
grade it as a 7.
Mr. Swecker. You know, I hesitate to use the word
``crisis'' because I think I have a different definition of
that word. That means, you know, clear present imminent danger.
I would say there is a serious problem because there is the
potential for a terrorist cell to come in through an alien
smuggling organization, come in through that means.
I will say, however, we haven't found--we have found very
few instances where that has happened. Most of these, the 19
hijackers came in legally for the most part. But I would look
at it as a very gray--
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Is it an increasing problem from 2001?
Mr. Swecker. Yes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Okay, thank you. Mr. Gorelick.
Mr. Gorelick. I would say it is a large problem. And as a
problem, it is not just dealing with the movement of people. If
you look at alien smuggling or the illicit movement of people,
it is also connected to terrorism, movement of terrorists,
possible movement of terrorists.
It is connected to corruption of public officials, both in
the United States and overseas. Alien smugglers can't move
people across borders unless they corrupt immigration and
border authorities.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. One to ten?
Mr. Gorelick. It is a 7.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I didn't get your number.
Mr. Swecker. I will go with the 7 also. It is an important
problem that needs to be addressed.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Does anyone want to talk about--in
concluding because of the bells--the whole idea of intelligence
sharing, the lack of a singular database between ICE, FBI to
even share this information.
Mr. Clark. It is difficult relative to what the database
has captured to say there should be one database to serve all
agencies especially when you consider what the FBI does in
terms of counterterrorism is of a much more classified nature
than what ICE does generally in a criminal capacity.
I would say something like the Center, where all the
intelligence is there and available to the agencies, gets us
over some of the problems relative to the databases or data
banks not actually comporting to fuse everything into one.
Mr. Swecker. It is systemic throughout government that all
of the agencies have their own databases. But I will say there
is an intelligence sharing method or network. It is a
classified system that all intelligence analysts tap into and
pull information from. So we all post our information on this
network and any analyst that participates in this network can
pull the information out.
Mr. Gorelick. As a fusion center we have looked at this
problem, and particularly the fact that various agencies have
their various databases and even different communication
systems. It is not just broken up between the agencies but also
broken up between classifications, whether it is unclassified
or classified information you are dealing with, you have two
separate systems.
We have also discussed taking all the information and
trying to put it into one system in the Center, but that would
take a lot of money and effort.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me thank you, let me ask unanimous
consent to ask to have a statement by Susan Ginsberg,
nonresident Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, put into the
record.
Ms. Harris. Absolutely. I was going to do that, yes. Thank
you, Ms. Jackson-Lee. Your time has expired. I, too, concur
with the Ginsberg insertion into the record. She has a number
of issues and concerns that she has addressed as well as
solutions.
[The statement of Ms. Ginsburg follows:]
For the record
Submitted to the Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Management, Integration and Oversight
The 9/11 Reform Act: Examining the Implementation of
the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
March 8, 2006
By
Susan Ginsburg
Nonresident Fellow
Migration Policy Institute
Mr. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, and Members of the
Subcommittee, it is a privilege to provide testimony for your
consideration about the vital homeland security mission of the Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). My testimony discusses
terrorist travel facilitation as a core aspect of homeland security
that must be addressed together with human trafficking and human
smuggling.
Congress' statutory establishment of the HSTC in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) provides the foundation for
critical US action against the global illicit travel market. The
illicit travel market is fueled by three diverse and devastatingly
harmful groups: terrorists, who in order to function must travel to
gain access to countries but also remain clandestine; human
traffickers; and human smugglers.
The mission of the HSTC reflects the fact that the triple threat of
terrorist access, human degradation and rights violations, and the
violence of transnational organized smuggling crimes, derives in part
from a single set of overlapping and interwoven illicit travel
practices. The HSTC's commitment to three purposes simultaneously may
be unusual (typically, government entities focus on one type of
security issue at a time, for example, narcotics traffickers, illegal
dealers in arms, and terrorist groups), but focusing on only one of the
three paramount threats associated with travel would curtail the full
flow of information necessary to effectively defend against and attack
any one of these three threats.
The HSTC has already demonstrated that it can contribute
significantly to the protection of homeland security and the rule of
law, but much can be done to strengthen this vital organization.
As a team leader and senior counsel on the staff of the 9/11
Commission, I had overall responsibility for the investigation of and
recommendations concerning the entry of the September 11th terrorists
into the United States. During the 1990s, I developed national crime
control policy as an advisor to the Under Secretary for Enforcement in
the Department of the Treasury, which oversaw US Customs, ATF, and
FinCEN among other agencies. In that capacity I worked closely with the
Department of Justice on crime control policy issues and programs. In
the late 1970s I served in the Department of States? Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters, now the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). Thus, I have experience with the
challenge of establishing innovative and joint efforts among several of
the agencies and departments whose contributions are essential for the
success of the HSTC in its vital homeland security mission. Recently, I
have written a report, Countering Terrorist Mobility: Shaping an
Operational Strategy, published by the Migration Policy Institute. This
report places the role of the HSTC in the context of the larger
operational strategy to counter terrorist travel. I am providing the
Subcommittee with copies of this report for your consideration.
The HSTC exemplifies the promise and problems of the new post-9/11
security information organizations that are based on a concept of
jointness--or fusion, or integration--and which are vital to the
homeland security of the United States. Joint centers are needed to
connect the dots at the tactical and investigative level and to provide
a comprehensive view of the big picture to support clear strategic
analysis. Joint centers combine classic national security and crime
control concerns, bridge the classified and unclassified environments,
and confront organizations that cross foreign and domestic borders.
But organizations that depend on collaboration are challenged in
today's government environment because the individual agencies that are
essential to joint efforts are pitted against each other in the
competition for resources and historically have derived a sense of
identity and accomplishment from winning contests of institutional
culture. Thus, it all too often goes against the incentive structure
now in place, and against the grain, to contribute resources to and
share authority for activities through joint efforts.
Because of the essential role of the HSTC in attacking the global
illicit travel market to protect homeland security, and the challenges
the HSTC faces, Congress? thoughtful oversight and decisive legislation
are important and timely.
THE ILLICIT TRAVEL MARKET
Terrorists' need to move around globally--to go to and from
meetings, recruit, train, purchase and transport material, reconnoiter
and strike--exposes them to potential detection. Terrorist operations
therefore dedicate specific resources and attention to travel, or
mobility, or movement--three words for the same functional element, the
need to gain access to countries and facilities, which must be done
without being detected. For the United States and its security
partners, terrorist mobility represents an aspect of the terrorist
threat to be defended against by improving security processes, but it
is also simultaneously a vulnerability of terrorists that must be
exploited.
Terrorist travel facilitators, human traffickers, and human
smugglers all systematically exploit legitimate international travel
channels and national entry and residence channels. All these different
types of groups are engaged in interwoven travel schemes and criminal
enterprises. Human smuggling and trafficking organizations can be
detected and intercepted, and aspects of the system they rely on
subjected to greater regulation and penalties. Terrorist travel
facilitators, their terrorist clients, and partner criminal enterprises
can also be targeted and interdicted through law enforcement,
regulatory processes, intelligence operations, and diplomacy that
advance security standards, the rule of law, and enforcement and
intelligence cooperation in travel channels.
The world of illicit travel and terrorist travel tactics is as
intricate, specialized, interwoven, and evolving as the world of money
laundering and terrorist finance. The need to travel creates an illicit
world market fueled and exploited by the range of terrorists and
transnational criminal groups that organize travel on a large or small
scale.
Although the activities of drug traffickers, arms traffickers,
money launderers, and terrorist financiers are familiar in public
policy circles and in the media, the idea of an illicit travel market
and the image of a terrorist travel facilitator as the foundation of
terrorists? ability to travel, cross borders, and enter the United
States and other countries are not as widely recognized.
The 9/11 Commission came to focus on terrorist travel because it
undertook a detailed examination of the visa and port of entry
processes as they functioned to protect the homeland leading up to 9/
11. Osama bin Ladin's senior leadership and internal terrorist travel
facilitators largely planned al-Qa'ida travel tactics, managed al-
Qa'ida travel, and controlled the travel of the 9/11 conspirators.
Through the research process the Commission learned, however, that the
travel, entry, and residence tactics of the conspirators involved in
the 9/11 plot and of the 19 hijackers themselves, were part of a much
bigger picture of global illicit travel. Al Qaeda travel tactics were
similar to and to some degree overlapped with the larger illicit travel
market.
Some of these terrorist mobility tactics and illicit travel market
services are described in some detail in a 9/11 Commission Staff Report
entitled 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, authored by Thomas R. Eldridge,
Walter T. Hempel II, Janice L. Kephart, Kelly Moore, and myself, with
the assistance of Joanne M. Accolla. This report identified up to 21
different entry and embedding tactics used by terrorists during the
1990s and in support of the 9/11 plot, from the use of multiple fake
passports to facilitation by corrupt border officials and the use of
multiple types of immigration fraud.
Travel facilitator networks that support terrorist travel rely on a
continuum of participants that overlap with human smuggling and human
trafficking networks. Among many other illicit travel channels, travel
facilitator networks include:
Actual terrorists who are travel facilitators and
their couriers, such as those individuals the 9/11 Commission
documented were running the al-Qa'ida passport office in
Kandahar;
Cells that are trafficking in documents as a source of
funds for operations;
Corrupt passport and border officials who are either
subject to bribery or are sympathetic;
Organized criminal organizations, involved in human
smuggling and trafficking or transporting narcotics or weapons
material who might provide services to terrorists for payment
or exchange; and
Travel agencies and employer organizations that may
wittingly or unwittingly assist terrorists.
The illicit travel market is above all characterized by its global
nature and by the fact that countering terrorist mobility requires an
understanding of global patterns and actions, and a coordinated
response to them. For example, an Algerian is arrested in France for
supplying forged documents to Iraqi-bound volunteers. Jamaah Islamiyah
leader Hambali is arrested in Thailand carrying two Spanish passports.
Belgian, French, and Portuguese passports are also available in
Bangkok. Couriers who supply them may be Greek or Dutch.
Understanding and interdicting these patterns of activity is at the
core of US counterterrorism, crime control, and immigration management.
Are terrorists favoring passage by land, sea or air routes, licit or
illicit channels? What smuggling organizations are exploited by
terrorists? What illicit travel businesses are terrorist-operated? How
can we penetrate the aliases, documents and legends that cloak
terrorist identities? Which embarkation points--Canada or Europe,
Mexico or Pakistan--are used for what purposes?
ILLICIT TRAVEL INFORMATION AND INTERDICTION: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The US government can only obtain a comprehensive and accurate
picture of illicit travel networks and tactics by simultaneously
collecting and analyzing information from the various elements of the
illicit travel market. Given the interwoven schemes and routes that
terrorists, human traffickers, and smugglers use, it is not possible to
separate counterterrorism from crime control or vice versa due to the
fact that the investigative and intelligence leads from one group?s
exploiting of travel channels to that of another group are too useful.
The combined intelligence, information, and investigative approach
will enable policymakers and operational managers to decide what
diplomatic, legal, enforcement, and special operations should be taken
to interdict and dismantle terrorist organizations, human trafficking
organizations, human smuggling organizations, and illicit travel
service providers which are part of or selling services to terrorist
and other criminal organizations.
To build this comprehensive picture using an all-source approach,
the government must draw on the resources and skills of the legacy
intelligence community; crime control organizations at the federal,
state, and local levels; the border and immigration agencies; and the
counterparts of our intelligence, crime control, and border agencies in
foreign countries.
The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center was first conceived of
in the late 1990s in response to a new awareness of the violence
associated with large-scale human smuggling and the horrors of human
trafficking. It was established in early 2001. As its name reflects,
the HSTC's initial purpose was to provide integrated intelligence on
human smuggling and trafficking organizations to support actions
against them by the US government, foreign governments, and
international organizations. The 9/11 attacks demonstrated the
catastrophic consequences of terrorist exploitation of global travel
pathways and US border systems. Recognizing that terrorists use
criminal travel networks to support their activities, the Department of
State, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland
Security signed a charter for the HSTC that added efforts against
terrorist travel facilitation to its mission.
The HSTC thus incrementally and logically has become a major
resource for attacking the illicit travel sphere as a means of finding
terrorists and constraining terrorist mobility; deterring and
controlling the crimes of human trafficking and smuggling; and through
those functions supporting immigration management and migrant safety.
The 9/11 Commission recognized that terrorist travel and crime
control are inseparable because terrorist travel tactics intersect the
illicit travel market that also services human smugglers and
traffickers and other criminals. The Commission therefore recommended
that: ``The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence,
operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists,
find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.''
It stated specifically that the small terrorist travel intelligence
program was producing disproportionately useful results and should be
expanded.
Continuing this bi-partisan concern about terrorist travel and the
illicit market in travel services, Congress in Sections 7201-2 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act:
mandated a new terrorist travel strategy;
required an assessment by the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center of US vulnerability to travel and
immigration system exploitation;
established the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
as a statutory entity; and
directed that federal agencies report back to Congress
on how to make the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center more
effective in countering terrorist travel.
Congress enacted that legislation in December 2004. Over a year
later, it is now an appropriate time to assess what has been and still
must be done to make the HSTC an effective fusion center that provides
a platform for a strong and coordinated US government attack on illicit
travel by terrorists, human traffickers, and human smugglers.
HSTC: MISSION AND REQUIREMENTS
The vital homeland security mission of the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center is to counter these tactics, broadly speaking, in
three fundamental ways including:
Facilitating broad dissemination of all-source
information about the illicit travel market and its terrorist,
human trafficker, and smuggler elements;
Preparing operational, tactical, and strategic
assessments, with the emphasis on ongoing field support and an
annual risk (threat and vulnerability) assessment for
participating agencies and for Congress; and
Identifying issues for further joint attention.
To grow into its full potential as a center for the development of
information, assessments, issue identification, and initiative support
relating to terrorist travel, human trafficking, and human smuggling,
several aspects of the HSTC need strengthening. These relate to its:
(1) mission; (2) senior management; (3) governance; and, (4) resources.
The suggestions below for strengthening the HSTC in these four
areas are offered with two caveats.
First, the ideas offered are not intended to supplant the ongoing
discussion among HSTC officials and their Steering Group supervisors
and with Congress, but to contribute some ideas to the mix. Second, the
goal of these suggestions is to make some immediate improvements based
on currently recognized issues, rather than to solve all problems for
all time. This is especially so in that Congress' own committee
structure makes it challenging to take into account all the critical
interests at stake by various congressional committees in one piece of
legislation.
With these caveats, some possible approaches to strengthening the
HSTC are discussed below.
Mission
The HSTC's mission should be clarified. The original Charter for
the HSTC created one set of mandates, and then the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) created a second set. These
mandates define purposes and they define functions or tasks. All the
desired purposes and functions should be placed on the same legislative
footing.
The three current purposes are to counter terrorist travel, human
trafficking, and human smuggling. It is important to have all three
purposes considered together as one entity that can integrate
information and identify opportunities for action in the multiple
spheres of law enforcement, intelligence, policy, diplomacy, and even
military affairs, and ensure that attention to the various issues is
balanced among the interwoven concerns of national security, human
rights, and crime control.
Congress should consider including one additional purpose to this
list: countering the illicit travel market and illicit travel
facilitators. This purpose is the common denominator that relates to
and supports the missions of countering terrorist travel, human
trafficking and human smuggling, and would support US action against
these and other transnational criminal activity, such as smuggling of
all kinds. Countering the illicit travel market is therefore a homeland
security mission that is consistent with and supports the existing
national security, human rights, and crime control purposes of the
HSTC.
The functions of the HSTC listed in the Charter and/or IRTPA
include:
serving as a clearinghouse and disseminating all-
source information;
supporting select initiatives, including of the
National Counterterrorism Center;
preparing strategic assessments;
identifying issues for possible enhanced interagency
attention; and
coordinating and ensuring coordination among all
relevant agencies.
As with the HSTC's purposes, the functions currently established
only by Charter should be embodied in legislation. These five
purposes--informational, tactical, strategic, issue identification for
joint operations and policymaking, and coordination--all make sense.
The role of the HSTC in strategic assessment requires
clarification. The annual strategic assessment that Congress required
in the IRTPA is described as a vulnerability assessment, to identify
vulnerabilities that may be exploited by international terrorists,
human smugglers and traffickers, and travel facilitators. It would be
helpful if in conjunction with this vulnerability assessment by the
HSTC there was a threat assessment that focused on the actual threats
posed by terrorist group mobility capability and intent, human
smugglers, human traffickers, and other travel facilitators. (With
respect to terrorism, such an assessment requires the strategic
operational direction of, and likely most or all of the actual
preparation by, personnel of the National Counterterrorism Center,
pursuant to the IRTPA.) A threat assessment will support government
leadership in setting priorities as to which vulnerabilities should be
addressed to reduce actual threats, a process commonly referred to as
risk assessment.
Senior management
Directing the HSTC is a major responsibility. Congress should
ensure it is exercised by a senior manager with relevant operational,
policy, and managerial experience. The key requirements of the Director
and Deputy Director, apart from such management capability, are a
commitment to collaboration or joint functioning, and strategic vision
for the organization.
Governance
The governance and organizational structure of the HSTC are unique
and still provide a ``demonstration project'' for a successful joint
center. An interagency Steering Group provides guidance and the
Director and Deputy Director who manage HSTC's operations are
accountable through the Steering Group to the Secretary of State,
Attorney General, and Secretary for Homeland Security.
This tripartite management structure has been critical to
maintaining appropriately balanced focus on the two original
operational arenas for the HSTC: human trafficking, an issue
principally associated with the Department of State, and human
smuggling, an issue principally associated with legacy INS and the
Department of Homeland Security. The Attorney General--as the executive
of the Department of Justice, the supervisor of US attorneys and the
FBI, a partner with the Secretary of State in US participation in
international legal matters, and the executive in charge of the
immigration appeals process--has institutional interests in enforcement
and regulation relating to both human smuggling and trafficking that
will tend to lead to a balanced commitment to both sets of goals.
This governance structure has two weaknesses that merit correction
by Congress.
First, in a structure where the two pre-9/11 policy arenas are
linked to operational authorities of supervisory departments, the HSTC
legislation does not provide for a Steering Committee member and
Cabinet-level authority with comparable operational authority in the
arena of global terrorist travel facilitation. This omission undermines
the terrorist travel facilitation mission of the HSTC. To correct this
problem legislatively, a designee of the Director of National
Intelligence, likely from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
should be added to the Steering Committee, and the Director of National
Intelligence should be added as the Cabinet-level equivalent. The
formal presence of the NCTC will not only benefit the terrorist travel
mission but also the two other missions, because information that
supports the interdiction of terrorists overseas and the constraining
of terrorist travel may also assist in the dismantling and deterring of
human trafficking and smuggling organizations. For example, the core
intelligence community may learn of a corrupt passport official who is
facilitating terrorist travel, human smuggling, and human trafficking.
Second, the governance structure of the HSTC appears to place its
Director in an untenable management structure. He or she is accountable
through a committee to three Cabinet heads, and as a practical matter
already to four, since the NCTC reporting to the DNI is responsible for
strategic operational planning relating to terrorism. When the three or
four Cabinet level executives are multiplied by the numerous
responsible Congressional committees, the Director's ability to make
management decisions is rendered even more unworkable on a day-to-day
basis and it becomes unstable over time.
Although the Steering Group could be comprised of a group of
results-oriented individuals who might be personally committed to
collaboration, the formal reporting structure is likely to undermine
even the best intentions. The Director will inevitably be caught in the
bind of having to meet competing and irreconcilable requirements when
the Cabinet sponsors of the component missions of the HSTC demand their
prioritization. The Director confronts a situation in which if he or
she does not submit, the Cabinet head can cut off resources. If one
Department is satisfied with the priorities, one of the others is
likely not to be. When the Director's home agency is involved, lack of
satisfaction can impose a personal career penalty.
A solution to this problem is for the HSTC Steering Group, as
augmented by the DNI designee, to be chaired by a member of the staff
of the Homeland Security Council (or National Security Council). The
HSC/NSC staff role would be to ensure that the activities of the HSTC
effectively transcend the sum of its parts and contribute to the
homeland security. This would allow full development of the terrorist
travel facilitation, human trafficking, human smuggling, and general
illicit travel missions.
Assigning an HSC/NSC staff member to a chair position would permit
more rapid build-up of the HSTC as it would allow for more rapid
resolution of most conflicts. To the extent there are issues that
require Cabinet-level attention, such as the annual HSTC risk
assessment, the HSC/NSC Steering Group chair is positioned to staff a
Principals?-level meeting.
Personnel and Other Resources
To fulfill its statutory missions, including supporting actions
against terrorist travel facilitation, the HSTC requires sufficient
personnel, access to all relevant informational pipelines, appropriate
legal authorities, and adequate, consistent funding.
The HSTC is a new entity that responds to the post-9/11 recognition
that institutional barriers must be dismantled to permit efficient
collaboration in joint missions. This goal will not be achieved without
a commensurate investment.
Currently three Cabinet departments engage in negotiations to
reimburse one bureau for its support to the HSTC. While this was
appropriate as a seed funding mechanism, the HSTC has been vulnerable
to the vagaries of funding by its Charter sponsors. Therefore, the most
important next legislative step is to place the HSTC on a secure
funding base, with a specific authorization and appropriation. There
are many possible ways to establish a permanent funding mechanism for
the HSTC, but a core principle should be that HSTC be able to reimburse
agencies for their costs in supporting the HSTC.
There should also be career incentives, and at a minimum no
disincentives, for working at the HSTC. Because the HSTC is
quintessentially a joint mission with priorities that extend beyond
those of home agencies, there is a risk that home agency managers will
treat assignment to the HSTC as a disadvantage or marginal to career
advancement. HSTC service should not pose a risk to careers and
preferably should represent an important step toward home agency
leadership.
At present, the goal should be to double the number of staff at the
HSTC, with the foreseeable scale of staff required being on the order
of 100 people, a number greater than ten times the current staffing
level. Approximately a third of these should be intelligence analysts,
with the remainder of operational personnel including a mix of agents,
attorneys, diplomats, border agents and inspectors, and immigration
fraud officers. There are approximately twenty agencies whose
authorities and expertise make their participation in the HSTC
essential to fulfill its fusion mission.
Data systems and legal authorities also must be commensurate to the
informational and operational support responsibilities of the HSTC.
Like other homeland security functions, the HSTC will ultimately
require more substantial office space.
CONCLUSION
The gap between a realistic vision of what the US government must
accomplish through the HSTC--reduce the vulnerability created by the
terrorist and criminal groups that perpetuate and exploit illicit
travel networks--and the support provided to the HSTC today is
daunting. Congress should immediately move to close this gap. By
developing shared information, supporting investigations, operations
and other active countermeasures, and promoting working interagency and
international partnerships, the HSTC can become a vital component of
homeland security that will repay the US investment many times over in
protecting against terrorist attacks, securing international travel
channels, and upholding the rule of law.
Ms. Harris. I want to also state that Chairman Rogers has
indicated to the ranking member that this subcommittee will
continue on its examination of this issue.
And finally, after hearing the testimony, I was really
encouraged when we originally created this Center. I was
optimistic of the breakdown of the stovepipe of information and
that this was going to be that interoperable sort of agency.
I think in theory that is happening with the information.
My concern still remains if we are actually accomplishing those
key issues for terrorist travel, sex trafficking and human
smuggling in the field. I am concerned about the staffing
issues, the funding issues, and the lack of maybe focused
leadership in this arena because there is not that kind of
accountability to make sure that the rubber meets the road,
that these things are being accomplished.
But I sincerely want to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony. I wish there were some more tangible things
that resulted from this hearing that we knew we could go do. We
will continue on our quest.
We will leave these issues open and the members of the
committee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and
we will ask you to respond in writing. The hearing record will
be open for 10 days.
The committee stands adjourned.
And once again thank you very much for your input.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]