[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE STATE OF INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS
PART I, II AND III
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 15, 2006, MARCH 1, 2006, and APRIL 25, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-62
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael T. McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Dave G. Reichert, Washington, Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Michael McCaul, Texas Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Islands
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology................ 1
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology............. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 41
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 47
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 39
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 84
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State North Carolina....................................... 7
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State California............................................... 42
The Honorable Bobby Jindal, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Louisiana............................................. 6
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 78
Witnesses
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
Mr. Tim Bradley, Senior Deputy State Fire Marshal, North Carolina
Office of State Fire Marshal, National Volunteer Fire Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Ms. Diane Linderman, Director-at-Large, Public Works Management/
Leadership, American Public Works Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. William Moroney, President and Chief Executive Officer,
United Telecom Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Trooper Casey L. Perry, Wisconsin State Patrol, Chairman,
National Troopers Coalition:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Dr. William W. Pinsky, Executive Vice President & Chief Academic
Officer, Ochsner Clinic Foundation, American Hospital
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
The Honorable Robert Drake, Mayor, Beaverton, Oregon:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
The Honorable Gino P. Menchini, Commissioner, Department of
Information Technology and Telecommunications, City of New
York, State of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
Steven H. Proctor, Executive Director, Utah Communications Agency
Network, (USCAN):
Oral Statement................................................. 71
Prepared Statement............................................. 73
Mr. Charles L. Werner, Fire Chief, Charlottesville Fire
Department, Commonwealth of Virginia:
Oral Statement................................................. 61
Prepared Statement............................................. 65
Tuesday, April 25, 2006
Panel I
Dr. David G. Boyd, Director, Office of Interoperability and
Compatibility, Directorate of Preparedness, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 101
Prepared Statement............................................. 103
The Honorable Tracy A. Henke, Assistant Secretary, Office of
Grants and Training, Directorate of Preparedness, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 94
Prepared Statement............................................. 96
Mr. Kenneth P. Moran, Director, Office of Homeland Security,
Federal Communications Commission:
Oral Statement................................................. 113
Prepared Statement............................................. 115
Mr. Carl Peed, Executive Director, Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS), U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 118
Prepared Statement............................................. 121
Panel II
Mr. James Gass, Deputy Director, National Memorial Institute for
the Prevention of Terrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 149
Prepared Statement............................................. 151
Mr. John Morgan, Assistant Director for Science and Technology,
National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 137
Prepared Statement............................................. 139
Mr. Dereck Orr, Program Manager, Public Safety Communications
Systems, National Institute of Standards and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 145
Prepared Statement............................................. 147
Mr. Bruce Walker, Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Affairs,
Homeland Security and Defense Business Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 154
Prepared Statement............................................. 156
THE STATE OF INTEROPERABLE
COMMUNICATIONS: PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE FIELD
PART I
----------
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Reichert
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Reichert, Dent, Jindal, Pascrell,
Thompson, Harman, Lowey, Norton, Christensen, and Etheridge.
Mr. Reichert. [Presiding.] Good morning. The Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology will come to order.
The subcommittee will hear testimony today on perspectives
from the field on the state of interoperable communications.
I would first like to welcome our witnesses and thank them
for taking time out of their busy schedules to be with us
today. Thank you very much.
I would also like to ask unanimous consent to allow Mr.
Jindal to be a part of our panel this morning and be allowed to
question the witnesses.
Without objection.
Good morning. Let me first welcome our distinguished panel
and thank you all for being here to share your thoughts on the
issue of great personal and professional importance to me: The
problem of achieving and maintaining interoperable emergency
communications.
I would like to be really, very, very blunt here: It is
intolerable to me that our nation's law enforcement, fire
service and emergency medical personnel still confront many of
the same emergency communications problems that I did as a
rookie cop more than 34 years ago.
It is intolerable to me that even with the rapid pace of
technological and innovation and the vast amounts of money
dedicated to improving emergency communication, our nation's
first responders still experience difficulty communicating with
one another on demand, in real time when needed.
Until the events of September 11, 2001, many people just
simply assumed that first responders from different disciplines
and jurisdictions could communicate with one another.
Unfortunately, that was not the case then. And as demonstrated
by the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina, it is not the
case even now.
The inability of police, fire, emergency medical services,
public works, utilities and health case workers to communicate
with one another effectively, may have even led to the loss of
many lives in New Orleans and the Gulf states. The status quo
is unacceptable.
Our local police, fire and emergency medical service
professions are our nation's first line of prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery. And effective
communication is absolutely essential to their mounting a well-
coordinated response, whether manmade or natural. Indeed, first
responders and federal, state and local officials cannot
establish meaningful command and control in the absence of a
functioning communication system.
Without the ability to receive timely reports from the
field, the incident commander may have difficulty establishing
situational awareness. Without the ability to issue
instructions to first responders in the field, the operations
chief cannot direct resources and personnel to areas where they
are most needed. And without the ability to call for help,
citizens cannot reliably seed medical and other emergency
assistance. In other words, effective communication is
essential for the right people to make the right decisions at
the right time.
The message is worth repeating: To mount an effective
emergency response requires timely and accurate information so
that the right people may make the right decisions at the right
time.
As I previously said, I have firsthand understanding and
experience and an appreciation for this problem. Suffice it to
say, I have faced the perils of life and death decision-making
in my law enforcement career, and as sheriff of King County in
Seattle, I have provided the safest possible environment for
those that served in my office.
But, sadly, inadequate emergency communications sometimes
stood in my way. For example, the regional radio communications
system in King County, in the Seattle area, which served all 49
governments in the county, suffered terrible interference.
The proliferation of cell phone towers overpowered and
disrupted the deputies' ability to receive their radio signals,
thus jeopardizing their safety. As sheriff, I took immediate
remedial action to redress that particular situation. But now
as a Member of Congress and chairman of this subcommittee, I
have a forum through which I intend to solve this larger
communication problem across our country.
While the recently enacted Deficit Reduction Act included a
necessary initial step of freeing up much needed spectrum and
established a $1 billion interoperable grant program,
interoperable communications is about much more than just
spectrum and money. It was about the need for strong
leadership, effective communication, adequate planning and a
management system that worked.
Today is the first in a series of hearings that will be
scheduled in the future to highlight the issues and
perspectives of the various experts which you are all here as
members of and I know serve on the front lines. Sort of where
the rubber meets the road, kind of, is what we need to hear.
In the successive hearings, the subcommittee will hear the
perspectives of state and local officials, federal officials
who administer interoperable grant programs and other
activities and experts in the field of emergency communications
technology.
And, again, I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony today.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this series of hearings. And as you know, I must
apologize, I have three things going on at the same time, but
the Ranking Member is here and obviously will carry on as will
other members.
It goes without saying that this an issue of utmost
urgency. My profound hope is that this subcommittee, with the
leadership of my friend, Chairman Reichert, will have as its
legacy a lasting solution for the communications problem.
Indeed, I am heartened by the chairman's commitment to hold
these hearings in anticipation of bipartisan legislation, which
we have already started to look at, that will improve the
communication capabilities of emergency responders. I can
assure all of you who are testifying today, we mean business.
When the 9/11 Commission released its final report, it
found that the inability of our first responders to talk with
each other and their commanders resulted in a loss of life. The
9/11 Commission identified the need for more spectrum as
crucial to assist emergency responders in communicating during
an emergency such as a terrorist attack or a hurricane.
But the 9/11 Commission in this regard, at least,
identified a problem that has been in existence for decades,
and it identified a problem that many policy makers have known
about for some time.
In 1996, Congress, asked a blue ribbon committee, the
Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee, to examine the
issues of interoperable communications. It concluded 10 years
ago that public safety agencies did not have sufficient radio
spectrum to do their jobs.
This is nothing new to you. You are the front lines, we
thank you for your service, and here we are again.
The committee is supposed to have congested channels on
radio frequencies cleared on the fifth anniversary date of the
release of the report. Five years later, on September 11, 2001,
the spectrum identified was still not available for public
safety use in most of the nation.
In 2002, the National Task Force on Interoperability
convened several meetings with various national associations
representing public safety officials to discuss the challenges
of interoperable communications. They explicitly identified the
key challenges that must be addressed if we are to move
forward.
For example, incompatible and aging equipment, limited
funding from the federal government, fragmented planning, in
general, lack of coordination and cooperation from all
different stakeholders, as well as, of course, insufficient
radio spectrum. And I might add, Trooper Perry, I did read
through all of your testimony, by the way, and again apologize
for having to leave soon. But I did read yours, and I want to
just quote something that you did say in your presentation:
``The lack of common standards among vendors continues to
present difficulties of interconnection.''
Now, I am certainly not an expert on interoperability, but
it is pretty logical here, if vendors of equipment and software
received tax-supported dollars from state, counties and
municipal governments, they must be held accountable so that
their products will create optimal technologies compatible with
other vendors' systems. That is pretty logical to us, but it is
not happening.
So they have known about the problems, and many have
explored the possible remedies that we should undertake. Yet
here we sit after 9/11, after Hurricane Katrina wondering why
no real progress has been made, not only in this area but in
other areas.
And I think it is fair to add that I believe the current
administration has provided very little leadership. The
President's fiscal year 2007 budget requests no funds for
grants to enhance interoperability. I want that to set in this
morning. Nada. Zero.
The President's fiscal year 2007 budget proposed to
eliminate the COPS Interoperability Grant Program, which is
charged with awarding technology grants to law enforcement
agencies for the purpose of enhancing interoperability and
information sharing. The President zeroes out this program
after it was significantly cut in fiscal year 2006 budget. It
was funded at $10 million, down from $99 million in the fiscal
year 2005 budget.
The administration justifies its proposed elimination of
COPS interoperability grants on the ground that the program is
redundant with the efforts of the Department of Homeland
Security. The Department does not have a dedicated
interoperability grant program, however.
Now, who are we kidding here?
We stand behind the executives whenever they get their
pictures taken, and you guys and gals are there all the time,
and it is time--if the gig is up, the gig is up. If we mean
business, let's do something about it. If we do not mean
business, then we will have charades, time for more charades. I
do not think this chairman wants a charade. I am convinced that
he does not.
This has nothing to do with partisan politics either. This
administration does not get it. I do not know what party they
belong to, to be very honest with you.
The President's budget proposes a modest $3.5 million
increase for the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility
in the 2007 budget. This increase is far less than what is
necessary to remedy the weaknesses that were evident with the
glaring failure of emergency communication in Katrina and Rita.
This slight increase is far from what SAFECOM, with only
four to seven full-time employees, needs to accelerate the
standards and the development of interoperable communications
equipment.
We are long past the point where we in Washington pay lip
service to the problem. I know my chairman feels the same way.
Finally, I would like to add that as we move forward and
work toward achieving interoperability, we must realize that we
are facing basic operability issues as well. Past domestic and
international instances, whether manmade or natural disasters,
have shown that our nation's communications systems are closely
tied together.
We have seen that one storm can overload or completely
damage our landline-based communications systems. Wireless
networks, land-based radio communications systems
simultaneously. We need to continue to work together to
determine how we can be prepared if an event takes all our
terrestrial communications systems out at once.
Indeed, we have some very serious responsibilities before
us and look forward to working closely with Chairman Reichert
to help propose serious solutions to these serious problems.
And I might add, Mr. Chairman, that I am glad to see that
we are going to have the FCC before us, and all hell is going
to break out, I am going to tell you that, when they get here.
As you well know, we have a history.
So I want to commend you for the floor hearings you put
together. This is no easy task, and it is not going to be
pleasant, it is not going to be a day at the beach, but we are
going to get something accomplished. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. It is a
good thing there is a sheriff in the house. We do not want all
hell to break loose.
[Laughter.]
The Chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairman Reichert and
Ranking Member Pascrell. I want to associate myself with your
comments. I agree with them wholeheartedly.
But, also, as you know, this is the first of four hearings
that we will hold on this issue, on the challenges of achieving
interoperability during times of emergency.
As a former volunteer firefighter, I can personally attest
to the important communications that first responders need
during emergencies. It can mean the difference between life and
death. It is deeply unsettling that even after the devastating
Oklahoma bombing, the 9/11 attacks, the London and Madrid
bombings and the catastrophic devastation of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita that interoperability communications remains a rainbow
at the end of the storm. Everyone claims to see it in the
horizon, but no one has been able to find a magical
interoperable pot of gold at the other end.
The 9/11 communications report made it clear that
interoperable communications is critical, yet the colossal
communications challenges during Hurricane Katrina was a
stinging indictment of Congress' to lead on a very critical
issue.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses here
today. I am also looking forward to the subsequent hearings on
the roles of state and local government, the role of federal
agencies in the state and impact of technology in the area of
interoperable emergency communications.
The ultimate goal is to produce clear legislation that
expedites and facilitates the delivery of emergency
communications systems to those who need it most. It is not
enough to make lofty speeches that fail to give clear
directives. It is not enough to support our first responders
and yet shortchange them by improperly funding the critical
programs that funds the emergency communication systems they
need.
I, therefore, welcome the spirit of bipartisan, Mr.
Chairman, in ultimately coming up with a piece of legislation
that can fix this problem so that once and for all those
individuals who are tasked with the responsibility of helping
in time of need can in fact do their job and communicate with
each other.
Thank you, and I look forward to the testimony today.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Reichert. Other members of the committee are reminded
that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
with us today. First, we have Trooper Casey L. Perry of the
Wisconsin State Patrol and chairman of the National Troopers
Coalition. We also have with us today Mr. Tim Bradley, senior
deputy state fire marshal for the North Carolina Office of
State Fire Marshal and a member of the National Volunteer Fire
Council; Ms. Diane Linderman, director-at-large of American
Public Works Association; Mr. William Moroney, president and
chief executive officer of the United States Telecom Council;
and Dr. William Pinsky, executive vice president and chief
academic officer of the Ochsner Clinic Foundation and a member
of the American Hospital Association's Committee on Health
Preparedness.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire witness
statement will appear in the record. We ask that due to the
number of witnesses on our panel today that you strive to limit
your comments to no more than 5 minutes.
The Chair now recognizes Trooper Perry.
First, before we go to the first witness, I would ask Mr.
Jindal to introduce the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. Jindal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
and the other members for allowing me to come and sit with my
colleagues on the subcommittee. I also want to thank you for
holding this hearing. You are obviously uniquely qualified to
talk about the issue of interoperability.
I certainly share my colleagues' frustrations. Having been
through Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we saw firsthand in
Louisiana the difficulties caused by the lack of interoperable
communications, this even after the fact the federal government
spent billions of dollars toward interoperable communications.
My colleagues have pointed out this has been a challenge not
only since 9/11 but well before that.
It is my privilege to introduce not only a distinguished
member of this panel before us but also an individual who was
on the ground during Hurricane Katrina. Dr. Pinsky serves at
the Ochsner Clinic Foundation or the hospital operated by the
Ochsner Clinic Foundation.
I went of tell you a little bit about Ochsner and why it is
so important we are hearing from Dr. Pinsky today. Ochsner's is
one of only three hospitals in the greater New Orleans area
that was able to stay open continuously through Hurricane
Katrina. Despite the lack of power, despite being surrounded by
flooded waters, they were able to keep their doors open and to
provide critical services for the people of the greater New
Orleans area.
They are also one of three graduate medical education
programs in the area and the only one that continues to operate
at full capacity. So they were serving a critical role, and
since the hurricane they have not closed their doors for one
minute, and I think they need to be recognized and applauded
for this heroic effort.
Dr. William Pinsky is the executive vice president, the
chief academic officer of the foundation. He is responsible for
all of the professional medical education and research
programs. He received his medical degree from St. Louis
University in 1973 following his training in pediatrics and
pediatric cardiology at the Baylor College of Medicine.
Dr. Pinsky pursued a career in academic pediatric
cardiology, served on the faculties at Baylor, the Baylor
College of Medicine, the University of Nebraska, Tulane
University and Wayne State University.
We are very pleased to have him here.
I will add, not only am I proud of the work they have done,
my son is actually a patient at Ochsner, so I can say firsthand
they do an excellent job for our community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Jindal.
Mr. Etheridge, you have an introduction to make.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to
say a word for my friend, Tim Bradley, and welcome him to this
subcommittee hearing today.
Tim is a senior deputy fire marshal for the state of North
Carolina. He also serves as the state fire training director,
which, as you know, is important as well. He is well-qualified
to talk about state interoperable communications from the
perspective of the first responder. Let me just say why.
He began his career with the Mebane Volunteer Fire
Department, including 7 years as chief. He continues to serve
as volunteer assistant chief even today. During his 32 years of
public service, he has been a certified fire rescue instructor,
fire arson investigator, life safety educator and hazardous
material responder. So he has had a pretty good broad base, and
so I look forward to his comments today.
You know, good interoperable communications are critical,
as you well know, Mr. Chairman, to success in a response, and I
was proud to join my colleague, Representative Harman in the
HERO Act, but I am dismayed that the administration's foot-
dragging in interoperable equipment. The President, as you have
already heard, zeroed out the few programs that help local and
state responders obtain communications technology, which I
think is critical.
And the American people have a right to expect their
national leaders to provide all the necessary means for their
safety and security. And we should no longer tolerate
negligence in the need for interoperable equipment now more
than 4 years after 9/11 terrorist attack. Our first responders
should not have to struggle to answer that famous TV
commercial: ``Can you hear me now?''
Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Etheridge.
The Chair now recognizes Trooper Perry.
STATEMENT OF CASEY PERRY, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TROOPERS COALITION
Mr. Perry. Good morning, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member
Pascrell and distinguished committee members. I am Casey Perry,
chairman of the National Troopers Coalition, representing our
nation's state troopers. It is both an honor and a privilege to
be before this committee today in order to testify on state
troopers' thoughts, ideas and concerns. I will share with you
my experiences as users from the field who provide service and
security to our citizens.
To begin, I would like to thank our members of Congress for
their support to the Department of Homeland Security. I have
served 3 years in the United States Army and 27 years as a
Wisconsin state trooper. Throughout my career I have
consistently confronted obstacles in cooperation and trust
between the various layers of government and discipline of
emergency services.
I am pleased to report, however, that since the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security, we have made great strides
in both trust-building and information sharing. During the past
2 years, I have attended various programs and conferences
hosted by the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Justice and Office of Justice Assistance.
My experience has been as the delegates debate potential
solutions to address the problems we face, the age-old failure
continues between states, counties and municipal rights, as
well as with the disciplinary of emergency medical services,
fire, law enforcement and emergency government. Each entity
resists losing their share of control.
This is the underlying root of the problems we face today.
We cannot address communication interoperability without first
addressing the problems in the current power structure as we
continue to waste our tax dollars.
The government, in serving as the parental figure, has to
hold the children and it has told the children to be nice to
their brother and sister but has failed as a parent in gaining
compliance.
The parent needs to now withhold the children's allowance,
or in this case federal grant money, until they learn to
cooperate with each other. We need to overcome the political
issues across our jurisdictions to build a communications
platform that will serve each partner equally. The cost-
building of such a program is not a one-time investment. It
will require ongoing investments.
Therefore, federal grant monies need to come with strings
attached. States must be held accountable in creating a
communications network that is a dedicated channel and/or
shared channel capability for EMS, fire, law enforcement and
emergency government, which will serve their entire state,
allowing each county and municipal government full access.
States redistributing federal grant money to county and
municipal governments must ensure the money is spent on
compatible equipment and software to interface with the
statewide platform.
The lack of common standards among vendors continue to
present difficulties in interconnection. If vendors of
equipment and software receive tax-supported dollars from
states, counties or municipal governments, they must be held
accountable. So their products will create optimal technologies
compatible with other vendors' systems.
Being on the front line, so to speak, troopers and other
law enforcement officers throughout our nation rely on
communication each and every day. Agencies must provide
equipment that will allow our law enforcement officers to
communicate with one another along with other disciplines of
EMS, fire, emergency government.
As communication equipment users, we count on other law
enforcement jurisdictions, EMS and fire several times a day
during the regular course of our duty. If we address the issue
of interoperability at the basic level here, on the front line,
during these daily occurrence, we will have addressed a number
of issues regarding the localized emergency response, services
involving multiple intrajurisdictions, planned events,
including athletic events, conferences and conventions and
regional incident management of natural and manmade disasters.
In closing, it is my assessment that currently federal tax
dollars are not being allocated, managed or spent efficiently.
Furthermore, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure
accountability. Therefore, the lack of such coordination among
our federal programs creates confusion and duplication of
equipment and software that the end users contend with on a
daily basis.
I would be happy to answer any of your questions after the
other panel members have a chance to provide testimony, and I
will be more than happy to provide personal experiences related
to my testimony.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Perry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Casey Perry
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
Good morning Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell and
distinguished Committee Members. I am Casey Perry, Chairman of the
National Troopers Coalition (NTC), representing our nation's state
troopers. It is both an honor and a privilege to appear before this
committee today in order to testify on state troopers' thoughts, ideas,
and I will share with you our experiences as users from the field who
provide service and security to our citizens.
To begin, I would like to thank our Members of Congress for their
support of the Department of Homeland Security. I served three years in
the U.S. Army and the past 27 years as a Wisconsin State Trooper.
Throughout my career I have consistently confronted obstacles in
cooperation and trust between the various layers of government and
disciplines of emergency services. I am pleased to report, however,
that since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security we have
made great strides in both trust-building and information sharing.
During the past few years I have attended various programs and
conferences hosted by the Department of Homeland Security, Department
of Justice, and the Office of Justice Assistance. My experience has
been that as the delegates debate potential solutions to address the
problems we face, the age-old barriers continue between states,
counties, and municipal rights, as well as with the discipline areas of
emergency medical service, fire, law enforcement, and emergency
government. Each entity resists losing their share of control. This is
the underlying root of the problems we face today. We cannot address
communication interoperability without first addressing the problems in
the current power structure or we will continue to waste our tax
dollars. The govemment, in serving as a parental figure, has told the
children to be nice to their brother and sister but has failed as a
parent in gaining compliance. The parent now needs to withhold its
children's allowance (or in this case federal grant money) until they
learn to cooperate with each other.
We need to overcome the political issues across our jurisdictions
to build a communication platform that will serve each partner equally.
The cost of building such a platform is not a one-time investment but
one that will require an ongoing investment. Therefore, federal grant
money needs to come with strings attached. States must be held
accountable for creating a communications network--that is a dedicated
channel shared channel capability for EMS, Fire, Law Enforcement, and
Emergency Government--which will serve their entire state, allowing
county and municipal governments full access. States redistributing
federal grant money to county and municipal governments must ensure
that the money is spent on compatible equipment and software to
interface with the statewide platform.
The lack of common standards among venders continues to present
difficulties of interconnection. If venders of equipment and software
receive tax-supported dollars from states, counties, or municipal
governments, they must be held accountable so that their products will
create optimal technologies compatible with other venders' systems.
Being on the front line so to speak, troopers and other law
enforcement officers throughout our nation rely on communications each
and every day. Agencies must provide equipment that will allow our law
enforcement officers to communicate with one another as well as the
other disciplines of EMS, Fire, and Emergency Government.
As communication equipment users, we count on other law enforcement
jurisdictions, EMS, and Fire several times a day during the regular
course of duty. If we address the issue of interoperability at the
basic level here, on the front lines, during these daily occurrences,
we will have addressed a number of issues regarding localized emergency
response: services involving multiple intra-jurisdictions; planned
events including athletic events, conferences, and conventions; and
regional incident management of natural and man-made disasters.
In closing, it is my assessment that currently federal tax-dollars
are not being allocated, managed, or spent efficiently. Furthermore,
there are no mechanisms in place to ensure accountability. Therefore,
the lack of such coordination among our federal programs creates
confusion and duplication of equipment and that end-users contend with
on a daily basis.
I would be happy to answer any of your questions or to provide
personal experiences related to my testimony.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Trooper Perry.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bradley on behalf of the
National Volunteer Fire Council.
STATEMENT OF TIM BRADLEY, SENIOR DEPUTY STATE FIRE MARSHAL,
NORTH CAROLINA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FIRE
COUNCIL
Mr. Bradley. Thank you, Congressman Etheridge, for that
fine introduction.
It is a pleasure to be here today.
Interoperability became a catch word after 9/11 and has
increased since Hurricane Katrina, but it is important to
remember that interoperability is not just about responding to
hurricanes or terrorist attacks; it is being prepared to handle
any kind of event that occurs.
It is also not about technology alone. It is about
enhancing communications. That is the ultimate goal.
It can be reached only if the varying parties know not only
what the other individuals said but what the individual is
saying and what they mean.
Some of the necessities for enhancing coordination in
addition to communication equipment is commonness in management
terminology, common policies and procedures, standardized
training and compatible equipment.
From a state perspective, North Carolina has been working
on a system called VIPER, or Voice Interoperability Plan for
Emergency Responders. It is a statewide system that will be
available to all public agencies and is targeted to be complete
in 2010.
The problem is that VIPER is not being used by most local
agencies. Local government has simply not taken advantage of it
due to cost. It is estimated that there are 75,000 individual
radios in use by first responders in North Carolina, yet county
to county, discipline to discipline, it is extremely
fragmented. Few of those can talk to one another.
Interoperability communications was identified by the
general assembly in 1995 as a problem, yet we still, agency to
agency, cannot communicate well in our state.
From a federal perspective, the national preparedness goal
for the Department of Homeland Security established
strengthening interoperability communications as a primary goal
and one of their seven national priorities.
Also on the federal level, following the creation of VIPER
and which VIPER modeled very closely, the Office of
Interoperability Communication and the Department of Justice's
CommTech Program brought about and announced the first ever
statement of requirements for public safety and
interoperability.
SAFECOM released its first statements of requirements in
2004, and it defines future communication requirements for
voice and data systems, as well as preparing the nation's
50,000 public safety agencies to develop a communication
network. SAFECOM was designed to create interoperability
solutions that are driven from the bottom up by the users.
From an accessed radio spectrum of 700 megahertz, Mr.
Chairman, that you mentioned, first off, I would like to thank
the members of this committee. You were leaders in getting that
band released for first responders, and I would like to offer
my personal appreciation.
But that band will be available for first responders in
2009. $1 billion in proceeds from the sale of radio-to-radio
spectrum have been earmarked to assist public safety agencies
in the use of this interoperable communications. This is just
the tip of the iceberg in terms of the eventual cost for
creating a truly national system of communications.
Cost is a concern for all fire departments, but
particularly is acute for the volunteer fire departments like I
served on. Many departments of this nature depend on private
funding, private fundraising and donations. Fire departments
that are always stretching their budgets just to survive are
unlikely to remain operable with this kind of increase in
technology simply because of the large amount of money required
in expenditures.
So the challenges we face are that most departments have
learned to deal with their problems, but the problems are going
to be increased. For example, if one county puts in an 800
megahertz system, another county does not have it, ca not
communicate with them and the issue of switching radio channels
no longer exists from VHS to 800 megahertz.
From a recommendation standpoint, I would simply say that
the federal government needs to get serious about implementing
national communications interoperability. There has been many
positive steps that have been mentioned, but if improving
interoperability communications capabilities is really one of
the seven national priorities critical to achieving DHS' goals,
then there needs to be stronger federal coordination.
OIC is currently under the engineering and development
section, which is under the Science and Technology Directorate
in DHS. Interoperability really needs a higher profile within
DHS and in the federal government, in general.
As I mentioned earlier in my print remarks, NTIA has been
tasked with facilitating the transition to the radio spectrum
in the 700 megahertz band of first responders and administering
$1 billion currently set aside for that purpose. We think DHS
would be the logical candidate to amend this program simply
because of their prior work in dealing with first responders.
The federal government should continue to improve and
encourage use of SAFECOM, not only seeing it as a
recommendation but making it a requirement. We should consider
establishing federal standards such as the App Code 25 SAFECOM
to receive federal grants for communications. If we do not,
counties, local government will continue to purchase equipment
and still continue to be stand-alone agencies.
Last but not least, I would just like to say that in
addition to providing this equipment and in addition to
providing interoperability, one, we must continue to remember
that state training agencies need funds to train first
responders. You cannot be interoperable simply with equipment;
you have to have the training as well.
Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer any questions after
the panel members are through, and thank you for the
opportunity to be here.
[The statement of Mr. Bradley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tim Bradley
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
Introduction
Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee, my name is Tim Bradley, and I am Senior
Deputy State Fire Marshal over the Office of State Fire Marshal in
North Carolina, as well as volunteer Assistant Chief of the Mebane Fire
Department and a member of the National Volunteer Fire Council, who I
am representing here today. Thank you for the opportunity to provide
you with my perspective on the issue of interoperability in
communications.
In North Carolina the responsibilities of State Fire Marshal are
with the Insurance Commissioner. The North Carolina Office of State
Fire Marshal employs 106 individuals who coordinate building and fire
codes; conduct building plan review; building code interpretations; as
well as fire and rescue training; professional qualifications and
certifications of first responders; and inspection of fire departments
and fire incident reporting. We also work closely with our states
emergency management office and serve as the coordinating agency for
fire and rescue personnel and equipment during disasters. We work
closely with 1289 fire departments, of which 967 are volunteer, 245 a
combination of career and volunteer, and 77 career.
In my position I serve as State Fire Training Director and work
closely with the National Fire Academy, International Fire Service
Accreditation Congress, and other state training offices.
On a local level, I serve as volunteer Assistant Chief of a
combination department that serves a community of 10,000 in a suburban
and rural setting, and deals with two different County communication
centers. I am a certified firefighter, Officer, Instructor, Fire/Arson
Investigator, Rescue Technician, and Life Safety Educator. I have been
a volunteer firefighter for 32 years.
I also serve as an elected member of the City Council of our small
community.
Interoperability Overview
Interoperability is a critical issue for the emergency services and
affects metropolitan, urban, and rural settings. It has received
varying levels of attention depending on which region of the country
you live in. Interoperability became a catchword after 9/11, and again
since Hurricane Katrina. However, interoperability isn't just about
responding to terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Truly
interoperable communications allow emergency responders to better
coordinate their response to all types and all sizes of events.
Interoperability is also not just about technology and equipment.
While my testimony focuses on communication, enhancing coordination is
the ultimate goal and it can only be reached if the various parties
responding to an event know not only what the others are saying, but
what they mean. For example, in Indiana, a tanker is a truck full of
water, while in California it is an airplane full of fire-retardant
agents. Outside of interoperable communications, some of the
necessities for enhancing coordination are:
--common incident management systems and terminology
--common policy and procedures
--standardized training
--compatible equipment
State and Local Perspective
North Carolina is working diligently on a state-wide communication
system called VIPER, or Voice Interoperability Plan for Emergency
Responders. This system will be available to all public agencies and is
targeted to be completed by 2010. This does not mean all public
agencies will all use it, and many will not due to costs of updating
their existing equipment. Interoperable communications was identified
in theSec. General Assembly's Criminal Justice Information Network
report of 1995 as a critical need for public safety agencies when
responding to emergencies. It is estimated that there are over 75,000
individual radios in use in NC by first responders, yet county to
county, discipline to discipline, it is extremely fragmented. I'm sure
it mirrors the national trend.
It is estimated that State and local agencies in North Carolina,
prior to the coordinated effort of VIPER, had already invested over
$270 million in 800 MHZ technology, much of which would not be easily
compatible with VIPER, even though VIPER is 800 MHZ. Hence the need for
guidance and standardization. If you extrapolate that out on a national
level, it would be astounding. If every state in the country had spent
as much per capita as North Carolina on this technology, it would come
out to a national bill of almost $10 billion.
Public safety officials in North Carolina should be able to
communicate directly with other public safety officials without having
to relay the message through a communications center. If put in place,
VIPER interoperable communications would benefit all public safety
agencies when dealing with daily emergency calls or large scale
disasters. This will make fire, rescue, and law enforcement agencies
better able to serve the citizens of North Carolina. The problem with
the VIPER system is that most local governments are not taking
advantage of it due to cost. It actually may become just another
variable in a myriad of systems.
Federal Perspective
The overarching National Preparedness Goal for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) is ``to engage Federal, State, local, and
tribal entities, their private and non-governmental partners, and the
general public to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of
capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and
the economy.'' When DHS established the goal in March 2005, one of the
seven National Priorities identified as being critical to achieving
success was strengthening interoperable communications capabilities.
SAFECOM
The creation of VIPER in North Carolina was followed very closely
by the establishment of the SAFECOM program. SAFECOM is self-described
as, ``. . .a communications program within the Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) that provides research,
development, testing and evaluation, guidance and assistance for local,
tribal, state, and federal public safety agencies working to improve
public safety response through more effective and efficient
interoperable wireless communications.''
OIC and the Department of Justice's CommTech program partnered to
formulate the first ever Statement of Requirements (SoR) for public
safety communications and interoperability. SAFECOM released the SoR in
April 2004. The SoR provides the Nation's 50,000 public safety agencies
with a document defining future communications requirements for both
voice and data communications.
The foundation of the SAFECOM Program and the driving force behind
it has been the support of the local and state public safety
practitioners. As a practitioner-driven program, SAFECOM is a program
designed by public safety creating interoperability solutions that are
driven from the bottom-up.
Access to Radio Spectrum in the 700 MHz Band
As I'm sure the Committee is aware, legislation was recently
enacted that establishes February 17, 2009 as the date when parts of
the 700 MHz band of radio spectrum, currently being used to transmit
television signals, will be made available to first responders for
communications. NVFC worked alongside other first responder groups for
years to get a hard date set for the transition to take place. Many of
our biggest supporters on this issue are members of this Committee and
I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you for your leadership.
Now that we know when the spectrum will be available our focus
turns to how it will be utilized. My understanding is that $1 billion
in proceeds from future sales of radio spectrum have been earmarked to
assist public safety agencies in acquiring, deploying, or training for
the use of interoperable communications. This is just the tip of the
iceberg when it comes to the eventual cost of creating a truly national
system of communications interoperability, but it is an excellent
start. While that funding is currently slated to be administered by the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at
the Department of Commerce instead of DHS, I think that it is worth
mentioning in any conversation about interoperable communications and
because it demonstrates the tremendous cost implicit in transitioning
thousands of fire departments' communications systems.
Cost is a concern for all fire departments, but it is particularly
acute for thousands of volunteer departments. As noted in A Needs
Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, a 2002 study published by the
National Fire Protection Association in conjunction with FEMA and the
US Fire Administration, many volunteer departments depend on private
fund raising to pay for operating expenses. Also, it is not uncommon
for a volunteer department to rely on used equipment to save money. It
is unlikely that fire departments that are already stretching their
budgets just to remain operable would be able or inclined to invest a
large amount of money to become interoperable.
Challenges
You cannot make fire departments nationwide interoperable until we
make them operable, meaning having local communication systems that
meet their needs. Most fire departments have learned to cope with their
current communications problems internally, but when they respond
outside their jurisdictions on mutual aid, either within the region or
outside of it, multiple problems exist. If one county has strict use of
800 MHz systems, but does not use the low band and responds mutual aid
to another county in the State that does, problems are encountered
immediately.
Effective communication is based upon funding availability and
system structure design within local areas. Many metro counties and
systems seem to be ahead of the communication curve versus the rural
areas and their systems. In fact, the advancement of technology has, in
some cases, actually made the disparity between systems even greater.
This is particularly disconcerting when you consider that rural areas,
which are primarily protected by volunteer departments, contain the
vast majority of our highway system, traveled by hundreds of millions
each year.
Recommendations
The federal government needs to get serious about implementing
national communications interoperability. There have been many positive
steps in recent years, but if improving interoperable communications
capabilities really is one of seven National Priorities critical to
achieving the DHS' National Preparedness Goal there needs to be
stronger federal coordination. OIC, which houses SAFECOM, is part of
the Office of Systems Engineering and Development, which is under the
Science and Technology Directorate at DHS. Interoperability needs a
higher profile than this within DHS and in the federal government in
general.
As I mentioned earlier, NTIA has been tasked with facilitating the
transition of radio spectrum in the 700 MHz band to first responders
and administering the $1 billion currently set aside for that purpose.
DHS would be a logical candidate to administer this program because of
its past work through SAFECOM and OIC and its experience dealing with
first responders and first responder grants, which NTIA lacks. NVFC
would prefer to see responsibility for administering this program
shifted to DHS. At the very least, NTIA should follow SAFECOM grant
guidance.
The federal government should continue to promote the use of
SAFECOM's Statement of Requirements for interoperability, mandating it
to receive federal grants for communication equipment within states.
Grants for communication equipment should be granted based on regional
standardization, so that grant recipients purchasing communication
equipments don't become stand alone agencies.
Nationally, we should consider the establishment of standards for
communication interoperability instead of simply providing
recommendations, so that when funds are expended for communication
equipment by local government, it meets interoperability needs.
Promotion of the National Incident Management System and the training
and use requirements are a model of the attention given when programs
are mandated rather than recommended. Do away with the ability of
manufacturers to do their own thing in providing public communications
and require APCO's Project 25 compliance when government agencies
purchase equipment except, consistent with SAFECOM grant guidance, when
a public safety agency cannot afford to do so.
We must provide State fire training agencies with funds and
programs to train first responders, not only in communications, but in
all areas of interoperability. Awareness often drives technology on the
local level, and state training routinely gets left out when grants are
awarded. Without a common training and standardization platform, any
advances in technology or expenditures for equipment will be confusing,
and counter productive.
There must be a concerted effort to educate local and state
government officials on the needs of first responders regarding
interoperability. Local officials must be made aware of the impact of
poor communications, not only during disasters, but during routine
emergency operations. Interoperability will never occur with first
responder awareness alone. Local government officials who control
budgets must be convinced.
We need to reach out and explore how similar organizations
accomplish command and control communications. These may include the
military, UPS, Fed Ex or other agencies who manage large sums of
information constantly. During disasters, FEMA must have a task group
that immediately establishes communication mechanisms region wide to
allow all incoming responders to be interoperable. This will be much
easier if the local region has standardized protocols and equipment
parameters.
Conclusion
I believe we have an opportunity to blend improvements in
technology with needs of interoperability. The critical issue is that
we must move rapidly to prevent that same technology from becoming
another stumbling block.
It has been an honor and privilege to speak with you, I'll be happy
to answer any questions you have.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 36399.001
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Bradley.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Diane Linderman.
STATEMENT OF DIANE LINDERMAN, DIRECTOR-AT-LARGE, PUBLIC WORKS
MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP
Ms. Linderman. Good morning, Chairman Reichert, Ranking
Member Thompson and distinguished members of the panel.
My name is Diane Linderman, and I am the director of Urban
Infrastructure and Development for VHB, Incorporated, in
Richmond, Virginia, and formerly the Public Works director for
the city of Richmond.
I am also director-at-large for leadership and management
of the American Public Works Association, or APWA. I am here
today on behalf of APWA's 27,000 members and our nearly 2,000
public agency members.
Public works officials are first responders. We work
alongside police, fire and emergency service professionals to
ensure that water is flowing through the fire hoses, traffic
lights are operating and traffic is moving, barricades are up,
debris is removed and the public is safe. We are often the last
to leave the scene, as we manage the lengthy clean-up and
restoration of any disaster site.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak today about
interoperable communications and the indispensable role it
plays in achieving an effective, coordinated emergency
response. APWA has been, and will continue to be, an advocate
for the development of policies which coordinate incident
response across multidisciplinary agencies in a way that saves
lives and restores communities' properties and critical
lifelines.
My own experience as the director of Public Works in the
city of Richmond when Hurricane Isabelle struck in September of
2003 demonstrates how vital interoperable communications is
during an emergency. During the response and recovery,
agencies, such as Public Works, Recreation and Parks, fire and
law enforcement, were able to communicate. Regional system
redundancies kept the system operating during and after the
storm. The ability of fire and police to talk to the men and
women clearing the streets of debris was necessary to
effectively respond to calls for service, minimizing the impact
on the health and safety of Richmond citizens.
The national discussion on interoperability has been
centered on the need for people in different departments,
different levels of government and mutual aid forces to be able
to communicate.
Two issues stand out as fundamental. First, there continues
to be a critical need for communication among responder groups
to communicate effectively between other relief units and
determine where resources are needed most. We cannot
overemphasize the importance of having the ability to maintain
uninterrupted communications. All of the compatible
communications in the world will not help if the power and
phone lines are down or backup power is not available.
In the aftermath of last year's catastrophic storms,
stories of communication problems became an increasing subject
of concern. For example, as response communications broke down
during Hurricane Katrina, our understanding was that the most
reliable communication backbone was e-mail, turning personal
BlackBerry wireless devices into critical communication
lifelines.
When an F4 tornado struck Missouri in 2003, the first
problem encountered was the total loss of wireless and land-
based phones when winds downed power cables, antennas and
telecom lines. Using their personal radios, public works
officials responded by relaying limited messages to City Hall
until one of the main repeaters was lost, forcing messages to
be relayed through a nearby fire station radio instead.
As we develop solutions to these problems, greater emphasis
should go towards making these systems more resilient during
extreme conditions. To neglect this preparation is to invite
further disaster in the midst of a catastrophe.
Reliable communications capabilities between all responders
is critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of all response
and recovery activities. In many cases, police have gone to 800
megahertz frequency radios, which they have received through
federal grants, leaving public works with older high-band
equipment. In such cases, public works can communicate through
a dispatch center but cannot talk directly with police, fire or
rescue personnel in the field.
In cases where public safety agencies are on digital and
public works agencies are on analog, the ability to communicate
is limited.
Additionally, the costs of obtaining digital radios is
significant, and public works departments often do not have the
resources to obtain them. Increased resources are needed to
help local jurisdictions achieve interoperable communications.
The second fundamental issue of governance is non-
technical. That is deciding who needs to communicate with whom,
how and under what circumstances. Not every agency needs to
have access to all information all of the time, but figuring
out who does and when and obtaining agreement on the issue has
been given very little consideration to this point.
Governance is an important tool to improve interoperability
for public safety and emergency preparedness. That implies
broadening the understanding of the barriers to effective
interoperability at all levels, removing or overcoming the silo
mentalities and turfism that exists among response agencies;
demonstrating a willingness to collaborate with agencies with
which emergency response is inevitable and recognizing that
serving the needs of public safety is paramount.
Collaborative efforts like those that exist in the greater
Richmond area through the Capital Region Communications
Steering Committee can and do work. The Steering Committee was
formed by a simple and short agreement signed by the three
localities' executives in 1998. The Steering Committee sets
policies and operational protocols while maintaining autonomy
of operation by each locality. It is effective and a model to
be emulated.
APWA recognizes the vital role interoperable communications
plays in effective emergency response. It is more than simply a
communications technology issue. It includes equipment as well
as training, response team structure and operations. We see the
need for increased funding for the equipment and training
necessary to improve interoperable communications.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this
morning, and we look forward to being of assistance to you and
your committee, and I will answer any questions later.
[The statement of Ms. Linderman follows:]
Prepared Staement of Diane Linderman, PE
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
Good morning, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and
distinguished members of the panel. My name is Diane Linderman, and I
am Director of Urban Infrastructure and Development for Vanasse Hangan
Brustlin, Inc., in Richmond, VA and formerly Public Works Director for
the City of Richmond, VA. I am also Director-at-Large for Public Works
Leadership and Management of the American Public Works Association, or
APWA.
I am here today on behalf of the 27,000 public works officials who
are members of APWA including our nearly 2,000 public agency members.
APWA is an organization dedicated to providing public works
infrastructure and lifeline services to millions of people in rural and
urban communities, both small and large.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak today about interoperable
communications and the indispensable role it plays in achieving an
effective, coordinated emergency response. APWA has been and will
continue to be an advocate for the development of policies which
coordinate incident response across multi-disciplinary agencies in a
way that saves lives and restores communities, property and critical
lifelines.
Let me take a moment to describe who public works officials are and
what we do, and then I will go into more detail about the role APWA
members play in preparation, response and recovery during catastrophes,
and how interoperable communications is key to supporting these
functions.
APWA's membership includes public works directors, city engineers,
directors and senior managers of all areas of infrastructure, city
managers, water and waste water treatment professionals among many
others. Public works officials manage the very essence of our nation's
communities: we manage the design, planning, and operation of critical
infrastructures, including roads, bridges and water systems, and are on
the front lines in the face of natural disasters, terrorist attacks and
other public emergencies. We run the gamut of city services, with one
overriding commonality: we are the nuts and bolts of local government.
Public safety is our priority at all times.
Public works officials are first responders: we work alongside
police, fire, and emergency service professionals to ensure that water
is flowing through fire hoses; traffic lights are operating and traffic
is moving; barricades are up; debris is removed; and the public is
safe. Additionally, we are often the last to leave the scene as we
manage the lengthy cleanup and restoration of any disaster site.
Public works officials know what it takes to make infrastructure
less susceptible to damage from disasters as well as how to rebuild
infrastructure after a disaster. We know how to get the roads and water
mains in working order, how to restore power, how to rebuild or
reinforce public buildings damaged by natural or man-made disaster, how
to identify equipment needs, and how to assist other first responders
in dealing with immediate threats.
Experience demonstrates how vital interoperable communications is
during a catastrophe. During the terrorist attack on the Pentagon in
September 2001, responders from local jurisdictions were able to
communicate with each other but federal and military agencies could not
communicate with the local responders nor could they communicate with
each other due to the disparate communications systems and had no means
to bridge the gap.
In another example, the I-95 Sniper attack of October 2002 in
Hanover County, VA, immediately north of Henrico County and the
Richmond metropolitan area, required a joint response by local and
federal agencies. Hanover County uses an analog 800 MHz system which is
incompatible with the Capital Region's digital, trunked 800 MHz system.
Virginia State Police and federal responders' systems employ other
frequencies, so interoperability was initially absent. Quick thinking
on the part of Capital Region system managers solved the dilemma by
gathering available portable radios from Henrico, Chesterfield and
Richmond and reassigning them as needed to the Sniper Task Force while
in the area.
With Hurricane Katrina, response communications were almost non
existent. The few communications that were operational were not
interoperable. One team of responders told us they had radio
communications (base, mobile, and repeaters) but could not talk to many
other responders due to lack of interoperability. This was true for
many other responding teams. All had their own systems but were
operating on various bands and frequencies. They were able to reprogram
some systems to common frequencies but the ones that were operating on
different bands caused a lot of communications problems. This not only
leads to a response that is uncoordinated and inefficient but also
created real safety issues to both the responders and to the public.
My own experience as Director of Public Works in the City of
Richmond when Hurricane Isabel struck in September 2003 also
demonstrates how vital interoperable communications is during an
emergency. During the response and recovery, agencies such as public
works, recreation and parks, fire and law enforcement were all able to
communicate. Regional system redundancies kept the system operating
during and after the storm. The ability of fire and police to talk to
the men and women clearing the streets of debris was necessary to
effectively respond to call for service, minimizing the impact on
health and safety of Richmond's citizens.
The national discussion on interoperability has been centered on
the need for people in different departments, different levels of
government within a state, or mutual aid forces to be able to
communicate. The focus of this point has been on the compatibility of
technology and frequency management. Two issues stand out as
fundamental. First, there continues to be a critical need for
interoperable communications among responder groups to allow people to
communicate effectively with other relief units, and determine where
resources are needed most. We cannot over emphasize the importance of
having the ability to maintain uninterrupted communications. All the
compatible communications in the world will not help if the towers and
phone lines are down or back-up power is not available.
Again, citing experience from Hurricane Katrina, the most reliable
communication backbone was e-mail, turning personal BlackBerry wireless
devices into a critical communications lifeline. Aside from email and
the occasional satellite phone, there was no form of reliable
communication between New Orleans and the outside world apart from
BlackBerry devices. In many instances, hand written notes were used to
communicate among responders. More attention is needed to understand
how communications systems will hold up under extreme conditions. To
neglect this preparation is to invite further disaster in the midst of
a catastrophe.
The other fundamental issue related to communications
interoperability is completely non-technological: that is, deciding who
needs to communicate with whom, how (by voice, by data, and so forth)
and under what circumstances. Solving the question of compatibility is
relatively easy compared to establishing a set of protocols for an
integrated federal, state and local communications interoperability
matrix. Not every agency needs to have access to all information all
the time, but figuring out who does and when, and obtaining agreement
on this issue has been given very little attention to this point.
Reliable communication capability between all responders is
critical to the efficiency and effectiveness of all response and
recovery activities. Radio communication is a major issue and concern
during emergencies and disasters. In many cases, police have gone to
800 MHz frequency radios which they have received through Department of
Homeland Security grants. Public works is often left with older High
Band. In such cases, public works can communicate through a dispatch
center, but cannot talk directly with police, fire or rescue personnel
in the field. Increased resources are needed to help local
jurisdictions achieve interoperable communications. In cases where
public safety agencies are on digital and public works agencies are on
analog, the ability to communicate is limited. Additionally, the cost
of obtaining digital radios is significant and public works departments
often do not have the resources to obtain them.
As first responders, we urge that funding for radio communications
grants be targeted specifically to public works departments. Currently,
because of the insufficient funding towards improving interoperable
communications, states in some cases are not pushing adequate funds
down to local jurisdictions because of the cost of implementing their
systems. In Illinois, the state's STARCOM radio system is costing
millions to implement and will provide every community with one radio.
However, additional radios will cost local agencies between $6,000 and
$7,000 each. One community in Illinois just received a new VHF 150 MHz
channel for a city-wide communications band, but public works will have
to re-radio their fleet to accomplish that, at a cost of about
$100,000. With local budgets oversubscribed, many communities cannot
afford these kinds of costs.
Interoperable capability also needs to include strengthening our
existing phone/cell/radio systems. In Missouri where an F4 tornado
struck in 2003, the first problem was the loss of all cell phone and
land lines when the wind disrupted the power and phone lines and
damaged antennas. Public Works was able somewhat to relay messages to
city hall through their radios. However, one of the main repeaters had
been lost, so the messages had to be relayed through a nearby fire
station radio. The public works department had assistance from other
area cities and counties through face-to-face communications only,
because the radios were not on the same frequencies.
In addition to resources, governance is an important tool to
improve interoperability for public safety and emergency preparedness.
That implies broadening the understanding of the barriers to effective
interoperability at all levels; removing or overcoming the silo
mentalities and `turfism' that exists among response agencies;
demonstrating a willingness to collaborate with agencies with which
emergency response is inevitable; and recognizing that serving the
needs of public safety is paramount. Joint training and disaster
reaction drills with team partners in law enforcement, fire and related
agencies is critically important. Good working relationships are key to
establishing who is in charge and who is responsible for what.
Collaborative efforts like those that exist in the greater Richmond
area through the Capital Region Communications Steering Committee
(CRCSC) can and do work. To address the months of wrangling between
neighboring jurisdictions who in the past often failed to reach desired
mutually beneficial objectives, the CRCSC was formed by a simple and
short MOU signed by the three localities' executives in 1998. The CRCSC
sets policies and operational protocols while maintaining autonomy of
operation by each locality. It is effective and, in our opinion, a
model to be emulated.
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate's Office for Interoperability and Compatibility
has the SAFECOM Program. It is a communications program that provides
research, development, testing and evaluation, guidance and assistance
for local, tribal, state, and federal public safety agencies. Through
more effective and efficient interoperable wireless communications,
SAFECOM is working to improve the public safety response in a
meaningful way.
APWA has an Emergency Management Technical Committee within our
organization that has consistently supported, provided comments for and
helped to implement HSPD-8, the National Response Plan (NRP) and the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). We continue to support an
emphasis on cross-discipline communication, interoperable
communications and training for our members, public officials and all
first responder groups.
Public works personnel have been available to interoperable
communications groups over the past four years. As we have in the past,
we are again serving on the President's HSPD-8 working group, with a
goal to ``establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the
United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.''
APWA recognizes the vital role interoperable communications plays
in effective emergency response. Interoperable communications is more
than simply a communications technology issue. It includes equipment as
well as training, response team structure and operations. As first
responders, we see the need for increased funding for the equipment and
training necessary to improve interoperable communications so that we
can be better prepared for the challenges we will all face in the
future. Through cooperation, training and additional resources, we
believe that we can achieve better response and recovery capabilities
for the communities we serve.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify this
morning. We look forward to being of assistance to you and the
subcommittee. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Ms. Linderman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Moroney.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. MORONEY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, UNITED TELECOM COUNCIL
Mr. Moroney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. My name is Bill Moroney, and it has been my honor
for the last 8 years to serve as the president and CEO of the
United Telecom Council.
For nearly 60 years, UTC has been the voice of electric,
gas and water utilities on telecommunications matters. UTC's
several hundred members range from large investor-owned
utilities to municipalities, to coops operating in big cities,
smaller towns and rural areas throughout the country.
These utilities own, maintain and operate private mission-
critical communications systems, including ultra-reliable two-
way radio networks. And these systems are vital to their safe
and efficient operation. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today and discuss some issues of vital concern to
all emergency responders.
I would like to make three important points today. One,
power and water utilities require reliable interoperable
communications to provide services considered necessary for
normal life.
Two, effective and interoperable communications are needed,
both among utilities responding to emergencies and between them
and public responders, something we do not generally have
today.
And, three, government oversight of emergency preparedness
and interoperability that mandates inclusion of the entire
emergency response community in policy and planning.
The job of an electronic company lineman is nearly always
listed among the 10 most dangerous jobs in the nation.
Communications networks, especially our private radio systems,
are considered safety equipment to utility crews just as they
are to police officers and firefighters. Safe operations and
rapid restoration of service in emergencies are not possible
with these systems.
It is understood that police and fire personnel are among
the first responders to an emergency, but utility workers, who
also immediately race to disaster-stricken areas, are all too
often overlooked as vital to any emergency response planning,
even though the most important step back to normal life
following any disaster is the restoration of electric power and
supplies of safe drinking water to homes and businesses.
We use the term, ``emergency responders,'' to encompass a
broader community than traditional first responders. We
recognize a distinct difference between police and
firefighters, traditional public safety and the rest of the
emergency response community.
We use the term to include all of us who are on the ground
responding within minutes and hours to disasters of all kinds.
Utilities support emergency response by building highly
robust communications systems. Simply put, these systems are
designed to keep working when the power is out. That is a fact
that makes us excellent partners as the nation looks for
interoperability solutions.
Recently, the communications systems--our land mobile radio
systems, microwave and fiber optic networks--owned by the most
Gulf coast utilities, large and small, continued to function or
were back up within hours during and after Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita and Wilma. This is in contrast to nearly all other
communications networks in the area. This is just one finding
from a recent UTC research study that has been provided to the
subcommittee and attached to part of my statement.
Tens of thousands of utility field crews from around the
United States and Canada responded to the hurricane-stricken
areas in both 2004 and 2005. They do the same after ice storms
in the North or other disasters, and just this week crews from
other utilities could be seen around the Washington area
helping restore power after this weekend's snowstorm.
While local utilities generally get excellent performance
from their communications systems, one of the major problems
for coordinating such large-scale restoration efforts is the
fact that utility communications systems themselves are not
often interoperable with other utility systems. Our members
operate on several different frequency bands, using different
technologies like everybody else here today.
Therefore, our need for interoperability emergency is
twofold: We need communications among crews from different
utilities, and we need much better coordination between
utilities and the traditional public safety community.
Unlike public safety, critical infrastructure industries
have not dedicated spectrum for our use. The spectrum we use is
shared with incompatible users like pizza delivery companies
and taxi companies and is becoming increasingly congested and
is subject to harmful interference.
So how does the federal government help us get to real
interoperability? Utilities should be designated as an
emergency responders along with everybody else who is racing
toward the problem and should be included in the preparedness
and response planning.
And with a small nationwide spectrum allocation of 6 to 10
megahertz, utilities could build a next-generation voice and
data network that would not only make utilities more efficient
during disaster recovery but could also be made available to
all emergency responders as needed. More details on this
proposal are attached to my written statement as well. And we
believe that congressional leadership is needed here.
Utilities build the most robust communications
infrastructure in our country. This combined with our strong
habit of emergency planning and response operations we believe
makes us excellent partners in the drive toward
interoperability.
UTC and its hundreds of members stand ready to help in any
national efforts to make the United States both more prepared
for a disaster and more equipped to recover from it quickly,
but, Mr. Chairman, we need your help.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you.
I will be glad to answer your questions later.
[The statement of Mr. Moroney follows:]
Prepared Statement of William R. Moroney
Wednesday, February 15, 2006
Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the Subcommittee:
I am William R. Moroney, President and Chief Executive Officer of
the United Telecom Council (UTC). I thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss issues of vital concern to all
emergency responders.
For nearly 60 years, UTC has been the voice of electrical, gas and
water utilities in matters relating to their voice and data
telecommunications. UTC's several hundred critical infrastructure
members range in size from multi-state organizations such as National
Grid and Exelon, to municipally owned utilities and co-ops operating in
cities, towns and rural areas throughout the country. All of these
companies own, maintain and operate private, mission-critical
communications systems. Most importantly for purposes of this hearing,
these include two-way land mobile radio systems on which we all rely
for both routine and emergency communications.
Critical Infrastructure Communications Affect Homeland Security
All critical infrastructure industries are becoming increasingly
dependent on information management and private internal communications
systems to control and maintain their operations. A 2002 study by the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA),
entitled, ``Current and Future Use of Spectrum by the Energy, Water and
Railroad Industries,'' makes very clear the extent of this dependency
to meet essential operational, management and control functions.\1\
Communications systems, especially radio systems, are considered safety
equipment just as they are by public safety personnel. Safe operations
and rapid restoration in emergencies are not possible without these
systems.
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\1\ A copy of the Executive Summary of the NTIA Study is included
as Attachment A to this document. The full study can be found at http:/
/www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/sp0149/sp0149.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All parties concerned with homeland security agree that one of the
most important considerations is the availability of reliable,
interoperable communications for ``emergency responders,'' a term we
use to encompass a broader community than traditional first responders.
It's meant to include all those who are on the ground responding within
hours to disasters of all kinds. Another fact brought to attention by
recent events, especially the disastrous hurricanes of the past two
years, is that the most important step back to ``normalcy'' is the
restoration of electric power and a supply of safe drinking water to
homes and businesses.
In this regard, there are three important issues which need to be
addressed: 1) The critical players that require such communications
include not only the first responders from the public safety community,
but also the critical infrastructure enterprises such as power and
water utilities that provide services considered necessary for normal
life; 2) We must ensure effective and interoperable communications both
among critical infrastructure entities responding to emergencies, and
between them and public safety responders; and 3) Government oversight
of emergency preparedness and interoperability must mandate inclusion
of the entire emergency response community in federal policy and
planning to overcome local biases and coordinate what are now only
piecemeal efforts.
Emergency Responder Communications
It is understood that the local and state police and fire personnel
are among the first responders to an emergency, as well as emergency
medical personnel. But critical infrastructure employees--the utility
workers who immediately head to disaster-stricken areas and get to
work--are often overlooked as vital to any emergency response. Along
with protecting life, the first order of business following a manmade
or natural disaster is the restoration of essential public services,
including water (to fight fires and ensure clean and safe supplies),
gas and electricity (to restore heat, light, computer-based networks of
all kinds, commercial communications, and more). These are the first
services that must be brought back on line, so these workers are among
the first personnel on the scene.
The job of an electric lineman is nearly always listed among the
ten most dangerous in the nation--and reliable communications is key to
safety, especially in the chaos that follows a disaster. One element of
reliability for critical infrastructure industries, beyond that for
traditional public safety: our radios must work, wherever our crews go,
when the power is out. During any kind of manmade or natural disaster,
you will see police, fire, utility and other emergency personnel on the
scene at the same time. Any discussion of emergency interoperability
must include critical infrastructure industries such as electric, gas
and water utilities if the United States is to have an effective
system.
Some examples: as soon as the magnitude of the 9/11 disaster became
apparent, more than 1900 Consolidated Edison emergency workers were
dispatched to Ground Zero to assist critical service restoration
efforts and provide emergency communications capabilities to others on
the scene. ConEd's two-way land mobile radio system was among the only
communications available and was widely used during the first few hours
following the collapse of the Twin Towers. More recently, the
communications systems--land mobile, microwave and fiber--of Gulf Coast
utility companies, large and small, continued to function or were back
up within hours during and after hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, in
contrast to nearly all other communications networks. This performance
is documented in UTC's November 2005 study, Hurricanes of 2005:
Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications
Networks. The findings of the study, as outlined in its Executive
Summary, are included with this statement as Attachment B.\2\ Among
them is the highlighted need for better interoperability to get the
work done safely and as fast as possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The full text of the study will be provided to the Subcommittee
as supplemental material, or may be found at http://www.utc.org
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, utility emergency response is usually a nationwide, and
even international, response. Tens of thousands of field crews from
around the U.S. and Canada responded to hurricane-stricken areas in
both 2004 and 2005; they do the same after ice storms in the North or
any other disaster. This week, crews from other utilities could be seen
around the Washington area helping to restore power after this
weekend's snowstorm. While local utilities generally get excellent
performance from their communications systems, one of the major
problems for coordinating such large-scale efforts is the fact that
utility communications themselves are not interoperable. Our entities
operate on several different land mobile frequency bands, using
different technologies. Therefore, critical infrastructure's need for
interoperability in emergency response is two-fold: we need
communications among crews from different utilities, and we need much
better coordination between utilities and local public safety agencies
to facilitate restoration.
Local Efforts Toward Interoperability
Congress recognized the importance of our systems in 1997, when you
included utilities, pipelines and other critical infrastructure among
``public safety radio services:'' those private systems that provide
support to such vital systems that entities operating them should have
access to spectrum without obtaining it via auction. Since then,
critical infrastructure has not sought access to existing public safety
spectrum. However, the FCC has not made an allocation to non-public
safety private wireless since 1985, and critical infrastructure
industries, unlike Public Safety, have no dedicated spectrum for their
use. Therefore, UTC and its members have looked for opportunities to
bolster interoperability among all emergency responders by other means,
while continuing to seek a dedicated spectrum allocation. The most
effective means on a local basis has been through shared radio systems
shared among multiple agencies including utilities and traditional
public safety, and there are dozens of these throughout the country.\3\
Many of them have been built by utilities, because we often can get the
system funded and into operation faster than public safety agencies.
And--we build our systems so they work when the power is out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ While most shared systems include a municipal utility, UTC is
aware of a pending statewide system in Missouri that is designed to
include various public safety agencies and investor-owned utilities.
Such a system, if encouraged by state leadership, could become a model
of cooperation for other areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just a few examples of shared systems: Gainesville, Florida, where
Gainesville Regional Utilities has built and maintains a non-profit,
shared 800 MHz system. Local public safety agencies use this system as
low-cost subscribers. There are many municipalities, as throughout the
Philadelphia metro area, where local utilities and public safety
agencies share a common radio system owned by the local government.
In Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and the Florida Gulf Coast,
Southern Company has built a commercial 800 MHz system to utility
standards, making it attractive to thousands of public safety users, as
well. The Southern system was among the utility systems that remained
operational post-Katrina, when all other cellular systems were down. A
system like Southern's is the only form of commercial system
appropriate for mission-critical communications, since utilities must
have complete coverage of their service territories, as well as
guaranteed reliability at all times. No consumer-oriented commercial
wireless provider can afford to offer service to this standard, nor do
commercial systems continue to function during power outages of any
duration.\4\ Utility communications must function ultra-reliably, and
never more so than when the power is out. Since commercial
communications networks cannot meet this standard, they generally are
not relied upon for emergency or mission-critical communications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Subcommittee should take notice that programs promoting
commercial wireless providers for Wireless Priority Access Service are
completely useless to critical infrastructure. Even if not overloaded
with traffic during a disaster, whether manmade or natural, cellsites
do not have long-term backup power. A system that simply doesn't work
during power outages--regardless of our low priority to start--is
useless to critical service restoration personnel and should be
considered useless for public safety personnel, as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The shared systems outlined above are only local or company-
specific attempts to solve interoperability problems, and the United
States needs a nationwide solution so that all emergency responders can
communicate with each other. We offer our expertise to help reach this
vital goal.
Critical Infrastructure Could Build an Interoperable Network
Unlike traditional public safety, the critical infrastructure
industries have no designated spectrum for their own use, and we suffer
from increasing congestion and interference on the bands we share with
millions of other non-public safety private wireless users. We have
requested a small, exclusive allocation of six to ten megahertz on a
band below 1 GHz, on which we propose to construct a nationwide system.
This system would be interoperable among the many critical
infrastructure entities that always respond to regional emergencies,
and would be made available to traditional public safety, federal
agencies and others through additional equipment, or as part of a
network of networks (see Attachment C, below).
While it is understood that spectrum is a scarce resource, homeland
security initiatives should consider an exclusive allocation of
spectrum to critical infrastructure for the establishment of a
nationwide emergency communications network. This would achieve three
objectives: 1) economies of scale would drive down the cost of
equipment; 2) efficient spectrum use would dictate the use of this
spectrum on a day-to-day basis for critical infrastructure operations
support, while entities would be responsible for maintaining the
emergency network; and 3) emergency response capability would be served
by all response agencies having immediate access to fully operational
communications equipment, priority access and a fully interoperable
network when the need arose.
Federal Coordination is Necessary
One of the questions posed for this hearing concerned the
appropriate role of the Federal government in interoperability efforts.
To begin with, UTC does not believe that this government is prepared
to, or should, fund a stand-alone emergency system for just a portion
of the emergency response community. Not only would this be ruinously
expensive, it would be an extremely inefficient use of scarce spectrum,
would duplicate existing systems and would not appreciably help
emergency response as it occurs in real life. Instead, Federal
coordination is needed to ensure that all segments of the emergency
response community are included in planning efforts, whether national,
state or regional, and to encourage coordination among national
representatives to develop policies and procedures that will help
entities work together. For example, non-local utility crews often are
stopped by law enforcement from getting into damaged areas to restore
power; a simple, standard procedure could eliminate this problem. The
Federal government should designate critical infrastructure industries
such as utilities as ``emergency responders,'' and mandate their
inclusion in preparedness and response planning. Congressional
leadership also is needed to establish the spectrum allocation outlined
above--while UTC has great respect for the Federal Communications
Commission and its personnel, the agency's focus on commercial
communications services has made it less than well-equipped to
understand or act on the needs of non-commercial licensees.
UTC and its hundreds of members stand ready to help in national
efforts to make the United States both more prepared for disaster, and
more equipped to recover from it quickly. Critical infrastructure
entities build the most robust communications infrastructure found in
the U.S., as proven by its performance, and our strong habit of
emergency planning and operations makes us excellent partners in the
drive toward efficient emergency response and recovery. We urge you to
include us in interoperability development and implementation.
Attachment B
Hurricanes of 2005:
Performance of Gulf Coast Critical
Infrastructure Communications Networks
November 2005
A Research Study by the United Telecom Council
1.0 Executive Summary
The hurricane season of 2005 resulted in immense damage and tragic
loss of life to Florida and the Gulf Coast of the United States. Storms
Katrina, Rita and Wilma also pointed out the weaknesses in many of our
critical infrastructures, including telecommunications networks, some
of which are still recovering months later. However, in sharp contrast
to many commercial wireless, landline telephone and other
telecommunications networks, the private, internal networks (radio,
microwave and fiber) of electric, gas and water utilities for the most
part continued to function throughout and immediately after the storms.
In some cases, it was utility communications networks that provided the
only reliable communications among emergency responders and other
officials during the first few days after the storms.
The reliable performance of these internal systems was neither
unexpected nor unusual; utility communications systems are constructed
specifically to withstand major disasters. The United Telecom Council
(UTC), the international trade association representing the
telecommunications interests of critical infrastructure industries,\5\
has conducted informal polling of its members after such emergencies as
a major Northeast ice storm in 1998; the huge electric blackout of
August 2003; and the hurricanes of 2004, with similar results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ UTC's membership consists primarily of publicly-held, municipal
and cooperative electric, gas and water utilities and gas pipelines,
and Federal power authorities. Through affiliated association members,
UTC reaches out to other Critical Infrastructure
Industries (CII) as defined by the FCC in Section 90.7 of its Rules
(47 CFR Sec. 90.7), including petroleum and oil pipeline companies and
railroads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, given the magnitude of this year's disasters and resulting
national discussions concerning the survivability of communications
networks, UTC felt it imperative to undertake a formal survey of Gulf
Coast electric, gas and water utilities of all sizes, to generate data
that would quantify our anecdotal information.
Overall findings:
All by one of impacted CII entities responding
reported that their communications networks generally survived
the hurricanes and continued to operate well throughout
restoration efforts (the single exception was a utility that
relied on commercial wireless service;
Private land mobile radio (LMR) networks provided
critical communications among crews; however, the huge number
of responding entities from around the country taxed capacity
or could not operate on local systems, pointing up the need for
CII interoperability;
Utility fiber and microwave systems survived and
generally continued to function; however, this was due in part
to built-in redundancies, robustness and recovery mechanisms
that would be cost-prohibitive for a for-profit network
designed to serve the general public. Therefore, CII entities
will continue to require private networks to meet mission-
critical needs for the foreseeable future, along with the
ability to expand them as needed to meet system growth
requirements.
Unfortunately, there was little or no formal
coordination with state or local agencies or public safety
organizations during or after the storms. Given the
opportunities for improved response communications offered by
robust CII systems, and the presence of CII personnel ``on the
ground'' in nearly every disaster scenario, this lack
emphasizes that CII MUST be included in emergency response
planning at the Federal level.
We believe these findings should be of significant
importance to Congress and to Federal agencies charged with
communications-related Homeland Security responsibilities, such
as the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of
Homeland Security. UTC and its members look forward to
discussing these findings and their implications with
policymakers and others.
[Note: the full text of the report is being provided to the
Subcommittee as supplemental material]
Attachment C
U.S. Emergency Wireless Network_
A Responder Build-out Proposal
All parties concerned with homeland security agree: one of the
primary needs in any emergency situation is reliable communications,
interoperable among all responding entities. Due to its long-standing
regulatory framework and division of jurisdiction over radio-frequency
(RF) spectrum, the United States currently has no such capability.
Whether manmade or natural, emergencies leave traditional public safety
agencies, utilities and other responding critical infrastructure
entities, and relevant federal agencies unable to communicate
effectively either among themselves or with other responders, at the
time it is needed most. This serious gap in capability, witnessed after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and natural disasters such as
the hurricane season of 2004 and 2005's Hurricane Katrina, must be
addressed.
The United Telecom Council (UTC), the voice of critical
infrastructure (CI) telecommunications since 1948, is among the many
parties seeking a solution to this difficult problem. In addition, UTC
is increasingly concerned that critical infrastructure industries have
no spectrum dedicated for their exclusive use on any frequency band, as
noted in the 2002 National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (Commerce) study of current and future spectrum use by
the energy, water and railroad industries. CI wireless voice systems
currently operate in bands shared with many incompatible uses. Mission-
critical telemetry and SCADA systems are often found on bands where
they have only secondary status and may be required to cease
operations, and all CI communications face increasing congestion and
harmful interference. Moreover, different utilities do not use the same
spectrum for the same operations because of varying frequency
availability across the Nation, thus hampering cooperative efforts in
times of emergency. However, in spite of these difficulties, utility
telecommunications systems--because they are built to support
restoration, preserve personnel safety and underlie the reliability of
electric, gas and water service--generally prove to be the most robust
in times of emergency.
Proposal
UTC proposes to solve all these problems simultaneously, by a means
we believe would: 1) cost less; 2) use spectrum more efficiently; and
3) meet the needs of emergency responders more closely than other
proposals. Utilities and other CI entities traditionally work closely
with traditional public safety agencies: they respond to the same
emergencies, but utilities generally have more emergency-reliable
wireless communications due to construction methods. In fact, CI
entities increasingly help to build traditional public safety radio
systems and/or share frequencies with public safety agencies. Congress
and the FCC recognized the close working relationships among these
entities when they re-classified utilities, pipelines and other CI
entities as ``public safety radio services'' along with more
traditional public safety organizations such as police and fire
departments.
To promote faster, more reliable and interoperable emergency
response, as well as to meet the urgent communications needs of CI
entities for the next decade or more, UTC proposes an innovative use of
scarce RF spectrum:
To meet everyday needs for reliable wireless voice and data
communications, UTC urges a small CI nationwide spectrum allocation of
6-10 MHz in a frequency band below 1 GHz;
CI entities would construct infrastructure nationwide, implementing
an integrated voice and data technology platform providing an
interoperable communications system. Utilities and other CI entities
would migrate to this system over time (an estimated 7-10 years, based
on equipment life cycles). Migration and build-out could be
accomplished more quickly with partial Federal funding. Additional,
fully operational equipment would be kept on hand by local CI entities
using the system. In emergency situations, all traditional public
safety, federal and other agencies would have immediate access to this
equipment. A system of emergency priority access to frequencies also
would be implemented to ensure reliable access for emergency
responders.
An alternative interoperable system would consist of a ``network of
networks,'' in which CI entities, traditional public safety agencies
and other emergency responders would designate existing frequencies to
an interoperable network during emergencies, all entities retaining
control over their existing networks. With nationwide designated
spectrum, CI entities could build and maintain the technology platform
necessary to make this system possible.
Either method of interoperability would ensure that scarce spectrum
resources are used efficiently, while providing the widespread access
to joint communications needed urgently to meet U.S. emergency response
needs. Given the long-time expertise in infrastructure build-out by CI
entities, coupled with their deep understanding of emergency
communications needs, UTC believes this proposal would provide for the
type of nationwide emergency communications system most needed, built
by the best-qualified entities.
UTC is anxious to discuss its efforts in this direction and means
by which this proposal may be implemented, and looks forward to working
with your office to develop it further.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Moroney.
Dr. William Pinsky is now recognized.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PINSKY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
ACADEMIC OFFICER, OCHSNER CLINIC FOUNDATION, NEW ORLEANS,
LOUISIANA
Mr. Pinsky. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
committee members.
As Representative Jindal introduced me, I am Dr. William
Pinsky, a pediatric cardiologist and the executive vice
president and chief academic officer of the Ochsner Clinic
Foundation in New Orleans, Louisiana.
On behalf of the American Hospital Association's 4,800
hospitals, health systems and other health care organization
members and our 33,000 individual members, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today.
Ochsner, which has 478 acute-care beds in the main
hospitals, and 24 clinics throughout the New Orleans area and 4
clinics and a hospital in Baton Rouge, is not a not-for-profit
comprehensive integrated health care system, the largest non-
governmental employer in Louisiana and a center of excellence
in research, patient care and education.
Throughout Katrina's onslaught and its devastating
aftermath, we remained open, caring for patients.
This morning, I would like to tell you how we prepared for
the storm, what we did to ensure our communications systems
worked, how we kept our doors open and answer questions you may
have about our experience.
Hospitals routinely plan and train to deal with disasters,
both natural and manmade. Our plan, revised after every
disaster or near-miss event, was updated less than 3 months
before Hurricane Katrina struck.
On Friday, August 27, when we were notified that the storm
would likely hit the area, we immediately initiated the first
phase of our plan: Notifying essential personnel and securing
previously stockpiled supplies. Staff began discharging
appropriate patients and moving those unable to leave the
facility into areas thought to be the most secure. We then
settled in and waited.
We sustained structural damage, but overall the news was
positive. Our emergency generators functioned, our internal
communications system and internet were fully operable. We had
adequate supplies, we believed we would ride out the next few
days until help arrived.
It was not easy, but we faired well in the beginning. On
day 2, an emergency generator failed, forcing us to go without
air conditioning. As a result, we shut down our internet server
to prevent heat damage, losing our electronic medical records
system. Luckily, we were able to repair the generator the next
day and restore full operations.
We had made extensive plans for securing and relieving
essential personnel, going to great lengths to keep staff
apprised of the situation, setting up a telephone tree as well
as a dedicated Web page with information. And we found
ourselves in some difficulty in reaching our relief staff.
We were eventually able to locate the staff and brought
them to Baton Rouge and then conveyed them into New Orleans by
bus convoy. Those same convoys were our lifeline to supplies as
well, enabling us to continue functioning.
With the situation in our main facility in hand, we sought
to offer our assistance to others. However, we had great
difficulty contacting the proper authorities, finding it hard
to even locate state and federal officials to offer our
assistance.
According to our regional emergency plan, we were to report
to the Jefferson Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness. When
our attempts to reach them failed, we explored other channels.
Eventually, we were able to contact the Orleans Parish office.
From them we learned of their communication difficulties with
evacuating downtown hospitals. It was virtually impossible to
coordinate air evacuations due to the various agencies
involved, both military and civilian, and the lack of ability
to communicate.
Police communications systems were ineffective because of
infrastructure damage and the volume they were trying to
handle. The National Guard system was able to facilitate
communications among Guard units but had difficulty
communicating with local authorities.
Communication improved on day 4 when the United States
Public Health Service arrived. They were able to facilitate
requests through the previously blocked channels. However, they
did not have many of the assets we required.
Prior to their arrival, we were not able to alert
authorities that we were functioning and could receive
patients. We even went as far as using large trash bags on the
garage of our roof to spell out the word, ``open,'' to attract
the attention of helicopters overhead.
In light of the events, we are revising our disaster
policy, and I am very interested in improving our ability to
communicate with authorities and others in future emergencies.
In conclusion, we survived Hurricane Katrina as well as
could be hoped for because of the communication difficulties
with the outside world, we became self-sufficient, securing our
own methods of sustaining our facility. We were able to do this
primarily because our facility in Baton Rouge could be used as
an off-site command post and because our own communications
system remained operational through built-in redundancy.
However, we could have done much more to assist the authorities
and the local community if a fully interoperable communications
system had been in place.
Communication with local, state and federal authorities is
crucial for ensuring that hospitals can fulfill their mission
during disasters.
We look forward to working with the committee and the staff
toward a shared goal of improving the disaster preparedness for
America's hospitals and communities.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Pinsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of William W. Pinsky, M.D.
Wednesday, February 15, 1006
Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am William W. Pinsky, M.D., executive
vice president and chief academic officer of Ochsner Clinic Foundation
(OCF), in New Orleans, La. On behalf of the American Hospital
Association's 4,800 hospitals, health systems and other health care
organization members, and our 33,000 individual members, I appreciate
the opportunity to speak to you and your colleagues about the
importance of interoperable communications during a disaster.
For nearly 60 years, OCF has cared for residents in the greater New
Orleans and Baton Rouge communities. Our main campus, including the 478
acute-care bed hospital and clinic, is located in Jefferson Parish,
less than a mile from the Orleans Parish line and only a 15 minute
drive to downtown New Orleans. In addition, we have 24 clinics
throughout the New Orleans area and a sub-acute nursing facility/
inpatient psychiatry/inpatient rehabilitation hospital two miles from
our main campus. In Baton Rouge, we have three clinics, 70 physicians
and 50 percent ownership of an acute care hospital. Recognized as a
center for excellence in research, patient care and education, OCF is a
not-for-profit, comprehensive, integrated health care system, and the
largest non-governmental employer in Louisiana. With more than 7,400
employees--including more than 600 physicians in nearly 70 medical
specialties--OCF is also one of the largest non-university-based
physician-training centers in the country, annually hosting over 350
residents and fellows, 450 medical students and 400 allied health
students.
When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, no one could have truly
imagined the intense devastation it would leave in its wake. The wind
and the rain wreaked havoc across Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.
Knowing that the storm was headed their way, hospitals began sending
home patients deemed well enough to be discharged. Those in critical
condition or requiring special assistance, such as ventilator-assisted
breathing, remained in the hospital. When hospital staff emergency
teams arrived for work during the weekend before the storm hit, they
expected it might be only a few days before they were able to return
home. However, when the levees in New Orleans broke, the situation
changed dramatically. We, and our colleagues in the New Orleans
metropolitan area, faced a dire situation beyond our imagination.
Throughout the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina, and during its
devastating aftermath, OCF remained open, caring for patients. This
morning, I'd like to tell you how my hospital prepared for the storm;
what our facilities did to ensure our communication systems worked and
our doors remained open to provide critical health care services to our
community; and answer any questions you and your colleagues might have
about our experience.
Planning for Disaster
Hospitals routinely plan and train to deal with disaster, whether
it's the derailment of a train carrying hazardous substances, a
multiple-vehicle accident on a nearby interstate, a plane crash, or a
natural disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake. As hospitals plan
for disasters and the prospect of going without public services such as
electricity and water, we prepare to be on our own for at least 72
hours, in the event it takes that long for assistance to arrive from
the state or federal government. Our plan, which we revise after every
disaster or ``near-miss'' event, had been revised most recently on June
1, 2005, less than three months before Hurricane Katrina struck.
On Friday, August 27, our entire executive leadership team had
assembled in New Orleans for the first day of a two-day leadership
retreat. Late in the afternoon, we were notified that the storm had
turned to the West and likely would strike the area. We immediately
initiated the first phase of our disaster plan, which included
notifying essential personnel and securing previously stockpiled
supplies.
Under the most recent disaster plan, two teams of essential
personnel, Teams A and B, were created to ensure continuity of care and
relief for employees on duty at the time disaster strikes. Each team
was to include staff members from all departments, e.g. security,
housekeeping, dietary, nursing, physicians, house staff, IT, media
relations, research, etc. Team members had been identified and
committed by June 1.
From previous experience, we realized the importance of not only
adequately stocking essential supplies on-site, but also creating a
back-up system to ensure additional supplies could be secured in times
of an emergency. On Friday, we activated our supply chain and began to
secure the additional supplies we had stockpiled off-site. Important
supplies included: 400 flashlights; 100 head lamps; 2,000 batteries;
4,000 glow sticks, including 2,000 with lanyards; 600 SpectraLink
wireless telephones with 1,800 batteries; 450 oscillating fans, one per
patient; 250 box fans for work and sleeping areas; 20 55-gallon drums
of water on each floor for commode flushing; 3000 gallons of water for
drinking (we also have a deep water well on campus with a 10,000 gallon
holding tank for additional water in an emergency); 60,000 gallons of
diesel fuel; 10 pallets of sandbags; eight pallets of plastic bags; 100
blue tarps; 20 dehumidifiers; five pallets of plywood; and 50
additional shop vacuums. We also increased our food supply. At this
time, we inspected our power sources. Our emergency generators are all
located above our facility's second floor and our transformers were
located on the ground level, behind 10-foot floodwalls.
On Saturday, August 28, executive leadership met with the vice
presidents, directors, and managers and agreed to order Team A on-site
by Sunday afternoon. Staff then began discharging the appropriate
patients and moving those that would be unable to leave the facility.
The families of the remaining patients were given ``boarding rules''--
one family member per patient would be allowed to stay. Similarly,
staff was discouraged from bringing family members to work unless they
absolutely could not make other arrangements. All patient and personnel
families were pre-registered and given ``special'' parking passes to
access our parking garage. During previous storms, we experienced
problems with people in the community attempting to use our garage to
protect their cars and boats. Under the revised plan, we stationed
armed guards at the entrances to the garage to ensure that hospital
staff, patients and their families could access the garage, and that
all entrances were kept clear.
On Sunday, ``sleeping'' assignments were made. Due to concerns
about the predicted high winds, patients were removed from the highest
floors of the hospital. Patients were also moved into hallways and
rooms without windows to protect them in the event of flying glass.
Because OCF is a research facility, we house numerous research animals,
which were evacuated to facilities in northern Louisiana. After
evacuations were complete, we settled in to wait and see what Hurricane
Katrina would bring.
Weathering the Storm
Ochsner's main campus survived the actual hurricane quite well. We
sustained some roof and structural damage to our main facility, but
overall the news was positive. Our generators functioned properly, the
Internet was up and running, and our internal communications system was
fully operable. Employees lost cellular phone and beeper capabilities
due to damage to local cell towers; however, we had planned for such an
event, and staff members were armed with SpectraLink wireless
telephones. As a result, communication critical to patient care was
uninterrupted. Our land-based telephones also remained in working order
due to redundancy in our carrier network. Our medical record system is
entirely electronic, and with power and the Internet operable, we did
not have concerns about the availability of critical patient
information. We had adequate supplies and believed we would be able to
ride out the next few days.
However, as the situation in and around New Orleans rapidly
deteriorated with the breach of the levees, conditions inside the
hospital also took a turn for the worse. On the second day, one of our
generators failed due to a mechanical problem, and we were forced to do
without air conditioning. As a result, our Internet servers were shut
down to prevent them from being damaged by the heat. Unfortunately,
server shutdown meant the electronic medical record system was
inoperable. We attempted to send our helicopter out to secure the
needed parts for the generator, but all non-governmental aircraft were
temporarily grounded. We were, however, able to locate the necessary
parts the next day to get the generator up and running again.
Conditions in our immediate area continued to worsen. Our main
facility is located a few miles from the I-10/Causeway where large
numbers of people attempting to make their way out of New Orleans after
the storm congregated. Many of those gathered turned to the hospital
for assistance on their way. However, we are a hospital, not a shelter.
We tried to point people in the right direction to get the help they
needed, and also dispatched medical personnel to the site to care for
individuals in need, transferring those needing hospitalization back to
our campus. Conditions in our neighborhood further destabilized as
floodwaters began to rise; looting of nearby businesses began. At that
point, we felt compelled to ask the National Guard to assist us in
securing the safety of our patients and staff, and placed OCF on
lockdown.
Operations inside the hospital similarly were beginning to show
signs of strain. Although we had made extensive plans for securing and
relieving essential personnel with the Team A and B designations, and
had gone to great lengths to keep staff apprised of the situation--
setting up a telephone tree as well a dedicated Web page with
information--we had difficulty securing relief staff. Many had
evacuated with their families to Baton Rouge and beyond. Fortunately,
we were able to locate a good portion of staff members there and bring
them in by bus convoy. As the floodwaters continued to rise, the same
convoys were used to evacuate exhausted staff and their families, as
well as patients who could be moved and their family members, to our
facilities in Baton Rouge. These same convoys were our lifelines for
supplies as well, enabling us to continue functioning.
At their height, the floodwaters rose as far as the doors on one
side of the hospital, but we maintained the ability to leave and enter
the building from other entrances and faced no real danger. Instead, we
realized that rumor and speculation were a larger threat to the
internal stabilization of the hospital than the floodwaters, and
created an internal communication system to keep staff and patients
informed of the conditions within the hospital and the city at large.
The leadership team met twice daily to be updated and then fanned out
across the facility, sharing the news they had just heard and answering
questions. This open and honest communication policy went a long way
toward assuaging staff and patient fears, and keeping the hospital in a
calm state.
Toward the end of the crisis, we began to run low on food. However,
we had an ample supply of water and were able to make do until relief
shipments could be brought in. We also ran low on insulin, but because
our telephones had been unaffected, we were able to secure 10,000 doses
donated from sanofi-aventis pharmaceutical company.
Reaching Beyond Our Walls
With the situation in OCF's main facility well in-hand, our
leadership team sought to inform local officials and offer assistance
to other health care facilities hit harder by the storm. Since our
land-based telephone system was operable, we believed this would be
easy. However, we had great difficulty trying to contact other
hospitals and local agencies that were not as fortunate in the quality
of their communications systems. We even found it difficult to locate
the proper state and federal officials to offer our assistance.
According to our regional emergency plan, we report to the
Jefferson Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). However, the
OEP system was overwhelmed and communication was impossible. When our
attempts to reach the Jefferson OEP failed, we attempted to reach the
Baton Rouge OEP. This was also challenging, as it appeared that the
bandwidth of their system could not accommodate the high volume of
incoming requests and was overloaded. We eventually successfully
contacted the Orleans Parish OEP following the levee break, requesting
both information, as well as assets. During this exchange, we became
aware of their communications difficulties with the downtown hospitals
that were in the midst of evacuating.
It was virtually impossible to coordinate air evacuation due to the
various agencies involved--both military and civilian--and their lack
of ability to communicate. We sent a vice president through the
floodwaters downtown to the Orleans OEP with a hand radio to try and
assist their coordination efforts, but were unsuccessful in reaching
them. We instead found a widespread lack of coordination: police
communication systems that were ineffective due to infrastructure
damage and volume, and a National Guard system that was able to
facilitate communications amongst guard units, but had difficulty
communicating with local authorities. Of external communications,
satellite systems were unreliable, and cell service, for a while, was
virtually eliminated. Text messaging and Internet were the most
reliable methods of communication.
Communication improved on day four when the United States Public
Health Service (USPHS) arrived, and interagency daily meetings at OCF's
main facility began. In addition to the USPHS, these meetings included
``all'' hospitals and representatives from the Jefferson and Orleans
OEP health care divisions. The USPHS was able facilitate requests
through the previously frustrating channels. They were particularly
helpful with things like fuel and security; however, they did not have
access to many of the assets we required. Prior to the USPHS's arrival,
we were so frustrated in our inability to notify authorities that we
were open and able to accept patients, that we used large trash bags to
spell ``OPEN'' on our garage roof (see attachment A), hoping to attract
the attention of the armada of helicopters flying overhead.
Assessing the Damage
Compared to our neighboring facilities, OCF weathered Hurricane
Katrina well, and most aspects of our disaster plan worked as we had
hoped. We sustained some structural damage on our main campus and lost
three facilities. Our remaining facilities are stressed to their
maximum. We currently are operating at 112 percent of inpatient
capacity, and more than 50 percent of our staff has been displaced.
We are also revising all of our disaster policies in light of the
events that transpired in Hurricane Katrina's wake. In particular, we
are examining our family policy. Although we tried to limit the number
of family members patients and staff could have at the hospital, we
still found ourselves with more relatives than was optimal. We did our
best to accommodate as many people as we could, and even set up a
temporary kennel in the parking garage for pets. However, this added a
great deal of complexity to our operations and was not accounted for
when calculating the amount of supplies needed.
We are paying close attention to our generators and transformers.
In the future, we will be sure to stock replacement parts for the
generators onsite, so repairs can be made in a timely manner. We are
also contemplating relocating the transformers to higher ground,
despite the presence of a floodwall.
Our data storage system has also drawn scrutiny. As noted, we have
a fully electronic medical record system. At the time Hurricane Katrina
struck, we backed up those records at a location away from our main
campus--in downtown New Orleans. Though neither location was
jeopardized, we have secured a new location to house back-up copies of
our electronic records. I cannot emphasize enough how important our
electronic records were. The system allowed us to instantaneously have
the medical records available for our displaced patients who found
their way to Baton Rouge.
We are very interested in ensuring that communication with the
appropriate authorities and our colleagues across the area is
maintained in the event of future emergencies. We weathered Hurricane
Katrina and her aftermath as well as could be hoped for at our main
facility. Because of the communication difficulties with the outside
world, we knew we had to be self-sufficient, securing our own methods
of sustaining our facilities. We were able to do this primarily because
our facility in Baton Rouge could be used as an off-site command post,
and our own communication systems remained operational. However, we
could have done much more to assist the authorities and the local
community if a fully interoperable communication system had been in
place.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the mission of every hospital in every community in
America is to provide the best care possible to people in need. At no
time is that more important than during a crisis, whether it be natural
or man-made.
Hospitals across the country are doing their best to prepare for
disasters that could strike at any moment. Many have become completely
self-sustaining, capable of withstanding the most unimaginable crisis.
But we cannot provide and help coordinate the care the community needs
if we are islands unto ourselves. Communication with local, state and
federal authorities is crucial for ensuring that hospitals can fulfill
their mission to serve the health of the community during future
disasters.
We look forward to working with this committee and staff to forge
ahead toward to a shared goal of improving the disaster preparedness of
America's hospitals and communities.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Doctor.
Thank all the witnesses for your testimony, and now we have
all the opening comments and presentations out of the way. We
want to get to the bottom line.
First, I would like to just say a couple of things.
September 11 and Katrina and Rita really shed a huge spotlight
on this interoperability question. A few months ago, right
before the break, we held a hearing on the topic of
operability. We ca not become inoperable if we are not operable
first. And so as we performed our jobs as first responders pre-
September 11 and pre-Katrina, we experienced it in our own
communities individual events that highlighted our inability to
communicate with each other.
And then we tried to handle that within our community. I
know that happened in Seattle in King Counties. Things would
happen, we could not communicate, we tried to improve the radio
system. We moved some towers, we moved some cell towers, et
cetera. We tried to work with the companies providing the
radios, and all of those things were going on in our own
individual communities.
September 11 and Katrina highlighted this as a national
problem.
Now, we need to look for leadership from the federal
government, I believe, and, as I think most of you pointed out,
from Congress in helping lead the way in setting some
standards.
Some things have happened since September 11 in the federal
government. There was recently enacted the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act, which does a number of things
that we think are good, but, boy, we have a long way to go. It
directs the secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate all
existing programs. It establishes a national approach to
achieving interoperable communications. It provides for
technical assistance. It requires the states to develop a 5-
year interoperability plan. All of those things are in the law,
but they are not happening.
And the questions we have today is, why aren't they
happening? And part of that, I think we are going to hear, is
leadership is going to play a huge role. It is the turf wars
that Ms. Linderman talked about. It is cooperation that needs
to take place and relationship-building.
Lots of money has been spent. $2 billion already allocated,
already out there in the pipeline on interoperability. $1
billion additional money has been allocated for
interoperability grants this year, and more money is even
authorized or placed in the budget, the upcoming budget that we
are going to be discussing, $29 million more for
interoperability. So things are happening in those arenas.
I would like to ask just very simply what the current state
is. We have heard some of the issues, some of the problems.
I would like to hear from Trooper Perry. In Wisconsin, what
is the current state of interoperability or the lack of
interoperability?
Mr. Perry. As every state, I am sure we share similar
problems. Currently, our state has been working with a mobile
data communications network to assist officers through writing
their reports, crash reports, electronic citations, warnings,
the gamut. With this communications tool, it is the in-car
laptop computers. They are prevalent throughout the nation. We
should be able to send a message to any other law enforcement
in our state. We ca not.
And the reason being is we have 72 counties and not all 72
counties will play together and get on one statewide system.
And it not only affects law enforcement, for instance,
electronic reporting of a crash report. If it is not done
electronically, it has to be done manually by someone else.
Electronic citations, we send them in to what we call CCAP,
Circuit Court Automated Program. That is the key; it is all
automated. By sending it electronically, clerks in the Clerk of
Court offices do not have to type the information manually from
paper citations.
The area that I live, Green Bay, and the counties that I
work, Brown, Outagamie, Winnebago and Calumet, those four
counties decided that they had a better way of doing things and
they would create their own mobile data system. So they are not
operable with the other counties, they are not operable with
all the law enforcement within those counties.
They cannot print electronic citations, electronic crash
reports, because they spent their money on getting their system
up, what powers communications for their plant form. Now they
have no money to write the software. Now they have to go back
and get more money from state and federal tax dollars so they
can write programs so they can begin the process of electronic
citations, for instance, when it was available, and it still is
available, if the political leaders would get on board and say,
``Look, it is time to play with the other communities
throughout the state.''
We also see it in communications. If it was not for the
industry private sector, often officers throughout this nation
would not have communications. Police officers, deputy sheriffs
and troopers throughout this nation are not all issued a cell
phone. I use my cell phone religiously. I carry it with me.
That is the first thing I put in my shirt pocket after putting
my protective vest. Those are the two most important things I
have each day beyond any of the other equipment I carry on the
belt.
The last car fire I was at was on a freeway. Our portable
radios are so out of date, our technicians cannot purchase
rechargeable batteries from the vendor. They actually go to
Radio Shack and build a rechargeable unit for us. Last fall,
they were behind in car swaps and putting in new equipment and
IT radios to run the mobile data communications network. They
did not have time to build those batteries, so during a 3-month
period my portable batteries would run out within 1 to 2 hours.
So with having issued two to three of them, I was out during my
shift.
Not only was officer safety compromised, but at this car
fire on the freeway where I have to shut down the highway using
city of Kaukauna police officers, Outagamie sheriffs deputies,
state troopers, I also have to call fire. It would have been
extremely embarrassing, and I know would have had the political
fallout from my own Department had I dialed 911, but that is
what I should have done and maybe I would have gotten some
action.
Instead, I had to call my dispatcher, get through her and
then ask her to call fire, ask her to continue to stay on the
line so we could coordinate getting the traffic off the freeway
and around the community so that we could take care of the
fire, put it out, have a tow truck respond, tow it off so we
could open the freeway once again.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. This is the kind of information
that we are looking for, the people that are actually out there
doing the street, and I appreciate you being here today,
Trooper.
One of the things--and what you have described is something
that is happening in the area of the country that I come from
too, so it is not a surprise to me that you described your
state of affairs the way that you did.
I am going to ask a real quick follow-up question. You
know, we changed the definition of ``first responders.'' Now it
includes all of you at the table. We know that we have to take
a broader look at that.
I am just interested to hear quickly from Dr. Pinsky and
Ms. Linderman. Are you able to include yourselves, your
associations, in the discussion with first responders, and are
you having some success in the areas of the country that you
come from in building those partnerships, including your groups
in the discussion around being interoperable?
Mr. Pinsky. I can probably answer that from a couple
different directions. Number one, we are now working much more
closely through the local hospital association, the
Metropolitan Health Council, as well as the Louisiana Hospital
Association with our fellow hospitals to be sure that we can
establish communication among ourselves.
Because we found that Katrina that we were unable to
communicate with each other. Our Internet function stayed up
because we had multiple ports. We have a very large wide area
network. The other hospitals did not have that redundancy, so
we could not communicate directly to them.
We have also had conversations now, we have had meetings
now with the local first responders to improve upon the
situation that we had. Our biggest difficulty in New Orleans
right now is that we have not recovered from Katrina yet, and
so we are still dealing with all of those issues, at the same
time trying to prepare for the new hurricane season in 3.5
months.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Ms. Linderman. As Trooper Perry talked about Wisconsin, I
was reflecting on our membership, and the situation across this
country is different in every community. Richmond has the
advantage of having the leadership within the region to, with
local tax money, implement regional communications system that
would work. But there are many communities and members in our
organization that did not have that leadership at their local
level.
So it is going to vary all over the board depending on who
is helping to make the decisions, who is pulling together the
different agencies to be able to communicate.
There are still challenges as you go up through the
government strata. In local government, there can be decisions
made that force communications among agencies, but as you get
into the state and federal level and interoperability between
those different levels of government, I think there is still a
challenge.
Certainly, APWA is trying to help our members to be more
knowledgeable and educated so that they can take a stronger
stand in their local governments or in their state governments
in order to make interoperability happen.
Mr. Reichert. And, Mr. Moroney, I did not want to ignore
you on this one, but, certainly, you have a comment. Please.
Mr. Moroney. I think that when we look at what is being
done in the market, I struck by your comments about how a
billion dollars is being spent. Ours is an industry that spends
$1 billion a year just building wireless systems, upgrading
existing wireless systems, and they are all over the block.
Because nowhere in our country is there a single place that
they can work, that they can build a wireless system that is
interoperable with other parts of the country.
In terms of your question about how is it going in terms of
working with the other communities, I think it is not going as
well as it could. In some areas, you find great models. I look
to the state of Missouri that is proposing a statewide
interoperable communications system and all emergency first
responders are included in that.
I look at the state of Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina
and one of our members, the Southern Company, had a
communications system that was used by a number of local first
responders as well. And it was a system that stayed up and
running following the hurricane.
So it is very spotty, and I think it was Trooper Perry who
said, ``You all have told the rest of government what it needs
to do, and maybe now it is time to take their allowance away or
something.''
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think it
is quite clear that we still have a problem. All of the
witnesses have, in their own words, shared their horror stories
around the problem.
What we have had is a difference on how we approach it. My
own state, Mississippi, has indicated that it will cost us $300
million to design a system statewide. So a billion dollars does
not go very far when you are investing $300 million in one
state alone. So we are talking about a significant investment.
Another one of our challenges associated with investment is
to what extent are we using the latest technology to allow the
notion of interoperability to be satisfied? My experience is
that many times the vendors are selling their products to
individual departments as the savior for what happens. So, in
essence, you are putting up towers, you are buying radios, but
you have not solved the problem of interoperability, because
you now have new equipment for the police department but what
does that do for the fire department, what does that do for the
public works department?
So the notion is to acknowledge it has to come into play at
some point to facilitate this communication.
Mr. Chairman, I think what we will have to do, taken this
testimony, is to see how we can provide the leadership, so
rather than becoming the purveyor of radios, how do we deal
with the technology so that people can communicate? And that is
a real challenge.
To what extent, and I guess Mr. Moroney, you can help me
with this piece, do you see technology providing the
breakthrough for interoperability?
Mr. Moroney. I think technology is one answer, part of the
answer. One of the problems we all face with technology is we
are all either public institutions or we are regulated
commercial companies, like utilities, in which all of our costs
get passed through the citizens. And so we are still looking at
building radio systems, interoperable or not, that are going to
last for 10 years. Technology is changing so rapidly that 6
months after we agree on a technology there is a better one out
there.
One of the things that we need to be able to look at is,
how can we better fund the adoption and use of new
technologies?
Another part of the answer is not just technology, it is
when I look at every plan that I have heard mentioned here
today about communications. When your state looks at building a
system for $300 million, they are talking about a big part of
that cost is the infrastructure necessary to support it--the
towers, the fiber back hall, the computer systems that will
manage the voice and data traffic--and it is going to be built
right alongside another set of infrastructure.
If we could look where we have seen success with shared
systems is where a whole group of emergency responders
collectively invest in building the same infrastructure, and
then the cost of providing additional handsets, the cost of
providing additional laptop computers and additional
communications becomes much more reduced when you have that
huge infrastructure cost shared by all the participants.
So it is a combination of technology. If you shared the
infrastructure and invested in adapting new technologies to
that infrastructure, we could take advantage of newer
technologies more rapidly.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you know, one of the things that I
think we have to do is mandate the cooperation and coordination
between entities. So many times we have cities who are on radio
systems and counties or parishes who are on another, and they
are somehow helping the same citizens but they ca not
communicate. And we have to break down some road barriers to
facilitate the communications.
Now, I think that is where Congress can play a significant
role by saying, ``If you agree to take the money, then you
agree to communicate and cooperate with each other in a time of
need.'' And as I see what is occurring, I see what you are
saying, but we have to provide the additional leadership to
facilitate the cooperation and communication, and that is where
I see this bipartisan legislative effort, which will get us
there hopefully, and that is why your testimony adds
significantly to what we will ultimately come up with.
I yield back.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To Trooper Perry, I want to address my question to you. In
the state of Pennsylvania where I live, we have 67 counties,
2,500 municipalities and 501 school districts. Suffice it to
say, we have turf issues, very serious turf issues, and I was
struck by your testimony where you said, ``The parent needs to
withhold its children's allowance, or in this case federal
grant money, until they learn to cooperate with each other.''
I think Ranking Member Thompson kind of alluded to those
issues, and maybe as a federal government we can play a role. I
am not so sure a mandate will help, but, certainly, withholding
money will get some people's attention.
You also mentioned we need to overcome the political issues
across jurisdictions, that states must be--the federal grant
money needs to come with strings attached. You get into the
issue, too, of states redistributing federal grant money to
county and municipal governments, must be sure that that money
is spent on compatible equipment and software when we are faced
with a statewide platform.
I would also note, too, that I recently met with my
regional counterterrorism task force in southeastern
Pennsylvania, which is Philadelphia and four surrounding
counties, a region of about 4 million people. And I was
impressed by the fact that they were largely interoperable, and
that is the question, all but for about four or five
municipalities, which in that part of the world was pretty
good. So I was pleased by that.
Then you also talked about the lack of common standards
among vendors. It continues to present difficulties for
interconnection, and your bottom-line assessment was that
federal tax dollars are not being allocated, managed or spent
efficiently.
So I guess my question to you is, knowing that we have
spent all this money on interoperability, is this really more a
problem of--is this a money problem or a coordination and
accountability problem when you get right down to it? That is
my main question.
And, finally, I think you also illustrated the problem
quite well with your disclosure requirement statement, and I am
just curious, your program was to receive $211,000 and to date
the NTC has not drawn down any of that funding. And I take that
this grant was approved in 2003. Can I ask why that money has
not been drawn down?
Mr. Perry. Yes, sir. In putting together this study, we
decided that it would be better appropriately for our
organization to create another corporation that we could serve
for research and training. And we are waiting for approval for
that final one.
Mr. Dent. So you are ready to spend the money but you can
not get an approval?
Mr. Perry. No. The money is approved. We were internally
adding another corporation to our branch of the Troopers'
Coalition so we could better serve that under education,
training, and that is why we wanted that grant money to go into
that corporation so that we could do this appropriately.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Because, again, in a state like mine, much
of our terrorism preparedness grants have not been drawn down,
for whatever reason, one of which I just met with a large fire
department in my district, municipal fire department, city of
Allentown, where they cannot draw money down, and they ca not
get purchase orders processed. That is at the state emergency
management agency so that they can draw down funds or they are
desperate, they need it right now. So I am glad to hear that is
not the case with your grant.
Could you just please address this question of, is this
really an issue of money or is it more of an issue of
accountability and coordination?
Mr. Perry. I think that it is money and accountability
coordination. More funds have to be allocated for this because
of the amount of technology that is constantly changing and
putting that infrastructure throughout the state that the users
can then operate off. But when we come into the accountability,
politics does play a role. The money from the federal
government goes to the state, and sometimes the money going
into the county or the municipality sometimes there is politics
involved here. That is where the problem comes in.
Sometimes you will have the squeaky wheel gets the grease,
so to speak, and if one region is very political and has the
ear of the person in charge of redistributing the state grant
money, that is where that money is going to go, whether it is
going to be compatible to the state's system or not.
Mr. Dent. And should we be looking at--and maybe Mr.
Moroney or somebody else could comment on this--I remember the
Philadelphia region doing a reasonably good job on
interoperability, interoperable within southeastern
Pennsylvania where also part of that region includes portions
of southern New Jersey and the state of Delaware.
And maybe we need to look at this more on a regional basis.
The same thing can be said in the New York metropolitan area:
You deal with New York and New Jersey and Connecticut.
Anybody have any thoughts on that issue?
Mr. Moroney. It would be wonderful if we could come up with
one totally interoperable, totally shareable communication
system used by all emergency responders nationwide. I think
practically anybody here at the table could tell you what it
ought to look like and what it ought to do. I have no idea how
we would get from here to there. So your suggestion that
regional approach is this is going to be a series of steps that
are taken.
But I think some of the steps are not just looking at it
from a regional point of view of where there is the political
will to do it. It is going back to providing the incentives
necessary to get it done. And maybe it is not so much
withholding the allowance, it is putting a carrot out there.
And there are a number of ideas. Our suggestion of saying
to the utility industry to allocate a certain amount of
spectrum, not spectrum that is currently being or already been
allocated to traditional public safety, is a carrot, and you
say, ``Here, if you use this spectrum to build communication
systems, you must build a system that is then shareable by all
emergency responders in an emergency or you must do this with
it. If you do not do that, you ca not have it.'' That is the
kind of a carrot that would provide an incentive, because there
is already a financial incentive for our companies to move
toward that.
And I think the same is true for kinds of incentives for
political entities to support traditional public safety.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. The Chair recognizes Ms. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this hearing.
I want to thank the panelists particularly for your
recommendations. It has not been a question that interoperable
communications is a necessity, but the recommendations are very
important, and I think that we can in this committee move in a
bipartisan way to respond to some of what we have heard here
this morning.
I want to direct my question, at least if I get more than
one out, I will move around, but first to Dr. Pinsky. And I
ought to commend Ochsner and their good work. As I was reading
the testimony last night, I was going, ``Wow, they really did a
good job,'' until I got to whatever page that was and you tried
to communicate outside. Everything was just flowing perfectly.
But I am not sure whether that was because of citywide
planning and maybe some statewide planning and exercising or in
spite of it. So I have three questions, and I am going to ask
them all at once so I can get them out.
Prior to Katrina, were you a part of the planning and the
exercising of the city's Emergency and Homeland Security
Preparedness Council or whatever it is called there?
And was there exercising with other hospitals, the public
health system and private physicians?
I would like to know from the American Hospital Association
perspective if you feel that there is enough involvement of
hospitals and public health and planning.
The electronic medical records, do you consider that an
integral part of interoperable communication when we talk about
homeland security? I am always curious also as to how much in
hospital preparedness funding did Ochsner get from the
Department?
Mr. Pinsky. Okay. I will start with the second question
first, which was in regards to the electronic medical records.
We have an electronic medical record with all of our patients'
data on that. If there was ever any question of whether
investment in electronic medical records was worth it, this
answered it.
With so many of the patients being--virtually the whole
city being displaced, a large number of those patients,
individuals ending up in the Baton Rouge area where we have
facilities, we were able to make patient information available
immediately. Or if the patient had relocated to Houston or
somewhere else, a physician in the other city could call us and
we could make available the information immediately.
It was very important, and I suppose that is another form
of interoperable--
Mrs. Christensen. I think so.
Mr. Pinsky. --communication.
As an adjunct to that, because we are an academic
institution, we have a large number of patients who were part
of clinical trials and research. In fact, many of our cancer
patients, many of our heart patients depend on these trials for
their regular care. Because of the electronic medical record in
our databases, we were able to have that data available as well
and be able to set up communications for these people to
contact us.
That is the part that many times is overlooked when we talk
about the delivery of health care.
The funding of our electronic medical records, the funding
of our own internal emergency preparedness comes from our own
budget. We, like many hospitals, have a significant number of
Medicare patients. We probably had prior to Katrina about 50
percent of our discharges in the hospital were Medicare
patients. On top of that, we have a significant amount of
Medicaid patients. And now post-Katrina, the number of
uninsured patients has quadrupled.
So when we talk about our hospital, and I think hospitals
as well, ability to fund their activities, obviously our
payment sources are critical. So every change, every tweak that
goes into the Medicare plan or goes into Medicaid plan hurts us
in terms of ability to be able to, a, keep our doors open and,
b, be able to fund these other activities.
Mrs. Christensen. Participating in the planning.
Mr. Pinsky. Prior to Katrina, even though our planning was
very intense internally, it was not integrated into the rest of
the area. We did meet with the Jefferson Parish emergency
office and had updates and had the data that they had produced
in terms of the modeling of the effects of the hurricane but
not in terms of going through a mock hurricane disaster, city
or region-wide.
I can tell you that the American Hospital Association feels
this is very important for us to be doing, and that is why I
mentioned earlier our involvement with the other hospitals,
particularly locally in terms of the city, which is the
Metropolitan Council, and then statewide is going to help
facilitate for us going forward.
Mr. Reichert. The Chair recognizes Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
Congressman Etheridge is no longer here, but I do
appreciate his reference to H.R. 1646, the so-called HERO Act,
which adds a critical dimension to this problem. And just for
the record, I want to remind our committee and our witnesses of
what this bipartisan bill has been after for the several years
since its introduction.
What it has been after is to keep the promise Congress made
10 years ago to free up analog spectrum for emergency
communications by the end of this calendar year, 2006.
The promise, as many of the promises he made, contained a
loophole. That loophole was that this would only happen if 85
percent of the broadcast channels had transitioned to digital
broadcast, and since that has not happened, the promise is not
happening.
But I think a lot of what has been discussed today could be
substantially alleviated if there were national dedicated
spectrum for emergency communications. And I think the
resistance for this idea, which comes from the broadcast
community, is enormously shortsighted, because those folks live
on the same pieces of real estate that the rest of us do, and
they, their families, their children and their uncles and aunts
and other friends are at the same place that the rest of us are
in the event of a manmade or natural disaster.
So I want to call one more time for Congress to review this
issue. It is true that we acted last year, not in this
committee but the full Congress acted, to transition analog
spectrum by February 2009. Everyone should get it that that is
3 years from now, and I do not think the next Katrina or the
next al-Qa'ida assault is going to say, ``Ooh, let's wait until
February of 2009.''
So I think we are doing the wrong thing. This subject is
not in this committee's jurisdiction, but this issue is in this
committee's jurisdiction, and on behalf of the many members of
this committee who are co-sponsoring this bipartisan
legislation, I would like to send a message out and about that
we should not back off. The broadcasters should back off.
At any rate, I do not assume I have any disagreement from
the panel, but I thought that that rant might be useful.
I want to say, Dr. Pinsky, that you performed a great
service to the communities you serve during Katrina. I think we
either should have you or a clone of you in charge of FEMA and
our national strategy. Clearly, there is a lot of room for
improvement, and you bring a learning curve that is very
valuable. So on behalf of the constituents of the 36th district
in California, I thank you for what you did.
I just want to make a general comment and get your
reactions. And that is that in addition to spectrum, the other
big pieces, at least that we can contribute, are a national
strategy, which we do not have, and standards, which this
committee is working on and can work on within our
jurisdiction.
I just want to ask you folks whether you agree with me, at
least from the federal perspective, that spectrum, strategy and
standards are the three S's at arriving at a true national
interoperability capability and that Congress should move
faster?
Ms. Linderman. I would agree that those are certainly very
important for us, but the challenge is going to be figuring
out--many communities have made investments in their systems
and how you do not throw that away with the bathwater. We have
to figure out how to make that work.
The standards, I would suggest in the development of
standards that there is a representation, certainly, from local
governments, state governments and federal governments, to make
sure that those standards can be implemented successfully.
Ms. Harman. I agree. And part of the problem is in the
vacuum localities have done whatever they could do to at least
make certain that they can talk to each other. That is not true
in every locality, and, clearly, there was a massive breakdown
in New York and at the Pentagon on 9/11. We all understand
that.
And so I salute you for your efforts. We do not want to
throw out the baby with the bathwater. On the other hand, we do
want to provide more guidance quickly so we do not have
interoperable capabilities in various parts of America that are
not interoperable with each other.
I see my light has turned red, but I am sure the chairman
will give me permission to hear from the others in response to
my question.
Mr. Reichert. Absolutely. In fact, if you have an
additional question, feel free to ask.
Mr. Bradley. I would just like to say that those are
certainly the three critical issues, and one of the most
critical to me would be that the standards are complete before
the spectrum is available. If not, there will be a lot of work
done on the spectrums by people who are interested in getting
on it immediately. It will not meet the rest of the individuals
when they come on board. So I think the standardization needs
to be done very rapidly before the spectrum is done.
Mr. Moroney. I could not agree more. I would just suggest
or remind that one of the things that I think is critical in
either the strategy or the standards is that those
interoperable systems be built in a manner that they can
survive a disaster. Terrorist attacks or hurricanes tend to
take out the power, and the best interoperable system that no
longer has power supporting it ceases to function, and
interoperability is not the issue.
And as I said in my testimony, utilities do build systems
this way, and so including them and their systems and how they
build them in a strategy we think is essential to interoperable
systems that continue to interoperate during emergencies.
Mr. Perry. I agree also on the standards. It has to be a
priority. I also want to reemphasize that not only is the big
picture the next disaster important, first responders face this
interoperability compatibility issue daily. This is where we
need immediate help is on the day-to-day activities of all the
first responders. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think these are
folks we should be consulting as we move forward on this issue.
I think their testimony was enormously valuable.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for accommodating my extra time.
Mr. Reichert. You are welcome.
Ms. Christensen, do you have additional questions?
Mrs. Christensen. I did have a question based on something
that Mr. Bradley had in his testimony regarding the
administering of the spectrum by NTIA and your concern that it
perhaps would be better under the Department of Homeland
Security.
So I wonder if you would comment on that and if anyone else
had an opinion?
Mr. Bradley. The administering of the grants is a critical
issue and dealing with the first responders I think DHS has a
better relationship, has better experience in the past in
dealing with grants or doling out grants to first responders
agencies.
There is a myriad of first responders agencies. They often
are confusing to those who have not dealt with them, the
structure, the relationships between them. And of course the
consensus or the standardization of getting all of them working
together is important, so I think we believe that DHS is the
appropriate agency to administer.
If it is not administered by DHS and is transferred or kept
in NTIA, then we think that it ought to follow the guidelines
in the SAFECOM report or the SAFECOM requirements for the
distribution of funds for communications.
Mr. Reichert. I have a couple of additional questions.
First is for Mr. Bradley. Has the fire profession,
volunteer and full-time, undertaken a national operable
communications needs assessment that you know of?
Mr. Bradley. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, other than
working through or following the guidelines of SAFECOM.
Mr. Reichert. I guess I want to take a moment here just to
kind of sum up what we have kind of heard. And I also want to
take a moment to reinforce the statement that Mr. Pascrell
made. We are going to get this done, and, as I said in my
opening statement, this is a subject that is near and dear to
my heart after 34 years of doing the job that Trooper Perry has
done for many years.
You know, we can share life and death stories about the
failure of our ability to communicate with each other, and some
are so dramatic that we wonder why. And in my own career, I
think back, why haven't we done something yet? And as I said
earlier, September 11 and Katrina pointed out the severe
weaknesses in our ability to communicate across this country.
There are a few things I think that are key in our success
as we move forward, and today what we want to ensure is that we
continue to have dialogue with all of the people here this
morning who have testified.
You are the experts in the field. You are the ones using
the systems or not using systems that are not available right
now and see the weaknesses. We need to know about those. We
want to keep in touch with you.
But some of the things that I have heard today really are
leadership management. It is about accountability, and I like
to kind of equate that to really having some performance
measures in place so that when money is allocated and the
people do start to build a program, to build an interoperable
system or first an operable system, that much like COPS office
operates, and I know because I have over my years had a great
partnership with the COPS office. They have a system of
accountability and performance measures already in place that I
hope the Department of Homeland Security would view as one that
they may be able to adopt.
The most important thing I think that needs to happen here,
and I think I have heard it from all the witnesses and from the
members of our committee, is that there is no priority higher
right now in the protection of our country and our ability to
respond to emergencies, both natural and manmade and
interoperability. And right now this administration and the
Department of Homeland Security has not made interoperability a
high priority, and we intend to change that.
And this committee, as you can see, this is not a partisan
issue, this is an issue that we all come together on. So we are
with you, and we are going to make this happen.
I want to thank you all for your testimony, and our
committee hearing stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
THE STATE OF INTEROPERABLE
COMMUNICATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
PART II
----------
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Reichert
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Reichert, Dicks, Harman, Lowey,
Norton, Etheridge, and DeFazio.
Mr. Reichert. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and
Technology will come to order.
The subcommittee will hear testimony today from state and
local governments on the state of interoperable communication.
I would first like to welcome our witnesses and thank them
for being here today, and thank you for taking time from your
busy schedules.
And before we get into opening statements, Mr. DeFazio from
Oregon has asked unanimous consent to introduce the Honorable
mayor from Beaverton.
Mr. DeFazio?
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for allowing
me to move ahead.
This is an issue of tremendous concern for me, and I know
the committee will do a good job today. Unfortunately, we also
have a hearing on a critical regional issue, our Bonneville
Power Administration, which I have to go to.
But I was particularly anxious to introduce Mayor Drake,
the mayor of Beaverton, Oregon, today, because not only has he
been a great mayor for that city for more than a decade now--
Rob, we have been doing this for a long time--but he has
extraordinary expertise in public safety issues. And he will be
a great witness to represent the local perspective on the need
for interoperability and what the federal government can do
better to partners.
Chair of the regional emergency management group since
1993, he is a member of the Public Safety and Crime Prevention
Steering Committee with the National League of Cities, and he
represents National League of Cities on the Department of
Homeland Security's Project SAFECOM Executive Committee.
So I think that his input, and I know the other witnesses,
will be extraordinarily valuable.
And, again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that
today's hearing marks further progress on interoperability,
which we need so critically.
Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Let me welcome you again, and on behalf of the members of
the subcommittee, we are glad that you are here to share your
experience and knowledge with us. Your leadership in trying to
solve the problem of emergency communications in your
perspective jurisdictions distinguishes you, and we look
forward to hearing from you today.
The purpose of this hearing's second series on
interoperability is to understand the state of public safety
interoperable communication from the perspective of state and
local governments. Public safety interoperability begins with
you, our state and local partners.
You own the majority of our nation's public safety
communication systems. Your fellow citizens must live with the
consequences of your successes or failures. And you are in the
trenches day in and day out trying to solve this problem. That
is why your perspective is so valuable to us.
Public safety is among the most basic and critical of the
services coordinated, regulated and funded by state and local
governments. Yet when our nation's first responders lack the
ability to relay mission-critical information to each other on
demand and in real time, everyone's safety may be needlessly
compromised.
Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions, public safety
agencies still operate and maintain largely independent
emergency communication systems. Such stovepipe communication
systems generally lack the capacity to support interoperability
with the surrounding federal, state and local agencies. But
interoperability, by definition, requires coordination among
and partnership between all levels of government.
It is clear that the problem of public safety
communications cannot be solved by any one jurisdiction alone.
That is precisely why federal, state and local officials have
begun to establish state interoperability executive committees
and regional interoperability committees, councils and/or
workshops.
Such high-level coordinating and rulemaking bodies play a
vital role in helping state and local officials improve public
safety communications. And they provide badly needed venues for
planning, policy development and fostering interagency
relationships.
In mid-February, this subcommittee received testimony on
interoperable communication from first responders. From each
and every witness we heard the same thing. We heard about the
need for consistent leadership, not for billions of dollars in
additional funding, but for policy makers and government to
simply work together.
The members of this subcommittee have heard that message
loud and clear, and as its chairman and a cop of over 33 years,
I intend to make sure that Congress does its part to help
federal, state and local officials implement a unified approach
to the problem of emergency communications.
I want to thank the witnesses again for their testimony.
And the Chair will now recognize--would recognize my friend
from New Jersey, but he is not here, tied up on other business.
I will recognize Ms. Harman from California.
I would like to acknowledge the bipartisan spirit of this
subcommittee. Today's hearing marks the first time that any
subcommittee of the Committee of Homeland Security has
distributed to members a bipartisan briefing memo drafted
jointly by both staffs. It is an important precedent that I
would like to continue in the future with Mr. Pascrell's
consent, of course, and assistance.
And I know we often talk about working together, but I hope
that this sets an example and shows my intention to work
cooperatively on issues of national importance. Quite frankly,
how can we expect state and local governments and emergency
providers and others to work together to solve the problem of
interoperability if we do not practice what we preach?
I look forward to continuing to work on a bipartisan basis
with my colleagues and so now yield to Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I applaud the remarks
that you just made. I often say that the terrorists are not
going to check our party registration before they blow us up.
And so it is absolutely imperative that we work together to fix
at the federal level what I think are two huge gaps in our
homeland security. One is, the lack of a national integrated
strategy. We are doing better but we have a long way to go.
And the second is, the lack of true interoperability. I see
these witnesses nodding and I see our colleagues nodding. The
folks in this room, on this committee, have been dedicated to
fixing this problem for a long time, and we have not, at our
level, gotten very far.
So that is why I want to congratulate the dedicated public
servants in front of us who are doing everything they can at
the local level to make certain that when they have both
natural and manmade disasters, they have the ability to talk to
each other.
Just speaking for my region of California, the largest
county in the United States, Los Angeles County, my local first
responders and law enforcement personnel have figured out some
bridging technologies that give them the ability to drive a
flatbed to the site of a problem, and on that flatbed are a
series of ACU-1000s, which are a device to grade a number of
frequencies.
Now, that is great if the flatbed can get there. But in the
case of a fire where the roads are out and the heat is too
high, I mean, we still literally have people having to drive
around the entire fire, swap radios and so forth, and we are
are obviously in a dreadful mess in those situations.
So I do not think we need another Katrina or a catastrophic
terrorist attack to tell us how serious this problem is. I
think what we need is more action at this level.
Some of you, I assume all of you, know that I have
coauthored the HERO Act with Congressman Weldon, who is another
member of this committee, which would require that Congress
keep its promise for dedicated spectrum by the end of this
year. Sadly, HERO has not become law. The promise Congress is
now making is to move that date to sometime in 2009. I think
that is inadequate. But the good news is what you are all doing
and also the fact that there are new technologies out there--I
just heard about one--that may be able to get this job done
without the need for dedicated spectrum. And if that pans out,
we may be able to solve this problem faster.
Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the
Homeland Security Department itself, sadly, is no longer
funding the COPS Interoperability Grants Program on the
grounds--or the government is not, on the grounds that the
program is redundant with what Homeland Security is doing. But
Homeland Security does not have a dedicated Interoperability
Grant Program. So that is unsatisfactory.
And I think if there is a short-term future, we are going
to hear it from our witnesses, and I just want you to know that
on a bipartisan basis the members of this committee want to
help you achieve something in our national interest.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Ms. Harman.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record, and we are pleased
to have with us today a distinguished panel of witnesses.
The first is the Honorable Rob Drake, mayor of the city of
Beaverton, Oregon, and member of the National League of Cities,
Public Safety and Crime Prevention Steering Committee. Next is
the Honorable Gino Menchini, commissioner of the New York City
Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications.
And Chief Charles Werner, fire chief of the city of
Charlottesville, Virginia, and member of the Virginia Statewide
Interoperability Executive Committee. And Mr. Steve Proctor,
executive director of the Utah Communications Agency, former
national president of the Association of Public Safety
Communications.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statement will appear in the record. We ask that due to the
number of witnesses on our panel today, that you strive to
limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
And the Chair now recognizes the Honorable Mayor Rob Drake.
STATEMENT OF ROB DRAKE, MAYOR OF BEAVERTON, OREGON, MEMBER, AND
CRIME PREVENTION STEERING COMMITTEE, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES
Mr. Drake. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Pascrell and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. My name is Rob Drake, and I am the mayor of the
city of Beaverton, Oregon.
Today, I am testifying on behalf of the National League of
Cities where I serve as a member of the Public Safety and Crime
Prevention Steering Committee. I also represent NLC on the
Department of Homeland Security's Project SAFECOM Executive
Committee.
Interestingly, today marks the third anniversary of
Department of Homeland Services, and NLC's wish is for the
Department to make greater strides on interoperability. For
many communities and regions around the country, the challenge
of interoperable communications represents an immediate threat
to the viability of their public safety operations.
In my hometown of Beaverton, which is part of the greater
Portland metropolitan area, we approach interoperable
communications from a regional perspective because public
safety is an issue that does not respect political or
geographic boundaries.
I have served as chair of the Portland Area Regional
Emergency Management Group, REMG, since 1993. REMG is the
vehicle by which the public and private sectors in the
Portland-Vancouver region work together to organize, plan and
define regional needs and develop common policies and
procedures to follow in the event of a disaster. The group is
dedicated to providing a long-term model for regional
coordination and planning, driven by operational necessity, not
by financial incentives.
This is a voluntary group, formed through intergovernmental
agreements between special districts, city, county and regional
agencies in the five-county, bi-state, Portland-Vancouver
metropolitan area. It includes the American Red Cross and
steady participation from utility providers and local and
global businesses.
Some key initiatives for REMG include identification and
publication of regional emergency transportation routes;
development of the greater Portland-Vancouver area emergency
alert system, EAS Operation Plan, in coordination with
broadcasters across the region; development of a regional
disaster debris management plan in cooperation with Metro,
Portland's regional government and local solid waste program
managers; voluntary agreement between local governments to
address emergency management issues for the benefit of the
entire region, regardless of resources or participation in the
group; staff deployment from participating agencies without
compensation to work with the regional partners; and, finally,
involvement of policy-level representatives from each signatory
agency who provides structure to the group and assists in
developing sound policies and procedures for use in disaster
situations.
REMG works effectively because its signatories agencies
believe in the value of a regional plan, which ensures the
integration of all individual plans under the umbrella of one
common plan.
There are many advantages to coordinated emergency
response. First, it develops proactive relationships between
likely co-responders. Second, it brings together from across
our region a collective knowledge for the benefit of the entire
region.
Third, it reduces duplicate efforts, which helps identify
and allocate finite resources, maximizes resource utilization
and ensures communication of a consistent message to our
public. Congress should support mechanisms that encourage
coordinated planning on a regional level.
The challenge of integrating levels of service provision is
daunting. I have helped guide regional cooperation among local
officials for the last 13 years. It has taken very hard work
and commitment to keep this on track.
I would recommend the following to strengthen the federal
role on interoperable communications.
One, elevate the visibility of Project SAFECOM. Project
SAFECOM at Department of Homeland Security is a great example
of a federal agency incorporating the input of local
governments to improve interoperable communication plans and
guidelines. Elevate the visibility of Project SAFECOM and its
mission, because interoperable communication influence hometown
security directly.
Two, build on the spine of existing communication networks.
The federal government should design programs that benefit
first responders at the local level but within a national
scheme. Build on the spine of communication networks that
promote enhanced public safety and disaster response
capabilities across multiple jurisdictions.
Three, funding flexibility. NLC urges Congress to allow
more flexibility in the use of federal public safety funds for
upgrade technology communication systems and training. The
federal government should provide funding directly to local
governments for homeland security, emergency preparedness and
response because we are the initial focal point of all disaster
mitigation and recovery activities.
The fourth point, federal government should commit to date
certain for return of analog spectrum. While NLC acknowledges
the political challenges that led to a date certain return of
analog spectrum by February of 2009, NLC reminds Congress that
more lives than necessary may be lost between now and then
because of the lack of spectrum. NLC urges Congress to lead
efforts to accelerate, if possible, efforts to resolve
interoperability problems that affect emergency communications
and data systems throughout the nation. No one should lose his
or her life because public safety officials cannot communicate
with another.
Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Drake follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert Drake
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
Good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. My name is Rob Drake and I
am Mayor of the City of Beaverton, Oregon. I have served as mayor since
1993. We are a city of 83,500 citizens and touch Portland on its west
side. I am testifying today on behalf of the National League of Cities
(``NLC''), where I serve as a member of its Public Safety and Crime
Prevention Steering Committee. I also represent NLC on the Department
of Homeland Security's Project SAFECOM Executive Committee.
NLC is the country's largest and oldest organization serving
municipal government, with more than 1,800 direct member cities and 49
state municipal leagues, which collectively represents more than 18,000
United States communities. Its mission is to strengthen and promote
cities as centers of opportunity, leadership, and governance, and to
serve as a national resource and advocate for the municipal governments
it represents.
NLC appreciates the opportunity to present a municipal perspective
on the state of interoperable communications. Let me begin with a brief
summary of NLC's initial recommendations to Congress:
(1) Elevate the visibility of the SAFECOM program for
interoperable communications within the Department of Homeland
Security.
(2) Build on the ``spine'' of existing communications networks
to promote enhanced regional public safety and disaster
response capabilities.
(3) Provide state and local governments with federal funding
flexibility.
(4) Accelerate efforts necessary to implement the ``date
certain'' return of analog spectrum required to improve public
safety communications.
These recommendations represent a starting point for action. Action
is necessary now because no one knows when or where the next natural or
man-made crisis may strike that demands a rapid response and seamless
communications among and between first responders and others engaged in
public safety. For many communities and regions across the country, the
challenge of interoperable communications represents an immediate
threat to the viability of their public safety operations.
In my hometown of Beaverton, which is part of the greater Portland
metropolitan area, we approach interoperable public safety
communications from a regional perspective because public safety is an
issue that does not respect artificial political or geographic
boundaries.
I. Interoperability in Beaverton, Oregon
I have served as Chair of the Portland-area Regional Emergency
Management Group (REMG) since 1993. This is a voluntary group formed
through intergovernmental agreement between special districts, city,
county and regional agencies in the five-county, bi-state Portland/
Vancouver Metropolitan area. It includes the American Red Cross and
steady participation from utility providers and local and global
businesses such as Portland General Electric, Northwest Natural Gas,
Bonneville Power Administration, PacifiCorp, and Intel.
Subsequent to the formation of REMG, the Department of Homeland
Security Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) designated the Portland/
Vancouver Metropolitan area as one of the key regions nationwide at
risk from potential disasters--natural or man-made. The UASI funds
provide resources for the equipment, planning, and training needs of
these designated regions.
REMG is the vehicle by which the public and private sectors in the
Portland/Vancouver region work together to organize, plan and define
regional needs and develop common policies and procedures to follow in
the event of a disaster. The group is dedicated to providing a long-
term model for regional coordination and planning driven by operational
necessity, not by financial incentives. The REMG consists of two
committees:
Technical Committee (REMTEC)--Comprised of emergency
management professionals from the signatory agencies.
Policy Advisory Committee (REMPAC)--Comprised of
elected officials from all the signatory agencies.
The key initiatives for REMG include:
Identification and publication of regional emergency
transportation routes in cooperation with transportation
officials from the region.
Development of the Great Portland/Vancouver Area
Emergency Alert System (EAS) Operation Plan in coordination
with broadcasters across the region.
Development of a regional disaster debris management
plan in cooperation with ``Metro,'' Portland's regional
government, and local solid waste program managers.
Voluntary agreement between local governments to
address emergency management issues for the benefit of the
entire region, regardless of resources or participation in the
group.
Staff deployment from participating agencies, without
compensation, to work with the regional partners for the
benefit of the entire region.
Involvement of policy level representatives from each
signatory agency who provide structure to the group and assist
in developing sound policies and procedures for use in disaster
situations.
Emphasis on policy level coordination, resource
management, and joint training and information management.
REMG works effectively because its signatory agencies believe in
the value of a regional plan. A separate functional policy level allows
technical experts such as emergency management professionals to focus
solely on achievements at the field level. These officials also provide
accountability and oversight for the group. REMG provides a place for
business, government, and disaster relief organizations to have a voice
and collaborate in disaster planning. REMG does face challenges
including its ineligibility to receive federal grant funding directly,
and its lack of statutory authority. However, a regional plan ensures
the integration of all individual plans within a common plan.
There are many advantages to coordinated emergency response. First,
it develops proactive partnerships between likely co-responders. A
diverse group of partners provides the opportunity to capitalize on the
strengths of each for policies and procedures, knowledge and funding.
Second, it brings together from across our region a collective
knowledge for the benefit of the entire region. This is more powerful
than each entity working alone and in competition for available
resources. Third, it reduces duplicate efforts, helps identify and
allocate finite resources, maximizes resource utilization, and ensures
communication of a consistent message to the public.
As stated in ``A Failure of Initiative,'' a final report of the
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina:
``The failure of initiative was also a failure of agility. Response
plans at all levels of government lacked flexibility and adaptability.
Inflexible procedure often delayed response. Officials at all levels
seemed to be waiting for the disaster that fit their plans, rather than
planning and building scalable capacities to meet whatever Mother
Nature threw at them.'' Executive Summary at 2 (February 15, 2006).
While direct funding for local projects helps day-to-day, mission-
critical capabilities for any given agency, it does not always
guarantee a benefit or ensure coordination when major incidents like
large weather disasters or an earthquake involving multiple
jurisdictions and disciplines strike. To remedy this situation,
Congress should support mechanisms that encourage, streamline and
improve coordinated planning on a regional level. There is a need to
transcend traditional barriers associated with jurisdictional
boundaries or ``turf issues.''
For instance, regional jurisdictions and disciplines must train
together on the plans within the Incident Command System (ICS)
environment. Our nation needs a multi-jurisdictional, multi-
disciplinary approach to public safety planning inclusive of all levels
of government and parties affected--urban and rural. The challenge for
our national emergency preparedness system is to integrate local,
state, and federal government resources and ensure that federal money
provides incentives to develop integrated systems.
II. NLC Position on Interoperability
Since 1995, NLC has been a national leader in support of clearing
radio spectrum for public safety use. This was the year when domestic
terrorists bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma. In the intervening years, our nation has experienced
dramatic natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and
terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Centers. NLC's policy
states that ``[t]he federal government must allocate sufficient
telecommunications spectrum to cities for public safety use in order to
enhance inter-operable communications among public safety and service
agencies, and to ensure the ability of local governments to meet their
responsibilities for public safety and emergency services. ational
Municipal Policy at Sec. 7.04 A. (2006).
Last December 2005, NLC adopted a resolution during its annual
governance meeting that re-affirmed its long-standing position that
interference-free broadcast spectrum and reliable and interoperable
wireless communications are essential to the public safety role of
local officials. NLC Resolution #2006-46. The resolution expresses that
``past federal public safety frequencies and channels have been
scattered and inadequate, resulting in a fragmented public safety
spectrum.'' Id. The federal government ``must lead the efforts to
resolve interoperability problems that affect emergency communications
and data systems throughout the nation.'' Id.
Since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, NLC worked to ensure that
city leaders have the resources and the best possible capabilities to
prevent serious attacks in their communities and to respond when a
catastrophic event occurs. In 1997, NLC coordinated with key Senate
leaders and then-U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno to obtain new
wireless telecommunications capacity exclusively for state and local
public safety use. In addition, NLC supported a requirement in the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that the FCC reallocate 24 megahertz of
spectrum in the upper portion of the 700 MHz band (channels 60-69) for
public safety use.
In 1998, NLC co-authored with the Department of Justice a guidebook
entitled, Public Safety and Radio Spectrum Guide, to help city leaders
enhance their public safety communications capacity. The following
year, NLC spotlighted the need for vigilant legislative and regulatory
action to clear the radio spectrum for public safety communication
needs. Oklahoma City Councilwoman Ann Simank, a member of NLC's Public
Safety and Crime Prevention Steering Committee, described the chaotic
scene of the bombing site in testimony before the House Government
Reform Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency
Management:
``That morning we learned first-hand the extreme importance of
interoperable voice communications. Under the best of circumstances,
when terrorism or natural disasters strike, you are working in chaos.
But when you can't communicate, your hands are tied.''
Two years later, the events of September 11, 2001, and the
shortcomings of public safety communication systems that day served as
a deadly reminder of Councilwoman Simank's testimony. Our first
responders must have timely information and resources to lead the way
in emergency response. Unfortunately, because emergency responders do
not share common broadcast frequencies, lives are at risk. The 9/11
Commission's Final Report specifically stated that the inability of
these first responders to talk with each other and their commanders
resulted in loss of life that day. The 9/11 Commission identified the
need for more spectrum as crucial to assist police, firefighters, and
emergency responders in communicating during an emergency such as a
terrorist attack or a hurricane.
The radio spectrum is a finite, non-renewable natural resource
owned by the people and managed by its elected officials. Having the
capability to transmit vital information to different emergency
response personnel among all levels of government without interference
and delay is key to disaster preparedness and emergency response. Only
the federal government can remedy the current availability shortage of
broadcast spectrum for public safety needs across the nation.
III. Recommendations to Congress to Improve InteroperabilitySec. Sec.
Whether at the local, county, regional, state, or federal level, as
elected officials we have one common link. We generally represent the
same constituents and they remind us of shortfalls when large disasters
such as Hurricane Katrina befall us.
The challenge of integrating levels of service provision is
daunting. I have helped guide regional cooperation among local
officials for the last 13 years and it has taken skill and commitment
to keep us on task. We began the REMG in 1993, but our work became even
more focused after a major windstorm hit the Portland/Vancouver area in
late 1995. Our collective response was weak with poor communication and
cooperation between agencies and the utility providers. In post-event
evaluations, we recognized that we failed in many ways and committed to
improving communication, response and planning. All of this happened
long before the tragic events of 9/11. We seek partnership and
financial assistance from Congress to implement local and regional
plans. Moving beyond our own boundaries to a collective response is
desirable, but funding becomes the big obstacle at each turn.
I would recommend the following to strengthen the federal role in
interoperable communications:
(1) Elevate the Visibility of Project SAFECOM.
NLC policy calls for the federal government to establish a
comprehensive spectrum management master plan that includes input from
all stakeholders, including local government. National Municipal Policy
at Sec. 7.04 C. Project SAFECOM at the Department of Homeland Security
is a great example of a federal agency incorporating the input of local
governments to improve interoperable communications plans and
guidelines. Elevate the visibility of Project SAFECOM and its mission
because interoperable communications capacity influences hometown
security directly.
While we have built a functional and interoperable radio
communication system in the Portland/Vancouver area, this is not the
case on a national basis. The federal government should encourage
regional planning for public safety communication needs and address the
current shortage of spectrum channels with a long-term plan that
ensures available broadcast channels to meet future public safety needs
across the nation. If federal reallocation of radio spectrum forces a
municipality to change radio frequencies, channels, or both to preserve
its public safety and emergency communications services, then in
consideration there should be prompt and fair compensation paid for
transfer costs, such as new equipment and additional personnel and
training.
(2) Build on the ``spine'' of existing communications networks.
NLC recommends that Congress encourage states to facilitate local
and regional interoperable communications efforts that build on the
``spine'' of communications networks that promote enhanced public
safety and disaster response capabilities across multiple jurisdictions
and areas. The federal government should design programs that benefit
first responders at the local level, but within a national scheme.
Congress should support the construction and maintenance of emergency
preparedness plans and communications infrastructure systems that
operate not only within the internal system for day-to-day mission-
critical tasks, but are also ``interoperable'' between disciplines when
major emergencies escalate.
Related, the federal government should commit to link all emergency
warning systems and supply all areas with appropriate equipment so that
we leave no area unprotected. National Municipal Policy at Sec. 6.02
E.2. (2006). Emergency alert systems should be used to ensure that any
emergency declared by the President, homeland security, or through
National Weather Services alerts are timely and accurate and provide
direction on recommended protective measures local governments should
take when the threat level is increased. Reimbursements to local
governments for any costs associated with heightened alerts are
necessary.
NLC urges the federal government to ensure that all areas of the
country have access to modernized 911 technologies for emergency use.
Currently, cities and towns that do not have timely emergency response
services usually have not implemented a 911 system or their systems are
antiquated. NLC also urges the federal government, in particular the
Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission, to
continue its efforts to improve the wireless 911 or E-911 services by
working in partnership with state and local land use authorities,
public safety officials, and the telecommunications industry. In
addition, the telecommunications industry must fully develop and fund
wireless emergency locater services, tracking systems, and lead efforts
to resolve interoperability problems that affect emergency
communications systems throughout the nation. These efforts must
continue to respect the premise of local autonomy, avoid burdensome
mandates, and reflect the need for greater funding in underserved
jurisdictions.
The federal government must also involve cities as it develops
standards for the delivery of emergency information on cable systems.
National Municipal Policy at Sec. 7.04 A. (2006).
(3) Funding Flexibility.Sec.
NLC urges Congress to allow more flexibility in the use of federal
public safety funds for upgraded technology communication systems and
training. Many municipalities face great difficulty in purchasing
necessary public safety equipment because of budget constraints or
their inability to qualify for available funds. New duties placed on
law enforcement related to homeland security have shrunk budgets
further. NLC urges the federal government to assist all municipalities
in advancing their public safety capabilities without imposing
inflexible compliance guidelines.
Local governments are the first level of government to respond to
most disasters and emergencies. The federal government should provide
funding directly to local governments for homeland security, emergency
preparedness, and response because we are the initial focal point of
all disaster mitigation and recovery activities. The structure of
federal and state technical and financial assistance should allow local
officials maximum flexibility in meeting identified needs. Regarding
the homeland security funding formula, NLC supports the federal
government continuing to fund risk-based threats in highly populated
and high-threat areas. NLC also supports a minimum level of funding for
state grants sufficient to allow jurisdictions to prepare for possible
terrorist-based threats, with flexibility to use the funds for dual-use
(risk and all-hazards) pursuant to their state homeland security plans.
National Municipal Policy at Sec. 6.03 A. (2006).
(4) Federal Commitment to ``Date Certain'' for Return of Analog
Spectrum.
While NLC acknowledges the political challenges that led to a
``date certain'' return of analog spectrum by February 19, 2009, NLC
reminds Congress that more lives than necessary may be lost between now
and then because of a lack of spectrum. No one should lose his or her
life because public safety officials cannot communicate with one
another. NLC urges Congress to lead the efforts to accelerate, if
possible, efforts to resolve interoperability problems that affect
emergency communications and data systems throughout the nation.
Reliable and interoperable wireless communications are essential to
public safety's mission to protect life and property.
* * *
Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of
municipalities on the important work of building interoperable
communications networks.
ATTACHMENT ONE
NLC RESOLUTION #2006-46
IN SUPPORT OF INTEROPERABLE PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND FUNDING
WHEREAS, interference-free broadcast spectrum and reliable and
interoperable wireless communications are essential to the public
safety role of local officials;
WHEREAS, the federal government has a responsibility in providing
adequate telecommunications spectrum to enhance interoperable
communications among public safety and emergency services;
WHEREAS, past federal public safety frequencies and channels have been
scattered and inadequate, resulting in a fragmented public safety
spectrum;
WHEREAS, the federal government must provide funding to purchase the
necessary equipment and training; and
WHEREAS, federal funding of interoperable public safety equipment
continues not to meet the new needs and requirements of the post
September 11th environment.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the federal government must lead
the efforts to resolve interoperability problems that affect emergency
communications and data systems throughout the nation;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the federal government must remedy the
current shortage of broadcast spectrum availability for public safety
needs across the nation;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the federal government must provide
adequate funding for interoperable equipment to better facilitate
coordinated and effective emergency response in cites and across
jurisdictions; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the National League of Cities (NLC) insist
that Congress adhere to the December 31, 2006 compliance date for
vacation of television channels currently blocking radio spectrum
required for public safety radio communications systems.Sec.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mayor Drake.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Menchini.
STATEMENT OF HON. OGINO MENCHINI, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, NEW YORK CITY
Mr. Menchini. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Good afternoon. My name is Gino Menchini. I am getting over
a cold, so please bear with my voice. But I am commissioner of
the New York City Department of Information Technology and
Telecommunications, and the city's chief information officer.
Accompanying me today is Inspector Charles Dowd, commanding
officer of the New York City Police Department's Communications
Division.
I am privileged to have the opportunity to testify before
you today about public safety communications in the city of New
York, to describe the interoperable systems we have put into
place and to outline the city's future needs.
Allow me to begin by saying that one of the primary
challenges in designing interoperable radio systems is
anticipating the many different circumstances in which
interoperable communications will be required. This type of
contingency planning is fundamental because, contrary to
popular belief, interoperability cannot be achieved by simply
putting thousands of emergency responders onto the same radio
channel.
I see you are nodding because I think Los Angeles has a
similar situation that New York City does.
The shortcomings of such an approach mirror limitations
associated with telecom voice traffic, generally. For example,
just as it would create havoc to have thousands of participants
on a single telephone conference bridge, so too would essential
radio communications become jumbled and lost, with too many
responders talking at the same time, on the same channel.
To do their jobs effectively and safely emergency
responders must have specific channels dedicated to those
personnel participating in particular operations. These
personnel must not be required to contend with the traffic of
other users communicating about something other than the
mission at hand.
Some believe that an alternative means of achieving
interoperability would be for responders to scan through their
radio channels in search of information that might be useful to
them. This approach overlooks the fact that emergency
responders generally must remain on their primary incident
radio channel or else risk losing critical messages related to
command, control and coordination.
As I said, achieving interoperability solutions really does
depend on our ability to specifically anticipate the types of
situations in which interoperable communications will be
required. Since September 11, the city has focused on defining
these interoperability requirements and on tailoring
interoperability initiatives to address them.
In regard to first responder interoperability, the city has
made the determination that the optimal approach is to bring
all users onto a common UHF frequency band so that
interoperability can be achieved among police officers,
firefighters and emergency medical technicians when the
circumstances dictate that particular users from these forces
must communicate with each other.
In this regard, in 2004, the FCC permanently allocated TV
broadcast channel 16 for the use of public safety
communications by multiple New York City agencies, including
the police departments and fire departments, emergency medical
services and the Office of Emergency Management, as well as
neighboring counties. The channel 16 frequency band is used in
various situations that require interoperable communications.
These range from on-scene mission-specific interoperable
communications between walkie-talkies, to communications on a
borough or citywide basis among officials from different
agencies, to communications on a regional basis.
In regard to secondary responder interoperability, I want
to outline how we have addressed these requirements for
interoperable communications during major incidents. The city
has implemented specialized talk groups on our citywide 800 MHz
system for 56 state, city and regional agencies; 78 hospitals
and healthcare facilities; and the commissioners of 44 city
agencies.
For multi-jurisdictional interoperability, in the aftermath
of September 11, the city has established a regional
Interoperability Communications Committee, known as the ICC.
The ICC meets regularly to evaluate the current state of
interoperable communications and to develop strategies for
improving interoperability.
Finally, the city has deployed several TRP-1000 radio
interoperability systems to provide interoperability during
incidents that require communications among city, state,
regional and federal organizations using different radios and
different frequency types. The ICC has established protocols
for the deployment of TRP-1000s to support the tactical
communications of these multijurisdictional agencies at a
scene.
I should emphasize that achieving interoperability is an
ongoing process, rather than an end state that we can never
perfectly achieve that interoperability, and it must be dynamic
and meet the changing requirements and changing needs of our
first responders.
Obtaining adequate funding is, however, critical for these
endeavors. I will describe briefly some of the interoperability
projects the city is currently pursuing.
For tactical interoperability communications plan, the city
is in the process of finalizing its tactical interoperability
communications plan, which will be submitted to the Department
of Homeland Security by May 1. This plan will document what
interoperable communications resources are available within our
urban area and who controls each resource, as well as the rules
and operational procedures for the appropriate use of each
interoperable resource.
The creation of this plan is a requirement of the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Grants and Training
2005 Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program. The city is
fully compliant with the Department's requirements.
I am going to go over my time here, if that is okay. Is it?
Thanks. I hope this is of value. And as a New Yorker, I can
speak much quicker, but you may not be able to understand it.
On the implementation of 700 MHz, the city certainly
appreciates the establishment of a firm date for transfer of
the 700 MHz spectrum, as well as the congressional allocation
of $1 billion for interoperability contained in the budget
reconciliation bill recently signed by the President. Clearly,
however, $1 billion when dispersed throughout the nation is not
sufficient to fund optimal use of the 700 MHz system, and we
would urge you to consider expanding funding for this
initiative.
As you know, this spectrum was allocated to public safety
with three main objectives: One, to provide much needed
additional public safety voice channels, and, two, to improve
regional Interoperability, as well as allow for transmission of
wideband data.
In regards to wideband data, the city is moving
aggressively to deploy a state-of-the-art interoperable
citywide mobile broadband data network, which will provide
emergency responders with data access to large files, including
maps, building layouts and massive federal and state anti-crime
and anti-terrorism databases, as well as mug shots of
terrorists and be able to have video-on-demand coming to and
from scenes. These networks will provide for downloads of full-
motion video at emergency scenes and continuous biological,
chemical, nuclear and radiological monitoring.
The transmission capability of this network will be the
first of its kind and will literally transform the way in which
officials respond to emergencies. Given the substantial public
safety and national security components of the project, the
city is pursuing federal funding to offset its costs, which
will be several hundred million dollars.
With regard to funding, I would like to recommend that
Congress consider establishing funds specifically for local
governments. Ultimately, local governments are in the best
position to determine their public safety needs and establish
local first responder programs that can provide for
interoperability based on the specific needs of the given area.
I would also like to emphasize that some of the key
criteria that should be applied in the allocation of funds
should be level of risk, population concentration and
consequences associated with damage to critical economic and
physical infrastructure.
Let me close by thanking you again for the opportunity to
provide you with the overview of what the city has been doing
to improve interoperability and our funding needs for these
endeavors. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you
may have.
[The statement of Mr. Menchini follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gino P. Menchini
Wednesday, March 1,2006
Good afternoon. I am Gino Menchini, Commissioner of New York City's
Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications, and the
City's Chief Information Officer. Accompanying me today is Inspector
Charles Dowd, Commanding Officer of the New York City Police
Department's Communications Division. I am privileged to have the
opportunity to testify before you today about public safety
communications in the City of New York; to describe the interoperable
systems we have put into place; and to outline the City's future needs.
Allow me to begin by saying that one of the primary challenges in
designing interoperable radio systems is anticipating the many
different circumstances in which interoperable communications will be
required. However, this type of contingency planning is fundamental
because, contrary to popular belief, interoperability cannot be
achieved by simply putting thousands of emergency responders onto the
same radio channel.
The shortcomings of such an approach mirror limitations associated
with telecom voice traffic, generally. For example, just as it would
create havoc to have thousands of participants on a single telephone
conference bridge, so too would essential radio communications become
jumbled and lost, with too many responders talking at the same time, on
the same channel.
To do their jobs effectively--and safely--emergency responders must
have specific channels dedicated to those personnel participating in
particular operations. These personnel must not be required to contend
with the traffic of other users communicating about something other
than the mission at hand.
Some believe that an alternative means of achieving
interoperability would be for responders to scan through their radio
channels in search of information that might be useful to them. This
approach overlooks the fact that emergency responders generally must
remain on their primary incident radio channel, or else risk losing
critical messages related to command, control, and coordination.
As I said, achieving interoperability solutions really does depend
on our ability to specifically anticipate the types of situations in
which interoperable communications will be required. Since 9/11, the
City has focused on defining these ``interoperability requirements,''
and on tailoring interoperability initiatives to address them.
First Responder Interoperability
With respect to first responders, the City has made the
determination that the optimal approach is to bring all users onto a
common UHF frequency band; so that interoperability can be achieved
among police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians
when the circumstances dictate that particular users from those forces
must communicate with each other.
In this regard, in 2004, the FCC permanently allocated TV broadcast
Channel 16 for the use of public safety communications by multiple City
agencies, including the Police and Fire Departments, emergency medical
services, and the Office of Emergency Management, as well as
neighboring counties. The Channel 16 frequency band is used in various
situations that require interoperable communications. These range from
on-scene mission specific interoperable communications between walkie-
talkies, to communications on a borough or City-wide basis among
officials from different agencies, to communications on a regional
basis.
Secondary Responder Interoperability
Next, I would like to outline how we have addressed secondary
responder requirements for interoperable communications during major
incidents. The City has implemented specialized talk groups on our
Citywide 800 MHz system for 56 City, State, and regional agencies; 78
hospitals and healthcare facilities; and the commissioners of 44 City
agencies.
Multi-Jurisdictional Interoperability
Let me now turn to multi-jurisdictional interoperability. In the
aftermath of 9/11, the City established a regional Interoperability
Communications Committee (known as the ``ICC''). The ICC meets
regularly to evaluate the current state of interoperable communications
and to develop strategies for improving interoperability.
Finally, the City has deployed several TRP-1000 radio
interconnection systems to provide interoperability during incidents
that require communications among multiple City, State, regional, and
Federal organizations using different radios and different frequencies.
The ICC has established protocols for the deployment of TRP-1000s to
support the tactical communications of these multi-jurisdictional
agencies at a scene.
Other Interoperability Initiatives
I should emphasize that achieving interoperability is an ongoing
process, rather than an ``end state'' that can ever be perfectly
achieved. Obtaining adequate funding is, however, critical for these
endeavors. I will describe below some of the interoperability projects
the City is currently pursuing.
Tactical Interoperability Communications Plan
The City is in the process of finalizing its Tactical
Interoperability Communications Plan which will be submitted to the
Department of Homeland Security by May 1, 2006. This plan will document
what interoperable communications resources are available within our
urban area, and who controls each resource, as well as the rules and
operational procedures for the appropriate use of each interoperable
resource. The creation of this plan is a requirement of the Department
of Homeland Security Office of Grants and Training 2005 Urban Area
Security Initiative grant program. The City is fully compliant with the
Department's requirements.
Implementation of 700 MHz
The City certainly appreciates the establishment of a firm date for
transfer of the 700 MHz spectrum, as well as the Congressional
allocation of $1 billion for interoperability contained in the Budget
Reconciliation Bill recently signed by the President. Clearly, however,
$1 billion when dispersed throughout the nation is not sufficient to
fund optimal use of the 700 MHz spectrum, and we would urge you to
consider expanding funding for this initiative. As you know, this
spectrum was allocated to public safety with three main objectives: (1)
to provide much needed additional public safety voice channels; (2) to
improve regional interoperability; and (3) to allow for transmission of
wideband data.
Citywide Wireless Network
The City is moving aggressively to deploy a state-of-the-art
interoperable Citywide mobile broadband data network, which will
provide emergency responders with data access to large file transfers,
including maps, building layouts, and massive Federal and state anti-
crime and anti-terrorism databases. These networks will provide for
downloads of full-motion video at emergency scenes, and continuous
biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological monitoring.
The transmission capability of this network will be the first of
its kind and will literally transform the way in which officials
respond to emergencies. Given the substantial public safety and
national security components of the project, the City is pursuing
federal funding to offset its costs, which will be several hundred
million dollars.
With regard to funding, I would like to recommend that Congress
consider establishing funds specifically for local governments.
Ultimately, local governments are in the best position to determine
their public safety needs and establish local first responder programs
that can provide for interoperability based on the specific needs of
the given area. I would also emphasize that some of the key criteria
that should be applied in the allocation of funds should be level of
risk, population concentration, and consequences associated with damage
to critical economic and physical infrastructure.
Let me close by thanking you again for the opportunity to provide
you with this overview of what the City has been doing to improve
interoperability and our funding needs for these endeavors. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Menchini.
Chief Werner?
STATEMENT OF CHARLES WERNER, FIRE CHIEF, CHARLOTTESVILLE FIRE
DEPARTMENT, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Chief Werner. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you very much, and let me commend you on your
bipartisan commitment to working toward interoperability for
us. We appreciate that.
My name is Charles Werner. I am the fire chief for the city
of Charlottesville, Virginia, and I have been in the fire
rescue service for over 30 years.
In addition to that, I serve on the International
Association of Fire Chiefs Communications Committee. I am the
Virginia fire chiefs interoperability technology chair, and I
serve on the State Interoperability Executive Committee and was
the first and, fortunately now I can say, past chair of that
Interoperability Executive Committee.
What we get to now is understanding, as we have all said--
and I am not going to get into too much detail--but citizens
rely on us to have the communications that we need. They expect
it, and the for the most part they thought we had it. For many
of us, as Mr. Chairman has already mentioned, for over 30
years, there has been a problem with this issue of operability
and interoperability. It is nothing new. We have just had a
highlighted focus that hopefully will move us to getting that
taken care of.
Radio operability is critical for public safety agencies to
maintain the communications capability to protect safety of
life and property, and in cases of larger, more complex
incidents, interoperability becomes important in order for us
to maintain the continuity of command and control. And you are
going to hear that repeatedly.
Interoperability has been an ongoing issue for public
safety for decades and reinforced after these major
catastrophes.
Since 9/11, the need for public safety communications
interoperability has increased as law enforcement, fire, EMS
and emergency managers are asked to assume greater roles in
homeland security.
Today, I will speak to you from three vantage points.
First, I will give you an overview from the 10,000-foot view,
as I review Virginia's efforts from the statewide
Interoperability Executive Committee's perspective. Second, I
will provide you a view from ground level where I serve as a
regional interoperability project manager for the city of
Charlottesville, the county of Albemarle and the University of
Virginia. And, last, I will express my experiences and
observations at the national level, as I serve on SAFECOM's
Executive Committee as one of public safety's practitioner
members.
In Virginia, it is interesting, because the methodology
that we ended up choosing was what SAFECOM had already done. As
a member of the SAFECOM Executive Committee, I observed the
development and the involvement of practitioners to understand
that really to get a firm understanding of what we need and
where we need to go, you need to involve the people who know
how to get there and what they need.
And that is just what we did. We mirrored SAFECOM's
philosophy and the methodology, which is now the model that is
set up on the SAFECOM Web site that allows you to pull that
stripped Virginia pieces to a methodology that can be emulated
by any state that desires.
What is really interesting and important about this process
is that not only is it practitioner-driven but it is driven by
people processes, getting the people in the positions that are
responding to these emergencies together, across disciplines--
fire, police, EMS, emergency managers--together to talk about
what we need.
And what we found out was something unique: We are a lot
more alike than we are different. And, operationally, when it
comes to a situation that we have to deal with, together,
collectively, it is going to take us to solve it.
The state methodology is broken down in 10 phases.
Phase one--and please note, this is the most important
point here--is to establish key relationships and funding. The
relationships are number one, because without the relationships
then working together collectively, we are not coming up with a
solution that is going to be universal. And developing those
relationships will be key in everything else that happens in
the rest of this process.
There is a very significant thing I would like to share as
an experience. There is a very different thing that happens
when you work with someone you do not know and when you work
with a friend. When you call an ask for a resource from a
friend, that friend says, ``When and where do you want it.''
When you do not have that relationship, the question gets into,
``What do you need it for, why do you need it, who gave you the
authority to ask me for it?'' This is a key point.
Phase two is, gather the information, what is it that we
need. Then from that information create a project plan and a
road map. I think that many of us have heard that without road
map any road will lead you to where you want to go. And if we
do not have that road map, we are all going in different
directions.
Phase four is, identify roles and responsibilities.
Phase five, recruit focus group participants. Make sure
that you have all the stakeholders involved, and that includes
appointed and elected officials, because we ca not move this
process forward without an understanding and support.
Conduct focus group interviews to find out more
specifically what is needed.
Phase seven, analyze the data and prepare for strategic
planning sessions. Bring the people together, now talk about
it. And what we found in these sessions was really interesting.
There were efforts underway in regions that people knew nothing
about, that suddenly there were opportunities that we could
take advantage of that we did not even know about before.
Nine, develop statewide communications interoperability
strategic plan.
And then phase 10 is, guidelines for the first 90 days to
launch what you have started. What we have seen too many times
is that we do not follow through once we have the plan.
In Virginia's situation, the outcome yielded the formation
of the Interoperability Executive Committee, an advisory group,
the hiring of a full-time interoperability coordinator,
implemented a Supportive Program Management Office, conducted
two statewide interoperability conferences, developed,
implemented and updated the Statewide Interoperability
Strategic Plan, legislated the plan would be updated annually
and that by 2015 anything grant oriented would meet the
requirements or the goals of that particular plan.
Virginia's success would not have been possible if it were
not for Governor Warner and his administration. Again, this is
about bipartisanship and about everybody working together. And
I would also be remiss if I did not mention George Foresman who
is now our under secretary of emergency preparedness, who, too,
was right side by side making these things happen.
And, last, and importantly, on this particular issue at the
state level, it is the funding. The funding was key to the
element of getting Virginia launched and making things happen.
As far as locally, a national demonstration project in
Charlottesville is proof again that the SAFECOM model works now
at the ground level where the boots are on the ground, where
the rubber meets the road.
And I have to say this, by the city manager, me being here
today, is that in 2004, Charlottesville was chosen as the
number one city, and it is largely because probably of our
cooperative spirit, and this regional effort that we have done
as the city of Charlottesville, the county of Albemarle and the
University of Virginia, with a land mass of 744 square miles of
both flat and mountainous terrains.
The University of Virginia increased its student
population, staff, and in addition to that, we have some very
national treasures: Thomas Jefferson's home, Monticello, and
James Monroe's home, Ashlawn.
In 2003, a $6 million grant was given to the city of
Charlottesville, the county of Albemarle and the University of
Virginia because of the projects, and I want to go through it
very quickly to tell you the scope. And I am going to go
through some of the references here, not to endorse any
particular project but just to give you the scope of what was
involved.
First, we developed a parallel and secondary logistical
network for the use of Nextel push-to-talk technology for the
sheer reason that the push-to-talk technology here is not
dependent on the public telephone switch.
In the process of implementing a robust Motorola 800
megahertz digital analog public radio system that will bring
together all public safety agencies in our region, including
the jails, the airports, everything that has to do with public
safety and will support NIMS and the National Response Plan.
We are in the process now of creating a console integration
between the Nextel parallel network and our public safety
network, which allows us to bring in non-public safety agencies
in an affordable way to create interoperability and a whole
community approach. Because what we have learned through this
process is that public safety alone cannot handle the
situations, especially of extreme magnitude, that are
necessary.
And we are in the process of putting in place a M-A/COM
mobile data system that will support us on the data side.
Mr. Reichert. Chief, can you do this in 1 minutes and 20
seconds?
Chief Werner. One minute.
Mr. Reichert. Okay.
Chief Werner. Tactically, we have an incident command radio
interface that we put in place and Edge Access to do satellite
communications. And that equipment was sent to Hancock,
Mississippi and was in operation there for 20 days.
Let me just get to the 30,000-foot view really quick. What
we have seen is SAFECOM is the agency which focuses on the
federal oversight of interoperability, and what I envision here
is that we need to make sure that it has made impacts and that
it needs to be made strong and kept strong.
Standards are important, but be careful when you do
standards, because it does not necessarily mean it is going to
cover all the bases. An example, a smaller public safety agency
that does not have a trunked radio system does not need to buy
a $4,000 P25 radio when a $500 analog radio would suffice.
And, last, operability needs to be handled first to make
sure the system works, because interoperability does not matter
after that. And we need to commit to interoperability in the
long term. This is not a short-term process.
And, finally, recognize that full interoperability and all
the critical live-saving capabilities it offers is a long-term
mission. Do not sacrifice the long-term goal of full
interoperability by focusing only on the near-term problem.
And one last thing I want to leave you graphically. I
brought today one of many gateways that are available. If I
walked up and handed this to you and said, ``Here, you have
interoperability,'' you would not have it. If one of these or
any device similar was given to every city in the country, the
thought process is that interoperability happens. But I want to
leave it on the thought of it is about a people process. It is
about the governance and the cooperation between people that we
must continue to work on. And, again, SAFECOM is that vision to
help us move in that direction.
Thank you.
[The statement of Chief Werner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles L. Werner
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
DEVELOPING A SPECIFIC INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY IS
PARAMOUNT TO SUCCESS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Charles Werner and I am the Fire Chief for the City of
Charlottesville, Virginia and have served in the fire-rescue service
for over 30 years.
I serve on the Communications Committee of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC). I also serve as the Virginia Fire
Chiefs Technology/Interoperability Chair and on the Virginia Statewide
Interoperability Executive Committee (VA SIEC--past Chair).
Citizens rely upon their local and state police agencies, sheriffs'
offices, fire departments and emergency medical services to come to
their assistance wherever and whenever needed, whether it is crime in
progress, a civil disturbance, a building fire, a forest fire, an
automobile accident, a health emergency, a natural disaster, or, as we
learned on 9/11, a terrorist attack. Citizens assume that those first
responders will get the call and will have the communications tools
they need to address emergencies quickly and efficiently.
Radio operability is critical for public safety agencies to
maintain the communications capability that we need to protect the
safety of life and property. In cases of larger and more complex
incidents interoperability becomes very important in order to maintain
the continuity of command and control. Interoperability has been an
ongoing public safety issue for decades and reinforced after major
catastrophes across the United States.
Since 9/11, the need for public safety communications
interoperability has increased as law enforcement, fire, EMS are being
asked to assume greater roles in roles of homeland security.
Today, I will speak to you from three different vantage points.
First I will give an overview from the 10,000 foot view by reviewing
Virginia's efforts and outcomes. Second, I will provide you a view from
ground level where I serve as the regional interoperability project
manager for the City of Charlottesville, County of Albemarle and the
University of Virginia. Last, I will express my experiences and
observations at the national level as I serve on SAFECOM's Executive
Committee as one of its public safety practitioner members.
Virginia's Interoperability Efforts_``10,000 foot aerial view''
I have been specifically asked to explain about Virginia's
methodology for developing a statewide interoperable strategic plan.
Having served as Virginia's SIEC Chair during the majority of this
process I am pleased to share what has been a very positive and
proactive process.
The Virginia methodology for addressing interoperability at the
state level mirrored the process developed by Office of
Interoperability/SAFECOM. SAFECOM worked with Virginia to customize the
methodology and was designed to be an effective tool to help local
governments and states to improve public safety communications across
disciplines and jurisdictions. Virginia's efforts resulted in a
comprehensive plan that addresses the interoperability needs and
challenges of Virginia's public safety community as identified by
Virginia's public safety practitioners. The key is that the initiatives
are public safety practitioner (boots on the ground) driven at the
state and federal levels.
Virginia's Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning
(SCIP) methodology has now been institutionalized as a model that can
be accessed from the Internet (http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/
library/interoperabilitycasestudies/1223--statewidecommunications.htm).
The SCIP methodology is broken down into ten essential planning
phases that local government and states can use to create their own
communications plan.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 36399.003
A National Demonstration Project:
Charlottesville-Albemarle-University of Virginia_``a ground level
view''
The Charlottesville region is living proof that the Virginia
(SAFECOM) model works. Chosen as the #1 City in America in 2004, this
region includes the City of Charlottesville, County of Albemarle and
the University of Virginia with a geographic land mass of approximately
744 square miles and includes both flat and mountainous terrain.
The University of Virginia (UVA) also adds the element of a
university town with a sizeable student, faculty and staff population.
In addition to UVA, the region is home to other national treasures
such as Thomas Jefferson's home, Monticello and James Monroe's home,
Ashlawn.
In 2003, the region developed a national demonstration project that
was submitted and awarded one of the few $6M FEMA Interoperable
Communications Equipment grants. This project is governed by all three
jurisdictions and public safety practitioners of every discipline (Law
Enforcement, Fire, EMS, and Emergency Management).
An overview of what the region has done to create a robust,
redundant and resilient interoperable system is as follows:
Developed a parallel and secondary public safety
communications network for logistical communications using
Nextel's PTT (because Nextel's iDEN network is the only PTT or
walkie-talkie service that does not rely on the public
telephone switch).
In the process of implementing a robust Motorola 800
MHz digital/analog public safety mission critical radio system
which provides communications to every public safety agency in
the region (20+ agencies). This will support the National
Incident Management System (NIMS).
In the process of implementing console integration
between the Nextel iDEN network and the Motorola 800 MHz radio
system to allow communication between Nextel talk groups and
Motorola talk groups. This enables us to reach out to non
public safety agencies to create an affordable way to establish
a ``Whole Community Approach'' and bring in other agencies such
as public works, health departments, schools and more.
In the process of implementing a M-A/COM Mobile Data
System that will serve all public safety agencies in the region
to provide information such as law enforcement vehicle and
criminal wants and warrants, building floor plans, emergency
operations plans, etc.
In addition to fixed infrastructure, this project also
addresses tactical interoperability at an incident site beyond
the normal day to day operations which meets the RAPIDCOM
recommendations (to achieve incident interoperability within
one hour of the incident) and supports the communications with
the federal agencies as outlined in the National Response Plan
(NRP). This tactical equipment was chosen because of its
effectiveness, simplicity and price:
Incident Commander's Radio Interface (ICRI)--tested
and listed by several DoD evaluations. It is a true plug and
play technology and is EASY.
Edge Access self deploying Satellite--Voice over IP
(VoIP) which also establishes satellite telephone service, an
internet connection and establishes a quarter mile hotspot
which can be set up in a matter of 5 minutes or less by simply
turning on and pushing one button. THIS IS IN MY VEHICLE TODAY
AND I WOULD BE GLAD TO DEMONSTRATE IT ANYTIME.
NOTE: CHARLOTTESVILLE FIRE DEPARTMENT's UNIT WITH THIS TACTICAL
EQUIPMENT RESPONDED TO AND WAS USED IN HANCOCK, MS FOLLOWING HURRICANE
KATRINA.
In the area of situational awareness, the region has
implemented WebEOC (same as the National Capital Region--
Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia) to share information
between jurisdictions and disciplines.
In the process of implementing DMIS (Disaster
Management Interoperability Software). This is one of the E-Gov
Disaster Management tools.
In the process of implementing the Emergency Email
Wireless Network to serve as interoperable communications with
the public through email and other wireless devices.
SAFECOM's Efforts_``a 30,000 foot aerial view''
As one of the public safety practitioners that serve on the SAFECOM
Executive Committee that has been directly involved at both the state
and local level I would like to share the following observations:
1. SAFECOM is having a real impact and is a genuinely practitioner
driven program. It is the primary federal focus on interoperability and
needs to be made and kept strong.
2. Standards are very important, but be cautious about requiring a
particular standard to meet all occasions. For example, a smaller
public safety agency that does not have a trunked radio system does not
need to be buying $4,000 P25 radios when $500 analog radios would
suffice. Make sure that standards are robust and can actually meet
practitioner needs before requiring them.
3. Most of achieving near term interoperability is a matter of two
things:
a. Build an effective ``operable'' system, first, then
b. Commit to interoperability because at the end of the day,
achieving a reasonable level of emergency interoperability
requires a willingness to cooperate among and between agencies
and jurisdictions more than it requires a particular
technology.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 36399.004
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Proctor?
STATEMENT OF STEVE PROCTOR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UTAH
COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY NETWORK, (USCAN)
Mr. Proctor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for the opportunity to speak before you today.
My name is Steve Proctor. I am the executive director of
the Utah Communications Agency Network, and I am also a
representative of APCO, the largest public safety communication
organization in the country, with about 17,000 members.
I personally have 35 years of experience in this field,
beginning as an emergency dispatcher during my college
training. I have also been privileged to serve on many national
committees, FCC advisory committees and currently sit on the
SAFECOM Executive Committee.
UCAN is a quasi-state agency that was established by our
legislature for the sheer purpose of developing a radio system
and serving currently 120 separate entities of government--
state, local and federal. The system currently supports 15,000
users. It is governed by a board of directors made up of those
users who set the rates, establish the budget, determine the
direction and provide for the level of coverage.
One of our directors said it best: ``We pay for the
privilege of governing ourselves.'' And that is one of the key
successes of this agency.
Our system in Utah experienced the acid test, providing
interoperable communications during the 2002 Winter Olympic
games. Not only were we responsible for supporting public
safety, but we supported all the Salt Lake Organizing Committee
events at each and every venue. During those 17 days, our
system processed 10.5 million radio calls. That is about
400,000 calls per day.
We are here to talk about interoperability. The experience
I described above with reference to UCAN did not come about
magically. It took 6 long years of political compromise,
negotiations and wrangling before the equipment order was ever
placed. I hope as I briefly tell you how we got here some of
these principles will aid you in determining where we take this
public safety community nationally toward this sometimes
elusive goal of being able to communicate with each other.
The first thing we did was identify the common pain that we
all had together and that brought together all the
stakeholders. We had a convener of stature, in this case our
governor, who brought us all together, put us in a room and
said, ``Figure this out. Figure it out now.''
A committed leader was appointed to broker the effort and
to make sure that we directed--am I to stop or go ahead? Keep
going? A committed leader was appointed to broker the effort
and keep everybody focused on achieving results. There was a
set of clearly defined purposes with predictable management and
maintenance processes established. And all this was
memorialized in a piece of legislation passed by our
legislature establishing the agency.
After all those issues went through the process, then we
talked about the money and how we were going to fund this
effort and began to order the equipment.
So what does all this have to do with the committee? It has
been said that during times of emergency, people expect
government or at all levels to provide appropriate response to
mitigate disasters, save lives, protect, support and help the
needy and care for the injured. A major tool in providing that
response is a communications system with reliable and
dependable capabilities and capacity. There is simply no room
for error.
The citizens we serve today expect in this world of
miraculous technology that this is what will take place, and,
sadly to say, that is not what takes place.
Why is that so? The public safety market is so limited in
demand with a focused product line, that the equipment is
costly to procure, maintain, upgrade and install. Most public
safety radio systems are designed to last for 10 years, with
many of them having to last for over 30 years. The system we
replaced was 40 years old. Because of the limited market
presence, the cost of individual units and equipment is very,
very high.
There is a high degree of resistance from public safety
entities supported by age-old political barriers that create
roadblocks in motivating agencies to work together and share
systems across city, county, state and federal lines. This is
because there is a presumed loss of control.
So what can this committee do to assist the public safety
entities and agencies across this country to achieve this
interoperable goal? First of all, take a leadership role and
support the SAFECOM program. This program is DHS' effort to
promote interoperability. They cannot do it without proper
staff, funding, direction and mission. With appropriate
resources, SAFECOM can and should staff up with state and local
experienced personnel who have a background in communications
to assist them in this process. In many instances, this has
been done by their Executive Committee made up of state and
local members.
That federal government should tie future federal funding
to performance measures, give priority attention to multi-
agency, multi-disciplined projects with long-term goals and
reasonable chances of success. The government should reward
innovative projects and highlight them at association events,
such as the police, fire chiefs and communications conventions,
sending this message that funding will be tied to cooperative
efforts.
Congress should establish long-term sustainable funding to
support the public safety effort. This problem is not going to
go away with one-time funding. It is going to take continued
funding over a numbers of years period. Congress should push
and sustain and provide funding to motivate the standards
effort. As my distinguished colleagues have said before, the
standards effort is what will allow manufacturers to build to a
set of standards and have systems that will integrate with one
another; therefore, driving down the cost.
I am quite sure, as you have already listened to many of
these points many times; however, in actuality, they are the
keys to success. While they are an important part of the
process, this problem will not go away with simply providing
more frequencies and more money. What is required is true
leadership, vision, bringing together all the players and
resources to make better operability and interoperability
possible.
Thank you. I would be happy to take any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Proctor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven H. Proctor
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
Good Afternoon. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee
for the opportunity to speak before you today.
My name is Steven Proctor. I am the Executive Director of the Utah
Communications Agency Network (UCAN). I appear to today with the
support of the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials
(APCO), the nation's oldest and largest public safety communication
organization. I personally have 35 years of service in this field,
beginning as a public safety dispatcher during my college training, and
serving in various positions to my current position. I have also been
active on the national level. I am a past-president of APCO, served on
several FCC advisory committees, and currently sit on the SAFECOM
Program Executive Committee.
UCAN is a quasi-state agency set up by the Legislature for the
purpose of establishing a statewide public safety communications
network. We operate a public safety communications system within the
borders of Utah serving 120 separate state, local and federal
government agencies. The system supports 15,000 users. A board of
directors made up of our users manages the system. That board
represents the user base in making decision concerning system
implementation, growth, maintenance, and expansion. They also set the
budget, determine the rates, and contribute towards the system growth
and enhancement. One of our directors said it best: ``we pay for the
privilege of governing ourselves''. That is one of the keys to success
of this agency.
Our system, in Utah, has experienced the acid test of providing
interoperable communications. That came four years ago when we
supported the 2002 Winter Olympic games. Not only were we responsible
for public safety radio traffic; we also supported the communications
requirements of the Olympic organizing committee managing the venue
events. During the events, our system processed 10.5 million requests
to talk, supporting just under 16,000 radios. There were no major
system failures, network traffic issues or inability to communicate.
We are here to talk about interoperability. The experience I
describe briefly above did not come without a focused effort. It took
six years of hard work, political compromise, negotiations and
wrangling before the system equipment order was ever signed. I hope as
I briefly tell about how we got here some of those principles will aid
you in assisting the public safety community to achieve this sometimes-
illusive goal of being able to communicate with each other.
How Did We Get Here?
We identified a ``Common Problem'' which brought the stakeholders
together. This was done without concern as to whether there would be a
final product. It simply brought the potential users of a combined
network together to get the issue on the table. A convener of stature
brought us together--in this case it was our Governor.
A committed leader was appointed to broker the effort and focus on
keeping the effort together. All meetings were held with openness,
transparency and with voluntary participation. The effort utilized
committed decision makers who came to the table to make commitments.
There was a set of clearly defined purposes and goals, a predicable
management and maintenance process. A formal charter was developed: it
outlined governance, outcomes, funding and levels of participation.
Legislation was passed to memorialize and charter the effort for long-
term results.
We recognized that this is not a problem with a one-time fix. It
will require nurturing and management, because the problem is here to
stay and will be come a part of a long-term organizational management
process requiring ongoing resources.
After all these issues, directions and organizational efforts--then
we talked about the money, and possible funding mechanisms.
So what does all this have to do with the Homeland Security Sub-
Committee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology?
Let me share with you the following:
It has been said that: ``During times of emergency, people expect
government at all levels to provide the appropriate response to
mitigate disaster, save lives, provide support, help the needy and care
for the injured. The major tool in providing that response is a
communications system with reliable and dependable capabilities and
capacity''. There is simply no room for error. The communications
system must rise to the occasion at a moments notice--and be prepared
to sustain the highest degree of operability for whatever the duration
of the situation will be--whether it is a multi-car freeway accident or
a sustained attack on our country. It will then go back to supporting
day-to-day traffic loading until the next emergency.
The citizens we serve expect in today's world of miraculous
technology that this is what will take place. Sadly, in many instances
it may not. While some areas of the county have progressed, many are
still searching for answers.
Why is that so?
The public safety market is a limited demand market with a focused
product line. The equipment is costly to procure, install, maintain and
upgrade. Typical public safety systems have to last a minimum of 10
years with many working well into thirty years. This makes it so
difficult to overcome the technology curve. The system must be
installed in protected hardened environments with redundant
connections. It must be prepared to operate in the highest of demand.
Because of its limited market presence, the cost of the individual
units and the infrastructure is very high.
A public safety system falls behind the ``other needs of
government''. Roads, social services, police cars, fire equipment,
staffing and training all take precedence over the expensive
proposition of funding a public safety radio system. Many times when
funding is set aside it comes from limited resources or one-time
allotments. There never seems to be sustainable sources to keep the
effort fully funded, progressing to a solution and fully maintained.
There is a high degree of resistance from public safety agencies
supported by age-old political barriers that create roadblocks in
motivating agencies to work together and share a system and the
associated costs. Cities, counties, states, and yes, federal agencies
in some instances cannot find the common ground on which to chart the
course and build a common communications infrastructure to support them
all, giving the autonomy they need and the interoperability they
desire, when it is needed. There is also reluctance between fire
departments, police departments, and EMS providers to share resources
and communications systems, because of the presumed loss of control.
In multi-agency endeavors there is a reluctance of one governmental
agency to spend its tax dollars supporting a system located across
multiple jurisdictions because their agency should not have to pay to
support services in another city or county. We have run into this
problem with our own system when justifying expansion into areas to
support state users.
Bringing agencies together requires a unique ``governance''
structure for operation, implementation and maintenance of the
communications system. Many governmental agencies cannot or will not
participate in these unique organizations.
So what can this Committee do to assist public safety to achieve
this interoperable goal? Take a leadership role and support the SAFECOM
program. This program is the DHS effort to promote interoperability.
They cannot do it without proper staff, funding and a direction and
mission.
With appropriate resources, SAFECOM can and should staff up with
state and local experienced personnel who have the background in
communications to assist in the process. SAFECOM needs to be able to
provide the resources to take the interoperability message nation wide.
It should be able to host instructional seminars focused at state,
local and federal partnerships to develop a dialogue among users and
future partners. These forums will allow for the exchange of ideas and
instructions to regions beginning interoperability projects. SAFECOM
should develop resource tools for use by agencies such as case studies,
how to guides, success stories available to those starting the
interoperability process.
The federal government should also tie future federal funding to
performance measures. Give priority attention to multi-agency, multi-
discipline projects with long-term goals and reasonable chances to
succeed with long-term results. Have the grant requests reviewed by
peer groups who are familiar with successful projects before awards are
made.
The government should reward innovative projects and highlight them
at association events (APCO, IACP, IAFC), sending the message that
funding is tied to cooperative efforts. Future investments of federal
dollars must equal measurable results. Any grants must have a definable
purpose and expected outcomes.
Congress should establish long term sustainable funding to support
the public safety effort. This problem will not go away in a few years.
It is a long-term commitment that will take continued to sustain and
support.
Congress should also push, sustain and provide funding to motivate
the standards efforts. The quicker manufacturers have a set of
standards to build systems to, the quicker we have a larger selection
of user devices (handheld and mobiles), and component infrastructure
pieces the more effective and interoperable public safety systems.
I am quite sure these are points you have already listened to.
However in actuality, they are the keys to success. While they are an
important part of the process, this problem will not go away with more
frequencies and more money. What is required is true leadership,
vision, and bringing together of all the players and resources to make
better operability and interoperability possible.
Thank you. I will gladly take any questions you might have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Proctor.
I have a few questions. There will be a vote that will be
called, I am told, in the next 15 or so minutes, and we may
have to recess for a brief amount of time to allow everyone to
ask questions.
Mr. Proctor, you summed it all up pretty well. Support
SAFECOM, performance measures, innovative projects need to be
identified, regional projects and partnerships need to be
identified, long-term funding and support, and motivate people
who are meeting all those standards and requirements that you
laid out.
One of the things that we are doing in this subcommittee is
that we are going to have all of the testimony evaluated. We
started back before Christmas looking at operability first. I
think the chief mentioned operable, we must be operable first.
We are taking a look at every statement, every answer that is
given to this committee, and we are going to draft legislation
that addresses the issues that you just talked about, all four
of the witnesses.
But I want to follow up just a little bit further and maybe
get some specific answers from anyone who chooses to answer the
first question. Do you believe that the Department of Homeland
Security sufficiently supports SAFECOM and the Office of
Interoperability and Compatibility, honestly? Anyone?
Mr. Proctor. I personally believe the SAFECOM project needs
more support. I think they are severely understaffed, I think
they have good ideas, great direction, and many of the things
we did before SAFECOM was even invented are the things SAFECOM
is now using now and trying to promote. I think it is key that
that message be taken around the country in regional seminars,
in big cities so that people can come together, begin talking,
learning, establishing priorities, working together. Those
relationship that Charles talked about are critical in
developing interoperability communications. Technology is easy;
it is the relationships that are difficult to form.
Mr. Reichert. Right.
Chief?
Chief Werner. I guess to add to that, if you look at the
monumental task that has been laid out to accomplish and the
expectations that are there, I would argue, if you evaluate the
desire that you hope to accomplish and you evaluate the
resources that are in place, that might answer the question
that you are looking to have answered.
Mr. Reichert. We do know that there are authorized 16--in
the Office of Interoperability, 16 FTEs, and they now have 4
working in that office.
Anyone else want to answer the question about SAFECOM and
interoperability?
Mr. Drake. Mr. Chairman, members, thank you. The
application would be the same as it would be on a local basis
with the funding for this effort. You need to prioritize. I
think my colleagues have made the case today for you to promote
interoperability and operability. And I am the newest member of
the SAFECOM Committee, but it did not take me long to realize
that the committee is understaffed, the effort, while well-
intended, will not wash out in local government and will not
wash out back in your districts and mine and back in my city.
Talk is cheap, and if this is not funded, the collective
effort is not given, the next disaster will come and everybody
will be throwing up their hands and pointing, and you control
the ability here to not have that happen. So I would suggest
further funding.
Mr. Reichert. In your dealings with the federal government
and helping you build your system from the ground up, is there
any one federal official that in your view is accountable for
interoperability? Yes or no?
Mr. Proctor?
Mr. Proctor. In our process prior to the Olympics, we
worked with six or seven different agencies for assistance
besides the 120 agencies we have at home. So it is a multi set
of tasks.
Mr. Reichert. So the answer would be, no, I am taking it,
from the panel. If there is not, should there be?
Chief Werner. Well, to answer your question, no, I do not
think so. And because, as you mentioned, if you take a look at
how many agencies are involved in the interoperability at the
federal level, I am not really sure there is an assignment that
is specifically given and authorized to take that
accountability. Should there be? Certainly.
Mr. Reichert. Anyone else? No?
Do you believe the federal government's efforts are well
coordinated as they worked with you? Anyone on the panel?
Mr. Menchini. Commissioner Menchini here. We really have
been appreciative of SAFECOM's efforts, especially in the area
of data communications, to publish statements of requirements
that begin to provide much needed leadership to be able to get
common infrastructure in place.
And we have made our feelings on this known, that we really
believe that each area needs to be very carefully considered in
terms of its particular requirements for operability and for
interoperability. And there is not one particular approach that
really can be applicable across the nation.
Mr. Reichert. Right.
Mr. Menchini. In fact, it really has to be a grassroots
type of an effort with, and being driven, as I have heard here
at the table, by the requirements of the first responders based
on their operational needs, based on the particular threats
that they have to deal with, and interoperability and operable
systems need to be built from the ground up. So whatever
happens at a national level and the need for strategy is clear,
but it does need to be based on a variety of different types of
models. Again, large cities, I think, very much are different
types of environments for radio communications as well as for
first responders operations.
Mr. Reichert. I would agree with that.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you all for your testimony. It is very
interesting, and it is clear to me that you are all enormously
qualified in your own rights, but the stories you have told us
show that local and state agencies are ahead of the federal
government on this issue. And I worry about that.
I was thinking about the four S's here: Strategy, spectrum,
standards and sustained support. It seems to me that might
cover some of the gaps in the federal response.
I just want to ask you a couple things, just as the
chairman did, and ask any of you to answer.
The first is big state, little state, big city, little
city, sure, there are differences. I come from a big city, and
New York City would certainly qualify as that. Maybe some of
the Portland cities would be considered smaller, maybe, but
their west coast cities; therefore, they are very important.
But, seriously, should we have different approaches or is
it rather that each approach needs to be considered as part of
this national strategy? For example, should we have a
catastrophic attack that perhaps is avian flu--let's pick
something horrible--that would hit all of us, maybe one region
at a time, but that region would have big places and little
places.
When we think about strategy, shouldn't we include both
small and big in the strategy?
Chief Werner. I think that the approach to evaluating the
situation can be very similar, and I think that you can also
identify outcomes that you hope to achieve as being very
similar. I think the method or the medium to which that gets
you there can be very uniquely different based on geographic
region. So I think if you take a methodology and use it to help
evaluate and give you a vision, that can be standardized and
institutionalized. But, as my colleague here from New York has
mentioned, there are some very unique things that have to be
addressed in each locality.
Mr. Drake. Congresswoman, I think a basic framework is
essential because whether the flu hits my city, Beaverton is
83,500, or Portland, which is about 525,000, we will share the
same problem, and my children will react the same way to the
flu as someone in Portland will.
We need the flexibility to be able to respond individually,
and the National League would always argue that, ``Give us a
basic framework, give us general guidelines, but let us
implement it that works best for each one of us.''
As a past president of the League of Oregon Cities, I
represented cities from--actually have 241 cities in Oregon, 2
were ghost towns with no population, but the smallest actual
city had 25. And between 25 and 525,000, there are a lot of
cities that ranged in size, but when we would approach the
legislature we would ask for a general framework but always
allowed to implement it on a local basis.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Menchini. I would have to--I am sorry.
Ms. Harman. Go ahead.
Mr. Menchini. I would have to agree, and I think it is
really a matter of local-based solutions based on local needs
but a common set of requirements and a common set of
expectations.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
My second question is about spectrum. I would like to thank
all your organizations for supporting the HERO Act. The League
has done this, the international fire and police organizations
have done it, I think the National Governors Association has
done it. The problem is, Congress has not done it. And we will
be turning over analog spectrum, as some of you mentioned, in
2009. That is 3 years from now.
My question to you is, in those 3 years, tell me about the
challenges you are going to face. Some of you have described
this, why spectrum matters, but for those who have not, here is
an additional opportunity to rail against Congress' inaction
here about the problems you are going to have for 3 years
without common, dedicated emergency spectrum.
Mr. Menchini. I can answer. In regard to New York City, we
are faced with a challenge of addressing our broadband data
requirements without the benefit of the 700 megahertz spectrum.
So we are now building out--the first pilot areas are going up
as we speak, building out a citywide broadband wireless
network. We have had to do that with spectrum that we were
actually leasing from the archdiocese of New York to be able to
get the type of spectrum that we need to be able to support
public safety data requirements. So the 700 megahertz spectrum
cannot come soon enough.
I think there needs to be a constant eye on the evolving
needs of public safety and a look out even beyond the 2009
timeframe and the availability of a 700 megahertz spectrum to
keep the availability of spectrum in line with the needs of
public safety responders.
Ms. Harman. Any other responses? My time is expired, but I
know the chairman will let you answer.
Mr. Proctor. I would just like to echo what my colleague
has said from New York City. We, too, are building out a 700
megahertz data system. We are using the state licensed 700
megahertz spectrum and appreciate it so greatly because there
was no other place to go. And we look forward in completing our
plan and being able to use the balance of that spectrum very
soon to enhance our system operations.
Ms. Harman. Anyone else?
Mr. Drake. Yes, Congresswoman. We are all, at least I am
the only elected, I believe, at this table, and you are all
elected. We represent real people and real constituents, and
there is no excuse for politic or anything else when it comes
to public safety. We have within our power and authority, you
certainly have within yours, to implement this sooner. The
National League would always encourage you to deal with this
sooner than later.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Ms. Lowey?
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony, and I want
to especially thank the chairman and the ranking member for
their bipartisanship.
And you should know, if you have not appeared before our
committee before, many of us have been talking about
interoperability for a very long time. We have introduced
legislation, we have tried to move the Department of Homeland
Security, and yet with 180,000, I believe, people at the
Department of Homeland Security, whether it is four or five, I
am not sure who has been hired or fired today, we still do not
feel that there is a serious commitment. And I do appreciate
the chairman having this hearing.
Following up on the questions before, one of the questions
I have had following up with Katrina is that a backup
communications system really is essential and could be
invaluable. I think it is safe to assume that in a catastrophic
incident there could be serious damage to communications
infrastructure. And a backup system might enable lines of
communication to remain open, even if the major network is
inoperable.
Perhaps I would begin with our commissioner in New York
City and then you could all respond. I wonder if any of the
areas you represent have a sufficient backup system. Do you
have a backup system? Are there any promising technologies that
should be examined by this committee or are being examined to
see if a backup system is feasible and can be effective? I
would be most appreciative, beginning with the commissioner.
Mr. Menchini. Well, I think the events last year in the
Gulf area are really telling. In fact, in New York City, we had
a different type of a problem 2 years ago when we had a
blackout that also created a very similar situation where we
lost power citywide in some areas for over 22 hours. That put
strain on telecommunications infrastructure, on telco
infrastructure, on cellular infrastructure, on public safety
radio infrastructure. It is probably very similar. I mean, it
is a shorter period of time, but it is similar, in effect, to
what we saw in the Gulf area.
So the ability for us to implement at an infrastructure
level very robust, very survivable and redundant radio
infrastructure to be able to survive power outages caused by
blackouts or caused by natural events like hurricanes is a
critical area that requires a lot more investment and the
applicability of known methods.
You just need to be able to have, in addition to a battery
backup, the ability to be able to roll generators up, if need
be, or have a much extended battery life for your different
components that are out there acting as receivers and
transmitters, for example, in a radio infrastructure
environment.
So we have seen something like that in New York City. We
have taken steps to be able to do what we can to be able to
reinforce the infrastructure. But I think there is still a lot
more that needs to be done, and if we have learned anything as
a result of the events in the Gulf area, having radio
infrastructure that can survive those types of events and give
us operability first and then interoperability is critical.
Mrs. Lowey. Anybody else care to comment?
Yes, sir.
Mr. Proctor. We have done many things as we have developed
our system. For instance, we put two paths of control
communications in every site so that if one fails, we have a
redundant link going in. We house fuel and generators at the
site that will allow them to operate for 7 days without having
to be visited. We put redundant transmitter facilities on
different mountaintops . I do not know how familiar you are
with the geography of Utah, but most of our facilities are
built on mountaintops rather than on the tops of buildings. We
have different mountaintops built into the network, so that if
one fails, we immediately route to another one.
And all those battery backups, uninterruptible power
supplies are critical. Good grounding, we take a lot of
lightening on tops of mountains. We have good grounding systems
to ensure that the equipment is properly grounded. And good
installation procedures to make sure it is installed properly.
It has never failed to amaze me how many agencies will
install $1 million worth of equipment in an old shanty on top
of a mountain and expect it to function properly over a 20-year
lifespan. We have tried to avoid that.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
Chief Werner. I guess I would like to add that in the
catastrophic situation that occurred in Katrina, which was
really unusual as far as the amount of infrastructure that was
affected, one thing that might also be considered because a
total redundant system is going to become very expensive, and
when we are trying to get operable and interoperable systems to
begin with and thinking about getting backup systems to go in
place, there is just not going to be enough money to do that.
One of the things that we might want to think about is to
have some type of tactical equipment being set up quickly,
infrastructure, in areas that we know are prone to major
disasters. For example, have something--I know Florida has some
things where they drop pods right in place, get the
transmitters in place and allow people to begin communicating
when everything is gone. And I think that is one of the new
things that we have not really planned for.
If we had some of these things strategically placed that
could be pulled in in a certain amount of time that we define
as acceptable, that might be an alternative solution.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you. My time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and let me
associate myself with Ms. Lowey's comments as it relates to
thanking the chairman for calling this hearing, because I think
all of us see this as a critical weakness in our emergency
response systems.
Since the terrorist attack of 9/11, it really exposed a
very serious problem, and Katrina laid it bare once again, the
lack of a backup.
The federal government promised to devote more resources to
solve the critical problem, and while some of the funding has
increased, recent DHS budgets have focused on border security
and other issues that were out there that tend to get more
attention.
In fact, the Republican chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee is quoted in the morning Congressional Daily as
saying, ``The Bush administration has paid scant attention to
homeland security.''
So I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that on a bipartisan basis
we are going to address this and hopefully apply the lessons we
learned on 9/11 as it relates to operability and
interoperability, finally.
In previous hearings on interoperability, many of the
witnesses contended that there is a lack of leadership on the
federal and state levels on this issue. However, it appears
that in some areas of the country local first responders groups
do not always appreciate bias and direction from officials at a
higher level, whether that be state or otherwise. We are trying
to develop a statewide system or a regional system.
Would you share with us your views on this issue and how
you think communications and cooperation between state and
localities can be improved, which I think is critical if we are
going to make it work.
Chief Werner. I agree. I think it goes back again to this
methodology of developing the relationships first and creating
a partnership. And one thing I would urge that we have learned
in Virginia is that it is important that you have practitioners
involved in what those solutions are and that you listen to
them and help develop whatever it is that you are going to put
in place and not come across as a dictator of how it is going
to be and you are going to accept this solution or here it is,
take it or leave it.
Mr. Proctor. Prior to establishing our agency and
constructing our network, we literally took a road show around
the state and talked to every city and county, sheriffs and
police chiefs at conventions and asked them what they needed to
see. How do we do this? What can we do to best serve your
needs?
And as we went through that process, there were a lot of
them who pushed back and did not want to be part of it, and
there were some who came, immediately stepped forward and
wanted to be a leadership person in it. And we capitalized on
those, we moved forward with those who would be a part of it,
and it was interesting to see that the rest after the system
came full circle they came back around and wanted to join up.
Mr. Etheridge. Anybody else want to comment?
Mr. Drake. Yes, Congressman. Some states are certainly
ahead of others in terms of the cooperative effort. Oregon's
SIEC is bottom-up and top-down and is well integrated. I think
more and more of the states are beginning to do this. And,
again, I think we are all learning from our experiences. We
would welcome the leadership on a local level without being
given a straight jacket.
And I guess I would offer that those who are moving in the
right direction be awarded an rewarded for their effort, and
those that are not, one way or another, by the positive-
negative incentives, they would eventually come to the table.
Mr. Etheridge. Do you agree?
Let me ask one final question, because I know we are
running out of time. Secretary Chertoff said earlier--and I
know some of you wanted to comment on this--said the states
were getting funds now about additional funding. Would you care
to comment on that?
I raised the issue with him that there a lot of those funds
in the pipeline and they have pretty stringent requirements.
Any of you want to comment on that?
Mr. Menchini. I think it is also important to note what
type of financial challenges localities and states are facing
in regard to their radio requirements.
Mr. Etheridge. Right.
Mr. Menchini. One thing many of us have, aging radio
infrastructure that we are already dealing with that need to be
replaced. But the requirements of interoperability are bringing
more and more public safety and first responder users onto our
radio infrastructure is stressing those networks. The need for
us to make them more survivable and the need for us to meet FCC
requirements for narrow banding as well as to be able to
implement 700 megahertz radio frequencies and to begin to move
broadband data capabilities to our first responders is a
tremendous set of undertakings that will have huge cost
implications for localities.
The needs, I think, are really snowballing, and I do not
think any area is able to keep up without tremendous
expenditures that will have to come from other areas of
government.
Chief Werner. If I may add something really quick, what I
see is if we are looking at the state grants, I do not think
any of us at this point know what our state grants will be now
since the federal grant process has changed. With the
vulnerability and risk, a device has now been put in place. The
numbers are going to change, and if you think that the money
that is being given now to states is going to be enough to
achieve interoperability it is not.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Well, it is just you and me.
[Laughter.]
I am going to make this public announcement. I am going to
miss this vote. We are going to wait for Mr. Dicks to come
back. I think he had a couple of questions. I have a couple
more questions. The votes was a vote honoring the service of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Of course, my vote certainly would
have been a yes vote in honoring her service to this nation. We
will make a public record when we go back to the floor of House
later.
I wanted to follow up on a couple of things. You talked a
lot about--I think it was last week I was in Portland and we
chaired a subcommittee hearing on health IT. And one of the
witnesses there testified that there were nearly 800 vendors of
different technologies that touched on just about every problem
that you could think of that may be associated with just the
health IT interoperable discussion.
I imagine there are at least 800 or more vendors out there
with different technologies. In your four jurisdictions how did
you deal with the different myriad of options and choices when
it comes to the technology decisions that you made?
Mr. Drake. Mr. Chairman, there partly lies the whole crux
of the issue that for many systems, both for us in the Portland
area and I know speaking on behalf of many jurisdictions in the
state, you are not looking to new technologies and new systems.
You are looking for ways to bridge the gap.
The real difficulty, I think, for us on a local basis is
either the ability to find a patch to get us there or finding
the barebones system. And you do not have the luxury, I do not
care what the issue is, it could be interoperability, it could
be anything, you ca not just start musing and think, ``What is
it I would like to get,'' and start exploring. Part of it is
this is America, so the vendors come to you, but it also is
just the fact that--
Mr. Reichert. Sorry.
Mr. Drake. That is okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The fact is, is that there is
going to be a basic technology you are working with, and I
think Mr. Menchini touched on it, that there is difficulty in
many cities, many areas just to afford the basics. And whether
you are just trying to get to the next technology, in many
cases you ca not afford to buy that next system; you look for
the patch.
So my comment would be that there are plenty of places you
can go in terms of expertise to find out what the right system
is, but the real issue initially is, can you afford to even do
that patch? And looking ahead to the next technology, in many
cases, is very difficult.
Mr. Reichert. I was just consulting there briefly. There
are 38 police departments within the King County, the county
where I was sheriff in Seattle, and there were a couple of
smaller police departments that purchased a system, more of an
information communications system, I suppose, and it failed. So
they spent $1 million or $2 million in these small cities and
it crumbled on them.
So I guess there is this fear, I think, that at least in
some areas where there is technology out there and there is a
sales job and it looks good, they pay for it, and it blows up
in their face. And that is, kind of, you know, how do you weed
that sort of--
Mr. Drake. Mr. Chairman, I would defer after a quick
comment to my colleagues who have the technical expertise. But
therein lies some of our request in that we get some basic
framework in terms of general guidelines, and I think that
would take care of some of that concern that you would have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Chief Werner. What I think is a part of the question you
are asking is defining what it is that you want the system to
do and then trying to encourage as many people to be a part of
that system. And, fortunately--or unfortunately, or however it
may be perceived--the cost of radio systems, as we know them
today, to meet the requirements that we are hoping to achieve,
are very expensive.
What we did in our locality in the regional perspective is
that all the agencies in the three jurisdictions came together
to do one radio system, which helped to share the cost between
the three. How do you get there? It is defining the
specifications as specifically as you can and making sure that
you have as best an iron clad contract that you can when you
negotiate it. And even then you are not guaranteed that the
system that you get will be what you thought it was going to
be.
Mr. Reichert. In your opinion, should the National Telecom
Communications and Information Administration have
responsibility for administering a $1 billion grant program for
interoperability?
Chief Werner. I guess I will address this first. I guess I
would question why we bring in another agency on top of the
myriad of other agencies that have been involved with
interoperability? Why are we adding one more layer of someone
who has not been involved in this particular discussion?
Mr. Reichert. Yes. I hope you notice that some of the
question I am asking I know the answers to already. I do not
want you to get the idea--Mr. Dicks arrived just in time.
Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
compliment you for holding this hearing. I think this is very
important, and I appreciate the excellent testimony we have had
here today.
What happens, Chief, in a situation where you do not have
any cells, where you are in an area where it is blank and you
need to be able to communicate? The reason I raise this, there
is a company, I think, in your district in Kirkland that has
come up with a way of using wireless and then in a dead zone
they connect up to the iridium satellite.
Now, would that work? I mean, does that sound plausible to
you?
Chief Werner. Well, it depends on the level of
communications that you are talking about. Typically, when you
are talking about satellite communications, it is not a good
tactical solution because of delays, latency of transmissions,
the amount of capacity that can be in place. As far as some
singular command issues and communications between them, it
probably is a good alternative.
Moreover, I would think that if you have areas that do not
have coverage, an alternative would be some type of
transportable tower site that can give you communications
within a region to a cache of radios that allows multiple
agencies to work. I think this is probably similar to what
Forestry has done on many occasions.
I think that we have seen that Forestry has been one of
those areas that has to deal with the very unique logistics of
being in the middle of nowhere and having to communicate and
deal with some very large incidents.
Mr. Dicks. And how do they do that again?
Chief Werner. Well, in some cases, they will bring their
own portable towers that are radio--
Mr. Dicks. Oh, that is right. That is right.
Mr. Menchini. Actually, in New York City, we have an
erectable system, tractor trailer-based that can be rolled to a
hilltop in Central Park, wherever we need to be able to provide
additional coverage and a cache of 500 radios that can be
supported by that system. We keep that on standby, and even
though our infrastructure can support communications, in the
event that we need to have that type of portable capability, we
can roll that in and deploy that very rapidly.
Mr. Dicks. But not everybody has that, right?
Mr. Menchini. No. We acquired after September 11.
Mr. Dicks. Tell me about SAFECOM. I mean, I get the
impression that they are trying to help you, but they are not
adequately staffed, they are not adequately funded, and,
therefore, they are not able to help all the communities that
need to be helped.
Yes. Mr. Proctor?
Mr. Proctor. I believe that to be the case. I believe the
SAFECOM Program is a good effort. I believe they are focused on
some of the things we need to get done. I think they
desperately to hire staff up, hopefully getting some support
from state and local communities, as people change jobs and
change careers, that will give them some direction from the
ground up level to help them focus more on the interoperability
issues.
The Executive Committee, which I am a part of and Charles
has been a part of and the mayor is a part of, has worked
wonders so far in getting this thing off the ground. But they
just physically do not have the people to march through the
bureaucracy of government to get the message down to the lowest
level, which are the states, cities and counties.
And one of the programs previous to the SAFECOM Program was
called the FSWIN Program, and it took the message out to the
cities and counties. They held regional meetings and that was
so critical because it brought people together. It started the
conversation, it started the interaction, one with another, and
it started--
Mr. Dicks. So that is not happening now?
Mr. Proctor. No, it is not.
Mr. Dicks. Unless the region does it itself.
Mr. Proctor. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Mayor Drake, isn't that basically what you have
tried to do down in the Portland area?
Mr. Drake. Yes, Congressman, and, again, being the newest
member of SAFECOM, I did all the brushing up I could do prior
to joining the committee, and I was flabbergasted. I like lean
and that is how I operate my city, but it was skeletal. And I
think the chairman correctly stated that it is permitted to be
staffed at a much higher level.
Mr. Dicks. Well, and the point is, why isn't it staffed
then? I mean, do you have any idea why they have not gotten
more people on board? Is it a lack of will or commitment or it
just takes time? When was SAFECOM stood up? When did they start
this operation?
Mr. Drake. I believe it is about 3 years old, 3.5 years
old.
Mr. Dicks. And not to be partisan, and I am probably one of
the least partisan people you will meet, but this is Congress.
This is not the only area in the Department of Homeland
Security that has gotten off to a very slow start. So one has
to wonder whether there is just not the effort being placed or
the commitment of resources or the willingness to go out and
get these things up and running. That takes leadership, as you
all four represent leaders who have done it in your area. It
takes some commitment from either the White House or Mr.
Chertoff's position or whoever's in charge. Dr. David Boyd, is
he the person?
I mean, it takes somebody that says, ``We have got to get
this done.'' And that is what worries me is that this thing has
dragged on and we are not getting the resources out to the
local communities, and it is not happening.
Now, who is supposed to evaluate all this technology? I
mean, everybody's out there working on coming up with
solutions. We have got several companies in our own state of
Washington that are coming out, one with a software solution
and others with wireless, using satellites. I mean, who
evaluates this? Is Homeland Security in a position, the science
aspects of Homeland Security to do this or does it happen at
the local level? Is it just, kind of, everybody goes out and
presents their technology and it is utilized in some places?
How is that working?
Mr. Menchini. I think it is essential for that to occur at
a local level. And, again, I think first responders, public
safety officials in a local area are the only ones that really
know what their needs are and really would only be able to
determine whether or not a particular technology--and as you
have mentioned, there are so many different technologies and
more arriving every day. How that fits into the needs of a
locality can only be determined by the locality itself.
Mr. Dicks. So you think that is the best way to do it. They
should evaluate, they should--
Mr. Menchini. Well, let me qualify that.
Mr. Dicks. Because you have got each situation is
different. Maybe some things will work in one situation when
they might not work at another place.
Mr. Menchini. I mean, I think it depends on the locality as
well. There are some localities, and you mentioned before, the
chairman, what happens when monies are invented and a
particular solution is not successful. A lot of it has to do
with the fact that in addition to the monies that are needed to
acquire these systems, there needs to be technical staff and
people in that locality that understand these technologies--
and, again, they are changing very rapidly--and understand how
to implement them.
So there is a need for local knowledge, and where that
local knowledge does not exist, I think there might be some
other solutions that need to be considered. But it is not a
one-solution-fits-all.
Mr. Dicks. How many staff people do you all have in your
office working on these issues? You are the staff, right?
Mr. Proctor. We run a system that has over 500 repeaters
located on mountaintops, over the half state of Utah. We have
one director, four technicians and one operations manager, a
secretary and an administrative assistant.
Mr. Dicks. So seven or eight people you are talking about.
Mr. Proctor. That is right. If there are issues with system
problems or things that come up that we ca not handle, we hire
it on a contractual level.
One other thing I wanted to say in defense of Dr. Boyd and
the SAFECOM Program, I think part of the issue why this has not
organized and boiled up to the top is simply all of the changes
that are taking place in the Department of Homeland Security
and all that consolidation and effort that has gone on, I mean,
these folks have had to take this program forward as fast as
they can and get something out on the street. And they have
been successful in doing that, using resources like the EC and
the contractors they have to help.
It takes time, it takes a lot of time to go through a
hiring process to get qualified people to be a part of your
staff. Coming from a state government level, I understand that.
It takes about 2 to 3 months to hire somebody. And I just think
they need to get with it and get moving forward to take care of
that. And part of the issue is, is they have got so many things
on their plate now--
Mr. Dicks. And they have got to find good people too. You
have got to have people who have some background.
Mr. Proctor. That is exactly right. And having just
recently gone through a hiring process for some technical
staff, that pool of technically oriented public safety
personnel is willowing drastically. It is drying up quickly as
people retire. People like me who grew up in the systems go on
to other things and retire.
Mr. Dicks. I would assume the contractors are hiring up
some of these people--
Mr. Proctor. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. --the people that are trying to market this
equipment.
Mr. Proctor. That is correct. They will go to places where
they make more money. A cell company will pay a radio
technician a lot more than a government agency will and give
him all the overtime that he can use.
Mr. Dicks. Chief, how many people do you have working on
this?
Chief Werner. Well, if you look at the state efforts, there
are two people, and if you look at our local efforts, we are
talking about three people. And I guess if you take that in
perspective and say if the state of Virginia is doing their
effort of guidance with two people and we are doing our
coordination with three people and Steve is using seven or
eight people and you reflect that on the national level, would
that give you some perspective of how short we are at the
national level with staffing?
Mr. Dicks. It certainly would.
Mr. Menchini?
Mr. Menchini. Well, when you say, ``people dedicated to
this,'' do you mean to interoperability?
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Menchini. Or to radio infrastructure as a whole?
Mr. Dicks. Well, you know, the whole picture.
Mr. Menchini. The whole picture is one--I mean, we worked
very--
Mr. Dicks. New York's got a lot of people.
Mr. Menchini. We are large.
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Menchini. We are going to be very different, I think,
than some of the other people here at this table. Again, we
have 40,000 police officers alone that are protecting New York
City. And we have approached this, I mean, first of all, with--
and I have the benefit of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg who gets
technology and understands the role that it can play in
supporting not only public safety but regular government
operations.
Commissioner Raymond Kelly from the police department,
Commissioner Nick Scoppetta from the fire department, and Joe
Bruno from the Office of Emergency Management. It is very much
a team and collaborative effort.
So I think we had direction from the top to be able to
address our interoperable radio requirements and to work as a
team. And as a result, the entire radio group, each of those
departments. Have been dedicated towards the planning and
implementation process, which has resulted in a lot of
achievements.
So it is not just a matter of a group dedicated to
interoperability, but it is really incorporating the need for
interoperability into the overall radio infrastructure
development and rollout. We are about to implement--in fact,
one of our next pieces in getting to where we want to be to
support interoperability is to move our fire trucks themselves
onto the same UHF infrastructure that our walkie-talkies are
now on. So that I can turn from a fire truck, turn a channel
and be on the same channel as the fire fighters going into a
fire. That project is--actually, a contract was just awarded to
Motorola for $75 million to build that infrastructure
throughout New York City. We have a mob of people walking to be
able to implement that.
But, again, a strategy that once implemented made every
action of our various radio people moving down a path toward
accomplishing interoperability.
So, again, I am a different situation, but I think it is
key to have a vision, have the leadership and support from
leadership and to be able to make every step and every
investment that you make in line with where you want to be. I
do not know if that answered your question, but--
Mr. Dicks. Yes. That was good.
Mr. Menchini. Okay.
Mr. Dicks. Mayor?
Mr. Drake. Congressman, thank you. The first request from
the National League of Cities is to elevate SAFECOM, and I
would guess being the newbie coming in but understanding
politics, if you are not funding something to the level it
should be and more so giving it the recognition it needs, there
may be difficulty in getting people to complete the task that
SAFECOM is supposed to complete.
Mr. Dicks. They do not think that there is a real
dedication.
Mr. Drake. Well, that would be, I think, NLC's guess that
it is not getting the visibility and recognition it deserves,
and there are so many cities across the country that do not
have the expertise. We do things in a collective way, not only
in my county, I chair our county's 911 Board and in the region
we collectively talk about the technology. But SAFECOM is there
to give some national guidelines, but if it is not elevated to
the level it should be, I think Dr. Boyd's hands are tied then.
Mr. Dicks. So you are not getting guidelines? You are not
getting a lot of input from the national level?
Mr. Drake. Congressman, I do not think we are getting what
we need from SAFECOM, and the NLC is asking that SAFECOM be
given the recognition and the support that it needs to do just
what you are asking.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Well, Mr. Dicks and I are from the same
state, the state of Washington, and this is my first term in
Congress. We are in the United States Congress, and now that we
are here together, we are going to get some things done, right?
Mr. Dicks. That is right. And I have been here 15 terms and
I have never been chairman, so you started off on the right
team.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Reichert. Well, you can always become an R, I guess.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Dicks. I do not think this is the right time for that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Reichert. So you can see we can have some fun even.
We are really serious, though, about this interoperability
effort. This is a committee, and as I think you saw from
previous questions and the previous members' questions, that
there is a real, real deep interest here to make things happen
for our first responders across this country. And it is not
just about interoperability. It is about operability first. It
is about interoperability, not just with our fire departments,
EMS, emergency managers and police departments, but it is also
coordinating the ability to communicate with businesses and to
others now that we recognize Department of Defense, et cetera.
So all of those things are now a part of our discussion
around interoperability. But we have got to start somewhere.
And some of the things that you have mentioned, I mean, it all
starts with leadership. So we recognize that leadership is the
first thing, and Mr. Dicks spoke about leadership in the
Department of Homeland Security. We recognize there is a
weakness there.
We recognize that there are some good things that SAFECOM
has done and at the Office of Interoperability has done and
will continue to do, but we need to be there to help them push
this forward.
And what I also hear loud and clear--and there were a list
of things that I listed off earlier that Mr. Proctor touched
on, I will not go through those again--but loud and clear, each
system has to fit the community and the needs of the community.
I know that, you know that, we all recognize that fact. I see
it very much like the community-oriented policing programs that
were started back years ago. Of course, most cops were a little
bit nervous about community-oriented policing. As one of those
people back them, I was too.
But it is the way that that system was set up in a way to
across the nation set a standard and have performance measures
and have grants attached with the performance that police
agencies across the nation were required to meet that were
molded to the specific communities. And that is the key with
interoperability.
I want to let you know that your testimony, although now
this room is rather bare of members of Congress, is very
important and very key. Your presence here today is going to
get the ball rolling. As with the other witnesses who have
appeared before, will move this issue forward. Your role today
will be an integral part of making interoperability a reality
in this nation.
So both of us who are still here would like to thank you so
much for your testimony and taking time out of your busy
schedule to be here.
Chief, you have the last word.
Chief Werner. I just would like to say thank you all for
letting us come and speak. And one thing I would like to
reinforce is that the one thing that has really been a good
thing that SAFECOM has done that must be noted is the
continuity of grant guidance when it comes to interoperable
communications equipment. There needs to be one force that
decides those guidance standards that go across every agency
that has that money, so that we do not have fragmented and
different understandings of how that money should be spent.
Mr. Reichert. Okay.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Menchini. I would have one message that I would like to
leave. One of the real challenges for us has been that we have
had to react to the grants that are available rather than there
being a dialogue with us as to where our needs are. It is not
my needs, I am in a support role, but where the needs of first
responders are and to have the grants designed to be able to
meet those needs and to have, I think, if SAFECOM can play this
role, that would be terrific, but to have more of a voice in
where grants are available so that when monies do become
available through a grant process, it is more targeted towards
where the actual needs are.
Mr. Reichert. But you do not want them to tell you what you
have to buy, do you?
Mr. Menchini. No.
Mr. Reichert. Wouldn't you like to have some flexibility to
decide what it is that you are going to--
Mr. Menchini. Again, what I think we need to do is to hear
from first responders as to what the problem is that we are
trying to address before we get down to a particular solution.
And then we can talk about having standards, which, again, is a
double-edged sword by getting to a point where the solutions
can be available from the marketplace and can address a need.
But it should really be driven from the need, as articulated by
the public safety first responders themselves, have grants that
are available to meet those needs and then a process in place
to be able fairly distribute those funds.
Mr. Reichert. Out to the people that do the work, right?
Mr. Menchini. That is what we do. It has worked well.
Mr. Reichert. Yes. Absolutely.
Mr. Proctor, did you have one more thing?
Mr. Proctor. Just thank you very much--
Mr. Reichert. You are welcome.
Mr. Proctor. --for the opportunity to be here. And if any
of us ever had to come back, all you would have to do is call.
We would be happy to provide further testimony. We appreciate
the highlight of interoperability that Congress is providing,
appreciate the support you give us and hope that it will end up
in good results out in the field with the folks--
Mr. Reichert. So do we.
Mr. Proctor. --who use it every day.
Mr. Reichert. Are you free at 5 o'clock? No, I am just
kidding.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in
writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
And without objection, the committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
THE STATE OF INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS: PERSPECTIVES
ON FEDERAL COORDINATION OF GRANTS,
STANDARDS, AND TECHNOLOGY
PART III
----------
Tuesday, April 25, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:13 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. David Reichert
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Reichert, Brown-Waite, Pascrell,
Harman, Lowey, Norton, and Christensen.
Mr. Reichert. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology
will come to order. The subcommittee will hear testimony today
on Federal coordination of grants, standards and technology
with respect to inter operability and emergency communications.
I would first like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
taking time out of their busy schedules to be with us today. I
thank you all.
On behalf of the members of the subcommittee, we are glad
that you are here today to share your experiences and your
knowledge with us. We look forward to hearing your testimony
today. This is the final hearing. It is part of series of
hearings examining the state of interoperability. Last fall
following the devastating loss of communication capabilities as
a result of Hurricane Katrina, the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science and Technology examined how the
operability of communication was the foundation of any
interoperable system.
On February 15, 2006, the subcommittee held the second of
four hearings dedicated to examining the ongoing challenges of
achieving interoperable communications during times of
emergency. That hearing analyzed the role and ability of State
troopers, fire volunteers, health care facility operators, and
managers of critical infrastructure and high risk targets to
communicate during times of emergency. Unlike past hearings
that focused on the challenges faced by first responders at the
scene of an emergency, the third hearing held in March looked
at the leadership role of State and local governments in
achieving interoperability.
From each witness we heard the same thing. We heard about
the need for consistent leadership, for policy makers and
government officials to work together more effectively, not for
billions of dollars in additional funding.
Today's hearing will feature two panels. The first panel
consists of the Federal agencies principally responsible for
helping State and local governments achieve interoperable
emergency communication capabilities. We want to examine the
extent to which these various Federal agencies coordinate their
activities and grant programs.
The second panel consists of Federal and nongovernmental
entities with expertise in emergency communications standards
and technology. Of particular concern is the slow pace of
identifying standards.
The government's foremost duty is to safeguard our Nation.
When our police officers, firefighters, emergency medical
service personnel, public health officials and others charged
with safeguarding America are unable to effectively and
efficiently interoperate by communicating and coordinating
their emergency response, their safety and the lives of those
they are aiding are at grave risk. Our Nation has learned the
lesson that incompatible emergency communication systems impede
intergovernmental coordination efforts. The Federal Government
has a long history of addressing Federal, State and local
government public safety issues. The important work of
government requires many partnerships, including the active
participation of private industry, particularly the technology
sector, which is why we have an industry representative with us
today.
In summation, DHS, Department of Homeland Security, has
obligated $2.1 billion to States and local governments thus far
to improve interoperability through the purchase of
communications equipment and associated projects. In addition,
other Federal agencies within the Department of Justice and
Commerce, along with the Federal Communications Commission,
have made and continue to make significant human and fiscal
investments for interoperable emergency communications.
The question before us today is whether our Federal efforts
and investments are synchronized and integrated to ensure that
the right people have the right information at the right time.
So the right decisions are made to protect America. The Chair
now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Pascrell, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
fourth and final hearing on the challenges of achieving
interoperable communications during times of crisis.
It goes without saying that this is an issue of utmost
urgency. I am truly hopeful that this subcommittee, with the
leadership of the chairman, will have as its legacy a lasting
solution to the communication problems that plague our
emergency responders and have plagued them for the last 15 to
20 years. Indeed, we are thus far engaged in a robust
exploration on this subject. Speaking extensively to a variety
of first responders and State and local government officials,
we are all ready for the line, ``slowly I turned'' when we hear
the world interoperability.
Over the recess, I had the opportunity to attend a field
hearing and the chairman's district in Washington State,
Warden. What we heard from local officials and emergency
managers there were the same things I hear daily from safety
personnel back in Patterson, New Jersey, that is interoperable
communication is critical to defending the homeland and
performing everyday public safety services.
The simple fact is this: Lives depend on solving the
communications crisis, once and for all. We understand this and
we are working towards comprehensive legislation that will
truly tackle this problem. That is the purpose and product of
our hearings hopefully.
This hearing with its notable witnesses representing the
principal Federal agencies responsible for coordinating
communication and the communication systems with State and
local jurisdictions will no doubt help us as we move forward.
Today we must examine whether the Department of Homeland
Security is truly acting as the Federal Government's lead
agency in coordinating interoperable communication among
Federal, State and local governments. We need to probe into the
role that various agencies have in assisting the coordination
efforts of State and local governments. And we need to identify
the Federal Government's strategy for developing a national
emergency communications plan.
You know I have been pretty tough on the FCC but the other
Federal agencies cannot get their act together in basically
enunciating what their goals are, and the FCC cannot do very
much for us.
Critical issues--ll of those things are critical--nd issues
that have been with us now for too long. It has been said
before but it is worth stating repeatedly, when the 9/11
Commission released its final report it found that the
inability of our first responders to talk with other each other
and their commanders resulted in a loss of life. That is
unacceptable and we must all have a sense of urgency about
this. This is not a committee assignment or a term paper.
The 9/11 Commission also identified the need for more
spectrum as crucial to assist emergency responders in
communicating during an emergency such as a terrorist attack or
hurricane, and I am convinced that the FCC is now moving in the
right direction, Mr. Moran. I would not say that unless I
believed it. In 1996, 10 years ago, the Congress asked a blue
ribbon committee, the public safety wireless advisory
committee, to examine the issue of interoperable
communications. And it concluded, that is 10 years ago, that
public safety agencies did not have sufficient radio spectrum
to do their jobs, but spectrum is not the only impediment to
success. As the Department of Homeland Security has concluded,
barriers that hinder well coordinated interoperability of
efforts are both technical and human. Different jurisdictions
may use different equipment, may communicate using different
radio frequency bands. There is limited amount of radio
spectrum available to public safety. ``Funding to replace aging
communications equipment is limited, and is subject to
jurisdictional budget cycles.''
I think that capsulized pretty well what the problem is
here. So we have known about the problems. This is 10 years
ago. And many have explored the possible remedies that we
should undertake, but while some progress has been made, we are
still far from where we need to be.
With this in mind, the President's fiscal year 2007 budget
requests no funds for grants to enhance interoperability. The
President's fiscal year 2007 budget proposes to eliminate the
COPS interoperability grant program, which is charged with
awarding technology grants to law enforcement agencies for the
purpose of enhancing interoperability and information and
sharing.
Is the administration talking out of both sides of its
mouth? It is long past the point where we in Washington pay lip
service to this problem without actually demanding true
results. We are talking about human life. And we talk about
these guys and gals, we pat them on the back, we say all nice
things about them, but really, we are talking about protecting
their lives, helping local agencies protect the lives of people
that are on the line every day.
I know my chairman feels the same way that I do, and for
that I am grateful. I look forward to continued collaboration
with my friend, Chairman Reichert, to help propose serious
solutions to serious problems. I want to thank the witnesses
for being here today and I look forward for your testimony.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. Other members of the
committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted
for the record. We are pleased to have two distinguished panels
with us today and we will now call the first panel. And with us
today we have the honorable Tracy Henke, Assistant Secretary of
Office and Grants and Training, Directorate of Preparedness,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Dr. David Boyd, director,
Office of Interoperability and Compatibility, Directorate of
Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
And Mr. John Kneuer was supposed to be here, but unfortunately
has a family emergency and could not be with us today.
Next Mr. Kenneth Moran, director, Office of Homeland
Security, Federal Communications Commission; and Mr. Carl Peed,
executive director, Office of Community Oriented Policing
Service, U.S. Department of Justice.
Mr. Reichert. The Chair now recognizes the Honorable Tracy
Henke to testify.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRACY HENKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF
GRANTS AND TRAINING, DIRECTORATE OF PREPAREDNESS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Henke. Thank you, Chairman Reichert, Congressman
Pascrell and members of the committee. I am pleased to have
this opportunity to discuss the efforts of the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Grants and Training to enhance
State and local interoperable communications. The Department
recognizes the critical importance of interoperable
communications in enabling our Nation's public safety personnel
to respond quickly, safely, and effectively during an
emergency. For this reason, the Office of Grants and Training
is working with our partners at the Federal, State, local,
territorial, and tribal levels to build interoperable
communication capabilities throughout the country.
As you may know, Mr. Chairman, strengthening interoperable
communications capabilities is one of seven priorities set by
the interim National Preparedness Goal. The Goal is designed to
help State and local jurisdictions understand what they need to
do in order to be able to respond to a terrorist attack or a
natural disaster. At Grants and Training, we have refocused our
funding, refocused our training, our exercises and our
technical assistance programs to provide the resources State
and local leaders need to meet the capabilities and
preparedness levels set by the National Preparedness Goal,
including interoperable communications.
Today, 43 out of 56 States and territories are working at
some level on a Statewide interoperable communications project
using G&T funding or technical assistance. However, as you
know, Mr. Chairman, we rely on the Department's Science and
Technology Directorate to develop interoperable communications
standards and to conduct research in this area. Grants and
Training's focus is on providing assistance to States to help
State and local jurisdictions purchase interoperable
communications equipment, develop interoperable communication
systems, but I want to stress it is more than just equipment.
It is also helping States and local jurisdictions plan, train
and exercise. In the past 2 years, we have awarded $2.1 billion
in grants for this purpose and developed two major initiatives
for which we provided technical expertise and guidance.
Our interoperable communications technical assistance
program is working with jurisdictions across the country to
help them design and implement interoperable communications
systems. Since the program was created in 2003, we have
allocated almost $38 million to support what we call the ICTAP
and provide assistance to nine States, four territories, and 58
local jurisdictions throughout the Nation. Currently, we are
working to respond to requests for assistance from another
seven States, one territory and four localities. In addition to
the technical assistance provided under ICTAP, we are also
working to help major urban areas across the country develop a
tactical, interoperable communications plan.
As you know, the 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program
required each of the 50 jurisdictions participating in our
Urban Areas Security Initiative to develop a plan for providing
incident-based critical voice communications among all first
responder agencies. States and territories without an urban
area specified were required to designate an area to meet this
requirement. These plans are due to Grants and Training on May
1st for review and approval.
In addition, in early May, we have invited teams from all
approximately 75 participating jurisdictions to Washington to
help them plan full-scale exercises to validate their
interoperable communication plans and identify gaps in
planning, coordination and technology. The teams will use this
information to develop an improvement plan that will document
the specific steps the region can take to improve
communications interoperability. At the same time, the States
and localities as well as the Office of Grants and Training and
the Department will use the information gained from the
exercises and the after action reports to help determine
interoperability investments under our Fiscal Year 2007 grant
programs. Grants and Training works closely with SAFECOM as
well as the Justice Department, the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration at the Department of Commerce
and other Federal partners to coordinate our efforts to improve
interoperable communications among our Nation's emergency
responders.
However, Mr. Chairman, we recognize that there is no silver
bullet solution or one-size-fits-all answer to resolving the
issues of communications interoperability. Assistance must be
tailored to the unique needs and resources of each
jurisdiction. For this reason, the Office of Grants and
Training will continue to work closely with our partners at the
State and local levels, as well as on a national level to
ensure that our Nation's first line of home defense, our State
and local responders, have the technology, the training and the
tools they need to effectively communicate before, during and
after a crisis.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I am happy to answer questions
at the appropriate time.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Henke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tracy A. Henke
April 25, 2006
Chairman Reichert, Congressman Pascrell, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I am Tracy Henke, and I serve as the Assistant Secretary
of the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) within the Preparedness
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It is my
pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the current status of
the Department's efforts to enhance state and local interoperable
communications, and our coordination internal and external to the
Department of Homeland Security.
I wanted to thank the Members of the Committee for your ongoing
support of the Department. I also thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
foresight and leadership on the issue of interoperable communications,
which is a cornerstone of our ability to save lives and protect
property during threatened or actual emergencies and disasters
including terrorist events.
Mr. Chairman, G&T is an essential element of the Department's
capacity building efforts at the state, local, territorial, and tribal
levels to deter, prevent, respond, and recover from emergencies and
disasters of all kinds, including terrorism. DHS, through G&T, has
worked with Federal agencies and state and local jurisdictions to
develop and disseminate information to assist in making more informed
preparedness decisions, including capability assessments, preparedness
planning and strategies, and choices relating to training, technical
assistance, equipment, and exercises.
G&T and its predecessor organization has provided assistance to all
50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. territories. Through our programs and initiatives, more
than 1.4 million emergency responders from more than 5,000
jurisdictions have been trained and conducted more than 500 exercises.
By the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, states and localities will have
received from DHS over $17.9 billion in assistance and direct support
since September 11, 2001. This includes specifically $2.1 billion in
grant assistance that states and local jurisdictions have obligated
thus far to improve interoperability through the purchase of
communications equipment and other projects.
The Department's three primary sources of financial assistance to
states and local communities, the State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP), Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI), require states and urban areas to
assess their risk, capabilities, and needs, including requirements
relating to interoperable communications. These assessments and
strategies have given us valuable information on the current state of
interoperable communications and how various states and localities are
addressing this issue. While financial assistance is an important tool
with which we support our state and local partners, the Department
offers a wide array of support through technical assistance, training
and exercise programs.
INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS A PRIORITY UNDER HSPD-8
As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, on December 17, 2003, the
President issued ``Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8.''
Through HSPD-8, the President tasked the Department of Homeland
Security, in coordination with other Federal departments, as well as
state and local jurisdictions, to develop a National Preparedness Goal
to improve the delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and
local jurisdictions, and strengthen the preparedness capabilities of
Federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments.
Through the work that is being conducted under HSPD-8, the
Department has developed an Interim National Preparedness Goal that
establishes measurable readiness priorities and targets that
appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources
required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.
This effort is producing readiness metrics and elements that
support the National Preparedness Goal, including standards for
preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the
Nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events. The National
Preparedness Goal focuses on seven national priorities, including
``Strengthening Interoperable Communications Capabilities.'' This
priority is meant to achieve interoperability not only in terms of
communications, but also in the broad ability of systems and
organizations to provide service and to accept service from one another
across jurisdiction lines, enabling them to operate effectively
together.
It should be noted as well that two recent Hurricane Katrina
reports--one from Congress and the other from the White House--both
mention the enhancement of public safety communications
interoperability as a critical National priority. The Department is
working to enhance Nationwide communications interoperability through a
number of different programs and initiatives. I would like to take this
opportunity to discuss these initiatives with the Subcommittee.
INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ICTAP)
In the area specific to my direction, G&T administers more than
three dozen technical assistance programs. One of our most important
technical assistance efforts to date is the Interoperable
Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP). ICTAP is designed
to enhance interoperable communications among local, state, and Federal
emergency responders and public safety officials, and is associated
with the UASI grant program. The goal of the ICTAP program is to enable
local public safety agencies to communicate as they prevent or respond
to a weapons of mass destruction attack. ICTAP also leverages and works
with other Federal, state, and local interoperability efforts whenever
possible to enhance the overall capacity for agencies and individuals
to communicate with one another. This program enables the jurisdictions
to understand the scope of their interoperability needs, and implement
solutions to address those needs.
ICTAP has received requests for assistance from 46 of the
Department's 50 UASI partners, as well as 9 States and 5 U.S.
Territories. In the past 4 years, $37.9 million has been made available
for ICTAP's efforts. All requests for ICTAP assistance are coordinated
through the states to ensure consistency with state, and, where
applicable, the urban area homeland security strategies. ICTAP provides
technical assistance at no cost to jurisdictions in conjunction with
the implementation of state and UASI preparedness strategies. This
process streamlines the relationship between the requests for
interoperability funding and the need for technical assistance and
training to ensure it is used effectively. In the context of ICTAP's
work, it is essential that we neither duplicate nor contradict any
other Federal, state or local interoperability initiatives. In
conjunction with our Federal partners, we have striven to present a
coordinated approach. The current listing of the states, regions and
territories in which we are working is attached to my testimony in
Appendix A.
While the ICTAP program has provided significant assistance and
support to a number of urban areas and states, it is important to note
that there are no ``silver-bullet solutions'' that we can ``drop-off''
in a region that will resolve its problems. From start to finish,
interoperability requires a great deal of work and coordination with
the key communication stakeholders in that region.
TACTICAL INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATION PLANS
As part of the FY 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) each
of the Department's 50 UASI partners was required to develop a Tactical
Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP). States and territories that
did not have a designated urban area were required through grant
guidance to designate a multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area or
region as a substitute. There are now a total of 75 urban areas and
multi-jurisdictional metropolitan areas that are required to submit a
TICP. This initiative builds on an effort led by SAFECOM and G&T in FY
2004 called RapidCom that focused on achieving tactical-level emergency
interoperable communications in ten major urban areas. States are
required to submit the TICPs to G&T by May 1, 2006, for review and
approval.
Tactical interoperable communications is defined as the rapid
provision of on-scene, incident based mission critical voice
communications among first-responder agencies (EMS, fire, and law
enforcement), as appropriate for the incident, and in support of
incident command system as defined in the National Incident Management
System (NIMS). Each TICP has six critical elements:
(1) Urban Area Information--A basic description of the urban/
metropolitan area and its efforts to address interoperable
communications. A list off all agencies represented in the TICP
including those agencies represented in the Urban Area Working
Group
(2) Governance Structure--An overview of the governance
structure including the contact information for the members of
the governing body
(3) Interoperable Equipment--A detailed listing of all
interoperable communication equipment available in the urban/
metropolitan area
(4) Policies and Procedures--Specific information on how urban/
metropolitan areas will utilize their communications equipment
and adhere to proper protocol
(5) Incident response plan--A detailed listing of functional
disciplines to which the TICP applies, and plans for how the
available interoperable communications equipment will be used
within the NIMS structure to support the response to the
incident.
(6) Training--Information on the progress and future plans to
ensure that adequate staff are training as communications unit
leaders as defined by NIMS
The objective is for each Urban Area to have plan that will allow
them to achieve command level interoperability within one hour of the
incident. Within 6 months of submitting their TICPs, G&T will provide,
if requested, direct assistance to the 75 identified areas to validate
the plans by conducting a full scale exercise. The exercise will be
evaluated by a team of subject matter experts and will utilize exercise
evaluation guidelines that are consistent with previously identified
target capabilities to improve interoperable communications. At the
conclusion of the exercise, an after action report (AAR) for each of
the 75 identified areas will be created to clearly present any issues
the public safety community must address, including recommendations to
achieve meaningful communication interoperability. Included in the AAR,
as an appendix, will be an improvement plan that will document specific
steps the region can take to improve their interoperability. Meanwhile,
the Science and Technology Directorate Office of Interoperability and
Compatibility is in the process of conducting a Nationwide Baseline
Survey to measure the capabilities necessary for first responder
agencies to achieve communications interoperability. Through the TICP
exercise, the subsequent AAR process, and Nationwide Baseline Survey,
the Department can identify shortfalls, and work with our state and
local partners to fill communication gaps and focus resources for where
they are needed the most to improve communication interoperability.
This effort should drive state's FY 2007 investments related to
interoperability.
DHS COORDINATION
As we are all aware, there are a number of different activities
both within DHS, as well as in other departments that involve
interoperable communications issues. The range of activities includes
research, development and testing of interoperability solutions;
defining industry standards; conducting nationwide baseline surveys;
designing long term national interoperability strategies; and
operational delivery of systems and training and technical assistance.
We work hard to closely coordinate these efforts.
SAFECOM
The Department is well aware of the importance of developing
national interoperability policy. For guidance on these issues, G&T
relies on SAFECOM, which is the Federal government's umbrella office
for coordination of public safety interoperability programs, to provide
standards and conduct research that can help our jurisdictions develop
a better interoperable communications program. As an example, all FY
2006 guidance for G&T grant programs that provide eligibility for
spending on communications interoperability requires compliance with
the SAFECOM grant guidance on interoperability. In addition, ICTAP is
examining how to incorporate the findings from the recently developed
SAFECOM Statement of Requirements (SoR) for Wireless Public Safety
Communications and Interoperability. The SoR contains interoperability
scenarios describing how SAFECOM envisions technology enhancing public
safety. In addition, we have entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with SAFECOM to codify the areas in which we can work more effectively
together. This includes continuation of grant support for SAFECOM
projects like the Statewide Communication Interoperable Planning
methodology, as well as coordinating other areas of mutual interest
such as the dissemination of grant guidance and providing technical
assistance in the field. SAFECOM has also recently allocated resources
to support the development and subsequent exercise validation of the
TICP. SAFECOM will soon distribute a national survey to assess the
baseline communications capabilities of thousands of state and local
public safety agencies. We look forward to combining these results with
the results of the TICP process to gain a more detailed picture of
interoperability capabilities.
NIMS Integration Center
The NIMS is a nationwide approach for all levels of government to
work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for and respond to
domestic incidents. Together with SAFECOM, the NIMS Integration Center
(NIC) is currently developing the Communications Unit Leader (COML)
training course referenced in FY 05 HSGP Guidance for the TICP. ICTAP
assisted the NIC in developing the core competencies for the COML that
will be used as part of the certification requirements. When completed,
the COML will be integrated into existing DHS training programs.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
Federal Interagency Coordination Council (FICC)
G&T, is represented on the Federal Interagency Coordination Council
(FICC) addressing interoperability. The FICC, which is chaired by
SAFECOM, seeks to avoid duplication, promote best practices and
coordinate Federal grants and technical assistance among the Federal
agencies supporting public safety interoperable wireless communications
improvements.
Coordination with the Department of Justice
In coordinating with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on
interoperability initiatives, the Department through G&T has ensured
that response agencies have incorporated this work into their homeland
security interoperability efforts. For example, ICTAP has worked
closely with personnel from DOJ's Integrated Wireless Network, Wireless
Management Office--25 Cities Program, National Institute of Justice-
CommTech Program, and Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)--
Interoperable Communications Technology Program to ensure that ongoing
Federal efforts are closely coordinated.
Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications (FPIC)
We also participate in Federal Partnership for Interoperable
Communications (FPIC) meetings. FPIC's goal is to foster partnerships
among Federal agencies that promote the exchange of knowledge and
resources among members of the wireless communications community. This
participation assists in the creation and maintenance of a Federal
roadmap to achieve wireless communications interoperability across
Federal departments, bureaus, and agencies.
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), located within the Department of Commerce, received a
significant source of funding for interoperable communications grants
to states and localities through the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
(Public Law 109-171). Under provisions of the bill, the Assistant
Secretary of NTIA is authorized to use $1 billion from the Digital
Television Transition and Public Safety Fund to carry out a grant
program to assist public safety agencies in the acquisition of,
deployment of, or training for the use of interoperable communications
systems that utilize, or enable interoperability with systems that can
utilize, reallocated public safety spectrum for radio communications.
The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with NTIA to
ensure that any grants provided under this program are consistent with
the approach taken by G&T and the SAFECOM initiatives. Further, DHS is
committed to working with NTIA to ensure that these funds are spent in
a manner that will have a meaningful impact on the state of
communications interoperability.
CONCLUSION
In closing, thank you for convening this hearing on the vital issue
of communications interoperability. The Department of Homeland Security
is committed to working with Congress and our stakeholders to continue
to address this critical area of need. It is a cornerstone effort to
enhancing our Nation's preparedness. Mr. Chairman, let me reinforce the
Department of Homeland Security's continuing commitment to support the
Nation's state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to ensure that
America's emergency responders have the ability to effectively
communicate before, during, and after a crisis. This concludes my
prepared statement. I am happy to respond to any questions that you and
the members of the Committee may have. Thank you.
Appendix A: States and UASI Sites Receiving Support Under the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance
Programs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active UASI ICTAP Sites
---------------------------------------------------- Pending UASI ICTAP ICTAP States ICTAP U.S.
Sites Territories
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anaheim, CA Orlando, FL Long Beach, CA California Guam
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta, GA Philadelphia, PA Alabama Connecticut Northern Mariana
Islands
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baton Rouge, LA Phoenix, AZ Baltimore, MD Hawaii Puerto Rico
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buffalo, NY Pittsburg, PA South Carolina Idaho Virgin Islands
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charlotte, NC Portland, OR Iowa Kentucky
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago, IL San Antonio, TX Utah Louisiana
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cincinnati, OH San Diego, CA Montana New York
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cleveland, OH San Francisco, CA Wyoming New Jersey
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Columbus, OH San Jose, CA Boston, MA Washington
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dallas/Ft. Worth/ Santa Ana, CA Rhode Island
Arlington, TX
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Denver, CO Seattle, WA Sacramento, CA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detroit, MI St. Louis, MO American Samoa
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fresno, CA Tampa, FL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Honolulu, HI Toledo, OH
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Houston, TX Twin Cities, MN
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indianapolis, IN Washington, DC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jacksonville, FL Alaska
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas City, MO Arkansas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Las Vegas, NV Delaware
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los Angeles, CA Kansas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Louisville, KY Maine
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miami, FL Mississippi
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milwaukee, WI North Dakota
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Haven, CT New Hampshire
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Orleans, LA New Mexico
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York City, NY South Dakota
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oakland, CA Tennessee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oklahoma City, OK Vermont
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omaha, NE West Virginia.....
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Reichert. The Chair recognizes Dr. Boyd.
STATEMENT OF DAVID BOYD, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTEROPERABILITY
AND COMPATIBILITY, DIRECTORATE OF PREPAREDNESS, DHS
Mr. Boyd. Good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member
Pascrell, and members of the subcommittee. I want to thank you
for inviting me to speak to you today.
As the events of September 11 and Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita demonstrated, interoperability is not possible when the
foundation for operations has been degraded or destroyed.
The White House report on Hurricane Katrina said it
plainly. ``The complete devastation of the communications
infrastructure in the gulf region left responders without a
reliable network to use for coordinating emergency response
operations.'' Secretary Chertoff has made this issue a top
priority for the Department.
SAFECOM, the Presidential management initiative,
established to strengthen and coordinate interoperability
initiatives at all levels of government, has created highly
successful tools and methodologies to achieve interoperability
and initiated and coordinated communications research and
development initiatives across the Federal Government. These
tools support all the technical, policy and best practices
elements required to achieve interoperability.
While I am pleased to report that we have made significant
progress on many fronts, I want to be clear that moving the
Nation's 60,000 public safety agencies toward wireless
interoperability is an enormous undertaking. Much remains to be
done at all levels of government if we are to be successful.
SAFECOM grant guidance, for example, is required by OMB to be
included in every Federal grant program that may support
communications investments. The guidance identifies the
requirements that must exist before Federal funds can be spent
on equipment procurement and brings clarity to grant recipients
regarding how to best build, maintain, upgrade and operate
communications systems to promote interoperability. In the 15
years, before SAFECOM undertook the coordination of standards
for interoperability, only one standard in the P25 suite of
eight had been created. Under SAFECOM leadership and funding
and with the collaboration of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, and the support of both industry and
our public safety partners, we dramatically accelerated this
process, completing at least three additional standards just
since last October.
Products incorporating these standards should be available
in about a year, but I want to emphasize that standards cannot,
by themselves, achieve interoperability. It is possible
however, as we demonstrated in RapidCom 1, that command level
emergency interoperability can be achieved, even in the absence
of comprehensive standards in any community willing to commit
to SAFECOM guidelines. In accordance with the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, SAFECOM took its
statewide communications interoperability planning guide, the
SCIP, first piloted with the State of Virginia, and initiated
two additional regional communications pilots, one in Nevada
and one in Kentucky, to create locally-driven plans for
improving public safety communications. At the same time, we
worked to better integrate the urban areas of Las Vegas, Nevada
and Louisville, Kentucky into their respective statewide plans.
These initiatives are producing comprehensive communications
and interoperability plans that will provide a viable framework
for a unified multi-jurisdictional response to high consequence
events.
This effort has yielded essential tools and best practices
that will be applied by localities and will States on a
national level. In fact, the city of Louisville will put
Kentucky's interoperability plan to the test in its
preparations for the May 6 Kentucky Derby.
SAFECOM also continues to work with the National Governors
Association, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and similar
organizations that can function as a force multiplier for
wireless interoperability.
The National Governors Associations Policy Academy, for
example, worked last year with five States to introduce SAFECOM
tools and methodologies to their interoperability planning and
will expand this efforts to include additional sites this year.
Several more SAFECOM tools and resources will be delivered in
the coming months, including a request for a proposal RFP tool,
to help agencies write proposals that ensure they get what they
need and ensure that what they get is compatible with SAFECOM's
national guidance, guidance to help jurisdictions test and
evaluate plans, procedures and equipment in preparing for an
all-hazard incident. This tabletop methodology originally
employed in RapidCom 1 is being enhanced for use in RapidCom 2
with the Office of Grants and Training, a national baseline
study to provide the first ever quantitative assessment of the
Nation's level of interoperability and continued funding and
coordination of research and development initiatives into new
technologies, such as software-defined radio, IP, and cognitive
radio initiatives already underway in defense, DHS, NIST, and
others.
More SAFECOM activities and accomplishments can be found in
my statement for the record and in the SAFECOM toolkits which
we provided to each of your offices as well as on the SAFECOM
Web site.
The SAFECOM strategy is built on an understanding that
achieving both operability and interoperability, among the
Nation's public safety agencies is a national, not just a
Federal effort. I would be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
[The statement of Boyd follows:]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of Dr. David Boyd
Tuesday, April 25, 2006
Introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak to you
today.
When I appeared before this committee late last year, I testified
that SAFECOM \1\ is the federal program dedicated to improving the
connectivity of the 60,000 public safety agencies through interoperable
wireless communications. With this program, we are working to enable
public safety agencies to communicate across jurisdictions and
disciplines during a disaster to ensure a coordinated response to save
lives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SAFECOM is a communications program of the Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), managed by the Office of
Systems Engineering and Development in the Science and Technology
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). SAFECOM
provides research, development, testing and evaluation, guidance,
tools, and templates on communications-related issues to local, tribal,
state, and federal public safety agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today's testimony will focus on the state of interoperable
communications and what S&T is doing to improve communications and
interoperability across the nation. Specifically, the testimony will
address S&T's interoperability initiatives and the formidable
challenges that are inherent in moving the nation's public safety
community towards wireless interoperability.
In discussing interoperability, I must be clear about the
relationship between operability and interoperability. Simply put,
operability must be in place for interoperability to be possible.
Operability exists when responders have a basic level of
communications. Once that is established, interoperability--defined as
the ability for public safety agencies to talk to one another via radio
communications systems to exchange voice and/or data with one another
on demand, in real time, when needed, regardless of specific spectrum
or technology--becomes possible.
Operability, or lack thereof, played a key role in the recent
natural disasters of 2005. While people may assume that public safety
agencies are already interoperable, these recent disasters tell a
different story. Too many emergency responders still cannot talk to
parts of their own organizations, let alone communicate with agencies
in neighboring cities, counties, or states, during a crisis. As
September 11, 2001 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated,
interoperability is not possible when the foundation for operations has
been degraded or destroyed. It is essential that operability remain a
focus point.
The White House report on Hurricane Katrina released in February
said it plainly: ``The complete devastation of the communications
infrastructure [in the Gulf region] left responders without a reliable
network to use for coordinating emergency response operations.'' \2\
Because operability is the foundation of interoperability, Secretary
Chertoff has made this issue one of the Department's highest
priorities. In a recent speech he pointed out that ``in addition to
interoperability, you have to have operability. If all of the
communications have been blown down, if the satellite phones are
running out of power, if all the radio towers are down, then it's not a
question of interoperability, it's a question of ability to operate at
all.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lesson
Learned (2006) pg. 37.
\3\ Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff to the International
Association of Fire Fighters Legislative Conference March 21, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence indicates that operability cannot be ensured in austere
conditions in many of the nation's 60,000 public safety agencies. We
must make a concerted effort to remove the obstacles that are
preventing these agencies from achieving basic operability. While most
public safety agencies have some basic level of communication,
operability remains an issue of concern, as it must be in place before
interoperability becomes possible. Toward this end, SAFECOM has made
significant progress in overcoming some of the most common barriers to
operability in emergency incidents by providing guidance for achieving
operability and by addressing issues associated with system migration
and the coordination of communications spectrum policy. Tools which
SAFECOM has developed that address operability include the coordinated
grant guidance and the Statement of Requirements (SoR). SAFECOM will
soon conduct the National Interoperability Baseline survey to determine
the level of operability and interoperability across the nation.
SAFECOM will also leverage the Office of Grants and Training's (G&T)
Communications Assets Survey and Mapping tool, which inventories
infrastructure information, to help determine the level of public
safety operability in the nation today.
It is important to remember that facilitating operability and
interoperability between and among the nation's public safety agencies
requires a national rather than a Federal effort. It requires public
safety practitioners at all levels of government and across the nation
to work collaboratively to develop a better appreciation of the steps
they must take to achieve operability and interoperability and of the
tools and resources that are available through SAFECOM that will help
them along the way.
To address the most urgent interoperability needs, however, SAFECOM
is working with its Federal partners \4\ to develop and implement a
national strategy that ensures that all public safety agencies have the
necessary tools and resources to meet the immediate demands for
interoperability to meet the most likely emergencies, and to support
the migration from their existing communications capabilities to more
interoperable systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ SAFECOM's partners are listed in Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to provide an overview of the components--the tools and
initiatives--that SAFECOM is using to help local and state public
safety agencies accelerate their communications progress now, but I
also want to make clear that while we are making significant progress
on a number fronts, much more remains to be done.
Impact on Interoperable Communications
Operational Support
One major SAFECOM effort is focused on assisting local and state
agencies in the development of interoperable communications plans.
While SAFECOM recognizes that each locality and state may have
different communications needs and requirements, the effective
implementation of consistent criteria in each plan provides a common
foundation for establishing an interoperable system. SAFECOM,
therefore, provides guidance, tools, and coordination in support of
these local and state needs. To this end, SAFECOM is working with G&T
to leverage resources to provide funding and technical assistance. The
following sections describe SAFECOM initiatives that focus on near-term
local, statewide, and/or regional interoperable communications support.
RapidCom
In 2004, SAFECOM, in coordination with G&T, took steps to improve
interoperability in 10 top-threat cities through the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI). RapidCom 1 helped the targeted areas
achieve interoperable communications between incident commanders within
one hour of an event. This effort incorporated tabletop exercises,
planning support, tool development, training, and technology operating
procedures to ensure better communications among top-level officials in
each city. SAFECOM published a report on lessons learned from RapidCom
1 to assist states and localities in their effort to implement a system
of interoperable communications. To continue this initiative, $5
million was appropriated to S&T's Office for Interoperability and
Compatibility (OIC) to expand RapidCom in FY 2006.
The Interoperability Continuum (see fig. 1), is an example of one
of the tools that supported the RapidCom initiative. It allows public
safety agencies to assess progress in key areas affecting
interoperability such as governance, standard operating procedures,
technology, training and exercises, and usage. The Interoperability
Continuum is designed to illustrate how communications interoperability
is a complex goal, requiring multiple simultaneous improvements in
communications use, governance, standard operating procedures,
technology, and training/exercises. The degree of interoperability
depends upon the improvement of all five of these factors--no one
factor (e.g. technology) is the solution to obtaining interoperability.
For this reason, OIC and G&T have invested considerable resources into
developing standards, providing technical assistance to state and local
entities, and facilitating regional coordination and standard operating
procedures. Communications continues to be one of the largest uses of
G&T grant funds by states and urban areas--to date, nearly $2.2 billion
has been spent for interoperable communications since September 11,
2001.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 36399.002
emergency response agencies at both local and state levels have been
directly involved in the planning efforts. As a result, state
leadership has succeeded in designing systems that are in line with the
diverse needs of their public safety stakeholders. The Policy Academies
of the National Governors Association's Center for Best Practices also
use the SCIP to help improve statewide interoperable communications in
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, and Wisconsin. These states now have
a roadmap based on a locally-driven, bottom-up approach to planning for
improving communications systems. The SCIP methodology is posted on
SAFECOM's Web site.
According to Chris Essid, Virginia's Commonwealth Interoperability
Coordinator within the Office of the Secretary of Public Safety,
``Virginia now has a Strategic Plan for Statewide Communications
Interoperability that was developed by local public safety responders
for local public safety responders.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning (SCIP)
Methodology, November 2004 http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/
9628BE4B-E7A5-4F1B-9179-2CFCF2653CA9/0/SCIPMethodology.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As SAFECOM works to strengthen local and state initiatives to
develop interoperable communications plans, it has made significant
progress in addressing a requirement of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). In its work with
Nevada and Kentucky on the RCIP projects, SAFECOM ensured that state
and local coordination remained a priority in the states' efforts to
develop interoperable communications plans. Input from emergency
responders and policy makers from all levels of government has been
incorporated into the RCIP to provide the most comprehensive plan for
Nevada and Kentucky.
The impact of SAFECOM's work reaches beyond Nevada and Kentucky and
across the nation. By leveraging the lessons learned, best practices,
and subsequent templates, SAFECOM is able to provide jurisdictions
nationwide with the tools to successfully initiate planning processes
based on sound, practitioner-driven input. The guidance has also been
promulgated through G&T. As a pre-condition for interoperability
funding in next year's (FY2007) Homeland Security Grants, states will
be required to submit interoperability strategies consistent with the
SCIP methodology. Work in both Nevada and Kentucky is nearing
completion and a final report to Congress will be delivered in June
2006.
Coordinated Grant Guidance
Historically, different sources of funding have brought different
interoperability requirements. This lack of coordination has led to
stove-piped systems, incoherent planning processes, and incompatible
communications goals. One of SAFECOM's early successes in working with
G&T, as well as other agencies in the Federal government (e.g., the
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services in the Department of
Justice) was the creation of coordinated and consistent criteria for
agencies receiving federal funds to use in guiding their grantees. This
criteria, or grant guidance, lists the planning requirements that must
be followed before federal funds can be spent on equipment procurement.
It also provides specific questions that should be addressed in grant
applications to ensure that the potential recipients of federal funds
have thoroughly assessed how their money will improve interoperability.
At the direction of the Office of Management and Budget, this grant
guidance is now required for all public safety grant programs that
provide Federal funds for communications interoperability.
The grant guidance maximizes the effectiveness for the significant
resources available for public safety communications. Nearly $2.2
billion has been allocated for public safety interoperability under
this guidance, which also provides succinct criteria to grant
recipients as to how to best build, maintain, upgrade, and operate
communications systems to promote interoperability. Coordinated grant
guidance also results in a more responsive Federal funding system for
the creation of national communications interoperability. SAFECOM's
grant guidance is updated at the beginning of each fiscal year to
accommodate any changes in technologies, standards, or other conditions
that might affect the public safety community.
Tool Development
As depicted in the Interoperability Continuum (see fig. 1), public
safety agencies need to integrate and coordinate many issues to achieve
interoperable communications. The following tools help agencies move
along the lanes of the Continuum.
SAFECOM is developing a Request for Proposal (RFP) tool that will
radically simplify the often cumbersome local and state procurement
processes and ensure compatibility with SAFECOM's national strategy.
Through SAFECOM's work with localities and states, the program has seen
confusion among localities and states in terms of what information to
include in an RFP. This tool will be a step-by-step, how-to guidebook
for writing the major RFPs needed for communications interoperability
planning and implementation. It will guide state and local public
safety officials through the complex process for procuring
communications systems and equipment and services for enhancing
interoperability capabilities. Specifically, the guide will demonstrate
best practices for identifying needs, determine the appropriate method
of procurement, develop an RFP, write a statement of work, evaluate
proposals, and follow federal guidance, requirements, and standards for
communications interoperability. The RFP tool is currently under
development and will be released in the coming months.
While the SCIP streamlines planning, and the RFP tool enhances
communications equipment procurements, attention must also be paid to
providing consistent guidance regarding multi-jurisdictional exercises
concerning plans and equipment purchases. It is critical to enable
jurisdictions to test and evaluate the plans and procedures that they
have developed in preparing for an all-hazard incident. Therefore,
SAFECOM and our partners at G&T are developing consistent training
practices and a communications-specific tabletop methodology. SAFECOM
expects this methodology to help communications departments identify
and discuss gaps in current capabilities and processes and to recognize
differences in capabilities. It is intended to guide communities and
Federal technical assistance programs in planning, designing, and
executing communications exercises for public safety. Communities may
modify and apply the methodology to suit specific needs, realities, and
cultures in the local area. The content, including the lessons learned
and recommendations presented, are based directly on input from local
first responders who participated in exercise planning, design, and
execution. This tabletop methodology builds on the methodology employed
in RapidCom 1 and is being finalized now.
National Interoperability Baseline Initiative
To date, there is no quantitative or qualitative assessment of the
nation's level of interoperability. A baseline is crucial to assess the
maturity of operational, governance, and technical considerations for
interoperable communications; identify capability gaps; and direct
Federal investments as well as future SAFECOM initiatives. Later this
year, SAFECOM will administer a National Interoperability Baseline
survey to 23,000 public safety agencies to measure the current state of
interoperable communications capabilities across the nation. The
results of the survey will provide the first quantitative assessment of
public safety's interoperable communications capabilities.
SAFECOM will conduct a second assessment as a follow-up to the
National Interoperability Baseline. This assessment will continue to
measure the state of interoperable communications capabilities across
the nation and allow SAFECOM to pilot more tools and methods. The
results of the survey will provide a comparable quantitative assessment
of public safety's interoperable communications capabilities to show
improvement compared to the original baseline.
The RFP tool, the tabletop methodology, and the baseline will all
help local, tribal, state, and federal public safety agencies to
proceed along the lanes of the Interoperability Continuum toward a more
optimal level of interoperability.
Technology Guidance
Just as the tools and efforts described above are directly mapped
to progress along the Interoperability Continuum, so too is the work
SAFECOM has done to advance communications technology. While technology
is not the only component of a system of systems approach for improving
interoperable communications, it remains an essential piece.
Project 25 Standards
Project 25 (P25) is a suite of eight standards that will enable any
component of one communications system to work with components of
another communications system. These eight technical standards are
intended to provide public safety access to non-proprietary, open
architecture standards. What this means to emergency responders is that
they could take their P25-compliant portable radio and travel across
the country in response to a disaster and communicate within another
jurisdiction's P25 system. These standards for equipment are essential
to achieving communications interoperability and will enable emergency
responders using equipment from different manufacturers to communicate
with one another.
While SAFECOM promotes the completion and deployment of the P25
suite of standards, it is important to note that P25 is only one set of
standards. There are instances in which communities have achieved
interoperability through non-P25 solutions. In fact, there are
instances where requiring P25 might actually be irrelevant (for
example, if the equipment being purchased has to work with non-P25
equipment, such as the case with some analog equipment frequently used
by the fire services), or where moving to a P25 system without adequate
planning and coordination might damage existing interoperability.
Additionally, we understand that, as technology changes, other
standards might become more appropriate.
Currently, SAFECOM is working with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) to support the public safety community
and industry in their efforts to accelerate the development of the P25
suite of standards for interoperable communications. In the fifteen
years before SAFECOM undertook this coordination, only one standard in
the suite of eight had been created. Since NIST and SAFECOM have
partnered with industry and public safety to accelerate P25,
significant progress has been made. Three standards have been completed
including the Inter-RF Subsystem Interface, the Fixed/Base Station
Subsystem Interface, and the Console Subsystem Interface. The public
safety community can expect technology resulting from these three
standards to be available next year.
SAFECOM is continuing to work with NIST to complete the remaining
four interfaces of the P25 suite of standards. By continuing to use the
voluntary consensus standards process, it is likely that the remaining
interfaces will be completed in the next few years, but it will take
the cooperation of both industry and practitioner members of the
standards process to make this happen.
With input from the user community, P25 standards have been
developed to allow for backward compatibility with existing digital and
analog systems and to provide for interoperability in future systems.
New and old equipment will be able to work together. This will allow
public safety agencies to maintain interoperability with other agencies
as they begin to replace and upgrade their current communications
systems. For example, agencies that purchase new P25 compatible
equipment ideally will be able to operate that equipment within its
existing communications infrastructure.
To ensure that P25 standards will be implemented where appropriate,
they will be tied to SAFECOM's grant guidance. SAFECOM's investment in
this standards activity will result in public safety being better
enabled to swap or share communications equipment when responding to
emergencies.
SAFECOM is also working with G&T to link standards to interoperable
communications planning efforts. Localities and states will be
encouraged to use P25 equipment where it makes sense. Standards are
already being tied to grants and will be included in the Tactical
Interoperable Communications Plans.
P25 Compliance Assessment Program
Public safety demands that equipment claiming to be P25 compliant--
or generally capable of its manufacturer's claims--will communicate
with other P25 radios. Unfortunately this is not often the case.
Initial testing shows that often one manufacturer's ``P25-compliant
radio'' will not communicate with another manufacturers ``P25-compliant
radio.'' SAFECOM is currently addressing this issue by developing a P25
conformance testing program in partnership with NIST to ensure
equipment really does meet the new P25 standards. NIST, in cooperation
with technical representatives from the Institute for Telecommunication
Sciences and industry representatives, has established a framework for
the program and is moving into the first stage of testing. The safety
of emergency responders will be enhanced when industry's claims of P25
compliance can be measured objectively and independently. This
initiative will also ensure federal grant dollars are being used
appropriately to purchase equipment that is truly P25 compliant.
Statement of Requirements
It became clear in 2003 that a comprehensive understanding of
public safety communications requirements was needed before any
advanced research or development was likely to succeed. As a result, in
2004 SAFECOM produced version 1.0 of the Statement of Requirements for
Public Safety Wireless Communications and Interoperability (SoR).
Developed with public safety practitioner input, the SoR defines
operational and functional requirements for public safety
communications. Later this year, SAFECOM will release version 1.1,
which further defines user requirements to enable industry to develop
equipment that meets the needs of public safety and federal users.
Additionally, SoR version 1.1 presents unified technical requirements
for interoperable communications and enables results-oriented
discussions between public safety, industry and policy makers. SAFECOM
is also developing version 2.0 of the SoR which will begin to
incorporate quantitative values for the requirements. Version 2.0 will
quantify the requirements for the most important applications
identified by the public safety community: mission-critical voice, and
emerging technologies for tactical video. Version 2.0 will also help
industry to develop equipment that meets the new public safety
requirements. Version 2.0 will be published later this year.
Public Safety Architecture Framework
Having established a set of requirements, SAFECOM began building a
national architecture framework. SAFECOM is now completing the
development of a Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) that, with
the SoR, will serve as a tool to help the nation's public safety
community understand the technical requirements and system
modernization plans without imposing requirements that stifle
innovation. The PSAF will be released later this month.
In moving public safety towards greater interoperability, the
impact of the PSAF is likely to be substantial. Currently, public
safety has no effective way of comparing systems and existing
communications infrastructure, which prevents them from identifying
paths towards interoperability. The PSAF, for the first time, will
enable local, state, and federal agencies to analyze current systems
and determine what is necessary to achieve interoperability with other
systems and agencies. The PSAF also inventories and identifies
capability gaps to help public safety agencies target areas for
improved interoperability.
Working with Industry
Seamless national interoperability depends upon the development and
implementation of solutions based on public safety's expressed needs.
The SAFECOM program works with the public safety community and industry
as equipment is developed and included in local and state planning
efforts across the nation. On March 23, 2006, S&T hosted the inaugural
SAFECOM Industry Summit in Washington, DC. The Industry Summit afforded
SAFECOM and the public safety community a valuable opportunity to
engage with the telecommunications industry on critical
interoperability issues. The summit addressed public safety's role in
the SAFECOM program, the impact of standards on new technologies, and
how to leverage SAFECOM's technical and procedural foundations to
optimize research, development, testing, and evaluation efforts. More
than 300 attendees from the telecommunications industry participated in
the event, which according to Charles Werner, Fire Chief,
Charlottesville, Virginia ``established a firm foundation from which
public and private partnerships may now build upon.''
Conclusion
SAFECOM is developing high-quality tools and resources today to
help public safety migrate towards an interoperable system-of-systems
nationwide. Although it is difficult to predict a specific date when
full interoperability will be achieved, SAFECOM has created the roadmap
and is developing the tools to help agencies move along it. The
Interoperability Continuum, the SoR, and the PSAF among others will
enable public safety and industry to ensure further interoperability.
As you are aware, interoperability saves lives; those of our public
safety officials and the citizens they serve. Though many challenges
remain, DHS is committed to ensuring that the nation's public safety
community has the necessary tools and resources to ensure
communications systems are interoperable when they must be. However,
the Federal government cannot fix interoperability alone. Both public
safety and industry must be committed to using and improving the
available tools and models to make sound investments while addressing
all of the critical elements of interoperability.
In closing, I want to thank you for your past support and I ask for
your continued support. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before
you today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Appendix A: Table of Federal Partners
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Partner Mission Area Coordination
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Commerce Develo Coordination on
National Institute of pment and the acceleration of P25
Standards and Technology promotion of standards
(NIST). standards and P25 compliance
technology to testing program
enhance Ongoing
communications collaboration on
interoperabili industry and technology
ty. development
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Commerce The SAFECOM grant
National Telecommunications Executive guidance
and Information Association Branch's Regular
(NTIA). primary voice coordination and
on domestic collaboration on
and communications
international activities
telecommunicat SAFECOM
ions and Emergency Response
information Council representation
technology Member of the
issues within Federal Partners for
the Department Interoperable
of Commerce. Communications (FPIC)
Perfor
ms spectrum
management for
all Federal
agencies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Defense (DoD) Commun SAFECOM
Joint Tactical Radio System ications Emergency Response
(JTRS). across the Council representation
U.S. military.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Homeland Provid Coordination
Security (DHS) Federal es on the with the National
Emergency Management Agency ground Incident Management
(FEMA). operational System Integration
support in Center on Communications
response to Unit Leader Training
all-hazards curriculum and other
disasters. communications
activities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS/ Department of Treasury/ Commun Regular
Department of Justice (DOJ) ications among coordination and
Integrated Wireless Network federal users. collaboration on
(IWN). communications
activities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS National Communications Consor Collaboration on
System (NCS). tium of DHS communications
Federal activities
departments
and agencies
that have
assets,
resources,
requirements
and/or
regulatory
authority
regarding
national
security and
emergency
preparedness
(NS/EP)
communications.
Respon
sible for the
Federal
Telecommunicat
ions Standards
Program.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Office of Grants and Block SAFECOM grant
Training. grants to guidance
state and RapidCom 1 and 2
locals. Table-top
Techni exercises
cal assistance SAFECOM
to state and Emergency Response
locals. Council representation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Wireless Management Commun Collaboration on
Office (WMO). ications among DHS communications
DHS users. activities
Spectrum Plan
Advisory Committee
Participation in
working groups
SAFECOM
Executive Committee (EC)
and Emergency Response
Council representation
Coordination on
IRTPA report on
telecommunications needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOJ High-Risk Metropolitan Connec RapidCom
Area Interoperability tivity between Table-top
Assistance Project (``25 federal and exercises
Cities'') local users. SAFECOM EC
representation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOJ Community Oriented Discre SAFECOM grant
Policing Services (COPS). tionary grants guidance
to state and Peer review and
locals. grantee training
programs in FY 2004
SAFECOM
Emergency Response
Council representation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOJ CommTech Program........ Techni SoR development
cal assistance RapidCom 1
to state and SCIP
locals. Table-top
Resear exercises
ch and SAFECOM
development. Emergency Response
Council representation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Communications Regula Spectrum Needs
Commission (FCC). tes interstate Assessment
and Narrowbanding
international Report to Congress
communications SAFECOM
by radio, Emergency Response
television, Council representation
wire,
satellite and
cable.
Respon
sible for all
spectrum
issues
associated
with public
safety.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Guard Bureau (NGB). Commun SAFECOM
ications Emergency Response
across the Council representation
National Guard. SAFECOM
representation on NGB
Senior Advisory Board
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B: Other S&T Directorate Efforts Regarding Standards
Development and Interoperability
The S&T Standards Portfolio partners with private sector American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) and other DHS components and
federal agencies on standards for emergency preparedness and response
Standards Portfolio has worked with the private sector to establish
a public-private partnership for homeland security standards
development. The ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP) has a
proactive agenda for sponsoring workshops and conferences in emergency
preparedness. The chart below lists some of these activities. As a
direct result of the meetings in New York City from January--March
2004, the 9/11 Commission was informed about National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 1600: Standard for Emergency Preparedness and
Business Continuity which had been developed with strong participation
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Subsequently,
Secretary Ridge testified before the 9/11 Commission that DHS was
adopting NFPA 1600 (action by Standards Portfolio) and the DHS Office
of the Private Sector co-sponsored with NFPA a series of regional
workshops on emergency preparedness.
ANSI-HSSP Workshop Activities on Emergency Preparedness and Training
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Dates Location
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Workshop on Private Sector January 28, 2004 NYC
Emergency Preparedness and
Business Continuity (with the 9/
11 Commission).
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Workshop on Private Sector February 27, 2004 NYC
Emergency Preparedness and
Business Continuity (with the 9/
11 Commission).
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Workshop on Private Sector March 22, 2004 NYC
Emergency Preparedness and
Business Continuity (with the 9/
11 Commission).
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Workshop on Training Program June 10, 2004 Braintree, MA
Standardization for First
Response to WMD Events.
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Workshop on Training Program September 23, Arlington, VA
Standardization for First 2004
Response to WMD Events.
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Workshop on Training Program January 27, 2005 Arlington, VA
Standardization for First
Response to WMD Events.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workshop on Citizen Preparedness December 2, 2004 Schaumburg, IL
(in conjunction with workshop
on emergency communications).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISO International Workshop April 24-26, 2006 Florence, Italy
Agreement (IWA) Meeting on
Emergency Preparedness.
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Workshop on Lessons Learned from May 2006 NYC (tentative)
Hurricane Katrina and Role for
Standards and Conformity
Assessment Programs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth ANSI-HSSP Plenary Meeting October 2006 NYC or
(emergency preparedness is the Gaithersburg, MD
proposed theme for the event).
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Standards Portfolio: Cooperation with DHS Office of Grants and Training
The S&T Standards Portfolio has created a framework for standards
development, adoption and advice to DHS Office of Grants and Training
(G&T) to guide purchases of equipment with $3.9 billion in grants to
states and localities. Management Directives were developed and
approved by the Under Secretary for Management which governs the
operation of seventeen standards working groups that are shepherding
standards for specific threats and conventional mission needs. This
includes a key step that allows S&T technical reports and studies to be
converted to grants guidance by G&T. This handshake between RDT&E and
grants guidance is critical to technology transfer for all S&T mission
elements.
Standards and G&T are working collaboratively to develop a model
for providing G&T with standards for equipment, standard operating
procedures, and training for state and local entities. Our main
contacts in G&T are with the System Support Division. Their three main
activities are: 1) the SAVER program for test and evaluation of
commercial-off-the-shelf equipment; 2) the Center for Domestic
Preparedness (CDP) in Anniston, AL that trains 50,000 emergency
responders annually on equipment and procedures for responding to
terrorists' incidents; and 3) the Memorial Institute for the Prevention
of Terrorism (MIPT) Responder Knowledge Base (www.RKB.mipt.org) for
advising responders on equipment and standards.
G&T has assigned a Standards Coordinator who attends weekly staff
meetings with the Standards Portfolio as well as all Standards Working
Groups and brings additional subject matter experts to working group
meetings. Working with this coordinator and the three programs listed
above, the Standards Portfolio is coordinating with System Assessment
and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) and CDP on developing
standards for chemical, biological, radiological and explosives
detectors. With this effort, we will ensure that training protocols are
developed for new equipment as it is developed by S&T.
We have also greatly expanded the materials available on the
Responder Knowledge Base by supplying information on standards and
product comparisons. Direct collaborations on standards for testing and
evaluation include: sampling, testing and training for suspicious
biological materials, and testing and evaluation for blast resistant
trash receptacles. We are also working with the G&T Training and
Exercises Division to provide standard training protocols that can be
incorporated in G&T training and exercises programs. We are working to
include subject matter experts from S&T as guest instructors in
training and exercises programs in G&T, and conversely, to include G&T
experts in all S&T Integrated Process Teams (IPT) related to standards,
equipment and training.
The Nation's First Radiation Detector Standards
The S&T Standards Portfolio has worked with other federal agencies
(Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
Department of Energy) and DHS components, including the offices of
Research & Development and Systems Engineering and Development's
Counter-Measures Test Bed, Customs and Border Patrol, the Secret
Service, Transportation Safety Administration, and more recently
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office) to develop and adopt standards for
radiation detectors for use by emergency responders. These standards
were developed in a record 15 months by IEEE/ANSI N42. Standards
Portfolio sponsored testing against these standards at NIST and four
national laboratories (S&T Office of Research and Development (ORD)
project management) and results of these tests were made available to
DHS Grants and Training for publication on their Web site (Responder
Knowledge Base). These results were shared with Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office and the other federal agencies. This radiation
detector Commercial Off-Of-The-Shelf (COTS) testing and evaluation
study focused attention on the G&T data base, and they expanded access
to the data base to other federal agencies due to increased interest in
their website.
Standards for Local Response to Suspicious Powders
The Standards Portfolio is leading an interagency effort to develop
standards for biological detectors used by emergency responders to
suspicious powder events. Other agencies involved include DOD, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Food and Drug
Administration and Centers for Disease Control (CDC)/ National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Environmental
Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU).
The working group was co-chaired by Office of Science and Technology
Policy. DHS components included in this standards working group include
G&T Center for Domestic Preparedness and the Bio-Countermeasures
Portfolio in S&T. This project resulted in performance standards for
hand-held assays for Bacillus anthrax. The work also indicated a need
for standard operating procedures, sampling standards and training
standards for responding to suspicious powders. This is an excellent
example of the value of gathering all the stakeholders (DHS, FBI, HHS/
CDC and HazMat teams--represented by the NFPA) to define the
operational goals for national standards that are used by voluntary
private sector organizations--but still meet the needs of diverse
federal agencies.
Protective Equipment Standards for Emergency Responders
The Standards Portfolio has led the national effort to develop
Personal Protective and Operational Equipment for emergency responders
and all this work is closely coordinated with DHS G&T, FEMA and the
U.S. Fire Administration. The portfolio has worked with an interagency
team that includes NIST, DOD (Edgewood and Natick) and HHS (CDC/NIOSH).
Other DHS components included in the planning process are the S&T
Emergency Preparedness and Response Portfolio, Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and WMD Operations as well as Coast
Guard R&D Center. This work has led to development and adoption of
three NIOSH and five NFPA standards for respirators and protective
ensembles. Work is underway with American Society for Testing and
Materials on standards for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) robots which
includes a team assembled from 20 FEMA USAR task forces.
Mr. Reichert. The Chair recognize Mr. Moran.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH MORAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Mr. Moran. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. My name is Ken
Moran, and I serve as the director of the Federal
Communications Commission, Office of Homeland Security. In my
testimony today, I will provide an update of the Commission's
actions in the areas of interoperable communications and
emergency communications preparedness since I last appeared
before the subcommittee last October.
Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act, the
Commission conducted an assessment of short-term and long-term
spectrum needs for emergency response providers and submitted a
report to Congress regarding that assessment in December. The
report reached the following principle conclusions: Mobile
broadband communications implemented in combination with
upgraded equipment and associated training and close
coordination can offer emergency response providers emergency
important capabilities. Emergency response providers would
benefit from the development of an integrated interoperable
nationwide network capable of delivering broadband services
throughout the country.
While commercial wireless technologies are not appropriate
for every type of public safety communication, there is a place
for commercial providers to assist public safety in securing
and protecting the homeland. While the effort to address the
short term spectrum needs of public safety is underway,
attaining a wholesale assessment of long-term spectrum needs is
an ongoing task. The Commission is also working to solve the
interference problems in the 800 megahertz band by tightening
the interference standards and by reconfiguring the band to
separate the public safety systems from the commercial systems.
Reconfiguration of the 800 megahertz band is currently
taking place on a region-by-region basis. When completed, the
reconfiguration will alleviate the interference problems in the
800 band. Moreover, approximately 4.5 megahertz of additional
spectrum will be made available for public safety
communications systems. In light of the findings set forth in
the report to Congress, last month the commission started a
rule making to examine the operational, technical and spectrum
requirements for meeting Federal, State, and local public
safety communications needs through the year 2010.
At the urging of the public safety community and in
recognition of the need for spectrum appropriate for broadband
communications, the Commission seeks comment on whether certain
channels in the 700 megahertz public safety bands should be
modified to accommodate broadband communications.
In addition, the Commission adopted rules requiring
providers of digital broadcast and cable TV, satellite radio,
and direct broadcast satellite services to participate in the
Commission's emergency alert system. The Commission also
initiated a rule seeking comment on how the Commission can
expedite the development of next generation alert warning
systems that take full advantage of digital media's potential.
In January, the Commission established an independent panel
to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on communication
networks. The Katrina panel is studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on all sectors of telecommunications and media,
including public safety communication, reviewing the
sufficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure recovery
efforts, and making recommendations regarding ways to improve
disaster preparedness, network reliability and communications
among first responders. Several representatives from the public
safety sector, including law enforcement, fire, and emergency
medical on are on the panel. The panel will report its findings
and its recommendations to the Commission in June.
Finally, in March, the Commission voted to create a new
public safety and homeland security bureau. The Commission
proposes to take functions currently residing in seven separate
bureaus and offices at the Commission and consolidate them into
one bureau. By creating a unified structure to oversee and
respond to public safety and homeland security matters, the
Commission seeks to improve its operating efficiency and
effectiveness in areas it deems of highest priority.
In addition, the new structure will enable the Commission
to better coordinate its national security, homeland security,
public safety and emergency communications roles.
In conclusion, the Commission is committed to working with
its Federal, State, tribal and local partners, with industry
and with the Congress to ensure public safety communications
are as reliable as possible and are fully interoperable and
that effective emergency plans and assets are at the ready to
quickly restore these services if they ever fail. I would be
pleased to answer questions. Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Moran.
[The statement of Mr. Moran follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth P. Moran
April 25, 2006
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Ken Moran and I serve as the Director of the
Federal Communications Commission's Office of Homeland Security in the
Commission's Enforcement Bureau. In that role, I am primarily
responsible for the national security, homeland security, and emergency
preparedness responsibilities of the Commission.
The Commission's strategic goal for homeland security is to provide
leadership in evaluating and strengthening the nation's communications
infrastructure, in ensuring rapid restoration of that infrastructure in
the event of disruption, and in ensuring that essential public health
and safety personnel have effective communications services available
to them at all times, and particularly in the event of an emergency.
Interoperability is an essential aspect of ensuring effective
communications. First responders must have the ability to communicate
seamlessly, especially during a disaster.
In my testimony today, I will provide an update of the Commission's
recent activities in the area of interoperable communications and
emergency communications preparedness. Since I last appeared before the
Subcommittee in October, the Commission has:
Submitted a Report to the Congress, pursuant to the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act, regarding the
development of an interoperable nationwide network and on the
use of commercial wireless technologies for public safety
communications;
Continued the transition of commercial wireless and
public safety services within the 800 MHz spectrum;
Initiated a rulemaking proceeding to examine
allocation of the 24 MHz spectrum that will be available for
public safety communications when the DTV transition is
completed;
Issued rules extending the reach of the emergency
alert system to include digital broadcast and cable TV, digital
audio broadcasting, satellite radio, and direct broadcast
satellite services;
Solicited comments on how the Commission can best help
develop a next-generation alert and warning system that takes
full advantage of digital media's potential;
Established a federal advisory committee, known as the
Katrina Panel on Communications Networks, that is developing
recommendations for improved emergency preparedness and
response for future disasters; and
Proposed the establishment of a new bureau, the Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, which will be the unified
entity for carrying out the Commission's public safety,
homeland security, national security, and emergency
communications responsibilities.
Briefly, I will provide detail on each of these activities:
Report to Congress
Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act, Congress
asked the Commission, in consultation with DHS and NTIA, to undertake a
study and prepare a report assessing the short-term and long-term
spectrum needs of emergency response providers. The Commission
conducted the assessment and submitted the report to Congress in
December, 2005. The report addressed not only the questions posed by
Congress, but also considered the many thoughtful proposals submitted
in the record for addressing the spectrum needs of traditional public
safety entities and other critical emergency response providers, as
well as some lessons learned from the impact of hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma on our nation's communications infrastructure. The
report reached the following principal findings:
Emergency response providers would benefit from the
development of an integrated, interoperable nationwide network
capable of delivering broadband services throughout the
country.
While commercial wireless technologies are not
appropriate for every type of public safety communication,
there is a place for commercial providers to assist public
safety in securing and protecting the homeland.
While the effort to address the short-term spectrum
needs of public safety is underway, attaining a wholesale
assessment of long-term spectrum needs is an ongoing task.
Mobile, broadband communications, implemented in
combination with upgraded equipment, associated training and
close coordination, could offer emergency response providers
many important capabilities. To this end, and at the urging of
public safety community, the Commission will expeditiously
examine whether certain channels within the current allocation
of twenty-four megahertz of public safety spectrum in the 700
MHz band could be modified to accommodate broadband
communications.
800 MHz
As you are aware, the public safety community has experienced
interference problems in the 800 MHz band. In 2004, the Commission
provided a two-pronged solution to the problem. First, the Commission
adopted a plan to reconfigure the 800 MHz band to separate public
safety and critical infrastructure industry entities from commercial
wireless carriers, such as Nextel. Second, the Commission adopted a
specific technical standard regarding what constitutes unacceptable
interference to public safety and critical infrastructure providers.
The Commission will hold commercial carriers strictly responsible for
complying with this standard.
Reconfiguration of the 800 MHz band is taking place on a region-by-
region basis based upon the 55 National Public Safety Planning Advisor
Committee (NPSPAC) regions. Each of the 55 NPSPAC regions is assigned
to one of four staggered ``prioritization'' waves. Band reconfiguration
for non-NPSPAC channels began last year. In February, band
reconfiguration for NPSPAC channels began.
The reconfiguration will alleviate the interference problems that
public safety communications systems have faced in the 800 MHz band
from commercial wireless systems. Moreover, an average of 4.5 megahertz
of additional spectrum in the 800 MHz band will be made available for
public safety communications systems.
700 MHz
In light of the findings set forth in the Report to Congress, last
month the Commission started a rulemaking proceeding to examine the
operational, technical, and spectrum requirements for meeting federal,
state and local public safety communication needs through the year
2010. The Commission believes that mobile broadband communications can
offer public safety many important capabilities, including delivery of
real-time video, images, automated dispatch, multi-media alerts and
real-time monitoring. Accordingly, accommodating public safety's need
for mobile, broadband communications may be critical in the long-term.
Certain public safety entities have identified the 700 MHz band as a
potential home for broadband operations. At the urging of the public
safety community, and in recognition of the need for spectrum
appropriate for broadband communications, the notice seeks comment on
whether certain channels within the current twenty-four megahertz of
public safety spectrum in the 700 MHz public safety band (764-776 MHz
and 794-806 MHz), should be modified to accommodate broadband
communications. The Commission is using this proceeding to implement
many of the recommendations of the National Coordination Committee
(chartered by the Commission to formulate standards for interoperable
voice and data systems in the recently-allocated 700 MHz public safety
band), which are designed to ensure total, mandatory voice
interoperability between all radios used in the 700 MHz band.
Emergency Alert System (EAS)
On November 3, 2005, the Commission adopted rules requiring
providers of digital broadcast and cable TV, digital audio
broadcasting, satellite radio, and direct broadcast satellite services
to participate in the Commission's EAS program. With the exception of
DBS service, all affected entities must comply with these new
requirements by December 31, 2006. DBS services must comply no later
than May 31, 2007.
Also on November 3, the Commission initiated a rulemaking seeking
comment on how the Commission can expedite the development of a next-
generation alert and warning system that takes full advantage of
digital media's potential. Questions included what type of architecture
would support a next-generation system and what common protocols would
be required to allow an alert to be delivered simultaneously to
multiple platforms such as radios, televisions and wireless devices.
The Commission also asked how it could facilitate the effective
integration of wireless technologies into a next generation alert and
warning system, and whether traditional telephone companies that plan
to provide high definition digital content to customers' homes should
have public alert and warning responsibilities. In addition, the
Commission asked how a next generation EAS can more effectively reach
individuals with hearing and vision disabilities and non-English
speaking individuals. Finally, the Commission sought comment on how the
Commission should coordinate its efforts with FEMA and how, if at all,
the participation of state and local authorities in the EAS system
should be changed. The record in this proceeding closed on February 23,
2006.
Katrina Panel
In January, the Commission established the Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
(Katrina Panel) pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Specifically, the Katrina Panel is: studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on all sectors of the telecommunications and media industries,
including public safety communications; reviewing the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to the
infrastructure; and making recommendations regarding ways to improve
disaster preparedness, network reliability, and communication among
first responders.
The Panel's membership includes several representatives from the
public safety sector, including law enforcement, fire fighters, and
emergency medical services. Also serving on the Panel are
representatives from all segments of the communications industry
including the wireline, wireless, satellite, broadcast, and cable
industries. The Panel established three working groups: (1)
Infrastructure Resiliency; (2) Recovery Procedures and Coordination;
and (3) Emergency Communications. Thus far, it has held three meetings.
The Panel has heard testimony about the impact of Hurricane Katrina
from representatives of public safety agencies, telecommunications
carriers, broadcasters, satellite radio service providers, equipment
manufacturers, consultants and consumer organizations. In addition it
has seen presentations from federal officials and Panel members
regarding emergency communications problems and solutions.
The Panel will report its findings and recommendations to the
Commission by June 15, 2006. The Commission looks forward to the
Panel's report and plans to carefully consider all of its
recommendations.
Reorganization
On March 17, 2006, the Commission unanimously voted to create a new
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. The action is subject to
Congressional notification. The Commission proposes to take functions
currently residing in seven separate Bureaus and Offices at the
Commission and consolidate them into one Bureau.
This Bureau will provide a single central hub for the development
of policies and rules to promote reliable communications for public
safety, national security, and disaster management. The Bureau will be
tasked to expend all of its resources to make sure that the Commission
does its part to support reliable emergency communications and address
the needs of first responders, law enforcement, and emergency response
personnel.
The new Bureau will be organized along three functional lines:
Policy, Public Communications Outreach & Operations, and Communications
Systems Analysis. It will be responsible for all Commission policy,
outreach, and operations with respect to public safety communications,
including 911 and Enhanced 911 (E911) requirements, Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs), operability and interoperability of public
safety communications, and matters falling under the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (known as CALEA). Setting the
requirements for priority emergency communications, such as the
Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) and Wireless Priority Service
programs that the National Communications System (NCS) administers,
along with the national Emergency Alert System (EAS), network security
and reliability, and communications infrastructure protection will also
be a responsibility of the new Bureau. In addition, the new Bureau's
Policy Division will handle the licensing of spectrum for public safety
entities, a task that currently resides in the Commission's Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau.
The Commission's other public safety and homeland security
responsibilities will also fall within the new Bureau's jurisdiction.
These responsibilities include Continuity of Government Operations
(COG); Continuity of Operations (COOP); the Commission's 24 hour a day,
7 day a week Communications and Crisis Management Center; disaster
management coordination and outreach; Federal Advisory Committee
coordination (e.g., Media Security and Reliability Council (MSRC) and
the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC)); and
industry information collection and attendant analytical activities.
By creating a unified structure to oversee and respond to public
safety and homeland security matters, the Commission seeks to improve
its operating efficiency and effectiveness in areas it deems of highest
priority. In addition, the new structure will enable the Commission to
better coordinate its national security, homeland security, public
safety, and emergency communications roles with its federal partners as
well as with state, tribal, and local governments, and industry.
Other Activities
In addition to the activities described above, the Commission
continues to work closely with federal agencies and national public
safety organizations, including:
DHS/SAFECOM/FCC-WTB Interoperability Working Group
SAFECOM Executive Committee and Advisory Committee
Working Groups
NTIA Ad Hoc 214 Working Group (a committee established
by the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) with
responsibility for, among other things, reducing regulatory
barriers to better facilitate interoperability between federal
agencies and their state and local counterparts)
Public Safety Regional Planning Colloquiums
National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
Conclusion
The importance of effective public safety communications cannot be
over-stated, especially during disasters, when the American public is
most vulnerable. The Commission is committed to working with its
federal, state, tribal and local partners, and with the Congress to
ensure these communications systems are as reliable as possible, are
fully interoperable, and that effective emergency plans and assets are
at the ready to quickly restore these services if they ever fail. I
would be pleased to respond to your questions.
Mr. Reichert. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Peed, and I must
say that I am pleased to see Carl again. I worked with Carl
when I was the sheriff in Seattle and was fortunate enough back
at that time when the COPS office had some funding that was
coming its way to be the benefactor of some of the money that
was coming through the COPS office. So thank you Carl for your
help and for your service. Good to see you again.
STATEMENT OF CARL PEED, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Peed. Thank you, Chairman Reichert and Ranking Member
Pascrell, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to address you here today. I am pleased to appear
before you on behalf of the Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, or COPS. As a 25-year veteran of law
enforcement, I am proud to lead an organization whose mission
is to support local efforts to reduce crime through community
policing. This is why COPS has worked to establish and
successfully administer our interoperability communications
technology grant program, which is the very program that I am
here to speak to you about today.
Communications interoperability refers to the ability to
share information across disciplines, in jurisdictions near
radio and data networks on demand, in real-time, when needed
and as authorized to do so.
The interoperability projects, funded by the COPS office,
represent region specific approaches to enhancing
interoperability and improving the capacity of emergency
service personnel to connect to broader, multi-regional
systems. To date, COPS invested more than $242 million to
support real-time information sharing and enhanced command and
control capacity by first responders in 63 of the Nation's
metropolitan areas in 37 States and one territory.
In fiscal year 2003, COPS awarded $66.5 million to 14
communities to develop interoperable communications networks.
In 2004, COPS awarded $82.6 million in grants to 23
communities. And in 2005, COPS awarded 26 agencies nearly $93
million through this program. This year, COPS has appropriated
$10 million to continue the interoperable communications
technology grant program. We plan to use these funds to make
several grants and to support training, technical assistance
and publications that will assist the field in our ongoing
efforts to improve interoperability.
There are general elements of the way we have made these
grants that I want to bring to your attention today. First is
the degree with which we coordinated with out other fellow
entities and the kind of partnerships we engaged in. COPS
recognized early in 2003 that it would be critical that we have
strong relationships with other Federal agencies and
departments, the professional associations that represent State
and local law enforcement and technical experts and first
responders like firefighters.
The COPS office had experience with efficient grant
management. We had a strong relationship with law enforcement
and had awarded many grants for purchasing and employing crime
fighting technology. But we recognize that in the complicated
and dynamic world of interoperable communications, the COPS
office needed to form new collaborative partnerships and
coordinate with other Federal agencies. Within the Department
of Justice, we coordinated with the Office of Justice Programs,
the National Chief of Justice, and the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, with the Department of Justice's high risk
metropolitan areas interoperability project or the 25 cities
project, and within the Department of Homeland Security with
SAFECOM, the Office For Interoperability and Compatibility, the
Office of Grants and Training, which was formerly the Office of
Domestic Preparedness and Federal Emergency Management Agency.
In Commerce, we are coordinating with the National
Institute of Standards and Training. We have also worked
closely with the International Associations of Chiefs of
Police, the National Sheriffs Associations, the National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the Police
Executive Research Forum Representing Law Enforcement, as well
as APCO, the Association of Public Safety Communications, and
the International Association of Fire Chiefs. They helped us
design and implement this program.
Second, COPS designed a grant system that allowed us to
take advantage of many of these partnerships in the form of a
peer review panel to evaluate grant proposals. Using the
relationship we have with some of my fellow panelists here
today, SAFECOM and DHS and representatives of local law
enforcement to effectively review the proposals and on the
Federal level, to ensure the highest degree of consistency with
existing interoperability standards. The panel of peer
reviewers was comprised of law enforcement, fire and emergency
medical service personnel as well as technological
professionals, so each provided an expert evaluation on the
practical and technical aspects of the proposals.
Finally, we invested heavily in providing training and
technical assistance opportunities for the grantees. We
recognize there is a need to provide ongoing support to
grantees as they further develop these networks. Therefore, we
offer a wide array of training and technical assistance
resources. We have hosted technical assistance kick-off
conferences, assisting grantees with everything from handling
the administrative requirements of the grant, to addressing
interjurisdictional liability issues related to interoperable
networks, and we have hosted advanced technical assistance
workshops, a national interoperability summit, and we have
offered on-site remote technical assistance and worked closely
with our partners, especially SAFECOM, to produce a ``how to''
publication that will provide unified Federal voice to
jurisdictions looking for interoperability guidance.
Let me share an example from the program with you. In
Texas, the city of Austin, which is in Travis County, will use
COPS funds to expand their existing 800 megahertz regional
radio system into neighboring Williamston County, and to
upgrade Williamston County older analogue system so it is
compatible with Austin's. Once this project is completed, it
can be used as a Statewide benchmark that will enable State,
local and Federal agents to communicate on a common platform.
America has learned that tragedies, natural disasters and
crimes do not recognize jurisdictional boards. My neighbor's
problem is my problem. Like we learned from the terrorist
attacks on 9/11 at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
D.C. sniper attacks and Hurricane Katrina, when we act
together, we are stronger than when we attempt to go it alone.
First responders have accepted the challenge of achieving
interoperability, and COPS is pleased to have been a partner
with many Federal agencies in a coordinated Federal response to
address this need.
Thanks in part to these grants, police and fire
communications and information systems will be developed in the
future with an eye toward interoperability. In closing, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today,
and I will be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Peed follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl R. Peed
April 25, 2006
Good Afternoon. I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf
of the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS). As a twenty-five year veteran of law enforcement, I am
proud to lead an organization whose mission is to support local efforts
to reduce crime through community policing.
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, which created the Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services (COPS) and our mission of advancing community
policing and assisting state, local, and tribal law enforcement
throughout the country. Since then, more than two-thirds of the
nation's law enforcement agencies have received assistance from COPS
programs, including training and technical assistance, grants for
purchasing and deploying crime fighting technology, and law enforcement
hiring assistance.
Community policing calls for law enforcement agencies to develop
collaborative relationships within the community that support a
detailed understanding of community needs, community norms, and
ultimately, community vulnerabilities. Furthermore, community policing
encourages law enforcement to rely on this understanding of the
community to implement proactive measures that prevent crime and
illegal behavior before it evolves into a significant criminal or
terrorist act, and to effectively respond to emergencies and disasters.
We have heard repeatedly from local law enforcement that the nexus
between national efforts to secure our homeland from terrorism and
disaster and local efforts to secure individual communities from all
types of threats and emergencies is clear. This is why COPS has worked
in close cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security in
administering the Interoperable Communications Technology Grant
Program, which is the program that I am here to speak with you about
today.
One of the major issues currently facing emergency service
providers is the inability of first responders to share vital
information during crisis, and our interoperability grant program
directly addresses this issue. Communications interoperability refers
to the ability to share information across disciplines and
jurisdictions via radio and data networks on demand, in real-time, when
needed, and as authorized.
Effective emergency response requires operational coordination and
the sharing of vital information among numerous public safety agencies.
Unfortunately, many emergency service providers rely on communication
systems developed solely to meet their own unique needs, and these
systems are often not compatible with those of neighboring agencies.
Recognizing this challenge, Congress, through the Omnibus FY 2003
Appropriation and the Wartime Supplemental Appropriation, allocated $66
million to COPS to administer a discretionary interoperability program
for law enforcement agencies.
During the same fiscal year, the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate (i.e. FEMA) in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), received almost $80 million for a similar program aimed at
various public safety agencies. Therefore, we worked together, and with
the assistance of the Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
and the Department of Commerce's National Institutes of Standards and
Technology (NIST), COPS and FEMA developed a coordinated program for FY
2003.
Since the Interoperable Communication Technology Program's
inception, COPS has worked closely with the NIJ and the Justice
Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance, the our 25 city High Risk
Metropolitan Areas Interoperability Project, the DHS Office for
Interoperability and Compatibility--SAFECOM, DHS' Office of Grants and
Training, FEMA, and the NITJ. We have collaborated with these entities
on issues such as establishing program guidelines and criteria,
reviewing applications, developing national interoperable standards,
and providing interoperable training and technical assistance to first
responders.
In fact, these partnerships are a key contributor to the success of
federal efforts. COPS recognized early on that Government-wide goals
would best be achieved by collaborating with other federal agencies,
technical experts, and experienced practitioners. An integral part of
implementing successful interoperable networks is the willingness and
capacity of the systems' users to work together effectively. For COPS
to overlook the very actions that we require of grant recipients would
be hypocritical.
Our collaborative efforts were even acknowledged in the FY 2005
Appropriations Conference Report. In the language of the Report, ``the
Conferees commend the COPS Office for its coordination with other
federal agencies that deal with public safety interoperability. The
Conferees believe coordination of federal efforts is critical to ensure
our nation's safety and a necessity if we are not to fall victim to the
pitfalls of the past.''
With a program of this nature we believed it was imperative to
leverage the program's funds to ensure the greatest possible impact on
the largest population centers in the country. This was COPS' goal when
inviting jurisdictions to apply from the beginning. Initially, in 2003,
we invited the largest 50 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) in the
United States and the largest metropolitan area in each State to apply
for the program. In 2004, we received additional guidance from Congress
instructing us to consider both large and small entities. Therefore, we
used the same process, and invited the two largest MSAs in each State
to apply. In 2005, the process was the same, but due to increased
funding we added the three largest MSAs in each State. Ultimately, by
increasing the number of MSAs in each State that were eligible to
apply, and as previous grantees were removed from the list of potential
applicants each year, we steadily increased the number of smaller
jurisdictions that became eligible to benefit from the program.
In fiscal year 2003, COPS awarded $66.5 million to 14 communities
to develop interoperable communication networks. In fiscal year 2004,
COPS awarded $82.6 million in grants to 23 communities in 17 states,
and in fiscal year 2005, COPS awarded 26 agencies nearly $93 million
through this program. In total, this equates to more than $242 million
to support real-time information sharing and enhanced command and
control capacity by law enforcement in 63 of the nation's largest
metropolitan areas.
The grants provided one year of funding (three years in 2005), and
population determined the amount of funding available to grantees. The
maximum federal share for a grant award is $6 million for MSA regions
with a population of greater than 500,000 persons according to the 2000
Census, and $3 million for MSAs with a population of 500,000 persons or
less. The program requires a local cash match of 25% of the total
project cost.
Successful applications for the program demonstrate a detailed
understanding of the first responder interoperability needs within the
MSA applying for funds. Proposals have also been required to be
comprehensive and convey a clear and demonstrated plan for achieving
improved multi-jurisdictional and/or multi-disciplinary
interoperability.
Again, COPS recognized the importance of partnerships, and we
worked closely with SAFECOM and our other partners during the proposal
evaluation process. We relied on partnerships to effectively review the
proposals, and on the federal level to ensure the highest degree of
consistency with existing interoperability standards.
All applications were peer reviewed to ensure that the best
proposals were funded. The panel of peer reviewers was comprised of law
enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service personnel, as well as
technological professionals who provided expert evaluation on the
technical aspects of the proposals.
The major factors considered during the peer review process have
been: (1) the quality and merit of applications, which represents 40%
of the application score; (2) projected project outcomes and
deliverables, which represent 18% of the score; (3) project management
details, which represent 30% of the score; and (4) budget and
jurisdictional/disciplinary coordination issues, which represent 12% of
the score.
The program funds can be used to support purchasing and deploying
interoperable communications equipment; providing neighboring
jurisdictions with the equipment or services they need to participate
on existing networks; and the purchase or deployment of any other
technologies that can be demonstrated to significantly increase
interoperability within the public safety community of a given MSA.
Ideally, these MSAs are going to become models for successfully
developing and implementing interoperable networks, and we want to be
certain that they have any guidance that they may need during the
development and implementation process.
Therefore, we have offered a variety of training and technical
assistance resources to the grant recipients, working in consultation
with the Department of Homeland Security. We have hosted a technical
assistance kickoff conference that assists grantees with everything
from handling the administrative requirements of the grant to
addressing interjurisdictional liability issues related to
interoperable networks. Our two agencies have hosted advanced technical
assistance workshops, a National Interoperability Summit, and we have
offered consultative services. Whatever form of technical assistance
best meets the needs of a grantee--conferences, workshops, direct on-
site consultation, or publications--we have sought to provide it.
Let me share some examples from the program with you. In Washington
State, the City of Seattle and other cities within the Seattle MSA are
working to establish a wireless data exchange system that will link
their police and fire dispatch systems. The project also calls for
their collective systems to be linked to the King County Sheriff's
Department, the jail system, Prosecutor's Office, Municipal courts, the
State Police, and the state's Criminal Justice Information system.
While there is still much work that must be done to get all of the
existing systems to the stage that they are capable of linking, this
system will allow officials throughout the Seattle MSA to share vital
information and work together toward common public safety goals.
In Texas, the City of Austin, which is in Travis County, will use
COPS funds to expand their existing 800 MHz regional radio system into
neighboring Williamson County, and to upgrade Williamson County's older
analog system so that it is compatible with Austin's. Once this project
is completed, it can be used as a statewide benchmark that will enable
state, local, and federal agencies to communicate on a common platform.
And, in Orange County Florida, COPS funds are being used to provide
five shared communications channels across a nine-county region. First
responders in nine counties will all be able to share and react to
information in real-time.
This year, COPS was appropriated $10 million to continue the
Interoperability Communications Technology Grant Program. Coordinating
with the Department of Homeland Security, we plan to use these funds to
make several grants and to support training and technical assistance
that will assist the field and their ongoing efforts to improve
interoperability. As in previous Budgets, the President's 2007 Budget
proposes to focus support for first responder interoperability within
Department of Homeland Security, which has a broader range of grant and
technical assistance resources.
The potential of interoperable communications systems is tremendous
and the need great. Thanks, in part, to these grants, police and fire
communications and information systems will be developed in the future
with an eye toward interoperability.
America has learned that tragedies, natural disasters, and crimes
do not recognize jurisdictional borders. My neighbor's problem is my
problem. When we act together, we are stronger than when we attempt to
go it alone. First responders have accepted the challenge of achieving
interoperability, and COPS is pleased to have been a partner with many
federal agencies in a coordinated federal response to address this
need.
Thank you, and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, and I do have a few questions. I
will start out with general questions for the panel, anyone on
the panel that wishes to respond.
With all the Federal agencies involved in this process in
touching some piece or part of it, I am interested in who is
keeping score, and accurate and timely and comprehensive
Federal scorecard, if you must. Someone who is kind of tracking
what we have done, what we are doing right now for
interoperability, what we are going to be doing, what we are
spending our money on, and what we have spent our money on,
what has worked, what as not worked, just to ensure that the
investments are actually matching the Federal plan.
If there is a Federal plan and I have heard some discussion
about a Federal plan, but is there a watchdog? Is there one
person responsible kind of overseeing this effort by the many
Federal agencies.
Mr. Boyd. Ultimately, OMB, of course, is the watchdog, but
what OMB asks us to do at SAFECOM is to look at all the
departments' budgets that touch on wireless communications,
that includes the independent agencies. Each year, OMB includes
a requirement that before they can--before that money can be
released, they need what amounts to a certification from
SAFECOM that they are aligned with the national strategy. So we
do that. We began that last year for the first time. We have
done it again this year, and I assume we will do it again next
year.
Honorable Henke. Sir, if I may, in addition to that, there
are numerous things that are being undertaken. As Dr. Boyd
mentioned in his opening statement, there is the baseline
review that will be coming out later this year. In addition to
that, at the Office of Grants and Training, we have what we
call our Biannual Strategy Implementation Report that I know we
have provided information to your offices on before. That is
how we track the expenditure of resources, and we can draw it
down to counties and localities on what they are investing
those resources on.
In addition to that, one of the things that we are
undertaking and we are undertaking in partnership with and in
cooperation with SAFECOM and other entities is our tactical
interoperable communication plans, which are due May 1st. We
are going to do full scale exercises on those. That will allow
us, from a tactical interoperable communications standpoint, to
see later in the fall where we are in those jurisdictions. We
will be able to have those drive those investments for fiscal
year 2007, and also identify lessons learned and how we take
what we learn and then expand it to other jurisdictions,
including the States.
Mr. Reichert. Anyone else? So last year, Dr. Boyd, was the
first time there was this kind of oversight to make sure the
money spent was in line?
Mr. Boyd. Yes, sir. Last year was the first time that we
had gone through that. Now, it is also important to understand
a lot of other coordination activities that go on at the same
time. In 2007, there will be a mandatory requirement that there
be a State plan before grant funding can be provided to each of
these activities. That is included, the Secretary has required
that that be included in the guidance. The SAFECOM common grant
guidance, which outlines how investments are made, again at OMB
direction, has to be included in every grant program. It is
included in the grants and training grant guidance.
It is included in the COPS office grant guidance and will
be included as well in the allocations that come from the sale
of auctions in the commerce department, and those discussions
are already underway. So those will include the same kind of
grant guidance.
Finally, we have an interagency coordinating commission
activity, where we try to bring together all the Federal
players, including the Defense Department, the Guard Bureau,
all of the activities in DHS, in fact, all together in some
eight different departments, to try to look at what everybody
is doing, not all through grants. There are, for example, in
justice programs that touch on interoperability because of the
Department of Justice 25 cities project.
In the Customs Border patrol arena, there are a series of
border pilots that are underway that also involve
communications applications. We try very hard, to coordinate
all of those at the same time, and to make sure they all comply
with the national guidance.
Mr. Reichert. What have we not done in this endeavor that
we need to do immediately? What is the one thing that from this
panel that strikes you as something we need to do now, that we
need to commit to doing?
Mr. Boyd. Actually I think, let me be real clear. There is
a natural tendency to wonder what is it the Federal Government
can do to make this happen quickly? I would argue that the most
fundamental requirement is that communities themselves commit
to being willing to participate in developing interoperability.
Now the long haul part is our job. We have to be able to help
to develop the standards. We have to provide the guidance, but
at the end of the day, the individual communities are the ones
who have to decide they are really going to make that happen.
And every jurisdiction that has gone to work to develop the
kind of agreements across jurisdictions and across disciplines
that are required to do it, they have been able to achieve what
we call emergency command level interoperability.
It is not the perfect interoperability we would like to
have once we have a real standards regime in place and all the
other things have happened, but it is something that can
address the emergencies now. The public safety community has
been very, very responsive to that.
So I think you are seeing a lot more multi jurisdictional
efforts in a lot more places than has ever been the case
before. So one of the things I think the national baseline is
going to demonstrate is that there is a lot more happening in
the field than is always apparent.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, in the next panel, Mr. Morgan
is going to testify that to date, there is no quantitative or
qualitative assessment of the nation's level of
interoperability. Do you all agree with that?
Mr. Boyd. I think that is exactly true now. That is what
the national baseline is designed to answer.
Mr. Pascrell. When we say now, this is 5 years after 9/11
almost.
Mr. Boyd. When we took over SAFECOM in 2003, the very first
thing we did was to impose a requirement to establish a
baseline because we thought we needed to be able to figure out
where we were measuring from. And so that is now underway to
create exactly the kind of analysis you are talking about.
Mr. Pascrell. Director Peed, I read your statement very
carefully. The high in the COPS interoperability budget was a
few years ago, $92 million. This year it is $10 million. And
you spend a lot of time talking about COPS in your
presentation, as you well know. I am not telling you something
you do not know. And we are talking about how local communities
must commit to the systems, Dr. Boyd, in order to have a system
of emergency command level.
How do we expect local communities to commit to the system
that we are trying to develop, and yet we have not developed
the standards? How do you expect local communities to commit to
the system without the resources.
Mr. Peed. Congress appropriated the funds obviously, and in
their appropriations--
Mr. Pascrell. I am sorry, Mr. Peed.
Mr. Peed. When Congress appropriated the funds for our
agency, they included in our language the first year that we
address the critical needs of law enforcement, and the second
year funding required that we address the immediate needs of
law enforcement. So we went out and partnered with all of our
Federal partners to develop the program. We required the grants
to be regional and multi-disciplined and multi-regional in
effort, and then they were up to, in the first year, were up to
$6 million per grant. And we think there are some successes
there in terms of meeting the immediate needs.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Peed, every year you have a lower amount
of awardees. You have less money. You have just started to
touch the surface, and yet you are reducing the budget. In
fact, you are trying to eliminate the budget according to your
own numbers. I mean, how can you sit there and talk to us about
the COPS program when the administration has tried to eliminate
it? How do you do that? Tell me how you do that.
Mr. Peed. Since we had our funding in 2003, we have
coordinated with originally the Office of National
Preparedness, so we knew where our grants were going and that
responsibility has now shifted to the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you support the COPS program in your
position with the Department of Justice?
Mr. Peed. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you think it should be fully funded.
Mr. Peed. It is funded, I think, given the priorities at
the level I think the administration--
Mr. Pascrell. What other priorities exist besides public
safety, tell me?
Mr. Peed. Many of those priorities have shifted to the
Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Pascrell. You mean to tell me now that the COPS program
that the administration has tried to eliminate three times, you
are telling me that that function, that activity is going to be
adopted by some other Federal agency so we can look forward to
the COPS program doing what it did in the 1990s to reduce crime
in this country, to help reduce crime, you mean to tell me we
are on track to do the same thing? We are going to be able to
hire the same amount of police officers, is that what you are
telling me?
Mr. Peed. The original goal of the COPS office was to add
over 100,000 officers to the street. We have added about
118,000, so the Attorney General has testified before Congress
on several occasions, both Attorney General Ashcroft and
Attorney General Gonzalez that we have achieved that goal.
Mr. Pascrell. We have achieved the goal. Okay. I want to
come back to this later, Mr. Chairman. I find that incredible.
Mr. Moran, back in 1996, the public safety community identified
a need for 100 megahertz spectrum to accomplish their mission
to communicate. Public safety will finally gain 24 megahertz.
You brought that out in your testimony I think, in February of
2009. Is it not about time that the FCC does what it needs to
do to allocate the necessary spectrum that public safety needs
in your wisdom.
Mr. Moran. Well, you are right, the 97 Budget Act, actually
the 97 Budget Act directed the Commission to allocate 24
megahertz for public safety use, and it would not be available,
as you know, until some time in the future when the digital TV
transition occurred. In some parts of the country, that
spectrum is available for public safety. In many parts of the
country, it will not be available until 2009, as you point out.
Mr. Pascrell. I come here as a friend, Mr. Moran, believe
it or not. What is stopping us from implementing the urgent
talk that we all have on all sides of the table here? What is
the main factor that stands in our way in your estimation?
Mr. Moran. For, I think you are now referring to adequacy
of spectrum, not interoperability.
Mr. Pascrell. Correct.
Mr. Moran. On the spectrum issue, the Commission, of
course, is responsible for administering nonfederal spectrum.
Frankly, the spectrum is being used by many parties. It is
pretty much congested. The Commission has made a major effort,
as a matter of fact, a coalition of public safety, Nextel and
other 800 megahertz licensees came in to us and asked us to do
some things to eliminate interference problems in the 800
megahertz public safety area. I believe the chairman talked
about some of these interference problems last time that I
testified.
The Commission, at the behest of this coalition, including
public safety, we aggressively got into this, found a solution
to not only eliminating the 800 megahertz interference spectrum
that there therefore could make the public safety spectrum to
be used more efficiently and effectively, but we also, through
this process, there will be another 800 megahertz that will be
freed up from that. So we are working on that. This was not a
simple task. There were thousands of licensees in the 800
megahertz band that we are in the process of clearing out, to
free this up for public safety, to give them a bigger band that
is adjacent so their systems would work better.
Mr. Pascrell. It would seem to me, I don't mean to
interrupt you and there are other questions, and we would have
another round, I assume. It would seem to me, Mr. Moran, and I
thank you for your honesty. You have been very direct. I hope
folks listen to what you just said. But I conclude, tell me I
am wrong, tell me I am not perceiving what you said correctly,
I am perceiving this as, well, public safety public safety will
have to wait until the other interests decide to give up some
of their space. Is that rather a cynical interpretation.
Mr. Moran. Well, the 24 megahertz, in most places, will not
be available until February of 2009. That is true. We are doing
what the Congress has asked us to do there and that is the
situation.
Mr. Pascrell. But our frustration is, and I realize you can
deal only as director in the department, but our frustration is
to us there is nothing more important than the lives of our
first responders. And to hear you and I know you are not, you
are a very compassionate individual, I know a little bit about
your background, do you wonder why we get a bit frustrated and
a bit anxious and concerned? You do not have to answer the
question.
This is unacceptable. We are going to wait for the private
sector to give room to police and fire. We are not going to do
that when you are forcing us to make regulations that we should
not have to make. Do you understand what I am saying, Mr.
Moran?
Mr. Moran. I understand what you are saying, yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for your
patience.
Mr. Reichert. Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to you and
the ranking member for holding four very interesting hearings
on this issue. I think as we assess the gaps in homeland
security this issue of interoperable communications is the
number one gap. I do agree that we have made some progress, but
I don't feel that we are close to where we need to be, and part
of that is Congress's fault. It would be nice to point fingers
at these witnesses, several of whom I have worked with in other
lifetimes, especially Dr. Boyd when he was at the National
Institute of Justice, but it is not only their fault. It is our
fault. Our fault, meaning Congress.
We made a promise to our first responder community and to
the American people a decade ago that we would turn over
dedicated spectrum for emergency communications by the end of
this calendar year and we, we, the Congress of the United
States, broke our promise. Several of us on this committee have
been pushing for 4 years to enact H.R. 1646, the HERO Act,
which would keep Congress's promise. HERO is still alive but it
is not well. And instead, as Mr. Pascrell was just saying,
Congress has punted and we will finally turn over spectrum in
2-1/2 years from now.
I am the ranking member on the House Intelligence
Committee, and I receive scary briefings all the time. And I
doubt that the terrorists who are plotting to attack us are
waiting for 2-1/2 years until we can have an adequate framework
for interoperable communications.
So my question to you is not to blame you for Congress's
mistakes, but to see whether on an interim or patchwork basis
we really are developing systems out there in our communities
that can do most of this job. I hope the answer is yes. I am
not sure that it is. But I just want to talk about for a minute
some of the things that are happening in Los Angeles county and
in some of the cities that I represent. Small cities are
pooling resources. Los Angeles city and county which is a huge
metropolitan area, is plugging into an I.T. base system with
the capability to connect divergent frequencies. There is talk
about creating a single platform of gateways, and also talk of
building out a system of repeater networks so that this ability
of ACU-1000 to integrate spectrum can be expanded and extended.
My question for the panel is are these strategies
sufficient bridges to get us to 2009, or are we seriously, in
my view, and you can respond, are we seriously inadequately
fielding the interoperable strategies necessary to protect
Americans in the event of terrorist or natural disasters?
Mr. Boyd. Well, I would have to say that the work being
done in Los Angeles is probably some of the best effort in the
country to try to bring together near-term interoperability.
That is to achieve interoperable now with what you have. One of
challenges, and nobody is comfortable with this, but it is the
reality, is you have to start with what we have. There is a
huge infrastructure there that cannot be changed that quickly.
It is typically bought with the bond issue that takes anywhere
from 20 to 30 years to pay off. So it is a very, very
complicated thing to try to move it. In the meantime, Los
Angeles has done a really, really solid job, in my judgement,
of doing that. In the northern Virginia, southern New York
area, for example, I was pleased when a few weeks ago, I was
really pleased to hear from your committee staff that when they
had gone out to talk to the communications officers and looked
at the communications centers in each of those places, they saw
the continuum which we talked to you about before in the front
of the tool box posted in every one of those communication
centers with pins showing where they were on that process.
I would like to remind you what that continuum showed,
because I think it is crucial, and that is that technology is
only one of the critical lanes. There has to willingness and an
agreement among the multiple jurisdictions and a number of
Members of Congress here have helped to do that. You, Ms.
Harman, did a lot of that in the early days when we first did a
field hearing some years ago out in El Segundo, in helping to
bring the communities together and get them to talk to each
other and agree. Because once they are willing to make those
agreements, we are not at a point that it is the cleanest kind
of solution we want, but they can achieve emergency level
interoperability now if they are willing to do that.
Ms. Harman. Does anyone else wish to answer the question. I
know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
have the answers for the record.
Mr. Moran. Yes, may I. Yes, I think some of the things you
are mentioned, I.T.-based technologies to interconnect existing
public safety systems that are operating at different
frequencies and different modulation techniques and all of
this, I think that there are real potentials here to have some
real improvements in interoperability that can be achieved in
the short term.
When the 24 megahertz is fully available in a couple of
years, that is the first step. Systems have to be built. A lot
of money will have to be spent to put these things in. And with
the new systems, the FCC, by the way, has rules that the new
700 megahertz systems, we have set aside some interoperability
channels and we have made a requirement that all 700s, that all
the radios associated with them have to be able to access these
interoperability channels. But there is still going to be the
question, how about all the embedded base? Will those things be
able to interoperate with the 700?
We think there are a number of technologies out there that
will help us make some substantial progress in interoperability
in the short term. It appears that the amount of capital needed
to do it is much less than full scale change out of these
systems. But I certainly agree with Dr. Boyd that it is not
just the technology. You have to have the local authorities to
agree that this is what they want to do. You have to have them
work out how these systems are going to work, who is going to
be in charge, how it will work tactically and strategically,
and you have to train all the people to make this thing work.
It is a lot more than just buying the technology. There is a
lot of human element here and it is all essential. But
nonetheless, I think progress can be made in the short term
with solutions like this.
Mr. Reichert. The gentleman's time has expired. Mrs.
Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Probably part of
this have already been answered, but the last, or the most
recent example of interoperable communications not working was
Katrina, and have you responded already as to what your
assessment has been of what went wrong in Katrina and given the
fact that we are just a month and a half from hurricane season
and a disaster could happen at any time, based on what went
wrong then, what has been done to ensure that by June 1st, that
some of these problems will not recur?
Mr. Boyd. I think the first thing to understand is that the
principal problem in Katrina was the failure of operability
rather than interoperability. The whole basic system went out.
Mrs. Christensen. But that could happen in any--if I was a
terrorist, I would take that out first.
Mr. Boyd. That is correct, but if you do not have that
communications infrastructure in place, you cannot even get to
interoperability. In Katrina, you had a combination of things.
You also lost a power grid. By losing the power grid you lost
your ability to even charge batteries and handheld units. So
that is why it took some days to put it back together. You lost
the powers. You lost the power grid. You lost the ability to
charge those things over an area about the size of the United
Kingdom, now that takes some time to recover.
Mrs. Christensen. I live in the Virgin Islands. We have had
hurricanes, power outages. It would seem to me that we should
have learned how to deal with those issues already. No one--
does anyone else have an answer?
Ms. Henke. If I can tell you some of the things we are
undertaking, some of the things we are working on to address
those issues. One, as I mentioned prior to your arrival, is
tactical interoperable communications, the plans that are due
on May 1, and the exercises that will occur that will identify
shortfalls and gaps.
In addition to that, before hurricane season starts, the
Department of Homeland Security in coordination with multiple
agencies within the Department as well as outside the
Department, with our State and local partners, is conducting
hurricane exercises along the eastern seaboard and the Gulf
Coast. Those exercises will look at evacuation as well as
communications and help us to once again test some of the
things that have been corrected or fixed since Hurricane
Katrina and also identify where some of those gaps are and how
we can potentially quickly address those.
Mrs. Christensen. Thanks for the answers. I am still not
very comfortable and I am just always amazed at what we have
not learned over the years of having gone through hurricanes.
The integrated wireless network, I am not sure who I should
direct this one to, but it is to provide a consolidated
nationwide federal wireless communication service and the
partnership started in October, 2001. We are now four and a
half years into this. How many of the 80,000 law enforcement
users or 2,500 sites have been served? That is SAFECOM.
Department of Defense I guess it would be.
Mr. Boyd. There are two elements to that. DHS has a role in
it and the Department of Justice are partners. That is not the
program in my office. I can't tell you how many sites have been
in place. What I can tell you is that there is an extensive
collaboration involving SAFECOM, the Department of Justice, the
Office of Grants and Training, and the National Guard Bureau
and others, in trying to make sure that as that
interoperability is established in those major cities, that it
also fits within the larger national construct, but I can't
give you the details on the program because the manager for
that is in the Wireless Management Office in the Department of
Justice.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Another question to the
Department of Commerce. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. I believe the NTIA person is not here.
Mrs. Christensen. Okay. I guess I came in late. I will let
that be my last question on this round.
Mr. Reichert. Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much. I want to thank the
chairman and the ranking member for holding this hearing again,
although we have been looking for answers for a very long time.
Some of us have been working on this for 4 years. Before I get
to the immediate question, just following up, I believe Dr.
Boyd said the problem in Louisiana was communication, not
interoperability.
Now I am not an expert in this area, although many of us
have been working on this for 4 years, but I believe Director
Moran is Director of the Office of Homeland Security Federal
Communications Commission. Now it would seem to me that yes,
the communications got flooded; yes, it all broke down. This is
the United States of America. What does the military do in
situations like this? Can't you preposition equipment that can
be used?
Four experts here. We are just trying to look for answers
with great respect for your expertise. Shouldn't you be able to
say to me, Dr. Boyd, Mr. Moran? Don't worry about it, we know
how to preposition equipment, whether it is on trucks or on a
high ground or whether using equipment that you plug into. How
can you sit there and say we didn't have interoperability but
now I can't guarantee you they will be able to communicate
because that is a communications issue, not an interoperability
issue.
And then you were saying, I believe it was Dr. Boyd, I am
not sure, might have been Mr. Moran, again, I apologize, that
this gets more complicated as we move along because many
communities who aren't going to wait for you guys, they are fed
up with the Federal Government, are taking out bond issues to
buy communication. And in many instances, because there are no
Federal guidelines, which we were told by Secretary Ridge 2
years ago they were going to be in place. Okay. They are moving
ahead, and as you said, it gets more complicated.
Now I understand this is extremely complex, it is a time
consuming issue, but, again, we have known about all of this
for years, and 9/11, where we lost hundreds of lives, many
could be attributed to the fact that they couldn't communicate.
The final report of the Federal Public Safety Wireless
Advisory Committee concluded, quote, unless immediate measures
are taken to promote interoperability, public safety agencies
will not be able to adequately discharge their obligation to
protect life and property in a safe, efficient and cost
efficient manner. That report was written over 9 years ago. Not
4 years ago, 9 years ago.
Okay. You are all in charge here. We are just trying to
move this along and to understand why you can't get it done. So
looking at the broader picture, when will we reach a point
where we understand this is an emergency. We could have a real
problem with the storms in about a month and a half, or month.
When will our communications system not be a liability? What
steps have been taken specifically to bolster communication
systems in hurricane-prone areas since the Katrina debacle?
Because you are going to tell me, and I heard this well, we are
studying it, in 6 months, in a year. No wonder the public says
what is this whole apparatus. You have hundreds and hundreds,
thousands of people working on this and yet our citizens are
not safe because you haven't come up with even a temporary
answer.
You can come up with a better answer a year from now, 2
years from now, but what have we done, how can you tell us and
the people down there or another hurricane area that this is
going to work, they are going to be able to communicate, that
it won't be the days of Paul Revere where someone from a roof
had to throw down a glass jar with a message in it? Can you
give us any confidence that you are doing something that is
worthwhile, that is going to keep people safer, that is moving
along and making us able to-- don't know if I even want to
stick to interoperability--being able to communicate in an
emergency. If I sound frustrated, I apologize, but I am.
Mr. Boyd. First, I didn't use the term ``communicate,'' I
said ``operability.'' That means you have a communication
system able to provide communications among all of the elements
of that agency. Interoperability refers to the ability of that
agency to communicate with another agency.
Mrs. Lowey. Talk about the first because you have told me
the problem was everything went down. What have you done, what
technology is out there, what does the military have to address
operability?
Mr. Boyd. As a soldier retired after 23 years of combat
service the first thing the military does is take anywhere from
5 to 15 days to put in a new infrastructure to bring in the
things they need to cover that area. They don't do it
overnight. I know there is a comic book notion that the
military drops in and communication takes place. That does not
happen.
Mrs. Lowey. Can you preposition material?
Mr. Boyd. You can preposition materials but you are going
to have to preposition them outside the affected area because
you don't want them destroyed by the storm, which means you
always stock with the painful reality that you have to move
them. That takes time. Not only do you have to move them, you
have to figure out where you are going to put them when you get
there.
So some of the best sites were under water. The towers were
gone. You can't replace a 300-foot tower with a hundred foot
tower that you can stick into an airplane and move into place.
So you are always going to have to do the best you can in that
kind of environment.
What I think is most important, and I was involved in the
PSWAC study back then, is that more for interoperability has
occurred in the last probably 4 or 5 years than I saw in the
entire time I have been involved in interoperability. But the
point I want to make and have been trying to make repeatedly in
every hearing is whether we like it or not this is going to
take some time. This is a huge, huge expensive infrastructure
that greatly exceeds a hundred billion dollars just for the
infrastructure itself. Of that, most of it is legacy equipment,
so whatever standards we build now has to figure out how to
connect to some of these old systems.
I had a county commission ask me to come down last week and
help them figure out how to go about moving to a 700 megahertz
system because they are currently on 4.9 gigahertz. They built
that--or a 490 megahertz system. They built that in 1985. It is
21 years later. If they could get the county commission now to
approve, using a combination of straight grant money and their
money, a new system, it will take, and this is the normal for
any communication system, 5 to 10 years, if the money is
available, the licensing is available, there aren't any
problems with environmental impact statements, they can get the
towers built, no not in my backyard problems; it takes 5 to 10
years under perfect circumstances to build a new communications
system.
So none of this will happen overnight. But I will tell you
that a great deal has happened. What is most refreshing is what
is happening in the regions themselves that are beginning to
address this work. The Mississippi Wireless Commission asked me
to come down so they could talk to me about what they were
doing. Last month Montana came down to see me, or last week,
and Montana pointed out that they have built a new plan,
everybody on board in the State, so that they have been able to
reduce the number of towers, the most expensive piece of a
communications infrastructure, from 33 to cover their northern
border, which is one time zone wide, to 11. One-third the cost
because they got everybody together. But the important issue is
they got everybody together. Although we at the Federal
Government like to think we are driving the whole train, the
reality is it is that local level and those States that will
drive that train. We can help by offering the tools, we can
help by offering them the guidance.
The public safety community will tell you that they like
the SAFECOM guidance because that is exactly how they think
they need to build those communications systems. And we can
help with grant money to focus things in the direction we need
to have things go. But we will not at the Federal level force a
dramatic change in 1 or 2 or 3 years. The communities will make
that happen, but it will take them within the period of time it
takes them to replace an existing infrastructure that has a
lifespan of 15 to 30 years.
Mr. Reichert. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Peed.
Mr. Peed. I wanted to follow up. As Dr. Boyd said, this was
a 90,000 square mile area, an area the size of Great Britain. I
just got back from there, I spent 6 days and I toured through
Biloxi and New Orleans and the parishes talking to sheriffs and
chiefs and it was interesting that some little organizations
like Slidell did not lose communications even though they lost
half their tower.
New Orleans in its entirety lost all its communications,
including the FBI. They couldn't even make cell phone calls.
What the COPS office has done is we have made a number of
grants to those gulf regions. We have made grants to
Birmingham, Shreveport, Baton Rouge, New Orleans and Mobile,
just to name a few. And New Orleans had partnered with five of
the parishes there to develop an interoperable communications
system to protect their ports as well as respond to emergencies
of this measure.
Mrs. Lowey. I know I would be out of order but I know we
would all like to hear, could the gentlemen just follow up, why
did Slidell not lose power?
Mr. Peed. I don't know exactly why. It would require a
technical person to take a look at that, but I sat with the
chief there and he was showing me pictures of his cruisers
under water and his towers located there has not been rebuilt
yet but they still have radio communication. It would take a
technical person to take a look at that.
Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Chairman, I know this is out of order
again, but just following up with the gentleman.
Mr. Reichert. Do you have one additional question for the
gentleman?
Mrs. Lowey. I just don't understand it. I wonder how often
you have briefed Secretary Chertoff. Could you tell us in
writing at another time because my time ran out already the
state of communications in ever locality in the country? And if
something like that is successful in Louisiana, I would think
coming before this committee we would be briefed or you would
be immediately following up on what was successful and
recommending that.
I would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, if we don't have it,
if we can get a briefing that I am assuming you give to
Secretary Chertoff at least once every other week, or something
like that, with the state of communications across the country
and are there other examples like that that could beSec.
Mr. Reichert. What we will do is we will have the staff
coordinate with the panel of witnesses and see if we might be
able to arrange that.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you so much.
Mr. Reichert. You are welcome.
We will have a second round of questions. And I have a
couple of questions. I would like to go back to the issue of
reconfiguring 800 megahertz. I just want to make it very clear
that this has been a lot longer than 4 years that we have been
struggling with this issue. I know some Members of Congress
have been involved in this process for that long.
But back in 1997 when I first became the sheriff of Kane
County we were still on a VHF system and transitioning to 800
megahertz, and since 1997 as we transitioned to 800 megahertz,
and maybe you are familiar, I know Carl has visited Seattle,
and Dr. Boyd, familiar with the King County area and the
inability of 800 megahertz to serve the needs there, especially
the foothills of the Cascades and sometimes downtown within the
inner city area with the tall buildings, especially with the
firefighters and police officers together, their inability to
communicate on 800 megahertz.
So we have been hearing about the reconfiguration of 800
megahertz for almost 10 years. That has been a frustrating
thing for first responders to be patient because now we are
told to be even more patient. And we are tired of waiting, I
guess is the message that I want to deliver. I understand the
complexities of the problem but it seems to me nothing can be
more important than the safety of our first responders, and to
put some business ahead of that doesn't seem to be--doesn't
seem to be--is not the right thing.
I would like to ask Assistant Secretary Henke, NTIA has a
$1 billion grant program for interoperability; do you think
they should have that within their jurisdiction to manage and
disseminate, or should that better be placed in your shop?
Ms. Henke. I can tell you that Congress provided the money
to NTIA. I can tell you NTIA and the leadership of NTIA as well
as myself and members of my staff have met and have discussed
those resources. The goal of both NTIA as well as the Office of
Grants and Training at DHS is the most effective and efficient
use of those dollars to have a measurable result on
interoperability.
So whether it is housed and transferred to Grants and
Training or whether it stays within NTIA, I can assure the
Committee that we are already talking and coordinating to make
certain that we have--that those resources accomplish a
measurable result.
Mr. Reichert. Wouldn't it make sense though to have that
money in your shop rather than have another entity to
communicate with, coordinate with and make sure that we are
spending the money on the strategic plan that has been
described?
Ms. Henke. That is a possibility. Congress provided the
resources to NTIA. We have had those communications and I can
assure you that once again in the language it says that NTIA
should coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and
with the SAFECOM guidance. Our goal once again is to make
certain that it is the most efficient way for our first
responders. And so if that means transferring it to the Office
of Grants and Training in the end for us to administer those
funds, if that is the most efficient way, we will do so.
Mr. Reichert. There is discussions taking place, I know.
Thank you.
Dr. Boyd, you mentioned an interoperability baseline
survey. Did it include, the survey include questions around
standards?
Mr. Boyd. Not so much--what we did was to build the
baseline survey around the interoperability continuum. We
didn't build it specifically around standards. And the reason
we didn't is that there is no standard now that can cover the
range of equipment used in the field and the survey does look
at what are some of the kinds of different technologies you
use.
We think standards are a forward-looking activity where we
have to build in hooks and ability to get to those legacy
systems, but it is not so much a backward-looking activity.
Mr. Reichert. Wasn't this a voluntary survey?
Mr. Boyd. It is a voluntary survey. It will go out very
shortly. It will go out to 23,000 different police, medical,
fire service.
Mr. Reichert. So it hasn't gone out yet? We have already
spent $2.2 billion on interoperability and we are just now
doing a survey?
Mr. Boyd. When SAFECOM came to DHS, one of the first things
we decided we needed to do was a baseline survey. So when
Congress appropriated funding in 2005 we immediately started
the contract to get into place the survey and design that
survey.
Mr. Reichert. I will yield my time.
Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moran, the FCC's strategic plan recognizes that over
90Sec. rcent of the Nation's communications system is privately
owned. The Department of Homeland Security has stated that
85Sec. rcent of the Nation's critical infrastructure is owned
by the private sector.
I have a couple of questions for you. What tools does the
FCC have to mandate that the products marketed for
interoperability live up to their claim? What tools do you
have, what power do you have, what authority do you have? That
is my first question.
Mr. Moran. Well, what tools do we have that can assure that
products manufactured to promote interoperability do in fact
provide interoperability? To the extent it is a radio product,
the product has to be certified by the FCC. So perhaps there is
something there if it is a radio-based product. If it is an IP-
based product, I don't think that is the issue there.
I don't know that the FCC requiring the products--that
products meet the criteria that they are designed for, that is
not a normal process that the FCC is involved with.
Mr. Pascrell. Is that your answer? Do you wish to make a
phone call?
Mr. Moran. I better check back with the people back home.
Mr. Pascrell. The second question--am only being serious.
How does the strategic plan, Mr. Moran, fit within the
Department's plans for proposed Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau? How does that strategic plan fit into the
Department's plans, Homeland Security department's plans?
Mr. Moran. How does the FCC's plan to reorganize fit into
the Department of homeland security's plans? I don't really
know the answer to that but I will say this; the FCC, myself
included, deal routinely with a number of segments of the
Department of Homeland Security, most notably the national
communications system. But other parts with FEMA and other
parts, and we work closely with them on joint issues, including
the national response plan in which the FCC is a support agency
to ESF2 function, emergency support function number 2
communications, for communications response when a major
disaster takes place. We work closely with them. We do that
now.
When the commission reorganizes, which we believe it will
here if this is all approved, we intend to work just as closely
with the Department of Homeland Security on the same kinds of
things after the reorganization. We hope we will be able to
actually do a better job in that coordination because we
believe by bringing all the focus of all the national security,
homeland security, emergency things in one part at the FCC, we
will have a more comprehensive, effective unity process there
so that we can work better with Department of Homeland Security
and Justice and others that we need to work with.
Mr. Pascrell. Because, Mr. Moran, if the figures are right,
and I think you would agree with them, 85 or 90Sec. rcent of
the Nation's communications systems, it would appear to me that
the enforcement power of FCC is going to have to be very
definitive, and how far are you willing to go in terms of what
was said previously. I am very concerned about this because you
are an independent agency, and you should be. Or should you be?
Do you have the power to enforce what you have talked about
today, which I think is going to be another question.
Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of questions, I am going to
submit them for the record, and I want to thank the panelists
for their cooperation today.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. No further
questions?
Mrs. Lowey. I will save it until after we get that report.
Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey. I would like to thank
the witnesses again for their valuable testimony. This panel is
excused, with the exception of Dr. Boyd, whom I hope will also
sit on the second panel for purposes of responding to our
questions related to standards and technology.
The Chair now calls the second panel. Thank you all so much
for being here.
Good afternoon. With us on the second panel today, Dr.
Boyd, welcome again. Dr. John Morgan, Assistant Director for
Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Defense; Mr. Dereck
Orr, Program Manager, Public Safety Communications System,
National Institute of Standard and Technology; Mr. Jim Gass,
Deputy Director, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention
of Terrorism; and Mr. Bruce Walker, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Government Affairs Committee, Homeland Security and Defense
Business Council.
Mr. Reichert. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Morgan to
testify.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MORGAN
Mr. Morgan. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Chairman
Reichert, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear
before you today on behalf of the Department of Justice to
speak to you on the issue of public safety communications. I
will address the need for a complete set of standards and a
compliance testing program, new technology development and the
role of independent evaluation of interoperability programs.
NIJ, the National Institute of Justice, is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs. Its mission is to advance
scientific research, development and evaluation to enhance the
administration of justice and public safety. Our primary focus
is on State and local criminal justice agencies, which are
responsible for over 95Sec. rcent of the investigation and
adjudication of crime in the United States. NIJ is the only
Federal agency dedicated to improving the effectiveness of
criminal justice through scientific research.
NIJ has a great deal of experience with regard to
assistance programs related to technology and other criminal
justice needs. For example, Mr. Chairman, NIJ administers the
President's DNA initiative, and I know you are very familiar
with the power of DNA to solve violent crime.
NIJ has been involved in addressing public safety
communications issues for over a decade. Through its
communications technology portfolio, also know as CommTech, NIJ
pursues short and long-term interoperability solutions
involving wireless radio systems and information technology.
CommTech, like all of NIJ's portfolios, relies on a Technology
Working Group of frontline practitioners to identify the most
critical technology problems that will receive investment from
our agency. These law enforcement and public safety
practitioners have identified standards development and
compliance assurances among their highest priorities.
Mr. Chairman, NIJ strongly recommends the adoption of a
full suite of standards and a compliance testing program to
ensure compliance of federally funded systems with those
standards. To achieve this will require a very close
coordination among all of the Federal entities here today and
NIJ welcomes even closer coordination among our Federal
partners.
NIJ suggests that any Federal assistance funding program
targeted to public safety communications include independent
evaluations of program outcomes. These evaluations should focus
on compliance with standards, assessment of the fielded systems
against the SAFECOM Statement of Requirements, the improvements
in interoperability and operability that those systems produce.
Such evaluations should also include fundamental examination of
public safety benefits such as improvements in response to
critical incidents.
Federal assistance programs in interoperability have thus
far lacked such independent evaluation. Because of this there
is no objective data on their impact, whether positive or
negative.
NIJ also recommends that continuing technology research and
development be a central part of the Federal Government's role
in public safety communications. While a comprehensive suite of
standard and effective policy coordination are essential to
addressing the issues of public safety communications, new
technology development is also critical for success in this
area.
NIJ has focused its research and development investment on
Cognitive Radio and Software-Defined Radio technologies because
we believe these emerging tools may enable first responders to
communicate seamlessly at critical incidents in the future.
These and other technologies will improve interoperability and
operability; that is, the ability to communicate reliably under
normal circumstances.
Mr. Chair, spectrum allocation is a major problem for the
effective deployment of interoperable and operable
communications systems. One approach has been to increase the
spectrum available to public safety agencies. Another approach,
which NIJ is pursuing, is to develop technology that will
enable public safety agencies to better use the spectrum
allocated to them. Through current and future grants, focusing
on cognitive radio technologies, frequency allocation
coordination databases and other approaches, we believe greater
access can be attained by public safety in the existing
spectrum on a day-to-day basis and during emergency or disaster
situations.
NIJ has devoted an average of $13 million per year to its
CommTech portfolio. A remarkable amount of work has been done
through this focused investment. In addition to technology
assistance, standards development and testing, NIJ funds
approximately 20 research and development and demonstration
projects each year. Among our accomplishments, NIJ funded
development of the Virginia Statewide Communications
Interoperability Plan, a national model for State level
planning and cooperation. With the support of the FCC, NIJ also
funded the development of the Computer-Assisted Precoordination
Resource and Database System which is used to plan and use
regional frequency spectrum more efficiently.
NIJ convened the National Task Force on Interoperability
and published the Why Can't We Talk guidebook as well as a wide
range of other technical documents for practitioners, such as
our Understanding Wireless Guide.
Every day, through our center system, NIJ provides
technology assistance around the country. In particular, the
NIJ's Western Center has supported CommTech efforts in
software, radio as well as responding to calls for technology
assistance defined.
Mr. Chairman, a single entity or even the entire Federal
Government will not solve the interoperability challenge alone.
Clear delineation and better coordination among Federal
entities is certainty beneficial. Although the challenges in
public safety communications will take many years to solve, the
Federal Government can play a very positive role through a
comprehensive, coordinated and standards-based approach.
My full statement has been submitted in writing for the
record.
[The statement of Mr. Morgan follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Morgan
April 25, 2006
Good afternoon Chairman Reichert, Mr. Pascrell, members of the
Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the
Office of Justice Programs' National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to
speak to you on the issue of public safety communications
interoperability. I will address communications interoperability needs
of state and local law enforcement and public safety, especially with
respect to emerging technology and the need for standards.
Congress created NIJ in 1968 as the research, development and
evaluation arm of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Its mission is
to advance scientific research, development, and evaluation to enhance
the administration of justice and public safety.
NIJ's primary focus is on state and local criminal justice
agencies, which are responsible for over 95 percent of the adjudication
of crime in the United States. NIJ is the only federal agency dedicated
to improving the effectiveness of criminal justice through scientific
research. NIJ is committed to the scientific process of open
competition, peer-review, published reports and archived data. NIJ's
Office of Science & Technology (OS&T) was established in 1992 to
execute the agency's technology research and development program. This
program includes: technology research and development; establishment
and maintenance of performance standards for test and evaluation of
technologies and equipment; and establishment and maintenance of the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC)
system. The NLECTC system supports NIJ through development of
technology requirements, test and evaluation, and providing technology
assistance to state and local agencies through 10 technology assistance
and specialty centers across the United States.
Although OS&T has been in operation for more than a decade,
Congress officially recognized the office in Title II of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (HSA). Through that legislation, Congress assigned
several critical responsibilities to NIJ, including:
To establish and maintain advisory groups to assess
the technology needs of federal, state and local criminal
justice agencies;
To establish and maintain performance standards, test
and evaluate law enforcement technology and equipment, and
establish programs to certify, validate and mark technologies
and equipment conforming to these standards;
To take the lead in establishing a coordinated federal
approach to issues relating to criminal justice technology; and
To administer a program of research, development,
testing, and demonstration to improve the interoperability of
voice and data public safety communications.
NIJ has extensive experience in addressing public safety
communications issues. Through its Communications Technology portfolio
(CommTech), NIJ pursues both short- and long-term interoperability
solutions involving wireless telecommunications and information
technology. NIJ's work in this area includes:
Research and development of technology for wireless
interoperability;
Test and evaluation of current products;
Standards development for wireless interoperability;
Pilot demonstrations on cutting edge technology; and
Technology assistance to state and local agencies.
The CommTech research and development efforts are concentrated on
Software Defined Radio (SDR), cognitive radio, Voice-over-Internet
Protocol (VOIP), Advanced Wireless Voice and Data, and in-building
location and communication technologies. As in all of its technology
portfolios, NIJ maintains a practitioner-based Technology Working Group
(TWG) for the CommTech portfolio comprised of state and local
practitioners who offer advice on technology requirements and program
direction. NIJ's CommTech investments are based on the specific needs
identified to us by this TWG. NIJ also coordinates its program with all
the federal agencies involved in public safety communications
interoperability, including SAFECOM and the Office of Grants and
Training in the Department of Homeland Security, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology within the Department of Commerce, and the
Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services within the Department of
Justice.
These front line practitioners have identified standards
development and compliance assurance as among the priorities in this
area. Only a very small number of standards exist to ensure that radio
systems are interoperable across jurisdictional and agency boundaries.
In addition, there is no compliance testing program to ensure that
systems conform to the few standards that do exist. Compliance testing
is an integral component of any standards development effort to ensure
that fielded systems meet the requirements of standards.
While federal assistance programs for interoperability already
include technical assistance for state and local agencies, more
independent evaluations of the outcomes would be advisable. Evaluations
should focus on actual compliance with standards, assessment of the
fielded systems against the SAFECOM Statement of Requirements (SoR) for
Public Safety Wireless Communications and Interoperability, and the
improvements in operability and interoperability those systems produce.
Such evaluations would also include fundamental examination of public
safety benefits, such as improvements in response to critical
incidents. Federal assistance programs in interoperability thus far
have lacked such independent evaluation, therefore there is
insufficient data on the impact, whether positive or negative. NIJ has
a close working relationship with SAFECOM and has played a primary role
in the initial development of the SoR and in its ongoing review.
The Role of Technology Development
Developing a comprehensive suite of standards and effective policy
coordination are critical to addressing the issues of public safety
communications interoperability and operability; but developing new
technology is also vital. NIJ believes the issues of operability and
interoperability are inextricably linked. Operability means that two
individuals from the same agency can talk with each other. Operability
deals with issues such as equipment availability, bandwidth and
spectrum allocation issues for voice and data, interoperability between
vendors and technology, standards, command and control, and federal,
state, and local coordination. Interoperability occurs when two (or
more) individuals from different public safety agencies communicate
with each other. Without operability, interoperability is irrelevant.
Focusing solely on interoperability will not allow the practitioner to
communicate or access information effectively.
Although technology development alone will not solve all
communications problems, it can provide important solutions that enable
public safety to access the revolution in wireless communications
underway in the commercial market. For this reason, NIJ has made
significant investments in new technologies such as SDR, cognitive
radio, and satellite communications for rural agencies. Such
technologies should enable public safety practitioners to ``roam''
freely just as cell phone users do and maximize the potential of the
limited radio frequency spectrum made available to the public safety
community. Of course, this can take place only when standards are in
place to ensure that systems will be compatible with each other through
advanced technology. Any federal investment in communications should
recognize the need to develop technology solutions that enable improved
operability and interoperability. Cognitive radio and SDR may enable
first responders to communicate seamlessly at critical incidents in the
future.
A SDR radio is one where frequency range, modulation or maximum
output power can be altered by making a change in software without
making any changes to hardware components that affect the radio
frequency emissions. SDR may provide an efficient and comparatively
inexpensive solution to the problem of building multi-mode, multi-band,
multi-functional wireless devices that can be easily enhanced. As such,
SDR can be considered an enabling technology that is applicable across
a wide range of areas within the wireless industry, not just public
safety.
Through CommTech, NIJ is funding the Public Safety Special Interest
Group (PS SIG) within the SDR Forum. The goals of the PS SIG are to
raise awareness of SDR, to publicize the activities of the Forum in
addressing issues confronting public safety, and to increase
participation of the public safety community in the SDR Forum. One of
the Forum's more important undertakings is a study to assess the
potential of, and issues associated with, SDR technology for the public
safety community, with emphasis on disaster response. The report was
approved by the SDR Forum membership this month (April 2006).
One specific SDR development example is the Dynamic Open
Architecture Radio System (DOARS). DOARS is a collaboration with the
U.S. Navy's Space and Naval Warfare System Center-Charleston. The
project heavily leverages work in SDR projects within the Department of
Defense, and seeks to create an affordable, user-friendly PC-based
``universal radio'' for public safety agencies.
A cognitive radio is a step beyond SDR. Whereas an SDR requires
human programming, a cognitive radio will have the ability to adapt its
behavior based on external factors without human intervention. A
cognitive radio can alter its transmitter parameters based on
interaction with the environment in which it operates, i.e., it senses
what systems a radio can connect to and connects to them. This
interaction may involve active negotiation or communications by the
device with other devices or passive sensing and decision-making within
the radios. A cognitive radio may be able to change its operating
frequency to optimize use, sense signals from other nearby transmitters
in an effort to choose an optimum operating environment, modify
transmission characteristics, waveforms, and transmitter power to allow
greater sharing of spectrum, select operating parameters based on what
power and frequency are allowed at its current location, and implement
``device-negotiated'' sharing of spectrum under the terms of a
prearranged agreement between a licensee and a third party. Cognitive
radios may eventually enable parties to negotiate for spectrum use on a
real-time basis, without the need for prior agreements between all
parties. Of course, this will be important to both commercial and
public safety customers who have limited amounts of radio spectrum
available.
NIJ is funding Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
to build a prototype cognitive radio that can recognize and
interoperate with commonly used public safety waveform standards. This
work leverages National Science Foundation investments to develop and
test cognitive radio techniques for commercial applications.
Spectrum Allocation
Spectrum allocation is a major requirement for the effective
deployment of interoperable and operable communications systems. One
approach to dealing with this difficulty has been to increase the
spectrum available to public safety agencies. Recent legislation that
sets a date certain for the digital television transition will
facilitate the reclamation of valuable spectrum resources for public
safety use. This spectrum is anticipated to enable greater
interoperability among public safety agencies. Another approach, which
is being pursued by NIJ, is to develop technology that will enable
public safety agencies to better use the limited spectrum allocated to
them. NIJ is funding multiple efforts to develop such technologies that
would be of use to state and local agencies receiving Federal grant
funds.
In the current fiscal year 2006 solicitation cycle, NIJ is looking
to fund technologies that will utilize the newly allocated public
safety bands more efficiently. This includes technologies that involve
mesh, or ad-hoc, networking that operate in the 4.9 GHz band and, in
the future, the 700 MHz band. We believe these efforts will allow more
effective and productive use of existing bands and quicker
identification of additional bands if needed to meet national
objectives for our first responders.
The Current Status of Standards
It cannot be over emphasized that developing standards is vital to
dealing with the issue of public safety interoperability. Long before
September 11, 2001, NIJ recognized the importance of interoperability
standards for the public safety community. NIJ, through CommTech, is
deeply involved in development of the APCO (Association of Public-
Safety Communications Officials--International, Inc.)--25, or Project-
25 (P-25) standard. This initiative is an industry-wide effort to set
voluntary standards for digital two-way radio technology for public
safety organizations. In the early 1990s, the P-25 Steering Committee
approved the very first public safety, user-driven Statement of
Requirements (SoR) with the support of NIJ's CommTech Program.
NIJ funds the chairmanship of the P-25 standard steering committee,
a public standards committee under the Telecommunications Industry
Association, and the travel costs of some of the public safety agency
representatives who participate in the process, thus helping to ensure
objectivity and representativeness in the standards process. While
these costs are small, less than $250,000 per year, they have provided
both the impetus and the core element of a truly user-driven standards
process. Within P-25, the steering committee and its user groups
determine the user requirements, the standards that are acceptable, and
the priority of developing those standards. Through that funding, we
have leveraged the extensive economic resource of the major public
safety telecommunications industry in a cooperative and consolidated
effort to improve competition, provide interoperability, and ensure a
transparent and achievable migration path.
Since P-25's inception, the P-25 steering committee and its
partners in the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) have
completed over 34 technology standards that will provide one of the
three primary legs in our long-term efforts to create public safety
interoperability. Long-term planning and interagency cooperation will
also be necessary to implement interoperable communications systems
across the nation.
Although significant progress has been made, there are a number of
standards that need to be developed. These include:
Inter-Sub-System Interface (ISSI) which allows a
mobile from one system to transparently roam into another
compatible system and have complete communication.
Enhancement to the Fixed Station Interface to ensure
easier and more complete console access.
Enhancement of the Consol Interface Standard to ensure
greater transparency.
Completion of the Network Management standard
interface.
Enhancement of data interface to ensure transparent
system-to-system data transport on a more ubiquitous bases.
Enhancement of mobility to improve upon ease of access
during roaming.
Telephone Interconnect--ISSI compatible
A multitude of other conformance and performance standards are also
needed, including interface standards for such things as global
position systems or other user requirements as they arise. A total of
as many as 90 standards are anticipated. The new standards that are
required will be much more abbreviated than the current 34 since they
will be based on many of the original standards and modified to fit the
need of the next technology platform. Of course, all these new
technologies and associated standards must be compatible with existing
systems and standards. Public safety agencies do not have the resources
to replace entire systems every few years. Even beyond these standards,
there is a complete suite of needed standards that relate to spectrum
efficiency. Finally, there is work continuing on broad-band data and
4.9 GHz data standards to allow the transport of high-speed wireless
data among field radios and to and from major Public Safety Answering
Points or Incident Management Centers. In short, there is a great deal
of work that needs to be done to address standards for public safety
communications.
Testing and validation of P-25 compliant technology is necessary to
ensure the equipment being sold is interoperable at all levels. While
there is significant compliance at the level of common-air-interface,
there have been problems with the interoperability of features and
functions. The P-25 steering committee, its user groups, TIA and its
members, with the support of NIJ, have been aggressively working with
the Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and
Technology's Office of Law Enforcement Standards, the Institute for
Telecommunications Sciences, and SAFECOM, to develop a coordinated
solution. In particular, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology has made significant progress in the development of
critically important compliance testing programs to implement standards
in practice and provide public safety practitioners with performance
assurance independent of manufacturer claims.
The long term goal of P-25 is seamless public safety communications
interoperability and telecommunications transparency. Achieving that
goal is dependent upon leadership, adequate funding and sound planning
at all levels of government.
While the P-25 Steering Committee continues to meet and the
standards continue to evolve, public safety practitioners continue to
purchase communications systems. Because the completion of the P-25
suite of standards continues to be delayed, at the same time
advancements in wireless technology continue, NIJ's CommTech TWG has
recommended that NIJ follow a dual path approach: both supporting
development of standards in technology beyond P-25 (such as WiFi/
802.11x, WiMax/806.16x and VoIP) and continuing to support P-25. We
concur with them that the completion of P-25 standards, by itself, will
not solve the standards problem.
NIJ's Efforts
Within existing budget constraints, and the myriad of competing
technology needs of the criminal justice community, NIJ has been
devoting on average $13 million per year to its CommTech portfolio. We
are pleased to report that a remarkable amount of work has been done
through focusing our investment. In addition to technology assistance,
standards development and testing, NIJ has funded approximately 20
research, development and demonstration projects per year.
Among our accomplishments, NIJ funded the development of the
Virginia Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP), a
national model for state-level planning and cooperation. NIJ worked
closely with SAFECOM to develop the Virginia SCIP and continues to
encourage the use of the SCIP methodology elsewhere in the nation.
One of our most notable accomplishments in the public safety
communications technology arena has been funding the development of the
Computer Assisted Pre-Coordination Resource and Database System
(CAPRAD). This tool aids more than 50 regional planning committees to
plan and use regional frequency spectrum efficiently and to better
manage potential interference near jurisdictional borders. NIJ also
convened a National Task Force on Interoperability and published a
guidebook and pamphlet: Why Can't We Talk that discussed the need for
federal, state and local leadership on interoperability. This
publication was developed to facilitate education and discussion among
and between elected and appointed officials, their representative
associations, and public safety representatives on public safety
wireless communications interoperability.
NIJ publishes a wide range of communications-related information
for public safety professionals, such as the Understanding Wireless
Guide, which provides a comprehensive discussion and explanation of
communication systems for public safety. NIJ sponsored the development
of a satellite link for the Alaska LMR system. This technology will be
tested in other rural environments in the coming year under NIJ
funding. The benefit of this technology in situations where the local
communications infrastructure has been significantly degraded by a
manmade or natural disaster is clear. However, its potential to address
the more common needs of policing in rural environments with minimal
communications infrastructure needs to be explored.
Through CommTech, NIJ was responsible for development of the
Metropolitan Interoperability Regional System (MIRS). MIRS is designed
to meet the voice communication interoperability needs of the public
safety agencies in the Metropolitan Washington, DC region. It is being
used extensively by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
to aid in communication for multiple agencies in high-profile events
such as the Presidential Inauguration. The MIRS testbed has produced
important national benefits to public safety by improving the
understanding of the benefits of communications switching technology
and the pitfalls involving effective implementation of such systems.
CommTech pilot programs are unique in leveraging the participation
of the vendor community by pairing a vendor with a public safety
agency. NIJ partners with local law enforcement agencies and brings a
specific technology to evaluate. This maximizes outcomes while
simultaneously minimizing costs to the federal government. For example,
NIJ is conducting a pilot program in VOIP in Danville, VA. NIJ is also
exploring opportunities to initiate new pilots with SDR and wireless
broadband technologies.
A major part of the CommTech program is technology test and
evaluation to provide unbiased information to the public safety
community. NIJ serves as an independent evaluator, trusted partner, and
honest broker. These evaluations also serve to point out technology
gaps that need to be filled through further research and development.
NIJ has administered standards-based testing programs for criminal
justice practitioners for nearly 30 years, such as its body armor
testing program. Because of NIJ's body armor standard, officers have
confidence in the protection afforded by their personal protective
equipment. Over 3,000 officers' lives have been saved by NIJ-compliant
body armor.
Public safety officials are making communications purchase
decisions every day and assistance to evaluate the rapidly changing
communications landscape. NIJ provides this in many ways including
through our web site and publications such as the Why Can't We Talk
guidebook and pamphlet, and our Technology In-Shorts documents.
NIJ also actively responds to technology assistance requests that
we receive from public safety officials across the country. In just the
last two weeks, we have responded to a request to assist with
development of a communications system in Katrina-affected Mississippi
and Louisiana; a technology assistance request in Haverhill, MA; and
participated in a meeting with San Joaquin, CA officials concerning
communications needs. Last week, a captain of the Alexandria Police
Department and a member of the CommTech team, along with staff from the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center- Southeast
started to work with the Fredericksburg, VA Police and Fire Chiefs to
establish interoperable communications via an interconnect switch and
are addressing ways in which to optimize coverage without significant
financial investment. Through the Sheriff's Association of Texas (SAT),
NIJ has active and ongoing technology assistance requests with 26
Brazoria County fire departments; Frio County, Webb County, Medina
County, Caldwell County, and El Paso County Sheriff's offices; and the
Middle Rio Grande Development Council of Governments. NIJ is also
working with SAT to further develop communications operability and
interoperability for state and local agencies along the entire 26
county US-Mexico border.
CommTech provides technical support to tactical operations.
CommTech provided interoperability assistance in both the 2001 and 2005
Presidential Inaugurations, Hurricane Rita response, the dedication of
the World War II Memorial, and the Moussaoui trial. In May 2006, the
CommTech Program will provide interoperability support for the opening
ceremonies for the Woodrow Wilson Bridge via the development of an
interoperability plan.
NIJ provides a critical resource to other components of DOJ related
to interoperability. NIJ works very closely with the COPS Office to
support their grants review process. NIJ helped to fund the DOJ
Interoperability Summit in Seattle in May, 2005 and will do so again in
Austin next month (May 2006). NIJ has arranged for active sworn state
and local law enforcement personnel, as well as interoperability
technical experts, to support all of our federal partners in
interoperability efforts.
Assistance to State and Local Practitioners
NIJ's National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
(NLECTC) system offers public safety agencies, both large and small,
no-cost assistance in the implementation of current and emerging
technologies. With a network of ten regional centers and specialty
offices located across the country, the NLECTC system delivers
expertise in a number of technologies including communication
interoperability and information sharing. The NLECTC system plays a
vital role in NIJ's CommTech efforts.
The staff of the NLECTC system's Western Center (NLECTC-West) has
supported CommTech by providing subject matter experts in the field of
SDR. Also, Pima County Arizona asked NLECTC-West for technology
assistance in developing a communication network. The various agencies
in the county use different radio systems making mutual aide
interoperability difficult or impossible. Additionally, radio coverage
is poor due to the mountainous terrain. NLECTC-West drafted a technical
requirements document for that communication system.
The NLECTC system's Rocky Mountain Center houses the previously
discussed CAPRAD database, which allows all 55 regional planning
committees (RPC) to have access to tools to coordinate their frequency
planning. The RPCs also provide feedback on the CAPRAD system for
continuing improvement.
Conclusion
The goal of improving public safety communications interoperability
can only be achieved by dealing with the overall problem of
operability. Focusing on interoperability as the only issue in first
responder communications will not yield a result that will allow the
responder to communicate or access information effectively.
NIJ has, at the recommendation of its practitioner-driven TWG,
focused on many aspects of first responder communication operability,
including interoperability. With the support of the FCC, NIJ has funded
Regional Planning Councils to address local spectrum issues. It has
supported the development of CAPRAD to monitor and track first
responder spectrum requirements and usage across the U.S. We have
supported fundamental R&D in SDR and cognitive radios in order to
address issues of operability as much as interoperability. We have
worked closely with the vendor community to test and evaluate the
products in a real world environment and NIJ provides ongoing
technology assistance through our NLECTC system.
Today, there are fundamental challenges to operability. SDR and
cognitive radio technologies offer the promise to enhance
communications capabilities within the current available spectrum
allocations. Although new spectrum from the digital television
transition will help, new technologies can help public safety to
improve operability and interoperability for years to come. A single
entity, or even the entire federal government, will not solve the
interoperability challenge alone. There is overlap between the
activities of the various federal partners for interoperability. Each
represents a constituency with common as well as unique needs. Clearer
delineation and better coordination among federal entities with respect
to interoperability is what all of the agencies are striving to
achieve. Although the challenges in public safety communications will
take many years to solve, the federal government can best play a role
by working towards the establishment of a comprehensive, coordinated,
standards-based strategy.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Mr. Orr.
STATEMENT OF DERECK ORR, PROGRAM MANAGER, PUBLIC SAFETY
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND
TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Orr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sincerely honored to
be here this morning with you and the esteemed members of the
subcommittee. This public safety communication program serves
as the technical lead for several of the administration's
initiatives focusing on communications, including SAFECOM and
the COPS office, and although NIST is helping to improve public
safety communications through a number of efforts, many of
which other panelists have spoken of, I will focus the
remainder of my remarks on the state of standards for public
safety communications systems.
Interoperability for public safety communications is
defined as the ability to share information via voice and data
on demand, in real time, when needed and as authorized. The
public safety community expects this level of interoperability
will be available using equipment from multiple manufacturers,
be transparent to the user, require little or no special
knowledge of the system and not be dependent on common
frequency assignments. Obviously this is not what we have
today.
Achieving this definition of interoperability in the future
will not be possible without the existence of standards. Of
course, public safety radio users have recognized this for some
time. Approximately 15 years ago representatives from local,
state and federal agencies joined together to address the
absence of available standards. They did this for two primary
purposes. First was to ensure the interoperability could be
achieved assuming the use of equipment from multiple
manufacturers. Second, through standards, the public safety
community wanted to be able to take advantage of cost
reductions associated with the more competitive land mobile
environment.
The public safety community in the form of a P25 steering
committee partnered with the Telecommunications Industry
Association, TIA, to serve as the standards development
organization for this effort. Thus, Project 25 or P25 as we
know it today, was launched. A commonly misunderstood aspect is
that it is comprised of a single standard. Instead, it is a
suite of standards that specify the eight interfaces between
the various components of a land mobile radio system. Handheld
to handheld, handheld to mobile unit, mobile unit to tower.
Until this past January, the last years had resulted in
only one of the P25 interfaces, the common air interface that
deals with the functions of the handheld units; i.e., the
walkie-talkies, being advanced to a level where it would help
satisfy one or both of the goals of P25. However, over the last
year through the concerted efforts of industry, public safety
practitioners and NIST and its federal partners, with the
support of SAFECOM, the technical development of standards for
the critical P25 interfaces has been greatly accelerated.
Industry representatives with key involvement, like public
safety practitioners, have dramatically increased the pace and
scope of their standards development activities consistent with
the priorities set by Congress. As a result, significant
progress has been made through the formal standards development
framework established by the P25 TIA partnership in 1993.
Specifically, the most critical P25 radio system interfaces
have all been addressed. Basic protocol standards that specify
the functionality and capability of those interfaces have been
completed and have been or are on the verge of being published.
Adoption of P25 standards is now occurring within a timeframe
acceptable to public users, NIST, and manufacturers.
As of the March 2006 P25 meetings, the following has
occurred: The Fixed Station Interface standard has been
approved for publication as a TIA standard. The Fixed Station
Interface standard also serves as a Basic Console Interface
standard. The Inter-RF Subsystem Interface, ISSI, a key
standard for interoperability, is in final stages of balloting
and is expected to be approved by TIA during a May 1st P25
meeting.
I can report that state and local public safety agencies
are already referencing the above standards in formal requests
for proposals to industry and that manufacturers are in the
process of building these standards into future land mobile
radio product lines. In addition, Mr. Chairman, over the last 2
years NIST, with funds from the Department of Homeland Security
and Justice, has tested a number of the handheld P25 radios
that claim to meet the widely available Common Air Interface
standard. Using the test procedures called for in the
standards, NIST found none of the available radios met all
aspects of the standard.
Therefore, NIST, with the support of SAFECOM and the P25
steering committee, is developing a P25 Compliance Assessment
Program. NIST is preparing and documenting standardized test
protocols for the most important aspects of the Common Air
Interface standard. The standardized test protocols will be
provided to NIST's National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program, which can accredit laboratories across the country
interested in offering these testing capabilities. These will
go a long way in assuring the community that the equipment
being purchased meets the P25 standard.
In summation, Mr. Chairman, there are positive steps being
taken by leaders in the community, key Federal programs, the
Congress and industry to significantly change the current
environment and move the state of standards for public safety
forward. By the end of May, there will be newly adopted P25
standards covering three additional key interfaces which can be
tied to grants and procurements. By the end of this calendar
year, radio users will have a mechanism in place to ensure the
products they are purchasing do what is called for in the
applicable standards.
Again, I am honored to be here before this committee today
and I am happy answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Orr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dereck Orr
April 25, 2006
Thank you Chairman Reichert and Members of the Committee, I serve
as the Program Manager for Public Safety Communications Systems in the
Office of Law Enforcement Standards at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST a non-regulatory agency within
the U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration serves
industry, academia, and other parts of the government by promoting U.S.
innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement
science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic
security and improve our quality of life.
NIST's public safety communications program serves as the technical
lead for several Administration initiatives focusing on communications,
most importantly the SAFECOM Program. NIST is involved in many of the
key SAFECOM initiatives, including the Statement of Requirements,
Public Safety Architecture Framework, testing and evaluation, and
standards development. The strong partnership between SAFECOM and NIST
is an excellent example within the Administration of multi-agency
coordination and collaboration, and is something for which we at NIST
are very proud. In addition, NIST relies heavily on the world-class
engineering expertise of the Institute of Telecommunications Sciences
within NTIA.
I will focus the remainder of my remarks this morning on the state
of standards for public safety communications systems.
Interoperability for public safety communications is defined as
``the ability to share information via voice and data signals on
demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized.'' The public
safety community expects that this level of interoperability will be
available using equipment from multiple manufacturers, that they are
transparent to the user, requiring little or no special knowledge of
the system, and that they are not dependent on common frequency
assignments.
Achieving this definition of interoperability is not possible
without the existence of standards that will define how the various
components of a public safety communications system will interoperate,
regardless of manufacturer. In fact, I would venture to say that in the
absence of standards, achieving this level of interoperability would
not be possible.
Public safety users have recognized this for some time.
Approximately fifteen years ago, representatives from local, state, and
federal public safety associations and agencies joined together to
address the absence of available standards. They did this for two
primary purposes. First was to ensure that interoperability could be
achieved, assuming the use of equipment from multiple manufacturers.
Second, through standards, the public safety community wanted to be
able to take advantage of cost reductions associated with a more
competitive land mobile radio market.
Understanding the difficulty in specifying the complex operations
of the various components of a land mobile radio system, the public
safety community partnered with the Telecommunications Industry
Association (TIA) to serve as the standards development organization
(SDO) for this effort. Thus Project 25, or P25 as we know it today, was
launched. A Memorandum of Understanding formalizing this relationship
created a Steering Committee comprised only of public safety and
government representatives and invested the committee with the sole
authority to designate a P25 standard.
A commonly misunderstood aspect of P25 is that it is comprised of a
single standard. Instead, it is a suite of standards that specify the
eight interfaces between the various components of a land mobile radio
system (hand held to hand held, hand held to mobile unit, mobile unit
to repeater, etc.):
Common air interface: this interface defines the
wireless access between mobile and portable radios and between
the subscriber (portable and mobile) radios and the fixed or
base station radios;
Subscriber data peripheral interface: this interface
characterizes the signaling for data transfer that must take
place between the subscriber radios and the data devices that
may be connected to the subscriber radio;
Fixed station interface: this interface describes the
signaling and messages between the RFSS and the fixed station
by defining the voice and data packets (that are sent from/to
the subscriber(s) over the common air interface) and all of the
command and control messages used to administer the fixed
station as well as the subscribers that are communicating
through the fixed station;
Console interface: this interface is similar to the
fixed station interface but it defines all the signaling and
messages between the RFSS and the console, the position that a
dispatcher or a supervisor would occupy to provide commands and
support to the personnel in the field;
Network management interface: this interface to the
RFSS allows administrators to control and monitor network fault
management and network performance management.
Data network interface: this interface describes the
RF subsystem's connections to computers, data networks,
external data sources, etc.;
Telephone interconnect interface: this interface
between the RFSS and the Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN) allows field personnel to make connections through the
public switched telephone network by using their radios rather
than using cellular telephones;
Inter RF subsystem interface: this interface permits
users in one system to communicate with users in a different
system, from one jurisdiction to another, from one agency to
another, from one city to another, etc.
Until this past January, the last fifteen years had resulted in
only one of the above P25 interfaces, the Common Air Interface that
deals with the functions of the hand held units (i.e., walky-talky),
being advanced to a level where it would help satisfy one or both of
the goals of P25. The remainder of the interfaces had either remained
undefined, or lacked enough specificity to allow for a common
implementation of the interface; in other words each manufacturers
implementation of the interface would be different and proprietary thus
resulting in systems that would not meet the ``interoperability''
requirements as defined by the steering committee.
I would like to emphasize that the Common Air Interface was a major
step forward and extremely important. It provides a level of
interoperability and competition in the hand-held market that was not
available before. But, it alone cannot satisfy the definition of
interoperability that the public safety community is calling for.
However, over the last year, through the concerted efforts of
industry, public safety practitioners, and NIST, with the support of
SAFECOM, the technical development of standards for the critical P25
interfaces has been greatly accelerated. Industry representatives, with
key involvement by public safety practitioners, have dramatically
increased the pace and scope of their standards development activities
consistent with priorities set by Congress. As a result, significant
progress has been made through the formal P25/Telecommunications
Industry Association (TIA) standards development framework established
by the P25/TIA partnership in 1993. Specifically, the most critical P25
radio system interfaces have all been addressed. Basic protocol
standards that specify the functionality and capability of these
interfaces have now been completed and have been, or are on the verge
of being published. The adoption of P25 standards is now occurring
within a time frame acceptable to public safety users, NIST and its
Federal partners, and the manufacturers.
As of the March 2006 P25 meetings the following has been achieved
to add to the existing P25 Common Air Interface:
Inter-RF Subsystem Interface (ISSI): A draft ISSI
standard was approved on January 11, 2006 for letter balloting
as a TIA standard. TIA anticipates that the vote for
publication will occur during a formal meeting on May 31, 2006.
The public safety community can expect ISSI products to be
available in 2007 (within approximately six months after
publication of relevant standards in 2006 consistent with
deadlines established by the P25 Steering Committee
Fixed/Base Station Subsystem Interface (FSSI): A
completed FSSI standard was approved on January 11, 2006 for
publication as a TIA standard. The realization of a TIA
standard for the FSSI is extremely important because this
standard will result in the offering and procurement of
interoperable multi-vendor equipment enabling direct control by
the console and Radio Frequency Subsystem (RFSS) of fixed/base
station equipment. The console functionality provided by the
FSSI substantially mitigates the urgency for completion of the
CSSI. The public safety community can expect FSSI products to
be available in late 2006 (within approximately six months
after publication of relevant standards in 2006 consistent with
deadlines established by the P25 Steering Committee).
Console Subsystem Interface (CSSI): Completion in
January 2006 of a new TIA standard for the FSSI that enables
direct basic console control of fixed/base station equipment
now serves as the foundation for more comprehensive CSSI
standards to be developed in the future. Further development of
the CSSI will follow upon continued development of the ISSI and
FSSI throughout calendar year 2006. The public safety community
can expect CSSI products to be available in 2007 (within
approximately six months after publication of relevant
standards in 2006 consistent with deadlines established by the
P25 Steering Committee).
I can report that State and local public safety agencies are
already referencing the above standards in formal requests for
proposals (RFPs) to Industry and that manufacturers are in the process
of adding these standards to future land mobile radio product lines.
Of course, it is not only important that the various P25 interfaces
are completed in a timely manner, but that a mechanism exist to ensure
that products built to the standard, meet all of the requirements of
the standard. Over the last two years, NIST, with funds from the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, has
tested a number of the hand held P25 radios that claim to meet the
available Common Air Interface Standard. Using the test procedures
called for in the standard, NIST found that none of the available
radios met all aspects of the standard.
As with many other standards developed through the private sector
consensus process, the key to correct adoption and implementation by
different manufacturers is a strong conformity assessment program. A
conformity assessment program will validate P25 standardized systems
through a set of agreed upon tests which will validate that the systems
can interoperate among themselves, thus ensuring Federal grant dollars
are being used appropriately. NIST, with the support of SAFECOM and the
P25 Steering Committee, is developing a P25 Conformity Assessment
Program. NIST is preparing and documenting standardized test protocols
for the most important aspects of the Common Air Interface Standard.
The standardized test protocols will then be provided to NIST's
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP), which can
accredit laboratories interested in offering these testing
capabilities. These test protocols would go a long way in assuring the
public safety community that the equipment being purchased meets the
P25 standard.
NIST is working closely with the P25 Steering Committee and
manufacturers to ensure that the test procedures are correct and that
the results are accurate. In addition, not all aspects of the P25
common air interface will be immediately available for testing through
this program. To begin with, NIST is focusing on some basic functional
tests of the radios, which will allow us to get the Compliance
Assessment Program up and running. We will then begin to add
interoperability tests, as well as tests for more complex radio
functions.
In summation Mr. Chairman, there are positive steps being taken by
leaders within the public safety community, key federal programs, the
Congress and industry to significantly change the current environment
and move the state of standards for public safety forward. The last
twelve months have seen significant progress in the development of
critical P25 standards and the next twelve months will see even more
progress made., In addition, by the end of this year, local, state, and
federal agencies procuring P25 equipment will have a mechanism in place
to ensure that the products they are purchasing truly do what is called
for in the applicable standard. In conjunction with the other efforts
mentioned by the other witnesses, I am confident that we are making
significant headway in the pursuit of communications interoperability.
NIST looks forward to working with this Committee, Congress, our
federal partners, state and local public safety officials, and leaders
in industry to make this happen. Again, I am honored to be here before
this Committee today, and I will happy to answer any questions that you
may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. Mr. Gass is recognized.
STATEMENT OF JAMES GASS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL MEMORIAL
INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
Mr. Gass. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, my name is Jim Gass and I am the Deputy Director of
the National Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism,
MIPT for short. I have been there about 5 years, and I am also
a member of the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability and also have been for 5 years.
Just a quick note on MIPT by way of background. We are the
third component of the memorialization process that grew out of
the Oklahoma City bombing, and it was the desire of the
citizens that there be some institute that would be in the
proactive business of developing technologies, and so forth,
that would assist the responders either to prevent or better
mitigate against terrorism, and we are grateful to Congress for
our earlier appropriations. Those appropriations flowed
through, interestingly, the Office of Science and Technology,
NIJ, DOJ, and Dr. Boyd was our original Federal monitor.
In that original appropriations language we were instructed
among other things to conduct counterterrorism research and
development, build Internet accessible best practices and
lessons learned systems and institute a pilot project to
develop a research development test and evaluation program
similar to the Department of Defense systems. That guidance and
our focus on emergency responders led us to create something
called Project Responder, which given the threat from CBRNE we
asked the full spectrum of responder disciplines what kinds of
capabilities they needed, compared those needs to existing and
emerging technologies, trying to discover where there were gaps
in the research and development agenda.
That project produced a national technology plan for
emergency response to catastrophic terrorism. There was a
complete section of that report devoted to, quote, unified
incident command support and interoperable communications. I
will draw some of my remarks from that study.
A key finding of Project Responder was that technology
already existed to achieve interoperable communications and
concluded, quote, organizational changes, equipment/interface
standards and practice/training may be more relevant than
technology in solving some of the problems.
Two years ago MIPT launched the Lessons Learned Information
and Sharing System, LLIS.gov. In a quick review through that
database, it is obvious that we have had problems with
interoperable communications in just about every major
terrorist incident and national disaster. There were
communication problems in Oklahoma City, the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon and of course Hurricane Katrina.
Because of the Air Florida crash some years earlier, the
Washington Metro area diligently worked to buy interoperable
communications and had jointly practiced using them. So in some
degree they were well ahead of a lot of the communities. And to
the degree that the responders to the Pentagon were from that
mutual aid area, it worked pretty well. The problem was more
with the myriad of other responders that were not part of that
habitual group. Of course Katrina was a different animal. It
actually decapitated the local infrastructure, with much of it
under water.
So with all that background, why haven't we fixed the
problem? I am speaking now as someone non-federal and outside
the Beltway and with the perspective of having talked to
responders and having absorbed with their concerns are. I
believe the components to fixing the problem falls into five
categories: National policies and strategies; frequency
spectrum; national standards; a common operating picture; and
resources for replacing/augmenting legacy systems.
First, we need a national vision and strategy to achieve
it. Jurisdictions buy equipment based on their own needs and
resources. Without an overarching strategy we will keep doing
what we are doing, and that may not contribute to a national
interoperable plan.
Second, there is the issue of frequency spectrum. Although
Congress recently passed legislation that will allow access to
the 700 megahertz spectrum, there will still be competition
over how much and what parts to dedicate to the emergency
response community. Access to that part of the spectrum is
still 3 years away.
Third, there is a lack of standards for interoperable
communications. Progress is being made but it is painfully
slow. By the way, I believe that standards must include not
only technical elements but must also ensure that we have the
necessary test procedures and protocols in place to allow for
third party testing and certification. NIST is also working on
that.
We insist on certification testing for our responder
personal protective equipment. We should do no less for the
communications equipment. I think SAFECOM also advocates that
and is pushing that as well.
Fourth, we need to think about how to establish a common
operating picture. I mentioned I was in the Army for 30 years.
We always had--we had a set of what we called signal operating
instructions, SOIs, which enabled everybody who came into an
area of operations to know who to call and on what frequency
based on their level of command and function. While it may be
desirable to have the capability for everybody to be able to
talk to everyone else, that would be chaotic and not how we
would want to operate. We should predetermine who should talk
to whom and provide the information about how to do that in
advance of an incident.
Fifth, and after we have all of the above we will have to
deal with the issue of phasing out all of the legacy systems.
With the millions of communications systems in existence today,
we will have to go about that smartly or we may spend enormous
amounts of resources. There already exists several bridging/
gateway technologies that can help us through that phase into
standards-compliant communications systems.
In summary, we believe that the real challenge here is not
about new technology, it is about Federal leadership and
providing interference-free spectrum, clear standards with real
certification for equipment, and assistance in developing
effective communications plans and incident management
processes.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I am happy to
answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Gass follows:]
Prepared Statement of James M. Gass
Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, my name
is Jim Gass and I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you.
I am the Deputy Director of the National Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma City and have been with MIPT
for more than five years. Prior to joining MIPT, I served 30 years in
the United States Army.
MIPT is the third component of the Memorial of the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, April19, 1995. It was created in
response to the victims', family members', responders' and citizens'
desires to have an Institute dedicated to proactive efforts to prevent
terrorism or better mitigate its effects.
Since our inception, our primary focus has been on projects to
improve the preparedness of emergency responders. We are grateful to
Congress for originally supporting us with appropriations in our early
years. Initially, our awards were made through the National Institute
of Justice, Department of Justice, but with the formation of the
Department of Homeland Security, we have received additional
discretionary awards to continue our programs.
Language in some of our earlier Congressional Appropriations Bills
charged us with doing a number of things. I would like to restate a few
of those because they provide some underpinning to my remarks about the
critically important subject this committee is hearing today. These
bills instructed us to conduct counterterrorism research and
development; create an Internet repository where emergency responders
can share best practices, observations, and lessons learned; and to
institute a pilot project to develop an RDT&E system similar to the
Department of Defense System.
This guidance and our desire to focus our own research agenda on
emergency responders, led us to conduct an effort we called Project
Responder which produced a report titled ``National Technology Plan for
Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism. Project Responder
evaluated needed capabilities as stated by the responders themselves,
studied the state of current technology and provided information that
could help inform federal and private sector research and development
agendas. Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable
Communications was a significant part of the capabilities needed by
responders. In addition to the clear increases in capability that
interoperable communications would provide, many other highly desired
and needed functional capabilities could be enabled by interoperable
communications. These functional capabilities are currently not
available, but could be achievable at low technological risk. These
include 1) point location and identification to help incident
commanders know where their personnel and equipment are at any given
time, 2) seamless connectivity to aid when multiple agencies and
jurisdictions work together at a site, and 3) information assurance to
ensure the availability of information, as well as what is
communicated, not be compromised by adversaries during a crisis.
Providing command information and dissemination tools and multimedia
functional capabilities were also identified by Project Responder, but
were not as highly prioritized as the previous three. One of our key
findings was that technology already exists to achieve interoperable
communications. New research and development into communications
technologies is not needed to solve interoperability. Instead Project
Responder concluded that ``organizational changes, equipment/interface
standards, and practice/training may be more relevant than technology
in solving some of the problems.'' I will return to these points later
in my testimony.
I welcome the opportunity to talk to you today about the issue of
communications interoperability and its importance to the response
community. The ability to communicate is essential for local emergency
responders and the State and Federal officials who assist them. But too
often in major disasters our ability to communicate with one another
has been impaired. At Oklahoma City in 1995, at the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and in the countless other
emergencies that our emergency responders face everyday, communications
interoperability problems not only make their jobs more difficult, but
risk the lives of the both victims and responders.
Unfortunately, these are not new problems. One of MIPT's most
important goals is to promote the sharing of lessons learned and best
practices within the emergency response community. Two years ago MIPT
launched the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) system, the
national network for lessons learned and best practices. A quick glance
on LLIS.gov shows several lessons learned related to communications
interoperability. For example, during the response to the attack on the
Pentagon in 2001, mutual aid personnel arrived at the scene with radios
that could not communicate--or easily be reprogrammed--with either the
Arlington County Fire or Police Departments. And the DC Metro area was
probably years ahead of most jurisdictions in moving toward
interoperability. With the communications system, technical personnel,
and cellular phone networks quickly overloaded during the initial
response to the World Trade Center attacks, emergency responders were
forced to rely on foot messengers to communicate during the first few
hours of operations.
The response to Hurricane Katrina further highlighted
communications interoperability as a significant problem in the
response--at the Federal, State, and local level. The after-action
report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina--Lessons Learned
concludes that communication plans and assets were neither sufficient
nor adequately integrated to respond effectively to the disaster. Many
available communications assets were not utilized fully because there
was no National, State-wide, or regional communications plan to
incorporate them. Officials from national leaders to emergency
responders on the ground lacked a common interoperable communications
infrastructure to provide the necessary situational awareness so
critical to a prompt and effective response. The Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina found that ``issues with interoperability among Federal, state,
and local communications systems complicated the efforts of first
responders and government officials to work together in managing the
response to Katrina.''
Because communications problems have appeared as a ``lessons
learned'' in almost every major terrorism event or major natural
disaster, why haven't we fixed it? It's because some of the components
of fixing it are incredibly complex and incredibly expensive. I believe
the components of the fix falls into five categories: (1) National
Policies and Strategies; (2) National Standards; (3) Frequency
spectrum; (4) Resources for replacing legacy systems; and (5) a common
operating picture.
Let me give a brief discussion of each:
First, I believe that we must, as a nation, develop a set of
comprehensive policies or strategies that lay out a national
interoperable communications vision. Jurisdictions across the country
follow their own guidelines regarding communications systems and
equipment based upon their own resources and needs. Some areas of the
country have established regional or state communications systems that
link State and local agencies. But Federal policies and strategies are
needed to guide decision makers at all levels of to strive for a
national solution to the interoperability problem.
Second, there is also a lack of national standards for
interoperable communications. A recent report released by Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security found that no new
standards have been issued since February 2004. National interoperable
communications standards must be developed in order to provide guidance
to state and local jurisdictions on acceptable and required equipment
and systems. The Responder Knowledge Base, another key MIPT program,
provides information on adopted equipment standards and certifications
to the emergency response community and will quickly disseminate
information on new interoperable communications standards as it becomes
available. There is work underway to develop these standards called
P25, but there are complex issues associated with that effort. The
constant advances in technology make this a moving target. Just imagine
that if ten years ago, we had decided to assign national standard to
computers. We might well have been stuck in the 286 mode instead of
Pentium 2 or 3. Having said that, it still is not an excuse for not
setting a minimum standard to meet emergency response interoperability
needs based on currently available technology knowing that in a few
years (or months) you may have adjust them based on the advances. And,
I believe that we must insist on independent third party testing to
assure compliance with the standards.
Third, we must, as a nation, decide how much and in which frequency
spectrums we need to give exclusive domain to the emergency response
community. It is my understanding that we have a good idea about that,
but those spectrums are currently occupied and buying out the spectrum
to dedicate to emergency response is both a legal and expensive
problem. I'm not an expert on that but I have read that the figure to
buy out spectrum short of current agreements is in the billions.
Forth, and only after we have national standards, we must consider
the amount of resources that would be required to replace all of the
non-compliant communications in the nation and who should pay. Most
communications capability resident in the local jurisdictions have been
purchased with local dollars and designed to meet local needs as best
envisioned by local leaders. Once we have national standards, how do we
phase out the old and phase in the new. I don't know the exact number
of communications devices there are in the nation, but if we have
upwards of 8,000,000 responders and even half of them are equipped with
communication equipment, replacing them all would be a staggering
amount and doesn't answer the question about who would have the primary
responsibility for the cost burden--Federal, state or local?
Jurisdictions across the country do not have the resources available to
do an immediate upgrade to existing systems and equipment. Project
Responder found that ``jurisdictions have existing radios and support
tower infrastructure and do not have the money to upgrade them''. Once
we have national standards and certification testing, I have to believe
that when new equipment is purchased, even with local money,
jurisdictions would go in the direction of standards compliant
equipment.
Fifth, I believe we must procedurally standardize how and with whom
we must communicate. This is definitely not a technology issue--it is a
procedures issue. Even if we had perfect ability for everybody to
communicate with everybody else, it doesn?t mean that is how we would
want to operate. We must determine in advance who needs to talk to whom
and provide them with the information about how to link their
communications based on the function(s) being performed. I mentioned
that I came from an Army background. We used to have Signal Operating
Instructions (SOIs) which provided all the players in the area of
operations predetermined information about how to contact other people
based on the levels of command and functions being performed. These
SOIs contained the frequencies and call signs of all of the
participants who might enter the area of operations. No one had to
search for information about how to contact the appropriate people to
engage their capabilities. As the National Response Plan, the National
Incident Management System and mutual aid agreements mature and are
practiced, this process will become clearer. But it is one of the
reasons Project Responder suggested that ``organizational changes,
equipment/interface standard and practice/training may be more relevant
than technology in solving some of the problems.''
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my written statement. I am happy to
answer any questions that you or the members of the subcommittee may
have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you very much. Mr. Walker is
recognized.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE WALKER, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
AFFAIRS, HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE BUSINESS COUNCIL
Mr. Walker. Good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking
Member Pascrell, and distinguished members of this
subcommittee. My name is Bruce Walker and I work for Northrop
Grumman Corporation. Today I am testifying on behalf of the
Homeland Security Defense Business Council and our 30-plus
member companies. I serve as the Chair of the Government
Relations Committee and have had the privilege of delivering
and developing a number of Homeland Security topical briefings
to the committee staff over the last year.
The Homeland Security Defense Business Council is a
nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that represents good
governance and successful program outcomes in the Homeland
Security marketplace. The Council offers straight talk and
honest assessments of programs, technologies and processes
integral to the mission of the Department of Homeland Security.
The Council's goal is to be a world class private sector
component and partner to the public sector in all significant
areas of homeland security, to include risk mitigation, mission
effectiveness and management efficiency.
The Council appreciates the opportunity to present our
industry perspective on the state of interoperable
communications today. I would like to begin with a brief
summary of the Council's recommendations to Congress.
First, in order to get it right, interoperability is more
than just technology. It is standards and money. Federal,
State, local, tribal and even private sector participants also
need to deal with business process changes and user training
issues and the long-term investment model changes required to
successfully leverage interoperability.
While we are talking about leverage, interoperability is
really about leverage. Applying interoperable communications to
today's safety and first responder communities opens the
aperture to new applications in technologies and voice, data
and video. These need to be designed to deliver higher value,
tactically significant information at the point where it is
going to do the most good.
Third, we believe that more emphasis needs to be placed on
the governance layer of the SAFECOM interoperability continuum.
The focus has been centered around technical and spectrum
issues. More engagement of the practitioner community for
developing practical models is something we need to do to
address the real issues of multiplayer interoperability.
Finally, we believe there needs to be more complete
engagement of industry, especially national players in DOD
systems, where RDT&E programs eligible for inclusion in the DOD
1401 Technology Transfer Program can be used to address SAFECOM
initiatives.
For many public safety organizations interoperability is
best seen from a cost and timeline perspective. The more
affluent organizations have access to current generation
capabilities at a faster pace and are able to deploy and
sustain systems that leverage flexible spectrum use and more
efficient use for weight and power usage. Those with more
modest budgets extend existing systems as far as possible in
order to delay the need to reinvest. Yet, the costs of
sustaining the legacy environment increase every year and
reinvestment becomes more and more difficult to achieve.
One of the core difficulties occurs when communities need
coordinated responses from organizations on either end of this
budget reality. The 2004 release of the SAFECOM statement of
requirements for wireless public safety communications
interoperability established the structure, explained the need,
and describes the future operational model for everyone to
shoot for. Certainly all good things, but the practical funding
reality makes this a very challenging objective.
What is missing is guidance and governance on how to get
there. Budget formulation options, grant applications support,
business process, training and operation overhauls are all
needed services in order to make SAFECOM's vision a reality at
the national level. Private industry also needs to be included
in the picture.
Clearly it makes sense to apply resources and funding in
urban areas where the threat is the highest. But ignoring the
need to upgrade, integrate and train rural and remote
communities moves the SAFECOM vision to the right. Small border
state communities and internal communities alike need to
interoperate with their urban counterparts, particularly in
situations where regional response capabilities are stretched
beyond the breaking point.
The SAFECOM SoR provides need direction to the challenge.
It gives both government and industry access to the leverage
mentioned in the second of our recommendations. Industry
directly benefits from the SoR because it allows us to design
critical research and development efforts with interoperable
demand.
Public safety and other first responder organizations
benefit from the establishment of a standards baseline upon
which they can base sourcing and selection decisions. Clearly
these are again all good things but the real measure of success
will be in the integration and the deployment of new
capabilities directly addressing new threats of terrorism and
old threats, like national disasters.
The new application horizons that interoperability offers
are critical components in ensuring the safety and security of
our country. The ability to provide integrated command and
control across multiple responders with different technology
baselines or the ability to locate first and then dispatch
critical resources and material to specific locations will make
huge differences in our ability to respond to potentially
disastrous events. These applications come from many sources,
not the least of which is DOD, and aggressive reuse of
technologies developed to support our troops in foreign
operational theaters. They need to be accelerated wherever
appropriate because the investment in R&D has already been
made. Public safety and first responder environments are not
the same as foreign operational theaters and solutions need to
be carefully vetted to make sure they are used as well as any
unintended consequences of their use meet our laws and fit
business and operational needs of the user community.
That concludes the remarks I have today, sir. Glad to
answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce V. Walker
April 25, 2006
Good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. My name is Bruce Walker and
I am with Northrop Grumman Corporation. Today I am testifying on behalf
of the Homeland Security and Business Council and our 30+ member
companies. I serve as the Chair of our Government Relations Committee
and have had the privilege of developing and delivering a number of
topical briefings to the Committee? staff over the last year.
The Homeland Security & Defense Business Council is a non-profit,
non-partisan organization that represents good governance and
successful program outcomes. The Council offers ``straight talk'' and
honest assessments of programs, technology, and processes that are
integral to the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. The
Council's goal is to be a world class private sector component and
partner to the public sector in all significant areas of homeland
security to include risk mitigation, mission effectiveness, and
management efficiency.
The Council appreciates the opportunity to present our industry
perspective on the state of interoperable communications.
Let me begin with a brief summary of the Council's recommendations
to Congress:
(1) In order to ``get it right'', interoperability is more than
technology, standards and money. Federal, state, local and
tribal governments as well as the private sector also need to
deal with the business process changes, end-user training
issues, and the long term investment model changes required to
successfully leverage interoperability.
(2) Interoperability is also about leverage. Applying
interoperable communications to today's public safety and first
responder communities opens the aperture for new technologies--
voice, data, video--and new applications designed to deliver
higher value, tactically significant information at the point
where it will do the most good.
(3) We believe that more emphasis needs to be placed on the
``governance'' layer of the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum.
Although the focus on the various interoperability initiatives
has been centered around technical and spectrum issues, more
engagement of the practitioner community for developing
practical and effective governance models is something that we
need to do to address that real issues of multi-player
interoperability.
(4) Finally, we believe there needs to be more complete
engagement of industry, especially national players in DoD
systems, where RDT&E programs eligible for inclusion in the DoD
1401 Technology Transfer program can be used to address SAFECOM
initiatives.
For many public safety organizations, interoperability is best seen
from a cost and timeline perspective. The more affluent organizations
have access to current generation capabilities at a faster pace and are
able to deploy and sustain systems that leverage flexible spectrum use
and more efficient designs for weight and power usage. Those with more
modest budgets extend existing systems as far as possible in order to
delay the need to reinvest--yet the costs of sustaining the legacy
environment increase every year and reinvestment becomes more and more
difficult to achieve.
One of the core difficulties with this model occurs when
communities need coordinated responses from organizations on either end
of this budget reality. The 2004 release of the SAFECOM Statement of
Requirements (SoR) for Wireless Public Safety Communications and
Interoperability, established the structure, explained the need, and
describes a future operational model for everyone to shoot for--
certainly, all good things--but the practical funding reality makes
this a very challenging objective. What is missing is guidance and
governance on how to get there. Budget formulation options, grant
application support, business process reengineering support, training
and operations overhauls--are all needed services in order to make the
SAFECOM vision a reality at a national level. Private industry also
needs to be included in the picture--particularly in relation to the
critical infrastructure under their control and management.
Clearly it make sense to apply resources and funding in urban areas
where the threat is the highest, but ignoring the need to upgrade,
integrate and train rural and remote communities just moves the SAFECOM
vision to right. Small border state communities and internal
communities, alike, need to interoperate with their urban
counterparts--particularly in situations where regional response
capabilities (i.e., Katrina) are stretched beyond the breaking point.
The SAFECOM SoR provides needed direction and dimension to the
interoperability challenge. It also gives both government and industry
access to the leverage mentioned in the second of our recommendations.
Industry directly benefits from the SoR architectural perspective
because it allows us to align critical research and development efforts
with interoperability demand. Public safety and other first responder
organizations benefit from the establishment of a standards baseline
upon which they can base their sourcing and selection decisions.
Certainly, these are again, all good things--but the real measure of
success will be in the integration and deployment of new capabilities
directly addressing both new threats of terrorism and old threats like
natural disasters.
The new application horizons that interoperability offers are
critical components in ensuring the safety and security of our country.
The ability to provide integrated command and control across multiple
responders with different technology baselines, or the ability to first
locate and then dispatch critical materials and resources to specific
locations, will make huge differences in our ability to respond to
potentially disastrous events. These applications come from many
sources, not the least of which, is the DoD and aggressive reuse of
technologies developed to support our troops in foreign operational
theatres should be accelerated, wherever appropriate, because the
investment is R&D has already been made. This is not suggest, however,
that DoD technologies are immediately applicable. Public safety and
first responder environments are not the same as a foreign operational
theatre and solutions need to be carefully vetted to ensure that their
use (as well as any unintended consequences of their use) meet our laws
and fit the business and operational needs of the user community. For
example, systems requiring fixed infrastructures that incur high
sustainment costs are not likely to be economically viable for internal
US deployment.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, sir. Thank the witnesses for their
testimony and I have a couple of questions and we will move to
the other members.
We heard on both panels some common themes, and I think
that Mr. Gass, is that how I would pronounce it correctly, kind
of summed it up for me in the five points that he made with
national security frequency spectrum, lack of standards, common
operating structure would be, if I understood that correctly,
would be incident command sort of a structure, and then the
phaseout of the legacy systems, which some of the other
witnesses have testified to.
I understand there is no silver bullet and all of these
five are in process and have been for years, but I asked the
last panel, the first panel this question, and I want to pose
it to the members of this panel. Is there any one thing that we
can commit to right now today that needs to be done that is
foremost in your minds, or all five of these equally have to be
pursued right now? Is there something today you would jump on
if you were given direction?
Mr. Morgan. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I think that the number
one recommendation that I would make to you is to recognize,
and certainly NIJ recognizes, in the U.S. we have 19,000 law
enforcement agencies, 4,500 correctional agencies, several
hundred crime labs, innumerable social agencies which are part
of this picture, and that doesn't include public safety and the
commercial sector that would be involved. So you have an
enormously complex policy environment in which to solve the
interoperability problem. And so, the first thing to do is take
a deep breath and realize it is going to be a long-term problem
to put in the basic foundations in terms of standards and
policies necessary to provide for interoperability to be in
public safety, not next year, not in 5 years, but over the long
haul. And if you take a long-term view and you execute policies
that reflect that, I think you will be very successful in the
long-term.
Mr. Reichert. Anyone else?
Mr. Boyd. I would like to suggest that probably the most
important thing you can do is exactly what this committee has
been doing now I think for the last 2 or 3 years. I first got
involved in interoperability when we were supporting PSWAC back
in 1993. At that time there was an occasional member, might be
occasional article, staffer who would ask questions about
interoperability.
The intensity of interest on the part of this committee
isn't just remarkable, I think it is incredibly important to
the public safety community. I frankly think that is the most
important first step, and I would ask you not to stop.
Mr. Reichert. Well, I might just take a moment to comment
on that. We aren't going to stop. When we started this process
several months ago we made a commitment to the people in our
first hearing that we were going to help to solve this problem,
and a lot of it I think stems from all the hard work that was
done before I got here and certainly my personal interest in
those who wear the badge. Firefighters and first responders and
police officers across this Nation I have a close relationship
with, as you well know. So we will continue our fight and help
you in any way that we can.
I have just noticed now, out of law enforcement and a
Member of Congress, that sometimes things move quite a bit
slower and need to be nudged quite a bit. So if you hear a
little bit of urgency in our questions and a tone of
impatience, I know that you will understand that because it
does, as Ranking Member Pascrell has mentioned earlier, we are
talking about lives here. Just think about that for a moment.
It has been going on for years. That is how important this is.
I think that, Mr. Gass, you really have captured in your
testimony some very important thoughts. And I am interested, as
you said, you are outside the Beltway and have a different
perspective. Having listened to the two panels and their
testimony, do you have a better sense really that there is a
promising federally coordinated effort in putting together all
the five critical aspects that you have described for us in
your testimony?
Mr. Gass. Yes, sir. I believe they are going in the right
direction. I wish some of it had started sooner and was further
along. All indications are that the brethren have gotten
together and they have come to these conclusions and most of
the Federal agencies are acting in accordance, having heard
those issues from the responders, and trying to go in the right
direction.
I was familiar with--was on the Standards Coordinating
Committee of the IAB and my interest was on personal protective
clothing and equipment standards, specifically respirators. It
became painfully obvious to me just coming into this business
just how cumbersome is the standards development process,
especially if you have to go through the formal rule making
process. Thankfully, NIOSH short cutted that and did it by
policy and we got there in a couple of years instead of 5 or 6
years.
But this whole standards development process maybe takes
longer than it should. That is just perhaps my observation. I
think we are well along that way but I do also think the
important thing is that at the end of it, whatever standards we
have also calls for testing and certification. I think we do a
disservice if we allow the manufacturers to self-test and say
we are good. We need to assure the response to the community
that what they are bringing to the table is what they say it
is.
Mr. Reichert. I agree.
Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Morgan, to what extent does the NIJ comply with the
Homeland Security Act mandating use of voluntary consensus
standards?
Mr. Morgan. As you may know, Mr. Pascrell, NIJ actually has
authority under the Homeland Security Act to promulgate
standards for law enforcement and other criminal justice
agencies, and our most notable standard in that case is the
body armor standard, and we are very proud of it. We have had
our 3,000th save of a law enforcement officer from body armor.
So NIJ is very, very committed to standards development across
the law enforcement arena and has for many years contributed to
the support of the P25 effort and other standards development
efforts within the communications area.
We also coordinate very, very closely with both SAFECOM and
NIST in all of our technology and research development efforts,
and I can say that we are very, very impressed and would like
to congratulate the work that NIST is doing not only in the
standard development process but also the critical component,
which is the compliance assurance process which is necessary,
we have found, in other law enforcement equipment areas to
ensure that the standards aren't a hollow shell.
Without compliance testing you don't know whether those
manufacturer claims of compliance are true or not. So NIJ very
much supports those kinds of activities and incorporates it in
all of our 17 different investment areas for technology,
research and development for criminal justice.
Mr. Pascrell. How does, for instance, the National
Institute of Justice hold vendors accountable?
Mr. Morgan. The primary way that we have to hold them
accountable is through the standards and compliance assurance
process. We are obviously, even within the Federal picture for
criminal justice, a fairly small player. We don't even
necessarily have nearly the money of a Bureau of Justice
Assistance to purchase equipment and things of that nature. We
do have that hook of whether a particular piece of equipment
meets the particular NIJ standard in an area. So, for example,
going back to body armor, the Bullet Proof Vest Partnership
program requires NIJ compliance for all body armor that is
purchased with Federal funds. The NIJ standard has been
successful in that area because the vast majority of State and
local governments will call that out in their procurements.
They have learned through hard experience over many, many
years that not having NIJ compliance for their body armor is a
real problem from a quality assurance perspective in keeping
the officers safe. I think that the public safety community is
going to see over the next few years the importance of that
same philosophy with respect to purchasing communications
equipment, they see the compliance assurance programs and
standards development programs of NIST under P25 and other
standards mature.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you very much.
Mr. Orr, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, do you think that the labs that you have to work in
order to assess the technology are adequate, are they updated
constantly, are they outdated?
Mr. Orr. I think the labs that we have are certainly
adequate. I think we have a world class laboratory environment
in NIST both in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and out in Boulder,
Colorado. The work that was originally done over the last, say,
3 years to determine the issues regarding the P25 standards and
its implementation and the P25 subscriber units, what that
taught us is that, one, obviously there needs to be some kind
of objective testing of the products.
The second thing it taught us is, we do not have enough
money to do that testing nor do we have enough staff to test
all the various products that are available. So the compliance
assessment program that we are currently working on in
partnership with the public safety community's association
leadership that is involved in P25, as well as industry, is
going to have industry and the manufacturers pay for testing of
that equipment in certified accredited laboratories.
So in the future the tests will not be done at NIST. The
tests will be done at accredited laboratories paid for by the
manufacturers themselves.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. I am glad you pointed that out. It
is very important, I think.
Mr. Gass, according to your testimony there is a lack of
leadership, and that is the main reason why the Nation has not
progressed in using the technology available to improve
interoperable communication.
What Federal incentives would you propose to move State and
local jurisdictions in the direction of standard compliance,
standards compliance?
Mr. Gass. I believe that once we have those standards out
there and a means to test and certify them, when the local
jurisdictions make their decisions on equipment to purchase,
they will go in that direction whether we are talking Federal
dollars or their local dollars. We do not have that now, so
they will buy their communications equipment based on their
local jurisdictional needs and resources and budgets. But once
we begin to shape in this vision and have a set of standards, I
think they will fall in line and want to go that way. And then
all we have to worry about is, Okay, how do we transition from
here and now to the objective state?
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
I have one final question if I may, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Walker, your testimony calls for an increased private-
sector role; you want to improve that role, you want to
increase that role with regard to securing critical
communication infrastructure.
There have been many instances when private industry has
been hesitant to detail their plans because of propriety
issues. How are we going to adjust that?
Mr. Walker. I think it is a critical issue, but at the same
point in time, the infrastructure that we are responsible for
operating as a part of our businesses is managed and provides a
security cordon of our own that is necessary for the insurance
that we can continue that business. They are the first line of
defense if there is an attack on those facilities.
Public safety responds primarily to the people that are
there who are already in a security mode, and not having those
people connected to those same kinds of public safety systems
means that the response coordination is delayed until public
safety actually arrives at the location.
When you look at port facilities or some of the other truck
transfer facilities that we as an industry are responsible for
managing and maintaining, the availability and the
responsiveness of those private security forces is a key
component of the way we can defend and detect.
So, yes, there is a propriety issue and, yes, there is
probably an issue with respect to the way the law is actually
applied to those private security forces in the commission of
their own responsibilities; but having access from an
interoperability perspective is something we think is an
important goal.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Again, just a follow-up question or two just
to come at this issue just a little bit differently. This panel
is saying clearly that technology is not the problem;
technology exists to solve the interoperability problem. Is
that a correct statement? Yes.
So what is the problem? I came at you before. What do we
need to do? What is the problem? We have technology out there.
I know we have already rehashed some of this. Is it
leadership within the Federal Government that you are looking
for?
Mr. Boyd. I think clearly that is part of it. Part of what
we are trying to do is work with States to help them understand
how to do this so that they can build statewide plans that are
really supported from the ground up.
One of challenges, I think, at the Federal level is that we
sometimes think that we can push a solution down. What we need
to do is pull a solution up. We need to have them design it at
the bottom level.
Your department, your sheriffs department, for example, had
its own mission and its own citizens and its own requirements
to meet. We need to figure out how we protect that mission and
at the same time provide both incentives--and sometimes those
incentives just amount to helping people understand why they
are useful to them to begin to cooperate with adjacent
jurisdictions. In fact, some places have done that really well
already; some have not.
Mr. Walker, I think, really hit the nail on the head. The
toughest of all the nuts to crack, but the most important, is
governance because that requires leadership at the local agency
and political level; and it requires commitment to agree, a
commitment to work together.
Mr. Reichert. I can identify with that problem very
personally. To get people to work together, 38 police
departments within King County and the turf wars that might
cause is a huge problem to overcome. I understand that.
Dr. Morgan.
Mr. Morgan. It is absolutely true that technology is not
the problem. Technology does exist today that if the United
States were a unitary place without thousands and thousands of
jurisdictions you could deploy systems that were interoperable,
there is no question.
However, I just want to add one thing about that, and that
is, technology development, research and development, can play
a contributing role to solutions in certain locations and
certain ways that can be helpful. It is a multifaceted problem;
you will have multifaceted solutions. And every solution,
because all the problems have grown up from unique situations
in the State and local arenas where they exist today, you are
going to need a variety of different kinds of technology
solutions to be able to make interoperability happen over the
long haul.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Just one quick question. So working with the State
government officials and local police departments and counties
and sheriffs departments, sheriffs offices, you also have to
work with yourself, so you have NIST and the Federal Government
and NIJ and SAFECOM.
Do NIST and NIJ and SAFECOM meet? Do you all meet? How
often do you all meet? You have a meeting right after this
hearing, right?
Mr. Orr. At a bar. I meet up with the members of SAFECOM,
NIJ. We attend each others' program meetings that occur usually
quarterly. We see each other at various open standards meetings
that we go to. I show up downtown and meet with the staff of
these offices probably once a week.
But NIJ and SAFECOM come to our program reviews. I go to
SAFECOM's and NIJ's, and SAFECOM goes to NIJ's and ours. So we
are very coordinated and, in fact, share a lot of resources.
My staff helps peer review of NIJ's programs and SAFECOM's.
We get funding from SAFECOM; we get funding from NIJ. There is
a lot of coordination and a lot of cooperation from them.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Pascrell, any additional questions?
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions. The members of the committee may
have some additional questions for the witnesses and we will
ask that you respond to these in writing. The hearing record
will be open for 10 days.
Mr. Reichert. Without objection, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]